* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-20523

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

EDGAR FERNANDO BLANCO PUERTA, 

also known as Commandant Emilio

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:02-CR-714-4

Before WIENER, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This is an appeal in a criminal case. Defendant-Appellant Edgar

Fernando Blanco Puerta pleaded guilty to conspiracy to “provide material

support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization,”in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2339B, and to conspiracy with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. The District Court

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 2, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-20523

2

applied a sentencing enhancement for an offense involving or promoting a

“federal crime of terrorism.” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4(a). Puerta did not object to the

sentencing enhancement in the District Court. Nevertheless, Puerta now

appeals the sentencing enhancement. We affirm.

We review the decision of the District Court for plain error. See United

States v. Villegas,404 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that the plain error

standard applies when a defendant fails to object to a sentencing enhancement)

(citations omitted). We find plain error only when “(1) there was an error; (2) the

error was clear and obvious; and (3) the error affected the defendant’s

substantial rights.” Id. (citations omitted). If all three conditions are met, we

have “discretion to notice a forfeited error but only if (4) the error seriously

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.

at 358-59 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).

There is no plain error in this case. A “‘federal crime of terrorism” is “an

offense that – (A) is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government

by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct; and (B)

is a violation of ... [18 U.S.C. §] 2339B.” 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5); see U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3A1.4 cmt. (n.1) (2004) (“For the purposes of

this guideline, ‘federal crime of terrorism’ has the meaning given that term in

18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5).”).

Puerta’s conviction falls squarely within the definition of a“federal crime

of terrorism” in § 2332b(g)(5). Puerta pleaded guilty to violating § 2339B.

Specifically, Puerta and his co-conspirators sought to trade drugs and money for

weapons to supply the United Self Defense Force of Colombia, a designated

foreign terrorist organization that opposes the Colombian government. Puerta’s

argumentthat § 2332b(g)(5) applies only to the government ofthe United States

is unavailing. The relevant text refers broadly to “government,” §2332b(g)(5),

in contrast to other subsections which specify “the United States Government,”
No. 06-20523

3

§2332b(b)(1)(c). See United States v. DeAmaris, 406 F. Supp. 2d 748, 749-51

(S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that“the word ‘government’ as used in § 2332b(g)(5)(a)

includes foreign governments and is notlimited to the government ofthe United

States”). Accordingly, we find no plain error in the District Court’s decision to

apply the sentencing enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4(a).

AFFIRMED