1 Tex. R. A pp. P. 47.2(a). NO. 07-02-0182 -CR IN THE COU RT OF APP EALS FOR THE SEVENT H DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMA RILLO PANE L C MAY 5, 2003

______________________________ GENTLE MARCH ED W ARDS, APPE LLANT

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

_________________________________ FROM THE COUNT Y CRIMINAL COURT AT LAW NO. 9 OF HARR IS COUNTY;

NO. 1100375; HON ORABLEANALIA W ILKERS ON, JUDGE

_______________________________ Before JOHNS ON, C.J., an d QUINN and R EAVIS , JJ.
MEM ORAN DUM OP INI ON 1 App ellant Gentle March Edw ards appeals a Class A m isdemeanor conviction for failing to keep an accurate and legible inventory of com ponent a utom obile parts. A j ury2 The trial court defined the term “motor vehicle salvage dealer” using the definition

provided by the current stat ute’s prede cess or. See Tex. Rev . Civ. Stat. A nn. art. 6687- 2(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 199 3); see also United States v. Cobb, 975 F.2d 152, 15 6, n.5 ( 5 th Cir. 1992), cert. deni

ed, 507 U.S . 965, 113 S.C t. 1397, 122 L.Ed .2d 771 (1993). For purpose s o f this appeal, however, we find the prior and current def initions do not differ substantive ly. Moreover, by this appeal appellant makesno clai m of charge error. Fin ally, because the parties and the current sta tute re fer

to “ salvageveh icle dealer,” we utilize that term instead of the one em ployed by the trial court. Tex. Rev . Civ. Stat. A nn. art. 6687-1a (Vernon Supp. 2003). 2 found him guilty, and the trial co urtassessed punishm ent at 100 days co nfinement in the Harris County

jail. By two points of error , appell ant contends the evi dence is legally and fac tua llyinsufficient to sup por t th e co nvic

tion . B ase d up on t he r

atio naleexpressed herein, we affi rm. A salvage vehicle dealer is a person who is engaged in the business of acquiring, selling, or otherwise dealing in salvage vehicles or vehicle parts of a type required to be covered by a salvage vehicle certificate of t itle or n onr epa irab le ve hiclecer

tificateof t itle under a license issued by the Texas Departm ent of Transportation that allows the holder o f the licen se to acquire , sell, d ismantle, repai r, or otherwise dea l in sal vage vehicl es. Te x. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6687-1a (17) (Ve rnon 200 3). 2 Appellant becam e licensed in 1989 to do business as a salvage vehicle dealer in Houston. A s a dealer, appellan t was required by statute to keep an accurate and legible inv ento ry of ea ch com ponent p art purchased by or delivered to him , including the following information: (1) date of purchase o r deli very;3

(2) name, age, address, sex , and driver’s license num ber of the seller and a legible photocopy of the seller’s driver’s license; (3) the license number of the m otor vehicle used to d eliver the used com ponent part; (4) a com plete de scr iptio n of the item purchased, including the type of material and, if appl ica bl e, the m ake, m odel, color, and size of the item; and (5) the vehicle identification number of the motor vehicle fr om w hich the used com ponent part was rem oved. Art. 6687-2(c). The statute aut horizes a peace officer to inspect i nventory on the de aler’s premisesat a ny r

eas ona ble t im e in order to veri fy, check or audi t the records. Art. 6687- 2(f); see State v. K inkle, 902 S.W. 2d 187, 189 (Tex. App.–Houston [14 th Dist.] 1995, no pet.). The failure to keep an accurate and legible i nventory is a Class A m isdemeanor. Art. 6687-2(l). The record keeping statute is designe d to deter the resale of stolen parts by allowing police to trace used auto parts. Kinkle , 902 S.W.2d at 190. For a num ber of years, appellant owne d and operated G.M . Edwards Us ed C arsin a building that doubled as his business and residence. On N ovem ber 19, 2001, officers from the Auto Theft D ivision’s Salvage Squad of the Houston P olice Department a rrived atappellant’s shop to conduct a salvage regul ator y inspection

. The officers requested appell ant to produce records docum enting the purchase or sale of all salvaged vehicles an d c omponent parts for that year. Appel lant i ndicated he possessed no such recor ds. During the inspecti on of appel lant’s shop, off icers l ocated numerous automobile par ts, along with s eve ral v ehic les in various stages of dism antling or repair. The State4

sub seq uen tly

filed an information alleging, “on or about Novem ber 19, 2001, [appellant] did then and there un lawfull y, intentionally and knowingly fai l to comply with Section (c) of A rticle 6687-2, of Vernon’s Tex as Civil Statutes by failing to keep an accurate and legib le inventory of each used compon ent part purchased or delivered to [him], while [he] was an a utom obile salvage dealer.” Byhis two points of e rror, appellan t ass erts th e ev iden ce is lega lly a nd f

act ually insufficient to establish the autom obile parts located at hi s shop were “component parts” as defined by the statute, m uc h le ss to show that he, in fact, purchas ed the parts. We disagree.
Th e standards by w hich we determ ine the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are well established, and we need not spell them out. See Jackson v. V irginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Clew is v. State, 922 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Crim .App. 1996); Johnson v. S tate, 23 S.W.3d 11 (Tex.Cr.App. 2000). W e must first determ ine if

the evidence is legally sufficient, and if it i s, render an acquittal judgm ent. If the evidence i s lega lly sufficient, we m ust then determ ine if it is factually sufficient meas ured by the standards ex plicated in Cle wis . 92 2 S .W .2d at 134. The suffi ciency standards of rev iew are the sam e for both direct and circum stantial cases, and the p rosecution need not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis ex cept the guilt of t h e accus ed. S onnier v. State , 913 S .W.2d 511, 516 (Tex.C r.App. 1995).3 The definition tracked the language of the statute. See art. 66 87-2(a)(2 ). 5 We first address appellant’s contention there is no evidence to e stablish the autom obileparts found at his shop on Novem ber 19, 2 001 were com ponent parts as that term is defined by the statute. A t trial, o ne o f the investigating officers explained the concept of com ponent parts under the statute. A

dditionall y, he provided the jury with the following exam ples of component parts: doo rs, fenders, hoo ds, frames, useable engines or transmissions, i nner component parts, seats, ra dios. The State i ntroduce d in to ev idence eight photographs depicting autom obile parts, including car seats, fe nders , doors, fra m es, and hoo ds. In his b rief , ap pella nt e xp lain s all of t he autom obile parts depicted in the photographs “cam e from whole vehicles that [he ] purc hased or wa s repairing.” Final ly, in its charge to the jury , the court ex plained:

A “co m pon ent

par t” m ean s th e fr

ont end ass em bly o r ta il section of a motor vehicle , the cab of a truck (light or heavy), the bed of a one tone [si c] or lighter tr uck, an interior com ponent part of a m otor vehicle, a special acces sory

part, or a vehicle part that c ontains or should contain a federal safety s tic ker, m otor num ber, serial number, m anufacturer’s perm anent veh icle identification number, or a derivative of a vehicle identification num ber. 3
Jurorsare entitled to draw reasonable i nferences from basic facts to ul timate facts. Griffith v. State, 97 6 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.App. –Tyler 1997, pet. ref’d). Moreover, the jury ma y use com mon sense and apply com mon knowledge, observation, and experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life when giving effect to the inferences that m ay be6

reasonably drawn from the evidence. Id. at 690. As aconseq uence, we concludethere wasevidence from which t h e jury could reasonably infer the items depicted in the photographs were com ponentparts as that term wasdescribe d by th e investiga ting office r, and as it was defined by statute and in the court’ s charge. We next co nsider appellant’s contenti o n there is no evidence to establish he “purchased” any com ponentpar ts. In m akin g hisargum ent, appellant neglects that portion of thesta tute re quir ing s alva ge v ehic le dealers to m aintain records of any com ponent parts “purchased by or delive red to ” the dealer. (Em phasis added). Art. 6687-2(c). Appellant testified he purc hased s alvage ve hicles at a uction, r epaired or r

ebuilt the m , th en s old th em. He claimed the only used parts on his property w ere tho se h e ut ilize d in t he r epa ir process, and he m aintained that once he finished rebuilding a car, he gave aw ay any parts notem ployed during the repair. After viewing the photographs introduced into evidence bythe State, appellant acknow ledged the autom obile parts d epicted t here “[cam e] from the Suburban [he was ] fixing.” On cross-ex aminati on, a ppellant agreed he possessed a salvage veh icle dealer’s license, and acknow ledged the reporting requirements attendant to that licensure.
In reviewing the eviden ce in the light most f avorable to the prosecution , w e conclude any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the com ponentparts located at appellant’s shop were “delivered” at the time he purch ased the salvage vehicle from w hich those parts were harvested. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 318-19. By7

his own adm ission , appell ant maintained no r ecords of his rem oval of parts from the salvage vehicles. Therefore, the evidence is legally sufficient to establish appellant was a salvageveh icle dea ler w ho f ailed to m aintain r

eco rdsin violation of section (c) of art icle 668 7-2 of the Revised Civil Statutes. Additionally, having reviewed all of the avai labl e evidence, w e ca nno t sa y th e ve rdic t is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence or s o weak

as to b e cle arly

w ron g an d m anif

est lyunjust

. SeeJohnson v. S tate, 23 S.W.3d at 11. W e conclude the ev idence is lega lly and fac tually suff

icient to s upport the conviction. Appellant’s tw o points of error are overruled. Accordingly, the j udgme nt of the trial court is affirmed. Don H. Rea vis Justice Do not publish.