# FILED December 2, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRIMINA L APPEALS OF T ENNESSEE AT JACKSON AUGUST SESSION, 1997
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) C.C.A.NO. 02C01-9705-CC-00166 ) Appellee, ) ) MADISON COUNTY ) V. ) ) HON.WHIT LA FON, J UDGE CHARLES GWYNNE BLEDSOE, ) ) Appe llant. ) (RESISTIN G ARRE ST)

FOR THE APPELLANT : FOR THE APPELLEE : JOSEPH L . PATTERSON JOHN KNOX WALKUP Distri ct Public

Defender Attorney General& Reporter 225 West Baltimore, Sui te B Jackson, TN 38301 KENNETH W. RUCKER Assistant Attorney General 2nd Floor, Cordel l Hull Bui lding 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashvill e, TN 37243 JAMES G. WOODALL Distri ct Attor ney General JAMES W. THOMPSON Assis tant D istrict Atto rney G enera l 225 Martin Lu ther King Drive P.O. Box 2825 Jackson, TN 38302-2825
OPINION FILED ________________________ AFFIRMED THOMAS T. WOODALL, J UDGE-2- 

# OPINION

The Defen dant, Ch arles Gw ynne B ledsoe , appea ls as of right fr om his convicti on of resis ting arre st follow ing a ju ry trial in the Madison County Cri minal Cou rt. In this a ppea l, the Defendant chal lenges the sufficiency of the evidence to susta in the convic

tion. He al so argues that the indi ctment failed to alleg e an essential element of t he of fe nse o f resistin g arres t and w as the refore a void indictme nt. W e affirm the judgm ent of the tria l court.

S UFFICIENCY OF

THE EVIDENCE

When a n accused chall enges the suff iciency of the convi cting evi dence, the standard is wh ether, after re viewing the evid ence in the ligh t mos t favora ble t o the prosecut ion, any r ational trier

of fact could have fou nd the e ssen tia l eleme nts of the crim e beyon d a reas onable doubt. Jackson v. Virgin ia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979 ). On appeal, the State is enti tled to the str ongest legiti mate view of the evidenc e and a ll inference s therefro m. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 197 8). Because a verdict of guilt re moves t he presumption of innocence and rep laces it with a presum pti o n of guil t, the acc used has the burden in thi s court of ill ustrati ng why the evidence i s insuff icient to support t he verdictreturned by

the tri er offact. State v. Tug gle , 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Grace , 493 S.W .2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 197 3).
Questions concerning t he credibi lity of witnes ses, the weight an d value to be given the evidenc e, a s well as all factual issues raised by the evidence , are-3-

resolved by the tr ier of fac t, not this court. State v. Pappas , 754 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. A pp.), perm. to appeal denied , id . (Ten n. 198 7). No r may this court reweigh or reevalu ate the ev idence
. Cabbage , 571 S.W.2d at 835. A jury verdi ct approved by the trialjudge accredits the State’s witness es and re solves all conflicts in fa vor of the S tate. Grace , 493 S.W.2d at 476.

Three police office rs testified for th e State. T erry Halfo rd, an office r with the Jackso n Police D epartm ent, was on duty on July 29 , 1994 . He re ceived a call thata blac k ma le was cutti ng window screens of f windows at an apartmentinside the housing area of L incoln C ourts. W hile en rou te to the apartment, Hal ford saw a black male in the bushes in the apartment complex. Because he had previous contact with theDefendant, he r ecognized the man as t he Defendant. Defen dant wa s crouched down wit h a knife i n one hand and two crushed be er cans in t he otherhand. Halfor

d approached the Defendant , and the Defendant stood up. Because Defendant had the k nife in his hand and Halford d id n ot know the Defen dant’s inte ntions, H alford dre w his we apon fo r his own safety.

Halford asked the D efendant to dro p the knife severa l tim es, but he continued to approach Half ord while hol ding the kni fe. The Defendant was mumbling something undeterminabl e, then began cussi ng and yelling for Halford to go ahead and shoot him. When Defendant got appr oximately

eight (8)to ten (10) feet away from Halfor

d, he stopped walki ng and Halford cal led for bac kup. Two oth er o fficers, Jenkins and Pollack, arrived within one or two minutes. These officers wa lked up b ehind the Defen dant, and they also drew their weapon when they saw the Defendant holdi ng a knife . Defe ndan t still refus ed to d rop his weapon, so Officer

s Halford and Pol lack holstered their weapons and Jenkins-4-

kept his w eapon out. Pollackused a che mica l weap on ca lled “Fr eeze ” to help disarm the Defendant. Halford r an towards him and hi t his hand wi th a flashl ight to knock the kni fe out of hi s hand. Defendant was told he was under arrest . The Defendant becam e very violent , kicking, scratching a nd biting, and the o fficers were forc ed to wre stle him to the grou nd to plac e him in h andcu ffs.

After the offi cersgot De fend ant i nto t he pat rol car, Halford d roveDe fendan t towards the poli ce stati on. Defendant waskicking t he screen and sideglass so hard that the pl exi-gl ass screen was coming up and hitting t he back ofHalfor d’s seat. Because Halford was afraid that he would ki ck the window out, he stopped the car and got into the back seat w ith the Defend ant. Halford app lied pressure to several nerv e pr essure points on Defendant’s body untilhe stopped kick ing. Halford a dmitted that Defendant was bleeding, but state d that he had al ready begun bleeding from the earlier strug gle with the offi cers prior to being arr

ested. He stated th at Defendant coul d possibly have continue d to bleed f rom the altercat ion in the car . After Defendant was taken to booki ng, he threatened t he lives of t he officers and thei r families.

Officer Pollack al so testi fied regar ding the event

s of July 29, 1994. He and Officer Jenki ns were dis patc hed t o theLincoln Co u rt housing project t o take a report from the woman who call ed complaining t hat an indi vidual had threatened her and h ad cu t her win dow s creen . Wh ile talking with this woman , he heard overthe radio th at Halford had th e suspect atgunpoint. Pollack and Jenki ns imm ediate ly went to that locati on and found Halford th ere with the subject backed against a building
. When the y saw the kni fe in Defendant ’s hands, t hey drew their weapons. Pollackalso thought he saw some beer cans in the D efend ant’s-5-

otherhand. When Defendant refused to drop the k nife, he a nd Halford hol stered their weapons. He gotout his Fre eze a nd sp rayed the De fenda nt in the face in orderto shut hi s eyes. After struggl ing with t he Defendant to handcuff him, they tried to get him up and walk to the car, but Defendant refused to comply and the officers had to pick him up an d li terally ca rry him to Halford’ s car. On the way back to the stati on, he saw the Defendant t ry to ki ck the window out of the patr

ol car. At one point, Halford had to stop the ca r and ta lk to the Defe ndan t to settle him down. After

they arrived at the stati on, the Defendant made threats on t he officers’lives an d their fami lies. Officer Jenkins confi rmed the occurrence of these sa me eve nts in his tes timony.

Charles Gwynne Bledsoe then testifi ed on his own behalf . On that day , he was in Lincol n Cou rts and h ad played a prank on a friend by taking one of the screens off of her window. He stated that he did not cut t he scr een, only p ried it off with h is hands. Defendant h ad been cutti ng the grass and was sitting down, p ee ling and eating an appl e when he saw the poli ce approach. He recalled seeing four offic ers, alth ough he co uld not identify th e fourth officer. Immed iately, one of the o fficers p ut his service revolv er in Defendant’s faceand said to “drop the knife.”

Defendant stated that he di d n ot have a chanc e to drop the knife because he was then sprayed with mace. After being sprayed, he dro pped his head an d fel t a b urn ing sen sat ion . De fen dant was sca red , an d only be came angry with the officers w hen they drug him down the sidewalk to the police car. Defendant admitted t hat he did not try to walk. After be ing plac ed in H alford’s car, he told hi m to “[R]ead me my ri ghts. Read me my rights, boy.” Defendant thoughtthat was why the offi cer stopped the car and hit hi m in his mouth and face. Defendant

stated th at these i njuries caused him to bleed.-6- A person commits the of fense of res istingarrest i f he “intent ional ly prevent[s] or obs truct[s] a nyone known to the person to be a l aw enforcement officer . . . f rom effecting a stop, frisk, hal t, arrest or searc h of any person, includi ng the defendant , by using f orce against

the law enforcement officer or anothe r.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602(a). From the record, there is suffic ient evidence that a reasonable t rier of fact coul d have found the Defendant gui lty of resisting a rrest.

Each law enforcement officer who testi fied conf irmed that t he Defendant refused to drop his we apon when they re ques ted him to do so. When they forced him to drop his we apon after sp raying him w it h F reeze, the of ficers notifi ed Defendant he was under arrest and attempted to place h im in han dcuffs. The Defendant would not co opera te with th eir efforts to ha ndcuff him, to such ex tent thathe bit, k icked, and scratched t he officers. There was a cont inuing st ruggle, and when the offi cers gotDefendant handcuffed he refused to walk to t he police car. The D efend ant ad mitted during his testimony t hat he would n ot com ply with the officers ’ orders to walk to the car, using his body weight to force the o fficers to carry him to th e car in order to effect uate the arr est. This i ssue is wit hout merit.

S UFFICIENCY OF THE INDICTM ENT

In his second is sue, Defendant ar gues the indi ctment fai led to charge that the Defendant “used force agai nst a law enforcement offi cer,” an element of t he offense
. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602. The indictment reads as follows:-7- Charles Gwynne Bledsoe o n or about Ju ly 2 9, 199 4, in Madison County, Tennessee, and prio r to the fi nding ofthis i ndictment, in the Coun ty and State af oresa id , did intent ionally prevent or obstruct o fficers of the Jackson Police Depart ment, known to t he sai d Charl es Gwynn e Bleds oe to be law enfor ceme nt perso nnel, f ro m effecti ng an arrest of the said Charl es Gwynne Bledsoe by struggli ng, kicking, an d resisting efforts to be taken into custo dy, in violation of T .C.A. § 3 9-16-60 2 . . . The Defendant contends that the indi ctment as written above is fatally defec tive due to its wo rding. The fundamental purpos e of an indi ctment is to convey adequ ate notice o f th e offense to the defe ndant. See State v. Mayes , 854 S.W .2d 638 , 640 (T enn. 19 93).

W hile the indi ctment does not state theexact wordi ng of the statute, there are suffic ient all egations to necessaril y imply t he element of “usingforce against the lawenforce ment o fficer.” In deter mining the sufficien cy of the ind ictmen t, a court must consider the foll owing factors: (1) whether the indi ctment contai ns the eleme nts of the off

ense intended to be charged; (2)whether the i ndictment suffic iently

apprises t he accused of the of fense he is cal led upon to defend; (3) whetherthe trialcourt knows to what offenseit must appl y the judgment; and (4) whetherthe accused knows wit h accuracy to what extent he may pl ead a former acquittalor conviction in a subs equen t prosecu tion for the s ame o ffense. State v. Tate , 912 S.W .2d 785 , 789 (T enn. C rim. App . 1995).
Upon review

of the i ndictment under these factors, it

is clear the indi ctment contained the elem ents of the offense s uch th at t he De fenda nt was sufficie ntly apprised of the offense he wa s called upon to defe nd. W hile the ind ictme nt did not specifi cally st

ate that t he Defen dant ha d “used force” against a l aw enforcementofficer , the indi ctment did speci fy that the Def endant had “s truggled,-8-

kicked, and resisted effort s” by law enforcement personnel to arr est him. As a general rule, i t is suf

ficien t to state the offense c harged in the word s of the sta tute or words wh i ch are e quivalen t to the word s contain ed in the s tatute. Tate , 912 S.W.2d at 789. That t he Defendant str uggled, kicked and resisted the effor ts of the law enf or cement personnel is equivalent to the Defendant’s using force against t he law enforcement personnel. Defendant was suff icient ly appri sed of the nature of t he offens e for wh ich he would have to defen d him self. Th is issue is without m erit.

The Stat e raises a t hird iss ue in its brief r egarding the s entencing of the Defendant in that the j udgment form incor rectly reflect s that he wasconvicted of a Class B misde mean or when the State proved beyond areasonable doubt the possession of a deadly weapon, and therefore, this court should i mpose judgment for

a Cl assA mi sdemea nor convict ion. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16- 602(d). It is

true that

the State pr

oved that Defen dant p osse ssed a dea dly weapon during thecommission of the offen se. How ever, durin g oral arg umen t, in response to questio ning by th e court, the State conceded that poss ession of a deadly weapon was not alleged i n the indict ment. This is sue raised by the State ha s no m erit.

We affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.

____________________________________ THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge-9-

CONCUR:

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, Judge

___________________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, Judge