IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

May 30, 2019 Session

IN RE: PETITION TO STAY THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FORMAL

ETHICS OPINION 2017-F-163

No. M2018-01932-SC-BAR-BP

The Tennessee District Attorneys General Conference (“TNDAGC”) filed with this Court 

a petition to vacate Formal Ethics Opinion 2017-F-163 (“Opinion”) issued by the Board 

of Professional Responsibility (“Board”) regarding ethical considerations for prosecutors

under Rule 3.8(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct. The TNDAGC also 

requested that the Court stay the effectiveness of the Opinion pending review. This Court 

determined that a full and deliberate review of the issues was necessary and granted a 

stay of the effectiveness of the Opinion. Based on our review, we decline to interpret a 

prosecutor’s ethical duty under Rule 3.8(d) as being more expansive than one’s legal 

obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 

(1963), and its progeny, or that “timely” disclosure of the material should be interpreted 

as “as soon as reasonably practicable.” Accordingly, we vacate Formal Ethics Opinion 

2017-F-163 of the Board of Professional Responsibility. We also take this opportunity to 

interpret Rule 3.8(d) as coextensive in scope with a prosecutor’s legal obligations under 

Brady and its progeny, as explained in this opinion.

Formal Ethics Opinion 2017-F-163 of the Board of Professional Responsibility 

Vacated

JEFFREY S. BIVINS, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CORNELIA A. CLARK,

SHARON G. LEE, HOLLY KIRBY, and ROGER A. PAGE, JJ., joined. 

Brian S. Faughnan, for the petitioner, Tennessee District Attorneys General Conference.

Sandra Jane Leach Garrett, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, for the respondent, Board of 

Professional Responsibility.

Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney General; Donald Q. Cochran, United States Attorney 

for the Middle District of Tennessee; D. Michael Dunavant, United States Attorney for 

08/23/2019
2

the Western District of Tennessee; and J. Douglas Overbey, United States Attorney for 

the Eastern District of Tennessee, for amicus curiae, the United States of America.

Stephen Ross Johnson and Elizabeth Ford, Knoxville, Tennessee; Jonathan Harwell and 

Henry Martin, Nashville, Tennessee; and Doris Randle-Holt, Memphis, Tennessee, for 

amici curiae, the Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the National 

Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the three Federal Public Defenders for the 

Eastern, Middle, and Western Districts of Tennessee.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor 

General; and Zachary T. Hinkle, Assistant Attorney General, for amicus curiae, the 

Attorney General & Reporter of the State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Factual and Procedural Background

On March 15, 2018, the Board issued Formal Ethics Opinion 2017-F-163 to 

clarify the language in Rule 3.8(d)1of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct, 

which pertains to a prosecutor’s duty of disclosure of information to a criminal defendant. 

The Opinion states that the Board “has been requested to issue a Formal Ethics Opinion 

regarding the Prosecutors’ Ethical Obligations to Disclose Information Favorable to the 

Defense.” The Opinion addressed the following two questions:

I. Does a prosecutor’s duty under RPC 3.8(d) to disclose to the 

defense “all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to 

negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense” and in connection 

with sentencing, “all unprivileged mitigating information known to the 

prosecutor” extend beyond the “material” standard as construed by federal 

or state constitutional decisions?

II. What constitutes “timely disclosure” under RPC 3.8(d)?

 

1 The text of Rule 3.8(d) states that a 

prosecutor in a criminal case . . . shall make timely disclosure to the defense of all 

evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 

accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the 

defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the 

prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective 

order of the tribunal[.]

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 3.8(d). 
3

The Opinion then provided the following answers in conclusion:

Tennessee Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) is a separate ethical 

obligation of prosecutors and was not meant to be coextensive with a 

prosecutor’s legal disclosure obligations. This ethical duty is separate from 

disclosure obligations imposed under the Constitution, statutes, procedural 

rules, court rules, or court orders. A prosecutor’s ethical duty to disclose 

information favorable to the defense is broader than and extends beyond 

Brady. Once a prosecutor knows of evidence and information that tends to 

negate the guilt of the accused, or mitigates the offense, or otherwise falls 

within RPC 3.8(d)’s disclosure requirement, the prosecutor ordinarily must 

disclose it as soon as reasonably practicable.

On June 4, 2018, following the Board’s adoption of the Opinion, the United States 

Attorneys for the Middle, Western, and Eastern Districts of Tennessee requested 

reconsideration and withdrawal of the Opinion. The U.S. Attorneys requested permission 

to appear before the Board at its September 2018 meeting. Subsequently, the Board 

requested written statements from the Tennessee District Public Defenders Conference 

and the U.S. Federal Public Defenders and asked for a representative from these entities 

to speak at the September 2018 Board meeting. Additionally, the Board allowed

presentations at the September 2018 Board meeting from representatives of the 

TNDAGC, the U.S. Attorneys for the Middle, Western, and Eastern Districts of 

Tennessee, and the Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Following the 

presentations at the September 2018 Board meeting, the Board appointed a committee to 

review the Opinion and make a recommendation to the Board. On October 31, 2018, 

four members of the committee voted to recommend to the Board that the Opinion not be 

altered or rescinded. One member of the committee did not concur in the 

recommendation and instead would have recommended that the Board rescind the 

Opinion. 

On October 23, 2018, the TNDAGC filed with this Court a petition to “stay the 

effectiveness of Formal Ethics Opinion 2017-F-163,” pending the Board’s review of the 

Opinion following the public hearing held on September 14, 2018. The TNDAGC 

requested that this Court stay the effectiveness of the Opinion until June 1, 2019, or upon 

the conclusion of the Board’s evaluation process, whichever were to come sooner. The 

Board filed a response on November 5, 2018, stating that it would “hold in abeyance any 

recommended disposition by a Hearing Committee Member or the Board of any 

disciplinary complaint filed against a prosecutor wherein Formal Ethics Opinion 2017-F163 is referenced in the complaint” until the Board reconsidered the Opinion. 

On November 8, 2018, this Court granted the petition to stay as requested by the 

TNDAGC. On December 17, 2018, the Board filed a supplemental response, informing 

the Court that, “[a]t the Board’s meeting on December 14, 2018, the full Board 
4

considered the Ethics Committee’s Report and Recommendation and voted to not alter or 

rescind Formal Ethics Opinion 2017-F-163.” The TNDAGC filed a reply on December 

19, 2018, informing the Court of its intent to file a Petition to Vacate the Formal Ethics 

Opinion and asking the Court to continue to stay the effectiveness of the Opinion.

On January 15, 2019, the TNDAGC filed a petition to vacate the Opinion 2017-F163 and renewed its request that the Court stay the effectiveness of the Opinion. On 

February 4, 2019, this Court determined that public interest required a full and deliberate 

review of the issues raised, which would be furthered by delaying the effective date of the 

Opinion pending adjudication of this matter. Accordingly, this Court granted the 

TNDAGC’s motion for stay, ordered additional briefing, and heard oral arguments on the 

petition to vacate.

Analysis

As this Court stated in In re Youngblood, 

This Court’s authority to consider the validity of formal ethics 

opinions is implicit in its rules and prior decisions. Rule 9 provides for the 

establishment and operation of the Board, which, as indicated by its full 

name, the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of 

Tennessee, is an agency of this Court. Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 9, § 5. The 

responsibilities of the Board include the duty to “issue and publish Formal 

Ethics Opinions on proper professional conduct[.]” Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 9, § 

26.4(a). Jurisdiction to review these ethics opinions is grounded in the 

Court’s inherent power to review the actions of its boards, commissions, 

and other agencies. . . . 

. . . .

. . . This power to review is inherent in the grant from the sovereign 

to the Court, and the Court reaffirms its original and exclusive authority to 

formulate and enforce rules governing the practice of law. That authority 

includes the review of formal ethics opinions issued by the Board. 

895 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tenn. 1995). Furthermore, “The Court may in its discretion, upon 

application or upon its own initiative, consider the amendment, revision, or repeal of its 

rules and any interpretation or application thereof by its agencies.” Id. at 326.

The TNDAGC objects to both of the conclusions provided in the Opinion: first, 

that the prosecutor has an ethical duty extending beyond one’s constitutional obligations 

under Brady and its progeny; and second, that the prosecutor must disclose that 
5

information “as soon as reasonably practicable.” We will address each of the Opinion’s 

conclusions in turn.

History of Rule 3.8(d)

An overview of the history of Rule 3.8(d) will be helpful in our review of the 

Opinion at issue. On October 9, 2000, the Tennessee Bar Association (“TBA”) filed with 

this Court a petition to adopt the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct (“Rules”) to 

replace what was then the Tennessee Code of Professional Responsibility. Proposed 

Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct, M2000-02416-SC-RL-RL. Prior to 2000, the 

rule provision that addressed a prosecutor’s ethical responsibilities was EC 7-13, which 

provided in part:

The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual 

advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict. . . . With 

respect to evidence and witnesses, the prosecutor has responsibilities 

different from those of a lawyer in private practice; the prosecutor should 

make timely disclosure to the defense of available evidence, known to him, 

that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the 

offense, or reduce the punishment. Further, a prosecutor should not 

intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence merely because he believes it will 

damage the prosecutor’s case or aid the accused.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, EC 7-13 (2000). 

The proposed text for Rule 3.8(d), as provided in an exhibit to the TBA’s petition,

was verbatim what the Rule provides today and was identical to the corresponding 

American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d). The 

Court solicited comments from the bench, bar, and public on November 28, 2000. Of 

relevance to this case, the Court received two comments objecting to the language of 

Rule 3.8(d). The Tennessee District Attorneys General Conference worded the objection 

as follows: 

Proposed section (d) of this rule appears to track the Brady Rule 

requiring the disclosure of evidence known to the prosecutor which tends to 

negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense, but goes further by 

requiring any mitigating evidence to be presented to the tribunal as well as 

defense counsel at sentencing. This goes beyond the Brady requirement. 

Prosecutors should be required to follow Brady by providing mitigating 

evidence to the defense lawyer who will then make the decision on whether 

to present it to the tribunal. Ethical rules should not be used to alter a 

lawyer’s legal obligation. 
6

Further, this amendment requirement is unnecessary. A prosecutor 

should not be subjected to ethical sanctions simply because the prosecutor 

presented it to the defense but failed to present it to the tribunal. This 

proposed rule would in effect create an additional right for defendants 

beyond those already afforded them by law.

The United States Attorneys for the Eastern, Middle, and Western Districts of Tennessee 

also objected on this ground.

2

The Board did not raise any objection to proposed Rule 

3.8(d). In the TBA’s Revised Final Report of its proposed draft of the proposed Rules, it 

modified proposed Rule 3.8(d) to state that a prosecutor in a criminal matter shall, “in 

connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and, if the defendant is proceeding 

pro se, to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, 

except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the 

tribunal.” (Emphasis added to show change). In its final report, the TBA included the 

following comment regarding the modification:

In response to a comment from the [TNDAGC], and with its concurrence, 

the Committee has amended Paragraph (d) so that the disclosure of 

exculpatory evidence need only be made to the defense except when a 

defendant is proceeding pro se. In such a case, for the protection of the pro 

se defendant, the disclosure [at sentencing] must be made to both the 

defendant and the tribunal.

Thus, the TBA, in response to the objections above, changed the tribunal disclosure 

requirement to apply only to pro se defendants. Subsequently, the United States 

Attorneys for the Eastern, Middle, and Western Districts filed comments to the TBA’s 

Final Revised Report, in which they stated the following as to the TBA’s proposed 

revision to Rule 3.8(d): “Rule 3.8(d) as now proposed by the Committee essentially 

tracks the rule announced in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 

2d 215 (1963), requiring disclosure of certain exculpatory material and, accordingly, we 

 

2 The United States Attorneys’ objection provided:

Rule 3.8(d) essentially tracks the ruling announced in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 

S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), requiring disclosure of certain exculpatory material. 

The proposed rule, however, illogically and unnecessarily expands the Brady rule in one 

objectionable respect by requiring the mitigating evidence be disclosed not only to the 

defense attorney but also to the tribunal in connection with sentencing. The wellestablished standards under Brady already require that such information be disclosed to 

defense attorneys. The decision as to whether the client’s interest is served by presenting 

the information at sentencing is best left to the attorney. The proposed rule is a 

substantial change in well-established standards, and such changes are best left to the 

courts, not in legislating rules but in deciding cases, and to the legislature. Restated, the 

Rules of Professional Conduct should not be used to make fundamental changes in 

prosecutorial legal obligations.
7

do not object.” The Court enacted its new Rules on August 27, 2002, adopting 

substantially the same language as that provided in the TBA’s Revised Final Report. 

In 2010, again upon the petition of the TBA, this Court adopted comprehensive 

revisions to the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct. At that time, Rule 3.8(d) was 

revised3to the original version proposed in 2000, which is identical to the current 

language of the Rule. 

Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose

With this backdrop in mind, we review the two conclusions provided by the Board 

in its Opinion. The TNDAGC first challenges the Opinion’s requirement that a 

prosecutor must disclose “information favorable to the defense,” rather than “information 

known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the 

offense,” as provided in Rule 3.8(d). The Board has conceded that the phrase 

“information favorable to the defense” is different from the language used in Rule 3.8(d) 

and thus potentially confusing. The Board, accordingly, expresses its willingness to 

replace all references of “information favorable to the defense” with “information known 

to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense” so 

that the Opinion’s language in this regard would be identical to the language used in Rule 

3.8(d). 

Even with the above language mirroring that in Rule 3.8(d), the Opinion still 

provides that the rule provision’s “ethical duty is separate from disclosure obligations 

imposed under the Constitution, statutes, procedural rules, court rules, or court orders,” 

and that “[a] prosecutor’s ethical duty to disclose information favorable to the defense is 

broader than and extends beyond Brady.” Thus, it is necessary to determine further 

whether this Court agrees with the Opinion’s interpretation of a prosecutor’s ethical 

obligations under Rule 3.8(d). 

In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the 

prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 

the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or 

bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. “The evidence is material only if there is a 

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 

667, 682 (1985); see also Johnson v. State, 38 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tenn. 2001) (“This Court 

has held on several occasions that in order to establish a Brady violation, four elements 

must be shown by the defendant: 1) that the defendant requested the information (unless 

 

3 The revision removed “if the defendant is proceeding pro se” from the language of disclosure to 

the tribunal at sentencing. 
8

the evidence is obviously exculpatory, in which case the State is bound to release the 

information whether requested or not); 2) that the State suppressed the information; 3) 

that the information was favorable to the accused; and 4) that the information was 

material.”). 

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 also imposes obligations on a 

prosecutor for the disclosure of information to a criminal defendant. Additionally, the 

United States Supreme Court has stated in a footnote that “the obligation to disclose 

evidence favorable to the defense may arise more broadly under a prosecutor’s ethical or 

statutory obligations.” Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470 n.15 (2009) (citing Kyles v.

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995)). On July 8, 2009, the ABA issued Formal Opinion 

09-454 (“ABA Opinion”), titled “Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Evidence and 

Information Favorable to the Defense.” The ABA Opinion states, in pertinent part,

Rule 3.8(d) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires a 

prosecutor to “make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or 

information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 

accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, [to] 

disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating 

information known to the prosecutor.” This ethical duty is separate from 

disclosure obligations imposed under the Constitution, statutes, procedural 

rules, court rules, or court orders. Rule 3.8(d) requires a prosecutor who 

knows of evidence and information favorable to the defense to disclose it as 

soon as reasonably practicable so that the defense can make meaningful use 

of it in making such decisions as whether to plead guilty and how to 

conduct its investigation. Prosecutors are not further obligated to conduct 

searches or investigations for favorable evidence and information of which 

they are unaware. 

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 1 (2009). The 

Opinion presently at issue adopts much of the same analysis and interpretation of the rule 

provision as that provided in the ABA Opinion. The ABA Opinion, however, provides 

for a good faith exception, which is not present in the Board’s Opinion. See id. at 6 n.26 

(“If the prosecutor knows of the existence of evidence or information relevant to a 

criminal prosecution, the prosecutor must disclose it if, viewed objectively, it would tend 

to negate the defendant’s guilt. However, a prosecutor’s erroneous judgment that the 

evidence was not favorable to the defense should not constitute a violation of the rule if 

the prosecutor’s judgment was made in good faith. Cf. Rule 3.8, cmt. [9].”).

The TNDAGC argues that the Board’s unwillingness to provide a good faith 

exception makes the Opinion all the more problematic. The Board, in response, states 

that it “has no objection to modifying the Opinion to make clear that the ethical 

responsibilities created by [Rule] 3.8(d) only apply to ‘information known to the 
9

prosecutor’ as opposed to information known to the State and that all the circumstances, 

including a prosecutor’s good faith, should be considered in determining a prosecutor’s 

compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.”

Similarly to the ABA Opinion, several courts have interpreted a prosecutor’s 

ethical duty in that jurisdiction to extend beyond the obligations in Brady. See United 

States v. Walker, No. 17-cr-00570-EMC-1, 2018 WL 3023518, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 

2018) (“In November 2017, a new California rule of professional conduct went into 

effect which goes beyond Brady.”); United States v. Wells, No. 3:13-cr-00008-RRBJDR, 2013 WL 4851009, at *4 (D. Alaska Sept. 11, 2013) (“Rule 3.8(b) is more 

demanding than the constitutional case law. The rule requires disclosure of evidence or 

information favorable to the defense without regard to anticipated impact of the evidence 

or information on the trial’s outcome.”); In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202, 210 (D.C. 2015)

(“Thus, to the extent the Rule 3.8 commentary suggests a materiality test, we reject it. We 

see no logical reason to base our interpretation about the scope of a prosecutor’s ethical 

duties on an ad hoc, after the fact, case by case review of particular criminal 

convictions.”); Shultz v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline of the State Bar of Tex., No. 

55649, 2015 WL 9855916, at *1 (Tex. Bd. of Disciplinary App. Dec. 17, 2015) (“We 

hold that the materiality standard under Brady does not apply to Rule 3.09(d). We further 

hold that failure to disclose information otherwise required by law to be disclosed, 

regardless of intent, constitutes unlawfully obstructing another party’s access to evidence 

in violation of Rule 3.04(a).”); In re Disciplinary Action Against Feland, 820 N.W.2d 

672, 678 (N.D. 2012) (“A prosecutor’s failure to comply with the duties imposed by Rule 

3.8(d) should not be excused merely because, based upon the other evidence presented at 

trial, the result in the case would have been the same. A prosecutor’s ethical duty to 

disclose all exculpatory evidence to the defense does not vary depending upon the 

strength of the other evidence in the case. Accordingly, it has been recognized that a 

prosecutor’s ethical obligation of disclosure under Rule 3.8(d) is broader than the duties 

imposed by Brady and Rule 16.” (citations omitted)); see also N.Y. State Bar. Ass’n 

Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2016-3 (2016); Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal 

Ethics Op. 1862, (2012).

The Sixth Circuit examined a Brady issue in a federal habeas corpus case from 

Tennessee, determining that no Brady violation had occurred but noting that the 

prosecutor’s failure to disclose “was a serious professional failing.” Brooks v.

Tennessee, 626 F.3d 878, 892 (6th Cir. 2010). The court stated, “Nevertheless, the Brady

standard for materiality is less demanding than the ethical obligations imposed on a 

prosecutor.” Id. (citation omitted). However, the Sixth Circuit relied on the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Cone v. Bell, which stated in a footnote that a prosecutor’s obligation 

“may arise more broadly under a prosecutor’s ethical or statutory obligations” than what 

is provided under Brady and its progeny. Cone, 556 U.S. at 470 n.15 (emphasis added).
10

Other courts have interpreted their ethical rules as being coextensive with Brady

obligations, mainly based on public policy reasons. See, e.g., In re Att’y C, 47 P.3d 

1167, 1171 (Colo. 2002) (“Hence, the language of Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(2), Rule 3.8(d), and 

ABA Standard 3-3.11(a) is substantially identical. We have explicitly adopted a 

materiality standard with respect to our procedural rules, and we are disinclined to 

impose inconsistent obligations upon prosecutors. We therefore also adopt a materiality 

standard as to the latter, such that we read Rule 3.8(d) as containing a requirement that a 

prosecutor disclose exculpatory, outcome-determinative evidence that tends to negate the 

guilt or mitigate the punishment of the accused.”); Disciplinary Counsel v. KelloggMartin, 923 N.E.2d 125, 130 (Ohio 2010) (“We decline to construe DR 7–103(B) as 

requiring a greater scope of disclosure than Brady and Crim. R. 16 require. Relator’s 

broad interpretation of DR 7–103(B) would threaten prosecutors with professional 

discipline for failing to disclose evidence even when the applicable law does not require 

disclosure. This holding would in effect expand the scope of discovery currently required 

of prosecutors in criminal cases.”); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Ward, 353 P.3d 509, 

520-22 (Okla. 2015) (interpreting their Rule 3.8(d) “in a manner consistent with the 

scope of disclosure required by applicable law”); In re Riek, 834 N.W.2d 384, 391 (Wis. 

2013) (“Prosecutors should not be subjected to disciplinary proceedings for complying 

with legal disclosure obligations. We thus construe the ethical mandate of SCR 

20:3.8(f)(1) in a manner consistent with the scope of disclosure required by the United 

States Constitution, federal or Wisconsin statutes, and court rules of procedure.”); see 

also N.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 3.8(d) (“The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . .

after reasonably diligent inquiry, make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or 

information required to be disclosed by applicable law, rules of procedure, or court 

opinions including all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to 

negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with 

sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating 

information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this 

responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.” (emphasis added)). 

The Louisiana Supreme Court determined in In re Seastrunk, 236 So. 3d 509, 518-

19 (La. 2017), that the duties in its ethical rule, akin to our Rule 3.8(d),

4

and the duties in 

 

4

Provided below is the Louisiana rule provision, emphasizing the only portion differing from 

Tennessee’s rule provision:

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the 

prosecutor that the prosecutor knows, or reasonably should know, either tends to negate 

the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, 

disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known 

to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a 

protective order of the tribunal[.]
11

Brady are coextensive. Noting several other jurisdictions coming to the same conclusion, 

the court stated, 

As these other courts have found, under conflicting standards, prosecutors 

would face uncertainty as to how to proceed, as they could find themselves 

in compliance with the standard enumerated in Brady, but in potential 

violation of the obligation set forth in Rule 3.8(d). In finding the 

obligations coextensive in Rule 3.8(d) and Brady, we decline to impose 

inconsistent disclosure obligations upon prosecutors, thereby eliminating 

confusion. 

A broader interpretation of Rule 3.8(d) also invites the use of an 

ethical rule as a tactical weapon in criminal litigation. We find the practical 

effect of this potential threat to be poor policy, and, again, decline to adopt 

the reasoning proffered by ODC.

Id. at 519 (footnotes omitted).

We agree with the policy interests espoused in the line of cases determining their 

ethical rules for prosecutors as coextensive with the constitutional obligations under 

Brady. To say that our ethical rules require prosecutors to consider different standards 

than their constitutional and legal requirements has the potential to bring about a myriad 

of conflicts. See Michael D. Ricciuti, Caroline E. Conti & Paolo G. Corso, Criminal 

Discovery: The Clash Between Brady and Ethical Obligations, 51 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 

399, 436 (2018) (“[H]aving two competing, mandatory and inconsistent sets of rules 

simply means that it remains ambiguous which rule prevails, and allows ethics rules to be 

used as tactical weapons in criminal cases and beyond.”). As an example, the United 

States’ amicus brief filed with this Court cited a motion filed in a federal district court 

requesting that the United States disclose the names of confidential informants and “all 

information about the Informant that could be useful to the defense.” The request for 

information was not based on the prosecutor’s legal duty under Brady but pursuant to the 

prosecutor’s ethical obligations under Rule 3.8(d). See U.S. v. Darden, 353 F. Supp. 3d 

697, 722 (M.D. Tenn. 2018). Thus, based on our review, we decline to interpret Rule 

3.8(d) as providing any greater ethical obligation upon prosecutors than the constitutional 

obligations under Brady and its progeny. 

Moreover, the history of Rule 3.8(d) in Tennessee supports our understanding of 

the rule provision’s parameters. With the exception of the obligation to disclose the 

information to the tribunal at sentencing, no entity, including the Board, indicated 

through its comments to the proposed rule that the provision extended a prosecutor’s 

ethical duties beyond the scope of a prosecutor’s legal obligations under Brady. 

 

La. R. Prof’l Conduct 3.8(d) (emphasis added).
12

Therefore, to now interpret the provision as extending beyond Brady effectively amends 

the Rule. For the reasons provided above, we decline to do so. Accordingly, we vacate 

section I of the Opinion.

Because we are vacating the Board’s interpretation of Rule 3.8(d) as it relates to 

Brady, we take this opportunity to further clarify the rule provision. As the District of 

Columbia Court of Appeals addressed in Kline, we recognize that to say the obligations 

are completely coextensive could be interpreted to mean that a prosecutor could commit 

an ethical violation inadvertently. See Kline, 113 A.3d at 213 (“[A] Brady violation is not 

focused on the conduct of the prosecutor, only whether the evidence was potentially 

exculpatory and whether the outcome of the trial was seriously affected.”). Conversely, 

Rule 3.8(d) states that the ethical duty arises for “information known to the prosecutor 

that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 

8, RPC 3.8(d) (emphasis added). We note, however, that although our Rules of 

Professional Conduct define “known” as “actual awareness of the fact in question,” the 

rule provision also provides that “[a] person’s knowledge may be inferred from 

circumstances.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.0(f). Furthermore, we agree with the Board 

as it provided in its appellate brief that, in reviewing these matters, “all the 

circumstances, including a prosecutor’s good faith, should be considered in determining a 

prosecutor’s compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct.”

As noted above, the rule provision requires the disclosure to the defendant and the 

tribunal at sentencing, which differs from the obligations under Brady. See Tenn. Sup. 

Ct. R. 8, RPC 3.8(d). Thus, with this language being the only exception, we interpret 

Rule 3.8(d) as coextensive in scope with Brady and its progeny, recognizing that the 

prosecutor also must have knowledge of the information in order to establish an ethical 

duty to disclose. 

Definition of Timely

The TNDAGC also argues that the Opinion’s interpretation of “timely” as “as 

soon as reasonably practicable” runs afoul of the ordinary meaning of “timely” within the 

legal context. 

The ABA Opinion sets forth the same definition for timely as adopted in the 

Board’s Opinion. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-

454, at 6 (“Because the defense can use favorable evidence and information most fully 

and effectively the sooner it is received, such evidence or information, once known to the 

prosecutor, must be disclosed under Rule 3.8(d) as soon as reasonably practical.”). 

Likewise, other courts have adopted the same or similar definition. See, e.g., In re 

Larsen, 379 P.3d 1209, 1215 (Utah 2016) (holding that, where its rules of criminal 

procedure require disclosure “as soon as practicable,” “Rule 3.8(d) of the Utah Rules of 

Professional Conduct requires more than just disclosure; it requires ‘timely disclosure’”); 
13

People v. Robinson, No. 2010QN040333, 2011 WL 7112937, at *2 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Dec. 

9, 2011) (stating that the New York Rules of Professional Conduct “require a prosecutor 

to make timely disclosure at the earliest feasible opportunity”). 

Under Brady and its progeny, “as long as a defendant possesses Brady evidence in 

time for its effective use, the government has not deprived the defendant of due process 

of law simply because it did not produce the evidence sooner.” United States v. Coppa, 

267 F.3d 132, 144 (2d Cir. 2001); see also State v. Vaughn, M2006-01659-CCA-R3-CD, 

2008 WL 110094, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 9, 2008) (“Tennessee courts analyze 

delayed disclosure differently from outright suppression, focusing on the prejudice of the 

delay. In United States v. Blood, the Sixth Circuit stated, ‘Brady generally does not 

apply to delayed disclosure of exculpatory information, but only to a complete failure to 

disclose and that a [d]elay only violates Brady when the delay itself causes prejudice.’

435 F.3d 612, 627 (6th Cir. 2006).” (other internal citations omitted)).

In United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), the United States Supreme Court 

examined whether a prosecutor must disclose material impeachment evidence prior to 

entrance of a guilty plea. In concluding in the negative, the court provided the following 

reasoning:

First, impeachment information is special in relation to the fairness 

of a trial, not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary (“knowing,” 

“intelligent,” and “sufficient[ly] aware”). . . .

. . . .

Second, . . . this Court has found that the Constitution, in respect to a 

defendant’s awareness of relevant circumstances, does not require complete 

knowledge of the relevant circumstances, but permits a court to accept a 

guilty plea, with its accompanying waiver of various constitutional rights, 

despite various forms of misapprehension under which a defendant might 

labor. . . .

. . . .

At the same time, a constitutional obligation to provide 

impeachment information during plea bargaining, prior to entry of a guilty 

plea, could seriously interfere with the Government’s interest in securing 

those guilty pleas that are factually justified, desired by defendants, and 

help to secure the efficient administration of justice. . . . 

Consequently, the Ninth Circuit’s requirement could force the 

Government to abandon its “general practice” of not “disclos[ing] to a 
14

defendant pleading guilty information that would reveal the identities of 

cooperating informants, undercover investigators, or other prospective 

witnesses.” Brief for United States 25. It could require the Government to 

devote substantially more resources to trial preparation prior to plea 

bargaining, thereby depriving the plea-bargaining process of its main 

resource-saving advantages. Or it could lead the Government instead to 

abandon its heavy reliance upon plea bargaining in a vast number—90% or 

more—of federal criminal cases. We cannot say that the Constitution’s due 

process requirement demands so radical a change in the criminal justice 

process in order to achieve so comparatively small a constitutional benefit.

Id. at 629-32 (alterations in original).

The United States, in its amicus brief, argues that, if we agree with the Opinion’s 

interpretation of timely, prosecutors arguably would be required under our ethical rules to 

provide material impeachment evidence to a defendant prior to entering a plea agreement, 

even though the United States Supreme Court has specifically stated that there is no 

constitutional obligation to do so. See id. This example demonstrates merely one

problem with having an ethical obligation that is distinct from a prosecutor’s 

constitutional obligations.

Because we already have interpreted Rule 3.8(d) as coextensive in scope with 

Brady and its progeny, we decline to interpret “timely” as any other definition than what 

is required constitutionally as a timely disclosure. Accordingly, we hereby vacate section 

II of the Board’s Opinion. 

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we vacate the Board’s Formal Ethics Opinion 2017-

F-163. We also hold that, except as provided otherwise in this opinion, the ethical 

obligations under Rule 3.8(d) of Tennessee’s Rules of Professional Conduct are

coextensive in scope with the obligations of a prosecutor as provided by applicable 

statute, rules of criminal procedure, our state and federal constitutions, and case law. 

___________________________________

JEFFREY S. BIVINS, CHIEF JUSTICE