Filed 12/30/22 In re G.T. CA2/1

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re G. T., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B316544, B318898

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 20LJJP00490)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

THERESA P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Stephanie M. Davis, Temporary Judge. Dismissed in 

part and affirmed in part.

Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the 

Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and 

Family Services (DCFS or the agency) initiated juvenile 

dependency proceedings concerning G.T., who at that time was 

seven years old, based on his mother’s substance abuse.1 The 

juvenile court sustained the dependency petition, removed G.T. 

from his mother, denied her family reunification services on 

account of mother’s failure to reunify with G.T.’s two older 

siblings who had been removed from her custody because of her 

substance abuse, and scheduled a hearing to determine G.T.’s 

permanent placement. 

Mother filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and 

Institutions Code2 section 388 to set aside the juvenile court’s 

ruling denying her reunification services, arguing, inter alia, that 

after the court issued that order, mother had become sober and

participated in substance abuse programs. The court held a 

hearing on the petition at which mother testified, and thereafter

denied the petition, appointed G.T.’s maternal aunt as his legal 

guardian, permitted mother to have monitored visits with G.T.,

and terminated jurisdiction.

On appeal, mother contends the juvenile court erroneously

inferred from her use of medication to manage withdrawal 

1 The identity of G.T.’s father is unknown. 

2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
3

symptoms that she had failed to establish she was no longer 

abusing substances. We decline to resolve this issue. The order 

denying the petition indicates the court found that even if mother 

had established her recent sobriety, the circumstances had not

changed sufficiently to show that delaying implementation of 

G.T.’s permanent plan (i.e., legal guardianship by G.T.’s maternal 

aunt) by awarding mother reunification services was in G.T.’s 

best interest.

We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying mother’s section 388 petition given mother’s 25-year 

history of substance abuse; her recent arrest in another state for 

possessing methamphetamine and marijuana while she was in a 

drug treatment program; the fact that G.T.’s request to be 

reunified with his mother stemmed from his apparent desire to 

act as her caretaker; and G.T.’s interest in permanence and 

stability in his new home with his maternal aunt and his older 

brother. 

Finding no error, we affirm the order denying mother’s

section 388 petition. Additionally, we dismiss as abandoned 

mother’s appeal of the orders denying her subsequent section 388 

petitions. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

We summarize only those aspects of the procedural history 

that are relevant to our disposition of the instant appeals.

3 We derive part of our Procedural Background from 

undisputed portions of the parties’ appellate briefing and 

assertions DCFS makes in its respondent’s brief to which 

mother does not respond in her reply. (See Artal v. Allen (2003) 

111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 (Artal) [“ ‘[B]riefs and 

argument . . . are reliable indications of a party’s position on the 
4

On August 4, 2020, DCFS filed a juvenile dependency 

petition concerning G.T., who was seven years old at that time.

In the petition, the agency asserted jurisdiction under 

section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). 

In support of jurisdiction, the petition alleged the following: 

“[G.T.’s] mother . . . has a history of substance abuse and is a 

current abuser of cocaine, marijuana, opiates, benzodiazepines, 

oxycodone, hydrocodone, and Dilaudid, which renders the mother 

incapable of providing regular care of the child. On prior 

occasions, the mother was under the influence of cocaine, 

marijuana, opiates, benzodiazepines, oxycodone, hydrocodone, 

and Dilaudid, while the child was in the mother’s care and 

supervision. On 06/27/2020, the mother had a positive toxicology 

screen for cocaine, marijuana, opiates, benzodiazepines, and 

oxycodone. On 07/02/2020, the mother had a positive toxicology 

screen for marijuana metabolites and hydrocodone. The child’s 

[two older] siblings . . . are prior Dependents of the Juvenile 

Court and received Permanent Placement Services due to the 

mother’s substance abuse. Such substance abuse by the mother 

endangers the child’s physical health and safety and places the 

child at risk of serious physical harm[ and] damage . . . .”4

facts as well as the law, and a reviewing court may make use of 

statements therein as admissions against the party.’ ”]; Rudick v. 

State Bd. of Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 89–90 

[concluding that the appellants made an implicit concession by 

“failing to respond in their reply brief to the [respondent’s] 

argument on th[at] point”].)

4 Indeed, according to the detention report filed on 

September 15, 2020, mother’s adult daughter told the agency that 
5

The juvenile court later detained G.T. from mother, and 

G.T. was placed with his maternal aunt. Maternal aunt is the 

legal guardian of one of the two older siblings identified in the 

dependency petition, to wit, an older brother of G.T. with whom 

mother failed to reunify in a prior dependency proceeding.

On October 20, 2020, the juvenile court sustained the 

dependency petition and scheduled a separate disposition 

hearing. At the November 23, 2020 disposition hearing, the court

declared G.T. a dependent; removed him from mother’s custody;

denied mother family reunification services pursuant to 

section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10);5 and scheduled a section 366.26 

hearing to devise a permanent plan for G.T.

6

On August 16, 2021, mother filed a section 388 petition

requesting “[t]he child be returned to mother’s care; or Family 

hospital staff informed her that mother’s name was “on a ‘list’ for 

people who abuse medication.”

5 As pertinent here, section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)(A)

provides: “Reunification services need not be provided to a 

parent . . . when the court finds, by clear and convincing 

evidence, any of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] That the court ordered 

termination of reunification services for any siblings or half 

siblings of the child because the parent . . . failed to reunify with 

the sibling or half sibling after the sibling or half sibling had been 

removed from that parent . . . and that, according to the findings 

of the court, this parent . . . has not subsequently made a 

reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the 

sibling or half sibling of that child from that parent . . . .” 

(§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10)(A).)

6 (See In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774, 1788 

[indicating that the purpose of a section 366.26 hearing is to 

“devise a permanent plan”].)
6

Reunification Services be reinstated; or mother’s visits . . . be 

unmonitored and/or liberalized.” In the petition, mother alleged

the following changes had occurred since the November 23, 2020 

disposition hearing: “Mother has been focusing on her sobriety. 

Mother has completed Parenting Classes, a Substance Use 

Disorder (SUD) at Penny Lane, as well as at Tarzana Treatment 

Center. Mother is consistently testing weekly, and participating 

in Group and individual counseling. Mother has regularly visited 

with her son, and she has stable housing.” The court thereafter

scheduled a hearing on the section 388 petition for 

October 22, 2021, and continued the section 366.26 hearing 

to that date as well. 

On October 22, 2021, the juvenile court held a hearing on 

mother’s section 388 petition at which mother testified. On 

October 29, 2021, the court denied the section 388 petition, 

appointed maternal aunt as G.T.’s legal guardian, authorized 

mother to have weekly monitored visitation, and terminated 

jurisdiction. Later that day, mother appealed the orders denying 

her section 388 petition, establishing a legal guardianship for 

G.T., and terminating jurisdiction. 

On November 9, 2021, mother filed her second section 388 

petition, wherein she requested that the juvenile court remove 

G.T. from maternal aunt’s home or return him to mother’s 

custody. On December 3, 2021, mother amended her section 388 

petition to ask the court to reopen the case and provide her with 

additional time to reunify with G.T. On February 23, 2022, 

mother filed yet another section 388 petition, which sought an 

order returning G.T. to her custody, granting her family 

reunification services, or authorizing her to have unmonitored

and overnight visits. 
7

On February 23, 2022, the juvenile court denied the 

section 388 petition that mother had filed earlier that day. 

On February 28, 2022, the court denied mother’s other pending

section 388 petition. On March 1, 2022, mother filed a notice of 

appeal of the February 28, 2022 ruling. On March 7, 2022, 

mother amended the March 1, 2022 notice of appeal to 

indicate that she sought review of the rulings issued on 

February 23 and 28, 2022.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Section 388 provides for modification of juvenile court 

orders when the moving party presents new evidence or a change 

of circumstances and demonstrates modification of the previous 

order is in the child’s best interests.” (In re Samuel A. (2020) 

55 Cal.App.5th 1, 6–7.) “Generally, the petitioner must show by 

a preponderance of the evidence that the child’s welfare requires 

the modification sought.” (In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 

612 (A.A.).) “ ‘In determining whether the petition makes the 

necessary showing, the court may consider the entire factual and 

procedural history of the case.’ [Citation.]” (In re Mia M. (2022) 

75 Cal.App.5th 792, 812.)

“Not every change in circumstance can justify modification 

of a prior order. [Citation.] The change in circumstances must 

relate to the purpose of the order and be such that the 

modification of the prior order is appropriate.” (A.A., supra, 

203 Cal.App.4th at p. 612.) “[A] section 388 petition seeking 

reinstatement of reunification services or return of the child will 

necessarily involve a parent who has made mistakes sufficient to 

support termination of services at some point in the past. The 

question must be whether the changes the parent made since 

then are substantial enough to overshadow that prior 
8

determination, such that reunification is now in the child’s best 

interests.” (In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 848 (J.M.).) 

“ ‘A petition which alleges merely changing circumstances and 

would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home for a 

child to see if a parent . . . might be able to reunify at some future 

point[ ] does not promote stability for the child or the child’s best 

interests. [Citation.] “ ‘[C]hildhood does not wait for the parent 

to become adequate.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Mary G. (2007) 

151 Cal.App.4th 184, 206 (Mary G.).)

“The [section 388] petition is addressed to the sound 

discretion of the juvenile court, and its decision will not be 

overturned on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of 

discretion.” (A.A., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 612.) Under that 

standard, “[t]he appellate court ‘ “will not disturb [a] decision 

unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion 

by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd 

determination [citations].” ’ [Citation.]” (See Mary G., supra,

151 Cal.App.4th at p. 205; see also In re M.L. (2012) 

205 Cal.App.4th 210, 228 [“A review for abuse of discretion must 

be highly deferential to the decision maker[,] . . . and requires a 

showing that the decision was ‘so irrational or arbitrary that no 

reasonable person could agree with it.’ ”].) In reviewing “ ‘the 

factual basis for an exercise of discretion,’ ” “a reviewing court 

should ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of 

witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts[,]’ ” and “ ‘ “ ‘[w]hen two 

or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the 

reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for 

that of the trial court.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (See In re Caden C. (2021) 

11 Cal.5th 614, 640–641 (Caden C.).)
9

Additionally, “[t]he juvenile court’s orders are ‘presumed to 

be correct, and it is appellant’s burden to affirmatively show 

error.’ [Citations.] ‘ “Appellate briefs must provide argument 

and legal authority for the positions taken.” [Citation.] “When 

an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support 

it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat 

the point as waived.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re J.F. (2019)

39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79.) 

DISCUSSION

As we noted in our Procedural Background, mother 

appealed the October 29, 2021 order denying her initial 

section 388 petition and the February 2022 orders denying her 

subsequent section 388 petitions. Apart from her challenge to the 

order denying her first section 388 petition, mother does not 

contest the validity of the juvenile court’s October 29, 2021 orders 

appointing a legal guardian and terminating jurisdiction. We 

first address mother’s appeal of the October 29, 2021 denial of 

her initial section 388 petition, then we discuss her appeal of the 

February 2022 orders. 

A. Mother Fails to Establish the Juvenile Court Erred 

in Denying Her First Section 388 Petition

Although in her initial section 388 petition mother sought

the return of G.T. to her care, unmonitored or liberalized visits 

with the child, and family reunification services, on appeal, she 

contests only the juvenile court’s denial of her request for 

reunification services.

7 Mother’s principal challenge to this 

7 Although mother asserts at one point in her opening brief 

that “the issue was whether the juvenile court abused its 
10

ruling is that the court erroneously inferred from mother’s use of 

Suboxone that she “had not stopped taking opioids and therefore

failed to show she had maintained sobriety to show changed 

circumstances.” Specifically, mother contends “[t]here is no 

evidence in the record, medical or otherwise, to support the 

court’s conclusion that the use of [S]uboxone means a patient is 

‘still on opioids’ when that medication is prescribed through a 

[medication assisted treatment] program.” Mother insists that 

Suboxone is a medication used to treat drug withdrawal 

symptoms. 

We need not decide whether the juvenile court erroneously 

found that mother failed to establish her sobriety because the 

court’s order denying her petition does not hinge on that 

conclusion. Admittedly, in the course of rendering its decision, 

the court did find that mother was “still on the opioids,” the court

doubted whether “a competent treating physician” had in fact

decided to allow her to use the opioids “as part of her treatment 

program,” and the court “question[ed]” whether the medication 

assisted treatment (MAT) program was “the best and most 

effective treatment for the mother under the circumstances . . . .”

Nevertheless, the court also observed that it “ha[d] to consider 

the chronic, long-standing history of addiction suffered by the 

mother” and found, “based on the evidence presented, that the 

mother ha[d] shown, at best, changing circumstances.” The 

juvenile court further ruled that “the facts do not support the 

conclusion that returning or offering the mother reunification 

discretion [in] denying a hearing on mother’s [first] petition,” this 

appears to be a typographical error because she admits elsewhere 

in her briefing that “the juvenile court ordered a hearing on the 

petition.” 
11

services is in the minor’s best interest.” Liberally construing the 

juvenile court’s statements, as we must, we conclude the court

had found that, even if it were to credit mother’s evidence of 

sobriety, she nonetheless failed to show the circumstances had 

changed to such a degree that granting her reunification services

was in G.T.’s best interest.

8 As we explain below, mother fails to 

establish the court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently 

absurd manner in arriving at that conclusion.

In assessing a parent’s section 388 petition for an order 

granting reunification services, “a court must perform a . . . 

nuanced best interests analysis” that takes into account “ ‘(1) the 

seriousness of the problem which led to the dependency, and the 

reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of 

relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent 

and caretakers,’ taking into account ‘any interest of the child in 

preserving an existing family unit, no matter how, in modern 

parlance, “dysfunctional” ’ and ‘the complexity of human 

existence’; and (3) the nature of the changed circumstances and 

the reason a change was not made sooner.” (See J.M., supra, 

50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 847–848, italics omitted.)

We address the first and third factors together because 

they overlap in this case. (See, e.g., J.M., supra, 50 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 848 [noting that these two factors can be “closely related” to 

each other].) Regarding the seriousness of the problem that led 

to the dependency case, the juvenile court sustained a 

jurisdictional allegation that mother’s “substance abuse . . . 

8 (See In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 

1133 [“A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be 

correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are 

indulged in favor of its correctness.”].) 
12

endangers the child’s physical health and safety and places the 

child at risk of serious physical harm . . . .” In sustaining this 

allegation, the court also found that G.T.’s two older siblings “are 

prior Dependents of the Juvenile Court [who] received 

Permanent Placement Services due to the mother’s substance 

abuse.” Although the court advised mother of her right to seek 

writ relief from the ensuing dispositional order that set a

section 366.26 hearing, mother failed to do so.9 Consequently, 

mother waived her right to challenge these jurisdictional 

findings.

10

Concerning the nature of the changed circumstances,

mother asserts she “provided substantial evidence of maintaining 

sobriety while participating in medication-assisted treatment,”

including her multiple negative results for drug tests 

administered after April 14, 2021, her completion of a substance 

9 We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of mother’s notice of 

intent to file a writ petition vis-à-vis the dispositional order, 

along with the appellate docket relating thereto, which shows 

that the proceedings were terminated after mother failed to file 

any such writ petition. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.) 

10 As our colleagues in Division Two of the Fourth District 

explained: “Failure to appeal from an appealable dispositional 

order waives any substantive challenge to the jurisdictional 

findings. [Citation.] . . . [¶] . . . ‘When the . . . order [setting a 

section 366.26 hearing] is made at the dispositional hearing,’ . . . . 

[i]t could be reviewed, if at all, only by way of a writ petition. 

[Citations.] [¶] Much like failure to appeal from an appealable 

dispositional order, failure to take a writ from a nonappealable 

dispositional order waives any challenge to it. [Citations.] But 

there is one exception to this rule. The juvenile court is required 

to advise a parent of the writ petition requirement.” (See In re 

Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 624–625.)
13

abuse treatment program, and her participation in, and full 

compliance with, a MAT program. Yet, mother concedes she

testified that “[s]he has struggled with substance abuse for 

25 years” and that she became sober no earlier than 

April 16, 2021, which was approximately six months prior to the 

hearing on her petition. (See Artal, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 275, fn. 2 [holding that a reviewing court may construe a 

statement in a brief as an admission against the party making 

it].) Further, the section 366.26 report filed on March 5, 2021

and mother’s testimony at the section 388 hearing show that in

March 2021, while mother was in the midst of one of her drug 

treatment programs, mother was arrested in Indiana for 

possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, and cocaine, thus

illustrating the seriousness of her addiction to substances at that 

time. Given these facts, it was not unreasonable for the juvenile 

court to question whether mother would be able to maintain her 

sobriety upon being afforded family reunification services. (Cf. 

In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 420–421, 423–424 

[upholding the denial of a father’s section 388 petition for 

reinstatement of reunification services because, given the father’s 

long history of drug use, “200 days [of sobriety] was not enough to 

reassure the juvenile court” that he would not relapse].) 

With respect to the second factor (i.e., the strength of the 

relative bonds between the child and the parent and the

caretaker, respectively), mother argues that G.T. had been in 

mother’s care since birth, G.T. told the agency that he wanted to 

reunify with mother, G.T. “was consistently happy to see mother 

and relatives confirmed there was a bond between mother and 

[G.T.]” Mother also intimates that offering her reunification 

services would not undermine G.T.’s interest in permanency and 
14

stability because G.T. “was not being adopted, mother continued 

to have visitation,” and “maternal aunt . . . did not want adoption 

[because she wanted] to give mother a chance to ‘get her act 

together’ and get her son back.” 

Admittedly, the interim review report filed on 

September 9, 2021 shows G.T. told the agency “he want[ed] to 

return home to his mother.” Per the report, G.T. asked, “ ‘Who’s 

going to take care of her?’ and [stated] ‘I need to know she is 

okay, so she is not alone.’ ” Further, according to the detention 

report filed on September 15, 2020, G.T. informed the agency that

on multiple occasions, he had accompanied his mother to the 

hospital in her quest for pain medicine, and the medical director 

for the county fire department disclosed that mother has 

requested transportation to the hospital to get opiates. The 

juvenile court could have reasonably inferred from this evidence

that G.T.’s request to return home stemmed from his desire to act 

as a caretaker for mother, and that facilitating the return of an 

eight-year-old child to mother to assume that role would not have 

been in his best interest.11 

11 (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 640–641 [holding

that “ ‘ “ ‘[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be 

deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority 

to substitute its decision for that of the trial court’ ” ’ ” 

under the abuse of discretion standard]; cf. In re L.S. (2014) 

230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1199–1200 [concluding that the beneficial 

parental relationship exception to the termination of parental 

rights was inapplicable, given that the minors did not have “a 

positive emotional attachment” to their parents because, inter 

alia, the minors’ “desire to go home was due in part to . . . a need 

to act as caretakers for” the parents].) 
15

Further, assuming arguendo mother is correct in asserting 

that G.T. “was emotionally attached to his mother and there was

an acknowledged bond between them,” mother overlooks the fact 

that denying her petition for reunification services would not 

have severed that bond. Specifically, in the interim review report 

filed on September 9, 2021, DCFS sought the appointment of a 

legal guardian—and not adoption—as G.T.’s permanent plan, 

and the agency sought to allow mother to continue to have 

monitored visits with the child. Because the juvenile court’s 

docket indicates this was the last report filed by the agency prior 

to the hearing on mother’s initial section 388 petition, there is no 

indication the denial of that petition had the potential to 

extinguish mother’s relationship with G.T.12

We also note that the interim review report states G.T. had 

“been acclimating to life with his half-brother and maternal 

aunt,” and that he had been “enroll[ed] in the local school.” This 

evidence supports the conclusion that granting mother’s petition 

would have disrupted a permanent and stable living environment 

for G.T. (See also In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 569, 590, 

fn. 30 [“ ‘ “ ‘Once reunification services are ordered terminated 

[by the juvenile court], the focus shifts to the needs of the child 

for permanency and stability.’ ” ’ ”].)

In light of the above-described evidence before the juvenile 

court, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 

mother’s recent sobriety did not establish that granting her 

reunification services would have been in G.T.’s best interest.

(See J.M., supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 847 [holding that whether 

12 We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of the juvenile 

court’s docket. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
16

granting reunification services would be in the child’s best 

interest is “the ‘ultimate question’ on [this type of] section 388 

petition”].)

B. We Dismiss as Abandoned Mother’s Appeal of the 

Orders Denying Her Subsequent Section 388 

Petitions

After she filed her opening brief, mother moved to 

consolidate her appeal of the order denying her initial section 388

petition with her appeal of the February 2022 orders denying her 

subsequent section 388 petitions. In her motion, mother asked 

this court to accept her previously-filed brief as her opening brief

for both appeals. The presiding justice thereafter granted 

mother’s motion and consolidated both appeals “for purposes of 

briefing, oral argument and decision.” The order granting the 

motion provides that the opening brief mother had already filed

“now applies to both cases.” 

At no point in her opening or reply briefs does mother

challenge the February 2022 orders. We therefore dismiss as 

abandoned mother’s appeal of those rulings. (Uzyel v. Kadisha

(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 866, 888, fn. 12 [dismissing an appeal 

from an order because the appellant abandoned his appeal by 

failing to challenge the order in his briefing].)
17

DISPOSITION

We affirm the juvenile court’s October 29, 2021 orders 

(a) denying mother’s petition filed under Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 388, (b) appointing a legal guardian for G.T., and 

(c) terminating dependency jurisdiction. We dismiss as 

abandoned mother’s appeal of the February 23, 2022 and 

February 28, 2022 orders denying her subsequent section 388 

petitions.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.