CH RI STI NACO NY ERS WI L L I AM S Plaintiff,
v. ROBERT JOHNSON, e t al

. De fe nd ants . UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 06-2076 ( CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (Mar ch 18, 2010) Plaintiff, Christi na Cony ers Williams, brings this action ag ainst the District of Columbia, and her supervisors Rober

t J ohnson, individually

and as Senior D eputy

Direc tor of the Addic tion Prevention and Rec overy Administration (“APRA”) of the District of Columbia Depa rtment of He a lth(“ DO H” ), and

Da vid Antho ny , in div idu a lly

and a s Ch ie f o f S ta ff

to t he Se nio r D e puty Direc tor of APRA (collec tively “De fenda

nts”). Plaintiff alleg es that De fenda nts violated her rig hts under the F irst Amendment and the D istrict of Columbia W histleblower Protec tion Act (“WPA”), D.C. Code § 1- 615.01 et seq. , by reta liating a g ainst her f

or re marks made during te sti mony be fo re the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

Counc il ( “ D. C. C ounc il” ) a nd duri nga se pa rate meetingwith a D.C. Councilmember. Presently pendingbefor e the Court ar e the pa rties’ c ross-motions for summary judgme nt. Def endants have filed a

[68] Motion for Summary J udg ment, arguing that Plainti ff’ s remaining claims are without merit beca use Plaintiff’s testimony

befor e the D.C. Council does not constitute protecte d disclosures and D efe ndants had no knowle dg e that Plaintiff private ly met with the individual Councilm ember . Plaintiff in turn has filed a [72] Mot ion for PartialBe cause Plaintiff is a resident of Ma ryland and se eks dama g es in an amount in ex cess of 1 $75,000, the Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s WPA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (diversity jurisdiction). Alternatively , the Court, in its di scre tion, ex erc ises its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s cla im pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 2 Summary judgme nt, in which she ar g ues that De fenda nts are bound unde r the princ iples of collater al estoppel fr om relitigating at trial any claim that Plaintiff violated the District of Columbi a Residenc y

Prefe renc e Ac t. Upon a sea rchingrevie w of the pa

rties’ motions and responsive br iefing , the attac hments thereto, the r eleva nt statutes and ca se law, a nd the re cord of this case a s a whole, the Court GRANTS-I N-PART and DEN I ES-I

N-PART Def

endants’ [68] Mo tio n f or Sum mary

Judg me nt. Spe c if

ic a lly , D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on is G RA NT ED wi th r e sp e c t to Plaintiff’s claims of re taliation in violation of the First Amendment a nd the WPA to t he extent bo th a re ba se d o n h e r p ri vate me e tin g wi th t he D. C. C ounc ilm e mbe r, but is DENI ED wi th
re sp e c t to Pla int if

f’ s WPAc la im t o th e e xtent it is p re mis e d o n h e r t e sti mony be fo re the D. C. Council. As such, only

Plaintiff’s alleg ation in Count I Iof the F irst Amended Complaint that Def endants impermissibly

reta liated ag ainst her in violation of the WPA based upon re marks made to the D.C. Council re mains viable. The Court shall also DENYPlaintiff’s [72] Motion 1 for Par tial Summ ary

J udg ment, for the r easons se t forth below. Plaintiff may re- raise a ny evidentiar y issues relatingto the char g es ag ainst Plainti ff a nd the Off

ice of Personnel’s f

inal decision, as may

be appr opriate, at the motions i n limine stage
.

I. BACKG ROUND A. Factual Back

ground At all times releva

nt to this action, Plaintiff was e mploy ed as Chief of the Center

ofThe Court notes that it strictly adher es to the text of L ocal Civil Rule 7(h)(1) when 2 re so lvi ngmot ion s f

or summa ry jud g me nt. Ac c or din g ly , a s th e Court a dv ise d th e pa

rt ie s, it “assumes that fac ts identified by the moving pa

rty in its st atement of

materia l fac ts are a dmitted, unless such a f

act is controve rted in the stateme nt of g enuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.” See Fe b. 14, 2009 Orde r, Doc ket No. [65] , at 2. In setting f orth the re levant ba c kg ro un d f

or De fe nd ants ’ m oti on

fo r s umm a

ry jud g me nt, the Court

the re fo re c ite s o nly

to Def endants’ statement of mate rial fa cts submitted in support of their motion for summary jud g me nt ( “ De fs .’ Stmt .” ), un le ss P la int if f h a s o bje c te d to the re le va nt a sp e c ts o f D e fe nd ants ’ statement, in which c ase the Court shall also cite to Plaintiff’s response to Defe ndants’ stateme nt (“Pl.’s Resp.”) . In addition, the Court notes that Plainti ff’ s response statement includes seve ral additional fac ts that she asser ts are in dispute. SeePl.’s Resp. ¶¶ 23-65. As De fenda nts did not provide a specific para g raph- by -par ag raph r eply response to these additional fa cts, see Def s.’ R e p l y a t1
- 3 , th e C o urtth e r e f o r e a s s u m e s th a t

s u c hf a c t s i d e n t i f

i e d ar e a dm i t t e d
. F i n a l l y, De fe nd ants sim ila

rl y de c lin e d to fi le a

re sp on se to P la int if

f’ s st a te me nt o f m a te ri a l f a c ts submitt ed in support of he r motion for par tial summary

judgme nt (“Pl.’s Stmt .”), indicating that they “ac cept the f

acts plea ded by

plaintiff as true for the pur poses of” Plaintiff’s motion. See De fs .’ Op p’ n to Pl. ’s MSJ at 1, n. 2. Ac c or din g ly , in

se tti ngfo rt

h th e re le va

nt b a c kg ro un d w ith respe ct to Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgme nt, the Court cites only to Plainti ff’ s statement. Where a

ppropriate , the Court also cites dire ctly to evidence in the rec ord. 3 Re s e ar c hE v a lu a ti o nan d

G r an ts f o r A PR A
. D e f s . ’ Stmt . ¶

1 , D o c k e t N o . [6 9 ]. Def endant 2 Robert J ohnson serve d as Senior De puty Direc tor of APRA and wa s Plainti ff’ s supervisor at DOH. Id. ¶ 2. De fenda

nt David Anthony

was Chief of

Staff to Senior De puty

Direc tor J ohnson. Id. ¶ 3. In April of 2005, Plaintiff was a ssigne d responsibility for the implementation of APRA’s Client I nformation Sy stem (“ACI S”) softwa re. Id. ¶ 4 . T he AC I S so ft wa re wa s inte nd e d to allow “a ll staff member s [t o] go online . . . [and] i nput information or . . . download infor mation” about data c ollected f

rom APRA’s clients. Id. ¶ 4 (quotingDeposition of Christina Cony ers Wil liams, attache d as Ex. A to Defs.’ Stmt., at 15:18-16:6).

1. Pla int if

f’ s T e sti mony

B e fo re the D. C. C ounc il Co mmi tte e on He a lth On Fe bruar

y 14, 2006, Plaintiff and Def endant Johnson attended a r outine oversig ht hear ing be fore the D.C. Council Comm ittee on Hea lth (“Committ ee” ), hea ded by Councilmember Da

vid Catania. Id. ¶ 5 & Ex . E (D.C. Off ice of Cable Tele vision videoIn draf ting their respe ctive plea dings, the parties have re lied upon differ ent video 3 rec ordingversions of the F ebrua ry 14, 2006 Commi ttee hea ring , leadingto some confusion b e tw e e nth e p art i e s a s t o th e a c c ur a c y o f th e i r r e s p e c t i v e r e c o r d

c i t a t i o n s . M o r e s p e c i f

i c a l l y, Plaintiff appea

rs to have r eviewe d a diffe rent — substantially shorter — vide o rec ordingthan Def endants re lied upon and attac hed as Exhibit E t o their motion. SeePl.’s Resp. at p. 2, n.1. As 4 rec ordingof the F eb. 14, 2006 D.C. Council Commi ttee on He alth hear ing) . In advanc e of the hear ing, A PRA was require d to submit written re sponses to a ser ies of questions posed by the Commi ttee, a por

tion of which foc used on ACI S. Id. ¶¶ 6, 7 & Ex. D (D OH -A PRARe sp on se s to DOH Que stions (FY 2005)) . In particula r, question number 17 a sked for the status of the “installation and implementation”of the ACI S software
. Id. ¶ 7 & Ex. D (D OH -A PRA Re sp on se s to DO H Q ue sti on s ( F Y 2 00 5) ) a t p. 17 . A PRA ’s wr itt e n r e sp on se ind ic a te d in
re le va nt p art that A CI S ph a se 1. 0 h a d b e e n d e plo y e d in late June of

20 05 and that A PRA anticipated that ACI S phase 2.0 would be r elea sed in J uly 2006 with the rele ase of

ACI S phases 3.0, 4.0 and 5.0 to follow in Novembe r of 2006, F ebrua ry of 2007, and Ma

y of 2007, respe ctively
. Id. ¶ 8 & Ex . D (DO H-APRA Responses to DOH Q uestions (FY2005)) at pp. 17- 18. In addition, APRA indi cate d that it had spent $900,000 on ACI S as of the date of its written response s and that it anticipated spe nding a n additional $1.4 milli on on the softwar e in FY2006
as we ll as another $800,000 in F Y 2007. Id. ¶ 8 & Ex . D (DO H-APRA Responses to DOH Questions (F Y 2005)) at pp. 17-18. Duringthe cour se of the F ebrua ry 14, 2006 hear ing, Counc ilmember Catania a sked
sever al questions reg ardingthe ACI S software
. Id. ¶ 1 0 & Ex. E (D .C. Of fi c e of Ca ble Te le vis ion

vid e o r e c or din g of

the F e b. 14 , 2 00 6 D .C. Counc il Co mmi tte e on He a lthhe ari ng ); see also Pl. ’s Op p’ n, Ex. E (T ra ns c ri pt o f s e le c te d p or

tio ns of F e b. 14 , 2 00 6 D .C. Counc il Committe e on

He a lthhe ari ng ). He be g an th e dis c us sio n b y c omm e nti ngthat “ the c loc k is 3a re sult, P laintiff has objec ted to any fac tual statements made by Def endants that a

re suppor ted by citations to the video rec ordingof the Committee hear ing on the basis that “the pa rts of the rec ord re lied upon by

defe ndants do not support the alleg ations.” See, e .g., Pl.’s Resp. ¶¶ 7, 8. The Court has r eviewe d the DVD vide o rec ordingof the he aringprovided by Def endants a s Ex hibit E to t heir motion and has c onfirmed that De fenda nts’ citations to that recor ding a re larg ely acc urate . In addition, Plainti ff ha s attache d a tra nscript of the Committee hea ringto her opposition briefing , which fur ther c onfirms the substantive acc urac y of De fenda

nts’ statements. SeePl.’s Opp’n, Ex. E (Transcr ipt of selecte d portions of Fe b. 14, 2006 D.C. Council Com mittee on He a lthhe ari ng ). Ac c or din g ly , a s Pla int if f h a s p ro vid e d n o o the r o bje c tio n to De fe nd ants ’ fac tual statements and a s the Court finds that Defe ndants’ stateme nts conce rningthe Fe bruar y 14, 2006 Commi ttee hea

ringare supported by

acc urate citations to the rec ord, Plaintiff’s objec tions are without merit. Defe ndants’ stateme nts reg ardingthe substance of the Committee hear ing a re there fore deeme d undisputed. 5 tic kin g and

a wh ole lot of mon e y ha s b e e n p oure d into t

his sy ste m [ i.e., the ACI S software sy stem] and we still don’t have any thing to show for

it.” Def s.’ Stmt. ¶ 11. Councilm ember Catania then a sked De fenda nt J ohnson to address the ty pe of data that the ACI S software was capa ble of c ollecting ; Defe ndant J ohnson in turn indicated that Plaintiff should approa ch the witness table and r espond to the Councilmember’ s questions reg ardingthe ACI S software on APRA’s behalf. Id. ¶ 12. Pla int if f d id s o a nd su bs e qu e ntl y

pr ov ide d a

pp ro ximate ly

te n mi nute s o f t e sti mony in response to Councilmember Catania’ s questions about the ACI S software
. See id. ¶¶ 12, 13 & Ex. E (D .C. Of

fi c e of Ca ble Te le vis ion

vid e o r e c or din g of

the F e b. 14 , 2 00 6 D .C. Counc il Commi ttee on He alth hear ing) at 1:10:20-1:19:20. Pl aintiff beg an her testimony

by stating that she wa s the individual responsible for the ACI S software
. Id. ¶ 1 4. Counc ilm e mbe r C a tania then re peate d his question about the ty pe of data that was be ing c ollected by the ACI S software ; Plaintiff testified that, to-date, the softwar e wa s capa ble of c ollecting only

“demog raphic data”

— i.e. , the g ender

and ra ce of

APRA’s clients and the ty pe of dr ug s that the clients wer e using
. Id. ¶ 1 5; se e als o id. , Ex . E (D.C. Off ice of Cable Tele vision video recor ding of the Fe b. 14, 20066

D.C. Council Com mittee on Hea lth hearing ) at 1:13:10-1:13:30; Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex . E (Tra nscript of selec ted portions of F eb. 14, 2006 D.C. Council Commi ttee on He alth hear ing) at 9:17-10:1. Councilmember Catania

responde d: “I

mean, this solicits a g iant big whoop, Imean to have a
c omp ute r s y ste m th a t te lls me the g e nd e r, se x, and ra c e that ha s c os t taxpay e rs , le t’ s se e , in thi s fiscal year , $1.4 milli on and next y ear another $600,000, to say

nothing of

what we ’ve inve sted
so fa r i n th is s y ste m.” Pl. ’s Re sp . ¶ 27 ; se e als o De fs .’ Stmt ., Ex. E (D .C. Of fi c e of Ca ble Television video re cordingof the F eb. 14, 2006 D.C. Council Commi ttee on He alth hear ing) at 1:13:40-1:14:05. After sever al minutes of additional discussion reg ardingthe collec tion of data a nd the purpose of

the ACI S software , Councilmember Catania asked Plaintiff whe n the ACI S software would be “up a

nd functioningin ever

y corne r of APRA with eve ry vendor that we utiliz e? ” De fs .’ Stmt ., Ex. E (D .C. Of fi c e of Ca ble Te le vis ion

vid e o r e c or din g of

the F e b. 14 , 2 00 6 D .C. Counc il Co mmi tte e on

He a lthhe ari ng ) at 1: 17 :53 -1 :18 :13 . Pl a int if f r e sp on de d th a t A CI S wo uld be fully functional by

“Nove mber 2006.” Id. ¶ 16 & Ex . E (D.C. Off ice of Cable Tele vision video re cordingof the F eb. 14, 2006 D.C. Council Commi ttee on He alth hear ing) at 1:18:13-15. Councilmember Catania

responde d by

stating, “ Oh g ood. That’s a short period of time. . . . I hope that you are rig ht beca use that is a ver

y optimis tic deadline.” Id. ¶ 17 & Ex . E (D.C. Off ice of Ca ble Te le vis ion

vid e o r e c or din g of

the F e b. 14 , 2 00 6 D .C. Counc il Co mmi tte e on He a lth he ari ng ) at 1: 18 :16 -1 :18 :39 . H e fu rt he r c on tin

ue d th a t if

Pla int if f m e t th a t de a dli ne , h e wo uld “per sonally

rec ommend [her] promoti on to whateve r point and plac e in this gove rnment” she reque sted. Id. Def

endants sug g est that these c omments by Councilmember Catania

should be construed liter ally

and take n as evide nce that he was ple ased w ith Pl aintiff’s testimony that the7

ACI S software would be in place by November

2006. See De fs .’ MSJ at 11 . Pl a int if

f d isa g re e s, arguing that “Mr. Catania ’s tone of voic e and body languag e” de monstrate that “he was not being complementar

y of plaintiff; he w as beingsarc astic.” Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 31. Ha ving r eviewe d the video re cordingof the F ebrua ry 14, 2006 hear ing, the Court finds that Councilmember Catania’ s comments are open to interpre tation and that, dra wing all rea sonable infe renc es in Plaintiff’s favor , a re asonable jury

could conc lude that Councilmember Cata nia’s comments to Plaintiff
we re sarc a sti c in n a tur e . A c c or din g ly , in e va luatin g De fe nd ants ’ m oti on fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, the Court pr oc e e ds wi th t

he un de rs tand ingthat Co un c ilm e mbe r C atania did no t in te nd

his statements nec essar ily

to be re ceive d in a complimentary nature . The he aringthen shifted to a discussion of a nother topic. Id. ¶ 17 & Ex . E (D.C. Off ice of Ca ble Te le vis ion

vid e o r e c or din g of

the F e b. 14 , 2 00 6 D .C. Counc il Co mmi tte e on He a lth hear ing) at 1:18:20. When Councilm ember Catania re g ained the micr ophone appr ox imately ten min ute s late r, he on c e a g a in e xpre sse d d iss a tis fa c tio n w iththe slo w p ro g re ss b e ingma de wi th respe ct to the ACI S software implementation, particular ly g iven the lar g e amount of mone y being spent on the sy stem. Id. ¶ 18 & Ex . E (D.C. Off ice of Cable Tele vision video recor ding of the Fe b. 14, 2006 D.C. Council Com mittee on Hea lth hearing ) at 1:31:09-1:33:50. Councilmember Catania a lso noted that the written re sponses submitted by APRA in advance of the he aring ind ic a te d th a t — i n c on tr a st t o Pl a int if f’ s te sti mony

— th e “ e xpe c te d d a te of

de liv e ry” fo r a

fu lly functioningACI S sy stem was Jul y of 2006; in light of Plaintiff’s testimony , howeve r, Counc ilm e mbe r C a tania

state d th a t “ we ’r e g oin gto g o a nd mov e on c e a g a in f

ro m th e July de a dli ne to t

he No ve mbe r ‘ 06 de a dli ne , b ut t he n th a t is it. ” Pl. ’s Re sp . ¶ 43 ; see also Def

s.’ Stmt ., Ex. E (D .C. Of

fi c e of Ca ble Te le vis ion

vid e o r e c or din g of

the F e b. 14 , 2 00 6 D .C. Counc il8

C o m m i t t ee o nHe al thh ea ri n g) a t1 : 3 1 : 3 2 -1 : 3 1 : 5 2
. He co n cl u d edb y wa rn i n g that if I don’t have a fully functioning ACI S sy stem by November of ‘06, we ’re g oing to investigate how this supposed contra ct g ot let. This, what looks like a c omp e tit ive ly

bid co nt ract , I

do n’ t se e that be ingc omp e tit ive
. . . . if anyon e is seriously thinking we’ re g oing to spe nd 3 milli on dollars on what could be an off-theshelf sy stem, they ’re nuts. . . . [ T]his smells. . . . So I mean it, Novembe r ‘06, it better g o nowher e nea

r that 3 milli on dollar mark be cause if Ifind that these ve ndors have provided us cla ims that c annot be substantiated, I ’ll introduce them to the be auty of t h e Fa l s e C laims Act. . . . Okay , so unless these vendor s are prepa red to g o out of business, Isug g est t h ey

g et this sy stem up and runningand under this trumped up bu dg e t and

the y be qu ic k a

bo ut i t. Pl. ’s Re sp . ¶

¶ 4 4- 49 ; see also Def

s.’ Stmt., Ex . E (D.C. Off ice of Cable Tele vision video
rec ordingof the F eb. 14, 2006 D.C. Council Commi ttee on He alth hear ing) at 1:31:53-1:33:50.

2. Alleg ed Retaliatory Acts Take n by

Def endants Immediately

Followingthe D.C. Council Com mittee on Hea lth Hear ing Plaintiff asserts — and D efe ndants do not dispute for purpose s of this Memorandum Opinion — that “def

endants be g an to har ass [P laintiff]” immediately following her te stimony be fo re the D. C. C ounc il. Pl. ’s Re sp ., Ex. D (P l.’ s Su pp le me nte d A ns we r t o F ir st Inte rr og a tor ie s)
a t p. 11 ; see also Def

s.’ Stmt. ¶ 19 & n.1 (indicating that a lthough “ Def endants dispute plaintiff’ s alleg ations that she was r etaliated a g ainst or har assed, [] t his dispute is not materia l for the purposes of [Def

endants’] motion [ for summary judgme nt] ”). A ccor ding to Plaintiff, while she had a “ g ood workingrelationship” with Defenda nt J ohnson prior to testifying at the Fe bruar y 14, 2006 hear ing, “ the re lationship im mediately underw ent a c omplete cha ng e” dir ectly

following her te stimony

befor e the D.C. Council. Pl.’s Resp. ¶¶ 50-51. Spec ifically , Plaintiff alleg es that Def endant Johnson held an unprec edente d “debr iefing ” session the ne x t day at work, dur ing wh ic h h e bla

me d Pl a int if

f “ fo r d oin g a

po or job of ans we ri ng[Counc ilm e mbe r] Ca tania be c a us e she said the ACI S contrac t would not be rea dy until November 2006” and complaine d that her9

“testimony

made APRA look like ‘cr ooks’ and made it appear [t hat] the ag ency

was doing something wrong .” Id. ¶¶ 53 -5 5. Pla int if

f f ur the r s tate s th a t D e fe nd ant Johns on “ thr e a te ne d to hold [ her] liable for the failure s of the contr act.” Id. ¶ 56. Ac cordingto Plainti ff, “ [f] rom the debrie fingforwa

rd, [Defe ndant] J ohnson was hostile to plaintiff. He r efuse d to speak with her oth e r t ha n a ‘ye s’ or ‘n o. ’ H e c anc e lle d o r p os tpo ne d h is ‘ on e -o n- on e ’ s up e rv iso ry se ssi on s w ith her that previously

wer e held r egularly , ever y other we ek.” Id. ¶ 57. In addition, Plainti ff contends that De fenda

nt J ohnson eng ag ed in additional re taliatory and har assing conduct in the immediate day s following the Fe bruar y 14, 2006 hear ing a

nd debrie fing— specific ally on Fe bruar y 22, 23, 24 and 26, 2006. Id. ¶ 58 (“ J ohnson aimed additional har assing conduct at plaintiff on Fe bruar

y 22, 23, 24 and 26, 2006”)
. 3. Plaintiff’s Private Mee ting with D.C. Councilmember Cata nia on Marc h 8, 2006 Sho rt ly the re a ft e r, Pla int if

f’ s hus ba nd arr ang e d f

or he r t o h ave a

pr ivate me e tin g wi th Councilmember Catania

to discuss Defe ndants’ alleg ed re taliation ag ainst Plainti ff ba sed upon her te stimony

at the F ebrua

ry 14, 2006 D.C. Council hearing . Def s.’ Stmt. ¶ 22. The meeting took place on Ma

rch 8, 2006. SeeDef

s.’ Stmt., Ex . A (Excerpts fr om Dec. 22, 2008 D eposition of Christina Cony ers Williams) (here inafter “Willi ams Dep.” ) at 55:6-10 ( indicating that meeting too k p la c e in “ the fi rs t w e e k o f M arc h” ); id. , E x . F ( D e c l ar a t i o no f T o r i F e r n an d e z W h i tn e y) (her einaf ter, “ Whit ney

Dec l.”) ¶ 9 ( confirmingthat meetingtook place on Ma rch 8, 2006) . The only people pr esent at the meetingwer e Plaintiff and he r husband a s well as Councilmember Catania a nd two of his staff me mbers, spec ifically , Councilmember’s spe cial policy advisor Tori F e rn and e z Whitne y

and ano the r u nid e nti fi e d me mbe r o f t

he Counc ilm e mbe r’ s st a ff . D e fs .’ Stmt
.10

¶ 2 3; see also Wil liams Dep. at 56:13-57:10. The parties discusse d Def endants’ a lleg ed hara ssment of Plaintiff based on he r testimony befor e the D.C. Council as we ll as various problems re g ardingthe ACI S software . Def s.’ Stmt. ¶ 24. 4. De fe nd ants ’ K

no wl e dg e of

Pla int if f’ s Ma rc h 8 , 2 00 6 Pr ivate Me e tin g wi th Counc ilm e mbe r C a tania Plaintiff admits that she did not tell any one prior to the Ma rch 8, 2006 me eting that she int e nd e d to me e t pr ivate ly wi th C ounc ilm e mbe r C a tania . D e fs .’ Stmt . ¶ 25 ; see also Willi ams Dep. at 56:2-5 (“Q. D id y ou discuss the fac t that y ou wer e g oing to mee t with Ci ty Councilman Cantania [ sic ] wit h any

body other than your husband? A. No.”) . Plaintiff also admits that neither she nor her

husband discussed the me etingwith any one af ter it took place , explaining that “City Councilman Catania made it very clea r . . . that the mee ting wa s closed door a nd should not be dis c us se d. ” De fs .’ Stmt . ¶ 26 ; se e als o Wil liams Dep. 62:9-18. In particula r, Plaintiff
conce des that she ne ver spoke with Defe ndant J ohnson or Def endant Anthony

about the Mar ch 8, 2006 meeting . Def

s.’ Stmt. ¶ 30. S he fur

ther a dmits t hat no one f

rom APRA was aw are that she planned to mee t with Councilm ember Catania a nd that she neve r spoke a bout the Marc h 8, 2006 meetingwith any one fr om APRA. SeeWilli ams D e p. a t 63 :7- 8, 19 -2 1 ( “ Q. No on e fr om A PRA knew a bout the meeting ? A. No one. . . . . Q . Did any body at APRA ever

speak to you about the meeting ? A. No.”)
. Def endants have also provide d the dec lara tion of Councilmember Catania’ s special policy advisor, Ms. Whitney , who ave rs that she did not reve al that the Mar ch 8, 2006 mee ting had take n place to any one at DO H or APRA nor did she discuss the me eting with any one at DO H
or APR A unti l a ft e r t

his laws uit

wa s f ile d. De fs .’ Stmt . ¶

¶ 2 7, 29 ; see also Whit ney Dec l. ¶¶ 10,Pla int if f m ake s mu c h o f t

he fa c t th a t Ms . Wh itn e y ’s de c laratio n s tate s o nly that sh e “ did 4 not reve al that the Mar ch 8, 2006 mee ting ha d taken plac e to anyone at the De pa rtm e nt o

f H e alt h or at APRA ” and that she “did not discuss the Marc h 8, 2006 meetingwith any one at the Departme nt of Health or APRA until after this lawsuit was filed.” SeePl. ’s Re sp . ¶ 16 (e mph a sis in Plainti ff’ s response) . Acc ordingto Plainti ff, a rea sonable jury

could infer

from Ms. Whitney ’s choice of languag e choic e that she w as the sourc e of a leak r eg ardingthe Marc h 8, 2006 meeting beca use: “if [Ms. W hitney ] had not been a sour ce, she would not have a dded the wor ds at the end of the sente nce[s] t hat limit[ ] her denial to ‘a ny one in the De partment of H ealth or at APRA.’” Id. In other wor ds, Plainti ff spe culates that — in the absenc e of spe cific la ng uag e to the contr ary — a possibility

rema ins that at some unspecifie d point in ti me Ms. Whit ney disclosed the exis tence of the Mar ch 8, 2006 mee ting to an unide ntified person outside of DOH or APRA who in t ur n c a us e d th a t f

a c t to be e ve ntu a lly

dis c los e d at so me un sp e c if ie d ti me to D e fe nd ants (o r t o another third party

who in turn disclosed the infor mation to Defe ndants). The Court is not persua ded by

Plaintiff’s attempt to manufac ture a dispute of mater ial fac t based solely upon her own unsupported c onjecture , particula rly wher e Plaintiff has off

ere d no evidenc e that such a n alleg ed lea

k ever occur red. Cf. Montgomery v . Chao , 546 F.3d 703, 708 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) (“The po ssi bil ity

that a jur y mig ht s pe c ulate in t

he pla int if

f’ s f avo r u nd e r s uc h c ir c ums tanc e s is sim ply insufficient to def

eat summary

judgme nt.”). Plaintiff’s a rguments reg ardingMs. Whi tney ’s interrog atory

response s, seePl’s Opp’n at 20, n. 8, ar e without merit for the same re ason. 11 12. Ms. Whi tney

further states that she ha s “no per sonal knowledg e that anyone at APRA wa s
awa re of the [March 8, 2006] conver sation prior to the filing of this action.” De fs.’ Stmt. ¶ 29; see also id. , Ex . G (Ms. Whitney ’s re sponses to Plainti ff’ s I nterrog atories) at 3. 4 Finally , both Defe ndant J ohnson and De fenda nt Anthony

aver that they did not learn about the Mar ch 8, 2006 mee ting until afte r the instant lawsuit was f iled. SeeDef

s.’ Stmt. ¶¶ 35- 36 ; see also id. , E x. B (D e c laratio n o f R ob e rt John so n) (h e re ina ft e r, “ John so n D e c l.” ) ¶ 6; id. , Ex . C (Dec laration of David Anthony ) (he reina fter, “ Anthony

Dec l.”) ¶ 6. Ba sed on this rec ord, Plaintiff conc edes that “she ha s no direct e vidence that anyone at APR A k ne w a bo ut t he me e tin g a t th e tim e ” it o c c ur re d. Pl. ’s Re sp . ¶

20 . Sh e ma int a ins , ho we ve r, that sh e ha s p ro ff e re d s uf fi c ie nt “ ind ir e c t e vid e nc e that th e fa c t of the me e tin g and

its ag enda le aked f

rom Councilman Catania’s of fice ” at some unspe cified time a fter the meeting took place. Id . The Court does not agree . Plaintiff herself testified at deposition that she has no12

persona l knowledg e that anyone at APRA — includingeither D efe ndant J ohnson or Def endant Antho ny — k ne w o f t he Marc h 8 , 2 00 6 me e tin g a t a ny tim e pr ior to t he ini tiatio n o f t

his laws uit : Q. No o n e f

ro mAP RA k n ew ab o u tth e m ee t i n g? A. No one. Q. Di d an y b o dy atAP RA l ea rn ab o u tth e m ee t i n g? A. I don’t know bec ause I n ever said any thing to any

body and my husband didn’t know AP RA staff, so he never said any thing. I just know on my

part I never spoke about it ag ain to nobody

else. Q. You have no rea son to believe your husband did? A. I don’t think so. Q. Di d an y b o dy atAP RA e v er

s p ea k t o y o uab o u tth e m ee t i n g? A. No. Q. Di d M r. J o h n s o nkn o w ab o u tth e m ee t i n g? A. No. Q. Di d M r. An th o n y

kn o w ab o u tth e m ee t i n g? A. No. Q. Either be fore or af

ter it occ urre d? A. I kn owbe fo re no . A ft e r, Ido n’ t kn owif so me on e in h is o ff

ic e sp ok e wi th someone e lse, Idon’t know fr om me, from my self I never spoke to either one of the m. Q
. D o y o uh av e an y

r e a s o nt o b e l i e v e th a tM r . J o h n s o nkn e wa b o u tth e m e e t i n g ? A
. B e f o r e ? Q
. T h a th e e v e r ? A. Ap pa re ntl y , h is r e ta liat io n co nti nu e d at a highe r r a te , a ft e r a

we e k o r t

wo his13

reta liation took on a differ ent spin. Q. Any thi nge lse oth e r t

ha n th a t? A. He ne ver discusse d any thing with me a

bout Mr. Cantania [ sic ]. Q. You ar e shakingy our hea d? A. No, Mr. Johnson never spoke to me a bout the meetingwith Mr. Cantania [ sic ]. Q. Do y o u. . . h av e a n y

re as o nt o b el i ev e M r. An th o n y kn ew ab o u tth e m ee t i n g? A. No, not from me. Q. Did y ou hear

or obser ve any thing to lea d y ou to believe that he had? A. No. Q. Yo uh adn o re as o nt o b el i ev e a n y b o d y el s e a tAP RA k n ew ab o u tth e m ee t i n g? A. No , b e c a

us e it w a s o nly

me and my hu sb and wi th M r. Catania

and his a ide s. Wil liams Dep. at 63:7-65:12. As is clear

from re view of this testimony , Plaintiff herself has no per sonal knowledg e that either D efe ndants wer e aw are of her Marc h 8, 2006 meetingwith Councilmember Catania. Whil e she spe culated in he r testimony that Def endant Johnson, in particular, may have le arne d of the meetingat some unspec ified point in tim e af ter it occ urre d, she conc eded that she did know whether he in fa ct had knowle dg e of the meeting
. Id. at 64:1-10 (“ Iknow bef ore no. A fter, I don’t know if someone in his office spoke with someone else, I don’t know fr om me, from my self I never spoke to either one of them.”) . Rather, he r testimony was ba sed solely

on her opinion that “his retaliation continued at a hig her r ate, a fter a wee k or two his reta liation took on a diffe rent spin.” Id. at 64:15-17. Plaintiff, howeve r, did not specify how Def endant Johnson’s alleg edly reta liatory

actions cha

ng ed in the we ek or two a fter Ma rch 8, 2006. See id. Nor ha sPlaintiff’s only ref ere nce on the prese nt rec ord to alleg edly reta liatory

conduct oc curr ing 5 duringthat time period is contained in a lone footnote in her

opposition briefing , in which Plaintiff directs the Court to alleg ations in her Amende d Complaint t hat Def endant Johnson asked he r duringa super

visory session on Marc h 22, 2008, whether she had be en conta cted by the per sonnel depa

rtment about her

residenc y

status. SeePl. ’s Op p’ n at 18 , n . 7 (c iti ngAm
. Compl. ¶ 59). Plainti ff a

rgues that this “fa ct” supports a n infere nce that Defe ndant J ohnson “knew the investig ation [i nto Plainti ff’ s residenc y status] was we ll under wa y by that time” — i.e. , by mid-Marc h. Id. Plaintiff’s alleg ations, howeve r, ca rry no weig ht at the summary jud g me nt s ta g e . D isc ov e ry is n owc los e d, and

Pla int if f c ann ot c on tin

ue to r e ly on a lle g a tio ns in her A mended Complaint absent supportingfac tual evidenc e, which Plaintiff ha s not provided. Whil e De fenda

nts briefly

sug g est that the Smith Declaration may be inadmissable, see 6 Def s.’ Reply at 4, Def endants have not ac tually advanc ed any

specific objection to the admissibili ty

of the de clar ation nor have they argued that the Court should not consider the d e c l ar a t i o na s p arto f

th e r e c o r d

o ns u m m ar

y j u d g m e n t . A l th o u g hC o urt ’ s h av e a “ m an d a t o r

y” obligation to ex clude “ clea rly inadmissible” evidenc e in re solving motions for summary judgme nt, see Bu sh v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , __ F.3d __, 2010 WL610228, *4 (D.C. Cir. Fe b. 23, 2010) (Randolph, J., concurring ), the Court notes that in this case, c onsideration of the statements containe d in the Smit h Dec laration does not alter or in a ny way aff ect the Court’ s decision on the pa

rties’ pe nding motions. Acc ording ly , absent a ny specific objections by Def endants, the Court de clines to make a final dete rmination at this stage as to admissibili ty of the Smith Declaration. 14 Plaintiff directe d the Court to any evidenc e on the pr esent re cord suppor ting he r cla im that Def endant Johnson’s alleg edly reta liatory

conduct incr ease d in severity or fr equenc y

duringthat pe ri od of tim e . Ind e e d, the re is n o e vid e nc e on the re c or d n owbe fo re the Court that D e fe nd ants eng ag ed in any

reta liatory

conduct dur ing the second or third wee k of Mar ch 2006. Plaintiff’s 5 unsubstantiated spec ulation that Defe ndant J ohnson “appa rently” lea

rned a bout the meetingat some unspecif

ied time is insufficient to cre ate a dispute of mater ial fac t on this record. Pla int if f’ s r e lia nc e on the de c laratio n o f D or othy Smit h is sim ila

rl y mis pla c e d. Ms.

6 Smit h, an employ ee of

APRA, avers that Defe ndant Anthony informed he r in April of 2006 that “he w as g oing to f

ire one of his own manag ers, a n employ ee na

med Christine [ sic ] W illiams.” Pl. ’s Re sp ., Ex. B (D e c laratio n o f D or othy Smit h) (h e re ina ft e r, “ Smit

h D e c l.” ), ¶ 2 . A c c or din g to15

Ms. Smi th, [De fe nd ant] A nth ony

tol d [he r] that [Pla int if

f] w a s n ot o n g oo d te rm s w ithhe r b os s Robert J ohnson beca

use of he r testimony befor e the D.C. Council. Anthony stated that J ohnson was unhappy and dis please d about t he thi ng s [P laintiff] said at a hearing befor e Councilman Catania. Johnson said that [ Plain t iff] “talked too much” and reve aled thing s to Councilman Catania that J ohnson did not want disclosed. Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff urg es that a “ rea sonable jury could [] find that Ms. Smi th’s statement . . . re fer s to t he pr ivate me e tin g be tw e e n Co un c ilm an Cata nia and Ms. Willi ams a

nd no t ju st t o M s. Willi ams’ te sti mony

be fo re the Counc il, ” su c h th a t “ bo th M r. John so n a nd Mr . A nth ony

bo th [ sic ] knew about Ms. Wi lliams’ private Mar ch 8, 2006 mee ting with Council member Catania.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 21-22. The Court is not so persuaded. Ms. Smith — who submi tted a dec laration on Plaintiff’s behalf

in this m atter — doe s not mention or refe r to the Mar ch 8, 2006 mee ting. To the contra

ry , she ave rs only

that she wa s informed De fenda nt J ohnson was displease d

“ be c a us e of [Pla int if f’ s] te sti mony

be fo re the D. C. C ounc il. ” Smit h D e c l. ¶ 3. Pla int if

f’ s c la im that Ms. Smi th’s statements should be re ad to indicate that Defe ndants wer e also a war e of, a nd unhappy with, Plainti ff’ s meetingwith Councilmember Catania is without merit. In addition, Plainti ff dire cts the Court to the deposition testimony of Jul ian Muhammad, who serve d as risk mana g er at DOH duringthe re levant time per iod. SeePl. ’s Re sp . ¶ 20 ; see als o Pl.’s Not. of Filing Deposition of J ulian Muhammed, Doc ket No. [81] (her einaf ter, “Muhammed D ep.”) , at 6:14-16. The c ited portions of Mr. Muhammed’ s testimony , howeve r, do not mention or ref

er to the pr ivate Mar ch 8, 2006 mee ting be tween Plaintiff a nd Councilmember Catania, let a lone indicate whether Mr. Muhammed ha d rea son to believe that e ither De fenda nt John so n o r D e fe nd ant Anth ony we re awa

re that su c h a

me e tin g ha d ta

ke n p la c e ; in de e d, the re is no indication that Mr. Muhammed himself wa s awa re that such a mee ting e ver oc curr ed. See16

Muhammed De p. at 18-26; 35-36; 47-48; 61; 88. Rather , Mr. Muhammed’s te stimony was lim ite d to dis c us sin g the De fe nd ants ’ a lle g e d e ff or ts t o te rm inate Pla int if

f f or fa ilure to c omp ly with a District re sidency

require ment, as is discussed in more de tail below. See ge nerally id. Acc ording ly , Plaintiff has failed to pr offe r any evidenc e on the pr esent re cord ( either of a direc t or indirect nature) to c ontradict De fenda nt J ohnson and De fenda

nt Anthony ’s sworn state me nts that th e y

we re un awa

re of Pla int if f’ s p ri vate me e tin g wi th C ounc ilm e mbe r C a tania
un til a ft e r t

his laws uit

wa s f ile d. Th e Court

the re fo re fi nd s th a t Pla int if f h a s f a ile d to demonstrate that a dispute of mater ial fac t exi sts with respect to De fenda nts’ knowledg e of the Marc h 8, 2006 meeting
.

5. De fe nd ants ’ A lle g e d E ff or ts t o T e rm inate Pla int if

f f or F a ilure to C omp ly with a District Residency Prefe renc e Require ment F ina lly , Pl a int if

f a lle g e s —

and De fe nd ants do no t di sp ute fo r p ur po se s o f t his
m e m o r an d

u mo p i n i o n—

th a tD e f e n d an tJ o h n s o n , w i tha s s i s t an c e f r o mD e f e n d an tA n th o n y, attempted to terminate Plaintiff for fa ilure to comply with a District re sidency pref ere nce require ment. SeeDe fs .’ Stmt . ¶ ¶ 2 0- 21 ; see also Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 61. Acc ordingto Plainti ff, on or about April 3, 2006, she wa s informed by Mr. Muhammad that she ha d been a ccuse d of violating a statutory

require ment that she re main a re sident of the District of Columbia. Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 61 & Ex . D (Pl.’s Supplemented Answe r to First Interrog atories) at p. 4. Ther eaf ter, on May

1, 2006, DO H i ssu e d a

No tic e to S ho w C a

us e why Pla int if f’ s e mpl oy

me nt s ho uld

no t be fo rf

e ite d d ue to non-complianc e with the D.C. re sidency pref ere nce r equire ment. Id. ¶ 64 & Ex . C (Final Dec ision and Order

to Dismiss reg ardingChristian W illiams R esidenc y Prefe renc e Deter mination) at 2. Pre-he aringconfe renc es we re he ld on May 5, 2006 and on May

15, 2006, at which Plaintiff and r epre sentatives fr om the District wer e in attenda nce. Id. ¶ 64 & Ex . C (Final17

Dec ision and Order

to Dismiss reg ardingChristian W illiams R esidenc y Prefe renc e Deter mination) at 1-2. An e videntiary hear ing w as ultimately

held on J une 19, 2006 to consider the cha rg e ag ainst Plainti ff. Id. ¶ 64 & Ex . C (Final De cision and Orde r to Dismiss reg arding Chr ist ia n Wil liams R e sid e nc y

Pr e fe re nc e De te rm inatio n) a t 4. Cou ns e l f or bo th p art ie s w e re in attendanc e. Id. ¶ 6 4 & Ex. C ( F ina l D e c isi on and Or de r t o D ism iss re g ard ingChr ist ian Wil liams Residency

Prefe renc e De termination) at 2. Th e c ha rg e wa s u lti mate ly

dis mis se d a g a ins t Pla int if f o n Augus t 8, 20 06 , o n th e ba sis that: (1) the “ Ag ency ’s evidenc e fa il[ ed] to establish that [ Plaintiff] was g rante d a re sidency require ment,” and the Ag ency there fore “ha[d] not m et its burden of pr oof to show that [P laintiff]
was re quired to live in the District for five y ear s from the date of a ppointment and that her f ailure to do so violated the reside ncy require ment resulting in forfe iture of the position;” and ( 2) “[ e] v en as s u m i n g arguendo that the [P laintiff] rece ived a r esidenc y pref ere nce . . . [t]he failure of th e A gen cy

t o fo l l o w i t s p ro ce d

ure s i np ro v i d i n g a w ri t t en n o t i ce t o th e [ P l ai n t i ff ] an d o b t ai n i n g a written ce rtification that she r ece ived notification of the r esidenc y require ments deprived [P laintiff] of adequate notice a nd does not comply

with basic due pr ocess.” Id. ¶ 64 & Ex . C (F inal Dec ision and Order to Dismiss reg ardingChristian W illiams R esidenc y Prefe renc e Deter mination) at 12. B. Pr oc e du ra l H

istor y Pla int if f’ s F ir st A me nd e d Co mpl a int c on ta ins tw o c la ims . Co unt I is b ro ug ht p ur su ant t o 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleg es that De fenda nts retaliated a g ainst Plainti ff f or ac tivity

protec ted under the First Amendme nt to the United States Consti tution, namely her te stimony

befor e the D. C. C ounc il a

nd he r r e mark s d

ur inghe r p ri vate me e tin g wi th C ounc ilm an Catania . A m.18

Com pl. , D oc ke t N o. [13] ¶

¶ 1 01 -0 7. Count I Iis b ro ug ht p ur su ant t o th e Di str ic t of Col umb ia Whis tleblower Protec tion Act and alleg es that De fenda nts took or threate ned to take “ prohibited personne l actions” a g ainst Plainti ff f or the “ protec ted disclosures” she made duringher te stimony befor e the D.C. Council and he r mee ting with Councilman Catania. Id. ¶¶ 108- 113. By order and memora

ndum opinion dated Marc h 14, 2008, the Court dismiss ed Plaintiff’s F ir st A me nd

me nt C la im ( Count I ) i ns of ar a s it wa s b a se d u

po n h e r t e sti mony

be fo re the D. C. Counc il a nd a lso dis mis se d a

ny po te nti a l Whi stl e blo we r P ro te c tio n A c t c la im ( Count I I ) a g a ins t Def endants Johnson and Anthony in their individual capa cities. See W illiams v. Johnson , 5 37 F. Sup p. 2d 14 1 ( D. D. C. 2 00 8) . Pl a int if f’ s r e ma ini ngc la ims in t

his a c tio n a

re the re fo re a s f

oll ow s: (1 ) P la int if

f’ s F ir st A me ndme nt c la im r e ma ins via ble a s a g a ins t th e Di str ic t and De fe nd ants J ohnson and Anthony

in their individual as well as off icial ca pacities to the e x tent it is premised upon speec h made dur ing the Marc h 8, 2006 private me eting with Councilmember Catania; a nd ( 2 ) P l a i n t i f

f ’ s W P A c l a i mr e m a i n s v i a b l e i ni t s e n t i r e ty ( i.e., based upon he r testimony befor e the D.C. Council as well as stateme nts made duringher pr ivate mee ting with Councilmember Catania ), but on ly

a s a sse rt e d a g a ins t th e Di str ic t and De fe nd ants John so n a

nd Antho ny in t he ir of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s. Def endants have now moved f or summary

judgme nt on Plainti ff’ s remainingclaims. See Def s.’ MSJ , Docke t No. [68] . Def endants fir st argue that they are entitled to summary

judgme nt
on Pla int if f’ s WPAc la im, to t

he e xtent it

is b a se d o n h e r t e sti mony be fo re the D. C. C ounc il, beca use such state ments do not qualify as protec ted disclosures unde r the Ac t. Second, De fe nd ants argue that th e y are e nti tle d to summa

ry jud g me nt o n b oth

Pla int if f’ s F ir st Am e ndme nt a

nd WPA c la ims , to the e xtent e a c h a re ba se d o n s tate me nts ma de duri ngthe pr ivateThe Court notes that Plaintiff subsequently filed a N otice of Supplementa l Authority on 7 Marc h 1 5, 20 10 , a s ame nd e d b y no tic e Ma

rc h 1 7, 20 10 , a dv isi ngthe Court of re c e nt a me ndme nts to the WP A. SeePl.’s Notice, Docke t No. [84] . In particula r, Plaintiff hig hlighted the following c ha ng e s to the WPA, wh ic h s he a sse rt s are re le va nt t o th e pe nd ingmot ion s: ( 1) ame ndme nts to the statutory

definition of a “ prohibited personne l action” to include r etaliatory investigations and to clarify that the mode of disclosure does not aff ect the pr otected nature of the disclosure; and (2 ) a dd e d la

ngua g e to m ake c le ar t

hat su pe rv iso rs c ann ot i nte rf

e re wi th a n e mpl oy e e s’ communications to the D.C. Council. See id. Th e Court pr ov ide d D e fe nd ants an o pp or tun ity to file a r esponse to Plaintiff’s notice, which Def endants de clined. See 3/17/10 Min. Order. Upon revie w of Plaintiff’s notice and the spe cific WPA amendments hig hlighted the rein, it is appar ent that no ne of

the pa rt ic ula r WPApr ov isi on s h ig hli g hte d b y Pla int if f a re imp lic a te d o r p ut i nto iss ue by the pa rt ie s’ argume nts in t

he pe nd ingmot ion s. Th a t is , D e fe nd ants do no t argue in t he ir prese nt motions that Plaintiff’s WP A claim must fail bec ause the Def endants’ a lleg ed ac tions do not constitute a “prohibited pe rsonnel ac tion” or bec ause D efe ndants wer e per mitted to int erf

ere wi th P la int if

f’ s c omm un ic a tio ns to t

he D. C. C ounc il. As su c h, the ame ndme nts — e ve n if applied to Plaintiff’s claims in this case, a s Plainti ff ur g es — would not have a substantive impact on the Court’s dec ision herein. Ac cording ly , the Court does not consider the Plaintiff’s no tic e in r e so lvi ngthe pe nd ingc ro ss- mot ion s f or summa ry jud g me nt. 19 me e tin g wi th C ounc ilm e mbe r C a tania , b e c a us e the un dis pute d f

a c ts d e mon str a te that D e fe nd ants
wer e unaw are that the meetinghad take n place and ther efor e could not have reta liated ag ainst her on that basis as a matter of law . Plaintiff has since f iled an opposition to Defenda nts’ motion,
seePl.’s Opp’n, Docke t No. [74] , and De fenda nts have filed a

reply , seeDef

s.’ Reply , Docke t N o . [7 9 ]. 7 In addition, Plainti ff ha s filed a [72] M otion for Partial Summary J udg ment on g rounds of collater al estoppel, in which she argues that De fenda nts are ba rre d under the principles of collater al estoppel fr om relitigating at trial any claim that Plaintiff violated the District of Columbi a Residenc y

Prefe renc e Ac t. Defe ndants have filed an opposition to Plainti ff’ s motion,
seeDef s.’ Opp’n, D ocket No. [78], and Plainti ff a reply , seePl.’s Reply , Docke t No. [80]
. Acc ording ly , the par

ties’ motions are both fully briefe d and ripe for the Court’ s resolution.II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a par ty is entitled to summ ary

judgme nt “if the ple ading s, the discover y and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits show that the re is n o g e nu ine iss ue a s to any mate ri a l f

a c t and that th e mov ant i s e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a
matte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ); see also Tao v. Free h , 27 F.3d 635, 638 ( D.C. Cir. 1994). Under the summary

judgme nt standard, the movingparty bear s the “initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for [its] motion, and identifying those portions of the pleading s, depositions, answers to interr og atories, a nd admissions on file, toge ther with the aff idavits which [it ] believe[s] demonstrate the absenc e of a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t.” Ce lote xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 4 7 7 U. S
. 3 1 7 , 3 2 3 (1 9 8 6 ). Inre s p o n s e, th e n o n -m o v i n g p arty mu s t“go beyond the pleading s and by [i ts] own af

fidavits, or depositions, answer s to interrog atories, a nd admissions on file, ‘desig nate’ specific fac ts showing that ther e is a g enuine issue f or trial.” Id. at 324 (interna l citations omit ted). Although a

court should dra

w all infer ence s from the supportingrec ords submitted by the nonmoving pa

rty , the mere exis tence of a f actua l dispute, by

itself, is insufficient to bar summar y judgme nt. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To be materia l, the fac tual asser

tion must be ca

pable of aff ectingthe substantive outcome of the litigation; to be g enuine, the issue must be suppor ted by sufficie nt admissible evidence that a re asonable trier- offac t could find for the nonmoving pa rty . Laningham v. U.S. Navy , 8 13 F .2 d 1 23 6, 12 42 -4 3 ( D. C. Cir . 1 98 7) ; Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 251 (the c ourt must determine “ whether the evidenc e prese nts a sufficie nt disag ree ment to require submissi on to a jury or whe ther it is so one-sided that one par

ty must prevail as a

matter of la

w”) . “I f the e vidence is merely colora ble, or is not sufficie ntly

probative, summar

y judgme nt may

be g rante d.” Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 249-5021

(interna l citations omit ted). “ Mere alleg ations or denials in the a dverse party ’s pleading s are insufficient to def

eat a n otherwise pr oper motion for summar y judgme nt.” W

illiams v. Callaghan , 9 38 F . Su

pp . 4 6, 49 (D .D .C. 19 96 ). Th e a dv e rs e pa rt y mus t do mor e tha

n s imp ly “show that ther e is some metaphy sical doubt as to the mater ial fac ts.” Ma tsu sh ita El e c . I nd us . Co. v . Ze nit

h R ad io C or p ., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, while the movant bear s the initial responsibility

of identifying those portions of the re cord that demonstrate the a bsence of a g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t, t he burd e n s hif

ts t o th e no n- mov ant t o “ c ome fo rw ard wi th ‘s pe c if ic fa c ts s ho wi ngthat th e re is a genuine issue for trial .’” Id. a t 58 7 ( c iti ngF e d. R. C iv. P. 56(e) ) (e mphasis in origina l). III . D ISC USS ION A. Defendants’ M

otion for Summary Judgme nt The Court beg ins by

consideringDef

endants’ motion for summar y judgme nt. As indicated a

bove, De fenda

nts make two principa l arguments in favor of their motion for summary judgme nt. First, Def

endants a rgue that they

are entitled to summary

judgme nt on Plainti ff’ s WPA c la im, ins of

ar a s it is b a se d o n a lle g e d s tate me nts ma de be fo re the D. C. C ounc il, be c a us e
su c h s tate me nts do no t c on sti tut e pr ote c te d d isc los ur e s und e r t he WPA. Se c on d, De fe nd ants
argue that th e y

are e nti tle d to summa

ry jud g me nt o n Pl a int if

f’ s F ir st A me ndme nt a

nd WPA
c la ims , in so fa

r a s e a c h a

re ba se d o n s tate me nts ma de duri nghe r p ri vate me e tin g wi th Councilmember Catania , beca use the re cord de monstrates that De fenda nts were unawa

re that the
me e tin g ha d ta

ke n p la c e and

the re fo re c ou ld n ot h ave re ta liate d a g a ins t he r o n th a t ba sis a s a matter of la

w. Eac h argument shall be consider ed in turn below.22 1. Pla int if

f’ s WPACla im B a se d Upo n H e r T e sti mony B e fo re the D. C. Counc il De fe nd ants fi rs t argue that Pla int if f’ s st a te me nts ma de be fo re the D. C. C ounc il Commi ttee on He alth at the F ebrua ry 14, 2006 hear ing do not qua lify as protec ted disclosures under the WP A. The D istrict of Columbia’s Whi stleblower Protec tion Act prohibits, in relevant pa rt , a su pe rv iso r f ro m thre a te nin g to t ake or takin g a pr oh ibi te d p e rs onne l a c tio n o r o the rw ise reta liating a g ainst an employ ee be cause of the e mploy ee’ s “protec ted disclosure.” D.C. Code § 1- 61 5. 53 . A“ pr ote c te d d isc los ur e ” is s tatut or ily de fi ne d a s: any disclosure of inf

ormation, not specific ally prohibited by

statute, by an employ ee to a su pe rv iso r o r a

pu bli c bo dy that th e e mpl oy e e re a so na bly be lie ve s e vid e nc e s: (A ) G ro ss m ism ana g e me nt; (B ) G ro ss m isu se or

wa ste of pu bli c re so ur c e s o r f

un ds ; (C) Abuse of

authority in c onnection with the administration of a public program or the e xec uti on

of a pu bli c c on tr a c t; (D) A violation of a fede ral, state, or l ocal law , rule, or r egulation, or of a te rm of a contra ct betwe e n

th e D is tric t g overnme nt and a District g overnme nt contrac tor which is not of a mere ly

technica l or minimal nature; or ( E ) A s u b s t an t i a l an d

s p e c i f i c d an g e r t o th e p u b l i c h e a l than d

s a f e ty. Id. § 1-615.52(a )(6) . A “public body” includes a member of

the D.C. Council. Id. § 1- 615.52(a) (7). The District of Columbia Court of Appe als has re cently explained that “[a] ‘protected disclosure’ unde r the DC-WPA is one that the employ ee ‘ rea sonably believes’ evidenc es one or more of the circ umstances de lineated in D.C. Code § 1-615.52( 6)(A) -(E) (2001).” W ilburn v. Di str ic t of Colum bia , 957 A.2d 921, 925 (D.C. 2008). The “‘e mploy ee must disclose such
se ri ou s e rr or s b y

the a g e nc y

that a c on c lus ion

the a g e nc y

e rr e d is no t de bata

ble amon g re a so na

ble23

people.’ ” Id. (q u o t i n g W

hite v. De p’t of the Air Force , 391 F.3d 1377, 1382 ( Fe d. Cir. 2004)). To de te rm ine wh e the r a

n in div idu a l r e a so na

bly be lie ve d th a t su c h e rr or s c on sti tut e d g ro ss misconduct or abuse or we re illeg al, a c ourt must consider whe ther “ ‘a disintere sted observe r with knowledg e of the essential fa cts known to and re adily asce rtainable by

the employ ee [could]
rea sonably

conclude that the ac tions of the g overnme nt evidence [i lleg ality , g ross abuse, e tc.].’” Zirk lev . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 8 3 0 A. 2 d

1 2 5 0 , 1 2 5 9 -6 0 (D
. C
. 2 0 0 3 ) ( q u o t i n g Lac ha nc e v . W

hite , 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 ( Fe d. Cir. 1999)). “‘ A pure ly subjective pe rspec tive of an e mploy ee is not sufficie nt even if sha

red by other e mploy ees.’ ” Id. The ke y inquiry rema ins whether the plaintiff
rea sonably

believed the conduct disclosed w as illeg al and/or a g ross abuse a

nd not whether

the conduct wa s in fact ultimately found to be illeg al or a

g ross abuse, e tc. See id. P l a i n t i f f i nth i s c a s e a l l e g e s th a th e r s t a t e m e n t s b e f

o r e th e D
. C
. C o un c i l th a t( 1 ) th e A C IS
so ft wa re wa s c a pa ble a t th a t ti me of

c oll e c tin g on ly

de mogra ph ic data and (2 ) t he sy ste m w ou ld not be fully

functional until November of 2006 qualify

as protec ted disclosures unde r the WPA. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41-42. Acc ordingto Plainti ff, these statements re veale d that the ACI S software
was a “major f ailure.” Id. Specifica lly , she asse rts that this testim ony reve aled that, de spite the signif ic ant m on e tary

e xpe nd iture s ma de on

the sy ste m, t

he AC I S so ft

wa re wa s c ur

re ntl y un a ble to t ra c k c ru c ia l in fo rm a tio n c on c e rn ingan in div idu a l’ s e du c a tio n a nd us e of dr ug s ( i.e. , nondemog raphic information), a nd that the softwar e would not be c ompleted until November 2006, contra ry to APRA’s written statement indicatingthat the softwar e would be r eady by J uly 2006. Id. Plaintiff theref

ore ur g es that these statements qualify as protec ted disclosures be cause she
rea sonably

believed that the statements evidenc ed (1) “[g]ross manag ement,” D .C. Code § 1- 615.52(a) (6)( A); (2) “[g]ross misuse or waste of public re source s or funds,” id. § 1-24

61 5. 52 (a )( 6) (B ); (3 ) “ [a]b us e of a uth or ity in c onne c tio n w iththe a dmi nis tr a tio n o f a pu bli c prog ram or the execution of a public c ontrac t,” id. § 1-615.52(a )(6) (C); and/or ( 4) “[a] violation of a f eder al, state, or loc al law, r ule, or re g ulation, or of a te rm of a c ontrac t betwee n the District g overnme nt and a District g overnme nt contrac tor which is not of a me rely technica l or minimal nature ,” id. § 1-615.52(a )(6) (D). Def endants c ontend that Plaintiff’s statements do not qualify as protec ted disclosures
un de r a ny of the re le va

nt D .C. Cod e pr ov isi on s f or tw o p ri nc ipa l r e a so ns . F ir st, De fe nd ants
asser t that the D.C. Council was alre ady awa re that the ACI S software sy stem was a “ major failure .” De fs.’ MSJ at 9-10. Ac cording ly , Def endants urg e that Plaintiff’s testimony did not
reve al any

new infor

mation and there fore cannot qua lify as a “ disclosure” under the WP A. Id. The Court does not agree . Whil e District of Columbia ca se law sug g ests that a plaintiff’ s statements do not qualify as “pr otected disc losures” unde r the WPA if the statements conve y ed only information that was a lrea dy known to the per son to whom the information is reporte d,
see W ilb ur n , 9 57 A. 2d

a t 92 5- 26 , D e fe nd ants have no t sh ow n th a t th is w a s th e c a se in t his instance. D efe ndants’ only evidenc e in support of their position that Plaintiff’s testimony disclosed no new inf

ormation is Councilmember Catania’ s statement, made a t the beg inning of the dis c us sio n r e g a

rd ingthe AC I S so ft

wa re , th a t “ a wh ole lot

of mon e y ha s b e e n p oure d into t

his sy ste m [ i.e., the ACI S software sy stem] and we still don’t have any thing to show for

it.” See Def s.’ MSJ at 10. This statement, howe ver, is insuffic ient to establish that Councilmember Catania kn e w e ith e r t

hat th e AC I S so ft

wa re c ou ld c oll e c t on ly

de mogra ph ic inf or matio n o r t

hat it would not be fully

functional until November of 2006. Althoug h Councilmember Catania ’s comment sug g ests that he wa s alrea dy awa re, or at least suspec ted, that the ACI S software was25

not perfor ming a s expected, it does not nece ssarily demonstrate that he was a lso awar e of the specific details disclosed by Plaintiff during the hea

ring . This is particularly

so g iven that af

ter
makin g the g e ne ra l ob se rv a tio n q uo te d b y De fe nd ants , Co un c ilm e mbe r C a tania imm e diate ly proce eded to a sk detailed que stions about the ty pe of data cur

rently beingcollecte d as we ll as the timeline for plac ing the ACI S software fully online. A re asonable jury could there fore infer that Councilmember Catania

was una war e of this information. Ac cording ly , the Court finds that Def endants have not shown on the pre sent rec ord that Plaintiff disclosed only information alre ady publicly known. Cf. Mentzer v. Lanier , __ F. Supp. 2d __, Civ. Act. No. 06-281, 2010 WL24151, *5 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2010) (deny ing summar

y judgme nt on WP A claim bec ause the
rec ord indicate d that “it is probable that some of [t he] details [ disclosed by plaintiff] were not public knowledg e ava ilable” pr ior to plaintiff’s disclosures)
. Second, De fenda

nts contend that eve n if Plaintiff’s statements disclosed infor mation not pr e vio us ly

kn ow n, he r WPAc la im b a se d o n h e r t e sti mony be fo re the D. C. C ounc il n on e the le ss fails bec ause “ [a] t worst, her [testimony ] reveals that a g overnme nt project wa s six -months behind sche dule.” De fs.’ MSJ at 10-11. De fenda nts urg e that such te stimony “mer ely buttressed Councilmember Catania ’s prior knowle dg e that the ACI S project wa s expensive and was not pe rf or min g a s e xpe c te d. ” De fs .’ Re ply a t 4. De fe nd ants the re fo re c on c lud e that “ no re a so na ble jur or c ou ld f ind that pl a int if

f’ s Co un c il t e sti mony

wa s e vid e nc e of

the ty pe of g ro ss a bu se
cover ed by

the WPA.” Id. a t 11 . T he Court do e s n ot a g re e . D ra

wi nga ll r e a so na

ble inf e re nc e s in Plaintiff’s favor , her state ments disclosed specif ic evidenc e that a thr ee million dollar softwar e sy stem was both larg ely

ineffe ctive and be hind schedule. I ndeed, a fter he aringPlaintiff’s testimony , Councilmember Catania questioned the va lidity

of spending“3 million doll ars on26

wh a t c ou ld b e an o ff

-t he -s he lf sy ste m” and

thr e a te ne d to purs ue re lie f u nd e r t he F a lse Cla ims Ac t. P l.’ s Re sp . ¶

¶ 4 4- 49 ; see also Def

s.’ Stmt., Ex . E (D.C. Off ice of Cable Tele vision video
rec ordingof the F eb. 14, 2006 D.C. Council Commi ttee on He alth hear ing) at 1:31:53-1:33:50. Def endants’ pr esent c laim that no one with knowledg e of the essential fa cts could find that Plaintiff’s statements re veale d any thing more than an innoce nt delay is belied by

Plaintiff’s
e v id e n c e —

un c o n te s te d

b y D e f e n d an ts —

th a t D e f e n d an t Jo h n s o nh im s e lf

c o mp la in e d

th e n e xt day that her “ testimony

made APRA look like ‘cr ooks,’ and made it appear [t hat] the ag ency

was doing some thing wr ong .” Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 55. De fenda nts have ther efor e fa iled to demonstrate that they are entitled to summary

judgme nt on Plainti ff’ s WP A claim to the extent it is based on he r testimony at the F ebrua

ry 14, 2006 D.C. Council hearing . The Court there fore DENI ES Def endants’ [68] Mot ion for Summary J udg ment insofar a s Defe ndants contend that Plainti ff’ s testimony befor e the D.C. Council does not qualify as a pr otected disc losure under the WPA. 2. Pla int if

f’ s Cl a ims of

Re ta liatio n in

Vi olatio n o f t

he WPA a

nd the F ir st Amendment B ased U

pon Statements Made Dur ing he r Private Me eting wi th C ounc ilm e mbe r C a tania Def endants ne x t argue that Plaintiff’s cla ims of retaliation — under both the WP A and the Fir st Amendment — fail to the extent that eac h is based on stateme nts made by Plaintiff duri nghe r m e e tin g wi th C ounc ilm e mbe r C a tania on Ma rc h 8 , 2 00 6. Spe c if

ic a lly , D e fe nd ants contend that ther e is no evidenc e on the pr esent re cord that Defe ndants knew a bout Plainti ff’ s meetingwith Councilmember Catania, suc h that Plaintiff cannot succ eed on he r cla ims that Def endants re taliated ag ainst her ba sed on protec ted disclosures made duringthat meeting
. SeeDef s.’ MSJ at 11-12. F or the re asons set for th below, the Court ag ree s and shall there fore g ra nt D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt o n Pl a int if

f’ s F ir st A me ndme nt a

nd WPA27

c la im i ns of

ar a s e a c h is pr e mis e d u

po n c omm e nts ma de duri nghe r p ri vate me e tin g wi th Councilmember Catania
. To pr e va il o n h e r s e c tio n 1 98 3 c la im a lle g ingre ta liatio n in vio latio n o f h e r F ir st Amendment rig hts, Pl aintiff must show, inte r a lia , that her spe ech w as “a substantial or motivating fa ctor in prompting the re taliatory or punitive ac t.” W

ilburn v. Robinson , 480 F.3d 1 1 4 0 , 1 1 4 9 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g O’ Do nn e ll v . B arry , 148 F.3d 1126, 1133 ( D.C. Cir. 1999)). Similarly , to succe ed on her WP A claim, Plaintiff is require d to demonstrate a s part of her pr im a fa c iec a se that th e pr ote c te d d isc los ur e wa s a “ c on tr ibutin g fa c tor ” to t he a lle g e dly reta liatory

actions and a

jury must ult imately

find that “a direct causal link in o rd e r f or the re to be liability ” — i.e., that Def endants would not have taken the a lleg edly reta liatory

actions “but for” her pr otected disc losures. J oh ns on v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 9 35 A. 2d

11 13 , 1 11 9 ( D. C. 20 07 ) ( e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) . T he c a

us a tio n in qu ir

y , th e n, is
su bs tanti a lly

sim ila r u nd e r b oth the F ir st A me ndme nt a

nd the WPA. Whil e the qu e sti on is ordinarily one of f act f or the jury , se e W

ilb ur n , 480 F.3d at 1149, summary judgme nt may

be g rante d wher e, as he re, the plaintiff has fa iled to proffe r any evidenc e (e ither of a

direc t or indirect nature) f

rom which a

rea sonable jury

could find the re quired c ausal link betwe en the protec ted disclosures a lleg edly made by Plaintiff to Councilm ember Catania at the Marc h 8, 2006 meetingand the a lleg edly reta liatory

actions. Se e Am os v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 589 F. Supp. 2d 48 , 5 6 ( D. D. C. 2 00 8) (gra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt t o th e Di str ic t of Col umb ia

wh e re “ no on e in the D.C. g overnme nt knew that [plaintiff] had [ made the pr otected disc losure],” such that the disclosures “c ould not have bee n a substantial or motivating fac tor” for the alleg edly

reta liatory
a c tio n) ; Johnson , 935 A.2d at 1120-21 ( aff irming grant of summar

y judgme nt to District of28

Columbi a on plaintiffs’ c laims of reta liation in viol ation of F irst Amendment and WPA where there was insuffic ient evidenc e esta blishing a c ausal link betwe en the a lleg edly protec ted disclosures and r etaliatory conduct)
. Pla int if f h a s f a ile d to pr of

fe r a ny e vid e nc e that D e fe nd a

nts we re awa

re of he r p ri vate meetingwith Councilmember Catania at any time prior to the institut ion of this lawsuit, and the
rec ord is there fore devoid of a ny evidenc e fr om which a r easona ble jury could find that Def endants re taliated ag ainst her f or statements made duringthat meeting . As discussed above , Plaintiff conce des that she lac ks any direc t evidence that anyone at APRA, includingeither Def endant Johnson or Defe ndant Anthony , was a war e of he r mee ting with Councilmember Catania, seePl.’s Resp. ¶ 20, and the Court finds that she ha s not offer ed suff icient indirec t evidenc e fr om which a r easona ble jury could infer

Def endants’ know ledg e of the meeting
. See ge ne ra lly su pra a t pp . 1 0- 16 . A t mo st, Pla int if f’ s e vid e nc e de mon str a te s th a t sh e me t w ith Councilmember Catania

on Marc h 8, 2006, and that appr ox imately three wee ks later she was informed by

Mr. Muhammad that she ha d been a ccuse d of violating a statutory require ment that she re main a re sident of the District of Columbia. Althoug h in many instances tempor al proxi mity by itself may

be suff icient to cre ate a

n infere nce of

reta liation based on a pr otected activity , the Court conclude s that — in light of the spe cific f acts of this ca se — a jury could not
rea sonably

infer that Defe ndants reta liated ag ainst Plainti ff f or her participation in the March 8, 2006 meetingsimply

beca use the a lleg ed re taliatory action ( i.e., the investig ation into Pl aintiff’s
c omp lia nc e wi th t he Di str ic t’ s r e sid e nc y

re qu ir e me nt) too k p la c e sh or tly a ft e r h e r m e e tin g wi th Councilmember Catania . In addition, Defe ndants undisputably had knowledg e of Plaintiff’s te sti mony be fo re the D. C. C ounc il o n F e br ua ry 14 , 2 00 6, and , a c c or din g to P la int if f, be g an th e ir29

reta liatory

actions immediately

afte r that testimony . In other wor ds, Defe ndants beg an to take alleg edly reta liatory

actions we ll before she met private ly with Councilmember Catania on Ma rch 8, 2006. As such, abse nt specific e vidence that Def endants we re a

war e of Plaintiff’s me eting on Marc h 8, 2006, the fa ct that Def endants’ a lleg edly

reta liatory

conduct c ontinued throug hout Marc h and Apr il of 2006, ultim ately culminating in a

n attempt to terminate he r employ ment for failure to comply

with the residenc y

require ment, does not cre ate a rea sonable infe renc e that Pla int if f’ s m eeting — as opposed to her testimony

befor e the D.C. Council — was e ither a “substantial” or

“contr ibuting” f

actor behind Def

endants’ a lleg edly

reta liatory

conduct. For this reason, Plaintiff’s re liance on Jones v . Bernanke , 557 F.3d 670 ( D.C. Cir. 2009), is mispl ace d, as the plaintiff in that c ase de monstrated that the de fenda nt employ er ha d knowledg e of the protec ted ac tivity
. Id. at 678-79 (f inding plaintiff’ s evidenc e that the e mploy er had knowledg e of the employ ee’ s protecte d activity , and that the a dverse personne l action took place shortly

afte r that ac tivity , sufficie nt to permit an infer ence of re taliatory motive). Even
se tti ngthat f

a c t a sid e , h ow e ve r, the Cou rt is n ot p e rs ua de d th a t th e D. C. C ir c uit ’s op ini on in Jones , which involved conside ration of a reta liation claim under Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 19 64 , is dir e c tly

a pp lic a ble to P la int if

f’ s in sta nt c la im o f r e ta liatio n in

vio latio n o f t

he F ir st Am e ndme nt a

nd the WPA. In c on sid e ri ngc la ims of re ta liatio n und e r T itl e VI I , th e D. C. C ir c uit has made clea

r that the pr im a fa c iecase is “almost alway s irrele vant;” a district c ourt there fore need not, a

nd should not, decide whe ther a plaintiff has met he r prima facie burden unde r the Mc Do nn e ll D ou

gla s burden shiftingtest, but should ins tead pr ocee d direc tly to consider the ultimate issue of reta liation vel non
. Id. at6 7 8 (q u o t i n g Brad yv . O ff. of S e rge an t at

Am rs , 520 F.3d 490, 494 ( D.C. Cir. 2008)).30

By contra st, a plaintiff alleg ing r etaliation in violation of the First Ame ndment has the ini tia l bu rd e n o f s ho wi ngthat sh e e ng a g e d in “ c on sti tut ion a lly

pr ote c te d [c on du c t] and

that th is
c on du c t w a s a

‘s ub sta nti a l f a c tor ’ o r . . . a

‘m oti vatin g fa c tor ’ i n th e [em plo y e r’ s] de c isi on

[to eng ag e in re taliatory

conduct].” Mt . H

e alt hy City Sc h. Di str ic t B d. of E

d. v . D oy le , 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Only

once the plaintiff meets this burden of showing at least some c ausal ne x us be tw e e n h e r s pe e c h a

nd the a lle g e d r e ta liator

y c on du c t do e s th e burd e n s hif t to the de fe nd ant t o show why

it would have take n the same a ction even in the a bsence of any

protec ted ac tivity
. Velikonja v. M

ueller , 362 F. Supp. 2d 1, (D.D .C. 2004), aff’d in relevant part and rev’d on other grounds by 446 F.3d 122 ( D.C. Cir. 2006) (“The District Court properly g rante d summary judgme nt on Velikonja’s F irst Amendment re taliation claim . . . beca use [she] i ntroduce d no
e vid e nc e e sta

bli sh inga c a us a l li nk be tw e e n h e r s pe e c h a

nd the g ov e rnme nt’ s a c tio ns a g a ins t her.” ). Simil arly , pursuant to D.C. Code § 1-615.54(b) , a plaintiff a lleg ing r etaliation in violation of the WPA h a s th e ini tia l bu rd e n o f e sta

bli sh ingby

a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e that a protec ted ac tivity

was a contributing fac tor in the alleg edly prohibited personne l action; only then does the burde n shift to the employ er to de monstrate by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that the alleg ed ac tion would have occ urre d for leg itimate rea sons even a bsent the protec ted ac tivity
. See als o Crawf

or d , 891 A.2d at 218-19. Plaintiff ther efor e re tains the burden of proff eringsufficie nt evidenc e fr om which a r easona ble jury could infer

that Def endants re taliated ag ainst her ba sed upon her pa

rticipation in the Marc h 8, 2006 meetingwith Councilmember Catania. G iven the particula r fa cts of this case , Plaintiff cannot mee t this i nitial burden abse nt evidence that Def endants ha d knowledg e that such a meetingoccur

red. H er c laims of reta liation in viol ation of the F ir st A me ndme nt a

nd the WPA b a se d o n th e pr ivate me e tin g wi th C ounc ilm e mbe r C a taniaPla int if f a sse rt s in

he r m oti on

fo r p art ia l summa

ry jud g me nt t

hat th e Court

sh ou ld a pp ly 8 the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia ’s law o f c oll a te ra l e sto pp e l in thi s c a se . Pl .’ s MS J at 5 -6 . D e fe nd ants fo r t he ir pa rt do no t e xplic itl y

argue that Pla int if

f’ s p os iti on

is i nc or re c t, b ut n on e the le ss c ite to fede ral — ra

ther than D istrict — collatera l estoppel rules. See De fs .’ Op p’ n at 3. Whil e “ it i s ‘uncle ar’ whether

the law of

collater al estoppel is proc edura l or substantive for the purposes of applying f

eder al or D.C. law, the rules of e ach jur isdiction are ‘ substantially simil ar.’ ” Me lara , 6 5 8 F. S u p p . 2 d at1 8 2 , n . 6 (q u o t i n g Br

y so n v . G e re , 2 68 F . Su

pp . 2 d 4 6, 55 -5 6 & n. 5 ( D. D. C. 2003)). The sole diffe renc e betwe en the two jurisdictions is the fede ral law ’s additional consideration of whether

application of c ollatera l estoppel would “wor k a basic unfairne ss” to the party bound by the first dete rmination. Id. Gi ve n th e Court ’s de c isi on he re in, thi s d ist inc tio n is not releva nt to the instant memorandum opinion. 31 must therefor e fa il. Accor dingly , the Court GRANTS Def endants’ [68] Mot ion for Summary Judg me nt i ns of

ar a s Pla int if

f a lle g e s th a t D e fe nd ants imp e rm iss ibl y re ta liate d a g a ins t he r i n vio latio n o f t

he F ir st A me ndme nt a

nd the WPA b a se d o n h e r p ri vate me e tin g wi th Councilmember Catania

on Marc h 8, 2006. B. Plaintif

f’s Motion for Partial

Summary J

udgment Th e Court

tur ns fi na lly to c on sid e r P la int if

f’ s [72 ] Mot ion

fo r P art ia l Summa

ry Judg me nt, in which she c ontends that Def endants a re pr eclude d from re litigatingat trial any claim that Pla int if f v iol a te d th e Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

Re sid e nc y

Pr e fe re nc e Ac t. C oll a te ra l e sto pp e l ba rs a party from re litigating“‘( 1) [an] i dentical issue ( 2) that wa s fully and fa irly

litigated a

nd (3) deter mined by a valid judg ment on the merits (4) in whic h the issue was e ssential.’” Melara v. China N. Indus. Corp. , 6 5 8 F. S u p p . 2 d 1 7 8 , 1 8 2 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Rogers v. Johnson-Norman , 466 F. Supp. 2d 162, 169 (D.D .C. 2006)). In this case, Plaintiff asse rts that 8 “[t] he District of Columbia has e x presse d the intention to relitigate at trial the issue of whether [Pla int if f] v iol a te d th e D. C. R e sid e nc y Pr e fe re nc e Ac t.” Pl. ’s MSJ at 5. Pla int if

f c on te nd s, howeve r, that the District is pre cluded f rom doing so under the r

ules of collate ral e stoppel beca use the D.C. Of

fice of Personne l has alre ady found “tha

t [ Plaintiff] was not subject to a32

District of Columbia residenc y require ment [and] that she [] did not violate any statutory require ment that she re main a District re sident.” Id. at8
. Ac co rd i n g t o P l ai n t i ff , th i s “f i n d i n g” by the D.C. Off

ice of Personnel is binding on D efe ndants. Id. She there fore “re quests that the jury in this case be a dvised” that the “ char g es broug ht ag ainst plaintiff befor e the District of Columbi a Of

fice of Personne l” wer e ultimately found to be “ without merit for the re asons stated by the D.C. Off

ice of Personnel” in its final dec ision. Id. Pla int if f a lso a sk s th e Court

to h old that the D.C. Off

ice of Personnel’s “ finding . . . that plaintiff did not violate [t he] District of Columbi a Residenc y

Prefe renc e Ac t is bindi ng on the jury in this case.” Id. Un fo rt un a te ly fo r P la int if

f, he r a rgume nt i s p re mis e d o n a mis c ha ra c te ri zat ion

of the D. C. Offic e of Per sonnel’s final de cision. Although Plaintiff is cor rec t that the Offic e of Per sonnel ultimately

dismiss ed the c harg es ag ainst Plainti ff, it did so based upon its conc lusion that “the
e vid e nc e of

re c or d e sta

bli sh e s b y

a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e that th e Ag e nc y ha s n ot m e t it s Bur den of pr oof in the matter.” Pl.’s MS J , Ex . C (Final De cision and Orde r to Dismiss reg arding Christian W illiams R esidenc y Prefe renc e De termination) at 12. Spec ifically , the Off ice of Personnel dismissed the cha rg es ag ainst Plainti ff ba sed on a f inding that: (1) the District “ha [d] not met its burden of proof to show that [P laintiff] was require d to live in the District for five y ear s from the date of a

ppointment and that her f ailure to do so violated the r esidenc y
re qu i re m en tre s u l t i n g i nfo rf ei ture o f t h e p o s i t i o n ; ” a n d (2 ) “ [ e] v en as s u m i n g arguendo that the [P laintiff] rece ived a r esidenc y pref ere nce . . . [t]he failure of the Ag ency

to follow its procedure s in providing a

written notice to the [Plaintiff] and obtaininga wr itten cer tification that she
rec eived notification of the reside ncy require ments deprived [Plaintiff] of adequate notice and does not comply

with basic due pr ocess.” Id. Contrary to Plainti ff’ s assertions, the Of fice of33

Personnel’s f

inding that the D istrict failed to mee t its burden of proof or follow its own proce dures is not substantively equivalent to an a ffirmative finding that Plaintiff was neve r subject to any

residenc y

require ment in the first instance, suc h that the District’s cla ims were “without merit.” In addition, the Court notes that Plainti ff’ s reque sts to bar Def endants fr om proffe ring
cer tain evidenc e at tria l and to provide c erta in instructions to t he jury reg ardingthe pre clusive eff ect of the Off ice of Personnel’s f

inal decision ar e pre mature. Such r equests ar e more appropr iately

dealt with throug h a motion in lim ine rather than through the pendingmotion for partial summary

judgme nt. At the pre- trial stag e in this lit iga tion, the parties will have a more
concr ete unde rstandingof the ty pe of e vidence they

intend to introduce at trial as well as the
manner in which they

intend to utili ze such evidenc e. While the District may arguably be prec luded from r elitigating at trial the proprie ty of the Of fice of Personne l’s final dec ision dismiss ing the char g es ag ainst Plainti ff, it does not nec essar ily follow that Def

endants a re ba rre d from prof fer ing e vidence in support of their position that the char g es ag ainst Plainti ff we re broug ht for non-r etaliatory rea sons. To the extent Defenda nts seek to do so at trial by prese nting
e vid e nc e re latin g to t

he Of fi c e of Pe rs onne l’ s f

ina l de c isi on , r

uli ng s r e g a

rd ingthe a dmi ssi bil ity of such e vidence are better le ft for pr e-tria l motions in limi ne. Ac cording ly , the Court DENI ES Plaintiff’s [72] motion for partial summary judgme nt. Plainti ff may

re- raise a ny evidentiar

y issues relatingto the char g es ag ainst Plainti ff a nd the Off

ice of Personnel’s f

inal decision, as may be appr opriate, at the motions i n limine stage
.34 IV . C ON CL USI ON F or the re a so ns se t f

or th a bo ve , D e fe nd ants ’ [6 8] Mo tio n f or Sum mary

Judg me nt i s GRANTED- I

N–PART and DENI ED-I N-PART. Specifica lly , Def endants’ motion is GRANTED wi th r e sp e c t to Pla int if

f’ s c la ims of

re ta liatio n in

vio latio n o f t

he F ir st A me ndme nt a

nd the WPA based on he r private meetingwith the D.C. Councilmember Catania, but is DENI ED with respe ct to P la int if

f’ s WPAc la im b a se d u

po n h e r t e sti mony

be fo re the D. C. C ounc il. As su c h, on ly Pla int if f’ s a lle g a tio n in

Count I Iof

the F ir st A me nd e d Co mpl a int that D e fe nd ants imp e rm iss ibl y reta liated ag ainst her in violation of the WPA for re marks made to the D.C. Council remains viable. The Court shall also DENY Plaintiff’s [72] Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment. Plaintiff may

re- raise a ny evidentiar

y issues relatingto the char g es ag ainst Plainti ff a nd the Offic e of Per sonnel’s final de cision, as may be appr opriate, at the motions i n limine stage
. Date: Marc h 18, 2010 /s/ CO LLEEN K OLLA R- K OTEL LY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge