# C_2018166EN.01002301.xml

| 14.5.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 166/23 |
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14.5.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 166/23

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Justice de paix du troisième canton de Charleroi (Belgium) lodged on 27 February 2018 — André Moens v Ryanair Ltd

(Case C-159/18)

(2018/C 166/30)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Referring court

Justice de paix du troisième canton de Charleroi

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: André Moens

Applicant:

Defendant: Ryanair Ltd

Defendant:

Questions referred

Questions referred

[The] request for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (1) [is] worded as follows:

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| 1. | Does the circumstance at issue in the present proceedings, that is to say, the spillage of petrol on a runway which caused that runway to be closed, fall to be classified under the notion of an ‘event’ within the meaning of paragraph 22 of the judgment of 22 December 2008, Wallentin-Hermann (C-549/07, EU:C:2008:771), or under that of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ within the meaning of recital 14 of that regulation, as interpreted by the judgment of 31 January 2013, McDonagh (C-12/11, EU:C:2013:43), or do those two concepts overlap? |
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1.

Does the circumstance at issue in the present proceedings, that is to say, the spillage of petrol on a runway which caused that runway to be closed, fall to be classified under the notion of an ‘event’ within the meaning of paragraph 22 of the judgment of 22 December 2008, Wallentin-Hermann (C-549/07, EU:C:2008:771), or under that of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ within the meaning of recital 14 of that regulation, as interpreted by the judgment of 31 January 2013, McDonagh (C-12/11, EU:C:2013:43), or do those two concepts overlap?

Wallentin-Hermann

McDonagh

| 2. | Must Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, be interpreted as meaning that an event such as that at issue in the present proceedings, that is to say, the spillage of petrol on a runway which caused that runway to be closed, must be found to be an event inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of an air carrier and, accordingly, cannot be classified as an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ capable of exonerating the air carrier from its obligation to compensate passengers in the case where a flight operated by that carrier is subjected to a significant delay? |
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2.

Must Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, be interpreted as meaning that an event such as that at issue in the present proceedings, that is to say, the spillage of petrol on a runway which caused that runway to be closed, must be found to be an event inherent in the normal exercise of the activity of an air carrier and, accordingly, cannot be classified as an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ capable of exonerating the air carrier from its obligation to compensate passengers in the case where a flight operated by that carrier is subjected to a significant delay?

| 3. | If an event such as that at issue in the present proceedings, that is to say, the spillage of petrol on a runway which caused that runway to be closed, must be found to be an ‘extraordinary circumstance’, must it be inferred from this that, for the air carrier, this is an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ that could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken? |
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3.

If an event such as that at issue in the present proceedings, that is to say, the spillage of petrol on a runway which caused that runway to be closed, must be found to be an ‘extraordinary circumstance’, must it be inferred from this that, for the air carrier, this is an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ that could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken?

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(1)  OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1.

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