IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 10, 2017

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. WILLIAM WAYLON HANSON

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marshall County

No. 2015-CR-97 Forest A. Durard, Jr., Judge

___________________________________

No. M2016-00502-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

A Marshall County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, William Waylon Hanson, 

of violating an order declaring him to be a motor vehicle habitual offender, failing to 

provide evidence of financial responsibility, and passing another vehicle in a no passing 

zone. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by granting the State’s 

motion in limine to prohibit the Appellant from collaterally attacking the order declaring 

him to be a motor vehicle habitual offender, by limiting the defense’s closing argument, 

and by admitting the Appellant’s driving record into evidence through an employee of the 

Department of Safety and Homeland Security. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of 

the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E. GLENN 

and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JJ., joined.

M. Wesley Hall IV, Unionville, Tennessee (on appeal), and Brian M. Griffith, Nashville, 

Tennessee (at trial), for the Appellant, William Waylon Hanson.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Sophia S. Lee, Senior Counsel; 

Robert J. Carter, District Attorney General; and Weakley E. Barnard and Drew Wright, 

Assistant District Attorneys General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

The Appellant was indicted for violating an order declaring him to be a motor 

vehicle habitual offender (MVHO), a Class E felony; failing to provide evidence of 

03/02/2018
- 2 -

financial responsibility, a Class C misdemeanor; and passing another vehicle in a no 

passing zone, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-616; 55-12-139; 

55-8-121. 

On September 11, 2015, the State filed a motion in limine asking the trial court to 

prohibit the Appellant from collaterally attacking the validity of the MVHO order. Citing 

State v. William Tony Wright, No. M2001-01418-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1336655

(Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, June 19, 2002), the State contended that any argument or 

testimony suggesting the Appellant had no notice of the MVHO order was misleading 

because the Appellant had been convicted of violating the MVHO order on three prior 

occasions; therefore, such argument or testimony was inadmissible. 

On September 30, 2015, immediately prior to trial, the trial court granted the 

State’s motion. Defense counsel informed the trial court that he did not plan to 

collaterally attack the MVHO order. Instead, the defense strategy was to show that the 

State did not introduce proof the Appellant had notice of the MVHO order and that, 

accordingly, the State could not prove the Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or 

recklessly violated the MVHO order. The State then suggested that the easiest way to 

establish the Appellant’s awareness of the MVHO order was to introduce proof of the 

Appellant’s prior convictions of violating the order. Defense counsel responded that the 

State could prove the Appellant had notice of the order without informing the jury that 

the Appellant had prior convictions of the same crime, which were “more prejudicial than 

probative.” The trial court warned that if the Appellant proceeded with the argument he 

did not have notice of the MVHO order, it would allow the State to rebut the claim by 

introducing “documents regarding service of process and awareness of court dates.” The 

State again noted the Appellant’s three prior convictions of violating the MVHO order 

and argued that because of those convictions, the Appellant was prohibited from asserting 

he had no notice of the order according to case law. The trial court agreed that the State 

could not “try the case with its hands behind its back like that,” and reiterated its warning 

that if defense counsel raised the issue of notice, it would allow the State to rebut the 

defense’s claims. Nevertheless, the trial court stated that it would not allow the State to 

introduce proof of the prior convictions until the Appellant “opens that door.” 

At trial, Chapel Hill Police Officer Andrew Kon testified that at 9:40 p.m. on 

Tuesday, March 31, 2015, he was driving his marked patrol car north on Highway 31-A 

in the area of Henry Horton Park when he saw a red Chevrolet Monte Carlo that was 

traveling southbound pass a blue Ford Expedition. Officer Kon saw the headlights of the 

Monte Carlo two or three hundred yards in front of his car “coming toward” him. Officer 

Kon said that although it was dark, the double yellow line indicating it was a no passing 

zone was clearly visible. Officer Kon made a U-turn and activated his patrol car’s blue 

lights to initiate a traffic stop. 
- 3 -

The red Monte Carlo stopped in a Dollar General Store parking lot. Officer Kon 

parked and approached the Appellant, who was the driver. Officer Kon advised the 

Appellant that he had been stopped for passing another vehicle in a no passing zone. He 

asked for the Appellant’s driver’s license, automobile registration, and proof of 

insurance, but the Appellant did not produce the documents. Officer Kon requested the 

Appellant’s name and date of birth, then he conveyed the information he obtained to the 

police dispatcher. After receiving a response from the dispatcher, Officer Kon arrested 

the Appellant for driving on a revoked license, violating a MVHO order, failing to 

provide proof of financial responsibility, and improper passing. Officer Kon recalled that 

other vehicles were on the roadway when the Appellant passed the Expedition. 

On cross-examination, Officer Kon acknowledged that the Appellant did not cause 

an accident and that no one was injured. 

Nicholas Kiefer testified that he was a deputy clerk in the Davidson County 

Criminal Court Clerk’s Office and that he was a “keeper of the records.” From the 

Appellant’s file, Kiefer identified a certified copy of an “Order to Appear . . . in an 

habitual offender matter.” Kiefer explained that according to the order, the Appellant 

was ordered “to appear before the criminal court on the 19th of January, 2005, to show 

cause why he should not be declared an habitual traffic offender.” Kiefer said that on the 

second page of the order was a “certificate of service from the deputy sheriff.” 

Kiefer identified another order by the Davidson County Criminal Court, which 

stated that the Appellant was declared to be an habitual traffic offender. The order, 

which was dated January 20, 2005, prohibited the Appellant from driving for three years 

and ordered that he surrender his license to the court. On the second page of the order 

was a signed certificate of service reflecting that a “true and exact copy” of the order had 

been “mailed or hand-delivered” to the Appellant “and/or” his attorney. 

Kiefer also identified a “certified copy of what we call a file jacket. It’s the front 

of the file that – it’s the front of what would be a criminal case file.” He explained that 

“only two specific clerks” in the office made notations on the front of the file jacket. The 

grand jury clerk wrote the case number, the division assignment, and the reason for the 

case. The “judge’s in-court clerk” wrote the date of the docket and “notations similar to 

what would be on a minute entry.” Kiefer examined the Appellant’s file jacket and 

noticed that the first date listed was January 19, 2005. Kiefer said, “The notation for that 

day states that the [Appellant], Mr. William Hanson, was served and that the case was 

reset.” The next date listed was January 20, 2005, which was the same date the MVHO 

order was entered. 

On cross-examination, Kiefer acknowledged that he began working in the clerk’s 

office in 2011 and that he was not present for any of the 2005 court proceedings. 
- 4 -

Glendora Graves testified that she was a district manager with the Tennessee 

Department of Safety and Homeland Security. Through her employment, she had access 

to driving histories. In preparation for trial, she accessed the Appellant’s driving history, 

which included a January 20, 2005 order declaring the Appellant to be a MVHO. The 

order resulted in the revocation of the Appellant’s license. Graves stated that the 

Appellant’s driving privileges were never restored and that the order was in effect on the 

day of the Appellant’s arrest. 

On cross-examination, Graves acknowledged that the branch of the Department of 

Safety and Homeland Security which was responsible for maintaining driving records 

was located in Nashville. She further acknowledged that she did not maintain the driving 

records. She also acknowledged that sometimes a driving record contained incorrect 

information but that it did not happen often. 

On redirect examination, Graves asserted that the Appellant’s driving record had 

“been certified as true and accurate by Susan Lowe of the financial responsibility 

division.” 

The jury convicted the Appellant as charged. On appeal, the Appellant contends 

that the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to prohibit the Appellant from 

collaterally attacking the motor vehicle habitual offender order, by limiting the defense’s 

closing argument, and by admitting the Appellant’s driving record into evidence through 

State’s witness from the Department of Safety and Homeland Security. The Appellant 

also contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for violating an 

order declaring him to be a motor vehicle habitual offender. 

II. Analysis

A. Collateral Attack on MVHO Order

As his first issue, the Appellant contends that he “makes a good faith argument for 

[a] change in the law thus allowing this case to be remanded to allow collateral attack on 

the Davidson County [MVHO] Order.” In the trial court, the Appellant repeatedly 

asserted that he was not collaterally attacking the MVHO order and was instead claiming 

that the State failed to prove he received notice of the order and thus failed to prove he 

violated the order intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. On appeal, however, the 

Appellant concedes that he is collaterally attacking the MVHO order.1 The Appellant 

contends that the trial court misconstrued State v. William Tony Wright, No. M2001-

 

1We caution that “an appellant is bound by the evidentiary theory set forth at trial, and may not 

change theories on appeal.” State v. Alder, 71 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).
- 5 -

01418-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1336655 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, June 19, 2002), 

as authority to grant the State’s motion in limine restricting collateral attack on the 

MVHO order. He maintains that Wright did not stand for the proposition that a 

defendant could not collaterally attack an MVHO order. The Appellant did not cite any 

other cases in support of his contention. The Appellant contends that the trial court’s 

erroneous ruling limited his ability to argue that the State had failed to prove that the 

Appellant knew about the MVHO order and, accordingly, that the Appellant could not 

have violated the order intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. 

This court has explained previously that “[a] proceeding under the Motor Vehicle 

Habitual Offender Act is civil in nature and therefore is governed by the Tennessee Rules 

of Civil Procedure.” State v. Malady, 952 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). As 

the State notes, this court has held consistently that a defendant cannot collaterally attack 

an order declaring him to be a MVHO. See Davis v. State, 793 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1990); Everhart v. State, 563 S.W.2d 795, 797-98 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978); 

State v. Tony Lynn Allen, No. M2007-00826-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2743882, at *3 

(Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, July 15, 2008); State v. Nelson Keith Foster, No. E2001-

02976-CCA-RM-CD, 2002 WL 181359, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Feb. 1, 

2002); State v. Michael Samuel Eidson, No. 03C01-9711-CR-00506, 1999 WL 160944, 

at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Mar. 24, 1999). Instead, “the appropriate 

procedure for challenging a habitual [motor vehicle] offender order is to file a motion 

pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02.” State v. Ernest Michael Turner, 

No. W2006-02661-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 1700338, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, 

Apr. 4, 2008) (citing Bankston v. State, 815 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)). 

We agree with the State that the Appellant’s arguments regarding Wright are “not 

entirely accurate.” The Appellant contends that the defendant in Wright was allowed to 

collaterally attack the MVHO order. However, in Wright, the defendant pled guilty to 

violating an MVHO order. Wright, No. M2001-01418-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1336655, 

at *1. Thereafter, he filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, arguing that he was 

“‘legally innocent’” of the violation because the order did not comply with Tennessee 

Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Id. Simultaneously, the defendant filed a motion 

challenging the MVHO order under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. Id. at *2. 

On appeal, this court determined that the defendant’s issues turned upon whether he was 

entitled to relief under Rule 60.02 and, after consideration, held that “the trial court did 

not err in denying [the defendant’s] motion for relief from the order declaring him to be a 

motor vehicle habitual offender.” Id. at *4. 

The record before us does not reflect that the Appellant ever filed a motion 

pursuant to Rule 60.02 challenging the MVHO order, and he has not filed such a motion 

in the instant case. Moreover, the State did not argue that Wright stood for the 

proposition that an MVHO order could not be collaterally attacked; instead, the State 
- 6 -

cited Wright to support the proposition that a defendant who had pled guilty to violating 

the MVHO order previously consequently has notice of the order. We agree. The 

Appellant’s arguments are unavailing. 

B. Closing Argument

The Appellant next contends that the trial court erred by limiting defense counsel’s 

ability to argue during closing argument that the State introduced no proof the Appellant 

had notice of the MVHO order and that, accordingly, he could not have intentionally, 

knowingly, or recklessly violated the order. The State responds that the Appellant is not 

entitled to relief on this issue. 

It is well-established that closing argument is an important tool for both parties 

during a trial; thus, counsel is generally given wide latitude during closing argument, and 

the trial court is granted wide discretion in controlling closing arguments. See State v.

Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 577-78 (Tenn. 2000) (appendix). “Notwithstanding such, 

arguments must be temperate, based upon the evidence introduced at trial, relevant to the 

issues being tried, and not otherwise improper under the facts or law.” State v. Goltz, 

111 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). 

The record reflects that during closing argument, defense counsel acknowledged 

that the State had shown the jury the MVHO order but argued that it was required also to

prove that the Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly violated the order. 

Defense counsel told the jury that all three mental states “require [the Appellant’s]

knowledge. That he knew this [order] existed.” Defense counsel contended, however, 

the State presented no witnesses who testified that they saw the order being given to the 

Appellant or that he was in court the day the order was issued. The State objected to 

defense counsel’s argument as a collateral attack on the MVHO order after the proof was 

closed. Defense counsel responded that he was not arguing that the order was invalid. 

The trial court said that it was being “liberal” with defense counsel’s argument but 

cautioned that if defense counsel went “too far,” it would let the State respond “within the 

confines of the proof.” The trial court agreed that the Appellant’s prior convictions were 

not part of the proof; nevertheless, the court observed that defense counsel was 

attempting to “sand bag” the State by claiming the Appellant had no notice of the MVHO 

order after the proof was closed in order to render the State unable to rebut the claim. 

Defense counsel maintained that the State could have introduced the minutes or 

transcript of the MVHO hearing or called the district attorney who prosecuted that case to 

prove the Appellant had knowledge of the MVHO order. However, the trial court 

responded that the State was not required to go to such lengths to prove the Appellant’s

knowledge of the order and that it was “dis[i]ngenuous” for defense counsel to argue that 

the Appellant did not have notice of the MVHO order. The trial court allowed defense 
- 7 -

counsel to argue “about what is on the order” but refused to let him argue that the 

Appellant did not have notice of the order. The court cautioned that if defense counsel 

persisted in his argument, the court might “have to craft a specific instruction,” noting 

that the standard MVHO instruction did not explain that the State did not “have to prove 

a negative. They have to prove there was an order and he drove.” 

Initially, we note that the Appellant failed to cite any authority in support of his 

argument that the trial court erred by limiting his closing argument. Generally, “[i]ssues 

which are not supported by argument, citation to authorities, or appropriate references to 

the record will be treated as waived in this court.” Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b); see

Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7). 

Further, the Appellant argues that the trial court warned defense counsel that if he 

“continued this sort of argument, that the Court would allow the State to present to the 

jury evidence to show the [Appellant’s] knowledge of the [MVHO] order.” The 

Appellant provided no citation to the record where the court issued the foregoing 

warning. Our review of the record reveals that the trial court issued no such warning; 

instead, the trial court told the Appellant that it would allow the State to “do what they 

have got to do within the confines of the proof” and that the trial court would fashion a 

special jury instruction to inform the jury that the State did not have to prove the 

Appellant was in court on the day the MVHO order was issued. 

Moreover, once defense counsel continued his closing argument, he argued to the 

jury that the certificate of service on the second page of the MVHO order was “pro 

forma” and did not specify the method in which the order may have been delivered to the 

Appellant. Defense counsel also argued that Kiefer did not work at the court at the time 

the order was issued and therefore could not testify specifically about how the Appellant

received the order, whether it was mailed or hand-delivered, and could not assert that the 

Appellant definitively had received the order. Although defense counsel was allowed to 

make this argument, it was inappropriate and an attempt to collaterally attack the 

underlying judgment. The Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue. 

C. Graves’s Testimony

As his next issue, the Appellant argues that Graves was not qualified to testify 

about his driving record because she was not the keeper of the records at the Department 

of Safety and Homeland Security and that the driving record was not a self-authenticating 

document. He complains that the trial court required the Appellant to choose between 

allowing Graves to testify that his driving privileges had not been reinstated since the 

MVHO order or allowing the Appellant’s redacted driving history to be entered into 

evidence as a self-authenticating document. The State responds that the Appellant has 

waived the issue by failing to include the Appellant’s driving record in the appellate 
- 8 -

record for our review. In the alternative, the State argues that the trial court did not err by 

limiting Graves’s testimony to whether the Appellant’s driving privileges had been 

reinstated. We agree with the State. 

During a jury-out hearing, the State announced that it intended to call Glendora 

Graves as the keeper of the records of the Department of Safety and Homeland Security. 

She said that her department was responsible for issuing driver’s licenses and keeping

information regarding driver’s histories. Graves asserted that the Appellant’s driving

history reflected that his driver’s license had been revoked and had never been reinstated. 

Defense counsel objected to Graves being allowed to testify, arguing that although 

she could access the records, she was not the keeper of the records. The trial court asked

whether the records were self-authenticating. The State responded that the records were 

self-authenticating. 

We are unable to address any of the Appellant’s concerns regarding whether the 

Appellant’s driving record was self-authenticating because the Appellant failed to include 

the driving record in the appellate record for our review. The Appellant carries the 

burden of ensuring that the record on appeal conveys a fair, accurate, and complete 

account of what has transpired with respect to those issues that are the bases of appeal. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b); see also Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 156, 172 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1997). “In the absence of an adequate record on appeal, this court must presume 

that the trial court’s rulings were supported by sufficient evidence.” State v. Oody, 823 

S.W.2d 554, 559 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). Accordingly, the Appellant is not entitled to 

relief on this issue. 

D. Sufficiency of the Evidence

As his final issue, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

sustaining his conviction for violating the MVHO order, asserting that the State failed to 

prove that he violated the order intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. The State 

responds that the proof was sufficient. On appeal, a jury conviction removes the 

presumption of the appellant’s innocence and replaces it with one of guilt, so that the 

appellant carries the burden of demonstrating to this court why the evidence will not 

support the jury’s findings. See State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). The 

appellant must establish that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319 (1979); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e).

Accordingly, on appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom. See State v.

Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). In other words, questions concerning the 
- 9 -

credibility of witnesses and the weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all 

factual issues raised by the evidence, are resolved by the trier of fact, and not the 

appellate courts. See State v. Pruett, 788 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990).

The guilt of a defendant, including any fact required to be proven, may be 

predicated upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both direct 

and circumstantial evidence. See State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1999). Even though convictions may be established by different forms of 

evidence, the standard of review for the sufficiency of that evidence is the same whether 

the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence. See State v. Dorantes, 

331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011). 

This court previously has observed that in order to sustain a conviction under 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-616(a), the State must “prove (1) that [the 

A]ppellant was subject to a judgment or order prohibiting him from operating a motor 

vehicle and (2) that he operated a motor vehicle while that judgment or order was in 

effect.” State v. Mark A. Crites, No. M2013-01681-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 2567146, at 

*5 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, June 6, 2014). This court also has noted that because 

the statute does not plainly dispense with a mens rea requirement, the necessary culpable 

mental states are intentional, knowing, or reckless.2 State v. James Stacy Carroll, No. 

W2003-01182-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 541130, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Mar. 

 

2

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-302 provides in pertinent part:

(a) “Intentional” refers to a person who acts intentionally with 

respect to the nature of the conduct or to a result of the conduct when it is 

the person’s conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 

cause the result.

(b) “Knowing” refers to a person who acts knowingly with 

respect to the conduct or to circumstances surrounding the conduct when 

the person is aware of the nature of the conduct or that the circumstances 

exist. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of the person’s 

conduct when the person is aware that the conduct is reasonably certain 

to cause the result.

(c) “Reckless” refers to a person who acts recklessly with respect 

to circumstances surrounding the conduct or the result of the conduct 

when the person is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and 

unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. 

The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes 

a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would 

exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person’s 

standpoint.
- 10 -

15, 2004) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301(b) (2003); Crittenden v. State, 978 

S.W.2d 929, 930 (Tenn. 1998)).

In the light most favorable to the State, the proof adduced at trial revealed that on 

the evening of March 31, 2015, Officer Kon was driving north on Highway 31-A when 

he saw a red Monte Carlo pass a blue Ford Expedition in a no passing zone. Officer Kon 

stopped the Monte Carlo, which was being driven by the Appellant. The Appellant was 

unable to produce his driver’s license, automobile registration, or proof of insurance. 

Davidson County Criminal Court records reflected that on January 19, 2005, the court 

issued an order for the Appellant to appear in an habitual traffic offender matter. On the 

order was a certificate of service from the deputy sheriff. The court records also reflected 

that on January 20, 2005, the court issued an order declaring the Appellant an habitual 

traffic offender. The second page of the order reflected that a copy of the order was to be 

sent to the Appellant or his attorney and also reflected a signed certificate of service. The 

Appellant’s driving privileges were never restored. We conclude that the foregoing 

evidence was sufficient to sustain the Appellant’s conviction of violating an MVHO 

order. 

III. Conclusion

In sum, we conclude that the Appellant is not entitled to relief on any of his issues. 

The judgments of the trial court are affirmed. 

____________________________________

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE