J. N. II I i s the f at her of the chi ldre n. Hi s rig hts w er e not te rm inate d. J. N. II I w as a ppointe d a

pos se ss ory

c onse rv at or w ith 1 re st ric te d v is ita

tion and is not a par

ty to this a ppea l. Opinion filed Au gust 6, 2009



### In The 

# Eleven th Court of Appeals

__________ 

### No. 1 1- 08 -0 03 09 -CV

____ ____ __ IN TH E INT ERE ST OF A. N. AN D S .N ., CH ILDR EN

On App eal from the County Court AtLaw No. 2

Ector C ounty, Texas
T ri a l Co u rt Ca u s e N o . CC 2 -2 7 2 0 -PC

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant is the m other of A.N. and S.N. After a bench t rial, t he trial c ourt terminated the pare nt-child relationship between the c hildren and a ppellant. T h e trial c ourt appointed the Te x as Depa rtment of F amily

and Protec tive Service s as the perma nent sole manag ing conser vator of the children. We re verse and re mand. 1 Th e so le iss ue br ou g ht by app ell ant i s h e r c la im that th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o support termination based on a finding under T EX
. F AM
. C ODE ANN . § 161.001(l) (V ernon 2008)

.2

The re levant fa cts are not in dispute. Acc ording to the father of the childre n, it seems that the eve nts of th e day

beg an whe n he we nt to the plasma ce nter to sell blood to buy beer and

c ig are tte s. He bo ug ht t

he a lc oh ol an d g a ve so me of it t o a pp e lla nt. He and

a pp e lla nt c on tin ue d to drink, to party , and eve ntually to argue. Appe llant became upset, and she drove a way from the plac e wh e re the pa

rt y wa s be ing he ld. F ive -y e ar- old A. N. and thr e e -y e ar- old

S.N . w e re in t

he ve hic le wi th her, unr estraine d in the backse at. Appellant was holding another child, an infant, in he r lap a s she dr ov e aw ay . T he inf

ant d ie d w he n a

pp e lla nt d ro ve he r v e hic le int o a

te le ph on e po le . A s a

re su lt of the c ra sh , A .N . a

nd S.N . r e c e ive d c uts and

br uis e s “ a ll o ve r t

he ir bo die s” and

were a dmi tte d to the hos p it a l f

o r o b s e r v a ti o n
. Su

b s e qu e n tl y , a

p p e ll an t w a s c o n v ic te d , u p o n h e r p le a o f g u il ty , of intox ication manslaug hter a nd rema ined incar cer ated at the time of the trial of this ca se. Th e tr ia l c ourt

fo un d b y c le ar an d co nv inc ing e vid e nc e that te rm inatio n o f t he pa re nt- c hil d relationship between a

ppellant and A.N. and S .N. would be in the best i ntere st of the childre n. That finding has not bee n challeng ed. The trial court a lso found that appellant ha d:

[B]een convicted or has been place d on community supervision, i n cl u d i ng defe rre d adjudication community supervision, fo r being c riminally responsible for the death or serious injury of a child under the f ollowing se ctions of the Penal Code or adjudicated under

Title 3 for conduct that cause d the death or serious injury of a ch i l d and that would constitute a violation of one of the followingPenal Code se c tio ns : (i) Section 19.02 (murde r);

(ii) Section 19.03 (c apital murder ); (iii) Section 19.04 (manslaug hter); (iv) Section 21.11 (inde cenc y with a child); (v) Sec tion 22.01 (assault); (vi) Section 22.011 (se x ual assault); (vii) Section 22.02 (a g g ravated assault); (viii) Section 22.021 (ag g ravated sexual assault); (ix ) Section 22.04 (injury to a child, elde rl y i ndividual, or disabled individual); (x) Section 22.041 (abandoningor enda ng eringchild); (xi ) Section 25.02 (pr ohibited sex ual conduc t); (xi i) Section 43.25 (sexual perf ormanc e by

a child); (xii i) Se c tio n 4 3. 26 (po sse ssi on or pr omo tio n o f c hil d pornog raphy

); and (xiv ) S e c tio n 2 1. 02 (c on tin uo us se xua l abu se of y oungc hil d or childre n).Prior t o Se pte m ber 1, 1994, the re w as no of

f ens e ca lle d “i ntox ic at ion” m ans la ug hte r. Be f

ore that tim e, f

orm er T EX
. P E NAL 2 C ODE § 19 .05 (a) (1 9 7 4 ) p ro vid ed th atin vo lu n ta ry m an sl au gh te r co u ld be co m m it te din on e o f two way s: (1 ) b y “rec kle ssl y

cau s[ in g] the de at h of an indi v idua l” or (2) “ by a cc ide nt or

m is tak e w

hen oper at ing a

m otor v ehi cl e, a ir p la n e, h el ic o p te r, or boa t w hile intox ic at ed and, by re as on of s uch intox ic at ion, ca

us[ing ] the de at

h of an indi v idua l.” A f

te r S ept em

ber 1,1994, the s ec ond w ay

to com m it inv olunta

ry m ans la ug hte r unde r t

he old l aw be ca m e intox ic a

t i o n m a n s l a u gh t er unde r T EX
. P E N A L C O D E A NN . § 49. 08 (Ve rnon Supp. 2008) . B ef

ore the e f f ec tiv e dat e of

Sec tion 49.08, intox ic at ion m ans la ug hte r w as s im

ply one a lte rnate m et

hod of c om m itt ing the off ens e of invol unta

ry m ans la ug hte r unde r t

he f orm er s tatute

. See Ex parte Roemer , 215 S .W .3d 887 ( T ex . C rim . A pp. 2007)

. 3 Ap pe lla nt a rgue s th a t th e e vid e nc e is le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a te rm inatio n o f h e r r ig hts under Sec tion 161.001(l). Specifica lly , appellant’ s position is that, althoug h she wa s convicted of int oxic a tio n ma

ns la ug hte r, int oxic a tio n ma

ns la ug hte r i s n ot o ne of

th e offe ns e s e nume ra

te d in Section 161.001(1). I nv ol un tar y

ter mi nat io n p roce edi ngs an d s tat ut es ar e st ri ctl y sc ru tin ize d in fa vo r o f t he pa re nt. Ho lic k v . S mi th , 685 S.W .2d 18, 20-21 (Tex

. 1 9 8 5 ). Due proce ss require s that the g rounds for termination be e stablished by clea r and c onvincing evi d en ce . This require s the measur e or de g ree of pr oo f t hat w ill pr od

uc e in t he min d o f t

he tr ie r o f f

a c t a fi rm be lie f o r c on vic tio n a s to the tr uth of the a lle g ations sought to be e stablished. T EX
. F AM
. C ODE ANN . § 101.007 (Ve rnon 2008); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel , 879 S.W .2d 10, 31 (Tex. 1994). Whe n c on du c tin g a le g a l su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w, we re vie w t he e nti re re c or d in the lig ht m os t favor able to the f

inding and deter

mine whether a reasonable trier of fac t could have f

ormed a firm b elief or conviction that its finding wa s true. In re J .F .C. , 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d 2 5 6 , 2 6 6 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 2 )

. We must assume that the trial court resolved di sputed fac ts in favor of i ts finding

. Phillips v. Tex. Dep’ t of Pro te c tiv e & Re

gu lator ySe rv s. , 1 4 9 S. W. 3 d

8 1 4 , 8 1 7 ( T e x. A p p
. — E a s tl an d 2 0 0 4 , n o p e t. )

. We must also disreg ard a ll evidence that a re aso n ab l e fa ct finder c ould have disbelieve d or found incre dible, but we ca

nnot disreg ard undisputed f acts. In re J

.F .C. , 96 S.W .3d at 266. Manslaug hter, a s defined in T EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 19. 0 4 (Ve rnon 2008), is one of the

enumer ated of

fense s upon which termination of the pare nt-child relationship mig ht be based, e ither afte r convic tion o r af

ter having be en plac ed upon community supervision (including defe rre d adjudication community supervision). Appellant ar g ues, howe ver, that intox ication manslaug hter is a se pa rate of fe ns e fr om mans la

ug hte r and

is n ot l ist e d in

Se c tio n 1 61 .0 01 (1 ) a s p ro vid inga ba sis for ter mination. There fore , she say s, beca use t he trial court specific ally terminated he r rig hts under 2 Section 161.001(1), the e vidence is leg ally insufficient to support the ter mination.4

The De partment re sponds to appellant’s ar g ument in two way s. First, it ag ree s with appellant that in to xic a ti o nma

n s la u g h te r “ is n o t a

s p e c if ic a ll y e n u me r a te d

c o n v ic ti o n ” under Section 161.001(1). I t also ag rees that “[t] he first c lause, whic h [appellant] arg ues that the Depa rtment does not meet, state s that te rm i n at ion may be g rante d if a pa

rent ha s actua lly

been convicted of one of the fore g oing [P ]enal [C ]ode offense s.” Howe ver, the Depa rtment claims that pr ov inga c on vic tio n f

or on e of the e nume ra

te d off e ns e s is no t the on ly wa

y that it c an p ro ve its c a se f o r t e r m i n a t i o n ; i tc ana l s o p r o v e i t s c a s e u n d e r t h e s t a tu t e i f i t c an s h o w u n d e r S e c t i o n1 6 1

. 0 0 1 ( l ) ( L) that a par ent has be en “a djudicated unde r Title 3 for c onduct that ca used the de ath or ser ious injury of a c hild and that would constitute a violation of one of the [enumerate d statutes].” The De partment a

rg ues that “Title 3” as conta ined in Section 161.001(l) re fer s to Title 3 of the Texas Penal Code, the Pena l Code section that re fer s to punishme n t s . Howeve r, Section 311.006(1) of

the Tex as C ode C onstruction Act provides that a re fer ence to a title within a

c od e , w ith ou t f

ur the r i de nti fi c a tio n, re fe rs to t he c od e . Sec tio n 161 .0 01 (l ) is with in the Te xas F a mil y Code. Ther e is no furthe r identification of “Title 3” in Sect i o n 161.001(l). The ref ore, Title 3 a s mentioned in Section 161.001(l) is a refer ence to the Tex as Family Code, not the Texas Penal Code. See T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE ANN . § 311.006(1) ( Ver non 2005). Title 3 of the Te x as F amily Code co n tains the J uvenile Just ice Code. Consistent with our holding that the ref

ere nce to T itle 3 in Sec tion 161.001(l) is a ref ere nce to the F amily

Code, the word “adjudicate” is a term of art within Title 3 of the Te x as F amily Code. See, e .g. , T EX
. F AM
. C ODE ANN
. § 54.03 (Ve rnon 2008) ( ref err ing to a n adjudication hear ing at which a dete rmination is made as to whether a child enga g ed in delinquent conduc t or conduc t indicating a need f or super vision). Also consistent with our holding is the statement in the Family Code that, with exceptions not here rele vant, a n order of adjudication is not a convic tion of crime. T EX
. F AM
. C ODE ANN
. § 51.13 (Ve rnon 2008). Wit hout the “adjudication” langua g e in Section 161.001(l), it would not be possible to t e r

mi n a te th e p ar e n ta l r ig h ts o f a juv e n il e p ar e n t s o le ly

u p o nth e g r o u n d s th a t s h e h ad

c omm itt e d o ne of

the e nume rate d a c ts i n Se c tio n 16 1. 00 1(l ) but wa s n ot c on vic te d in

the a du lt jus tic e sy ste m but, r a the r, wa s a dju dic a te d in the juv e nil e jus tic e sy ste m.5

We hold that the refe renc e to Title 3 in Section 161.001(l) is a ref ere nce to that pa

rt of the Texas F amily

Code known as the Juvenile J ustice Code. T EX
. F AM
. C ODE ANN . §§ 51.01-61.107 (Ve rnon 2008). Whil e we express no opinion on whe ther there might have been othe r g rounds upon which appellant’ s pare ntal rig hts m i gh t have be en ter minated, the trial c ourt was ve ry specific that termination was bas ed u p o n appellant’ s conviction for intoxi cation manslaug hter. Intox ication

mans la ug hte r i s cov e re d by Se c tio n 4 9. 08 of the Te xas P e na l Co de and is n ot a n e nume rate d o ff

e ns e in Section 161.001(l). The offense of manslaug hter is cove red by Section 19.04 of the Te x as Penal Code and is an e numerated offe nse in S ec t i o n 1 6 1 .001(l) of the Texas Family Code. Section 161.001(1) is ver

y specific , and in it, the leg islature re fer red to spec ific sec tions of the Texas Penal Code. Perhaps the leg islature would want to consider adding Section 49.08 of the Pena l Code to the list contained in Section 161.001(l) of the F amily Code. Howe ver, f

o r n o w, ap p el lant was

never convicted of any of the enumer ated offe nses, nor had she been adjudicate d under Title 3 of the Texas Family

Code to have eng ag ed in conduct that violated any of the spec ific Penal Code se ctions listed in S ection 161.001(l). The evidence was l eg ally insufficient to support a finding that she had. Appellant’s sole issue on a ppeal is sustained. Appellant has asked us to re nder judg ment denying the petition for termination. We note that she has not c halleng ed the trial court’s finding and judgme nt that it would be in the best interest of the childre n if her pa

renta l rig hts were terminated. Whil e we normally would rende r the judg ment that the trial cour

t should have re ndere d when we reve rse a case on leg al insufficie ncy g rounds, we do have the authority

to remand w hen it would be in the best intere st of justice to do so. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 43 .3 ; In re N.A.F. , 282 S.W. 3d 11 3 (T e x. Ap p. —Wa c o 200 9, no pe t.) ; W illiams v. W

illiams , 150 S.W .3d 436 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied) . Appellant has sa id that she was guilty of intox ication m anslaug hter because she wa s intox icated w hen she dr ove her vehicle in suc h a manne r
a s to c a us e the de a th o f h e r i nf

ant s on . Sh e did no t c on te st the fi nd ing that it wo uld be in t he be st in t e r e s to f

t h e c h i l dr e nt o t e r

m i n a t e h e r

p ar e n t a l r i g h t s
. T h e c a s e b e f o r e u s i s a

c a s e o f f ir st impression reg ardingthe application of the offe nse of intoxi cation manslaug hter in this context. The interests of justice a

re be tter ser

ved by a re mand of thi s case in light of our holdingin this opi nion.6

The judg ment of the trial court is r ever sed, and we rema nd this c ase for another trial. There ha s b e e n no c omp la int re g ard ing the te mpo ra ry or de rs that th e tr ia l c ourt e nte re d e arl ie r, and

tho se temporar y order s remain in ef

fec t pending the new tr ial of this case

.

J I M R. W RI GHT CH I EF JUSTI CE
Aug ust 6, 2009 Panel consists of: Wright, C.J ., M c C a l l , J. , an d

S t r an g e , J.