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*********************************************** 
NICHOLAS ADAMS v. COMMISSIONER

OF MOTOR VEHICLES

(AC 40272)

Alvord, Keller and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, who had been charged with the crime of operating a motor

vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs in

violation of statute (§ 14-227a), appealed to the trial court from the

decision by the defendant Commissioner of Motor Vehicles suspending

his motor vehicle operator’s license for forty-five days, pursuant to

statute (§ 14-227b [g]), for his refusal to submit to a urine test to determine his blood alcohol content. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court,

challenging the findings of the hearing officer that there was probable

cause for his arrest, that he refused to submit to chemical testing or

analysis and that he had been operating a motor vehicle. Held that the

judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal was affirmed;

the trial court having thoroughly addressed the arguments raised in this

appeal, this court adopted the well reasoned and clearly articulated

decision of the trial court as the opinion of this court.

Argued January 22—officially released May 22, 2018

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision by the defendant suspending the plaintiff’s motor vehicle operator’s license,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district

of New Britain and tried to the court, Huddleston, J.;

judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Jonathan Ross Sills, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Christine Jean-Louis, assistant attorney general,

with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney

general, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, Nicholas Adams, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor

of the defendant, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

(commissioner), dismissing his appeal from the decision of the commissioner to suspend his motor vehicle

operator’s license, pursuant to General Statutes § 14-

227b,1

for forty-five days and requiring an ignition interlock device in his motor vehicle for one year. On appeal,

the plaintiff claims that the court erred in finding that

(1) he was operating a motor vehicle; (2) he refused

to submit to chemical testing; and (3) the police had

probable cause to arrest him for operating under the

influence in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a.2 We

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On May 14, 2016, the plaintiff was

arrested and charged with operating under the influence

of liquor or drugs in violation of § 14-227a.3 The plaintiff

submitted to a Breathalyzer test, but refused a urine

test. As a result of this refusal, and in accordance with

§ 14-227b, the plaintiff’s motor vehicle operator’s

license was suspended by the Department of Motor

Vehicles (department) for forty-five days, effective June

13, 2016, and he was required to install and maintain

an ignition interlock device in his vehicle for one

year thereafter.

Subsequently, the plaintiff requested, and was

granted, an administrative hearing to contest the license

suspension. The administrative hearing was held on

June 8, 2016, before a department hearing officer, acting

on behalf of the commissioner. The hearing officer rendered a decision the same day as the hearing, ordering

the suspension of the plaintiff’s motor vehicle operator’s license or operating privilege for forty-five days

and the installation of an ignition interlock device for

one year thereafter.

On June 17, 2016, the plaintiff filed an appeal in the

Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183,

challenging the findings of the hearing officer that (1)

there was probable cause to arrest him for operating a

motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating

liquor or any drug or both; (2) he refused to submit to

a chemical testing or analysis; and (3) he was operating

the motor vehicle. A one day trial took place before

the court on December 1, 2016. On March 7, 2017, the

court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal and rendered judgment in favor of the commissioner. This appeal

followed.

Having carefully reviewed the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and applicable law, we find no

error in the trial court’s determination. Accordingly, we

adopt the well reasoned and clearly articulated decision

of the trial court, en toto, as the opinion of this court.
See Adams v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No.

CV-16-6033742-S (March 7, 2017) (reprinted at 182 Conn.

App. 169); see also Samakaab v. Dept. of Social Services, 178 Conn. App. 52, 54, 173 A.3d 1004 (2017).

The judgment is affirmed.

1 General Statutes § 14-227b is commonly referred to as the implied consent statute. Santiago v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 134 Conn. App.

668, 674, 39 A.3d 1224 (2012).

Section § 14-227b provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any person who operates

a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given such person’s

consent to a chemical analysis of such person’s blood, breath or urine and,

if such person is a minor, such person’s parent or parents or guardian shall

also be deemed to have given their consent. . . .

‘‘(c) If the person arrested refuses to submit to such test or analysis . . .

the police officer, acting on behalf of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,

shall immediately revoke and take possession of the motor vehicle operator’s

license . . . . The police officer shall prepare a report of the incident and

shall mail or otherwise transmit in accordance with this subsection the

report and a copy of the results of any chemical test or analysis to the

Department of Motor Vehicles within three business days. . . .

‘‘(e) (1) . . . [T]he Commissioner of Motor Vehicles may suspend any

operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege of such person effective

as of a date certain, which date shall be not later than thirty days after the

date such person received notice of such person’s arrest by the police officer.

Any person whose operator’s license or nonresident operating privilege has

been suspended in accordance with this subdivision shall automatically be

entitled to a hearing before the commissioner to be held in accordance with

the provisions of chapter 54 and prior to the effective date of the suspension.

The commissioner shall send a suspension notice to such person informing

such person that such person’s operator’s license or nonresident operating

privilege is suspended as of a date certain and that such person is entitled

to a hearing prior to the effective date of the suspension and may schedule

such hearing by contacting the Department of Motor Vehicles not later than

seven days after the date of mailing of such suspension notice. . . .’’

2 General Statutes § 14-227a (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No person shall

operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or

any drug or both. A person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle

while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both if such

person operates a motor vehicle (1) while under the influence of intoxicating

liquor or any drug or both, or (2) while such person has an elevated blood

alcohol content. . . .’’

3 The plaintiff also was charged with evading responsibility in violation

of General Statutes § 14-224 (a) and (b), and failure to drive right in violation

of General Statutes § 14-230. Those charges are not at issue in this appeal.