IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCCOA-135

No. COA20-548

Filed 1 March 2022

McDowell County, No. 18 CRS 50817-18

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

JOANNA KAYE JULIUS

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 17 April 2019 by Judge J. 

Thomas Davis in McDowell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 

October 2021.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General William 

Walton, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Hannah 

Hall Love, for defendant-appellant.

TYSON, Judge. 

¶ 1 Joanna Kaye Julius (“Defendant”) appeals her convictions of trafficking in 

methamphetamine by possession and possession of methamphetamine with the

intent to sell or deliver. We find no error.

I. Background

¶ 2 McDowell County Sheriff’s Deputy Jesse Hicks (“Deputy Hicks”) and State 

Highway Patrol Trooper Justin Sanders (“Trooper Sanders”) responded to a single-
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

Opinion of the Court

car accident on Tom’s Creek Road on 20 May 2018. At the time of the crash, 

Defendant was the passenger and her acquaintance, Kyle, was driving the vehicle 

with Defendant’s permission. The silver Suzuki SUV was owned by Defendant’s 

parents, and had come to rest in a drainage ditch on the side of the road, with the 

driver’s side partially submerged in water. 

¶ 3 At least three witnesses at the site of the accident told the officers the driver 

had fled the scene and walked into nearby woods because of having outstanding 

warrants. Defendant stood alone, away from those gathered on the side of the road, 

with a pink backpack on the ground next to her. She provided Trooper Sanders with 

her identification from the wallet inside her pink backpack. Defendant also told 

Trooper Sanders the driver, a man she knew as Kyle, had fled the scene. Defendant 

claimed not to know Kyle’s full or last name.

¶ 4 Trooper Sanders searched the SUV to “look[ ] for Kyle’s driver’s license or ID.” 

He entered the car through the passenger side and found a black and green Nike bag 

on the passenger side floorboard. Inside the Nike bag, Trooper Sanders discovered a 

black box. Inside the box were two cell phones, a scale, and two large bags of a clear 

crystal-like substance, which was later determined to be 40.83 grams of 

methamphetamine.

¶ 5 Officers placed Defendant into custody after locating the substances inside of 

the vehicle. The officers searched her pink backpack. Inside of Defendant’s backpack,
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

Opinion of the Court

the officers found a glass smoking pipe, five cell phones, a handgun, a notebook, 

$1,785 in cash, and a clear container holding several bags of a white crystal-like 

substance, one of which contained one tenth of an ounce of methamphetamine. 

¶ 6 Defense counsel filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence found in the 

black and green Nike bag and the pink backpack, alleging the search of the vehicle 

violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches and 

seizures. 

¶ 7 During a hearing on 5 March 2019, Trooper Sanders testified he had searched 

the vehicle to locate the driver’s identification in order to investigate the motor 

vehicle collision and a potential hit-and-run. The alleged driver, Kyle, had left the 

scene of a car accident after causing property damage. The trial court concluded the 

warrantless search was constitutional because Trooper Sanders had probable cause 

to search the SUV and denied Defendant’s motion. 

¶ 8 Defendant was indicted for two counts of possession of methamphetamine, 

possession of drug paraphernalia, two counts of trafficking methamphetamine, 

possession with intent to sell and deliver a Schedule II controlled substance, and 

failure to appear. 

¶ 9 Defendant’s trial began on 15 April 2019. Defendant pled guilty to possession 

of methamphetamine. Pursuant to her plea, the State agreed to consolidate the 

conviction of possession of methamphetamine with Defendant’s conviction of 
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

Opinion of the Court

possession with intent to sell and deliver methamphetamine in 18 CRS 50818 and 

dismiss the charges of possession of drug paraphernalia and failure to appear. 

¶ 10 Defendant was convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine by possession by 

a jury’s verdict and sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 70 to maximum 93 

months imprisonment. The court consolidated Defendant’s convictions of possession 

with intent to sell and deliver and possession of methamphetamine for judgment, and 

imposed a sentence of 6-17 months in prison that was suspended for 30 months of 

supervised probation, to commence upon Defendant’s release from prison. Defendant 

appealed. 

II. Jurisdiction

¶ 11 Appellate jurisdiction is proper pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1)

(2021).

III. Issues

¶ 12 Defendant contends the trial court: (1) erred in denying her motion to suppress 

evidence found in a warrantless search of her parents’ vehicle without sufficient 

probable cause; and, (2) plainly erred by failing to provide an additional instruction 

about her actual knowledge of the drugs found inside the vehicle. 

IV. Standard of Review

In examining the case before us, our review is limited. It is 

the trial judge’s responsibility to make findings of fact that 

are supported by the evidence, and then to derive 

conclusions of law based on those findings of fact. Where 
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

Opinion of the Court

the evidence presented supports the trial judge’s findings 

of fact, these findings are binding on appeal. . . . The trial 

court’s conclusions of law, however, are fully reviewable on 

appeal.

State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 207–08, 539 S.E.2d 625, 630–31 (2000).

V. Defendant’s Motion to Suppress

¶ 13 It is well established that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, 

without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated 

exceptions.” State v. Fizovic, 240 N.C. App. 448, 452, 770 S.E.2d 717, 720 (2015)

(citations omitted). 

[W]here a search of a suspect’s person occurs before instead 

of after formal arrest, such search can be equally justified 

as “incident to the arrest” provided probable cause to arrest 

existed prior to the search and it is clear that the evidence 

seized was in no way necessary to establish the probable 

cause. If an officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect 

and as incident to that arrest would be entitled to make a

reasonable search of his person, we see no value in a rule 

which invalidates the search merely because it precedes 

actual arrest. The justification for the search incident to 

arrest is the need for immediate action to protect the 

arresting officer from the use of weapons and to prevent 

destruction of evidence of the crime. 

State v. Wooten, 34 N.C. App. 85, 89–90, 237 S.E.2d 301, 305 (1977) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted).

¶ 14 The same reasoning in Wooten applies to the search of Defendant’s parents’ 
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

Opinion of the Court

vehicle involved in the accident and subsequently of her person and backpack. Our 

Supreme Court held, “when investigators have a reasonable and articulable basis to 

believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in a suspect’s vehicle 

after the occupants have been removed and secured, the investigators are permitted 

to conduct a search of that vehicle.” State v. Mbacke, 365 N.C. 403, 409-10, 721 S.E.2d 

218, 222 (2012).

¶ 15 Defendant challenges the following conclusion of law: “Trooper J.L. Sanders 

did not know . . . the true identity of the suspect, the cause of the collision, the extent 

of any damage caused by the collision, or the reason the alleged perpetrator had fled, 

if any. The answer to those inquiries lay within the vehicle driven by Kyle Lytle.” 

¶ 16 Here, the evidence and findings show officers received a dispatch call and 

responded to the scene of a vehicle accident. Defendant told officers the vehicle 

belonged to her parents, she was a passenger in the car at the time of the accident, 

and she had allowed Kyle to drive the SUV. Defendant stated she did not know 

“Kyle’s full name.” 

¶ 17 Officers on the scene were told the purported driver of the vehicle had fled from 

the scene because he had pending active arrest warrants. Defendant claimed she was 

not driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Defendant could not tell officers if 

the purported driver had taken his driver’s license or other identification with him. 

Trooper Saunders’ search of the vehicle was limited to plain view areas and 
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

Opinion of the Court

containers in which the alleged driver’s identification could have reasonably been 

located.

¶ 18 Officers had reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle to verify the claims of 

another occupant and custodian of the vehicle to determine that alleged driver’s 

identity. Kyle’s true identity was unknown at the time of the search. Kyle’s 

identification may not have been inside the vehicle, but there was no other way for 

the officers to try to find information to identify the driver if the passengers and other 

witnesses did not know or would not provide his full name. The identification of the 

purported driver may have reasonably been determined from looking inside the 

wrecked vehicle. 

¶ 19 It is not disputed, and evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the 

officers did not know the “true identity” of the purported driver, the cause of the 

collision, the extent of the damage caused by the collision, or the reason the driver 

had fled. Presuming the last sentence of the conclusion: “The answer to those 

inquiries lay within the vehicle” is overstated, the officers were trying to identify the

driver, who had fled from the scene of the accident, which itself is a crime, and who 

reportedly had outstanding warrants for other crimes. Defendant providing the name 

“Kyle” did not identify the driver. As it turned out, “Kyle” was middle name of the 

driver. 

¶ 20 In either event, the officers were justified in searching the wrecked vehicle to 
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

Opinion of the Court

get it out of the ditch for an inventory or for officer safety. Officers searched the 

vehicle in an effort to find the purported driver’s name or some means of

identification. Once they discovered the black and green Nike bag containing druglike substances and multiple cell phones was discovered, the officer testified “the 

nature of the investigation changed.” The trial court properly denied Defendant’s 

motion to suppress. Mbacke, 365 N.C. at 409-10, 721 S.E.2d at 222.

VI. Jury Instructions

¶ 21 Defendant failed to object to the jury instructions at trial and is limited only to 

appellate review for plain error. “[T]o rise to the level of plain error, the error in the 

instructions must be so fundamental that it denied the defendant a fair trial and 

quite probably tilted the scales against him.” State v. Barton, 335 N.C. 696, 702, 441 

S.E.2d 295, 298 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

¶ 22 “A jury instruction must be evaluated as a whole. If the entire instruction is 

an accurate statement of the law, one isolated piece that might be considered 

improper or wrong on its own will not be found sufficient to support reversal.” State

v. Roache, 358 N.C. 243, 311, 595 S.E.2d 381, 424 (2004).

¶ 23 Defendant argues the court failed to instruct on the knowledge element of the 

illegal drug charges. The jury was instructed that the State must prove Defendant 

“knowingly” possessed methamphetamine. The trial court adequately advised the 

jury of the knowledge requirement by stating, “[a] person possesses 
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

Opinion of the Court

methamphetamine if the person is aware of its presence . . . and intent to control the 

disposition or use of that substance.”

¶ 24 In totality, the jury was sufficiently instructed the State had to prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt that Defendant knowingly possessed methamphetamine, and 

Defendant could not be convicted if she lacked knowledge of the methamphetamine 

found inside of her parent’s vehicle. Roache, 358 N.C. at 311, 595 S.E.2d at 424. The 

trial court properly instructed the jury that the State had to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Defendant knowingly possessed methamphetamine. 

Defendant’s argument is overruled. 

VII. Conclusion

¶ 25 The trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. Officers had 

reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle involved in an accident to find the 

identification of the purported driver and, from the contents of black and green Nike 

bag, developed probable cause to search Defendant’s person and backpack. The trial 

court’s instructions to the jury adequately explained the knowledge element and 

requirement of the possession of methamphetamines charge. Defendant received a 

fair trial free from prejudicial errors. We affirm the findings and conclusions as noted 

to deny Defendant’s motion to suppress and find no error in the jury’s verdict or in 

the judgment entered thereon. It is so ordered.

NO ERROR. 
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

Opinion of the Court

Chief Judge STROUD concurs.

Judge INMAN dissents in part and concurs in the result only in part with 

separate opinion.
No. COA 20-548 – State v. Julius

INMAN, Judge, dissenting in part; concurring in result only in part.

¶ 26 Because the evidence and argument presented to the trial court did not 

establish probable cause for the warrantless search of Defendant’s parent’s vehicle, I 

respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision affirming the trial court’s denial of 

Defendant’s motion to suppress. I concur in the majority’s mandate denying 

Defendant relief related to the trial court’s failure to give the requested jury 

instruction, but for a different reason, as explained below. 

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 27 The majority opinion omits the following facts relevant to Trooper Sanders’ 

search of the vehicle: 

¶ 28 In addition to telling officers that the driver of the vehicle had fled the scene 

on foot, witnesses described the driver as a white male with short hair and a facial 

tattoo. Deputy Hicks was familiar with a man named Kyle, later determined to be 

William Kyle Lytle (“Mr. Lytle”), matching the description of the driver.

¶ 29 After learning that the driver had fled but before learning the driver’s last 

name, Trooper Sanders searched the vehicle without Defendant’s consent, specifically 

“looking for Kyle’s driver’s license or ID.” Neither the black and green Nike bag nor 

the black box discovered during the search of the vehicle contained any identification.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained by Warrantless Search of Vehicle

¶ 30 We review a motion to suppress to determine “whether competent evidence 
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

INMAN, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result in part

supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the 

conclusions of law.” State v. Malone, 373 N.C. 134, 145, 833 S.E.2d 779, 786 (2019) 

(citation omitted). The trial court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if 

supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting. Id. at 145, 833 

S.E.2d at 786. Findings of fact not challenged on appeal are binding. State v. Lupek, 

214 N.C. App. 146, 150, 712 S.E.2d 915, 918 (2011). We review the trial court’s 

conclusions of law de novo. Malone, 373 N.C. at 145, 833 S.E.2d at 786 (citation 

omitted).

¶ 31 The Fourth Amendment protects all persons from “unreasonable searches and 

seizures,” U.S. Const. amend. IV, subject to only a few clearly designated exceptions, 

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290, 298 (1978). To overcome a 

defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, the State bears the burden of demonstrating 

“how the [warrantless search] was exempted from the general constitutional demand 

for a warrant.” State v. Nowell, 144 N.C. App. 636, 642, 550 S.E.2d 807, 812 (2001) 

(brackets in original) (citation omitted).

¶ 32 Here, the trial court concluded the search of the vehicle was constitutional 

based on the following reasoning:

During his investigation of this collision, Trooper J.L. 

Sanders was provided with the first name and physical 

characteristics of the alleged perpetrator of a hit and run. 

He became aware that someone with the first name ‘Kyle’ 

had been operating a silver Suzuki SUV involved in a 
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

INMAN, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result in part

collision and that this man had fled the scene on foot. He 

learned that the man was concerned about having 

unserved warrants. In speaking with each of the 

eyewitnesses, Trooper J.L. Sanders and Deputy Jesse 

Hicks were able to determine it was possible that the crime 

of hit and run had been committed and that the person 

responsible was fleeing into the woods. Trooper J.L. 

Sanders did not know, however, the true identity of the 

driver, the cause of the collision, the extent of any damage 

caused by the collision, or the reason the alleged 

perpetrator fled, if any. The answer to those inquiries lay 

within the vehicle. It was reasonable for [Trooper] J.L. 

Sanders to conclude that the vehicle may contain evidence 

of the true identity of the driver, the cause of the collision, 

and/or the reason for the driver fleeing the scene, and he 

therefore had probable cause to search the vehicle for that 

evidence . . . . As a result, Trooper J.L. Sanders had legal 

authority to search the vehicle and every place within the 

vehicle where any form of identification for Kyle Lytle 

could be found. Trooper J.L. Sanders’ subsequent search 

of the black and green Nike bag and the black box inside it 

were therefore constitutional searches.

¶ 33 While there may have been probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant 

by a magistrate, no exception to the warrant requirement authorized the warrantless 

search of the vehicle on the scene of the single-car accident in this case. Even if it 

was reasonable to believe that Kyle’s identification would be in the car to corroborate 

witnesses’ testimony that he was the driver and that he had subsequently committed 

the crime of hit and run by leaving the scene of the accident, the warrant requirement 

protection may not be usurped absent some exception. See State v. Fizovic, 240 N.C. 

App. 448, 452, 770 S.E.2d 717, 720 (2015) (“Searches conducted outside the judicial 
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

INMAN, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result in part

process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under 

the Fourth Amendment––subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.”). 

1. Search Incident to Arrest Exception

¶ 34 The majority relies on the State’s argument that the search of the vehicle was 

incident to Mr. Lytle’s arrest and therefore authorized without a warrant, but Mr. 

Lytle was not arrested anywhere near the vehicle, and he was not arrested at the 

time of the search.

¶ 35 Police may “search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the 

arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the 

search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of 

arrest.” Fizovic, 240 N.C. App. at 452, 770 S.E.2d at 720 (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 

U.S. 332, 351, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485, 501 (2009)) (emphasis added). 

¶ 36 The search of the vehicle fails an essential threshold requirement of the search 

incident to arrest exception––the arrest of a recent occupant of the vehicle. Trooper 

Sanders testified that at the time of the warrantless search of the vehicle, the person 

officers intended to arrest in connection with the accident, the driver, Kyle, was not 

on the scene and his whereabouts were unknown. The officers’ authority to arrest 

Mr. Lytle once they found him “does not necessarily include the authority to search a 

motor vehicle in the absence of probable cause.” State v. Braxton, 90 N.C. App. 204, 
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

INMAN, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result in part

208, 368 S.E.2d 56, 59 (1988).

¶ 37 For a search incident to arrest based on an outstanding warrant, “it is highly 

unlikely that [evidence relevant to the crime of arrest] would exist to permit a search 

of a vehicle, unless incriminating facts concerning the offense charged in the warrant 

exist at the arrest scene.” Robert L. Farb, Arrest, Search, and Investigation in North 

Carolina 250-52 (UNC Sch. of Gov’t, 5th ed. 2016) (citing United States v. Hinson, 

585 F.3d 1328, 1334-35 (10th Cir. 2009) (applying Gant)). Because Mr. Lytle was not 

present on the scene at the time of the search, there was no arrest to justify, even 

retroactively, the warrantless search of the vehicle. Cf. State v. Fisher, 141 N.C. App. 

448, 456, 539 S.E.2d 677, 683 (2000) (“Because [the] defendant was never arrested, 

the search of his vehicle was not justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest. 

Furthermore, in accordance with Knowles, the officers were not justified in searching 

[the] defendant’s car based upon the issuance of the citation. This is true even though 

the officers may have had probable cause to arrest [the] defendant.”). 

¶ 38 The majority relies on State v. Wooten, 34 N.C. App. 85, 237 S.E.2d 301 (1977),

to justify the warrantless search at issue in this case. In Wooten, this Court reasoned: 

[W]here a search of a suspect’s person occurs before instead 

of after formal arrest, such search can be equally justified 

as ‘incident to the arrest’ provided probable cause to arrest 

existed prior to the search and it is clear that the evidence 

seized was in no way necessary to establish the probable 

cause. 
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

INMAN, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result in part

Id. at 89, 237 S.E.2d at 305. Contrary to the majority’s summary of the evidence, 

officers did not testify that they suspected Defendant had been driving the vehicle at 

the time of the collision. Witnesses told police unequivocally Kyle had been driving 

the vehicle. Further, there was no probable cause to search or arrest Defendant; even 

if she were the driver, she remained with the vehicle after the accident. See N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 20-166 (2021) (“Duty to stop in event of a crash.”). The search of the 

vehicle could not be justified as incident to Defendant’s arrest because, as the majority 

concedes, the illegal drugs and paraphernalia seized from the search of the vehicle 

singularly established the probable cause to arrest and search Defendant and her 

belongings. See Wooten, 34 N.C. App. at 89, 237 S.E.2d at 305. Police did not form 

the intent to arrest Defendant until after finding contraband in the vehicle through 

the warrantless search.

2. Other Exceptions to Warrant Requirement

¶ 39 Nor was the search of the vehicle authorized under the automobile exception 

to the warrant requirement, as the State contends. 

¶ 40 “A search of a motor vehicle which is on a public roadway or in a public 

vehicular area is not in violation of the fourth amendment if it is based on probable 

cause, even though a warrant has not been obtained.” State v. Isleib, 319 N.C. 634, 

638, 356 S.E.2d 573, 576 (1987) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809, 72 L. 

Ed. 2d 572, 584 (1982)). “Probable cause requires that the existing facts and 
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

INMAN, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result in part

circumstances be sufficient to support a fair probability or reasonable belief that 

contraband will be found in the automobile.” State v. Corpening, 109 N.C. App. 586, 

589, 427 S.E.2d 892, 894 (1993) (citing State v. Simmons, 278 N.C. 468, 180 S.E.2d 

97 (1971); State v. Ford, 70 N.C. App. 244, 318 S.E.2d 914 (1984)). The automobile 

exception exists because “the inherent mobility of motor vehicles” creates the risk 

that evidence of criminal activity will be removed from the scene before officers have 

time to obtain a search warrant. Isleib, 319 N.C. at 637, 356 S.E.2d at 576; see also 

Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1669, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9, 18 (2018) (“The ‘ready 

mobility’ of vehicles served as the core justification for the automobile exception for 

many years.” (citations omitted)). In this case, as the majority acknowledges, the 

vehicle was in a ditch and inoperable, negating the automobile exception’s purpose. 

¶ 41 The other theories offered by the majority to justify the warrantless search of 

the vehicle––officer safety, an inventory search, or search for other people––are 

nowhere to be found in the evidence, the officers’ testimony at the motion to suppress 

hearing, in the trial court’s findings on the motion to suppress, or in the State’s 

arguments presented on appeal. It is not within the province of this Court to create 

the probable cause which might have existed to justify the warrantless search of the 

vehicle; that burden falls squarely on the State to present evidence to the trial court. 

See Nowell, 144 N.C. App. at 642, 550 S.E.2d at 812. I would hold that the 

warrantless search of the vehicle was unconstitutional.
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

INMAN, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result in part

3. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

¶ 42 Because the warrantless search of the vehicle was unconstitutional, the 

evidence discovered in the black and green Nike bag should be suppressed under the 

exclusionary rule. See State v. Jackson, 199 N.C. App. 236, 244, 681 S.E.2d 492, 498 

(2009); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 455 

(1963) (holding evidence that is the “fruit” of an illegal search is inadmissible).

¶ 43 As the trial court concluded, “[t]he discovery of what appeared to be 

methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia inside of the black and green Nike bag 

found in the passenger floorboard provided [the officers] with probable cause to arrest 

[Defendant] and search her pink backpack.” Because the probable cause to arrest 

Defendant and search her pink backpack arose only from the illegal search of the 

vehicle, the evidence seized from Defendant’s backpack also should have been 

excluded as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Jackson, 199 N.C. App. at 243-44, 681 

S.E.2d at 497-98. 

¶ 44 I would reverse the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, 

vacate Defendant’s convictions, and remand for a new trial.

B. Additional Jury Instruction

¶ 45 I concur in the majority’s denial of relief to Defendant based on the trial court’s 

failure to instruct the jury on additional pattern jury language after Defendant 

denied knowledge of the drugs in the black and green Nike bag. But unlike the 
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

INMAN, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result in part

majority, which holds that the trial court did not err, I would conclude that Defendant 

has failed to demonstrate plain error.

¶ 46 “Failure to follow the pattern instructions does not automatically result in 

error.” State v. Bunch, 363 N.C. 841, 846,689 S.E.2d 866, 870 (2010). We will uphold 

instructions when, “viewed in their entirety, [the instructions] present the law fairly 

and accurately to the jury.” State v. Roache, 358 N.C. 243, 304, 595 S.E.2d 381, 420 

(2004).

¶ 47 Footnote 6 of the pattern jury instruction for drug trafficking provides: “If the 

defendant contends that the defendant did not know the true identity of what the 

defendant possessed, add this language to the first sentence: ‘and the defendant knew 

that what the defendant possessed was (name substance).’” N.C.P.I. Crim. 260.17 n.6 

(2019) (emphasis added).

¶ 48 The supplemental instruction is derived from State v. Boone, 310 N.C. 284, 311 

S.E.2d 552 (1984), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Oates,

366 N.C. 264, 732 S.E.2d 571 (2012), in which our Supreme Court held

the trial court erred in instructing the jury that defendant 

could be found guilty of possessing marijuana if he had 

reason to know that what he possessed was marijuana . . . . 

[T]he court should have instructed the jury that the 

defendant is guilty only in the event he knew the 

marijuana was in the trunk of his automobile and that if 

he was ignorant of that fact, and the jury should so find, 

they should return a verdict of not guilty.
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

INMAN, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result in part

Id. at 294, 311 S.E.2d at 559. Here, on the charge of drug trafficking by possession, 

the trial court instructed jurors, in relevant part, that they must determine whether 

the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that “the defendant knowingly possessed 

methamphetamine. A person possesses methamphetamine if the person is aware of 

its presence and has, either by one’s self or together with others, both the power and 

intent to control the disposition or use of that substance.” The Supreme Court’s 

holding in Boone and the additional jury instruction would have resulted in the jury 

being told in this case that “defendant knowingly possessed the methamphetamine in 

the black bag and the defendant knew that what she possessed in the black bag was 

methamphetamine.” (emphasis added).

¶ 49 Throughout the trial, Defendant denied knowledge of the contents of the black 

and green bag, which she testified Mr. Lytle had left in her car at the time of the 

accident before he fled the scene. She testified she never opened, touched, or saw 

what was in the bag. During closing argument, Defendant’s counsel argued that even 

if Defendant knowingly possessed the methamphetamine contained in her pink 

backpack, she did not knowingly possess a trafficking amount of methamphetamine 

because she had no knowledge of what was in the black and green Nike bag. The 

State asserted in its closing arguments that Defendant was aware of the 

methamphetamine contained in the black and green bag and therefore was guilty of 

trafficking by possession. 
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

INMAN, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result in part

¶ 50 Here, unlike in Boone, the trial court correctly instructed jurors on the 

standard of actual knowledge required for them to find Defendant guilty of possessing 

a controlled substance. But in light of the evidence presented to support the 

trafficking charge, Defendant’s knowledge of the contents of the black and green bag 

was a “determinative issue of fact” at trial, and she was still entitled to the additional 

jury instruction on that issue of fact. State v. Lopez, 176 N.C. App. 538, 546, 626 

S.E.2d 736, 742 (2006) (awarding the defendant a new trial because “[o]ur courts have 

previously awarded new trials for the failure to properly instruct the jury that a 

defendant was guilty only if he knew a package contained an illicit substance, when 

the defendant had presented evidence that he lacked knowledge of the true contents 

of the package.”) (citing Boone, 310 N.C. at 295, 311 S.E.2d at 559)); see also State v. 

Coleman, 227 N.C. App. 354, 362, 742 S.E.2d 346, 352 (2013) (“[S]ubstantive evidence 

that defendant did not know that the substance he possessed was heroin was 

sufficient to . . . trigger the necessity to give the required additional instruction on 

guilty knowledge contained within [the pattern jury instructions].”) For these 

reasons, I would hold the trial court erred in failing to further instruct the jury about 

Defendant’s knowledge as prescribed by our pattern jury instructions. But given the 

ability of Defendant’s trial counsel to present to jurors the argument that Defendant 

did not know the black and green Nike bag contained methamphetamine, and 

considering all other evidence of record, as well as the jury’s sole province to assess 
STATE V. JULIUS

2022-NCCOA-135

INMAN, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result in part

the credibility of all witnesses, I do not conclude that the error had a probable impact 

on the jury’s verdict. See Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d at 334.

III. CONCLUSION

¶ 51 Based on the reasons outlined above, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s 

decision in part and concur in result only in part.