Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed March 3, 2015.

In the

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-01107-CR

HENRY JAMES GRADNEY II, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 248th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1251706

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Henry James Gradney II appeals the trial court’s judgment 

revoking his community supervision. Appellant contends that the trial court 

abused its discretion because the evidence is insufficient to prove that he 

committed an offense against the laws of the State of Texas. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 15, 2010, appellant pleaded guilty to driving while 

intoxicated—third offender, a third-degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code 

§§ 49.04(a), 49.09(b) (West 2011). On January 4, 2011, the trial court sentenced 

appellant to four years’ confinement, probated for four years. Among the 

conditions of his community supervision was that appellant not commit any

offense against the laws of the State of Texas. 

On October 4, 2013, the State filed a motion to revoke community 

supervision, alleging two separate thefts committed by appellant. 

The trial court held a revocation hearing on November 21, 2013. The trial 

court found that the first theft allegation in the motion was not true. However, the 

court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the second theft allegation in 

the motion was true. The trial court revoked appellant’s community supervision 

and sentenced him to two years’ confinement.

II. ANALYSIS

In a single issue, appellant complains the trial court abused its discretion 

because the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that he committed the 

offense of theft. See Tex. Penal Code § 31.03 (West 2011).

In its motion, the State alleged that appellant committed two separate thefts 

while on community supervision. The trial court found the first allegation “not 

true.” The court found that the following allegation was “true”: 

On or about October 2, 2013, in Harris County, Texas, the Defendant 

Henry James Gradney II, hereafter styled the Defendant did and there 

unlawfully appropriate, by acquiring and otherwise exercising control 

over property, namely, one motor vehicle owned by Robert Trammel, 

hereafter styled the Complainant, of the value of over one thousand 

five hundred dollars, with the intent to deprive the Complainant of the 

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property.

During the revocation hearing, Houston Police Officer Zielonka testified that 

on October 2, 2013, while on proactive patrol, he observed appellant in the vicinity 

of 2710 Wayne Street, Houston, Harris County, Texas, a high-crime area. 

Zielonka testified that at the time he observed appellant, appellant appeared to be 

in the process of “stripping” a motor vehicle. Zielonka further testified that the 

vehicle had been reported stolen and that Robert Trammel was the registered 

owner. 

Appellant complains that there is no evidence in the record to prove to 

whom the vehicle was registered. In addition, appellant asserts that the record is 

devoid of evidence showing that appellant’s possession of the vehicle was without 

the effective consent of the owner.

We review an order revoking community supervision under an abuse-ofdiscretion-standard. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2006). In conducting this review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the trial court’s order. Greer v. State, 999 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d). The trial court is the exclusive judge of the 

credibility of the witnesses and determines if the allegations in the motion are 

sufficiently demonstrated. Id. The State must prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the defendant violated a condition of his probation. Id. The 

preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is met when the greater weight of the 

credible evidence before the trial court supports a reasonable belief that a condition 

of community supervision has been violated. Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 764.

A trial court does not abuse its discretion in revoking probation if there is 

one sufficient ground for revocation. See Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“We have long held that ‘one sufficient ground for 

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revocation would support the trial court's order revoking’ community 

supervision.”); Joseph v. State, 3 S.W.3d 627, 640 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (“A finding of a single violation of community supervision is 

sufficient to support revocation.”).

Here, the preponderance of the direct and circumstantial evidence, along 

with reasonable inferences, is sufficient to establish that appellant committed a 

violation of the conditions of his probation. The record establishes that Zielonka 

observed a motor vehicle (missing the motor) which appeared to be in the process 

of being “stripped” by appellant. The vehicle was missing the engine, hood, doors, 

and tires. Zielonka testified that the vehicle was confirmed to be reported stolen, 

and was registered to Robert Trammel—the name of the owner alleged in the 

motion to revoke probation. Appellant offered no explanation for his possession 

of, and did not claim to own, the vehicle. It is reasonable to infer from this 

evidence that the owner of the vehicle was Robert Trammel, and that appellant’s 

possession was without Trammel’s effective consent. See Joseph, 3 S.W.3d at 641 

(concluding that evidence at revocation hearing raised inference of guilt and was 

sufficient for trial court to conclude appellant committed theft offense).

We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

/s/ Marc W. Brown 

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jamison, Busby, and Brown.

Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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