COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

October 17, 2023

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2022AP572-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2018CF1765

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

HOWARD EDWARD WELLS,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Brown County: 

DONALD R. ZUIDMULDER, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ. 

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Howard Wells, pro se, appeals from a judgment 

convicting him of possession of a firearm by a felon. Wells raises a series of 
No. 2022AP572-CR

2

issues related to motions he filed seeking to dismiss the complaint and to suppress 

evidence. We conclude that the issues Wells attempts to raise on appeal related to 

the complaint are procedurally barred by his entry of a no-contest plea. We reject 

Wells’ remaining arguments challenging the circuit court’s suppression ruling and 

affirm the judgment of conviction.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On December 11, 2018, a Brown County police officer met with 

Barbara Parks1at a domestic abuse shelter in response to a dispatch call. Parks 

informed the officer that she had previously been in a physically and verbally 

abusive relationship with Wells, with whom she shared two children. Parks

alleged that Wells had recently been “intimidating” her. Among several incidents 

that Parks described were a sexual assault, a beating that led her to seek medical 

treatment for a head injury, and an episode during which Wells texted Parks that 

he would have shot her if their daughter had not been present. 

¶3 On December 14, 2018, Parks again contacted the police to report that 

Wells, armed with a gun and a hammer, had confronted her and another woman, 

Kate Woods, outside of Wells’ apartment building while Parks was attempting to 

retrieve her truck. Parks reported that Wells had threatened to shoot them.

Responding officers arrested Wells at the scene because he was “wanted on 

several felony charges” stemming from Parks’ prior report. After speaking with 

Parks and Woods, the police obtained a warrant to search Wells’ apartment for the 

 

1

 This matter involves the alleged victims of a crime. Pursuant to the policy underlying 

WIS. STAT. RULE 809.86(4) (2021-22), we use pseudonyms instead of the victims’ names. All 

references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 2022AP572-CR

3

gun and hammer used in the most recent incident. During the search, the police 

discovered a loaded firearm, two hammers, a baggie of methamphetamine, and

various drug paraphernalia. The police then obtained a second search warrant to 

seize the drugs and drug paraphernalia. 

¶4 The State filed a complaint three days later charging Wells with nine 

offenses. Wells waived his right to counsel. Following a preliminary hearing, the 

State filed an Information amending the charges to: (1) disorderly conduct by use 

of a dangerous weapon, as domestic abuse and as a domestic abuse repeat 

offender; (2) possession of a firearm by a felon as a repeat offender; (3) possession 

of methamphetamine as a second or subsequent offense; and (4) possession of 

drug paraphernalia as a repeat offender. 

¶5 Wells moved to dismiss the charges on the grounds that he was 

arrested on “mere hearsay”; that an “invalid arrest” was insufficient to confer 

subject matter and personal jurisdiction upon the circuit court; and that the 

complaint merely recited the elements of the crimes charged. Wells alternately 

moved to suppress the gun and other evidence recovered from his apartment on 

the grounds that his arrest was invalid and there was no probable cause to support 

the search warrant. 

¶6 The circuit court denied Wells’ suppression motion during the final 

pretrial conference, without taking evidence. The court concluded that there were 

no grounds to suppress evidence obtained during the search because the search 

warrant was signed by a magistrate who found probable cause and Wells had not 

alleged that the officer applying for the warrant knew that any information in his 

application was false. The court also denied the motion to dismiss the case, but 

noted that it would be willing to entertain a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
No. 2022AP572-CR

4

evidence—including whether there were sufficient facts to establish personal 

jurisdiction—after trial.

¶7 Wells subsequently pled no contest to the charge of possession of a 

firearm by a felon, without the repeater penalty enhancer, in exchange for the 

dismissal of the remaining charges as read-in offenses and a joint recommendation 

for an eighteen-month term of probation. The circuit court followed the parties’ 

recommendation and placed Wells on probation for eighteen months. 

¶8 After the appointment and withdrawal of postconviction counsel, 

Wells filed this pro se appeal. Wells now contends: (1) the circuit court failed to 

provide adequate reasoning for denying his motions to dismiss the charges and to 

suppress evidence; (2) the court failed to make factual findings to support its 

rulings; (3) the court violated Wells’ “right to be heard” by denying his motions 

without an evidentiary hearing and without allowing him to fully present his 

arguments; (4) the search warrant was not supported by probable cause; (5) the 

complaint was defective because it was based upon hearsay; (6) Wells’ arrest was 

unlawful because it was based upon hearsay and suspicion; (7) the court cannot 

obtain jurisdiction through an invalid arrest; and (8) evidence seized from the 

search should have been suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Wells further 

claims that he should be allowed to withdraw his no-contest plea as a remedy for 

these alleged errors.

¶9 We note that the eight issues Wells discusses in the argument section 

of his brief overlap, but they do not fully correspond to the five issues he identifies 

in his statement of the issues. Although we have listed the issues as Wells 

discusses them in his argument, we will reorganize them for our own analysis 

based upon a framework that better addresses the procedural posture of the case.
No. 2022AP572-CR

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DISCUSSION

¶10 As a threshold matter, the State asserts that Wells has forfeited all 

issues relating to the validity of the complaint. By entering a valid plea of guilty 

or no contest, a defendant forfeits the right to challenge nearly all nonjurisdictional 

defects and defenses occurring prior to the plea, including most alleged violations 

of constitutional rights. See State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶¶18 & n.11, 34, 294 

Wis. 2d 62, 716 N.W.2d 886. There is a statutory exception to this forfeiture rule 

allowing review of a suppression ruling following a plea of guilty or no contest. 

WIS. STAT. § 971.31(10). We review questions involving the effect of a plea

de novo. Kelty, 294 Wis. 2d 62, ¶13.

¶11 Here, Wells attempts to avoid the application of the 

guilty-plea-forfeiture rule by framing his challenge to the validity of the complaint 

as jurisdictional in nature. However, the type of jurisdictional defects that are 

exempted from the guilty-plea-forfeiture rule involve challenges to subject matter 

jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction. See State v. Aniton, 183 Wis. 2d 125, 129, 

515 N.W.2d 302 (Ct. App. 1994) (regarding subject matter jurisdiction); State v. 

Asmus, 2010 WI App 48, ¶4, 324 Wis. 2d 427, 782 N.W.2d 435 (regarding 

personal jurisdiction).

¶12 Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to decide 

certain types or categories of actions. City of Cedarburg v. Hansen, 2020 WI 11, 

¶49, 390 Wis. 2d 109, 938 N.W.2d 463 (citation omitted). Under the Wisconsin 

Constitution, circuit courts have original subject matter jurisdiction over “all 

matters civil and criminal.” WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 8. Subject matter jurisdiction 

in a criminal case is conferred upon the court by the filing of an Information that 

states the elements of a crime. Asmus, 324 Wis. 2d 427, ¶4. A circuit court lacks 
No. 2022AP572-CR

6

subject matter jurisdiction over a criminal case only when the charged offense 

does not exist. Aniton, 183 Wis. 2d at 129.

¶13 Wells does not (and could not successfully) contend that any of the 

four offenses alleged in the Information do not exist under Wisconsin law, or that 

the Information failed to state any of the elements of those offenses. Wells’ 

assertion that the complaint was invalid because it was based upon hearsay that 

was insufficient to establish probable cause has no bearing upon the circuit court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, a claim that a complaint fails to state probable 

cause raises a question of personal jurisdiction. See State v. Higgs, 230 Wis. 2d 1, 

8-9, 601 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1999). Therefore, Wells forfeited the right to 

challenge the complaint by entering his no-contest plea.

¶14 We turn next to the denial of Wells’ suppression motion without an 

evidentiary hearing. In order to obtain an evidentiary hearing, a defendant must 

allege material facts sufficient to warrant the relief sought. State v. Allen, 2004 

WI 106, ¶¶9, 36, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433. No evidentiary hearing is 

required when the defendant presents only conclusory allegations or when the 

record conclusively demonstrates that he or she is not entitled to relief. Nelson v. 

State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 497-98, 195 N.W.2d 629 (1972). We review the decision 

to deny a motion without an evidentiary hearing de novo, independently 

determining whether the facts alleged would, if proven, establish the right to the 

relief sought. See State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 308, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).

¶15 In his suppression motion, Wells claimed: (1) his arrest was invalid 

because officers acted without prior approval by a judge or magistrate and without

exigent circumstances justifying their failure to obtain an arrest warrant; (2) his 

arrest was invalid because it was based upon mere hearsay that fell short of 
No. 2022AP572-CR

7

probable cause; and (3) the initial search warrant also was invalid because it was 

based upon hearsay that fell short of probable cause. We conclude that Wells was 

not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his suppression motion because the facts 

alleged in his motion do not establish a right to relief on any of these claims.

¶16 First, there is no requirement under Wisconsin law that there be 

exigent circumstances in order to make a warrantless arrest. Rather, pursuant to 

WIS. STAT. § 968.07(1)(d), a law enforcement officer may arrest a person without 

a warrant when “[t]here are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is 

committing or has committed a crime.” The term “reasonable grounds” is 

synonymous with the term “probable cause.” Johnson v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 344, 

348, 249 N.W.2d 593 (1977). A judicial determination of probable cause may be 

properly made after the arrest. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 

44, 55-56 (1991). Therefore, neither the lack of an arrest warrant nor the lack of 

exigent circumstances rendered Wells’ arrest illegal.

¶17 Second, the facts set forth in both the complaint and the suppression 

motion were sufficient to establish probable cause for Wells’ arrest. Probable 

cause for arrest exists when the totality of the circumstances within the arresting 

officer’s knowledge would lead a reasonable law enforcement officer to believe 

that the suspect probably committed a crime. State v. Kutz, 2003 WI App 205, 

¶11, 267 Wis. 2d 531, 671 N.W.2d 660. The officer’s belief may be predicated in 

part upon hearsay and upon the collective knowledge of the police. Id., ¶12. The 

probable cause test is “not a high bar,” and “requires only a probability or 

substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” 

District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (citation omitted). When 

competing reasonable inferences could be drawn, the officer is entitled to rely on 

the one justifying arrest. Kutz, 267 Wis. 2d 531, ¶12.
No. 2022AP572-CR

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¶18 We first note that the allegations against Wells made by Parks and 

Woods at the scene of the hammer and gun incident were not hearsay statements 

being relayed to the arresting officers by third parties. See generally WIS. STAT.

§ 908.01(3) (defining hearsay). Instead, they were direct accounts of the women’s 

own experiences that would have been admissible in circuit court if the women 

had testified at trial. To the extent that the arresting officers also relied upon a 

dispatch report regarding felony charges stemming from Parks’ prior allegations of 

battery and sexual assault, that information was within the collective knowledge of 

the police. Again, Parks’ prior statement regarding the battery and sexual assault 

allegations would not have constituted inadmissible hearsay if she had testified at 

trial. The arresting officers therefore were entitled to consider the statements the 

two women made at the scene of the hammer and gun incident, as well as the 

collective knowledge of the police regarding Parks’ earlier report of battery and 

sexual assault, as part of their evaluation of whether there was probable cause for 

the arrest. 

¶19 Wells seems to argue that Parks’ allegations were untrue, and that 

the police should have further investigated the allegations before acting upon 

them. That, however, is not the legal standard that applies. Although Wells 

challenged the truth of Parks’ and Woods’ statements, he did not dispute that the 

complaint accurately conveyed the substance of those statements. Therefore, there 

was no need for an evidentiary hearing or for the circuit court to make factual 

findings to determine what knowledge the police possessed at the time of the 

arrest. 

¶20 We conclude, as a matter of law, that the substance of the statements 

Parks and Woods made to the police at the scene of the hammer and gun incident 

were sufficient to lead a reasonable police officer to believe that Wells had, at a 
No. 2022AP572-CR

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minimum, committed the offense of disorderly conduct. Therefore, the facts 

alleged in the suppression motion did not establish that Wells was arrested without 

probable cause.

¶21 Third, the facts alleged in the suppression motion did not establish a 

right to relief based upon an invalid search warrant.

2

 To begin, essentially the 

same facts that established probable cause for Wells’ arrest would also establish 

probable cause for the first search warrant. See State v. Romero, 2009 WI 32, 

¶¶16, 19, 317 Wis. 2d 12, 765 N.W.2d 756 (requiring “a fair probability that 

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place”). Given the 

proximity in time and place to when Parks and Woods reported the hammer and 

gun incident outside Wells’ house, and when the police responded, there was a fair 

probability that the hammer and gun would be located in the house.

¶22 Moreover, evidence seized pursuant to a warrant does not need to be 

suppressed unless the affidavit in support of the search warrant contained false 

statements necessary to a finding of probable cause that were made intentionally 

or with reckless disregard for the truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 

(1978). Wells did not allege that the officer who applied for the first search 

warrant made any intentionally false or reckless statements. Although the circuit 

court did not explicitly cite Franks in its decision, it is plain that it applied the 

Franks test when concluding that suppression would not be an available remedy 

even if the search warrant had not been supported by probable cause. We are 

 

2

 Our ability to evaluate the validity of the search warrant is somewhat constrained by 

the fact that it is not included in the appellate record. Given that the circuit court denied Wells’ 

suppression motion without holding an evidentiary hearing at which Wells could have introduced 

the warrant, we will accept as true the allegations in the suppression motion as to the basis for 

issuing the warrant.
No. 2022AP572-CR

10

satisfied that the court’s discussion, though brief, adequately explained the 

grounds for its decision.

¶23 We conclude that the circuit court acted properly in denying Wells’ 

suppression motion without a hearing, and without making factual findings, 

because the allegations in the suppression motion were insufficient to establish 

grounds for relief. We are further satisfied that the court adequately explained its 

decision. We therefore affirm the judgment of conviction.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.