IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs March 25, 2015

IN RE ROGER T., ET AL.

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Decatur County

No. 12JV81 Ricky L. Wood, Judge

No. W2014-02184-COA-R3-PT – Filed April 27, 2015

In this appeal, R.C.B. (“Mother”) contends that the trial court erred in terminating her 

parental rights. Because the grounds for termination are met by clear and convincing 

evidence, and there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best 

interests of the minor children at issue, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed

ARNOLD B. GOLDIN,J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRANDON O.GIBSON,J.,

and KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., joined.

Stephanie Rhiannon Cody, Lexington, Tennessee, for the appellant, R.C.B.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter, and Kathryn A. Baker, Assistant 

Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of 

Children’s Services.

OPINION

I. Background

In this appeal, we review the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights. 

Mother’s oldest child, R.C.T. (born 7/22/99), was fathered by R.D.T. Mother’s second oldest 

child, K.S.R. (born 9/29/01), was fathered by J.S.R. J.S.R. died in 2009. Mother’s youngest 

child, A.J.H.B. (born 7/5/06), was fathered by A.L.B.1 Although the trial court terminated he

 

1

In cases involving minor children, it is the policy of this Court to use the initials of children and 

parties to protect the privacy of the children involved.
2

parental rights of R.D.T. and A.L.B. in addition to those of Mother, only Mother appealed to 

this Court.

By her own admission, Mother has used drugs “[o]ff and on” since she was thirteen 

years of age. Her struggles with drug use have posed significant challenges for both her and 

her children. In 2007, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed the minor 

children from Mother, in part, due to her drug use. Although Mother later regained custody 

of the children, she struggled to maintain sobriety. Indeed, at the time of trial in this case in 

August 2014, she was participating in a drug treatment program at a facility in Memphis.

The children entered the custody of DCS for a second time on June 5, 2012. DCS 

had received a report that the children did not have a guardian, and when an investigator for 

Child Protective Services looked into the matter, he discovered that the children were living 

in a camper belonging to one of Mother’s paramours, D. H. (“Mr. H.”). The investigator 

found that the camper did not have enough room for the children and that there was not 

enough food in the home. Mr. H., a convicted criminal and methamphetamine user per 

Mother’s testimony, was not present at the time the investigator arrived. Mother was also not 

present at the camper, as she was incarcerated in the Henderson County Jail at the time.2 

When Mother was screened for drugs at the Henderson County Jail on June 6, 2012, she 

tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, and opiates.

On June 7, 2012, DCS filed a petition in the trial court asking that the children be 

adjudicated dependent and neglected. The petition recounted the investigation conducted by 

Child Protective Services on June 5, 2012, and stated that DCS had received a report that the 

children had been subjected to drugs, physical abuse, and environmental neglect. In its 

prayer, DCS requested the trial court to enter an order placing temporary care of the children 

with the State. A protective custody order giving custody of the children to DCS was 

subsequently entered. On September 6, 2012, DCS amended its dependency and neglect 

petition to include allegations of severe abuse against Mother. The children were ultimately 

declared dependent and neglected by an order entered on June 2, 2014. The trial court’s 

order, which also found A.J.H.B. to be a victim of severe child abuse, noted that it was a final

order in accordance with Rule 36 of the Tennessee Rules of Juvenile Procedure.

 

2 Mother testified she was incarcerated for a violation of probation in connection with a charge of driving on a 

suspended license. Immediately subsequent to her jail time in Henderson County, Mother spent jail time in 

Chester County, which had a hold on her in relation to another probation violation. 
3

After the filing of the dependency and neglect petition, several permanency plans were 

created. In part, these plans required Mother to: not associate with people who use drugs; 

only leave her children with people she trusts and knows do not use drugs; talk to the 

children about the harms drugs cause; schedule an intake assessment, and after completing it, 

follow its recommendations; submit to random drug screens; obtain safe and stable housing; 

work on her alcohol and drug issues; find employment; and meet the children’s financial 

needs. The first permanency plan, dated July 16, 2012, was ratified by the trial court on 

October 15, 2012. The specific goal of the plan was to return the children to Mother. 

However, by the time the last permanency plan was created in June of 2014, the permanency 

goal had changed—over Mother’s objection—to adoption of the minor children.3 In 

addition to the permanency plans that were created, Mother signed the Criteria and 

Procedures for Termination of Parental Rights on several occasions. This form gave notice 

of the grounds pursuant to which Mother’s parental rights could be terminated.

On November 26, 2013, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of 

Mother, R.D.T., and A.L.B. As grounds for terminating Mother’s rights, the petition alleged 

as follows: (1) Mother abandoned the children by willfully failing to visit them and/or 

willfully failing to contribute to their support; (2) Mother abandoned the children by failing 

to establish a suitable home; (3) Mother had not substantially complied with the permanency 

plans; (4) the conditions that led to the removal of the children still existed and thus 

prevented their return; and (5) Mother committed severe child abuse against A.J.B.H. 

Mother filed a response to DCS’s petition on July 7, 2014. A trial was held on August 18, 

2014. The first witness to testify was Nicole Schleuning (“Ms. Schleuning”), a family 

service worker with DCS. Ms. Schleuning described her role with DCS as a foster care case 

manager. Specifically, she noted that she meets with children and their parents to work 

towards reunification. Ms. Schleuning testified that she began working on the case involving 

Mother and the children approximately two weeks after the children entered DCS’s custody 

in June 2012. She indicated that the children had never exited DCS’s custody since that time, 

and that the children had not had a trial visit with Mother since she was working on the case.

In addition to testifying to details of the permanency plans that were created, including 

Mother’s responsibilities under them, Ms. Schleuning testified as to Mother’s success in 

completing the rehabilitation and reunification goals that had been outlined. In pertinent 

part, Ms. Schleuning testified as to Mother’s efforts at completing a long-term rehabilitation 

 

3

The permanency plan created in June 2014 was ratified by the trial court on July 7, 2014. A sole goal of 

adoption was first established in the permanency plan created on November 26, 2013. The November 26, 

2013, permanency plan was ratified by the trial court on February 3, 2014. Mother’s whereabouts were 

unknown when the November 26, 2013, permanency plan was created. In addition to the permanency plans 

already mentioned, other permanency plans were created on December 4, 2012, and May 28, 2013. 
4

program.

4

 Ms. Schleuning testified that Mother first participated in a treatment program at 

New Leaf, a facility in Cookeville, Tennessee. Although Ms. Schleuning indicated that the 

treatment program at New Leaf was scheduled to be a twenty-eight day program, she testified 

that Mother was discharged from the program after eleven days due to inappropriate 

behavior.5 Mother’s stay at New Leaf was not her only attempt to address her drug issues, 

and Ms. Schleuning testified that Mother later entered Pathways in Jackson, Tennessee, for 

five days in order to detox before starting a ninety-day treatment program at Memphis 

Recovery Center. Despite starting the program at Memphis Recovery Center following her 

detox in Jackson, Mother failed to complete the program due to more inappropriate conduct.6

According to Ms. Schleuning, although Mother was given the option to start over in the 

program, Mother was not willing to do so and was discharged.7

Despite Mother’s failure to complete these prior programs, Ms. Schleuning testified 

that Mother entered a treatment program in May 2014 at Grace House in Memphis.8 Despite 

suggesting that there had been “some bumps in the road,” Ms. Schleuning testified that 

Mother was still participating in the program as of the date of trial. Ms. Schleuning testified 

that the program at Grace House was scheduled to last for six months.

Through her testimony, Ms. Schleuning described the various ways she had attempted 

to assist Mother achieve the steps outlined in the permanency plans. For example, Ms. 

Schleuning testified that she had entered several case service requests on behalf of Mother, 

provided transportation to Mother’s rehabilitation programs, and taken the children to visit 

Mother on a number of occasions. Ms. Schleuning also testified as to her efforts in assisting 

the children. She testified that in addition to facilitating therapeutic supervised visitation 

between Mother and the children, she had ensured that the children’s medical, dental, 

educational, and mental health needs were met.

 

4 Mother’s intake assessment recommended that she stay in a long-term rehabilitation facility in order to 

address her drug needs.

5 According to Ms. Schleuning, “a letter passed between a male client and [Mother] . . . that was against the 

rules[.]” 

6

Similar to her stay in Cookeville, Mother once again apparently engaged in what was considered 

“inappropriate correspondence with a male client.” 

7 Although Ms. Schleuning testified that the documentation indicated Mother stayed at Memphis Recovery 

Center for thirty-six days, Ms. Schleuning testified she thought Mother’s stay was closer to sixty days.

8 According to Ms. Schleuning’s testimony, Mother found Grace House through her own efforts. 
5

Ms. Schleuning also testified as to Mother’s success at remaining drug free. She 

indicated that DCS conducted several drug screens and that Mother had tested “positive at 

different times for different drugs.” Ms. Schleuning described how Mother had tested 

positive for several drugs on June 6, 2012, and then tested positive again on August 30, 2012.

According to Ms. Schleuning, Mother even confessed to being high during one of the 

occasions on which Ms. Schleuning transported Mother to rehabilitation. Moreover, out of 

the approximately twenty to thirty drug screens DCS administered since the children’s 

removal in June of 2012, Ms. Schleuning estimated that Mother passed only one. Ms. 

Schleuning also testified to the various crimes Mother had been charged with subsequent to 

the children’s removal in June 2012. These crimes included two charges for driving on a 

suspended license, one domestic assault charge, a failure to appear charge, a possession of 

drug paraphernalia charge, and a simple possession charge. 

Regarding the impact of Mother’s drug use on her visitation with the children, Ms. 

Schleuning testified that DCS allowed supervised visitation so long as Mother could provide 

a negative drug screen. This requirement, she noted, had not resulted in a lot of visits. 

Although Mother and the children frequently participated in supervised visitation in the 

months following June 2012, Ms. Schleuning stated that visitation was stopped in December 

2012 due to Mother’s admission that she was using morphine.9 Ms. Schleuning further 

testified that, between December 2012 and December 2013, Mother probably visited the 

children only twice. She stated that one of these visits had been in the spring of 2013, when 

the children visited with Mother at Memphis Recovery Center. According to Ms. 

Schleuning, there was a six-month period where Mother was not in contact with her own 

attorney or DCS. We note that at the time DCS filed its termination petition, Mother’s 

whereabouts were unknown. 

Ms. Schleuning further testified that Mother exercised no visitation with the children 

from December 2013 to May 2014. She estimated that in the two years prior to trial, Mother 

probably spent less than seventy-five hours with the children. Following Mother’s entry to 

the treatment program at Grace House in May 2014, however, Ms. Schleuning noted that 

Mother visited with the children on a couple of occasions. She testified that she personally 

observed one of Mother’s visitations with the children and that it had gone “[v]ery well.”

Ms. Schleuning testified that all three children had been placed in foster care with 

M.A. and D. A. (“Mr. & Mrs. A.”) since June 2012, and she stated that she observed the 

children at Mr. & Mrs. A.’s home during her time on the case. In addition to stating that the 

 

9A quarterly progress report prepared by the Department in February 2013 indicated that “[p]arent/child visits 

are not currently taking place due to the mother refusing to submit to random drug screens or testing positive 

for drugs.”
6

home was safe and appropriate for the children, Ms. Schleuning testified that Mr. & Mrs. A.

involved the children in a lot of extra-curricular activities. For example, she testified that the 

children had been active church participants and were involved in several sports. She further

indicated that the children questioned why Mother had not done what she needed to do in 

order to regain custody.

Concerning the relationship between Mother and the children, Ms. Schleuning 

testified that, with the exception of one gift brought by Mr. H. on behalf of Mother in July 

2012, none of the children received birthday gifts or cards from Mother since coming into 

custody of DCS. She did specifically note, however, that the children were bonding with 

Mother in the recent visits that had been allowed since Mother entered Grace House. She 

also testified that all three children wished to return to Mother. Although Ms. Schleuning 

further stated that she had seen a change in Mother since Mother’s arrival at Grace House, 

she ultimately opined that it would be in the children’s best interests for Mother’s parental 

rights to be terminated. Ms. Schleuning acknowledged that an adoptive home had not been 

identified at the time of trial, but she testified that DCS had already begun the search for one.

The trial court also heard testimony from Shante Caper (“Ms. Caper”), Mother’s 

counselor at Grace House in Memphis. Ms. Caper testified that Mother checked into Grace 

House on May 12, 2014. According to Ms. Caper, at the time of trial, Mother was on the 

second level of what was described as a three-level treatment program. She testified that 

Mother participated in several types of counseling sessions and meetings at Grace House in 

order to address her drug issues. When asked how Mother was doing in the program, Ms. 

Caper testified that “[s]he’s been doing well.” She stated that although Mother had been 

screened for drugs both on the date of trial and three days prior, she received a negative 

reading on both occasions. Ms. Caper’s testimony did recount one occasion, however, where 

Mother engaged in behavior not allowed by the treatment program. Ms. Caper testified that 

about a week prior to trial, Mother left a medical appointment unauthorized, with the 

apparent intention to buy some soda. A drug screen conducted upon Mother’s return did not 

result in a positive reading, but Mother received a ten-day restriction as discipline, which 

prohibited her from making phone calls, receiving mail, and having visitors.

Notwithstanding Mother’s previous failures to complete a drug treatment program 

prior to May 2014, Ms. Caper opined that Mother had committed herself to the process of 

rehabilitation at Grace House. She further testified that Grace House has an extended 

transitional program available following a participant’s completion of the standard six-month 

program offered at Grace House. Ms. Caper compared this aftercare option to a halfway 

house and indicated that it could potentially be an option that Mother could pursue.
7

Mother’s testimony at trial covered many areas, including her history of drug use and 

prospects for rehabilitation. Mother testified that she was incarcerated in June, 2012, when 

the children were removed from Mr. H’s camper. She stated that she lived with Mr. H in the 

camper prior to her incarceration and further testified that the children would stay in the 

camper on weekends during the school year. She explained that the children lived with a 

friend of hers on weekdays when school was in session. With regard to her drug problems, 

Mother was extremely forthcoming. She admitted that she had been a drug user since the age 

of thirteen and did not deny that she had frequently used drugs during the two years the 

children had been in custody of the Department. She also did not deny that she had been 

arrested and criminally charged several times during that two-year timeframe.

When questioned how many times she visited the children since their removal, Mother 

stated that she was not sure of the exact number, but “kn[e]w it ha[d]n’t been as many as it 

should.” She further admitted that she had not contributed any financial support to the 

children during that period. When asked if she had a particular reason why, Mother replied, 

“Not a very good one, no.” Mother also testified as to her whereabouts during the six-month 

period when she was not in contact with DCS. Mother admitted to using drugs in this period 

and testified that she did not work or file for disability. She further testified that she had 

prostituted herself in order to obtain drugs.

Although Mother testified that she had not successfully completed the prior drug 

treatment programs in which she participated, she expressed optimism in achieving success 

at Grace House. Nonetheless, she indicated that her recovery was still ongoing:

I’m not ready to be out in the world yet. I’m not -- I don’t want 

to lose custody of my kids. Whatever happens, I have to deal 

with, but as of right this moment, I know that I’m not 

emotionally, and I’m not physically ready to be out in the world 

yet as far as my addiction goes, and my addiction affected my 

kids as well.

In addition to testifying that she could give no assurances of what progress she would achieve

in the coming months at Grace House, Mother expressed uncertainty as to when she would 

finally complete treatment. Specifically, Mother indicated that she was planning on applying 

for the transitional extended program offered at Grace House. Mother testified that her 

participation in the extended program could potentially last as long as two to three years.

The last witness to testify was M. A. (“Mr. A.”). Mr. A. testified that he and his wife 

had served as foster parents for the minor children since June 2012. He stated that the 

children adjusted well while in his and his wife’s care, and he testified that the children 

participated in sports, assisted with household chores, and regularly attended Sunday church 
8

services. Mr. A. also testified that Mother had not given any type of financial support for the 

children since they had been in his care. Although Mr. A. indicated that he and his wife were 

not willing to adopt the children, he testified that he and his wife were willing to care for the 

children until a permanent placement was found. He further testified that he believed the 

children would be happy if they could return to Mother once she gets herself together.

On September 26, 2014, the trial court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental 

rights. In addition to finding that all of the grounds for termination alleged in DCS’s petition 

were proven by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court’s order of termination found by 

clear and convincing evidence that the termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the 

children’s best interests. Mother subsequently initiated the present appeal.

II. Issues

We address the following issues in this appeal:

1. Whether there is clear and convincing evidence to support the 

trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on the 

grounds of (1) abandonment by willful failure to visit and/or 

contribute to the children’s support; (2) abandonment by failure 

to establish a suitable home; (3) failure to substantially comply 

with the permanency plans; (4) persistence of conditions; and 

(5) severe child abuse.

2. Whether there is clear and convincing evidence to support the 

trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights 

is in the children’s best interests.

III. Standard of Review

Under both the federal and Tennessee Constitutions, a parent has a fundamental right 

to the care, custody, and control of his or her children. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 

(1972); Nash-Putnam v. McCloud, 921 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Tenn. 1996). Notwithstanding the 

fundamental nature of this right, however, it is not absolute. In re S.Y., 121 S.W.3d 358, 366 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Well-defined circumstances exist under which a parent’s rights may 

be terminated. In Tennessee, these circumstances are defined by statute. In re Audrey S., 

182 S.W.3d 838, 860 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). “To terminate parental rights, a court must 

determine that clear and convincing evidence proves not only that statutory grounds exist but 

also that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 

(Tenn. 2002) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)). Such evidence “produces in a fact-
9

finder’s mind a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts sought to be 

established.” In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted). 

As this is a higher standard of proof than that which applies in most civil cases, on appeal we 

must modify the customary standard of review provided for by Rule 13(d) of the Tennessee 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 861. “First, we must review 

the trial court’s specific findings of fact de novo in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).” 

In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d at 654. “Second, we must determine whether the facts, either as 

found by the trial court or as supported by the preponderance of the evidence, clearly and 

convincingly establish the elements required to terminate a biological parent’s parental 

rights.” Id.

IV. Analysis

Grounds for Termination

We first review the trial court’s finding that Mother abandoned the minor children by 

failing to visit or financially support them. As one of the grounds for termination, 

abandonment is statutorily defined as “the willful failure to visit, to support, or to make 

reasonable payments toward the support of the child during the four-month period preceding 

the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights.” In re Adoption of Angela E., 402 

S.W.3d 636, 640 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i)). The failure to 

visit or support a child is willful “when a person is aware of his or her duty to visit or 

support, has the capacity to do so, and has no justifiable excuse for not doing so.” In re 

Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 864 (citations omitted).

Having reviewed the record transmitted to us in this case, we find that there is clear 

and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s determination that Mother abandoned the 

children by failing to visit them in the four-month period preceding the filing of the 

termination petition. Mother argues in her brief that her failure to visit was not willful 

because her visitation during this time was suspended by the trial court. In fact, the 

suspension of Mother’s visitation was the direct result of her failure to produce negative drug 

screens. As this Court has previously noted, a “parent’s choice to continue to use drugs when 

the parent is prohibited from visiting a child until passage of a drug test constitutes a willful 

failure to visit the child.” In re Morgan S., No. E2009-00318-COA-R3-PT, 2010 WL 

520972, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2010).

Additionally, we find that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the trial 

court’s determination that Mother abandoned the children by willfully failing to support them

financially in the four-month period preceding the filing of the termination petition. 
10

Although Mother was aware of her duty to provide financial support10, she testified at trial 

that she had not contributed any support to the children since they came into DCS’s custody. 

In its order terminating Mother’s parental rights, the trial court specifically found that Mother 

was “able-bodied and able to work[,]” and we note that Mother admitted at trial that she did 

not have a good reason for failing to provide the children with financial support. Mother did 

not file for disability benefits, and rather than working in order to help support the children, 

Mother’s testimony indicates that she prostituted herself in order to obtain drugs. The trial 

court did not err in concluding she abandoned the children based on her failure to support 

them.

We next address the trial court’s finding that Mother abandoned the children by failing 

to establish a suitable home. This ground of termination, which is defined in Tennessee 

Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii), means that: 

The child has been removed from the home of . . . a parent or 

parents or a guardian or guardians as the result of a petition filed 

in the juvenile court in which the child was found to be a 

dependent and neglected child, as defined in § 37-1-102, and the 

child was placed in the custody of the department or a licensed 

child-placing agency, that the juvenile court found, or the court 

where the termination of parental rights petition is filed finds, 

that the department or a licensed child-placing agency made 

reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the child or that the 

circumstances of the child’s situation prevented reasonable 

efforts from being made prior to the child’s removal; and for a 

period of four (4) months following the removal, the department 

or agency has made reasonable efforts to assist . . . a parent or 

parents or a guardian or guardians to establish a suitable home 

for the child, but that the . . . parent or parents or a guardian or 

guardians have made no reasonable efforts to provide a suitable 

home and have demonstrated a lack of concern for the child to 

such a degree that it appears unlikely that they will be able to 

provide a suitable home for the child at an early date. The 

efforts of the department or agency to assist a parent or guardian 

in establishing a suitable home for the child may be found to be 

reasonable if such efforts exceed the efforts of the parent or 

guardian toward the same goal, when the parent or guardian is 

aware that the child is in the custody of the department[.]

 

10 As already noted, Mother signed the Criteria and Procedures for Termination of Parental Rights on several 

occasions.
11

In its order terminating Mother’s parental rights, the trial court made the following findings 

pertaining to Mother’s efforts at providing suitable housing for the children:

The children at issue were removed from their mother . . . as the 

result of a Petition filed in Juvenile Court in which the children 

were found to be dependent and neglected and the children were 

placed in DCS custody[.]

* * * *

For a period of four (4) months following removal, the DCS has 

made reasonable efforts to assist [Mother], to establish a suitable 

home for the children; but [Mother] has made no reasonable 

efforts to provide a suitable home and has demonstrated a lack 

of concern for the children to such a degree that it appears 

unlikely that [Mother] will be able to provide a suitable home 

for the children at an early date.

* * * * 

The reasonable efforts DCS made in the first four months 

include, but are not limited to, repeatedly referring [Mother] to 

various rehabilitation programs/providers; providing her with a 

list of rehabilitation programs; personally going over the list of 

programs/providers with [Mother] at her home; telephoning 

providers in an effort to find a suitable rehabilitation facility; . . . 

arranging for visitation with [Mother’s] children when 

appropriate; . . . arranging for counseling and home services for 

[Mother]; . . . and updating [Mother] about children’s wellbeing, appointments, and court hearings. 

[Mother’s] lack of reasonable efforts include but are not limited 

to, continuing to use illegal drugs, refusing to seek treatment for 

her drug use; continuing to associate with drug users; [and] 

failing to maintain safe and stable housing[.] 

We fail to discern any error in the trial court’s legal conclusion concerning Mother’s failure 

to provide suitable housing for the children. As we have previously pointed out, a suitable 

home requires more than a “physical space.” In re A.D.A., 84 S.W.3d 592, 599 (Tenn. Ct. 
12

App. 2002). It also “requires that the home be free of drugs[.]” In re Hannah H., No. 

E2013-01211-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 2587397, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 10, 2014) 

(citation omitted). When the children were removed on June 5, 2012, they were staying at a 

camper that lacked both space and food. Mother was incarcerated at the time, and she tested 

positive for drugs when she was screened on June 6, 2012. Although she stayed in the 

Henderson and Chester County jails for a total of approximately fifty days following the 

children’s removal, she did not make any significant strides towards providing suitable 

housing following her release. Notwithstanding DCS’s efforts in assisting Mother, Mother’s 

actions in the four months following the children’s removal did little to suggest that she 

would be able to provide a suitable home for the children “at an early date.” Tenn. Code. 

Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii) (2014). Mother continued to use drugs following her release, and 

as pointed out by DCS, she stated that she was homeless when she presented for a diagnostic 

assessment at a mental health center on August 22, 2012. Moreover, on August 30, 2012, 

Mother tested positive for amphetamines. As observed by one of Mother’s counselors, 

Mother “made several excuses about her drug use and did not take responsibility at all for her 

using.” Although Mother argues in her brief that her entry into Grace House is evidence of 

her reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home for the children, we note that Mother did 

not enter Grace House until May of 2014. When examining the efforts of DCS or a parent 

under this statutory ground, our inquiry is concerned with only the “four months following 

the removal.” Id.

We next review whether the trial court erred in determining that Mother failed to 

substantially comply with the permanency plans entered in this case, which is a ground for 

termination pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(2). Termination of 

parental rights on this basis cannot be predicated on minor or technical deviations from a 

permanency plan’s requirements. In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d at 656˗67 (citations omitted). 

DCS must not only “demonstrate . . . that the requirements of the permanency plan are 

reasonable and related to remedying the conditions that caused the child to be removed from 

the parent’s custody in the first place,” but DCS must also show that “the parent’s 

noncompliance is substantial in light of the degree of noncompliance and the importance of 

the particular requirement that has not been met.” Id. at 656 (citations omitted).

As previously discussed, the trial court ratified several permanency plans following 

the children’s entry into DCS’s custody. On each occasion a plan was ratified, the trial court 

found that the requirements outlined therein were reasonable and related to remedying the 

conditions that necessitated the children’s placement in foster care. Among other things, the 

plans required Mother to submit to random drug screens, stay drug free, complete a long-term 

rehabilitation treatment program, not associate with people who use drugs, and maintain safe 

and stable housing.
13

Having reviewed the record, it is clear that addressing Mother’s drug use was of 

central importance to the permanency plans that were entered. Indeed, when the trial court 

entered its order terminating Mother’s parental rights, it stated that “[r]equirements relating 

to [Mother’s] history of drug use are particularly important in reducing the risk of harm to the 

children so that the children could be safely returned to the parent’s care[.]” In making this 

statement, the trial court referenced the fact that this was the second time the children had 

been removed from Mother’s custody due to her drug use.

Although we recognize that Mother made recent efforts to maintain sobriety as of the 

date of trial, we nonetheless conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence to support 

the trial court’s determination that Mother failed to substantially comply with the 

requirements of the permanency plans. The permanency plans directed Mother to complete 

long-term rehabilitation, but Mother had not done so as of the date of trial.11 Although she 

was participating in long-term treatment as of that date, a considerable amount of time 

remained before Mother could complete the program.12 In addition, Mother failed to 

maintain safe and stable housing as directed. Whether these failures constitute substantial 

noncompliance “is a question of law which we review de novo with no presumption of 

correctness.” In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 548. As the Tennessee Supreme Court has 

previously observed:

Substantial compliance is not defined in the termination statute. 

The statute is clear, however, that noncompliance is not enough 

to justify termination of parental rights; the noncompliance must 

be substantial. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “substantial” as 

“[o]f real worth and importance.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1428 

(6th ed. 1990). In the context of the requirements of a 

permanency plan, the real worth and importance of 

noncompliance should be measured by both the degree of 

noncompliance and the weight assigned to that requirement.

Id. Mother’s completion of a long-term rehabilitation program was a significant requirement 

to ensure the children could be returned to a safe and stable home. Likewise, it was 

significant to require Mother to obtain safe and stable housing. These requirements were of 

“real worth” to enabling any return of the children to Mother. Mother’s success at remaining 

drug free while at Grace House is certainly commendable, but as of the date of trial, she was 

 

11We note that in the permanency plan created on December 4, 2012, Mother was directed to complete a longterm rehabilitation program by June 4, 2013. In the permanency plan created on May 28, 2013, Mother was 

directed to complete a long-term rehabilitation program by November 28, 2013.

12 Mothered entered Grace House on May 12, 2014. According to the evidence presented at trial, the inpatient 

program at Grace House lasts a total of six months.
14

uncertain of when she would complete her treatment and be ready “to be out in the world[.]” 

We note that Mother previously failed to complete two other drug treatment programs, in 

part, due to her engaging in behavior that was not authorized. Although the testimony 

reflects that Mother was generally doing well at Grace House, the record is also clear that she 

engaged in unauthorized behavior while there about a week prior to trial. Given the totality 

of the circumstances, including Mother’s failure to complete drug treatment within the 

timeframes outlined in the permanency plans and her inability to maintain a safe and stable 

home, we find the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Mother was in 

substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans.

We next review the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights based upon 

persistence of conditions. This ground for termination of parental rights applies when:

(3) The child has been removed from the home of the parent or 

guardian by order of a court for a period of six (6) months and:

(A) The conditions that led to the child’s removal or 

other conditions that in all reasonable probability would 

cause the child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect 

and that, therefore, prevent the child’s safe return to the 

care of the . . . parent or parents or a guardian or 

guardians, still persist;

(B) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be 

remedied at an early date so that the child can be safely 

returned to the . . . parent or parents or a guardian or 

guardians in the near future; and

(C) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child 

relationship greatly diminishes the child’s chances of 

early integration into a safe, stable and permanent 

home[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3) (2014). In this case, there is no dispute that the children 

had been removed for a period of at least six months as defined by the statute. The children 

entered DCS’s custody in June 2012 and they were still in DCS’s custody as of the date of 

trial. Their entry into DCS’s custody resulted from DCS’ response to a report that alleged the 

children had been drug-exposed, physically abused, and subjected to environmental neglect. 

When DCS investigated the matter, it found that the children were living in a small camper 

belonging to one of Mother’s paramours, an apparent drug user himself. The camper was not 
15

only lacking in space, but it also lacked sufficient food for the children. Mother was 

incarcerated at the time. It was these circumstances that prompted the trial court to enter an 

order of protective custody.

Having reviewed the record transmitted to us, it is clear that conditions still exist that 

prevent the children’s return to Mother. Mother continued to struggle with drugs following 

the children’s removal, and although she was participating in a rehabilitation program as of 

the date of trial, she had not completed the program and testified that she was uncertain as to 

when she would be ready to transition back into the world drug-free. Mother had not 

maintained a suitable home for the children to live in as of the date of trial, and the evidence 

convincingly suggests that there is little likelihood Mother would be able to provide one at an 

early date. As already indicated, Mother testified that she wanted to participate in the 

extended program at Grace House following her planned completion of the standard sixmonth program. According to her, her participation in this extended program could 

potentially last as long as two to three years. Mother simply did not demonstrate any ability 

to be able to care for the children in the foreseeable future.

We next address the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights based upon 

the ground of severe child abuse. This ground for termination is outlined in Tennessee Code 

Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(4) and is established when:

The parent or guardian has been found to have committed severe 

child abuse as defined in § 37-1-102, under any prior order of a 

court or is found by the court hearing the petition to terminate 

parental rights or the petition for adoption to have committed 

severe child abuse against the child who is the subject of the 

petition or against any sibling or half-sibling of such child, or 

any other child residing temporarily or permanently in the home 

of such parent or guardian[.]

In this case, this ground for termination is clearly met. In its June 2, 2014, order, which 

found the minor children to be dependent and neglected, the trial court stated as follows: 

“The Court finds that the child, [A.J.H.B.] suffered from abuse and/or neglect and therefore 

pursuant to T.C.A. 37-1-129(a)(2) finds that the child is a[] victim[] of severe child abuse as 

defined at T.C.A. 37-1-102(23)(A) and (B), respectively, and perpetrated by his mother[.]” 

The record transmitted to us indicates that this order was not appealed, and as such, the trial 

court’s findings are res judicata. The trial court did not err in terminating Mother’s parental 

rights based upon a prior finding of severe abuse. 

Best Interests of the Children
16

“When at least one ground for termination of parental rights has been established, the 

petitioner must then prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the parent’s 

rights is in the child’s best interest.” In re Dakota C.R., 404 S.W.3d 484, 503 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2012) (citing White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 192 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)). Although 

terminating an unfit parent’s parental rights is not always in the child’s best interest, “when 

the interests of the parent and the child conflict, courts are to resolve the conflict in favor of 

the rights and best interest of the child.” Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-101(d)). The 

best interest analysis “must be viewed from the child’s, rather than the parent’s, perspective.” 

White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted).

The Tennessee Legislature has codified nine factors that courts should consider in 

determining the best interest of a child in a termination proceeding. The relevancy of these 

factors, which are found at Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) (2014), “depends on the 

unique facts of each case.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. Indeed, “[a]scertaining a 

child’s best interests does not call for a rote examination” of the factors. Id. “[D]epending 

upon the circumstances of a particular child and a particular parent, the consideration of one 

factor may very well dictate the outcome of the analysis.” Id. (citation omitted).

In this case, the trial court made several findings responsive to the factors outlined in 

the statute. The trial court stated that Mother had failed to make lasting adjustments with 

regard to her drug use and specifically found that her treatment at Grace House was “only in 

the infancy stages[.]” It characterized her sobriety as of the date of trial as “fragile at best,” 

and found that it “would be unfair to further delay the children’s permanency until a time in 

the future when [Mother] may or may not complete [treatment.]” Although the trial court 

acknowledged that the children had a prior relationship with Mother, it concluded that a 

return of the children to Mother would “likely ...have a negative effect on the children’s 

emotional, psychological and/or medical condition.” In support of this finding, the trial 

court noted that the children were “thriving” in their placement with Mr. & Mrs. A. It 

further noted that Mr. & Mrs. A. are willing to care for the children until an adoptive home is 

found.

Although we realize that Mother was participating in a drug rehabilitation program 

when this case came to be heard at trial, we conclude there is clear and convincing evidence 

that the termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. The 

children need permanency in their lives, and although DCS had not yet located an adoptive 

placement as of the date of trial, Ms. Schleuning testified that a search for an adoptive home 

had already begun. There is no guarantee that the children will be adopted, but such a 

guarantee is not required in order to terminate a parent’s parental rights. “At most, 

Tennessee law requires only that an adoption be contemplated at some point in the future.” 
17

In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 879 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Mother’s history of drug use has 

consistently threatened the children’s ability to be raised in a safe and stable home, and 

despite her efforts at Grace House, the evidence does not suggest that Mother will be in a 

position to care for the children at any point in the near future. Even Mother’s own testimony 

indicated that she could potentially remain in treatment for several years after she completes 

the primary program offered at Grace House. Her ability to maintain sobriety is certainly a 

speculative proposition. Given totality of the circumstances, we conclude there is clear and 

convincing evidence in the record to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s 

parental rights and remand the case for such further proceedings as may be necessary and are 

consistent with this Opinion. Costs on appeal are assessed against the Appellant/Mother, 

R.C.B., for which execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________

ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, JUDGE