COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bray and Clements 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

GREGORY BOYD 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2947-99-4 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS 

 APRIL 17, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

William T. Newman, Jr., Judge 

 Janell M. Wolfe for appellant. 

 Shelly R. James, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Appellant Gregory Boyd was convicted in a jury trial of 

robbery in violation of Code § 18.2-58. On appeal, he contends 

the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to 

cross-examine him about the nature of his prior felony offenses. 

After examining the record, we conclude that, although the trial 

court did err, that error was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm 

appellant's conviction. 

 As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this 

case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential 

value, this opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of this appeal. 
 Boyd's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court 

erred in permitting the Commonwealth to question him on 

cross-examination about the nature of his prior felony 

convictions. 

 In reviewing Boyd's claim, we are guided by several 

established principles. When a defendant testifies in his own 

defense, he puts his credibility in issue. Smith v. Commonwealth, 

212 Va. 675, 676, 187 S.E.2d 191, 192 (1972) (per curiam). The 

defendant's credibility may then be impeached by evidence of prior 

convictions. Sadoski v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1069, 1071, 254 

S.E.2d 100, 101 (1979). The Commonwealth may ask the defendant on 

cross-examination "the number of times he has been convicted of a 

felony, but . . . not the names of the felonies, other than 

perjury, and not the nature or details thereof." Id.; see also

Code § 19.2-269; Jewel v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 416, 425-26, 

517 S.E.2d 264, 269 (1999) (construing Code § 19.2-269 to mean 

that the Commonwealth may show the fact of defendant's felony 

convictions but not the names, other than perjury, and details 

thereof), aff'd, 260 Va. 430, 536 S.E.2d 905 (2000). Likewise, 

when the defendant "testifies on direct examination that he has 

been convicted previously of a certain number of felonies, he may 

be cross-examined only with respect to the correctness of the 

number stated and, if his answers are truthful, not with regard to 

the names or the nature of the offenses." McAmis v. Commonwealth, 

225 Va. 419, 422, 304 S.E.2d 2, 4 (1983). Furthermore, a 

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defendant's credibility may be impeached by evidence of his prior 

misdemeanor convictions involving moral turpitude. Chrisman v. 

Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 89, 348 S.E.2d 399 (1986). 

 Here, Boyd testified on his own behalf at trial. He 

testified on direct examination that he had been convicted of "six 

or maybe seven" felonies. He did not identify on direct 

examination the name or nature of any of his felony convictions. 

He also testified that he had been convicted of misdemeanors 

involving moral turpitude. 

 On cross-examination, the following exchange took place 

between the prosecutor and Boyd: 

 Q. And defense counsel had asked you 

about your criminal record. You have 

approximately eight felony convictions. Is 

that right? 

 A. Yes, sir — I mean, yes ma'am. 

 Q. Okay. And some of those are for 

lying, cheating or stealing. Is that 

correct? 

 A. I wouldn't say – I wouldn't say it 

exactly like that, lying, cheating or 

stealing. They was petit larcenies. You 

know what I mean? It was grand larceny, you 

know, but now — it wasn't for lying, cheating 

and stealing. That's what you trying to say. 

 Q. Lying, cheating or stealing. Let's 

focus on stealing. Were any of the felonies 

for any stealing kinds of crimes? 

 A. Yes. It was for petit larceny, yes. 

 Q. The felonies? You know a felony is 

a more serious crime? 

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 A. Yes. 

 Q. When your counsel asked you about 

felonies, do you understand what a felony is? 

 A. Yes, I do. 

 Q. Now, thinking back on your record, 

were any of those felonies, the serious ones, 

for involved — did those involve stealing? 

 A. No. 

 Boyd's counsel then objected, asserting that the Commonwealth 

could not ask about the nature of Boyd's previous offenses. The 

trial court overruled the objection, ruling that the Commonwealth 

could ask Boyd if he had been convicted of a felony involving 

lying, cheating, or stealing. The cross-examination continued as 

follows: 

 Q. I'm going to ask again about the 

felonies, the serious crimes. 

 A. Yes, ma'am. 

 Q. Any of those crimes, not the petit 

larcenies or misdemeanors but the serious 

crimes, has to do with stealing? 

 A. No, ma'am. It was a drug offense, 

my serious charge that I went to the 

institution for. 

 Q. Okay. Would it refresh your 

recollection, or do you just not remember or 

are you just saying no, I had no felony 

crimes involving stealing? 

 A. I'm not saying that. 

 Q. But if you looked at your criminal 

record, might you remember if you had any 

crimes involving stealing that were serious 

crimes? 

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 A. Well, okay. Yes, I did. Yes, I 

did. Okay. 

 Q. Do you remember now? 

 A. I'm just saying for to answer your 

question correctly, you know what I mean, you 

saying did I have any felonies that is for 

lying, cheating or stealing. And as far as 

my recollection as do I have it? Yes, I do. 

 Q. Okay. And do you think there is 

probably three or four of those? 

 A. It may be, yes. 

 Because Boyd testified on direct examination that he had been 

convicted previously of six or seven felonies, the Commonwealth 

was permitted to question Boyd on cross-examination regarding the 

correctness of the number stated. McAmis, 225 Va. at 422, 304 

S.E.2d at 4. Once, however, Boyd testified truthfully that he had 

been convicted of eight felonies, the Commonwealth was not 

permitted to subsequently ask about the nature of his previous 

felony convictions. Id. We hold, therefore, that the trial court 

erred in allowing the Commonwealth to pursue its questioning of 

Boyd regarding the nature of his previous felony convictions. 

 However, our inquiry does not end there. We must decide 

whether the error requires reversal of Boyd's conviction. A 

non-constitutional error by the trial court is harmless if 

"it plainly appears from the record and the 

evidence given at the trial that" the error 

did not affect the verdict. An error does 

not affect a verdict if a reviewing court 

can conclude, without usurping the jury's 

fact finding function, that, had the error 

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not occurred, the verdict would have been 

the same. 

Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1003, 1005, 407 S.E.2d 

910, 911 (1991) (en banc) (quoting Code § 8.01-678). "Each case 

must . . . be analyzed individually to determine if an error has 

affected the verdict." Id. at 1009, 407 S.E.2d at 913. 

 In this case, it plainly appears from the record and the 

evidence given at the trial that the error did not affect the 

jury's verdict. The victim unequivocally identified Boyd as the 

person who robbed him. Furthermore, Boyd told the jury that he 

had eight previous felony convictions and that he had been 

convicted of misdemeanors involving moral turpitude. The 

improperly elicited evidence was limited to Boyd's disclosure 

that, of his eight felony convictions, one was for a drug 

offense and three or four involved lying, cheating, or stealing. 

No other details of those convictions were revealed. 

 Moreover, the trial court gave a limiting instruction that 

told the jury that the evidence of other offenses could only be 

considered for impeachment of the defendant and could not be 

considered as evidence of his guilt. When, as here, the record 

does not show otherwise, "it is to be presumed that the jury 

followed an explicit cautionary instruction." Albert v. 

Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 734, 741, 347 S.E.2d 534, 538 (1986). 

 We can conclude, therefore, without usurping the jury's fact 

finding function, that, had the erroneously permitted questions 

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propounded to Boyd on cross-examination over defense counsel's 

objection not been asked, the verdict would have been the same. 

Accordingly, the error was harmless, and we affirm appellant's 

conviction. 

 Affirmed.

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