IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

September 2013 Term 

No. 12-0835 

GINA YOUNG, Administratrix of the Estate of
 

RICHARD YOUNG, JR.,
 

Plaintiff Below, Petitioner
 

v.
 

APOGEE COAL COMPANY, LLC,
 

FILED
 

November 6, 2013
 

released at 3:00 p.m.
 

RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

PATRIOT COAL CORPORATION and JAMES RAY BROWNING,
 

Defendants Below, Respondents
 

Certified Question from the
 

United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
 

The Honorable Joseph R. Goodwin, Judge
 

Case No. 2:12-cv-01324
 

CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED
 

Submitted: October 15, 2013
 

Filed: November 6, 2013
 

Timothy R. Conaway, Esq. Jeffrey M. Wakefield, Esq. 

Benjamin M. Conaway, Esq. Joshua C. Dotson, Esq. 

CONAWAY & CONAWAY PLLC FLAHERTY SENSABAUGH 

Madison, West Virginia BONASSO PLLC 

Attorneys for Petitioners Charleston, West Virginia 

Attorneys for Respondents 

Guy R. Bucci, Esq. 

Mark A. Barney, Esq. 

BUCCI, BAILEY & JAVINS, L. C. 

Charleston, West Virginia 

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 

West Virginia Association for Justice 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Thomas P. Maroney, Esq. 

MARONEY, WILLIAMS, WEAVER 

& PANCAKE, PLLC 

Charleston, West Virginia 

Attorney for Amicus Curiae 

Kenneth M. Perdue as President of The 

West Virginia Labor Federation, AFL-CIO 

JUSTICE WORKMAN delivered the Opinion of the Court. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
 

1. “‘A de novo standard is applied by this court in addressing the legal 

issues presented by certified question from a federal district or appellate court.’ Syl. Pt. 1, 

Light v. Allstate Ins. Co., 203 W.Va. 27, 506 S.E.2d 64 (1998).” Syl. Pt. 2, Aikens v. 

Debow, 208 W.Va. 486, 541 S.E.2d 576 (2000). 

2. “Where the issue on an appeal . . . is clearly a question of law or 

involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. Pt. 

1, in part, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995). 

3. “The statute creating a legislative standard for loss of employer 

immunity from civil liability for work-related injury to employees found in W. Va. Code 

§ 23-4-2 (1983) essentially sets forth two separate and distinct methods of proving 

‘deliberate intention.’” Syl. Pt. 1, Mayles v. Shoney’s, Inc., 185 W. Va. 88, 405 S.E.2d 

15 (1990). 

4. “A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that significance and 

effect must, if possible, be given to every section, clause, word or part of the statute.” Syl. 

Pt. 3, Meadows v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 207 W.Va. 203, 530 S.E.2d 676 (1999). 

5. “‘In the interpretation of statutory provisions the familiar maxim 

expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one thing implies the 

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exclusion of another, applies.’ Syllabus Point 3, Manchin v. Dunfee, 174 W.Va. 532, 327 

S.E.2d 710 (1984).” Syl. Pt. 6, Phillips v. Larry’s Drive-In Pharmacy, Inc., 220 W.Va. 

484, 647 S.E.2d 920 (2007). 

6. West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii) (2005) provides for a 

“deliberate intent” cause of action against an employer only. A non-employer “person,” 

as identified in West Virginia Code § 23-2-6a (1949), may not be made a defendant in a 

cause of action brought pursuant to West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii). 

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WORKMAN, Justice: 

This case is before the Court upon a certified question presented by the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia regarding whether 

a “deliberate intent” cause of action pursuant to West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii) 

(2005) may be brought against a non-employer “person,” such as a supervisor or coemployee. Upon careful review of the briefs, the appendix record, the arguments of the 

parties, and the applicable legal authority, we conclude that a non-employer “person,” 

who enjoys the immunity contained in West Virginia Code § 23-2-6a (1949), may not be 

made a defendant in a cause of action brought pursuant to West Virginia Code § 23-4­

2(d)(2)(ii). Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On May 14, 2011, Richard Young, Jr. (hereinafter “Young”) was killed 

while working for Apogee Coal Company LLC (hereinafter “Apogee”). Young was 

allegedly instructed by his supervisor, respondent James Browning (hereinafter 

“Browning”), a maintenance supervisor, to remove a counterweight on an end loader to 

access the fuel tank. While Young was removing the counterweight, it fell on top of him 

and killed him. As a result, petitioner Gina Young, Administratrix of the Estate of 

Richard Young, Jr., (hereinafter “petitioner”) filed suit in the Circuit Court of Boone 

County, West Virginia, against Apogee, Browning, and Patriot Coal Company, Apogee’s 

alleged parent company (hereinafter collectively “respondents”). Petitioner’s complaint 

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alleges, inter alia, a “deliberate intent” cause of action pursuant to West Virginia Code § 

23-4-2(d)(2)(ii) against respondents Browning and Apogee on the basis that Young had 

not been properly trained on removal of the counterweight. Petitioner alleges that 

Browning and Apogee violated each of the five factors contained in West Virginia Code 

§ 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii)(A) through (E). 

Respondents removed the case to the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of West Virginia on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Respondents 

alleged that the diversity-defeating defendant, Browning, had been fraudulently joined 

inasmuch as West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii) provides a cause of action against an 

employer only and that individuals, such as supervisors or co-employees, are not proper 

party defendants. Noting the split of authority among the West Virginia federal districts 

on this issue, by order dated July 3, 2012, the District Court certified the following 

question to this Court pursuant to the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 

West Virginia Code § 51-1A-1 (1996) et seq.: 

Does the “deliberate intention” exception to the exclusivity of 

Workers Compensation benefits outlined in West Virginia 

Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii) apply to “persons” (supervisor and 

co-employees) as well as employers? 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

This Court has consistently held that “‘[a] de novo standard is applied by 

this court in addressing the legal issues presented by certified question from a federal 

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district or appellate court.’ Syl. Pt. 1, Light v. Allstate Ins. Co., 203 W.Va. 27, 506 S.E.2d 

64 (1998).” Syl. Pt. 2, Aikens v. Debow, 208 W. Va. 486, 541 S.E.2d 576 (2000). 

Moreover, “[w]here the issue on an appeal . . . is clearly a question of law or involving an 

interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal 

R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995). 

III. DISCUSSION 

West Virginia Code § 23-2-6 (2003) establishes the exclusive remedy as 

against an employer for workplace injuries or death and provides general immunity from 

suit for such injuries or death to qualifying employers.1 West Virginia Code § 23-2-6a 

(1949) extends the same immunity to a variety of natural persons through whom the 

employer acts: “The immunity from liability set out in the preceding section [§23-2-6] 

shall extend to every officer, manager, agent, representative or employee of such 

employer when he is acting in furtherance of the employer’s business and does not inflict 

1 West Virginia Code § 23-2-6 provides, in pertinent part: 

Any employer subject to this chapter who subscribes and pays 

into the Workers’ Compensation Fund the premiums provided 

by this chapter or who elects to make direct payments of 

compensation as provided in this section is not liable to 

respond in damages at common law or by statute for the 

injury or death of any employee, however occurring, after so 

subscribing or electing, and during any period in which the 

employer is not in default in the payment of the premiums or 

direct payments and has complied fully with all other 

provisions of this chapter. 

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an injury with deliberate intention.” As is well-established, however, that immunity is 

stripped to the extent that a workplace injury or death is inflicted with “deliberate intent.” 

W. Va. Code § 23-4-2(c) (2005) (“If injury or death result to any employee from the 

deliberate intention of his or her employer to produce the injury or death, the employee . . 

. has the privilege to take under this chapter and has a cause of action against the 

employer . . . .”); W. Va. Code § 23-2-6a (granting immunity to employee insofar as 

employee does not “inflict an injury with deliberate intention”). Deliberate intent may be 

proven in two “separate and distinct” ways, as set forth exclusively in West Virginia 

Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(i) and (ii). See Syl. Pt. 1, Mayles v. Shoney’s, Inc., 185 W. Va. 88, 

405 S.E.2d 15 (1990) (“The statute creating a legislative standard for loss of employer 

immunity from civil liability for work-related injury to employees found in W. Va. Code 

§ 23-4-2 (1983) essentially sets forth two separate and distinct methods of proving 

‘deliberate intention.’”). 

The first type of activity which the Legislature has defined as constituting 

deliberate intent involves injury which comes about as the result of a “consciously, 

subjectively and deliberately formed intention to produce the specific result of injury or 

death[,]” as described in West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(i) (hereinafter “(d)(2)(i)” or 

“(i)”).2 The second type of conduct which constitutes deliberate intent is described in 

2 Such a cause of action under West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(i) “requires a 

showing of an actual, specific intent and may not be satisfied by allegation or proof of: 

(A) Conduct which produces a result that was not specifically intended; (B) conduct 

(continued . . .) 

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West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii) (hereinafter also “(d)(2)(ii)” or “(ii)”) and requires 

the employee to prove violation of five factors. The five-factor test requires, generally, 

the employee to prove that he or she was injured as the result of a “specific unsafe 

working condition” as defined therein, of which the employer had actual knowledge and 

to which the employer nevertheless intentionally exposed the employee. This certified 

question requires interpretation of the entirety of subsection (d)(2)(i) and (ii), which 

describes these two methods of establishing deliberate intent. With emphasis to the 

operative terms which form the underpinning of the certified question, West Virginia 

Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(i) and (ii) provide: 

(2) The immunity from suit provided under this section and 

under sections six [§23-2-6] and six-a [§23-2-6a], article two 

of this chapter may be lost only if the employer or person 

against whom liability is asserted acted with “deliberate 

intention”. This requirement may be satisfied only if: 

(i) It is proved that the employer or person against 

whom liability is asserted acted with a consciously, 

subjectively and deliberately formed intention to produce the 

specific result of injury or death to an employee. This 

standard requires a showing of an actual, specific intent and 

may not be satisfied by allegation or proof of: (A) Conduct 

which produces a result that was not specifically intended; 

(B) conduct which constitutes negligence, no matter how 

gross or aggravated; or (C) willful, wanton or reckless 

misconduct; or 

(ii) The trier of fact determines, either through specific 

findings of fact made by the court in a trial without a jury, or 

through special interrogatories to the jury in a jury trial, that 

all of the following facts are proven: 

which constitutes negligence, no matter how gross or aggravated; or (C) willful, wanton 

or reckless misconduct[.]” 

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(A) That a specific unsafe working condition existed in 

the workplace which presented a high degree of risk 

and a strong probability of serious injury or death; 

(B) That the employer, prior to the injury, had actual 

knowledge of the existence of the specific unsafe 

working condition and of the high degree of risk and 

the strong probability of serious injury or death 

presented by the specific unsafe working condition; 

(C) That the specific unsafe working condition was a 

violation of a state or federal safety statute, rule or 

regulation, whether cited or not, or of a commonly 

accepted and well-known safety standard within the 

industry or business of the employer, as demonstrated 

by competent evidence of written standards or 

guidelines which reflect a consensus safety standard in 

the industry or business, which statute, rule, regulation 

or standard was specifically applicable to the particular 

work and working condition involved, as contrasted 

with a statute, rule, regulation or standard generally 

requiring safe workplaces, equipment or working 

conditions; 

(D) That notwithstanding the existence of the facts set 

forth in subparagraphs (A) through (C), inclusive, of 

this paragraph, the employer nevertheless intentionally 

thereafter exposed an employee to the specific unsafe 

working condition; and 

(E) That the employee exposed suffered serious 

compensable injury or compensable death as defined 

in section one [§23-4-1], article four, chapter twentythree whether a claim for benefits under this chapter is 

filed or not as a direct and proximate result of the 

specific unsafe working condition. 

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(emphasis added). The certified question as framed by the District Court inquires as to 

whether a non-employer “person” may be made a party defendant in a case brought 

pursuant to West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii).3 

In absence of any outcome-determinative caselaw, the parties urge the 

reasoning employed by the various federal district courts in this State in support of their 

respective positions and advance a variety of policy-related arguments.4 This issue has 

apparently frequently arisen in federal court in instances where defendants remove the 

case on diversity grounds, but in so doing must establish that the individual, diversitydefeating defendant has been fraudulently joined, as in the case sub judice. As a result, a 

split of authority between the Southern and Northern Districts of West Virginia has 

arisen. In general, the Southern District has held that (d)(2)(ii) does not support a cause 

of action against an individual defendant, dismissed the diversity-defeating defendant, 

3 The Court recognizes, of course, that a natural “person” may be an “employer” 

for purposes of workers’ compensation. (“A person, firm, association or corporation, 

regularly employing other persons for the purpose of carrying on any business in this 

State within the usual meaning of those words, who holds himself or itself out to be an 

employer, and is accepted as such by the State Compensation Commissioner, is an 

‘employer’ within the meaning of the Act.” Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. Red Jacket Coal 

Corp. v. Stokes, 142 W.Va. 126, 94 S.E.2d 634 (1956)). To the extent reference herein is 

made to “persons” or “individuals,” those persons or individuals are defined as being 

those non-employer individuals identified in West Virginia Code § 23-2-6a. 

4 The West Virginia Association for Justice and Kenneth M. Perdue, President of 

the West Virginia Labor Federation, AFL-CIO provided a joint amici brief which 

essentially mirrors the arguments advanced by petitioner. The Court acknowledges and 

expresses its appreciation for their submission. 

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and retained jurisdiction. The Northern District has largely held that there is at least a 

“possibility” that a (d)(2)(ii) case may be made against individuals and therefore 

remanded the cases back to state court for lack of diversity. (“‘The removing party must 

establish either: [t]hat there is no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a 

cause of action against the in-state defendant in state court; or [t]hat there has been 

outright fraud in the plaintiff’s pleading of jurisdictional facts.’” Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 

F.3d 457, 464 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232 

(4th Cir. 1993)).5 

In that regard, petitioner first argues that because the prefatory language of 

subsection (d)(2)—which introduces the successive descriptions of the two types of 

deliberate intent contained in (d)(2)(i) and (d)(2)(ii)—utilizes the phrase “the employer or 

5 Each district does, however, have a minority of decisions to the contrary of the 

prevailing view of that district. See Burch v. Monarch Rubber Co., 2:06-cv-760 (S.D.W. 

Va. 2006) (Goodwin, J.) (granting motion to remand for lack of diversity); Bledsoe v. 

Brooks Run Mining Co., LLC, 2011 WL 5360042 (S.D.W. Va. 2011) (Berger, J.) (same); 

Fincham v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 2008 WL 9007258 (N.D.W. Va. 2008) (Bailey, 

J.) (denying motion to remand and dismissing non-diverse, individual defendant). 

Notably, in Bledsoe, the court highlighted the requirement that, on a motion to remand 

based on fraudulent joinder, “‘all legal uncertainties are to be resolved in the plaintiff’s 

favor.’” Bledsoe at *3 (citing Hartley v. CSX Transp. Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 425 (4th Cir. 

1999)). Respondents note, however, that when faced with this issue in the context of a 

motion to dismiss both Judges Berger (while on the State circuit bench) and Goodwin 

dismissed an individually named defendant from a (ii) case. See Farley v. Argus Energy, 

LLC, C.A. 07-C-2683 (Cir. Ct. Kan. Cnty. June 5, 2008) (Berger, J.); Stover v. Matthews 

Trucking, Inc., 2011 WL 6141099 (S.D.W. Va. 2011) (Goodwin, J.) (contrasting the 

required analysis of propriety of (ii) case against individual defendant in context of 

motion to dismiss as opposed to the higher burden imposed upon the moving party under 

fraudulent joinder standards). 

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person against whom liability is asserted,” it controls the subsections thereafter, in which 

event either type of deliberate intent case may be alleged against an employer or a 

person, such as a co-employee, supervisor, or corporate officer. (emphasis added). As a 

corollary to this argument, petitioner cites this Court’s opinion in Bennett v. Bucker, 150 

W. Va. 648, 149 S.E.2d 201 (1966), in which we found a co-employee immune from suit 

as a result of the extension of immunity to fellow employees under West Virginia Code § 

23-2-6a. Petitioner cites to the Bennett Court’s statement that “[i]t is obvious that the 

purpose of [West Virginia Code § 23-2-6a] . . . was to ‘extend’ the same immunity and to 

accord an immunity identical with that of the employer to additional persons, including 

fellow employees.” 150 W. Va. at 654, 149 S.E.2d at 205. Petitioner contends that if the 

employer loses immunity in instances where an individual does not, the immunity 

between the two is no longer “identical” and that only by reading (d)(2)(i) and (d)(2)(ii) 

coextensively with one another is that purpose fulfilled. 

Petitioner’s argument in this regard is similar to—and likely derives from— 

the rationale utilized in the leading case in the Northern District on this issue, Weekly v. 

Olin Corp., 681 F. Supp. 346 (N.D.W. Va. 1987) (Kaufman, J.).6 In Weekly, the court 

agreed with the plaintiff’s position that because the 

6 Senior Judge Frank A. Kaufman of the United States District Court for the 

District of Maryland was sitting by designation. 

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introductory language of section 23-4-2(c)(2),7 which governs 

the application of all parts of section 23-4-2 and thus of both 

subsections 23-4-2(c)(2)(i) and 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii), speaks of the 

“employer or person[,]” . . . . the two subsections merely 

represent two alternative methods of proving liability against 

either one or both of the employer and co-worker. 

Id. at 352 (footnote added). Citing Bennett, the Weekly court likewise noted that the 

immunity afforded to employees was intended to be identical to that afforded to the 

employer and that “[t]he scope of immunity would cease to be identical if a co-worker, 

i.e., a ‘person’ who is not an ‘employer,’ enjoyed greater statutory protection with respect 

to the burden of proof than did his employer.” Id. (citations omitted). 8 

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that because the plain language of 

(d)(2)(ii) references only the employer, a “specific unsafe working condition”-type 

7 The methods of establishing deliberate intent were originally contained in West 

Virginia Code § 23-4-2(c)(2), but were redesignated as § 23-4-2(d)(2) in 2003 after 

insertion of an additional subsection. 

8 Two additional courts in the Northern District subsequently agreed with this 

interpretation, granting motions to remand for lack of diversity where individual 

defendants were named in (ii) suits. See Goudy v. McElroy Coal Co., 2010 WL 4179254 

(N.D.W. Va. 2010) (Stamp, J.); Hoffman v. Consolidation Coal Co., 2010 WL 4968266 

(N.D.W. Va. 2010) (Stamp, J.); Williams v. Harsco Corp., 2011 WL 3035272 (N.D.W. 

Va. 2011) (Keeley, J.); Blythe v. Consolidation Coal Co., 2013 WL 486871 (N.D.W. Va. 

2013) (Stamp, J.). In support of their decisions, and without much additional analysis, 

they cite to Weekly, other Northern District cases which relied upon Weekly, and state 

court cases from Harrison and Kanawha Counties finding similarly. Knight v. Baker 

Material Handling Corp., No. 01-C-39-1 (Cir. Ct. Harrison Cnty. Sept. 26, 2001); 

Anderson v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., No. 06-C-770 (Cir. Ct. Kanawha Cnty. April 

10, 2007). Like Judges Berger and Goodwin in the Southern District, most of these 

decisions also reference the court’s requirement to resolve “legal uncertainties” in 

plaintiff’s favor within the context of a motion to remand. See n.5, supra. 

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deliberate intent case may only lie against the employer and not a “person,” such as a coemployee or supervisor. Respondents further counter petitioner’s argument about the 

“identical” nature of employer and employee immunity by noting that 1) Bennett was 

decided before (d)(2)(i) and (ii) were enacted;9 and 2) simply because an employer and 

“person” can lose their immunity in different ways does not mean that the grant of 

immunity under West Virginia Code §§23-2-6 and -6a is not identical as to both. 

Respondents’ position mirrors that subscribed to in large part in the 

Southern District, as set forth in Evans v. CDX Services, LLC, 528 F. Supp.2d 599 

(S.D.W. Va. 2007) (Johnston, J.). In Evans, the court found that the rules of statutory 

construction required that the court “‘give significance and effect to every section, clause, 

word or part of a statute[.]’” Id. at 605 (quoting Savilla v. Speedway Superamerica, LLC, 

219 W.Va. 758, 763, 639 S.E.2d 850, 855 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Murphy 

v. Eastern American Energy Corp., 224 W.Va. 95, 680 S.E.2d 110 (2009)). Criticizing 

the Weekly court for “cho[osing] to give no effect to the differing terminology in the two 

subsections[,]” the court found that since the Legislature referenced only “the employer” 

in (ii), a case against an individual defendant would not lie. Id.10 

9 See n.7, supra. 

10 Since Evans, other courts in the Southern District have followed its reasoning 

and refused to allow (ii) cases to be asserted against individual defendants. See King v. 

Sears Roebuck & Co., 2011 WL 672065 (S.D.W. Va. 2011) (Faber, J.); Stover v. 

Matthews Trucking, 2011 WL 6141099 (Goodwin, J.); Adkins v. Consolidation Coal Co., 

856 F. Supp.2d 817 (S.D.W. Va. 2012) (Copenhaver, J.); see also Hager v. Cowin and 

(continued . . .) 

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Subscribing to the reasoning employed in Evans, the court in Adkins v. 

Consolidation Coal Co. offered further analysis in support of its conclusion that (ii) does 

not provide a cause of action against an individual. Likewise noting that the word 

“person” appears nowhere in the text of (ii), the court characterized the contrasting 

language in (i) and (ii) as “stark and telling.” 856 F. Supp.2d at 824. The court 

concluded that employee immunity could be lost only under a (d)(2)(i) case and, given 

the absence of liability-creating language for a “person” in (d)(2)(ii), stated: 

Surely, the legislature did not intend, by the express 

language it used in section 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii), to withdraw 

immunity from an employee simply because the employer 

had actual knowledge of the existence of the specific unsafe 

working condition and the employer had actual knowledge of 

the high degree of risk and the strong probability of serious 

injury or death[.] . . . Such an unacceptable result is readily 

avoided by giving apt meaning to all parts of section 23-4­

2(d)(2). 

Id. The Adkins court found that such a construction of the statute resulted in “[e]very 

word, every phrase, and every clause [being] construed in connection with the whole 

statute so as to harmonize all parts and faithfully apply the language the legislature 

adopted. What this reading does not do is add words to subsection 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii) that 

are not there.” Id. Finally, the court readily dismissed any applicability of Bennett to the 

analysis because it was decided before the two types of deliberate intent actions were 

codified in 1983. Id. at 823. 

Co., Inc., 2011 WL 2175075 (S.D.W. Va. 2011) (Johnston, J.); Cartwright v. Superior 

Well Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 4528251 (S.D.W. Va. 2011) (Faber, J.); 

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Having outlined the various reasoning employed in our federal courts, we 

find that this case presents a straightforward issue of statutory construction. To that end, 

this Court has long recognized that a “cardinal rule of statutory construction is that 

significance and effect must, if possible, be given to every section, clause, word or part of 

the statute.” Syl. Pt. 3, Meadows v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 207 W.Va. 203, 530 S.E.2d 

676 (1999); see also State ex rel. Johnson v. Robinson, 162 W.Va. 579, 582, 251 S.E.2d 

505, 508 (1979) (“It is a well known rule of statutory construction that the Legislature is 

presumed to intend that every word used in a statute has a specific purpose and 

meaning.”); Davis Mem’l Hosp. v. W. Va. State Tax Comm’r, 222 W.Va. 677, 686, 671 

S.E.2d 682, 691 (2008) (same). “Courts should favor the plain and obvious meaning of a 

statute as opposed to a narrow or strained construction.” T. Weston, Inc. v. Mineral 

Cnty., 219 W.Va. 564, 568, 638 S.E.2d 167, 171 (2006) (citing Thompson v. Chesapeake 

& O. Ry. Co., 76 F. Supp. 304, 307-08 (S.D. W. Va. 1948)). 

We find the Legislature’s express reference to a “person against whom 

liability may be asserted” in (d)(2)(i) and starkly contrasting omission of a commensurate 

reference thereto in (ii), which was crafted and enacted at the exact same time, 

unmistakable evidence of its intent. To find otherwise would violate virtually every 

known tenet of statutory construction. “‘[I]t is not for this Court arbitrarily to read into [a 

statute] that which it does not say. Just as courts are not to eliminate through judicial 

interpretation words that were purposely included, we are obliged not to add to statutes 

something the Legislature purposely omitted.’” Phillips v. Larry’s Drive-In Pharmacy, 

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Inc., 220 W.Va. 484, 491, 647 S.E.2d 920, 927 (2007) (citations omitted); see also State 

ex rel. Frazier v. Meadows, 193 W.Va. 20, 24, 454 S.E.2d 65, 69 (1994) (“Courts are not 

free to read into the language what is not there, but rather should apply the statute as 

written.”). 

Moreover, the statute’s silence as to the elements necessary to establish a 

(ii) case against a non-employer person supports the construction that liability against a 

non-employer person is simply not contemplated under this manner of proving deliberate 

intent. This Court has long-observed the tenet that “‘[i]n the interpretation of statutory 

provisions the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention 

of one thing implies the exclusion of another, applies.’ Syllabus Point 3, Manchin v. 

Dunfee, 174 W.Va. 532, 327 S.E.2d 710 (1984).” Syl. Pt. 6, Phillips, 220 W.Va. 484, 

647 S.E.2d 920. Critically, we have found that “[t]he expressio unius maxim is premised 

upon an assumption that certain omissions from a statute by the Legislature are 

intentional.” Id. at 492, 647 S.E.2d at 928 (emphasis added). Subsection (d)(2)(ii) 

clearly sets forth the very detailed elements of proof required as against “the employer,” 

but says nothing of what sort of commensurate finding would be necessary to find a mere 

co-employee, supervisor, or even officer liable. Petitioner summarily argues that a jury 

would have to find the identical elements of proof against the person to create liability 

against him or her; however, this contention is pulled from thin air and merely 

underscores the complete lack of direction in the statute as to how a case may be made 

against a non-employer individual for a (ii) claim. 

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Although petitioner’s argument that the reference to “employer or person 

against whom liability is asserted” in the prefatory section contained in (d)(2) governs all 

subsequent subsections may have some surface level appeal, we find that such language 

is simply a grammatical necessity to encompass all of the optional defendants described 

in each of the two following subsections. This Court has aptly noted that “statutory 

interpretation ‘is a holistic endeavor . . . and, at a minimum, must account for a statute’s 

full text, language as well as punctuation, structure and subject matter.’” W. Va. Health 

Care Cost Review Auth. v. Boone Mem’l Hosp., 196 W.Va. 326, 338, 472 S.E.2d 411, 

423 (1996) (quoting United States Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 

508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993) (emphasis added). 

Subsection (d)(2) simply provides an introduction to the general principle 

that the immunity provided to employers in West Virginia Code § 23-2-6 and nonemployer “persons” in West Virginia Code § 23-2-6a may be lost only if either acts with 

deliberate intent, as defined in (i) or (ii). Since (i) expressly allows for a suit against a 

“person” for a “consciously, subjectively and deliberately” inflicted workplace injury, 

while (ii) restricts such an action to “the employer,” the only way to collectively 

reference all of the types of otherwise-immune defendants who will be stripped of that 

immunity if they act in accordance with the elements of (i) or (ii) is to reference both 

employers and persons in the disjunctive. “Recognizing the obvious, the normal use of 

the disjunctive ‘or’ in a statute connotes an alternative or option to select.” Carper v. 

Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 157 W.Va. 477, 517, 207 S.E.2d 897, 921 (1974) 

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(emphasis added). Subsections (i) and (ii) present a variety of options to an employee as 

to how he or she may prove deliberate intent and who may or may not be sued for each 

type of deliberate intent. However, for purposes of establishing one of those actions, (i) 

and (ii) are obviously limited to their express terms. An employee may bring an (i) suit 

against an employer, a “person against whom liability is asserted,” or both. An employee 

may likewise bring a (ii) suit against the employer. Subsection (d)(2) simply introduces 

these options. Any concern about not giving effect to the “employer or person” language 

in § 23-4-2(d)(2) is misplaced; there is simply no other grammatical way for the 

Legislature to make collective reference to all of the various options contained in (i) and 

(ii). 

Finally, we agree with the Adkins court that our decision in Bennett lends 

little, if anything, to our analysis. As noted, Bennett was decided seventeen years before 

the deliberate intent exceptions now contained in § 23-4-2(d)(2) were enacted, and 

frankly stands only for the proposition that West Virginia Code § 23-2-6a provides fellow 

employees with immunity from suit for ordinary workplace negligence. The lone 

sentence in Bennett about the “identical” nature of the immunity of employers and 

employees, upon which petitioners and the Weekly court so heavily rely, is mere dicta 

and can certainly not be said to alter the manner or degree to which an employer or 

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employee loses his or her immunity, which matter is governed exclusively by the 

language of West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(i) and (ii).11 

As noted above, petitioner further advances several policy-based arguments 

to encourage this Court to interpret the statute as providing a cause of action against 

“persons,” particularly supervisors and officers. In sum, petitioner argues that 1) if 

11 Petitioner further argues that the deliberate intent cause of action is actually 

“created” in § 23-4-2(c) which likewise contains no reference to “person,” despite the 

fact that a cause of action against an individual defendant is expressly permitted under 

(d)(2)(i). From this, petitioner argues that a similar omission of the word “person” in 

(d)(2)(ii) is therefore “insignificant.” West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(c) provides: 

If injury or death result to any employee from the deliberate 

intention of his or her employer to produce the injury or 

death, the employee . . . has the privilege to take under this 

chapter and has a cause of action against the employer, as if 

this chapter had not been enacted, for any excess of damages 

over the amount received or receivable in a claim for benefits 

under this chapter, whether filed or not. 

(emphasis added). We find this argument meritless. First, we note that this argument is 

fairly at odds with petitioner’s contention that the specific inclusion of “person” in the 

introductory language contained in (d)(2) is actually controlling in this matter. More to 

the point, however, the deliberate intent exception to workers’ compensation immunity 

was first codified in 1913, at which time “persons” such as employees or supervisors had 

not yet been granted concomitant statutory immunity. 1913 W.Va. Acts Ch. 10; W. Va. 

Code § 23-4-2. Therefore, it was unnecessary to extend the statutory deliberate intent 

exception to non-employer “person” immunity at that time inasmuch as they had no 

statutorily-created immunity. When the immunity was extended to the natural persons 

identified in West Virginia Code § 23-2-6a in 1949, the deliberate intent exception was 

articulated within that statute itself and it was therefore unnecessary to amend § 23-4­

2(c): “The immunity from liability set out in the preceding section shall extend to every 

officer, manager, agent, representative or employee of such employer when he is acting 

in furtherance of the employer’s business and does not inflict an injury with deliberate 

intention.” (emphasis added). 

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supervisors are not subject to liability for specific unsafe working conditions, they will 

have no incentive to enforce safety rules; 2) employers will simply hide assets with highranking officers and supervisors to deplete their corporate funds from which a judgment 

can be collected; 3) such a result would permit supervisors, as employees, to sue the 

employer, but be immune from suit themselves; and 4) such a rule would force plaintiffs 

out of state court, requiring them to cede their local judges and juries and travel to the 

closest district court.12 

Insofar as petitioner’s policy arguments are concerned, it is simply not the 

place of this Court to opine as to the wisdom or efficacy of those concerns in this area 

which the Legislature has unmistakably set out to manage wholly by statutory enactment. 

See Roberts v. Consolidation Coal Co., 208 W. Va. 218, 234, 539 S.E.2d 478, 494 (2000) 

(“[T]he right to workmen’s compensation benefits is based wholly on statutes, in no 

sense based on the common law; that such statutes are sui generis and controlling; [and] 

12 Respondents commensurately attempt to debunk these policy arguments and 

offer policy concerns of their own. Respondents contend that: 1) individual supervisors 

or officials may face criminal or regulatory penalties for safety violations, which is more 

of a deterrent than a lawsuit for which they may be judgment-proof; 2) companies are not 

likely to funnel their assets away from stockholders to officers and managers just to avoid 

judgment, and if they do, a plaintiff may pierce the corporate veil; 3) companies, not 

supervisors, set policy and therefore permitting a supervisor to sue but not be sued is 

consistent with the statutory scheme; and 4) diversity jurisdiction exists to protect nonresident defendants from local prejudices and plaintiffs only join individuals to defeat 

diversity, not to retain a culpable party. Respondent also argues that public policy favors 

disallowing a (ii) case against persons such as respondent Browning, as it will have a 

chilling effect on attracting qualified people to supervisory roles where they will be 

subject to liability for policy decisions over which they have no control. 

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that the rights, remedies and procedures thereby provide are exclusive[.]” (quoting 

Bounds v. State Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 153 W. Va. 670, 675, 172 S.E.2d 379, 382­

83 (1970)). We have long held that “[i]t is not the province of the courts to make or 

supervise legislation, and a statute may not, under the guise of interpretation, be 

modified, revised, amended, distorted, remodeled, or rewritten[.]” State v. General 

Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W.Va. 137, 145, 107 S.E.2d 353, 358 (1959) 

(citation omitted). While this Court frequently looks to legislative intent as needed to 

interpret an ambiguous statute, “[t]his does not mean, however, that we are at liberty to 

substitute our policy judgments for those of the Legislature whenever we deem a 

particular statute unwise.” Taylor-Hurley v. Mingo Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 209 W.Va. 780, 

787, 551 S.E.2d 702, 709 (2001). Moreover, the rules of statutory construction should 

not be used to “‘displace legislative policy on the basis of speculation that the legislature 

could not have meant what it unmistakably said.’” Id. at 787-88, 551 S.E.2d at 709-710 

(quoting 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46:07, at 199 (6th 

ed. 2000)). We believe the express language of West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(i) and 

(ii) compels the conclusion that a non-employer person is not a viable defendant in a (ii) 

case. We therefore hold that West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii) (2005) provides for a 

“deliberate intent” cause of action against an employer only. A non-employer “person,” 

as identified in West Virginia Code § 23-2-6a (1949), may not be made a defendant in a 

cause of action brought pursuant to West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(d)(2)(ii). 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth hereinabove, we answer the certified question in 

the negative. 

Certified Question Answered. 

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