12-2857-cv

McGrath v. Thomson Reuters

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO 

A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS 

GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLAT E PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S 

LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED 

WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY 

CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT 

REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 

States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on 

the 1

st day of November, two thousand thirteen.

PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK,

DENNY CHIN,

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,

Circuit Judges.

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CHARLES F. MCGRATH, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

-v- 12-2857-cv

THOMSON REUTERS,

Defendant-Appellee.

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FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Charles F. McGrath, Jr., pro se, 

Brooklyn, New York.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Mitchell Boyarsky, Gibbons P.C., 

Newark, New Jersey.
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of New York (Rakoff, J.; Francis, M.J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-appellant Charles F. McGrath, Jr., 

proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court's judgment 

entered June 12, 2012, granting summary judgment in favor of 

defendant-appellee Thomson Reuters ("TR"). By order dated June 

10, 2012, the district court adopted the report and 

recommendation ("R&R") of the magistrate judge (Francis, M.J.) 

dated April 30, 2012, and dismissed McGrath's complaint, which 

alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment 

Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Americans with 

Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq. We assume 

the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and 

issues for review.

Upon de novo review, we affirm substantially for the 

reasons set forth in the district court's order and the 

magistrate judge's thorough R&R.

As explained in detail in the R&R, McGrath failed to 

establish the existence of triable issues of fact as to his 
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claims of religious, age, and disability discrimination, and he 

failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could 

find a connection between any of his protected categories and

any purported adverse employment action. Moreover, TR provided 

legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for each of McGrath's 

alleged adverse employment actions, and McGrath did not present 

any evidence that these actions were merely pretextual.

McGrath also failed to present evidence sufficient to 

show an objectively hostile work environment, with respect to 

his religion, his age, or his disability. And he has provided 

neither direct nor indirect evidence that his termination was in 

retaliation for his threat to file a charge with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission.

Because we affirm the judgment of the district court 

on its merits, we agree with the court that it is not necessary 

to decide whether, under all the circumstances, McGrath waived 

his right to review by failing to timely file a formal objection 

to the R&R.

We have considered McGrath's remaining arguments and 

conclude they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we 

AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk