United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 23, 2014*

Decided January 23, 2014

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 13-1994

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LARRY D. LOVETT, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:07CR30099-002-DRH

David R. Herndon,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Larry Lovett appeals from the denial of his motion for a reduced sentence under

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He based his motion on amendments to the sentencing guidelines

that retroactively lowered the base offense level for many crimes involving crack

cocaine. See U.S.S.G. App. C, vol. III 374–85, 391–98, 416–21 (2011). The district court

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

 After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is *

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).
No. 13-1994 Page 2

concluded that Lovett’s imprisonment range was not affected by the amendments and

denied the motion. We affirm the district court’s order.

Lovett pleaded guilty in 2009 to conspiracy and substantive counts of possessing

and distributing crack and powder cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. The district

court concluded that Lovett is a career offender and, following the directive of U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.1(b), calculated a base offense level of 37 under that guideline and 34 under the

Chapter 2 guideline for drug offenses, see id. § 2D1.1. As required by § 4B1.1, the court

used the higher number and a criminal history category of VI to calculate an

imprisonment range of 262 to 327 months, sentencing Lovett to 276 months. When the

government later moved for a sentence reduction, ostensibly under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 35(b), the district court shortened Lovett’s prison term to 228

months; this is a full year below the statutory minimum given the amount of crack and

the information filed by the government establishing a prior felony drug conviction.

See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(vii), 851.

The district court correctly denied Lovett’s motion in this case. The court lacked

jurisdiction to reduce his sentence under § 3582(c)(2) because, as the court recognized,

the amendments did not lower his imprisonment range. See United States v. Davis, 682

F.3d 596, 610–11 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Forman, 553 F.3d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 2009).

Lovett’s range was based on the career-offender guideline, but the amendments left that

guideline untouched, providing no basis for a reduced sentence. See United States v.

Williams, 694 F.3d 917, 918–19 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Griffin, 652 F.3d 793, 803

(7th Cir. 2011). Indeed, the conspiracy involved more than a kilogram of crack, so the

amendments did not even effect Lovett’s base offense level under § 2D1.1(c).

Compare U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3) (2008), with id. § 2D1.1(c)(3) (2012).

Still, Lovett argues (and the government concedes) that, in hindsight, it is now

clear that his prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance was incorrectly

classified in the presentence report as possession with intent to deliver, and thus he is

not a career offender after all. For that reason, he insists, his § 3582(c)(2) motion should

have been granted. But this argument is beyond the scope of § 3582(c)(2). The

amendments say nothing about when to classify a defendant as a career offender, and

§ 3582(c)(2) does not open the door to reconsidering sentencing decisions that could

have been challenged on direct appeal. See Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2694

(2010); United States v. Jackson, 573 F.3d 398, 400 (7th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.