[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-14869

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

IRAMM WRIGHT, 

Petitioner-Appellee,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-24060-PCH

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-14869

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The government appeals the district court’s order granting 

Iramm Wright’s authorized successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to 

vacate his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction and sentence in light of 

United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). After 

review and given our binding precedent in Granda v. United States, 

990 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2021), we reverse the district court’s grant 

of Wright’s § 2255 motion and remand to the district court with 

instructions to deny the motion.

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Offense Conduct 

Wright’s convictions arise out of a planned stash-house 

robbery. An undercover agent posing as a disgruntled drug courier 

approached Wright about robbing 20 to 30 kilograms of cocaine 

from his employers’ stash house. 

Three times Wright and a co-conspirator met with the 

undercover agent to plan the stash-house robbery. During their

meetings, the conspirators discussed, among other things, the need 

to recruit an experienced robbery crew and bring firearms to the 

robbery because the stash house had armed guards, and how to 

split the stolen cocaine after the robbery. 

On the day of the planned robbery, Wright and the rest of 

the crew were arrested after they arrived at a prearranged 

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20-14869 Opinion of the Court 3

rendezvous point. Agents found two loaded firearms, gloves, and 

a black ski mask in the Chevy Tahoe in which Wright had been 

riding.

B. Trial and Convictions 

In 2005, a jury convicted Wright of: (1) conspiracy to 

commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) 

(Count 1); (2) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a 

controlled substance (cocaine), in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846 (Count 2); (3) attempt to possess 

with intent to distribute a controlled substance (cocaine), in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846 and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2 (Count 3); (4) using and carrying firearms during and in relation 

to a crime of violence and a drug trafficking crime “as set forth in 

Counts 1, 2, and 3,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 2 

(Count 4); and (5) possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) (Count 5). 

As to the § 924(c) firearm offense in Count 4, the trial court 

instructed the jury that Wright could be found guilty if the 

government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Wright 

“committed a drug trafficking offense or a crime of violence as 

charged in Counts 1, 2 and 3 of this indictment” and that he carried 

the firearm in relation to or possessed the firearm in furtherance of 

“the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.” The trial court 

further instructed the jury that the § 924(c) firearm offense in 

Count 4 was charged “in two separate ways”—that Wright

“knowingly carried a firearm during and in relation to a drug 

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4 Opinion of the Court 20-14869

trafficking crime or a crime of violence and possessed a firearm in 

furtherance of [a] drug trafficking offense or a crime of violence.”

The trial court instructed that the government could prove Wright 

committed the crime either way, but that the jury needed to 

“unanimously agree upon the way in which [Wright] committed 

the violation.” As to Count 4, the jury returned a general verdict

and did not indicate which of the charged predicate offenses it 

relied on. 

The district court sentenced Wright to 240 months’ 

imprisonment on Count 1 and 360 months imprisonment on 

Counts 2, 3, and 5, all to be served concurrently. As to Count 4, 

the district court imposed a consecutive 60-month sentence, for a 

total sentence of 420 months’ imprisonment. 

C. Direct Appeal and First § 2255 Motion 

Wright filed a direct appeal but did not challenge the validity 

of the predicate offenses supporting his § 924(c) conviction on 

Count 4 or argue that any part of § 924(c) was unconstitutionally 

vague. On December 19, 2007, this Court affirmed Wright’s 

convictions and sentences. See United States v. Reed, 259 F. App’x 

289 (11th Cir. 2007).

In 2009, Wright filed his first § 2255 motion raising 

numerous claims, none of which are relevant to this appeal. 

Wright’s § 2255 motion was denied on the merits, and both the 

district court and this Court denied Wright’s requests for a 

certificate of appealability. 

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D. Authorized Successive § 2255 Motion based on Davis 

In June 2019, the Supreme Court held in United States v. 

Davis that the residual clause definition of a “crime of violence” in 

§ 924(c)(3)(B) was unconstitutionally vague. 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. 

Ct. 2319, 2323, 2336 (2019).1 Shortly thereafter, this Court granted 

Wright’s application for leave to file a successive § 2255 motion

attacking his § 924(c) conviction on Count 4 based on Davis. 

Wright’s authorized successive § 2255 motion argued that 

his § 924(c) conviction on Count 4 must be vacated because one of 

the three predicate crimes—conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act 

robbery—was no longer valid given that it qualified as a crime of 

violence only under the residual clause invalidated in Davis. See

Brown v. United States, 942 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th Cir. 2019) 

(concluding shortly after Davis that conspiracy to commit Hobbs 

Act robbery did not qualify as a crime of violence under 

§ 924(c)(3)(A)’s still-valid elements clause). 

1 Section 924(c) makes it a separate crime punishable by a mandatory consecutive sentence to use or carry a firearm during a “crime of violence” or a “drug 

trafficking crime.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Under § 924(c)(3), a crime of violence 

is an offense that is a felony and (A) “has as an element the use, attempted use, 

or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” 

or (B) “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against 

the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing 

the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), (B). Courts have referred to 

§ 924(c)(3)(A) as the “elements clause” and to § 924(c)(3)(B) as the “residual 

clause.” Davis, 588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2323. 

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6 Opinion of the Court 20-14869

The government opposed Wright’s motion, arguing that:

(1) Wright had procedurally defaulted his Davis claim by failing to 

raise it on direct appeal and could not overcome the default; and in 

any event, (2) Wright’s Davis claim failed on the merits because he 

failed to show that the jury relied solely on the Hobbs Act 

conspiracy predicate to find him guilty of the § 924(c) offense.

E. District Court’s Order Granting § 2255 Motion 

On October 7, 2020, the district court granted Wright’s 

§ 2255 motion and vacated his § 924(c) conviction and sentence as 

to Count 4. The district court concluded, based on the jury 

instructions and the jury’s general verdict as to Count 4, that it was 

impossible to determine from the record whether Wright’s Count 

4 conviction was based on the now-invalid Hobbs Act conspiracy 

predicate. The district court concluded there was error under 

Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 532 (1931), and that 

Stromberg “forbids” a finding that the error was harmless. The 

district court instead found the error was not harmless because it 

was “impossible to determine from the jury instructions and the 

jury’s general verdict the basis on which the jury’s conviction on 

Count Four rested.” 

The district court also rejected the government’s procedural 

default argument, concluding: (1) Wright’s Davis claim was 

jurisdictional and thus not subject to procedural default; and 

(2) alternatively, Wright had demonstrated cause and prejudice to 

overcome the procedural default. 

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Shortly thereafter, the district court resentenced Wright to 

240 months on Count 1 and 312 months on Counts 2, 3, and 5, all 

to run concurrently. This appeal by the government followed.2 

II. DISCUSSION 

On appeal, the government reasserts its arguments that 

Wright procedurally defaulted his Davis claim and, in any event, 

his Davis claim fails on the merits. While this appeal was pending, 

we issued our decision in Granda v. United States, 990 F.3d 1272 

(11th Cir. 2021), which is materially indistinguishable from this case 

and supports both of the government’s contentions.3

2 The government’s notice of appeal, filed December 29, 2020, sought to 

appeal both the October 7, 2020 order granting Wright’s § 2255 motion and 

the November 3, 2020 amended criminal judgment. However, the 

government now states it challenges only the § 2255 order and not the 

amended criminal judgment. In light of the government’s express 

abandonment, we need not address Wright’s argument in response to this 

Court’s Jurisdictional Question that the government’s notice of appeal was 

untimely as to the amended criminal judgment and DENY AS MOOT 

Wright’s construed motion to dismiss the government’s appeal from the 

amended criminal judgment.

3 When reviewing a district court’s denial of a § 2255 motion, we review questions of law de novo and factual findings for clear error. Lynn v. United States, 

365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004). Similarly, we review de novo whether 

procedural default precludes a § 2255 movant’s claim, which is a mixed question of law and fact. Granda v. United States, 990 F.3d 1272, 1286 (11th Cir. 

2021). 

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8 Opinion of the Court 20-14869

A. Procedural Default Principles 

Section 2255 allows federal prisoners to obtain postconviction relief and set aside prior convictions when a sentence 

“was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. However, a § 2255 claim may be 

procedurally defaulted if the movant failed to raise the claim at trial 

or on direct appeal. Granda, 990 F.3d at 1285-86. A movant can 

overcome the procedural bar by establishing either (1) cause for the 

default and actual prejudice from the alleged error, or (2) that he is 

actually innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted. Id. at 

1286.

B. Granda 

In Granda, this Court applied these procedural default 

principles to a Davis claim that is indistinguishable from Wright’s

in all material respects. The § 2255 movant in Granda, like Wright 

here, was arrested during a planned robbery where an undercover 

agent posed as a disgruntled drug trafficker who wanted to rob his 

boss. Id. at 1281. Granda and the rest of the robbery crew planned 

to dress up as armed police and steal a “stash truck” they believed 

contained cocaine. Id. Instead, when they arrived with guns at the 

prearranged rendezvous spot, Granda ultimately was arrested. Id.

Like Wright, Granda was charged with, and convicted of, 

both drug and Hobbs Act offenses as well as a § 924 firearm offense. 

One of Granda’s convictions was for a § 924(o) firearm conspiracy 

count where the five charged predicates were a mix of alleged 

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20-14869 Opinion of the Court 9

crimes of violence and drug trafficking crimes, including Hobbs Act 

robbery conspiracy. Id. at 1281-82. At trial, the district court gave 

a jury instruction much like the one given at Wright’s trial. The 

district court instructed Granda’s jury that it could convict Granda 

of the § 924(o) firearm conspiracy if it found that the object of the 

conspiracy was to use or carry a firearm during and in relation to 

either a drug trafficking crime or a crime of violence, or both, “as 

charged in Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5” but that it had to unanimously 

decide on which predicate. Id. at 1281, 1285, 1291. And, as in 

Wright’s case, the Granda jury returned a general verdict. Id. at 

1282.

In 2009, Granda filed an unsuccessful direct appeal and later 

a first § 2255 motion. Id. at 1282. However,similar to Wright here,

Granda on direct appeal did not raise a constitutional challenge to 

§ 924(c)’s residual clause or argue that his Hobbs Act conspiracy 

predicate was invalid until his authorized successive § 2255 motion

in 2016.4 Id. And, in Wright’s case, the government responded that 

Granda had procedurally defaulted his claim. Id. The district court 

denied Granda’s § 2255 motion on the merits, concluding Granda 

could not show it was more likely than not that the jury relied on 

4 Granda originally brought his claim under Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 

591, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which invalidated a similar residual clause in the 

Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). This Court resolved 

Granda’s claim under Davis, which was announced while Granda’s appeal was 

pending. 

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10 Opinion of the Court 20-14869

the Hobbs Act conspiracy to convict him of the § 924(o) offense. 

Id. at 1282-83.

On appeal, this Court affirmed on two grounds: (1) Granda 

could not show either cause and actual prejudice or actual 

innocence to overcome the procedural default of his claim; and 

(2) Granda could not prevail on the merits. Id. at 1280-81. 

As to procedural default, this Court concluded that Granda’s 

constitutional vagueness claim was not sufficiently novel to 

constitute cause. Id. at 1286. The Court explained that while Davis

announced a new constitutional rule of retroactive application, it 

was not a “sufficiently clear break with the past” that an attorney 

representing Granda “would not reasonably have had the tools”

necessary to present the claim before Davis. Id. (quotation marks 

omitted). We also stated: “Moreover, the case law extant at the

time of Granda’s appeal confirms that he did not then lack the 

‘building blocks of’ a due process vagueness challenge to the 

§ 924(c) residual clause.” Id. at 1287-88 (citing cases going back to 

1986 that demonstrated litigants had been raising similar vagueness 

challenges to other parts of § 924(c) “for years”). Therefore, this 

Court ruled that Granda’s Davis claim was available in 2009 when 

he filed his direct appeal. Id.

Even if Granda could show cause, this Court also concluded 

he could not establish actual prejudice because he could not show 

“a substantial likelihood” that “the jury relied only on” the invalid 

predicate to convict him. Id. at 1288. The Court explained that it 

was “not enough for Granda to show that the jury may have relied 

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20-14869 Opinion of the Court 11

on the Count 3 Hobbs Act conspiracy conviction as the predicate” 

because “reliance on any of [the other valid predicates] would have 

provided a wholly independent, sufficient, and legally valid basis to 

convict . . . .” Id. In short, if the absence of the invalid predicate 

would not likely have changed the jury’s decision to convict, then 

the petitioner did not suffer actual prejudice. Id.

The Court found that Granda could not make this showing 

because: (1) the jury unanimously found him guilty of all the valid 

predicates, including conspiracy and attempted possession of 

cocaine with intent to distribute; (2) the trial record made “it 

abundantly clear” that the jury’s findings of guilt all “rested on the 

same operative facts and the same set of events” including “that 

Granda had conspired and attempted to rob the truck in order to 

possess and distribute the cocaine it held”; and (3) in light of the 

trial evidence, the jury could not have concluded he conspired to 

possess the firearm in furtherance of the robbery conspiracy 

without also finding he conspired to possess the firearm in 

furtherance of the drug conspiracy and the other valid predicates. 

Id. at 1289.

The Granda Court relied on United States v. Cannon, 987 

F.3d 924, 947-50 (11th Cir. 2021), which held on direct appeal that 

a Davis error in submitting an invalid Hobbs Act conspiracy 

predicate to the jury was harmless where the trial record made 

clear that the invalid predicate was “inextricably intertwined” with 

a valid cocaine conspiracy predicate such that “no rational juror 

could have found that [the defendants] carried a firearm in relation 

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12 Opinion of the Court 20-14869

to one predicate but not the other.” Id. at 1289-90 (quotation marks 

omitted). The Court determined that, as in Cannon, Granda’s 

“alternative predicate offenses [were] inextricably intertwined—

each arose from the same plan and attempt to commit armed 

robbery of a tractor-trailer full of cocaine.” And this “tightly bound 

factual relationship of the predicate offenses preclude[d] Granda 

from showing [on collateral attack] a substantial likelihood that the 

jury relied solely on” the one invalid predicate. Id. at 1291.

Finally, for the same reason—that no reasonable juror 

would have concluded Granda conspired to possess the firearm in 

furtherance of only the invalid Hobbs Act conspiracy and not the 

drug trafficking crimes—this Court also concluded that Granda 

could not establish actual innocence. Id. at 1292; see also Parker v. 

United States, 993 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2021) (following 

Granda as “materially indistinguishable” to conclude the § 2255 

movant had not shown actual innocence to overcome the 

procedural default of his Davis claim where it was “undeniable on 

this record” that the movant’s “valid drug trafficking predicates 

[were] inextricably intertwined with the invalid Hobbs Act 

conspiracy predicate”).

C. Wright’s Davis Claim is Subject to the Procedural Default 

 Bar 

Wright argues his Davis claim cannot be procedurally 

defaulted because the error is jurisdictional. On collateral review, 

a defendant can avoid the procedural default bar altogether “if the 

alleged error is jurisdictional.” United States v. Bane, 948 F.3d 

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20-14869 Opinion of the Court 13

1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2020). Although a district court has the 

statutory power under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 to adjudicate the 

prosecution of federal offenses, id., this Court has held “that a 

district court lacks jurisdiction when an indictment alleges only a 

non-offense.” United States v. Peter, 310 F.3d 709, 715-16 (11th Cir. 

2002). On the other hand, “[s]o long as the indictment charges the 

defendant with violating a valid federal statute as enacted in the 

United States Code, it alleges an ‘offense against the laws of the 

United States’ and, thereby, invokes the district court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction.” United States v. Brown, 752 F.3d 1344, 1354 

(11th Cir. 2014).5 

Here, Wright cannot claim that, in light of Davis, his 

indictment alleged only a “non-offense.” That is, he cannot, and 

does not, argue that Count 4 charged only conduct falling outside 

the sweep of § 924(c). This is so because Wright’s § 924(c) count 

alleged both the invalid Hobbs Act conspiracy predicate and two 

5 As this Court has explained, Peter and other cases finding jurisdictional 

defects in indictments involve the “specific and narrow circumstances” in 

which the indictments “affirmatively allege facts that conclusively negated the 

existence of any offense against the laws of the United States.” United States 

v. Brown, 752 F.3d 1344, 1353 (11th Cir. 2014). In Peter, the indictment defect 

was jurisdictional because the only conduct affirmatively alleged 

“undoubtedly fell outside the sweep of the [federal criminal] statute.” Id.

Absent such specific and narrow circumstances, the Supreme Court has made 

clear that “defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of its power to 

adjudicate a case.” Id. (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631, 122 

S. Ct. 1781, 1785 (2002)). 

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14 Opinion of the Court 20-14869

undisputedly valid drug trafficking predicates.6 Thus, Wright’s 

indictment charged him with violating a valid federal statute and 

the indictment defect Wright points to here was nonjurisdictional. 

See Brown, 752 F.3d at 1354. Moreover, this Court has repeatedly 

held that a Davis claim like Wright’s—in which the § 924(c) count 

charges both valid and invalid predicates—can be procedurally 

defaulted. See Granda, 990 F.3d at 1286-92; Parker, 993 F.3d at 

1262. 

D. Wright Cannot Overcome His Procedural Default 

On direct appeal in 2007, Wright did not argue that his 

§ 924(c) conviction was invalid because the § 924(c)(3)(B) residual 

clause was unconstitutionally vague. Thus, like the petitioners in 

6 For this reason, Wright’s reliance on United States v. St. Hubert is misplaced. 

The defendant in St. Hubert claimed that neither of the two predicates alleged 

in his § 924(c) count qualified as a crime of violence. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 335, 

343 (11th Cir. 2018) (concluding that St. Hubert’s Johnson claim was 

jurisdictional because he argued that all of the charged predicates were invalid 

and thus the indictment “consisted only of specific conduct” that as a matter 

of law was outside the sweep of § 924(c)), abrogated on other grounds by

Davis, 588 U.S. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 2332-36. 

Here, however, Wright does not dispute that the two drug trafficking 

predicates alleged in his § 924(c) offense in Count 4 remain valid after Davis. 

Thus, Wright’s indictment alleged conduct—possessing a firearm in 

furtherance of two drug trafficking crimes—that constitutes a valid federal 

offense. Wright’s claim, which turns on the fact that the jury returned a 

general verdict, is not like the claim in St. Hubert, which turned on the 

indictment’s purported failure to allege any § 924(c) offense at all.

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20-14869 Opinion of the Court 15

Granda and Parker, Wright procedurally defaulted his Davis-based 

challenge to his § 924(c) conviction. 

Wright cannot show cause or actual prejudice to overcome 

his default. First, Wright cannot show cause because, as was true 

in Granda, the building blocks to bring a due process vagueness 

challenge to § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause existed at the time of 

his 2007 direct appeal. Granda, 990 F.3d at 1286-92; see also Parker, 

993 F.3d at 1265. As we explained in Granda, the Supreme Court’s 

2007 decision in James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 127 S. Ct. 1586 

(2007), “indicated that at least three Justices were interested in 

entertaining challenges to the ACCA’s residual clause, and perhaps 

to similar statutes.” Granda, 990 F.3d at 1287. In addition, 

defendants had been raising similar vagueness challenges to 

various criminal statutes, including other parts of § 924(c), for 

many years leading up to 2007, indicating that by the time of 

Wright’s 2007 direct appeal “the tools existed” to bring such a 

challenge to § 924(c)(3)(B). See id. at 1287-88 (citing examples from 

other circuits all decided before the conclusion of Wright’s direct 

appeal).

Even if Wright could establish cause for his procedural 

default, he could not show actual prejudice. To do so, Wright 

would have to show a “substantial likelihood” that the jury actually 

relied only on his Hobbs Act conspiracy predicate to convict him 

of the § 924(c) count. See id. at 1288. But, based on the record 

before us, he cannot do so. 

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Given the trial evidence that Wright planned and attempted 

to rob at gunpoint a drug dealer’s stash house containing 20 to 30 

kilograms of cocaine so that he could then sell at least a portion of 

the cocaine himself, the jury unanimously found him guilty of all 

of the predicates: conspiracy and attempt to possess cocaine with 

intent to distribute it and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act 

robbery. The trial record establishes (1) that all of these findings of 

guilt “rested on the same operative facts and the same set of 

events”; (2) that the objective of Wright and his crew—to take at 

gunpoint and then sell multiple kilograms of cocaine—was the 

same for the planned robbery and the planned drug crime; and

(3) that all of the predicate offenses supporting the § 924(c) count 

“were so inextricably intertwined” that no reasonable jury could 

have convicted Wright of using and carrying the firearm in relation 

to only one of them. See id. at 1289-90. Moreover, Wright does 

not cite any record evidence allowing us to find the offenses are 

separate, nor did he offer a theory of defense at trial that would 

have permitted the jury to do so. See id. at 1290. And, because of 

the district court’s unanimity instruction, we know that the jury 

unanimously agreed on the “way” in which Wright committed his 

§ 924(c) offense, i.e., the predicates. See id. at 1291. In short, “the 

tightly bound factual relationship of the predicate offenses 

precludes [Wright] from showing a substantial likelihood that the 

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20-14869 Opinion of the Court 17

jury relied solely on” the Hobbs Act conspiracy predicate to convict 

him of Count 4. See id. at 1291.7

Further, for the same reasons, Wright cannot establish that 

he was actually innocent of his § 924(c) offense. To show actual 

innocence, Wright would have to show that no reasonable juror 

would have concluded he possessed a firearm in furtherance of 

“any of the valid predicate offenses.” Id. at 1292. And, as in 

Granda, the fact that Wright’s invalid predicate is “inextricably 

intertwined” with his valid predicates “makes it impossible” for 

him to make such a showing. See id.; see also Parker, 993 F.3d at 

1263 (following Granda and concluding Parker could not show 

actual innocence because his “predicate offenses were inextricably 

intertwined so that if jurors found one applicable—which, given 

7 Wright contends that for purposes of showing actual prejudice, Granda is 

materially distinguishable because Granda received a concurrent sentence on 

his § 924(o) conviction, while Wright received a consecutive sentence on his 

§ 924(c) conviction. Wright’s claim that a consecutive sentence is inherently 

prejudicial misses the point. Granda’s prejudice analysis made no mention of 

the concurrent sentence and focused instead on the likely effect of the invalid 

predicate on “the jury’s decision to convict.” See Granda, 990 F.3d at 1288 (“If 

the absence of the invalid [Hobbs Act conspiracy] predicate would not likely 

have changed the jury’s decision to convict, Granda has not suffered actual 

prejudice.”). 

We further note that Wright’s Davis claim is not a challenge to an 

extended prison term, such as a career offender designation under the 

Sentencing Guidelines or an armed career criminal designation under the 

ACCA, but to the validity of his conviction. Thus, contrary to Wright’s 

assertion, Wright’s consecutive sentence is not material to the prejudice 

inquiry here. 

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18 Opinion of the Court 20-14869

their guilty verdicts on Counts 4 and 5, we know they did—they

had to reach the same conclusion with respect to the others”).

For purposes of preserving the issue for further review, 

Wright contends Granda is wrongly decided and that, under a 

proper reading of Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 118 S. Ct. 

1604 (1998), he needed to show only legal innocence, not factual 

innocence, to overcome his procedural default. As Wright 

acknowledges, however, we are bound by Granda. See United 

States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining 

that under our prior panel precedent rule, the holding of a prior 

panel is binding on all subsequent panels unless or until it is 

overruled or is undermined to the point of abrogation by this Court 

sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court).

For these reasons and given our binding precedent, we 

conclude Wright has not shown either cause and prejudice or 

actual innocence to overcome the procedural default of his Davis

claim. 

E. Wright’s Claim Loses on the Merits 

Even if Wright’s Davis claim were not procedurally 

defaulted, Granda and our subsequent decisions applying Granda

compel us to conclude alternatively that it fails on the merits.

A § 2255 movant is entitled to relief on a Davis claim only if 

he can show that his § 924(c) conviction is supported solely by a 

predicate crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause. 

See In re Hammoud, 931 F.3d 1032, 1041 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing 

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20-14869 Opinion of the Court 19

Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1222-25 (11th Cir. 2017); 

In re Cannon, 931 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th Cir. 2019) (same). 

In Granda, we held that, notwithstanding procedural 

default, the harmless-error standard mandates that collateral relief 

for a Davis claim is appropriate only if the court has “grave doubt” 

about whether a trial error had “substantial and injurious effect or 

influence” in determining the verdict. 990 F.3d at 1292 (quoting 

Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 267-68, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197-98

(2015)). Applying the harmlessness standard in Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993), the Granda

Court held that “the court may order relief” for a Davis error “only 

if the error resulted in actual prejudice” to the petitioner. Id.

(noting that Brecht does not impose a burden of proof and that the 

reviewing court instead must “ask directly” whether the error 

substantially influenced the jury’s verdict).8

8 The Granda Court rejected several arguments against applying Brecht, 

including: (1) that it is improper to consider whether alternative valid 

predicates supplied the basis for the conviction based on Stromberg v. 

California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 532 (1931), and Parker v. Sec’y, Dep’t of 

Corrs., 331 F.3d 764 (11th Cir. 2003); and (2) that, in Davis cases, courts must 

apply a “categorical approach” to a § 924(c) conviction and assume that the 

conviction rested on the invalid predicate to avoid impermissible judicial 

factfinding prohibited by Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151 

(2013). See Granda, 990 F.3d at 1293-96. To the extent Wright raises these 

arguments in his appeal, they are foreclosed by Granda. See Archer, 531 F.3d 

at 1435.

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20 Opinion of the Court 20-14869

On this record, we have no such “grave doubt” about 

whether Wright’s § 924(c) conviction rested on an invalid ground. 

The jury unanimously found Wright guilty of all three predicate 

crimes. And, as already discussed, all three predicate crimes were 

inextricably intertwined as they stemmed from the same plan and 

attempt to rob cocaine from a drug dealer’s stash house using 

firearms. See id. at 1293; see also Parker, 993 F.3d at 1265 (holding 

that the record made clear that if the jury relied on the invalid 

Hobbs Act conspiracy predicate, it also relied on the valid drug 

trafficking predicates because they were inextricably intertwined 

and therefore any error was harmless); Foster v. United States, 996 

F.3d 1100, 1107 (11th Cir. 2021) (applying Parker and concluding,

on virtually identical facts to those found in Wright’s case, that the 

jury “could not have found that Foster’s gun use or possession . . . 

was connected to his conspiracy to rob the stash house without also 

finding at the same time that they were connected to his conspiracy 

and attempt to possess with intent to distribute the cocaine he 

planned to rob from the same stash house” and thus “the inclusion 

of an invalid predicate offense in the indictment and jury 

instructions was harmless”). 

The record establishes that Wright was actively involved in 

the planning of, and attempt to commit, the armed stash-house 

robbery. Specifically, Wright met with the undercover agent 

several times to plan the stash-house robbery; knew the stash 

house had armed guards; knew that they needed an experienced 

robbery crew and firearms in order to steal the cocaine from the 

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20-14869 Opinion of the Court 21

stash house; intended to divide the 20 to 30 kilograms of cocaine 

amongst the crew after the robbery; and had loaded firearms, 

gloves, and a ski mask in the vehicle with him while he was riding 

to what he believed to be the stash house to commit the robbery. 

Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could not have found that 

Wright committed the § 924(c) firearm offense in relation to the 

Hobbs Act conspiracy without also finding that he committed the 

§ 924(c) firearm offense in relation to the drug trafficking crimes. 

We therefore do not have a grave doubt that Wright’s § 924(c) 

conviction rested on only the invalid Hobbs Act conspiracy 

predicate, despite the jury’s general verdict. As such, Wright 

cannot establish actual prejudice, and the inclusion of the invalid 

Hobbs Act conspiracy predicate in Count 4 of his indictment and 

in the jury instructions was harmless.

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons discussed above, Wright cannot establish 

that he is entitled to collateral relief on his Davis claim. We 

recognize that the district court did not have the benefit of Granda

or our subsequent decisions applying Granda when it granted 

Wright’s § 2255 motion. Nonetheless, in light of Granda, the 

district court reversibly erred when it concluded that Wright had 

demonstrated cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural 

default of his Davis claim and that the Davis error was not 

harmless. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order 

granting Wright’s § 2255 motion and on remand the district court 

shall deny Wright’s § 2255 motion. 

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22 Opinion of the Court 20-14869

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

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