Filed 9/15/16 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE ex rel. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
, Plaintiffs and Respondents
,

v.

DANIEL H. DAHAN et al.
,
D efe ndant s and Appellants

. B 259799
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC 397695 )

APPEAL from a n order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ernest M. Hiroshige , Judge. Appeal dismissed

. Lerner & McDonald and Kenneth E. McDonald for Defendants and Appellants. Knox Ricksen, Thomas E. Fraysse, Reid M. Miller and Ryan G. Jacobson for
Plaintiff s and Respondent s

.

_________________________2 INTRODUCTION A private party who brings a qui tam 1 action for insurance fraud under Insurance
Code section 187 1.7, 2 where the d istrict a ttorney and the Insurance Commission er decline to intervene
, is entitled to a portion of the proceeds of the action plus fees and

costs

. ( Id
., subd. (g)(2)(A).) In this case we are confronted with the novel question
whether the judgment

- debtor defendant s in such an action have standing to challenge the
trial court ’ s post

-

judgment order allocating the judgment amount between the prevailing plaintiffs, i.e., the private party and the State. We hold that judgment

- debtor defendants in qui tam insurance fraud actions are not aggrieved by such allocation orders under section 1871.7, subdivision (g) (2)(A) , with the result that they do not have standing to appeal . Accordingly, we dismiss their appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Allstate Insurance Company , et al. (Allstate) 3 as private

- party plaintiff or “relator,” 4 brought a qui tam action on behalf of itself and the State of California (together plaintiffs), against defendants Daniel H. Dahan and his affiliated corporation
, Prog ressive Diagnostic Imaging, Inc. ( together defendants)
, pursuant to the California
In surance Frauds Prevention Act ( § 1871.7 (IFPA ) ). Neither the district attorney nor the

1 The term “qui tam” is short for the expression “ ‘qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,’ ” which in Latin means, “ ‘ “who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own ”.’ [Citations.]” ( People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Weitzman (2003) 107 Cal.App.4 th 534, 538 , italics added ( Weitzman ).)

2 All further statutory references are to the Insurance Code, unless otherwise noted.

3 The private

- party plaintiffs are Allstate Insurance Company, Allstate I ndemnity Company, Allstate Property and Casualty Insura nce Company, Deerbrook Insurance Company, Allstate County Mutual Insurance Company, and Allstate Fire and Casualty I nsurance Company

.
4 “A ‘relator’ has been described thus: ‘The real party in interest in whose name a state or an attorney general brings a lawsuit.

. . . A person who furnishes information on which a civil or criminal case is based; an informer.’ ” ( Weitzman , supra , 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 538, quoting from Black’s Law Dict. ( 7th ed. 1999) p. 1292, col. 1 & In re Veterans’ Industries, Inc

. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 902, 925.)3

Insurance Commissioner opted to take over the lawsuit. The trial court entered jud gment against defendants , finding that plaintiffs had proven 487 claims for violation of Penal
Code secti on 550 by defendants
, and awarding a total of $7,010,668.40, comprised of $5,788,516.78 in civil penalties and assessments, an d $1,222,151.62 in attorn ey fees,

costs , and expenses of investigation . (The qui tam judgment ). Following entry of the qui tam judgment, A l lstate began efforts to collect it

. During its investigation, Allstate learned of a series of real estate transactions conducted by def endants designed to t ransfer away their assets. Allstate, on behalf of the State
, filed
an action to set aside the fraudulent transfers of real and personal property

. (Case No.
BC 527960.)
Defendants demurred to the operative compl a int on the ground th at Allstate lacked standing to proceed with the fraudulent transfer suit
, in part because the judgment in the qui tam action was never allocated between Allstate and the People pursuant to section 1871.7, subdivision (g)(2)(A)
, with the result that Allstat e had no stake in the qui tam judgment or authority to pursue collect ion of that judgment from defendants. Defendants argued that section 1871.7, subdivision (g)(2)(A) requires that the court determine the

amount of the qui tam judgment the re la tor may co llect
, and the rela tor may only enforce the judgment up to that allocated amount
, because the remainder of the proceeds belongs
to the State

. Allstate obtained a stay of the fraudulent conveyance action and returned to the qui tam court where it filed a motion for an order allocating the qui tam judgment proceeds. The motion was based on a stipulation entered into between the People and Allstate allocating to Allstate 50 percent of the civil penalties an d assessments ($2,894,258.39)
, plus the reasonab le attorney fees and costs the court had awarded ($1,2 2 2,151.62), for a total of $4,116,410.01

. (§ 1871.7, subd. (g)(2)(A).) The People agreed to receive the remaining 50 percent of the civil penalties and assessments

. Defendants opposed the allocatio n motion . They argued, inter alia
, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order because the qui tam judgment had long since
become final depriving the court of power to “ ‘ materially vary[] ’ ” it. Allstate responded4

that the allocation ord er did not “ ‘ materially vary the judgment
, ’ ” which remained intact. Rather, Allstate argued that the allocation order simply apportion ed the judgment proceeds between judgment creditors and thus had no impact on either the rights of the People and Allst ate as plaintiffs and judgment creditors on the one hand
, or the obligations of defendants as judgment debtors , on the other hand . Regardless of the
outcome of the allocation motion
, Allstate argued, defendants remain obligated to pay the $7,010,668.40 ju dgment

. The tria l court in the instant qui tam action granted Allstate’s allocation motion
and entered the stipulation as the judgment

. Defendants filed their timely appeal. We requested supplemental briefing from the parties (Gov. Code, § 68081) to

a ddress whether defendants were aggrieved by the allocation order such that they would have standing to appeal it

. DISCUSSION The right to appeal is statutory. ( Conservatorship of Gregory D . (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 62, 67.) Code of Civil Procedure secti on 902 provides that “ [a] ny party aggrieved may appeal ” from a judgment. (Italics added.) “ ‘ “ One is considered

‘ aggrieved ’ whose rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment. ” [Citation.]’ ” ( Conservatorship of Gregory D
., at p. 67 .) The appellant’s “ interest

‘ “ must be immediate, pecuniary, and substantial and not nominal or a remot e
consequence of the judgment

. ” ’ [Citation.]” ( County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971)
5 Cal.3d 730, 737.) Conversely, “ ‘ A party who is not aggrieved b y an order or judgment has no standing to attack it on appeal. ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ( Conservatorship of Gregory D ., at p. 67.) “ Thus, notwithstanding an appealable judgment or order, ‘[a]n appeal may be taken only by a party who has standing to a ppeal. [Citation.] This rule is jurisdictional. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] It cannot be waived. [Citation.] ” ( Ibid. )
1. The Qui Tam procedure Anyone engaging in insurance fraud in violation of Penal Code sections 549, 550, or 551 is subject to pena lties and assessments. (§ 1871.7, subd. (b).) Section 1871.7 provides for civil penalties of not less than $5,000 to $10,000 for each fraudulent claim5

presented to an insurance company
, plus assessments of not more than three times the
amount of each cla im for compensation, and equitable relief . ( Id ., subd. (b).) Section 1871.7 authorizes “ a ny interested persons, including an insurer” to bring a qui tam civil action “

for the person and for the State of California” to recover penalties and equitable rel ief for fraudulent insurance claims. ( Id
., subd s

. (b) & (e)(1) , italics
added .) Pro c edurally, the interested person or relator files a complaint and serves it on the district attorney and the Insurance Commissioner . ( Id ., subd. (e)(2).) The complaint
i s sealed in camera for at least 60 days
, during which time the district attorney and the Insurance Commissioner may elect to intervene ( i bid. ) and conduct the action
themsel ves. When the district attorney intervenes in the qui tam insurance fraud action,

s ubdivision (g)(1) of section 1871.7 entitles the private

- party relator to a “ bounty ” of
between 30 and 40 percent “ of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim
, depending upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the

pros ecution of the action.” ( Ibid. ; see also Weitzman , supra , 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.)
W hen the state declines to intervene , as in this case
, the relator tries the action and
is entitled by subdivision (g)(2)(A) of section 1871.7 to a “ bounty ” of between 40 and 50 percent of the proceeds of the action “ for collecting the civil penalty and damages ” ( ibid

. ) , along with “ an amount for reasonable expenses that the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reaso nable attorney’s fees and costs” which fees and costs are imposed against the defendant. ( Ibid. ) 5

5 Section 1871.7, subdivision (g)(2)(A) reads: “If the district attorney or commissioner does not proceed with an action under this section, the person bringing the action or settling the claim shall receive an amount that the court decides is reasonable for collecting the civil penalty and damages . Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the amount shall not be less than 40 percent and not more than 50 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement and shall be paid o ut of the proceeds. That person shall also receive an amount for reasonable expenses that the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. All of those attorney’s fees and costs shall be imposed against the de fendant. The parties shall serve the commissioner and the local district attorney with complete copies of any and all settlement agreements, and6

2. Defendants are not aggrieved by the order they seek to appeal

. Defendants acknowledge that “this Appeal has no effect on that [qui tam] Judgment” and does not alter defendants’ obligation to pay the $7 million. Notwithstanding their apparent concession that they are not aggrieved by the order they appeal, defendants construct a theory under which they have been injured by the
allocation order: Defendants argue that the allocation order “ c hanged the legal rights of
Allstate to enable Allstate to arguably be able to legally collect on the judgment” because the allocation order “arguably legitim i zes” the insurer’s collection ef forts by conferring standing on Allstate

. (Italics added.) Citin g no authority, defendants argue that Allstate could only enforce the judgment up to the amount of the allocation order, and so until the
court allocate d the judgment between the People and Allstate
, the latter ha d no right to collect any proceeds. In ess ence , defendants assume that an allocation is a prerequisite or condition precedent to enforcement of a qui tam judgment by an insurer

- relator when the
State has not intervene d

. However, based on a plain reading of section 1871.7, subdivision (g)(2)(A), t he bounty in cases in which the People do not intervene is for trying and collecting the judgment. When the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, there is no need for statutory construction or resort to other indicia of legislative intent, such as legislative history. ( California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 11 Cal.4th 342, 349. ) Section 1871.7, subdivision (g)(2)(A) states , “If the district attorney or commissioner does not proceed with an action under this section, the person bringing the action or settling the claim shall receive an amount that the court decides is reasonable for collecting the civil penalty and damages

. . . [T]he amount shall not be less than 40 percent and not more than 50 percent of the proceed s of the action

. . . and shall be paid

terms and conditions, for actions brought under this article at least 10 days prior to filing any motion for a llocation with the court under this paragraph. The court may allocate the funds pursuant to the settlement agreement if, after the court’s ruling on objection by the commissioner or the local district attorney, if any, the court finds it is in the interes ts of justice to follow the settlement agreement.” (Italics added.)7

out of the proceeds.” (Italics added.) 6 To “collect” is “[t]o receive payment.” [¶] “To collect a debt or claim is to obtain payment

. . . .” (Black’s Law Dict. (6 th ed. 1990)

p. 263, col.1.) Thus, by employing the word “collect ing ” in section 1871.7, subdivision (g)(2)(A), the Legislature intended that
, when the State does not intervene, the insurer

relator is the plaintiff who levies on the judgment

. Our conclusion that the bounty for the prosecuting relator is for trying and collecting the judgment is bolstered by a comparison of subdivision s (g)(2)(A) with (g)(1) , in section 1871.7. ( Bostick v. Flex Equipment Co., Inc . (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 80, 107 , conc. opn. of Croskey, J. [“A court must harmonize a stat ute with other laws so as to give effect to all and avoid anomalies, if possible”].) Whereas the section 1871.7, subdivision (g)(2)(A) bounty is for “ collecting the civil penalty and damages
, ” the recovery awarded under s ubdivision (g)(1) (A)(i)

- when the district attorney takes over
the case

- is a percentage “ of the proceeds of the actio n or settlement of the claim.” (Italics added.) Under the latter subdivision, t he intervening People, not the relator, would collect the judgment. Thus, subdivision (g )(2)(A), relevant here because the State
did not adopt the action
, recognizes that the relator, in addition to trying the insurance fraud action, is the party who collects or levies on the ensuing judgment. “The remaining proceeds revert to the State

. . . .” (58 Cal.Jur.3d (2012) State of California, § 126 , italics
added .) That is, after collecting on the judgment , Allstate would pay the excess over its
allocation to the People

. “[T]he money generated by the cause of action that the [private

party] pla intiff recovers [in a qui tam action] is property owned by the plaintiff.” (11 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10 th ed. 2005) Community Property, § 111, p. 673, discussing In re Marriage of Biddle (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 396, 399 [community property interests in a qui tam action] .) The reading of section 1871.7, subdivision

6 Also, in cases where the People opt ed not to intervene, subdivision (g)(2)(A) of section 1871.7 awards the direct

- victim relator reasonable expenses, attorney’s fees, and costs “impose d against the defendant,” in addition to the bounty . The judgment here already awarded Allstate reasonable expenses, attorney fees and costs incurred by Allstate who has the right to collect that amount also.8

(g)(2)(A) advocated by defendant would result in the incongruous situation in which the
successful insurer

- relator would be unable to levy on the judgment it has won through its

own efforts until the bounty is allocated between it and the People who had abandoned prosecution of the action. The right to levy on the $7 million qui tam judgment was Allstate ’s for the
additional reason that the insurer was the direct victim of defendants’ insu rance fraud. Unlike the federal False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)) where the relator s are people with knowledge of the fraud but not victim s of that wrong , under California’s IFPA, the
direct victims of the fraud are the relator

- insurers and their ins ureds . ( Weitzman , supra , 107 Cal.App.4th at p p . 56 1

- 56 2.) Allstate, as the direct victim who prosecuted the action and prevailed without the People’s participation
, necessarily ha d the right to collect the
civil penalty and damages irrespective of an all ocation order

. To hold otherwise would
be absurd given the California qui tam IFPA action is brought, not merely on behalf of the People, but “

for the person and for the State of California” (§ 1871.7, subd. (e)(1), italics added) , and where the qui tam j udgment here , drafted by defendants, was written
in favor of all plaintiffs, not just the People. Therefore, a n allocation order is not a prerequisite to the Allstate ’s right to enforce the judgment ; it neither “change d ” nor “legitimize d ” Allstate’s legal right to collect the proceeds of the action from defendants
, a right Allstate always had as relator

. Defendants argue , citing People ex rel. Strathmann v. Acacia Research Corp

. (2012) 21 0 Cal.App.4th 487 ( Strathmann ) that Allstate admits that the rel ator is not entitled to any proceeds absent a court

- ordered allocation . Regardless of what Allstate admits, addressing the legal question de novo ( American Liberty Bail Bonds, Inc. v.
Garamendi (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1052 [ we exercise our independen t interpretation of the Insurance Code absent disputed facts])
, Strathmann does not stand
for the proposition that an allocation order is a prerequisite to collecting the judgment

. Strathman n stated, “ [ T ] he ‘relator [] ’ stands in the shoes of the People of the State of California, who are deemed to be the real party in interest. [Citation s .] The relator in a qui tam action under section 1871.7 does not personally recover damages bu t , if9

successful, receives a substantial percentage of the recovery as a bo unty.” ( Strathmann
, at p. 500 .) For this proposition, Strathmann cite d generally to subdivision (g) of section 1871.7, without distinguishing between the wording in subdivision s (g)(1) ( State

prosecuted actions) and (g)(2)(A) (insurer

- prosecuted actions)

. 7 As the allocation order is not a prerequisite to Allstate’s ability to levy on the qui

tam judgment under section 1871.7, subdivision (g)(2)(A) , and given defendants ’
concession that the appeal has no effect on
, and does not alter their obligation to pay the $7 million qui tam judgment
, defendants are not aggrieved by the allocation order and have no standing to appeal from it. (Cf. U.S. ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen.
Elec

. ( 6th Cir. 1994) 41 F.3d 1032, 1046 [under federal False Claims Act “ the Relators’

- Share Litigation did not directly involve the qui tam defendants

. . . [who] had no legal standing or right to participate in the proceedings
, ” italics added ] ; cf. Kim v. Yi (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 543, 549

- 55 1 [proceeding for apportionment of damages between judgment creditors is a special proceeding that did not involve any defendants].) 8 In the absence of standing by defendants as appellants, this court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. ( Conservatorship of Gregory D
., supra , 214 Cal. App.4th at p. 69.)

7 We are unpersuaded by the remaining cases c ited by defendants in their letter brief

.
8 Allstate argues that the California False Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 12650 et seq.) was patterned aft er the federal False Claims Act ( 31 U.S.C. § 3730 ) and encourages us to look to federal cases applying the qui t am provisions of the federal statute. While the California IFPA in section 1871.7 differs from the federal False Claims Act in “several significant respects” ( Weitzman , supra , 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 561), the two Acts are identical with respect to the boun ty when the government declines to adopt the action. (Compare § 1871.7, subd. (g)(2)(A) [“ the person bringing the action or settling the claim shall receive an amount that the court decides is reasonable for collecting the civil penalty and damages ”] & 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) [ “ the person bringing the action or settling the claim shall receive an amount which the court decides is reasonable for collectin g the civil penalty and damages”]. )10 DISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed. Allstate is to recover its costs of this proceeding

.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

ALDRICH, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

LAVIN, J.