# FILED
February 27, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE

PATRICIA ANNE PEHLMAN, ) KNOX CIRCUIT ) Appellant ) NO. 03A01-9708-C V-00339 ) v. ) HON. WILLIAM K. SWA NN, III ) JUDGE GREGORY LAWRENCE ) PEHLMAN, ) ) Appellee ) ) and ) ) SOBIESKI, MESSER & ) ASSOCIATES, ) ) VACATED a

nd Intervenor ) REMANDED

Robert L. Crossl

ey, Knoxville, fo

r Appellant. Wanda G. Sobieski, Knoxville, for Intervenor.



### O P I N IO N

INMAN, Senio

r Judge

At the outset we thi

nk it well to observe

what this case is not

about: the enforcement

of a lien for attor

ney fees. What the case is about is whether the motion of the plaintiff-wife [hereafter Wif

e], to discharge t

he purported lien cla

imed by the erstwhil

e attorney for Husband should have been granted, and specifically whether Husband should have the opportunity to “resolve

his dispute” with the Intervenor, as pr

ovided for in the judgme

nt. Intervenor Sobieski represented the defendant/husband [hereafterHusband] in this divorce case during pre-trial procedures. She then

withdrew, with

approval of the Cour

t. Husband engaged other counsel and the case was ultim

ately settled, wi

th the residence of the parties, owne d by them as tenants by the entirety, being awarded to the Wife. Before the case w

as settled and judgmen

t entered, the Int

ervenor filed a Notice of Attorney’s Lie n, pursuant to T.C.A. § 23-2-102, against “the property located at

1947 Grenada Boulev

ard, Knoxville, T

ennessee, 37922 in the amount of $34,555. 15 for unpaid legal fe es and expenses.” T

his property was owned by the par

ties as tenants by the entirety. After the final d

ecree was enter

ed, Wife filed a

motion to discharge th

e lien, asserting its

invalidity. We note

that only a statutory lien was asserted. The settlement was announced in open Cou rt, approved by the j udge and thereafter r

educed to judgment duly entered, which pr ovides, as pertinen

t here, that “Husband shall be sole

ly responsible for im

mediately resolving his dispute with Wanda Sobiesk i so that her attorne

y lien is removed from the resid ence.” After argument o

f counsel, with no e

videntiary hearing,

the trial judge declined to discharge

the lien, holding that

it was both statutory and equitable, and emph

asizing that Wife ha

d knowledge of it and s

tressing the reference to it in the final decree. Wife appeals, insisting that the lien is invalid under well-settled principles, one bei

ng that the lien descr

ibed in T.C.A.§ 23-2-102 applies only to the amount the at torney recovers for hi s client, see, Hudson v. Elk, 1989 WL 11875, and that I

ntervenor recover

ed nothing for her er

stwhile client. Intervenor responds

that her fees we

re contractual,

and that any property owned by her

then client was subj ect to a lien, but tha t in any event Wife waived any ob

jections to the legali

ty of the lien by enter

ing into the1 The assets of the par ties consis

ted principall

y of a mortgaged residence and some term life insurance policie s. Inte

rvenor’s f

ees are nea

rly $35,000. 00. Inquiry a t argument re

vealed that

this unus

ually high amou nt was br ought a bout ov er custod y squab bling. settlement which r

ecognized it. Intervenor also claims that her lien extends to the interest of Wife, whom she did not, of c

ourse, represent . Our review of the

findings of fact ma

de by the trial Court

is de novo upon the record of the

trial Court, acc

ompanied by a presumpt

ion of the correctness of the

finding, unless the pr

eponderance of the

evidence is otherwise. T ENN . R. A PP . P., R ULE 13(d). We think these arguments and the judgment below overlook a crucial point: the judgment orde

red Husband to resolve his dispute with his former attorney. 1 Whether the dispute concerned the amoun

t of the fee, or th

e purported lien, or both, does not appear, but in any event we think that Husband should be acc

orded the opportunity,

as the judgment provide s, to resolve his dispute w

ith Intervenor, not

only as to the amount of the fee, but as to the validity of th

e lien. The language “resolve his dispute” is vague and uncertain, to a marked extent. Interveno

r interprets the w

ords to mean, simply put, payment of the fee, in which event she will release the lien. But we think the words are susceptible of a lar

ger meaning; otherw

ise the Court would si

mply have ordered Husband to pa

y the fee. We thin

k that, in view of th

e attorney-client relationship, the hu sband must be given the b enefit of any reas onable doubt as to the meaning of the words because the cases clearly hold that such matters must be clos ely scrutinized. See, Alexander v. Inman, 903 S.W.2d 686 (Tenn. 1986); Adams v. Mellon, 616 S.W.2d 485 (Tenn. App . 1981). The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for an evidentiary resolution of the reasonableness of the fee and the validity of the assertedlien. Costs are assessed to the Intervenor.

____________________________ William H. Inma

n, Senior Judge CONCUR:

_______________________________ Houston M. Goddard , Presiding Judge

_______________________________ Herschel P. Fr

anks, Judge