Unless otherw ise noted, the fa cts set forth he rein a re undisputed a

nd draw n from the 1 parties’ Statements of Undisputed Materia l F acts submitt ed pursuant to L ocal Civil Rule 7(h) a nd the pa rt ie s’ su mma

ry jud g me nt p a

pe rs . UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA ROBERT FRAZ IER, : : P la in t if f, : : v. : Ci vi l A cti on No. 06 -61 5 (GK)

: EDWINA WILLIAMS, et al., : : De fend ant s. :

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION Pla int if f R ob e rt F ra zie r (“ Pla int if

f” ) b ri ng s th is a c tio n a g a ins t D e fe nd ants Ed wi na Willi a ms (“ De te c tiv e Willi a ms” ) a

nd the Di str ic t of Columbi a , pur su ant to 42 U.S .C. § 1 98 3. Th is m a tte r i s now bef ore the Court on Defe ndants’ Motion fo r S u m m ar y J udg ment [Dkt. No. 61] . Upon consideration of the Motion, Oppositi on, Reply , Surreply , the entire rec ord her ein, and f or the

re a so ns se t f

or th b e low , D e fe nd ants ’ M oti on fo r S umm ary

Judg me nt i s granted

. I. BACK GR OUND 1 This la w suit c oncer

ns an alter cation at a

downtown District of Columbia night c lub called L aC age , wh er e Plaintiff worke d as a “ g o-g o boy .” L aCag e is widely perc eived a

nd had the reputation of being a gay nightc lub which fe ature d male ente rtainer s who danc ed on a sta g e and on bar tops. Pl. Compl . ¶ 9.T h er e i s s o me dispute about whe ther the inc ident occur red on F ebrua

ry 16 or 17, 2 2003; however , the diffe renc e is immaterial and the date a lleg ed in the Complaint will be used. -2- W h i l e t h e r e i s s u

b s t an t i a l d i s p u t e a

b o u t m an y o f t h e f

a c t s , t h e f o l l o w i n g ar e u n d i s p u t e d

. In the ea rly m orning of F ebrua

ry 16, 2003, Plaintiff completed his perf ormanc e, dre ssed in street 2 clothes, and joined the customers in the ba r are a of the nightc lub. Plaintiff be lieved that two men in the audienc e had be en cr iticiz ing or disparag ing his pe rfor

m an ce as h e danc ed. An a ltercation the n o c c ur

re d b e tw e e n Pl a int if

f and the tw o a

ud ie nc e me mbe rs he tho ug ht w e re c ri tic izin g his perf ormanc e, who we re later identified a s J onathan Ta rt and Shane Kline. Whil e it is undisputed that Pl aintiff touche d Kline first, and without consent, Plaintiff ende d up being assaulted and suffe ring some phy sical injury , the extent of which is also disputed. There is contradictor

y evidenc e about whether Kline and Tart had or had not been drinking heavily . The next day , Plaintiff telephoned Sg t. Bre tt Parsons of the Metropolitan Police Depa rtment (“MPD” ) Gay and L esbian L iaison Unit , an d descr ibed the incident to him. At that time, Plainti ff wa s

uncer tain about pre ssing c harg es, bec ause he did not want bad publicity or exposure for

his employ er

and be c a us e his inj ur ie s d id not a

pp e ar to be pe rm ane nt. Th e ne xt da y , Tart and Kl ine ma de the ir

own re ports to MPD claiming that Plaint i ff h ad att acke d Kline, and Kline sw ore out a complaint ag ainst Plainti ff f

or simple assault. Def endant, De tective Edw ina Will iams, was assigned to investigate the incident. She int e rv ie we d a ll thr e e pa

rt ie s and sp ok e wi th S g t. P ars on s. Th e re is muc h d isp ute a bo ut t he de ta ils of De tective Williams’ invest i gat i o n an d how it was conduc ted. Ultimately , she pre pare d an aff idavit in support of a wa

rra nt for Plaintiff’s arr est. On Marc h 31, 2003, Assistant United States-3-

Attorney Catherine Worthing ton review ed and a pproved the aff

idavit a nd a war rant wa s issued for Plaintiff’s arr est. Detec ti v e W i l l iams called Plaintiff, at his home in P ennsylvania, to inform him that the

war rant h ad b ee n i s sued. Plaintiff ag ree d to turn himself in the next morning and did so. The Pla int if f w a s d e ta ine d a

nd inc arc e rate d o ve rn ig ht a

nd re le a se d the da

y a ft e r he ha d tu

rn e d h ims e lf in. On t hat s ame day , the U.S

. Attorney ’s Office infor med the ar

raig nment court that it was e ntering

a no lle prosequi , there by

dismiss ing the case . On April 3, 2 006, Plaintiff filed the pre sent one-c ount Compl aint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff a lleg ed that Detec tive Wil liams violated his Fourth Amendme nt rig ht to be fre e fr om

unrea sonable sea

rche s and seizures, that De tective Wil li a ms v io la te d h is F if th Amendment rig ht “not to experience invidious di scrimination” and that the District of Columbia is responsib le f o r D e te c ti ve Wil liams’ “wr ong doing unde r principles of municipal liability .” Compl., ¶ 34-36. II. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW Summary judgme nt may

be g rant ed “o nly

if” the ple ading s, the discover y and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue a s to any materia l fac t and that the moving pa

rty is entitled t o j u d g ment as a matter of law . See F ed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), as

a m e n d e d D e c e mb e r

1 , 2 0 0 7 ; A r

r i n g t o nv . U n i t e d

S t a t e s , 4 7 3 F

. 3 d

3 2 9 , 3 3 3 ( D

. C

. C i r . 2 0 0 6 )

. In other wor ds, the moving pa rty must satisfy

two require ments: first, d em o nstrate that ther e is no “g enuine” fac tual dispute and, second, that if there is, it is “mater ial” to the case. “A dispute ove r

a materia l f

act is ‘ g enuine’ if ‘the evidenc e is suc h that a rea sonable jury could re turn a ve rdict for the nonm oving party .’” Arring ton, id. (quoting Ander son v. L iberty L obby , I nc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-4-

(1986)) . A fa ct is “mater ial” if it might a ffe ct the outcome o f t h e case under the substantive g overninglaw. L iberty

L obby , 477 U.S. at 248. I n its most rec ent discussions of summary judgme nt, in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007), the Supre me Court said:

[a]s we have e mph a size d, “ [w]h en th e mov ingpa rt y ha s c arr ie d it s burd e n und e r R

ule 56 (c ), its op po ne nt m us t d o mor e tha

n s imp ly show that there is some metaphy sical doubt as to the mater ial fac ts. . . . W here the re cord taken as a whole c ould not lead a r ational trier of fac t to find for the nonmoving party , there is no ‘g enuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. I ndustrial Co. v. Z enith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 -8 7

. . . (1986) ( footnote omitted). “[T]he mere exis tence of some alleg ed fa ctual dispute betwee n the par ties will not defe at an other

wise properly

supported motion for summary judgme nt; the require ment is that there be no genuine iss u e of material fac t.” Ander son v. L iberty L obby , I nc., 477 U.S. 242, 247- 48 . . . (empha sis in original). Howeve r, the S upreme Court has also consistently emphasized that “at the summary judgme nt stag e the judg e’s f unction is not . . . to weig h the evidence and deter mine the t ruth of the matter but to deter

mine whether

there is a g enuine issue for trial.” L iberty L obby , 477 U.S. at 249. I n both L iberty

L obby and Ree ves v. Sander son Plumbi ng Prods., I nc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000), the Supreme Court cautioned that “ [c] redibility deter minations, the weig hing of the evidenc e, and the dra wing of leg itimate infere nces f rom the fa cts, are jury functions, not those of a judg e” de ciding a motion for summary

judgment. L iberty

L obby , 477 U.S. at 255. “To survive a motion for summary judgme nt, the party bear ing the burden of proof at trial

. . . must provide evidenc e showing that t h er e i s a t ri able issue a s to an eleme nt essential to that party ’s claim. See Ce lotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).” Arring ton, 473 F.3d at 335.I t is ha rd to un de rs tand wh y the De fe nd ants wa ite d un til tw o y e ars a ft e r t his laws uit 3 was filed to r aise the issue of qualified immunity . As the Supreme Court ha s reiter ated, it should be ruled on be fore defe ndants are put to the ex pense and inconvenienc e of discovery , motions practice, and, of c ourse, trial. Saucier , 533 U.S. at 200 (quoting Hunter v. Br y ant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (“ we re pe a te dly

have str e sse d th e imp or

tanc e of re so lvi ngimmun ity

qu e sti on s at t

h e e arl ie st p os sib le stag e in litigation”) ). -5- III . AN AL YSI S A. Defendan t De tec tive William s Is En titled to Qualif ied Im m uni ty The Supreme Court emphasized in Saucier v. Kat z , 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001), that qu al i fi edi m m u n i t y

i s a qu es t i o n o f l aw wh i ch t h e co u rt s h o u l d d ec i d e “at t h e e ar l i es tp o s s i b l e s t age in liti g ation.” Consequently , it is t he first issue to which the Court will now turn. 3 I n Pearson v. Callahan, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009), the Supreme Court g ave the following succinc t overviewof the qua lified immunit y doctrine: Th e do c tr ine of

qu a lif ie d im mun ity

pr ote c ts g ov e rnme nt o ff ic ia ls “fr om liabilit y

for c ivil damag es insofar as th eir c onduct does not violate clea

rly established statutory or constit utional rig hts of which a reasonable person would have known.” Har low v Fitzge rald, 457 U. S. 8 0 0 , 8 1 8

. . . ( 1 9 8 2 )

. Q u a li f ie d im mu n it y b a la n c e s tw o imp or tant int e re sts

-- the ne e d to ho ld pu bli c of fi c ia ls accoun ta

ble wh e n th e y

e xer c ise po we r i rr e sp on sib ly and the ne ed to shi e ld officia ls from hara ssment, distraction, an d li a b il it y wh e n th e y p e rfor m their duties re asonably . The prote ction of qualified immunit y applies reg ardle ss of whethe r the g overnme nt official’ s err or i s “a mistake of law, a mistake of fa ct, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law an d f a c t

. ” G r o h v . R a m i r e z , 5 4 0 U

. S

. 5 5 1 , 5 6 7

. . . ( 2 0 0 4 ) ( K e n n e dy, J . dissenting) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 . . . (1978) (noting that q ualified immunity cover s “mere mistakes in judgment whether the mistake is one of f

act or one of la w.”)

. Under p r e - e xis ti n g p r e c e d e n t, th e Co u rt h a d r e qu ir e d th e lo w e r

c o u rts to f

ir s t d e te rmine whether the fa cts alleg ed by a plainti ff made out a viol ation of a constituti onal rig ht and if they did, to then deter

mine whether

the asser ted rig ht was “cle arly established” at the time of the violation.-6-

Saucier , 533 U.S. at 201. I n Pearson, the Supreme Court “ ruled that the Saucier sequenc e is optional and that lower

fede ral c ourts have the discretion to dec ide only the more na

rrow ‘ clea rly established’ issue ‘in light of the circ umstances in the pa rticular c ase at hand.’” Rasul v. My ers, 563 F .3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818). I n this c ase, the Court sees no re ason not to f ir st a dd re ss t he fi rs t qu e sti on

a sk e d in Sa uc ie r, nam ely wh e the r “ [t]ak e n in the lig ht m os t favor able to the pa

rty asser ting the injury , do the fac ts a lleg ed show the office r’s conduct violated

a c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht?” Sa uc ie r, 53 3 U .S. a t 20 1. Thus , the fi rs t que sti on to b e ans we re d is wh a t, if any , constitutional right has be en violated. Pla int if f a rgue s th a t his F ourt

h Am e ndme nt c on sti tut ion a l ri g ht to be fr e e fr om u nr e a so na ble

se arc he s and

se izur e s h a s b e e n v iol a ted be c a us e of the mann e r i n w hic h D e te c tiv e Willi a ms conducte d h er i nvestig ation of the a ltercation at the L aCag e club, a nd beca use the a ffidavit she pr e pa re d to su pp or t he r r e qu e st f

or an arr e st wa

rr ant wa s fa lse , mis le a din g , and de sig ne d to ob ta in Pla int if f’ s fa lse arr e st a

nd wr on g fu l pr os e c uti on . In th e c a se of a c on sti tut ion a l f

a lse arr e st c la im, a police of

fice r is en t i t led to qualified immunity if “a rea sonable off

icer could have believed that probable cause exis ted to arr est.” Hunte r, 502 U.S. at 228. “The qualified immunit y standard ‘ g ives ample room for

mistaken judg ments’ by

prot ec t i n g ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those w ho knowing ly

violate the law.” I d. at 229 (quoting Malley v. Br igg s, 475 U.S. 335 (1986)). Thus, a n office r who “‘r easona

bly but mistake nly conclude [s] that probable cause is pr esent’” is not li able f or making the ar

rest. Hunter , id. (quoting Ander son v. Creig hton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)). I n this case, a ssuming the a ccur acy of Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Fa cts Not in Dispute, there is no que stion that the fac ts a nd circ umstances surrounding Detec tive Wil liams’ investigation would have justified a rea sonable poli ce office r i n her positi on to conclude that Plainti ff’ s arr est was-7-

supported by

probable cause . Detec tive Wil liams interviewed t wo d i ff erent antag onists with t wo conflicting versions of how a n alterc ation occur

red, of who touched w ho first, and of the manner and im pac t of the tou c hin g . F or

purp os e s o f e va luatin g the re a so na ble ne ss o f D e te c tiv e Willi a ms’

c on du c t, i t is mos t si g nif ic ant t hat Pla int if

f a dmi ts t

hat he fi rst to uc he d K lin e on the nig ht i n question, and did so without his permission or consent. Def s.’ St. of Materia l F act, ¶ 8, 9. More over, it is undi sputed that Dete ctive Willi ams believe d that, in the District of C olumbia, such a movement constituted an “unwanted touching,” which is an assault under the law of the District of Columbia. I d., ¶ 36. I n Br osseau v. Ha

ug en, 543 U.S. 194, 197 (2004), the Supreme Court made it clear that

“ [q]ua l i f i e d i m m u n i t y

s h i e l d s ano f

f i c e r f r o m s u i tw h e ns h e m a k e s a d e c i s i o nt h a t , e v e nif constitutionally

defic ient, rea sonably

misapprehe nds the law g overni ng the circ umstances she

c on fr on te d.

. . . I f t

he law at th a t ti me did

no t c le arl y

e sta bli shtha t th e of fi c e r’ s c on du c t w ou ld violate the Constituti on, the officer should not be subj ect to liability or, i ndeed, even the burdens of litigation.” 543 U.S. at 198. The Court emphasized that “this inquiry ‘must be under

taken in lig ht of the sp e c if

ic c on te xt o f the c a se .’ ” I d. (q uo tin g Sa uc ie r, 53 3 U .S. a t 20 1) . Pl a int if f h a s f a ile d to clea rly establish that the ar

rest for assault, under

the par ticular fa cts of this c ase and the law of the District of Columbia, l ac k ed probable cause , and has f ailed to cite a

ny case law in support of that proposition. The District of Columbi a ci t es Daniels v. City of Ne w York, 2003 WL22510379, *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), in suppor t of its position. I n that case , the district c ourt said that “[t] o the extent that the offic ers e ncounter ed two people who ea ch appear ed credible and who each claimed to be the victim of assault by

the other, the police had pr obable c ause to arre st either plaintiff or P ag alisi or-8-

both.” See a lso Dahl v. Holley , 312 F.3d 1228, 1234 ( 11th Cir. 2 0 0 2 ); W ri g ht v. Cit y of Philade lp h ia , 4 0 9 F

. 3 d

5 9 5 , 6 0 3 ( 3 d

Ci r . 2 0 0 5 )

. T h a t i s p r e c is e ly th e s it u a ti o nw h ic h D e te ctive Wil liams face d. She encounte red Plaintiff a nd Kline, who both appe are d cre dible to her, a nd who

eac h clai m ed t o b e t h e victim of assault by the other. A t that point, under Danie ls, Detec tive Wil liams had probable cause to arre st either the Plaintiff or K line. F ina lly , Pl a int if

f, him se lf , a dmi ts that: I t is the policy of the District of Columbi a that a light t ap p i n g of so me on e ’s sh ou lde r t o g e t th a t pe rs on ’s a tte nti on c on sti tut e s si mpl e assault and can j u s t ify

an ar rest if the pe rson who wa s tapped su bs e qu e ntl y

c la ims to b e of

fe nd e d, e ve n if

the re is n o h arm . Plaintiff’s Counter-Statement of F acts, pursua nt to L CvR 56.1, P art I , ¶ 6. Pla int if f’ s a dmi ss ion

de mon str a te s th a t D e te c tiv e Willi a ms w a s a c tin g in c on fo rm ity wi th District of Columbia policy when she obtained a warr ant for the arr est of Plaintiff, and ther efor e fu rt he r s up po rt s th e c on c lus ion th at P la int if f’ s arr e st w a s su

pp or te d b y pr ob a ble c a us e . I t mu st alway s be re membere d that probable cause is e v a lu a te d “ ‘fr om the perspe ctive of a rea sonable off

icer on the sce ne, rather than w ith the 20/20 visi on of hindsight.’ ” Wolfe v

. P er ry , 4 12 F.3d 707, 717 (6th Cir. 2005); (quoting Klein v. L ong , 275 F.3d 544, 550 ( 6th Cir. 2001) ); Moorehe ad v. District of Columbia, 747 A.2d 138, 147 (D.C. 2000) (in deter mining probable ca

use, “the court e valuates the evidenc e fr om the perspe ctive of the office r, not the plaintiff” ). I n s u m m ar

y , P l a i n t i f

f h a s f a i l e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a tt h e o f f i c e r w a s v i o l a t i n g t h e F ou rt h Amendment in the situation she conf ronted. Give n al l t he fa cts and c ircumstance s, Detec tive Wil liams acted r easona

bly in concluding that probable cause exis ted to justif y t h e i ssuance of an

ar r e s tw ar r a n t

. C o n s e qu e n t l y, s h e i s e n t i t l e d t o qu a l i f i e d i m m u n i t y.-9-

B. P lai nt iff Ca nnotEsta b lish t he Exi st e nc e of A ny P oli c y o r Cus to m of t he Met ropolitan Police Depart m ent Wh ich Caused His Allegedly Unconstitution al Ar r e st As a lr e a dy

e sta bli sh e d, De te c tiv e Willi a ms’ c on du c t, a s a lle g e d by Pla int if f, did no t vi olate a constitutional rig ht. Even if it did, however , Plaintiff cannot pre vail on his claim that the District of Columbia is resp o n s ib le f o r D e te c ti v e Williams’ conduct “ under pr inciples of municipal liability .” Compl., ¶ 36. Under the longestablished princ iples set forth in Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Ser vs. of the City of Ne w Y or k, 43 6 U .S. 65 8, 69 4 (19 78 ), the Di str ic t of Columbi a c an o nly be he ld l ia

ble for a plaintiff’s succ essful constitutional c laims if the injury itself was cause d by a policy or custom of the Di str ic t of Col umb ia g ov e rnme nt. Th e Sup re me Court ha s e xpla ine d that, “ a t the ve ry le a st there must be an af

firmative link betwe en the policy and the particular c onstitut ional violation alleg ed.” City

of Oklahoma

City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985). Her e, viewingthose fac ts which are undisputed, it is clear that ther e is no such District of Columbi a policy

or custom. Thus, there can be no “af firmative link” be tween a ny Di s t ri ct of Columbi a policy

and any alleg ed constit utional violation by Detec tive Wil liams. At most, P laintiff alleg es that he was m istreated by a si ng le pol ice officer

. There is absolutely no evidenc e fr om which any rea sonable jury could conclude t hat P laintiff’s alleg ed injury was c aused by

a custom or policy of the Di str ic t of Col umb ia

. I nd e e d, Pla int if f’ s ow n wo rd s r e fute any

su c h a rgume nt. Ac c or din g to him :

o t h e r t h an D e t e c t i v e W i l l i a m s , A L L o f t h e M P D C p e r s o n n e l w ith

wh om I c a me in c on ta c t r e g ard ing th is inc ide nt .

. . we re un if or mly se ns iti ve , int e re ste d and c on c e rn e d fo r t he sa fe ty and se c ur ity of my p e r s o nan d

p r o p e rt y.P l a i n t i f f a l s o a l l e g e s i n C o u n t 1 , ¶ 3 5 , t h a t D e t e c t i v e W i l l i a m s v i o l a t e d h is r ig hts 4 “under the Fif th A mendment not to experience invidious discrimination.” He contends, at ¶ 4 of the Com p l ai n t, that “Def

endant Williams was motivated by animus ag ainst the Plaintiff beca use she perc eived him to be g ay

and by her bia ses per ceive d from the nat u re o f h i s employ ment as an enter tainer.” There is no a

uthority holding that Plaintiff’s status a s an enter tainer may

provide the basis for a n equal protec tion c laim unde r the Fifth Amendment. I n addition, it is far from esta blished that “per ceive d sexual orie ntation” can provide the basis for a Constit utional claim. See Steffa n v. Perry , 41 F.3d 677 ( D.C. Cir. 1994). -10- Ex . E, Pl’s MPD C omplaint. Pl aintiff eve n rec omm en d ed that “a ppropriate commendations be iss ue d fo r the e ff

e c tiv e and re sp on sib le a c tio ns take n b y ” oth e r p oli c e of fi c e rs wi th w ho m he c a me into contact. I d. Consequently , Plaintiff cannot pre vail on his municipal liabili ty claims an d t h e District of Columbi a should be dismissed as a D efe ndant in this action. 4 F or a ll the fo re g oin g re a so ns , D e fe nd ants ’ M oti on fo r S umm ary

Judg me nt i s grante d.

June 2, 20 09 /s/ Glady s Kessler Un i t edS t at es Di s t ri ct J u d ge Copies via ECF t o all couns el of recor d