IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE ) )
v. ) ) I.D. No. 2010001104 ) DANIEL MOPKINS , ) ) Defendant. )

ORDER

Submitted: February 8 , 202 3 Decided: March 7 , 2023

AND NOW TO WIT , this 7 th day of March, 2023, upon consideration of Daniel Mopkins (“Defendant”)’s Motion for Modification/Reduction of Sentence under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35, the sentence imposed upon the
Defendant, and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that:

1. On March 17 , 2022, Defendant pled guilty to one count of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”) and one count of Reckless Endangering First Degree. 1 On June 3 , 2022, Defendant

was sentenced to: (1) for PFDCF, eight years at Level V, suspended after three years for transitioning levels of probation; and (2) for Reckless Endangering

1 D.I. 13.2 First Degree, five years at Level V, suspended for two years at Level III

. 2

2. On January 31, 2023, Defendant filed this Motion for Sentence
Modification/Reduction, askin g for “no probation.” 3 In support, Defendant

asserts that he is rehabilitated and employable, received funds from a small business association, and has been promoting liter acy programs through various writings and publications . Further, he asserts that no probation would be good for “marketing.” 4

3. Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b), the Court may reduce a sentence of imprisonment on a motion made within ninety days after the sentence is imposed. 5 Defendant filed this pending Motion 242 days after the sentencing. Defendant’s Motion is time

- barred. T o overcome the ninety

- day time bar, Defendant must show that “extraordinary circumstances” forgive the

tardiness of his Motion. 6 Rehabilitation, employability, receipt of funds, promotion of literacy, and marketability do not constitute extraordinary circumstances to justify the delay

.

2 D.I. 15. 3 D.I. 16. 4 Id. 5 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b). 6 See Colon v. State , 900 A.2d 635, 638 (Del. 2006) ; Washington v. State , 2023 WL 2028713, at *2 (Del. Feb. 15, 2023) (citing State v. Diaz , 2015 WL 1741768, at *2 (Del. Apr. 15, 2015) (explaining that e xtraordinary circumstances are the circumstances that “specifically justify the delay; are entirely beyond a petitioner’s control; and have prevented the applicant from seeking the remedy on a timely basis.” ).3 4. Moreover, Defendant’s request is statutorily barred. 11 Del. C. 4204(l) requires th is Court to impose the period of custodial supervision as imposed

. 7

5. The Sentence was appropriate for all the reasons stated at the time of sentencing.

IT IS SO ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Sentence

Modification is DENIED.

/s/Vivian L. Medinilla Vivian L. Medinilla Judge
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Defendant Investigative Services

7 11 Del. C. 4204(l) (“ Excep t when the court imposes a life sentence or sentence of death, whenever a court imposes a period of incarceration at Level V custody for 1 or more offenses that totals 1 year or more, then that court must include as part of its sentence a period of custodi al supervision at either Level IV, III or II for a period of not less than 6 months to facilitate the transition of the individual back into society. The 6

- month transition period required by this subsection may, at the discretion of the court, be in addition to the maximum sentence of imprisonment established by the statute. ”) ; see also Nave v. State , 783 A.2d 120, 122 (Del. 2001) (“Section 4204(l) clearly requires the sentencing court to impose a period not less than six months of custodial supervision at Level IV, III, or II, i.e., probation, to follow any Level V sentence of one year or more.”).