FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OSURE BROWN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.; 

PATENAUDE & FELIX APC; US 

BANK, N.A.; NATIONAL 

COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN 

TRUST 2004-1; NATIONAL 

COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN 

TRUST 2004-2; NATIONAL 

COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN 

TRUST 2005-1; NATIONAL 

COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN 

TRUST 2005-2; NATIONAL 

COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN 

TRUST 2005-3; NATIONAL 

COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN 

TRUST 2006-1; NATIONAL 

COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN 

TRUST 2006-2; NATIONAL 

COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN 

TRUST 2007-1; NATIONAL 

COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN 

TRUST 2007-2, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-35244 

D.C. No. 2:20-cv00669-DGE 

OPINION
2 BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

David G. Estudillo, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 17, 2023

Seattle, Washington

Filed July 14, 2023

Before: William A. Fletcher, Richard A. Paez, and 

Lawrence VanDyke, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Paez;

Concurrence by Judge VanDyke

SUMMARY*

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act / Bankruptcy Law

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the 

district court’s dismissal, for failure to state a claim, of an 

action brought by Osure Brown, a student loan borrower 

who had received a bankruptcy discharge, alleging that 

defendants’ attempts to collect debts that were discharged in 

bankruptcy violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

and the Bankruptcy Code.

Affirming the dismissal of Brown’s claims that were 

based on a violation of his bankruptcy discharge order, the 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC. 3

panel reiterated that Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, 276 F.3d 

502 (9th Cir. 2002), precludes FDCPA claims and other 

claims based on violations of Bankruptcy Code § 524. 

The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal, as 

barred by the one-year statute of limitations, of Brown’s 

remaining FDCPA claim based on the theory that defendants 

knowingly brought a meritless post-discharge debt 

collection lawsuit because they knew they could not prove 

ownership of Brown’s debts. Agreeing with other circuits, 

the panel held that certain litigation acts, including service 

and filing, can constitute distinct violations of the FDCPA 

that each trigger the statute of limitations. In determining 

which acts constitute independent violations, the court 

considers (1) the debt collector’s last opportunity to comply 

with the statute and (2) whether the date of the violation is 

easily ascertainable. The panel concluded that Brown 

sufficiently alleged one post-filing FDCPA violation in the 

filing of an affidavit that presented a new basis, not 

contained in the complaint, to show that defendants owned 

the debts. Disagreeing with the Tenth Circuit, the panel 

further held that when service occurs before the filing of a 

suit, filing constitutes an independent violation of the 

FDCPA.

Concurring in the judgment, Judge VanDyke agreed 

with the outcome and much of the reasoning of the majority 

opinion, but he wrote that the rule announced in Part III.B of 

the majority opinion—that when service occurs before the 

filing of a suit, filing constitutes an independent violation of 

the FDCPA—was an unnecessary conclusion and failed to 

anticipate the intricacies that future cases are bound to raise.
4 BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

COUNSEL

Scott C. Borison (argued), Borison Firm LLC, Casper, 

Wyoming; Phillip Robinson, Consumer Law Center LLC, 

Silver Spring, Maryland; Christina L. Henry, Henry & 

DeGraaff PS, Seattle, Washington; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Albert J. Rota (argued), Jones Day, Dallas, Texas; Justin H. 

Homes (argued), Bryan C. Shartle, and Bradley J. St. 

Angelo, Sessions Israel & Shartle LLC, Metaire, Louisiana; 

Emily J. Harris and Benjamin C. Byers, Coor Cronin LLP, 

Seattle, Washington; Marc Rosenberg, Lee Smart PS Inc., 

Seattle, Washington; Thomas N. Abbott, Perkins Coie LLP, 

Portland, Oregon; Kristine E. Kruger, Seattle, Washington; 

for Defendant-Appellees.

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

In this case, we clarify what actions trigger the statute of 

limitations for a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

(“FDCPA”) claim when the alleged violation of that statute 

occurs within the context of a debt collection lawsuit. We 

first reiterate that Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, 276 F.3d 502 

(9th Cir. 2002), precludes FDCPA and other claims based on 

violations of Bankruptcy Code § 524 (11 U.S.C. § 524). We 

then conclude that certain litigation acts—including service 

and filing—can constitute distinct violations of the FDCPA

that each trigger the FDCPA’s one-year statute of 

limitations. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). Accordingly, we 

affirm in part and reverse in part. 
BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC. 5

I.

From 2003 to 2007, Plaintiff Osure Brown (“Brown”) 

took out ten student loans to attend college in Washington 

state. Defendants National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts 

(collectively, “the Trusts”) ultimately purchased Brown’s 

loans. The Trusts appointed Defendant U.S. Bank as their

special servicer. The Trusts also hired Defendant 

Transworld Systems, Inc. (“Transworld”), to collect the 

defaulted loans, and hired Defendant Patenaude & Felix 

(“Patenaude”), a law firm specializing in debt collection, to 

represent them in debt collection actions.1 

Several years after taking out the loans, Brown filed for 

Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief. During his bankruptcy 

proceeding, the Trusts filed ten proof of claim forms for the 

outstanding student loan balance. As part of his Chapter 13 

repayment plan, Brown made payments to his creditors for 

thirty-six months, after which any remaining funds were 

distributed to certain “non-dischargeable student loan 

creditors,” including the Trusts. The bankruptcy court then 

issued an order of discharge for all dischargeable debts under 

11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). The parties dispute whether the loans 

owned by the Trusts were dischargeable, although that fact 

is not relevant to our analysis of the district court’s dismissal 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

After the bankruptcy discharge, Patenaude, on behalf of 

Transworld and the Trusts, sent Brown ten letters seeking to 

collect the remaining loan balance on each of Brown’s ten 

loans. When attempts to settle the debts were not successful, 

the Trusts turned to Washington state court to collect the 

1 We refer to the Trusts, U.S. Bank, Transworld, and Patenaude 

collectively as “Defendants”.
6 BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

debts. They served Brown with ten summonses and 

complaints on February 16, 2019. The Trusts then filed the 

complaints on April 5, 2019, which were later consolidated 

into one lawsuit.2 

Along with the complaints, the Trusts filed an affidavit 

by Jennifer Audet (“the Audet Affidavit”), a Transworld 

employee, purporting to show that the Trusts owned the 

underlying student loan debt. After Brown questioned 

whether the Audet Affidavit demonstrated that the debts 

were properly assigned to the Trusts in his summary 

judgment motion, the Trusts filed an affidavit by Bradley 

Luke (“the Luke Affidavit”), another Transworld employee, 

on October 7, 2019, which also purported to show that the 

Trusts owned the debts. The state court ruled that the Luke 

Affidavit was inadmissible hearsay and excluded it. 

Because the Trusts could not prove that the debts had been 

properly assigned to them, the state court granted summary 

judgment to Brown, dismissing the debt collection suit. The 

Trusts did not appeal the judgment. 

On April 6, 2020, Brown filed this putative class action

in Washington state court, alleging violations of the FDCPA 

and the bankruptcy court’s discharge order on behalf of 

himself and others similarly situated. He alleges two distinct 

classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c), a

“FDCPA Class” and a “Bankruptcy Class.” In Count I, 

Brown alleges that Transworld and Patenaude violated the 

FDCPA under two alternative theories: (1) by violating his 

bankruptcy discharge order and (2) by filing a knowingly 

meritless debt collection lawsuit. Count II requests

2 We thus refer to the state court “action” or “lawsuit” in singular form. 

No party argues that the date of consolidation is relevant to the FDCPA 

statute of limitations defense.
BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC. 7

declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis of Count I for 

the FDCPA Class against all Defendants. In Count III, 

Brown alleges that the Trusts violated Bankruptcy Code 

§ 524(a) (11 U.S.C. § 524(a)) by seeking to collect debts that 

were discharged in bankruptcy. Count IV requests

declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis of Count III for 

the Bankruptcy Class against the Trusts. Defendants 

removed the case to federal court and Brown promptly filed 

an amended complaint. 

Defendants filed a combined five motions to dismiss. 

The district court considered all the motions together and 

granted them in February 2022. The district court concluded

that most of Brown’s claims were precluded by Walls, which 

held that discharged debtors do not have a private right of 

action under Bankruptcy Code § 524 and thus cannot bring 

FDCPA claims based on a violation of § 524. See 276 F.3d 

at 509–11; 11 U.S.C. § 524.

3 The district court then

considered Brown’s remaining FDCPA claim, which was

based on the theory that Defendants knowingly brought a 

meritless debt collection lawsuit. The court concluded that 

dismissal was warranted under the FDCPA’s one-year 

statute of limitations because more than a year had elapsed 

between when Defendants served Brown with their debt 

collection suit and when Brown filed his FDCPA claim. See 

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). Brown timely appealed. 

3 Section 524 provides that a discharge order “operates as an injunction 

against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment 

of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a 

personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is 

waived.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). 
8 BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A 

judgment dismissing a case on the pleadings is reviewed on 

appeal de novo.” Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). On review, we “must accept 

all material allegations in the complaint as true and construe 

them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 

Id. (quoting NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 

(9th Cir. 1986)) (cleaned up). We will affirm dismissal only 

if “no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could 

be proved consistent with the allegations.” Id. (citations 

omitted). We also review de novo the question of whether a 

claim is barred by the statute of limitations. See Bliss v. 

CoreCivic, Inc., 978 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2020) 

(citations omitted). 

III.

We first address Brown’s claims based on a violation of 

his bankruptcy discharge order. These claims are precluded 

by Walls. We then address Brown’s remaining FDCPA 

claim—that Defendants knowingly brought a meritless debt 

collection lawsuit—and decide whether Brown has alleged 

any violations of the FDCPA that are not barred by the 

statute of limitations. We hold that he has. 

A.

In Counts I and III, Brown alleges that Defendants 

attempted to collect debts that were prohibited from 

collection by his bankruptcy discharge order. In Count I, 

Brown contends that Transworld and Patenaude violated the 

FDCPA by attempting to collect such debts. In Count III, 

Brown alleges that the Trusts violated 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) by 

attempting to collect debts discharged in bankruptcy. As the 
BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC. 9

district court correctly concluded, both claims are squarely 

foreclosed by Walls. See 276 F.3d at 509–11. Our decision 

in Manikan v. Peters & Freedman, LLP, 981 F.3d 712 (9th 

Cir. 2020), does not alter this conclusion. 

In Walls, we held that a debtor who alleges a violation of 

a bankruptcy court’s discharge order has no private right of 

action under 11 U.S.C. § 524. The appropriate remedy is 

contempt of court against the offending creditor pursuant to 

11 U.S.C. § 105(a). See Walls, 276 F.3d at 506–09. Because 

§ 105 allows “an aggrieved debtor to obtain compensatory 

damages, attorneys fees, and the offending creditor’s 

compliance with the discharge injunction,” “no further 

remedy is necessary.” Id. at 507. In so holding, we 

explained that 

[i]mplying a private remedy . . . could put 

enforcement of the discharge injunction in 

the hands of a court that did not issue it 

(perhaps even in the hands of a jury), which 

is inconsistent with the present scheme that 

leaves enforcement to the bankruptcy judge 

whose discharge order gave rise to the 

injunction. 

Id. at 509. 

We also held that a debtor may not pursue an FDCPA

claim based on a violation of the discharge order. Walls, 276 

F.3d at 510–11. The plaintiff in Walls had sought relief 

under the FDCPA, claiming that Wells Fargo violated her 

discharge order by attempting to collect her debt after it had 

been discharged. Id. at 504. We concluded, however, that 

“[t]here is no escaping that Walls’s FDCPA claim is based 

on an alleged violation of § 524.” Id. at 510. To allow her 
10 BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

to bring such a claim would allow a private right of action 

“through the back door.” Id. at 510. Her claim would 

“necessarily entail[] bankruptcy-laden determinations,” 

which are best left to the bankruptcy court. See id. 

Brown’s Count III claim, entirely based on an alleged 

violation of Bankruptcy Code § 524, is squarely precluded 

by the first holding in Walls.

4 See 276 F.3d at 507–09. The

Count IV claim, which seeks declaratory and injunctive 

relief on the basis of Count III, also fails because these 

remedies are not stand-alone claims, and they do not survive 

the dismissal of Count III when Brown has pled no facts 

suggesting that any of the Defendants are likely to sue him 

again. See City of Reno v. Netflix, Inc., 52 F.4th 874, 878–

79 (9th Cir. 2022); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil 

Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). Moreover, any declaration 

that certain debts have been discharged would need to be 

made by the bankruptcy court.

5 See Stout v. Prussel, 691 

F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1982) (“It has long been the rule in 

4 The Trusts also argue that Brown was required to assert his claims that 

they did not have the right to enforce his loans and that those loans were 

discharged as a compulsory counterclaim in the state court litigation. 

Because Brown’s claims are precluded by Walls, we do not reach this 

issue. 

5 Despite Brown’s argument, the Supreme Court’s decision in Taggart 

v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795 (2019), does not grant the district court 

authority to issue declaratory and injunctive relief relating to bankruptcy 

discharges. Taggart concerned the legal standard for holding a creditor 

in civil contempt when the creditor attempts to collect a debt in violation 

of a discharge order. Id. at 1801. It did not concern a district court’s 

jurisdiction to enforce a discharge order. The Court had no reason to 

address that question because a bankruptcy court issued the civil 

contempt order in Taggart. Id. at 1800. 
BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC. 11

this circuit that the right to a discharge in bankruptcy is left 

to the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court.”).

To the extent Brown’s FDCPA claim in Count I is based 

on the theory that Transworld and Patenaude improperly 

sought to collect debts discharged in bankruptcy, the claim 

fails under the second holding in Walls. See 276 F.3d at 510. 

Brown disputes this conclusion, arguing that our decision in

Manikan narrowed Walls to allow his claim. This argument

is incorrect. 

In Manikan, we clarified that Walls does not preclude 

claims under the FDCPA when those claims are not based 

on a violation of a bankruptcy discharge order. 981 F.3d at 

714. There, Manikan fully paid a debt to his homeowner’s 

association through his Chapter 13 bankruptcy repayment

plan two years before the bankruptcy court entered a

discharge order. Id. at 714, 717. Nevertheless, after the 

entry of the discharge order, a debt collector attempted to 

serve Manikan with a Notice of Default. Id. at 714–15. 

Manikan sued under the FDCPA because the debt collector 

attempted to collect a debt that Manikan no longer owed. Id. 

at 714–15. We held that Walls did not preclude his claim 

because “whether an unfair debt collection practice occurred 

does not depend on issuance or enforcement of the discharge 

order.” Id. at 716. Rather, “even if Manikan had never 

received a discharge in his bankruptcy case, he could still 

assert [that the defendant] acted unlawfully by attempting to 

collect a debt that he fully satisfied.” Id. at 717. His FDCPA 

claims were “therefore premised on a wholly independent 

theory of relief.” Id. Unlike in Walls, the FDCPA claims in 

Manikan were not “inextricably intertwined with bankruptcy 

issues.” Id. 
12 BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

Brown cannot make the same argument. His theory is 

identical to the one presented in Walls: that the Defendants 

violated the discharge order by attempting to collect debts 

that were discharged. See Walls, 276 F.3d at 504. Such a 

claim necessarily requires a determination of whether the 

debt was discharged, which is “within the exclusive 

jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.” Banks v. Gill Dist. 

Ctrs., Inc., 263 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2001). As in Walls, 

Brown’s claim is “premised on a violation of a bankruptcy 

discharge order.” Manikan, 981 F.3d at 716. Indeed, 

Brown’s definition for his proposed FDCPA class requires

that each class member received a bankruptcy discharge. 

Allowing Brown’s FDCPA claims to proceed would 

“circumvent the remedial scheme of the [Bankruptcy] Code 

under which Congress struck a balance between the interests 

of debtors and creditors by permitting (and limiting) debtors’ 

remedies for violating the discharge injunction to contempt.” 

Walls, 276 F.3d at 510. Brown’s Count I claim thus fails on 

this theory. 

B.

Brown’s Count I claim also alleges an alternative 

FDCPA theory, arguing that because Transworld and 

Patenaude knew that they could not prove ownership of 

Brown’s debts, they violated the FDCPA by bringing a 

knowingly meritless debt collection lawsuit.

6 Because this 

6 In support of this theory, Brown cites several FDCPA sections, 

including: § 1692e(2)(A) (prohibiting debt collectors from making a 

“false representation of the . . . legal status of any debt”); § 1692e(5) 

(prohibiting debt collectors from “threat[ening] to take any action that 

cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken”); § 1692e(10) 

(prohibiting debt collectors from using “any false representation or 

deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect a debt”); and § 1692f 
BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC. 13

theory is not “premised on a violation of a bankruptcy 

discharge order,” Manikan, 981 F.3d at 716, it is not

foreclosed by Walls. The district court acknowledged this 

distinction but concluded that Count I nevertheless failed 

because—to the extent it was based on the meritless lawsuit 

theory—the claim was time-barred by the FDCPA’s oneyear statute of limitations, as Brown was required to file the 

FDCPA claim one year from the date the state court 

complaints were served, rather than one year from the date 

the complaints were filed. To so conclude, the district court 

looked to Washington law, which provides that a plaintiff 

commences a lawsuit when a complaint is served or filed, 

whichever comes first. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.28.020; 

Seattle Seahawks v. King County, 913 P.2d 375, 376 (Wash. 

1996). Brown challenges this conclusion, arguing that he 

has alleged several independent violations of the FDCPA, 

including the filing of the complaints on April 5, 2019 and 

the filing of the Luke Affidavit on October 7, 2019, each of 

which commences a one-year statute of limitations under the 

FDCPA and render timely the April 6, 2020 filing of this 

lawsuit (April 5, 2020 was a Sunday). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6(a)(1)(c) (explaining that if the last day to file falls on a 

Sunday, the plaintiff may file the next business day); see also 

Hart v. United States, 817 F.2d 78, 80 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(applying Rule 6(a) to a federal statute). 

We hold that Brown correctly asserts that some litigation 

acts can constitute independent FDCPA violations and that 

each such violation triggers its own one-year statute of 

limitations under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d)

(creating a one-year statute of limitations for each violation 

(prohibiting debt collectors from using “unfair or unconscionable means 

to collect or attempt to collect any debt”). 
14 BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

of the FDCPA). After discussing relevant FDCPA 

precedent, we address the alleged post-filing violations, and 

then address the distinction between service and filing. 

Because Brown has alleged discrete violations after the date 

of service of the complaints, we reverse. 

1.

Congress enacted the FDCPA to “eliminate abusive debt 

collection practices by debt collectors” in order to “protect 

consumers.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). “The FDCPA pursues 

[this purpose] by imposing affirmative requirements on debt 

collectors and prohibiting a range of debt-collection 

practices.” Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 358 (2019) 

(citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b–1692j). While Congress’s 

“ultimate objective was to protect consumers from 

harassment by debt collectors, Congress intended to achieve 

this purpose by regulating the conduct of debt collectors.” 

Mattson v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, Inc., 967 F.2d 259, 261 (8th 

Cir. 1992) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)). “Because the statute 

is broadly remedial, we liberally construe the FDCPA in 

favor of consumers.” McAdory v. M.N.S. & Assocs., LLC, 

952 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Hernandez v. 

Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1078–79 

(9th Cir. 2016)). 

Although we perhaps have not yet said so explicitly, 

every alleged FDCPA violation triggers its own one-year 

statute of limitations as provided in §1692k(d). See Bouye 

v. Bruce, 61 F.4th 485, 490, 491 n.5 (6th Cir. 2023) 

(explaining that at least five circuits “adhere to the view that 

every alleged violation of the FDCPA has its own [one-year] 

statute of limitations”); Solomon v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 395 

F. App’x 494, 497 (10th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases) (“For 

statute-of-limitations purposes, discrete violations of the 
BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC. 15

FDCPA should be analyzed on an individual basis.”). This 

rule is clear from the text of the statute. Under the FDCPA, 

consumers can bring private actions “in any appropriate 

United States district court without regard to the amount in 

controversy . . . within one year from the date on which the 

violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). The Supreme 

Court recently clarified that there is no “discovery rule” for

FDCPA claims, so “absent the application of an equitable 

doctrine, the statute of limitations in § 1692k(d) begins to 

run on the date on which the alleged FDCPA violation 

occurs, not the date on which the violation is discovered.” 

Rotkiske, 140 S. Ct. at 358. Thus, to determine when the 

FDCPA’s statute of limitations begins to run, the key 

question is what act constitutes the occurrence of an FDCPA 

violation. The Supreme Court has said only that whether 

something “occurred” under the FDCPA means whether it 

“actually happened.” Id. at 360. 

Although the FDCPA clearly “appl[ies] to lawyers 

engaged in litigation,” Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294 

(1995), it is less clear which litigation acts can constitute 

independent FDCPA violations when the underlying 

FDCPA violation is a debt collection lawsuit. As the 

Supreme Court has explained, “it would be odd if the 

[FDCPA] empowered a debt-owing consumer to stop the 

‘communications’ inherent in an ordinary lawsuit and 

thereby cause an ordinary debt-collecting lawsuit to grind to 

a halt.” Id. at 296. While making clear that Congress did 

not intend to “create a [] broad[] exception[] for all litigating 

attorneys” in the FDCPA, the Court explained that it is not 

necessary to read “ordinary court-related document[s]” as 

violating the FDCPA. See id. at 296–97. Nevertheless, the 

FDCPA “applies to attorneys who ‘regularly’ engage in 

consumer-debt-collection activity, even when that activity 
16 BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

consists of litigation.” Id. at 299.7 In short, some litigation 

acts may constitute independent FDCPA violations;

otherwise, debt collectors could commit unlimited FDCPA 

violations after commencing an improper debt collection 

action. 

We have considered FDCPA claims related to debt 

collection lawsuits in two prior cases. In Naas v. Stolman, 

130 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 1997), we noted that we had never 

before “determined at which point the statute of limitations 

begins to run when the alleged violation of the Act is the 

filing of a lawsuit.” Id. at 893. We concluded that an 

FDCPA violation occurred when a debt collector filed an 

allegedly improper debt collection lawsuit, not when the

lawsuit was decided. Id. To so conclude, we considered that 

“[f]iling a complaint is the debt collector’s last opportunity 

to comply with the Act, and the filing date is easily 

ascertainable.” Id.; see also id. (discussing the Eighth 

Circuit’s decision in Mattson, 967 F.2d at 261, which relied 

on these considerations to determine that an FDCPA 

violation occurred when abusive debt collection letters were 

mailed, but not received). The statute of limitations for the 

FDCPA claim thus ran from the date the debt collection 

lawsuit was filed. We had no reason to consider whether the 

date of service affected this analysis. 

In McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, 

LLC, 637 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2011), we held that certain post7 This rule does not mean that lawyers can be found liable for any 

missteps in the litigation process. Lawyers acting as debt collectors 

“may not be held liable if [they] ‘show[] by a preponderance of evidence 

that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error 

notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to 

avoid any such error.’” Heintz, 514 U.S. at 295 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692k(c)).
BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC. 17

filing litigation acts can constitute FDCPA violations. Id. at 

951–52. In McCollough, the debt collector served requests 

for admission that asked the debtor to admit facts that were 

not true, even though the debt collector “had information in 

its possession that demonstrated the untruthfulness of the 

requested admissions.” Id. at 952. The debt collector also 

did not explain to the debtor that “the requests would be 

deemed admitted after thirty days.” Id. Because we 

“consider the debt collector’s conduct from the standpoint of 

the least sophisticated debtor,” we held that this conduct 

violated the FDCPA as a matter of law. Id. By utilizing

abusive discovery procedures, the debt collector committed 

an FDCPA violation through its litigation conduct. That 

decision, however, did not directly address the statute of 

limitations.8

To determine whether a litigation act constitutes an 

independent violation of the FDCPA and thus has its own 

statute of limitations, we now derive the following test from 

Naas: When the alleged FDCPA violation is the bringing of 

a debt collection lawsuit, we determine which actions 

constitute independent FDCPA violations by considering (1) 

the debt collector’s last opportunity to comply with the 

8 Our sister circuits have also held that mid-litigation acts can constitute 

new FDCPA violations, but have done so without addressing statute of 

limitations issues. See, e.g., Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 

226, 234 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that debtor properly alleged an FDCPA 

violation based on the theory that “the summary judgment motion itself 

contained false statements”); Bentrud v. Bowman, Heintz, Boscia & 

Vician, P.C., 794 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2015) (reviewing whether motion 

for summary judgment violated the FDCPA); Miljkovic v. Shafritz & 

Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[D]ocuments filed 

in court in the course of judicial proceedings to collect on a debt, like [a] 

sworn reply, are subject to the FDCPA.”).
18 BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

statute and (2) whether the date of the violation is easily 

ascertainable. See 130 F.3d at 893. 

Under this test, if a debt collector decides to take a 

certain action during litigation, courts must assess whether 

that act was the debt collector’s “last opportunity to comply” 

with the FDCPA. Examples of litigation-related acts that 

could independently violate the FDCPA include a debt 

collector serving a request for admission of facts it knows 

are false or filing an affidavit containing new information it 

knows to be false. See, e.g., McCollough, 637 F.3d at 652. 

The debtor must, however, allege “specific actions” taken by 

the debt-collector that show “more than another attempt to 

argue that a violation arising from the filing of a debtcollection suit continues as long as the suit remains 

pending.” Gajewski v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, 650 F. App’x 

283, 287 (7th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc denied; see also 

Bouye, 61 F.4th at 491 (quoting Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & 

Rothfuss, 587 F. App’x 249, 259 (6th Cir. 2014)) (“[T]he 

violations that occur within the limitations window must be 

discrete violations; they cannot be the later effects of an 

earlier time-barred violation.”). Put simply, to plausibly 

allege that a litigation act is a violation of the FDCPA, the 

debtor must aver sufficient facts to show that the debt 

collector’s act is a new violation of the FDCPA. Under our 

newly formulated test, the focus appropriately remains on 

the debt collector’s actions. There is a difference between 

litigating a case and committing affirmative FDCPA 

violations during that litigation. 

With this framework in mind, we turn to Brown’s claims. 

2.

We first consider Brown’s argument that several of 

Defendants’ post-filing acts constituted independent 
BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC. 19

FDCPA violations. These include Patenaude mailing the 

filed lawsuits and the affidavit to Brown on April 8, 2019; 

Transworld submitting the Luke affidavit to replace the 

Audet affidavit in the state court action on October 7, 2019; 

and the state court hearing on October 24, 2019, including 

statements made by Patenaude lawyers at that hearing. 

Two circuits have addressed mid-litigation acts and the 

FDCPA’s statute of limitations. Both concluded that when 

certain acts constitute independent violations of the FDCPA, 

those acts will trigger their own one-year statutes of 

limitations under § 1692k(d). In Demarais v. Gurstel 

Chargo, P.A., 869 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2017), the Eighth 

Circuit concluded that the debtor plausibly alleged an 

FDCPA violation on the basis of a law firm’s request for a 

continuance on the October 5, 2015 trial date. Id. at 695. 

The law firm argued that the FDCPA claim was time-barred 

because the request was simply a “permissible litigation 

tactic” in the underlying debt collection lawsuit, which was 

filed in June 2014, and the debtor filed the FDCPA claim 

over a year later on February 5, 2016. Id. at 689–90. The 

Eighth Circuit noted that not “every continuance request 

violates the FDCPA.” Id. at 696. But the law firm had a 

pattern of falsely threatening to proceed to trial, showing up 

on the trial date with no witnesses or evidence, and—if the 

debtor appeared with counsel—requesting a continuance. 

See id. at 689–90. Litigation tactics are not insulated from 

liability when they violate the FDCPA, id. at 696 (citing 

Heintz, 514 U.S. at 296), and in Demarais, the debtor had 

plausibly alleged that the law firm had threatened to take 

action that it did not intend to take in violation of § 1692e(5),

id. at 695. In so holding, the Eighth Circuit explained that 

the district court improperly looked to whether the alleged 

violation “relate[d] back” to the complaint. Id. at 694. 
20 BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

Instead, the district court should have looked at the lawyer’s 

actions at The October 5 trial and “determined whether [the 

plaintiff] plausibly alleged that [the law firm] violated the 

FDCPA on that date.” Id.

The Sixth Circuit also recently decided that a midlitigation misrepresentation carried its own statute of 

limitations, such that a debtor’s FDCPA claim based on that 

act was not time-barred. The facts of that case are similar to 

those presented here concerning the filing of the Luke 

Affidavit. In Bouye v. Bruce, attorney James Bruce 

represented Mariner Finance, LLC, an entity that had bought 

debtor Zahra Bouye’s debt from Winner Furniture. 61 F.4th 

at 487. After Bouye defaulted on her retail installment 

contract (“RIC”), Bruce filed suit in state court on behalf of 

Mariner on March 4, 2019. The RIC attached to the 

complaint, however, did not establish that Winner had ever 

properly transferred the debt to Mariner such that Mariner 

had a right to sue on the debt. Id. at 487. On July 2, 2019, 

Bruce supplemented the record with a second, updated RIC 

that showed a Winner employee had authorized the transfer 

of the debt to Mariner. Id. at 487–88. On March 19, 2020, 

Bouye sued Bruce in federal court, alleging a violation of the 

FDCPA based on the theory that “Bruce, on Mariner’s 

behalf, doctored the RIC mid-litigation to make it look like 

the debt assignment from Winner to Mariner was proper.” 

Id. at 488. Bruce argued that Bouye’s claim was timebarred, as she brought suit more than a year after the state 

court lawsuit was filed. 

The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that 

the alleged filing of a false RIC constituted a new FDCPA 

violation. Id. at 491. By filing an updated RIC and moving 

for summary judgment on that basis, Bruce made an 

“affirmative[] misrepresent[ation] to the [c]ourt.” Id. The 
BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC. 21

claim for that misrepresentation “would have started 

accruing either [] when Mariner filed the second RIC, or . . . 

when Mariner moved for summary judgment based on that 

filing.” Id. (finding it unnecessary to decide which date 

triggered the statute of limitations). The court explained that 

FDCPA violations must be discrete instances, and the 

replacement of the RIC was discrete from the initiation of 

the lawsuit:

Bouye’s single claim is independent of 

Mariner’s initial filing of the lawsuit—not a 

continuing effect of it—because it is a 

standalone FDCPA violation. This is not a 

case where Bruce simply “reaffirmed” the 

legitimacy of the state suit throughout the 

litigation. Rather, the allegation is that Bruce 

introduced an RIC with a false assignment of 

debt that occurred after the lawsuit was filed. 

If we were to only consider the date Mariner 

filed suit . . . without regard to subsequent 

FDCPA violations within that lawsuit, we 

would create a rule that disregards the fact 

that § 1692k(d) creates an independent 

statute of limitations for each violation of the 

FDCPA.

Id. at 493 (citing Slorp, 587 F. App’x at 259). 

We agree that when a debt collector commits an FDCPA 

violation that does more than “simply reaffirm[] the 

legitimacy of the state suit,” id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted), that new violation can constitute a “last 

opportunity to comply” with the FDCPA,see Naas, 130 F.3d 

at 893. Assuming the date of that action is easily 
22 BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

ascertainable, id., it may form the basis of a new FDCPA 

violation. Whether a lawyer appropriately litigates a case or 

engages in conduct that violates the FDCPA is a factintensive inquiry that requires a case-by-case approach. See 

Hemmingsen v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A., 674 F.3d 814, 819 

(8th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he diverse situations in which potential 

FDCPA claims may arise during the course of litigation, and 

the Supreme Court’s caution in Heintz . . . counsel against 

anything other than a case-by-case approach.”).

In this case, we conclude that Brown has alleged one 

post-filing FDCPA violation: the filing of the Luke 

Affidavit. By filing a new affidavit that attempted to show 

that the Trusts owned the debts, Defendants did more than 

“reaffirm” the original complaint. Rather, they presented a 

new basis—not contained in the complaint—to show that the 

Trusts owned the debts. When Defendants ceased to rely on 

the Audet Affidavit and moved forward with the Luke 

Affidavit, this discrete event created a “last opportunity to 

comply” with the FDCPA. See Naas, 130 F.3d at 893. The 

filing date is also easily ascertainable. See id. While Brown 

has thus alleged a violation, we do not address the merits of 

his claim. 

Brown’s remaining alleged violations, which include the 

mailing of the lawsuits and arguments made at the state court 

summary judgment hearing, are standard litigation events

that reasonably follow the commencement of a lawsuit. 

They do not constitute final opportunities to comply with the 

FDCPA and therefore are not independent FDCPA 

violations.

3.

Our analysis, however, does not end there. As other 

circuits have explained, there is no “continuing violation 
BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC. 23

doctrine” in the FDCPA context, which would allow 

plaintiffs to “sweep in a series of component acts that 

comprise a claim, if one of those acts was within the 

limitations period.” Bouye, 61 F.4th at 493. Rather, “the 

only kinds of claims a plaintiff can bring are discrete 

violations of the FDCPA.” Id. Thus, finding that the Luke 

Affidavit is an independent violation does not allow Brown

to include actions before October 7, 2019, the date on which 

the Luke Affidavit was filed, in his FDCPA claim. But 

Brown also argues that Defendants committed an 

independent FDCPA violation on April 5, 2019, when they 

filed the complaints, even though they had previously served 

him with the complaints. This argument requires us to 

consider the distinction between service and filing. 

Only the Tenth Circuit appears to have considered this 

issue head on. In Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107 (10th 

Cir. 2002), the court held that when service occurs after the 

filing of a debt collection lawsuit (the reverse of our situation 

here), the statute of limitations to bring an FDCPA claim 

runs from service, not from filing.9 Id. at 1113. The Tenth 

Circuit held that “the plaintiff does not have a ‘complete and 

9 Other circuits have interpreted Naas and Johnson as reaching opposite 

conclusions. “Where FDCPA claims are premised upon allegations of 

improper pursuit of debt collection litigation, courts are split as to when 

the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations begins to run: some have 

held that such claims accrue upon filing the underlying collection action, 

[citing Naas], while others use the date on which the purported debtor 

was served with the complaint [citing Johnson].” Schaffhauser v. 

Citibank, 340 F. App’x 128, 130–31 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding it 

unnecessary to reach the issue); accord Ruth v. Unifund CCR Partners, 

604 F.3d 908, 914 (6th Cir. 2010) (same). There is no conflict between 

these two cases. We had no reason to consider the difference between 

service and filing in Naas, as it made no difference to the overall 

timeliness of the plaintiff’s suit. 
24 BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

present cause of action,’ and thus no violation occurs within 

the meaning of § 1692k(d),” until both filing and service 

have occurred. Id. at 1113 (quoting Bay Area Laundry & 

Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp., 522 U.S. 

192, 201 (1997)). The court explained that if a debt collector 

files a suit but then “elects to call off the process server and 

abandon the collection suit before the plaintiff has been 

served,” id. at 113–14, the abandoned lawsuit does not 

constitute an “attempt to collect” the debt under the FDCPA,

id. at 114. “[T]he fact that a party that has committed half 

an actionable wrong is likely to commit the other half cannot 

suffice to create a complete and present cause of action.” Id. 

At least as it applies to the facts here, we reject the 

Johnson court’s two-halves-make-a-whole approach. 

Accord Tyler v. DH Capital Mgmt., 736 F.3d 455, 463–64 

(6th Cir. 2013) (rejecting Johnson’s approach and holding 

that filing alone may constitute an FDCPA violation). When 

service occurs first, Johnson’s reasoning does not make 

sense. See 305 F.3d at 113–14. Service alone can be a 

violation of the FDCPA, as it is the exact kind of threatening 

action Congress intended to prohibit. Indeed, it is clearly 

barred by § 1692e(5), which lists as a violation of the 

FDCPA “[t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally 

be taken or that is not intended to be taken.” If a debt 

collector serves a debtor with no intention of filing the

complaint, the debt collector is clearly threatening legal 

action in violation of the FDCPA. Because service does not 

require the payment of filing fees, it is not hard to imagine a 

debt collector engaging in abusive service practices to coerce 

alleged debtors into payment. But filing may also constitute 

an independent violation of the FDCPA, especially because 

it can cause additional harm to the debtor. A pending legal 

action “could be a red flag to the debtor’s other creditors and 
BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC. 25

anyone who runs a background or credit check, including 

landlords and employers.” Tyler, 736 F.3d at 464. The 

debtor may thus have additional FDCPA claims under § 

1692e and § 1692f once the lawsuit is filed. 

Applying our newly derived test here, we hold that when 

service occurs before filing, filing constitutes an independent 

violation of the FDCPA. Under the first factor of the test, 

service is not a debt collector’s “last opportunity to comply” 

with many FDCPA prohibitions. See Naas, 130 F.3d at 893. 

Because filing requires an additional act that can cause new 

harm to the debtor, filing is the debt collector’s last 

opportunity to comply. This test correctly places the onus 

on debt collectors to analyze their actions to make sure they 

comply with the FDCPA. See Mattson, 967 F.2d at 261 

(explaining that Congress intended to protect consumers by 

“regulating the conduct of debt collectors” (citing 15 U.S.C. 

§1692(e)); Tyler, 736 F.3d at 464 (“[T]he focus should be on 

the debt collector’s actions.”). Filing is not merely 

“doubling down” on the initial act of service; it requires an 

affirmative step forward. After serving a complaint, a debt 

collector could learn new information about the validity of 

the case or decide against filing for any number of reasons. 

Thus, while service alone can constitute an FDCPA 

violation, the final step of filing presents a “last opportunity” 

to comply with the FDCPA when the alleged violation is the 

bringing of a knowingly meritless lawsuit. See Naas, 130 

F.3d at 893. And as to the second factor, the filing date is 

easily ascertainable. See id. 

Because we conclude that service and filing are 

independent FDCPA violations, each act has its own oneyear statute of limitations under § 1692k(d). Thus, Brown 

had one year from the date of filing of the state court action
26 BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

to bring his FDCPA claim, and his lawsuit is timely.10 We 

reverse the district court’s dismissal of Count I. Because 

Count I survives, we also reverse and remand Brown’s 

Count II claim for declaratory and injunctive relief for 

consideration consistent with this opinion. 

C.

Finally, Brown argues that because the state court found 

that the Trusts lacked admissible evidence to demonstrate 

ownership of the debt, we must give “full faith and credit” 

to that decision by directing judgment for Brown on his

FDCPA claim. This argument fails. The state court found 

that Defendants failed to present sufficient evidence to show 

that they owned the debts, but did not address the issue in 

this case: whether Defendants knowingly brought a meritless 

lawsuit in violation of the FDCPA. The Supreme Court has 

explicitly said that it does “not see how the fact that a [debtcollection] lawsuit turns out ultimately to be unsuccessful 

could, by itself, make the bringing of it an ‘action that cannot 

legally be taken.’” Heintz, 514 U.S. at 295–96 (quoting 15 

U.S.C. § 1692e(5)). While the state court’s decision could 

possibly be evidence in support of Brown’s FDCPA claim,

this lawsuit does not in any way “relitigate” the issues in the 

10 Transworld and Patenaude also argue that certain alleged violations, 

such as filing, are not actionable because they were directed at Brown’s 

counsel, not Brown. This position is plainly wrong. See, e.g., Sayyed, 

485 F.3d at 232 (“A communication to debtor’s counsel, regarding a debt 

collection lawsuit in which counsel is representing the debtor, plainly 

qualifies as an indirect communication to the debtor.”); Demarais, 869 

F.3d at 692 (recognizing that discovery requests could constitute FDCPA 

violations even though they were sent “directly” to plaintiff’s counsel); 

Miljkovic, 791 F.3d at 1300 (“[W]e find it impossible to conclude, under 

the plain language of the FDCPA, that a debt collector’s communications 

to an attorney representing a consumer are not covered by the Act.”). 
BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC. 27

state court action. See Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 

1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1998). 

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and 

REMANDED. 

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. 

VANDYKE, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

I agree with the outcome and much of the reasoning of 

the majority opinion, but I write separately because the rule 

announced in Part III.B.3 of the majority’s opinion—

“hold[ing] that when service occurs before filing, filing 

constitutes an independent violation of the FDCPA”—is an 

unnecessary conclusion that carries our circuit into the 

unknown without anticipating the intricacies future cases are 

bound to raise.

First, the rule is unnecessary. In this case, the limitation 

periods began when the trusts filed the affidavits of Jennifer 

Audet and Bradley Luke on April 5, 2019, and October 7, 

2019, respectively. Those periods ended on April 6, 2020, 

and October 7, 2020, respectively. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(c). Brown timely filed his complaint 

on April 6, 2020, alleging that the trusts had knowingly filed 

meritless debt collection suits. If those affidavits knowingly 

misrepresented that the trusts owned Brown’s loan debt, the 

filing of each affidavit constituted a discrete violation of the 

FDCPA and marked the last opportunity to not violate the 

FDCPA with respect to that affidavit. See Naas v. Stolman, 

130 F.3d 892, 893 (9th Cir. 1997). Since I agree with the 

majority that the filing of an allegedly false affidavit triggers 

the limitations period for the FDCPA, see Bouye v. Bruce, 
28 BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

61 F.4th 485, 490–91 (6th Cir. 2023), the concurrent filing 

of Jennifer Audet’s affidavit with the trusts’ complaints 

makes it unnecessary to decide (as the majority nonetheless 

does) whether complaints filed after service independently 

violate the FDCPA. Since Brown’s claim that the trusts filed 

knowingly meritless collection suits was raised within one 

year of the underlying affidavits, it is gilding the lily to 

decide whether the trusts’ complaints also triggered the 

FDCPA’s limitations period. 

Second, it’s a much harder question whether the filing of 

a complaint after service constitutes an independently 

wrongful act under the FDCPA for purposes of calculating a 

new limitations period, and I therefore hesitate to set down 

new precedent in that regard when it’s unnecessary. A 

comparative illustration will underscore the difficulty: In 

instances where service of process post-dates the filing of a 

complaint, it is hard to discern when an actionable wrong has 

occurred because a debtor typically feels threatened at the 

moment of service, not the moment of filing. Debtors are 

often unaware of a collection suit that has been filed until 

service is rendered. In such situations, it is arguable that an 

adverse action has not been consummated until the date of 

service. Indeed, that’s what the Tenth Circuit decided in 

Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1113–14 (10th Cir. 2002). 

The Johnson court decided that service rendered after filing 

was an indispensable “half” of an “actionable wrong,” and 

only with service did the limitations period begin to run on 

the whole action. Id. That has some intuitive appeal. After 

all, a filed complaint might be abandoned before a debtor is 

haled into court. When that happens, the harm arguably 

never reaches fruition.

But where, as here, service pre-dates the filing of a 

complaint, a debtor receives the threat of legal action first. 
BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC. 29

So it is hard to see how filing a complaint after service is 

sufficiently distinguishable from other downstream 

litigation activities that do not constitute separate adverse 

actions. See, e.g., Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 296 

(1995) (noting it would be odd to interpret the FDCPA as 

allowing an “ordinary court-related document” or 

communication “inherent in an ordinary lawsuit” to cause 

“an ordinary debt-collecting lawsuit to grind to a halt”). The 

majority appears to recognize this difficulty and suggests 

that “filing may also constitute an independent violation of 

the FDCPA” because it “can cause additional harm to the 

debtor” and “could be a red flag” for a debtor’s credit score. 

(Emphasis added.) But such indeterminate consequences do 

not merit the majority’s unconditional holding that, in all 

instances “when service occurs before filing, filing 

constitutes an independent violation of the FDCPA.” It is 

far from certain that the post-service filing of a complaint 

constitutes an independently actionable wrong, nor does 

Brown assert that the trusts’ complaints harmed his credit. 

By contrast, Brown does assert that the affidavits were 

knowingly false. 

Third, to the extent the majority views the post-service 

filing of a complaint as a debt collector’s “last opportunity 

to comply with” the FDCPA, that is a strained reading of 

Naas, 130 F.3d at 893. See Johnson, 305 F.3d at 1114 n.4 

(“[T]he choice between accrual upon filing and accrual upon 

service was not before the court in Naas.”). Pre-filing 

service of a meritless complaint already constitutes a failure 

to comply with the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). So 

the term “last opportunity to comply” can’t really mean the 

last opportunity to rectify a previous wrong or to reverse 

prior non-compliance. Otherwise, every litigation action 

would constitute another “last opportunity to comply,” since 
30 BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

every such action marks a missed opportunity to turn back 

and cease from litigating an improper debt-collection action. 

Instead, the phrase obviously meant something more like the 

“last clear chance to avoid” the discrete commission of a 

different FDCPA violation. Here, that discrete misstep was 

clearly the service of process, not the subsequent filing of the 

complaint. 

It may very well be that some meritless debt collection 

complaints filed after service constitute actionable wrongs 

under the FDCPA, but because that is a factually contingent 

inquiry that should turn on the facts and allegations of each 

case, I cannot endorse the majority’s broader rule and 

needlessly prejudge such future cases. Here, it is enough that 

the filing dates of the affidavits show that the district court 

erred in holding that Brown’s claim that the trusts knowingly 

filed meritless collection suits was time-barred, and I 

therefore respectfully concur in the judgment.