1

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the 

convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the 

interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

Karon K. Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC (075044) (A-33-14)

Argued January 5, 2016 – Decided July 27, 2016

CUFF, P.J.A.D. (temporarily assigned), writing for a majority of the Court. 

In this appeal, the Court considers whether a 2011 amendment to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 (2011 amendment), 

which allows a personal injury protection (PIP) provider to obtain reimbursement from the tortfeasor’s insurer for 

payments that the PIP provider made to the injured insured only after the insured’s claim is satisfied in full, applies 

retroactively.

On December 16, 2009, plaintiff Karon K. Johnson sustained severe personal injuries after driving his 

mother’s car into a tree while intoxicated, rendering him a paraplegic. Plaintiff filed a claim for PIP benefits with 

defendant GEICO Insurance Company (GEICO), and GEICO paid the policy limit for PIP coverage of $250,000. 

On June 19, 2011, plaintiff commenced suit against defendant Roselle EZ Quick LLC, which owned and operated L 

& J Liquor & Deli, and the non-insurer defendants (collectively, EZ Quick), asserting claims for negligent service of 

alcoholic beverages to a minor. Plaintiff also sued GEICO, seeking payment of additional PIP benefits. GEICO 

filed crossclaims against EZ Quick, and a third-party complaint against its insurer (One Beacon), seeking 

reimbursement for the PIP benefits that it paid to plaintiff. GEICO relied on N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1, as it was written 

prior to the 2011amendment, and the decision in Fernandez v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 402 N.J. 

Super. 166 (App. Div. 2008), aff’d by an evenly divided court, 199 N.J. 591 (2009), which addressed insurers’ 

claims for reimbursement under the statute.

On August 9, 2012, EZ Quick settled with plaintiff, and agreed to pay the limit of its policy with One 

Beacon in the amount of $1,000,000.00. Plaintiff agreed that a portion of the payment would be held by the court

(withheld payment) until GEICO’s claim for PIP reimbursement was resolved. Plaintiff and GEICO filed crossmotions for summary judgment regarding the withheld payment. GEICO argued that it was entitled to the withheld 

payment even though this would prevent plaintiff from being fully compensated by EZ Quick on his claim for 

bodily injury. GEICO relied on N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1, prior to the 2011 amendment. Plaintiff asserted that GEICO 

was precluded from obtaining reimbursement of the PIP benefits that it paid until his claims against EZ Quick were 

satisfied in full. Plaintiff relied on the 2011 amendment, and argued that although the amendment was enacted on 

January 28, 2011, and thus after he had filed his claim for PIP benefits, it should be applied retroactively. The trial 

court disagreed, and concluded that the amendment was not retroactive. The court granted GEICO’s motion for 

summary judgment on the withheld payment, thereby awarding GEICO reimbursement of the $250,000,00 payment 

for PIP benefits to plaintiff, and accumulated interest. 

Plaintiff appealed, and GEICO cross-appealed. A divided panel of the Appellate Division affirmed the trial 

court’s determination. A majority of the panel agreed with the trial court that nothing in the amendment indicated 

that it should apply retroactively. The panel majority further found no basis for retroactivity under the common law. 

One member of the panel dissented, and concluded that the amendment should be applied to claims that were 

unresolved and unpaid before its passage, based on the sponsors’ statements explaining the amendment and the 

panel member’s conclusion that the amendment is curative. The dissenting member also concluded that the 2011 

amendment applied because the PIP provider’s claim did not accrue until the tortfeasor’s liability was established in 

August 2012 when plaintiff and EZ Quick reached a settlement, which was after the date on which the amendment 

was adopted. Plaintiff filed an appeal as of right. R. 2:2-1(a)(2).

HELD: The 2011 amendment to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 does not expressly or implicitly present any of the factors 

necessary to rebut the presumption that, as a newly enacted law, it should be applied prospectively. Consequently, 

the amendment does not apply to plaintiff’s claims for personal injuries. The trial court therefore properly granted 

GEICO’s motion for summary judgment on its claim for reimbursement of the PIP benefits that it paid to plaintiff. 
2

1. Prior to 1972, insurers were free to file suit against other insurers to recover payments for medical expenses 

based on the common-law right of subrogation. After the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act, N.J.S.A.

39:6A-1 to -35 (No-Fault Act), was enacted in 1972, and based on judicial interpretations of an insurer’s subrogation 

rights, it became necessary to clarify and reaffirm an insurer’s right to reimbursement through subrogation. As a 

result, in 1983, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1, which expressly permits an automobile insurer to obtain 

reimbursement of the PIP benefits that it paid to an insured. In Fernandez, the Appellate Division recognized that, 

under the statute, a PIP carrier which has paid PIP benefits is entitled to reimbursement from the insurance coverage 

of a third-party tortfeasor, even if the tortfeasor’s insurance policy would then become insufficient to make the 

insured injured party whole. An equally divided Supreme Court recognized this holding as the controlling 

application of the No-Fault Law for more than a decade, undisturbed by any legislative disapproval. (pp. 12-17)

2. The 2011 amendment to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 was intended to reverse the holding in Fernandez, by providing that 

an insurer’s claim for reimbursement of PIP benefits is subject to the injured party’s claim against the tortfeasor, and 

shall be paid only after satisfaction of that claim. Whether the 2011 amendment should be applied retroactively, as 

plaintiff asserts, is a legal question of statutory interpretation. (pp. 17-18)

3. As a general rule, newly enacted laws are applied prospectively. Whether a court should apply a statute 

retroactively requires the court to determine whether the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive 

application. Legislative intent for retroactivity can be demonstrated by the following: (i) when the Legislature 

expresses its intent that the law apply retroactively, either expressly, in the statute or pertinent legislative history, or 

implicitly, such as where retroactive application may be necessary to make the statute workable or provide the most 

sensible interpretation; (ii) when an amendment is curative, and thus designed to carry out or explain the intent of 

the statute; or (iii) when the parties’ expectations warrant that interpretation. (pp. 18-22)

4. The 2011 amendment does not include any language evidencing that it applies retroactively. Because the 

amendment altered the reimbursement scheme established by the pre-amendment statute, and changed settled law, it 

cannot be applied retroactively without an unequivocal expression of legislative intent, which is absent here. A 

legislative intent for retroactive application cannot be inferred from the unofficial statements of individual

legislators. Additionally, the amendment is not curative because it was not designed to carry out or explain the 

intent of the original statute. Instead, it was intended to change settled law by providing that PIP insurers cannot 

receive PIP reimbursement that would prevent the injured party from being made whole. There is also no basis to 

conclude that it was the parties’ expectation that GEICO would be unable to seek reimbursement until plaintiff was 

made whole. Because none of the three factors warranting retroactive application are present in this matter, the 

Court does not determine whether retroactive application would result in an unconstitutional interference with 

vested rights, or a manifest injustice. (pp. 22-30)

5. Plaintiff’s alternative argument that, even if the statute is applied prospectively, he should prevail, does not 

entitle him to relief. Pursuant to the express language of the statute and the controlling case law, GEICO’s claim 

accrued when it paid plaintiff’s PIP claim on August 20, 2010, and the law in effect at that time is applicable. The 

2011 amendment was adopted later, and therefore does not apply to plaintiff’s claim. (pp. 30-34) 

The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.

JUSTICE ALBIN, DISSENTING, agrees that the 2011 amendment should not be applied retroactively. 

However, Justice Albin would conclude that the accrual date of GEICO’s claim did not give it a vested right to a PIP 

reimbursement after passage of the amended statute. Nothing in the amended statute suggests that the Legislature 

intended that, after the law’s effective date, an insurer should be made whole at the expense of the insured, 

particularly since this is the result that the amendment was enacted to prevent. 

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, and SOLOMON, join in 

JUDGE CUFF’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate, dissenting opinion. JUSTICE FERNANDEZVINA did not participate. 
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-33 September Term 2014

075044

KARON K. JOHNSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROSELLE EZ QUICK LLC, L & J 

LIQUOR & DELI, HARSHIRA 

PATEL, SURESH PATEL, GREGORY 

PARISI, INTREPID 

INVESTIGATIONS,

Defendants,

and

GEICO INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Respondent,

and

GEICO INSURANCE COMPANY,

Third-Party Plaintiff,

v.

ONE BEACON INSURANCE and THE 

CAMDEN FIRE INSURANCE 

ASSOCIATON,

Third-Party Defendants.

Argued January 5, 2016 – Decided July 27, 2016

On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate 

Division.

James C. Mescall argued the cause for 

appellant (Mescall & Acosta, attorneys).
2

Curtis J. Turpan argued the cause for 

respondent (Harwood Lloyd, attorneys; Mr. 

Turpan and Paul E. Kiel, on the brief).

JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) delivered the opinion of 

the Court.

In this appeal, we consider whether a 2011 amendment to 

N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 should be applied retroactively. The 

amendment provides that a personal injury protection (PIP) 

insurance provider may be reimbursed for payments made to an 

injured insured party by the tortfeasor’s insurer only after the 

injured party’s claim is fully satisfied. The parties entered 

into a policy agreement, plaintiff drove while intoxicated and

was injured in an automobile accident, and plaintiff filed a 

claim for PIP benefits prior to the enactment of the 2011 

amendment. 

Plaintiff also filed a civil action alleging negligence by 

the store that sold him alcohol. When that litigation settled,

and pursuant to the pre-amendment law, plaintiff’s PIP provider 

sought priority reimbursement from the tortfeasor’s insurer, 

even though doing so would prevent plaintiff from being fully 

compensated on the bodily injury claim. Plaintiff contends that 

this was improper because the legislative intent and purpose of 

the 2011 amendment, along with the expectations of the parties,

justify retroactive application of the amendment to his case.
3

The trial court concluded that the amendment was not 

retroactive and therefore granted in part the PIP provider’s 

motion for summary judgment.1 The Appellate Division affirmed

over the dissent of one of its panel members. The dissenting 

judge concluded that the amendment was retroactive and,

additionally, that the PIP provider’s claim did not accrue until 

the tortfeasor’s liability was established, after the 2011 

amendment was enacted.

This appeal comes before us as of right, and we now affirm. 

In so doing, we conclude that plaintiff failed to rebut the 

presumption that the 2011 amendment to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1, as a 

newly enacted law, is prospective. Specifically, the language 

and legislative history of the amendment provide no indication 

that the Legislature intended retroactive application. There is 

also insufficient evidence that the amendment was merely 

“curative,” because it altered well-settled law and was not 

enacted in response to a misapplication of that law. Similarly, 

given the established law at the time the agreement was entered 

into and when the injury occurred, we cannot conclude that the 

expectations of the parties warrant retroactivity.

We are also unpersuaded that PIP providers’ reimbursement 

claims do not accrue until such a claim is filed or the 

 

1 The remaining issues before the trial court are not at issue.
4

tortfeasor’s liability is established -- in this case, through

settlement. Such a position departs from settled practice that 

a claim accrues when a party gains the right to institute a suit

and the statute of limitations begins to run. In cases such as 

this, the claim accrues when the insured party files a claim for

PIP benefits. Moreover, accepting either of plaintiff’s 

proposals would tie the date of accrual to illogical, 

unpredictable, or statutorily disfavored events.

I.

On December 16, 2009, plaintiff Karon K. Johnson was twenty 

years old. On that date, Johnson purchased a bottle of vodka 

from L & J Liquor & Deli, owned and operated by defendants 

Roselle EZ Quick, LLC, Harshira Patel, and Suresh Patel 

(collectively, EZ Quick). Johnson was not asked for 

identification when making his purchase. Several hours later,

after consuming some of the vodka, Johnson was seriously injured 

when he drove his mother’s car into a tree. Johnson’s blood 

alcohol content was determined to have been 0.128% at the time 

of the crash. Johnson suffered serious injuries rendering him a

paraplegic.

Johnson filed a claim for PIP benefits on August 8, 2010, 

through his mother’s auto insurer, defendant GEICO Insurance 

Company (GEICO). By August 20, 2010, GEICO had paid the full 

PIP benefits policy limit of $250,000 to Johnson. Over five 
5

months later, on January 28, 2011, an amendment to N.J.S.A.

39:6A-9.1 was enacted preventing PIP carriers such as GEICO from 

being reimbursed from a tortfeasor’s insurer for benefits the 

PIP carrier paid to an insured party until the insured party’s 

claims against the tortfeasor are fully satisfied. L. 2011, c.

11, § 1.

On June 10, 2011, Johnson filed suit in the Law Division 

against EZ Quick for the negligent service of alcoholic 

beverages to a minor, and against GEICO for additional no-fault 

insurance benefits.2 GEICO filed its answer on December 20, 

2011, in which it requested contribution and indemnification 

from EZ Quick. GEICO also sought PIP reimbursement from EZ 

Quick, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1. On February 22, 2012, 

GEICO filed a third-party complaint seeking the same relief from 

EZ Quick’s insurer, One Beacon Insurance and/or The Camden Fire

Insurance Association (collectively, One Beacon).

On August 9, 2012, Johnson entered into a settlement 

agreement and release with EZ Quick and One Beacon. Under the 

agreement, EZ Quick agreed to pay Johnson $1,000,000, the limit 

of its policy with One Beacon. The $1,000,000 was to be divided 

 

2 Johnson also alleged that defendants Gregory Parisi and 

Intrepid Investigations tampered with evidence. Those claims 

were dismissed with prejudice and are not at issue in this 

appeal. Johnson’s claims against GEICO for additional insurance 

benefits are also not at issue in this appeal. 
6

as follows: $251,449.90 to Johnson’s attorneys; $483,970.10 to 

Johnson’s special-needs trust; and $264,580 to the court to be 

held until GEICO’s claim for PIP reimbursement was resolved. 

The trial court approved the settlement and dismissed with 

prejudice Johnson’s claims against EZ Quick on August 15, 2012.

GEICO and Johnson filed cross-motions for summary judgment 

regarding the $264,580 held by the court pending resolution of 

GEICO’s reimbursement claim. In support of its motion, GEICO 

argued, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1, as interpreted by 

Fernandez v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 402 N.J. 

Super. 166 (App. Div. 2008) (Fernandez I), aff’d by an evenly 

divided court, 199 N.J. 591 (2009) (Fernandez II), that it was 

entitled to reimbursement from One Beacon, EZ Quick’s insurer, 

even if the limits of EZ Quick’s policy would prevent Johnson

from being made whole. The portion of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 on 

which GEICO relied states, in part, that

[a]n insurer . . . paying . . . personal injury 

protection benefits . . . as a result of an 

accident occurring within this State, shall, 

within two years of the filing of the claim, 

have the right to recover the amount of 

payments from any tortfeasor who was not, at 

the time of the accident, required to maintain 

personal injury protection . . . benefits 

coverage, other than for pedestrians, . . . or 

although required did not maintain personal 

injury protection or medical expense benefits 

coverage at the time of the accident.

[N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1(a).]
7

That section was not altered by the 2011 amendment. L. 2011, c.

11, § 1. 

In response, Johnson argued that GEICO was prevented from 

recovering its payments until his own claim against EZ Quick was 

fulfilled. In support, Johnson cited the 2011 amendment to 

N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1, which limits an insurer’s right to recover 

PIP benefit payments from a tortfeasor, by providing that 

[a]ny recovery by an insurer . . . pursuant to 

this subsection shall be subject to any claim 

against the insured tortfeasor’s insurer by 

the injured party and shall be paid only after 

satisfaction of that claim, up to the limits 

of the insured tortfeasor’s motor vehicle or 

other liability insurance policy.

[L. 2011, c. 11, § 1 (codified as N.J.S.A.

39:6A-9.1(b)).]

The amendment, which was enacted on January 28, 2011, was to

“take effect immediately.” L. 2011, c. 11, § 2. Although 

enacted more than a year after he was injured and over five 

months after he filed a claim for PIP benefits, Johnson 

contended that the amendment applied retroactively.

In a written decision, the trial court rejected Johnson’s 

argument that the 2011 amendment to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 should be 

applied retroactively. The court found that the amendment’s

language indicated that it was to take effect “immediately,” 

that the available legislative history did not demonstrate a 

curative purpose, and that GEICO fairly expected the pre-
8

amendment version of the law to apply. As a result, the trial 

court entered summary judgment in favor of GEICO. The trial 

court subsequently entered a final order stating that GEICO was 

entitled to withdraw $250,000, plus all accumulated interest, 

from the $264,580 held by the court. The balance was to go to 

Johnson.

Johnson appealed and GEICO cross-appealed. A divided

Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The 

majority agreed that the language of the 2011 amendment stated 

that it was to take effect immediately and that the Legislature 

could have indicated otherwise had it so intended. The majority

similarly found no retroactive intent in the legislative history

and concluded that the amendment was not curative because it 

substantially altered the substance and intent of the statute. 

The majority also found that the parties’ expectations did not 

warrant retroactive application because the pre-amendment law

was in effect at the time of the crash and when Johnson claimed 

the PIP benefits.

Addressing an issue not raised before the trial court, the 

majority next held that the amendment applies when the injured 

party submits a PIP claim on or after the effective date of the 

amendment, January 28, 2011. The court reasoned that a prior

decision established that an insurer’s right to recover PIP 

payments arises when an injured party submits a PIP claim. As 
9

such, the majority rejected Johnson’s argument that the 

amendment applied because GEICO’s claim only accrued when it

filed its third-party complaint -- an event that the court 

described as an unusual, unreliable, and statutorily unsupported 

benchmark.

One member of the panel dissented. Addressing 

retroactivity, the dissenting judge concluded that statements 

made by the amendment’s sponsors clearly indicated an intent to 

apply the amendment to claims unresolved and unpaid before its 

passage and that the amendment was curative because it clarified 

the legislative intent of the statute. The dissenting judge

also stated that retroactive application would not affect any 

vested rights held by GEICO because GEICO was required to pay 

the PIP benefits to Johnson regardless of whether it could be 

reimbursed. 

The dissent also maintained that neither Johnson nor GEICO 

had a right to be compensated until One Beacon’s obligation to 

cover the claim was conceded or established, and that GEICO’s 

right to reimbursement therefore did not exist until August 

2012, when Johnson and EZ Quick settled Johnson’s claim. As a 

result, according to the dissent, the trial court was bound to 

apply the 2011 amendment, which was in force at that time.

Johnson appealed to this Court as of right. R. 2:2-

1(a)(2).
10

II.

A.

Johnson asserts three arguments on appeal. First, he 

contends that the 2011 amendment to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 should be 

applied retroactively because its legislative history, including

statements made by its sponsors, implies such an intent. 

Johnson also relies on those statements made by individual 

sponsors to argue that the amendment was curative because it was 

meant to improve N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 and correct judicial 

misinterpretation of that statute. In addition, Johnson 

maintains that retroactivity would be consistent with the 

parties’ expectations because, at the time of contracting, he 

expected to receive no-fault benefits from GEICO, and GEICO 

expected to receive insurance premiums in exchange for that 

coverage. Johnson also argues that retroactivity would not 

cause manifest injustice because GEICO has not quantified the 

financial impact of applying the amendment retroactively.

Second, Johnson argues that the amendment controls because 

GEICO did not file its third-party complaint seeking 

reimbursement from One Beacon until February 22, 2012, and the 

amendment, if not retroactive, applies to “any legal actions 

commenced after the effective date” of January 28, 2011.

Alternatively, Johnson adopts the dissent’s conclusion that 

GEICO did not have a right to reimbursement until Johnson’s 
11

claim against One Beacon was settled on August 9, 2012.

Third, Johnson argues for the first time that the right to 

the disputed $250,000 is governed by the insurance contract with

GEICO, which does not entitle GEICO to reimbursement for PIP 

benefits owed to insured parties. Johnson therefore submits

that permitting such reimbursement would be contrary to the 

parties’ expectations in executing the agreement.

B.

In response, GEICO contends that none of the exceptions for 

retroactivity apply to the 2011 amendment. GEICO argues that 

there is no explicit or implicit legislative intent for 

retroactivity, as reflected by the amendment’s immediate 

effective date, and that the sponsors’ oral statements cited by 

Johnson are not entitled to interpretative weight. GEICO 

contends that the amendment was not curative because its 

prioritization of payments to injured parties departs from the 

statute’s original legislative intent and represents a change in 

settled law, rather than an attempt to merely make the statute 

more workable or sensible, and because it was enacted in

response to a disagreement with a judicial decision. 

GEICO also argues that retroactivity would not comport with 

the parties’ expectations because the pre-amendment version of 

the law was in effect when Johnson filed for PIP benefits, and

because the law was well-settled at that point. Similarly, 
12

GEICO argues that retroactive application would result in 

manifest injustice by denying GEICO, along with other parties in 

similar situations, expected PIP reimbursements.

GEICO also urges the Court to affirm the Appellate 

Division’s holding that the amendment, when applied 

prospectively, is inapplicable in this case because GEICO’s

claim accrued when Johnson filed for PIP benefits on August 8, 

2010. Like the appellate panel, GEICO notes that the “two-year 

time period within which a PIP carrier can assert a right to 

reimbursement under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 begins to run when a PIP 

claim is filed[,]” and that, “[g]enerally, a cause of action 

accrues when the applicable statute of limitation[s] begins to 

run.” 

Finally, GEICO requests that the Court reject Johnson’s 

argument regarding the language in the insurance policy because 

that issue was not raised before the trial or appellate courts 

and does not involve a matter of public concern. 

III.

A.

Before 1972, “insurers were free to file suit against other 

insurers to recover payments for medical expenses based on the 

common-law right of subrogation.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 

Co. v. Licensed Beverage Ins. Exch., 146 N.J. 1, 6 (1996). That 

approach, however, was considered “an inefficient means of 
13

compensation since it required expensive and time-consuming 

litigation, and . . . would not compensate drivers whose own 

fault caused their injuries.” Ibid. (quoting Garden State Fire 

& Cas. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 176 N.J. Super. 301, 

305 (App. Div. 1980)). 

As a result, in 1972, the Legislature enacted the New 

Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act,3 N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -35 

(the No-Fault Act), to “eliminate this type of litigation” by 

requiring automobile insurers to provide “primary coverage” and 

“pay the medical expenses of [their] insured[,]” State Farm, 

supra, 146 N.J. at 6 (quoting Garden State Fire, supra, 176 N.J. 

Super. at 305). The No-Fault Act also provided a limited 

subrogation right, in that PIP carriers would be “subrogated to 

the rights of any party to whom [they] make[] [PIP] payments,” 

but only through “inter-company arbitration or by inter-company 

agreement” with the tortfeasor’s insurer. L. 1972, c. 70, § 9. 

That provision would also become “inoperative” two years from 

its effective date. Ibid.

Nine years after its passage, the Court concluded that, 

following the expiration of the No-Fault Act subrogation 

provision, “an insurer’s right to ‘subrogation,’ if any, would 

 

3 In 1998, the No-Fault Act was amended by the Automobile 

Insurance Cost Reduction Act, commonly known as AICRA. See L.

1998, c. 21, § 1 (codified as N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1.1).
14

be the same as prior to [the provision’s] enactment.” Aetna 

Ins. Co. v. Gilchrist Bros., 85 N.J. 550, 567 (1981). In the 

same opinion, however, the Court held that another section of 

the No-Fault Act, which stated that “[e]vidence of the amounts 

collectible or paid pursuant to [PIP coverage] . . . is 

inadmissible in a civil action for recovery of damages for 

bodily injury by such injured person[,]” id. at 562 (quoting 

N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12), extinguished an injured person’s right “to 

maintain an action for PIP payments[,]” ibid. As a result, 

because the No-Fault Act “eliminated the ability of the insured 

in an action in this State to recover damages from the 

tortfeasor for the amounts collectible or paid under PIP[,]” 

ibid., insurers had no right to reimbursement through 

subrogation, id. at 567.

In 1983, the Legislature responded to the Court’s decision 

in Aetna by enacting N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1.4 State Farm, supra, 

146 N.J. at 9. The purpose of that amendment was to “alleviate 

the imbalance” caused by Aetna by “allowing automobile insurers 

to recover PIP through reimbursement.” Ibid. (citations 

omitted). The insurers’ new right of reimbursement was primary 

to, and independent of, any insured’s rights, including the 

 

4 The Legislature also created an exemption in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 

for the admissibility of evidence of the amount of insurance 

benefits paid to an injured party for actions brought pursuant 

to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1. L. 1983, c. 362, § 11. 
15

right to subrogation. Ibid.

That reimbursement right, as enacted, provided for recovery 

from the tortfeasor’s insurer as follows:

An insurer paying personal injury protection 

benefits in accordance with [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 

or 39:6A-10], as a result of an accident 

occurring within this State shall, within two 

years of the filing of the claim, have the 

right to recover the amount of payments from 

any tortfeasor who was not, at the time of the 

accident, required to maintain personal injury 

protection coverage, other than for 

pedestrians. In the case of an accident 

occurring in this State involving an insured 

tortfeasor, the determination as to whether an 

insurer is legally entitled to recover the 

amount of payments and the amount of recovery, 

including the costs of processing benefit 

claims and enforcing rights granted under this 

section, shall be made against the insurer of 

the tortfeasor, and shall be by agreement of 

the involved insurers or, upon failing to 

agree, by arbitration.

[L. 1983, c. 362, § 20.] 

Subsequent amendments broadened the types of parties that 

could seek reimbursement for benefits paid so that, by 2003,

N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 provided that

[a]n insurer, health maintenance organization 

or governmental agency paying benefits 

pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.3], personal 

injury protection benefits in accordance with 

[N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 or 39:6A-10], medical 

expense benefits pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:6A3.1] or benefits pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 39:6A3.3], as a result of an accident occurring 

within this State, shall, within two years of 

the filing of the claim, have the right to 

recover the amount of payments from any 

tortfeasor who was not, at the time of the 
16

accident, required to maintain personal injury 

protection or medical expense benefits 

coverage, other than for pedestrians, under 

the laws of this State, including personal 

injury protection coverage required to be 

provided in accordance with [N.J.S.A. 17:28-

1.4], or although required did not maintain 

personal injury protection or medical expense 

benefits coverage at the time of the accident.

[L. 2003, c. 89, § 53.]

Significantly, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 continuously provided PIP 

providers a “right to recover the amount of payments from any 

tortfeasor” without PIP coverage. L. 2003, c. 89, § 53. The 

Legislature also did not alter the time when an insurer’s right 

to reimbursement accrued. Ibid.

Thus, the Appellate Division in Fernandez I, supra, 

addressed a consistent, over twenty-year-old framework for PIP 

reimbursement when, in 2008, it held that, “where a PIP carrier 

has paid benefits to its insured, it is entitled to 

reimbursement of those benefits from the insurance proceeds of a 

third-party tortfeasor . . . even if the limits of the 

tortfeasor’s insurance policy are insufficient to make the 

insured whole.” 402 N.J. Super. at 168-69. That decision was 

affirmed the next year by an equally divided Supreme Court. In 

affirming, three justices stated that the appellate holding “has 

been the controlling application of the No-Fault Law in this 

state for more than a decade, undisturbed by any legislative 

disapproval.” Fernandez II, supra, 199 N.J. at 593. Those 
17

justices also found no compelling reason “to justify 

reinterpretation of the No-Fault Law,” and stated that the 

Legislature could “alter the law” if it believed “that a 

different policy is preferable[.]” Ibid.

Thereafter, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 191, an 

amendment to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1, which was signed into law by 

the Governor on January 28, 2011. L. 2011, c. 11, § 1. The 

amendment added the following language to the end of N.J.S.A.

39:6A-9.1, which is now part of subsection (b):

Any recovery by an insurer, health maintenance 

organization or governmental agency pursuant 

to this subsection shall be subject to any 

claim against the insured tortfeasor’s insurer 

by the injured party and shall be paid only 

after satisfaction of that claim, up to the 

limits of the insured tortfeasor’s motor 

vehicle or other liability insurance policy.

[L. 2011, c. 11, § 1 (emphasis added).]

The Sponsor’s Statement, the Senate Commerce Committee 

Statement, and the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance 

Committee Statement provided that the amendment was “in response 

to” the Fernandez decisions, and that it “would reverse th[e] 

outcome” of that case. Sponsor’s Statement to Senate No. 191

(2010); Senate Commerce Comm., Statement to Senate No. 191

(2010); Assembly Fin. Insts. & Ins. Comm., Statement to Senate 

No. 191 (2010). The amendment provided that it would “take 

effect immediately.” L. 2011, c. 11, § 2.
18

B.

The central question presented here is whether the 2011 

amendment to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 was intended to apply 

retroactively. The trial and appellate courts answered that 

question in the negative on a motion for summary judgment. We 

review an order granting summary judgment “in accordance with 

the same standards as the motion judge.” Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 

N.J. 22, 38 (2014) (citations omitted). Such a motion will be 

granted if the record demonstrates that there is no genuine 

issue of material fact and “the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment or order as a matter of law.” R. 4:46-2(c). Whether 

the 2011 amendment should be applied retroactively is a purely 

legal question of statutory interpretation. See McGovern v. 

Rutgers, 211 N.J. 94, 108 (2012). We review questions of law de 

novo, and do not defer to the conclusions of the trial or 

appellate courts. Ibid.

C.

When interpreting a statute, “our overriding goal must be 

to determine the Legislature’s intent.” Jersey Cent. Power & 

Light Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 212 N.J. 576, 586 (2013) (quoting 

Cast Art Indus., LLC v. KPMG LLP, 209 N.J. 208, 221 (2012)). 

“In most instances, the best indicator of that intent is the 

plain language chosen by the Legislature.” Cashin v. Bello, 223 

N.J. 328, 335 (2015) (quoting State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 
19

(2010)). “If the plain language leads to a clear and 

unambiguous result, then our interpretive process is over.” 

Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 192 

N.J. 189, 195 (2007) (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 

492 (2005)). It is only when there is ambiguity in the language 

that we turn to extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history. 

Id. at 195-96 (citing DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492-93).

Generally, newly enacted laws are applied prospectively. 

James v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 216 N.J. 552, 556 (2014). This

approach is based on “long-held notions of fairness and due 

process[,]” Cruz v. Cent. Jersey Landscaping, Inc., 195 N.J. 33, 

45 (2008), because, “although everyone is presumed to know the 

law, no one is expected to anticipate a law that has yet to be 

enacted[,]” Maeker v. Ross, 219 N.J. 565, 578 (2014) (citations 

omitted). That practice, however, is no more than a rule of 

statutory interpretation meant to “aid the court in the search 

for legislative intent.” Twiss v. State, 124 N.J. 461, 467 

(1991) (citation omitted). As such, it “is not to be applied 

mechanistically to every case.” Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J.

515, 522 (1981) (citing Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 224 

(1974))).

Rather, “[t]wo questions inhere in the determination 

whether a court should apply a statute retroactively.” Twiss,

supra, 124 N.J. at 467. “The first question is whether the 
20

Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive 

application.” Ibid. (citing Gibbons, supra, 86 N.J. at 522). 

“If so, the second question is whether retroactive application 

is an unconstitutional interference with ‘vested rights’ or will 

result in a ‘manifest injustice.’” Ibid. (quoting State, Dep’t 

of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 498-99 (1983)). 

Both questions must be satisfied for a statute to be applied 

retroactively.

In addressing the first question, legislative intent for 

retroactivity can be demonstrated: “(1) when the Legislature 

expresses its intent that the law apply retroactively, either 

expressly or implicitly; (2) when an amendment is curative; or 

(3) when the expectations of the parties so warrant.” James, 

supra, 216 N.J. at 563. “Only if one of these grounds is 

present, will we give a statute retroactive effect.” Cruz, 

supra, 195 N.J. at 46.

The Legislature’s expression of intent to apply a statute 

retroactively “may be either express, that is, stated in the 

language of the statute or in the pertinent legislative history, 

or implied, that is, retroactive application may be necessary to 

make the statute workable or to give it the most sensible 

interpretation[.]” Gibbons, supra, 86 N.J. at 522. When the 

Legislature is silent on the issue, a prospective intent “may be 

inferred from [the] knowledge that courts generally will enforce 
21

newly enacted substantive statutes prospectively, unless [the 

Legislature] clearly expresses a contrary intent.” Maeker, 

supra, 219 N.J. at 578. Moreover, “a statute [that] changes the 

settled law and relates to substantive rights is prospective 

only, unless there is an unequivocal expression of contrary 

legislative intent.” Phillips v. Curiale, 128 N.J. 608, 617 

(1992) (alteration in original) (quoting Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds 

Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 95 (1990)).

A statute is curative “if it is designed merely to carry 

out or explain the intent of the original statute[,]” in that 

its purpose is “to remedy a perceived imperfection in or 

misapplication of a statute and not to alter the intended scope 

or purposes of the original act.” Nelson v. Bd. of Educ., 148 

N.J. 358, 370 (1997) (quoting Kendall v. Snedeker, 219 N.J. 

Super. 283, 288 (App. Div. 1987)). A curative statute may

clarify, but may not change, the meaning of existing law. 

Schiavo v. John F. Kennedy Hosp., 258 N.J. Super. 380, 386-87

(App. Div. 1992) (citing Carnegie Bank v. Shalleck, 256 N.J. 

Super. 23, 29-40 (App. Div. 1992)), aff’d, 131 N.J. 400 (1993). 

The same restrictions apply when the Legislature seeks to remedy 

what it “perceive[s] as a misapplication of the law” by the 

courts. 2nd Roc-Jersey Assocs. v. Town of Morristown, 158 N.J.

581, 605 (1999). 

Finally, “in the absence of a clear expression of 
22

legislative intent that the statute is to be applied 

prospectively, such considerations as the expectations of the 

parties may warrant retroactive application of a statute.” 

Gibbons, supra, 86 N.J. at 523. In such circumstances, a court 

will look at the controlling law at the relevant time and 

consider the parties’ reasonable expectations as to the law. 

James, supra, 216 N.J. at 573. An expectation of retroactive 

application “should be strongly apparent to the parties in order 

to override the lack of any explicit or implicit expression of 

intent for retroactive application.” Ibid. For example, a 

party may not rely on pending legislation because “[t]he 

possibility that a bill might become law is an expectation built 

on uncertainty until it happens.” Ibid.

IV.

Johnson concedes that the Legislature did not explicitly 

provide that the 2011 amendment would be applied retroactively. 

Rather, the amendment directs that it is to “take effect 

immediately.” L. 2011, c. 11, § 2. Such language “bespeak[s]

an intent contrary to, and not supportive of, retroactive 

application.” Cruz, supra, 195 N.J. at 48 (citation omitted). 

Indeed, we have understood it to mean that newly enacted 

provisions “will apply to claims that arise immediately after 

the effective date of the amendment to the Act.” Id. at 49.

Like the 2011 amendment before us now, the amendment
23

considered in James, supra, stated that it was “to take effect 

immediately.” 216 N.J. at 568. The amendment considered in 

James prohibited inclusion of step-down provisions to provide 

less uninsured and underinsured coverage for employees in motor 

vehicle liability policies issued to corporate or business 

entities. Id. at 555-56. There, the plaintiff had been injured 

while driving his employer’s vehicle two months before the 

amendment barring step-down clauses was enacted. Id. at 558-59. 

The motor vehicle liability policy issued to the plaintiff’s 

employer containing a step-down provision for employees was 

issued five months before the amendment was enacted. Id. at

559. In determining whether the amendment was nonetheless meant 

to be applied retroactively, the Court noted that, “had the 

Legislature intended an earlier date for the law to take effect, 

that intention could have been made plain in the very section 

directing when the law would become effective.” Id. at 568

(citation omitted). In that case, however, “[n]either the law

nor the bill sponsor’s statement expresse[d] that the law was to 

have operative effect before its stated effective date.” Ibid.

(citation omitted). As a result, “the plain language of the 

statute simply [did] not specify an intended retroactive 

effect[.]” Ibid.

As in James, the 2011 amendment to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 was 

meant to “take effect immediately” and includes no language 
24

indicating a retroactive intent. Had the Legislature sought to 

apply the amendment to all pending claims, it could have adopted 

the approach taken in other amendments, such as applying it to 

“all actions and proceedings that accrue, are pending or are 

filed” at the time of enactment. See Phillips, supra, 128 N.J.

at 611 (quoting L. 1987, c. 217, § 6). That it did not do so

indicates a lack of intent to depart from the standard practice 

of prospective application. Maeker, supra, 219 N.J. at 578.

Nonetheless, Johnson argues that a retroactive intent may 

be inferred from statements made by the amendment’s sponsors.

Those statements, however, are not official sponsor statements 

affixed to a bill. See Panzino v. Cont’l Can Co., 71 N.J. 298, 

301-02 (1976); Deaney v. Linen Thread Co., 19 N.J. 578, 584-85 

(1955). Instead, they are unofficial statements of individual 

legislators, which “are not generally considered to be a 

reliable guide to legislative intent[,]” Berg v. Christie, ___ 

N.J. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op. at 40) (quoting State v. Yothers, 

282 N.J. Super. 86, 104 (App. Div. 1995) (Skillman, J.A.D., 

dissenting)), because they “tell us only what the speaker . . . 

believed” and “nothing about what the Legislature meant by the 

words it chose to include in the amendment[,]” Cruz, supra, 195 

N.J. at 48. The sponsors’ statements, like the text of the 

amendment, only indicate that the amendment was to take effect 

immediately, which, as noted, belies any claimed retroactive 
25

intent.

We also do not find that retroactive application is

“necessary to make the statute workable or to give it the most 

sensible interpretation[.]” Gibbons, supra, 86 N.J. at 522. 

Johnson has offered no evidence to support such a finding, and 

it appears that the pre-amendment law, although perceived by 

some as unjust, was entirely workable, particularly in ensuring 

that PIP carriers could seek reimbursement from tortfeasors.

Moreover, because the amendment altered the reimbursement 

scheme established by the pre-amendment statute, the amendment

changed settled law. Between October 4, 1983 and January 28,

2011, PIP carriers had a primary right to reimbursement, 

unconnected to the claims of the insured. The 2011 amendment 

reversed that statutory order, making a PIP carrier’s 

reimbursement contingent on full satisfaction of the insured’s 

claims. An amendment altering settled law cannot be applied 

retroactively without an “unequivocal expression of . . .

legislative intent[,]” Phillips, supra, 128 N.J. at 617 (quoting 

Dewey, supra, 121 N.J. at 95), of which there is none here. 

Further, our concern in Cruz, supra, 195 N.J. at 49, that 

retroactive application could reach “beyond pending and nonfinalized claims[,]” thereby “rais[ing] the specter that all of 

the awards that have been entered in years past would be 

reopened[,]” is not dissipated by the fact that this amendment 
26

may affect only a small number of cases.

For similar reasons, we conclude that the 2011 amendment 

was not curative, because it was not “designed merely to carry 

out or explain the intent of the original statute[,]” Nelson, 

supra, 148 N.J. at 370, or “to remedy a perceived imperfection 

in or misapplication of [the] statute[,]” ibid. (quoting 

Kendall, supra, 219 N.J. Super. at 288). To the contrary, the 

purpose of the amendment was to alter settled law by providing 

that PIP insurers cannot receive reimbursements that would 

prevent the injured party from being made whole. The amendment

therefore not only changed the reimbursement process, but also 

altered the purpose of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1, which had ensured

that PIP providers had a right to reimbursement for paid claims. 

A statutory change based on public policy considerations cannot 

be curative. James, supra, 216 N.J. at 573; see also Olkusz v. 

Brown, 401 N.J. Super. 496, 503-04 (App. Div. 2008) (stating 

that amendment expressing, “for the first time, the public 

policy position of the Legislature” is not curative).

In addition, unlike in 2nd Roc-Jersey Associates, supra, 

158 N.J. at 605, in which an official sponsor statement 

explicitly provided that the amendment was meant to clarify 

existing law, there is no indication in the legislative history 

of the 2011 amendment that it was enacted to address a perceived 

misapplication of the law. See also Cty. of Monmouth v. 
27

Commc’ns Workers of Am., 300 N.J. Super. 272, 292 (App. Div. 

1997) (finding statute curative where committee statement 

provided that the amendatory act was meant to clarify existing 

law). Similarly, in contrast to Twiss, supra, 124 N.J. at 468,

the amendment does not apply to a period of time preceding its 

enactment, “as if [the act] had been in effect during that 

period[,]” (emphasis omitted) (quoting N.J.S.A. 46:30B-5), and 

retroactive application therefore would not reflect “the 

Legislature’s attempt to improve the existing statutory scheme” 

or be “necessary to achieve its remedial purposes,” ibid. To 

the contrary, Johnson’s arguments rely on informal sponsor 

comments, which, as noted, do not warrant interpretative weight. 

Moreover, those statements do not evince a curative intent.

For example, although Johnson argues that the Assembly 

Sponsor characterized the outcome in Fernandez II as “not what 

the Legislature intended[,]” the Sponsor was actually describing 

the view of the three justices who did not vote to affirm the 

appellate decision in that case. Public Hearing Before Assembly 

Fin. Insts. & Ins. Comm. at 4 (Dec. 9, 2010). Indeed, the 

Sponsor later described the amendment as a “new policy[,]” id.

at 16, remedying “a quirk in the law that the Supreme Court has 

recognized should be addressed[,]” id. at 7. The Senate 

Sponsor’s statements -- that there was “a judicially determined 

ranking of plaintiffs” and that the amendment would “rerank[] 
28

the primacy in which we allow claims” -- also do not establish

that the Legislature viewed the Fernandez decisions as 

misinterpreting the law, or that it intended the amendment to be 

curative. Public Hearing Before Senate Commerce Comm. at 19 

(Oct. 7, 2010).

The language used in the official sponsor and committee 

statements, providing that the amendment was “in response” to, 

and meant to “reverse,” the Fernandez decisions, also cannot

support retroactivity. Although the sponsor and committee 

statements constitute legislative history, see State ex rel. 

Hayling v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 422 N.J. Super. 363, 373 

(App. Div. 2011), we have found that such language does not 

suggest a curative purpose or retroactive intent, see James, 

supra, 216 N.J. at 562, 574 (finding amendment “not curative”

despite official sponsor statement that it was “in response to” 

and would “reverse[] the effect” of specific court decision); 

see also Serrano v. Gibson, 304 N.J. Super. 314, 319 (App. Div. 

1997) (stating that “reverse” is “not [a] curative or 

ameliorative term”). There is no justification for a different

conclusion in this case.

We also decline to find that the parties expected that 

GEICO would be unable to seek reimbursement until Johnson was 

made whole. In this case, the pre-amendment law was in effect 

when the parties entered into the insurance contract, when 
29

Johnson was injured, and when Johnson sought PIP benefits. Both

Fernandez decisions had also been issued by the time Johnson was 

injured. Moreover, those decisions were rooted in earlier case 

law establishing that carriers paying PIP benefits “have a right 

to be made whole even though reimbursement may reduce the pool 

of available insurance coverage to which the claimant . . . may 

look for recovery.” Knox v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 304 N.J. 

Super. 431, 437 (App. Div. 1997); see also David v. Gov’t Emps. 

Ins. Co., 360 N.J. Super. 127, 140-41, 144 (App. Div.) 

(reaffirming Knox and finding no conflict with IFA Insurance Co. 

v. Waitt, 270 N.J. Super. 621 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 136 

N.J. 295 (1994)), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 251 (2003).

As such, it would be reasonable for an insurer such as 

GEICO to rely on the well-settled statutory and case law

establishing PIP carriers’ primacy in seeking reimbursements

when it issued the PIP policy and formed its expectations 

regarding reimbursement. Any contrary expectations held by 

Johnson or any other driver would have been completely contrary 

to established law and cannot support retroactivity.

An amendment will not be applied retroactively unless one 

of the three above-mentioned factors is present. Cruz, supra, 

195 N.J. at 46. Because none of those factors are implicated by 

the text, legislative history, or purpose of the 2011 amendment, 

or by the expectations of the parties, we need not determine 
30

whether retroactive application would result in unconstitutional

interference with “vested rights” or a “manifest injustice.” 

Cf. Nobrega v. Edison Glen Assocs., 167 N.J. 520, 537 (2001).

V.

Johnson next contends that the amendment is applicable even 

if applied prospectively because GEICO’s claim had not been 

perfected at the time the Legislature amended the statutory 

reimbursement order on January 28, 2011. Specifically, Johnson 

argues that GEICO’s right to file a claim did not accrue until 

it filed its third-party complaint against One Beacon on

February 22, 2012, or, in the alternative, when EZ Quick’s 

liability was established through settlement between Johnson and 

One Beacon on August 9, 2012. We are unpersuaded by this 

argument.

A cause of action will accrue on the date that “‘the right 

to institute and maintain a suit’ first arose.” White v. 

Mattera, 175 N.J. 158, 164 (2003) (quoting Rosenau v. City of 

New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 137 (1968)). The date of accrual 

also generally coincides with “the date on which the statutory 

clock begins to run.” Ibid. (quoting Ali v. Rutgers, 166 N.J.

280, 286 (2000)); see also Poetz v. Mix, 7 N.J. 436, 445 (1951) 

(stating that two-year limitations period would expire two years 

from accrual of plaintiff’s claim).
31

An insurer paying PIP benefits to an injured party has a 

right to recover the amount of its payments “within two years of 

the filing of the claim[.]” N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1(a). In other 

words, the insurer “must commence suit for reimbursement from a 

tortfeasor within two years of ‘the filing of the claim.’” N.J. 

Mfrs. Ins. Grp. v. Holger Trucking Corp., 417 N.J. Super. 393, 

394 (App. Div. 2011). “The claim” that triggers the two-year 

limitations period, based on the language and purpose of the 

statute, is the injured party’s “submission of the PIP claim 

form[.]” Id. at 399-400; see also N.J. Auto. Full Ins. 

Underwriting Ass’n v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 270 N.J. Super. 49, 

53 (App. Div. 1994) (stating Legislature intended “to limit the 

right of insurers to seek reimbursement for PIP payments from 

the tortfeasor to a period of two years, which period begins to 

run from the filing of the claim”).

Thus, pursuant to the express language of the statute and 

settled case law, GEICO’s claim accrued, and the statute of 

limitations began to run, when Johnson filed his PIP claim on

August 8, 2010. The Legislature has provided no justification 

or intent, whether explicit or implicit, for us to reach a 

different result. The cases cited by Johnson, therefore, are 

inapposite. See, e.g., James, supra, 216 N.J. at 568-69 

(finding “language of the new law” clearly showed legislative 

intent to affect policies in force at enactment); Alan J. 
32

Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 232, 236 (1998) (finding 

amendment covering “causes of action which occur on or after the 

effective date” applicable to conduct, not claims, occurring 

after enactment).

Further, where the Legislature has failed to “define or 

specify when a cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued 

within the meaning of [a] statute,” the courts will exercise 

their “proper judicial function” to determine when the cause of 

action accrues for that class of cases. Fernandi v. Strully, 35 

N.J. 434, 449 (1961) (citations omitted). Making such a 

decision “is to establish a general rule of law for a class of 

cases, which . . . must be founded on reason and justice.” 

Ibid. (quoting 1 Wood on Limitations § 122a, at 685-86 (4th ed. 

1916)). As described above, tying the accrual of a cause of 

action to when the right to institute a suit arises is 

reasonable, fair, and based on long-standing practice.

In contrast, the accrual dates of an insurer’s right to PIP 

reimbursement suggested by Johnson, that is, when GEICO filed 

its third-party claim or when EZ Quick’s liability was 

established by settlement, represent events which the original 

and amended versions of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 eschewed. The 

accrual dates offered by Johnson are contrary to the explicit 

language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1(a), which provides that the right 

accrues when the injured party files a claim for PIP benefits. 
33

Johnson had filed his claim and received all PIP benefits to 

which he was entitled by August 20, 2010, months before the 

effective date of the 2011 amendment. As of that time, GEICO’s 

right to reimbursement had accrued and the amount of 

reimbursement was known. As in James, supra, “the new law did 

not retroactively alter . . . claims that arose before the 

legislation took effect.” 216 N.J. at 556. Johnson submits no 

legal authority to support departure from the express terms of 

the statute.

VI.

We decline to address Johnson’s argument that this case 

should be governed by the PIP policy agreement. This issue was 

not raised before the trial or appellate courts, and we “will 

consider matters not properly raised below only if the issue is 

one ‘of sufficient public concern.’” Cornblatt, supra, 153 N.J.

at 230 (quoting State v. Churchdale Leasing, Inc., 115 N.J. 83, 

100 (1989)). The significance of Johnson’s argument, however, 

is limited to the case at hand. Moreover, the record on this 

issue is incomplete -- the full policy agreement has not been 

provided to the Court -- making its resolution now all the more 

inappropriate. Ibid. (citations omitted). 

VII.

In sum, we conclude that the 2011 amendment to N.J.S.A.

39:6A-9.1 does not expressly or implicitly present any of the 
34

factors needed to rebut the presumption of prospective 

application. Because the 2011 amendment altered settled law, we 

would expect to find an unequivocal statement that it was to be 

applied retroactively. Moreover, at the time when the policy 

was issued, when Johnson was injured, and when he filed his PIP 

claim, both parties expected GEICO to have a primary right to 

reimbursement.

To be sure, prospective application of the 2011 amendment 

diminishes Johnson’s recovery. Applying the 2011 amendment 

retroactively, however, would be contrary to established law and 

would upend the expectations of PIP providers before enactment 

of the amendment. The same would be true were we to rule in 

Johnson’s favor on the basis that GEICO’s claim did not accrue 

when Johnson filed for PIP benefits. That too would create a 

rule untethered to settled law.

VIII.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, 

and SOLOMON, join in JUDGE CUFF’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed 

a separate, dissenting opinion. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA did not 

participate. 
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-33 September Term 2014

075044

KARON K. JOHNSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROSELLE EZ QUICK LLC, L & J 

LIQUOR & DELI, HARSHIRA 

PATEL, SURESH PATEL, GREGORY 

PARISI, INTREPID 

INVESTIGATIONS,

Defendants,

and

GEICO INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Respondent,

and

GEICO INSURANCE COMPANY,

Third-Party Plaintiff,

v.

ONE BEACON INSURANCE and THE 

CAMDEN FIRE INSURANCE 

ASSOCIATON,

Third-Party Defendants.

JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting.

Plaintiff Karon Johnson suffered catastrophic injuries in 

an automobile accident that rendered him a paraplegic. GEICO 

paid $250,000 in personal injury protection (PIP) benefits 
2

toward plaintiff’s medical expenses because he was covered by 

his mother’s automobile insurance policy. After the accident, 

the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 to ensure that an 

insurance carrier is not reimbursed PIP payments from a 

settlement or damages award that has not made the insured whole. 

The majority’s tortured interpretation of the effective date of 

the amendment to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 allows GEICO reimbursement 

of its PIP payments from plaintiff’s settlement with the 

tortfeasors -- even though doing so will reduce the available 

financial resources to pay plaintiff’s medical expenses and 

other future needs. By extending the reach of the old statute, 

the majority perpetuates the very injustice the amended statute 

was intended to eliminate. I therefore respectfully dissent. 

I.

A.

In 2011, plaintiff filed a dram shop lawsuit against the 

captioned defendants, including a liquor store for allegedly 

selling him alcohol before the accident.5 At the time, plaintiff 

had not reached the statutory age to purchase alcohol. 

Defendants settled the lawsuit with plaintiff, agreeing to pay 

the $1,000,000 limit of their insurance policies. The 

 

1 Defendants included a number of individuals and entities: 

Roselle EZ Quick, LLC, L & J Liquor & Deli, Harshira Patel, 

Suresh Patel, Gregory Parisi, and Intrepid Investigations.
3

settlement award was allocated in the following manner: 

$483,970.10 was placed in a special-needs trust for plaintiff; 

$251,449.90 was paid to plaintiff’s attorneys; and $264,580 was 

deposited with the court pending the outcome of GEICO’s claim 

for reimbursement of PIP benefits paid to plaintiff. 

Despite having received premium payments for the PIP policy 

on the covered vehicle,6 GEICO sought reimbursement of PIP 

benefits paid to plaintiff to make itself whole at the expense 

of its insured. Plaintiff suffered permanent injuries in the 

accident and will incur expenses far in excess of the settlement 

monies over his lifetime. In short, GEICO wanted to deduct from 

plaintiff’s settlement $264,580 -- representing $250,000 of PIP 

benefits plus interest -- funds necessary for plaintiff’s 

medical expenses and long-term care. 

In 2011, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 to 

reverse the consequences of the decision in Fernandez v. 

Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance (Fernandez I), 402 N.J. Super.

166 (App. Div. 2008), aff’d by an equally divided court, 199 

N.J. 591 (2009) (per curiam). Sponsor’s Statement to S. No. 191

(2010); S. Commerce Comm., Statement to S. No. 191 (2010); 

Assemb. Fin. Inst. & Ins. Comm., Statement to S. No. 191 (2010). 

Fernandez I, supra, which was affirmed due to a three-three 

 

2 Plaintiff was covered under his mother’s insurance policy.
4

split on the Supreme Court, held that “[a] PIP carrier who has 

paid PIP benefits to an insured is entitled to reimbursement of 

those benefits from the insurance proceeds of the third-party 

tortfeasor, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1, even when the amount 

of the tortfeasor’s insurance is insufficient to make the 

insured whole.” 402 N.J. Super. at 176.7

Justice Long, in a dissent joined by two members of the 

Court, stated that “the Legislature intended the carrier to be 

reimbursed for its PIP payments only to the extent that the 

proceeds of the tortfeasor’s policy exceed the full amount of 

the insured’s damages for all claims.” Fernandez v. Nationwide 

Mut. Fire Ins. (Fernandez II), 199 N.J. 591, 594 (2009) (Long, 

J., dissenting). By passing the 2011 amendment, the Legislature 

effectively adopted Justice Long’s interpretation of N.J.S.A.

39:6A-9.1. The purpose of the amendment was to prevent a

repetition of Fernandez I -- to make certain that the PIP 

carrier does not receive priority over its insured when the 

insured is not made whole by a settlement or a damages award. 

See Sponsor’s Statement to S. No. 191 (2010) (stating that 

purpose of amendment was to “reverse” outcome of Fernandez I, 

 

3 The pre-amendment version of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 provided that 

“[a]n insurer . . . paying benefits pursuant to . . . personal 

injury protection benefits . . . as a result of an accident 

occurring within this State, shall . . . have the right to 

recover the amount of payments from” certain tortfeasors. See

L. 2003, c. 89. 
5

which held that under pre-amended statute “the claim of an 

insurer which has paid PIP benefits has priority over the claim 

of that insurer’s insured who seeks recovery from the 

tortfeasor’s liability insurance for unpaid medical expenses, 

pain, suffering, or other damages caused by the accident”); S.

Commerce Comm., Statement to S. No. 191 (2010) (same); Assemb. 

Fin. Inst. & Ins. Comm., Statement to S. No. 191 (2010) (same). 

The amended version of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1(b) provides that 

“[a]ny recovery by an insurer . . . pursuant to this subsection 

shall be subject to any claim against the insured tortfeasor’s 

insurer by the injured party and shall be paid only after 

satisfaction of that claim, up to the limits of the insured 

tortfeasor’s motor vehicle or other liability insurance policy.” 

The Legislature instructed that the amendment “shall take effect 

immediately.” L. 2011, c. 11. The Legislature thus made clear 

that, after the effective date of the amendment, a PIP carrier 

should not be reimbursed at the expense of its insured. 

The amended statute, if applied prospectively in the 

circumstances of this case, leads to but one reasonable 

conclusion -- that the Legislature did not intend plaintiff’s 

financial recovery to be sacrificed so that GEICO could be 

reimbursed PIP benefits paid to plaintiff. A review of the 

timeline of events demonstrates this point. On August 20, 2010, 

GEICO paid PIP benefits in the amount of $250,000 to plaintiff. 
6

As of that date, GEICO had a right to reimbursement from the 

tortfeasor’s insurance company under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1. On 

January 28, 2011, the amendment to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1 went into 

effect, ensuring that a PIP carrier could not secure 

reimbursement from the tortfeasor’s insurance company if doing 

so would leave the PIP carrier’s insured with unpaid medical 

expenses or other unpaid damages. On June 10, 2011, plaintiff 

sued defendant tortfeasors, including the liquor store that sold 

him alcohol. Almost a year after the amendment went into 

effect, GEICO cross-claimed against the liquor store and the 

liquor store’s insurers for reimbursement. 

The amended statute went into effect before GEICO submitted 

its reimbursement claim. Under the newly enacted statute, GEICO

had no vested right to a PIP reimbursement from an injured 

insured not made whole by his tortfeasors. See Farmers Mut. 

Fire Ins. Co. of Salem v. N.J. Prop.-Liab. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 215 

N.J. 522, 547 (2013) (PLIGA). GEICO, an insurance company in a 

highly regulated industry, had “no ‘contractual expectation’

that a naturally fluid regulatory scheme, ‘subject to change at 

any time,’ [would] remain in an unalterably fixed state.” Ibid.

(citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. State, 124 N.J. 32, 

64-65 (1991)).

That point was made clear in State Farm. There, the 

Legislature passed a law establishing the Joint Underwriting 
7

Association (JUA) for the purpose of underwriting insurance 

policies issued to high-risk drivers. State Farm, supra, 124 

N.J. at 40-41. The Legislature explicitly stated that carriers 

were not responsible for the liabilities incurred by the JUA. 

Id. at 41. When the JUA became heavily indebted, the 

Legislature recognized that the regulatory scheme was not 

functioning as intended. Id. at 42-43. The Legislature enacted 

a new law taxing insurers to pay off the JUA’s debt. Id. at 43-

44. We rejected the insurers’ claims that the Legislature was 

not authorized to impose a tax on carriers for matters that had 

accrued under the earlier scheme. See id. at 64-65. We 

explained that “[t]he JUA was simply a regulatory scheme for the 

insurance of high-risk drivers; like all regulatory schemes, it 

was potentially transient, subject to change at any time by the 

Legislature that had created it.” Id. at 64. We noted that 

“[i]n a highly regulated business such as insurance, 

participants cannot credibly assert that they [have] any vested 

right or contractual expectation in the indefinite continuance” 

of a particular regulatory scheme. Id. at 64-65.

Under the principles set forth in PLIGA and State Farm, 

GEICO understood that the Legislature was authorized to put in 

place a new scheme, regardless of the accrual date of 

plaintiff’s claim.

B.
8

The manifest objective of the amended statute, based on the 

statute’s language, effective date, and legislative history, was 

to immediately implement the new law to avoid the shortchanging 

of another injured insured. Yet, the majority has produced a 

judicial framework -- at odds with the legislative one -- that 

delays the effective date of the statute, rendering plaintiff’s 

rights under the amended statute a nullity. The majority’s 

mistaken interpretation has real-life consequences for 

plaintiff, who is now denied the necessary financial resources 

to address his permanent injuries.

The issue is not about whether the amended statute should 

be retroactively applied; it should not. Rather, the issue is 

when the prospective application of that statute commences. The 

majority posits that GEICO’s right to reimbursement accrued when 

it paid plaintiff PIP benefits, six months before the amended 

statute went to effect. Although the majority is correct about 

the accrual date, the amended statute subjected GEICO’s right to 

reimbursement to the insured being made whole. As mentioned 

earlier, the amended statute went into effect before GEICO made 

a reimbursement claim. The accrual date did not give GEICO a 

vested right to a PIP reimbursement claim against its insured 

after passage of the amended statute.

Nothing in the amended statute suggests that the 

Legislature intended that, after the law’s effective date, a PIP 
9

carrier would be able to file a reimbursement claim that would 

strip an insured of PIP benefits already paid to defray medical 

expenses. The Legislature could not have intended for another 

paraplegic or seriously injured insured to suffer under the preamendment statute while the PIP carrier was made whole. Indeed, 

the PIP carrier here, GEICO, has received a windfall because 

plaintiff’s mother dutifully paid premiums for the very benefits 

that the majority has withdrawn from her son. 

In the end, the majority has failed to give the amended 

statute the true prospective effect intended by the Legislature 

and therefore allows one further injustice under the old 

statute.

II.

For the reasons expressed, I respectfully dissent.