alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
STATE OF VERMONT

ENVIRONMENTAL COURT

In re: Appeal of Larson, et al. }

}

}

}

}

Docket No. 70-5-01 Vtec

Decision and Order on Remaining Issues

A decision and order was entered in this matter on September 17, 2001; Appellants dispute 

whether that order concluded all issues in this appeal. Appellants are represented by Karl C. 

Anderson, Esq.; Appellee-Applicant is represented by Kevin P. Candon, Esq.; the City is 

represented by Henry Brislin, Esq. We address the remaining issues as identified by Appellants in 

the telephone hearing held on September 26, 2001.

Appellant argues that a present owner of the property, as well as Easter Seals as the prospective 

purchaser of the property, must sign the application. It is sufficient that the applicant have an 

equitable ownership interest in the property its prospective purchaser, whether under a purchase 

and sale agreement, option contract or other agreement. In the present case there is no secret 

agreement between the owner and the permit applicant , which was the disability in Mad River 

Valley Enterprises, Inc. v. Town of Warren Board of Adjustment, 146 Vt. 126 (1985). Rather, as in 

In re Appeal of Foti, Docket No. E96-209 (February 24, 1997) (entry order), the entity which will 

own and operate the improvements qualifies as an interested person under the statute, and 

qualifies as an applicant under the City= s zoning ordinance.

Appellants also argue that the Burnham Road school is simply an extension of and an integral 

part of the Stratton Road group home, and therefore itself is a group home, which should be 

prohibited because it will be located within 1000 feet of the Stratton Road group home. However, 

the fact remains that no residential use of the Burnham Road property is proposed. Rather, it falls 

within the definition of A school,@ and not within the definition of A group home,@ regardless of

whether residents of a group home attend it or are required to attend it. If the state legislature or 

the Town had wished to establish subcategories of A school@ in the zoning statute or ordinance, 

which would receive differential regulatory treatment if attended by group home residents, they 

had ample opportunity to do so when the A group home@ definitions and regulations were being 

added. They did not do so, and the Court cannot create this distinction where none exists in the 

Zoning Ordinance or state statute.

Accordingly, as discussed by the parties in the conference held on September 26, 2001, this 

ruling concludes the appeal.

Done at Barre, Vermont, this 2nd day of November, 2001.
___________________

Merideth Wright 

Environmental Judge
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-83,053-01

EX PARTE DONALD AEKINS, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. D-1-DC-12-904056-A IN THE 403RD DISTRICT COURT

FROM TRAVIS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of three counts of

sexual assault and sentenced to fifty-five years’ imprisonment on each count. The Fourth Court of

Appeals vacated the judgment as to the third count and affirmed the judgment as to counts one and

two. Aekins v. State, No. 04-13-00064-CR (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 6, 2013) (not designated

for publication). We affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. Aekins v. State, 447 S.W.3d 270

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 

Applicant contends that he was denied due process and equal protection of the laws because
2

we denied his motion for an extension to file a petition for discretionary review (PDR) and failed to

file his PDR. 

Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. Ex parte Patterson, 993

S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In these circumstances, additional facts are needed. As

we held in Ex parte Rodriguez, 334 S.W.2d 294, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960), the trial court is the

appropriate forum for findings of fact. The trial court shall obtain copies of the mail logs where was

incarcerated in June and July 2014 to determine when Applicant placed his PDR in the prison mail

system. The trial court may use any means set out in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07, § 3(d). 

If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. 

If Applicant is indigent and wishes to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint an

attorney to represent him at the hearing. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04. 

After obtaining the mail logs, the trial court shall determine when Applicant placed in his

PDR in the prison mail system. The trial court shall also make any other findings of fact and

conclusions of law that it deems relevant and appropriate to the disposition of Applicant’s claim for

habeas corpus relief.

This application will be held in abeyance until the trial court has resolved the fact issues. The

issues shall be resolved within 90 days of this order. A supplemental transcript containing all

affidavits and interrogatories or the transcription of the court reporter’s notes from any hearing or

deposition, along with the trial court’s supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, shall

be forwarded to this Court within 120 days of the date of this order. Any extensions of time shall

be obtained from this Court.

Filed: April 22, 2015
3

Do not publish
Comment Info: =================

General Comment:Withheld - This document contains privileged and 

confidential trade secrets and commercial

or financial information which is exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 

552(b)(4).
gyti_ex109.htm

EXHIBIT 10.9
  
 [Name]
 [Address]
  
 July__, 2018
  
 Gyrotron Technologies, Inc.
 3412 Progress Drive
 Bensalem, PA 19020
  
 Re: 10% Convertible Redeemable Series A Preferred Stock, 10% Convertible Redeemable Series B Preferred Stock, 10% Convertible Redeemable Series B-1 Preferred Stock (together “Preferred Stock”)
  
 Gentlemen: 
  
 Reference is hereby made to the Preferred Stock of Gyrotron Technologies, Inc. (the “Company”) that the undersigned expects to purchase from a third party. Capitalized terms used herein and not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Certificates of Designation with respect to the Preferred Stock.
  
 For good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned has agreed as of July 11, 2018 with respect to the Preferred Stock referenced in the paragraph above, that notwithstanding the terms of the Preferred Stock upon acquiring such Preferred Stock it waives its right (i) to convert such Preferred Stock into Common Stock and (ii) to vote its Preferred Stock on an as converted basis, until July 11, 2019.
  
 This agreement has been duly executed and delivered by the undersigned and constitutes the valid and binding obligation and waiver of the undersigned, enforceable against it in accordance with the terms hereof.
  
 No other term or provision of the Certificate of Designation or of the rights of the undersigned shall be affected by this agreement other than as specifically provided for herein. 
  
 This agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the respective heirs, executors, administrators, representatives and the permitted successors and assigns of the parties hereto. This agreement and the rights and obligations of the parties hereunder shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York, without regard to conflict of laws rules applied in such state.
  
 This agreement shall be construed to effectuate the mutual intent of the parties. Each party hereto acknowledges and agrees that it has received or has had the opportunity to receive independent legal counsel of its own choice and that it has been sufficiently apprised of its rights and responsibilities with regard to the substance of this agreement.
  
 This agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts and by facsimile or other electronic transmission, and all of said counterparts taken together shall be deemed to constitute one and the same instrument.
  
  	 	 [NAME] 
	
	 	 	 	 
		By:		
	  
	 Name: 
		 
	 	Title: 		 
	  
	  
	  
	  

	  
	 ACCEPTED:
 Gyrotron Technologies, Inc. 
	  

	  
	  
	  
	  

	  
	 By:
	  
	  

	  
	 Name: 
	  
	  

	  
	 Title:
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan



### July 31, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice


### 130710 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan 

### PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices



### v SC: 130710 COA: 263158 St. Joseph CC: 01-010550-FH ROBERT DON VALLANCE, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 23, 2006 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishi ng entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

s0724 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

July 31, 2006

Clerk
BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. ) Application of: ) ) SERVICIOS INTEGRALES DE ) AVIACION, S.A. DE C.V. ) Docket OST -04-19340 d/b/a FL YMEX ) ) For an Exemption to Engage 

### in Charter Air ) Transportation ofPersons, Property and Mail ) Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §40109 ) (U.S.-Mexico Passenger Charters) )



### APPLICATION FORRENEWAL OF EXEMPTION AUTHORITY ERRATUM Communication with respect to this document should be sent to:

April1, 2015 Pierre Murphy Law Offices ofPierre Murphy 1200 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Suite 590 Washington, D.C. 20036 Telephone: (202) 776-3980 Facsimile: (202) 776-3975 Email: pmurphy@lopmurphy.comBEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C. ) Application of: ) ) SERVICIOS INTEGRALES DE ) AVIACION, S.A. DE C.V. ) Docket OST-04-19340 d/b/a 

### FLYMEX ) ) For an Exemption to Engage in Charter Air ) Transportation ofPersons, Property and Mail ) Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §40109 ) (U.S.-Mexico Passenger Charters) )

APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL OF EXEMPTION AUTHORITY ERRATUM Servicios Integrales de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V. d/b/a/ FlyMex ("FlyMex" or "Applicant") hereby submits this erratum to its March 30, 20 15 application for renewal ofits exemption authority to include "Persons" in the caption such that it reads "For an Exemption to Engage in CharterAirTransportation of Persons, Property and Mail Pursuantto 49 U

.S.C. §40109" to conform with the reliefrequested.

April1, 2015

# Resp**lly** submi 

# A {L::hl

w Offices WPierre Murphy 00 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Suite 590



### 2 Washington, D.C. 20036 Telephone: (202) 776-3980 Facsimile: (202) 776-3975 Email: pmurphy@lopmurphy.com Attorney for Servicios Integrales de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V.
<Page>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 11

AAMES FINANCIAL CORPORATION
COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE LOSS
FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2001 AND 2000
(DOLLARS AND WEIGHTED AVERAGE NUMBER OF SHARES IN THOUSANDS)



<Table>
<Caption>


                                                             THREE MONTHS ENDED
                                                         ----------------------------
                                                                SEPTEMBER 30,
                                                         ----------------------------
                                                             2001           2000
                                                         ------------ ---------------
<S>                                                     <C>           <C>
BASIC NET LOSS PER COMMON SHARE:
  Net income                                                $   626       $     693
  Accrued preferred dividends on Series B,
     C, and D Convertible Preferred Stock                    (4,324)         (3,163)
                                                         ------------ ---------------
  Basic net loss to common stockholders                      (3,698)         (2,470)
  Basic weighted average number of common
    shares outstanding                                        6,265           6,211
                                                         ------------ ---------------
  Basic net loss per common share                           $ (0.59)      $   (0.40)
                                                         ============ ===============

DILUTED NET LOSS PER COMMON SHARE:

  Basic net loss to common stockholders                     $(3,698)      $  (2,470)
  Interest on convertible subordinated debentures                 -              -
                                                         ------------ ---------------
  Diluted net loss                                           (3,698)         (2,470)
  Diluted weighted average number of
    common shares outstanding                                 6,265           6,211
                                                         ------------ ---------------
  Diluted net loss per common share                         $ (0.59)      $   (0.40)
                                                         ============ ===============
</Table>
IV 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 62 

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding sexually 

exploited and trafficked girls in the United States. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 28, 2015 

Ms. DELAURO (for herself, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY

of New York, Ms. BASS, Mr. VARGAS, Ms. MCCOLLUM, Mr. WEBER of 

Texas, Mr. LOWENTHAL, Ms. SPEIER, Mr. COHEN, Ms. FRANKEL of 

Florida, Mr. LARSON of Connecticut, Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Ms. 

SLAUGHTER, Mr. TONKO, Mr. CA ́RDENAS, Ms. BORDALLO, Mr. NOLAN, 

Ms. ESTY, Mrs. WAGNER, Mr. DOGGETT, Mr. CICILLINE, Mr. POE of 

Texas, Mr. JOHNSON of Ohio, Ms. JACKSON LEE, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. 

DIAZ-BALART, Mr. HONDA, Mr. MCDERMOTT, Mr. GRIJALVA, Ms. KAPTUR, Ms. WILSON of Florida, Mr. PETERSON, Ms. JENKINS of Kansas, 

and Mr. COURTNEY) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding sexually exploited and trafficked girls in the United 

States. 

Whereas most girls subjected to commercial sexual exploitation and trafficking come from a broken child welfare 

system or are runaway youth that were subsequently 

preyed upon by exploiters and traffickers; 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with BILLS

2 

•HRES 62 IH 

Whereas it is important to provide education for family, 

friends, and neighbors to understand that these girls are 

victims; 

Whereas survivors of domestic trafficking need support in 

their efforts to raise awareness on identifying trafficked 

girls and the systems of support that such girls require 

to heal from the complex trauma of sexual violence and 

exploitation; 

Whereas the same protections and supports available to victims of child abuse should be extended to child victims 

of trafficking; and 

Whereas exploited and trafficked girls are not ‘‘bad girls’’ or 

‘‘child prostitutes’’, but are victims of systemized rape 

who need the same legal supports and protections other 

rape victims are afforded: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the House of Representatives supports 

2 efforts to— 

3 (1) provide protections and supports for sexu4 ally exploited and trafficked girls in the United 

5 States; and 

6 (2) create criminal or civil penalties for anyone 

7 who buys or sells a child through a system of child 

8 trafficking. 

Æ 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-7359

ROBERT EUGENE EASON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

JOSEPH B. HALL,

Respondent – Appellee,

and

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,

Respondent.

No. 14-7393

ROBERT EUGENE EASON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

JOSEPH B. HALL,

Respondent – Appellee,

and

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,

Respondent.
2

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, 

Chief District Judge. (5:13-hc-02004-D)

Submitted: January 27, 2015 Decided: February 6, 2015

Before KEENAN, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

No. 14-7359 dismissed; No. 14-7393 affirmed by unpublished per 

curiam opinion.

Robert Eugene Eason, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, 

III, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, Robert Eugene Eason 

seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as 

untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition (No. 14-7359), and 

the court’s post-judgment order overruling his pleading 

purported to be objections to the magistrate judge’s 

recommendation (No. 14-7393). The order dismissing Eason’s 

§ 2254 petition as untimely is not appealable unless a circuit 

justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability 

will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the 

district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner 

must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is 

debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the 

denial of a constitutional right. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484-85 (2000). 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude 

that Eason has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis, and dismiss Eason’s appeal of the district 

court’s order dismissing his § 2254 petition as untimely. We 

affirm the district court’s order overruling Eason’s objections 

to the magistrate judge’s recommendation because Eason’s 
4

petition was not referred to a magistrate judge. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

No. 14-7359 DISMISSED

No. 14-7393 AFFIRMED
## United States Court of Appeals
**For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________

No. 20

- 1896

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Ambrose Rayshawn Spires, also known as Ambrose Spries

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern

____________

Submitted: November 19 , 2020 Filed: November 24, 2020 [Unp ublished]

____________ Before ERICKSON, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

After considering a number of factors, the district court 1 reduced Ambrose Spires’s life sentence to 360 month s in prison under the First Step Act

. See Pub. L.

1 The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.-2- No. 115

- 391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). Though he challenges the decision on a host of grounds, we affirm.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declin ed

to reduce Spires’s sentence even further

, s ee United States v. Harris , 960 F.3d 1103, 1106 (8th Cir. 2020) ( articulating the standard of review)

, or when it denied his
motion for reconsideration

, s ee United States v. King , 854 F.3d 433, 443 (8th Cir. 2017) (same)

. Nor is a motion like this one the proper way to open a collateral attack

on his original sentence

. See United States v. Moore , 963 F.3d 725, 728 (8th Cir. 2020) (explaining how motions under the First Step Act are different from “original, plenary sentencing” p roceedings); see also United States v. Denson , 963 F.3d 1080, 1089 (11th Cir. 2020) (refusing to entertain this type of attack ).

We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court and grant counsel permission to withdraw.

______________________________
1

The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District

Judge for the District of South Dakota.

___________

No. 95-2315

___________

United States of America, *

 *

Appellee, *

 * Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

 * District of South Dakota.

Lawren J. Barse, *

 * [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: December 29, 1995

 Filed: January 3, 1996 ___________

Before BOWMAN, BEAM, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. ___________

PER CURIAM.

Lawren J. Barse appeals the district court's1 sentencing upon

revocation of his supervised release. We affirm.

Barse pleaded guilty to one count of distribution and

possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841. The district court sentenced Barse to four months in

prison and two years of supervised release, which began in January

1994. In March 1995, Barse's probation officer petitioned for

revocation on the grounds that Barse violated the terms of his

release. The district court granted the petition and sentenced

Barse to six months in prison and two years supervised release. On

appeal, Barse argues the district court erred in imposing combined
-2-

terms of imprisonment and supervised release that exceed Barse's

original two-year term of supervised release. 

We review a sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised

release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Grimes, 54 F.3d

489, 492 (8th Cir. 1995). We find the district court did not abuse

its discretion. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h), a term of supervised

release imposed upon revocation may "not exceed the term of

supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that

resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term

of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised

release." Barse's initial offense authorized as much as three

years of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(4),

3583(b)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). Barse's two-year term of

supervised release falls within the two years and six months

remaining when Barse's six-month prison sentence is subtracted from

the three years of supervised release authorized by statute.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
### C OURT OF 

### A PPEALS

FOR THE



### T HIRD 

### D ISTRICT OF 

### T EXAS

P.O. B OX 12547, A USTIN

, T EXAS 78711

- 2547

(512) 463

- 1733

Date: May 3, 2013

Case Number s : 03

- 12

- 00610

- CV & 03

- 12

- 00 715

- CV

Trial Court No.: D

- 1

- GN

- 12

- 000798

Style: Nancy C. Perez and Jose A. Perez v. Texas Medical Board

The enclosed opinion and judgment s were sent this date to the following persons:

Ms. Nancy C. Perez

10223 Broadway

, Suite P317

Pearland, TX 77584

- 8417

Mr. Ted A. Ross

Assistant Attorney General

Administrative Law Division

P. O. Box 12548

Austin, TX 78711

- 2548

Mr. Jose A. Perez

10223 Broadway

, Suite P317

Pearland, TX 77584

- 8417 The Honorable Scott H. Jenkins

Judge, 53rd District Court

Travis County Courthouse

P. O. Box 1748

Austin, TX 78767

The Honorable Amalia Rodriguez

- Men doza

District Clerk

Travis County Courthouse

P. O. Box 1748

Austin, TX 78767