Filed 9/19/23 P. v. Yancy CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER BERNARD 

YANCY,

Defendant and Appellant.

B320666

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. PA058905-01)

APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court 

of Los Angeles County, David W. Stuart, Judge. Affirmed. 

Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy 
2

Attorney General, and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________

A jury convicted Cristopher Bernard Yancy in October 2010 

of the second degree murder of Bobby Ray Gates. We affirmed 

the judgment on direct appeal, holding, in part, the trial court’s 

instruction that an aider and abettor was equally guilty of the 

crime as the perpetrator who committed it was harmless error 

under the circumstances of Yancy’s case. (People v. Yancy

(July 23, 2012, B228563) [nonpub. opn.].)

In May 2022, after appointing counsel for Yancy and 

receiving memoranda from the prosecutor and Yancy’s counsel, 

the superior court denied Yancy’s petition for resentencing under 

Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95),1 finding, 

although the jury had received torture-felony-murder 

instructions, the record of conviction established as a matter of 

law that Yancy was ineligible for resentencing relief. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Yancy’s Murder Conviction

a. The evidence at trial

In the early morning of December 5, 2005 Sidney Cole, 

Beatrice Brothers’s adult son, woke up Lachelle Robinson, 

Brothers’s daughter, at her home and told her to go to Brothers’s 

residence immediately. Soon after Robinson arrived, Yancy and 

his uncle, Sam Persons, Brothers’s boyfriend, came to the home 

at Brothers’s request. Brothers told Robinson, Yancy and 

Persons that Gates, who lived with his girlfriend in a converted 

1 Statutory references are to this code.
3

garage in the back of Brothers’s house, had molested one or more 

of Brothers’s grandchildren.2 

Gates, who had been called into the house by Brothers, was 

taken to the garage, where Brothers, Persons and Yancy took 

turns beating him with a stick while he was confined to a chair. 

Yancy told police, “It wasn’t just me killing that man. . . . 

Everybody took part in this shit.” Yancy explained in his 

interview with police that he, Persons and Brothers were all 

“outraged” and wanted to beat Gates for “raping kids.” According 

to Yancy, Brothers sodomized Gates with a rod during the attack. 

At some point, Yancy claimed, he had had enough and left while 

the others continued to beat Gates. According to Yancy, when he 

left, Gates was still alive, and nothing had been stuffed down his 

throat. 

Gates’s body was found on December 6, 2005 near a 

freeway in Lakeview Terrace. The body was wrapped in a blue 

tarp that had been lit on fire. Gates’s wrists were bound behind 

his back with a shoestring and a braided cord. A shirt or cloth 

had been stuffed in Gates’s mouth, and his eyes were covered 

with a blindfold. Gates had suffered bruising to his face, chest, 

abdomen, back, arms and legs, with lacerations on his forehead 

and face. The Los Angeles County deputy coroner who performed 

the autopsy opined Gates died primarily from asphyxiation 

caused by a cloth stuffed down his throat although blunt force 

trauma was also a contributing cause of death. 

Yancy did not testify or present any defense witnesses.

2 The description of the events leading to the death of Gates 

was based primarily on Yancy’s and Robinson’s recorded police 

interviews.
4

b. The instructions

The People presented three theories to support the charge 

of murder: (1) Yancy directly committed (was the perpetrator of) 

Gates’s murder (acting with express or implied malice); (2) Yancy

aided and abetted the perpetrator of the murder; (3) Yancy

committed, or aided and abetted, torture, a serious felony that 

resulted in Gates’s death (first degree felony murder). The 

defense theory was that Yancy was at most guilty of 

manslaughter, either voluntary manslaughter based on heat of 

passion or involuntary manslaughter based on a misdemeanor 

battery resulting in death.

As pertinent to Yancy’s current appeal, the court defined 

express and implied malice pursuant to CALCRIM No. 520 

(murder with malice aforethought): “The defendant acted with 

express malice if he unlawfully intended to kill. The defendant 

acted with implied malice if: 1. He intentionally committed an 

act; 2. The natural consequences of the act were dangerous to 

human life; 3. At the time he acted, he knew his act was 

dangerous to human life; and 4. He deliberately acted with 

conscious disregard for human life.”3 The court also instructed 

with CALCRIM Nos. 521 (degrees of murder); 540A and 540B 

(first degree felony murder based on torture or aiding and 

abetting torture); 810 (elements of torture); 570 (voluntary 

manslaughter based on killing in heat of passion); and 522 

3 When quoting this and other instructions given at Yancy’s 

trial, we have omitted unnecessary paragraphing, italics and 

capitalization.
5

(provocation reducing first degree murder to second degree or 

voluntary manslaughter).4 

In light of Yancy’s defense the court also gave CALCRIM 

No. 580 (involuntary manslaughter based on misdemeanor 

battery): “When a person commits an unlawful killing but does 

not intend to kill and does not act with conscious disregard for 

human life, then the crime is involuntary manslaughter. The 

difference between other homicide offenses and involuntary 

manslaughter depends on whether the person was aware of the 

risk to life that his or her actions created and consciously 

disregarded that risk. An unlawful killing caused by a willful act 

done with full knowledge and awareness that the person is 

endangering the life of another, and done in conscious disregard 

of that risk, is voluntary manslaughter or murder. An unlawful 

killing resulting from a willful act committed without intent to 

kill and without conscious disregard of the risk to human life is 

involuntary manslaughter. The defendant committed 

involuntary manslaughter if: 1. The defendant committed a 

misdemeanor crime that posed a high risk of death or great 

bodily injury because of the way in which it was committed; and 

2. The defendant’s acts unlawfully caused the death of another 

person.” The court added to the pattern instruction, “Depending 

on your point of view, the facts in this case could be construed to 

suggest that the defendant committed an uncharged 

misdemeanor battery. The definition of misdemeanor battery 

4 The court’s instruction on provocation, after stating 

provocation may reduce a murder from first degree to 

second degree and may reduce a murder to manslaughter,

included the explanation, “Provocation does not apply to a 

prosecution under a theory of felony murder.” 
6

will be provided in the very next instruction.[5] . . . . In order to 

prove murder or voluntary manslaughter, the People have the 

burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

acted with intent to kill or with conscious disregard for life. If the 

People have not met either of these burdens, you must find the 

defendant not guilty of murder and not guilty of voluntary 

manslaughter.” 

The jury was also instructed on aiding and abetting with 

CALCRIM former No. 400 (general principles of aiding and 

abetting): “A person may be guilty of a crime in two ways. One, 

he or she may have directly committed the crime. I will call that 

person the perpetrator. Two, he or she may have aided and

abetted a perpetrator, who directly committed the crime. A 

person is equally guilty of the crime whether he or she committed 

it personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator who committed 

it.” 

In addition, the court gave CALCRIM No. 401 (aiding and 

abetting: intended crimes): “To prove that the defendant is guilty 

of a crime based on aiding and abetting that crime, the People 

must prove that: 1. The perpetrator committed the crime; 2. The 

defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the 

crime; 3. Before or during the commission of the crime, the 

defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing 

the crime; and 4. The defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid 

and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime. Someone 

aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s 

unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does 

in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the 

5 The court defined simple battery using CALCRIM No. 960. 
7

perpetrator’s commission of that crime. If all of these 

requirements are proved, the defendant does not need to actually 

have been present when the crime was committed to be guilty as 

an aider and abettor.” 

c. Verdict and sentence

The jury convicted Yancy of second degree murder and 

found true an enhancement allegation he had personally used a 

deadly or dangerous weapon when committing the offense. The 

court sentenced Yancy to an aggregate indeterminate state 

prison term of 16 years to life. 

2. Yancy’s Direct Appeal

We affirmed Yancy’s murder conviction on appeal (People v. 

Yancy, supra, B228563), rejecting both his arguments for 

reversal. First, we held the trial court had not erred in denying 

Yancy’s motions for mistrial based on improper comments during 

Yancy’s trial indicating that Brothers had previously been

charged and convicted for her role in Gates’s homicide.

6 On each 

occasion the trial court had admonished the jury to disregard the 

remark. We held the court’s prompt and careful admonitions 

cured any error. 

6 Brothers, Yancy and Persons were tried separately. 

Brothers was initially tried before Yancy, convicted of first degree 

murder and sentenced to 26 years to life in prison. After Yancy’s 

trial had concluded, we reversed Brothers’s conviction based on 

instructional error and remanded the case for a new trial. 

(People v. Brothers (Dec. 12, 2011, B225376) [nonpub. opn.].) 

When she was retried, Brothers, who testified at her new trial,

was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. We affirmed that 

conviction. (People v. Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24.) 
8

Second, we agreed with Yancy that the court erred in 

instructing the jury pursuant to CALCRIM former No. 400 that a 

person is “equally guilty of the crime whether he or she 

committed it personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator who

committed it” because it suggested a defendant could be guilty of 

murder, even if he or she acted in the heat of passion, based 

solely on the greater culpable mental state of his or her 

coparticipants. But we held under the circumstances of his case 

the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We 

explained, “For the erroneous instruction to have had any effect 

in this case, the jury would have had to have found that Yancy 

had acted in the heat of passion while one or more of his 

coparticipants had acted with express or implied malice. It is 

simply not conceivable on this record that the jury could have 

found the children’s grandmother and/or her boyfriend had not 

acted in the heat of passion, but that Yancy, who, by his own 

admission, did not know Brothers or any of her grandchildren, 

had.”

3. Yancy’s Petition for Resentencing

On April 19, 2019 Yancy, representing himself, filed a 

petition for resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95. The 

superior court appointed counsel to represent Yancy during the 

proceedings. The prosecutor filed two memoranda in response; 

and Yancy’s counsel filed a reply memorandum, arguing, because 

the jury had been instructed on the felony-murder rule and 

aiding and abetting a felony murder, it was unclear whether

Yancy had been convicted on a now-invalid theory of imputed 

malice. After argument of counsel at a hearing on May 25, 2022 

to determine whether to issue an order to show cause, the 
9

superior court denied the petition, finding the record of conviction 

conclusively established Yancy was ineligible for relief. 

Explaining its ruling at the hearing the court stated, based 

on the instructions given at Yancy’s trial and the jury’s verdict, 

the only possible conclusion was that “the jury found [Yancy] 

either actually killed the victim—with intent, with express 

malice or implied malice—or aided and abetted his cohorts with 

intent to kill. If the jury had found that [Yancy] participated in 

torture without intent to kill and the victim had died, they would 

have found [him] guilty of first degree felony murder. But that 

didn’t happen. . . . And there is no instruction or suggestion that 

any intent to kill was imputed to him based on any legal theory 

or any codefendant’s state of mind.” 

Yancy filed a timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

1. Section 1172.6 Petitions for Resentencing

Under the ameliorative changes to the law relating to 

accomplice liability for murder effected by Senate Bill No. 1437 

(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), malice must be proved to convict a 

principal of murder except under the narrowed felony-murder 

rule set forth in revised section 189, subdivision (e), and may not 

be imputed based solely on an individual’s participation in a 

crime (§ 188, subd. (a)(3)), thereby eliminating the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant 

guilty of murder (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-

843; see People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984). As amended 

by Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2), effective 

January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 1437’s changes to the law of 

murder expressly apply to individuals convicted of attempted 

murder and voluntary manslaughter. 
10

Section 1172.6 authorizes an individual convicted of 

murder under the felony-murder rule or murder or attempted 

murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine

or any other theory under which malice is imputed based solely 

on that person’s participation in a crime to petition the 

sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on 

any remaining counts if he or she could not now be convicted of 

murder or attempted murder under revised sections 188 and 189. 

The superior court may not engage in judicial factfinding or make 

credibility decisions before issuing an order to show cause 

pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (c), and conducting an 

evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d), to 

determine whether the People have proved the petitioner is 

guilty of murder or attempted murder under current law. (People 

v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970-971.) However, when first 

evaluating whether the petitioner has carried the burden of 

making a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the 

superior court properly examines the record of conviction,

“allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit 

from those that are clearly meritless.” (Id. at p. 971; accord, 

People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.) “[I]f the 

record, including the court’s own documents, contain[s] facts 

refuting the allegations made in the petition, then the court is 

justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the 

petitioner.” (Lewis, at p. 971, internal quotation marks omitted.)

We review de novo whether the superior court conducted a 

proper prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c).

(People v. Williams, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1251; People v.

Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14; People v. Harrison (2021)

73 Cal.App.5th 429, 437.)
11

2. Yancy Is Ineligible for Relief Under Section 1172.6

Yancy does not challenge the superior court’s finding that 

his second degree murder conviction could not have been based 

on the felony-murder rule. And it is undisputed the jury was not 

instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. 

Thus, Yancy’s murder conviction was necessarily based on a jury 

finding that he was an actual killer of Gates or he directly aided 

and abetted the actual killer. Although the record of conviction 

does not disclose which theory the jury applied, it does establish 

the guilty verdict was not based on a theory of imputed malice. 

As Yancy contends, the prosecutor stated in his closing 

argument he could not prove it was Yancy who put the gag in 

Gates’s mouth, which the coroner testified was the primary cause 

of death. But, as discussed, the coroner also testified blunt force 

trauma was a contributing factor in Gates’s death; and the trial 

court instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 620 there 

could be more than one cause of death and an act causes death if 

it is a substantial factor in causing the death.7 Thus, the jury 

could have convicted Yancy as one of Gates’s actual killers 

because it concluded he viciously beat Gates with a stick with the 

intent to kill (express malice) or with conscious disregard for 

human life (implied malice) without imputing malice to Yancy. 

(See People v. Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130, 1146-1147 [finding 

7 The court also instructed with language taken from 

CALCRIM No. 240 (causation): “When there are multiple 

concurrent causes of death, you are not required to decide 

whether the defendant’s conduct was the primary cause of death, 

but need only decide whether the defendant’s conduct was a 

substantial factor in causing death.” 
12

a defendant guilty of murder under a substantial concurrent 

cause analysis does not involve imputing malice].) 

Similarly, if, pursuant to CALCRIM No. 401, the jury 

concluded the actual killer (Brothers or Persons) acted with the 

intent to kill Gates and, with knowledge of the perpetrator’s 

intent, Yancy specifically intended to, and did in fact, aid in the 

commission of the murder, Yancy’s conviction of second degree 

murder would not be predicated on an invalid theory of imputed 

malice. (See People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 641.) But 

the jury might also have convicted Yancy of second degree 

murder as the aider and abettor of the perpetrator acting with 

implied, not express, malice. Relying on People v. Maldonado

(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257 (Maldonado), People v. Langi (2022) 

73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi) and People v. Powell (2021) 

63 Cal.App.5th 689 (Powell), Yancy contends an ambiguity in 

CALCRIM No. 401 discussed in those cases, particularly when 

coupled with the “equally guilty” language in CALCRIM former 

No. 400, would have permitted the jury to convict him of 

second degree murder by imputing the implied malice of one of 

the other participants in the beating of Gates without finding 

that he personally acted with an intent to kill or conscious 

disregard for life, thereby precluding a determination at the 

prima facie stage that he is ineligible for resentencing relief as a 

matter of law.8 The record of conviction does not support Yancy’s 

argument.

8 The Attorney General argues Yancy forfeited this claim

because he argued in the superior court only that the instructions 

and prosecutor’s argument invited the jury to convict him for 

aiding and abetting a felony murder, not that CALCRIM former 

No. 400 and No. 401 allowed the jury to convict him under a 
13

The Supreme Court in People v. Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 

page 990 confirmed that aiding and abetting an implied malice 

murder remains a valid theory of murder liability notwithstanding

Senate Bill No. 1437’s amendments to sections 188 and 189. 

Quoting from Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pages 712 to 713

(footnote omitted), the Court explained, “‘[D]irect aiding and 

abetting is based on the combined actus reus of the participants 

and the aider and abettor’s own mens rea. [Citation.] In the 

context of implied malice, the actus reus required of the 

perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. For the 

direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts 

constitute aiding the commission of the life-endangering act. 

theory of imputed malice. Yancy responds by citing section 1259, 

which provides the appellate court may review any instruction 

that affects the substantial rights of the defendant even if no 

objection was made in the trial court. Section 1259 is 

inapplicable. Yancy is not arguing the superior court erred in 

giving CALCRIM No. 401 but that, because CALCRIM No. 401 

was given and is ambiguous, the superior court erred in 

concluding the record of conviction demonstrated his ineligibility 

for resentencing relief as a matter of law—an entirely different 

proposition. Nonetheless, because we review de novo the 

superior court’s determination a petitioner failed to make a 

prima facie showing of entitlement to resentencing relief under 

section 1172.6, we exercise our discretion to address the issue 

even though not previously raised. (See Waller v. Truck Ins.

Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 24 [appellate courts have

discretion to consider questions of law based on undisputed facts

even though not raised in the trial court]; Ward v. Taggart (1959)

51 Cal.2d 736, 742 [new theory pertaining to question of law on

facts appearing in the record may be raised for the first time on

appeal]; Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021)

67 Cal.App.5th 657, 699 [same].)
14

Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider 

and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the 

life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens rea, 

which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, 

is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, 

intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, 

knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in 

conscious disregard for human life.’” (Reyes, at pp. 990-991.)

Yancy does not contest the validity of a conviction for 

second degree murder based on aiding and abetting an implied 

malice murder, but contends, as the courts held in Maldonado, 

supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pages 1265 to 1266, Langi, supra, 

73 Cal.App.5th at pages 982 to 983, and Powell, supra, 

63 Cal.App.5th at page 714, that CALCRIM No. 401 (and the 

substantially similar CALJIC No. 3.01), is flawed because the 

instruction refers to the aider and abettor’s knowledge of the 

perpetrator’s purpose, which in an implied malice case does not 

include an intent to kill, and an intent to facilitate the commission 

of the crime by the perpetrator without stating aiders and abettors

must themselves have known the act being aided was lifethreatening or that they must themselves have acted with 

indifference to human life. Accordingly, as the Maldonado court 

explained in reversing the superior court’s order finding the 

petitioner had failed to make a prima facie case for resentencing 

relief, although the jury “could have construed the instructions as 

requiring the aider and abettor know the perpetrator intended to 

commit the act and know the perpetrator acted with implied 

malice—in other words, know the perpetrator knew the act was 

dangerous to human life and deliberately disregarded the risk to 

life,” it also could have reasonably construed the instructions to 
15

convict the petitioner as an aider and abettor based on his intent 

to encourage the perpetrator’s act whether or not he personally 

knew of and disregarded the risk of death—“a theory of imputed 

malice.” (Maldonado, at pp. 1266-1267.)

Applying the reasoning of these cases, Yancy argues the jury 

could have found he aided and abetted the implied malice murder 

of Gates by Brothers or Persons without himself acting with 

indifference to human life or intending to encourage not only the 

act that caused Gates’s death but also the perpetrator’s deliberate 

disregard that the act was dangerous to human life—thereby 

impermissibly imputing the perpetrator’s implied malice to him. 

Whatever we may think of the Powell-Maldonado line of cases, 

Yancy’s analysis fails to consider his trial theory of involuntary 

manslaughter and CALCRIM No. 580. As discussed, the jury was 

instructed, if it found Yancy did not intend to kill Gates and did 

not act with conscious disregard for human life, he was guilty, at 

most, of involuntary manslaughter, not murder. The jury’s 

rejection of that theory necessarily means it found he acted with 

express or implied malice, even if CALCRIM No. 401, considered 

in isolation, might have permitted a guilty verdict on a nowprohibited basis.

The equally guilty language in CALCRIM former No. 400, 

even when considered in conjunction with the purported ambiguity 

in CALCRIM No. 401, does not further Yancy’s argument the 

superior court erred in concluding the record of conviction 

established he was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. 

The problem with the former version of CALCRIM No. 400, as 

discussed in People v. Nero (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 504, and People 

v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, the cases upon which 

Yancy relies, is that an aider and abettor of a homicide could be 
16

guilty of a lesser homicide offense than the perpetrator if the aider 

and abettor had a less culpable mens rea. Thus, as Yancy 

unsuccessfully argued in his direct appeal, the jury might have 

believed Yancy participated in the attack on Gates in the heat of 

passion after hearing that Gates had raped Brothers’s grandchild 

but found him guilty of second degree murder because the actual 

killer was not similarly provoked. The jury’s rejection of the 

defense’s involuntary manslaughter theory, however, refutes 

Yancy’s contention on appeal that he might have been convicted of 

murder for his role in Gates’s homicide without a finding he acted 

with either an intent to kill or conscious disregard for life. 

In addition, the potentially misleading language in 

CALCRIM former No. 400 created, at most, a question of trial 

error. It did not transform Yancy’s case into a prosecution based 

on a theory “under which malice was imputed to a person solely on 

that person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) To 

reiterate, aiding and abetting implied malice murder was and 

remains a valid theory of murder liability. Yancy’s remedy for an

erroneous instruction given during a trial for murder on theories 

unaffected by Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775 was a direct appeal

(which he took and lost) or a petition for writ of habeas corpus, not 

a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6.

Finally, putting aside that the jury had been instructed to 

disregard the references to Brothers’s conviction and life sentence 

for her role in Gates’s death and that we presume the jury followed 

the court’s instruction to disregard those comments (see, e.g., 

People v. Schultz (2020) 10 Cal.5th 623, 674), the jury never 

learned that Brothers had been convicted of first degree murder, 

whether she had been convicted on a felony-murder theory without 

any finding of malice, or even that her conviction was for murder, 
17

rather than manslaughter. Even if the jury considered CALCRIM 

former No. 400’s equally guilty language, therefore, its finding 

that Yancy was guilty of second degree murder could not have 

been influenced by its knowledge that Brothers had been convicted 

of something, let alone the basis for imputing malice from 

Brothers to Yancy. 

DISPOSITION

The postjudgment order denying Yancy’s petition for 

resentencing is affirmed.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur: :

FEUER, J.

MARTINEZ, J.