Filed 8/21/24 In re A.R. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re A.R. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL 

SERVICES AGENCY,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.M. et al,

 Defendants and Appellants.

 G063607

 (Super. Ct. Nos. 21DP1317,

 21DP1318)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Julie 

Anne Swain, Judge. Affirmed.

Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant P.R.
2

Sarah Vaona, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant J.M.

Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torrez and Deborah B. 

Morse, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

No appearance for the Minors.

* * *

J.M. (Mother) and P.R. (Father), the parents of dependent 

children A.R. and C.R., now ages 14 and 13 respectively (the children), appeal 

from the orders terminating their parental rights and freeing the children for 

adoption, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1

Mother and Father argue the juvenile court erred by terminating 

reunification services at the disposition hearing. Neither challenged that 

order by a writ petition, and the issue therefore has been forfeited. Even if we 

were to consider the issue now, we would conclude the Orange County Social 

Services Agency (the Agency) offered or provided reasonable services to 

Father.

Mother and Father also challenge the termination of parental 

rights on the grounds the juvenile court failed to make a finding of detriment 

to the children and because there was no evidence the children were 

adoptable. We conclude the court’s findings of detriment at the disposition 

hearing, which were not challenged, were sufficient for purposes of the 

section 366.26 hearing, and there was substantial evidence the children were 

adoptable.

We therefore affirm.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code, unless otherwise noted. 
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

I.

DETENTION THROUGH DISPOSITION

A petition was filed in November 2021 alleging A.R. and C.R., 

then ages 12 and 10 respectively, came within section 300, subdivision (b)(1).

At the time, they were living with Mother. Father resided in Mexico, having 

been deported around 2014 due to drug-related criminal offenses. Mother was 

alleged to have failed to provide for the children’s medical, educational, and 

basic hygiene needs. She also was alleged to have an unresolved history of 

mental health, anger management, and substance abuse problems. The 

children were ordered detained and removed from Mother’s custody.

In December 2021, Father contacted the Agency to express his 

interest in being involved in the child welfare proceedings and his availability 

to participate in the jurisdiction/disposition hearing scheduled in January 

2022.3Father indicated he was willing to participate in reunification services,

and the social worker informed Father she had left a message with the 

Mexican Consulate regarding services available in Tijuana. Regarding 

visitation, the jurisdiction report noted: “Since he lives in Tijuana, face to face 

visits will be difficult to complete. Contact between the father and the 

children [has] consisted of one phone call since they came to the attention of 

Social Services. The father reported that he will continue to call them. In the 

future, communication via video chats may be explored.” Father was given 

2 Although Mother joined in Father’s appeal, she does not raise 

any separate arguments. We therefore limit our summary of the relevant 

facts to those necessary to understand and analyze the issues before us. 

3 Father’s contention that the social worker did not attempt to 

contact him in Mexico until June 7, 2022, is incorrect.
4

contact information for the children, but he lost the information. Father 

initially maintained consistent contact with the Agency, participated in the 

development of a case plan, and participated in a child and family team 

meeting. However, he later stopped contacting the children or the social 

worker, and his phone number was changed or disconnected.

At the jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found the 

allegations of the petition, as amended, true by a preponderance of the 

evidence and found the children came within the court’s jurisdiction. At the 

disposition hearing, Father’s counsel submitted. The court found by clear and 

convincing evidence it would be detrimental to the children to vest custody 

with either Mother or Father and declared the children to be dependents of 

the court.

Father’s case plan responsibilities consisted of general 

counseling, parenting education, a 12-Step program, an outpatient substance 

abuse program, and substance abuse testing. Father was approved to have 

unsupervised phone calls with the children. 

II.

THE AGENCY’S ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT FATHER

Because of a series of continuances (the reasons for which are 

irrelevant to the issues on appeal), separate six-month, twelve-month, and 

eighteen-month hearings were not held in this case. The status review 

reports, interim reports, and addendum reports filed by the Agency between 

September 2022 and May 2023 revealed the following regarding attempts to 

communicate with or about Father, his case plan services, and his visitation 

with the children.
5

Between May and July 2022,4the Agency made repeated 

attempts to communicate with the Mexican Consulate in Santa Ana to 

discuss Father’s case plan services. In August, the assigned social worker met 

with a consulate employee and was advised the consulate had thus far been 

unable to locate Father in Mexico. The social worker provided the consulate 

employee with the address the Agency currently had for Father.

In June and July 2022, the social worker made several attempts 

to contact Father by phone, but was never able to leave a voicemail message.5

On July 27, the social worker mailed a contact letter to Father at the address 

on file.

On August 18, 2022, the social worker contacted the paternal 

grandmother, who provided a new cell phone number for Father. The next 

day, the social worker was able to communicate directly with Father. Father 

confirmed he had not participated in any case plan services, and the social 

worker told him to contact Desarrollo Integral de la Familia, a Mexican child 

welfare agency in Tijuana, Mexico (DIF). (See In re N.O. (2019) 31 

Cal.App.5th 899, 903.) The social worker also provided Father’s new cell 

phone number and address to the Mexican Consulate.

On August 24, 2022, the social worker spoke with Father via cell 

phone. Father advised he had the next day off work and would be going to 

DIF to get help with his case plan services. On September 8 and 27, 2022, the 

social worker called Father’s cell phone and left a voicemail and/or text 

message requesting a follow up call regarding his case plan services. The 

children’s caregiver reported Father had an unsupervised phone call with 

4 May 4, May 17, June 6, June 16, June 29, and July 20, 2022.

5

June 7, June 29, and July 20, 2022.
6

A.R. for one hour on August 28, 2022. The social worker advised the caregiver 

physical visits were currently suspended, but the children could use 

WhatsApp to have videoconference visits with Father.

As of September 2022, the Agency believed additional time was 

necessary to assess Father’s ability to address the issues that brought him 

before the juvenile court, and it recommended the court continue 

reunification services for Father.

On October 14, 2022, a consulate employee sent an email 

advising the Agency that cross-border visits would be suspended until further

notice. On the same day, the social worker spoke with Father via cell phone.

Father told the social worker he had not gone to DIF because there were 

three locations in Tijuana and he was unsure which one to go to. Father could 

not explain why he had not requested further information from the social 

worker. Father promised to text his current mailing address to the social 

worker and to contact the social worker on another day to schedule a 

telephonic meeting in November. Father failed to provide his mailing address

despite multiple text messages from the social worker over the next seven 

months requesting the address.6

In response to a request from the social worker, an employee of 

the Mexican Consulate sent an email to the Agency on November 9, 2022, 

reiterating that cross-border visits were suspended until further notice.

6 October 19, October 20, October 26, November 21, and 

December 15, 2022; January 19, January 20, February 9, February 15, 

February 21, March 2, March 3, March 13, March 20, April 4, April 10, April 

17, May 8, May 15, May 17, and May 24, 2023. The social worker noted he 

was using the WhatsApp application, so he could confirm Father had read his 

text messages. 
7

Despite multiple communications between the Agency and the consulate,

7

inperson visitation between Father and the children was never an option

during the relevant period.

The addendum reports for January through May 2023 noted 

Father had made no progress on his case plan.

In March 2023, A.R. reported he had not talked to Father, but 

would like to do so. The social worker advised A.R. in-person visits were not 

possible at that time. In April, A.R. told the social worker he had been text 

messaging Father via Facebook Messenger. The children’s maternal 

grandmother had helped A.R. find Father on Facebook.

C.R. told the social worker she did not want to talk to Father.

The caretaker stated the last phone call between Father and the children 

occurred in August 2022. She further stated A.R. had not requested any 

phone calls with Father and C.R. had responded “No” when asked if she 

would like to talk to Father.

In May 2023, A.R. stated he had not talked to Father “‘in a 

while,’” but he would like to talk to Father on the phone. He was aware the 

caretaker could contact Father. C.R. again stated she did not want to talk to 

Father. The caretaker and various relatives confirmed the children had not 

spoken with Father recently.

In an addendum report dated May 31, 2023, the Agency reported 

Father had not participated in his case plan and concluded he had “made no 

progress in mitigating and alleviating the circumstances which have brought 

him and the children to the attention of the [Agency].” The Agency therefore 

7 March 7, March 22, April 7, April 14, May 8, May 15, and May 

24, 2023.
8

recommended reunification services be terminated and the matter be set for a 

section 366.26 hearing.

Because of a series of continuances involving the unavailability of 

the court and/or counsel, the six-month, twelve-month, and eighteen-month 

hearings were consolidated into a single hearing in June 2023. At the 

conclusion of the contested hearing, the juvenile court found reasonable

services had been provided to Mother and Father and returning the children 

to their parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to their safety, 

protection, or physical or emotional well-being. The court then terminated 

reunification services and set the matter for a permanency hearing under 

section 366.26. Mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition to review 

the order setting a section 366.26 hearing, but never filed a petition.

III.

THE SECTION 366.26 PERMANENCY HEARING

In the section 366.26 report, the Agency noted that because of the

children’s ages and their status as a sibling set, it could be “challenging” to 

find them an adoptive home. The children were specifically adoptable, 

however, as the caregivers with whom they had lived for 18 months wanted 

to adopt them. The children wanted to be adopted and wanted the 

permanency of adoption. Their visits with Mother during the child welfare 

proceedings had caused both of them “anguish.” The Agency concluded 

adoption was the most appropriate permanent plan for the children.

As to the children’s relationship with the caregivers/prospective 

adoptive parents, the Agency noted: “The children have been adjusting well 

in placement. The caregivers are meeting the children’s medical, 

developmental, emotional, and educational needs. The caregivers have 

consistently followed up with the undersigned regarding the children’s 
9

medical appointments, as well as newly achieved developmental milestones.

The children appeared to be doing well in their current placement home as 

evidenced by their warm, loving and affectionate relationship towards the 

caregiver. The children . . . have a CASA worker, and they enjoy their 

outings, and have a strong support system through maternal family 

members. Furthermore, the caregivers are willing and capable of providing 

permanency for the children through adoption. The undersigned has observed 

positive interactions between the caregivers, the caregiver’s child during the 

children’s monthly visits. The children have shown attachment to the 

caregivers and have been responsive to simple directions from them.”

The Agency noted nothing had happened since reunification

services were terminated that would enable the children to be safely returned 

to either Mother or Father. The maternal relatives, who had visited the 

children regularly during the child welfare proceedings, expressed their 

desire that the children be adopted by the caregivers/prospective adoptive 

parents.

Based on all the foregoing, the Agency recommended the juvenile 

court terminate parental rights to allow the children to be adopted.

A preliminary adoptive assessment of the caregivers established 

they understood the rights and responsibilities of adoption, had the ability to 

meet the children’s needs, and were committed to providing permanency for 

the children. When the children were asked to identify someone by whom 

they would like to be adopted, A.R. identified the caregivers “‘because I feel 

safe.’” C.R. said adoption means to “‘live with the person forever and they are 

your parents. I want that to happen with [the caregivers], to live with them.’”

C.R. also said the caregivers “‘feed us and care for us’” and take them on 

trips.
10

C.R. testified at the section 366.26 hearing she wanted to be 

adopted by the caregivers/prospective adoptive parents. She said her desire to 

be adopted would not change even if adoption, rather than legal 

guardianship, meant she could not visit with Mother or her maternal 

relatives again.

A.R. also testified at the section 366.26 hearing he would like to 

be adopted by the caregivers/prospective adoptive parents. But A.R. testified 

he wanted a permanency plan that would allow him to continue to have visits 

with Mother and his maternal relatives, and he “would say no” to being 

adopted if it meant having no contact with them. He wanted Father to 

continue being his father.

No other witnesses were called to testify at the hearing. The 

juvenile court found the children were likely to be adopted, and neither 

Mother nor Father had met their burden of proving an exception to adoption.

Therefore, the court ordered that Mother and Father’s parental rights over 

the children be terminated and the children be placed for adoption. Mother 

and Father separately filed timely notices of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I.

TERMINATION OF REUNIFICATION SERVICES

A. Failure to File a Writ Petition

On appeal, Father challenges the reasonableness of the 

reunification services provided to him by the Agency. An order terminating 

reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing must be 

challenged by a writ petition. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1), (2).) Mother timely filed a 

notice of intent to file a writ petition after the hearing setting the section 

366.26 hearing, but later submitted a letter to the Court of Appeal indicating 
11

her intent not to file a petition because of a lack of arguable merit, pursuant 

to Glen C. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570, 583–584. No party 

ever filed a writ petition. Father therefore waived his right to challenge the 

termination of reunification services. 

Father argues good cause exists to excuse his failure to comply 

with the writ petition requirement because the juvenile court’s record lacks 

evidence the court clerk served him with a written advisement of the right to 

seek writ review of the order terminating reunification services and setting 

the section 366.26 hearing. “[J]udicial error in failing to advise a party in a 

dependency proceeding of the writ requirement for challenging an order 

setting a section 366.26 hearing that results in a failure to file a writ petition 

may excuse a party’s failure to comply with that requirement and allow a 

reviewing court to reach the issues on appeal from the orders following the 

section 366.26 hearing.” (In re A.H. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 337, 347.)

California Rules of Court, rule 5.590(b) provides, in relevant part:

“When the court orders a hearing under section 366.26, the court must advise 

all parties and, if present, the child’s parent, guardian, or adult relative, that 

if the party wishes to preserve any right to review on appeal of the order 

setting the hearing under section 366.26, the party is required to seek an 

extraordinary writ by filing a Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition and 

Request for Record (California Rules of Court, Rule 8.450) (form JV-820) or 

other notice of intent to file a writ petition and request for record and a 

Petition for Extraordinary Writ (California Rules of Court, Rules 8.452, 8.456)

(form JV-825) or other petition for extraordinary writ. [¶] . . . [¶] If a party is 

not present when the court orders a hearing under section 366.26, within 24 

hours of the hearing, the advisement must be made by the clerk of the court 

by first-class mail to the last known address of the party or by electronic 
12

service in accordance with section 212.5. If the notice is for a hearing at 

which the social worker will recommend the termination of parental rights, 

the notice may be electronically served in accordance with section 212.5, but 

only in addition to service of the notice by first-class mail.” (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 5.590(b)(2).)

Father was not present at the hearing at which reunification 

services were terminated and the matter was set for a section 366.26 hearing.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 5.590(b), the court clerk provided 

the writ advisement to him by first-class mail. The court’s minute order from 

the hearing reads, in relevant part: “Parents noticed by first class mail that if 

the party wishes to preserve any right to review on appeal of the order 

setting the hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 366.26, the 

party is required to seek an extraordinary writ by filing a Notice of Intent to 

File Writ Petition and Request for Record (JV-820) and Petition for 

Extraordinary Writ (JV-825). [¶] Clerk to send writ advisement to [Mother 

and Father] to their address on file. [¶] Forms JV-820 and JV-825 and copy of 

minute order dated June 27, 2023 mailed on June 28, 2023 to: [Mother and 

Father].”

Father argues, however, that the writ advisement did not comply 

with the Rules of Court because it was not sent with a proof of service. He 

contends the advisement is a “notice,” which is defined in California Rules of 

Court, rule 5.502(27) as “a paper to be filed with the court accompanied by 

proof of service on each party required to be served in the manner prescribed 

by these rules. If a notice or other paper is required to be given to or served 

on a party, the notice or service must be given to or made on the party’s 

attorney of record, if any.” Therefore, he argues, the clerk was required to 
13

attach a proof of service to the writ advisement. This argument fails for three 

related reasons.

First, the writ advisement required by California Rules of Court, 

rule 5.590(b) is not a paper to be filed with the court, but rather is an 

advisement “made by the clerk,” for which a formal proof of service is not 

required. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.590(b)(2).) Notably, that rule refers to 

the clerk making a writ advisement, not serving a notice on an absent party.

Second, rule 5.502(27) references notice to or service on an attorney of record; 

rule 5.590(b), however, requires that the writ advisement be sent to a party, 

further indicating rule 5.502(27) does not apply to writ advisements. Third, 

rule 5.502(27) specifically notes that its definitions do not apply if “the 

context or subject matter otherwise requires.” To make sense together, rules 

5.502(27) and 5.590(b) cannot be read as Father suggests.

The notation in the minute order that the writ advisement had 

been mailed to Father was sufficient to show the court advised Father of the 

right to seek writ review of the order terminating reunification services and 

setting the section 366.26 hearing because “[i]t is presumed that official duty 

has been regularly performed.” (Evid. Code, § 664; see In re Mary C. (2020) 48 

Cal.App.5th 793, 806.) Father has offered nothing to rebut this presumption

that the writ advisement was mailed as indicated. The issue has been waived

for purposes of this appeal.

B. Reasonable Services Were Offered or Provided

If we were to address the issue despite its waiver, we would 

review the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services had been provided 

or offered under the substantial evidence standard. (Katie V. v. Superior 

Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598.) “[I]n reviewing the reasonableness of 

the reunification services provided by the [Agency], we must . . . recognize 
14

that in most cases more services might have been provided, and the services 

which are provided are often imperfect. The standard is not whether the 

services provided were the best that might have been provided, but whether 

they were reasonable under the circumstances.” (Elijah R. v. Superior Court

(1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) In reviewing the reasonableness of services 

offered, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent and 

draw all reasonable inferences to uphold the juvenile court’s order.

(Christopher D. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 60, 70.) The Agency 

bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable 

services were provided. (Serena M. v. Superior Court (2020) 52 

Cal.App.5th 659, 674.) We must bear this heightened standard of review in 

mind when applying the substantial evidence test. (Ibid.)

Where the issue of reasonable services is considered for the first 

time at a combined six-, twelve-, and eighteen-month hearing, we must 

consider whether reasonable services were provided throughout the entire 

dependency period. (Serena M. v. Superior Court, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 675.) 

Services for parents, such as Father, who have been deported 

may include: “Reasonable efforts to assist parents who have been deported to 

contact child welfare authorities in their country of origin, to identify any 

available services that would substantially comply with case plan 

requirements, to document the parents’ participation in those services, and to 

accept reports from local child welfare authorities as to the parents’ living 

situation, progress, and participation in services.” (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1)(E).)

Father contends the services provided were not reasonable because the social 

worker failed to arrange services with DIF and failed to attempt to 

communicate with Father through Facebook.
15

The evidence is undisputed that on August 24, 2022, the social 

worker spoke with Father, at which time Father stated he would go to DIF 

the next day to get help with his case plan services. The social worker was 

unable to contact Father in September despite leaving multiple voicemail and 

text messages. On October 14, 2022, the social worker again was able to 

contact Father, who stated he had not gone to DIF because he was confused 

about which location he should go to. Father promised to text his current 

mailing address to the social worker and to schedule another telephone call.

But Father failed to communicate with the Agency for seven months, despite 

numerous messages from the social worker. Although the Agency’s written 

reports show the social worker used different phone numbers to contact 

Father, we see this as an attempt to go beyond the information provided by 

Father and make additional efforts.

In In re D.R. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 583, the appellate court 

concluded the child welfare agency had failed to give the father adequate 

notice of the proceedings and granted his section 388 motion to void the 

jurisdiction and disposition orders as to the father. After the children were 

detained, the mother told the child welfare agency the father had been 

deported to Mexico. (Id. at p. 587.) An older half-sibling advised the child 

welfare agency investigator he had contact with the father through Facebook, 

and someone had provided the agency a phone number in Mexico. (Ibid.) One 

of the dependent children spoke with the father via cellphone during an 

unmonitored visit with another half-sibling, who also had contact with the 

father via Facebook. (Id. at p. 588.) The agency never asked the half-siblings 

about the father’s Facebook profile, conducted searches only within the 

United States, and did not research the father’s whereabouts after being 

provided with a Mexican telephone number for him. (Id. at pp. 588–589.) The 
16

agency did not follow up with the mother although she told the juvenile court 

she had taken the children to visit the father in Tijuana. (Id. at p. 592, fn. 2.)

The appellate court reversed the jurisdiction and disposition 

orders because the agency had failed to exercise reasonable diligence in 

locating the father. The agency could have asked the half-siblings to help 

locate the father via social media and could have used search methods more 

likely to produce useable results. “Not once did DCFS follow the most likely 

means of being able to actually identify Father and gain his contact 

information to notify him.” (In re D.R., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 591–592.) 

Similarly, in In re A.G. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, the appellate 

court held the juvenile court failed to provide reasonable services to the 

parent living in Mexico. “The record does not contain any evidence to show 

that during the review period, the Agency assisted A.J. in contacting DIF for 

service referrals or identified any available services that would substantially 

comply with case plan requirements. The record shows that A.J. was not 

offered, or provided with, the court-ordered services in his case plan during 

the review period. Accordingly, we conclude there is not substantial evidence 

to support the reasonable services finding.” (Id. at p. 1003.)

The facts at hand are very different from those in In re D.R. and 

In re A.G. Contrary to the implication in Father’s opening brief, neither the 

statute nor the relevant cases impose on the Agency a duty to contact foreign 

child welfare authorities on behalf of the deported parent, rather than to 

assist the parent in contacting those authorities. Substantial evidence in this 

case supports the juvenile court’s finding the Agency took all reasonable steps 

to provide reasonable services to Father in Mexico. This is not a case where 

the Agency was looking for a needle in a foreign haystack without the use of 

social media or other contacts provided by the deported parent’s family. To 
17

the contrary, the Agency had actual contact with Father; Father participated 

in creating his case plan; and the Agency communicated to him the steps he 

needed to take to obtain those services and identified for him the 

organization in Mexico at which he could do so. Father then ceased all contact 

with the Agency without providing updated contact information.

Where—as here—the Agency has contact information for an outof-country parent and uses that contact information to communicate with 

that parent, develop a case plan, and provide information on where and how 

to obtain services in the foreign country, but the parent ceases

communication with the Agency and fails to even attempt to participate in 

services or to contact the children, there is sufficient evidence that reasonable 

services have been provided. A.R.’s communication with Father through 

Facebook messenger does not change our analysis. The appellate record 

reflects this communication did not begin until April 2023 and had ended by 

May 2023. This method of communication was clearly no more likely to elicit 

a response from Father than the ones being used by the Agency.

The Agency’s failure to arrange visits between Father and the 

children did not deny reasonable services to Father because visitation was 

not permitted during the relevant time period. Moreover, from the beginning 

of Father’s participation in the child welfare case, the Agency made clear 

video visits would be necessary, but Father failed to communicate with the 

children in this fashion.
18

The Agency did not fail to provide or offer reasonable services to 

Father.8

II.

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

“‘The juvenile court may terminate parental rights only if it 

determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely the child will be 

adopted within a reasonable time. [Citations.] In making this determination, 

the juvenile court must focus on the child, and whether the child’s age, 

physical condition, and emotional state may make it difficult to find an 

adoptive family. [Citations.] In reviewing the juvenile court’s order, we 

determine whether the record contains substantial evidence from which a 

reasonable trier of fact could find clear and convincing evidence that [the 

child] was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. [Citations.]’

[Citations.] We give the court’s finding of adoptability the benefit of every 

reasonable inference and resolve any evidentiary conflicts in favor of 

affirming.” (In re Gregory A. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1561–1562.) 

Adoption is the preferred option after parental rights have been 

terminated. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1).) One of the exceptions to the preference 

for adoption is that a child who is 12 years of age or older objects to the 

termination of parental rights by the juvenile court. (§ 366.26, 

subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).)9 We review the juvenile court’s decision not to apply that 

8

In reaching this conclusion, we need not rely on the Agency’s 

references to its internal policies and memorandum of understanding with 

the Mexican government. We do not accept Father’s argument these are 

irrelevant, however.

9 A.R. and C.R. were 14 and 12, respectively, at the time of the 

section 366.26 hearing.
19

exception for substantial evidence. (In re Christopher L. (2006) 143 

Cal.App.4th 1326, 1333.) Father bears the burden of showing the court’s 

order is not supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at pp. 1333–1334.)

A. Finding of Detriment 

Father argues the juvenile court erred by failing to find by clear 

and convincing evidence that awarding custody to him would be detrimental 

to the children. (In re G.P. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1193.) But Father 

concedes he failed to raise this issue at the section 366.26 hearing.

Accordingly, the issue has been forfeited. (See In re T.G. (2015) 242 

Cal.App.4th 976, 984; In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 222.) 

Additionally, Father submitted at the disposition hearing without 

argument. At that hearing, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing 

evidence pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c)(1) that it would be 

detrimental to vest custody of the children with Mother or Father. Father 

correctly notes the juvenile court did not make a finding of detriment under 

section 361.2.10 There was, however, no error. Previously, section 361, 

subdivision (c) did not authorize the court to enter an order removing a 

dependent child from a parent who did not currently reside with that child.

(In re Dakota J. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 619, 629; see In re V.F. (2007) 157 

Cal.App.4th 962, 969 [§ 361, subd. (c) does not address noncustodial 

parents].) But at the time of the hearing in this case, section 361, subdivision 

(d) applied the same standard of detriment whether or not the children 

10 Section 361.2 addresses the placement of a child with a 

noncustodial parent if the juvenile court orders the child’s removal from the 

custodial parent. (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) If the noncustodial parent requests 

custody, the court must place the child with that parent unless it makes a 

finding of detriment. (Ibid.) 
20

resided with the parent at the time the petition was initiated. (Stats. 2017, 

ch. 665, § 1.) Therefore, the juvenile court’s finding of detriment at the 

disposition hearing was sufficient as to Father as a noncustodial parent, and 

substantial evidence supports that finding as to both Mother and Father, 

even in light of the heightened burden of proof.

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding the Children Were Likely to be 

Adopted

Father argues the juvenile court erred by failing to consider legal 

impediments to adoption under Family Code section 8602, which reads: “The 

consent of a child, if over the age of 12 years, is necessary to the child’s 

adoption.” Father contends the evidence did not support a finding the 

children would consent to adoption by the caregivers. Family Code section 

8602 does not apply in this child welfare proceeding. “Dependency 

proceedings are special proceedings governed by their own rules and statutes.

[Citations.] Statutes applicable to civil cases are not applicable to dependency 

actions unless expressly made so. [Citations.] Further, although section 

366.26 explicitly adopts certain provisions of the Family Code, there is no 

provision under section 366.26 adopting Family Code section 8602 for 

juvenile dependency court proceedings.” (In re Christopher L., supra, 143 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1333, fn. 3.) 

More important, contrary to Father’s argument, the children did 

express their desire to be adopted by the caregivers. C.R. testified at the 

section 366.26 hearing she wanted to be adopted by the caregivers, even if 

that meant she would not thereafter see her parents and extended family.

A.R. also testified he wanted to be adopted by the caregivers. Both children 

expressed an understanding of the difference between adoption and legal 

guardianship, and both testified they would prefer not to lose contact with
21

Mother and their extended family. But both ultimately expressed their desire 

to be adopted by the caregivers. The caregivers indicated they would allow 

visits between the children and their relatives.

C. There Was No Error in Failing to Allow A.R. to Testify Regarding Whether 

He Would Consent to Adoption

Father argues the juvenile court erred by prohibiting Father from 

asking A.R. if he would consent to adoption. The following colloquy occurred 

at the hearing:

“Q [To A.R. from Father’s counsel]: Do you know, as you sit here 

today, that you would have to consent and sign off on your own adoption?

“The Court: Ms. Nerney, I am going to object. I am not going to 

allow that question. It’s not the state of the law as the Court understands it.

“Ms. Nerney: I believe it is, Your Honor, for children over 12.

“The Court: They can object, but their consent is not required.

“Ms. Nerney: I believe at the adoption hearing they have to sign 

the form.

“The Court: My understanding is that whatever the forms are—

“Ms. Nerney: I can—

“The Court: —they can object to the termination of parental 

rights. The Court still would have to find a compelling reason for determining 

that termination would be detrimental to the child due to that circumstance.”

Because consent to adoption is not an issue for the juvenile 

court’s consideration at a section 366.26 hearing, the court did not err in 

prohibiting the inquiry.
22

DISPOSITION

The orders terminating parental rights are affirmed.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

GOETHALS, J.