In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-2707

Reid L., et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Illinois State Board of Education,

Glenn W. McGee, in his capacity as

Illinois State Superintendent of

Education, and Corey H., et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-3432

Corey H., et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

Board of Education of the City of

Chicago, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,

Appeal of: Reid L., et al.,

Prospective Intervenors.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

Nos. 01 C 4180, 92 C 3409--Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.

Argued September 25, 2001 and February 15, 2002--

Decided May 13, 2002

 Before Rovner, Diane P. Wood, and Evans,

Circuit Judges.

 Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judge. In these

two cases, which we have consolidated

solely for the purpose of issuing our

opinion, certain parties are seeking to

enjoin the Illinois State Board of

Education (ISBE) from promulgating and

implementing new rules on special

education teacher certification. The Reid

L. parties are minor children enrolled in

Illinois public schools outside of

Chicago; they all have been classified by

their respective school districts as
having disabilities, within the meaning

of the Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. sec. 1400

et seq. The Corey H. parties are their

counterparts within the City of Chicago.

 After a great deal of litigation, which

we describe below, the district court

entered a remedial decree designed to

bring the Illinois system of special

education teacher certification into

compliance with various requirements of

the IDEA, particularly its directive that

students be educated in the least

restrictive environment, see 20 U.S.C.

sec. 1412(a)(5). The two appeals before

us represent the efforts of the Reid L.

parties to prevent the new rules

developed pursuant to the district

court’s order from entering into effect

(or, if necessary, to roll them back).

The Reid L. appeal (No. 01-2707) arises

from the district court’s denial of a

preliminary injunction that would have

stopped the rules from going into effect

on July 1, 2001. The Reid L. parties and

certain teachers also tried to intervene

directly in the Corey H. litigation; the

Corey H. appeal (No. 01-3432) is brought

by the would-be intervenors to challenge

the denial of their motions to intervene.

We conclude that the district court did

not err either in refusing to enjoin the

new rules or in denying the Reid L.

parties’ attempt to intervene in the

Corey H. case; we therefore affirm.

I

 In order to place the present dispute in

context, we must look back a quarter of a

century to the way in which children with

disabilities have received their

education in the Chicago Public Schools.

In 1975, Congress passed the Education

for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L.

94-142 (Nov. 29, 1975), which for the

first time required that children with

disabilities be educated with the least

restrictive accommodations possible. In

1990, Congress replaced that statute with

the IDEA. In the meantime, however,

Chicago had done little to change the way

in which it handled the education of the

affected students. Briefly put, it relied

heavily on categorization of both

students and teachers, and had little

flexibility for cross-categorical or

individualized arrangements.
 On May 22, 1992, the Corey H. plaintiffs

and their parents, acting on behalf of

themselves and all similarly situated

disabled students attending the Chicago

Public Schools (CPS), filed an action in

federal court against the Board of

Education of the City of Chicago, the

Superintendent of the Board, and the

Illinois State Board of Education,

claiming that the defendants had failed

to provide students with disabilities who

attended the CPS with a free appropriate

public education in the least restrictive

environment, as mandated by the IDEA,

sec.sec. 1412(a)(1) and (5). The Chicago

Board and the ISBE opposed class

certification, but the district court

disagreed and certified the Corey H.

class on February 1, 1993, at the same

time denying the defendants’ motion to

dismiss.

 Four years later, on February 10, 1997,

the Corey H. plaintiffs filed a second

amended complaint, in which they alleged

that the ISBE violated the IDEA by

failing to ensure that an adequate supply

of qualified special education teachers

and related personnel was available and

properly trained. On July 29, 1997, joint

experts hired by all the parties in Corey

H. issued a report. Their report

concluded that the current certification

system for special education teachers was

in part responsible for the failures in

the education of the affected children.

That system employed eight disability

categories: learning disabilities,

social/emotional disorders, educable

mentally handicapped, trainable mentally

handicapped, physically handicapped,

blind/visually impaired, deaf/hard of

hearing, and speech/ language

handicapped. The report described this

system as "archaic" and asserted that

"the current certification system results

in categorical service delivery, limits

the way staff can be used and limits

involvement in general education. . . ."

The experts reported also that the

certification system improperly supported

the segregation of students with

disabilities according to their

disability category and unlawfully

limited the educational environment in

which they were placed.

 In September 1997, the Corey H.

plaintiffs and the Chicago Board reached

a settlement, which the district court
preliminarily approved on October 23,

1997. The district court ordered the

parties to provide notice of the

settlement, and it then held a fairness

hearing on January 16, 1998. That

settlement was finally approved on that

day, and its terms are not part of the

present controversy.

 What continued after that settlement was

the question of the ISBE’s liability. As

to that part of the case, the Corey H.

parties and the ISBE proceeded to trial

on October 20, 1997. See Corey H. v.

Board of Education of the City of

Chicago, 995 F. Supp. 900, 903 (N.D. Ill.

1998). On February 19, 1998, the district

court found in favor of the plaintiffs on

the liability question, holding that the

ISBE had violated the least restrictive

environment mandate of the IDEA. Id. The

court’s findings specifically singled out

the categorical system of special

education teacher certification as a

contributing factor to the violation.

Accordingly, the court ordered the ISBE

to develop rules and regulations for

teacher certification that would bring

the state into compliance with the

statute.

 Rather than appealing the liability

decision, the ISBE and the plaintiff

parties entered into settlement

discussions with respect to remedies.

Their efforts bore fruit a year later,

and on March 24, 1999, the district court

preliminarily approved the proposed

settlement, and ordered notice and a

public hearing which was scheduled for

June 18, 1999. The notice was

disseminated widely throughout both

Chicago and the state; it elicited

hundreds of written comments on the

settlement. Importantly, people from

throughout the State of Illinois

responded, many with objections. Among

the responders was the Illinois Education

Association (IEA), the principal

teachers’ organization in Illinois, which

submitted a letter through its president,

Bob Haisman.

 Although the Corey H. litigation

concerned only the Chicago public

schools, it was obvious that the teacher

certification issue would affect the

entire state. Illinois has long since

done away with separate teacher

certification standards for Chicago and
the rest of the state, and thus to fix

matters for Chicago inevitably meant a

change in statewide standards. See 105

ILCS 5/14-9.01 ("No person shall be

employed to teach any class or program

authorized by this Article [Children with

Disabilities] . . . unless he has had

such special training as the State Board

of Education may require."). At the start

of the hearing, in fact, the district

court advised the participants that if

they had wished to have a more formal

voice in the content of the settlement

agreement, they should have moved earlier

either to intervene or to submit a brief

amicus curiae. Nevertheless, there was

extensive testimony from interested

parties.

 On the same day that the fairness

hearing was held, June 18, 1999, the

district court entered an order approving

the settlement between the Corey H.

plaintiffs and the ISBE. The settlement

agreement covered a number of topics, in

cluding monitoring procedures and

policies, pre-school services, funding

policies, and, central for present

purposes, teacher certification. Instead

of having the court draft the detailed

remedial plan, the parties agreed that

ISBE would have the primary

responsibility to develop special

education teacher certification rules, in

cooperation with the CBE and the

plaintiffs. Any such rules were subject

to the court’s retained jurisdiction to

ensure that any plan eventually adopted

was consistent with the permanent

injunction the court had already entered

against ISBE forbidding further

violations of the IDEA. See Corey H., 995

F. Supp. at 918.

 The ISBE set out to do just that. Even

before the settlement agreement had been

approved, in 1998, the ISBE began working

with Illinois parents, advocates for

students with disabilities, and

educators, to revamp these teacher

certification rules. It created two

advisory panels, which conducted a dozen

public statewide hearings on the issue.

The panels also sent proposed

certification standards to numerous

outsiders, including teachers,

universities, and professional

associations, for their comments. In

October 1999, the panels submitted their

report to the ISBE, recommending that the
existing eight categories be reduced to

five. Because opinions still conflicted

so strongly on the best way to achieve

the goals of the IDEA, however, the ISBE

then convened another Blue Ribbon Task

Force, which met in February 2000 to

develop recommendations for certification

of special education teachers. That task

force suggested combining the five

categorical certificates (learning

disability, social/emotional disorder,

educable mentally handicapped, trainable

mentally handicapped, and physically

handicapped) into two new certificates--

one for Learning Behavior Specialist

Adapted Curriculum Focus, and the other

for Learning Behavior Specialist Modified

Curriculum Focus. In addition to these

two recommendations, the IEA and the

Illinois Special Education Coalition

submitted a proposal recommending

retention of the eight categorical

certificates and adding a new crosscategorical certificate.

 At this point, the ISBE realized that it

was decision time. The diversity of views

that were before it made it clear that

the Board was not likely to find a

consensus solution that made everyone

happy. In coming up with its final

proposal, it took a number of factors

into account, including the fact that

many students’ disabilities touch several

of the old categories, the need to train

teachers properly for any new system that

was implemented, the impact of any new

system on the supply of special education

teachers, the impact of any new system on

the ability of local school districts to

deliver services to disabled students,

the length of time needed to implement

any new system, and the effect of a new

system on existing teachers. The ISBE

staff accordingly developed its own

option, which contemplated one

certificate ("Learning Behavior

Specialist 1", or LBS1) for all the

former categorical certificates (learning

disability, etc., as mentioned above),

and separate certification for

specialists in teaching students who have

vision impairments, hearing impairments,

or early childhood or speech/language

disorder. This was the proposal the ISBE

submitted for the approval of the

district court.

 The court had appointed a Monitor to

assist it in overseeing both the Chicago

Board’s and the ISBE’s compliance with
their respective settlement agreements.

The Monitor accordingly submitted

comments on the ISBE’s proposed

certification rules on June 22, 2000. In

those comments, the Monitor suggested

that the certification rules should be

submitted as peremptory rules to the

Joint Committee on Administrative Rules

(JCAR) in the Illinois General Assembly

(a legislative support services agency

created under Illinois law, see 5 ILCS

100/5-90). See also 5 ILCS 100/5-50

(describing peremptory rulemaking). On

September 12, 2000, the district court

accepted the Monitor’s recommendation and

ordered the ISBE to file its proposed

certification rules as peremptory rules

under the Illinois Administrative

Procedure Act. It concluded that this was

proper because these rules were "required

as a result of federal law, federal rules

and regulations, [or] an order of a

court," see 5 ILCS 100/5-50, not as a

"consent order or other court order[ ]

adopting settlements negotiated by the

agency," see id. ISBE never would have

taken action had it not been for the

court’s February 1998 decision on

liability and the remedial order that

followed.

 On October 26, 2000, the ISBE published

the certification rules under its

peremptory rulemaking authority. The

rules identify specific common standards

that all special education teachers must

master, as well as standards for those

who want the LBS1 certificate. At that

point, however, a tug-of-war at the state

level emerged. In January 2001, JCAR

suspended the rules, claiming that they

constituted a serious threat to the

public interest and welfare. The district

court judge then met with the Corey H.

parties and certain members of the

Illinois General Assembly to decide what

to do. These efforts at consensus also

failed, however; on February 21, 2001,

JCAR again announced that the rules were

suspended. On February 27, 2001,

exercising the power to act independently

of the ISBE altogether that it had

reserved in both the ruling on liability

and in the settlement agreement, the

court ordered the ISBE to implement the

rules immediately without referral to

JCAR. The Illinois 92nd General Assembly

also attempted to stop the implementation

of the rules, voting to continue

indefinitely the suspension of the rules
and passing a joint resolution of both

houses on May 31, 2001.

 At the same time, the court ordered the

ISBE to conduct public hearings on

another set of rules, the Rules for Tran

sition to the New Special Education

Certification Structure (transition

rules). The transition rules outlined the

procedure for teachers holding

certificates under the old system to

become requalified as holders of the LBS1

certificate. Essentially, they created a

three-year grace period for such

teachers, giving them time to acquire any

additional training they might need.

During that interim period, no Illinois

school district would be permitted to

assign a transitional teacher to teach

students outside his or her prior

categorical certificate. As ordered by

the court, the ISBE held public hearings

on the transition rules in March 2001. It

received extensive comments. As a result

of those comments, ISBE proposed

splitting the LBS1 certificate into two

(general curriculum and differentiated

curriculum), but the district court

refused to do so.

 On June 28, 2001, the court ordered the

ISBE to implement the transition rules.

We now turn back to the parties who are

attempting to challenge these results

from the Corey H. case: the plaintiffs in

the Reid L. litigation (who are also the

proposed intervenors in the Corey H.

case, which allows us to refer to them

simply as the Reid L. parties). On May 7,

2000, the Reid L. parties (a group

ofspecial education teachers and students

who live outside the boundaries of the

Chicago Public School district, and are

hence nonmembers of the Corey H. class)

filed a motion to intervene in the Corey

H. litigation. Their motion alleged that

the ISBE had violated the IDEA, the 11th

and 14th Amendments to the U.S.

Constitution, and the Illinois

Administrative Procedure Act when it

promulgated both the certification rules

and the transition rules. On August 15,

2001, the district court denied the Reid

L. students’ motion to intervene; on

August 30, 2001, it denied the Reid L.

teachers’ motion to intervene. Appeal No.

01-3432 is from those orders of the

district court.

 Meanwhile, on June 4, 2001, the Reid L.
parties filed a separate action for

declaratory and injunctive relief (No. 01

C 4180 in the district court). The

complaint in the injunction action

contained exactly the same allegations as

the motion to intervene. The district

court denied the Reid L. parties’ request

for a preliminary injunction and a tempo

rary restraining order on June 28, 2001;

Appeal No. 01-2707 in this court concerns

that order. We consider first the Reid L.

parties’ arguments with respect to their

motions to intervene; we then turn to

their effort to obtain injunctive relief.

II

 In remarks delivered in open court, the

district court gave several reasons for

denying the motions to intervene, either

of right or permissively. First, he found

that the Reid L. parties filed their

motion too late: "the individual named

intervenors . . . knew about the case for

a long time. The case has been

extensively publicized throughout the

state. I can certainly take notice of

that, because it all came out in the

fairness hearing back in June of 1999,

more than two years ago." Timing alone,

the district court found, was "enough to

deny the motion." In that connection, the

court also noted the active role that the

IEA was playing in the Reid L. effort and

commented that had they tried to

intervene back before all the work was

done, they would have had a better

argument. The court expressed concern for

the finality of its order and found that

to allow the proposed intervention would

unravel results that had been reached

since February of 1998, the date of its

original decision on liability and its

general injunction against the ISBE. At

that early date, the court had identified

the need for cross-categorical

certification of special education

teachers in order to comply with the IDEA

and its "least restrictive environment"

mandate.

 In addition to these central concerns,

the court also indicated that it did not

believe that the proposed intervenors had

shown that they had standing to sue, in

that they were asserting only a

generalized interest in a sound

educational system. Next, it stated that

the intervenors had failed to demonstrate

that their interests had not been
adequately represented by an existing

party, namely, the ISBE (which, the court

noted, had opposed the Corey H.

plaintiffs on the liability merits, and

then opposed them at the remedies stage

for a long time). Finally, the court

found that the intervenors had failed to

show that their rights or interests would

be impaired by anything in the Corey H.

settlement. Placement decisions for

students would continue to be made on a

child-by-child basis, pursuant to each

child’s individual education plan; and

teachers had no interest in refusing to

tailor their continuing educational

training to the requirements of the new

system, which ensured that no one would

be decertified.

 A. Intervention of Right

 There are four requirements for

intervention of right under Fed. R. Civ. P.

24(a), in the absence of a statute giving

an absolute right to intervene: (1)

timeliness, (2) an interest relating to

the subject matter of the main action,

(3) at least potential impairment of that

interest if the action is resolved

without the intervenor, and (4) lack of

adequate representation by existing

parties. See Commodity Futures Trading

Comm’n v. Heritage Capital Advisory

Servs., Ltd., 736 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir.

1984). The burden is on the party seeking

to intervene of right to show that all

four criteria are met. Keith v. Daley,

764 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1985). If

not, then the district court must deny

intervention of right. See United States

v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 858

(7th Cir. 1985).

 Here, the principal ground on which the

district court relied to deny the motion

is expressly recognized by the Rule:

timeliness. As it had long since entered

its decree, the court relied on People

Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Ed., 68 F.3d

172 (7th Cir. 1995), to find that the

presumption against intervention at that

late date was sufficiently strong to

defeat the effort of the Reid L. parties

to do so. The Reid L. parties take

exception to the court’s characterization

of them as latecomers to the event. They

insist that they acted as soon as they

realized that the certification rules

were indeed going to be applied on a
state-wide basis and that the legislature

would not be able to protect their

interests. They point to February 17,

2001, as the critical date, because it

was then that the district court ruled

that the Illinois General Assembly could

not nullify its remedial order. They also

point out that the rules had not yet been

implemented at the time of their

intervention motion.

 We see no flaw in the district court’s

conclusion that the Reid L. parties

waited too long before attempting to

intervene. Timeliness is fundamental not

only to intervention, but to the overall

conduct of a lawsuit, and it is a clearly

spelled out requirement of Rule 24. "The

purpose of the [timeliness] requirement

is to prevent a tardy intervenor from

derailing a lawsuit within sight of the

terminal." Sokaogon Chippewa Community v.

Babbitt, 214 F.3d 941, 949 (7th Cir.

2000) (internal quotations omitted). In

order to decide whether a motion to

intervene was timely, we look at factors

like (1) the length of time the

intervenor knew or should have known of

her interest in the case, (2) the

prejudice caused to the original parties

by the delay, (3) the prejudice to the

intervenor if the motion is denied, and

(4) any other unusual circumstances.

Ragsdale v. Turnock, 941 F.2d 501, 504

(7th Cir. 1991).

 These motions were filed nine years

after the Corey H. litigation began; more

than two years after the district court’s

opinion finding the ISBE liable and

singling out the state-wide teacher

certification standards as a particular

violation of the least restrictive

environment rules; and more than ten

months after the court approved the

settlement agreement that formed the

basis for the work leading up to the

certification rules and the transition

rules. These events provided ample notice

to the Reid L. parties that their

interests might be implicated in the

ISBE’s response to the court’s orders. To

the extent that they are arguing that the

standard requires that their interests

have been impaired beyond any remedy,

they are wrong. Indeed, just as we

rejected this kind of argument in

Sokaogon Chippewa, we reject it here. See

214 F.3d at 949. The time to intervene

was, at the very latest, when the
remedial process began, ten months before

the actual motion. That was when the

rules were being drafted and publicly

discussed; that was when their input

could have been received without undoing

the long and difficult process that all

other parties to this litigation had been

pursuing in good faith. Even if we were

to consider the ten months to be the only

relevant delay, we could find no error in

the district court’s determination, as a

decision about timeliness is reviewed for

abuse of discretion. Vollmer v.

Publishers Clearing House, 248 F.3d 698,

705-06 (7th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court

in N.A.A.C.P. v. New York, 413 U.S. 345

(1973) found that even a 17-day delay

made the motion untimely as "it was

incumbent upon the appellants, at that

stage of the proceedings, (a critical

stage) to take immediate affirmative

steps to protect their interests." 413

U.S. at 367.

 The district court’s conclusion that the

other parties to the litigation would

suffer prejudice if the Reid L. parties

were entitled to intervene is also well

supported on this record. This case is

close to completion, after a decade of

litigation in the federal courts. If the

Reid L. parties were allowed to enter

now, everyone would be forced to return

to Square One, with the same old

certification rules in place, the same

old problems under the IDEA, and no

remedy in sight. The district court

correctly noted that our decision in

People Who Care strongly discourages such

eleventh-hour measures. See also United

States v. South Bend Community School

Corp., 710 F.2d 394, 396 (7th Cir. 1983).

This is true notwithstanding the fact

that the Reid L. parties will be

disadvantaged to the extent that they

will have lost the chance to urge ISBE to

implement a system more like the old one

they are losing. But any such loss is of

their own making; it is perfectly clear

that they knew about this litigation and

were content to participate on the

sidelines for a long period of time.

Theirs is not the kind of prejudice that

should weigh in favor of a long-delayed

motion for intervention. Since there are

no other unusual circumstances counseling

in favor of intervention, we conclude

that the district court was justified in

denying the motion on the ground of

untimeliness.
 Even assuming that untimeliness was not

enough to bar the claim, intervention as

of right would still not be appropriate.

The Reid L. parties argue that they have

asserted the kind of substantial interest

in the new certification rules that would

justify intervention, claiming that their

interest is exactly the same as that of

the Corey H. plaintiffs themselves: an

interest in the most effective system for

teaching children with disabilities

consistent with the IDEA. At that level

of generality, of course, they are

correct. But the new element the teacherintervenors seek to introduce into the

case is more parochial: they wish to urge

that the new rules will force them to

change in ways that they regard as

undesirable. The non-Chicago students

among the Reid L. group wish only to

argue that a different solution to the

proven violation would have been

preferable. The teachers’ interest is far

afield from the core concerns of the

IDEA, which as we have already said are

to assure the best appropriate education

for students with disabilities in the

least restrictive environment. As for the

students, while they may have had a valid

interest while the new rules were being

drafted, now that the rules have been

embodied in a decree the picture is

different. Once the new rules are

implemented, the violation of the IDEA

should be redressed. At that point, the

Reid L. students have merely a

disagreement about pedagogical theory

with the Corey H. plaintiffs. Such a

vague concern is not enough to support

intervention of right. Thus, at either a

high or low level of generality, the Reid

L. students’ claim for intervention

fails: if it is a general interest in

Illinois’s compliance with the IDEA, that

is taken care of by all the parties in

the Corey H. litigation already; if they

are concerned only with the specifics of

the new certification rules, they have no

independent interest in the details of

their teachers’ certification, once the

remedial order brings such certification

in compliance with federal law.

 We also see no independent interest the

Reid L. intervenors can assert in the

specific procedures that were used to

develop the new rules; it is plain on the

face of this record that extensive

notice, opportunity to comment, and
review were involved, and we see nothing

in the IDEA that requires more.

 Next, we agree with the district court

that the Reid L. students have not shown

how their interest in the least

restrictive educational environment has

been impaired by the new rules. As the

court noted, each pupil will still be en

titled to have an individualized

education plan developed for him or her;

school districts will continue to have an

obligation to provide qualified personnel

to teach those students (or to place them

elsewhere if that cannot be done); and

students will still be able to take

advantage of the procedural protections

afforded by the statute if they or their

parents believe that the program is

falling short.

 Finally, we consider whether the

district court correctly found that the

legally cognizable interests of the Reid

L. proposed intervenors were adequately

represented by the existing parties to

the case. See People Who Care, 68 F.3d at

177. Insofar as the students had an

interest in proving a violation of the

federal statute, it is clear that the

Corey H. parties represented them very

well--so much so that a major problem of

noncompliance with federal law has been

redressed. Insofar as the students had an

interest in having the court adopt an

effective remedy for that violation--

another thing that was accomplished--it

is also true that numerous points of view

were aired before ISBE and the court

settled on the final remedial measures.

The mere fact that no student from

downstate Illinois was formally entitled

to party status does not mean that the

court was unexposed to arguments about

the virtues of more categorical

certification standards, or fewer such

standards. As the district court pointed

out, for much of this litigation ISBE, a

governmental body, was opposing the Corey

H. plaintiffs in much the same way one

would have expected the Reid L. proposed

intervenors to behave. See generally

United States v. South Bend Community

School Corp., 692 F.2d 623, 625 (7th Cir.

1982); Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d at 1270

("Adequacy can be presumed when the party

on whose behalf the applicant seeks

intervention is a governmental body or

officer charged by law with representing

the interests of the proposed
intervenor.").

 But, the Reid L. parties respond, at

this point in the litigation ISBE is

trying to defend the new rules that

itauthored itself, and then allowed to

take effect over the express opposition

of the JCAR and the Illinois General

Assembly. The latter point, however, is a

red herring; the district court properly

found that the state authorities did not

have the power to override an injunctive

decree issued by a federal court to

remedy a state’s violation of standards

established by federal law. Were it

otherwise, we would risk a return to the

unlamented period when states asserted

the right to interpose their laws against

unpopular federal civil rights decrees,

see Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), a

period that has long been put to rest

throughout the country. A remedial order

"can neither be nullified openly and

directly by state legislators or state

executive or judicial officers, nor

nullified indirectly by them," id. at 17.

As for the former point, it is just

another way of arguing that the Reid L.

parties should be entitled to attack the

present rules in the capacity as

intervening parties to the Corey H.

litigation, even though their motion was

untimely. The problem with this argument

is its ex post perspective. The ISBE

represented their interests vigorously in

its opposition to Corey H.: its being

sensible enough to enter into a consent

decree in no way left the Reid L. parties

unrepresented, and the ISBE is entitled

to defend the rules it drafted. Everyone

must now comply with the rules the ISBE

itself has chosen to enact, under the

spur of the liability finding, until such

time as a new opportunity for public

input on revised rules arises or until

the court chooses to terminate the

decree.

 B. Permissive Intervention

 The court denied the motions for

permissive intervention for the same

reasons it denied the motions for

intervention of right. With respect to

permissive intervention, however, our

review is more deferential. "Reversal of

a district court’s denial of permissive

intervention is a very rare bird indeed,

so seldom seen as to be considered
unique." Shea v. Angulo, 19 F.3d 343, 346

n.2 (7th Cir. 1994). Once again, the

untimely nature of the requests, the

prejudice that the existing parties to

the case would suffer, and the

questionable nature of the legal injuries

the proposed intervenors would suffer,

all combine to demonstrate that the

district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying this part of the

motions.

III

 The Reid L. parties pursued an

alternative avenue of attack on the new

teacher certification rules and the

transition system before it took effect

by filing a separate suit for declaratory

and injunctive relief. We have

jurisdiction to review the district

court’s denial of preliminary injunctive

relief. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1292(a)(1).

 A party seeking to obtain a preliminary

injunction must demonstrate a likelihood

of success on the merits, a lack of an

adequate remedy at law, and a future

irreparable harm if the injunction is not

granted. See Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson

& Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1992).

Once the court is satisfied that these

three conditions have been met, it must

consider the harm that the nonmoving

party will suffer if the injunction is

granted, balancing it against the

irreparable harm to the moving party from

the denial of relief. See Storck USA,

L.P. v. Farley Candy Co., 14 F.3d 311,

314 (7th Cir. 1994). Finally, the court

must consider the interest of and harm to

nonparties from a denial or grant the

injunction. Id.

 The district court explained in its

order denying the preliminary injunction

that it was doing so for several reasons:

the Reid L. parties had failed to

exercise due diligence in bringing the

motion; they lacked standing to attack

the rulings in the Corey H. case; they

were not likely to succeed on the merits

of their claims; and finally, it found

that the harms foreseeable to them if the

injunction were denied were less than the

harms that the Corey H. parties would

suffer were the injunction granted. In

reviewing the denial of a preliminary

injunction, this court adopts a

deferential stance: we review any
findings of fact the district court made

for clear error, and we review its

balancing of the considerations for or

against an injunction for abuse of

discretion. United Airlines, Inc. v.

International Ass’n of Machinist and

Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, 243 F.3d 349,

360 (7th Cir. 2001).

 The principal substantive claim the Reid

L. parties are asserting is that the ISBE

harmed them by not conducting formal

public hearings before it implemented the

new certification rules--something they

believe can be redressed under 42 U.S.C.

sec. 1983. They find the source of the

public hearing requirement in the IDEA,

under which state agencies must conduct

such public hearings as a prerequisite

for their eligibility for federal funding

under the Act. 20 U.S.C. sec.

1412(a)(20). Not having the appropriate

hearings, they contend, is the requisite

predicate violation of federal law.

Notably, the section says nothing about

the right of either schoolchildren or

their teachers to compel anyone to hold

such hearings; it merely creates a

precondition for the state to receive

funds. Without such a right, any sec.

1983 claim is a nonstarter.

 Under the Illinois Administrative

Procedure Act, there is also a

requirement for notice and an opportunity

to comment. From a technical standpoint,

it is true that the new certification

rules were promulgated without the

required notice, in apparent violation of

5 ILCS 100/5-40. But for several reasons,

the violation is only apparent. First, as

the Monitor had suggested, the rules were

promulgated under the alternative

statutory authority to issue peremptory

rules, found in 5 ILCS 100/5-50. The

rules were later suspended by the JCAR in

any event, which meant that the new rules

had been prevented from going into effect

as a matter of state law. But it was then

that the federal court stepped in and

mooted any point about compliance with

state administrative procedures. Rather

than using these procedures, the court

simply ordered on February 27, 2001, that

the rules were to go into effect. Since

the court could have simply drafted a

complete remedial decree on its own,

without any assistance at all from the

ISBE or Illinois administrative procedure

rules, we see no ground for basing a
federal lawsuit on an alleged failure to

follow state law. See, e.g., Kirkland v.

New York State Dept. of Correctional

Servs., 628 F.2d 796, 801 (2d Cir. 1980)

(once a violation of federal law is

found, the power of the district court to

fashion a remedy arises as a matter of

federal law, and nonconformance with

state law is immaterial).

 Furthermore, as was noted above, there

was extensive public input into the

development of these rules, which assured

from a practical standpoint that the

purposes of notice and comment

requirements were fulfilled.

 The district court also thought that the

Reid L. parties neither had standing to

sue nor a private right of action to

enforce the public hearing provisions of

the statute. We need not resolve this

issue definitively, as we are satisfied

that the court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the injunction. But

we confess to serious doubts about the

standing of the teacher-plaintiffs. It is

hard to see what legally protected

interest of theirs has been invaded and

how the invasion has injured them. No

teacher will be decertified because of

the new certification standards or the

transition rules; teachers will be able

to qualify for the new LBS1 certificate

over a three-year period, through their

ordinary continuing education process;

and in the meantime teachers may not be

forced to teach in areas for which they

are unprepared. We would have just as

little sympathy if an attorney complained

that her law license was impaired because

the state bar toughened its continuing

legal education or bar membership

requirements. See, e.g., Brown v. McGarr,

774 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1985). One has no

legally protectible interest in taking

easy classes rather than hard ones. Thus,

it appears that the teachers lack

standing to participate in the present

case. As for the Reid L. students, once

the Corey H. plaintiffs obtained relief

that redressed the statutory violation,

any injury they may have had has already

been redressed. It is hard to imagine any

abstract interest the students might have

in the kinds of hearings on proposed rule

changes that took place in the past that

would qualify under familiar federal

standing rules. See Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
But, as noted before, we do not need to

resolve this definitively for purposes of

ruling on a preliminary injunction

denial; it is enough to say that there is

only a small likelihood of success on the

merits on this point.

 We are equally dubious about whether 20

U.S.C. sec. 1412(a)(20) confers a private

right of action on either the teachers or

the students. In the past, sec. 1415

actions have been brought only to redress

individual denials of appropriate care to

a child, not for failures to comply with

hearing and notice requirements for

broader rule-making exercises. As the

appellees note, in Alexander v. Sandoval,

532 U.S. 275 (2001), the Supreme Court

held that no implication of a private

right of action should be read into a

statute that merely sets forth

requirements that an entity must meet in

order to receive federal funds. Id. at

290. It seems that this is all that sec.

1412(a)(20) does.

 When, prior to the oral argument on the

denial of intervention, the preliminary

injunction appeal was argued to this

court, the Reid L. parties also urged

that it was unfair to foreclose any

method of participation for them: if they

could not intervene (as the district

court had held by then), then they must

be able to bring an independent action;

if they could not sue separately, then

intervention must be an option. But our

reasons for rejecting intervention do not

imply that a timely motion to participate

in the case would or should have been

denied, and nothing the district court

said leads us to believe that it would

have frowned on such an effort. Rights

can be lost, and that one was. That does

not mean that the district court was

required to permit exactly the same kind

of disruption under the guise of a freestanding action for injunctive

relief.Under the present circumstances,

the denial of both avenues is perfectly

legitimate, given that the parties did

not make the requisite showing under

either one.

 To prevail on the merits of their

request for a permanent injunction, the

Reid L. parties would have to convince

the court that the remedy it has just

ordered for the IDEA violations it found

in 1998 is itself a separate violation of
the statute. The district court

reasonably evaluated as slim their

likelihood of success on that claim, even

assuming they could surmount the standing

problem. This is not because children

outside the class certified in Corey H.

are bound as parties to that outcome, on

some sort of virtual representation

theory. They are not. But the procedural

arguments based on the IDEA and state law

are weak, and as a substantive matter it

will be hard for them to show that the

remedy the court has adopted, with ISBE’s

input, is not at least one of the

solutions to the violation that was

acceptable. It need not be the only one,

or even the best one, as long as it

remedies the violation in a properly tai

lored way and respects the law otherwise,

both of which it fulfills.

IV

 In No. 01-3432, we AFFIRM the orders of

the district court denying the motions to

intervene of the Reid L. parties. In No.

01-2707, we AFFIRM the district court’s

denial of the Reid L. parties’ motion for

a preliminary injunction. The district

court is free to proceed with any matters

still before it in a manner consistent

with this opinion.