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*********************************************** 
CITY OF HARTFORD v. HARTFORD POLICE UNION

(AC 44230)

Cradle, Clark and Norcott, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff city sought to vacate an arbitration award issued in connection

with its alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement that it had

entered into with the defendant police union. Between March, 2017, and

June, 2018, all five of the city’s police captains retired and their positions

remained vacant until September, 2018, when they were filled simultaneously. The union filed a grievance, alleging that the city had violated

the terms of certain appendices to the agreement, which it claimed

required the city to maintain five police captain positions at all times.

The parties submitted the issue for arbitration. An arbitration panel

found that the city had violated the agreement by leaving open the

vacancies and awarded each of the employees who were appointed to

the position of police captain in September, 2018, an amount equal to

the difference between their rate of pay on the date when the first

police captain retired and their rate of pay on the date when they

were appointed police captain, for the period between March, 2017, and

September, 2018, not including any overtime worked during that period.

The city filed an application to vacate the arbitration award, which the

trial court denied, and the city appealed to this court. Held:

1. The trial court properly rejected the city’s claim that the panel exceeded

its authority in violation of the applicable statute (§ 52-418 (a) (4)) in

finding that the city violated the agreement: although the agreement did

not explicitly state that the city must employ five police captains at all

times, the panel interpreted the language of the agreement in such a

manner, such an interpretation was not unreasonable, and the city’s

disagreement with the interpretation was not sufficient to establish that

the panel had exceeded its authority; moreover, the city could not prevail

on its claim that the award failed to draw its essence from the agreement

or that the panel was dispensing its own brand of industrial justice,

because the award referenced only the appendices of the agreement

that were referenced in the submission to arbitration and the panel’s

reference to the contractual requirement that the city fill vacancies

within a specified period of time underscored its good faith effort to

construe and apply the relevant terms of the agreement in the context

of the questions submitted to it.

2. The city could not prevail on its claim that, because the award was

inconsistent with the agreement, which explicitly stated that police

captains were not entitled to overtime pay, the panel exceeded its authority in fashioning the remedy: the agreement did not provide a remedy

for the violation at issue nor did it prohibit back pay and, therefore,

back pay was not inconsistent with the agreement; moreover, the agreement did not require a prevailing party who established that he or she

should have been promoted at an earlier date to return the salary,

including overtime pay, that he or she was previously paid for work

performed.

Argued December 1, 2021—officially released March 8, 2022

Procedural History

Application to vacate an arbitration award, brought

to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford,

where the matter was tried to the court, M. Taylor, J.;

judgment denying the application to vacate, from which

the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Alexandra D. Lombardi, deputy corporation counsel,

for the appellant (plaintiff).

Marshall T. Segar, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

CRADLE, J. The plaintiff, the city of Hartford (city),

appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying

its motion to vacate an arbitration award finding that

it violated its collective bargaining agreement (agreement) with the defendant, the Hartford Police Union

(union). On appeal, the city claims that the court erred

in concluding that the arbitration panel (panel) did not

exceed its authority in violation of General Statutes

§ 52-418 (a) (4) in (1) finding that the city violated the

agreement and (2) ordering retroactive pay as a remedy,

in addition to the overtime pay already received for

that same time period. We affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to the city’s claims on appeal. As of

March 3, 2017, there were five police captains employed

by the Hartford Police Department. Beginning on that

date those police captains began serially retiring over

the course of approximately fifteen months, until the

last of the five retired on June 15, 2018. All five of the

captain positions remained vacant until September 23,

2018, when they all were filled simultaneously.

On November 15, 2018, the union filed a grievance

alleging that, as of March 4, 2017, when the first of the

five captains retired, the number of captains fell below

the mandated number of captains required by Appendix

I of the agreement, which provides in relevant part:

‘‘[F]ive (5) Police Captains shall be appointed prior

to August 15, 1994 and the positions authorized for

Lieutenant shall be filled prior to January 1, 1995. These

positions shall not be decreased to allow for the

assigning of Deputy Chief.’’ The union also cited Appendix B of the agreement, which pertains to the compensation of members of the collective bargaining unit.

On April 17, 2019, the parties submitted the following

agreed upon issue for arbitration: ‘‘Did the city of Hartford violate Appendix I or Appendix B of the [agreement] when the number of captains fell below five (5)

effective March 4, 2017? If so, what shall the remedy

be?’’ The union claimed that the city violated the agreement by allowing the number of police captains to

decrease below five at any given time, and it sought

back pay and benefits for the employees who were

subsequently promoted to captain effective March 3,

2017. The city argued that the agreement did not require

that the number of police captains must be strictly

maintained at five and that the agreement did not provide for an award of back pay.

On December 5, 2019, the panel issued its award,

finding that the city violated the agreement by leaving

the captain vacancies open until September, 2018, and

awarding the employees who were appointed on September 23, 2018, ‘‘an amount that represents the differ-
ence between their individual rates of pay on March 3,

2017, and the rate of pay they received when appointed

captain for the period from March 3, 2017 to September

23, 2018, not including any overtime worked.’’

On January 3, 2020, the city filed an application to

vacate the arbitration award pursuant to § 52-418 (a)

(4) on the ground that the panel exceeded its powers

or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final

and definite award on the subject matter submitted was

not made.

By way of a written memorandum of decision filed

on August 7, 2020, the court denied the city’s application

to vacate the arbitration award. In rejecting the city’s

argument that the panel exceeded its powers or so

imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award on the subject matter submitted was not

made when it found that the city had violated the agreement, the court reasoned: ‘‘According to Appendix I

of the [agreement], in 1994, five of six police captain

positions were required to be filled and were not to be

reduced for the appointment of a deputy chief. Although

this language does not specifically state that these five

positions may not be decreased for any other reason,

or must be maintained, or that . . . any such vacancies

must be filled immediately, the decision of the panel

certainly does not manifest an egregious or patently

irrational application of the law.

‘‘Although the court disagrees that the plain meaning

of the contract language prohibits the delay of vacancy

appointments amongst the ranks of Hartford police captains, it is not an unreasonable interpretation of the

contract, taken as a whole. . . . Although the parties

have different interpretations of the language of Appendix I, and although its language may be seen as ambiguous, the court will not fault the panel for failing to seek

extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties in this

matter involving arbitration.’’ (Citation omitted.)

As to the city’s claim regarding the remedy awarded

by the panel, the court explained: ‘‘The same analysis

holds true for the remedy imposed by the panel. The

[agreement] provides no remedy for a violation of the

contract, as determined by the panel. Although retroactive pay does not appear to be provided for any purpose

in Appendix B, it is not prohibited. Although the panel’s

decision reflects anguish over the elusiveness of an

accurate and appropriate measure of damages for a

perceived violation of the [agreement], imposing no

remedy for a violation of the [agreement] would provide

no real consequence or incentive to ensure future compliance.

‘‘Without a remedy, the city would be free to avoid

its responsibilities under the contract, as determined

by the panel. Under the facts presented, the city was

not required to pay police captains wages to five individ-
uals for approximately three, four, fifteen, seventeen

and eighteen months, apparently saving the city just

less than a year’s worth of wages, on average, for five

highly compensated professionals. Instead, pursuant to

the decision of the panel, five lieutenants must be retroactively paid the difference between lieutenants’ and

police captains’ salaries for a period of approximately

eighteen months. It is unknown whether these payments represent an accurate and actual loss to each of

these individuals, had they been selected to fill individual vacancies as they occurred; however, it is neither

irrational to provide a measured remedy for a violation

of the [agreement], nor is the panel’s award unduly

punitive in light of the city’s apparent savings, resulting

from its failure to timely fill these higher salaried positions. Aside from these practical considerations,

importantly, the remedy is not inconsistent with any

specific prohibition on arbitration within the [agreement] in this unrestricted submission to arbitration.’’

On the basis of the foregoing, the court denied the city’s

application to vacate the arbitration award. This appeal

followed.

On appeal, the city claims that the trial court incorrectly denied its application to vacate the award pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (4) because the panel ‘‘exceeded [its]

powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,

final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.’’ The city challenges the court’s

denial to vacate the arbitration award both as to the

violation of the agreement and the remedy.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of

review. ‘‘The propriety of arbitration awards often turns

on the unique standard of review and legal principles

applied to decisions rendered in this forum. [Thus, judicial] review of arbitral decisions is narrowly confined.

. . . Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling

private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of

alternative dispute resolution. . . . Parties to an arbitration may make a restricted or an unrestricted submission.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of

Education v. New Milford Education Assn., 331 Conn.

524, 531, 205 A.3d 552 (2019).

Here, the court correctly concluded, and the parties

do not dispute, that the submission to the panel was

unrestricted.1

‘‘[U]nder an unrestricted submission, the

[panel’s] decision is considered final and binding; thus

the courts will not review the evidence considered by

the [panel] nor will they review the award for errors

of law or fact. . . . Even in the case of an unrestricted

submission, however, a reviewing court will vacate an

award when an [arbitration panel] has exceeded the

power granted to [it] by the parties’ submission. . . .

[A] claim that [an arbitration panel has] exceeded [its]
powers may be established under § 52-418 in either one

of two ways: (1) the award fails to conform to the

submission, or, in other words, falls outside the scope

of the submission; or (2) the [panel] manifestly disregarded the law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 531–32.

‘‘In considering whether the [panel] exceeded [its]

powers on that basis, a reviewing court’s inquiry is

limited to a comparison of the award to the submission.

. . . [A] court cannot base the decision [regarding

whether the panel has exceeded its authority] on

whether the court would have ordered the same relief,

or whether or not the [panel] correctly interpreted the

contract. The court must instead focus on whether the

[panel] had authority to reach a certain issue, not

whether that issue was correctly decided. . . .

Because the [panel] is required to consider the submission in light of the parties’ agreement, the [panel’s]

award . . . must draw its essence from the contract

and cannot simply reflect the [panel’s] own notions of

industrial justice. But as long as the [panel] is even

arguably construing or applying the contract and acting

within the scope of [its] authority, that a court is convinced [it] committed serious error does not suffice to

overturn [its] decision. . . . [E]very reasonable presumption and intendment will be made in favor of the

award and of the [panel’s] acts and proceedings. Hence,

the burden rests on the party challenging the award to

produce evidence sufficient to show that it does not

conform to the submission.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663 v. Dept. of Children &

Families, 317 Conn. 238, 252–53, 117 A.3d 470 (2015).

‘‘[I]n determining whether the arbitration award draws

its essence from the collective bargaining agreement,

the reviewing court is limited to considering whether

the collective bargaining agreement, rather than some

outside source, is the foundation on which the arbitral

decision rests. . . . If that criterion is satisfied . . .

then [the court] cannot conclude that the [panel]

exceeded [its] authority or imperfectly executed [its]

duty. . . . Ultimately, [n]either a misapplication of

principles of contractual interpretation nor an erroneous interpretation of the agreement in question constitutes grounds for vacatur. . . . It is not [the court’s]

role to determine whether the [panel’s] interpretation

of the collective bargaining agreement was correct. It

is enough to uphold the judgment of the court, denying

the . . . application to vacate the award, that such

interpretation was a good faith effort to interpret the

terms of the collective bargaining agreement.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1303-325 v. Westbrook, 309

Conn. 767, 780, 75 A.3d 1 (2013).

In interpreting an agreement, a panel ‘‘may of course
look for guidance from many sources, yet [its] award

is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from

the collective bargaining agreement. . . . If, for example, there was evidence that revealed that [the panel]

had reached [its] decision by consulting a ouija board,

[it would] not suffice that the award conformed to the

submission. . . . It must be emphasized, however, that

merely claiming inconsistency between the agreement

and the award will not trigger judicial examination of

the merits of the arbitration award. Rather, in the face

of such a claimed inconsistency, this court will review

the award only to determine whether it draws its

essence from the collective bargaining agreement. . . .

We will not, however, employ a broader standard of

review simply as an alternative means for determining

whether the [panel] correctly decided the issues that

were submitted to arbitration. . . .

‘‘Finally, we previously have stated that [m]erely

because an arbitral decision is not based on the express

terms of a collective bargaining agreement does not

mean that it is not properly derived from the agreement.

An [arbitration panel] is entitled to take cognizance of

contract principles and draw on them for guidance in

construing an agreement.’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Burr Road Operating Co.

II, LLC v. New England Health Care Employees Union,

District 1199, 162 Conn. App. 525, 538, 131 A.3d 1238

(2016). With these principles in mind, we turn to the

city’s claims on appeal.

I

The city first claims that the trial court improperly

concluded that the panel did not err in finding that it

violated the agreement. We disagree.

The city’s challenge to the panel’s determination that

it violated the agreement is twofold. First, the city

argues that ‘‘[t]he award at issue here was rendered in

excess of the [panel’s] authority in violation of § 52-418

(a) (4) because it is inherently inconsistent with the

agreement and fails to draw its essence [from the agreement], as evidenced by the panel’s own admission in

its memorandum that ‘nothing in the agreement states

that the city must ‘‘maintain’’ five (5) captains, as stated

by the union.’ ’’ The city contends that, ‘‘[b]ecause the

panel was unable to cite to a provision of the agreement

that ‘clearly’ required the city to have five captains and

admitted that the agreement contained no requirement

to maintain five captains, but nonetheless found the city

in violation of the agreement for allowing the number

of captains to fall below five, one can only conclude

that the panel disregarded its obligation to render an

award that draws its essence from the agreement.’’

Although the city accurately asserts that the agreement

does not explicitly state that there must be five captains

employed by the Hartford Police Department at all

times, the panel interpreted the language of the agree-
ment requiring the city to hire five captains to mean

that the city must maintain five captains at all times.

We agree with the trial court that the panel’s interpretation of the agreement was not unreasonable. The city’s

argument in this regard simply reflects its disagreement

with the panel’s interpretation of the agreement. It is

well settled, however, that ‘‘[a] mere difference of opinion as to the construction of the [agreement] does not

establish that the [panel] exceeded [its] authority

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) AFSCME,

Council 4, Local 1303-325 v. Westbrook, supra, 309

Conn. 784.

The city also argues that the panel’s award did not

conform to the parties’ submission. In support of this

argument, the city cites the panel’s statement that

‘‘ ‘[t]he chief of police should be held responsible for

maintaining a promotional list and discuss retirement

with current captains, in order to prevent the vacancies

that occurred in this case.’ ’’ The city contends that

this statement by the panel demonstrates that it went

beyond the scope of the submission, which was confined to claimed violations of Appendices B and I of the

agreement and, instead, found a violation of Appendix

F of the agreement. Because the panel’s decision does

not reference Appendix F, the city’s argument is

unfounded. Although the panel may have considered

Appendix F, or any other sections of the agreement in

interpreting Appendices B and I, which the city

acknowledges it was entitled to do, the award’s express

reference to only Appendices B and I of the agreement

underscore the focus of the panel’s award. Moreover,

the panel’s reference to the contractual requirement

that the city fill vacancies within a specified period of

time underscores its good faith effort to construe and

apply relevant terms of the agreement in the context

of the questions submitted to it. We therefore disagree

with the city’s claims that the award failed to draw

its essence from the agreement or that the panel was

dispensing its own brand of industrial justice. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly rejected

the city’s claim that the panel exceeded its authority

in violation of § 52-418 (a) (4).

II

The city also challenges the remedy awarded by the

panel. As stated herein, the panel’s award provided that

the five newly promoted captains receive ‘‘an amount

that represents the difference between their individual

rates of pay on March 3, 2017, and the rate of pay they

received when appointed captain for the period from

March 3, 2017 to September 23, 2018, not including

any overtime worked.’’ The city argues that the panel

exceeded its authority because the award was ‘‘inconsistent with the agreement, which explicitly states that

captains are not entitled to overtime pay.’’ We disagree.

In support of this argument, the city cites § 4.2 (A) of
the agreement, which provides in relevant part: ‘‘Police

Captains shall . . . receive five percent . . . of the

base rate of their class in lieu of all overtime pay . . . .’’

Therefore, the city correctly states that police captains

are not entitled to overtime pay.

In considering the remedy for the city’s violation of

the agreement, the panel noted: ‘‘[T]here is nothing in

the agreement that provides [for] a remedy [for the

violation in this case].’’ The panel reasoned: ‘‘It is impossible to request back pay for those who would have

taken the position and the exact number of hours they

would have worked if they were captain, as opposed

to lieutenant. These discrepancies make it difficult to

make a determination as to what the remedy should be.’’

In rejecting the city’s claim that the panel exceeded

its authority in fashioning its remedy, the court agreed

with the panel that the agreement provided no remedy

for the violation at issue but that back pay was not

prohibited by the agreement and, therefore, was not

inconsistent with it. We agree. There is nothing in the

agreement prohibiting the award of back pay in the

event of a contractual violation; nor is there a provision

in the agreement requiring a prevailing party who establishes that he or she should have been promoted at an

earlier date to return the salary that he or she was paid

for work performed. The submission also was silent

as to the potential remedies available for the panel’s

consideration. To the extent that the newly promoted

captains were permitted to maintain the compensation

they received for overtime hours that they worked during the time period at issue, we cannot conclude that

panel exceeded its authority in not ordering otherwise.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

‘‘ ‘A submission is deemed restricted only if the agreement contains

express language restricting the breadth of issues, reserving explicit rights,

or conditioning the award on court review.’ ’’ Board of Education v. New

Milford Education Assn., supra, 331 Conn. 531.