No. 2—09—0747 Opin ion f il ed Apri l 11, 2011

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPL

E OF TH E STATE ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court OF ILLINOIS, ) o f D u P ag e C o un t y. ) Plai ntif f-A ppelle e, ) ) v. ) No. 08—CF—2844 ) DAVID D. BURTON, ) Ho no r ab le ) Bla nc he Hill F aw ell, De f en da n t-A pp el l an t. ) Judge, Presi din g.

______________________________________________________________________________ PRE SI DI NG J US TI CE JOR GE NS EN deliver ed t he judg ment o f the co ur t , w ith o pinion. Jus t ices Mc Lar en and Bur ke c onc ur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion. OPINI ON On June 3, 2009, af

ter a benc h t rial, d efenda nt , D avid D. Bur t on, was f ound guil ty of un la wful posse ssi on of a wea pon b y a f elon (72 0 ILC S 5/24

—1.1(a ), (e) (West 2008)), unlawf ul pos se ss i on of fi rearm am mun ition by a fel on (720 ILCS 5/24—1.1(a), (e) (We st 2008 )), poss ess i on of a f i rearm withouta fi

rear m-owner’s ide

ntif ic ation (FOID) card (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1), 14(c)(3) (We st 2008 )), and be i ng a n a rmed hab itual

cr i m i na l (72 0 IL CS 5/2 4—1 .7( a)( 3) (W es t 200 8)) . Pri or to trial , on Ap r il 15, 2009, t he trial

court deni

ed defe ndan t’s motion to quash h

is arres t and t o s upp re ss t he
we ap ont ha t fo rmed t he ba sis o f t he ch ar ge s. On ap pe al, de fen da nt ar gu es t ha t t he co ur t er r ed in denying hi

s m oti on to suppress, because t he r e w as no va lid c o nse nt fo rt he wa rr an t les s s ea r ch o f his
co at po ck et . Fo rt he fo llo win g r ea so ns, we affir m.No. 2—09—0747

-2- I. BACKG

ROUND A. Mot ion to Su ppress The evi dence at the he ari ng on d ef en da nt’ s m oti on to suppress reve al ed that, o n October 14, 2008 , defen

dant resi ded at a Carol Stream apartm ent wi th hi s gi rlf rien d of seven y

ears, Candace Garlan d, an d her two ch

i l dre n, mothe r, a nd threesi bl i ng s. D ef en da nt res i de d a

t the ap artm en t f or ap pr o ximat ely

ni ne m onths (from

Februar y 2008 unt il hi

s ar re st on O ct obe r 1 4, 200 8) . T he apa rt ment contains a f

ront li vi ng space, a ki

tchen, two bedroo ms , and a b ath room . At one tim

e, defend ant and Garl

and sh ared the back bedroom. Both agreed, however, that, as of Octo ber 14, 2008, Garland di

d not sh arethe ba ck be droom wi th de f endan t, i.e. , de f en da nt wasthe

onl y pers on to use t he bed ro om. The bedr oo m cont ains a clo set wit h t wo do or s su ch t hat t he clo set may be accessed from the bedroom and the

bathroom. In the cl

oset is a stacked wash

in g ma chi ne an d dryer t hat t he ap ar t ment’ s o ccu pant s us e. Gar land ke pt so me clot hingand o t her items in t he clos et next to t he wa shin g ma ch in e and close r t o t he bat hro om, and d efenda nt kep t all of his clot hes o n t he opp osi te cl oset wall , closer

to t he be dr o o m an d s ep ar at e fr o m Ga r lan d’ s be lo ng ing s. Ga r lan d’ s na me i s on th e l ea se to th e a pa rtm en t; de f en da n t’s n am e is n ot. On October 14, 2008, at 8:44 p.m ., a radi o di spa tch a l erted C arol

Stream pol i ce of f i cers Jo hn Bu ch o lzand Peter Spizzi rri to a possib le

domesti c i

nci dent at the apartment. At 8:46 p.m ., t he off i cers ar rived at t he ap ar t ment. Gar land ans wer ed t he do or and inv ited the off ic ers i nsi de. Defend ant wa s int he bac k bed ro om, but walke d t o t he fro nt ar ea o f the apa rt ment af ter the of f i cers entered. Acco rd ing t o d efenda nt , he was on his cel l ph one at the tim

e, aski ng hi s m ot her to send over
a t ru ck s o t hat he co uld t ake his belong ings, including his fur nitu re , a nd l eav e the apartm en t. Spizzi rri confi rmed that he h

eard defe ndan t o n hi s cel l ph one m aki ng arrangem

ents to leave the res ide

nce.No. 2—09—0747

-3-

The off ic ers i nf ormed Garland that poli

ce had r ece ived a c all from her bro t her and si ster about
a domesti c di sturbance. While t he r e w as , ap pa r en t ly, an ea rlier d isagr eement bet wee n defend ant and Garland’s si ster, b oth

Ga rlan d a n d def en da n t den i ed th at i t wa s a ph y si ca l al terca ti on . Acc ordi

n g to t he off ic ers, there were no apparent phy si cal in juri es to ei th er pa rty an d th e a pa rtm en t con ten ts were undi sturbed

( i.e. , no furniture knocked o ver or o ther evidence of a f igh t). Nevertheless , to ma

ke further i nq ui ri es , Bu ch olz w al ke d w i th Garl an d tow ar d t he kit chen w hile Spizzir ri and defend ant remai ned in t he fr o nt r o o m. At 8:49 p.m. (three m i nute s af ter thei r arri va l), whi l e the

off i cers were se pa r at ely spe aking w ith G ar land and defend ant , t he di spa tche r an noun ced to the off i cers that the re was sen s i ti v e i n f orm ati on f or th em an d, a t 8: 52 p.m

., th e d i sp atch er i n f orm ed th e of f i cersth at, acc or ding to Ga

rlan d’ s b roth er and s i ste r, def

en da n t ke pt a gu n an d d ru gsi n th e a pa rtm en t, spe ci f i cal l y , i n a closet/laun

dry r o o m o ff o f o ne o f t he be dr o o ms a nd in an at t ic acc ess p anel in the
ce i l i n g of th at c l ose

t. At that t im

e, Buchol z wal ked Garla nd toward t he b edroo m a

nd ex pla in ed that t her e might be
a gu n a nd dr ug s in t he clo se t . Ga r lan d a pp ea r ed su r pr ise d a nd “alit t le ups et ” and po inted ou t t he cl oset to Buchol

z. Accordin

g to Buchol

z, Garlan d to ld h im to “go ahead a

nd s earch.”

The reaf ter, Gar land signed a c on se n t-to- se arch

f orm au th ori zi n g th e of f i cersto search the “apartment.” Af ter Ga rlan d s i gned the f orm, Bu ch olz l ef t he r i n th e b ed room an d w al ke d to the f

ron t room t o g ive the form to Spizzirri , to giv

e to defendan

t. Bucholz then

returned to the bedroom; h e was not pr ese nt when Sp izz irr i as ke d d efe nd an t t o sig n t he fo rm. Ga r lan d t es t ified t ha t she co uld hear onl y pa rts of t he conv ersa tion and he ard

de f en da nt s ay tha t he wa s n ot going t o sign the for m, because Gar land’s si gn atu rewa s a l re ad y on i t.No. 2—09—0747

-4-

Acco rd ingto Spizzirri , after recei vi ng the radio t ransm

is si on ab out a po ssible wea po n and drugs, he, fo r saf

ety reasons, patted down defen dant and i nstructed hi

m to si t at t he ki tchen tabl e. Bu ch o lzan

d G arl an d w al ke d to t he be dr o o m; B uc ho lz ulti ma tely returned with a cons ent-to -search f orm that he an

d Garl and ha d al ready si gne d. Buc

hol z gav e Spi zzi rri the f orm, a nd Sp izz irr i t o ld defend ant about the dispatch informat ion co ncer ning dr ugs and wea po ns. S pizzir ri ask ed d efenda nt to sig n t he fo rm, and “[def endan t said] y ou can search . Go ahead and sea rch. He sai

d, I wil l n ot sign t he form because I’m not on t he lease. I do n’tsee as t o why I wo uld have to sign that for m i f I’m not on t he lea se . ” S piz zir r i su mmar ize d t ha t , wh ile defend ant re fused t o s ign t he co nsent for m, he di d n ot re f us e c on se n t to s ea rc h th e a pa rtm en t:

“ Q. You al so ask ed f or c on se n t to s ea rc h th e a pa rtm en t? A. Yes. Q. And h e refus ed? A . N o, he d

i d n ot. Q. He ga v e y ou c on se n t? A. He sa id, go ah ea d a nd se ar ch t he ap ar t men t , bu t I willnot sign the form because I’m not on the leas e.” Defe ndan t t estif ie d that, as of the tim

e of the suppress ion h

earin g, he had b een conv

icted of
seven fel onie s in nine years a nd, t her efo re , he unde rst ands his right s. Whe n Sp izzirr i aske d de fendant to sig n t he co nse nt fo rm, “I r efu se d” an d “ t o ld h im no
. I t o ld him it wa sn ’t my ap ar t men t , r ea lly, and he say s l ike , Miss Ga rland signed t he lease . I said, ok ay. S o, why do you ne ed me t o s ign t hi s? ” Defend ant furt her explained t hat he did no t sign t he co nsent for m becau se “I just didn’t want to sign i t.” He t es t ified t ha t , in

res pon se to Spi zz i rri ’s ve rb al req ue st f orperm i ss i on to s ea rc h th e a pa rtm en t,No. 2—09—0747

-5-

“I t o ld h im

no.” Defen

dant agreed that he told Spiz zi rri that he (def endan t) “had no ne ed” to sign th e c on se n t f orm , b ec au se Ga rlan d w as on th e l ea se an d h ad al re ad y si gn ed i t. Af ter b ri n gi n g th e c on se n t f orm to defen dant, Bucholz

returnedto the bedroom and b egan sea rc hingthe c l oset. According to Bucholz, Garl and told hi

m that both sh

e and def endan t kept personal items in t he clo set . H e beg an his sea rc h wit h t he at t ic acc ess in t he clo set , w her e he fo und drug-related

i tem s, i n cl udi n g s poon s wi th wh i te resi due on them

and a “ Pyrex cup that had b een used to cook dr ugs i

n.” Spi zzi ri l eft def endan t in the f ront ro om an

d joi ned Buc ho lz in the s ear ch. Spi zzi rri l oca ted th e g un i n a l arge , m en ’s coa t th at w as

h an gi n g i n th e c l ose st. The coat al so contain ed defendant’s birt h cer t ifi

cat e and an I RS d oc ument wit h defend ant ’s name o n it. Defend ant was sub sequentl

y a rrested. Af ter hearin g closin g arguments, t he t rial co ur t denied defend ant ’s mot ion t o s upp re ss. The courtfo un d t ha t Ga r lan d c lea r ly co nse nt ed t o a s ea r ch o f t he en t ire ap ar t men t , bu t t ha t t he St at e d id not meet its bu rd en o f est ablishing tha t defend ant co nsent ed t o t he se ar ch. Nevertheless, the c ourt concl uded, Ga rlan d h ad th e a uth ori ty to co n se n t to a s ea rc h of b oth thebe droo m a

nd the cl oset because i t was a co mm

on area t o which sh

e had access. Defend ant moved

the c ourt to reconsi

der. At o ra l arg ument on t he mot ion t o r eco nsider , t he courtdis agreed

with de fen

dant that he “ex

pressl y ref used co nsent .” The co ur t summarize d t hat t he t est imony at the suppressi on heari

ng i ncl uded Spiz zi rri’s positi on that de fen da nt t o ld the off ic ers that they co uld g o a head and search, b ut t hat he would not sign

the consent f

orm. Wh il e defe ndan t had testifi ed that he nei

ther gave verbal

consent to t he search

nor signed t he wr itt en co nsent t o s ear ch, t he court f

ound l acki ng a n “ ex pres s ref usa l of c onse nt” to se arch

or a “c l ear a

nd une q uiv

ocal objec t ion” t o t he se ar ch. The court further cl arif ie d that it did not f

i n d th e te sti mon y to re f l ect th at,No. 2—09—0747

1 Pr io rt o t r ial, the

State nol -pross ed the ch arg esrel ate d to pos se ss i on of

dr ug pa r ap he rna lia -6- wh ene xp r es sly a sk ed fo rco nse nt , de fen da nt sa id “ no . ” I nst ea d, t he co ur t ex pla ine d t ha t , wh ile it fou nd th at th e S tate di d n ot me et its burden

on consent, i

t had not made spec if

ic fi ndi ngs on wh

at defend ant di

d or di d n ot s ay. “He

may b e d i dn ’t c on se

n t, buthe didn’t object. And I t hi nk this case [ Georgia v. Randolph , 547 U .S. 103 (2 006)] re qui res a clear a nd u ne qui voca l obj ection.” B. Trial As r ele va nt t o t his a pp ea l, the trial testim ony l argely mi rrored t he ev

ide nce pr ese nt ed a t t he
su ppr es si on heari ng. Gar land r eite ra t ed t hat , w hile bot h she an d def en da n t sto re d i tem s i n th e c l ose t, t he ir it ems we r e s ep ar at e a nd in d iffer en t pa r t s o f t he clo se t . De fen da nt ke pt a fe w c o at s inth e c l ose t; he wa s t he o nly p er so n t o we ar t he co at s— he did no t let an yo ne els e b o rr o w t he m. Garland’s brother , C or ey Kirkendoll, age 13, test if ie d that he was not all

owed to to uch defendant’s thi

ng s or bor row hi s clot hes. Nev

ertheles s, when

asked whe

ther he wasev

er told n ot to to uch defen dant’s thi ngs, Corey

responded “n

o.” Cor ey

cl arif ie d that he had accesst o t he clo set and did his ow n laundr y, but t hat he did no t t ou ch de fendant ’s belo ngings w hen he u sed t he wa sher and dry er. Bu ch o lztestifi

ed that, when he told Ga

rlan d that dispatch i

nf ormed him that t her e might be guns and d ru gs in t he ap ar t ment, “she wa s up set . S he wa s—s he had a su rp rised loo k o n her face a nd just see med ge nuinely upse t t hat t hat st uff mi ght be i n he r apartment.” Bef

ore Bucholz asked

her, Gar land im me d ia tely to ld h i m to search a

nd d i rected hi m to the cl oset wi th the washer and dry

er. Bu ch o lzfurt her t est ifi

ed t hat t he first ar ea he sea rc hed in t he clo se t wa s t he at t ic acc ess, wher e he fou nd a Pyrex gl

ass meas urin g cup and spoon wi

th whi te residue on them

, as well as a copper sc rub bing mat er ial. 1 Nex

t, Spizzi rri cam e i n a nd b egan sea rch i ng th e cl oset; Buch

olz saw Spi zzi rriNo. 2—09—0747

and, aft er t rial, t he cou

rt f oun d def en da n t n ot gu i l ty of unl awful possessi on of a controlled substance. -7- search a coat and fi

nd a l oaded handgun . Accordin g to Buchol

z, “i t was obvious t hat it wa s a man’s j acke t.” Buch ol z te sti f i ed th at, befo re beginning t he se ar ch, he r ece ived fo rmal co nsent fro m Gar land to s ea rc h th e a pa rtm en t an d S pi zz i rri re ce i v ed v er b al con se n t f rom de f en da n t. Spi zzi rri confi rmed that, when

he en tered t he cl

oset, Bucholz had

jus t comple ted pull in g down it ems from

the overhead attic acce ss area. Spi zzi rri then began going through “

ma le cl ot hi ng” hanging just pas t t he do or leading int o t he clo set fro m the be droom. He se arch ed i n si de th e p ock ets of a l arge m en ’scoat an

d located a

ha ndg un. Accordin

g to Spizzirri , approxim

ately 10 to 15 mi

nutes pas sed fro m the t ime the o ffi cer s ent er ed t he ap ar t ment t o lo cat ing t he we apo n. In cl osi n g a rgum en t, p re su mab l y to di sputeown

ers hi p of the weapon, defe

nse couns el

noted th at, even if

the coat wa s ob

v i ous l y a m an ’s coa t, that “doe sn ’t n

ec es sa ri l y mea n a m an we ar s i t. Co at s— es pe cia ll

y winter coats can be worn b y a ny body.” Couns el

further argued that, although Corey t es t ified t ha t he did not t ouchdefen dant’s thi ngs, “ in this household I thin

k it would h

ave b een impo ss ible no t t o t o uc h o t he rpe o ple ’s t hing s. ” H e n o t ed t ha t , wh ile d efe nd an t migh t ha ve ha d s o me priv acy in the bedroom and i

n the b athroo m, the apartm ent was “a

me ss,” there were onl

y two closets, t hings we re st or ed e ver ywhere , a nd eve ryo ne used and ac cessed the cl oset. He repr esented, “[t]hat closet

was by no mea

ns a p l ac e that [d

ef en da nt] exerc i se d e xc l

us i ve pos se ss i on a

nd con trol
over. Ev er

yon e h ad ac ce ss to i t.”In addi ti on, co unsel argued t hat no thing about defendant’s beha vior in

the apartmen

t suggested that he was tryi ng to hide a

ny thin g from police. Counsel conceded, “wh

en he ult imat ely w as as ke d if t he y co uld se ar ch , he sa id yes. H e di

dn’ t sign th

e f orm[ ,] buthe said y

es. T hat’s t he officer’s testim ony.” Co un se l lat er ag ain co nc ed ed t ha t de fen da nt “sa id go ahead a

nd s earch. H e di

dn’ t sign f

or it, b ut he verba l l y gave con sen

t.”No. 2—09—0747

-8-

The tria l courtco nvict ed de fend ant o f unla wfu l po ss es sio n o f a weapon by

a fel on, unlawful pos se ss i on

of f i rearm am m uni tion by a f elon, poss ess i on of

a f i rearm wi thout a F OID car d, and be ing
an armed h abi tualcri m i n al . Th e c our t f oun d th at th e g un b el onge d to def

en da n t, noting that the gun
was fo und i

n a m an’s coat along wi

th an IRS letter to defen

dant and that, according to Garland’ s t es t imo ny, the coat belonged to defen dant and h

e was the on

l y pers on wh

o wore i t. (The cou rt also noted that i

t had obse rve d Garl and asbe i ng a sm al l woman .) T he co ur t se nt en ce d d efe nd an t t o six ye ars’ i mprisonm ent on each

co un t , t he t er ms to run concurrentl y (an d la ter amende d the sentence
on one conv i cti on to fi

ve years ). Defend ant move d

t he co ur t t o r ec o nsid er , r ea ss er t ing his ar gu men t t ha t t he ev ide nc e s ho uld have been s upp re ssed due t o a n unlawfu l sear ch. The co ur t denied defend ant ’s mot ion. Defend ant appeals. II. AN AL YSIS The sole issue on appeal

is whether the trial

court properly

denie d defendant’s moti on to suppress. Defe

ndan t argues that r eversal i

s warranted for two reasons: (1 ) G arl an d l acke d a uth ori ty to consent to a search o f d ef en da nt ’s co at po ck et ; a nd ( 2) r eg ar dl es s o f G ar lan d’ s a ut ho r it y, defend ant ex pr es sly

re fused co nsent to the

se arc h. W he n r ev i ew i ng a tri al cou rt’ s r ul i ng on a moti on to su ppr es s, we def

er to th e tri al cou rt’ s f i nd i ng s of fact , r ever sing t hem only if they ar e ag ainst t he
man if est weight of t he evi

dence, b ut review de novo the

cou rt’ s ul ti matede term

i na ti on of whether
su ppr es si on is warra nted
. People v. McDonough , 239 Ill . 2d 260, 265-66 (2010). On appeal, we r ema in free to co nsider not only

the reco rd at the suppression hearin g, but also the trial

evi dence (see People v. Caball ero , 10 2 Ill. 2d 23, 34- 36 ( 198 4); People v. Robinson , 39 1 I ll. Ap p. 3d 822, 830 (2009 )), an

d to draw our own

conc l usi ons f rom th e ev i den ce. McDonough , 239 Ill . 2d at 266.No. 2—09—0747

2 Ac t ua lly, the Stat e asserts that defen dant “wai ved” the argum

ent, but the S tateconfus es wai ver, a vol untary rel in quis hm ent of a known ri

ght, with f

orfei ture, t he f ai lure to raise a

n i ssue that
co uld have been

rais ed and, theref

ore, is barred. See People v. Tomczak , 395 Ill . App. 3d 877, 879 (2009 ). -9- A. Garland’s

Authority

to Consent to Search Defend ant argues f

irst thatGa

rlan d l acke d th e a uth ori ty to consent to a warrantless se arch of his coat pocket. Prel i

m i nari l y , however, we m

ust addres s the St ate’s ar gument t hat defend ant forfe ited thi s a rgu men t by not rais in g it bel ow. 2 Speci fi

cally , the Stat e argues th at, i

n h i s m oti on to suppress, de f

en da nt a rgued onl y gene ral l y tha t the re wasno c on se nt to sea rc h t he clo set and be dr o o m. Defe

ndan t did not argue that his

coat po cket was a c l ose d c onta i ne r b ey ond the sc opeof th i rd -p ar ty cons en t. Moreover, t he State adds, defen dant at t r ial d id n o t ar gu e t ha t Ga r lan d c o uld not co nse nt t o a s ea r ch o f his co at be ca us e it was a cl osed container. Rather, def endan t’s theory at trial was onl y th at th e c on tra b an d w as n ot hi s. In

de ed , a s to con

se n t, the S tate

notes, defen se counsel at t rial co nced ed in his clo sing ar gument t hat defend ant ver bally conse nt ed t o t he se ar ch. Thus, t he Sta te a rgue s, we sh oul d n ot co n si der d ef en da n t’s cl ose d- con tai n er argu men t. W e do not a

gre e that th

i s iss uei s f orf ei ted . W hi l e i t i s tru e that, i n th e m oti on to suppress, defend ant general

ly argued la

ck of val id c o nse nt as it pertai

ne d to the c l oset, as

oppos ed to, sp ec ific ally, his co at po cke t , d efenda nt ’s co nsist ent ar gument bel ow was that his

righ ts were violated when po lice ex ec ut ed a w ar r an t les s s ea r ch wit ho ut va lid consent th

ere to: this was his argum

ent at t he suppression stage; he objected at t rial to test im ony regarding the search on the basi s that his
m oti on t o su pp r es s w as imp r o pe r ly d enied; and, finall y, he a rg ued in his pos t t rial mot ion t hat t he
m oti on to suppress had b een i

mproperl y de nied. Accordin

gly , although def

endan t’s argumen

t t hatNo. 2—09—0747

-10-

Gar land lac ke d a ut ho r it y t o co nsent to the search of hi s coat pocket is m ore specific than those
argu men ts rais ed bel

ow, it still touches on the l ack of va li d consent f

or a warrantless se arch an d we declin e to fin d it f orfei ted. The Uni ted St ates and Illi

nois Constitutions protect ind ividua ls fr o m un r ea so na ble searches and, ge ne r ally, search

es wi thout a warrant are pre sum ptiv el y unreasonab l e. U.S. Const., amend. IV; I ll. Co nst. 197 0, a rt . I , §6 ; Illinois v. Rodriguez , 4 97 U .S . 1 77, 181 (1 990 ). An exce pt ion t o t he
war ra nt re qui

re men t ex i sts where l aw en f orce men t of f i cers obta i n c ons en t to the se arc h f rom ei ther t he pers on

wh ose pr operty is bei ng search ed o rfr o m a t hir d p ar t y wh o po ss es se s “ co mmo n a ut ho r it y”
over t he prem i ses . United States v. Matlock, 415 U. S. 164 , 1 71 ( 197 4) . C ons ent is det er mined by whether a rea sona

bl e pers on woul

d ha ve und erstood—b

y an i ndi vi dual ’swords, acts , or conduct—that consent had be en gran ted. See , e.g. , Florida v. Jimeno , 500 U .S. 248, 2 51 (19 91). Com m on aut hor ity re st s “o n mut ual us e o f the pr op er t y by per so ns ge ner ally havi

ng jo intac ce ss

or con trol for m ost purpo ses” such

that each assum

es t he r isk t hat t he o t her may permit t he com mon area to be search

ed. Matlock , 415 U.S. at 1 71 n .7; se e al so People v. Stacey , 58 Ill . 2d 83, 89 (1974) (a do pt ingin

Ill in ois Matlock ’s

com mon -a uth ori ty t es t in t hird- par t y-co nsent cas es) . T her efo re , t he
au th ori ty just ify ing t hird- par t y cons ent is

based n ot on the la

w of property but, rather, o n the i dea that mutual use of the prope r t y by pe r so ns h av ing jo int ac ce ss o rco nt r o l fo rmo st pu r po se s ma ke s it
r ea so na ble to recogn

ize that each m

ay, i n h i s or h er own

ri ght, pe rm i t the i ns pecti on. People

v. Bull , 185 I ll. 2d 17 9, 19 7 ( 19 98 )
. T he S t at e b ea r s t he bu r de n o f e st ab lish ing co mmo n a ut ho r it y. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. at 181. Com mon aut ho r it y m ay be eit her act ual o r a ppa re nt . I n ot her wo rd s, u nder t he “ap par ent aut ho r it y” doctr in

e, a warrantles s search

does not violate the fourth amen dme nt where the poli

ceNo. 2—09—0747

-11-

re ceive consent f

rom a thi rd party whom

the police reasonably believe pos se ss escom mon au t ho r it y, butwh o, i n f act, does n

ot. Id. at 187-8 8. The rea son ab l en es s stan da rd i s ob j ecti v e: wou l d th e f acts avai la ble to t he off

ic er cause a

re aso nable pe rso n t o be lieveth at th e c on se n ti n g p ar ty h ad au th ori ty over t he pr emises? If so , t he se ar ch i s v al i d. I d. at 188-89. If

not, however, an

of f i cer m ay not blin d ly ac ce pt a p er so n’s co nse nt t o se ar ch , an d a wa rr an t les s s ea r ch wit ho ut fur t he rinq uir y is
un law ful. Id. Agai

n, the St ate bears the b ur de n o f pr o ving t ha t t he o ffice r s w er e o bje ct ive ly
r ea so na ble i

n th ei r b el i ef th at th e c on se n ti n g p er son h ad th e a uth ori ty to cons en

t. People v. James , 163 Il l . 2d 302 , 317 (1 994). Here, defen

dant does not dispute that Garlan d pos se ss ed

ac tual au thor i ty to con sent to a search of t he clo set . I ndee d, defend ant conceded at the scene tha t it was not hi s apartmen

t and that t he of f i cersdi d n ot need hi s si

gnature on the consent f

orm beca use Garland, the leasehol der, had al ready si gne d i t. Furt her, it is undisput ed t hat Ga rland (and all of the apar tment’s occupants) had
access to th e c l ose

t an d th at G arl an d kep t pers on al

b el ongi n gsth erei n . D ef en da n t d oes disp ute, however, that Ga

rlan d had ac tua l or ap pa ren t au thor i ty to j us ti f y the wa rra ntl es s s ea rch of hi s “cl osed contai ner,” i .e . , his c o at po ck et . Wit h r es pe ct t o ac t ua l au t ho r it y, h e a ss er t s t ha t t he ev ide nc e is undi sputedtha

t the coa t wa s h i s a nd tha t he wa s th e on l y pers on to wear i t. Fur th er , w i th re sp ect to app ar ent authority, he

argues that the police coul d not have r easonabl y b elie ved that Garla

nd ha d
au t ho r it y t o pe rmit t he se ar ch o f his c o at be ca us e, wit hin the cl oset, hi s c l othi

ng wa s s ep ara

te f rom Garland’s and the

off i cers quic kly dis cerned that i

t was “obvi

ously a m an’s ja cket.” Defe

ndan t argues t hat t he scope of Garland’s consent could n

ot in cl ude “the i nsi de contents of closed objects h idde n f rom view.” At that poi

n t, d ef en da n t ar gu es , the of

f i cerswerere qui

re d to m ake f ur th er i n qui ry i n to whether Ga rlan d c oul d c ons en t to asearch

of h i s c oat p ock

et, b ec au se

th e a pp aren t-a uth ori tyNo. 2—09—0747

3 We no t e t hat de fe nd ant ’s ent ire ar gument re gar ding Ga rland ’s au t hor ity t o c ons ent t o t he search o f his c o at is ir re leva nt if he consented to t he search . At trial, def ense couns el

conceded that defend ant verba

ll y cons en ted to the se arc h. How ever, the concess ion, wh ic h was n ot evi dence,
matters not t o our anal

ys is . We ul

tim ately concl ude that the tr ia

l c our t ’s de nia l o f

th e m oti on to suppress must

be affirmed be cau se G ar land’s c ons ent re nder ed t he se ar ch valid and beca use defend ant did no t expr essly re fuse c ons ent t o t he se ar ch. -12- do ct rine doe s n

ot pe rm i t of f i cers to as su

me c on se nt in

am bi guous circum

stances. Theref

ore, defen dant ar gue s, t he t rial co ur t er re d in faili ng t o s upp re ss t he gu n and, abse nt t hat evidenc e, hi s co nvictio ns canno t st and a nd must be reversed. We disag re e and co nclude t hat Gar land had app ar ent co mmon aut hor ity t o c ons ent t o t he se ar ch. 3 Defendant’s argu

men t i s pre m i se d on th e n oti on th at a home owner’s consen

t t o search a h o me does not extend t o ano ther perso n’s priv ate, closed contain

er or o bj ect to whi

ch the h omeowner

has
no access. SeeBull , 18 5 Il l . 2d at 1 97- 98;se e al so United States v. Karo , 468 U.S. 705, 725 (1984) (O’C onn or, J., concurring, j oine d by Reh nqui st, J.) . Defen

dant li kens h is coat po cket to a closed obje ct and ass erts th at i

t was a n enc l osed s

pace wi thi n a com mon are a. “[ C] o nt ain er s u se d t o ho ld one’s most p ers ona

l be l ongi ng s c om man d a hi gher d egree of pri va cy ,” a nd such cl ose d c onta

i ne rs or ob j ec ts mi ght in cl ude l ockers, suitcases, zi

pp ed duf f el ba gs, a nd p urse s. People v. Miller , 34 6 I ll. App. 3d 972, 9 83-84 ( 2004); see also People v. James , 163 Ill . 2d302, 318 (1994) . In some cases, pockets have been c ons ider ed c lose d sp ace s for pur po ses o f det er mini ng whe t her t hird- par t y cons ent to sea rch wasl awf ul . See, e.g. , United

States v. Adams , 5 83 F .3 d 45 7, 465 (6 t h Cir. 200 9) (finding
va lid thi rd-par ty c onse nt to sea rch j acke t pocket); United States v. Robinson , 999 F. Supp. 155, 163 (D. Mas s. 199 8) (f

i ndi ng i nv al i d thi rd-par ty c onse nt to sea rch pan ts pocket). T he in qui

ry i n toNo. 2—09—0747

-13-

whether the party consen

ting to a search of

cl osedit ems ha s a pp ar en t o rac t ua l au t ho r it y t o do so is
ne ce ss ar ily

fact speci fi c. See United Sta tes v. Ross , 4 56 U .S . 7 98, 822 -2 3 ( 198 2) (fo ur t h amendment prote cti on va ri esdepe nd

i ng on f ac ts of each ca se ); se e al so Miller , 346 Il l . Ap p. 3d at 984. Moreov er, in a ss es sing ap pa r en t au t ho r it y, “ [ w] e c an no t us e h ind sig ht ; t he cir cu mst an ce s a t t he t ime of the entry control the determ in ation whether

the police reasonabl

y b elie ved that they

had obtai ned val id c onsent.” People v. Huffar , 313 Il l . Ap p. 3d 59 3, 597 ( 2000)
. Here, bef ore searchi

ng the clo set , t he o ffi

cer s kne w t hat : Ga rland was a lease hold er of t he apa rt ment and def

endan t was not ; defend ant and G ar land we re in a da ti ng rel ati ons hi p a nd ha d, f or mostof the duration of de fen dant’s stay

in the apartmen

t, shared the back

bedroom that accessed

t he cl ose t; Garl and an d def endan t conti nue d to sha

re th e c l ose

t wi th b oth keepi ng cl ot hes an d personal it ems t her ein; t he cl

ose t wa s n ot lock ed or p ri v ate but, rather, co ntain

ed two do ors, incl

udin g one that accessed the apartmen

t’s only bathroom; the cl

oset held t he ap ar t ment’ s wa shing machine and dry er; and all eight

people resi

din g in the apartmen

t had access to the closet

t o , at a minimu m, do lau nd ry. We co nclude , ba sed on t his informat ion, t hat , e ven if Gar land lack ed a ct ual au t hor ity t o p er mit t he search of def endan t’s c oat (an i

ssue we d o not reach), the of

f i cers r ea so na bly believed

t hat Gar land pos se ss ed au th ori ty to pe rm i t a s ea rc h of th e c l ose t, i n cl udi n g def en da n t’s coa t. Furth er, we note that defendan

t’s actions rei

nf orced the reasonableness

of the off ic ers’ be li ef t ha t Ga r lan d h eld authority to permi t t he search . Specif

ic ally , defen dant remarked

t hat , be cau se he
wa s n ot na med on th e l ea se an d G arl an d had si gned the f orm, th e of

f i cers di d n ot need h im to sign t he fo rm. I n a dd it io n t o t his comm ent, defen dant ma de no eff ort to obje ct to or sto p the search as it pr og re ssed . Ac co rd ingly, the officer s’ belief t hat Gar land held a ut hor ity t o c ons ent t o t he sea rc h, and, acc or ding t o t heir t est imony, t hat defend ant had a cqu iesced t o t he search, was reas onab l e wh

ereNo. 2—09—0747

-14-

defendan t’s sil ence during the search was coupled wi th his explanation f

or h i s dec i si on n ot to sign the f orm, i.e. , because he di

d not t hi nk he had standing

to s i gn th e f orm , not, specif

ical ly , because he ob j ec te d t o t he sea

rch . See, e.g. , Adams , 583 F.3d at 464 (t he def endan t by h is conduct aban doned an y pri v acy i n terest h e h

ad i n coa t wh en h e w as pr es en t du ri n g th e s ea rc h b ut did not i n di ca te by his actions tha

t he h ad a pri vacy i ntere st or otherwi

se c l ai m an owne rsh i p i ntere st ther

ei n);
see al so 4 Way

ne R. LaF ave, Sea

rch an d Se izu re § 8.3 (g) , at 1 79 (4th

ed . 20 04)(cl

ai m of th i rd -p ar ty com m on authority can

be reasonably

reli ed upon by

police wh er e o t he rpe r so n is pr es en t an d c o uld be ex pected to obj ect if

the c l ai m of a uthori ty were i n error, but is si

l en t). Defend ant ma

kes m uch of t he fact s t hat , w ithin t he clo se t , he an d G ar lan d d id n o t int er ming le t he ir cl ot hes an

d that it was obvi

ous to the off

ic ers that the coat bel

onged to a man. We di sagree wi th defend ant that t he f

act t ha t t he co at wa s “o bvio us ly” a man ’s inhe r en t ly cr ea t ed a s uffic ien t ly
am bi guous situ at ion r ende ring t he o ffi cer s unr eas ona ble in not making fur t her inquiries r ega rd ing t he scope of Ga rlan d’ s c ons en

t. Re ga rdl es s of the gend er f orwhich the coat was designed: (1) coat s can b e w orn b y an y b ody; an d ( 2) th ere is n

othi n g i n th e rec ord

to i n di ca te th at, in t his clos et wher e she kept her bel

ongin gs, Garlan d could not

access or touch def

endan t’s th i ngs . Mo r eo ve r , we no t e a ga in that de f en da nt’ s a ss erti

on th at he e f f ec ti ve l y ha d n o st anding to consent to t he search fostered Garland’s appa

re n t au th ori ty to search “the apartment.” Defendant did not express that Garland’s app ar ent au t ho r it y wa s q ua lifi ed or li mi ted and, thus, the offi

cers were reasonab le

to bel ie ve that Ga rlan d’ s c on se n t ex ten de d to e v en a m an ’s coa t. In t his v ein , we di sag re e that this cas e i s like James , 163 Ill. 2d at 3 18, w here t he driver’s
au th ori ty t o c ons ent to a search of

the automobil

e di d not extend to a purse found on the passen ger se at. The courtin Jamesnote d that a pur se i s n ot nor mal l y sh are d by two or more pers ons. Id. NorNo. 2—09—0747

-15-

is this case l ike Miller , where the thi

rd-party consent did not extend to a zipped du ffel b ag fo un d in
a l ocked l ocker that pol i ce pri

ed open
. Miller , 34 6 I l l . A pp . 3d at 9 83 -8 4. H ere, con

tra ry to defendant’s ass erti on, the re wa s n o evi den ce pre sen ted tha t hi s coat wa s “

hi dden f rom v i ew.” Defend ant di

d n ot take an y ac ti on wit h re spe ct t o t he co at t hat mightin dic ate that he held a particul ar ex pe cta ti on of pri vacy to it as opposed to any other objec t in the c loset. For exam

ple , t he coat was not encl osed in a zi pped han gin g bag, or placed i

nsi de a clo sed suit cas e, or re moved fro m the cl oset and stored so me

where i n the b edroo m wh

ere, at t hat po intin

tim e, only he resi ded. See United States
v. Jackson , 598 F .3d 340 , 347 (7 th Ci r. 201 0) (in

appl yi ng f act-specif ic in quiry to deci de whether
so meone has a ppa re nt aut hor ity, it is mor e r eas ona ble for an o ffi cer t o be lievethat a third party has full access to an open crat e than, for example, a defendant’s purse or brief case). For these reaso ns, it was not unreasonab le fo r the of f i cersto b e u

n con cerned th at th e c oat m i gh t b e s ub j ect to hei ghtened pri

vacy concerns. A

ccordingl y, we do not t hi

nk the off ic ers unreasonably

bel ie ved that Garland’s consent to s ea

rch the cl oset f ora gun an

d drugs in cl uded defe ndan t’s coat t herei

n where, cle ar ly, t he co at co uld co nt ain t he o bje ct of th e se arch, i.e. , a weapon or drugs. See Jimeno , 500 U.S. at 251 (“Th

e sc ope of

a se arch i s general

l y def i ne d by i ts ex pres sed obj ect.”). S imila r ly, we do not fin

d convi nci ng in these circu msta nces defend ant ’s ar gument t hat Gar land
co uld no t co nse nt be ca us e t he co at be lo ng ed t o him a nd heal one wore it. One fac t or t o be considered

in a ss es sin g co mmon a uthority is whether the parti es had joint access to the item searched. See Bull , 18 5 I ll. 2d at 197. The m ere f act th at th e a pa rtm en t occ up an ts d i d n ot, i n f act, wear defen dant’s coat does not r efl

ect that t he consen

ting party —Garlan d, defendant’s gi

rlf rien d of
seven years who shar ed t he closet with hi m—“ was denied the m

utual use , acces

s to , or co ntrol over i t.” (Em phases adde d.) Id. at 198 (w

here the defe

ndan t li ved wi th hi s gi rlf rien d in her house an

d theyNo. 2—09—0747

-16-

shared a b ed r o o m, co ur t up he ld

t he gir lfrie nd ’s co nse nt t o a s ea r ch o f a c lo se d b o x in t he be dr o o m, even thou gh sh e di d n ot know what was i

nsi de i t and told the police that i

t b el onge d to th

e def en da n t, because t he fact t hat t he de fendant alone use d t he bo x d id not me anthat t he gi rlf rien d had b een deni ed m utua l ac ce ss to i t); se e al so Stacey , 58 Ill . 2d at 89-90 (wi f e’ s c ons en

t to se arc h of dresser wh erehusba nd

kept clothes was uph

el d because

“[t]he m ere fact t hat

t he [ husba nd] alone may have used thi s dresser drawer whi le hi s wi fe m

ay have used another

or an othe r dres ser doe s n

ot i n di ca te that the wi fe was denied t he mutu al use, acce ss t o o r co ntr ol o f the dr awer ”); People v. Ford , 83 I ll. App. 3d 5 7, 63 ( 198 0) (w ife cou ld co nsent to search of to ol box i n basem ent even thoughit bel

onged to her hus ban d and onl y h e used the to ols; basemen

t wa s n ot l ocked an d w i f e w asnot i

ns tructed not to handle t he tools, s o the m erefact that only

he used them

did n ot in dic ate that t he wi

fe was deni

ed
m utual use , ac ce ss

to, or con trol ov er th em ). H ere, th e m

ere f acts th at th e c oat b el

onge d to defend ant and t ha t o nly he wo r e it do not mean t hat Gar land wa s de nied mut ual ac ces s t o it in the cl oset that the

y shared. Ac co r din gly, we co nc lud e t ha t t he po lice we r e r ea so na ble in their b elie f that Gar land co uld co nsent unde r t he ap par ent -a ut hor ity do ct rine to asea rc h of d efenda nt ’s co at in the cl ose t. B. Defend ant ’s “E xpr ess R efusa l” to Co nsent Defend ant argu es

n ex t th at, even

if we concl ude that Garlan

d had actual or a pp aren t au th ori ty to search, h

is ex pr es s r efu sal t o a llow t he se ar ch invalidat ed G ar land’s a ut hor ity and r ende re d t he search unlawfu l. Relying o n Georgia v. Randolph , 54 7 U .S. 10 3 ( 20 06 ), def en da n t arg ue s that a thi rd pa r t y’ s c ons en

t to s ea rch prop erty ove r wh i ch he or s he sh are s c om mon a uthori ty doe s n ot t rump the express re fus al of consen

t from the person wh

ose belongin

gs are bei

ng search

ed. Defend ant argues that the trial court here erred i

n reasoni ng that an i

ndi vi dual refusi ng consent mustNo. 2—09—0747

-17-

cle ar ly and u nequ ivoca lly

objec t t o t he se ar ch. Rat her , d efenda nt co nt ends , he refuse d co nsent and he di d n ot ne ed to do a ny thi ng f urth er. A cc ordi

ngl y , de f en da nt a rgues , th e sub se que

nt s ea rch of his bel ongin gs was i nva li d. We di sagree. In Randolph , t he Su pr eme Co ur t add re ssed t he question whether a war rantless search b ased
on one co-occupa nt ’s co ns ent is valid if the o t her co -o ccu pant , w ho lat er see ks t o s upp re ss t he evi dence, was pr es en

t at the scene

and “ expressl

y ref use[d] to consent.” Id. at 106 . T her e, t he defendant’s est ra nged wife co nsent ed to a search of

the ma rital resi dence af

ter t he def

endan t had “u ne qu ivo ca lly

refuse d” to give consen

t t o search the hous e. Id. at 107 . T he co ur t held t hat “a warrantless sea rc h of a shar ed d welling for evi dence over the expre

ss r efusal of conse

nt by a physically pres ent re sident ca nn ot be j ustif

ie d as reasonab le

as to him on the basis of consen

t given to the poli ce b

y another re siden

t.” (Em phasi s ad ded.) Id. at 120. Here, we a gr ee w ith t he t rial co ur t t hat defend ant did no t expr essly re fuse t o c ons ent t o t he
sea rc h. Ac co r din g t o his own testim ony, def endan t’s express ref

usal to sign the form wa s b as ed on his belief that , be cau se he was not nam ed o n t he le as e, it wa s u nne ce ss ar y. D efe nda nt did no t t es t ify that he t old t he o ffi

cer s t hat he wo uld no t sign t he fo rm beca use he did no t want the m to se arc h, nor did h e testif

y that, i n f act, he di d not si gn th e f orm b eca use he obj ected to the

sea rch . Rather, defend ant explained t o t he o ffi cer s t hat he did no t need t o s ign beca use he wa s no t named o n t he le ase, and t hen he pr o ce ed ed t o sit in t he fr o nt r o o m wh ile the search took place. He never in dic ated that he wan

ted the search to cease, and he di d not t ake any

ot her action tha

t could reasonab ly be in terpret ed as an ex press ref usal of consen

t. We note t hat, although def endan t t estif ie d that when asked for verb al

co nsent t o t he se ar ch he sa id “no , ” t he t r ial c o ur t he r e d id no t cr ed it t ha t t es t imo ny. S pe cif ica lly, the trial

court stated t hat it did not find t he t es t imo ny to re flec t t ha t , wh en ex pr es slyNo. 2—09—0747

-18-

asked fo rco nse nt , de fen da nt sa id “no. ” I nst ead , t he cou

rt e x pl ai n ed th at, wh i l e i t f oun d th at th e S tate did not meet its b

urden on consent, i

t had not made spec if

ic fi ndi ngson w ha t de f en da nt d i d or d i d n ot sa y. The court in

stead found that the evi

dence l acke d the

ex pres s ref usa l of c onse nt. The tri al

court is in the best positi

on to judge

witne ss credi

bi li ty, and we c anno t co nc lude that its fi

ndi ng that defend ant di

d n ot ex pre ss l y ref us e c ons en

t i s a gai ns t the man i f es t we i gh

t of t he evi dence. McDonough , 239 Ill . 2d at 266 (t rial co urt is i

n a su per ior po sitio n t o d et er mine and we igh t he
cred i b i l i ty of th e wi tn es se s, ob se

rve th e wi tn es se s’ dem

ea n or, a n d r es ol v e c on f l i cts i n thei r testi mony ). Defend ant poi

nts to People v. Sweborg , 29 3 I ll. App. 3d 298, 30 2 ( 19 97 ), w h ere a de f en da n t, in resp ons e t o a n officer ’s r equ est t o s ear ch t he trunk of hi s car, repli ed “ ‘No . I re ally don’t want yo ut o. ’ ” While the officer sea rc hed t he t ru nk, t he de fendant re pe ate d, “ ‘I thought I to ld y ou I didn’twa nt y ou to l ook through m y pers onal i tem s,’ ” and h

e put his han d over a guitar case that was in the t ru nk

and tha t the of f i cer w as try

i ng to open . Id. at 3 03 . Th e a pp el l ate cou rt di sa gr ee d w i th t he t rial co ur t ’s as sess ment t hat t he de fendant consented to t he search when he sh owed the offi

cer how t o r emove t he ke y from t he ign ition but then wi

thdrew the consent whe

n the off ic er searched t he t ru nk. Inst ead , t he co ur t fou nd t hat co nsent was ne ve r giv en, hold ing t hat “[a] ‘No ’ means l i teral l y th at. There a

ren o re qui

re men ts for a def

endan t t o couch his denial o f co nsent in anything buta simple st at ement saying‘No.’ ” Id . at 3 04. Here, however, de f en da nt d i d n ot si m pl y sa y “no”
or“n o, I r eally don’t want you to” search. Nor did he try to in terrup t th e s ea

rc hat an y poi n t. Instead, defen

dant said that h e w oul

d n ot s i gn th e f orm , b ec au se th e of f i cersdi d n ot n ee d h i s c on se n t. Defe ndan t’s refusa l to si gn the form was not a cle ar refusal to consent to t he search. Further, citi

ng United States v. Plugh , 576 F.3d 135 (2nd Ci r. 2009), defendan

t anal ogizes t his ca se to a defen dant’s ref usal to sign a Miranda for m, which, he as serts, m us t, ab sent a

pri or orNo. 2—09—0747

-19-

contemporaneous st at ement sho wing a w ill ingness t o s pea k, be inte rp re t ed a s an e lect ion not t o w aive Miranda ri ghts
. Id. at 14 1. Ne ve r t he les s, de fen da nt qu ick ly asse rt s t hat he is by no mea ns su gge st ing that t he r efu sa l t o sig n a co nse nt - t o - se ar ch fo rm is per sean exp re ss r efusa l of co nsent , irr esp ect ive of the surro undin

g circumstances. To t he contrary, we re ad de f en da n t’s argu men t to b e ex actl

y th at. Defend ant ack now ledge s t hat he and t he o ffi cer s at t he sup pr essio n hear ing diver ged on w het her he
ve r ba lly con se n ted , but, ev

en i f we ac ce pt th e tr i al cou rt’ s f i n di n g th at defend an t did no t ve r

ba lly
con se n t, we are l ef t onl y wi th de f endan t’s re f usa l to si gn th e f orm — aga in, t he courtsp ec ified t ha t it had not fo un d t ha t , wh en ex pr es sly a sk ed fo rco nse nt , de fen da nt sa id “ no . ” T ha t find in g is no t contrar y to the man i f es t we i gh t of the ev i denc e. D ef

en da nt d oesnot wis h us to conside

rthe reasons he ex pressed f or not signi

ng the f orm, whi ch h ad nothin g to do with ex

pressi ng an objec t ion t o t he
sear ch. As suc h, by ask ing us t o find t hat he exp re ssly refus ed c ons ent by sim ply not signing t he fo rm, def endan t in deed asks us to fi nd th at a ref usa l to si gn a cons en t-to-search

f orm is, irr esp ect ive of the surroundi

ng ci rcumstances, a per seex

pre ss ref us al of consent. W e dec l i

ne to do s o. Ac co r di ng ly, we agree wi th the trial

court that, in these

ci rcumstances, def

endan t’s refusa l to sign the f

orm does not equate t o t he express refusa l of c ons ent t o t he se ar ch co nt emplat ed by Randolph an

d that d ef en da nt’ s rel i an ceon that case is

mi splaced. III. CONCLUSION For t he fo re go ing re aso ns, t he judg ment o f the ci rcuit court o f Du Page C ounty i s af fi rmed. Af fi rmed.