alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit



Exhibit 10.1 





AMENDMENT
TO THE
CNX RESOURCES CORPORATION.
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION RESTORATION PLAN


WHEREAS, CNX Resources Corporation (the “Corporation”) sponsors the CNX Resources Corporation Defined Contribution Restoration Plan (the “Plan”).


WHEREAS, the Corporation in its discretion may amend or terminate the Plan at any time and for any reason, and has exercised this authority previously.


WHEREAS, the Vice President of Human Resources has been directed to amend the Plan as set forth herein.


NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS RESOLVED, that the Plan is hereby amended, effective as of July 1, 2018, unless otherwise specified as follows:


		
	1.
	A new Section 1.4 is added to read as follows




1.4    This Plan is frozen effective July 1, 2018. 


		
	2.
	Section 2.2, Award Period, is amended to add the following underlined language where indicated at the end thereof




		
	2.2
	Award Period.  "Award Period" means each calendar year. The final Award Period for this Plan is 2017.




		
	3.
	Section 2.17, Participant, is amended to add the following underlined language where indicated at the end thereof:




		
	2.17
	Participant.  "Participant" means any eligible employee who has Compensation in excess of the Compensation Limit for any Award Period; provided, however, the foregoing provisions shall not limit the Committee's discretion to determine whether an employee remains eligible to continue to actively participate in the Plan; provided, however, that as of November 28, 2017, Participant shall not include any individual for whom Mining assumed the Transferred Obligations. Effective July 1, 2018, there will be no further Participants in the Plan.




		
	4.
	Section 4.1, Accounts is amended to add the following underlined language where indicated:




		
	4.1
	Accounts.  The Compensation Credits granted to a Participant under the Plan shall be added to the Participant's Account as set forth in this Article. Notwithstanding the foregoing or anything else in this Plan to the contrary, no Compensation Credits will be made to any Account     after July 1, 2018.












Exhibit 10.1 









IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company's duly authorized delegate has caused this Amendment to be executed this 23rd day of July, 2018.




CNX Resources Corporation




By:    /s/ Stephanie L. Gill_____________________
Stephanie L. Gill, Esq.
Vice President, General Counsel & Corporate Secretary


-2-
May 7, 2002

24014

#### Cedillos v. Balloon Man

Affirmed
Annex 11

CHAPTER 10.9.INFECTION WITH NEWCASTLE DISEASE VIRUS

Article 10.9.1.

General provisions!

1)	For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, Newcastle disease (ND) is defined as an *infection* of *poultry* caused by Newcastle disease virus (NDV), which is an avian paramyxovirus serotype 1 (APMV-1) that meets one of the following criteria for virulence:

a)	the virus has an intracerebral pathogenicity index (ICPI) in day-old chicks *(Gallus gallus)* of 0.7 or greater; or

b)	multiple basic amino acids have been demonstrated in the virus (either directly or by deduction) at the C-terminus of the F2 protein and phenylalanine at residue 117, which is the N-terminus of the F1 protein. The term ‘multiple basic amino acids’ refers to at least three arginine or lysine residues between residues 113 and 116. Failure to demonstrate the characteristic pattern of amino acid residues as described above would require characterisation of the isolated virus by an ICPI test.

In this definition, amino acid residues are numbered from the N-terminus of the amino acid sequence deduced from the nucleotide sequence of the F0 gene, 113–116 corresponds to residues –4 to –1 from the cleavage site.’

2)	*~~Poultry~~*~~is defined as ‘all domesticated birds, including backyard *poultry*, used for the production of *meat* or eggs for consumption, for the production of other commercial products, for restocking supplies of game, or for breeding these categories of birds, as well as fighting cocks used for any purpose’.~~

~~Birds that are kept in captivity for any reason other than those reasons referred to in the preceding paragraph, including those that are kept for shows, races, exhibitions, competitions, or for breeding or selling these categories of birds as well as pet birds, are not considered to be *poultry*.~~

~~3)~~	For the purposes of the *Terrestrial Code*, the *incubation period* for ND shall be 21 days.

~~4~~3)	This chapter deals with NDV *infection* of *poultry*~~as defined in point 2 above~~ in the presence or absence of clinical signs.

~~5~~4)	The occurrence of *infection* with NDV is defined as the isolation and identification of NDV as such or the detection of viral ribonucleic acid specific for NDV.

~~6~~5)	A Member Country should not impose bans on the trade in *poultry commodities* in response to information on the presence of any APMV-1 in birds other than *poultry*, including *wild* birds.

~~7~~6)	Standards for diagnostic tests, including pathogenicity testing, are described in the *Terrestrial Manual*. When the use of ND vaccines is appropriate, those vaccines should comply with the standards described in the *Terrestrial Manual*.

[...]

___________________________

Report of the Meeting of the WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Standards Commission/February 2023	1
19046, 19046

#### State v. Robinson

January 13, 1997

Order No. 97-2

Affirmed
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000854709
<NAME> DAYTON SUPERIOR CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                             203
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   12,348
<ALLOWANCES>                                       449
<INVENTORY>                                     14,155
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                31,532
<PP&E>                                          31,739
<DEPRECIATION>                                  13,041
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 107,835
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           18,568
<BONDS>                                         31,487
<COMMON>                                        42,385
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                      10,487
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   107,835
<SALES>                                        124,486
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               124,486
<CGS>                                           86,021
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   86,021
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                25,482
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  (68)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,829
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  8,154
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,538
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              4,616
<DISCONTINUED>                                   4,616
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                (2,314)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,302
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.47
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.47
        

</TABLE>
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 610

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION I

No. CR-14-783

KAMRAN TYSHUN JACKSON

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered October 28, 2015

APPEAL FROM THE CONWAY

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. 15CR-13-154]

HONORABLE JERRY RAMEY,

JUDGE

AFFIRMED; MOTION TO

WITHDRAW GRANTED

PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, Judge

Kamran Tyshun Jackson appeals his Conway County jury conviction of one count of

theft of property with a value over $1,000 but less than $5,000—a class D felony. His counsel

initially filed a motion to be relieved as counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(k), stating that there were no nonfrivolous

issues to present on appeal. However, on June 17, 2015, this court ordered rebriefing, finding

that counsel’s brief at that time did not satisfy the requirements of Anders, supra, or Rule 4-

3(k), because it failed to address an adverse-sentencing decision.1 This current appeal follows

after rebriefing. 

Counsel has once again filed a motion to be relieved as counsel pursuant to Anders,

upra, and Rule 4-3(k). The motion is accompanied by an abstract and addendum of

1

 Jackson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 400.
Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 610

theproceedings below, which includes all objections and motions decided adversely to

Jackson, and a brief in which counsel explains why there is nothing in the record that would

support an appeal. Jackson was informed of his right to file pro se points for reversal, but he

has not done so.

The test for filing a no-merit brief is not whether there is any reversible error but

whether an appeal would be wholly frivolous. See Tucker v. State, 47 Ark. App. 96, 885

S.W.2d 904 (1994). From our review of the record and the brief presented to us, we find

compliance with Rule 4-3(k) and hold that there is no merit to an appeal.

Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.

GLOVER and BROWN, JJ., agree.

Files & Brasuell, PLLC, by: Toney B. Brasuell, for appellant.

No response.

2
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5. Entity Print 

Plant-Trait-Mechanism of Action

(MOA) combinations that have been

determined by APHIS not to require

regulation under 7 CFR part 340.

Last Modified: 

Print

Plant-trait-MOA combinations that have previously been combined in molecular

stacks and determined by APHIS not to be regulated can be used independently or in

subsets of molecular stacks and the resulting plants will qualify for exemption from 7

CFR part 340 pursuant to § 340.1(c). For example, if a plant contains three MOAs (x,

y, z) in a molecular stack, then plants containing an individual plant-trait-MOA

combination (x or y or z) and all possible stacks of the plant-trait-MOA combinations

(xy, xz, yz, and xyz) will qualify for exemption pursuant to § 340.1(c).

Note:  This table will be updated on an ongoing basis. Check back for additional

plant/traits added periodically. Regulatory reference documents corresponding to

each plant/trait included in this table can be found at Petitions for Determination of

Nonregulated Status.

Loading...
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determine d that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 98-50037 Summary Calendar

____________________

BARBARA JO WEBB,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

WAYNE SCOTT, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION; PAMELA WILLIAM, Warden of Hobby Unit, Marlin, Texas; KENNETH SELLER, Correctional Officer #3 at Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division, Hobby Unit,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court, for the Western District of Texas (USDC No. W-97-CV-242)

_________________________________________________________________

December 3, 1998 Before KING, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Barbara Jo Webb, Texas inmate #335682, appea ls, p ro se , the

denial of her motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP)

in the district court and the dismissal of her complaint based on

her inability to pay the initial partial filing fee. (Webb’s2

motions f or supplementation of the record and for discovery are

DENIED .)

The district court ordered Webb to pay, within 30 days, an

initial partial filing fee of $7.50, as per 28 U.S.C. §

1915(b)(1),(2). The district court did not err in its initial

order dismissing the co mplaint, because this amount had not been

paid and Webb had not informed the court that she had no money in

her prison account to pay it. However, Webb’s F E D

. R. C IV

. P. 5 9(e)

motion and accompanying exhibits demonstrated that she had a zero

balance in her prison account for the 30 days following the

district court’s order and thus had no means with which to comply

with that order.

“In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a

civil action

... for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and

no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(4). Under this provision, Webb should be permitted to

proceed IFP while remaining responsible for paying the full filing

fee through installment payments. S ee Norton v. Dimazana

, 122 F.3d

286, 290-91 (5th Cir. 1998); Walp v. Scott

, 115 F.3d 308, 310 (5th

Cir. 1997).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is V ACATED and th e

case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED; MOTIONS DENIED
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Stephen R. Morrey, President and Chief Executive Officer of Dayton Superior
Corporation (the "Company"), do hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C.
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that, to my knowledge:

         The Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the period ending
         December 31, 2003 (the "Periodic Report") fully complies with the
         requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
         of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and

         The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in
         all material respects, the financial condition and results of
         operations of the Company.

Dated: March 30, 2004

                                          /s/ Stephen R. Morrey
                                          --------------------------------------
                                          Stephen R. Morrey
                                          President and Chief Executive Officer
**USA COMMENTS**

**GLOSSARY**

***PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE***

~~means the generation of *aquatic animal* health data by an *early detection system.*~~

means observer-initiated *aquatic animal* health surveillance, typically based on observations of clinical or behavioral signs, production measures, or mortality rates.  An observer-based *early detection system is one example of passive surveillance.*

**Rationale:** Revision needed to clarify that early detection systems frequently employ, but are not limited to, passive surveillance activities.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-10305

Summary Calendar

 

RANDY CHILDERS,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CITY OF ARLINGTON TEXAS; 

NATHANIEL G. HARDER; 

RUBEN A. PUENTE,

 Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------------------------------------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:01-CV-135-Y

--------------------------------------------------------------

December 13, 2002

Before JONES, STEWART and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Randy Childers appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the

defendants on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint. On appeal, Childers argues that his

complaint was not barred by limitations because duress imposed by the City of Arlington, Texas,

(“City”), and its officials precluded him from timely filing his complaint.
-2-

The standard of review following the district court’s order granting summary judgment is de

novo. Melton v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of America, 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1997).

Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).

In determining the limitations period for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, the applicable period is

governed by state law, which in this case, is the two-year Texas personal injury limitations period.

See TEX.CIV.PRAC.&REM.CODEANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 2002); Pete v. Metcalfe,

8 F.3d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 1993). Similarly, state law governs the applicability of any tolling

provisions. Pete, 8 F.3d at 217. In Pierce v. Estate of Harry Haverlah, 428 S.W.2d 422, 427-28

(Tex. App. 1968), the court established that to prevail on the defense of duress, the burden rests with

the movant to show that the alleged duress would have prevented “an ordinarilyprudent person” from

exercising his free will to file suit prior to the expiration of limitations.

Childers fails to carry his burden of proof. He argues that defendant Puente and other

members of the City police department threatened to reopen a former criminal arrest charge if he

pursued his civil rights complaint. Childers does not identify which officers other than defendant

Puente threatened him. With respect to the alleged threat from Puente, Childers describes only one

encounter insufficient to sustain his contention that the threat was continuous in nature. See Pierce,

428 S.W.2d at 427. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the

defendants. 

AFFIRMED.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

September 11, 2009 

d0831 

Order 

 

September 11, 2009 

138900 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 138900 

 COA: 290453 

Wayne CC: 08-009947-01-FH 

TERRELL BAKER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 27, 2009 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded 

that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of State

          - [Public Notice: 12275]

# SUMMARY:

                        Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: I hereby determine that a certain object being imported from abroad pursuant to an agreement with its foreign owner or custodian for temporary display in the exhibition “Bethlehem Reborn: The Wonders of the Church of the Nativity” at the Museum of the Bible, Washington, District of Columbia, and at possible additional exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, is of cultural significance, and, further, that its temporary exhibition or display within the United States as aforementioned is in the national interest. I have ordered that Public Notice of these determinations be published in the                         **Federal Register**                        .                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Reed Liriano, Program Coordinator, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: 202-632-6471; email:                         *section2459@state.gov*). The mailing address is U.S. Department of State, L/PD, 2200 C Street NW (SA-5), Suite 5H03, Washington, DC 20522-0505.                    

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    The foregoing determinations were made pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 (79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), Executive Order 12047 of March 27, 1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 2681,                     *et seq.;*22 U.S.C. 6501 note,                     *et seq.*), Delegation of Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, Delegation of Authority No. 236-3 of August 28, 2000, and Delegation of Authority No. 523 of December 22, 2021.                

Nicole L. Elkon,

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Professional and Cultural Exchanges, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State.

[FR Doc. 2023-26419 Filed 11-30-23; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4710-05-P