The H onor abl e J ed S. R ako ff , U ni t ed St at es D i s t r i ct J udge f or t he So ut her n D i s t r i ct of N ew Y or k, s i t t i ng by * des i gn at i on. 1 08- 4921- cr U SA v. H as an UN ITED STA TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT Aug us t T er m 2 009 (A rgue d: Oct ob er

6, 2 009 Dec id ed: No vem ber 10, 200 9) Do cket No . 08 -4 921 -c r U NI T ED S TATES O F A M ERI CA ,

Appellee , v. S YE D H AS AN , De

fe ndant -A ppella nt . B ef or e: C AB RA N E S and S ACK , Circuit Jud ges , and R AKO FF , District Judge
. *

______________ Def end ant Syed Has an ( “Ha s an” ) ap peal s fr om an O ct ob er 3, 2 008 ju dgm ent

of th e Unit ed St ate s Di s tr

ict Cou r t f or th e Eas te r n D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( San dr a L . T own es , Judge ) convicting him, af te r a ju ry t r ial , o f v ar io us cr im es , in clu di ng m aki ng afals e s tat eme nt ona pas s po r t ap pl

icat io n i n vio lat io n o f 1 8 U. S.C. § 15 42. Onapp eal, Has an ar gue s , int er ali a , that the evide nce w as insuff icient to convict him bec ause the evide nce fail ed to establish that he made a material misstatement on the passpor t applica tion. The question of whether § 1542 has a mate riality requirement is a matter of fi r s t i mp r es s io n i n thi s Cir cui t. Af te r r evi ewing the p lai n l ang

uag e of th e s tatut e, we con clu de that § 15 42 d oes no t r equ

ir e that th e f als e s tat eme nt

ona pas s po r t ap pl

icat io n b e “m ate r

ial .” We a lso conclude that the e vidence was suff icient to support defendant’s various convictions2

and that the District Court did not err in sentencing de fendant. Finally , we dismiss s everal of def end ant ’s clai ms of

in ef fe ct ive as s is tan ce o f c ou ns el, andwe d ecli ne t o co ns id er def end ant ’s
r emainin g cl aim s of

in ef fe ct ive as s is tan ce o f c ou ns el o n dir ect app eal. Affirmed.
B. A L A N S EI DLE R , N ew Yo r k, N Y, for DefendantAppella nt . D ANI EL A. S P EC T OR , As s is tan t U ni te d S tat es At to r ney (B ent onJ . Cam pb ell , Unit ed S tat es At to r ney for the Ea stern D istr

ict of New York, a nd Jo Ann M. Nav ick as , As s is tan t U ni te d S tat es At to r ney , o n th e brief ), United States Attorney’s Off ice for the Ea stern Di s tr ict of New Yor k, B r oo kly

n, NY, for Appellee
.
J OS É A. C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ge :: Def end ant Syed Has an ( “de fe nd ant ” or

“Ha s an” ) ap peal s fr om an O ct ob er 3, 2 008 judgment of the United States District Court f or the Eastern District of New York (Sandra L. T own es , Judge

) c onvic ti ng him , af

te r a ju ry t r ial , o f v ar io us cr im es . Sp ecif

ically, Has an wa s con

vic te d of on e co un t e ach o f m aki ng afals e s tat eme nt ona pas s po r t ap pl

icat io n, invio lat

io n o f 1 8 U. S.C.Thi s sta tut e p rov id es, in re le va nt p a rt, a s fol lo ws: 1 Whoev er willfully a nd knowingly makes any

false statement in an appli cation for pas s po r t w

ith i nt ent to in du ce o r

s ecu r e the i s s uan ce o f apas s po r t u nd er th e autho r it y of th e Unit ed S tat es , ei th er

fo r hi s ownus e or

th e us e of

ano th er , co ntr ary to the laws regulating

the issuance of passpor ts or the rules pres cribed pursuant to such laws; . . . [s]hall be fined . . ., imprisoned . . ., or both. 18 U .S. C. § 1 542
. Thi s sta tut e p rov

id es, in re le va nt p a rt, a s fol lo ws: 2 If t wo or more pers ons conspir e either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defr aud the United S tates, or any age ncy thereof in any manner or for any p urpo s e, an d o ne o r

mo r e of s uchper s on s do any a ct

to ef fe ct th e ob ject

of th e con s pi r acy, eachs hall b e f in ed u nd er

this ti tl e or

im pr is on ed n ot

mo r e thanfi

ve year s , o r bo th
. 18 U .S. C. § 3 71. Thi s sta tut e p rov

id es a s fol lo ws: 3 Who ever r emo ves a childfr om th e Unit ed S tat es , o r att emp ts to do s o, or

r et ain s a child (who ha s been in the United Sta tes) outs ide the United S tates with intent to obstruct the law ful exercise of parental rights shall be fined under this title or im pr is on ed n ot

mo r e than3 yea r s , o r

bo th
. 18 U.S.C . § 1204(a

). 3 § 15 42, con s pi r acy t o co mm it kid nap pi ng, invio lat

io n o f 1 8 U. S.C. § 37 1, andin te r nat io nal 1 2 par ent al k id nap pi ng, invio lat

io n o f 1 8 U. S.C. § 12 04(a). Has an wa s s ent enc ed p r in cip ally t o f

if ty
3 two months’ impr

isonment. On appeal, Hasan argues that (1) the evide nce w as insuff icient to
con vic t him ; ( 2) th e s ent enc e im po s ed w as un r eas on abl e; an d ( 3) he r ecei vedin ef fe ct ive as s is tan ce of cou ns el. BAC KGROUND We pr es ent

bel ow the r elev ant

evi den ce p r es ent ed at

tr ial , vi ewedinth e light

mo s t f avo r abl e4

to th e go ver nm ent . Se e J

ack so n v. V

ir gi nia , 44 3 U. S. 3 07, 318 -1 9 ( 197 9)
. Hasan entered into a n arranged marriage with Dr. Ayesha Taquee r. Soon after they married, Hasan bec ame ve rbally a nd physically abusive. The couple attempted to resolve their problems, and inFe br uar

y 20 05, Dr . T aqu eer

bec ame pr egn ant . T hr ougho ut her pr egn ancy , h owe ver , H as an continued to be ve rbally a nd physically abusive. On October 28, 200 5, Dr. Taqueer gave birth to a
s on , Sy ed M uzam mil H as an ( “M uzam mil”)
. In December 2005, Ha san suggested that he and Dr. Taqueer obtain a pa ss port f or M uzam mil, s o that

inth e f utur e he couldvis it

r elat ive s inI ndia. At

tr ial , D r . T aqu eer

te s ti fi ed that
s he s ign ed the thi r d p age o f the p as s po r t ap pl icat io n b ut nev er s aw the f ir s t t wo p ages , whichs et fo r thth e maili ng a dd r es s to whi ch the p as s po r t w ouldbe s ent . Impor tantly, Dr. Taqueer signed the thir d p age o f the f

or m thr ee d ays bef

or e Has an s ign ed the f

ir s t t wo p ages . Al th ough D r . T aqu eer te s ti fi ed that

s he b eli evedth e pas s po r t w ouldbe s ent to th e f amily h om e inB r oo kly

n, Has an h ad li ste d h is b rot he r’s S ou th C a rol in a a dd re ss a s Muz a mmi l’ s re sid en ce a nd ma il in g a dd re ss on the fir st two page s of the appli cation. On Friday, January 13, 20 06, Dr. Taqueer went to the Brooklyn home of Abdul Abuza id—a neighbor who ca red for M uzammil during the w eek w hile Dr. Taqueer and Ha san worked—to bring M uzam mil h om e f

or th e week end . Wh en s he arr ive d at Abu zaid ’s apar tm ent , Ab uzai d i nf or medher that Hasan had ta ken the chi ld. Hasan a nd Muzammil, howe ver, were not at the famil y home. Dr. T aqu eer att emp te d t o cal

l H as an n um er ou s ti mes , b ut Has an n ever

ans wer ed his ph on e. H e lat er call ed from a pay phone to informDr. T aquee r that his m other had taken Muza mmil to South Ca rolina to the home of Hasan’s brother. Dr . Taqueer demande d that Hasan return Muzammil to her immediately , but Hasan refused. Dr. T aquee r then moved out of the family home and into a5

fr ien d’ s apar tm ent , whichwas als o i n B r oo kly n. Ov er th e ne xt s ever al we eks , D r . T aqu eer repeatedly contacte d Hasan and Ha san’s family in South Ca rolina to demand that they return Muzammil, but they refused. B ecau s e Has an r ef

us ed t o co op er ate , D r . T aqu eer hi r ed anatt or ney , wh o r eco mm end ed that
s he f ile a pet it io n i n F amily Co ur t t o o bt aina cou r t o r der fo r th e ch ild ’s r et ur n. Up onDr . T aqu eer ’s informing Hasan that she had retained a n attorney, Hasan fled Brooklyn, lea ving the family home andhi s jo b wi th ou t n ot

ice. Several wee ks later, Hasan informed Dr. T aquee r that his parents had take n Muzammil to I ndia, bu t h e r ef

us ed t o p r ov

id e co nt act

in fo r mat io n. Ov er th e ne xt s ever al m on th s , D r . T aqu eer
r epe ate dly de man dedth at H as an r et ur n the c hildto her ; h e co nt in ually r ef us ed. Dr . T aqu eer

of fe r ed
to tr avel to I ndia t o ge t M uzam mil, b ut agai n, Has an r ef

us ed. I ns te ad, he i ns is te d that he w ould never return Muzammil unless Dr . Taqueer reconcil ed with him a nd dropped her petition pending inth e F amily Co ur t. Dr . T aqu eer r ef us ed thes e de man ds
. Beginning in May 2 006, Dr. Taqueer sought the ass istance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FB I”) to f

ind Muzammil. An FBI s pecia l age nt provided Dr. T aquee r with a
r eco r di ng d evi ce an d i ns truct ed h er to r eco r d any co nv er s ati on s s he h ad wi thHas an. Sh e r eco r ded tw o s uchcon

ver s ati on s inwhi ch H as an r epe ate dly r ef us ed t o r et ur n M uzam mil an d d ema nd ed that Dr . T aqu eer

dr op her Fa mily Co ur t p et

it io n. Because Hasan refused to attend the proceeding s in Family Court, that court entered a def aul t j ud gm ent

agai ns t him . I n J uly 20 06, th e F amily Co ur t i s s uedan o r der gr ant in g D r . T aqu eer
cus to dy o f M uzam mil an d i s s ueda war r ant fo r Has an’ s ar r es t. Finally, on Oc tober 28, 2006, Ha san was arrested in Detroit, M ichiga n, after he arrived on a6

flight fromIndia. Hasan wa s tr avel ing with Muzammil, who wa s s oon reunited with Dr. Taqueer. Hasan wa s then tr

ied in the District Court. On November 7, 2007, the jury returned a
ver di ct of guilt y onall th r ee co un ts of

th e in di ct men t. T he D is tr ict Cou r t thenim po s ed a s ent enc e pri nc ip a ll y o f fi fty -tw o m on ths’ im pri son me nt. Ha sa n n owa pp ea ls. DISCUSSI ON On appea l, Hasan a rgues that (1) the evide nce w as insuff icient to convi ct him; (2) the sentence imposed wa s unr easonable ; and (3) he rece ived ine ffective assist ance of counsel. He furt he r c on te nd s—a lb ei t i n a cu rsory ma nn er—th a t he di d n ot h ave the in te nt t o c om mi t th ese crimes. We a ddress eac h argument in turn. A. Su ff

ic ie nc y o f t he Evi de nc e Fi r s t, Has an ar

gue s th at the e vid enc e pr es ent ed at tr ial was in s uf fi cien t t o s up po r t the j ur

y’s guilty ve rdicts. Specificall y, he a rgues that the evidence was insufficient to conclude, a s the jury app ar ent ly did , that

Dr . T aqu eer

di d n ot giv e he r per mi s s io n f

or Has an’ s par ent s to tak e M uzam mil to India. He further contends that misst ating a mailing a ddress on a passport application is not suff iciently material to establish guilt of the offense of making a false statement on a pa ss port app lic ati on . Because “the task of choosing among c ompeting, permissible inferences is for the [jury and]
no t f or th e r evi ewing co ur t, ” United Sta tes v. M cDermott , 245 F.3d 133, 13 7 (2d Cir. 2001), w e are
r equ ir ed t o r evi ew the e vid enc e “i n the l igh t m os t f

avo r abl e t o the g ov er nm ent ,” United Sta tes v. Gas ki n , 36 4 F .3d438 , 45 9 (

2dCir . 20 04) , an d “r es ol

ve all is s ues of

cr edi bilit y infa vo r of th e ju ry’s
ver di ct ,” Uni

te d St ate s v . De se na , 28 7 F .3d170 , 17 7 (

2dCir . 20 02) (i nt er nal

qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d)
. Se e g en er all y Jackson , 44 3 U. S. a t 3 18- 19.7

At tr ial , the g ov er nm ent

in tr od uce d m uchevi den ce that Dr . T aqu eer

hadno t g ive n per mi s s io n t o H as an’ s par ent s to tak e M uzam mil t o I ndia. Fi r s t, Dr . T aqu eer te s ti fi ed that

s he did
no t g ive her con s ent to Has an’ s par ent s . F ur th er mo r e, s ever al em ail s wer e admit te d i nt o ev id enc e that were written by Ha san and demonstrated that Hasan knewthat Dr. T aquee r had filed a pe tition inFa mily Co ur t, kn ew that Dr . T aqu eer

des ir ed the r et ur n o f M uzam mil, a ndhadcon tr ol ov er Muzammil’s whereabouts. Hasan did testify that he had Dr. Taquee r’s cons ent to allow hi s parents to tak e M uzam mil t o I ndia, bu t w e “r es ol ve all is is s ues of

cr edi bilit y infa vo r of th e ju ry’s ver di ct ,” De se na , 287 F.3d at 177, and thus we conc lude that the jury found Dr. Taqueer’s tes timony, and not Has an’ s te s ti mo ny, cr edi bl e. T he g ov er nm ent

als o p r es ent ed o th er

evi den ce at

tr ial th at s up po r ts Has an’ s con vic ti on . The evidenc e, for example, that Hasan signed the first t wo pag es of M uzammil’s passport applic ation—the pag es that contained the fa lse address—s everal da ys after Dr . Taqueer signed the third page of the applic ation undermines Hasan’s claim tha t they filled out the pag es together. Simila rly, evi den ce p r es ent ed at tr ial th at H as an p ur chas ed a o ne- way t ick et to I ndia u nd er mi nes Has an’ s clai m that

he h ad o nly pl ann ed a b r

ief tr ip to I ndia i n J uly 20 06 t o r etr iev e M uzam mil. Pe r hap s mo s t i mp or tan tly, the r eco r dedte lep ho ne c onver s ati on s bet weenHas an an d D r . T aqu eer contradict Hasan’s statement that he continua lly made valia nt effor ts t o return M uzammil to Dr. T aqu eer . T akento gether , al on g wi thother evi den ce p r es ent ed at

tr ial , we c on clu de that

th er e was suff icient e vidence at trial to establish that Hasan intended to, and di d, commit the kidnappi ng crimes and thus to s upport the jury’s guilty ve rdicts. F or this reason, we a ffir m the judgment of the Di s tr ict Cou r t w ith r es pec t t o the c onvic ti on s fo r in te r nat io nal par ent al k

id nap pi ng a ndcon s pi r acy to com mi t k

id nap pi ng.8

Next, Hasan a rgues that the evidence was insufficient to s upport the jury’s guilty ve rdict on th e ch arge o f m aki ng f

als e s tat eme nt s ona pas s po r t ap pl icat io n. Sp ecif

ically, Has an ar

gue s th at his use of the incorrect address on Muzammil’s passpor t applica tion cannot support his conviction of thi s ch a rge be ca use itwa s no t a ma te ria l m isst a te me nt. W he the r th e st a tut e p roh ib itin g m a ki ng fa lse
sta te me nts o n a pa sspo rt a pp li ca ti on , 1 8 U .S .C . § 15 42 , c on ta in s a ma te ria li ty re qu ire me nt i s a question of f

irst impress ion in this Circuit. Whencon s trui ng afe der al s tatut e, we beg inwith the t ext

of th at s tatut e. See, e.g. , United St ate s v . K o ze ny , 54 1 F .3d166 , 17 1 (

2dCir . 20 08) (q

uo ti ng Uni

te d St ate s v . A lbe rt ini , 47 2 U. S. 6 75, 680 (1 985 )) . “Wh er e the s tatut e’s lan guage i s pl ain , the s ol e f un ct io n o f the c ou r ts is to enf

or ce it
acco r di ng t o i ts te r ms .” Id
. (i nt er nal qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d) (q uo ti ng Uni

te d St ate s v . Ro n Pa ir Ent er s. , I nc ., 4 89 U .S. 235 , 24 1 ( 198 9) ). Beginning with the tex t of 18 U.S.C. § 1542, we conclude that the statute plainly doe s not
r equ ir e that th e f als e s tat eme nt

be m ate r ial
. See no te 1 ante

(t ext of s tatut e) . Unlik e other

s tatut es invo lvi ng f

als e s tat eme nt s , § 1 542 do es no t c on tai n a m ate r ial it y r equ ir eme nt . F or

exam pl e, 1 8 U.S .C. § 100 1 p r ohib it s th e ma king of “an y ma terially false, fictitious, or f raudulent statement or
r epr es ent ati on ” inany m att er withi n the j ur

is di ct io n o f the f

ede r al go ver nm ent . 18 U.S .C. § 100 1 (emphasis added). The fact that a defenda nt knowingly and wil lfully made a false statement on the pas s po r t ap pl

icat io n i s s uf fi cien t t o s us tai n a co nv

ict io n. Altho ughwe h ave n ot di r ect ly ad dr es s ed this quest ion before, eac h of our s ister Circuits that has considered this question has agreed with our
con clu s io n that

§ 15 42 d oes no t r equ

ir e that th e all egedfals e s tat eme nt be “ mat er

ially f als e.” See United Sta tes v. Ramos, 72 5 F .2d132 2, 1 323 (1 1th Ci r . 19 84) (h ol di ng that , u nl ike § 10 01, § 15 42 d oes
no t h ave a m ate r

ial it y r equ ir eme nt ); see also Uni

te d St ate s v . S ali nas , 37 3 F .3d161 , 16 7 ( 1s t Ci r . 20 04)9

(s ame ); United Sta tes v. Hart

, 291 F.3d 1084, 1 085 (9th Cir. 2002) (adopting the holding in Ra mos, 72 5 F.2d at 1323). Her e, H as an l

is te d his br other ’s So uth Car ol in a add r es s as M uzam mil’s r es id enc e, ev en though Muzammil’s actual residence at the time w as in Br ooklyn. Onapp eal, Has an o nly ch all eng es th at the e vid enc e pr es ent ed at tr ial was in s uf fi cien t t o es tab lis h m ate r

ial it y anddo es no t dis pu te th at the evide nce w as otherwise suf ficient to establish that he knowingl y made a false statement with the in te nt to ob tai n a p as s po r t. B ecau s e we co ncl ud e that § 15 42 d oes no t r equ

ir e pr oo f o f m ate r

ial it y, we af fi r m the j ud gm ent

of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t o n thi s cou nt . B. Rea son ab le ne ss o f S en te nc e Onapp eal, Has an ch all eng es th r ee as pec ts of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s gui del

in es calc ul ati onus ed in his sentencing. Spec ifically , he argue s that the Dis trict Court err ed procedurally in (1) imposing purs uant to United States Sentenc ing Guideline s (“U.S.S.G.” or “the Guideline s”) § 2J1.2(b)(2) a three-level e nhance ment for s ubstantial interference with the a dministr ation of justice; (2) imposing purs uant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 a two-leve l enhanc ement for obs truction of jus tice; a nd (3) finding purs uant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 that the passport f raud conviction should not be “grouped” with the kid nap pi ng c onvic ti on s . Fo llo win g United Sta tes v. B ook er , 543 U.S. 2 20 (2005), a district court has br oad la titude to “im po s e either

a Gu id eli nes s ent enc e or

a no n- Guid eli nes s ent enc e.” United Sta tes v. Sanchez , 51 7 F. 3d651 , 66 0 (

2dCir . 20 08) ; see also United States v. Cavera , 55 0 F .3d180 , 19 0 ( 2dCir . 20 08) (e n banc). A ccordingly , the role of the Court of Appeals is limited to examining a sentence for
r eas on abl ene s s , whichis aki n t o r evi ew u nd er an “ abu s e- of

-dis cr et io n” s tan dar d. See Cavera , 55 0 F. 3dat 1 90; see also Gall v. Uni ted States, 12 8 S. Ct. 586 , 59 1 ( 200 7) (h ol di ng that

“co ur ts of

app eals10

mu s t r evi ew all s ent enc es —wh ether in s id e, j us t o ut s id e, o r

s ignif ican tly ou ts id e the G ui del

in es
r ang e—u nd er

a def er ent ial abu s e- of -dis cr et io n s tan dar d”) ; cf. Sims v. Blot , 534 F.3d 117, 13 2 (2d Cir. 2008) (“A district court has abused its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a c learly e rroneous assess ment of the evidenc e, or rendered a dec ision that cannot be lo cat ed w ithi n the r ang e of

per mi s s ib le d ecis io ns .” (

in te r nal alt er ati on , ci tat

io ns , an d quo tat

io n m ar ks omitted)). T his s tandard applie s “both to the [subst antive rea sonableness of the] sentence itself and
to th e pr oce du r es emp lo yedinar r ivi ng a t the s ent enc e.” Uni te d St ate s v . V er kho gl y ad , 51 6 F .3d122 , 127 (2 d Ci r . 20 08) (i nt er nal qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d)
. W he n a de fe nd a nt c ha ll en ge s the di stri ctco urt ’s int er pretat io n of a Gu id eli nes pr ov

is io n, we review this interpretation of the Guidelines—just as we would reviewthe interpretation of any law— de novo
. See, e.g. , Uni

te d St ate s. v. H er tul ar , 56 2 F .3d433 , 44 9 (

2dCir . 20 09) (“ I n ge ner al, we
r evi ew a dis tr

ict cou r t’ s det er mi nat

io n that a def end ant des er ves a[n ] . . . e nh ance men t . . . de
novo . . . .”)
. De novo review of the interpretation of a Guideli nes provis ion does not excee d the
nar r ow ap pellat e r evi ew p r es cr ib ed b y Gal

l . 12 8 S. Ct. at 5 91. Rath er , de novo r evi ew o f the l aw is adequa tely ca ptured in the deferential “a buse-of- discretion” standard that Gal l r equ ir es . Id
. As the of t- cit ed c as e Sims v. Blot

, 534 F.3d 117, 13 2 (2d Cir. 2008), notes, “[a] district court has abused its discretion if it based i

ts ruling on an erroneous v

iew of the law or on a clea rly erroneous ass essment of the evi den ce o r

r end er ed a d ecis io n that

cann ot be l ocat ed w

ithi n the r ang e of

per mi s s ib le d ecis io ns .” (i nt er nal alt er ati on , ci tat

io ns , an d quo tat

io n m ar ks om it te d) (e mp has is add ed) . P ut di ff er ent ly, a distr ict court necessarily “a buses its discretion” if it makes an error of law. In this way , review for “abuse of discretion” and de novo review a re not entirely distinct concepts, but rather, review for abu s e of di s cr et io n i nco r po r ate s , am on g other thin gs , de novo r evi ew dis tr ict cou r t o f rul

in gs of law.11

See, e.g. , United Sta tes v. Legr os , 529 F.3d 470, 47 3 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The abuse-of-discr etion standard in co rpo ra te s de novo review of questions of law (including inte rpretation of the Guideline s) and clea r -e r r or r evi ew o f q

ues ti on s of

fa ct .”)
. Further complica ting and confusing the discussion of standards of

review is that “a buse of discretion” is a misnomer in the reviewof a distr ict court’s r ulings on matters of law. The interpretation of Guidelines provis ions—or any law—is not “discretionary” in the ordinary sense of the word, see Webs te r ’s T hi r d N ew I nt er nat io nal Di ct io nar y 64 7 ( 197 6) (d ef

inin g “dis cr et

io n” a s “po wer of fr ee d ecis io n o r

cho ice w ithi n ce r tai n l egal

bo un ds ”) , b ecau s e, wh en ther e is a s et tl ed interpretation of a given law, judge s do not exercise their “discretion” on whether or how to in te r pr et or app ly the l aw. I ns te ad, th ey at te mp t i n go odfaith t o ap ply r elev ant pr eced ent

ial interpretations of

that law. Nevertheless, the phrase “abuse of discretion”—a phrase that has been a
s ou r ce o f s om e co nf

us io n an d m or e thanocc as io nal (an d u nd er s tan dab le) ir r

it ati onto di s tr

ict ju dge s —h as an ex pan s ive def init io n i n the f

ede r al co ur ts . See Ze rvo s v. Ve rizon N.Y., Inc. , 25 2 F .3d 163 , 16 8 n .4 (

2dCir . 20 01) . T hi s def

init io n s weep s s uf

fi cien tly f ar to def in e di s tr ict cou r t rul in gs th at a r e bas ed o n er r on eou s con clu s io ns of law as “ab us es of

di s cr et io n. ” See, e.g. , Cooter & Gell v. Har tmax Co rp. , 496 U.S. 3 84, 405 (1990); Si ms, 53 4 F .3dat 1 32; Zerv os , 25 2 F .3dat 1 69. Understanding that appell ate courts apply the term “abuse of discretion” to the overall revie w of a distr ict court’s implementation of a sentence a nd that the use of the term does not imply discretion
onth e par t o f the dis tr

ict ju dge indec idin g a m att er of law, we r evi ew the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s in te r pr et ati onof

th e Gu id eli nes her e de novo
. See Belot v. B urge , 490 F.3d 201, 20 6-07 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Z ervo s, 25 2 F .3dat 1 67- 69 ( exp lai ni ng the dif fe r enc es amo ng de novo , clea r-err or, and abuse-ofdi s cr et io n r evi ew)
.12

Hasan first

chall enges the three-leve l enhanc ement imposed by the District Court pur suant to U.S .S. G. § 2J 1.2 (b )(

2) fo r in te r fe r enc e with the ad mi ni s tr ati onof ju s ti ce. S pec if

ically, Has an
a rgu es t ha t th is e nh a nc em en t sho ul d n ot a pp ly to h im be ca use he wa s ne ve r se rve d wit h p roc ess fr om th e F amily Co ur t an d thu s was no t u nd er th e ju r is di ct io n o f that

cou r t. In United Sta tes v. Amer

, we c on clu dedth at thi s enh ance men t didapp ly t o a s et of near ly identica l facts. 110 F.3d 873 (2d Ci r. 1997). The defendant in Amer abducted hi s children and took them abroad without their mother’s knowledge, a s Hasan did here. In Amer , the mother then filed a petition in Family C ourt in New York, whic h awa rded her full custody of the children a nd iss ued a
war r ant fo r th e de fe nd ant ’s ar r es t— agai n, as Dr . T aqu eer di d i n thi s cas e. F in ally, the d ef end ant in Amer was even tu all

y ar r es te d an d co nv

ict ed o f i nt er nat

io nal par ent al k

id nap pi ng, as Has an wa s . We upheld the District Court’s imposition of this thr ee-leve l enhanc ement, reasoning that the defendant’s abduction of the chi ldren “prevented proper lega l proceeding s fr om occurring by taking
mat te r s com pl et ely o ut s id e the p ur vie w of th e adminis tr ati onof

ju s ti ce.” Id

. at 885. W e conc lude that our holding in Amer

con tr ol s andth us th at the D is tr ict Cou r t didno t e r r

inim po s in g thi s enhanc ement. Nex t, Has an ar

gue s th at the D is tr

ict Cou r t e r r ed i n ap plyin g, p ur s uan t t o U .S. S.G . § 3 C1.1 , a two-level e nhance ment for obs truction of jus tice by c ommitting perjury at trial. Specific ally , he
argue s th at thi s enh ance men t p unis hes hi m f or te s ti fy in g at tr ial . T hi s enh ance men t, ho weve r , “d oes
no t v io lat e a de fe nd ant ’s con s ti tu ti on al r igh t[ ] [ to te s ti fy inon e’s owndef

ens e] i f the d ef

end ant has mad e s worn s tat eme nt s th at h e kn ows to be f als e.” United Sta tes v. J

ohnson , 99 4 F .2d980 , 98 8 ( 2d Cir. 1993). Ha san further argues that the enhanc ement should only be imposed after a jury finds that he did obstruct jus tice. Beca use the Guidelines are no longe r mandatory, “the defenda nt has no13

rig ht t o a ju ry

de te rmi na ti on of t he fa ct s tha t th e j ud ge de em s re le va nt” wh en the tri a l j ud ge sel ec ts a
s ent enc e withi n a d ef

in ed r ang e. Boo ker

, 54 3 U. S. a t 2 33. T he D is tr ict Cou r t s elec te d a s pec if

ic sentence from within the well -defined range a pplica ble under the Guideli nes, thus Has an wa s not ent it ledto a s epar ate ju ry de te r mi nat io n r egar di ng his all egedper ju ry ch arge b ef or e the Co ur t c ould apply this enha ncement. Finally, Ha san argues that the Distr ict Court erred in “grouping” the c onvictions for kidnapping

and conspiracy

to commit kidnapping, but not the conviction for pass port f raud, bec aus e, i n H as an’ s vie w, all thr ee ch arges ar os e f r om a com mo n s che me a s par t o f “ a s in gle criminal epi sode” purs uant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 appli cation note 3. Convic tions are grouped, for Guid eli nes pu r po s es , o nly wh en they invo lve th e s ame vic ti m. See U.S .S. G. § 3D 1.2 (a) -( b) . H er e, the victims of the kidnapping a nd conspiracy to kidna p were the same—na mely, Dr. Taqueer and M uzam mil. S oci et

y at lar ge, ho weve r , was th e vi ct

im of Has an’ s pas s po r t f

r aud . F or this r eas on , we conclude that the Distr

ict Court did not err in grouping the kidnapping c harges, but considering
s epar ate ly the p as s po r t f

r audchar ge. C. Ine ff

ect iv e Ass ist an ce o f C ou ns el Fi nally, Has an ar

gue s th at h e r ecei

vedin ef fe ct ive as s is tan ce o f c ou ns el. Sp ecif ically, Has an contends that counsel was ineffective in failing to ca ll certain famil y members to test ify about the events in South Ca rolina and India; i n failing to subpoena witnesses related to the passport applic ation; in faili ng to call a family friend to tes tify aga inst Dr . Taqueer; in failing to obtain Dr. T aqu eer ’s te lep ho ne, ban k, a ndemp lo yme nt r eco r ds ; in

faili ng t o r ais e cer tai n o bj ect io ns to tr ial
te s ti mo ny; infaili ng t o s ecu r e exp er t t es ti mo ny c on cer ni ng the al te r ati onof te lep ho ne r eco r di ngs and written documents; in failing to clarify ce rtain facts during his summation; in failing to request a14

speedy trial for Hasan; in failing to pe rmit Hasan to participate in va rious m eetings; in failing to inform Hasan of the strategic implica tions of pleadi ng guilty a s compared to thos e of pleadi ng not guilt y; i n f ail in g t o f ile a Rul e 29 mo ti on ; an d i n f ail in g t o i nf or m H as an o f h ow the G ui del in es op er ate andth e ef

fe ct of pl eadi ng n ot

guilt y onth e Gu

id eli nes calc ul ati on s . To pr evai l on a cl aim of ineffective a ss istance of counsel under Strickland v. Washin gton , 46 6 U.S . 66 8 ( 198 4) , p et

it io ner “m us t ( 1) dem on s tr ate th at his cou ns el’ s per fo r man ce f ell bel ow an ob ject ive s tan dar d o f r eas on abl ene s s . . . and(2) af fi r mat ive ly p r ov e pr eju di ce ar

is in g f r om cou ns el’ s all eged ly d ef

ici ent r epr es ent ati on .” Ca rrion v. Smith , 54 9 F .3d583 , 58 8 ( 2dCir . 20 08) (i nt er nal quotation marks omitted). Altho ughwe p r ef er to add r es s clai ms of

in ef fe ct ive as s is tan ce o f c ou ns el incollat er al p r oce edi ngs , r ath er th an o n dir ect

app eal, we m ay t ake o ne o f thr ee act io ns whe n presented with a cla im of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appe al: “(1) dec line to hea r the clai m, permitting the appella nt to raise the iss ue as part of a subs equent [28 U.S. C.] § 2 255 petition; (2) remand the clai m to the distr ict court for necess ary fact-finding; or (3) decide the c laim on the
r eco r d b ef

or e us .” Uni

te d St ate s v . Le o ne , 215 F.3d 253, 25 6 (2d Cir. 2000). W hen the resolution of the cla ims “is beyond any doubt or to do so would be in the interest of jus tice,” w e may choose to
ent er tai n thes e claim s ondi r ect app eal. United Sta tes v. M

atos, 90 5 F .2d30, 32 (

2dCir . 19 90) (i nt er nal quotation marks omitted). I n thi s cas e, we ar e abl e t o co ns id er s om e of th e claim s of

in ef fe ct ive as s is tan ce o f c ou ns el bec aus e the r eco r d i s clea r , an d H as an’ s clai ms ar e cle arly co ntr adi ct ed b y the r eco r d. Fi r s t, Has an alle ges that his attorney failed to permit his father, br other, and sist er to test ify regarding the e vents in South Ca rolina and India. Ha san’s counsel did, howeve r, subpoena his father and brother, who th en didno t t es ti fy

af te r bei ng a dv is ed b y in dep end ent

cou ns el o f thei r

r igh t n ot to te s ti fy if th at15

testimony might incriminate themselves. With respect to Hasan’s sist er, we note tha t the record makes little mention of her, and nothing in the record would support relief on this basis . Next, Hasan argues that his counsel failed to obje ct to the introduction at trial of certain inflammatory
r ema r ks th at H as an m ade. T he r eco r d, ho weve r , in di cat es th at H as an’ s cou ns el didob ject . H as an’ s clai m that his tr

ial c ounsel did not file a timely motion purs uant to Rule 29 of the Federal R ules of Criminal Procedure is also contradicted by the record. Hasan also cla ims that counsel failed to object to the introduction of evidenc e regarding the proce dures to obt ain pa ss ports in India and the United States. Although it is uncle ar what, e xactly , Hasan cha llenge s here, it is clear that, given the overwhelming

evidenc e ag ainst him at trial, Hasan ca nnot show prejudice from the intr oduction of this evi den ce. A cco r di ngl y, we con clu de that

th e abo ve cl aim s of

in ef fe ct ive as s is tan ce o f c ou ns el are without merit. T he r eco r d o n ap peal

is in s uf fi cien t t o ad ju di cat e Has an’ s r emainin g cl aim s of in ef fe ct ive
as s is tan ce o f c ou ns el—nam ely, Has an’ s clai ms th at his cou ns el f ail ed t o s ub po ena w

itnes s es r elat ed to the passpor t applica tion; failed to ca ll a family friend to tes tify aga inst Dr . Taqueer; faile d to obtain Dr. Taqueer’s telephone, ba nk, and e mployment records; failed to secure expert testimony
con cer ni ng the al te r ati onof te lep ho ne r eco r di ngs andwr it te n d ocu men ts ; f

ail ed t o cl ar

if y cer tai n facts during his s ummation; failed to request a speedy trial for defendant; failed to permit appell ant to participate in va rious m eetings; faile d to informHasan of the str ategic implica tions of pleadi ng guilt y as com par ed t o tho s e of pl eadi ng n ot

guilt y; an d f ail ed t o i nf

or m H as an o f h ow the G ui del in es operate and the effect of pleading not guilty on the Guideli nes calc ulations We therefore dec line to hear th es e claim s andper mi t d ef end ant to r ais e thes e is s ues as par t o f as ub s equ ent pet it io n u nd er 28 U .S. C. § 2 255
. Se e U

nit ed Stat es v. Ol adime ji , 463 F.3d 152, 15 4 (2d Cir. 2006) (“W here the record16

onapp eal d oes no t i ncl ud e f act s nec es s ary t o ad ju di cat e a cl aim of in ef fe ct ive as s is tan ce o f c ou ns el,
our us ual practic e it not to consider the claim on direct a ppeal, but to leave i t to the defendant to raise the clai ms on a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C . § 2255. ”). CONCLUSI ON T o s um mar

ize: (1) We conc lude that the ev idence was suff

icient to support defendant’s convictions for in te r nat io nal par ent al k

id nap pi ng a ndcon s pi r acy t o co mm it kid nap pi ng; (2 ) W e c on cl ud e t ha t, un de r 18 U. S. C . § 15 42 , c on vi ctio n o f th e c rim e o f ma ki ng a fa lse statement on a passport

applic ation does not require that the statement be materially false, and thus
we c onclude tha t the evidenc e wa s s ufficient to suppor t defendant’s conviction on this count; (3) We conc lude that the District Court did not err in sentencing de fendant; (4) We dismiss several of defendant’s cla ims of ineff ective assis tance of counsel; a nd (5) We dec line to reviewdefendant’s remaining c laims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appea l—namely , defendant’s cla ims that his counsel failed to subpoena witnesses related to th e pas s po r t ap pl

icat io n; faile d t o cal

l a f amily f r ien d t o t es ti fy

agai ns t D r . T aqu eer ; f

ail ed t o o bt ain Dr. T aquee r’s t elephone , bank, a nd employment records; failed to secure expe rt tes timony
con cer ni ng the al te r ati onof te lep ho ne r eco r di ngs andwr it te n d ocu men ts ; f

ail ed t o cl ar

if y cer tai n facts during his s ummation; failed to request a speedy trial for defendant; failed to permit appell ant to participate in va rious m eetings; faile d to informHasan of the str ategic implica tions of pleadi ng guilt y as com par ed t o tho s e of pl eadi ng n ot

guilt y; an d f ail ed t o i nf

or m H as an o f h ow the G ui del in es operate and the effect of pleading not guilty on the Guideli nes calc ulations—all of whic h may be the
s ub ject , indu e co ur s e, o f apr oce edi ng u nd er 28 U .S. C. § 2 255
.17

Ac co rdi ng

ly , t he Oc tob er3, 20 08 ju dg me nt o f th e D ist ric t C ou rt i s AF F IRME D
.