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Argued October 6, 2020

J U S T I C E D E V I

N E delivered the opinion of the Court, in which C H I E F J U S T I C E H E C H T , J U S T I C E G U

Z M A N , J U S T I C E L E H R

M A N N , J U S T I C E B O Y D , J U S T I C E B U S B Y , J U S T I C E B L A N D , and J U S T I C E H U D D L E joined.
J U S T I C E B L

A C K L O C K filed a dissenting opinion.
During Hurricane Harvey in 2 017, the San J acinto River A uthority released water from its L ake Conroe reservoir into the San J acinto River. Contending that t h i s r e l e a se caused or contributed to the flooding of their properties, d ownst r ea m p r o p e rty owners filed three multiparty suits in two different district c o u r t s , asserting both common-law inverse condemnation claims under Article 1, Section 17 of the Tex as Constitution and statutory t a k i ng s c laims under Chapter 2 0 07 of the Government Code. These cases reach us as interlocutory appeals fro m t r i a l

2court orders deny ing the River Authority ’s motions to d ismiss the three su i t s
. The three cases

have been consolidated for purposes of this appeal. 1
The issue we must d e c ide is wh e t h e r C h a p t er 2007 applies strictly to reg ulatory taking s,

as the Ri v e r A u t h o r i t y maintains, or whether it may also a pply to a phy sical taking , as the property owners contend. The court of appeals affirmed the trial cour t s ’ orders, which denied the River Authority ’s motions to dismiss, concluding tha t C h a p t e r 2007’s statutory taking s claim included the phy sical taking s claim alleg ed in the property owne r s ’ p leading s. San J acinto River Auth. v. Burney, 570 S.W .3d 820 (Tex . App. —Houston [ 1st Dist.] 2018). W e ag r ee and affirm.
I The San J ac i n t o River Authority is a conservation and reclamation district created in
1937 as a political subdivision of the State of Tex as. 2 The River A u thority h as many responsi b i l i t i es, including “storing , controlling , and conserving storm and floodwaters of the San
J acinto River and its tributaries.” 3
I n 1 973, the River Authority completed the const r u c t i o n o f a n earthen dam across the
W e s t Fork of the San J acinto River to create L ake Conroe. The River Authority h as o p e r a t e d

1 Cau se No . 1 9

- 0 4 00 , S

a n Ja cin to River Au t

h . v. Vicen te Med in a , Ash ley Med in a , a n d Aris An to n io u ; Cau se No . 1 9

- 0 4 0 1 , Sa n Ja cin to River Au th . v. Mich ael A. Bu r n ey, Gin g er R. Bu rn ey, Ch a rles A. Ca sey, Ma u r een S . Ca sey, Jo h n M. Da n iel, Ca r o lyn F. Da n iel, Ro bert C. Miles, S h erry K. Miles, Ja ck L. No wlin , Lin d a S

. No wlin , Ba rry L. S

h ep h erd , Becky A. S h ep h erd

, Ch a rles H.F. W

h erry, Dia n e S . W

herry, Ro d

n ey M. W o lf, a n d Na n cy L. W

o lf ; an d Cau se No . 1 9

- 0 4 0 2 , S a n Ja cin to River Au th . v. Ch a rles J. Arg en to , Ka th a rin e Arg en to , Kristo

fer D. Bu ch a n , Melissa Bu ch a n , Bra n d o n Bu rg ess, Dia n e Bu rg ess, Jeff En sley, An n e En sley, Jo hn Fa ulkin berry, La u rie D. Fa u lkin b erry, Jo h n R. Freema n , Ba rb ara Freema n , Ku rt V. Hu s ema n , Deb b ie L. Hu sema n , W

illia m E. La n g e, Jen n ifer W o o d La n g e, Da vid

L. Miller, S

a lly T. Miller, W

illa im J. Na p ier, Jr., Ch r istin e D. Na p i er, Ja mes R. Revel, Lo u ise W . Revel, Bern a r

d F. Rya n , Cecilia M. Rya n , Da n a M. S teg a ll, Dan n y

C. S t eg a ll, To d

d R. S u mn er, a n d

Kimb erly A. S u mn er .

2 A ct o f May 1 2, 1 9 3 7 , 4 5th

L eg ., R.S., ch . 4 2 6 , § 1 , 1 93 7 T ex . Gen . L aw s 8 6 1 , 8 6 1 (creatin g th e San J acin to Riv er Co n serv atio n an d Reclam atio n

District). T h e District w as ren am ed th e “ San J acin to Riv er A u th o rity ” in 1 9 5 1. A ct o f May 1 4 , 1 9 51 , 5 2 n d L eg ., R.S., ch . 3 6 6 , § 1 , 1 9 5 1 T ex . Gen . L aw s 6 1 7 , 6 1 7

.

3 A ct o f May 1 2, 1 9 3 7 , 4 5th

L eg ., R.S., ch . 4 2 6 , § 3 (c), 1 9 3 7 T ex . Gen . L aw s 8 6 1 , 8 6 2

.

3and maintained the lake and da m since that time. The dam is a bout thirty miles north of the property owners’ homes and properties. The property o wners alleg e that d uring Hurricane Harve y in late A ug ust and early September 2017, the River Authority released rising w a t e r f r om L ake Conroe into the West F ork of the San J a cinto River, causing or ex acerbating the d ownstream flood i n g o f t h e i r properties. They seek damag es from the River Authority in three separate lawsuits in Harris Coun ty district
courts. Each suit alleg es taking s c laims under both the T ex as C o n stitution 4 a nd the Private Real Property Rig hts Pre s e rv a t i on Act, w hich is c odified as Chapter 2007 o f the T e x as Government Code. 5
The River Au t h o ri t y f i led Rule 91a motions to d ismiss the property owners’ suits on
g rounds of g overnmental immunity

. See T E X

. R. C I V

. P. 91a. The distric t co u r t s d e n ied the motions, and the River Authority appealed. See T E X

. C I V

. P R A C

. & R E M

. C O D E § 5 1

. 0 1 4(a)(8) (authoriz ing an interlocutory appe a l from an order on the g overnment’s jurisdictional plea). I n that appeal, the River Authority raised a new jurisdictional arg ument, a s s e r t i n g that the county civil courts at law in Harris C o u n ty possessed ex clusive, o rig inal jurisdiction o ver eminent d o m ain p r oceeding s. See T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 25.1032(c) (“A county civil court at law h a s

ex c lusive jurisdiction i n H a rris County of eminent domain proceeding s, both statutory and inverse.”). The c ourt of appeals a g reed that the d i s t r ict courts of H arris County lacked jurisdiction

over the pro p e r t y owners’ inverse-condemnation claims and dismissed them w ithout prejudice to

4 S ee T E X
. C O NST . art. I, § 1 7 (“ No p erso n ’ s p ro p erty sh all b e tak en , d am ag ed , o r d estro y ed f or o r ap p lied to p u b lic u se w ith o u t ad eq u ate co m p en satio n . . .”).

5 S ee T E X
. G OV ’ T C ODE § 2 0 0 7 .0 2 1 (au th o rizin g su it to d eterm i n e w h eth er a tak in g h as o ccu rred u n d er Ch ap ter 2 0 0 7 ). 4refile in the p roper court. 570 S.W .3d at 8 3 8

– 3 9

. Concluding that the district courts otherwise

possessed jurisdict i o n to determine the property o w n ers’ statutory taking s claims under Chapter 2007, the court of appeals affirmed the trial courts’ d e c i s i o n not to dismiss them. Id

. at 839; see also T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 2007.021(a) (s t a t ing that taking s claims under the chapter “must be filed in a dis t r i c t court”). The River Authority ’ s petition f or review to this Court complains that
t h e a p p e l l a t e court erred in not a lso dismissing the property owners’ statutory claims because the taking alleg ed in their pleading s is outside Chapter 2007’s scop e and limited w aiver of sovereig n immunity

. II Sovereig n and g overnmental immunity protect the state and its p olitical subdivisions, respectively , from suit and liability absent the state’s ex press w a iver. Rusk State Hosp. v. B l a c k , 392 S.W .3d 88, 93 (Tex

. 2012)

. Chapter 2007’s Property Rig hts A ct waives that immunity “to the ex tent of liability created by this ch a p t e r ” b y authoriz ing a property o wner to bring suit “to determine whether the g overnmental action of a political subdivision res u l t s i n a taking under this chapter.” T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E §§ 2007.004(a), .021(a). The Act defines the term “ taking ” to include g overnmental actions compensable as taking s under the s t at e a n d federal c onstitutions,

as well as less intrusive g overnmental actions that cause “a reduction of at l east 25 p ercent in the market value of the a ffected private real property .” Id. § 2007.002(5). T h e P r o p e r ty Rig hts Act further enumerates the g overnmental actions to which it applies, w h i l e s pecify ing fourteen
g overnmental actions to which it does not apply

. Id. § 2007.003. The River A uthority makes a twofold arg u ment t h a t the A ct’s waiver o f g overnmental immunity d oes not apply to its decision to release water from the L ake Conroe reservoir. Fi r s t , it

5contends that the Act a p plies only to reg ulatory taking s and n o t the phy si c al taking a lleg ed by the property owners; that is, the flooding a l l e ge d l y c aused b y the River Authority

. Alternatively , the Authority maintains that even if the Act mig ht be const r u e d to cover a phy sical taking , its actions here are nevertheless ex cluded because they w er e r e s p o n sive to “a g rave and immediate threat to life and property .” See id . § 2007.003(b)(7). W e consider these arg u ments in turn.
III The River Authority contends that Chapter 2007 applies to reg u latory taking s only

. Taking s may be classified as either p h y sical or reg ulatory

. Tarrant Reg’l W ater Dist. v. Gragg , 151 S.W .3d 546, 554 ( Tex

. 2004). A phy sical takin g o c c u rs when the g overnment literally takes property from its owner, such as when i t “ a u t h oriz es an unwarranted p hy sical occupation of an individual’s property .” Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale , 964 S.W .2d 922, 933 (Tex

. 1998). A
reg ulatory taking occurs when the g overnment restricts a property owner’s rig hts to such an

ex tent as to b ecome the functi o n al e q u i v alent of a phy sical seiz u re. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch,
Inc. v. State , 381 S.W

. 3d 468, 490 (Tex

. 2012). The River Authority maintains that a fair reading of the chapter indicates (1) that the liability create d here is only for reg ulatory taking s (not the phy sical taki n g alleg ed in the property owners’ pleading s) and ( 2 ) that g overnmental immunity is waived only

for suits to invalidate and rescind such reg u lations. The court o f appeals disag reed. I t “reject[ ed] the River Author i t y ’s contention that Chapter 2007 applies only to reg ul a t o r y t a k i n gs and does not apply to phy sical taking s, such as flooding , ” noting that “the statute ex pres sly applies to a g overnmental a ction ‘that imposes a phy sical invasion

. . . of private real property .’” 570 S.W .3d at 832 (quoting T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 2007.003(a)(2)). Th e c o u r t relied further o n the chapter’s b road definition of “taking .” That

6definition includes both r e gu latory and phy sical taking s. See id

. at 831 (noting the inclusion of

c o m p e n s a b l e taking s under both the state and federal constitutions in the statutory d efinition). The court according ly concluded that the property owners’ a lleg ations of a phy sical taking were sufficient to invoke the chapter’s waiver of g overnmental immunity

. Id . at 832. The River Authority maintains that the court o f ap p e a l s h a s misinterpreted the phy sicalinvasion provision to e x pand t h e c h apter’s scope to p hy sical taking s. I t concedes, h owever, that
g overnmental actions that impose a “phy sical invasion” of real property can refer to either a phy s i ca l o r reg ulatory taking

. B ut in the contex t of this statute, it reasonably refers only to the latter, according

to the River Authority

. The statute states that the chapter “applies only to the following g o vernmental actions:” (1) the adoption or issuance of an ordinance, rule, reg ulatory requir em ent, resolution, policy , g uideline, or similar measure; (2) an a c t i o n t h at imposes a physical invasion or r equires a dedication o r ex action of private real property ; (3) an action by a municipality that has effect in the ex traterritorial jurisdiction of the municipality , ex c luding annex ation, and that enacts or e n fo r ces an ordinance, rule, reg ulati o n , o r plan that does not impose identical requirements or r e strictions in the entire ex traterritorial jurisdiction of the municipality ; and (4) enforcement of a g overnmental actio n listed in Subdivisions (1) throug h (3), whether the enforcement o f the g over n m e n tal action is accomplished throug h the use of permit t i n g , citations, orders, judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding s, or other similar means.
T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 2007.003(a)(1)–(4) (emphasis added). B ecause each action on the list can refer to a reg ulatory taking , the River Authority a r g ues that “phy sical invasion” should be interpreted similarly and n ot as a n outlier, different in ty

p e from the other enume ra t e d actions. Althoug h a phy sical invasion can refer to either a p h y s i c al o r r e g u latory taking , the River

7Authority contends that the wo r d s here refer only to r eg u latory taking s, like the actions of

“dedication” or “ex action,” which a ppear along with phy sical inv a s i o n in Section 2007.003(a)(2). See Hearts Bl u f f G ame Ranch , 381 S.W .3d at 477 n .20 (referring to the terms

ex a c t i on a

nd dedication as “ somewhat distinct ty pes of reg ulatory taking s matters”). Moreover, interpreting “phy sical invasion” to ref e r en c e a reg ulatory taking only is consistent with the other enumerated g overnmental a ctions, which the River A uthority submits are als o r e gu l a t ory in
nature. See T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 2007.003(a)(1), (3). F inally , the River A uthority observes that “the tex t does not include the primary mode for phy sical taking s: a c o n d e m n at i o n petition filed in court,” citing section 21.012 of the Tex as Property Code.
I ndeed, it does not

. I n fact, the chapter ex pressly ex cludes formal condemnation proceeding s from its sco p e
. See T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 2007.003(b)(8) (ex cluding “a formal

ex e rcise of the power o f eminent do main” from the chapter). Condemnation is the formal
process by which private property is taken for a public use w ithout the owner’s c onsent, but on the pay ment of adequate compensation. See T E X

. P R O P

. C O D E § 21.012 (stating the requirements for a condemnati o n p e tition); 17 W I L L I A M V. D O R S A N E O I I I , T E X

A S L I T I G

A T I O N G U I D E §§ 261.40–.47 (2020) ( discussing procedure for ex e r c i s i n g eminent domain power).
W h en the g overnment takes or damag es property without f i rst initiating f

ormal condemnation proceeding s, howe v e r , t h e o wner of private property may bring a common-law action for inverse

c o n d e m n at i o n
. State v. Brownlow , 319 S.W .3d 649, 652 (Tex

. 2010) (citing W estgate, Ltd. v. State , 8 4 3 S.W .2d 448, 4 5 2 ( Te x . 1992)). The action is referred to as inverse b ecause the property owner initiates a common-law action to recover compensation for a taking that has already o ccurred instead of the g overnment initiating a formal statutory proceeding to d etermine

8a p p ro p r iate compensation for a prospective taking

. City of D allas v. Stewart , 361 S.W .3d 5 6 2 ,

5 6 7 ( T e x . 2012). B ut as noted, Chapter 2007 ex p ressly ex cludes f o rmal condemnati o n proceed i n gs
. T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 2007.003(b)(8). I t does not similarly ex clude c laims f or inverse condemnation. The property owners arg ue that the ex clusion of f ormal condemnation p roceedings f rom the chapter, which the River Authority describes as “the primary mode for ph y s i c al taking s,” confirms that Chapter 2007’s application is n ot limited to reg ulatory taking s. They submit that this ex clusion is rendered superfluous und e r t h e River A uthority ’s proposed limitation of the chap t e r t o reg u latory matters. I t merely ex cludes that w h ich the River Authority maintains is not included to begi n w i t h

. T h e property owners arg ue that the ex clusion h as meaning only if Chapter 2007 otherwise applies to non-reg ulatory p hy sical invasions that result i n a p h y s i c al taking o f real property

. The L e gi s l ature could have e x cluded all non-reg ulatory phy sical invasions o f real p r operty from th e c h a p t e r ’s scope, just as it ex cluded the “formal e x ercise of
t h e power of eminent domain” and thirteen other actions, many of which the property o w n e r s submit also include n o n - r e gu l atory , phy sical taking s. See, e.g. , id

. § 2 007.003(b)(2), (3), (6), (7), (8), and (13). The property owners also maintain that the statute’s phy sical-invasion pro v i s i on

ex p ressly states what these statutory ex clusions imply , that the chapter d o e s not apply solely to
reg ulatory taking s. The chapter instead applies to non-reg u latory g ov e r n m e ntal a ctions, such as the water release from the r eservoir that flood e d their properties and thus “impose[ d ] a phy sical invasion

. . . of private real p roperty .” Id

. § 2007.00 3 (a ) ( 2 )

. The property owners conclude that construing the p hy sica l

- i n v a sion p rovision to include phy sical taking s g ives meaning to that tex t

9and harmoniz es it with the chapter’s suit- au t h o r i z ation lang uag e, id

. § 2007.021(a), and taking ’s

definition, id . § 2007.002(5). W e ag ree. The chapter pr o v i des that p r ivate property owners may b ring suit to determine whether
g overnmental action results i n a “ t aking under this chapter.” Id

. § 2007.021(a). “Taking ” is defined broadly to include g overnmental actions that sati s fy the taking s standard under the federal or state constitution or that reduce the market value of the affected p roperty b y at least 25 percent. Id

. § 2007.002(5). A compensable taking under the sta t e o r federal constitution can be phy sical or reg u lat o ry
. Gragg , 151 S.W .3d at 554. And w e have held under somewhat similar circumstances that a political subdivision’s decision to f lood downstream properties for a public
purpose can be compensable as a phy sical taking u n der the Tex a s Constitution

. Id

. a t 554–55 (citing T E X

. C O N S T

. art. I , § 17). Chapter 2007 thus authoriz es a statutory taki n g s suit f or
g overnmental actions that constitute taking s u nder the state or f ederal cons t itution (either phy sical or reg

ulatory ) or that cause a reduction of at least 25 percent in market value. The Rive r A u t hority does not deny the breadth of these provisions, n or d oes it deny that “phy sical inva s i o n ” m a y refer to a phy sical taking

. Rather, it arg ues that a phy sical invasion can also be t h e c o n s equence of a r eg u latory taking and that we should construe the lang u ag e here to reference only that ty

pe of taking b e c ause that construction b etter fits the statutory scheme and its remedies. F or ex ample, Subchapter C of the statute e nvisions an orderly p r o c e s s throug h which a pol itical subdivision proposes a covered g o vernmental action that may result in a taking , prepares a w r i t t e n t a king s impact assessment of that action, and provides a 30-day public notice of its intentions. T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E §§ 2007.042 (public notice), .043 (tak i n gs i m pact assessment). I f the go v e r n m ental action is found to be a taking under the chapter, the “property

10owner is only entitled to, a nd the g overnmental e ntity is only liable for, invalidation of t h e
g overnmental action.” Id

. § 2007.023. The chapter does not oblig ate the g ov e rn m e n t a l e ntity to
pay damag es. I nstead, the River Authority submits that thi s statutory scheme e stablishes a new procedure for preventing ex c es s i v e r e gulatory taking s b efore they occur, a llowing for a sing le remedy : a judg ment rescinding the challeng ed a c t i o n
. I d

. § 2007.024(a). I t submits that these

r equirements cannot be satisfied d uring a tropical storm and that the c hapter’s r eme d y i s o f n o bene fi t t o t h e property owners, in any event, because they seek only damag es caused by the flooding

. The A ttorney G eneral makes a similar arg ument as amicus c uriae in support of the R i v er Authority ’s p etition for r e v i e w . The Attorney General arg ues that the property owners lack standing under Chapter 2007 because the chapter offers them no prospect of redres s
. The only relief the p roperty owners seek is an award of damag e s, and that is the o nly r e lief that can redress their alleg e d injuries. B ut the chapter does not include the judici a l p o w e r to award damag es. The chapter’s only remed y f o r a t ak ing is invalidation a nd r escission, which, the Attorney General argu e s , i s not p ossible here. The River Authority echoes this sentiment. I t
arg ues that Chapter 20 0 7 ’s d e c laratory remedies serve a purpose o nly when a reg ulatory taking can be undone and that here it cannot rescind the floodwaters back into the reservoir.
W e a gr e e t hat Chapter 2007 does not oblig a te a g overnmental entity to pay damag es. We also ag ree that rescission is not w hat the property owners seek. Bu t w e d o n ot ag ree that

r e s c i s s ion is the only remedy available to a prevailing property owner under the chapter. Chapter 2 007 plainly provides for more than just rescission. S ee id

. § 2007.006(a) (“The remedies provided by this chapter are in addition to other procedures or rem e d i es p r o v i de by

11law.” (emp h a s i s ad d ed)). F or ex ample, the property owners may sue to adjudicate whether

g overnmental actions result in a taking under the chapter, id

. § 2007.021; the y a r e e n t i t l ed to a “taking s” determination made by the trier of fact, id

. § 2007.023(b); they are entitled to invalidation of the g o vernmental action resulting in the taking , id .; they a r e entitled to a jud gment that “ include[ s] a fact finding that determines the monetary damag es suffered by the private real property owner as a result of the taking , ” id

. § 2007.024( b ) ; a n d they a re entitled to

a n a w a r d o f attorney s’ fees and costs, if they p revail, id

. § 2007.026(a). Thus, even thou gh damag es are not g enerally available 6 under the chapter, the statute d o e s p r ovide additional relief bey o nd that available to the property owners at common law for inverse condemnation. The Dissent, however, would releg ate the property owners to their constitutional remedy under the taking s clause and dism i s s t h e i r statutory claims for lack of jurisdiction. Post at ___. The Dissent submits that the most the property owners can hope to achieve under their statutory claim is a judicial determination t h a t t h e f l o oding of their homes was a taking and the cause of

an identified amount of damag es. Id

. at ___. I t d escribes these determinat i o n s a s “abstract” and of “no p ractical effect” without the g overnment’s consent. Id

. a t

_ _ _ . Bu t the g overnment has consented to this suit and to liability , and whether it chooses to p a y the a m o u n t o f d a mag es determined under the statute is not a matter of jurisdictional concern. The state h as wai v e d i t s immunity from suit and liability “to the ex tent of liability created b y [ C h ap t er 2007] ” a

nd has authoriz ed suits ag ainst its political subdivisions to determine “whether the g overnmenta l a c t i o n o f a political subdivision r e sults in a taking under this

6 A j u d g m en t , f

i n al d ecisio n , o r o rd er u n d er Ch ap ter 2 0 0 7, Su b ch ap ter B , m

u st in clu d e a f

act f in d in g o f th e m o n etary d am ag es cau sed b y

th e tak in g , b u t th e g ov ern m en tal en tity is n o t o b lig ated to p ay th ose d am ag es. T E X
. G OV ’ T C ODE § 2 0 0 7 .0 2 4(b ). If th e g o v ern m en tal en t ity

d o es n o t w ish

to rescin d th e actio n

th at cau sed th e tak in g , h o w ev er, it “ m ay elect to p ay

th e d am ag es as co m

p en satio n ” an d its “ im

m u n ity to liab ility

is w aiv ed to th e ex ten t th e g o v ern m en tal en tity elects to p ay .” Id . § 2 0 0 7 .0 24 (c). 12chapter.” T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E §§ 2007.004(a),

. 021(a). I f the property owner can establish a

taking under the statutory definition, the p roperty owner is entitled to inv a l i d ation of the
go v e r n m e ntal a ction resulting in the taking

. Id

. § 2007.023(b). The chapter further provides f o r alternative remedies o f either r e s c i ssion or damag es f or the taking

. Id

. § 2 007.024. Damag es are
pay a ble at the g ov ernmental entity ’s election from f unds appropriated to it. Id

. § 2007.024(c), (f).
B e cause the Dissent v iews the g overnment’s e lectio n t o p a y damag es as unlikely and the rescissi on of prior g overnmental action as inconsequential, it concludes that any judg ment the

c o urt mig ht render would b e “merely advisory ” and intrude on the other b ra n c h e s o f
g overnment. P ost at

_

__ (citing Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd. , 548 S.W .3d 477, 488 ( Tex

. 2018)). B ut i t is the L eg islature that has waived immunity from suit a nd liability for statutory taking s and provided for these alternative remedies. That the g overnment mig h t de c l ine to pay damag es is no r eason to dismiss the pending suits on jurisdictional g rounds. Even if the statute h a d n ot waived immunity from liability to determine these damag es, that would not af f e c t a court’s jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v
. Jones , 8 S.W

. 3 d 6 3 6 , 6 3 8 (Tex

. 1999) (per curiam) (ex plaining that immunity f rom liability is an “affirmative de f e n s [ e ] ” that “does not affect a court’s jurisdiction to hear a case”). The Dissent’s c ontrary rule would nullif y m a n y l e gi s lative
g rants of permis s i o n to sue, as any resulting suit ag a inst the g overnment would f ail the Dissent’s redressabil i t y test if the g overnment r etains immunity from liability or limits collectability or enforcement of a judg men t. S ee, e.g., T E X

. C I V

. P R A C

. & R E M

. C O D E §§ 101.107(a), 101.109, 107.002(b), 1 14.001; Fed. Sign v
. Tex. S. Univ. , 951 S.W .2d 401, 414 (Tex

. 1997) (Hecht, J .,

13concurring ) ( noting that even without “ g overnmental immunity from contract suits, successful

plaintiffs still could not be paid without leg islative appropriation”).
Nor is it a r eason to dismiss the statutory claim merely on the possibility that the

cons t i t u t i o n m a y provide the d esired remedy

. The taking defined by the chapter is broader than that cog niz able under the constitution, and the remedy the statute pro v ides may be all that is available to some of the property owners in these suits. The statutory remedies are cumulat i v e o f o t h er law but, of course, cannot be used to

recover twice “ for the same economic loss.” T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 2 0 0 7 .006(b). Moreover, the definition of “ taking ” does n ot say that the offending g overnmental action must be rescindable, continuous, o r recurring , but instead provides that it may be actionable e v e n t h o u gh temporary or permanent. Id

. § 2 0 0 7 .002(5)(A). Thus, we conclude that the statute’s rescission remedy , while
most relevant to a reg u latory taking , does not otherwise modify or limit the s cope of an actionable taking

under the chapter or provide the basis for dismissal on jurisdictional g rounds. Similarly , the requirements and formal procedures that a pply to proposed g overn m e n tal action under Subchapter C of the statute do not limit the chapte r ’ s scope to reg ulatory taking s only

. Subchapter C may be concerned with reg ulatory m atters, providing as it does for a taking s impact assessment and public n o t i c e of proposed g overnmental a ction. B ut Subchapter C i ndependently provides f or a suit to invalidate g overnmental action, stating that “[ a]
g overnmental action requiring a taking s i m p a ct a s sessment is v oid if an assessment is not prepared.” Id

. § 2007.044(a) (emphasis added). The subchapter authoriz es a n affected property

owner to “bring suit f

o r a declaration of the invalidity of the g overnmental action” and a g ain provides for an award of reasonable attorney ’s fees a nd c ourt costs to a p r e v a i l i n g p r o perty

14owner. Id

. § 2007.044(a), ( c )

. The subchapter sug g ests, however, that not every g overnmental

action o r taking under Chapter 2007 implicates these r equire m en t s. I n deed, the subchapter’s title states that its requirements are for “proposed g overnmental action.”
W e conclude that C h a p t er 2007 d oes not e x pressly limit its application to reg ulatory taking s nor does i t e x p r e ssly ex clude all phy sical taking s from its terms. We note further that Subchapter C, titled “ Requirements F or Proposed Governmental Action,” focuse s on prospective
reg ulatory taking s and authoriz e s an affected property owner to “bring suit for a d eclaration of the i n v a l i d i ty of the g overnmental action” if the required taking s impact assessment has not been d o n e
. Id

. § 2007.044(a). The property o w n ers obviously do not seek relief unde r t h a t subchapter. Their suit is instead un d e r S u bchapter B to determine whether the phy sical invasion of their properties by the River A u t h o rity ’s release of floodwaters constitutes a taking

. Id

. § 2007.021(a). As we have observed: “ The Property Rig hts Act creates two ca u s e s of action in favor of real property o wners: (1) a statutory cause of action for taking ; and ( 2) a c ause of action based o n g overnmental action taken without preparing a TI A [ taking s impact assessment] , if the Property Rig hts A ct requires a TI A .” B ragg v
. Edwards A quifer Auth ., 7 1 S.W .3d 729, 734–35 (Tex

. 2002). Subchapter B a uthoriz es a private r e al property o wne r t o “ b r i n g s uit u nder this subchapter to determine whether the g overnmental action of a political subdivision result s in a
t a k i n g” u n der the statute. T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 2007.021(a). The statute’s “General Provisions”
in Subchapter A define “taking ” to include both phy sical and reg ulatory taking s, and
g overnmental action to include, among other thing s, the “phy sical invasion” of prope r t y , which the parties ag ree may

refer to either ty

pe of taking

. Id . §§ 2007.002(5), .003(a)(2).

15The River Authority nevertheless maintains tha t t h e l o wer courts should have dismissed

the property owner s ’ statutory claims because Chapter 2007 does n o t waive g overnmental immunity for p h y sical taking s, which i s a l l t h at the property owners have alleg ed. The court of appeals rejected that notion, a nd we ag ree that the chapter d o e s n o t a p p ly e x clusively to
reg ulatory tak i ng s. I f that were true, no need would ex ist for several of the chapter’s e x clusions, including the two t h a t t he River Authority arg ues must apply to the actions it took during the
Hurr i c an e Harvey weather emerg ency
. “As a g e neral principle, we eschew constructions of a
statute that render any statutory lang uag e meaning less or superfluous.” City of Dallas v. TCI W

. End, Inc

. , 463 S.W .3d 53, 57 ( T ex
. 2 0 1 5 ) (p er curiam); see Spence v. F e nchler , 180 S.W

. 597,
601 (Tex

. 1915) (“I t is an elementary rule of c onstruc t i o n that, when possible to do so, effect
must b e g iven to every sentence, clause, and word of a statute so that n o p a r t t h e reof be rendered superfluous or inoperative.”).
IV
W e nex t c onsider the app l i c a tion of the statutory ex ceptions raised b y the River Authority in the contex t of its motion to dismiss under Tex a s Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. Chapter 2 007 ex pressly ex cludes fourteen t y pes o f g overnment actions, two of which apply h ere, according to the River A uthority

. See T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 2 0 0 7

. 0 03(b) (listing the
g overnmental actions ex c luded from the chapter). The chapter does not apply to: (7) an action taken out of a reason a b l e good faith belief that the action is necessary to prevent a g rave and immediate threat to life or property ; * * * ( 1 3 ) a n a c tion that: (A) is taken in response to a real and substantial thre a t t o p u b l ic health and safety ; (B ) is desig n e d to sig nificantly advance the health a nd

16safety p urpose; and (C) does not impose a g rea ter burden than is necessary to

achieve the health and safety purpose[ .] Id

. § 2007(b)(7), (13). Be ca use Chapter 2 007 ex cludes certain emerg e ncy situations and
responses, the River Authority arg ues that its actions here, which were respons i v e t o a w eather
emerg ency , preclude the property o w n e rs ’ s t atutory claims. I t concludes that the statutory claims should therefore h a v e b ee n dismissed u nder Rule 91a, rather than remanded to the trial
court. Rule 91a provides that a p arty “may move to dismiss a c ause of ac t ion on the g rounds that it has n o basis in law or fact.” T E X

. R. C I V

. P. 91a.1. “A cause of a ction has no basis in law
if the alleg ations, taken as true, tog ether with inferences reasonably d ra w n f r o m them, do not entitle the claim an t t o the relief soug ht. A cause of a ction h as no basis in fact if no reasonable
person c ould believe the facts pleaded.” Id

. I n ruling on a Rule 91a m o t i o n , a c o urt “may not consider evidence

. . . and must decide the motion b ased so l e l y o n t h e p l eading of the cause of action.” I

d

. 9 1 a
. 6. W e r eview the merits o f a Rule 9 1a motion de novo. City of Dallas v. Sanchez , 494 S.W .3d 722, 724 (Tex . 2016) (per curiam). The River A uthority a

rg ues that, as a matter of law and common sense, no reasonable
p erson could believe Hurricane Harvey was not “a g r ave a nd immediate threat to life o r property ” or “a real and substantial threat to public health and safety

. ” T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 2007(b)(7), (13). I t asks the Court to take judicial notice o f the d isas ter d eclarations made by the President and Governor to establish that the River Authority w as reacting to an emerg ency situation during the time it al leg edly flooded the property owners’ homes. The court of appeals declined to take judicial notice of t h e R i v er Authority ’s proffered evidence, noting that Rule 91a

ex p ressly prohibits a court’s considerat i o n o f e vidence and ex p ressly requires that the motion be 17decided on the p leading s. 570 S.W .3d at 831. B u t even without j u d i c i a l notice, the River

Authority maintains that the p roperty o wners’ p leading s similarly demonstrat e t h a t Hurricane Harvey presented an e merg ency that threatened life and property by indicating that the River Authority ’s p urpose in releasing the water was to p rotect the integ rity o f t h e d am , m a intain control over its flood g a tes, and protect upstream properties from flooding , among other thing s. The property owners respond that the factual alleg ations in their p leading s do not conclusively establish either e x c l u s i on. They describe the statutory ex c lusions as affirmative defenses , w h i c h under Rule 9 1a must “be conclusively established by the facts in a plaintiff’s petition.” Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, W inslett & Moser, P.C. , 595 S.W

. 3 d 6 5 1 , 656 (Tex

. 2020). They submit that these ex clusions raise inherent f a c t questions, which their pleading s d o not resolve. F or ex ample, t h e pleading s do not c onclusively establish the (b)(7)

ex c lusion because the propert y o wners have never asserted that the River Authority released
water as it did with a reasonable g ood fai t h b elief that doing so w as n ecessary to prevent a g rave and imminent threat to the dam’s s t r u c t u re a nd operation. To the c ontrary , their pleading s indicate that the River Authority knew the d am c o u l d w i thstand much more rainfall and much hig her inflow rates than the watershed rainfall and inflow rates ex perienced d uring Harvey and that it a lso knew the w ater from H arvey could have been released at much slower rates without damag ing the dam or losing control of its floodg ates

. T he River A uthority alleg edly knew this from another weather event dec a des earlier, which, according to the property owners, dropped almost twice a s m u c h rain in the watershed o ver a similar f o ur-day p eriod, w ith c orresponding larg e r peak inflows and y e t resulted in much slower and less damag ing wate r r e l e a s e rates.
B a sed on these alleg ations, the p ro p e rty owners submit a reasonable person could conclude that

18the River Authority did not have a reasonable g ood faith b e l i ef that it was necessary to release

water as it did to prevent a g r ave and immediate threat to life or property

. The property o w ners f

u rther maintain that the River A uthority knew it w as unnecessary
to release water a s it did to “ p r e v ent a g rave and immediate threat to” the dam and its floodg ates bec a u s e L ake Conroe had the capacity to store additional floodwaters until Harvey p assed. I n this reg ard, they note the e x istence of a flowag e e asement, which allows the River A u t h o r ity to

s t o re water up to 207 f

eet above mean sea level “during storm events.” The recorded easeme n t “notif[ ies] landowners that any structures below this elevation are subject to being flooded.” According to the pleading s, L ake Conroe’s w ater or p ool level did not r eac h 2 07 feet above mean sea level during the storm. After the water r eached its hig hest l e v e l o f 206.24 feet, the River Authority beg an releasing water at record fl o w r ates, reducing the pool level by about three and one-half feet over f o r ty -eig ht hours and alleg edly causing devastating flooding down stream. The p roperty owners thus complain that the River Authority did not use all available capacity to store f loodwaters during Harvey , even thoug h it co u l d h a v e done so without threatening th e d a m ’ s s tructural integ rity

. They submit that, as with the alleg ations reg arding

r a i n f a l l and flow rates, a reasonable person could conclude that the River Authority did not have

a reasonable g ood f

aith belief that it was necessary to release water as it did t o p r e v e n t a gr ave and immediate threat to life or property , based on their pleading s. The River A uthority , however, r eads the plaintiffs’ pleading s as an admission of its own
g ood faith. I t arg ues that the plaintiffs’ pleading s concede that the Riv e r A u t hority released
water “to relieve pressure on the dam” and “protect i t s stability and integ rity ” and thus conclusively establish its g ood faith in the matter.

19Not so, the property owners r espond. They submit that these p hrases in their pleading s

merely r efer to the various p ublic purposes s u p p osedly furthered by the River A uthority ’s decision to flood their downstream properties. The court of a ppeals ag reed, sum m a r i z i n g these various public purpose alleg a tions from the pleading s in its opinion: Reg ard i n g t he public-use e lement, the homeowners alleg e d that in the face of Hur r i c a n e H arvey and other circumstances, the River Authority f aced a choice. The River Authority could do nothing as the water level rose and accept all the associated risks. Or it could release floodwaters t h a t it knew would cause “devastating flooding downstream” with “ c atastrophic consequences.” The River Authority “chose the latter o p t i o n and intentionally , k nowing ly , affirmatively a nd consciously inundated, f looded, took, i n v e r s e ly condemned and sacrificed” the homeowners' property

for the g reater public g ood. The homeowners also alleg ed that the River Authority ’ s intentional, knowing , affirmative, and conscious acts, conduct, and decisions were done for p ublic u s e
. T h e y alleg ed that the River Authority ’s manag e ment and operation of the lak e , dam, and related infrastructure, co m b i n e d w ith its release of water between late Aug ust and early Septembe r 2 0 1 7 , was done for public use because the g overnmental actions p rotected the stability and integ rity o f the dam, its e ar t h en embankment, and other infrastructure; ensured that the lake would continue to be available for use as a reservoir for critical f r eshwater storag e a n d f

o r recreational activities a

n d sporting uses like boating and fishing o nce the st o rm a n d its effects had passe d ; p r otected and spared homes and other properties on the lake a nd upstream from flooding ; minimiz ed the dang er to the public b y k eeping docks, bulk h e a d s , small islands, a nd other structures unsubmerg ed for as long as possible; minimiz ed the dang er to the public associated with e lectrical outlets a nd equipment coming into c ontact with water; and enabl e d t he lake, adjacent parks, and adjacent roads t o r e o pen and become fully operational a s quickly as possible for the public’s benefit.
570 S.W .3d at 837. The property owners submit that their pleadings d o not establish that the River Authority ’s actions met e ither the “reasonable g ood faith belief” test of (b)(7) or the measuredand-appropriate response required by (b)(13). Rather, t h e y s u bmit that the River A uthority ’s

r e asonable g ood faith belief that it was necessary to release the water as it did or w he t h er i t s

20actions imposed a g reater b urden than nece s sary to p rotect public safety are fact questions which

their pleading s do not a n s w e r
. See T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 2007.003(b)(7) (ex cluding “an action taken out of a reasonable g ood faith belief that the action i s n ec e s s ar y to prevent a g rave and imme d i a t e t h reat”); id

. § 2007.003(b)(13) (requiring that the g overnmental action “not impose a
g reater burden tha n i s n e c e s sary to achieve

. . . safety ” ). The property owners’ p leading s thus put at issue whether it w as reasonable or ne c e ssary for the River Authority to r elease the floodwaters as it did. The p leading s assert t h a t L a k e Conroe’s water level can ex ceed 207 feet above mean sea level for a short time without threatening the dam’s structural int e gr i t y when necessary to minimiz e risk to life an d p r o p e r t y on both sides of the dam. The pleading s further compare Harvey to another slow-moving s t o r m d e c ades earlier that the property owners alleg e produced

more rainfall and hig h er inflow rates, but w hich the River Authority manag ed wi t h slower release rates. The pleading s also alleg e that the River A uthority had additional capacity to sto re H ar v e y ’s floodwaters without harm to the dam and note the ex istence of upstream fl o o d
easements for water l e v e l s a t 2 0 7 feet above mean sea level, ostensibly for this purpose. The property owners submit that a reasonable person mig ht therefore conclude that the River Authority c ould have stored more water and released it more slowly , w hile protecting the dam’s
structure a

nd operations. The p l e a d i n gs t h us sug g est that the River Authority ’s ex perience with the pri o r e x t reme weather e vent bear on the a pplication of these ex c lusions and the reasonableness of the burden cast on the downstream property o w n ers. Th e R i v er Authority vividly responds that “[ d] odg ing a bullet once does not make later
gu n f ire any less life-threatening .” Thus, a disaster avoided in a previous storm does n o t a l l o w

21reasonable persons to beli e ve Harvey posed no threat to life o r property

. While that may be true,

neither does it establish as a matter o f l a w t h e e l e m ents of the two ex c lusions at issue. The pleading s indicate that the River Authority ’s knowledg e and past ex periences inf o r m t h e issues of g ood faith and reasonableness entwined in the two ex clusions. The parties have n ot briefed the meaning of g ood faith in the contex t of this statute, and we according ly e x press no opinion

on the subject. W e hold only that the property owners’ p l ea d i ng s d o not conclusively establish

e i t h er s t atutory ex c eption, which is what Rule 91a demands. The lower courts according ly d i d not err in deny

ing the Rule 91a motions to dismiss.
* * * * *
I n summary , we hold that Chapt e r 2 0 07 creates liability and waives g overnmental immunity for two c a

uses o f action: (1) a statutory taking s claim under Subchapter B a n d ( 2) a suit to rescind p r oposed g overnmental action under Subchapter C. W e hold further that the statutory taking s claim may include a phy sical taking , such as the flooding alleg ed by the property owners, and is not limited solely to reg ulatory taking s. F inally , w e c o n clude that statutory ex ceptions to liability under the chapter are not esta b l i s h e d by the property owner’s pleading s a

nd that the court of appeals ther e f o r e did not err in a ffirming the trial courts’ orders, which denied the River Authority ’s motions to dismiss under Rule 91a. The judg ment of the court of appeals is affirmed.

_____________________ J ohn P. Devine J ustice
OPI NI ON DEL I VERED: April 16, 2021

22