Appellant’s f irst ap p ea l wa s dismiss ed for want of jurisdiction as untimely
. See R odriguez v. 1 Sta te , No. 03-02-023- CR (Tex. App.—Austi n J an. 31, 2002). He rece ived permissi on for an out-oftim e a pp e a l. T he tr ia l c ourt

c e rt if ie d a pp e lla nt’ s r ig ht t o a

pp e a l a dv e rs e ru lin g s o n p re -t ri a l mo tio ns . See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 44.02; Tex. R. App. P. 25.2, 26.2. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00356- CR

P abl o R odr igu e z , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 167TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 00-7 101, HO NORAB LE CHARLES F . CAMP B ELL, JR., JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Pa b lo Ro dr igu e z a

p p e a ls f r o m h is c o n v ic ti o nf

o r e n g a g in g in

o r g an iz e d

c r im in al activity
. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 71.026( a)( 1) (West Supp. 2004-05). Appe llant entere d a plea of g uilty . I n acc ordanc e wit h a plea ba rg ain ag ree ment, punishment was assesse d at eig ht y ear s defe rre d adjudication probation. I n two issues on appea l, appellant contends that the t rial cour t erre d in o v e r r u li n g a mo ti o n f

o r c o n ti n u an c e an d in o v e r r u li n g h is mo ti o n to qu a s h th e in d ic tm e n t. We 1

a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

Ap pe lla nt n ote s th a t he is n ot c ha lle ng ingthe su ffici ency of th e e vid e nc e , a nd so
rec ites the fac ts of the ca se in conne ction with eac h issue. We will do the same.The State contends that it had an “open file” policy and did, by letter, inform opposing counsel 2 that the mater ial was available for their i nspection. The discovery delivery times were complicated by the mul tip le de fe nd ants be ingtr ie d in tw o d if fe re nt g ro up s. 2 Discussion Cont inu ance This appea l arises fr om an org anized crime pr osecution of a n alleg ed insuranc e fr aud ring that stag ed automobile ac cidents to g ener ate insura nce cl ai m s . T h i s complex case involved multipl e def

endants a nd a ser ies of five indictments (the orig inal indictment and four r eindictments). Throug hout the course of the proc eeding s, issues arose c oncer ning the State’s tardy

delivery of discovery materia ls. The State indicated it intended to use hundre ds of ex h i b i t s , comprised of

2 thousands of pag es of mate rial and ultimately , forty -three t apes of witness interviews. Copies of other exhibi ts w ere delivere d in ba tches. Other exhibi ts inc luded: a sprea dsheet showing a deta iled listi ng of some for

ty acc idents with the insurance company , claim number, who was involved and the amount of loss and their a ccompa ny ing insura

nce c ompany files; lease documents for the of fice s
us e d; c lie nt l ist s; finge rp ri nt c ard s; l e dg e r b oo ks ; c he c ks ma de pa y a ble to t he de fe nd ants ; c ha

rt s documenting phone ca lls a nd money flow; scra

ps of pape r noting settlement ag ree ments; pay ment sta mps ; and a sso rt e d Ro lod e xes. Th e State c on c e de d it

wa s thre e da

y s late in the de liv e ry

of the fi na l di sc ov e ry . T he se problems culminated in the c ourt’s admonition to the prosec ution at the final pre- trial hea ring that

“ so me ho w . . . y ou

are g oin g to have to make thi s st uf f a va ila ble . I do n’ t kn owwh a t it ’s g oin g to take. We’ve been doing this for a y ear .” The court a lso ex presse d its concer n that arr ang ements had alre ady been ma de with the law school to try the case t here and “I can’ t just shut it off like hot andWe note that trial counsel “adopte d” co-de fenda nt Dunn’s motion on the day of trial. Howe ver, 3 a ft e r t he c ourt tol d a pp e lla nt’ s tr ia l c ouns e l th a t th e c ourt wo uld a llo w a ny ne c e ssary

re c e sse s to rev i ew materia l during trial, but would not continue the ca se, appe llant’s trial counsel made no further objection. Dunn’s trial counsel, now appellant’ s appellate counsel, persisted in his objection. 3 cold wate r. I

can’ t do that.” The c ourt ref used to g rant a

continuance . I n his first issue, appellant contends that the tria l court er red in de ny ing his motion for c ontinuance. A cr imina l a c ti o n

ma y b e c o nti n u e d o n written motion “upon sufficie nt cause shown,” but the continuance “may only be for as l o n g as n ecessary .” See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt
. 29.03 (West 1 9 8 9 )
. A ll mo ti o n s f o r c o n ti n u an c e mu s t b e in

w r it in g an d

“ s w o r nto b y a p e rson having persona l knowledg e of the facts relied on f or the c ontinuance.” Id . arts. 29.03, 29.08. The trial court’ s ruling on a

motion for continuance is reviewe d under an abuse of discretion standa rd. Col e ma n v . S

tat e , 481 S.W .2d 872, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). To establish an abuse of discre tion, the defe ndant must show that he wa s actua lly prejudice d by

the denial of

his moti on. See V

asquez
v . S tat e , 6 7 S. W.3 d 2 29 , 2 40 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); He ise lbe tz v . S tat e , 9 0 6 S. W. 2 d 5 0 0 , 5 1 1 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1995).

The State fir st arg ues that er ror wa s not preser

ved. B eca

use it appea

rs that appe llant intended to adopt co- defe ndant L loy d Dunn’s mot ion, we will assume for the purposes of

argument that e rr or wa s p re se rv e d and

ana ly ze w he the r t

he de nia l of

the c on ti n

u a n c e pr e jud ic e d th e de fe nd ant. 3 Appellant ar g ues t h at h e was harmed bec ause the failure to gr ant the continuanc e in essenc e compelled appellant’ s g uilty plea, rende ring that plea involuntary
. He urg es that counsel’s la ck of prepa ration time w ould ha

ve forc ed counsel into a position in which he would have been ine ffe ctive
as a matter of law
.Although he did not repr esent appellant at trial, appellate counsel repr esente d Dunn, one of the 4 co-de fenda

nts who was ac quitted. 4 The re cord shows that appellant plea ded gui l t y afte r jury

selec tion had beg un. Counsel stated t hat he “didn’t know until twenty minutes ag o that [appellant] would take the plea barg ain.” The rec ord reflec ts the proper admonis hments conce rning the pl ea. Appellant stated that he ma de the ple a

fr e e ly and vo lun tari ly
. Pun ish me nt wa s a sse sse d in a c c or da nc e wi th t he a g re e me nt. Admonishments are a pr im a fa c ie s h o w i n g t h a t t h e p l e a w a s kn o w i n g an d v o l u n t ar y. Cox v . S tat e , 1 5 6 S. W. 3 d 5 9 9 , 6 0 2 ( T e x. A p p . — T y le r 2 0 0 4 , p e t. r e f ’ d )
. O n c e a def

endant ha s
a tte ste d to the vo lunta

ry natur e of the ple a , h e be ars a

he a vy burd e n at any

su bs e qu e nt h e ari ngto contest voluntariness. Pe na v. S ta te , 132 S.W .3d 663, 666 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, no p et.). The defe ndant cha lleng ing the plea ha s the burden to show that he enter ed the plea without understandingthe conse quence s of his actions and thus wa s harmed. Id. I f appe llant is c laiming that he wa s harmed by

ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, he must show counsel’ s alleg ed def iciencie s
cause d the plea to be involuntary . I n other words, but for c ounsel’s er rors, the de fenda

nt would not have pleaded guilty but would have insist ed on g oing to trial. Ex parte Gray , 126 S.W .3d 565, 568- 69 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. dism’d). Appellant did not file a motion for new t rial t o raise his contention that the plea was inv olu nta ry or tha t c ouns e l w a s in effect iv e. The re c or d r e fl e c ts t hat mu lti ple oth e r c o- de fe nd ants
acc epted the ple a. Two de fenda nts proce eded to tria l (without the continuance) and wer e ac quitted. 4 I t is a log ica l in feren ce that th e pr e pa ra tio n ti me wa s n ot s o s e ve re ly imp a c te d b y

State de lay s in producingdiscovery

that the cour

t’s failure to gr ant the continuanc e would have rende red c ounselTh e State no te s that a pp e lla nt ha s be e n un a

ble to loc a te tr ia l c ouns e l’ s mot ion to qu a shthe fi ft h 5 ind ic tme nt. Th e State a g re e s th a t a pp e lla nt s uf fi c ie ntl y de mon str a te d p re se rv a tio n b y a do pti nghis c o- de fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to qu a shin h is a rgume nt at tr ia l. T h e p art i e s d i s c u s s o n l y c o u n t o n e o f t h e i n d i c t m e n t , t h e c o u n t t o w h i c h a p p e l l an t p l e a d e d g u i l t y. 6 Count two of the indictment alleg ed thef t and was dismissed. 5 “inef fec tive as a ma

tter of law.” Nothing in the record shows that appellant consider ed the de nial of the c on tin

ua nc e a s a fa c tor in d e c idi ngto a c c e pt t

he ple a ; in deed , th e accep tanc e se e me d to surpr is e a p p e ll an t’ s tr ia l c o u n s e l. T h is r e c o r d o nd ir e c t a

p p e a l d o e s n o t r e f

le c t e v id e n c e that
overc omes the pre sumption t hat the plea was voluntary
. Se e Ex

pa rtePu e nte , 71 S.W .3d 340, 344 n.14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (def endant m ay fi l e 1 1
. 0 7 writ of habe as cor pus and off

er pr oof on issue of voluntariness) . Acc ording ly , we ove rrule a ppellant’s first issue.
Mo tio n to Qua sh

I n h is s e c on d is su e , a

pp e lla nt c onte nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d w he n it

ov e rr ule d h is motion to quash the indictment. Appellant complains that count one of t he indi ctment cha rg ing that 5 he enga g e d

in o r g an iz e d

c r im in a l a c ti v it

y d id n o t p r o v id e a d e qu a te n o ti c e b e c a u s e th e a ll e g a ti o ns
conce rning the incorpor ated of fense of theft we re not spec ific enoug h. Count o ne of

the sixte e n- pa g e ind ic tme nt al le g e d th a t a pp e lla nt a nd a pp ro xima te ly 6 twenty -eig ht other co- defe ndants “with the intent to establish, maint ai n , an d participate in a combination and in the prof its of a combination” that c onsisted of three or more of the named defe ndants and seve n others conspire d to co mmit t he off ense of theft of $200,000 or

more by ag ree ing with e ach other that they would eng ag e in c onduct that constituted the o ff en s e. The6

indictment then listed eig hty -seve n overt acts that these c o-def endants c ommitt ed in furthe ranc e of that a g re e me nt.

Th e ov e rt a c ts s e c tio n o f t

he in di ctm ent d e sc ri be d th e fo rm a tio n o f a c hir op ra c tic clinic for the purpose of

g ener ating medical bills for insura nce c laims ari s i n g o u t of stag ed motor
ve hic le wr e c ks . T he ind ic tme nt t he n d e sc ri be d o the r s te ps in the sc he me : op e nin g a law of fi c e to service claims from these acc idents, prepa ring false doc ument s t o obtain driver’ s licenses, a nd
so lic iti ngind ivi du a ls t o p art ic ipate in sta g e d mot or ve hic le c oll isi on s to g e ne rate ins ur anc e c la ims
. The indictment alleg ed that Victor Cuevas, one of the conspirators, a nd others obtained insura nce po lic ie s to c ov e r t

he pa rt ic ipa nts in t he c oll isi on s, pa id e a c h in div idu a l in vo lve d in the c oll isi on

in exchang e for

their intere st in the insurance claim, and paid each co-conspirator a per-per son rate f or
e a c h in div idu a l th e y

so lic ite d to pa

rt ic ipate in t

he se wr e c ks
. Th e ind ic tme nt a lle g e d t hat the c on sp ir a tor s so lic ite d in div idu a ls w ho ha d b e e n in
wr e c ks to s e e k tr e a tm ent a t th e c hir op ra c tic c lin ic and se e k r e pr e se ntatio n at c e rt a in l aw o ff ic e s, including that of appe llant. I t specifica lly alleg ed that appe llant ag ree d with Cuevas to pr ovide leg al
re pr e se ntatio n to ind ivi du a ls w ho ha d b e e n in sta g e d c ar a c c i d e nts . F or

e a c h in div idu a l “ su c c e ssf ull y
so lic ite d, ” a

pp e lla nt r e c e ive d 1 6. 67 % o f the pr oc e e ds fr om Cue va s. As pa rt of the pla n, the vic tim s
wer e re fer

red to me dical clinics also involved in the scam. Appellant ag ree d to pa y the full medica l bills submitt ed, to lease Cuevas office space and to allow C uevas to repre sent himself as appe llant’s le g a l ass ist ant in ne g oti a tio ns of mot or ve hic le c la ims . App e lla nt l a te r a uth or ize d E ri c Ar

ri ola (a /k/ a Er ic Rio s) to t a ke ov e r f

or Cue va s and us e a

pp e lla nt’ s n a me and

ba r n umb e r t o o pe ra

te an A us tinA “swoop and squat” ref ers to a co l l i s i o n in which drivers intentionally cause rea r-e nd motor 7 vehicle c ollisi ons involving innoce nt parties. The “squat” vehicle pulls in front of the targ et; the “swoop” vehicle then pulls in front of the “squat” vehicle, w hich brakes suddenly , usually resulting in the targ et vehicle rea

r-e nding the squat vehicle. Rupp’s I nsuranc e & Risk Manag ement Glossar y available at

htt p:/ /w ww .in sura

nc e .c c h. c om/

ri pp s/s wo op -a

nd -s qu a t.h tm. 7 law o ff ic e wi th Cue va s in a

pp e lla nt’ s name . Th is o ff

ic e ha nd le d a pp ro xima te ly

10 0 mo tor

ve hic le
a c c ide nt i ns ur anc e c a se s.

The indictment enume rate d multipl e ac cidents in which a ppellant re prese nted ind ivi du a ls w ho ha d part ici pate d in sta g e d c oll isi on s, e sp e c ia lly the so -c a lle d “ sw oo p a

nd sq uat” collisions. Fo r example, appe llant repre sented thre e individuals who participated in a stag ed

7 automobile collision involving a renta l ve hicle on September 27, 1994. This c laim se tt l ed for approxima t el y

$16,864.95. I n another , appellant r epre sented thre e solicited individuals who participated in a “sw oop and squat” co l l i s i o n on November 6, 1996. Appellant neg otiated a settlement for a

pproxi mately $ 2 6 , 6 94.00 with another insura nce c ompany . The indictment
enumer ated e noug h acc idents with their acc ompanying se ttlement amounts to ag g reg ate ove r the $200,000 alleg ed. The indictment then went on to desc ribe the e x pansion of the scheme to El Paso.

When the adequacy of t he indi ctment i s a question of law, the district court’s r uling is subjec t to de novo revie w. Sta te v . M off , 154 S.W. 3d

59 9, 60 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); Guzman

v . S tat e , 9 55 S .W .2 d 85, 8 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ); State v. Mc Coy , 6 4 S. W. 3 d 9 0 , 9 2 ( T e x. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.). When re viewing the denial of a motion to quash, the appe llate cour t must first determine if the notice g iven was sufficie nt. I f it wa s, the court’s inquiry ends; if not, the court e x amines the re cord to deter mine the impact of the defic iency on the appellant’ s defe nse. See Cru m v . S tat e , 946 S.W .2d 349, 359 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1997, pet. re f’d)
.8 A def endant must be g iven notice be fore t ri al o f t he “na ture a nd cause ” of the
acc usation ag ainst him, and that notice must be g iven with sufficie nt clarity and deta il to enable the defe ndant to anticipate the State’s evidenc e and pr epar e a pr oper de fense to it. U. S. Const. amend. VI ; Te x. Con st. art
. I , § 1 0; Ga rc ia v . S tat e , 981 S.W. 2d 68 3, 68 5 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ). Thus , an indictment must alleg e all the f acts a nd circ umstances ne ce s s ary to establish all the materia l elements of the offe nse cha rg ed, using plain and intelligible la ng uag e. Ga rc ia , 981 S.W .2d at 685. A motion to qu as h s h o u l d only be g rante d when the la ng uag e conc erningthe de fe nd ant’ s c on du c t is so va g ue or ind e fi nit e a s to de ny him e ff e c tiv e no tic e of the a c ts h e a lle g e dly committed. De Va ug

hn v . S tat e , 7 49 S.W. 2d

62 , 6 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 88 ); Crum , 946 S.W .2d at 35 9. I n g e ne ra l, a

n in dic tme nt t

hat tra c ks the langua g e of the pe na l sta tut e wi ll be le g a lly su ff ic ie nt; the State nee d not alleg e fa cts that are mere ly evidentiar

y in nature. DeVaughn , 749 S.W .2d at 67; Sta te v . R iv e ra , 42 S.W.3 d 323 , 329 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Paso 20 01 , pe t. r e f’ d) ; se e als o B e c k v . S tat e , 6 8 2 S
. W
. 2 d 550, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). The indictment is rea d as a w hole to deter mine whether it sufficiently

char g es an of

fense
. DeVaughn , 749 S.W .2d at 67. Thus, the notice pr ovided by the ind ic tme nt may be inc lud e d in the c ha rg ing pa ra g ra ph and /or in the a lle g a tio ns of

ov e rt a c ts. Se e Sta te v . M

au ldi n , 6 3 S. W.3 d 485 , 489 (T e x. Ap p. —T y le r 2 00 1, pe t. r e f’ d) ; W oo ds v . S tat e , 801 S.W. 2d 93 2, 93 4 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 90 , p e t. r e f’ d) . In s ome c a se s, du e pr oc e ss r e qu ir e me nts wi th re g a rd to no tic e may be satis fi e d by me tho ds oth e r tha n the langua g e in the c ha

rg ingins tr

ume nt. Se e Mo ff , 1 54 S.W. 3d

a t 60 3; Ke lla r v . S

tat e , 108 S.W .3d 311, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). An indictment char g ing c onspiracy to commit a felony

need not a lleg e the intende d offe nse with the particula rity nece ssary

in an indictment char g ing the commission of the intended9

offe nse. Sm ith v . S

tat e , 781 S.W .2d 418, 420 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no pet.). An indictment alleg ing the essential ele ments of conspiracy , specify ing eac h conspirator

involved and the overt acts commit ted i n further ance of t he conspiracy , is adequately specific
. Id
. (c i t i n g United Sta te s v . W ill is , 583 F.2d 203, 207 ( 5th Cir. 1978)). When the indictment tr acks the lang uag e of the a ppropriate subsections of pena l code
se c tio n 7 1. 02 , it

a de qu a te ly

c ha rg e s th e de fe nd ants wi th the of fe ns e of e ng a g ing in o rg anize d c ri me and the trial court does not err in ref using to quash t he indictment. Ge mo e ts v . S tat e , 116 S.W .3d 59 , 7 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 20 01 , no pe t.) ; Crum , 9 46 S.W. 2d a t 35 9- 60 ; Childress v. Sta te , 80 7 S.W. 2d 42 4, 43 1 (T e x. Ap p. —A mari llo 19 91 , n o p e t.) ; Sm ith , 781 S.W .2d at 420. I n an org anized crime case , the State need not alleg e the manne r and me ans by which the unde rlying the ft
was c ommitt ed. Crum , 9 4 6 S
. W
. 2 d at 3 5 9 -6 0 (c i t i n g Luc ar ion v . S tat e , 6 5 8 S. W. 2 d

8 3 5 , 8 3 7 ( T e x. App.—H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 83 , n o p e t.) ); se e als o G e mo e ts , 1 1 6 S. W. 3 d a t 7 2
. A lso, in an
or g anize d c ri me c a se , w he n th e ind ic tme nt a lle g e s that the the ft s c omm itt e d by the de fe nd ants wh ile p a r t i ci p at i n g i nt h e c o mb i n at i o no cc u rr edo v er a p er i o d o f t i m e b et we en t wo d at es , t h i s l an gu age provides suff

icient notice of

the date on whi ch the c ontinuing off ense of theft took place
. See Ge mo e ts , 1 1 6 S
. W
. 3 d

at 7 2 (c i t i n g Crum , 946 S.W .2d at 360). A re ce n t tr il o g y o f c a s e s r a is in g is s u e s s im il ar to th e in s ta n t c a s e ar o s e out of a
c omp ara ble sc he me in t

he Ho us ton

are a . App ell ant Ge moe ts w a s c ha rg e d w ithe ng a g ingin org anized criminal ac tivity by committing theft of over $ 2 0 0,000 from five insurance companies betwee n Oc tober 9, 1993, a nd J anuar y 19, 1995. Id . at 63. The sc heme involved the sta g ing of automobile acc idents. Gemoets tre ated patien t s fr o m these stag ed ac cidents. Id . G e moe ts10

c on te nd e d th a t th e tr ia l c ourt sh ou ld h a ve ov e rr

ule d th e ind ic tme nt b e c a

us e it w a s in suffi cient ly specific conce rning the manner and mea ns of ea ch spec ific inciden t, any specific actions by

appellant that constituted theft, fa cts surrounding eac h incident of theft, names of all co-c onspirators, and a ny overt a cts perf

ormed by appellant or

other c o-conspirator. Id . at 71-72. The c ourt first noted that in an or g an ized crime ca se, the State ne ed not alleg e the
manner and mea

ns by which the unde rlying the ft was commit ted and ove rruled a ppellant’s contention t hat t he indi ctment needed to spec ify the manner

and mea ns of ea ch incident of

theft. Id
. T h e c o u rt a ls o n o te d th a t u n le s s a f a c t is e s s e n ti a l to n o ti c e , th e in d ic tm e n t n e e d n o t p lead the evi den ce rel ie d u

po n b y the State . B e c a

us e the ind ic tme nt t

ra c ke d th e langua g e of

the statut e , it adequately

char g ed appe llant with the offense of eng ag ing in or g anized crime. Id . T he c ourt a lso held that the alleg ation of date s betwee n October 9, 1993, and J anuar

y 19, 1995, sufficie ntly

alleg ed the dates o n wh i ch the continuing offe nse of thef t occur red. Id . The a

ppellate c ourt overr

uled appellant’ s challeng e to the trial c ourt’s over ruling of the motion to quash. Id . at 73. See also Tan Kie n Tu v . S

tat e , 61 S.W .3d 38 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2001, pet. re f’d) (same indictment fo r c o- c on sp ir a tor

of Go moe ts) ; J

ar nig an v . S tat e , 57 S.W .3d 76 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2001, pet. re f’d) (same)
. Application Th e g ra

vame n o f a

pp e lla nt’ s c omp la int

is that th e indict me nt g a ve him ina de qu a te notice of t h e o ffe nse alleg ed. Specif ically , appellant c ontends that the alleg ations conce rning the inc or po rate d c ri me of

the ft we re no t specif

ic e no ug h, arguin g that c ount o ne me re ly state s, “[C] onspire to commit the offe nse of theft o f $200,000 or more, by ag ree ing w ith each othe r thatUnlike Sta te v . M off , 1 5 4 S. W. 3 d

5 9 9 ( T e x. Cr im
. A p p . 2 0 0 4 ) , inv o lv in g an in d ic tment for 8 misapplication of fiducia

ry proper ty , this indi ctment details par ticular a cts on which the St ate r elied. I t did not require the def

endant to “g ather

evidenc e and pr epar e a de fense ” for eac h cre dit card a

nd cash tra nsaction over a seven- y ear period without knowing whic h transac tions the St ate a lleg ed we re illega l. Id . at 603. 11 they would eng ag e in conduc t that constituted said offense . . . .” Howe ver, a ppellant’s ar g ument would have us stop re ading count one be fore rea ching the spec ific a l l ega t i o n s enumerated in the overt a cts section. See W oods , 801 at 420 (notice may be in cha rg ing pa ragr ap h o r alleg ations of overt acts). Count one, read as a whole, g ave appellant notice of the offe nse ag ainst which he ha d to prepa re a defe nse: the cr eation of f alse c laims to collect wr o n gfu l l y pay ments from insuranc e companie s . I t g a v e mu lt ip le s p e c if ic in c id e n ts o f

f a ls e c o ll is io n s , th e n a me s ( o f te na li a s e s ) o f

the conspirator s involved, and the amount that was extracted from the insurance company and tra cked the lang uag e of the appropr iate subsec tions of penal code sec tion 71.02. Crum , 946 S.W .2d at 359- 60. 8 The indictment in this case is substantially the same a s the indictments in the trio of Houston case s. Se e Ge mo e ts , 116 S.W. 3d a t 59 ; Tan Kie n Tu , 61 S.W. 3d a t 38 ; Jarnigan , 57 S.W .3d at 76. We ag ree with those case s, and hold the tria l co u rt d i d n o t err in failing to quash the indictment. We overrule a ppellant’s sec ond issue.12 Conclusion We have he ld that appellant did n o t d em o n s trate ha rm from the de nial of the
c on tin ua nc e and did no t sh owtha

t the tr ial cou rt a

bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

ov e rr uli nghis mot ion

to qu a sh . H a vin g ov e rr

ule d b oth of a pp e lla nt’ s is su e s, we a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: Jul y

14, 2005 Do No t Pu

bli sh