United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 11, 2018

Decided May 16, 2018

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 17-3152

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KEEFER JONES,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 02-20029-001

James E. Shadid,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Fifteen months into the term of supervised release imposed as part of his 

sentence for possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1), Keefer Jones admitted to violating four conditions of his release: those

requiring him to participate in sex-offender and mental-health treatment, comply with 

the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act, and refrain from possessing any controlled 

substances. We concluded that the district court did not err in revoking his supervised 

release but provided an inadequate explanation for imposing a five-year prison term, so 

we vacated his sentence and remanded. United States v. Jones, 861 F.3d 687, 689, 691–92 

(7th Cir. 2017). On remand the district court again imposed a five-year prison term, and 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 17-3152 Page 2

Jones again filed a notice of appeal. His appointed counsel, however, asserts that this 

appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

At the outset we note that a defendant facing revocation of supervised release 

does not have a constitutional right to counsel unless he challenges the appropriateness 

of revocation or asserts substantial and complex grounds in mitigation. See United States 

v. Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d 1163, 1171 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Eskridge, 445 F.3d 

930, 932–33 (7th Cir. 2006). In his response to counsel’s motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), Jones 

does not raise any arguments falling into the latter category, and even though he 

challenges the propriety of revocation, we already decided this issue, Jones, 861 F.3d 

at 689, and cannot not consider it again here. See United States v. Husband, 312 F.3d 247, 

251 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[A]ny issue conclusively decided by this court on the first appeal is 

not remanded.”). Thus the Anders safeguards do not govern our review of counsel’s 

motion to withdraw. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554–55 (1987); United States 

v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016). Nevertheless it is our practice to apply that 

framework to an appointed attorney’s motion to withdraw from representing a criminal 

defendant. Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of the case and 

addresses the potential issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve, 

so we focus our review on the subjects that counsel discusses and those that Jones raises 

in response. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).

Counsel first considers whether Jones could challenge his five-year term of 

imprisonment, but correctly concludes that any such argument would be futile. Counsel 

rightly affirms that the district court accurately determined the policy-statement range 

for Jones’s prison term. Because his possession of cocaine while on supervised release 

was a grade B violation and he had a criminal history category of VI, the court correctly

concluded his policy-statement range to be 21 to 27 months. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); 

U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1(a)(2) & app. n.1, 7B1.4(a). Further, counsel rightly observes that the 

judge complied with all required procedures, including discussing the relevant factors 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and addressing Jones’s mitigation arguments.

Counsel next concludes, correctly, that it would be pointless to challenge the 

reasonableness of the five-year prison term, even though that sentence substantially 

exceeds the high end of the policy-statement range. The district judge adequately 

explained the variance. After detailing Jones’s open defiance of his probation officer’s 

directives while on supervised release, the judge concluded that any more supervised 

release “is simply a waste of time” for him and “would make a mockery of the [18 
No. 17-3152 Page 3

U.S.C. §] 3553 factors.” So the judge, determining that Jones was incapable of complying 

with the terms of his supervised release, imposed only prison time and concluded that 

the maximum allowable prison term was necessary. As required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), 

the judge considered the relevant sentencing factors in § 3553(a), including Jones’s 

history and characteristics and the need to provide adequate deterrence and protect the 

public. See United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016).

Counsel next evaluates whether Jones could argue that the district court violated

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2), but rightly concludes that the court 

followed an appropriate procedure on remand. Because we affirmed the revocation of 

Jones’s supervised release and Jones provided no new information to the district court, 

Jones had no right to another notice of his supervised-release violations or another

revocation hearing. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2); Husband, 312 F.3d at 251. He would 

have no sound argument that he did not receive the process due to him—he was 

represented by counsel at the resentencing hearing and had opportunities to present 

new arguments about the appropriate term of reimprisonment and to address the court. 

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2); see also United States v. Mobley, 833 F.3d 797, 801–02

(7th Cir. 2016). Jones says the district court erred by not conducting a “full” 

resentencing, which we interpret as an argument that he should have been allowed to 

respond anew to the violations (and presumably, not admit them). But we remanded 

his case solely for resentencing, so it would be frivolous to argue that the district court 

should have re-opened the revocation issue. 

Counsel finally considers whether Jones could raise an argument that his districtcourt lawyer provided ineffective assistance on remand but correctly concludes that, 

even assuming that Jones had a right to counsel, such an assertion would be pointless. 

We generally relegate ineffective-assistance claims to collateral attacks, and we think it 

best to do so here. 

Jones outlines several other potential arguments he could make on appeal. He 

contends that the district court committed multiple errors in deciding to revoke his 

supervised release, but he could not challenge that decision on appeal because we 

already decided that revocation was proper. See Jones, 861 F.3d at 689; Husband, 312 F.3d 

at 251. Jones also asserts that he could argue that his attorney in his prior appeal 

improperly abandoned him by not representing him on remand. But this argument 

would be frivolous because even if Jones had a right to counsel at his resentencing, he 
No. 17-3152 Page 4

does not have a right to counsel of his choice. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United 

States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989).

Jones finally contends that he was not given a chance to “review ... and make 

objections” to the presentence investigation report from 2002 that he says the district 

judge relied on when imposing the five-year prison term. But the judge used the PSR 

only to review Jones’s criminal history—information that was not, as Jones says, 

outdated. And the time to object to the accuracy of the PSR had long since passed by the 

time of the resentencing hearing. 

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion and DISMISS the appeal.