IV 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 410 

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Iran Nuclear 

Agreement Review Act of 2015 does not apply to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding Iran and submitted to Congress on July 

19, 2015, because the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is a treaty 

and, pursuant to Article II of the U.S. Constitution, the Senate must 

give its advice and consent to ratification if the Joint Comprehensive 

Plan of Action is to be effective and binding upon the United States. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 8, 2015 

Mr. GOHMERT (for himself, Mr. DUNCAN of South Carolina, Mr. MCCLINTOCK, Mr. KING of Iowa, Mr. BABIN, Mr. YOHO, and Mr. BRAT) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on 

Foreign Affairs 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that 

the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 does 

not apply to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 

regarding Iran and submitted to Congress on July 19, 

2015, because the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 

is a treaty and, pursuant to Article II of the U.S. Constitution, the Senate must give its advice and consent 

to ratification if the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 

is to be effective and binding upon the United States. 

Whereas, on March 11, 2015, Secretary of State John Kerry, 

in describing the Administration’s nuclear negotiations 


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•HRES 410 IH 

with Iran, clearly stated that it was ‘‘not negotiating a 

legally binding plan’’ with Iran and therefore it does not 

have to be submitted to Congress; 

Whereas, on August 6, 2015, White House Press Secretary 

Josh Earnest, at a White House Press Briefing, stated 

that ‘‘we don’t need Congress to approve this [Iran nuclear deal]’’; 

Whereas, on July 28, 2015, Secretary Kerry, at a hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, stated 

that ‘‘the reason why’’ the Iran nuclear agreement is not 

considered a treaty is because ‘‘it’s become physically impossible . . . [to] pass a treaty [through the United 

States Senate] anymore. . . . [I]t’s become impossible to 

. . . schedule. It’s become impossible to pass.’’; 

Whereas two days after Secretary Kerry testified that it has 

become ‘‘physically impossible’’ for the Senate to ratify 

treaties, the United States formally ratified the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material when Henry S. Ensher, the Department of 

State’s ambassador to the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA), delivered the United States instrument 

of ratification to the IAEA; 

Whereas, on June 4, 2015, less than two months before Secretary Kerry testified that it has become ‘‘physically impossible’’ for the Senate to ratify treaties, he stated that 

the Department of State is ‘‘preparing the instruments of 

ratification of [several] important treaties’’ and that he 

‘‘want[s] to personally thank the U.S. Congress . . . for 

their efforts on’’ the implementing legislation for the nuclear security treaties; 


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Whereas, on May 7, 2015, the Senate held a vote on the Iran 

Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, commonly referred to as the ‘‘Corker-Cardin bill’’, in which every Senator voted on that bill with the understanding that the 

Iran nuclear agreement was an executive agreement, and 

not a treaty, and that United States sanctions on Iran’s 

ballistic missile program remain in place; 

Whereas the Corker-Cardin bill states that ‘‘[i]t is the sense 

of Congress that . . . United States sanctions on Iran for 

. . . ballistic missiles will remain in place under an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes 

the United States’’; 

Whereas the Corker-Cardin bill was intended as a review of 

the application of statutory sanctions against only Iran’s 

nuclear program; 

Whereas the Corker-Cardin bill prescribes a process for congressional review only of ‘‘Agreements with Iran Related 

to the Nuclear Program of Iran’’; 

Whereas under subsections (b) and (c) of section 135 of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as added by the CorkerCardin bill, lawmakers may resolve to approve, disapprove, or take no action on ‘‘Nuclear Agreements with 

Iran’’; 

Whereas section 135(d) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 

as added by the Corker-Cardin bill, calls for ‘‘Congressional Oversight of Iranian Compliance with Nuclear 

Agreements’’; 

Whereas, on July 14, 2015, the Administration finalized the 

Iran nuclear agreement and referred to it as the ‘‘Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action’’ (JCPOA); 


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Whereas, on July 19, 2015, the Administration submitted the 

JCPOA to Congress; 

Whereas the JCPOA is not limited to sanctions enacted by 

Congress related to only Iran’s nuclear program; 

Whereas the JCPOA extends to Iran’s ballistic missiles programs and other weapons activities—including the lifting 

of international arms embargoes covering both ‘‘any material or technology that might be useful to a ballisticmissile program,’’ and ‘‘battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles, or missile systems’’; 

Whereas Congress was informed only after the JCPOA was 

submitted to Congress that it removed international restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missiles program and conventional arms; 

Whereas because the terms of the Iran nuclear negotiations 

changed after Congress voted on the Corker-Cardin bill, 

the bill does not permit Congress to review or approve 

agreements on ballistic missiles and other weapons; 

Whereas until July 22, 2015, more than a week after the 

Iran nuclear agreement was finalized, Secretary Kerry 

failed to inform Congress of the existence of ‘‘side deals’’ 

to nuclear agreement between the IAEA and Iran; 

Whereas recent news reports indicate the IAEA has a secret 

agreement which would allow Iran to use its own experts 

to inspect a site allegedly used to develop nuclear arms, 

directly contradicting the intended effect of the CorkerCardin bill by bypassing congressional oversight; 

Whereas the Administration failed to follow the CorkerCardin bill which required it to provide Congress with all 

nuclear agreement documents, including all ‘‘annexes, apVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:05 Sep 09, 2015 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6300 E:\BILLS\HR410.IH HR410

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pendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings and any related agreements, whether entered 

into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future’’; 

Whereas the Administration failed to comply with the CorkerCardin bill by not transmitting the nuclear agreement, 

‘‘including all materials,’’ to Congress by ‘‘September 7, 

2015’’; 

Whereas the JCPOA grants Iran’s Quds Force commander 

Qasem Soleimani, Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad 

Najjar, who trained and commanded Hezbollah fighters 

in Lebanon at the time of the Beirut barracks bombing, 

and Hossein Salami, the current second-in-command of 

the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, individual relief from international sanctions; 

Whereas the JCPOA amends Article I of the Treaty on the 

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’’ or 

‘‘NPT’’) to which the United States is a signatory, and 

under which the United States is obligated ‘‘not in any 

way to assist, encourage, or induce . . . [Iran] to acquire 

nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or 

control over such weapons or explosive devices’’; 

Whereas the JCPOA amends Article II of the NPT under 

which Iran is responsible not to acquire, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons or capabilities of controlling nuclear weapons; 

Whereas the JCPOA and the various secret side agreements 

to the JCPOA amend Article III of the NPT regarding 

international inspectors in Iran ‘‘who shall have access at 


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all times to all places and data and to any person who 

by reason of his occupation deals with materials, equipment, or facilities which are required by this Statute to 

be safeguarded’’; 

Whereas the JCPOA amends the NPT outside of the prescribed method of amendment in Article VIII of the 

NPT; 

Whereas, on July 31, 2015, the non-partisan Congressional 

Research Service released a study establishing that Iran’s 

defense budget ranges anywhere from $14 to $30 billion 

a year, with much of that money going to fund terrorist 

proxy groups and rebel fighters across the Middle East, 

including in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip; 

Whereas it is evident that the JCPOA is fundamentally different from the ‘‘international agreement’’ described by 

the Administration when Congress passed the CorkerCardin bill; 

Whereas it is evident that the Corker-Cardin bill does not 

reach many of the parts of the finalized nuclear agreement with Iran, and that the JCPOA thoroughly 

marginalized the Corker-Cardin bill; 

Whereas the Corker-Cardin bill is designed to address an 

international agreement that is fundamentally different 

from the JCPOA and not a treaty; and 

Whereas it is now evident the JCPOA is of sufficient magnitude that it rises to the level of a treaty: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That— 

2 (1) the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 

3 2015, commonly referred to as the ‘‘Corker-Cardin 


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1 bill’’, does not apply to the Joint Comprehensive 

2 Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding Iran because the 

3 JCPOA is fundamentally different from the agree4 ment as represented to Congress by the Administra5 tion and that the Corker-Cardin bill is only applica6 ble to an agreement that is not a treaty; 

7 (2) Article II of the U.S. Constitution declares 

8 that the President ‘‘shall have Power, by and with 

9 the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 

10 Treaties,’’ but only if ‘‘two thirds of the Senators 

11 present concur’’; 

12 (3) the JCPOA is a treaty and, pursuant to Ar13 ticle II of the U.S. Constitution, the Senate must 

14 give its advice and consent to ratification if the 

15 JCPOA is to be effective and binding upon the 

16 United States; and 

17 (4) not later than 30 days after the date of the 

18 adoption of this resolution, the Senate should sched19 ule and consider a resolution of ratification with re20 spect to the JCPOA. 

Æ 


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