United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted June 20, 2019*

Decided June 21, 2019 

Before 

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge 

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

Nos. 18-3330 & 18-3331 

ROBERT K. DECKER, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

J.R. BELL, 

 Respondent-Appellee.

 Appeals from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Indiana, 

Terre Haute Division. 

Nos. 2:18-cv-00074-JRS-DLP & 

2:18-cv-00198-JRS-DLP 

James R. Sweeney II, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Robert Decker, a federal inmate, appeals the denials of his petitions under 

28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his loss of good-conduct time for using and possessing an 

alcoholic substance. He argues that his two punishments covered the same conduct—

and each was more severe than his cellmate’s punishment—so they violated his 

 

*

 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
Nos. 18-3330 & 18-3331 Page 2 

double-jeopardy and equal-protection rights. But double jeopardy does not apply to 

prison disciplinary proceedings, and the distinction between Decker and his cellmate 

was rational. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

Decker faced two charges of misconduct. An associate warden at the United 

States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, found Decker and his cellmate drinking a 

brown liquid out of plastic mugs. The liquid was later tested with a breathalyzer device, 

and it registered as containing alcohol. Afterwards, Decker received his two incident 

reports: one for use of alcohol and another for possession of alcohol. The report 

regarding Decker’s use of alcohol was later returned to the Lieutenant’s Office to be 

rewritten on the correct form. 

The disciplinary process for possession moved forward first. The hearing on the 

charge against Decker’s cellmate—also accused of possessing alcohol—occurred just 

before Decker’s. After Decker heard his cellmate confess to exclusive responsibility for 

the alcohol, Decker moved to dismiss his charges at the beginning of his hearing. The 

hearing officer, however, denied that motion. After the hearing, the hearing officer 

credited the evidence of possession from the correctional officers over Decker’s denial 

of responsibility and found that Decker committed the prohibited act. He lost 41 days of 

good-conduct time; his cellmate lost 7 days. 

The next month, after Decker received the updated version of the incident report 

charging him with use of alcohol, the prison held another disciplinary hearing. Decker 

offered a statement from an inmate who said that the officer handling the breathalyzer 

test had to perform it on Decker at least five times before obtaining a positive result. 

Again, the hearing officer credited the evidence from the correctional officers and found 

that Decker committed the prohibited act of using contraband. Decker lost another 

41 days of good-conduct time and received 60 days of disciplinary segregation. 

Decker filed two petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, each challenging the 

revocation of his good-time credits. He contended that, by punishing him twice for the 

same incident, and more severely than his cellmate, prison officials violated his rights to 

double-jeopardy protection and equal protection. Because of a factual dispute about 

exhaustion, the district court decided the cases on the merits, see Brown v. Watters, 

599 F.3d 602, 609–10 (7th Cir. 2010), and denied the petitions. Decker appealed both 

decisions, and we have consolidated his appeals. We review de novo the denial of the 

petitions. Camacho v. English, 872 F.3d 811, 813 (7th Cir. 2017). And, like the district 

court, we bypass the fact dispute on the exhaustion question. (This renders irrelevant 
Nos. 18-3330 & 18-3331 Page 3 

Decker’s argument that, by the delaying the delivery of his post-hearing report, the 

defendants unlawfully impeded his administrative appeal.) 

Decker maintains on appeal that he received two punishments for the same 

conduct, so the punishments violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. He contends that his 

first punishment—for alcohol possession—barred punishment on the second charge—

for use—because possession is included within use. See United States v. Mire, 725 F.3d 

665, 677–78 (7th Cir. 2013). But the protections against double jeopardy apply only to 

criminal proceedings, and prison discipline is not a criminal proceeding. Hudson 

v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 98–99 (1997); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 

Thus, a defendant may be both disciplined in prison and criminally punished in court 

for the same conduct. Garrity v. Fiedler, 41 F.3d 1150, 1152 (7th Cir. 1994). And inmates 

may be prosecuted at a second disciplinary hearing for conduct of which they were 

acquitted at a first hearing. Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1996). The reason 

is that prison officials have an “overriding” need “to act swiftly to maintain institutional 

order,” so they may have to charge an inmate “on the basis of evidence that might be 

insufficient” at the first hearing. Id. 

We recognize that Decker was convicted, not acquitted, at his first hearing, and if 

this were a criminal case, the Double Jeopardy Clause might foreclose the second case. 

See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 501 (1984). But the holdings that double jeopardy does 

not apply to non-criminal proceedings, Hudson, 522 U.S. at 98-99, and that prison 

discipline is non-criminal, Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556, permit the dual proceedings. And 

because multiple withdrawals of good-time credits for the same misconduct can never 

force an inmate to serve more time in prison than a court sentenced him to serve, due 

process is respected. See McNeil v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 246 (1972). 

Decker also contends that his punishment violated his right to equal protection 

because his cellmate lost less good-time credit than he did for the same charge. (The 

cellmate lost 7 days compared to Decker’s 82.) We understand this to be a “class-of-one” 

argument. See United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2008). A class-of-one 

claim cannot succeed if the prison treated Decker differently than his cellmate for a 

rational reason. Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 254 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Del Marcelle 

v. Brown Cty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 888 (7th Cir. 2012)). A rational reason appears on the 

face of the petitions: The hearing officer may have shown leniency to Decker’s cellmate 

because he took responsibility for the infraction, whereas Decker denied blame. Thus, 

Decker is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
Nos. 18-3330 & 18-3331 Page 4 

We have considered Decker’s other arguments, but they are without merit. 

AFFIRMED