### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE N ove m be r 28, 200 6 S es sio n STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. JAM IE RO SKOM Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Bedf ord County No. 15841 Lee R ussell, Ju dge

No. M2006- 00764-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Fe bruary 9, 2007

The Appe llant, J amie Roskom, wa s convicted by a B edfor d Countyjury

of violating the Sexual Offe nder Reg istration, Verific ation, and Tra cking Act of 2004, a Class E felony

. On appe al, Roskom arg ues th at h e wa s i n d icted for failing to “re g ister” a s a sexual offende r, which is a violation of section 2 0 8 o f th e A c t; h o w e v e r , h e w a s c o n v ic te d o f f a il in g to “ r e p o rt, ” w h ic h is a v io lati o n of section 204. See T.C.A. § 40-39-208( 1), -204( c) ( Supp. 2004). As such, Roskom asserts that he w as not give n notice of th e cr ime for whic h he wa s convicted, and there is “no proof that [ he] [commi tted] t he off

ense fo r which he was indicted.” After revie w of the r ecor d, we a g ree and c on c lud e that the ind ic te d of fe ns e of faili ng to “ re g ist e r” imp e rm iss ibl y va ri e d f ro m th e pr oo f at tria l, which esta

blished the separ ate of

fense of failing to “r eport.” Acc ording ly , Roskom’s conviction for violation of the “sex offende r re g istration act” is re verse d and dismissed. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Reve rsed and Dismissed
D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE and D. KEL L Y T HOMAS , J R ., J J ., joined.
Joe M . B rand on , Jr. , Sm yrn a , T e nn e sse e , f or theAp pe llant, Jami e Ros ko m. Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attorne y Ge ne ral and Re po rt e r; B re nt C . Ch e rry , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; W. Micha el McCown, District Attorney Gene ral; and Michae l D

. Randles, Assistant Di s t rict Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION
F ac tu al B ac kgr ound
I n Dec ember

2003, the Appellant moved to B edfor d County , Ten n es see, and reg istered a s a sexual offe nder w ith the Tennesse e B ureau of Investig ation (TB I ) based upon his conviction for second de g reesexual assault in the State of Wis consin. At this ti me, sexual offende r re g istration was administered by

the TBI

. I n 2004, the leg islature re place d exis ting law with the “Te nnessee Sex ual Offe nder and Violent Sex ual Off ender Reg istration, Verific ation, and Tra cking Act of 2004,” which-2-

place d the re g istration and re porting require ments of the Act with loc al law enfor ceme nt. T he 2004 Ac t r e qu ir e d s e xua l of

fe nd ers to re g ist e r i n p e rs on , p ro vid e re qu ir e d in fo rm a tio n, a nd , at pe ri od ic intervals, re port bac k to update information. The 2004 Act al s o require d all curr ently reg istered sexual offende rs to re- reg ister with local law e nforc ement.
OnS e p t e mb e r

8 , 2 0 0 4 , t h e A p p e l l a n tm e tw i t h D e t e c t i v e B r o w n o f t h e B e d f o r dC o u n ty Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment and re g istered a s require d by the new A ct. At this “initial reg istration” session, the Appellant was also informed of and provided a preprinted information shee t expl aining future re po rting re qu ir e me nts , w hic h a rere c ite d inre le vant p art a s f oll ow s:
Re po rting re qu ir e me nts fo r o ff e nd e rs : After the offe nder h as re g istered with the SOR [sex ual offe nder r eg istry ], t he of fe nd e r s ha ll r e po rt

in pe rs on to the de sig nate d law e nf or c e me nt ag e nc y

a s f oll ow s: (1 ) S e xua l of

fe nd e rs sh a ll r e po rt

on c e a y e ar w ith in 7 day s o f the of fe nd e r’ s b irth d a te and pay an administrative f

ee of $60; . . . . Thus, beca

use the Appe llant’s birthday was March 20, 1974, the Appellant was required to re port back to t h e Be d fo rd CountySheriff’ s Depa rtment by Marc h 28, 2005, in order to update the information in the reg istry

. Detec tive Br own reviewed the penalties for failing to comply with the require ments, and the Appe llant signe d a stateme nt which re ad, “I acknow ledg e that I

have r ead or had read to me t he reg istration require ments for TN and I understand the se re quirements.” D etec tive B r o w n , i n t u r n , r e l a y e dt h e c u rr e n ti n f o r m a t i o n t o th e T B I.
I n A pril , 20 05 , the TB I

no tif ie d D e te c tiv e B ro wnthat th e Ap pe llant h a d n ot u pd a te d h is information in Marc h, 2005, as re quired. On A pril 22, 2005, Detec tive Br own obtained a war rant for the A ppellant’s ar

rest which alleg ed:
On t he 22 da y

o f A p r il , 2 0 0 5 th is o f

f ic e r d idc o n d u c t a

c h e c k o f th e s e x o f

f e n d er nd registry for any one in possible violation status . . . [ and] it was found that [the Appellant] should have re ported to the Bed ford County Sheriff’ s befor e 3-28- 05. After this date he is c onsidered to be in violation status. To wit: Violation of the Sex Offe nder Reg istry

. . . . (empha sis added). O n May 2, 2005, the Appellant r eporte d to the sheriff ’s depa rtment, and he was arr ested on the w arr ant. On May 25, 2005, the Appellant’ s case was bound ove r to the g ra n d jury and, on Jul y

18, 20 05 , a B e df or d Co un ty

g randjury

ind ic te d h im a s f

oll ow s: [Th e A p p e ll a n t] , w h o is a s e xu a l o f f e n d e r , d id f

a il to ti me ly r e g is te r a s a sexual offe nder wi t h t he Te nnessee Bur eau of I nvestig ation or other la w enf orce ment ag ency , in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated §40-39-208, and ag ainst the pea ce and dig nity

of the State of T ennesse e.T h e jury ve rdi ct for m r ec i t es , “ W e, t h e j u r y , u n an i mou s l y f i n d t h e D ef

en dan t , J ami e Ros k om G u i l t y of 1 vi ol at i on of

t he s ex offender r egi s t r at i on ac t , on or about Ap r i l 2 2, 2 00 5, ” wi t hout s peci f y i ng wh i ch provi s i on of t he A ct wa s i n f ac t v i ol at ed. -3- (empha sis added). A t trial, Detec tive Br own ac knowledg ed that the Appellant had timely reg istered with the TBI

in Dece mber, 2003, and had reg istered with the Bedfor d CountySheriff’ s Depa rtment in Se pte mber, 20 04

. De te c tiv e B ro wn te sti fi e d that the Ap pe llant ha d faile d, ho we ve r, to “ re po rt in person” on or bef

ore Ma rch 28, 2005, and update his re g istration information as re quired by law. The jury found t he Appellant g uilty of vi olating the “sex offende r re g istration act.” He wa s 1 sentenc ed to threey ear s, as a Rang e II , multipl e off ender , and he w as orde red to se rve his sente nce in the Depa

rtment of Corre ction. This timelyappeal followed.
Ana lys is The Appe llant asserts that his conviction should be dismissed because he w as indicted for failing to timelyreg is t er p ursuant to the Te nnessee Sex ual Off ender and Violent Sexual Offende r Reg istration, V erific ation, and Trac king Act of 2004, and the State pr esente d no evidenc e to support this alleg ation at trial. Rather , he alleg es the e vidence prese nted by the State prove d that he violated a diffe rent provision of the law which require d him to report in person to his local law e nforc ement ag ency within a week of his birthday , specific ally by Marc h 28, 2005. The State c ontends that the Appellant’s c onviction should be aff irmed bec ause a

violation of the sexual offe nder r eg istration law ba se d o n a

failu reto time ly

re g ist e r e nc omp a sse s a

failu reto r e po rt

in p e rs on sin c e theof

fe nd e r i s require d to essentially

provide or ve rify

the same information during these two c ontacts. More over, the State arg ues that the Appe llant’s “quibbling w ith the terms ‘re port’ and ‘ reg ister’ obscur es the rea litythat t h e indictment put him on not ice of the crime and suff

iciently described the ac t to be prosec uted.”
It is fundamental that an a ccuse d is constituti onally g uaranteed the rig ht to be informed of

“ the natur e a nd c aus e of the a c c us a tio n” . U.S. C ON ST . ame nd . V I , X I V; T ENN . C ON ST . a rt I § 9 ; see al so W yat t v. Sta te , 2 4 S. W. 3 d3 1 9 , 3 2 4 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 0 )

. A n in d ic tm e n t i s s u f f ic ie n t t o s a ti s f

y the constitutional gua

rante es of notice t o t h e accuse d if it “contains alleg ations that: (1) ena ble the a c c us e d to kn ow thea c c us a tio n to wh ic h a ns we r is re qu ir e d; (2 ) fu rn ish the tria l c ou rt a n a de qu a te basis for e ntry

of a pr oper judg ment; and (3) pr otect the a ccuse d from a subse quent prosec ution for the same of

fense .” State v. Hamm onds , 3 0 S

. W

. 3 d2 9 4 , 2 9 9 (T en n
. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Sta te v . H ill , 954 S.W. 2d72 5, 72 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ). I n a dd iti on , an ind ic tme nt is statut orily re qu ir e d to “ state thefa c ts constituting the off

ense in or dinary and concise lang uag e, without pr olix ity or re petition, in such a manner as to ena ble a pe rson of c ommo n u n d erstanding to know what is intended, and with that de g re e of c e rt a inty wh ic h w ill e na

blethe c ou rt , on co nv ic tio n, to pr on ou nc e thepr op e r j ud g me nt . . . .” T.C.A. § 40-13- 202 (2003).
A def endant c annot leg ally

be convic ted of an off

ense w hich is not charg ed in the indictment o r w h ic h is n o t a le s s e r o f f e n s e e mb r a c e d in th e in d ic tme nt. State v. Cleve land , 959 S.W .2d 548,B u t for a s t at u t e of l i mi t at i on s ba r , dou bl e j eopa r dy pr i n ci pl es w ou l d n ot pr oh i bi t s u bs equ en t pr os ec u t i on of 2
t he A p p el l ant fo r a vi o l at i o n o f T enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed s ect i o n 40

- 3 0

- 2 0 4 (c) , fai l i ng t o repo rt , be cause t he A p p el l ant has ne ver been i ndi ct ed for t hi s offens e.

T he Stat e argues al t ernat i vel y t hat t he p enal pro v is i o n of T enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed s eci t o n 40

- 3 9

- 2 0 8 (a), 3 i n a ddi t i on t o l i s t i n g ei g h t s epa r at e mea n s of v i ol at i n g t h e Act , a l s o ma k es pe n al a n y k n owi n g v i ol at i on of “ an y pr ov i s i on of t h i s pa r t

. ” Su ch v i ol at i on , t h e St at e as s er t s , wou l d i n cl u de a v i ol at i on of t h e r epor t i n g r equ i r eme n t s of T en n es s ee Code Ann ot at ed 40- 39- 204( c)

. W e mu s t re j ec t t h i s ar g u men t as t h e i n di ct men t m ak es no r ef er en ce t o a v i ol at i on of 40- 39- 2 0 4 (c), and t he l anguage o f t he i nd i ct m ent is no t o t herwi se suf f i ci ent l y “ co nci se” t o place t he accused on no t i ce t o any “d e g re e o f ce rta inty” tha t a v io la tio n o f sec tio n 2 0 4 (c ) is b e ing c h a rg e d

. See T

. C

. A

. § 4 0

- 1 3

- 2 0 2

. I n s um , we f i nd t he
cons t i t ut i onal r i gh t of

not i ce t o be m ore t han a s i mp l e qui bb l e. -4- 552 (Tenn. 1997)

. Put simply , not only must the State prove the crime it c harg es, it must char g e the crime it proves. After

an indictment has be en re turned, its char g e may not be broa dened or

chang ed except by consent of the defe ndant or by action of the g rand jury

. See U nited States v. Miller , 471 U.S. 130, 143, 105 S. Ct . 1811, 1819 (1985). A c onstructive ame ndment of the indictment which

“ oc c ur s w he n th e jury is perm ittedto c on vic t th e de fe nd a nt u po n a fa c tual ba sis that e ff

e c tiv e ly mod if ie s a n e sse nti a l e le me nt of the of fe ns e c ha rg e d[,]” auto matic a lly re qu ir e s a re ve rs a l, “ be c aus e the def endant may

have be en convic ted on a g round not cha rg ed in the indictment. . . .” State v. 2 Goodson , 77 S.W .3d 240, 244 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) (citing U.S. v. Adam s , 778 F.2d 1117, 1123 (5 Cir. 1985)). th
Th e la ng ua g e of

the ind ic tme nt r e c ite s th a t th e Ap pe llant “ didfail t o ti me ly re g ist e r a s a se xua l of fe nd e r” in v iol a tio n o f T .C. A. 40 -3 9- 20 8. Th e pr ov isi on s o f thi s sta tut e lis t e ig ht v iol a tio ns , including “ [f] ailure of

an off ender to timelyreg ister.” T.C.A. § 4 0 -3 9 -2 0 8 (a) (1). Thestatute, howeve r, lists no penal provision for failure to “re port.” 3 The pr o o f at trial established that the Appellant complied with the “ initial reg istration” re qu ir e me nt, a s r e fe rr e d to by De te c tiv e B ro wn , but that the Ap pe llant faile d to ann ua lly re po rt in person a s require d by

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-39-204(c ).
The trial c ourt instructed the jury that an esse ntial element of the char g ed cri m e re quired proof:
that the def

endant knowing ly

failed to report in person, no e arlier than seve n (7) cale nd ar d a y s b e f o r e a n dn o late r

th a n s e v e n ( 7 ) c a le n d ar

d a y s a f te r th e o f fende r’s date of birth, to the desig nated law enfor ceme nt ag enc y t o update suc h offe nder’ s fing erprints, palm prints, and phot o gra p h , to verify the continued a ccur acy

of the information in the TB I

reg istration form, and t o p aythe spec ified administrative c os ts.
I n addition, the trial court r ead, in its e ntirety , the specific provisions of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated section 40-39- 204(c)

.-5-

It is appare nt, as denoted by the sepa rate statutory

provisions , that the re quirement of reg istering is a separ ate and distinct re quirement from that of reporting. We conclude that the proof at trial and the jury

instruction give n amounted to a c onstructive ame ndment o f t he indictment by broade ning the g rounds for c onvict i o n o f a s eparate of fense . Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the constructive amendment of the indictment infringe d upon the Appellant’ s “rig ht to have the g rand jury make the c harg e,” thus, re sulting in reve rsible er ror. See G oodson , 77 S.W .3d at 245.
CO NC LU SION
For the aboverea s o n s , we co n cl u d e t h ata c o n s tru ct i v e a m en d m en to f t h e i n d i ct m en t occur red when the jury

was pe rmitted to co n v i ct the Appellant f or a c rime diffe rent fr om that which was char g ed or inc luded within the indictment. Acc ording ly , the Appellant’s c onviction for violation of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-39-204(c ), failing to re port, is reve rsed and dismiss ed.

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE