J-S66037-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LONNIE DUSTIN HAGGERTY,

Appellant No. 552 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered November 18, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-32-CR-0000761-2005

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 29, 2017

Appellant, Lonnie Dustin Haggerty, appeals pro se from the order 

denying his serial post-conviction petitions and motions, which we treat 

collectively as an untimely Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)1 petition.

2

 We 

affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

2 Although Appellant styled his filings otherwise, “[w]e have repeatedly held 

that . . . any petition filed after the judgment of sentence becomes final will 

be treated as a PCRA petition.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 

521 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 47 A.3d 845 (Pa. 2012) (citations 

omitted) (holding appellant’s attempt to frame his petition as “motion to 

correct illegal sentence” does not change applicability of PCRA); see also 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (“[The PCRA is] the sole means of obtaining collateral relief 

and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same 

purpose that exist . . . including habeas corpus and coram nobis.”);

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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A previous panel of this Court set forth the background of this case as 

follows: 

In July 2004, a fourteen-year-old boy accused Appellant of 

sexually abusing him while he slept. The Commonwealth 

charged Appellant with involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, 

sexual assault, statutory sexual assault, indecent assault, 

corruption of minors, and unlawful contact with a minor. In 

December 2005, Appellant entered a guilty plea to statutory 

sexual assault, in exchange for the remaining charges to be nol 

prossed. At sentencing, however, Appellant orally moved to 

withdraw his guilty plea and the trial court granted Appellant’s 

motion. Following a trial in April 2006, a jury convicted 

Appellant of all of the aforementioned crimes. On July 24, 2006, 

the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of nine 

to 20 years of incarceration and determined him to be a sexually 

violent predator (SVP) pursuant to Megan’s Law, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9791, et. seq. Appellant did not file post-sentence motions or a 

direct appeal. On October 11, 2007, the trial court reinstated 

Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. On direct appeal, 

a panel of this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence 

in an unpublished memorandum. Commonwealth v. 

Haggerty, 961 A.2d 1275 (Pa. Super. 2008). Appellant did not 

file an appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 

On June 3, 2009, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. 

The PCRA court appointed counsel who filed a timely, amended 

PCRA petition. The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on 

March 16, 2010. On July 28, 2010, the PCRA court entered an 

order determining that Appellant was entitled to supplement the 

record and/or request a new hearing regarding his SVP 

determination, but denied relief on the remaining PCRA issues 

presented. Appellant appealed and this Court quashed the 

appeal after finding the order interlocutory. Thereafter, 

Appellant filed a motion with the PCRA court wherein he asserted 

he would not seek a new SVP hearing. Appellant requested the 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 464 (Pa. Super. 2013) (treating 

appellant’s serial post-conviction writ of habeas corpus as an untimely PCRA 

petition).
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PCRA issue a final order. On October 16, 2011, the PCRA [court] 

entered an order determining its prior July 28, 2010 order was 

final. [Appellant] timely appeal[ed.]

(Commonwealth v. Haggerty, No. 1765 WDA 2011, unpublished 

memorandum at *1-3 (Pa. Super. filed June 21, 2012) (footnotes omitted)).

On June 21, 2012, this Court affirmed the PCRA court’s order. (See 

id. at *1). Our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of 

appeal on November 28, 2012. (See Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 57 

A.3d 68 (Pa. 2012)).

On or after July 22, 2016,3 Appellant filed the various underlying pro 

se petitions and motions seeking principally to set aside his sentence and

enforcement of the plea agreement that he withdrew.

4 On November 18, 

2016, the PCRA court entered an opinion and order denying the myriad 

motions and petitions, stating that Appellant could have brought his claims 

on direct appeal or under the PCRA, and that the time limitations for 

____________________________________________

3

Pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule, we deem Appellant’s pro se

documents filed on the day they were placed into the hands of prison 

authorities for mailing, rather than on the day they were docketed. See 

Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 234 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2012).

4 Appellant styled his various motions as, inter alia: “Petition Seeking the 

Issuance of a Writ of Error Coram Nobis to Open the Judgment, Set Aside 

the Sentences Imposed and Petitioner’s Immediate, Unconditional Discharge 

From Custody Upon the Writ,” and accompanying memorandum of law; 

“Petition Seeking Habeas Corpus Relief Under Article I, § 14 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6501 et seq. of the Judicial 

Code; Motion to Compel Specific Performance and Enforcement of an 

Executory Agreement Breached by the Commonwealth;[]and Motion Seeking 

Clarification and Correction of an Ambiguous Sentence Entered in Excess of 

the Sentencing Court’s Discretionary Power and Authority[.]”
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requesting such relief have long since passed. (See PCRA Court Opinion, 

11/18/16, at 5-6). This timely appeal followed.5

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court err by not ordering specific performance 

and enforcement of [Appellant’s] non-prosecution agreement 

and/or the separate plea agreement where the considerations 

of both agreements inducing the desired performance were 

violated by the Commonwealth prior to trial?

2. Was [Appellant’s] right to due process violated by the trial 

court’s act of sua sponte preferring and ordering the attorney 

for the Commonwealth to reinstate all criminal charges by 

filing an amended information in a manner inconsistent with 

established rules of procedure resulting in a coincidental loss 

of personal and subject matter jurisdiction?

3. Was [Appellant’s] right to due process and a fair trial 

violated where the evidence adduced by the Commonwealth 

at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to establish his guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt on two of the offenses charged 

due to a failure of proof?

4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion at sentencing and/or 

impose an illegal sentence illegal from its inception which was 

always subject to correction that must be vacated as a legal 

nullity? 

5. Was [Appellant] denied his due process right to meaningful 

appellate review due to direct appeal counsel’s failure to 

present any challenges to the judgment of sentence imposed 

and failing to present more promising issues on his appeal 

that would have likely compelled a far different result?

____________________________________________

5 The court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On April 17, 2017, it

entered an order adopting its November 18, 2016 opinion as its Rule 

1925(a) opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
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6. Was [Appellant’s] due process rights [sic] violated where 

the PCRA [court] failed to provide him with adequate 

corrective process for litigating his claims of error where 

multiple claims timely presented for the trial court’s review 

went unheard at the evidentiary hearing, were not addressed 

in the PCRA court’s opinion denying relief and were simply 

ignored?

7. Is [Appellant] being unlawfully detained in custody in 

violation of due process due to defective process, a void 

judgment and/or void or illegal sentence entitling him to 

immediate habeas corpus relief and his unconditional release 

from custody in the interest of justice and ensuring the proper 

administration of our laws?

(Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5).6,

7

When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA 

relief, this Court is limited to a determination of whether the 

evidence of record supports the PCRA court’s conclusions and 

whether its ruling is free of legal error. This Court will not 

disturb the PCRA court’s findings unless there is no support for 

them in the certified record. 

. . . The question of whether a petition is timely raises a 

question of law, and where a petitioner raises questions of law, 

____________________________________________

6 The Commonwealth did not file a brief.

7 We recognize that this Court granted Appellant’s application to exceed the

word-count limit prescribed by Pa.R.A.P. 2135; however, we note that his 

106-page brief is more than triple the maximum presumptive compliant 

page length of thirty pages. See Pa.R.A.P. 2135(a)(1). Additionally, the 

brief is defective. The argument section is rambling, difficult to follow, and 

lacks coherent legal analysis of the issues presented. (See Appellant’s Brief, 

at 35-106). Although we could quash this appeal for Appellant’s defective 

brief, we decline to do so, in the interest of judicial economy. See Pa.R.A.P. 

2101; see also Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 252 (Pa. Super. 

2003), appeal denied, 879 A.2d 782 (Pa. 2005) (stating pro se litigants must 

comply with procedural rules and declining to quash appeal despite defective 

brief).
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our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is 

plenary. 

Commonwealth v. Hudson, 156 A.3d 1194, 1196–97 (Pa. Super. 2017), 

appeal denied, 2017 WL 3614192 (Pa. filed Aug. 23, 2017).

All PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of the date upon which 

the judgment of sentence became final, unless one of the statutory 

exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). The petitioner bears the burden to plead and prove 

an applicable statutory exception. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 

A.3d 178, 186 (Pa. 2016). “If the [PCRA] petition is determined to be 

untimely, and no exception has been pled and proven, the petition must be 

dismissed without a hearing because Pennsylvania courts are without 

jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition.” Commonwealth v. 

Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 519 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 47 A.3d 845 

(Pa. 2012) (citation omitted).

Section 9545 of the PCRA provides only three limited exceptions that 

allow for review of an untimely PCRA petition: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result 

of interference by government officials with the presentation of 

the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained 

by the exercise of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 
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this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any petition attempting to invoke one of 

these exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could 

have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

Instantly, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on 

August 11, 2008, and he did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Therefore, Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence became final thirty days later, on September 10, 2008, and he had 

until September 10, 2009 to file a timely PCRA petition. See Pa.R.A.P. 

903(a); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), (3). Thus, the instant petition filed 

approximately seven years later is patently untimely, and the burden fell 

upon Appellant to plead and prove that one of the enumerated exceptions to 

the one-year time-bar applied to his case. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

Here, from what we are able to glean from Appellant’s rambling brief, 

he does not allege the applicability of any exception to the PCRA’s time-bar. 

(See Appellant’s Brief, at 35-106). Appellant instead focuses on issues that 

he could have raised on direct appeal, or in his first PCRA petition. (See id.

(challenging, inter alia, the withdrawal of his guilty plea, the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support his conviction, the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence, and the legality of his sentence)). Because Appellant did not

allege any exception to the time-bar, we conclude that he has failed to meet 

his burden under the PCRA. See Robinson, supra at 186.
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Further, we observe Appellant’s claim that his sentence is illegal and 

thus always subject to correction does not allow him to circumvent the 

PCRA’s timeliness requirements. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 76, 84-85). It is 

well-settled that “the period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the 

doctrine of equitable tolling; instead, the time for filing a PCRA petition can 

be extended only by operation of one of the statutorily enumerated 

exceptions to the PCRA time-bar.” Robinson, supra at 185 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n order for this Court to review a 

legality of sentence claim, there must be a basis for our jurisdiction to 

engage in such review. . . . [T]hough not technically waivable, a legality [of 

sentence] claim may nevertheless be lost should it be raised . . . in an 

untimely PCRA petition for which no time-bar exception applies, thus 

depriving the court of jurisdiction over the claim.” Commonwealth v. 

Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 995 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Finally, with regard to Appellant’s assertions of ineffective assistance 

of counsel, (see Appellant’s Brief, at 89-94, 100-01), it is well-settled that 

“claim[s] that counsel was ineffective will not save an untimely PCRA 

petition.” Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1167 (Pa. Super. 2001)

(citations omitted). In sum, we conclude Appellant has not met his burden 

of proving that his untimely PCRA petition fits within one of the three 
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exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar. See Robinson, supra at 186. 

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the PCRA court.8

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/29/2017

____________________________________________

8 Although our reasoning differs somewhat from the court, we may affirm on 

any basis. See Commonwealth v. Doty, 48 A.3d 451, 456 (Pa. Super. 

2012).