UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-6545

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

SHIRLEY INGRAM, JR. a/k/a Raheem,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, 

at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, Chief District Judge. (3:10-cr-00069-FDW-1; 3:15-cv00553-FDW)

Submitted: March 12, 2019 Decided: March 21, 2019

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and AGEE and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Shirley Ingram, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Shirley Ingram, Jr., of possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The district 

court concluded that Ingram qualified as an armed career criminal based in part on his 

prior North Carolina convictions for breaking or entering and imposed the statutory 

minimum sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), (e) (2012). 

After an unsuccessful direct appeal, Ingram filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion 

raising a variety of challenges to his convictions and sentence, including a challenge to 

his armed career criminal designation. Ingram filed several motions related to his § 2255 

motion, the last of which was a motion for summary judgment on his claim that his North 

Carolina breaking or entering convictions no longer qualified as predicate felonies for the 

armed career criminal designation in light of Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 

(2016). The district court construed this motion as an amended § 2255 motion, denied 

relief on Ingram’s Mathis claim, and concluded that Ingram had abandoned his remaining 

challenges to his convictions and sentence. The court thereafter denied Ingram’s Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 59(e) motion for reconsideration, in which Ingram argued that the court 

misconstrued his motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Ingram contends that the 

court erred in denying relief on his Mathis claim and concluding that he abandoned

review of his remaining claims. We vacate and remand in part and dismiss in part.

We conclude that Ingram did not mean to abandon his remaining claims to his 

convictions and sentence. See Jehovah v. Clarke, 798 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2015) 

(reiterating that pro se pleadings must be liberally construed). Although Ingram stated 
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that the district court could ignore the other arguments raised in his § 2255 motion, he 

clarified that the court could do so only in the event that it granted him relief on his 

Mathis claim, as that would purportedly result in his immediate release. Because the 

court did not grant him such relief, it should have considered his remaining claims. 

Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the court’s order construing Ingram’s motion for 

summary judgment as an amended § 2255 motion that abandoned all claims apart from 

the Mathis claim. Moreover, because the court’s rulings on Ingram’s related motions 

were based on its belief that Ingram was proceeding on his Mathis claim only, we vacate 

the court’s rulings on those motions. We deny Ingram’s motion for a certificate of 

appealability as unnecessary and remand for further proceedings.*

 See Harbison v. Bell, 

556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009) (holding that certificate of appealability requirement only 

“governs final orders that dispose of the merits of a habeas corpus proceeding”).

Ingram may not appeal from the denial of his challenge to his armed career 

criminal designation unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) 

(2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this 

standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 

 * Because we vacate and remand the portion of the court’s order interpreting 

Ingram’s motion for summary judgment, we need not consider his appeal of the order 

denying his Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider that interpretation.
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529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When 

the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both 

that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Ingram has not 

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and 

dismiss the appeal of the portion of the district court’s order denying Ingram’s challenge 

to his armed career criminal designation. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART