FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DANIEL VASQUEZ,  No. 08-55699

Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No.

v.  2:05-cv-00589-AGJWJ R. J. KIRKLAND, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Andrew J. Guilford, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 4, 2009—Pasadena, California

Filed July 20, 2009

Before: Betty B. Fletcher, Raymond C. Fisher and

Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge B. Fletcher

9251
COUNSEL

Michael Tanaka, Deputy Federal Public Defender (argued)

and Sean K. Kennedy, Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles,

California, for the petitioner-appellant.

David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney General (argued),

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Dane R. Gillette, Pamela Hamanaka,

and Steven D. Matthews, Office of the California Attorney

General, Los Angeles, California, for the respondent-appellee.

OPINION

B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Daniel Vasquez, a California prisoner, appeals the district

court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Vasquez was convicted in California state court of the firstdegree murder of Frank Hernandez. He alleges that he was

denied his Sixth Amendment rights under the Confrontation

Clause because he was unable effectively to cross-examine

the prosecution’s key witness, Carmen Zapata. Zapata, the

victim’s mother, is deaf, cannot speak, and has never learned

a standard sign language. Rather, she communicates by using

a combination of signs, gestures, facial expressions, and lip

reading. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the denial of Vasquez’s petition

9254 VASQUEZ v. KIRKLAND
because the California Court of Appeal’s decision to affirm

Vasquez’s conviction was neither contrary to nor an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law.

I.

On the afternoon of August 3, 2001, Frank Hernandez, a

member of the Eastlake gang, was at home with his mother

Carmen Zapata, who is deaf, and his girlfriend Shirley Sanchez.1

Hernandez and his mother were in the living room of their

apartment, and Sanchez was in a bedroom.

Zapata felt a “boom” from a gunshot, then saw Hernandez

fall to the floor. Looking up, she saw a young man standing

in the doorway holding a gun. The man fired a second shot

at Hernandez. Zapata grabbed the shooter’s hand and tried to

close the door, but the shooter put his foot in the doorway to

prevent her from doing so. Zapata was face-to-face with the

shooter during this struggle. 

After Sanchez heard the first shot, she entered the living

room, where she saw “some guy” shooting while Zapata tried

to protect her son. Sanchez helped Zapata force the door

closed, shutting the shooter out of the apartment. Zapata

waited a few minutes and then went to a neighbor for help

calling the police. The police received the 911 call at 1:25

p.m. When they arrived, they found Hernandez dead of gunshot wounds to the chest and abdomen.

At the police station, Zapata was interviewed by Detective

1We rely on the state appellate court’s decision for our summary of the

facts of the crime. Because this initial statement of facts is drawn from the

state appellate court’s decision, it is afforded a presumption of correctness

that may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009).

Vasquez does not allege that these preliminary facts are erroneous. 

VASQUEZ v. KIRKLAND 9255
Lisa Sanchez.2

 Detective Sanchez was assisted by a records

clerk who had learned American Sign Language from her

stepmother and by taking classes. Detective Sanchez showed

Zapata a “gang book,” which was a book of 160 photographs

of people whom the police believed belonged to the Clover

gang. Zapata “right away” identified a photograph of

Vasquez. Detective Sanchez testified that Zapata “became

like excited and scared and pointing and making noises with

her mouth and gesturing that he was the shooter.” After

selecting the photograph of Vasquez, Zapata wrote out the

following statement: “The person in photo no. 5 is the person

that shot my son today.” 

The police separately interviewed Shirley Sanchez. When

she reviewed the gang book, Sanchez selected photographs of

two men, one of whom was Vasquez. She described the

shooter as a light-skinned Hispanic male, 20 to 22 years old,

5′9′′ to 5′10′′ tall, with a shaved head. Sanchez told the police

that she had seen the shooter about five times before the

shooting and identified him as a member of the Clover gang,

a rival to the Eastlake gang to which Hernandez belonged.

She said that the shooter had driven by the apartment, holding

a gun, about three weeks earlier. She said that she heard the

man tell Hernandez, “You can’t be living here. Your homeboys killed mine not long ago, so you had better move out. I

am not playing no games.” 

Shortly thereafter, Vasquez was arrested and charged with

Hernandez’s murder.

Vasquez’s trial took about nine days. Zapata was the prosecution’s key witness. Although Zapata is deaf and does not

speak, she has never learned a standard form of sign language.

She also has a very limited ability to read and write. She communicates with others using a combination of signs, gestures,

2We refer to Shirley Sanchez as either “Sanchez” or “Shirley Sanchez”

and to Detective Lisa Sanchez as “Detective Sanchez.” 

9256 VASQUEZ v. KIRKLAND
facial expressions, and sounds. At trial, Zapata testified with

the assistance of a court-certified American Sign Language

interpreter and a certified intermediary interpreter. The intermediary interpreter, like Zapata, is deaf and cannot speak.

When counsel asked Zapata a question, the American Sign

Language interpreter translated the question into sign language for the intermediary interpreter, who then used signs,

gestures, and facial expressions to communicate the question

to Zapata. Zapata gave her answer to the intermediary interpreter, who then translated Zapata’s answer into American

Sign Language. Finally, the American Sign Language interpreter announced Zapata’s answer to the court. 

In addition to using the intermediary interpreter, the parties

facilitated Zapata’s testimony by pointing to photographs and

diagrams, using picture dictionaries to help identify colors,

asking Zapata to act out what happened at the apartment, and

occasionally asking the interpreters to offer a narrative

account of Zapata’s testimony rather than interpret her testimony directly.

Even with this arsenal of techniques, the attorneys and the

interpreters found it difficult to communicate questions to

Zapata and to interpret her answers. The American Sign Language interpreter and the intermediary interpreter paused to

confer with one another more than forty times during Zapata’s

testimony regarding the best way to interpret Zapata’s statements for the jury. The court, the interpreters, and the attorneys also conferred outside of the presence of the jury on

several occasions to determine how best to facilitate Zapata’s

testimony. During Zapata’s second day of testimony, after

several of these conferences had occurred, defense counsel

delivered a stipulated description of the method of interpretation to the jury.3

 After defense counsel addressed the jury, the

trial judge added,

3

In relevant part, the stipulation was read to the jury as follows: 

VASQUEZ v. KIRKLAND 9257
Now, we will proceed and will take whatever time

it takes and make whatever accommodation is

needed to ensure that all witnesses, regardless of

which party calls them, that all witnesses have an

ability to relate their testimony, and you will be the

ones at the end of the day to evaluate the credibility

of these witnesses.

Defense counsel repeatedly objected during both direct

examination and cross-examination, arguing that he was disadvantaged because he could not tell whether Zapata was “understanding what’s being interpreted to her because we have

no independent way of discerning what her state of mind is

when the question is posed to her.” Defense counsel was particularly concerned about his ability to examine Zapata about

colors, about the timing and the sequence of events, and about

[T]he court has seen fit to utilize the services of two different

interpreters for each occasion when Ms. Zapata is either questioned or gives an answer . . . . 

Ms. Gonzales[ ] is known as an intermediary interpreter. Her

skills are developed because she also does not speak and is hearing impaired. 

Accordingly, the intermediary interpreter has some similar

experiences as would a witness that does not speak and does not

hear. 

[T]he . . . intermediary interpreter will then utilize the services

of the American Sign Language interpreter . . . . 

So when a question is posed from counsel, it first goes to the

American Sign Language interpreter. . . . She will then translate

it in sign language for Ms. Gonzales. Ms. Gonzales will then use

a form or a mixture of both known sign language expression, gesture, and facial expression and body language to communicate

the essence of the question to the witness. 

The witness in turn will respond to Ms. Gonzales and then to

the American Sign Language interpreter, [who] will announce the

testimony to the court. 

9258 VASQUEZ v. KIRKLAND
inconsistencies between her prior statements and her testimony at trial. The trial court overruled Vasquez’s objections.

The trial court noted that Zapata’s answers were responsive to

the questions and consistent with other evidence; that the

defense was at no more disadvantage than the prosecution and

that in fact, the difficulties would more likely favor the

defense because the prosecution bore the burden of proof

beyond a reasonable doubt; and that there was no basis to

challenge the effectiveness of the interpreters. Stating that it

would give Vasquez “vast leeway,” the trial court placed no

limitations on the scope of Vasquez’s cross-examination of

Zapata. 

Zapata’s testimony was critical to the prosecution because

Shirley Sanchez, the only other witness to Hernandez’s shooting, claimed at trial that she could not remember identifying

Vasquez or making any statements because she was high on

methamphetamine at the time of the murder. Detective Sanchez testified regarding the statements and identifications

made by Shirley Sanchez; the jury also saw a videotape of

Shirley Sanchez’s statement to the police. 

The prosecution also introduced evidence of the “bad

blood” between Vasquez’s Clover gang and Hernandez’s

Eastlake gang, as well as evidence of a time sequence that

made it possible for Vasquez to have been at the scene of the

murder: Vasquez had picked up a pair of eyeglasses at Sears

Optical at 1:12 p.m. on the day of the shooting, just thirteen

minutes before the neighbor called 911 at 1:25 p.m; the Sears

store was about 3.8 miles from Hernandez’s apartment, about

an eight-minute drive; and Vasquez entered a Vons market

about two and a half blocks from Hernandez’s apartment at

1:37 p.m. 

Vasquez presented an alibi defense, arguing that he drove

straight to Vons after picking up the eyeglasses. Defense

counsel introduced a videotape made a year after the murder

showing a drive between Sears and Vons at 1:00 p.m. that

VASQUEZ v. KIRKLAND 9259
took thirty minutes, in contrast to the eight-minute drive

shown in the prosecution’s videotape.

The jury returned a verdict convicting Vasquez of firstdegree murder. The trial court sentenced Vasquez to sixty

years in prison. 

On appeal, Vasquez argued that he was denied his right to

due process and to confront and cross-examine witnesses

because of Zapata’s limited ability to comprehend questions

and to communicate responses. The California Court of

Appeal rejected Vasquez’s argument in an unpublished opinion. The Court of Appeal cited no federal cases, but adopted

the reasoning of People v. Tran, 47 Cal. App. 4th 759 (1996),

which it found to be “substantively indistinguishable” from

Vasquez’s case, and held that Vasquez was not deprived of

his right to confront and cross-examine Zapata. In Tran, Ahn,

a victim of a shooting, was left a quadriplegic and was unable

to speak as a result of his injuries. Id. at 765. When Ahn testified at Tran’s trial, the court explained Ahn’s condition to the

jury and said that he would tap once for “yes” and twice for

“no.” Id. at 766. On appeal, Tran claimed that he was

deprived of his right of confrontation because Ahn’s “physical

and mental limitations precluded him from conducting a

meaningful cross-examination.” Id. at 769. The Court of

Appeal disagreed, finding that the limitations on Tran’s ability to cross-examine Ahn “were not placed there by the court,

but arose from Ahn’s physical condition.” Id. at 770. The

court found that any limits on Ahn’s ability to testify affected

both the prosecution and the defense, and that although the

attorneys were frustrated that they had to ask questions in a

form that Ahn could answer by tapping “yes” or “no,” the trial

court did not restrict counsel’s ability to cross-examine the

witness. Id. The Tran court held that there was no violation

of the defendant’s confrontation rights because although

“[t]he confrontation clause guarantees the opportunity to confront and cross-examine, [ ] this does not mean that a defen9260 VASQUEZ v. KIRKLAND
dant has a constitutional right to ask a particular form of

question.” Id.

The California Supreme Court denied Vasquez’s petition

for review without opinion. 

After Vasquez filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus

in federal court, the magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the district court grant

habeas relief on the ground that Vasquez’s Confrontation

Clause rights were violated by the lack of effective crossexamination. The district court, however, declined to accept

the magistrate judge’s recommendation and entered an order

denying Vasquez’s habeas petition. 

The district court issued a certificate of appealability.

Vasquez timely appealed.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s decision to deny a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Campbell v. Rice, 408

F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Because Vasquez

filed his federal habeas petition after the effective date of the

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”),

he can prevail only if he can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claims:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). AEDPA establishes a “highly deferential

standard for evaluating state-court rulings.” Woodford v. VisVASQUEZ v. KIRKLAND 9261
ciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam). “A state court

decision is ‘contrary to’ clearly established Supreme Court

precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases or if the state

court confronts a set of facts materially indistinguishable from

those at issue in a decision of the Supreme Court and, nevertheless, arrives at a result different from its precedent.” Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)). “The ‘unreasonable application’ clause requires the state court decision to be

more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s application

of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable.”

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (internal citations omitted). Relief is

contingent on a determination that the constitutional error

“had [a] substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 637 (1993) (internal quotation omitted). 

Because the California Supreme Court denied Vasquez’s

petition for review without comment, we review the California Court of Appeal’s opinion as the last reasoned state court

opinion on the claims raised in this appeal. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991). The state court decision

need not cite Supreme Court cases “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts

them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).

III.

[1] The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment

guarantees a criminal defendant the right “to be confronted

with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The

Supreme Court has explained that the right of confrontation

“means more than being allowed to confront the witness

physically.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974).

Rather, “[t]he main and essential purpose of confrontation is

to secure for the opponent the opportunity of crossexamination.” Id. at 315-16 (internal quotation marks and

9262 VASQUEZ v. KIRKLAND
citation omitted); accord Melendez-Dias v. Massachusetts,

___ S. Ct. ___, 2009 WL 1789468, at *3 (June 25, 2009)

(“[The Confrontation Clause] guarantees a defendant’s right

to confront those ‘who bear testimony’ against him.” (quoting

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004))). The Confrontation Clause does not prevent a trial judge from imposing

“reasonable limits” on cross-examination. Delaware v. Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). The Court has held, however, that a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights were violated when he was “prohibited from engaging in otherwise

appropriate cross-examination designed . . .‘to expose to the

jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw

inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’ ” Id. at

680 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318). 

Vasquez argues that he suffered a “complete failure of confrontation” because he could not cross-examine Zapata effectively. He alleges that because the interpreters had difficulty

conveying questions relating to time, color, past statements,

or other abstract concepts, he was effectively barred from

questioning Zapata about her prior identifications and statements.4

 He contends that this placed him at a distinct disadvantage because the prosecution was able to obtain from

Zapata an essentially narrative account of the events on the

day of Hernandez’s murder, while the defense had the more

challenging task of impeaching that account with Zapata’s

prior statements.

[2] Vasquez is, however, unable to point us to any case in

which the Supreme Court found a violation of a defendant’s

Confrontation Clause rights where the limitations on the

effectiveness of cross-examination resulted from the witness’s

own physical impairments. The Supreme Court cases that

Vasquez cites in his brief to support his Confrontation Clause

4Vasquez does not challenge the admission of Zapata’s prior identification of Vasquez or the prior statements she gave to the police, nor does

he challenge Zapata’s competency to testify. 

VASQUEZ v. KIRKLAND 9263
argument follow four general themes. Although the cases recognize the general principle that a defendant has a right to

effective cross-examination, none involve issues or facts similar to those presented in this case.

[3] Vasquez’s first set of cases involves the admissibility of

prior statements of a witness. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.

74, 88 (1970) (plurality opinion) (defendant’s confrontation

rights not violated by the admission under state hearsay rules

of a co-conspirator’s out-of-court statement where the witness

was under oath and subject to cross-examination before the

trier of fact); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)

(defendant’s confrontation rights not violated by admitting a

declarant’s out-of-court statement “as long as the declarant is

testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective crossexamination”); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965)

(defendant’s confrontation rights violated by admitting a witness’s preliminary hearing testimony where the testimony was

not tested by cross-examination at the hearing and the witness

did not testify at the trial). See also Melendez-Dias, ___ S. Ct.

___, 2009 WL 1789468, at *3 (Under the Confrontation

Clause, “[a] witness’s testimony against a defendant is . . .

inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for

cross-examination.”). Here, Vasquez does not challenge the

admission of Zapata’s prior identification or her prior statements to police. The state court’s decision was therefore neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of thenexisting Supreme Court authority. 

[4] A second set of cited cases recognizes Confrontation

Clause violations where the trial court placed some procedural

obstacle before the defendant’s ability to cross-examine a witness. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 (defendant’s confrontation rights violated when the trial court prohibited all

inquiry into the possibility that the witness might be biased in

favor of the prosecution as a result of the state’s dismissal of

his pending public drunkenness charge); Davis, 415 U.S. at

9264 VASQUEZ v. KIRKLAND
318 (defendant’s confrontation rights violated when the trial

court did not allow the defendant to cross-examine a witness

about his probationary status as a juvenile offender). Again,

the state court’s decision is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of these cases. Vasquez makes no claim

that the trial court placed improper limits on his ability to

cross-examine Zapata. Rather, he bases his claim on the

inherent difficulty of cross-examining a witness whose ability

to understand questions and communicate answers is impaired.5

[5] A third set of cases involves challenges to procedures

invoked to protect child witnesses. See Maryland v. Craig,

497 U.S. 836, 855-57 (1990) (defendant’s confrontation rights

not violated by allowing child witnesses to testify by one-way

closed circuit television where the state made an adequate

showing of necessity and the child witnesses testified under

oath, were subject to full cross-examination, and were able to

be observed by the judge, jury, and defendant as they testified); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 744 (1987) (exclusion of a defendant from a hearing held to determine the

competency of child witnesses did not violate defendant’s

Confrontation Clause rights). Although an unusual twointerpreter process was used to elicit Zapata’s testimony,

Vasquez does not challenge this process. Thus, the state court

did not unreasonably apply these cases. 

5

In his reply, Vasquez argues that there is no rule that Confrontation

Clause violations result only from the actions of the trial court, because

confrontation rights can be violated when a witness refuses to testify. He

relies on Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), for this premise. In

Douglas, the state introduced a confession purportedly made by Loyd, a

separately-tried accomplice. Id. at 416. Loyd invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer any questions about the confession. Id. The Court held that Douglas’s inability to

cross-examine Loyd about the alleged confession denied his Confrontation

Clause rights. Id. at 419. Vasquez’s attempt to analogize Loyd’s refusal to

testify to Zapata’s willing testimony is misplaced. Even if Douglas establishes that a witness’s refusal to testify can violate a defendant’s confrontation rights, that is not what occurred here, and the Court of Appeal’s

holding is not, therefore, contrary to Douglas. 

VASQUEZ v. KIRKLAND 9265
[6] A final set of cases involve the use of a defendant’s own

statements against him; that is, they implicate a defendant’s

Fifth Amendment rights rather than the Sixth Amendment

right of confrontation. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231,

238 (1980) (Fifth Amendment not violated by using a criminal defendant’s pre-arrest silence to impeach the defendant’s

credibility); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971)

(Fifth Amendment not violated by using a statement taken in

violation of Miranda v. Arizona for impeachment purposes).

Because Vasquez raises no Fifth Amendment claim, the state

court’s decision cannot be said to be contrary to or an unreasonable application of these cases.

[7] The Supreme Court case that presents a factual situation

closest to the present case is United States v. Owens, 484 U.S.

554 (1987). In Owens, the victim’s memory was severely

impaired as a result of injuries he suffered when he was

attacked by a prisoner. Id. at 556. In an interview with an FBI

agent at the hospital, the victim was able to describe the attack

and identify Owens as his attacker. Id. At trial, the victim testified that he remembered identifying Owens, but during

cross-examination he admitted that he could not remember

seeing the assailant, nor could he remember whether any of

his many visitors had suggested that the defendant had

attacked him. Id. Defense counsel unsuccessfully attempted to

refresh the victim’s recollection with hospital records. Id. The

jury convicted Owens of assault with intent to commit murder. Id. The Supreme Court held that the Confrontation

Clause was not “violated by admission of an identification

statement of a witness who is unable, because of his memory

loss, to testify concerning the basis for the identification.” Id.

at 564. The Court stated that “[t]he Confrontation Clause

guarantees only ‘an opportunity for effective crossexamination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent the defense might wish.’ ”

Id. at 559 (quoting Stincer, 482 U.S. at 739) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also noted that “the traditional

protections of the oath, cross-examination, and opportunity

9266 VASQUEZ v. KIRKLAND
for the jury to observe the witness’ demeanor satisfy the constitutional requirements.” Id. at 560 (citing Green, 399 U.S.

at 158-61).

[8] Here, as in Owens, the trial court provided the defendant the opportunity for effective cross-examination: the trial

court placed no limits on the scope or duration of crossexamination. Moreover, Zapata testified under oath and the

jury was able to observe her demeanor in order to assess her

credibility. We empathize with the challenges that defense

counsel faced in cross-examining Zapata. Those challenges,

however, do not rise to a deprivation of the opportunity for

effective cross-examination. Defense counsel could question

Zapata about the shooting and about her identification of

Vasquez. The jury, having been instructed as to the nature of

the intermediary interpretation process, could observe the difficulties that the interpreters encountered in communicating

counsel’s questions and interpreting the gestures and signs

that Zapata gave in response, and weigh the value of Zapata’s

testimony accordingly. Thus, like the defendant in Owens,

Vasquez had ample opportunity “to expose to the jury the

facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” Davis, 415 U.S. at 318. In fact,

Vasquez’s opportunity for effective cross-examination

exceeded that in Owens, where the witness’s memory impairment left no possibility that defense counsel could crossexamine the witness about the attack or his identification of

the defendant. Here, by contrast, Zapata clearly remembered

the shooting and her prior identification of Vasquez, but had

difficulty communicating what she remembered. 

[9] Because there is no factually analogous Supreme Court

decision finding a confrontation clause violation on the basis

of the witness’s own physical impairments, the California

Court of Appeal’s decision affirming Vasquez’s conviction is

not contrary to a Supreme Court decision with materially

indistinguishable facts. See Lambert, 393 F.3d at 974. In addiVASQUEZ v. KIRKLAND 9267
tion, because the trial court imposed no limitations that

obstructed Vasquez’s opportunity to effectively crossexamine Zapata, the California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent. See Lockyer, 538

U.S. at 75; see also Owens, 484 U.S. at 559. We therefore

affirm the district court’s denial of Vasquez’s petition for a

writ of habeas corpus.

AFFIRMED.

9268 VASQUEZ v. KIRKLAND