J-S01011-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RONALD ANDREW KESSELRING,

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1205 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 13, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-01-CR-0001051-2016

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MARCH 21, 2018

Ronald Andrew Kesselring (“Kesselring”) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered following his conviction of two counts of hindering 

apprehension or prosecution, and one count of obstructing administration of 

law or other governmental function (“Obstruction”).

1

 Kesselring also has filed 

with this Court a “Petition to Proceed Pro Se, Amend Appellant’s Brief and for 

an Extension of Time” (“Petition”). We deny Kesselring’s Petition, and affirm 

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5105(a)(1), (5); 5101. 
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the judgment of sentence.2

The trial court aptly summarized the factual history underlying the 

instant appeal as follows:

On August 18, 2016, at approximately 4:30-4:45 p.m., Officer 

Gregory Morehead [(“Officer Morehead”),] of the Reading 

Township Police Department[,FN1] and Sheriff’s Deputies 

[Norman] McNeal [(“Deputy McNeal”)] and [Timothy] Beall 

[(“Deputy Beall”),

FN2] went to Café’s Motorcycle Shop 

[(“Café’s”),FN3] located at 2630 Hunterstown/Hampton Road in 

Reading Township, Adams County[,] to serve a domestic relations 

bench warrant on Nathan Brough [(“Brough”)], an employee at 

the motorcycle shop. As law enforcement approached and turned 

into Café’s parking lot, they observed two males, [Kesselring] and 

Brough, standing in the parking lot. Deputies Beall and McNeal 

testified [that Kesselring] and Brough made eye contact with them 

and then quickly went inside the building and closed and locked 

the door. [Deputy McNeal testified that he tried opening the door, 

but found that it was locked.] 

FN1 Officer Morehead was in full uniform and a marked police 

vehicle.

FN2 Deputies McNeal and Beall were in uniform and riding together 

in an unmarked vehicle.

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2 Kesselring’s counsel filed an advocate’s appellate brief for Kesselring on 

November 13, 2017. On November 29, 2017, Kesselring filed his Petition 

requesting permission to proceed pro se, and for an extension of time to 

amend his appellate brief to include additional issues. Petition, 11/29/17, at 

2. Our Supreme Court has held that there is no right to hybrid representation. 

Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626 A.2d 1137, 1139 (Pa. 1993). “Moreover, once 

the brief has been filed, any right to insist upon self-representation has 

expired.” Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1044 (Pa. 2011). 

Because Kesselring filed his Petition after his counsel had filed an appellate 

brief on Kesselring’s behalf, we cannot grant Kesselring the relief he seeks. 

We therefore deny Kesselring’s Petition.
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FN3 [Kesselring] owns Café’s [].

Deputy McNeal testified [that] he knocked on the door, 

announced his presence and that he had a warrant for Brough. 

While this was occurring, Officer Morehead and Deputy Beall went 

to the side and then the back of the building. [Kesselring]

answered approximately two minutes after Deputy McNeal began 

knocking on the door. Deputy McNeal testified [that] he told 

[Kesselring] they had a warrant for Brough and needed to talk to 

Brough. [Kesselring] told Deputy McNeal that Brough “wasn’t 

here, he left already, that his vehicle was broken and he got a 

ride.” 

Deputy McNeal entered the building and began searching for 

Brough. He testified that during the search[, Kesselring] was loud 

and yelling. At some point[,] Officer Morehead entered the 

building through an open back door and started searching for 

Brough. Deputy Beall remained in the back of the building in case 

Brough tried to leave. [Deputy Beall stated that he stayed in the 

back because he “wanted to be at a vantage point where he could 

see if [] Brough fled from the building.”] Officer Morehead 

testified [that] approximately ten minutes into his search of the 

building[,] he heard “a pretty heated conversation between 

Deputy McNeal and [] Kesselring on the first floor area. Officer 

Morehead took [Kesselring] outside to “diffuse the situation.” 

Officer Morehead eventually rejoined Deputy McNeal back inside 

the building, and continued searching for Brough. After 

approximately 30-40 minutes of searching, Deputy McNeal found 

Brough hiding in the insulation and duct work in a small “crawl 

space” area on the second floor. Brough was apprehended and 

arrested.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/29/17, at 1-3 (citations to record and some footnotes 

omitted). 

A jury subsequently convicted Kesselring of the above-described 

charges, after which the trial court revoked Kesselring’s bail in an unrelated 

probation revocation case. Following a pre-sentence investigation, the trial 

court sentenced Kesselring to an aggregate prison term of 10-24 months. The 
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trial court imposed the sentence consecutive to the sentence imposed in 

Kesselring’s unrelated probation revocation case. Thereafter, Kesselring filed 

the instant timely appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal.

Kesselring presents the following claims for our review:

1. Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence of

a “crime or violation of the terms of probation, parole, 

intermediate punishment or Accelerated Rehabilitative 

Disposition,” as required by 18 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 5105, where

the only evidence presented at trial was testimony that 

Sheriffs had a “domestic relations” warrant for another 

individual, and failed to introduce said warrant?

2. Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence of 

an affirmative act to hinder the execution of a warrant, as 

required by 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101, where [Kesselring] failed 

to open the door in a timely fashion?

NOTE: ...[T]hough [Kesselring] challenges the sufficiency of 

the evidence for two convictions under Section 5105, it will be 

addressed in one Question, as it involves the same factual and 

legal concerns.

Brief for Appellant at 4. 

In his first claim, Kesselring challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

underlying his conviction of hindering apprehension or prosecution. Id. at 11. 

Kesselring argues that the Commonwealth’s “[m]ere reference to an alleged 

‘domestic relations warrant,’ without allegation of a crime, is not sufficient to 

establish that [Kesselring] hindered apprehension of someone for a ‘crime or 

violation of the terms of probation, parole, intermediate punishment or 

Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition.’” Id. (quoting 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5105). 
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Specifically, Kesselring argues that the Commonwealth failed to introduce the 

actual warrant into evidence, and there was no allegation that Brough had 

committed a crime. Brief for Appellant at 11. Relying on this Court’s holding 

in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 100 A.3d 207 (Pa. Super. 2014), Kesselring 

contends that, although the officers stated that they were at his residence to 

serve “an active domestic relations warrant on another individual[,]” they did 

not testify as to the underlying basis for the warrant. Brief for Appellant at 

13-14. Kesselring takes issue with the trial court’s conclusion that the mere 

existence of the domestic relations warrant provided sufficient evidence of a 

crime by Brough. Id. at 14. Kesselring proffers that a domestic relations 

bench warrant is not necessarily premised on probable cause of criminal 

contempt, and can be issued for non-criminal purposes. Id. According to 

Kesselring, “[n]othing in the requirements for issuance of a domestic relations 

warrant requires a court to find that a person willfully fails or refuses to 

appear.” Id. at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). Kesselring 

acknowledges that the only evidence regarding the nature of the warrant was 

provided by Brough, the subject of the warrant. Id. at 16. Kesselring argues 

that Brough’s testimony failed to establish that Brough had consciously 

disregarded a court order supporting criminal contempt. Id. at 17. 

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply the 

following standard and scope of review:

There is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction when the 

evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn 
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therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict-winner, are sufficient to enable the 

fact-finder to conclude that the Commonwealth established all of 

the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence. Further, we note that the entire trial 

record is evaluated and all evidence received against the 

defendant is considered, being cognizant that the trier of fact is 

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Morales, 91 A.3d 80, 87-88 (Pa. 2014).

The Crimes Code defines the crime of hindering apprehension or 

prosecution as follows:

(a) Offense defined. — A person commits an offense if, with 

intent to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or 

punishment of another for crime or violation of the terms of 

probation, parole, intermediate punishment or Accelerated 

Rehabilitative Disposition, he:

(1) harbors or conceals the other;

...

or

(5) provides false information to a law enforcement officer.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5105(a)(1), (5). 

In Johnson, upon which Kesselring relies, twenty FBI agents and United 

States Marshalls went to the apartment of the defendant to execute an arrest 

warrant for Rodney Thompson (“Thompson”). Johnson, 100 A.3d at 208. 

Law enforcement officers knocked on the defendant’s door, announced that 

they were police officers, and said that they had an arrest warrant for 

Thompson. Id. Initially, no one came to the door. Id. However, after law 
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enforcement knocked again, the defendant inquired as to their identity. Id. 

Upon the officers identifying themselves as law enforcement, the defendant 

asked them to wait while she dressed. Id. About five minutes later, officers 

heard someone running within the apartment, after which they attempted to 

force open the apartment door. Id. As they did so, the defendant opened 

the door, but then denied that anyone was in the apartment. Id. The 

defendant further denied knowing Thompson, when shown his picture. Id. 

Officers then observed an open window, and Thompson running outside the 

window, on the roof. Id. The defendant was arrested and ultimately 

convicted of hindering apprehension or prosecution, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5105(a)(1). Johnson, 100 A.3d at 208.

On appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, 

arguing that the Commonwealth had failed to produce the arrest warrant for 

Thompson at her trial. Id. at 209. The Commonwealth countered, arguing 

that evidence of the underlying crime, which prompted the official action, is 

not required to sustain the conviction. Id. Ultimately, this Court concluded 

that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the defendant’s convictions. 

Id. at 214. In so holding, this Court explained that

[t]he Commonwealth offered no evidence as to why Thompson 

was wanted or whether it was in connection with a crime, or 

violation of the terms of probation, parole, intermediate 

punishment or Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition. It did not 

place the warrant into evidence and no witness testified 

regarding Thompson’s purported crime. In essence, although 

the Commonwealth offered evidence from which one might infer 

that [the defendant] intended to hinder the apprehension of 
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Thompson, it did not offer proof that Thompson was being sought 

for commission of a “crime or violation of the terms of probation, 

parole, intermediate punishment or Accelerated Rehabilitative 

Disposition[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5105(a)(1). The fact that the 

Commonwealth offered evidence that police officers apprised [the 

defendant] that they had a federal warrant, even an arrest 

warrant, was not enough to satisfy this element. Nor do we find 

persuasive the Commonwealth’s argument that Thompson’s 

threat to kill [the defendant] constituted circumstantial evidence 

that he was an outstanding felon. In short, the Commonwealth 

failed to prove an element of the offense: that Thompson was 

being sought for commission of a crime or any of the statute’s 

other enumerated violations.... 

Johnson, 100 A.3d at 214 (emphasis added).

By contrast, in the instant case, Officer McNeal testified that on August 

18, 2016, he was assigned to serve a Domestic Relations bench warrant for 

Brough, at 2630 Hunterstown/Hampton Road in Reading Township, 

Pennsylvania. N.T., 4/4/17, at 38. Officer McNeal stated that, upon arriving 

at Café’s, he saw Kesselring standing with Brough. Id. at 41. According to 

Officer McNeal, Kesselring and Brough “saw us, they turned around, the 

subject [Brough] went in first, [] Kesselring followed and closed the door.” 

Id. After exiting his vehicle, Officer McNeal proceeded to the door used by 

Kesselring and Brough, knocked on the door and stated, “Adams County 

Sheriff’s Office. I need you to come to the door and open it.” Id. at 42. No 

one responded at that time. Id. Officer McNeal indicated that he continued 

to knock on the door and demand entry. Id. at 43. Within about two minutes, 

Kesselring responded to the door. Id. at 44. Officer McNeal testified as 

follows, regarding what next transpired:
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I explained to [] Kesselring [that] we had a warrant for the 

subject and we needed to speak with him. He[,] in turn[,] 

informed us [Brough] wasn’t here, he left already, that his vehicle 

was broken and he got a ride. I explained to [] Kesselring we just 

observed him, along with the subject we were looking for, just 

enter the business and we needed to speak with him. He made 

the statement to the effect [that] we close at five. And I apologize 

for my language. I don’t have time for this shit. He then—I 

explained to him we needed to come in and search the place. He 

said I don’t have time for this, I have an appointment. I told him 

he didn’t have an option in the matter[,] we were coming in and I 

made entry.

...

I made entry. I believe Officer Morehead came in shortly behind 

me. Kesselring’s mannerism was loud. In my opinion[,] he was 

trying to hinder my search by announcing where we were to help 

the subject know where we were. He was almost like borderline 

belligerent.

...

As I was looking at the common spaces where the subject could 

hide[,] [] Kesselring was behind me yelling. He was yelling loud 

enough he could be heard throughout the building....

Id. at 44-45 (emphasis added). Officer McNeal indicated that he eventually 

found Brough hiding inside an opening where the insulation and duct work for 

the building were located. Id. at 49-50. Officer McNeal testified that he had 

“a warrant for a person[,]” and described the warrant as a “Domestic Relations 

warrant.” Id. at 54, 55. 

Officer Beall described Domestic Relations bench warrants as follows:

Domestic Relations bench warrants come ... through Domestic 

Relations cases. They originate as a result of a [d]efendant either 

failing to appear for a court appearance or being found in 

contempt of court and as a result[,] a bench warrant being issued 

for their arrest. 
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...

With domestic relations bench warrants specifically[,] if it’s a court 

day[,] the [d]efendant would be brought in for a court hearing. If 

it’s a non-court day[,] the subject would be transported to the 

local prison[,] and then arrangements would be made for the 

[d]efendant to be brought in on the next available court day. 

Id. at 59-60.

In his testimony, Brough confirmed that a Domestic Relations bench 

warrant had been issued against him. Id. at 94. When asked whether “that 

means that you didn’t show up for [a] Domestic Relations [c]ourt 

appearance[,]” Brough responded, “Right.” Id.

Thus, the testimony established that a Domestic Relations warrant had 

been issued for Brough, for his failure to appear for a hearing. The Domestic 

Relations Code provides that

[a] person who willfully fails or refuses to appear in response to a 

duly served order or other process under this chapter may, as 

prescribed by general rule, be adjudged in contempt. Contempt 

shall be punishable by any one or more of the following:

(1) Imprisonment for a period not to exceed six months.

(2) A fine not to exceed $ 500.

(3) Probation for a period not to exceed six months.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4344. As this Court has explained, 

contempt can be criminal or civil in nature, and depends on 

whether the core purpose of the sanction imposed is to vindicate 

the authority of the court, in which case the contempt is criminal, 

or whether the contempt is to aid the beneficiary of the order 

being defied, in which case it is civil.
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Commonwealth v. Bowden, 838 A.2d 740, 760 (Pa. 2003). “[T]he 

characteristic that distinguishes civil from criminal contempt is the ability of 

the contemnor to purge himself of civil contempt by complying with the court’s 

directive.” Orfield v. Weindel, 52 A.3d 275, 281 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted). 

Contrary to Kesselring’s claim, the Commonwealth presented sufficient 

evidence to establish that a Domestic Relations warrant was issued for 

Brough’s failure to appear before the Domestic Relations court, which, 

pursuant to section 4344, is subject to criminal contempt penalties. See 

Bowden, 838 A.2d at 760. We therefore conclude that the evidence is 

sufficient to establish the criminal conduct underlying the Domestic Relations 

bench warrant. Consequently, we cannot grant Kesselring relief on this claim.

Kesselring next claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 

conviction of obstruction. Brief for Appellant at 18. Kesselring argues that 

the Commonwealth failed to present evidence that he had intentionally 

hindered police officers from executing a warrant “through physical 

interference, where [Kesselring] closed the door prior to any notice of a 

warrant, and where he merely delayed opening the door through inaction.” 

Id. (emphasis omitted). Kesselring acknowledges that in Johnson, this Court 

recognized an affirmative duty for individuals to consent to such searches 

“under pain of criminal penalty.” Id. However, Kesselring argues that 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5101 requires “affirmative interference with governmental 
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functions.” Brief for Appellant at 19 (quoting 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101). 

Kesselring argues that the Johnson court criminalized a peaceful means of 

refusing consent to search, and, accordingly, is unconstitutional in its 

application. Brief for Appellant at 21. 

Pursuant to the Crimes Code,

[a] person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he 

intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of 

law or other governmental function by force, violence, physical 

interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other 

unlawful act, except that this section does not apply to flight by a 

person charged with crime, refusal to submit to arrest, failure to 

perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any other 

means of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative 

interference with governmental functions.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101. 

Initially, we point out that a three-judge panel of this Court cannot 

overrule another three-judge panel of the Superior Court. Commonwealth 

v. Beck, 78 A.3d 656, 659 (Pa. Super. 2013). On this basis, we cannot grant 

Kesselring relief on his claim.

In addition, as explained by this Court in Johnson, “[t]he interference 

need not involve physical contact with the government official as he performs 

his duties.” Johnson, 100 A.3d at 215. For example, in Commonwealth v. 

Mastrangelo, 414 A.2d 54 (Pa. 1993), our Supreme Court upheld a

defendant’s conviction of violating section 5101, where the defendant had 

verbally abused a parking enforcement officer upon receiving a parking ticket, 
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which deterred the officer from subsequently performing his duties. Id. at 

265.

As set forth above, the evidence established that once Brough and 

Kesselring had entered the building, Kesselring closed and locked the door, 

and then delayed responding to Officer McNeal’s knock and instructions to 

open the door. N.T., 4/4/17, at 44. Kesselring wrongfully told Officer McNeal

that Brough had left Café’s, and hindered Officer McNeal’s search for Brough 

by belligerently yelling and announcing Officer McNeal’s location throughout 

the search. Id. at 44-45. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to sustain 

Kesselring’s conviction of obstruction, and Kesselring is not entitled to relief 

on his claim.

Petition denied. Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/21/2018