This decision was not selected for publication inthe New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citati on of unpublished decisions. Please also note that this electronic decision may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Supreme Court and does not include the filing date. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Petitioner, 3

v. NO. 33,466 4 DEBORAH M. PULITI, 5 Defendant-Respondent. 6

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI 7 Douglas R. Driggers, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Martha Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Petitioner 12
McGraw & Strickland, L.L.C. 13 Margaret Strickland 14 Mollie C. McGraw 15 Las Cruces, NM 16 for Respondent 17

DECISION 182 Chávez, Justice. 1
{1} This matter came before the full Court on a petition for writ of certiorari to the 2 New Mexico Court of Appeals to review its memorandum opinion affirming the 3 district court’s denial of the State’s reque st for an extension of time within which to 4 commence trial pursuant to Rule 5-604 NMRA. The Justices have considered the 5 briefs and the record on appeal and agree that there is no reasonable likelihood that 6 a written decision or opinion will affect the di sposition of this appeal or advance the 7 law of the State. Acting within this Court’s discretion under Rule 12-405(B)(1) 8 NMRA to dispose of a case by order or decision rather than formal opinion where the 9 “issues presented have been previously d ecided” by the this Court, the Court enters 10 this decision. 11 PROCEEDINGS BELOW 12 {2} On May 29, 2008, Las Cruces Police Offi cer Amador Martinez filed a criminal 13 complaint in Dona Ana County Magistrate Court charging Deborah Puliti with 14 aggravated DWI, NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102(D)(2) (2008) (amended 2010), and 15 failure to use due care to avoid a co llision, NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-301(B)(1) 16 (2002). On June 4, 2008, Puliti entered a pl ea of not guilty and waived arraignment. 17 On August 14, 2008, Magistrate Judge Os car Frietze scheduled a jury trial for 18 October 22, 2008. On September 11, 2008, the State, represented by an assistant 19 district attorney, dismissed the case in DonaAna County Magistrate Court. The State 20 had already filed a three-count criminalinformation against Puliti in the Third 21 Judicial District Court on September 5, 2008, for the same occurrence that gave rise 223 to the magistrate court filing. 1 {3} On November 25, 2008, the State filed a petition for extension of time within 2 which to commence trial because the district court had not yet scheduled the trial and 3 the time within which the trial was to commence under Rule 5-604 would expire on 4 December 4, 2008. A hearing on the petiti on for extension of time was held on 5 December 3, 2008. The district court gr anted a sixty-day extension and scheduled 6 the case for a jury trial to take place on January 16, 2009. 7 {4} Two days later on December 5, 2008, Pul iti filed a motion to reconsider the 8 extension of time, arguing that Magistrate Court Rule 6-506 applied and that the State 9 had not shown good cause for anextension of time. The district court agreed with 10 Puliti, reconsidered its previous order, and—applying Rule 6-506—denied the State 11 an extension of time within which to try the case and dismissed the complaint. 12 Undeterred, the State filed a motion to reconsider the denial of the petition for an 13 extension of time, arguing that the districtcourt erred in appl ying Rule 6-506. The 14 district court agreed with the State that Rule 6-506 did not appl y, but concluded that 15 Rule 5-604 applied and, under the good cause provision of that rule, continued to 16 deny the State an extension of time within which to try the case. 17 {5} The Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion, State v. Puliti , No. 18 29,509, slip op. at 1, 9 (N.M. Ct. App. Oc t. 5, 2009). We granted the State’s petition 19 for writ of certiorari on December 7, 2009, and held the appeal in abeyance pending 20 our resolution of State v. Savedra , 2010-NMSC-025, 148 N.M. 301, 236 P.3d 20. On 21 July 16, 2010, we quashed certiorari and remanded to the Court of Appeals for 224 consideration in light of our Savedraopinion. The Court of Appeals continued to 1 affirm the district court in a memorandum opinion, State v. Puliti , No. 29,509, slip 2 op. at 3, 8 (Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2010), opining that Savedradid not apply to Puliti’s 3 case, id. at 2. We granted the State’s petition for writ of certiorari on January 27, 4 2011, but quashed certiorari on June 14, 2011, and remanded to the Court of Appeals 5 for consideration in light of our opinion in State v. Martinez , 2011-NMSC-010, 149 6 N.M. 370, 249 P.3d 82. 7 {6} The Court of Appeals again affirmed th e district court, holding that although 8 Rule 5-604 did not apply to this case because it was abrogated in Savedra , the district 9 court had the inherent authority to control its docket, and the State’s delay in 10 scheduling witness interviews jus tified dismissal of the case. State v. Puliti , No. 11 29,509, slip op. at 2-3 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2012). We granted the State’s petition 12 for writ of certiorari and the case was s ubmitted on October 31, 2012. We reverse 13 both the Court of Appeals and the district court and remand for proceedings 14 consistent with this decision. 15 DISCUSSION 16 {7} In Savedra , we addressed the State’s occasional practice of dismissing 17 complaints filed by the State in magistratecourt and refiling the same or similar 18 charges in district court. Savedra , 2010-NMSC-025, ¶ 1. In that case we 19 acknowledged that under New Mexico preced ent, when the State initially files 20 charges in magistrate court and then re-file s the case in district court, the six-month 21 rule in district court begins to run as of the time the defendant was arraigned in 225 magistrate court. Id. ¶ 5. We also recognized that Rule 5-604 had “become an 1 unnecessary and sometimes counterproductiv e method for protecting a defendant’s 2 right to a speedy trial,” and therefore ch ose to withdraw Rule 5-604 “for all cases 3 pending” on the May 12, 2010 filing date of the Savedra opinion. Id. ¶ 9. In 4 Martinezwe clarified that “ Savedracontrols . . . all [cases ] that were pending before 5 any court at the time we issued our Opinion” in Savedra

. Martinez , 2011-NMSC6 010, ¶ 12. 7 {8} Puliti’s case was pending in the appellatecourts at the time we issued our 8 opinion in Savedra . Therefore, Rule 5-604, as it exis ted at the time the district court 9 dismissed the State’s case, did not apply. Instead of applying Rule 5-604, Savedra 10 required district courts to use constitutional speedy trial considerations when deciding 11 motions for extensions of time. Savedra , 2010-NMSC-025, ¶¶ 5, 9. Although the 12 district court could not have known that we would withdraw Rule 5-604 13 retroactively, the appropriate disposition of th is case is to remand to the district court 14 to decide the State’s motion for extension of time by analyzing constitutional speedy 15 trial considerations as articulated in State v. Garza , 2009-NMSC-038, 146 N.M. 499, 16 212 P.3d 387. 17 {9} However, in a right-for-any-reason analys is, the Court of Appeals concluded 18 that the district court could have dismi ssed the case because of the State’s delay in 19 scheduling witness interviews based on a “district court’s inherent authority to 20 control its docket and sanction parties for their behavior.” Puliti , No. 29,509, slip op. 21 at 2. We disagree with this analysis and conclusion because the district court was 226 never asked to exercise its inherent authority to dismiss this case due to the State’s 1 alleged delay in scheduling w itness interviews. Such a request would have required 2 a much different analysis than was argue d by the parties and employed by the district 3 court. We recently analyzed the factors to be considered when a court is considering 4 sanctions for the delayed scheduling of witn ess interviews in State v. Harper , 2011- 5 NMSC-044, ¶ 21, 150 N.M. 745, 266 P.3d 25. 6 {10} In Harper the district court verbally instructed the attorneys to conduct all 7 witness interviews by a certain date. Wh en the district court learned that two 8 witnesses had not been interv iewed by the court-imposed deadline, the district court 9 precluded the State from calling th e two witnesses at trial. Id. ¶ 1. We reversed the 10 district court because the record did not support a finding that the State acted in bad 11 faith or completely blocked access to ev idence and because the defendant did not 12 prove that the delay in scheduli ng the witnesses prejudiced him. Id. ¶¶ 22, 24. We 13 repeated a well-established principle of law, which is thatthe exclusion of witnesses, 14 like the outright dismissal of a case, shoul d not be imposed excep t in extreme cases, 15 and only after an adequate hearing to determine the reasons for the delay and the 16 prejudicial effect on the opposing party. Id. ¶ 21. 17 {11} In this case, Puliti did not seek the sanc tion of dismissal alleging that the State 18 acted in bad faith in delaying the scheduli ng of the witness interviews which resulted 19 in tangible prejudice to her. Puliti’s argument was simply that the State was not 20 entitled to an extension of time to try the case because the State did not have good 21 cause for an extension of the six-month rule. The district court’s findings of fact and 227 conclusions of law were limited to th e question of whether the State had 1 demonstrated good cause for an extension of time. The district court’s findings 2 cannot fairly be interpreted to mean that the district court found that the State acted 3 in bad faith in delaying the scheduling of the witness in terviews and that Puliti was 4 prejudiced by the delay. 5 CONCLUSION 6 {12} We therefore reverse the Court of Appeal s, vacate the district court’s order of 7 dismissal, and remand this matter to the di strict court with instructions to conduct 8 such further proceedings as are consistent with this decision. 9 {13} IT IS SO ORDERED. 10

__________________________________ 11 EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice 12

___________________________________ 13 PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Chief Justice 14

___________________________________ 15 RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice 16

___________________________________ 17 CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice 188 ___________________________________ 1 PAUL J. KENNEDY, Justice 2