United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-60413

Summary Calendar

Jessica Roxana Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 

Petitioner,

versus

Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General, 

Respondent.

Petition for Review of the Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Agency No. A208-762-891

Before Jolly, Willett, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Jessica Roxana Gonzalez-Gutierrez is a native and citizen of El 

Salvador. She petitions us to review the Board of Immigration Appeals’

(BIA) decision that dismissed her appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 16, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under 

the Convention Against Torture (CAT). 

Gonzalez-Gutierrez alleges errors by both the IJ and the BIA.

As for the IJ, Gonzalez-Gutierrez argues that (1) the IJ misinterpreted

the concept of government acquiescence in denying her CAT claim, and (2) 

her due-process rights were violated when parts of her removal-hearingtestimony transcript were marked as “indiscernible.” Gonzalez-Gutierrez 

has not exhausted these claims, though, because she did not raise them before 

the BIA. See Vazquez v. Sessions, 885 F.3d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 2018); Omari v. 

Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 318–19 (5th Cir. 2009); Roy v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 132, 

137 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Likewise, Gonzalez-Gutierrez has not 

exhausted her claim that the BIA erred in deeming her CAT claim 

abandoned. She neither substantively appealed it in her brief to the BIA nor 

moved the BIA to either reopen or reconsider its determination. See

Vazquez, 885 F.3d at 868; Claudio v. Holder, 601 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 2010).

We therefore lack jurisdiction to review these claims. See Vazquez, 885 F.3d 

at 868; Wang v. Ashcroft, 260 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2001). 

As for the BIA, Gonzalez-Gutierrez contends the BIA erred in (1) 

affirming the IJ’s decision that her proposed particular social group

(PSG)—“Salvadoran women who fear gender based violence and 

delinquency in their home country”—was not cognizable, (2) holding that 

she failed to establish past persecution and a well-founded fear of future 

persecution on account of her PSG, and (3) affirming the IJ’s denial of 

withholding of removal. We review factual findings under the substantialevidence standard and legal questions de novo. Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 

685 F.3d 511, 517–18 (5th Cir. 2012). Under the substantial-evidence 

standard, we may not reverse the BIA’s factual findings unless “the 

evidence was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could conclude 

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against it.” Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 537 (5th Cir. 2009). Those factual 

findings include the conclusion that an alien is not eligible for asylum or

withholding of removal. Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 2006).

Applying this standard, we disagree with Gonzalez-Gutierrez that the 

BIA erred in reviewing her case. Her proposed PSG lacks particularity. It 

could potentially include every woman in El Salvador, without any 

limitations or distinguishing factors. See Orellana-Monson, 685 F.3d at 519. 

Accordingly, Gonzalez-Gutierrez has failed to show that her proposed PSG

is more than a “catch all” for persons fearing persecution. Id. at 518–19.

Additionally, the BIA properly affirmed the IJ’s decision that GonzalezGutierrez was not persecuted. Cf. Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 109, 116 

(5th Cir. 2006) (requiring “extreme conduct” beyond isolated incidents of 

“discrimination”, “harassment”, or “threats”); Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 

F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2004)(same). Substantial evidence similarly supports 

that Gonzalez-Gutierrez was victimized for personal or general-criminal 

reasons, and not because of a protected ground. See Thuri v. Ashcroft, 380 

F.3d 788, 790–93 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Substantial evidence further 

supports that Gonzalez-Gutierrez failed to show a well-founded fear of future 

persecution on account of a protected ground. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.13(b)(2)(i);Cantarero-Lagos v. Barr, 924 F.3d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 2019).

Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that 

Gonzalez-Gutierrez failed to show that she was eligible for asylum, she

necessarily has also failed to show that she is eligible for withholding of 

removal. See Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 906 (5th Cir. 2002) (quorum). 

Accordingly, the petition for review is DISMISSED IN PART and 

DENIED IN PART. 

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