United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 15, 2018 Decided June 25, 2019

No. 15-5207

MICHAEL ROY JOHNSON,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cv-01127)

Stephen S. Gilstrap, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause as amicus curiae in support of appellant. With him on 

the brief were Zachary J. Howe and Jeremy C. Marwell, 

appointed by the court.

Michael R. Johnson, pro se, was on the briefs for 

appellant.

James M. Burnham, Senior Counsel, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for federal appellees. With him on 

the brief were Jessie K. Liu, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig 

Lawrence and Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
2

Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney 

General for the District of Columbia, Loren L. AliKhan, 

Solicitor General, Stacy L. Anderson, Acting Deputy Solicitor 

General, and Mary L. Wilson, Senior Assistant Attorney 

General, were on the brief for appellee The District of 

Colombia.

Before: HENDERSON and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN.

SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge: In 1990, Michael Roy 

Johnson pleaded guilty to an armed rape he committed while 

out on bond for another alleged rape. He became eligible for 

parole in 2000. At his parole hearings in 2000, 2005, and 2008, 

the U.S. Parole Commission denied him parole. Each time, the 

Commission applied parole guidelines promulgated in 2000 

rather than the 1987 guidelines in effect at the time of his 

offense. 

Johnson brought an action claiming that the retroactive 

application of the 2000 guidelines in his parole hearings 

violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and Fifth Amendment Due 

Process Clause. He also alleged that his arrest had violated the 

Fourth Amendment because it was unsupported by probable 

cause. The district court granted a dismissal in favor of the 

defendants, and we affirm.

I.

A.

Because the district court dismissed Johnson’s complaint

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to 

state a claim, we “accept[] the allegations in the complaint as 
3

true” and grant him “the benefit of all inferences that can be 

derived from the facts alleged.” Vila v. Inter-Am. Inv. Corp., 

570 F.3d 274, 284 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). And 

because Johnson brings his action pro se, we consider the 

complaint “in light of all filings, including filings responsive to 

a motion to dismiss.” Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 

789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The following facts thus are taken 

from his complaint, supplemented as necessary by his other 

filings.

On December 27, 1989, Johnson was arrested by John 

Burke, a detective in the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, 

and charged with armed rape. The alleged victim of the rape 

was Johnson’s then-girlfriend. She had identified Johnson as 

the perpetrator and described the episode in detail, after which

the police contacted him for an interview. Johnson provided a 

handwritten statement in which he said that he and his 

girlfriend had spent time together on the day in question and 

engaged in consensual intercourse. He described an altercation 

over accusations of infidelity that culminated with his 

girlfriend grabbing a knife to prevent him from leaving the 

apartment. He was eventually able to wrest the knife from her. 

Detective Burke described the victim’s allegations in an 

affidavit supporting his application for an arrest warrant, in 

which he stated that Johnson had “admitted to arming himself 

with a knife and to engaging the Complainant in sexual 

intercourse.” Johnson Compl. ¶ 22, App. 18. Burke obtained 

an arrest warrant for Johnson based on the affidavit. 

On March 17, 1990, Johnson was released on bond. While 

on release, he raped a different woman. Johnson eventually 

pleaded guilty to the second rape, and prosecutors dropped the 

first charge as part of the plea deal. Under the District of 
4

Columbia’s indeterminate sentencing scheme, Johnson 

received a sentence of 15 years to life imprisonment. 

B.

The National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government 

Improvement Act vests responsibility for parole 

determinations for D.C. Code offenders in the U.S. Parole 

Commission. See D.C. Code § 24-131. From 1987 to 2000, 

the Parole Commission (and its predecessor, the D.C. Board of 

Parole) applied a point system prescribed by municipal law to 

guide its parole determinations. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 28 

§ 204.1–.22 (1987). In 2000, the Parole Commission replaced 

the 1987 guidelines with an updated system for assessing 

putative parolees. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.70–.107. 

Johnson first became eligible for parole in 2000. In three 

successive parole hearings—in 2000, 2005, and 2008—the 

Commission applied the parole guidelines promulgated in 2000 

rather than the 1987 guidelines in effect at the time of his

offense of conviction. 

The 1987 and 2000 guidelines differ in various respects. 

Under the 1987 guidelines, once a D.C. offender has served his 

minimum court-imposed sentence, he becomes “eligible” for 

parole. Sellmon v. Reilly, 551 F. Supp. 2d 66, 69 (D.D.C. 

2008). At the offender’s first parole hearing, the Commission

makes an initial determination whether he is “suitable” for 

parole—i.e., whether he will receive parole. Id. The guidelines 

prescribe an intricate scheme to determine suitability. See D.C. 

Mun. Regs. tit. 28, § 204.4–.22 (1987). The scheme assigns an 

offender a score of zero to five, based on several factors meant 

to account for an offender’s risk of recidivism and his conduct 

while incarcerated. Id. At an initial hearing, scores of two and 

below signify someone presumptively suitable for parole, 

whereas scores of three and above signify someone
5

presumptively unsuitable for parole. See id. § 204.19. If the 

offender does not receive parole after an initial hearing, a 

rehearing will be scheduled by the parole commissioners. At 

rehearings, the cutoff for the presumption of suitability is three 

rather than two. See id. § 204.21. 

In “unusual circumstances,” the 1987 guidelines allow

departure from the presumption of suitability for an offender to 

whom it applies. Id. § 204.22. To invoke a departure, the 

Commission must “specify in writing those factors which it 

used to depart.” Id. The guidelines contain a worksheet setting 

forth certain enumerated reasons for departure. See id. app. 

2-1. One of those reasons is an “[u]nusually extensive and 

serious prior record,” described as “at least five felony 

convictions.” Id. In addition to the enumerated grounds for 

departure, the 1987 guidelines enable the Commission to

“depart from [the guidelines’] numerical system anytime it 

wishes, as long as it specifies in writing those factors which it 

used.” Ford v. Massarone, 902 F.3d 309, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The 2000 guidelines, like the 1987 guidelines, use a point 

system to help identify when an offender merits a grant of

parole. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.20, 2.80. At the initial parole 

hearing, the Commission calculates a base score based on 

factors meant to measure the offender’s risk of recidivism and 

adjusted for several other considerations. The base score is 

then converted into a “base guideline range.” The lowest base 

guideline range, for offenders with a score of three or less, is 

zero months; and the highest range, for offenders with a score 

of ten, is 156 to 192 months. Id. At the last step of the 

calculation, the maximum and minimum of the range can be 

adjusted upward and downward based on “superior program 

achievement,” id. § 2.80(k), and disciplinary infractions, see id. 

§ 2.80(j). Those adjustments yield an adjusted guideline range,
6

which is then added to the offender’s minimum court-imposed 

sentence to produce a “total guideline range.” Id. § 2.80(l). 

The total guideline range represents the amount of time the 

Commission presumes an offender must serve before he 

becomes suitable for parole. See id. At each subsequent 

rehearing, the Commission takes the total guideline range from 

the prior hearing and readjusts the range for superior 

achievement or infractions in the intervening period. See id.

The 2000 guidelines permit the Commission to depart 

from the guideline range. See id. § 2.80(n). A departure is 

justified in “unusual circumstances,” based on “case-specific 

factors that are not fully taken into account in the guidelines, 

and that are relevant to the grant or denial of parole.” Id. 

§ 2.80(n)(1). The 2000 guidelines provide a list of potential 

factors justifying departure that is, by its own terms, 

non-exhaustive. See id. § 2.80(n)(2). 

C.

At Johnson’s initial parole hearing in 2000, the Parole 

Commission questioned him about his 1989 arrest and the 

underlying allegation of rape. Despite Johnson’s denial of the 

underlying conduct, the Commission found him guilty of the 

1989 rape for the purposes of parole, based solely on the 

contemporaneous police report. The Commission applied the 

2000 guidelines, determined that Johnson was presumptively 

unsuitable for parole, and calculated a recommended guideline 

range of twelve to eighteen months. Had the Commission 

applied the 1987 guidelines, Johnson would have been 

presumptively suitable for parole.

The Commission departed upward from the 

twelve-to-eighteen-month range, citing its assessment of the 

risk Johnson posed. The Commission gave him a sixty-month 
7

reconsideration date, which made him eligible for rehearing in 

2005. In each of his next two hearings, in 2005 and 2008, the 

Commission again departed upward from the guidelines for 

similar reasons.

In 2010, following litigation challenging the application of 

the 2000 guidelines to parole applicants who, like Johnson, 

were convicted before promulgation of the 2000 guidelines, 

Johnson received a parole hearing under the 1987 guidelines

for the first time. The Commission determined that he was

presumptively suitable for parole but opted to depart from the 

guidelines to deny him parole. 

Johnson later filed the present action. The action includes

a claim against Parole Commission members alleging that the 

application of the 2000 guidelines in his first three parole 

hearings violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause and 

Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. His action also 

includes a claim against Detective Burke and the District of 

Columbia contending that his original arrest for rape violated 

the Fourth Amendment. The complaint seeks damages as well 

as declaratory and injunctive relief, including expungement of 

his arrest record and parole file. 

The district court rejected Johnson’s claims and dismissed 

his complaint. The Commission subsequently granted Johnson 

parole, and he was released from prison in 2018.

Johnson now appeals. We appointed an amicus to present 

arguments in support of his position, and we consider both the 

amicus’s arguments and Johnson’s own arguments.
8

II.

A.

We first address the argument of Johnson and his amicus

that the Parole Commission’s retroactive application of the 

2000 guidelines at his first three hearings violated the Ex Post 

Facto Clause and Johnson’s argument that it violated the Due 

Process Clause. While Johnson sought various forms of relief 

in connection with that argument in the district court, the only 

remaining claim before us is his claim against members of the 

Parole Commission for damages. He does not dispute that his 

claim for a new parole hearing has become moot now that he 

has received a parole hearing under the 1987 guidelines and 

been released from custody. And while he initially sought 

expungement of the references to his first alleged rape from his 

parole file, the district court held that his sole avenue for 

expungement is the Privacy Act, and his briefing in our court 

contains no challenge to that holding.

The district court dismissed Johnson’s Ex Post Facto 

damages claim because it was barred by qualified immunity 

and dismissed the Due Process claim on the merits. We affirm

the district court’s dismissal of those claims for substantially 

similar reasons. 

1.

We initially consider the argument of Johnson and amicus 

that the application of the 2000 guidelines at his first three 

hearings violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. “[P]arole 

authorities violate the Ex Post Facto Clause when (i) they apply 

parole guidelines promulgated after an offender was convicted, 

and (ii) that retroactive application . . . creates a significant risk 

of prolonging [the offender’s] incarceration as compared to 

application of the prior guidelines.” Ford, 902 F.3d at 320
9

(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, there is no dispute that the first condition is satisfied: the 

2000 guidelines were promulgated after Johnson’s conviction. 

The sole issue is whether the retroactive application of those 

guidelines created a “significant risk” of prolonging his 

incarceration as compared to application of the 1987 

guidelines.

A party can establish a “significant risk” by identifying 

“facial distinctions between the old and new” regulations that 

demonstrate the requisite risk or by “introducing evidence 

drawn from the rule’s practical implementation by the agency 

charged with exercising discretion.” Fletcher v. Reilly, 433 

F.3d 867, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (formatting modified). “At the 

motion to dismiss stage . . . a plaintiff need only show that his 

ex post facto claim—like any other claim—is ‘plausible.’” 

Daniel v. Fulwood, 766 F.3d 57, 61–62 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

Johnson initially contends that the Parole Commission, in 

departing upwards under the 2000 guidelines, relied on certain 

factors on which it could not have relied under the 1987 

guidelines. Namely, the Commission departed upward based

on the dismissed rape charge; Johnson’s failure to obtain 

psychological or behavioral treatment for sex offenders; and 

“offense accountability,” meaning the severity of the 

underlying crime. Consideration of each of those factors is 

explicitly permitted under the 2000 guidelines but not the 1987 

guidelines. 

That difference does not create a “significant risk” per our 

decision in Ford v. Massarone, 902 F.3d 309. There, we 

rejected a virtually identical argument concerning the 

Commission’s use of unenumerated departure factors. 

Assessing the relationship between the same two guidelines, 
10

we explained that “when the Commission applies the 1987 

guidelines, it can depart from [the guidelines’] numerical 

system anytime it wishes, as long as it specifies in writing those 

factors which it used.” Id. at 321 (alteration in original) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, “the retroactive 

application of the 2000 guidelines” to permit consideration of 

departure factors not enumerated in the 1987 guidelines 

generally does “not pose a significant risk of increasing [an 

offender’s] prison term.” Id. 

True, the Supreme Court has cautioned that “[t]he

presence of discretion does not displace the protections of the 

Ex Post Facto Clause.” Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 253 

(2000). But our decision in Ford establishes that, under the 

1987 guidelines, the enumerated factors are merely illustrative 

and have no privileged position relative to unenumerated 

factors. All are potential bases for a departure, and whether 

enumerated or unenumerated, their invocation requires no 

more than a written explanation. Indeed, in a letter to the court 

submitted after we decided Ford, amicus acknowledged that 

the decision governed this issue. Consequently, the facial 

differences in departure factors cannot support Johnson’s Ex 

Post Facto challenge.

Johnson and his amicus next contend that the Parole 

Commission, by applying the 2000 guidelines, deprived 

Johnson of a presumption of parole suitability to which he 

would have been entitled under the 1987 guidelines. In 

particular, although Johnson would have received a score 

qualifying him for a presumption of suitability at each of his 

parole hearings under the 1987 guidelines, his total guideline 

range under the 2000 guidelines mandated that he serve an 

additional twelve to eighteen months above his minimum 

court-imposed sentence before he could be considered 

presumptively suitable for parole. 
11

That argument finds support in our decisions. Considering 

the relationship between the 2000 guidelines and an earlier 

iteration, the 1972 guidelines, we wrote that it was “reasonable 

to infer that the presumption of extended unsuitability 

contained in the 2000 Guidelines would prolong a prisoner’s 

period of incarceration as compared to the [earlier] 

guidelines—in which no such presumption existed—even if 

the same factors could have been considered under the earlier 

regime.” Daniel, 766 F.3d at 63. 

That “focus on the effect of a presumption” of suitability 

is consistent with decisions assessing the Ex Post Facto 

implications of revised sentencing guidelines. Id. at 63. In 

both Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987), and Peugh v. 

United States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013), the Supreme Court 

affirmed that advisory sentencing guidelines can give rise to an 

Ex Post Facto claim even if the sentencing court retains 

discretion to depart or vary from those guidelines. See Peugh, 

569 U.S. at 541. Even merely advisory guidelines, the Court 

explained, anchor discretion. See id. at 549. 

The same reasoning is applicable here. Though the 1987 

guidelines do not substantively limit the Commission’s 

discretion, they provide decisional scaffolding that structures 

the Commission’s evaluation of an offender seeking parole. 

The guidelines do not oblige the Commission to hew to the 

presumption, but they do require the Commission to begin with 

it. The presumption of suitability, when it applies, is thus the 

kind of facial difference that could support a plausible Ex Post 

Facto claim. 

Nonetheless, Johnson’s claim for damages fails for a 

different reason: the parole officials named as defendants are 

entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified 

immunity shields officials from civil liability if their conduct 
12

“does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” 

Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015). The result is that 

qualified immunity essentially “protects ‘all but the plainly 

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” 

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley 

v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). 

“Although the Supreme Court’s decisions do ‘not require 

a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established,’ for 

purposes of qualified immunity, ‘existing precedent must have 

placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’” 

Hedgpeth v. Rahim, 893 F.3d 802, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 

(quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per 

curiam)). Much turns, then, on the level of generality at which 

the relevant decisions establish the pertinent right. See id. A

plaintiff may be unable to overcome qualified immunity if the 

precedents define the right abstractly rather than in a manner 

“particularized to the [pertinent] facts.” Id. (quoting White, 137 

S. Ct. at 552). 

Johnson’s claim falls short on that ground. Months before 

his initial parole hearing, the Supreme Court recognized that 

“[t]he presence of discretion does not displace the protections 

of the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Garner, 529 U.S. at 253. But 

that broadly framed principle would not have put a reasonable 

officer on adequate notice that the specific violation alleged 

here—denying a presumption of suitability in the face of 

essentially unfettered discretion to depart from the

presumption—would entail a significant risk of a longer term 

of incarceration so as to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 

Indeed, Garner itself acknowledged that determining the 

Ex Post Facto consequences of any particular change is a 

“question of particular difficulty when the discretion vested in 
13

a parole board is taken into account.” Id. at 250. Neither 

Johnson nor his amicus identifies any contemporaneous 

precedent establishing the contours of the claimed right with 

the requisite specificity. And because Johnson’s Ex Post Facto 

claim for damages fails on that basis, we do not need to address 

the government’s contention that the denial of parole under the 

1987 guidelines in the 2010 hearing necessarily means that the

application of the 2000 guidelines in his three prior hearings 

could not have created a “significant risk of prolonging [his] 

incarceration.” Id. at 251. 

2.

Johnson contends that the Commission’s applications of 

the 2000 guidelines to deny him parole based on the risk he 

posed, including the Commission’s reliance on the 1989 rape 

allegations, violated the Due Process Clause. We disagree.

“Parole authorities deprive an offender of due process only 

if their decisions are ‘either totally lacking in evidentiary 

support or [are] so irrational as to be fundamentally unfair.’” 

Ford, 902 F.3d at 321 (alteration in original) (quoting Duckett 

v. Quick, 282 F.3d 844, 847 (D.C. Cir. 2002)); cf. Ellis v. 

District of Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413, 1420 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 

(“[W]e hold that the regulations do not give any prisoners a 

liberty interest in parole.”). Here, there was evidence before 

the Parole Commission that Johnson had committed two rapes. 

Even assuming the evidence supporting Johnson’s guilt of the

first rape was insufficient to support the denial of parole, it is 

undisputed that the second rape—his offense of conviction—

occurred while he was out on bond. That alone suffices to 

suggest a risk of recidivism and to support a rational 

determination that his relatively low guidelines range 

inadequately accounted for the risk he posed.
14

B.

Johnson next seeks damages from the District of Columbia 

and Detective Burke for his 1989 arrest for armed rape. 

Johnson contends that the arrest warrant was unsupported by 

probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He also 

seeks declaratory relief and expungement of his arrest record. 

We conclude that the district court properly dismissed these 

claims.

“Probable cause is an objective standard to be met by 

applying a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.” United 

States v. Burnett, 827 F.3d 1108, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). It is “more than bare 

suspicion but is less than beyond a reasonable doubt, and, 

indeed, is less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. 

Johnson argues that the warrant for his arrest in 1989 was 

unsupported by probable cause because Detective Burke’s 

affidavit in support of the warrant application had 

mischaracterized the content of Johnson’s statement. Johnson 

alleges that he informed police he had engaged in consensual 

sexual intercourse with his then-girlfriend (the alleged victim)

on the day in question, that they then had an altercation over 

accusations of infidelity, and that he was able to seize from her

a knife she had grabbed when she tried to keep him in the 

apartment. According to Johnson, Burke misrepresented 

Johnson’s statement by stating in the affidavit that Johnson had 

“admitted to arming himself with a knife and to engaging the 

Complainant in sexual intercourse.” Johnson Compl. ¶ 22, 

App. 18. He thus contends that Burke “made material 

misrepresentations” without which the arrest “would have . . . 

been without probable cause in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth 

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure.” 

Id. ¶ 64, App. 24. 
15

Johnson’s claim fails because the allegedly false 

statements were unnecessary to the finding of probable cause. 

See Miller v. Prince George’s Cty., 475 F.3d 621, 627–28 (4th 

Cir. 2007) (holding that a falsehood in an application for an 

arrest warrant does not violate the Constitution if it is not 

necessary to the finding of probable cause); Vakilian v. Shaw, 

335 F.3d 509, 517–18 (6th Cir. 2003) (same); Burke v. Town of 

Walpole, 405 F.3d 66, 82 (1st Cir. 2005) (same); Wilson v. 

Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789–90 (3d Cir. 2000) (same). Even 

according to Johnson’s own complaint, subtracting the 

allegedly falsified admission from the affidavit would have left 

in place a detailed victim statement identifying Johnson as the 

perpetrator. See Johnson Compl. ¶¶ 17–23, App. 17–18. Aside

from Johnson’s own protestations of innocence and his claims

that the allegations against him had been fabricated by the 

alleged victim for reasons of jealousy, he has identified no 

independent reason the police officer might have doubted her

credibility. And “probable cause does not require officers to 

rule out a suspect’s innocent explanation for suspicious facts.” 

District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 588 (2018); cf. 

Wayne LaFave et al., 2 Search & Seizure § 3.4(a) (5th ed.

2018) (“[W]hen information comes from one who claims to 

have witnessed a crime or to have been the victim of a crime, 

the information carries with it indicia of reliability and is 

presumed to be reliable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

The victim’s allegations sufficed to support probable cause for 

the arrest warrant. 

Johnson argues that Burke failed to investigate the 

conflicts between Johnson’s and the alleged victim’s accounts. 

Yet “[o]nce a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing 

there is probable cause, he is not required to explore and 

eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence 

before making an arrest.” Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 755 

F.3d 980, 990 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); see also 
16

Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 588. The same logic holds when an officer 

seeks an arrest warrant. Johnson’s assertions of innocence do 

not vitiate probable cause. 

Finally, Johnson’s claims against the District of Columbia 

also cannot prevail. As the district court held, Johnson has not 

alleged that Detective Burke acted pursuant to a municipal 

policy or custom. As a result, there is no basis for municipal 

liability under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 

U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Los Angeles Cty. v. Humphries, 

562 U.S. 29, 30–31 (2010). 

Johnson does not challenge that holding, but instead

“clarif[ies]” that he seeks only the expungement of the 

government’s files relating to his 1989 arrest. Johnson Br. 53. 

This court can order expungement of government records—

including arrest records—as a remedy for certain violations of 

statutory or constitutional rights. See Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 

F.2d 938, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Livingston v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Justice, 759 F.2d 74, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Doe v. 

Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1979). But Johnson 

has not demonstrated any violation of his Fourth Amendment 

rights—let alone the kind of flagrant violation that typically 

supports expungement of arrest records, see Webster, 606 F.2d 

at 1230—and he thus has shown no entitlement to any

expungement. See Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

787 F.3d 524, 536–37 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court. 

So ordered.