[Cite as In re C.I.R., 2019-Ohio-335.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

BUTLER COUNTY 

IN THE MATTER OF: 

 C.I.R. 

: 

: 

: 

: 

CASE NO. CA2018-06-123 

O P I N I O N 

2/4/2019 

APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

JUVENILE DIVISION 

Case No. JV2018-0213 

Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, John C. Heinkel, Government 

Services Center, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, OH 45011, for appellee 

Garrett Law Offices, Dawn S. Garrett, 9435 Waterstone Boulevard, Suite 140, Mason, OH 

45249, for appellant 

 S. POWELL, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, C.I.R., appeals the decision of the Butler County Court of Common 

Pleas, Juvenile Division, adjudicating him a delinquent child for having committed an act 

that if charged as an adult would constitute inducing panic as a second-degree felony rather 

than as a first-degree misdemeanor. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm as modified 

the juvenile court's decision adjudicating C.I.R. a delinquent child but reverse the juvenile 

court's dispositional decision and remand this matter to the juvenile court for further 
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proceedings. 

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On February 15, 2018, an officer with the Ross Township Police Department 

filed a complaint alleging C.I.R., who was then just 14 years old, was a delinquent child for 

having committed an act that if charged as an adult could constitute inducing panic in 

violation of R.C. 2917.31(A)(1).1 As alleged in the complaint, this was a crime that if 

committed by an adult would constitute a second-degree felony under R.C. 2917.31(C)(5) 

rather than a first-degree misdemeanor in accordance with R.C. 2917.31(C)(2). Pursuant 

to R.C. 2917.31(C)(5), the offense of inducing panic rises from a first-degree misdemeanor 

to a second-degree felony if the accused conduct caused the evacuation of "a school or an 

institution of higher education[.]" 

{¶ 3} According to the complaint, the allegation arose after C.I.R. posted a message 

on Snapchat, a social media platform, stating "17 people. I can beat that" followed by "three 

smiley face emojis next to it." It is undisputed the posting occurred the same day a gunman 

killed 17 people on the campus of Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School located in 

Parkland, Florida. The record indicates C.I.R. made the posting sometime after playing the 

video game "Fortnite" with his friends online.2 During this time, the record indicates C.I.R. 

and his friends were discussing the school shooting that took place earlier that day. 

{¶ 4} The complaint claims C.I.R.'s social media post caused panic and serious 

public inconvenience to administration, staff, students, and parents of Ross High School 

where C.I.R. was then attending. According to the record, this feeling of panic was further 

exacerbated by the fact that a Ross High School student had recently committed suicide. 

 

1. The complaint also included an allegation that C.I.R. was an unruly child as defined by R.C. 2151.022. The 

juvenile court subsequently dismissed this allegation by agreement of the parties. 

2. "Fortnite" is a free online player-vs-player "battle royale" style third-person shooter where the "last one 

standing wins." 
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The record also indicates C.I.R.'s social media posting occurred just two weeks after 

another Ross High School student is alleged to have murdered a fellow student during an 

apparent robbery, thereby also contributing to the feeling of panic within the administration, 

staff, students, and parents of Ross High School. 

{¶ 5} The juvenile court held an adjudicatory hearing on the matter on April 24, 

2018. At this hearing, the juvenile court heard testimony from several witnesses indicating 

C.I.R.'s social media message caused a high level of stress and anxiety in the students 

attending Ross High School. This includes testimony from the Ross High School principal 

who testified there was a palpable sense of fear in the building, as well as testimony from a 

Ross High School student who testified he did not attend school out of fear that C.I.R. "was 

going to shoot up the school." The record also indicates two and sometimes three additional 

police officers were stationed at Ross High School in the days after C.I.R. posted the social 

media message. It is undisputed, however, that while there was a significant disruption to 

the school's day-to-day operations, neither Ross High School nor any other school or 

institution of higher education was evacuated or otherwise postponed due to C.I.R.'s social 

media post. 

{¶ 6} Following this hearing, the juvenile court issued a decision from the bench 

finding C.I.R. was a delinquent child for having committed an act that if charged as an adult 

could constitute inducing panic in violation of R.C. 2917.31(A)(1). In so holding, the juvenile 

court rejected C.I.R.'s explanation that the social media posting was just a joke that was in 

no way intended to be a threat of violence to Ross High School or its students. 

{¶ 7} After issuing its decision, the juvenile court addressed C.I.R. directly 

expressing its hope that C.I.R. understood the harm he had caused by posting the social 

media message. The juvenile court, however, made no reference to whether the offense 

would constitute a second-degree felony under R.C. 2917.31(C)(5) or a first-degree 
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misdemeanor in accordance with R.C. 2917.31(C)(2). 

{¶ 8} The juvenile court held a dispositional hearing on May 14, 2018. Following 

this hearing, the juvenile court issued a dispositional decision remanding C.I.R. to the Butler 

County Juvenile Detention Center for 78 days (90 days minus 12 days credit). The juvenile 

court also committed C.I.R. to the custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services for a 

minimum term of 12 months, all of which was conditionally suspended. The juvenile court 

further ordered C.I.R. to submit a DNA specimen and placed C.I.R. on intensive probation. 

The juvenile court, however, again made no reference to whether the offense would 

constitute a second-degree felony under R.C. 2917.31(C)(5) or a first-degree misdemeanor 

in accordance with R.C. 2917.31(C)(2). This is true even though the juvenile court's written 

entry stated C.I.R. was "in violation of Count 1 INDUCING PANIC (2917.31) FELONY 2." 

(Emphasis sic.) 

Appeal

{¶ 9} C.I.R. now appeals the juvenile court's decision adjudicating him a delinquent 

child, raising three assignments of error for review. For ease of discussion, C.I.R.'s second 

and third assignments or error will be addressed together. 

{¶ 10} Assignment of Error No. 1: 

{¶ 11} THE FINDING OF DELINQUENCY WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE 

BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AND WAS CONTRARY TO THE MANIFEST WEIGHT 

OF THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶ 12} In his first assignment of error, C.I.R. argues the juvenile court erred by 

adjudicating him a delinquent child for having committed an act that if charged as an adult 

would constitute inducing panic in violation of R.C. 2917.31(A)(1), a second-degree felony 

in violation of R.C. 2917.31(C)(5), rather than a first-degree misdemeanor in accordance 

with R.C. 2917.31(C)(2). We agree. 
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Standard of Review

{¶ 13} The standard of review employed by this court in determining whether a 

juvenile's adjudication as a delinquent child was supported by sufficient evidence is the 

same as the standard used in adult criminal cases. In re B.T.B., 12th Dist. Butler No. 

CA2014-10-199, 2015-Ohio-2729, ¶ 16. Under this standard, this court examines the 

evidence presented at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince 

the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Intihar, 12th 

Dist. Warren No. CA2015-05-046, 2015-Ohio-5507, ¶ 9. In conducting this review, the 

relevant inquiry is "whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph 

two of the syllabus. Therefore, "the test for sufficiency requires a determination as to 

whether the state has met its burden of production at trial." State v. Boles, 12th Dist. Brown 

No. CA2012-06-012, 2013-Ohio-5202, ¶ 34, citing State v. Wilson, 12th Dist. Warren No. 

CA2006-01-007, 2007-Ohio-2298, ¶ 33. 

{¶ 14} Just as with the sufficiency of the evidence standard of review, the standard 

of review employed by this court in determining whether a juvenile's adjudication as a 

delinquent child was against the manifest weight of the evidence is the same standard used 

in adult criminal cases. In re D.T.W., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-09-198, 2015-Ohio2317, ¶ 32. Under this standard, this court examines the "inclination of the greater amount 

of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other." 

State v. Barnett, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-09-177, 2012-Ohio-2372, ¶ 14. In conducting 

this review, this court must look at the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether in resolving the 

conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 
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miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State 

v. Morgan, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2013-08-146 and CA2013-08-147, 2014-Ohio-2472, ¶ 

34. Therefore, an appellate court will overturn a conviction due to the manifest weight of 

the evidence only in extraordinary circumstances when the evidence presented at trial 

weighs heavily in favor of acquittal. State v. Blair, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-01-023, 

2015-Ohio-818, ¶ 43. 

{¶ 15} "'The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence 

are both quantitatively and qualitatively different.'" State v. Wright, 12th Dist. Butler No. 

CA2012-08-152, 2014-Ohio-985, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 

(1997). However, because this court's determination that a juvenile's adjudication as a 

delinquent child was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes 

a finding on sufficiency, "the determination that a juvenile court's delinquency finding is 

supported by the manifest weight of the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of 

sufficiency." In re M.J.C., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-05-124, 2015-Ohio-820, ¶ 29, citing 

In re N.J.M., 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2010-03-026, 2010-Ohio-5526, ¶ 35. 

Analysis

{¶ 16} As noted above, C.I.R. was adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an 

act that if charged as an adult would constitute inducing panic in violation of R.C. 

2917.31(A)(1). Pursuant to that statute, no person shall cause the evacuation of any public 

place, or otherwise cause serious public inconvenience or alarm, by "[i]nitiating or 

circulating a report or warning of an alleged or impending fire, explosion, crime, or other 

catastrophe, knowing that such report or warning is false[.]" In accordance with R.C. 

2917.31(C)(2), inducing panic is generally charged as a first-degree misdemeanor. But, 

under R.C. 2917.31(C)(5), if the "public place" the offender's conduct caused to be 

evacuated "in a violation of division (A)(1) of this section is a school or an institution of 
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higher education, inducing panic is a felony of the second degree." 

{¶ 17} The state concedes, and we agree, that the record in this case does not 

support the juvenile court's decision adjudicating C.I.R. a delinquent child for committing an 

act that if charged as an adult would constitute inducing panic as a second-degree felony 

rather than as a first-degree misdemeanor. This is because, as the record indicates, the 

state never alleged C.I.R.'s conduct caused the evacuation of any public place, let alone a 

school or an institution of higher education. Based on the plain language of R.C. 

2917.31(A)(1) and (C)(5), such a finding was necessary to raise the charged offense from 

a first-degree misdemeanor in accordance with R.C. 2917.31(C)(2) to a second-degree 

felony under R.C. 2917.31(C)(5). Again, the state concedes, and we agree, that the record 

does not support such a finding. 

{¶ 18} The record instead conclusively establishes beyond any reasonable doubt 

that C.I.R. violated R.C. 2917.31(A)(1) by causing serious public inconvenience or alarm by 

"[i]nitiating or circulating a report or warning of an alleged or impending fire, explosion, 

crime, or other catastrophe, knowing that such report or warning is false[.]" Based on the 

evidence presented by the state, and considering the state's theory of the case, that is 

exactly what the juvenile court found by adjudicating C.I.R. a delinquent child in this case. 

{¶ 19} As stated previously, a violation of the statute in this manner constitutes a 

first-degree misdemeanor in accordance with R.C. 2917.31(C)(2). The juvenile court 

therefore erred by adjudicating C.I.R. a delinquent child for committing an act that if charged 

as an adult would constitute inducing panic in violation of R.C. 2917.31(A)(1), a seconddegree felony under R.C. 2917.31(C)(5), rather than a first-degree misdemeanor in 

accordance with R.C. 2917.31(C)(2). Such an error, however, is nothing more than a 

misreading of the statute as to the degree of the offense and not whether the evidence 

presented at the adjudication hearing was insufficient to support the juvenile court's decision 
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to adjudicate C.I.R. a delinquent child. 

{¶ 20} Because the juvenile court erred by adjudicating C.I.R. a delinquent child for 

committing an act that if charged as an adult would constitute inducing panic as a seconddegree felony rather than a first-degree misdemeanor, we modify the juvenile court's 

decision adjudicating C.I.R. a delinquent child for committing an act that if charged as an 

adult would constitute inducing panic in violation of R.C. 2917.31(A)(1), a second-degree 

felony under R.C. 2917.31(C)(5), to an adjudication finding C.I.R. a delinquent child for 

committing an act that if charged as an adult would constitute inducing panic as a firstdegree misdemeanor in accordance with R.C. 2917.31(C)(2). In so holding, we reiterate 

that although the record conclusively establishes that C.I.R. violated R.C. 2917.31(A)(1) by 

causing serious public inconvenience or alarm by "[i]nitiating or circulating a report or 

warning of an alleged or impending fire, explosion, crime, or other catastrophe, knowing 

that such report or warning is false," the juvenile court erred by finding this violation was a 

second-degree felony rather than a first-degree misdemeanor. 

{¶ 21} Although affirming as modified the juvenile court's decision adjudicating C.I.R. 

a delinquent child, it is nevertheless necessary to remand this matter to the juvenile court 

with instructions that it can make an appropriate dispositional decision in light of this court's 

opinion affirming as modified the juvenile court's decision as to adjudication. Upon remand, 

the juvenile court must take into account the fact that C.I.R. has since been discharged and 

his probation terminated, thus calling into question whether C.I.R. should be subject to any 

additional punishment not already imposed and completed in the time since this appeal has 

been pending. 

{¶ 22} Moreover, because the adjudication as modified adjudicates C.I.R. a 

delinquent child for having committed an act that if charged as adult would constitute 

inducing panic as a first-degree misdemeanor, not a second-degree felony, the juvenile 
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court's dispositional decision shall include punishment, if any, permissible only for a firstdegree misdemeanor offense, thereby vacating any prior punishment that was not 

otherwise allowable under R.C. Chapter 2152. This includes committing C.I.R. to the 

custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services, albeit conditionally suspended, and 

ordering C.I.R. to submit a DNA specimen. 

{¶ 23} In light of the foregoing, because the juvenile court erred by adjudicating 

C.I.R. a delinquent child for committing an act that if charged as an adult would constitute 

inducing panic as a second-degree felony rather than a first-degree misdemeanor, C.I.R.'s 

first assignment of error is sustained to the extent as discussed above and this matter is 

reversed and remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with the law 

of this state and this court's opinion herein. 

{¶ 24} Assignment of Error No. 2: 

{¶ 25} DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE 

PROCESS AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 

{¶ 26} Assignment of Error No. 3: 

{¶ 27} THE DISPOSITION EXCEEDS THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY OF THIS 

JUVENILE COURT. 

{¶ 28} In his second assignment of error, C.I.R. argues his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to argue "[t]he action was overcharged as a felony." In his third 

assignment of error, C.I.R. claims the juvenile court exceeded its authority by committing 

him to the Butler County Juvenile Detention Center. C.I.R. also argues the juvenile court 

exceeded its authority by ordering him to submit a DNA specimen and by placing him on 

intensive probation. These issues are now rendered moot based on this court's decision 

regarding C.I.R.'s first assignment of error discussed above. C.I.R.'s second and third 

assignments of error are therefore dismissed as moot. 
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{¶ 29} Judgment affirmed in part as modified, reversed in part, and remanded. 

 HENDRICKSON, P.J., and RINGLAND, J., concur.