In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14-1301

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

PEDRO MIGUEL PEREIRA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois.

No. 4:11-cr-40118-JES-JAG-1 — James E. Shadid, Chief Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 13, 2015 — DECIDED APRIL 17, 2015

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and RIPPLE, Circuit

Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant, Pedro Miguel

Pereira (“Pereira”), was convicted by a jury, after a full trial, of

conspiracy with intent to distribute at least 100 kilograms of

marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On appeal, he argues

that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.

Specifically, Pereira contends that the government proved only

the existence of a buyer-seller relationship, which was insuffi-
2 No. 14-1301

cient to prove involvement in a drug-distribution conspiracy.

We find that the record contains sufficient evidence from

which a rational jury could infer that Pereira conspired to

distribute marijuana and we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 8, 2011, an Illinois state trooper pulled over

a vehicle driven by David Helsene (“Helsene”). Although it

was December, Helsene was transporting two kayaks on top

of his vehicle, which raised the trooper’s suspicion. After a K-9

unit detected the presence of narcotics near the top of the

vehicle, the trooper searched the kayaks and discovered

approximately 145 pounds of marijuana hidden inside.

Helsene was arrested and agreed to cooperate with law

enforcement by participating in a controlled delivery of the

marijuana to an individual in Philadelphia. Additionally,

Helsene told authorities that he had received instructions from

a man named Kenneth Clarke (“Clarke”), the source of the

marijuana, to travel to New Jersey to collect $50,000 from

Pereira. Helsene called Pereira and instructed him to “go

where [he] went the last time.” With law enforcement agents

close behind, Helsene met with Pereira, who handed him a

toolbox containing $41,000, and the agents arrested Pereira.

After a months-long investigation, Pereira, Clarke, Helsene

and Pereira’s brother, Jimmy, were charged with conspiring

with each other and with persons known and unknown, to

knowingly and intentionally distribute and possesswith intent

to distribute at least 100 kilograms of marijuana in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), and 21 U.S.C. § 846.
No. 14-1301 3

At trial, Helsene testified that Pereira bought marijuana

from Clarke, a supplier who worked out of California. Since

becoming a courier for Clarke in April 2011, Helsene had delivered marijuana to Pereira on at least six occasions before

they were both arrested in December 2011. On each of these

occasions, Helsene transported large amounts of marijuana,

which were stored in kayaks and secured to the top of his

vehicle, from California to Pereira’s residence in New Jersey.

On a least four of these trips, the weight of those loads ranged

from 60–100 pounds. Once Helsene arrived at Pereira’s

residence, he unloaded packagesofmarijuana from the kayaks,

which Pereira then stored in his garage. Clarke was present

during five of the deliveries, having met Helsene in New Jersey

and accompanied him to Pereira’s residence in order to “make

sure everything was on the up and up.” According to Helsene,

Clarke and Pereira would often discuss price terms and the

quality of the marijuana during those meetings. However,

Pereira never provided payment for a new load to Helsene or

Clarke at the time of delivery; rather, if any money was

exchanged at all, it was for the prior delivery. Only once did

Helsene stay in New Jersey for a few days, waiting for Pereira

to drop off a payment for the most recent delivery.

1

Helsene described this payment arrangement as one of “consignment,” 1

leading the government to rely, in part, on a consignment theory of

conspiracy. The legal term “consignment” refers to a sales arrangement in

which the buyer is permitted to return unsold goods to the seller. The

distinction between consignment sales and other payment arrangements,

such as credit sales, can be a critical one, as this court has described

consignment sales as “quintessential evidence of a conspiracy.” See United

(continued...)
4 No. 14-1301

After Pereira received marijuana from Clarke, he distributed it for sale to various individuals, chief among them

Nicholas Urciuoli (“Urciuoli”). Urciuoli testified that he aided

Pereira throughout 2011 by selling marijuana acquired from 

Pereira to others and collecting money from the customers.

Typically, Urciuoli received a pound of marijuana from Pereira

every one to three weeks, depending on how quickly Urciuoli

could sell it to his customers. Urciuoli was not required to pay

for the drugs up-front; rather, Pereira would receive payment

for the drugs after Urciuoli made his sales. Pereira never told

Urciuoli how much to charge for the marijuana, but chided

Urciuoli for not charging enough.

Urciuoli also performed a number of tasks for Pereira

beyond selling drugs, including storing large quantities of

marijuana at his residence on Pereira’s behalf. In May 2011,

Pereirapaid Urciuoli approximately $10,000 to store 33 pounds

of marijuana at his house. Within a few days, it was all gone:

Urciuoli sold some of the marijuana to his own three or four

customers, while the rest was picked up by Pereira’s customers, only one of whom paid for the drugs up-front. When

Pereira learned that Urciuoli’s father was planning to move

into the house in August 2011, he expressed concern over what

 (...continued) 1

States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 2013). However, upon review of

the record, there is no evidence beyond Helsene’s mere use of the term

“consignment”—such as testimony that Pereira was permitted to return

unsold drugs that he had previously accepted for sale—to suggest that

Pereira paid for the marijuana on consignment. Instead, the evidence

supports the conclusion that Pereira purchased drugs on credit, and our

analysis will proceed accordingly.
No. 14-1301 5

his “partners” would think about the situation and asked

Urciuoli to find a new location for the drugs. Urciuoli, who

understood that Pereira was referring to his suppliers in

California when he referenced his “partners,” reassured him

that nothing would change and continued to store marijuana

at his residence. Thereafter, Pereira paid him $250 per pound

to store large quantities of marijuana at his residence, which

Urciuoli again distributed to his and Pereira’s customers. Since

Pereira’s customers did not typically pay up-front for the

packages they received, Urciuoli maintained a handwritten

ledger containing a record of the outstanding debts and money

collected from those who owed Pereira for prior marijuana

orders. Following Pereira’s arrest, law enforcement personnel

recovered the ledger and over $60,000 in drug proceeds from

Urciuoli’s bedroom. Urciuoli agreed to cooperate with law

enforcement, and turned over $20,000 that he collected over

the next few weeks from customers who owed Pereira for prior

drug purchases.

In addition tocompensating Urciuoli for storing marijuana,

Pereira paid him $150 per package to ship large quantities of

money—typically $40,000 per shipment—to Clarke and others

in California via UPS. Urciuoli testified that Pereira asked him

to accept packages of marijuana at his residence as well, but

that he refused to do this. Text messages between Pereira and

Urciuoli revealed that Pereira viewed this task as a “job” and

that when Urciuoli wouldn’t accept it, one of Pereira’s customers, Nicola Pisani (“Pisani”), accepted the job in his place.

Pisani also testified at trial, characterizing his involvement

with Pereira as a “business relationship.” In describing his

role in this relationship, Pisani said that he would typically
6 No. 14-1301

receive three to four pounds of marijuana per month from

Pereira, except for when supply was low. Like Urciuoli, Pisani

did not have to provide cash up-front for the drugs that he

received from Pereira, nor was he required to sell the drugs at

a certain price. Rather, he had two to three weeks to pay

Pereira for these deliveries, usually owing him between $3,400

and $4,000 per pound of marijuana that he accepted.

Text messages between Pereira and Pisanirevealed that the

two men frequently communicated about the status of payments that Pisani was expecting from people to whom he had

distributed marijuana. One such conversation revealed that

Pisani had given anotherindividual $4,000 worth of marijuana

to distribute and was awaiting payment. When Pereira

questioned whether the other individual could “handle it,”

Pisani reassured him by explaining, “I trust the kid, and you

trust me.” Othertext messages revealed that Pereira and Pisani

also spoke frequently about where and when to drop off

payments for prior orders or pick up more marijuana, which

sometimes involved going to Urciuoli’s house. Pisani would

give the money he owed to Pereira, Urciuoli, or once to

Pereira’s brother, Jimmy. Occasionally, Pisani exchanged the

marijuana he received if he didn’t like the quality of the

product; he never returned any drugs without exchanging

them for more and explained that Pereira discouraged returns

of any kind, telling him at one point, “[t]here’s [sic] no returns

here.”

The district court instructed the jury on the difference

between a conspiracy and a buyer-seller relationship and told

the jury that it could find Pereira guilty only if it found beyond
No. 14-1301 7

a reasonable doubt that he was a member of the conspiracy

charged in the indictment. 

After deliberating, the jury found Pereira guilty of conspiracy with intent to distribute at least 100 kilograms of marijuana. Pereira moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that

the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict of guilty. The

court denied the motion. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

We will reverse a conviction on sufficiency-of-the-evidence

grounds only when, after viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, we determine that no

“rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Love,

706 F.3d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 2013).

“Conspiracy is the extra act of agreeing to commit a crime,”

United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 2013), but in

cases involving drug sales, the analysis is complicated by the

fact that the substantive trafficking crime is itself an agreement—one involving a buyer and seller who “agree on terms”

and “exchange money or commodities at the settled rate.” Id.

at 998 (citing United States v. Rock, 370 F.3d 712, 714 (7th Cir.

2004)). This underlying agreement between the buyer and the

seller is not the same as the agreement required to find

conspiracy. “Rather, conspiracy to traffic drugs requires an

agreement to further distribution.” Brown, 726 F.3d at 998. 

Thus, to support a conviction for conspiracy here, the government must prove (1) that Pereira agreed with another person

to further the distribution of drugs and (2) that Pereira knowingly and intentionally joined the agreement. See id. at 1005. 
8 No. 14-1301

The government may prove the existence of a conspiracy

through direct evidence, but often there will only be circumstantial evidence of the agreement to further distribution.

Circumstantial evidence can raise an inference of conspiracy,

but these factors can also be consistent with a mere buyer-seller

relationship. So, “we have routinely held that a conviction for

conspiracy to distribute drugs cannot be sustained solely on

circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749,

755 (7th Cir. 2010). In Johnson, we identified a nonexhaustive

list of characteristics that strongly distinguish a conspiracy

from a buyer-seller relationship. These considerations include:

“sales on credit or consignment, an agreement to look for other

customers, a payment of commission on sales, an indication

that one party advised the other on the conduct of the other’s

business, or an agreement to warn of future threats to each

other’s business stemming from competitors or law enforcement authorities.” Id. at 755–56 (internal footnote omitted).

Based on the evidence in this case, a reasonable jury could

infer that Pereira bought marijuana on credit from Clarke on at

least six occasions from April 2011 until his arrest in December

2011. Helsene testified that Pereira did not pay up-front for the

parcels of marijuana that Helsene delivered to his residence in

New Jersey. Instead, Pereira would pay for the prior delivery

or Helsene would wait in New Jersey for a few days until

Pereira paid him for the current load. Moreover, the record

indicates that the purpose of Helsene’s final trip to New Jersey,

which culminated in Pereira’s arrest, was to collect $50,000 that

Pereira owed Clarke. Finally, Urciuoli testified that Pereira

instructed him to mail packages of large quantities of cash to
No. 14-1301 9

Clarke on several occasions. Taken together, this evidence is

sufficient to establishthat Pereira obtained marijuana on credit. 

That Pereira merely bought marijuana on credit is not, on

its own, sufficient to permit an inference of a conspiracy. See

Brown, 726 F.3d at 999. But here, as we recounted earlier, the

government’s evidence of conspiracy encompassed far more

than just a credit arrangement and is sufficient to permit a

reasonable jury to discern an agreement to further trafficking

of drugs. In the first place, the record establishes that Pereira’s

dealings with Clarke amounted to much more than just “a

single sale, on credit, in a quantity consistent with personal

consumption.” Id. at 1000. Helsene’s testimony revealed that

on at least four of the six occasions that he delivered marijuana

to Pereira, the kayaks contained between 60 and 100 pounds of

marijuana, indicating that Pereira bought large quantities of

drugs from his supplier. Furthermore, Pereira’s transactions

were not, as he argues, episodic. Helsene testified that he made

six deliveries to Pereira, beginning in April 2011, before his

arrest in December 2011, but did not make any trips from June

through August because all of the crops had been harvested.

Urciuoli and Pisani corroborated this portion of Helsene’s

testimony, as they both explained that there was a “slow

season” for marijuana distribution that began in May and

lasted until October or November. Excluding the summer

months during which Helsene made no trips, the evidence

sufficiently shows that Pereira received large quantities of

marijuana from Clarke at a rate of once a month, for six

months.

Quantity and frequency are circumstantial evidence of

conspiracy to distribute drugs and when they are coupled with
10 No. 14-1301

the evidence of credit sales and other evidence of cooperation,

as we have in this case, there is a “basis for the jury to distinguish the alleged conspiracy from the underlying buyer-seller

relationship.” Johnson, 592 F.3d at 755, 756 n.5. See also Brown,

726 F.3d at 1002 (“[A] relationship exhibiting all three Johnson

factors ... [is] widely accepted as sufficient proof of a trafficking conspiracy.”). Given that all three factors—multiple, large

quantity purchases, on credit—are present here, a jury could

rationally conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Pereira

was guilty of conspiracy to distribute drugs.

III. CONCLUSION

Forthe foregoing reasons, we AFFIRMPereira’s conviction.