Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1409-JT-690 | April 21, 2015 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Megan B. Quirk

Public Defender

Muncie, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Abigail R. Miller

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the

Termination of the Parent-Child 

Relationship of:

J.G. (Minor Child),

and

A.S. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

April 21, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A02-1409-JT-690

Appeal from the Delaware Circuit 

Court.

The Honorable Kimberly S. 

Dowling, Judge.

Cause No. 18C02-1401-JT-2

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1409-JT-690 | April 21, 2015 Page 2 of 12

[1] A.S. (Mother) appeals the judgment of the trial court terminating the parentchild relationship between Mother and J.G. (Child). Mother raises the 

following arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in making a finding in 

the underlying Child in Need of Services (CHINS) case that the Department of 

Child Services (DCS) did not have to make reasonable efforts to reunify Mother 

and Child; and (2) there is insufficient evidence supporting the termination 

order. Finding that Mother has waived the first argument and finding sufficient 

evidence, we affirm.

Facts

[2] Mother and G.G.J. (Father) are the parents of Child, who was born on 

November 7, 2012.1 Mother and Father were also the parents of G.G., Child’s 

older sibling. G.G. was found to be a CHINS in May 2011, and both parents’ 

parental rights with respect to G.G. were terminated on July 23, 2013. Among 

other reasons, the trial court terminated the parent-child relationship in that 

case because of the “deeply disturbing, violent and troubled” relationship

between Mother and Father, which involved frequent domestic violence that 

caused injuries to Mother. DCS Ex. 25 at 66-67.

 

1

Father’s parental rights with respect to Child were also terminated, but he did not appeal the termination 

order.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1409-JT-690 | April 21, 2015 Page 3 of 12

[3] On May 29, 2013, DCS removed Child from Mother’s care,2 and on June 3, 

2013, DCS filed a petition alleging Child to be a CHINS based on allegations of 

domestic violence incidents occurring in Child’s presence, the parents’ history 

of domestic violence, Father’s arrest on May 29 for a domestic violence 

incident, Mother’s unstable housing, and the then-ongoing CHINS case 

involving G.G. After holding a factfinding hearing, on October 30, 2013, the 

trial court found that Child was a CHINS.

[4] On November 12, 2013, DCS filed a motion requesting that the trial court find 

that DCS was not required to make reasonable efforts to reunify or preserve 

Child’s family pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.6. On January 24, 

2014, the trial court granted DCS’s motion, ordering DCS to cease any 

reasonable reunification or family preservation efforts. Following that order, all 

services except for visitation ceased. Mother continued to have the ability to 

have supervised visits with Child.

[5] On January 23, 2014, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parent-child 

relationship between Mother and Child. At the June 27, 2014, termination 

hearing, evidence was presented regarding the violent relationship between 

Mother and Father. Specifically, on April 18, 2013, Mother went to the doctor 

for what she thought was a fractured nose resulting from a domestic violence 

incident with Father. On May 29, 2013, Child was removed after Father 

 

2 Child has been in the same preadoptive foster home since he was removed on May 29, 2013. It is the same 

home where G.G. is placed. There is an adoption pending with respect to G.G. and the foster parents.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1409-JT-690 | April 21, 2015 Page 4 of 12

assaulted Mother in front of Child, resulting in Father’s arrest. Throughout 

DCS’s involvement with this family, Mother and Father have had an “on 

again, off again” relationship, but they always reunited, even after violent 

altercations. Tr. p. 79. While Father was incarcerated, he and Mother spoke 

on the phone ninety-four times, and at times, Mother said “I love you” to him 

on the phone. Id. at 91.

[6] At the termination hearing, DCS also presented evidence regarding Mother’s 

inconsistent visitation with Child. Between June 2013 and February 2014, 

Mother’s visits were supervised by Brandie Campbell. Campbell testified that 

during those months, Mother had the opportunity to have fifty-seven visits with 

Child, but attended only fifteen. Id. at 62. The visits were closed in February 

2014 because of “too many cancellations and no shows.” Id. at 61.

[7] After Campbell’s agency closed Mother’s visits, DCS referred her visits to 

another agency. Between February 20, 2014, until June 27, 2014, Mother had 

the opportunity to have twenty-one visits with Child, but attended only

fourteen. Id. at 53.

[8] Since this family has been involved with DCS, Mother has engaged in criminal 

activity. In June 2012, Mother was charged with class D felony theft and class 

A misdemeanor conversion; she pleaded guilty to class A misdemeanor 

conversion in June 2013. In December 2013, Mother was charged with class A 

misdemeanor conversion. Her probation was revoked as a result of the new 

offense, and in March 2014, she pleaded guilty to class A misdemeanor 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1409-JT-690 | April 21, 2015 Page 5 of 12

conversion. In April 2014, she was charged with class D felony theft. At the 

time of the termination hearing, Mother had yet to pay the fine or complete the 

community service for her March 2014 conversion conviction.

[9] After the termination petition was filed, Mother repeatedly tested positive for 

illegal substances and prescription medication for which she did not have a 

prescription. On March 18, 2014, she tested positive for benzodiazepine, 

oxycodone, and tramadol. On March 26, 2014, she tested positive for 

benzodiazepine and THC. On June 10, 2014, she tested positive for THC. 

Mother was taking these illicit substances notwithstanding her knowledge, as of 

March 2014, that she was pregnant and due in October 2014.

[10] DCS also presented evidence at the termination hearing that Mother has not 

achieved stability. She had four different residences during the underlying 

CHINS case. She was evicted from one of her residences in November 2013. 

At the time of the termination hearing, Mother had been living with her mother 

for approximately one month. At that time, Mother was unemployed. Over 

the course of the underlying CHINS case, Mother gave the Family Case 

Manager (FCM) ten different phone numbers at which she could be reached.

[11] Child is placed in a preadoptive foster home with G.G., his brother. Child “is 

very bonded to his older brother.” DCS Ex. 13 at 33. The FCM and Child’s 

Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) testified that they believe it is in 

Child’s best interests for the parent-child relationship with Mother to be 

terminated and for Child to be adopted by his current foster family. On August 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1409-JT-690 | April 21, 2015 Page 6 of 12

28, 2014, the trial court issued an order terminating the parent-child 

relationship between Mother and Child. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. No Reasonable Efforts Order

[12] Mother focuses much of her argument on the trial court’s January 24, 2014, 

order in the CHINS case that DCS was no longer required to make reasonable 

efforts to reunify the family. A trial court’s order finding that reasonable efforts 

are not required is a final, appealable order. G.B. v. Dearborn Cnty. Div. of Family 

and Children, 754 N.E.2d 1027, 1029-30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Mother did not 

appeal that order or otherwise raise this issue until now. See Ind. Appellate 

Rule 9(A) (requiring that a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of 

entry of a final judgment). Consequently, she has waived this issue.

[13] Waiver notwithstanding, we note briefly that Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.6 

provides that the trial court “may” find that DCS is not required to make 

reasonable efforts to reunify a family when, among other things, “the parental 

rights of a parent with respect to a biological or adoptive sibling of a child who 

is a [CHINS] have been involuntarily terminated by a court under: (A) IC 31-

35-2 (involuntary termination involving a . . . [CHINS])[.]” Here, it is 

undisputed that the parent-child relationship between Child’s older sibling, 

G.G., and Mother, was involuntarily terminated in the past. Therefore, it was 

within the trial court’s discretion to grant or deny DCS’s request for a no 

reasonable efforts finding. We see no basis in the record to conclude that the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1409-JT-690 | April 21, 2015 Page 7 of 12

trial court abused its discretion in granting DCS’s motion in this case. 

Consequently, even if the appeal of this issue had been timely, Mother would 

not have succeeded with this argument.

II. Termination Order

A. Standard of Review

[14] Our standard of review with respect to termination of parental rights 

proceedings is well established. In considering whether termination was 

appropriate, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. 

K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). We will 

consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that may be drawn 

therefrom in support of the judgment, giving due regard to the trial court’s 

opportunity to judge witness credibility firsthand. Id. Where, as here, the trial 

court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the 

findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. In making that 

determination, we must consider whether the evidence clearly and convincingly 

supports the findings, and the findings clearly and convincingly support the 

judgment. Id. at 1229-30. It is “sufficient to show by clear and convincing 

evidence that the child’s emotional and physical development are threatened by 

the respondent parent’s custody.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 

839 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ind. 2005).

[15] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) requires that a petition to terminate 

parental rights for a CHINS must make the following allegations:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1409-JT-690 | April 21, 2015 Page 8 of 12

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least 

six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that 

reasonable efforts for family preservation or 

reunification are not required, including a description of 

the court’s finding, the date of the finding, and the 

manner in which the finding was made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has 

been under the supervision of a local office or probation 

department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most 

recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date 

the child is removed from the home as a result of the 

child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a 

delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of 

the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the 

child.

DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. 

K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230.

[16] In this case, Mother spends the vast majority of her brief presenting argument 

related to the no reasonable efforts finding. The remainder of her brief includes 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1409-JT-690 | April 21, 2015 Page 9 of 12

little to no argument, and no citation to authority or the record, regarding the 

elements of the termination statute set forth above. Based upon her list of issues 

in the brief’s concluding paragraph, we discern that Mother is challenging the 

trial court’s findings that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in Child’s removal will not be remedied, that the continuation of 

the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child’s well-being, and that 

termination is in Child’s best interests. 

B. Conditions Resulting in Removal

[17] In considering this issue, a juvenile court must judge a parent’s fitness to care 

for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing. In re E.M., 4 

N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). The juvenile court may, however, take into 

consideration the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the 

probability of future neglect or deprivation of the children. Id. Among other 

things, a juvenile court may consider a parent’s criminal history, substance 

abuse history, and lack of adequate housing. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of 

Family and Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

[18] In this case, Child was removed from Mother because of past and present

domestic violence between Mother and Father, Mother’s unstable housing 

situation, and the then-ongoing CHINS case with G.G. Regarding Mother’s 

habitual patterns of conduct, the record reveals the following facts that arose 

during G.G.’s CHINS case:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1409-JT-690 | April 21, 2015 Page 10 of 12

 Mother did not make any progress in services with respect to her 

parenting skills.

 Mother missed eleven of fifteen counseling sessions.

 Mother failed to maintain stable housing or a stable source of income. 

During the course of that CHINS case, Mother lived in fourteen different 

locations. Mother also failed to obtain her GED.

 Mother continued to be in a violent relationship with Father.

 Despite participating with services for two years, Mother made no 

sustainable progress in creating an environment suitable for G.G.

 Mother’s rights to G.G. were involuntarily terminated.

[19] In the course of the instant CHINS case related to Child, the record reveals the 

following evidence regarding Mother:

 Mother repeatedly engaged in criminal activity.

 Mother repeatedly used illegal substances despite being aware that she 

was pregnant.

 Mother continued to be in a romantic relationship with Father while he 

was incarcerated for assaulting her in Child’s presence.

 Mother failed to maintain stable housing or income.

 Mother failed to attend the vast majority of her visitation sessions with 

Child.

[20] In other words, the record establishes that despite years of contact with DCS 

and participation with services, Mother has failed to make progress on any of 

the reasons DCS became involved with Child. Given this record, we find that 

the juvenile court did not err by finding that DCS proved by clear and 

convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that led to Child’s removal from Mother’s care would not be remedied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1409-JT-690 | April 21, 2015 Page 11 of 12

C. Threat to Child’s Well-Being

[21] Mother also appears to argue that the trial court erred in finding that 

continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child’s wellbeing. In considering this element, the trial court “need not wait until a child is 

irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that her physical, mental, and 

social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child 

relationship.” In re E.S., 762 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). A 

parent’s inability to meet the case plan requirements is sufficient evidence to 

satisfy this element of the termination statute. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 221

(Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[22] In this case, DCS proved that Mother and Father have a history of domestic 

violence. It is well established that exposure to domestic violence is harmful to 

children, even if the child is an infant. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 644-45 (Ind. 

2014). Furthermore, the record reveals that Mother and Father engaged in 

domestic violence in the Child’s presence on at least one occasion.

[23] Additionally, the record reveals that Mother continued to engage in substance 

abuse and criminal activity, failed to participate with visits with Child, and 

failed to achieve and maintain housing and income stability. This evidence is 

sufficient to conclude that the juvenile court did not err by finding that DCS 

proved by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability 

that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child’s 

well-being.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1409-JT-690 | April 21, 2015 Page 12 of 12

D. Child’s Best Interests

[24] Finally, Mother seems to argue that the trial court erred by finding that 

termination is in Child’s best interests. In considering this factor, we must look 

to the totality of the evidence, subordinating the interests of the parent to those 

of the children. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2013). Furthermore, “we have previously held that the 

recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate

parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal 

will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination is in the child’s best interests.” Id. at 1158-59.

[25] In this case, both the FCM and the CASA testified that in their respective 

opinions, termination was in Child’s best interests. And we have already found 

herein that evidence of Mother’s habitual patterns of conduct, substance abuse, 

criminal activity, instability, domestic violence, and failure to participate fully 

with visits established that the conditions resulting in removal will not be 

remedied. We also note that Child is placed in a loving preadoptive home with 

his biological sibling, to whom he is strongly bonded. Consequently, we find 

that the trial court did not err by concluding that DCS proved by clear and 

convincing evidence that termination is in Child’s best interests.

[26] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Najam, J., and Friedlander, J., concur.