J-A09024-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

GEORGE B. KEAHEY, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

WENDY KEAHEY, :

:

Appellee : No. 2169 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered June 18, 2014,

Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County,

Civil Division at No. 2013-003741

BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED APRIL 21, 2015

Appellant, George B. Keahey (“GK”), appeals from the order entered 

June 18, 2014 granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Wendy 

Keahey (“WK”). GK contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his 

claims for defamation and libel based upon its conclusion that WK’s 

statements were protected by the judicial privilege. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm the trial court’s order.

GK and WK are divorcing spouses. GK initiated this action on or about 

April 18, 2013, alleging in a civil complaint that he had suffered damages as 

a result of an affidavit (hereinafter, WK’s Affidavit”) provided by WK in a 

federal civil rights lawsuit brought by GK against Bethel Township and 

certain of its police officers (hereinafter, the “Federal Suit”). In the present 

case, GK’s complaint against WK asserted three caused of action against 
J-A09024-15

- 2 -

WK: (1) statutory defamation (42 Pa. C.S.A. § §8343); (2) common law 

libel/defamation; and (3) wrongful use of judicial proceedings (42 Pa. C.S.A. 

§ 8351). 

By way of background, we begin with the Federal Suit. In its written 

opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, the trial court aptly summarized the factual and procedural 

background of the Federal Suit as follows:

On the evening of November 25, 2009, the Bethel 

Police responded to a call from [WK], concerning a 

domestic dispute at the Keahey residence, 1584 

Conchester Road, Bethel Township, Delaware 

County, Pennsylvania. [Bethel] Officers James 

Register and Brian Buck responded to the call. The 

officers arrived in separate cars, and they observed 

that there were two vehicles parked outside the 

residence, a Ford F150 truck and 1987 Mustang. 

Officer Buck described the couple as being "verbally 

combative upon [their] arrival." According to Officer 

Register, [WK] was "heated and agitated” upon the 

officers arrival, the couple was arguing, and [WK] 

was "adamant" that she wanted her husband out of 

the house. The officers then separated the couple to 

question them separately. [WK] informed Officer 

Buck that the mortgage to the property was in her 

name and the F150 truck and 1987 Mustang were 

titled solely in her name. When asked by Officer 

Buck if she had somewhere else she could go, [WK] 

replied that she did not. Officer Register asked [GK] 

if he had somewhere else he could go, and [GK] 

stated he had a friend's house to which he could go 

and voluntarily agreed to do so. [WK] refused to let 

her husband take the F150 truck and suggested that 

he contact Irene Reardon, a woman [GK] was 

allegedly seeing, and ask her for a ride. 
J-A09024-15

- 3 -

[GK] describes a different scene. He states that his 

wife was "very inebriated” and "really looped” when 

the officers arrived. He also states that, while his 

wife was angry that he would not give her the keys 

to the Ford F150 as a result of her intoxication, he 

would not classify the situation as an "argument." 

He also claims that he had been home from work for 

only ten minutes and was just sitting down to eat 

when the police arrived. [GK] says that Officer Buck 

said to him, "One of you has to leave. You both 

can't stay in the house tonight." He was also told 

that he would be unable to take the F150 truck or 

the Mustang to leave because they were his wife's 

vehicles. Finally, Officer Register told [GK] that he 

was going to take him in his police car, and asked if 

[GK] wanted to get his coat. 

[GK] was eventually taken by Officer Register in his 

police car and dropped off at a nearby McDonald's 

restaurant. At the time, [GK] states that he felt he 

was under arrest "in a legal sense," and felt this way 

because he was going to get in the front seat of the 

car but was told he need to sit in the back seat. 

[GK] was picked up and given a ride by Ms. Reardon 

to another friend's house where he spent the night. 

[GK] returned to the property the next morning. 

When his wife discovered he had returned, she 

"started screaming” and [GK] took the Ford F150 

truck and left. [WK] then informed [Bethel] Officer 

Bradshaw and Detective Mervine of the previous 

night's events, told them that her husband did not 

have her permission to use the truck, and that she 

did not want to file charges against her husband. 

[GK] spoke with Detective Mervine advising that he 

did not have to return the truck and was not 

planning on doing so. Later that day, a "stop and 

hold” order was placed on the truck. The "stop and 

hold” order was removed the following day after 

Officer Bradshaw consulted with the Delaware 

County District Attorney's Office. 

On January 23, 2010, upon discovering the truck 

parked outside the home of Irene Reardon, [WK] 
J-A09024-15

- 4 -

took the truck and parked it at a new location. Upon 

discovering that the vehicle was missing, [GK] called 

the Bethel Police and demanded that the truck be 

returned to him as he had personal belongings and 

items needed for his law practice. He also advised 

the Bethel police that he had a court order allowing 

him to use the truck. On the same day, [WK] 

contacted the Bethel police and informed them that 

Irene Reardon had called and threatened her. She 

advised that she would return her husband's 

personal belongings and items needed for his law 

practice, but she would not return the truck. Upon 

being informed that his belongings would be 

returned by his wife, [GK] advised that he wanted 

his wife charged with theft. [GK] was advised that if 

he wanted charges filed, he needed to contact the 

police where the alleged theft took place, Aldan 

Borough [Delaware County, Pennsylvania]. On 

February 17, 2010, the Delaware County Court of 

Common Pleas entered an order permitting [GK] to 

use what was identified as [WK’s] 1987 Mustang for 

a period of thirty days, "at which time he shall return 

the vehicle to [WK] without further proceeding." 

Following the above-described course of events, 

[GK] filed an action in the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

bringing six counts: (1) seizure and detention 

without probable cause in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 

1983; (2) seizure and deprivation of property in 

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) conspiracy to 

deprive [GK] of his rights under § 1983; (4) false 

imprisonment; (5) harassment; and (6) malicious 

abuse of process. Counts (5) harassment and (6) 

malicious abuse of process claims were dismissed 

and [GK] later agreed to drop count (3) the 

conspiracy claim. The remaining claims were 

ultimately dismissed following [the Honorable United 

States District Court] Judge Buckwalter's 

consideration of the Bethel Defendants Motion for 

Summary Judgment.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/10/2014, at 8-12 (citations and footnotes omitted).
J-A09024-15

- 5 -

WK signed her Affidavit on or about October 18, 2012, and on October 

23, 2012, the defendants in the Federal Suit attached it to a motion for 

leave to amend their motion for summary judgement. WK’s Affidavit stated 

in full as follows:

The undersigned, Wendy Keahey, hereby deposes and says as follows:

1. I married George Keahey on September 6, 2002.

2. Because of George's credit background, the mortgage on 1584 

Conchester Road was in my name only.

3. At the time of the marriage I owned a 1987 Mustang my father 

bought in 1988 and gave to me when I was in college.

4. I also owned a Subaru which I traded in for a Ford F-150 truck, 

through a discount I had as an employee of a Ford dealership. 

The truck and loan were in my name only.

5. Several weeks before the incident on November 25, 2009, I 

called police after George threw me across the kitchen when I 

was trying to leave to go to a friend's home.

6. George was yelling, "Go ahead, run me over!" and other things 

as he stood in the back of the truck preventing me from leaving. 

I locked myself in the truck and called police.

7. When officers arrived, one officer took George to one side of the 

driveway and another officer got me and my dog out of the 

truck.

8. In a threatening tone, George said I better get a good attorney.

9. The officer warned George that he should be careful because I

wasn't pressing charges and allowed me to leave in the truck 

since it was in my name.

10. On the night before Thanksgiving, 2009, we had another 

argument. I was not drunk or under the influence of drugs.

11. George was secretly taking boxes from the home and placing 

them in the back of the truck which was locked and he had the 
J-A09024-15

- 6 -

only key. He refused to give me the key so I could see what he 

was trying to take out of the house.

12. We were also arguing because I believed George was seeing 

another woman, Irene Reardon, and I confronted him about this.

13. After calling the police, I waited outside on the walkway for 

police to arrive and I believe George was in the sunroom.

14. When officers arrived, one asked me where George was and I 

believe I walked him to the sunroom and opened the door.

15. George immediately started giving the officer a hard time and 

was argumentative and uncooperative.

16. An officer asked me if I had somewhere I could go and I said I 

did not and I really didn't see why I had to leave.

17. I told the officer the mortgage was in my name alone, but the 

deed was in both of our names.

18. The officer with George then asked me to come inside.

19. He told me that George was willing to leave and wanted to know 

if George would take the truck.

20. I told the officer no, George would not take the truck and that it 

is in my name alone and suggested George call his girlfriend, 

Irene, for a ride.

21. By this point, George was no longer argumentative.

22. I went back outside and heard one of the officers offer to give 

George a ride and George walked away with them.

23. I did not see any of the officers forcibly remove George from the 

home.

24. During this time, George was wearing the same clothes he was 

wearing when he left for work in the morning.

25. Early the next morning, I heard the truck being started and I 

saw it being driven off.

26. After seeing the truck being driven off I called police.
J-A09024-15

- 7 -

27. Two officers arrived and I told them what had happened the 

night before and that George was told he wasn't to take the 

truck.

28. The next thing I heard about the truck was from Officer 

Bradshaw who advised me that the D.A. had told them they 

couldn't charge George with unauthorized use and there was 

nothing more they could do.

29. On January 23, 2010, after George refused to return my truck, I 

took my truck from where it was parked on the street in front of 

the home of Irene Reardon.

30. When I got home, I had a message I felt was threatening from 

Irene Reardon (telling me I was "done")

31. I was afraid of what they might do and called police.

32. An officer came to the house and listened to the message and 

said he could see how the message could be seen as 

threatening.

33. An Order was issued in the divorce case that allowed George to 

use the Mustang for 30 days only. When the 30 days were up 

and George refused to return the Mustang, I contacted the 

police.

34. I did not know any of the officers at the Bethel Police.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

Id. at 4-6. The federal district court granted the motion for leave to amend 

and subsequently granted the motion for summary judgment.1 

In the present lawsuit, GK alleges that WK’s Affidavit was defamatory 

because it “falsely accused him of criminal assault,” GK’s Brief at 3, and 

because in filing it WK “vindictively conspired with Bethel Defendants to 

 

1

 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment. Trial Court Opinion, 

11/10/2014, at 12 n.5.
J-A09024-15

- 8 -

thwart [GK’s] success in the [Federal Suit].” Complaint, ¶ 21. On April 28, 

2014, GK filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and on May 6, 2014, 

WK filed a motion for summary judgment. By order dated June 18, 2014, 

the trial court granted WK’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, GK 

contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law in issuing its June 18, 

2014 order.

Our standard of review with respect to a trial court's decision to grant 

or deny a motion for summary judgment is as follows:

A reviewing court may disturb the order of the trial 

court only where it is established that the court 

committed an error of law or abused its discretion. 

As with all questions of law, our review is plenary.

In evaluating the trial court's decision to enter 

summary judgment, we focus on the legal standard 

articulated in the summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 

1035.2. The rule states that where there is no 

genuine issue of material fact and the moving party 

is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary 

judgment may be entered. Where the non-moving 

party bears the burden of proof on an issue, he may 

not merely rely on his pleadings or answers in order 

to survive summary judgment. Failure of a non[-

]moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an 

issue essential to his case and on which it bears the 

burden of proof establishes the entitlement of the 

moving party to judgment as a matter of law. 

Lastly, we will view the record in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as 

to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact 

must be resolved against the moving party.
J-A09024-15

- 9 -

Thompson v. Ginkel, 95 A.3d 900, 904 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting JP 

Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258, 1261–62 (Pa. Super. 

2013)), appeal denied, 108 A.3d 36 (Pa. 2015).

The trial court determined that WK’s Affidavit could not form the basis 

for a defamation action because it is protected by the judicial privilege. We 

agree. In discussing the judicial privilege, our Supreme Court has 

instructed:

Pursuant to the judicial privilege, a person is entitled 

to absolute immunity for “communications which are 

issued in the regular course of judicial proceedings 

and which are pertinent and material to the redress 

or relief sought.” Post v. Mendel, 510 Pa. 213, 507 

A.2d 351, 355 (1986) (emphasis in original). This 

privilege is based on the “public policy which permits 

all suiters, however bold and wicked, however 

virtuous and timid, to secure access to the courts of 

justice to present whatever claims, true or false, real 

or fictitious, they seek to adjudicate.” Id. As we 

explained in Post, “[t]o assure that such claims are 

justly resolved, it is essential that pertinent issues be 

aired in a manner that is unfettered by the threat of 

libel or slander suits being filed.” Id. Notably, this 

privilege is extended not only to parties so that they 

are not deterred from using the courts, but also to 

judges so that they may “administer the law without 

fear of consequences,” “to witnesses to encourage 

their complete and unintimidated testimony in court, 

and to counsel to enable him to best represent his 

client's interests.” Binder v. Triangle 

Publications, Inc., 442 Pa. 319, 275 A.2d 53, 56 

(1971).

Bochetto v. Gibson, 860 A.2d 67, 71 (Pa. 2004).

Pennsylvania has adopted section 587 of the Restatement (Second) of 

Torts, which provides an absolute privilege to parties to private litigation “to 
J-A09024-15

- 10 -

publish defamatory matter concerning another ... if the matter has some 

relation to the proceeding.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 587 (2012); 

see, e.g., Pawlowski v. Smorto, 588 A.2d 36, 42 (Pa. Super. 1991). 

Section 588 offers a parallel rule for witnesses, providing that “a witness is 

absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in 

communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding or as a part of 

a judicial proceeding in which he [or she] is testifying, if it has some relation 

to the proceeding.” Restatement (Second) Torts § 588 (2012). Since final 

judgments in cases are based on witness testimony, “it is necessary [ ] that 

a full disclosure not be hampered by fear of private suits for defamation.” 

Restatement (Second) Torts § 588 cmt. (b) (2012).

The statements in WK’s Affidavit, even if defamatory, may not form 

the basis for civil liability in Pennsylvania. In accordance with sections 587 

and 588, WK’s statements were provided in the regular course of judicial 

proceedings (at the summary judgment stage of the Federal Suit) and were 

pertinent and material to the subject matter of the Federal Suit. As a result, 

the trial court did not err in granting WK’s motion for summary judgment 

dismissing all of GK’s claims against her.2

 

2

 On appeal, GK has not challenged the trial court’s dismissal of his claim for 

wrongful use of judicial proceedings pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8351 (Count 

III). The trial court noted that GK had not stated a cause of action because 

WK was not a party to the Federal Suit. Trial Court Opinion, 11/10/2014, at 

14.
J-A09024-15

- 11 -

In his appellate brief, GK contends that the trial court’s ruling applying 

the absolute judicial privilege was error because WK was not a client of the 

law firm representing the defendants in the Federal Suit, or a party, 

attorney, or judge in the Federal Suit. GK’s Brief at 17. GK cites to no 

authority in support of such limitations on application of the judicial 

privilege, however, and this Court is not aware that any such limitations 

exist. 

GK further argues that WK was not a “witness” because she did not 

testify in court or by deposition. Id. at 18. GK notes that WK stated that 

she submitted an affidavit so that she could avoid having to appear for a 

deposition. Id. Again, however, no such limitations on the application of the 

judicial privilege exist. Our Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that “[a]ll 

communications pertinent to any stage of a judicial proceeding are accorded 

an absolute privilege which cannot be destroyed by abuse,” and that 

“statements by a party, a witness, counsel, or a judge cannot be the basis of 

a defamation action whether they occur in the pleadings or in open 

court.” Binder v. Triangle Publ'ns, Inc., 275 A.2d 53, 56 (Pa. 1971) 

(emphasis added). 

As the trial court correctly emphasized, GK himself identified WK in his 

Disclosure Statement pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure in the Federal Suit as a an individual “reasonably likely to have 

information concerning the subjects” at issue in that case. Trial Court 
J-A09024-15

- 12 -

Opinion, 11/10/2014, at 13. We find unconvincing GK’s argument that this 

point is irrelevant because neither party subsequently listed WK as a witness 

in their pretrial statements in the Federal Suit. Even if, as GK contends, the 

omission from the pretrial statements precludes WK from being a “witness in 

the litigation as a matter of Federal Law,” GK’s Brief at 23, it is irrelevant for 

present purposes. A person’s status as a witness for purposes of application 

of the judicial privilege under Restatement section 588 does not depend 

upon their identification as a witness by a party to the litigation, as our 

Supreme Court has held that even those who volunteer as witnesses are 

protected under section 588. Ginsburg v. Halpern, 118 A.2d 201, 202 (Pa. 

1955) (“Even if defendants had been shown to have volunteered to be

witnesses and then [gave] false testimony against plaintiff [it] would not 

constitute a valid cause of action. In support of this we refer to the 

Restatement of Torts of the American Law Institute, Section 588.”). 

In WK’s Affidavit, she testified under oath to what she observed and 

heard regarding the events at issue in the Federal Suit. Pursuant to sections 

587 and 588 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, she is protected by an 

absolute judicial privilege, even if her statements could be construed as 

libelous or defamatory. For this reason, the trial court’s order granting WK’s 

motion for summary judgment was not error, and GK is not entitled to any 

relief on appeal.

Order affirmed.
J-A09024-15

- 13 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/21/2015