IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

January 26, 2021 Session

MATTHEW KEITH HUBBARD v. CLAIBORNE COUNTY BOARD OF 

EDUCATION ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Claiborne County

No. 19336 Elizabeth C. Asbury, Chancellor

___________________________________

No. E2020-00517-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

A tenured teacher appealed his dismissal for unprofessional conduct and insubordination. 

He contended that the decision of the Board of Education lacked sufficient evidentiary 

support. The teacher also contended that the decision was arbitrary and capricious and in 

violation of his constitutional and statutory rights. The trial court affirmed the Board’s 

decision. Upon review, we conclude that the teacher received pre-termination notice of the 

charges and evidence against him. And the Board complied with the procedural framework 

in the Tenure Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-512 (2020). The evidence does not 

preponderate against the trial court’s findings that the teacher was guilty of unprofessional 

conduct and insubordination. We further conclude that the teacher failed to establish that 

the Board’s decision was arbitrary or in violation of statutory or constitutional rights. So 

we affirm. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

W. NEAL MCBRAYER,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY,

C.J., and KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., joined.

Richard L. Colbert and C. Joseph Hubbard, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, 

Matthew Keith Hubbard.

Janet Strevel Hayes and Chris W. McCarty, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, 

Claiborne County Board of Education, Joseph A. Miller, Shane Bunch, Terry Keck, Neta 

Munsey, Justin Cosby, Linda Fultz, Shannon England, and Wade Breeding.

10/13/2021
2

OPINION

I.

A.

For almost twenty years, Matthew Keith Hubbard taught special needs children in 

the Claiborne County school system. He obtained permanent tenure in 2004. By all 

accounts, his classroom performance has been exemplary. But his behavior outside the 

classroom ultimately led to his dismissal. 

On April 16, 2018, Mr. Hubbard was arrested for driving under the influence. He 

pled guilty, and his driver’s license was revoked for one year. He was also ordered to pay 

a fine, spend 48 hours in jail, and attend an alcohol awareness program.

Driving while intoxicated can be grounds for dismissal of a tenured teacher. 

Mr. Hubbard met with the Director of Schools to discuss the consequences of his behavior. 

Although disappointed with Mr. Hubbard’s unprofessional conduct, the Director imposed 

a three-day suspension, without pay, rather than dismissal. As the Director informed 

Mr. Hubbard at the time, 

I . . . will not and cannot ignore your many years of valuable service to 

Claiborne County Schools as a special education teacher. It is that valuable 

service and your ability with our special education students which have 

caused me to decide against your dismissal. 

But the Director warned Mr. Hubbard that future conduct issues could lead to further 

discipline, including dismissal. 

A few months later, Mr. Hubbard was arrested for driving on a revoked license. 

While investigating the arrest, the Director learned that Mr. Hubbard had threatened 

another teacher. This time, the Director asked the Board of Education to approve dismissal 

charges against Mr. Hubbard for unprofessional conduct and insubordination. After 

receiving the Board’s approval, the Director notified Mr. Hubbard of the dismissal charges. 

In response, Mr. Hubbard requested a full and complete hearing before an impartial hearing 

officer. 

B.

The hearing officer heard testimony from multiple witnesses, including the Director 

of Schools; the Assistant Director; Mr. Hubbard; Mr. Hubbard’s wife, Pam Hubbard; and 

several teachers and administrators in the Claiborne County school system. Mr. Hubbard’s 
3

co-workers and principal attested to his outstanding performance in the classroom. In their 

interactions with him, Mr. Hubbard always displayed a calm, professional demeanor. 

As the Director explained, he considered pursuing dismissal charges against 

Mr. Hubbard after his April 2018 conviction for driving under the influence. But he 

decided to give the teacher another chance in light of his stellar classroom performance. 

Even so, he warned Mr. Hubbard not to engage in any further unprofessional conduct. 

Then, less than six months later, Mr. Hubbard was arrested again.

In October of that year, one of Mr. Hubbard’s sons had a late basketball practice at 

a Claiborne County middle school. Midway through practice, Mrs. Hubbard demanded to 

speak with the head basketball coach, Glen Smith. After speaking with Mrs. Hubbard, the 

visibly shaken coach told one of his assistants, Jason Miracle, that Mr. Hubbard was 

en route to pick up his son. And he relayed that Mr. Hubbard was believed to be intoxicated 

and possibly violent. 

Coach Miracle promptly locked all the gym doors and called 9-1-1. The police

questioned both Coach Miracle and Mrs. Hubbard. When Mr. Hubbard arrived, the police 

were still on the scene. He drove slowly through the parking lot without stopping. An 

officer arrested Mr. Hubbard on his way home for driving on a revoked license. He was 

not charged with an alcohol-related offense. 

When asked about his October arrest, Mr. Hubbard explained that, after his license 

was revoked in April, he obtained a restricted license. Unbeknownst to him, the restricted 

license was no longer valid. Still, the new charges were dismissed after he obtained another 

restricted license and installed an ignition interlock device. 

While investigating the October incident, the Director met with Mrs. Hubbard, who 

was also a teacher in the Claiborne County school system. She told the Director of rumors 

of an affair between Coach Smith and herself, rumors her husband apparently believed to 

be true. The month prior, Mr. Hubbard had sent his wife a number of disturbing text 

messages about Coach Smith. She shared a few examples: 

I’ve texted Glen [Smith] twice now to inform him that I’m aware of the 

situation and going to settle things with him. I’ll beat the hell out of him.

I know exactly where he lives. I’ll be waiting.

I know where he lives and works. I’m going to confront him.

Upon further questioning from the Director, Mrs. Hubbard revealed that her 

husband could become angry when drinking. She had seen him punch walls and other 
4

objects.1 And he had previously confronted another teacher about an alleged affair. She 

suspected that her husband had been drinking on October 4. So, when she learned he was 

on his way to the gym, she decided to warn Coach Smith.

The Director viewed Mr. Hubbard’s threats as more unprofessional conduct and a

clear violation of his previous directive. Threats directed at a co-worker presented a safety 

issue for the school system. 

The Assistant Director confirmed that the Director told Mr. Hubbard to avoid further 

unprofessional conduct. As he recalled, Mr. Hubbard was told “that this kind of behavior 

wouldn’t be tolerated and that the next occurrence could lead up to dismissal.” 

Mr. Hubbard acknowledged that he was given a verbal directive. But he claimed that the 

Director merely warned him to avoid future arrests and similar issues. 

The Assistant Director also disclosed that Mr. Hubbard had received a verbal 

reprimand in 2014 after a previous arrest for driving under the influence.

2

 At that time, the 

former director of schools warned Mr. Hubbard about the potential consequences of further 

unprofessional conduct. Mr. Hubbard’s counsel objected to this testimony as outside the 

scope of the charges. The hearing officer ruled that he would consider the previous incident 

only as evidence that Mr. Hubbard was on notice that his behavior outside the classroom 

could be grounds for discipline. 

For his part, Mr. Hubbard blamed his wife and Coach Smith for the unnecessary 

alarm at the gym. He had not been drinking. He only went to the gym to pick up his son 

from practice. When he saw his wife in the parking lot, he “was satisfied that [his] son was 

being picked up.” So he headed home. 

But he confessed that he was a protective and jealous husband. He had previously 

confronted another teacher about a suspected affair. In his words, “when I get emotional, 

I do and say things that are not quite appropriate.” 

Mr. Hubbard explained that he became convinced that “something was going on” 

between his wife and Coach Smith. In September, he sent approximately five 

confrontational text messages to Coach Smith. Among those messages was this one: “I am 

aware of the situation. I’m going to settle things. I will beat the hell out of you.” 

Mr. Hubbard admitted that threatening a co-worker was unprofessional. But he viewed his 

text messages as “emotional outbursts,” not threats. Still, he understood the Director’s 

 

1 Mr. Hubbard acknowledged that he had thrown a few punches but denied having an anger 

management problem. 

2 The 2014 charge was later reduced to reckless driving.
5

concerns. He regretted his choice of words. And he acknowledged that his behavior was 

inappropriate. But he never intended to harm Coach Smith. 

Mrs. Hubbard agreed that her husband had never hurt anyone. She described him 

as a good man when sober. Mr. Hubbard conceded that he had a drinking problem. But, 

with the help of his wife’s physician, he was trying to stop. 

C.

The hearing officer concluded that Mr. Hubbard received adequate notice of the 

charges. The officer also determined that Mr. Hubbard’s threats of violence against a 

colleague constituted both unprofessional conduct and insubordination. And dismissal was 

appropriate under these facts and circumstances. 

Mr. Hubbard appealed to the Board of Education. By a five-to-one vote, the Board 

approved the hearing officer’s decision. So Mr. Hubbard sought further review in chancery 

court. 

In his chancery court petition, Mr. Hubbard alleged that the evidence did not support 

the Board’s decision. And he asserted that the Board had violated his statutory and 

constitutional rights by relying on evidence beyond the scope of the notice of charges. 

Finally, he claimed that the Board’s approval of the hearing officer’s decision was arbitrary 

and capricious.

The chancery court ruled in the Board’s favor. The court found no evidence that 

the proceedings before the Board or the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious or 

in violation of Mr. Hubbard’s constitutional or statutory rights. Mr. Hubbard was 

adequately apprised of the charges against him. And the evidence supported both grounds 

for dismissal. The court also determined that dismissal was the appropriate remedy.

 

II.

The Tenure Act is designed “to protect school teachers from arbitrary demotions 

and dismissals.” Cooper v. Williamson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 746 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tenn.

1987) (citation omitted). The Act delineates five exclusive grounds for suspension or 

dismissal, including unprofessional conduct and insubordination. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-

5-511(a)(2) (2020). 

The Act also mandates a procedural framework for teacher discipline. Lemon v.

Williamson Cty. Sch., 618 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tenn. 2021). The first step is the presentation of 

written charges to the Board of Education, “specifically stating the offenses that are 

charged.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-511(a)(4). If the Board approves the charges, the 
6

director of schools must notify the teacher and provide the teacher with a copy of the 

charges and a notice of legal rights. Id. § 49-5-511(a)(5). 

The teacher may demand a “full and complete hearing on the charges before an 

impartial hearing officer.” Id. § 49-5-512(a) (2020). The Board has the burden of proof at 

the hearing. See Cooper, 746 S.W.2d at 182. After the hearing, the hearing officer must 

issue “written findings of fact, conclusions of law and a concise and explicit statement of 

the outcome of the decision.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-512(a)(9). 

If the teacher is dissatisfied with the hearing officer’s decision, the teacher must first 

appeal to the Board. Id. § 49-5-512(c)(1). No new evidence may be introduced. Id. § 49-

5-512(c)(3). But the teacher may appear before the Board and explain why the hearing 

officer’s decision should be modified or reversed. Id. The Board may send the record back 

for additional evidence, revise the penalty, or either sustain or reverse the decision. Id.

Both parties then have the right to seek review of the Board’s decision in chancery 

court. Id. § 49-5-512(c)(4). Review in chancery court is “de novo on the record of the

hearing.” Id. This standard of review does not permit the parties to submit new evidence 

on the merits of the charges. Emory v. Memphis City Sch. Bd. of Educ., 514 S.W.3d 129, 

142 (Tenn. 2017). The court’s review is “limited to the written record of the hearing before 

the board and any evidence or exhibits submitted at the hearing.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-

5-513(g) (2020). New evidence may be submitted at this juncture only “to establish 

arbitrary or capricious action or violation of statutory or constitutional rights by the board.” 

Id. 

In chancery court, no presumption of correctness attaches to the Board’s decision. 

Emory, 514 S.W.3d at 141. The court makes “a fresh and independent determination of 

both the facts and the law.” Finney v. Franklin Special Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 576 S.W.3d 

663, 677 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018). But the burden of proving the charges remains with the 

Board. Saunders v. Anderson, 746 S.W.2d 185, 189 (Tenn. 1987). The teacher has the 

burden of proving any allegations that the Board acted arbitrarily or in violation of the 

teacher’s rights. Crosby v. Holt, 320 S.W.3d 805, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).

On appeal, we apply our familiar standard of review for appeals after a bench trial. 

Emory, 514 S.W.3d at 142. We presume that the trial court’s factual findings are correct 

unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). We review 

questions of law de novo, with no presumption of correctness. Emory, 514 S.W.3d at 142.

A.

A tenured teacher has a constitutional right to due process. Thompson v. Memphis 

City Sch. Bd. of Educ., 395 S.W.3d 616, 627 (Tenn. 2012). “At a minimum,” the teacher 

is entitled “to pre-termination notice of the charges . . . , an explanation of the employer’s 
7

evidence, and an opportunity to present [his or] her side of the story to the employer.” Id. 

The notice should “fairly apprise the teacher of the charge[s] against him and enable him 

to prepare his defense in advance of the hearing.” Turk v. Franklin Special Sch. Dist., 640 

S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tenn. 1982) (citation omitted). 

Mr. Hubbard complains that his 2014 arrest was not included in the notice of 

charges. Asserting that this appeal is “on all fours” with our supreme court’s decision in 

Turk v. Franklin Special School District, he argues that the Board violated his rights by 

relying on evidence beyond the scope of the charges. See id. Mr. Hubbard’s reliance on 

the Turk decision is misplaced. 

In Turk, the charging document informed the teacher that she was charged with 

unprofessional conduct based on her recent conviction for driving under the influence. Id.

at 219. But, at the hearing, the Board also considered evidence of a prior automobile 

accident, as well as, the teacher’s absentee record and drinking habits. Id. at 219-20. The 

previous accident factored heavily in the Board’s decision to dismiss the teacher. Id. at 

220. Our supreme court held that “it was fundamental error” for the Board to base its 

dismissal decision on extraneous matters “not specified in writing prior to the hearing.” Id. 

And the recent conviction, standing alone, was insufficient to support the dismissal 

decision. Id. at 220-21.3 

We face notably different facts. The notice of charges fully apprised Mr. Hubbard 

of the charges and evidence against him. The Director charged Mr. Hubbard with 

unprofessional conduct and insubordination. The notice specified that these charges were 

based on his April 2018 conviction, the warning to avoid future issues, his subsequent 

arrest for driving on a revoked license, and his threats directed at a co-worker. While the 

notice did not mention his 2014 arrest, the Board did not base its decision on that previous 

arrest. The hearing officer found Mr. Hubbard guilty of both charges based on his threats 

to a co-worker. And the Board upheld that decision. The trial court independently came 

to the same conclusion. The 2014 arrest was considered, if at all, as evidence that 

Mr. Hubbard knew the possible consequences of unprofessional behavior outside the 

classroom. 

B.

1. Unprofessional Conduct

“Conduct unbecoming to a member of the teaching profession” includes immorality, 

dishonesty, felony convictions, ethical violations, and improper use of intoxicants. Tenn. 

 

3 Our supreme court cautioned that a single conviction for driving while intoxicated, under different

circumstances, could support dismissal of a tenured teacher. Turk, 640 S.W.2d at 221. 
8

Code Ann. § 49-5-501(3) (2020). This non-exclusive list is a “good starting point” for 

determining whether a charge of unprofessional conduct has been proven. Taylor v. 

Clarksville Montgomery Cty. Sch. Sys., No. M2009-02116-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 

3245281, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2010). 

Teachers must “adhere to the highest ethical standards.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-

1002(1) (2020). Teachers accept this heavy responsibility out of a “desire for the respect 

and confidence of . . . colleagues, . . . students, . . . parents[,] and . . . members of the 

community.” Id. § 49-5-1002(2). At all times, they are expected to “[c]onduct themselves 

in a manner that preserves the dignity and integrity of the education profession.” Id. § 49-

5-1004(c)(2) (2020). “[F]alse or malicious statements about a colleague” are expressly 

prohibited. Id. § 49-5-1004(b)(7). 

The court found that Mr. Hubbard’s repeated threats to and about a co-worker 

constituted unprofessional conduct. The evidence does not preponderate against this 

finding. Mr. Hubbard’s conduct did not reflect the high ethical standards of the education 

profession. He admitted that threatening another teacher was unprofessional and that his 

behavior was inappropriate. Yet he maintains that his text messages fell short of being 

actual threats. We disagree. Mr. Hubbard sent multiple messages to Coach Smith about 

the rumored affair. At least twice, he threatened to “settle the matter” with a physical 

beating. As he told his wife, he knew where Coach Smith lived and worked. While 

Mr. Hubbard may view his messages as empty threats, Coach Smith clearly did not. He 

was visibly shaken by the news that Mr. Hubbard was on his way to the gym. 

Mr. Hubbard’s “emotional outbursts” set in motion a chain of events that had a decidedly 

negative impact on the Claiborne County school system.

2. Insubordination

The trial court also found that Mr. Hubbard was guilty of insubordination. 

Insubordinate conduct typically involves “a defiance of authority.” Morris v. ClarksvilleMontgomery Cty. Consol. Bd. of Educ., 867 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). A 

teacher who refuses or fails “to carry out specific assignments made by . . . the director of 

schools . . . when the . . . assignment[] [is] reasonable and not discriminatory” may be 

insubordinate. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-501(7)(A). To warrant dismissal of a tenured 

teacher on this basis, the teacher must have refused or failed “to obey some order which a 

superior . . . is entitled to give and have obeyed.” Morris, 867 S.W.2d at 327.

The trial court found that the Director ordered Mr. Hubbard to avoid future issues. 

Mr. Hubbard concedes that the Director gave him an order, but argues that the order was 

much narrower. The evidence on this point was conflicting. The court credited the 

testimony of the Board’s witnesses. We find no basis in this record to set aside the court’s 

finding.
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Mr. Hubbard then argues that the Director’s order lacked the specificity necessary 

to meet the statutory definition of insubordination. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-501(7)(A); 

cf. Morris, 867 S.W.2d at 328 (concluding that the insubordination charge had not been 

proven because the “words used by the witnesses d[id] not amount to an order”). The 

Director’s order, when considered in context, was not overly broad. In April, Mr. Hubbard 

pled guilty to driving under the influence. He knew that his unprofessional conduct had 

placed his continued employment as a tenured teacher in jeopardy. Because of his 

exemplary record as an educator, the Director chose a lesser sanction. But this leniency 

came with an explicit warning against further instances of unprofessional conduct. The 

Director did not mandate perfection on Mr. Hubbard’s part. All teachers make mistakes. 

Rather, he gave Mr. Hubbard specific instructions to avoid the type of egregious behavior 

that could lead to his dismissal. 

Mr. Hubbard knew he had received a directive. He also knew that threatening a coworker was unprofessional. Yet, only a few short months after the Director’s order, he 

sent threatening messages to a co-worker. His decision to engage in unprofessional 

conduct despite the Director’s order was insubordinate.

C.

Proof of a statutory ground for dismissal does not end the matter. The question of 

the appropriate punishment remains. See Finney, 576 S.W.3d at 690. “Whether dismissal 

is warranted . . . must be determined on a case by case basis after a careful review of 

attendant circumstances.” Ripley v. Anderson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 293 S.W.3d 154, 157 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).

Mr. Hubbard complains that neither the hearing officer nor the Board independently 

determined whether dismissal was appropriate. And this failure, in his view, “rendered the 

entire hearing process arbitrary and in violation of his statutory rights.” 

The hearing officer concluded that dismissal was appropriate on these facts. 

Mr. Hubbard maintains that the hearing officer afforded undue deference to the Board’s 

initial approval of the charges. Based solely on the notice of charges, the Board determined 

that the specified conduct, if proven, warranted Mr. Hubbard’s dismissal. See Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 49-5-511(a)(5). After the hearing, the officer found that the charges had been 

proven. See id. § 49-5-512(a). But he expressed reluctance to set aside the Board’s 

“judgment” without “clear evidence” that the Board “acted arbitrarily or unreasonably.” 

See Childs v. Roane Cty. Bd. of Educ., 929 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (“It is 

presumed that actions of a board are not arbitrary and capricious, but are reasonable unless 

there is clear evidence to the contrary.”). The Board’s initial decision, made without the 

benefit of a full and complete hearing, was not entitled to deference. The hearing officer 

had a statutory obligation to “decide what disposition to make of the case.” Id. § 49-5-

512(a)(9). 
10

Even if the hearing officer’s analysis was flawed, this error was harmless. See Tenn. 

R. App. P. 36(b). The Board revisited this issue at Mr. Hubbard’s appeal hearing. After 

reviewing the record and hearing argument from counsel for both parties, the Board 

rejected a motion to reduce the penalty to a one-year suspension. Instead, the Board 

approved the hearing officer’s decision, including his conclusion that dismissal was 

appropriate. 

D.

Mr. Hubbard also argues that the Board violated his statutory rights by voting to 

uphold the hearing officer’s decision without first sustaining the charges. The relevant part 

of the Tenure Act provides, 

The board shall hear the appeal on the record and no new evidence shall be 

introduced. The affected employee may appear in person or by counsel and 

argue why the decision should be modified or reversed. The board may 

sustain the decision, send the record back if additional evidence is necessary, 

revise the penalty or reverse the decision. Before any findings and decision 

are sustained or punishment inflicted, a majority of the membership of 

the board shall concur in sustaining the charges and decision. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-512(c)(3) (emphasis added). 

While separate votes may be ideal, nothing in the cited statute precludes a single 

vote sustaining both the charges and the decision. And, absent a contrary indication, we 

conclude that the Board’s vote fulfilled the statutory requirement.

Mr. Hubbard maintains that deposition testimony from the individual members of 

the Board demonstrates a lack of consensus on the charges. We disagree. The Board’s 

consensus is evidenced by the official vote of its members. The Board, as a public body, 

acts through its official minutes. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-104 (2016). The Board 

members posed questions to counsel for both parties about the evidence at the hearing and 

the hearing officer’s decision. Having considered the evidence, a majority of the 

membership of the Board then voted to uphold the hearing officer’s decision. 

Yet Mr. Hubbard argues that our previous decision in Winkler v. Tipton County 

Board of Education, 63 S.W.3d 376 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), supports his position. We 

cannot agree. In Winkler, we considered whether the Board of Education had properly 

notified a teacher of its “findings and decision” after an evidentiary hearing on two charges 

of unprofessional conduct. Id. at 377, 381; see Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-512 (1996). At 

that time, the Tenure Act contained no right to a hearing before an impartial hearing officer. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-512 (1996). Rather, the Board decided the case and notified the 
11

teacher of its findings and decision after a full evidentiary hearing. Id. In Winkler, the 

Board notified the teacher that it “has determined that [her] actions . . . were improper.” 

Id. at 380. But it revised her dismissal to a one-year suspension. Id. The trial court upheld 

the Board’s decision. Id. at 381. The sparse written findings left us unable to determine 

whether the Board found the teacher guilty of unprofessional conduct. Id. at 382. During 

deliberations, some Board members expressed the opinion that the teacher was only guilty 

of poor judgment. Id. These comments, coupled with the Board’s vaguely-worded letter 

to the teacher, did not satisfy the Board’s statutory obligation to “make known its ‘findings 

and decision.’” Id. (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-512(a)(9) (1996)).

Here, we have no doubt as to the Board’s findings and decision. The Board publicly 

upheld the hearing officer’s decision. The hearing officer made extensive findings of fact 

and conclusions of law. He specifically found Mr. Hubbard guilty of both unprofessional 

conduct and insubordination based on his threatening messages. Mr. Hubbard has not 

shown that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously or in violation of his constitutional 

or statutory rights. See Crosby, 320 S.W.3d at 817. 

III.

Mr. Hubbard was adequately apprised of the charges and evidence against him. 

There is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings of unprofessional conduct 

and insubordination. And Mr. Hubbard failed to show that the Board’s decision was 

arbitrary and capricious or in violation of his statutory or constitutional rights. So we 

affirm.

 s/ W. Neal McBrayer 

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JUDGE