2005 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-25-2005

Neumeyer v. Beard

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 04-1499

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Recommended Citation

"Neumeyer v. Beard" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 588.

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-1499

 

TERESA NEUMEYER; LARRY NEUMEYER,

Appellants

v.

JEFFREY BEARD, in his official capacity as

Secretary of the PA DOC; KENNETH KYLER, in

his official capacity as Superintendent of SCI at Huntingdon

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 02-cv-02152)

District Judge: Hon. James M. Munley

 

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 11, 2005

Before: SLOVITER and McKEE, Circuit Judges,

and FULLAM, District Judge *

(Filed: August 25, 2005)

 

 

Hon. John P. Fullam, Senior Judge, United States District *

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by

designation.
2

Teresa Neumeyer, Pro Se

Larry Neumeyer, Pro Se

P.O. Box 172

Chesaning, Michigan 48616

Appellants Pro Se

Gerald J. Pappert

Attorney General

Francis R. Filipi

Senior Deputy Attorney General

Calvin R. Koons

Senior Deputy Attorney General

John G. Knorr, III

Chief Deputy Attorney General

Chief, Appellate Litigation Section

Office of Attorney General

Harrisburg, PA 17120

Attorneys for Appellees

OPINION OF THE COURT

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

Acting pro se, Plaintiffs/Appellants Teresa and Larry

Neumeyer brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

seeking a declaratory judgment against Defendants/Appellees

Jeffrey Beard, the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections, and Kenneth Kyler, the Superintendent of the State

Correctional Institute at Huntingdon, Pennsylvania (hereafter

“prison officials”), that the practice of subjecting prison visitors’

vehicles to random searches violated the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. The United

States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

rejected this claim as a matter of law and thus entered summary

judgment in favor of Defendants. Neumeyer v. Beard, 301 F.
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1

1331; this court has jurisdiction over the District Court’s final order

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

3

Supp. 2d 349 (M.D. Pa. 2004). The Neumeyers appeal.1

I.

Teresa Neumeyer’s father (“prisoner”) is a prisoner

incarcerated at the State Correctional Institute at Huntingdon

(“SCIH”), an institution managed by the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections (“DOC”). Neumeyer, 301 F. Supp.

2d at 350. Mr. and Ms. Neumeyer, who are citizens of

Michigan, make fairly regular trips to visit the prisoner at the

SCIH.

The SCIH maintains a parking lot for use by visitors such

as the Neumeyers while they are visiting the facility. Notably,

some inmates have outside work details and such inmates “may

have access to visitors’ vehicles parked at the prison.” 301 F.

Supp. 2d at 353.

Prison officials have posted large signs at all

entranceways to the prison and immediately in front of the

visitors’ parking lot. In part, these signs read:

THIS IS A STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION.

ALL PERSONS, VEHICLES AND PERSONAL 

PROPERTY ENTERING OR BROUGHT ON THESE 

GROUNDS ARE SUBJECT TO SEARCH. DRUG 

DETECTION DOGS AND ELECTRONIC DEVICES

 MAY BE USED FOR THIS PURPOSE.

Kyler Decla. ¶ 8. The signs further inform visitors that anyone

caught bringing prohibited items onto the SCIH’s property will

be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.

Under SCIH/DOC policy, prison visitor vehicles parked

on facility grounds are subject to random searches after the
4

owner or operator signs a pre-printed “Consent To Search

Vehicle” form. 301 F .Supp. 2d at 350. If an individual refuses

to sign this form, SCIH/DOC officials simply refuse the wouldbe visitor entry to the prison, ask the visitor to leave the

premises, and do not pursue further action. As found by the

District Court: “If a prison visitor refuses to provide written

consent permitting SCIH corrections officers to search his or her

vehicle, then the visitor will not be allowed to enter the prison to

visit any prisoner on that day.” Id. Compare with Spear v.

Sowders, 71 F.3d 626, 632 (6th Cir. 1995) (“Spear [a visitor to

the prison] claims that [prison] officials told her that she could

either consent to the search, or that she would be detained while

they secured a warrant and then she would be forcibly searched

if necessary.”). If, however, the search proceeds and the

SCIH/DOC officials uncover contraband or evidence of

illegality, they will notify the Pennsylvania State Police.

The SCIH/DOC policy does not require corrections

officers to possess a search warrant, probable cause, or

reasonable suspicion before they may seek to search a vehicle

parked on prison grounds. In addition, the SCIH/DOC officials

do not seek permission to search the vehicle of every visitor who

parks in the lot. As found by the District Court, “[t]here are no

written standards as to how the searches are to be conducted; in

general, they are conducted randomly as time and complement

permit.” Neumeyer, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 350.

The Neumeyers have visited the prisoner at the SCIH on

approximately ten occasions. On May 28, 2001, and again on

May 27, 2002, several SCIH/DOC correctional officers searched

the Neumeyers’ vehicle. 301 F. Supp. 2d at 350. Prior to these

searches, Ms. Neumeyer signed the written consent form. Id.

According to evidence submitted by the Neumeyers, once the

SCIH/DOC officers select a vehicle for inspection and obtain the

requisite signature, they require the operator and any passengers

to exit the vehicle and open passenger compartments and the

trunk for inspection.

The record shows that the two searches of the

Neumeyers’ automobile did not uncover any contraband or
5

evidence of illegal activity. Indeed, there does not exist any

information or allegations in any SCIH/DOC records or reports

indicating that the Neumeyers have brought – or attempted to

bring – unlawful contraband into the SCIH or possessed the

same in their vehicle.

On November 26, 2002, the Neumeyers filed a Complaint

seeking a declaratory judgment and an order enjoining further

searches of their vehicle. The Complaint contended that,

inasmuch as the Neumeyers planned to continue to visit their

incarcerated relative at the SCIH, they possessed a reasonable

fear that SCIH/DOC officials would continue to infringe upon

their rights in the future absent judicial intervention. See

generally City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02

(1983). The Complaint did not seek damages.

Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary

judgment. The District Court adopted the report and

recommendation of a magistrate judge, filed a Memorandum

Opinion, and entered summary judgment in favor of the prison

officials. Neumeyer, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 353. This appeal

followed.

II.

This court reviews the District Court’s grant of summary

judgment de novo, applying the same standard as did the District

Court. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Greentree Transp. Trucking Co.,

293 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is

appropriate where there are no genuine issues as to any material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. “Summary judgment, however,

must not be granted where there is a genuine dispute about a

material fact, ‘that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Fasold v.

Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Here, there are

no disputed issues of material fact and resolution of this matter

turns solely on interpretations of law.
 The case at bar involves only vehicle searches; thus, we 2

need not address the question of whether and when the

suspicionless search of a prison visitor’s person would be

constitutional. See generally Thorne v. Jones, 765 F.2d 1270, 1277

(5th Cir.1985) (holding that Constitution requires correctional

officers to have reasonable suspicion before subjecting prison

visitors to strip search); Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 674 (8th

Cir. 1982) (“[W]e conclude that the Constitution mandates that a

reasonable suspicion standard govern strip searches of visitors to

penal institutions.”); Deserly v. Mont. Dep’t of Corr., 995 P.2d

972, 978 (Mont. 2000) (“While prison visitors can be subjected to

some searches, such as pat-downs or metal detector sweeps, merely

as a condition of visitation, absent any suspicion, more intrusive

searches, such as strip searches, require more.”).

6

III.

Section 1983, the federal civil rights statute here at issue,

“is not itself a source of substantive rights, but [rather] a method

for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Baker v.

McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979). “To establish liability

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the

defendants, acting under color of law, violated the plaintiff’s

federal constitutional or statutory rights, and thereby caused the

complained of injury.” Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 281 (3d

Cir. 2005). Here, the Neumeyers’ Complaint averred that the

prison officials violated their rights under the Fourth

Amendment as made applicable to state actors by operation of

the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367

U.S. 643 (1961). Specifically, the Neumeyers’ Complaint

contended that the prison officials’ program has violated and

will continue to violate their constitutional rights because it

allows SCIH/DOC correctional officers to conduct vehicle

searches without any individualized suspicion.2

The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV. 

Typically, in order to be “reasonable” under the Fourth
7

Amendment, a search must be supported by a warrant, unless the

search is supportable under one or more of the “specifically

established and well-delineated exceptions” to the warrant

requirement. United States v. Brightwell, 563 F.2d 569, 574 (3d

Cir. 1977) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Here, the

prison officials argue that the SCIH/DOC policy is supportable

under both the “consent” exception and the “special needs”

exception to the warrant requirement. We first consider whether

this case falls within the “special needs” exception.

The Supreme Court of the United States has explained

that “[n]either a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed any

measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable

component of [Fourth Amendment] reasonableness in every

circumstance.” Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,

489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989). Rather:

[O]ur cases establish that where a Fourth

Amendment intrusion serves special government

needs, beyond the normal need for law

enforcement, it is necessary to balance the

individual’s privacy expectations against the

Government’s interests to determine whether it is

impractical to require a warrant or some level of

individualized suspicion in the particular context.

Id. at 665-66 (emphasis added). In other words, there are

instances when a search furthers a “special governmental need”

beyond that of normal law enforcement such that the search,

although not supported by the typical quantum of individualized

suspicion, can nonetheless still be found constitutionally

“reasonable.” See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515

U.S. 646 (1995); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.

444 (1990). But see Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67

(2001) (finding unconstitutional state hospital’s suspicionless

performance of diagnostic test to obtain evidence of pregnant

patient’s drug use and holding that state’s interest in using threat

of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using

cocaine did not qualify as special need); City of Indianapolis v.

Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (holding that suspicionless
8

seizures at highway checkpoints, conducted for interdiction of

illegal drugs, was “indistinguishable from [Indianapolis’]

general interest in crime control” and hence violative of Fourth

Amendment).

Because the government need not show probable cause or

even reasonable suspicion to support a search under the special

needs doctrine, the government must prove instead that its search

meets a general test of “reasonableness.” Under this standard,

the constitutionality of a particular search “is judged by

balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment

interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental

interests” beyond that of typical law enforcement. Wilcher v.

City of Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366, 373-74 (3d Cir. 1998)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

The ready applicability of the special needs doctrine to

the prison context is evident. As noted by the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit:

The penal environment is fraught with serious

security dangers. Incidents in which inmates have

obtained drugs, weapons, and other contraband are

well-documented in case law and regularly receive

the attention of the news media. Within prison

walls, a central objective of prison administrators

is to safeguard institutional security. To effectuate

this goal prison officials are charged with the duty

to intercept and exclude by all reasonable means

all contraband smuggled into the facility.

Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 674 (8th Cir. 1982); see also

State v. Manghan, 313 A.2d 225, 228 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.

1973).

Given these concerns, we conclude that, considering the

relatively minor inconvenience of the searches, balanced against

the SCIH/DOC officials’ special need to maintain the security

and safety of the prison that rises beyond their general need to

enforce the law, the prison officials’ practice of engaging in
9

suspicionless searches of prison visitors’ vehicles is valid under

the special needs doctrine. See Spear, 71 F.3d at 632-33 (“[W]e

have made it clear that a government official does not need

probable cause to conduct every search and that a prison visitor

search falls into a special category.”); Romo v. Champion, 46

F.3d 1013, 1016 (10th Cir. 1995) (“The public interest in

keeping drugs out of prisons and maintaining prison security is

substantial . . . . The stop of plaintiffs’ vehicle therefore did not

violate the Fourth Amendment.”); Commonwealth v. Dugger,

486 A.2d 382, 384 (Pa. 1985) (“A prison setting involves unique

concerns and security risks, thereby necessitating more leeway in

allowing searches than might be found in a non-penal

environment.”); see also United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d

496, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding airport searches reasonable

and hence constitutional).

The Neumeyers argue that the searches at issue cannot

fall under the special needs doctrine due to the fact that

SCIH/DOC officials notify the police if they uncover

contraband. Thus, argue the Neumeyers, the purpose of the

searches is to further the goals of ordinary law enforcement. We

reject this argument. The mere fact that a search may result in

arrest and criminal prosecution, and thus have the ancillary

effect of furthering ordinary law enforcement concerns, does not

negate the applicability of the special needs doctrine. Indeed,

the Supreme Court has upheld suspicionless search programs

even when the program at-issue results in arrests. See Sitz, 496

U.S. at 447. We thus decline to hold unconstitutional the vehicle

search program simply because SCIH/DOC officials report any

uncovered illegality to the police. Cf. United States v. Davis,

482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973) (“Of course, routine airport

screening searches will lead to discovery of contraband and

apprehension of law violators. This practical consequence does

not alter the essentially administrative nature of the screening

process, however, or render the searches unconstitutional.”).

One final point bears mention. The record shows that

SCIH officials employ no written standards as to which vehicles

are to be searched or how the searches are to be conducted;

rather, the DOC/SCIH correctional officers conduct the searches
10

“randomly as time and complement permit.” 301 F. Supp. 2d at

350. The Neumeyers thus complain that the vehicle-search

program vests too much discretion in the hands of the officers in

the field and consequently is not reasonable. See generally

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (holding

unconstitutional Delaware’s random automobile stop and

detention program in part because it vested ultimate decision of

what vehicles to stop in “the unbridled discretion of law

enforcement officials . . . in the field”).

Although the lack of standards or constraining

mechanisms in the SCIH/DOC program raises the specter of

arbitrariness, we find the Neumeyers’ argument ultimately

unavailing. As Professor LaFave has commented:

If not all visitors to a jail or prison are subjected to

screening . . . then there arises the potential for

arbitrariness. . . . While an inspection system

extended to all visitors is consequently not

accusatory in nature, a contributing factor to

finding it reasonable, it does not follow that a more

selective scheme is unreasonable. If personnel or

other limitations make a screening of all visitors

impracticable, it is certainly proper to conduct

searches at random, but it would be otherwise if

certain individuals were singled out upon an

improper basis.

5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth

Amendment § 10.7(b), at 326 (4th ed. 2004).

The Neumeyers have not argued, and the record contains

no evidence, that SCIH/DOC officers have selected search

targets on an improper basis (such as race). Stated otherwise,

although the SCIH/DOC search program certainly has more

potential for abuse than, for instance, a program whereby all

vehicles entering the prison were searched, there is no evidence

that SCIH/DOC officers have in fact abused the program. In

light of the substantial deference this court gives to prison

officials, see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987), we
 In light of our decision, we need not reach the prison 3

officials’ alternate argument that the SCIH/DOC policy is

supportable under the consent exception to the warrant

requirement.

11

decline to hold the SCIH/DOC vehicle-search program

unreasonable simply because it vests the decision of which

vehicles are to be searched in the random discretion of the

officers in the field.

IV.

In sum, we hold that the SCIH/DOC policy of subjecting

prison visitors’ vehicles to random searches is reasonable,

supportable as a special needs search, and hence constitutional

despite the lack of individualized suspicion. We will thus affirm

the District Court’s entry of summary judgment.3