Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, e-mail 

corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

KELLI M. RIGGS, 

Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC E. COONRADT, 

Appellee. 

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) Supreme Court No. S-15172 

Superior Court No. 1SI-05-00214 CI 

O P I N I O N 

No. 6961 - October 16, 2014 

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Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, First 

Judicial District, Sitka, David V. George, Judge. 

Appearances: Teka K. Lamade, Sitka, for Appellant. David 

Avraham Voluck, Sitka, for Appellee. 

Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen, and 

Bolger, Justices. 

MAASSEN, Justice. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

A mother appeals from a modified decree involving the custody of her three 

children. The superior court decided that the parents’ inability to communicate justified 

a modification of the existing joint-custody arrangement, and that the best interests of the 

children favored an award of sole legal custody to their father. We conclude that the 

superior court did not abuse its discretion in making these decisions and therefore affirm 

them. We also affirm, as within the superior court’s discretion, its allocation of the costs 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

of the court-appointed guardian ad litem. We remand for the superior court’s 

clarification of one issue: whether it meant to include, in its final modified decree, a 

change to the father’s weekend visitation schedule made by the attorney who drafted the 

decree. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

Kelli Riggs and Eric Coonradt were married and divorced twice, first 

marrying in 2000 and divorcing for the second time in 2006. They have three minor 

children. Their relationship deteriorated after their second divorce, but they successfully 

negotiated a custody agreement. Under the agreement they shared custody on an 

alternating two-week basis, and the non-custodial parent had dinner with the children on 

Wednesday evenings. 

Despite the agreement, tensions between Kelli and Eric persisted: there 

were disputes over child support, allegations that Kelli’s nephew sexually abused the 

parties’ youngest son, allegations that Kelli exposed the children to an abusive partner,1 

and Kelli’s arrest for drunk driving. In September 2011 Eric moved for primary physical 

and sole legal custody of the children, alleging that Kelli was exposing them to violence 

and substance abuse. The superior court found that a neutral party was necessary to 

advocate on the children’s behalf and in March 2012 appointed a guardian ad litem. 

The superior court held a two-day evidentiary hearing in January 2013 and 

at its close issued an oral decree. Finding that the parties’ inability to cooperate required 

a modification of custody, and weighing what it found to be the most relevant best 

interest factors, the court determined that Eric should be awarded sole legal custody. The 

court also found that the alternating two-week system did not provide the stability that 

Kelli was engaged to a different partner by the time of trial. 

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the children required, especially during the school year; it therefore modified the physical 

custody arrangement so that the children would live with Eric for most of the school year 

and with Kelli for most of the summer. 

Kelli was not represented by counsel during the hearing, and the superior 

court asked Eric’s attorney to draft a proposed modified custody decree reflecting its 

findings and conclusions. After Kelli had a chance to respond to the first draft, Eric’s 

attorney submitted a revised version of the modified decree. Kelli, through newly 

retained counsel, pointed out a change in the revised draft: the end of Eric’s summertime 

weekend visits had been unilaterally extended from Sunday evening to Monday morning. 

The court signed the revised version of the modified decree without expressly addressing 

the change. 

Kelli appeals, arguing that the superior court erred in four ways: (1) by 

concluding that a substantial change in circumstances justified a modification of custody; 

(2) by finding that the best interest factors favored a grant of sole legal custody to Eric; 

(3) by allocating to Kelli 20 percent of the guardian ad litem’s fees; and (4) by signing 

the custody decree including the late-added change to Eric’s visitation schedule. 

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

We review de novo a superior court’s decision that there has been a 

material change in circumstances justifying a modification of a prior child custody 

order.2 

Superior courts have broad discretion in child custody decisions, and we 

will reverse only if findings of fact are clearly erroneous or if the superior court abused 

Frackman v. Enzor, 327 P.3d 878, 882 (Alaska 2014). 

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its discretion.3 “A factual finding is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves 

the court with a definite and firm conviction that the superior court has made a mistake.”4 

“An abuse of discretion exists where the superior court ‘considered improper factors in 

making its custody determination, failed to consider statutorily mandated factors, or 

assigned disproportionate weight to particular factors while ignoring others.’ ”5 

IV.	 DISCUSSION 

A.	 The Superior Court Did Not Err When It Determined That A 

Substantial Change In Circumstances Warranted Modification of 

Custody. 

Kelli contends that Eric failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances 

sufficient to justify a modification of custody under AS 25.20.110(a). She notes that 

Eric’s motion to modify was based on allegations of violence and substance abuse which 

the superior court did not find substantiated. She argues that the superior court relied 

instead on the children’s academic performance, which she contends had not changed 

since the earlier order and thus could not justify modification. 

But the superior court did not base its modification decision on either of 

these possible grounds; rather, it relied on evidence that the parents could not effectively 

communicate. The court found “a complete breakdown in communication between the 

[p]arties, making joint legal custody impracticable and injurious to the children’s overall 

well-being.” Kelli admits that legal custody was not working because of the parents’ 

3	 Ronny M. v. Nanette H., 303 P.3d 392, 399 (Alaska 2013) (citing Hamilton 

v. Hamilton, 42 P.3d 1107, 1111 (Alaska 2002)). 

4 Id. (quoting Fardig v. Fardig, 56 P.3d 9, 11 (Alaska 2002)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

5 Id. (quoting Siekawitch v. Siekawitch, 956 P.2d 447, 449 (Alaska 1998)). 

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inability to cooperate, though she contends it was one-sided; in her brief she lays out 

what she portrays as Eric’s failures to communicate about the children. But she 

acknowledged in her testimony in the superior court that “it’s partly [Eric’s] fault and it’s 

partly my fault. . . . It’s lack of communication.” And what matters to a change in 

circumstances is not which parent is most at fault, but whether the parents are able to 

communicate in their children’s interests — and here they indisputably were not. 

A “continued lack of cooperation” between parents may be a change in 

circumstances sufficient to justify a modification of custody under AS 25.20.110.6 And 

in T.M.C. v. S.A.C., we upheld the superior court’s reliance on the parents’ sustained 

non-cooperation to reopen the custody arrangement even where, as here, neither parent 

had raised it as grounds for modification.7

 Although Eric’s motion to modify was based 

on other grounds, the superior court did not err when it relied instead on the “complete 

breakdown in communication” that has substantial support in the evidence. 

B.	 The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Awarded 

Sole Legal Custody To Eric. 

Kelli contends that the superior court abused its discretion when, in 

considering the best interests of the children, it granted sole legal custody to Eric, who 

Kelli asserts was likely to withhold information about the children. She points to facts 

supporting Eric’s “history of withholding or hiding information from [her] [and Eric’s] 

general uncommunicativeness.” She also argues that the court did not give enough 

weight to her own greater availability for the children during the day due to her more 

flexible schedule. 

6 T.M.C. v. S.A.C., 858 P.2d 315, 319 (Alaska 1993). 

7 Id. at 318-19. 

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Having found that the parents’ inability to communicate made joint legal 

custody unworkable, the superior court had to award sole legal custody to one parent or 

the other.8 The court found neither parent to be an ideal choice. It based its decision 

primarily on what it found to be Eric’s clearer recognition of the children’s educational 

and emotional needs. The court “did not believe [Kelli] appreciates the dire straits of 

these children educationally as much as [Eric] does,” and it found that Eric “more 

accurately and adequately considered the [emotional] needs of his youngest son.” The 

court acknowledged the possibility that Eric might “establish a wall to keep [Kelli] out” 

if he was awarded sole legal custody. But Kelli, the court found, was prone “to use her 

custody privileges as a sword” against Eric, and this attitude was “more destructive to 

the parental relationship than ignoring it.” Supporting the court’s finding was testimony 

that Kelli distrusted the police department, the Office of Children’s Services, and local 

counseling facilities, and that she therefore limited contact between her children and the 

services that were likely to benefit them. On balance, the court viewed the likelihood 

that Eric would try to shut Kelli out as less harmful to the children than Kelli’s desire to 

use custody as a weapon against Eric. 

It is true, as Kelli argues, that her day-to-day availability is a relevant 

consideration, as it could contribute to the stability of the children’s home environment.9 

But the court was aware of Kelli’s schedule and still found this benefit outweighed by 

other factors, concluding that the children’s educational and emotional needs would be 

better served by Eric, especially during the school year. 

8 See Peterson v. Swarthout, 214 P.3d 332, 336-37 (Alaska 2009). 

9 Farrell v. Farrell, 819 P.3d 896, 899 (Alaska 1991) (approving of the 

superior court’s consideration a parent’s day-to-day availability). 

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“We give ‘particular deference’ to the trial court’s factual findings when 

they are based primarily on oral testimony, because the trial court, not this court, 

performs the function of judging the credibility of witnesses and weighing conflicting 

evidence.”10 There is substantial evidence in the record to support the superior court’s 

findings of fact, which are not clearly erroneous. Presented with a difficult choice, the 

superior court reached a reasonably balanced custody arrangement that falls within the 

bounds of its broad discretion. 

C.	 The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Allocated 

Kelli A Portion Of The Guardian Ad Litem’s Fees. 

Kelli argues that the superior court abused its discretion when it allocated 

to her 20 percent of the fees charged by the guardian ad litem (GAL) assigned to 

advocate for the best interests of the children. She argues she should not have to bear 

any of the expense, given that it was Eric who demanded the GAL and committed to bear 

the cost; that “[b]ut for Eric’s disparately high income, the appointment could have been 

made at public expense”; and that she was financially stressed. 

We have already rejected the argument that only the party who requests a 

GAL may be held liable for the fees.11 The appointment of a GAL is ultimately the 

court’s responsibility and is committed to its discretion.12 In this case the superior court 

found the appointment to be “necessary and proper to protect the best interests of the 

10 Ebertz v. Ebertz, 113 P.2d 643, 646 (Alaska 2005) (quoting In re Adoption 

of A.F.M., 15 P.3d 258, 262 (Alaska 2001)). 

11 Siggelkow v. Siggelkow, 643 P.2d 985, 989-90 (Alaska 1982). 

12 AS 25.24.310; see also Thomas v. Thomas, 171 P.3d 98, 104 (Alaska 

2007); H.P.A. v. S.C.A., 704 P.2d 205, 212 (Alaska 1985) (citing Siggelkow, 643 P.2d 

at 989-90). 

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minor children” due to “the extreme tension between the parents and the need for a 

neutral party to independently investigate and present evidence and advocate on behalf 

of the children’s best interests.” The children’s best interests are the responsibility of 

both parents equally. That it was Eric who filed the motion prompting the court’s 

appointment of the GAL is irrelevant to the issue of the GAL’s fees. 

Nor was Kelli’s financial situation such as to necessarily relieve her of her 

share of the expense. Alaska Statute 25.24.310 and Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.7 

govern a GAL’s appointment and payment. We have held that the statute “generally 

precludes the superior court from taxing only one parent with the costs of a guardian ad 

litem where both parents can afford the cost,”13 and Rule 90.7(m) provides that the costs 

should be shared equally “unless the court finds good cause to change this allocation.” 

In H.P.A. v. S.C.A., for instance, we affirmed the superior court’s decision to allocate to 

the wife one-third of the GAL’s costs where she could “reasonably afford to pay [the] 

amount.”14 

In this case, the superior court expressly considered the disparity in the 

parents’ incomes in calculating its allocation of the GAL’s fees. The court had earlier 

held Eric solely responsible for the GAL’s $1,500 retainer. Of the remaining fees, the 

court assigned Eric 80 percent ($4,689.84) and Kelli 20 percent ($1,172.46), based on 

their relative incomes. 15 Implicit in this allocation is a finding of good cause to deviate 

13 Siggelkow, 643 P.2d at 990. The statute at issue in Siggelkow was 

AS 09.65.130, later renumbered as AS 25.24.310. 

14 H.P.A., 704 P.2d at 212. 

15 The court extrapolated the parties’ incomes from their paystubs, W-2s, and 

the affidavits required by Civil Rule 90.3. 

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from the 50/50 allocation contemplated by Rule 90.7(m). The court did not abuse its 

discretion in making this allocation. 

D.	 The Scrivener’s Change To The Modified Custody Decree Should Be 

Addressed On Remand. 

Kelli argues that the superior court abused its discretion when it signed a 

proposed modified custody decree allowing Eric to return the children on Monday 

mornings following his summertime weekend visits; this was a departure from an earlier 

version of the modified decree, which required the children to be returned on Sunday 

evenings. Kelli argues that the alteration was also a substantial departure from the 

court’s oral decree 16 and that it lacks sufficient explanation in the record. We agree that 

the issue needs clarification. 

The superior court, after giving its findings orally, assigned Eric’s attorney 

the task of drafting the modified custody decree. The attorney’s first draft defined both 

parties’ visitation weekends in the same way: beginning at 5:00 p.m Friday and ending 

at 5:00 p.m. Sunday. Kelli filed objections related to other aspects of the decree and the 

court ruled on them; Eric’s attorney then submitted a revised version of the modified 

decree. But the revised version also made the change at issue here: it changed the timing 

of Eric’s weekend visits so that they extended to Monday mornings. 

Kelli had represented herself at the modification hearing but retained a 

lawyer afterward. Through her new lawyer, she immediately filed a notice calling the 

superior court’s attention to the change in visitation timing, which she suggested was “a 

drafting errata.” The court did not respond to Kelli’s notice, however; it signed the 

16 There is no direct conflict with the court’s oral findings and conclusions. 

The court explicitly stated the timing of Kelli’s weekend visits with the children: 5:00 

p.m. Friday to 5:00 p.m. Sunday. It went on to assign certain summertime weekends to 

Eric, but it did not specify the hours for those visits. 

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revised version of the modified custody decree as submitted, with a Monday morning 

return for Eric’s summer weekend visits. 

We have held that “the superior court is not required to articulate its 

thoughts on every issue it considers” when it makes decisions about custody.17 But this 

specific issue was not discussed at trial, and the different definitions of Eric’s and Kelli’s 

weekends did not surface until the revised version of the modified decree, after Kelli’s 

objections to the first draft had been ruled on and incorporated into the second. 

Moreover, although notice to the other side is not at issue here because Kelli’s attorney 

saw the change, “[n]ew or additional matter should not have been included in the written 

findings without giving [the other side] advance notice of the changes and an opportunity 

to object.”18 

We have repeatedly observed that “[c]ounsel agreeing to draft written 

findings and conclusions for the superior court is essentially a scribe who must 

accurately memorialize the court’s oral findings and conclusions.” 19 Furthermore, “[i]f 

[the drafting] counsel has questions about what a court has ruled or perceives ambiguity, 

the proper course is to flag the issue so that the court may revisit it.”20 It is particularly 

17 Peterson v. Swarthout, 214 P.3d 332, 338 (Alaska 2009) (citing Thomas, 

171 P.3d at 102-03); AS 25.20.110. 

18 Ogden v. Ogden, 39 P.3d 513, 519 (Alaska 2001) (citation omitted). 

19 McDougall v. Lumpkin, 11 P.3d 990, 998 (Alaska 2000); see also Ogden, 

39 P.3d at 518. 

McDougall, 11 P.3d at 998; see also Ogden, 39 P.3d at 519 (“[I]f Julie’s 

counsel encountered questions or uncertainties in drafting the findings and conclusions, 

she should have at least specified in her proposed order those findings that were 

extrapolations from the court’s oral remarks or otherwise were not mentioned by the 

(continued...) 

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important that the drafting counsel take care “to ensure faithful and accurate renditions 

of the court’s rulings” when the other party is unrepresented;21 here, although Kelli 

obtained counsel after trial, the order being transcribed had been stated first on the record 

at the hearing, when Kelli was proceeding pro se and had no attorney of her own to 

independently recollect or record the substance of the court’s rulings. 

Although Kelli’s new attorney immediately caught the deviation and called 

it to the court’s attention, the circumstances leave us in some doubt as to whether the 

court intended to incorporate it into the signed decree. It is the role of the superior court 

to ensure that any decree drafted by a party conforms to the court’s own rulings.22 We 

remand the issue to the superior court for an express adoption or rejection of Eric’s 

proposal that summer weekend visits extend to Monday mornings. 

V. CONCLUSION 

We REMAND for the superior court to expressly adopt or reject the change 

to Eric’s weekend visitation in the second draft of the modified custody decree. We 

AFFIRM the superior court’s orders in all other respects. 

20(...continued) 

court.”). 

21 McDougall, 11 P.3d at 998. 

22 Id. (“An attorney’s failure to submit written proposed findings conforming 

to the oral findings does not relieve a trial court of responsibility for confirming that the 

written findings reflect the court’s thinking.”); Indus. Indem. Co. v. Wick Constr. Co., 

680 P.2d 1100, 1108 (Alaska 1984) (“A trial court is . . . entitled to adopt findings and 

conclusions prepared by counsel, so long as they reflect the court’s independent view of 

the weight of the evidence.” ) (discussing Alaska Civil Rule 78(a)). 

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