1

Filed 3/2/21 A.H. v. H.N. CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

A.H.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

H.N.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A158177

 (Del Norte County

 Super. Ct. No. CVPT071474)

This appeal arises from a custody dispute between A.H. (Mother) and 

H.N. (Father) over their son, O.N.1 The family court awarded sole custody to 

Mother and visitation rights to Father. Father subsequently moved for an 

order modifying those orders and requested sole custody. After the court held 

an evidentiary hearing, it ordered that O.N. remain in Mother’s sole custody, 

thereby denying Father’s modification request. Father, appearing in propria 

persona, appeals from that order, challenging it on multiple procedural and 

substantive grounds. We reject Father’s contentions and affirm.

1 We use initials for the names of the parties and their child to protect 

the personal privacy interest of O.N.
2

BACKGROUND2

Mother and Father are the unmarried parents of O.N., who was born 

on May 14, 2008. Father is married to B.N. Father, B.N., their children, and 

O.N. are members of the Yurok Tribe, “a federally recognized Indian Tribe.” 

(Yurok Tribal Code, tit. 1, ch. 1.05.) Mother of O.N. is not a member.

After this action was initiated in the family court, in late 2012, Father 

informed Mother he was willing to “give up both physical and legal 

custodies [sic] of [O.N.] over to [Mother]” because O.N.’s “back and forth” 

visits with his parents had caused the child hardship. He also stated, “I do 

not wish to have any further visits with him at this time . . . .” Accordingly, 

on February 20, 2013, the court issued its findings and order after hearing

and awarded both sole legal and physical custody to Mother and 

“[r]easonable” visitation rights to Father.

Five years later, in April 2018, B.N. filed a request in the Yurok Tribal 

Court for a temporary emergency order granting her sole custody of O.N.3 

The Yurok Tribal Court granted Father and B.N. joint physical and legal 

custody of O.N.

Approximately one month later, Mother filed a request in the family 

court for a temporary emergency order for the “immediate return of [O.N.] to 

[her] . . . in accordance with [the court’s] finding and order after hearing filed 

2 The record does not include a copy of the original petition or response 

in this action. It consists of pleadings and declarations that were filed 

beginning in May 2018 and thereafter, as well as a reporter’s transcript of 

the hearings related to Father’s modification request. We take our summary 

of the facts from these documents, where the evidence appears to be 

undisputed.

3 Section 13.25.150(a) of title 13 of the Yurok Tribe Family Code allows 

the tribal court to “grant visitation rights or the care, custody, and control of 

a child to a stepparent . . . .”
3

February 20, 2013.” In her supporting declarations, Mother stated that 

neither Father nor B.N. had seen or spoken to O.N. in over five years and 

that B.N. had failed to inform the Yurok Tribal Court of the standing

February 20, 2013 custody order in the family court.

On June 8, 2018, the family court stated in a minute order it had 

discussed with the Yurok Tribal Court the issue of the jurisdiction of the 

matter and that both courts “agree that this matter will remain in th[e] 

[family] court.” The parties did not raise an objection to the court’s 

communication with the Yurok Tribal Court.

On June 13, 2018, Father filed a responsive declaration to Mother’s 

request for order, stating he refused to return O.N. to Mother’s custody. 

Father argued among other things that it was not in O.N.’s best interests to 

remain with Mother and that Mother had coached O.N. to state false 

allegations of abuse against Father. He also highlighted that he and O.N. are 

members of the Yurok Tribe while Mother is not. Father contended, “I am 

[O.N.’s] father and only I can teach him the things he needs to know to be a 

man, according to our culture . . . .”

On June 15, 2018, the court granted Father temporary physical custody 

and Mother weekend visitation rights, pending a scheduled contested hearing 

set for September 26, 2018.

The court held the September 26, 2018 hearing, where Mother, Father, 

and O.N. each appeared (Mother and O.N. through counsel). Along with 

other witnesses, Mother and B.N. testified. After hearing testimony, the 

court issued a minute order, finding no evidence that Mother had coached 

O.N. to make false allegations against Father. The court also found no 

evidence that O.N. “should have been taken out of the Mother’s home.” The 

court thus awarded Mother both sole legal and physical custody of O.N. and 
4

granted Father visitation every weekend. The court directed Mother to 

prepare a proposed order. Mother submitted a proposed order, to which

Father objected.

On January 14, 2019, Father filed a request for a change in the custody 

and visitation orders, seeking both sole legal and physical custody of O.N., 

with visitation for Mother. Father asserted that placing O.N. with him was 

in O.N.’s best interests because Mother had deprived him of his connection to 

Yurok Tribe culture and traditions and had failed to care for his physical, 

emotional, and educational needs.

On February 7, 2019, Mother responded to Father’s request, arguing 

that Father had failed to show a significant change of circumstances that 

would justify modifying the initial custody and visitation order of 

September 26, 2018.

The court conducted a hearing on Father’s modification request the 

following day. It continued the matter to allow Father to file a reply to 

Mother’s response to the modification request. The judge also disclosed to the 

parties that Mother had previously “called [his] office when [he] was in 

private practice.” The judge recalled that the matter was “basically that the 

child had been taken away” and that he had told Mother he would not 

represent her and referred her to other attorneys. The judge then stated, 

“I’m not going to disqualify myself because I did not get into anything 

substantive.”

On February 25, 2019, Father replied to Mother’s response to his 

modification request. He additionally asked the court for an updated child 

custody evaluation, temporary joint legal custody with Mother, and 

additional time for the parties to conduct discovery.
5

The court held a hearing on March 1, 2019, to finalize its orders from 

the September 26, 2018 hearing, as well as to address arguments related to 

Father’s modification request. Father’s and O.N.’s counsel argued that

Mother was continuing to “coach” O.N. to make false allegations against 

Father. The court stated it would allow the parties to present evidence 

showing a change of circumstances at the next scheduled hearing. However, 

it limited such evidence to events that occurred after the September 26, 2018 

hearing.

Ultimately, on March 1, 2019, the court finalized its findings and order 

of the September 26, 2018 hearing. The court awarded both sole legal and 

physical custody to Mother and visitation rights every weekend to Father. 

With respect to the holiday visitation schedule, the court ordered, “Father 

shall have reasonable visitation over Christmas break, spring break and 

Thanksgiving week. The parties shall attend mediation and mediate in good 

faith if they are unable to reach an agreement between themselves regarding 

holiday visitation dates and times for Father.” (All caps omitted.)

The court proceeded with a contested hearing on April 23 and May 22, 

2019. The court heard testimony from the following: Mother,

4 Father, B.N., 

a social worker who investigated O.N.’s home, O.N.’s school teacher and 

administrators, his therapist, and a police officer who intervened during some 

of the parties’ exchanges of O.N.

On May 23, 2019, the court issued a written ruling with its findings 

and orders. The court directed Mother to prepare a formal order for the 

court’s approval. On June 26, 2019, the court issued its findings and order

4 After Mother was sworn in as a witness, the judge briefly mentioned 

the name of Mother’s grandfather and that he “used to have the chicken 

restaurant,” “was a retired police officer,” and “was around here for a long 

time.”
6

after hearing and awarded both sole legal and physical custody to Mother 

and visitation rights three weekends per month to Father. The court also 

made the following findings in the June 26, 2019 order: (1) “Father’s open 

objection to any culture other than his own native culture is detrimental to 

[O.N.]”; (2) O.N. “has an ongoing need of counseling”; (3) O.N.’s “reports of 

mistreatment by the Father were not the result of coaching by Mother”; 

(4) O.N.’s “best interest is served by continued custody with his Mother”; 

(5) “[t]he hostility exhibited by Father precludes any custody order awarding 

him physical or legal-joint custody”; (5) “Mother should have some weekend 

time with [O.N.]”;

5 and (6) “Mother is the parent most likely to facilitate 

continuing contact between [O.N.] and his Father.”

Finally, in the June 26, 2019 order, the court ordered the following: 

(1) “Mother is to notify Father of any injuries or illness of [O.N.] which 

requires intervention by medical professionals”; (2) “Neither parent will 

speak ill of the other parent, nor allow others to do so when in [O.N.’s] 

presence”; (3) O.N. “will remain in his Mother’s care for the weekend 

beginning the 3rd Friday of each month”; and (4) “All other provisions of the 

Custody & Visitation Order filed March 1, 2019, which are not in conflict 

with those set forth in this Custody & Visitation Order are to remain in full 

force and effect.”

Father filed a notice of appeal from the June 26, 2019 order. Mother 

has not filed a respondent’s brief.

DISCUSSION

Father challenges the family court’s order of June 26, 2019, asserting 

multiple claims of error on substantive and procedural grounds. We first 

5 At the May 22, 2019 hearing, Mother requested that the court allow 

her to visit O.N. on some weekends.
7

note that Father “is not exempt from the [appellate] rules because he is 

representing himself on appeal in propria persona. . . . ‘[S]uch a party is to be 

treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater 

consideration than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” 

(Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247.) As now explained, 

we conclude that his contentions on appeal have been forfeited or otherwise 

lack merit.

A. Claims of Judicial Bias

Father first argues that the judge assigned to preside over the 

contested proceedings of April 23 and May 22, 2019, was biased and should 

have been recused. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 170, 170.1, subd. (a).)6 He points to 

the following conduct: The judge, while in private practice prior to his 

assignment to this case, received a phone call from Mother, who shared that 

her “ ‘child had been taken away’ ”; the judge was familiar with Mother’s 

grandfather; and the judge made “racist statements” against Father. Father 

adds that the subsequent findings and orders made by the judge reveal his 

“personal racial bias” against him.

Father forfeited any contention that the court was biased by failing to 

file a disqualification motion (§ 170.3, subd. (c)) or otherwise express his 

concerns of bias during the proceedings. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly 

affirmed that a failure to raise the issue of judicial bias during the trial 

proceedings results in the forfeiture of such a claim on appeal. (E.g., People 

v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1110; People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 

96, 114; People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 698.)

6 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure.
8

Father additionally forfeited his judicial bias claims by failing to file a 

prompt writ petition. A statutory claim of judicial bias must be raised by 

writ; it cannot be raised on appeal. (§ 170.3, subd. (d); People v. Brown (1993) 

6 Cal.4th 322, 335–336; Roth v. Parker (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 542, 547–549.) 

Failure to pursue a statutory bias claim will also bar a nonstatutory, 

constitutional bias claim. (People v. Brown, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 335–336; 

Roth v. Parker, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at pp. 547–549.)

We further note that Father’s willingness to let the proceedings pass 

without raising the issue of bias against the judge not only forfeits his claims 

on appeal but also strongly suggests they are without merit. (See People v. 

Tappan (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 812, 817.) The record confirms that Father’s 

claims of judicial bias are indeed without merit.

Section 170.1 states the grounds for disqualification of a judge. It 

provides in pertinent part: “(a) A judge shall be disqualified if any one or 

more of the following are true: [¶] (1)(A) The judge has personal knowledge of 

disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. [¶] (B) A judge shall be 

deemed to have personal knowledge within the meaning of this paragraph if 

the judge, or the spouse of the judge, or a person within the third degree of 

relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person is to the judge’s 

knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. [¶] . . . [¶]

(6)(A) For any reason: [¶] . . . [¶] (iii) A person aware of the facts might 

reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be 

impartial. . . .” The test under section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii) “ ‘is 

fundamentally an objective one. . . .’ ” (Leland Stanford Junior University v. 

Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 403, 407–408, citing § 170.1, former 

subd. (a)(6)(C).)
9

The record does not demonstrate that the judge was disqualified under 

section 170.1, subdivision (a)(1). There is no evidence in the record that the 

judge had any “personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts” concerning 

the proceedings, as defined under section 170.1, subdivision (a)(2).

Nor does the record establish an adequate factual basis for 

disqualification under section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii). Father first 

takes issue with a phone call that was exchanged between Mother and the 

judge when he was an attorney in private practice, prior to his assignment to 

this case. However, as explained by the judge, he “did not get into anything 

substantive,” referred Mother to other attorneys, and did not form “any 

opinion or . . . decision about the matter.” This evidence indicates that the

judge had at most a cursory understanding of Mother’s case and undertook no 

attorney–client relationship with her. Further, the judge indicated that 

because he lacked substantive knowledge of the case, he would not disqualify 

himself. On these facts, we do not find that “[a] person aware of these facts 

might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be 

impartial.” (§ 170.1, subd. (a)(6)(A)(iii).)

We also reject Father’s claim of bias based on the judge’s familiarity 

with Mother’s family. Although the judge shared that he knew Mother’s 

grandfather based on his service to the community as a retired police officer

and restaurant owner, there is no indication that their connection was 

“intimate” or “personal.” These facts alone are not sufficient to reasonably 

raise “a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.” (§ 170.1, subd. 

(a)(6)(A)(iii); cf. People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1240–1241 [rejecting

claims of bias against judge who previously worked with prosecutor and 

officiated the prosecutor’s daughter’s wedding several months before death 

penalty trial, along with other intermittent social and professional contacts].)
10

Father’s allegations that the judge displayed “personal racial bias” 

likewise lack merit. Father takes issue with the court’s findings that Father 

“open[ly] object[ed] to any culture other than his own native culture,” 

exhibited “hostility,” and was less likely than Mother “to facilitate continuing 

contact” with the other parent. Other than stating in conclusory fashion that 

the judge displayed racial bias against him through these findings, Father 

fails to provide reasoned argument and citations to authority. (See Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [each point in a brief must be supported by 

“argument and, if possible, by citation of authority”].) “ ‘We are not bound to 

develop appellants’ arguments for them. [Citation.] The absence of cogent 

legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the 

contention as waived.’ ” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 

Cal.App.4th 939, 956 (Cahill); see In re Tobacco Cases II (2015) 240 

Cal.App.4th 779, 808 [“ ‘appellate courts are not required to perform an 

unassisted study of the record or a review of the law relevant to a party’s 

contentions on appeal’ ”].)

Even if we were to consider Father’s arguments, we would find them 

unpersuasive. “Mere expressions of opinion by a trial judge based on actual 

observation of the witnesses and evidence in the courtroom do not 

demonstrate a bias. [Citations.]” (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 

1111, overruled on another ground in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 

151.) As explained in Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 

Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219–1220, “ ‘[W]hen the state of mind of the trial judge 

appears to be adverse to one of the parties but is based upon actual 

observance of the witnesses and the evidence given during the trial of an 

action, it does not amount to that prejudice against a litigant which 

disqualifies him [or her] in the trial of the action. It is his [or her] duty to 
11

consider and pass upon the evidence produced before him [or her], and when 

the evidence is in conflict, to resolve that conflict in favor of the party whose 

evidence outweighs that of the opposing party. The opinion thus formed, 

being the result of a judicial hearing, does not amount to [improper] bias and 

prejudice . . . .” (Second, third, and fourth bracketed insertions added.) 

“Moreover, a trial court’s numerous rulings against a party—even when 

erroneous—do not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they 

are subject to review. [Citations.]” (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 

1112.)

As another example to support his claim of judicial racial bias, Father 

contends the court inaccurately stated he had failed to make child support 

payments. Father’s citations to the record do not refer to any comments by 

the court but rather to a line of questioning from Mother’s counsel and 

arguments from his counsel. California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) 

requires Father to support his arguments in his brief with citations to the 

record, “ ‘which includes providing exact page citations.’ [Citations.] If a 

party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record, 

that portion of the brief may be stricken and the argument deemed to have 

been waived.” (Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 

849, 853.) Father’s failure to provide accurate record citations thus waives 

his contention. (Ibid.) In any event, Father fails to establish how the court’s 

allegedly mistaken view of his child support obligations amounted to bias 

against him.

For the foregoing reasons, Father’s claims of judicial bias fail.

B. Evidentiary Challenges

Father next argues that the court prejudicially erred in excluding and 

admitting certain evidence at the April 23 and May 22, 2019 hearings. 
12

Father specifically challenges the exclusion of evidence related to incidents 

occurring before the September 26, 2018 hearing. He also contends the court 

erroneously admitted evidence of his prior felony conviction and housing 

situation. Because Father never objected to either ruling, he has forfeited his 

challenges to them. (Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 726; 

see Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).)

Father further asserts that the court made improper comments on 

inadmissible matters. To support this assertion, however, Father cites to 

pages that were “intentionally left blank” in the reporter’s transcript. Father

has thus forfeited his contention by failing to provide proper record citations. 

(Duarte, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 856.) Father has doubly forfeited the 

contention by failing to otherwise identify those allegedly impermissible 

comments. (See Cahill, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 956.)

Moreover, Father fails to explain how the court abused its discretion in 

excluding or admitting the evidence, much less how those rulings resulted in 

a miscarriage of justice. (See People v. Wall (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1048, 1069 [“A 

trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion, and it will not be disturbed unless there is a showing that the trial 

court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner resulting in a 

miscarriage of justice”]; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) For example, Father 

claims he was precluded from presenting evidence pertinent to his request for 

a change in the standing custody and visitation orders, but he does not 

specify the evidence he would have presented. Accordingly, Father has failed 

to provide a basis for reversing the court’s evidentiary rulings.

C. Remaining Contentions

Father additionally asserts the following procedural and substantive 

claims of error: (1) the court improperly proceeded with the September 26, 
13

2018 hearing over his objections;7 (2) the court ignored his request for an 

updated court investigation; (3) the court violated “[t]he federally protected 

rights of [Father] and [O.N.], under the Constitution of the Yurok Tribe, and 

Yurok Family Code”; and (4) the court “Failed to Give Full Force and Effect”

to the ordinance and custom of the Yurok Tribe. (Boldface omitted.) Once 

again, Father’s contentions are “in dramatic noncompliance with appellate 

procedures” and therefore forfeited on appeal. (Nwosu v. Uba, supra, 122 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1246.)

First, none of these contentions is supported with citations to the 

record. (Duarte, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 856.) On top of that, each 

assertion is devoid of either meaningful legal analysis or citation to 

appropriate authority, or both. (Cahill, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 956.) 

Father’s first three arguments listed above each consists of two to three 

sentences that are conclusory and lack reference to legal authority. Father 

does provide authority for the fourth assertion—that the court failed to give

full force and effect to tribal ordinance—but he fails to explain how that 

authority applies, let alone how the court supposedly misapplied or failed to 

apply the law. We decline “ ‘to perform an unassisted study of the record or a 

review of the law relevant to a party’s contentions on appeal’ ” and thus treat 

Father’s contentions as forfeited. (In re Tobacco Cases II, supra, 240 

Cal.App.4th at p. 808.)

7 To the extent Father’s challenge concerning the September 26, 2018 

hearing relates to the court’s March 1, 2019 order, which he did not appeal, it 

is barred from appellate review. (Chalmers v. Hirschkop (2013) 213 

Cal.App.4th 289, 304.) In any event, we reject the assertion on forfeiture

grounds, as explained post.
14

DISPOSITION

The June 26, 2019 order is affirmed. Because Mother has not 

appeared, it is in the interests of justice that each side bear its own costs on

appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
15

_________________________

Jackson, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Fujisaki, Acting P. J.

_________________________

Petrou, J.

A158177/A.H. v. H.N.