NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re:

DANIELA M. FARINA,

Debtor.

BAP Nos. NC-23-1060-GFS 

 NC-23-1073-GFS

 (Related Appeals)

Bk. No. 22-10021

MEMORANDUM*

CLAUDIO NICOLOSI; DANIELA M.

FARINA,

Appellants,

v.

JANINA M. HOSKINS, Chapter 7 

Trustee,

Appellee.

Appeals from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Northern District of California

William J. Lafferty, III, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: GAN, FARIS, and SPRAKER, Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

In these related appeals, chapter 71 debtor Daniela M. Farina 

(“Debtor”) and her father, Claudio Nicolosi, each appeal the bankruptcy 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for 

whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential 

value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.

1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the 

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532, all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules 

of Bankruptcy Procedure, and all “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure.

FILED

NOV 14 2023

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
2

court’s order imposing civil sanctions, jointly and severally against them, 

for willful violations of court orders. 

The bankruptcy court entered an Order for Judgment of Possession 

and Writ of Assistance (“Order of Possession”) which required Debtor and 

Mr. Nicolosi to immediately vacate real property belonging to the estate. 

The court later granted the motion for civil sanctions filed by chapter 7 

trustee, Janina M. Hoskins (“Trustee”), against Debtor and Mr. Nicolosi for 

violations of the Order of Possession and the automatic stay. 

Debtor’s violation of the Order of Possession was conclusively 

established by Debtor’s admissions and a final judgment based on the same 

conduct in Trustee’s adversary proceeding to deny Debtor’s discharge 

under § 727(a)(6)(A). But Trustee did not provide clear and convincing 

evidence that Mr. Nicolosi violated the Order of Possession. The court’s 

alternative basis for sanctions—that Mr. Nicolosi willfully violated the 

automatic stay by obtaining possession or control of estate property—also 

fails because the automatic stay terminated by operation of law before the 

alleged stay violation.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the court’s sanctions order as to Debtor 

and REVERSE it as to Mr. Nicolosi.
3

FACTS

A. Prepetition events and Debtor’s prior chapter 13 bankruptcy

Debtor’s current chapter 7 bankruptcy case has spawned twenty

appeals,

2 several of which relate to the real property located on First 

Avenue in Napa, California (the “Property”). The Property, and a second 

residential property located on Euclid Avenue in Napa, California, were

owned by Debtor and her former business partner and boyfriend, Victor 

Alam, with each holding a 50% interest as tenants in common. After the 

relationship deteriorated in 2020, Mr. Alam filed an action in state court for 

partition and to appoint a receiver.

After the state court appointed a receiver, Debtor filed a chapter 13 

petition. Mr. Alam filed a motion to excuse turnover of the properties 

under § 543(d)(1), and for stay relief to allow the receivership and other 

state court litigation to continue. The day before the hearing on Mr. Alam’s 

motion, Debtor voluntarily dismissed the case, and the court entered the 

dismissal order on October 28, 2021.

According to the receiver, Debtor “occupied” the Property from July 

31, 2021, until sometime prior to the receiver’s inspection on November 17, 

2 We borrow much of our recitation of prepetition events from recent decisions 

issued in Debtor’s four other appeals: Farina v. Hoskins (In re Farina), BAP No. NC-22-

1235-CFS, 2023 WL 5334078 (9th Cir. BAP Aug. 18, 2023); Farina v. Hoskins (In re Farina), 

BAP No. NC-22-1232-FSC, 2023 WL 5202392 (9th Cir. BAP Aug. 14, 2023); Farina v. 

Hoskins (In re Farina), BAP No. NC-22-1233-SCF, 2023 WL 5165405 (9th Cir. BAP Aug. 

11, 2023); and Farina v. Hoskins (In re Farina), BAP No. NC-22-1071-TBF, 2022 WL 

17484959 (9th Cir. BAP Dec. 7, 2022).
4

2021. The receiver concluded that the Property was vacant because of an 

absence of furniture and personal items, missing appliances and fixtures, 

and a missing thermostat. The receiver installed a continuous live feed 

camera at the Property which showed Debtor periodically visiting the 

Property but not living there.

B. Debtor’s chapter 7 bankruptcy, possession of the Property, and the 

Order of Possession

On January 18, 2022, Debtor filed a chapter 7 petition. As of the 

petition date, Debtor had seven lawsuits pending against Mr. Alam in 

various stages of litigation. The bankruptcy court granted Mr. Alam’s 

motions for stay relief to prosecute vexatious litigant and domestic violence 

claims in state court, and to excuse turnover of the Euclid Avenue 

property. This allowed the receiver to complete a pending sale and deposit 

the sale proceeds with Trustee. Mr. Alam then reached a settlement with 

Trustee that provided for Mr. Alam’s release of an abstract of judgment 

and waiver of his ownership interest in the Property in exchange for 

release of the estate’s claims against him and dismissal of the pending state 

court actions. The court approved the compromise, and we affirmed. In re 

Farina, 2022 WL 17484959, at *2.

On March 3, 2022, Trustee inspected the Property with the receiver 

and Trustee’s proposed real estate broker and obtained possession from the 

receiver. The Property was vacant and empty, other than boxes and 

moving items in the garage. Although the receiver had changed the locks, 
5

he informed Trustee that he believed Debtor had entered the Property 

because of a broken window in the guest bathroom.

The next day, on March 4, 2022, Trustee’s proposed broker arrived at 

the Property to assess its value and begin efforts to market the Property.3

Mr. Nicolosi confronted the broker and told him that the Property 

belonged to his daughter, and that he was removing items from the house 

that belonged to her. Mr. Nicolosi stated that he was unaware of the 

receivership or bankruptcy and, after being shown a copy of Trustee’s 

appointment and several pages from Debtor’s bankruptcy filing, claimed 

the documents were fake.

Later that day, the Napa County Sheriff’s Deputy (“Sheriff”) arrived 

at the Property and spoke with Mr. Nicolosi and Debtor but declined to 

remove them from the Property. On March 5, 2022, a private investigator 

hired by Mr. Alam arrived at the Property and observed Debtor and two 

others apparently removing items from the Property. The investigator also 

observed Mr. Nicolosi sitting in his vehicle while parked on the street near

the Property.

On March 7, 2022, Trustee filed an ex parte application for an order 

for judgment of possession and writ of assistance. Mr. Alam joined 

Trustee’s application. The same day, the bankruptcy court entered the 

Order of Possession, which stated: (1) an order for judgment of possession 

3 Trustee filed an application to employ the broker on March 5, 2022, and the 

bankruptcy court entered the order employing the broker on March 6, 2022.
6

is entered for the Property in favor of Trustee, effective immediately upon 

entry of the order; (2) the Property is property of the estate and any action 

to assert possession over the Property, by anyone other than Trustee, is a 

violation of the automatic stay; (3) immediately upon entry of the order, 

any and all occupants of the Property, including but not limited to Debtor 

and Mr. Nicolosi, “shall immediately vacate the Property upon the posting 

of this Order to the exterior of the Property;” and (4) any proper law 

enforcement agency is authorized to immediately remove Debtor, 

Mr. Nicolosi, or any other occupant from the Property and secure the 

Property while Trustee changes the locks and takes any necessary action to 

ensure her sole access. The bankruptcy court also issued a writ of 

assistance and notice of order granting writ of assistance and notice to 

vacate, which directed the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) to post 

the writ and notice to the front door of the Property, coordinate with 

Trustee to secure possession of the Property, and use reasonable force to 

remove all occupants from the Property.

On March 10, 2022, Debtor filed a motion to stay enforcement of the 

Order of Possession until the March 14, 2022 hearing on her pending 

motion to dismiss the case.4 Debtor admitted that she received the Order of

Possession and writ of assistance on March 10, 2022, when they were 

4 The bankruptcy court denied Debtor’s motion to dismiss. Debtor appealed the 

court’s decision to the BAP but subsequently dismissed her appeal. See BAP No. 22-

1067.
7

posted on the front door of the Property, and she attached the documents 

as exhibits. In support of her request to stay the Order of Possession, 

Debtor claimed that she lived at the Property with her elderly parents and 

minor children, and the Property was specially equipped for Debtor’s 

visual disability.5

In response, Trustee filed a motion for contempt. Trustee maintained 

that the Order of Possession and writ of assistance were posted at the 

Property on March 10, 2022, but the Sheriff refused to enforce the order

because the writ was directed to the USMS. Trustee questioned Debtor’s 

claim that she lived at the Property with her minor children because the 

Property was vacant and uninhabited, and Debtor’s children were not 

minors.

A few days later, on March 14, 2022, the bankruptcy court held a 

hearing on several pending matters, at which Debtor appeared and argued. 

The court briefly addressed Trustee’s motion for contempt but declined to 

rule on it. The court noted that if the Sheriff enforced the Order of 

Possession, the motion for contempt would be unnecessary, and based on 

Trustee’s assertion that she was having difficulty getting assistance from 

the Sheriff, the court entered an amended Order of Possession and writ of 

assistance which specifically directed the Sheriff to enforce the order. 

5 As we previously noted in Farina, 2023 WL 5165405, at *2 n.3, an order on 

Debtor’s motion for stay does not appear in the record. However, Trustee later 

represented that Debtor’s motion “did not succeed,” which Debtor did not dispute, and 

the court’s later rulings are consistent with an implicit denial of the stay motion.
8

On March 24, 2022, Trustee obtained possession of the Property when 

the USMS posted the original writ of assistance on the Property and waited 

while Trustee changed the locks.

C. Trustee’s adversary proceeding to deny discharge and motion for 

contempt

In April 2022, Trustee filed an adversary complaint objecting to 

Debtor’s discharge under § 727(a)(2), (4), and (6). In June 2022, Trustee 

moved for partial summary judgment on the § 727(a)(6) claim. Trustee 

argued that Debtor was aware of the Order of Possession when it was 

posted on March 10, 2022, and she willfully refused to obey the order by 

not immediately vacating the Property. Trustee contended that undisputed 

facts demonstrated that Debtor’s violation was willful, including Debtor’s 

false claims that: (1) her minor children lived with her at the Property; 

(2) both of her elderly parents lived with her at the Property and removing 

her mother might kill her due to her illness; and (3) the Property was 

specially outfitted for her visual impairment disability.

On July 1, 2022, while the motion for partial summary judgment was 

pending, Trustee filed a motion for contempt against Debtor and 

Mr. Nicolosi. Trustee alleged that Debtor and Mr. Nicolosi each willfully 

violated the stay by obtaining possession and exercising control over the 

Property. Trustee further alleged that both Debtor and Mr. Nicolosi 

intentionally violated the Order of Possession, which was posted at the 

Property on March 10, 2022, and they made no effort to return exclusive 
9

possession of the Property to Trustee, such as by turning over keys or 

communicating with Trustee to arrange return of possession. Trustee 

argued that Debtor and Mr. Nicolosi should be jointly liable for civil 

sanctions including compensatory damages and attorney’s fees incurred by 

Trustee in restoring possession.

In opposition to Trustee’s contempt motion, Debtor argued that the 

automatic stay terminated pursuant to § 362(c)(3)(A), prior to the alleged 

violation in March 2022. Although Debtor did not dispute her violation of 

the Order of Possession, she maintained that sanctions were not warranted 

because the order did not warn of the possibility of sanctions and Trustee 

did not present evidence that Debtor knew that failure to comply with the 

Order of Possession would result in sanctions. Debtor filed a declaration in 

support of her opposition which indicated that she resided at the Property 

since January 18, 2022, and remained in possession of the Property until 

March 17, 2022, when the amended Order of Possession was posted at the 

Property. Debtor maintained that she never knew that staying in her house 

violated the automatic stay.6

In reply, Trustee argued that the automatic stay terminated only 

“with respect to a debt or property securing such debt or with respect to 

6 Mr. Nicolosi filed an untimely opposition to Trustee’s motion for contempt in 

which he asserted that he was unaware of any court order regarding the Property. The 

bankruptcy court struck the opposition and additionally found that Mr. Nicolosi was 

not credible.
10

any lease,” and the actions of Debtor and Mr. Nicolosi were outside of the 

limited scope of termination. Trustee attempted to distinguish Reswick v. 

Reswick (In re Reswick), 449 B.R. 362, 373 (9th Cir. BAP 2011), by asserting

that its analysis makes sense only in a chapter 13, and regardless, there was 

no dispute that Debtor and Mr. Nicolosi violated the Order of Possession. 

Finally, Trustee acknowledged cases holding that a contemnor must be 

warned of possible sanctions resulting from a failure to comply, but she 

contended that Debtor and Mr. Nicolosi were amply warned despite the 

omission of specific language in the Order of Possession.

On September 26, 2022, the court held a hearing on Trustee’s partial 

motion for summary judgment and Trustee’s motion for contempt. The 

court granted Trustee’s contempt motion and held that Debtor and 

Mr. Nicolosi willfully violated the stay. The court acknowledged Reswick, 

but disagreed with its reasoning, and instead held that the stay terminated 

only with regard to Debtor, not the estate.

The bankruptcy court also determined that Debtor and Mr. Nicolosi 

willfully violated the Order of Possession. It concluded that neither Debtor 

nor Mr. Nicolosi took reasonable steps to comply with the order and they 

did not argue that they were unable to comply. The court reasoned that 

both parties were adequately warned of sanctions despite the omission of 

specific language in the Order of Possession and reasoned that the notice of 

bankruptcy specifically warned that violations of the stay could result in 

damages.
11

Turning to Trustee’s partial motion for summary judgment, the court 

held that Debtor was aware of the Order of Possession and willfully 

refused to comply with it. The court determined that Debtor’s actions were 

willful as demonstrated by misrepresentations in her motion to stay the 

Order of Possession. 

On September 30, 2022, the bankruptcy court entered a written order 

granting Trustee’s motion for contempt and holding Debtor and 

Mr. Nicolosi jointly liable for damages in an amount to be proven by 

Trustee. The same day, the court entered a written order granting Trustee’ 

motion for partial summary judgment. After Trustee dismissed the 

remaining claims in the adversary proceeding, Debtor appealed, and we 

affirmed. In re Farina, 2023 WL 5165405, at *4-6.

D. Mr. Nicolosi’s motion for reconsideration and the order for 

sanctions

Mr. Nicolosi filed a motion, pursuant to Civil Rule 59, made 

applicable by Rule 9023, for reconsideration of the contempt order. He 

argued that Trustee failed to plead or show that he knew of the Order of 

Possession or conspired with Debtor to violate it, and because Trustee 

failed to allege a prima facie case against him, the court should not have 

held him in contempt. 

Trustee opposed and argued that a Civil Rule 59 motion could not be 

used to raise arguments or present evidence which could have been raised 

earlier. In reply, Mr. Nicolosi reiterated that Trustee did not describe or 
12

present clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Nicolosi exercised 

possession of the Property or that he was at the Property on or after March 

7, 2022, when the Order of Possession was issued. Mr. Nicolosi argued that 

Trustee did not allege that he had keys to return or any authority or ability 

to do anything regarding the Property, other than to immediately vacate 

upon receipt of the Order of Possession, which he claimed he did.

The bankruptcy court denied the motion. The court reasoned that 

Mr. Nicolosi was aware of the Order of Possession, and according to 

Debtor’s statement, Mr. Nicolosi was still living at the Property on March

10, 2022.

In February 2023, Trustee filed a motion to set the amount of 

sanctions against Debtor and Mr. Nicolosi. Trustee sought damages of 

$21,435.66, consisting of attorney’s fees and costs incurred in restoring 

exclusive possession of the Property to Trustee. Trustee supported her 

request with billing records and declarations from counsel.

Debtor and Mr. Nicolosi each opposed Trustee’s request. Debtor 

argued that Trustee was not entitled to fees incurred after she vacated the 

Property on March 17, 2022, and she disputed whether the billing entries 

were related to Trustee’s efforts to restore possession.

Mr. Nicolosi argued that sanctions were not warranted because he 

complied with the Order of Possession by vacating the Property, and the 

order did not specify any other act which he was required to perform in 

turning over exclusive possession to the Trustee. He asserted that he did 
13

not disobey a specific court order once he left the Property with no 

intention of returning on either March 4 or 5, 2022. Mr. Nicolosi also 

questioned the time and rate billed by Trustee’s attorneys.

At the hearing on Trustee’s motion, the court declined to revisit 

whether Debtor and Mr. Nicolosi were liable for the sanctions, and it

determined that Trustee’s requested fees were reasonable and appropriate. 

The court entered an order awarding Trustee sanctions and holding Debtor 

and Mr. Nicolosi jointly liable for damages in the amount of $21,379.66.7

Debtor and Mr. Nicolosi each timely appealed.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 

157(b)(2)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.

ISSUES

Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion by holding Debtor in 

contempt and imposing sanctions?

Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion by holding Mr. Nicolosi 

in contempt and imposing sanctions?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review for abuse of discretion the bankruptcy court’s decision to 

hold a party in civil contempt and to impose sanctions. Knupfer v. Lindblade 

(In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003). A bankruptcy court abuses 

7 Trustee voluntarily reduced her request by $56, which represented 0.1 hours of 

work.
14

its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard or its factual findings 

are illogical, implausible, or without support in the record. TrafficSchool.com 

v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 832 (9th Cir. 2011).

DISCUSSION

A. Legal standards for contempt sanctions

Pursuant to § 105(a), bankruptcy courts have authority to hold parties 

in contempt and impose compensatory or coercive sanctions to remedy 

violations of specific orders, including violations of the automatic stay. See 

In re Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1189-90; Renwick v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 298 F.3d 

1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002). “The standard for finding a party in civil 

contempt is well settled: The moving party has the burden of showing by 

clear and convincing evidence that the contemnors violated a specific and 

definite order of the court.” FTC v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228, 1239 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see also Go-Video, Inc. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of 

Am. (In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig.), 10 F.3d 693, 695 

(9th Cir. 1993) (“Civil contempt . . . consists of a party’s disobedience to a 

specific and definite court order by failure to take all reasonable steps 

within the party’s power to comply.”). “The burden then shifts to the 

contemnors to demonstrate why they were unable to comply.” Stone v. City 

& Cnty. of S.F., 968 F.2d 850, 856 n.9 (9th Cir. 1992).

The contemptuous nature of a litigant’s conduct is determined by 

application of an objective standard. See Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 

1802 (2019) (“[A] party’s subjective belief that she was complying with an 
15

order ordinarily will not insulate her from civil contempt if that belief was 

objectively unreasonable.”); see also In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder 

Litig., 10 F.3d at 695 (“The contempt need not be willful, and there is no 

good faith exception to the requirement to obedience to a court order.” 

(cleaned up)). However, subjective intent is not always irrelevant, and

“civil contempt sanctions may be warranted when a party acts in bad 

faith.” Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 

32, 50 (1991)).

Before entering civil sanctions, the bankruptcy court must find that 

the contemnor “had sufficient notice of [the order’s] terms and the fact that 

he would be sanctioned if he did not comply.” Hansbrough v. Birdsell (In re 

Hercules Enters., Inc.), 387 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2004).

B. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by imposing civil 

contempt sanctions against Debtor.

Debtor argues that the court erred because Trustee failed to prove 

that she violated the automatic stay or a court order, and the Order of 

Possession did not warn Debtor that she could be sanctioned if she failed to 

comply. We disagree.

Trustee clearly proved that Debtor had notice of the Order of 

Possession on March 10, 2022, and refused to obey the order by 

immediately vacating the Property. On appeal, Debtor claims that she 

immediately vacated the Property as soon as she was aware of the Order of 

Possession and writ of assistance. But in her declaration filed in support of 
16

her motion to stay the Order of Possession, Debtor acknowledged she 

received the Order of Possession and writ on March 10, 2022. And in her 

declaration in support of her opposition to sanctions, Debtor admitted she 

vacated the Property on March 17, 2022, only after the amended writ of 

assistance was posted at the Property.

Moreover, the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment denying 

Debtor’s discharge conclusively establishes that Debtor willfully refused to 

obey the Order of Possession. We affirmed that decision, and it is now law 

of the case.

Under the law of the case doctrine, a court is barred from 

reconsidering an issue previously decided in the same court or a higher 

court in the same case.8 FDIC v. Kipperman (In re Com. Money Ctr., Inc.), 392 

B.R. 814, 832 (9th Cir. BAP 2008) (citing Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. 

of Am., 902 F.2d 703, 715 (9th Cir. 1990)); see also Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 

768, 771 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[U]nder the ‘law of the case’ doctrine one panel of 

an appellate court will not as a general rule reconsider questions which 

another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the same case.”). Law of the 

8 The main bankruptcy case and associated adversary proceedings are considered 

the “same case” for purposes of law of the case doctrine. See GXP Cap., LLC v. Argonaut 

Mfg. Servs., Inc. (In re Bioserv Corp.), BAP No. SC-22-1213-BGF, 2023 WL 4084824, at *6 

(9th Cir. BAP June 20, 2023); Rickert v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (In re Rickert), BAP 

No. MT-20-1100-BGF, 2020 WL 7043609, at *4 (9th Cir. BAP Dec. 1, 2020), aff’d, No. 21-

600003, 2021 WL 5985026 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2021). 
17

case doctrine applies where the issue was decided, either expressly or by 

necessary implication. In re Com. Money Ctr., Inc., 392 B.R. at 832.

In affirming the summary judgment, we expressly decided the issue 

by holding:

[T]he Order of Possession required [Debtor] to immediately 

vacate the Property. [Debtor] was aware of the Order of

Possession and her obligation to vacate the day it was 

posted . . . . [Trustee] produced evidence that [Debtor] 

knowingly sought to avoid her obligation to immediately 

vacate the Property on false grounds, thereby meeting her 

burden to prove that Debtor willfully or intentionally failed to 

comply with the Order of Possession.

In re Farina, 2023 WL 5165405, at *6.

The doctrine is nonjurisdictional and discretionary, but “the earlier 

decision should be followed, unless: (1) substantially different evidence 

was produced at a subsequent trial; (2) there has been an intervening 

change in controlling authority; or (3) the decision was clearly erroneous 

and its enforcement would work a manifest injustice.” Aalfs v. Sims (In re 

Straightline Invs., Inc.), BAP No. NC-04-1497-PSBr, 2005 WL 6960231, at *2 

(9th Cir. BAP Apr. 6, 2005), aff’d sub nom, Aalfs v. Wirum (In re Straightline 

Invs. Inc. 525 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). We typically apply the 

law of the case doctrine unless one of the above-referenced exceptions 

applies. See Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Frascilla (In re Fraschilla), 

235 B.R. 449, 454 (9th Cir. BAP 1999), aff’d, 242 F.3d 381 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(citations omitted). None of the exceptions apply here.
18

We agree that civil sanctions for violating court orders require

adequate notice that failure to comply is sanctionable, but the Order of 

Possession provided sufficient notice. The terms of the Order of Possession

are clear: Debtor and Mr. Nicolosi were required to immediately vacate the 

Property. And though the order does not expressly state that failure to 

vacate could result in sanctions, it does state that any act to assert 

possession of the Property would be considered a violation of the 

automatic stay. As we discuss below, the stay terminated prior to the 

alleged violation, but the warning of a potential stay violation serves as a 

clear warning to Debtor and Mr. Nicolosi that failure to immediately vacate 

the Property could result in compensatory damages.

Additionally, Debtor offers no argument that she would have acted 

differently had the Order of Possession contained a more explicit warning 

of sanctions, and thus, any insufficiency of warning was harmless error. See 

Van Zandt v. Mbunda (In re Mbunda), 484 B.R. 344, 355 (9th Cir. BAP 2012), 

aff’d, 604 F. App’x 552 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Generally speaking, we ignore 

harmless error.”); Civil Rule 61, made applicable by Rule 9005 (“At every 

stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that 

do not affect a party’s substantial rights.”).
19

C. The bankruptcy court abused its discretion by imposing civil 

contempt sanctions against Mr. Nicolosi.

1. The record does not demonstrate that Mr. Nicolosi violated 

the Order of Possession.

Trustee did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

Mr. Nicolosi violated a specific and definite order of the court. Trustee 

presented evidence that Mr. Nicolosi was at the Property on March 4, 2022, 

when Trustee’s proposed broker arrived at the Property, and he was in his 

vehicle, on the street in front of the Property, on March 5, 2022. But there is 

no credible evidence in the record that Mr. Nicolosi was at the Property 

any time after the Order of Possession was issued on March 7, 2022. 

The bankruptcy court initially reasoned that Mr. Nicolosi violated the 

Order of Possession by refusing to return possession to Trustee, and 

Trustee argues that Mr. Nicolosi was required to turn over keys to the 

Property and communicate with Trustee or her professionals to arrange to 

return possession. But the Order of Possession contains no such terms. 

Because “civil contempt is a severe remedy, . . . principles of basic 

fairness require that those enjoined receive explicit notice of what conduct 

is outlawed before being held in civil contempt.” Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802. 

The Order of Possession requires only that Debtor and Mr. Nicolosi 

immediately vacate the Property.9

9 The writ of assistance and notice of granting writ of assistance and notice to 

vacate both state that, pursuant to the Order of Possession, all occupants were “required 

to vacate the Property immediately and turnover exclusive possession of the Property” 
20

In denying Mr. Nicolosi’s motion for reconsideration, the court relied 

on Debtor’s claim in her motion to stay the Order of Possession, that as of 

March 10, 2022, she was living at the Property with her elderly parents. Not 

only were Debtor’s unsworn statements not evidence, but the court had 

already determined those statements were false. Trustee did not present 

clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Nicolosi violated the Order of 

Possession, and consequently, the court abused its discretion by entering 

contempt sanctions against him for violating the order.

2. Mr. Nicolosi did not violate the automatic stay because it 

terminated in its entirety before March 4, 2022.

Debtor filed her chapter 7 case within one year of dismissal of her 

prior chapter 13. Mr. Nicolosi argues that pursuant to § 362(c)(3)(A), the 

automatic stay terminated in its entirely 30 days after her petition date, on 

February 17, 2022. See In re Reswick, 446 B.R. at 373. Trustee contends that 

Mr. Nicolosi waived any argument that the stay expired by failing to raise 

the issue in the bankruptcy court.

We typically treat issues raised for the first time on appeal as waived. 

See Mano-Y&M, Ltd. v. Field (In re Mortg. Store, Inc.), 773 F.3d 990, 998 (9th 

Cir. 20014) (“In general, a federal appellate court does not consider an issue 

not passed upon below.” (cleaned up)). Although Mr. Nicolosi did not 

to Trustee. The writ of assistance and accompanying notice of writ and notice to vacate 

were issued by the clerk of the court, pursuant to Civil Rule 70(d). Neither document is 

an order of the court directed to Debtor and Mr. Nicolosi.
21

raise the issue in the bankruptcy court, Debtor did, and the bankruptcy 

court addressed it. Moreover, we have discretion to consider arguments 

raised for the first time on appeal when the issue is purely one of law and 

does not depend on the factual record developed below, or the pertinent 

record has been fully developed. Id. Whether the stay terminated under 

§ 362(c)(3)(A) is purely a legal issue, which we do not treat as waived. See

In re Reswick, 446 B.R. at 365 (“A bankruptcy court’s interpretation of the 

bankruptcy code is reviewed de novo.").

The bankruptcy court disagreed with the reasoning of Reswick and 

declined to apply its holding. The Ninth Circuit has not interpreted 

§ 362(c)(3)(A), but absent a change in law, we are bound by our precedent.

Gaughan v. Edward Dittlof Revocable Tr. (In re Costas), 346 B.R. 198, 201 (9th 

Cir. BAP 2006), aff’d, 555 F.3d 790 (9th Cior. 2009) (citing Ball v. PaycoGeneral Am. Credits, Inc. (In re Ball), 185 B.R. 595, 597 (9th Cir. BAP 1995)).

Trustee does not contest the holding of Reswick, but she argues it

should apply only to cases filed under chapter 13. By its own terms, 

§ 362(c)(3)(A) applies in “a single or joint case . . . filed by or against a 

debtor who is an individual in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 13.” Thus, our 

interpretation in Reswick that § 362(c)(3)(A) “terminates the automatic stay 

in its entirely on the 30th day after the petition date,” is equally applicable 

to individual cases filed under chapter 7, 11, and 13.

Because § 362(c)(3)(A) terminated the automatic stay in its entirety 

before March 4, 2022, Mr. Nicolosi’s actions did not constitute violations of 
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the stay as a matter of law. The bankruptcy court abused its discretion by 

holding Mr. Nicolosi in contempt and imposing civil sanctions under 

§ 105(a) based on his purported willful stay violation.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s order 

entering sanctions as against Debtor, and we REVERSE the order as it 

pertains to Mr. Nicolosi.