Filed 5/14/24

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

D.K.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Office of Administrative Hearings,

Defendant and Respondent;

 A167272

 (Napa County Super. Ct.

No. 23-CV-000110)

State Department of State Hospitals,

Real Party in Interest.

Petitioner D.K. appeals from a short-term order authorizing that she be 

involuntarily medicated under Penal Code1 section 1370. We conclude D.K.’s 

appeal is moot because the order has expired and no meaningful relief can be 

effectuated through review of that order. However, we exercise our discretion 

to address D.K.’s appeal of the superior court’s finding that the statutory 

scheme of section 1370 precluded her from filing a writ of administrative 

mandamus to challenge that medication order. We conclude both the 

significant liberty interests at issue and the language of section 1370 support 

D.K.’s right to seek writ review.2

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 We grant respondent’s unopposed request that this court take judicial 

notice of a February 7, 2023 involuntary medication order entered in People 
2

BACKGROUND

D.K. was found incompetent to stand trial (IST) and committed to the 

Department of State Hospitals (DSH) by the Orange County Superior Court.

D.K. is a patient at Napa State Hospital (NSH) and has been diagnosed with 

“[u]nspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorder.” 

After D.K.’s transfer to NSH, DSH filed a petition with the Office of 

Administrative Hearings (OAH) for an interim order to compel involuntary 

medication of D.K. with antipsychotic medication. DSH asserted D.K. lacked 

the capacity to make decisions regarding antipsychotic medication, her 

mental disorder required such treatment, and “it is probable that serious 

harm to [her] physical or mental health” would result absent such treatment. 

Alternatively, DSH argued D.K. posed a danger of inflicting substantial 

physical harm on others because of her mental disorder. 

Pursuant to section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(D)(i), an administrative 

law judge (ALJ) conducted an evidentiary hearing on January 20, 2023. The

ALJ found by clear and convincing evidence that D.K. “lacks capacity to make 

decisions regarding antipsychotic medication, [her] mental disorder requires 

treatment with antipsychotic medication[,] and without treatment with 

antipsychotic medication it is probable that serious harm to [her] physical or 

mental health will result.” The ALJ ordered D.K. involuntarily medicated 

from January 17, 2023 to February 7, 2023.

On January 27, 2023, D.K. filed a petition for a writ of administrative 

mandate with the Napa County Superior Court, asking the court to order 

OAH to vacate its medication order because insufficient evidence supported 

the finding of probable harm. D.K. further asserted the medication order 

v. D.K., Orange County Superior Court, case No. 22HF0015 F A. (Evid. Code, 

§§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
3

violated her federal and state due process rights. D.K. requested an 

expedited hearing on the basis that if the petition were not heard prior to 

February 7, 2023—when the medication order expired—she would be denied 

any effective relief. 

The superior court denied her petition. The court concluded D.K. was 

not entitled to writ review because section 1370 provided for a “plain, 

adequate, [] speedy remedy” which, in this instance, was an upcoming 

February 7, 2023 involuntary medication hearing before the Orange County 

Superior Court. The court reached this conclusion despite acknowledging 

that the upcoming hearing “is not a true review of the underlying temporary 

[involuntary medication] order.” 

Despite finding D.K. not entitled to writ review, the court proceeded to 

address her petition on the merits. The court found “more than substantial 

evidence in the record to meet” the first two elements—i.e., “whether [D.K.] 

lacked capacity to make decisions regarding antipsychotic medication and 

that her mental disorder required medical treatment with antipsychotic 

medication.” As to the third element, the court acknowledged “there wasn’t 

any evidence in the [treating psychiatrist’s] report that [D.K.’s] condition was 

substantially deteriorating,” but concluded that the psychiatrist’s hearing 

testimony provided substantial evidence to meet this element. The court 

noted the psychiatrist’s testimony that D.K. was currently suffering adverse 

effects to her physical or mental health, including heightened resistance to 

treatment, poor hygiene that placed her at risk for physical illness and 

infections, a pattern of being easily agitated and angry that placed her at risk 

for victimization, and—most importantly—a history of refusing treatment for 

her other medical conditions, including diabetes and hypertension, when her 

mental disorder was not treated. Based on those factors, the court concluded 
4

that “if her mental disorder was not treated by the antipsychotic medications 

sought it is probable that serious harm to her physical or mental health 

would result.” D.K. appealed. 

On February 7, 2023, the Orange County Superior Court conducted a 

hearing on DSH’s petition for a one-year order authorizing the involuntary 

administration of antipsychotic medication. D.K. submitted on the request. 

The court subsequently found D.K. “lack[ed] the capacity to make decisions 

regarding antipsychotic medication and if [her] mental disorder is not 

treated, serious harm to [her] physical or mental health is the probable 

result.” The court thus granted the petition. 

DISCUSSION

I. Mootness

The Attorney General contends the appeal is moot because the interim 

involuntary medication order is no longer in effect, and D.K. did not appeal 

from the subsequent involuntary medication order entered by the Orange 

County Superior Court. D.K. contends the appeal is not moot because the 

brevity of the involuntary antipsychotic medication order does not allow for 

appellate review and “[m]eaningful review as to this proceeding is a 

substantial state-created right.” 

Our role as an appellate court is to decide actual controversies, and not 

to opine ‘ “ ‘ “upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or . . . declare 

principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case 

before it.’ ” ’ ” [Citation.] ‘[A] case becomes moot when a court ruling can 

have no practical effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief.’ ” 

(People v. Rish (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1380.) Thus, “ ‘ “[a]n action that 

originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on 

appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events. A 
5

reversal in such a case would be without practical effect, and the appeal will 

therefore be dismissed.” ’ ” (People v. Delong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 

486.) However, even in the event of a moot controversy, courts may exercise 

their discretion to decide issues raised on appeal if they involve important 

issues of public interest that are capable of repetition yet evade review. (See, 

e.g., People v. Cheek (2001) 25 Cal.4th 894, 897–898; Conservatorship of 

Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 524, fn. 1.)

D.K. raises two main arguments on appeal. First, she contends 

substantial evidence did not support the temporary involuntary medication 

order. This argument is grounded in case-specific evidence not likely to recur 

in the same manner at future proceedings, specifically the treating 

psychiatrist’s testimony of D.K.’s then-current mental state. And future 

proceedings would presumably be based on updated medical reports and 

testimony. We therefore do not exercise our discretion to decide this issue as 

it is unlikely to recur in the same manner at future proceedings and does not 

qualify as an important issue of public interest that is capable of repetition.

(See People v. McCray (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 260, 268 [declining to address 

moot questions that are fact-specific].) 

D.K.’s second argument is that she was entitled to file a writ petition

contesting the ALJ’s temporary involuntary medication order, an important 

issue of public interest given the “ ‘significant’ constitutionally protected 

‘liberty interest’ in ‘avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic 

drugs.’ ” (Sell v. United States (2003) 539 U.S. 166, 178.) And it is an issue 

both capable of repetition and likely to evade appellate review due to the 

short, 21-day time frame of these temporary involuntary medication orders. 

Accordingly, we address the merits of D.K.’s argument that she is entitled to 
6

writ review of the temporary involuntary medication order under section 

1370.

II. D.K. Was Entitled to Writ Review of the Temporary Involuntary 

Medication Order 

D.K. argues she is entitled to writ review of the temporary involuntary 

medication order because section 1370 does not otherwise supply a plain, 

speedy, and adequate remedy to contest such an order. (See County of 

Sacramento v. Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2 (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 654, 672

“A writ of mandamus . . . only issues when there otherwise is no speedy and 

adequate remedy at law.”].) The Attorney General highlights that section 

1370 provides for a superior court hearing—which must be conducted within 

18 days from the initial date of involuntary medication—and contends this 

hearing provides an adequate remedy at law. Alternatively, the Attorney 

General argues D.K. could have sought a temporary restraining order or a 

preliminary injunction. 

We conclude D.K. was entitled to seek interim judicial review.

A. Statutory Scheme

“A court may not try a criminal defendant who is mentally 

incompetent. [Citation.] . . . If a defendant is found IST by the court, . . .

section 1370 provides that criminal proceedings ‘shall be suspended until the 

person becomes mentally competent.’ [Citation.] In order to ‘promote the 

defendant’s speedy restoration to mental competence,’ the court shall commit 

the defendant to a DSH facility for treatment.” (People v. Edwards (2023) 88 

Cal.App.5th 1259, 1263.) 

If an involuntary antipsychotic medication order is not already in place

and the defendant lacks capacity to consent, the treating psychiatrist may 

provide a certification assessing the defendant’s current mental status “and 
7

the opinion of the treating psychiatrist that involuntary antipsychotic 

medication has become medically necessary and appropriate.” (§ 1370, subd.

(a)(2)(C).) The defendant may then be involuntarily administered 

antipsychotic medication for up to 21 days following such a certification. 

(§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(D)(i).) However, within 72 hours of the certification, the 

defendant is entitled to a medication review hearing before an ALJ. (§ 1370, 

subd. (a)(2)(D).) The defendant is entitled to appointment of an attorney or 

patient’s right advocate to assist in preparing for the hearing, represent the 

defendant at the hearing, review the panel’s final determination following the 

hearing, and advise the defendant of the right to judicial review of the panel’s 

decision. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(D)(i).) 

If an ALJ determines the defendant meets the criteria for the 

involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication, such medication may 

continue for the entire 21-day certification period. (§ 1370, subd.

(a)(2)(D)(ii).) The treating psychiatrist must also file a copy of the 

certification and a petition with the appropriate superior court “for issuance 

of an order to administer antipsychotic medication beyond the 21-day 

certification period.” (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(D)(ii).) 

The superior court must then “hold a hearing, no later than 18 days 

from the date of certification, to determine whether antipsychotic medication 

should be ordered beyond the [21-day] certification period.” (§ 1370, subd.

(a)(2)(D)(iv).) However, the court may continue the hearing and extend the 

certification period for up to 14 additional days upon stipulation or a finding 

of good cause. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(D)(vii).) Following the hearing, the

superior court may, upon making the necessary findings, authorize 

involuntary medication of the defendant for up to one year. (§ 1370, subds.

(a)(2)(D)(viii), (a)(7)(A).) The district attorney, county counsel, or 
8

representative of the facility holding the defendant can petition the court for 

a renewal of the medication order prior to the expiration of this one-year 

period. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(7)(B).) 

B. Section 1370 Provides for Judicial Review of a Temporary 

Involuntary Medication Order

We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. (Cal. Advocates

for Nursing Home Reform v. Arágon (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 500, 507.)3 

“ ‘Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the 

Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘We 

first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense 

meaning.’ [Citation.] ‘If the language is clear, courts must generally follow 

its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd 

consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language 

permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other 

aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’ ” 

(Cal. Advocates for Nursing Home Reform, at p. 507.)

We therefore begin with the plain language of section 1370. Contrary 

to the Attorney General’s argument that section 1370 provides “a clear 

judicial review procedure” via a hearing with the superior court “no later 

than 18 days from the date of certification,” nothing in section 1370 specifies 

a review process in the event an ALJ authorizes a 21-day medication order. 

3 The parties question the appropriate standard of review. Here, the 

issue is whether the statutory scheme provides an adequate alternative 

remedy apart from writ review. Because “[t]he legal foundation for the 

alternative remedy does not vary with the circumstances of a particular 

case,” this appeal raises an issue of law subject to independent review on 

appeal. (See Villery v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2016) 246 

Cal.App.4th 407, 415.)
9

The subdivision relied upon by the Attorney General—namely 

subdivision (a)(2)(D)(ii)—is not designed to review the adequacy of the ALJ’s

order. Rather, that provision requires the treating psychiatrist to file a 

separate petition for the purpose of obtaining “an order to administer 

antipsychotic medication beyond the 21-day certification period.” Subdivision 

(a)(2)(D)(iv) likewise explains the purpose of the subsequent superior court 

hearing: “to determine whether antipsychotic medication should be ordered 

beyond the certification period.” This statutory language expressly states 

that the superior court is not reviewing the adequacy of the temporary 

medication order, but rather conducting a separate proceeding to assess 

whether an additional one-year involuntary medication order is appropriate. 

Accordingly, the plain language of the statute indicates the Legislature did 

not intend the superior court hearing to constitute the review mechanism for 

any temporary involuntary medication orders.

Moreover, subdivision (a)(2)(D)(i) expressly indicates the Legislature 

intended to allow for judicial review. That provision mandates appointment 

of an attorney or patients’ right advocate and sets forth their general duties. 

In listing those duties, the statute states the attorney or patient advocate 

must “advise the defendant of their right to judicial review of the panel’s 

decision, and provide the defendant with referral information for legal advice 

on the subject.” (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(D)(i).) Unless the Legislature intended 

judicial review to be available, it would make no sense for it to require the 

appointed attorney and/or patient advocate to advise the defendant of their 

right to judicial review.

This scheme largely tracks analogous statutes, sections 2602 and 2603, 

that address involuntary medication orders for state prison and county jail 

inmates. (See, e.g., In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 22 [initial medication 
10

period, which “may be certified for additional involuntary medication up to 21 

days,” a right to “contest [the] certification” “with the assistance of an 

attorney or advocate,” at a “certification review hearing [ ] conducted by the 

court-appointed hearing officer,” and a 24-day limit on the involuntary 

medication “without an order from the superior court.”]; People v. Thomas

(1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1037 [“By court order the period of involuntary 

medication can extend for an additional period of one year.”].) Sections 2602 

and 2603, like section 1370, require inmates be appointed representation and 

notified of the right to seek judicial review of the temporary involuntary 

medication orders. (See § 2602, subds. (c)(7)(C), (d)(3) [duty to notify inmate 

of right to contest findings of ALJ authorizing involuntary medication via a 

petition for administrative mandamus or file a writ of habeas corpus]; § 2603, 

subds. (c)(8)(B)(iii), (d)(5) [duty to inform inmate of right to appeal or file writ 

of habeas corpus as to “any decision . . . to continue treatment with 

involuntary medication” after order authorizing involuntary medication].) 

While sections 2602 and 2603 identify specific forms of judicial review—i.e., a 

petition for administrative mandamus, a writ of habeas corpus, an appeal—

the more generalized “judicial review” language in section 1370 presumably 

encompasses all such options depending on the circumstances from which a 

defendant seeks such review.

We further conclude the subsequent superior court medication hearing 

cannot constitute adequate judicial review because courts have uniformly 

concluded IST defendants have a right to appeal from involuntary medication 

orders. (People v. Christiana (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1046 [order 

“authorizing involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs under section 

1370 [is] an order made after judgment in a special proceeding” and thus 

appealable]; see also, e.g., People v. Coleman (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 627, 633 
11

[reviewing order authorizing involuntary treatment under section 1370]; 

People v. Lameed (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 381, 397 [same].) While these cases 

considered the issue in connection with one-year involuntary medication 

orders, we see no basis for distinguishing the appealability of a temporary 

involuntary medication order. As explained in Christiana, “section 1237 

authorizes a defendant to take an appeal ‘[f]rom any order made after 

judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party.’ ”

4 (Christiana, at 

p. 1046.) A temporary medication order, as with one-year orders, implicates 

significant liberty interests. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court 

has held that “an individual has a ‘significant’ constitutionally protected 

‘liberty interest’ in ‘avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic 

drugs.’ ” (Sell v. United States, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 178.) This interest also 

is protected under California’s right to privacy, which “clearly extends to the 

right to refuse antipsychotic drugs.” (In re Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 14.) 

Considering these significant interests, IST defendants subjected to 

involuntary medication—even over a relatively short 18 day period—must be 

able to seek judicial review of their involuntary medication orders.

Finally, we reject the Attorney General’s argument that temporary 

restraining orders and/or preliminary injunctions could provide adequate 

relief from temporary involuntary medication orders. The Attorney General 

makes this argument without citation to any authority to suggest such 

procedures have been used or are appropriate in these situations. And the

Attorney General does not explain how a defendant, who has been deemed 

incompetent to stand trial and thus has no pending litigation, could 

4 We recognize Christiana involved the right to appeal. However, due 

to the short timeframe of temporary involuntary medication orders, an 

appeal likely would not provide a sufficiently speedy remedy at law and, 

instead, writ relief would be appropriate.
12

reasonably be expected to initiate litigation to pursue such relief in a 

sufficiently timely manner. 

In light of the compelling liberty interest against involuntary 

medication, and the failure to identify any alternative form of relief 

reasonably available to D.K., the superior court erred in concluding writ relief 

was categorically unavailable. However, because the superior court 

subsequently decided D.K.’s petition on its merits, she did not suffer any 

prejudicial harm from the court’s error. And because D.K.’s challenge to the 

sufficiency of evidence supporting the medication order is moot (see Part I, 

ante), we need not remand the matter for further proceedings.

DISPOSITION

The superior court’s holding that defendant was not entitled to writ 

review is reversed. Because we dismiss as moot defendant’s challenge to the

court’s finding that substantial evidence supported the involuntary 

medication order, we need not remand. 
13

_________________________

Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Tucher, P.J.

_________________________

Rodríguez, J.

A167272/D.K. v. Office of Administrative Hearings
14

Trial Court: Napa County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Cynthia P. Smith

Counsel: Paul R. Kraus Attorney at Law, Paul Kraus, for Petitioner 

and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Senior

Assistant Attorney General, Gregory D. Brown, 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Samona L. 

Taylor, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.