### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE Ja nuary 25, 200 5 S es sio n

JAM ES A LLEN BOWER S v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Bledsoe Coun ty No. 56-2002 Thom as W. Gr aham , Judge

No. E2004-01734-CC A-R3- P C - F iled May 2, 2005

The pe titioner, J ames Al l en Bow ers, a ppeals the post-c onviction court' s denial of his petition for post-conviction re lief. I n this appeal, the pe titioner alleg es (1) that he wa s d enied the e ffe ctive

a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l a t tria l an d on a

pp e a l; ( 2) tha

t th e state faile d to dis c los e e vid e nc e fa vo ra ble to his defense in violation of the require ments of B rady v. Mary land, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and ( 3) that the post-conviction court erre d by ref using to a llow e x pert testimony on the issue of the pe rformance of his trial and a

ppellate c ounsel. The judg ment of the post-c onviction court is aff irmed.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Affirm ed

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J
., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

Do ug la s A . T ra nt, Kn oxvil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Jame s A lle n B ow e rs

. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; Re nee W. Turner, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; and J ames W. Pope, I I I , Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

I n Fe bruary

of 1997, the pe titi o n er wa s convicted of one count of

rape of a c hild and
sentenc ed to eig hteen y ear s' incar cer ation. T h i s co u rt aff irmed on direc t appea l. See State v. Bow er s , 7 7 S. W. 3 d 7 7 6 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. 2 0 0 2 )

. T h e f a c ts , a s s u mm ar iz e d b y th is c o u rt, are as fo llo ws :

A. S. t e sti fi e d th a t w he n th e of fe ns e oc c ur

re d, sh e was a n e le ve n- y e ar- old

s ixth

- g r a d e s tu d e n t. A t th e ti me , h e r mo th e r ' s f r ie n d
, Sh ar o n , w a s dating the [petit ioner]. A.S. testified that she once spent the nig ht wit h the [petiti oner], the [petit ion er ] 's g irlfriend a nd the [petiti oner]' s three- y ear -old daug hter by a pre vious marria g e. A.S. put the infant daug hter to bed f or the e vening and beg an watching television on the living room couch. She testified that the [petit ioner] c ame into the-2-

living room, turne d on the ra dio, and beg an slow-da ncing with he r. The [petitioner]

was we aring only

a pair of shorts, and A.S. noticed that he had a n ere ction as they dance d. The [petitioner] undressed A.S

. and eng ag ed in sexual intercourse with her on a blanke t on the floor.

A lth o u g h A

. S. in it ia ll y

to ldn o o n e about t he in c id e n t w ith th e [p e ti ti o n e r ], she eve ntually

told a school frie nd, who then told a tea cher , wh o i n t urn told a Tenne ssee Bur eau of I nvestig ation (T.B .I .) ag ent. The T.B.I

. ag ent propo s ed t h at A. S. t e le ph on e the [pe tit ioner] a ndre c or d th e ir c on ve rs a tio ns , d uring wh ic h A .S. would attempt to obtain an admission from the [pet i t i o n er] reg arding his sex ual

a c tiv ity wi th A .S.

Three rec ording s of conve rsations betwe en A.S. a n d t h e [ petitioner] were introduced a s evidenc e at tria l and play ed for the jury

. The first rec ording occur red in Febr uary 1995, and although no specific admission was made by the [petiti oner] durin g t h e co n v ersation, the jury hear d the [petiti oner]' s tone of voice and conc ern that " the la w" c ou ld b e lis te nin g . Two mor e tape d co nv e rs a tio ns oc c ur re d in Au g us t 19 95
, du ri ng wh ic h th e [pe tit ion e r] d isc us se d e xplic it s e xua l matte rs wi th A .S. B oth of the c onversation s t h at were tape d in Aug ust contained stateme nts by the [petit ioner] that c ould r easona bly be construe d by

a jury to be admissions that he had eng ag ed in sexual intercourse with A.S. at some prior time.

The ne x t witness for the State w as Jennifer Ne wby , the estra ng ed wife of the [petit ioner]. The majority of J ennife r Newby ' s testimonyperta ined to two rec orded

c on ve r s a t i o n s t h a tJe n n i f e r N e w b y h a d w i t h t h e v i c t i m , A

. S

. I n t h e f i r s to f t h e se
conver sations, which occur red in Ma rch 1996, A.S. denied that the [petitioner] had

ra pe d h e r. I n th e seco ndc on ve rs a tio n, wh ic h o c c ur re d in Au g us t 19 96 , A .S.

c on fi rm e d th a t sh e ha d h a d n o " se xua l c on ta c t" wi th the [pe tit ion e r]. B oth

co n v e r s ations were r ecor ded nea r A.S.' s school, beca

use of Jennifer N ewby ' s conce rn that any contac t betwee n J en n i fe r Newby and A.S. would be met with disapprova l by A.S.'s mother . The tape rec ording s of bot h of t hese conversations wer e admitted int o e vid e nc e , a ndthe jury lis te ne d to the m du ri ng the tr ia l.

Jenn ifer Ne wb y

a ndA. S. b othte sti fi e d th a t th e c on ve rs a tio ns re c or de d in Marc h and August of 1996 we re stag ed and that A.S. did not t ell the truth during either of the two conve rsati o n s

. J ennifer New by and A.S. testified that they discussed wha t A .S. should say befor e the taping beg an, and A .S. testified that she cooper ated in these two taped c onversations becau s e s h e was a fra id of the [petit ioner]. J ennife r Ne wby also testified that she a ssisted in these st aged
ta p e

- r e c o r d e d c o n v e r s a ti o n s b e c a u s e s h e w a s a f r a ido f th e [p e ti ti o n e r ].

***-3- The fina l witness for the St ate was J ames Newby
, J ennife r' s fathe r. Ne wby
te sti fi e d th a t he ha d h e ardthe [ pe tit ion e r] a dmi t to a ndbr a g abo ut h a vin g se x with A. S. H e a lso state d th a t th e [pe tit ion e r] c la ime d h e wo uld ne ve r be c a ug ht b e c a us e he wa s sm art e r t

ha n th e la w e nf

or c e me nt a

uth oriti e s.

Additional evidence was pre sented a s part of the State' s case in the form of

a stipulation that A.S. w as examined by a doctor on Fe bruary 17
, 1995,

app ro xima te ly

thr e e mon ths a ft e r the of fe ns e

. At the tim e of

the e xami natio n, A. S.

was e leven y ear s old. The doctor w ho examined A.S. determined that A.S.' s hy men
wa s n ot i nta c t.
The [petitioner]'s friend, Gre g Buc kner, te stified that he wa s prese nt with the [petit ioner] w hen eac h of the three rec orded c onversations between the [petit ioner] and A.S. occur

red. Buc kner confirme d that the [petit ioner] was abusing drug s and would become hypera ctive and vulga r when under the influence of " cra nk." B uckner be lie ve d th a t th e [pe tit ion e r] w a s c low nin g aro un d a nd play ing to a c ro wdof pe op le who were also prese nt when he was having the three rec orded conversations with t he victim. . . .

The [petitioner] testi fied that he had never eng ag ed in sexual intercourse or sexual rela tions with A.S . He testified that he did not meet A.S. until jus t before Christmas 1994, after the time f rame in w hich the alleg ed rape happene d. Acc ording to the [petit ioner], he was hig h on "c rank" during the tape- rec orded c onversations with A.S. He testified that being under the influence of " cra nk" ma de him hypera ctive and more likely

to u s e t h e t y p e of vulga r lang uag e that is hea

rd on the tape

rec ording s. He stated that other individuals we re prese nt during these c onversations listening to his end of the conver sation, and he ma intained that much of the time he was sim ply putting on a show for these individuals. He a lso testified that he believe d that the conve rsations wer e in fa ct being rec orded.

I d. at 779-781.

On September 11, 2002, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction re lief, alleg ing that he wa s d e nie d th e e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of co un sel a t tria l a ndon app e a l, that th e state e ng a g e d in prosec utorial misconduct, and that the judgme nt was void bec ause it listed the wrong county of conviction.

At the evidentiary hearing, J erry Richards, a private investigator employ ed by

the petitioner,
te sti fi e d tha t he inte rv ie we d J a me s Ne wb y a t the re qu e st of po st- c on vic tio n c ou ns e l. A c c or din g to R i ch ar d s , Ne wb y

p ro v i d ed t h e f

o l l o wi n g s t at em en ti n wr i t i n g:

On an unrec alled date [t he petitioner], in a round a bout way told me that he ha d s e xua l in te rc ou rs e wi th [the vic tim ]. T o th e be st o f m y re c oll e c tio n he sa id-4-

something to the e ffe ct, ["]I bet that was the bigg est dick the bitch e ver ha d.["] He did not tell m e d i rec tly

that he did, in fac t, have se x with her or pr ovide any other de ta ils . A t th e tim e thi s s tat eme nt was ma de to m e I wa s a t hi s h ou se , I

se e n h im shoot up that day

and he w as wire d. I

don' t know if he wa s serious when he made the statement. He was a

bull shit ter a nd a bra ggar t. No one else was a round whe n he made the sta tement[.]

J immy M i l l er , t h e victim' s uncle, testified tha t he had pled g uiltyto the ag g ravated sexual battery of the victim in 1991. He de nied ra ping the victim and contended that the victim' s mother

a tte mpt e d to e xtort $1 0, 00 0 f ro m hi m in e xch ang e fo r dro pp ing the c ha rg e s. Du ri ng c ro sse xami natio n, Mil le r c la ime d th a t he did no t hav e a g oo d re c oll e c tio n o f the e ve nts in 1 99 1 b e c a us e he s u f f e r e d a h e a d in

ju r y in a n a u to mo b il e a c c id e n t. H e c o n c e d e d th a t th e o n ly p erson he had informed of

the extortion attempt was his mot her.

Attorney Michae l Caputo, who was hire d to r epre sent the petitioner at trial, testified that he had bee n provided a

document during pretria l discovery that stated that the victim had bite mar ks

on he r n ipp le s a nda n e nla rg e d in tr oitus a ft e r b e ing a ssa ult e d by Mil le r in 19 91

. At torne y Capu to stated that this inf

ormation did not alter his de cision to e nter into a stipulation that Dr. J ames Ne lson would testify

that the victim's hymen was not intac t when sh e wa s ex ami ned af ter the a lleg ations

wer e made ag ainst the petit ioner. He ex plained that although the 1991 e x amination indicated that the victim ha d an enlar g ed introitus, it said nothing about the condition of the hy men and that a 1993

e xami natio n o f the vic tim e sta bli sh e d tha t her g e nit a lia wa s nor ma l. I t wa s h is o pin ion that be c a us e the 1993 examination was normal, the stipulation minim ized the damag e to the petitioner.

Attorney Caputo testified that if he ha d known t hat t he victim had reported to a nur se at the health depa

rtment that she wa s thirteen when she first had sex, he might have use d the information at the hea ring on the motion for new trial. He stated, howeve r, that within the same docume nt the victim also reporte d that she had be en sexually abused a s a child.

During cross-e x amination, Attorney Caputo testified that he did not want to make the jury
awa re of the details of Miller' s conviction for ag g ravated sexual ba ttery of the victim bec ause he was afr aid that the information would make her more sy mpathetic. He rec alled that whe n he attempted
to cross-e x amine the pe titioner' s wife g ener ally about M iller' s conviction, t he trial court sustained the state' s objection to the testimony . Attorney Caputo remembe red that the m edica l rec ord of the victim's 1991 e x amination indicated that the vic tim's " [i ]nt roitus [ was] larg e for [her] age sug g esting but not proving pe netra tion."

Attorney Caputo expl ained that he did not attempt to im peac h state witn es s J ames Ne wby with h is p r io r mi s d e me a n o r c o n v ic ti o n s b e c a u s e n o n e o f th e c o n v ic ti o n s in v o lv e d c r imes of dishonesty . He testified that he did question Newby about a f

elony t h ef t ch arge that had bee n dismiss ed by

the state, sug g esting th at i t had bee n done in exchang e for his testimonyag ainst the pe t i t i o n e r

. I tw a s h i s o p i n i o n t h a tN e w b y h a d l i t t l e c r e d i b i l i t y

b e c a u s e o f

h i s d e m e a n o r

a ttr ia l. Attorney Caputo conce ded that he did not question Newby about his a lcoholism or dr ug addiction-5-

beca use it was his understa nding that such questioning was not pe rmitted by the rules of evidenc e. He state d that he did not cross-e x amine the victim about p o ssible inconsistent statements she had g iven to r ape counselors, explaining that he was unawa re of such statements. Acc ording to Attorney Capu to, he wa s a

ble to e sta

bli sh that th e vic tim

ha d g ive n in c on si ste nt a c c ou nts of the inc ide nt t o
a variety of people prior to trial. He stated that the victim a dmitted at trial that she had told seve ral lies and had e ven assisted the pe titioner' s wife in manuf acturing e vidence

. Attorney David R ay

bin testified t hat he was initially hired to re prese nt the petitioner at the hearing on the motion for a new trial. He state d that the proof of penetr ation was c ontested at the petitioner' s trial and that if he had known that Mil ler had been indicted for the ag g ravated rape of the victim, he would have use d that as a g round for new tria l or appe al. I t w as his opinion that Attorney Caputo should not have stipul ated the c ondition of the victim's hy men: "I f y ou conce de one issue like that y ou' re c onceding half the g overnme nt's pr oof, and I wouldn' t do that, knowing now what I do ." At torne y

Ra y bin te sti fi e d th a t if

he ha d b e e n ma de a wa

re of the vic tim ' s st a te me nt t o h e a lth department officials that she did not have sex for the first time until she was thirteen, he "w ould have

us e d th a t a s p ow e rf

ul ev ide nc e in my [h]a nd to h a ve c on vin c e d th e Cou rt [the re c a ntatio n le tte r] w a s, in fac t, rea l an d t h e gi rl had truly rec anted." I t was his opinion that Mil ler' s indictment for

a g g ra va te d ra

pe , the le tte r a lle g e dly

writt e n b y

the vic tim

re c a nti ng he r t

ri a l te sti mon y , a ndthe he a lth de pa rt me nt r e c or d, tog e the r, lik e ly wo uld ha ve re su lte d in the pe tit ion e r' s b e ing g rante d a ne w t ri a l. At torne y Ra y

bin fu rthe r te sti fi e d that it wa s h is o pin ion that th e state ' s f a ilu re to d isc los e the he a lth d e p ar t m e n tr e c o r d a m o u n t e d t o a v i o l a t i o n o f

B r a d y.
During cross-e x amination, Attorney Ray bin a cknowledg ed that the audiotape r ecor dings of the petitioner' s conver sations with the victim corroborated her alleg ations. He a lso conce ded that Attorney Caputo had done " an excellent job" of impeac hing the cre dibilit y of th e v i ct i m. He ins ist e d, ho we ve r, that pr oo f o f the pr ior a lle g a tio n wou ld ha ve se rv e d to furthe r imp e a c h the vic tim

a ndto i mpe a c h th e me dic a l pr oo f tha t th e vic tim ' s h y me n w a s n ot i nta c t.

M el M at t h e w s , t h e c o u rt b ai l i ff an d a f o rm erd ep u t y

wi t h t h e B l ed s o e C o u n t y S h er i ff 's De pa rt me nt, wa s th e inv e sti g a tin g of fi c e r i n th e c a se inv olv ing Mil le r. He te sti fi e d that the vic tim

never alleg ed that Miller pene trated her vag ina and only asserted that Miller fondled he r. Matthews

c on c e de d during c ro ss- e xami na tio n tha t Mille r wa s indi c te d for the a g g ra vate d rape of the vic tim

.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the post-conviction court denied r elief, c oncluding that the petitioner had f

ailed to establish that his trial counse l was inef fec tive or that the state c ommitt ed prosec utor i al m i s co n duct. The c ourt determined that Attorney Caputo' s decision to enter into a sti pu la tio n r e g ard ing the me dic a l pr oo f w a s o ne of tr ia l st rate g y . T he po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt a lso conclude d that Att o rn ey C aputo was not inef fec tive for f

ailing to f urther attack the c redibility of Ne wb y

. Th e c ou rt ru le d that th e state didno t vi olate the re qu ir e me nts of B ra dy by faili ng to d isc los e the hea lth department re cord w hich contains the victim's s tatement that the a g e at whic h she first had sex was thirteen. Specific ally , the court found that the state did not have possession of this document during trial bec ause it was created after the trial. Further, the post-conviction court determined tha t

" on e mor e inc on sis te nt s ta te me nt m a de by a c hil d o n a n e mba

rr a ssi ng su bje c t to a

thi rdpa rt y c ou ld-6-

not have tilt ed thi s case in [ the petitioner' s] favor." Finally , the post-conviction court corre cted the clerical er

ror in the judg ment so t h at t he ame nded judg ment corr ectly ref lects the c ounty

of conviction.

I The pe titioner first asserts that he was denied the eff ective a ssistance of c ounsel at trial and on appea l. When a petitioner seeks post-conviction re lief on the ba sis of ineffe ctive assistanc e of

co u n s el
, h e m u s tfi rs tes t ab l i s h t h at t h e s er v i ce s re n d er ed o r t h e a d v i ce gi v en we re b el o w " t h e r an ge of compe tence demande d of attorn ey s i n criminal ca ses." Ba x ter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975) . Second, he must show that the de ficienc i es "a ctually had an a dverse eff

ect on the de fe ns e ." Str ic kla ndv. Was hin g ton , 4 66 U. S. 6 68 , 6 93 (1 98 4)

. Th e e rr or mus t be so se ri ou s a s to rende r an unreliable result. I d. at 687. I t is not ne cessa ry , howeve r, that absent the de ficienc y , the trial would have resulted in an acq u i t t al

. I d. at 695. Should the petitioner fail to establish either fa c tor , h e is n ot e nti tle d to re lie f. Ou r s up re me c ou rt de sc ri be d th e sta nd ardof re vie w a s f

oll ow s:

Be cause a petiti oner must establish both prong s of t he test, a failure to prove either de ficienc y

or pre judice provide s a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffe ctive assist ance claim. I ndeed, a court need not addre ss the components in any particula r orde r or e ven addr ess both if the [ petitioner] makes an insufficient showing of on e c omp on e nt.

Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996).

On claims of inef

fec tive assistance of counsel, the petitioner is not entitled to the benef it of hindsight, may

not second-g uess a r easona bly based tria l strateg y , and cannot criticize a sound, but

unsucce ssful, tactical decision made during the cour se of the pr ocee dings. A dkins v. St ate, 911 S.W. 2d33 4, 34 7 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 94 ). Su c h d e fe re nc e to the ta c tic a l de c isi on s o f c ou ns e l, howeve r, applies onl y i f t h e ch o ices a re ma de af

ter a dequate prepa

ration for the ca se. Cooper v. State, 847 S.W .2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)

.
Cla ims of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l are re g ard e d a s mi xedqu e sti on s o f l a w a ndfa c t. State v. Honey cutt, 54 S.W .3d 762, 766-67 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). When revie wing the application of law to the post-convic tion court 's fa ct ual finding s, our revie w is de novo, and the pos t-conviction court's conclusions of l aw are give n no presumption of

corr ectne ss. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 457-58 (Tenn. 2001); see also State v. Eng land, 19 S.W .3d 762, 766 (Tenn. 2000)

.

Un de r o ur statut ory la w, the pe tit ion e r be ars the bu rd e n of pr ov ing the a lle g a tio ns in his po stconviction petition by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110( f) ( 2003). Evidence is clea

r and convincing when there is no serious or substantial doubt about the accur acy of the c onclusions drawn f rom the evide nce. Hicks v. State, 983 S.W .2d 240, 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). On appeal, the finding s of fact m ade by the pos t-conviction court are conclusive a nd will not be disturbed unless the e vidence contained in the r ecor d preponde rate s ag ains t them. Br ooks v.-7-

State, 756 S.W .2d 288, 289 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). The burden i s on the petit ioner to show that the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate d a g a ins t tho se fi nd ing s. Cle nn y v. Sta te , 5 76 S.W. 2d12 , 1 4 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1978). The cre dibilit y of the witnesses and the weig ht and value to be aff orded the ir testimony

are questions to be resolved by the post-conviction court. Ba tes v. State, 973 S.W .2d 615 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

The pe titioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffe ctive by failing to use a medic al re port wh ic h, he c on te nd s, ind ic a te s tha t th e vic tim ha d b e e n p re vio us ly

ra pe d. He c on te nd s th a t th is evidenc e could ha ve bee n used to ca st doubt upon the state' s contention that h e h ad ca u s ed the opening of the victim' s hy men.

Dr . Jam e s N e lso n e xami ne d th e vic tim a ft e r s he ma de a lle g a tio ns of se xua l a bu se a g a ins t Jimmy Mil le r. Hi s r e po rt

pr ov ide s tha t the vic tim

su ff e re d a br a sio ns to h e r n e c k a ndbit e mark s to her nipples, a nd states that the " [i ]nt roitus is larg e for ag e, sug g esting but not proving pe netra tion." A sepa rate document within the victim 's m ed i cal r ecor ds indicates that the victim' s g enitalia wa s "normal" during a

medical e x am i n at ion conducted two y ear s later. Tw o y ear s after the sec ond examination, an ex amination conducte d as a result of the vi ctim's alleg ations ag ainst the petitioner

e sta bli sh e d th a t th e vic tim ' s h y me n wa s n o lo ng e r i nta c t. A tto rn e y Capu to t e sti fi e d th a t he c ho se to enter into a stipulation t hat the victim' s hy men was not int act in an effort to minimi ze the ef fec t of the pre sentation of the medic al testi m o n y d i rec tly to the jury . I t was his opinion that the medical

e vid e nc e of

the 19 91 e xami na tio n mi g ht h a ve c a us e d th e jury to b e mor e sympathe tic to the vic tim
, particularl y

b ec au s e t h e 1 9 9 1 m ed i ca l re co rd d i d n o tco n t ai n d ef i n i t i v e p ro o f o f p re v i o u s p en et ra t i o n. T h e p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n c o u r tru l e d t h a tA t t o r n e y C ap u t o ' s d e c i s i o n q u a l i f i e d a s s o u n d tr i a l s tr a t e g y.

I n our view, the evidenc e does not pre pondera te ag ainst the finding of the pos t -convic tion court. I n Hellar d v. State, our supreme court held that perf ect r epre sentation is not required and that
tr ia l c ou ns e l' s p e rf

or ma nc e sh ou ld n ot b e me a su re d b y hin ds ig ht:

"H indsight ca n alway s be utiliz ed by those not in the fra y so as to cast doubt on trial tactics a

lawy er ha s used. Trial counsel' s strateg y will va ry even among the most skil led lawy ers. When that judg ment exercised turns out to be wrong or eve n poorly advised, this fac t alone cannot support a belate d claim of inef fec tive counsel."

629 S.W .2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982) (quoting Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255 at 1256 (8th Cir. 1971)). Our

high c ourt, quoting U nited States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1201 (1973), r uled that appellate courts should not "' second gue ss strateg ic and tac tical choice s made by trial counsel' " a nd that it is onl y

"' when c o u n s el's choice s are uninformed be cause of inade quate pr epar ation, a defe ndant is denied the e ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel.' " I d. The hig h court e x plained:

I t c a nn ot b e sa id tha t in c omp e te nt r e pr e se nta t i o nh a s o c c ur

re d me re ly

be c a us e oth e r l a wy e rs , ju dg ing fr om h ind sig ht, c ou ld h a ve ma de a be tte r c ho ic e of

ta c tic s. As forme r trial lawy ers, we know that a c riminal trial is a very drama tic, vibrant and
tense c ontest involving manyvaria bles and that c ounsel must make quick and-8-

difficult dec isions respecting strateg y and tac tics which appe ar pr oper at the time but which, later , may appea

r to othe rs, or even to the trial lawy er himself, to ha ve bee n ill considered.

I d. at 9-10 (c itation omit ted).

I n retrospe ct, it may

h av e b ee n a better

strateg y to have insisted upon medial proof which

wo uldha ve inc lud e d te sti mon y abo ut the 19 91 a ssa

ult of the vic tim . T he 19 91 me dic a l r e po rt did not, however , conclusively state that t he victim ' s hy men had been torn. Moreove r, the e x amination of the victim conduc ted two y ear s after the alleg ations ag ainst Miller but tw o y ear s befor e the

a lle g a tio ns a g a ins t th e pe tition e r e sta bli sh e d th a t th e vic tim ' s g e nit a lia wa s n orma l. It is a t le a st possible that the j ury might have reacte d neg atively to trial counsel' s use of the 1991 r eport a s proof that Miller, rathe r than t h e petiti oner, c aused the opening of the victim' s hy men. Further, the decision to enter

into the stipul ation so as to minimi ze the impact of live medical e vidence qualifies

as a r easona

ble trial strate g y . I n conseque nce, the petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.

The pe titioner also claims that his trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive by failing to investiga te the pr ior c ri min a l re c or d a ndprior ba d a c ts o f s ta te wi tne ss Ja me s N e wb y be c a us e su c h e vid e nc e c ou ld have be en used to impeach the c redibility of the witness. The state submits that the petitioner has

wa ive d ou r c on sid e ratio n of thi s iss ue by faili ng to c ite to the re c or d, faili ng to d e ve lop his arg ume nt,

a ndfa ili ng to c ite to a ny

re le va nt a

uth ority . In th e a lte rn a tiv e , th e state a sse rt s th a t A tto rn e y Capu to

wa s n ot d e fi c ie nt.

I nit ia lly , th e pe tit ion e r ha s fa ile d to su pp ort th is i ssu e wi th a rg ume nt o r c itatio n to a uth or iti e s. Moreove r, he ha s failed to include a ppropriate ref

ere nces to the r ecor d. "I ssues which a re not supported by

arg ument, citation to a

uthorities, or appropriate re fer ence s to the rec ord will be treated

a s w a ive d in thi s c ou rt ." Te nn . Ct . Crim. Ap p. R. 1 0( b) ; see a lso Te nn . R. App . P. 27 (a )( 7) ; State v. Hammons, 737 S.W .2d 549, 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

. More importantly
, t h e p etitioner is not entitled to relief on the me rits of his claim. At the evidentiary h ea ri ng , Attorney Caputo testified that he wa s awa re of Newby ' s prior re cord of misdemeanor c onvictions. Bec ause none of the c onvictions involve d d i s h o n est y , it was Attorney Caputo' s opinion that he would not have be en permitted to ask Newby about them at trial. Attorne y Caputo rec alled that he did cr o s s -e x am i ne Ne wby about a f

elony theft cha

rg e that had be en dismiss ed by

the state a fter he ag ree d to be a witness a g ainst the petitioner.

Tenne ssee Rule of Evidence 609 g overns the use of prior c riminal convictions to impeach a witness. Tha t rule provides tha t "e vidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime may be admitted if .

. . the crime [i s] punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one y ear under the law under which the witness wa s convicted or , if not so punishable, the crime must have involved dis ho ne sty

or fa lse state me nt. " Te nn . R. Ev id. 60 9( a ). B e c a us e no ne of Ne wb y ' s pri or c on vic tio ns , wh ic h we re a ll fo r mis de me a no r of fe ns e s, inv olv e d dis ho ne sty or fa lse state me nt, At torne y Capu to-9-

would not have been permitted to use them to cr oss-examine him. I n our view, A ttorney Caputo was not ineffe ctive for

failing to do that which is prohibited by the Rules of Evidenc e.

T h e p e ti ti o n e r n e xt c o n te n d s th a t A tt o r n e y Ca p u to w a s in e f

f e c ti v e b y f

a il in g to u s e the inc on sis te nt s ta te me nts g ive n by the vic tim to the De pa rt me nt o f H uman Se rv ic e s, the Rape Cr isi s
c ou ns elo r, a ndthe jury . T he state su bmi ts that th e pe tit ion e r h a s w a ive d th is i ssu e by faili ng to provide re fer ence s to the rec ord, fa iling to d ev el o p h is arg ument, and by failing to cite re levant authorities. I n the alternative, the state asserts that the petit ioner failed t o establish his claim by clea r
a ndc on vin c ing e vid e nc e be c a us e he faile d to pr e se nt p ro of of the inc on sis te nt s ta te me nts

.
As the state c orre ctly

points out, t he petitioner ha s waiv ed o u r consider ation of this issue. Wai ve r n otw ith sta nd ing , th e pe tit ion e r i s not en tit le d to re lie f. Whil e he c la ims that A tto rn e y Capu to should have used inc onsistent statements provided by the victim, he did not prese nt any statement

ma de by the vic tim a t the e vid e nti ary he ari ng

. I n B la c k v. Sta te , 79 4 S.W. 2d 75 2, 75 7 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1990), this court plac ed the burden on the post-conviction petitioner to produc e that testimony which he c on te n d s may h a v e b e e n h e lp f u l. N o o n e w a s c a ll e d to c o rr o b o r a te th e c laim th a t the vic tim ma de inc on sis te nt s ta te me nts . F urthe r, the re c or d e sta bli sh e s th a t A ttorney Ca pu to cr os sexamined the victim thoroughly about ce rtain inconsistent statements she made to her mother and the pe tit ion e r' s e x-w if

e abo ut the a lle g a tio ns . In o ur view, the e vid e nc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate ag ainst the finding of the post-c onviction court that the pe titioner was not prejudiced by any inaction on the part of Attorney

Caputo.

II The pe titioner next contends that the state violated the require ments of B rady v. Mary land, 373 U

. S. 8 3 ( 1 9 6 3 )
, b y f a il in g to d is c lo s e a d o c u me n t c r e a te d b y th e h e a lth d e p ar tm e nt in 1998 wher ein the victim reports that she had sex f or the first time at a g e thirteen. He a lso complains that his trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive for failing to discover this document. The state submits that there was no B rady

violation and trial counsel was not ineffe ctive because the petitioner is prohibited by statute from ha ving a cce ss to the victim 's rec ords and be cause the document wa s cre ated a fter the pe tit ion e r' s tria l.

I n th e la nd mark c a se of B ra dy v. Ma ryla nd
, 37 3 U. S. 83 (1 96 3)
, the Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Court rul e d th a t a p r o s e c u to r h a s a d u ty to f u r n is h e xc u lp a to r y e v id e n c e to th e d e f e n d a n t upon reque st. Ex culpator y ev i d ence may perta in to the guilt or innoce nce of the ac cused a nd/or the punishment which may be imposed if the ac cused is convic ted of the c rime. State v. Mar shall, 845 S. W. 2 d 2 2 8
, 2 3 2 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. 1 9 9 2 )

. A n y " s u p p r e s s io n b y

th e p r o s e c u ti o n o f

e v ide nce fa vo ra ble to a n a c c us e d u po n r e qu e st v iol a te s d ue pr oc e ss wh e re the e vid e nc e is m a te ri a l e ith e r t o g uil t or pu nis hme nt, ir

re sp e c tiv e of

the g oo d fa ith or ba d fa ith of the pr os e c uti on ." B ra dy , 373 U. S. at 87. Thus, the duty to pr ovide arises when the e vidence is material, the e vidence is favora ble for the def ense, a nd a prope r re quest for pr o d u cti on is made by the def endant. See United States v. Ba g ley , 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985); S trouth v. State, 755 S.W .2d 819, 828 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986). Even in the a

bsence of a specific r equest, the pr osecution has a constitutional dutyto turn over exculpatory

evidenc e that would ra ise a re asonable doubt about a defe ndant' s g uilt. United States-10-

v. Ag urs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). "E vidence ' favor able to an accuse d' includes evidence deemed to be exculpatory

in nature a nd evidenc e that could be used to impea ch the state' s witnesses." J ohnson v. State, 38 S.W .3d 52, 55-56 (Te nn. 2001) (c i t i n g Bag ley , 473 U.S. at 676; State v. Walker, 910 S.W .2d 381, 389 (Tenn. 1995) ; State v. Copeland, 983 S.W .2d 703, 706 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)).

B e fo re thi s c ou rt

ma y fi nda du e pr oc e ss vio la tio n u nd e r B ra dy , th e fo llo wi ng e le me nts mus t be esta blished:

1. Th e de fe nd a nt mus t ha ve re qu e ste d th e inf orma tio n ( un le ss th e evid e nc e is obviouslyexculpa t o ry , in which ca se the state is bound to re lease the information whethe r re quested or not) ; 2. the state must have suppr essed the inf ormation; 3. the information must have be en fa vorable to the acc used; and 4. the inf

or ma tio n mu st h a ve be e n mate ri a l.

State v. Edg in, 902 S.W .2d 387, 390 (Tenn. 1995) (as a mended on r ehea ring ).

Although A ttorney

Caputo rec alled m ak i n g a gene ral discove ry reque st in thi s case , the
mot ion do e s n ot a

pp e ar i n th e re c or d. Th e re is a lso no in di cat ion that th e pe tit ion e r s pe c if ic a lly reque sted d i s co v ery

of the victim' s health depa rtment rec ords. Further, it is unclear whether the petitioner would have been e ntitled to the document had he reque sted it. Tennessee Code Annotated

se c tio n 3 7- 1- 61 2 mand a te s th a t a ll r e c or ds of c hil d sex ua l a

bu se re ma in c on fi de nti a l. T he statut e g rants ac cess to the r ecor ds only to "( a) la w enf

orce ment office rs i nvestig ating child sexual abuse, (b ) the dis tr ic t a tto rn e y

g e ne ra l, ( c ) g ra ndjur or s th ro ug h po we r o f a su bp oe na , ( d) tho se e ng a g e d in g enuine r esea

rch a nd audits, (e) probation off icer s or the like cha

rg ed with pre senting information in ju d ic ia l o r a d mi n is tr a ti v e p r o c e e d in g s , a n d ( f ) th o s e tr e a ti n g th e c h il d

. " St a te v . Gibson, 973 S.W .2d 231, 244 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 37- 1-612).

I n G ibs on , th e de fe nd a nt a lle g e d th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b y de nying him

a c c e ss t o th e c hil d victim's re cords f

rom the De partment of H uman Service s. This c ourt conclude d that the trial court did not err by

deny ing the petitioner' s reque st beca use Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 37-1-612 does not list the alleg ed abuser as a party who may have acc ess to suc h rec ords. I d. I n State v. J ames Di so n, No

. 03 C01 -9 60 2- CC- 00 05 1 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. , a t Kn oxvil le
, Jan. 31
, 19 97 ), thi s c ou rt he ld that D iso n w a s n ot p e rm itt e d u nd e r e ith e r T e nn e sse e Rul e of Cr imi na l Pr oc edu re 16 or B ra dy to inspect the victim' s entire f ile from the De partment of H uman Service s.

I n our view, the petitioner wa s not e ntitled to the rec ord in question. Bec ause the petitioner would not have be en entitled to the re cord, e ven if he had requested it, the s tate did not violate the

re q u ir e me n ts o f B r a d y b y f a il in g to d is c lo s e th e d o c u me n t. T h u s , A tt o r n e y Ca p u to was not ine ff e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ng to d isc ov e r a nduti lize a t tria l a do c ume nt t o w hic h h e ha d n o e nti tle me nt.

Second, and more importantly
, the document in question was cr eate d in 1998, more than a y ear afte r the c onclusion of the petitioner' s trial. I n conseque nce, it is our vi ew that the s tate did not-11-

v i o l a t e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f B r a d y b y f

a i l i n g t o d i s c l o s e a d o c u m e n t t h a t d i d n o t e x i s t

. O b v i o u s l y, At torne y Capu to w a s n ot i ne ff

e c tiv e by faili ng to d isc ov e r a

no n- e xiste nt d oc ume nt.

Moreove r, eve n if the docume nt did exis t and the petitioner was entitled to it, it is our view that no Br ady

violation occurr ed because the petit ioner has failed to establish that the document wa s exculpatory . I n the document, whic h appea rs to be a questionnaire cre ated by the hea lth department for patients seeking fam i l y p l an n i n g advice , the victim list s the ag e at whic h she first had se x as thi rt e e n. With in the sa me fo rm , ho we ve r, the vic tim ind ic a te s that sh e ha d p re vio us ly be e n s e xua lly abused. In our view, the victim's statement that she first had sexual intercour se at a g e thirtee n does

n o tn e c e s s ar i l y

c o n tr a d i c t

h e r c l a i mt h a ts h e w a s r ap e d b y t h e p e t i t i o n e r a ta n e ar l i e r

a g e

. In conseque nce, the petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.

III As his final issue, the petitioner c ontends that the post-convic tion court err ed by prohibiting Attorney Ray bin, who had bee n qualified as an e x pert witness, to testify as to the ultimate issue of the ef fec tiveness of trial counsel. The state submits that the petitioner has wa ived our c onsideration of this issue by failing to support it with arg ument, citation of authority , and re fer ence s to the rec ord. I n the alternative, the state asserts that the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion by l i m i t i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y.

T he admissibilityof expert testimony is gove rned by

Rules 702 and 703 of the Te nnessee Rules of Evidence . McDa niel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997). Rule 702

a dd re sse s th e ne e d f

or e xpe rt te sti mon y

a ndthe qu a lif

ic a tio ns of

the e xpe rt :

I f s c ie nti fi c , te c hn ic a l, o r

o th e r s p e c i a l i z e d

kn ow le dg e wi ll s ub sta nti a lly a ssi st the tr ie r of fa c t to un de rs ta nd the e vid e nc e or to de te rm ine a fa c t in iss ue , a wi tne ss qualified as an expert by knowledg e, skill, experienc e, training
, or edu ca t i o n m ay testify in the form of a n opinion or otherwise.

Tenn. R. Evid. 702. " To gi v e ex p er t testimony , one must be particularly skilled, learne d or

e xpe ri e nc e d in a

sc ie nc e , a

rt , trade, bu si nes s, pr of

e ssi on or vo c a tio n. Th e e xpe rt

mus t po sse ss a thoroug h knowledg e upon which he testifies that is not within the g ener al knowledg e and e x perie nce of the a vera g e per son." Otis v. Cambridg e Mut

. Fire I ns. Co., 850 S.W .2d 439, 443 (Tenn. 1992) (citing Kinley

v. Tenne ssee State Mut. I ns. Co., I n c. , 620 S.W .2d 79, 81 (Tenn. 1981) ). F urther, Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 704 provides that "testimony in the form of a n opinion or infere nce otherwise a dmissibl e is not objectionable be cause it embrac es an ultimate issue to be decide d by the trier of fac t." Te nn. R. Evid. 704.

Gene rally , the admission of expert testimonyis la rg ely entrusted to the sound discr etion of the trial court. State v. Ba llard, 855 S.W .2d 557, 562 (Tenn. 1993) . The trial c ourt' s decision may be over turned on a

ppeal only

upon a sh o wi ng that the trial court abused its discretion. I d. "T he ab u s e of d i s cr et i o n s t an d ar d co n t em p l at es t h at b ef o re re v er s al t h e re co rd m u s t s h o w t h a t a j u d ge

' applied an inc orre ct leg al standar d, or re ache d a d ec i s i o n wh i ch is ag ainst logic or re asoning that

cause d an injustice to the party co m p l aini ng .' " State v. Coley , 32 S.W .3d 831, 833 (Tenn. 2000)-12-

(quoting State v. Shirley
, 6 S.W .3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999)); see also State v. Shuck, 953 S.W .2d 662, 669 (Tenn. 1997)

.

I n this case, the post-c onviction court permitted Attorney Ray bin to be qualifie d as an e x pert witness on the issue of Attorne y Caputo 's p er fo rm an ce and ruled tha t he could testify as to " the deg ree o f knowledg e, skill, prudence , and dilige nce, w hich is commonly possessed and e x erc ised by lawy ers a nd the standar d of ca re in the c ommuni t y t o wh i ch t h ey ' re te stify ing." The c ourt determined, howeve r, that Attorney Ray bin would not be permitted to of fer an opinion a s to whether At torne y Capu to w a s in e ff

e c tiv e , c on c lud ing that " that' s ju st f or the jud g e to do the be st h e c a n w ith wh a t he be lie ve s, on c e a ll tha t' s p re se nte d. " Th e re c or d e sta bli sh e s, ho we ve r, that A tto rn e y Ra y bin did, in fact, off

er his expert opinion as to whether the def iciencie s in Attorney Caputo' s perf ormanc e
un de rm ine d c on fi dence in the jury ve rd ic t. H e state d th a t " pu tti ng a ll the se thi ng s to g e the r,

. . . it would have be en a dif

fer ent result." Although the post-conviction court should not have preve nted Attorney Ray bin from offering his opinion on the ul timate issue, see Tenn. R . Evid. 704, any err or can be classified a s harmless. Attorne y Ray bin actually

offe red his opinion t h at trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive. I n conseque nce, the petitioner is not entitled to relief.

Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the post-c onviction court is aff irmed.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE