J-A03043-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

CHRISTOPHER COOLEY,

Appellant No. 3474 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 9, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0006347-2014

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MARCH 28, 2018

Appellant, Christopher Cooley, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his jury conviction of attempted murder, aggravated 

assault, robbery, kidnapping, possession of an instrument of a crime, and two 

counts of criminal conspiracy.

1

 We affirm.

This case arises from the brutal robbery of Kevin Slaughter by Appellant 

and his four co-defendants, Timothy Gooden, Kylieff Brown, Shaheed Smith, 

and Kareem Cooley, after a chance meeting between Slaughter and Brown at 

the SugarHouse Casino. We take the following facts and procedural history 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2702(a), 3701(a)(1)(ii), 2901(a)(1), 907(a), and 

903, respectively.
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from the trial court’s March 10, 2017 opinion and our independent review of 

the certified record.

On December 8, 2013, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Slaughter ran into 

Brown, whom he knew from prison, at the casino. Brown told Slaughter that 

he wanted to purchase cocaine and a handgun, and Slaughter responded that 

he was able to sell both. Slaughter cashed out with $3,600.00 to $4,200.00, 

and left the casino alone to drop off the money at his home in Northeast 

Philadelphia.

Slaughter then returned to the casino to meet Brown and they drove to 

South Philadelphia and picked up the drugs and gun. While they were driving, 

Brown was on the phone, telling the person he was speaking with their exact 

location. When Slaughter pulled over to stop at a store, a van drove by and 

then quickly returned, veering out of its lane towards his vehicle. Slaughter 

then looked in his rear-view mirror and saw Timothy Gooden slumped down 

on the right side of his vehicle, creeping towards him with a gun. Slaughter 

attempted to flee in the car, but Gooden fired bullets at it. The car crashed 

into a telephone poll, and Slaughter exited it and started running.

Slaughter was shot in his lower back and two or three men threw him

into the van and tied him up with duct tape. The van fled the scene. Police 

quickly responded to a 911 call of gunshots and arrested Brown and Kareem 

Cooley, who had remained at the scene.
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As the van traveled in the direction of center city, Gooden and Appellant 

rode in the back with Slaughter.2 Gooden repeatedly asked Slaughter where 

his money and drugs were, and threatened to kill and burn him. Appellant 

pistol-whipped Slaughter numerous times, and put a gun in his face. Gooden 

punched Slaughter in the face several times and knocked out his front tooth. 

The men put a bag over his head at various points. Slaughter gave Gooden 

his address and the cell phone number of his wife, Samirah Savage, and told 

him to obtain the money he won at the casino from her. The men drove to 

his home.

Samirah Savage received several phone calls from a blocked phone 

number, which she did not answer. She then received a call from an 

unblocked number, (215) 789-0863, which she did not answer, and heard a 

knock on the front door. She went to the door, and a man with a cell phone 

told her that her husband was on the phone. She cracked the door open, took 

the phone, and spoke with Slaughter. He told her that he was being followed, 

that the person at the door was his friend, and to give the friend the money 

from the casino. When she questioned Slaughter, he told her to do what he 

said, or they would kill him. She gave the money and the phone to the man.

____________________________________________

2 Appellant wore a mask over his face during the episode and Slaughter did

not identify him at trial; the Commonwealth established his identity through 

circumstantial evidence. (See N.T. Trial, 5/18/16, at 84; Trial Court Opinion, 

3/10/17, at 5, 31). Slaughter identified Gooden as the man in the back of the 

van who did most of the talking during the incident at trial. (See N.T. Trial, 

5/18/16, at 83-84).
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Once the conspirators had Slaughter’s money, they drove behind a high 

school and threw him out of the van. Gooden or Appellant shot at him six 

times, with a bullet passing through his face and neck. A resident of the 

neighborhood heard gunshots, found Slaughter, and called 911. The 

conspirators drove the van to another location, doused it with an accelerant, 

and lit it on fire as a neighbor watched. Meanwhile, police responded to the 

scene where Slaughter was shot and he was airlifted to the hospital. He 

underwent multiple surgeries and survived his injuries.

During the ensuing investigation, police obtained search warrants for 

the defendants’ cellphone records, which showed frequent contact between 

them immediately before, during, and after the crime. The records showed

that, during the relevant time-period, Appellant’s cell phone had ten calls or 

text messages with Smith; sixty-two with Gooden; and thirty-five with Kareem 

Cooley. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was able to reconstruct the 

conspirators’ approximate locations throughout the crime using historical cell 

site data.3 Appellant’s cellphone was at the approximate site of each stage of 

the crime.

____________________________________________

3 Special Agent William B. Shute of the FBI testified that historical cell site 

analysis is when investigators take the information contained in a suspect’s 

call detail records, which are generated as a result of the suspect’s phone 

calls, and analyze the calls and depict them onto a map. (See N.T. Trial, 

6/01/16, at 40). 

 
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Arrest warrants were issued for those defendants not immediately 

apprehended at the scene of the first shooting. Appellant and Gooden were 

arrested on February 25, 2014. At the time of his arrest, Appellant had a cell 

phone in his possession with phone number (215) 789-0863.4

On June 13, 2016, a jury found Appellant guilty of the above-listed 

offenses. On September 9, 2016, the trial court sentenced him to an 

aggregate term of not less than twenty nor more than forty years’ 

incarceration, followed by ten years of probation. On October 25, 2016, the 

court denied Appellant’s timely post-sentence motion without a hearing. This

timely appeal followed.5

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1) [Whether] the verdict is against the weight of the evidence such 

that certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore 

them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny 

justice[?] Specifically, the Appellant contends:

(a) That there was a compelling lack, and even 

contradictory evidence of, any physical identification 

of Appellant Cooley as a suspect in this criminal case;

(b) That there was a compelling lack of evidence that 

Appellant Cooley was in actual possession of the cell 

phone in question on the date of the incident;

____________________________________________

4 Co-defendant Smith was arrested on June 5, 2014.

5 Appellant, through counsel, filed a filed an untimely concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). However, because 

the trial court addressed the issues raised by Appellant in its March 10, 2017 

opinion, we decline to find waiver, and it is unnecessary to remand. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a); see also Commonwealth v. Brown, 145 A.3d 184, 186 

(Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, 165 A.3d 892 (Pa. 2017).
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(c) That there was a lack of circumstantial physical 

evidence including, but not limited to, fingerprints and 

DNA evidence which would serve to link Appellant 

Cooley to this crime; 

(d) That there was a lack of evidence that Appellant 

Cooley had any prior contact with his co-defendants;

(e) That there was direct and conflicting identification 

evidence that an individual other than Cooley was 

involved in the crime.

2) [Whether] there was [] sufficient evidence to enable the factfinder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt including, but not limited to, the identification of the 

Appellant Cooley as participating in this crime[?]

3) [Whether] the court committed error when it permitted the 

prosecution to introduce an exhibit [Det. [Robert Daly’s] spread 

sheet] which unfairly prejudiced Appellant Cooley by adding 

information [[Appellant’s] name] which was not contained on the 

official cell phone records[?]

4) [Whether] the court committed error when it permitted hearsay 

evidence in the form of cell phone contact entry(s) allegedly made 

by Kareem Cooley without an applicable hearsay exception or 

calling Kareem Cooley[?]6

(Appellant’s Brief, at 7) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Appellant first challenges the weight of the evidence7 supporting his 

conviction, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he was 

physically present during the commission of the crime. (See id. at 10-11, 18-

____________________________________________

6 Co-defendant Kareem Cooley entered a negotiated guilty plea for his 

involvement in this case in February 2015. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 3 n.2, 34 

n.19). He did not testify at trial. (See N.T. Trial, 5/24/16, at 5).

7 Appellant preserved his weight claim by raising it in his post-sentence 

motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(3).
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19).8 He asserts that, at most, the Commonwealth established only that 

someone (other than him) used a cell phone associated with him during the

incident. (See id.). This issue does not merit relief.

At the outset, we note that the weight attributed to the 

evidence is a matter exclusively for the fact finder, who is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the 

credibility of the witnesses. The grant of a new trial is not 

warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and must 

have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the credibility 

of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine 

that, notwithstanding all of the facts, certain facts are so clearly 

of greater weight, that to ignore them or to give them equal 

weight with all of the facts is to deny justice.

An appellate court’s purview:

is extremely limited and is confined to whether the 

trial court abused its discretion in finding that the jury 

verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate 

review of a weight claim consists of a review of the 

trial court’s exercise of discretion, not a review of the 

underlying question of whether the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence.

An appellate court may not reverse a verdict unless it is so 

contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. [T]he 

trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based on a weight of 

the evidence claim is the least assailable of its rulings.

Commonwealth v. Hicks, 151 A.3d 216, 223–24 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal 

denied, 168 A.3d 1287 (Pa. 2017) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

____________________________________________

8

In the argument section of his brief, Appellant improperly conflates his 

weight and sufficiency claims (see Appellant’s Brief, at 10, 17-19), which are 

distinct challenges, in violation of our appellate rules. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) 

(requiring argument to be divided into as many parts as there are questions 

to be argued); see also Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 

(Pa. 2000).
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In the instant case, after considering all of the testimony and evidence 

presented at trial, the court determined that Appellant’s weight claim is

meritless. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 31). It explained:

[Appellant] was in possession of a phone at the time of his 

arrest in [February] 2014. (See N.T. Trial, 5/23/16, at 24-26, 

255-56). Detective Daly testified that the phone was turned over 

to him and a search warrant was executed. (See id. at 252, 256). 

The search warrant revealed that the number for the phone was 

(215) 789-0863. (See id.). Records obtained pursuant to the 

warrant revealed that the 0863 number was registered to “Blood 

Money” with an address of 923 South 60th Street in Philadelphia. 

(Id. at 253). This address was the exact address [Appellant’s]

mother provided when she visited [him] in prison. (See N.T. Trial, 

6/01/16, at 25-26). [Appellant] has “Blood Money” tattooed 

across his chest. (N.T. Trial, 5/23/16, at 253). His date of birth 

matched the birthdate associated with the account. (See id. at 

255).

The phones associated with co-defendants Kareem Cooley 

and Timothy Gooden had the 0863 number saved in their 

respective cell phone address books as “Bop.” (Id. at 179, 185, 

269). [Appellant] has “Bop” tattooed on his forearm. (Id. at 

253). [Appellant’s] mother provided phone number (215) 471-

0620 when she visited [him] in prison. (See N.T. Trial, 6/01/16, 

at 25-26). The 0620 number was saved in Gooden’s phone as 

“Bop Mom.” . . . (N.T. Trial, 5/23/16, at 270). [R]ecords for 

Gooden’s phone showed [Appellant] was the most contacted 

person in the phone from September 1, 2013, to December 15, 

2013. (See N.T. Trial, 5/24/16, at 165-66).

The complainant’s wife testified that she received the 

ransom call from the 0863 number. (See N.T. Trial, 5/20/16, at 

15-16). Records for the 0863 number showed that nine calls were 

placed to the complainant’s wife between 11:09 p.m. and 11:12 

p.m. on December 8, 2013, the night of the abduction. (See N.T. 

Trial, 5/24/16, at 149-151). Furthermore, cell phone records

showed that numerous calls were exchanged between the 0863 

number and co-defendants Kylieff Brown, Timothy Gooden, and 

Shaheed Smith from the time that Brown encountered the 

complainant at the SugarHouse casino until and after the time that 
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the complainant was removed from the van and shot at 

approximately 11:30 p.m. (See id. at 168, 176, 178-184). Cell 

site analysis showed that each of these calls and text messages 

were made in close proximity to the respective crime scenes. 

(See N.T. Trial, 6/01/16, at 56, 62, 64-65, 69, 71, 75-78). The 

number of calls and text messages, the content of those text 

messages, the timing of each of those communications, and the 

locations where those connections were made and received, and 

the fact that [Appellant] was in possession of the phone at the 

time of his arrest in [February] 2014, is strong circumstantial 

evidence that [Appellant] was one of the major players in this 

scheme. . . . 

(Id. at 30-31) (record citations provided).

Upon review, we agree, and conclude that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in finding that jury’s verdict does not in any way shock the 

conscience. See Hicks, supra at 223-24. Therefore, Appellant’s first issue 

does not merit relief.

In his second issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his conviction. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 10-19). This issue is 

waived.

In order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence on appeal, an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement must 

state with specificity the element or elements upon which the 

appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient. Such 

specificity is of particular importance in cases where, as here, the 

appellant was convicted of multiple crimes each of which contains 

numerous elements that the Commonwealth must prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(citations and quotation marks omitted) (finding sufficiency claim waived and 

declining to address issue where Rule 1925(b) statement failed to identify 

relevant elements or crimes).
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Here, in his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant generically argued that: 

“There was not sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt including, but not limited to, 

the identification of the [A]ppellant as participating in this crime.” (Rule

1925(b) Statement, 1/23/17, at 2 ¶ 2). Appellant’s concise statement does 

not specify which element or elements of the relevant crimes, or even which 

crimes, the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.9 This

vague assertion, which essentially reiterates his weight claim, is inadequate

to preserve his sufficiency claim for appellate review. See Freeman, supra 

at 1248. Therefore, Appellant has waived his second issue.

10

Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in permitting the 

Commonwealth to enter into evidence a spreadsheet prepared by Detective 

____________________________________________

9 We recognize that, in every criminal prosecution, the Commonwealth must 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the perpetrator of 

the offense, and that identity is an implicit element of each crime. See 

Commonwealth v. Hickman, 309 A.2d 564, 566 (Pa. 1973); 

Commonwealth v. Broadwater, 90 A.2d 284, 285 (Pa. Super. 1952). Here, 

the Commonwealth presented substantial evidence of Appellant’s involvement 

in the incident, and viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must under the relevant standard of 

review, there was sufficient evidence to establish Appellant’s identity beyond 

a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Duck, 171 A.3d 830, 835 (Pa. 

Super. 2017).

10 Appellant has also waived this issue by failing to develop it adequately in 

his brief. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 10-19); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2101, 

2119(a)-(b). Although the jury convicted him of numerous crimes, he does 

not set forth the elements of the crime(s) he is challenging, or otherwise 

identify the specific elements he disputes. (See id.). Additionally, as noted, 

he conflates his sufficiency and weight claims.
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Daly summarizing raw data from cell phone call detail records. (See 

Appellant’s Brief, at 19-20). Appellant contends that this was prejudicial 

because the detective added the names of the individuals associated with each 

phone number to the chart, which gave the unfair impression that the listed 

individual made the call. (See id. at 19). This was especially problematic in 

light of Appellant’s defense that someone else used the cell phone associated 

with him to make the calls. (See id.). This issue is waived.

As the Commonwealth points out, Appellant’s three-paragraph 

argument on this issue is underdeveloped, and does not contain a single case 

citation to support his assertion that admission of the spreadsheet was 

prejudicial. (See id. at 19-20; Commonwealth’s Brief, at 14). It includes no 

discussion of legal authority, save a bare passing reference to Pennsylvania 

Rule of Evidence 403. Appellant therefore waived his third issue. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (a)-(b); Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 

1262 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014) (“The 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure require that each question an 

appellant raises be supported by discussion and analysis of pertinent 

authority, and failure to do so constitutes waiver of the claim.”) (citation 

omitted).

Moreover, it would not merit relief.

Our standard of review concerning the admissibility of 

evidence is well settled:

With regard to the admission of evidence, we 

give the trial court broad discretion, and we will only 
J-A03043-18

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reverse a trial court’s decision to admit or deny 

evidence on a showing that the trial court clearly 

abused its discretion. . . .

Relevance is the threshold for admissibility of evidence. 

“Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more 

or less probable than it would be without the evidence[,] and the 

fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401. 

“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative 

value is outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice. . . . ” 

Pa.R.E. 403.

However, [e]vidence will not be prohibited merely because 

it is harmful to the defendant. [E]xclusion is limited to evidence 

so prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to make a decision 

based on something other than the legal propositions relevant to 

the case. . . . This Court has stated that it is not required to 

sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury’s 

consideration where those facts are relevant to the issues at 

hand[.]

Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 539 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal 

denied, 138 A.3d 4 (Pa. 2016) (some citations and quotation marks omitted).

“Visual aids [such as charts] may be used to assist the jury in 

understanding the evidence in appropriate cases, and permission to do so is 

within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Commonwealth v. 

Rickabaugh, 706 A.2d 826, 837 (Pa. Super. 1997), appeal denied, 736 A.2d 

603 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted). “A chart or diagram may be used at trial 

where it assists the jury in clarifying facts.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 

615 A.2d 1322, 1334 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citation omitted). “If the trial court 

could properly conclude that the exhibit would be helpful to the jury, the 

decision to admit the exhibit will likely be upheld on appeal.” Id. (citation 

omitted).
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Here, the trial court admitted the spreadsheet prepared by Detective 

Daly, based on its finding that it would help the jury break down and 

understand the voluminous call detail records in this case. (See N.T. Trial, 

5/23/16, at 9-10). It issued a cautionary instruction underscoring that the 

detective created the spreadsheet for trial, stating:

[The spreadsheet] is demonstrative evidence in the sense 

that these aren’t the exact, actual call records that you are going 

to be seeing. This detective took all of that raw information that 

you just heard about for an hour and took what he believed was 

needed, summarized it and put it in a format which will make it

easily understandable to you.

You are still the judge of the facts. He created this. So if 

there is something on there that you disagree with, based on the 

evidence that you heard, then it is your accounting of it, your 

recollection.

(N.T. Trial, 5/24/16, at 116-17). It its opinion, the court explained:

[Appellant] and his co-defendants were connected to each 

other and to the locations of the three crime scenes through 

circumstantial evidence in the form of cell phone messages and 

cell cite analysis. The call detail records for each defendant were 

voluminous and complex. Consequently, Detective Daly created 

spreadsheets highlighting the relevant calls and text messages in 

each of the defendants’ call detail records in order to assist the 

jury on understanding the relevant data. The defense was in 

possession of all of the raw data and it was admitted into evidence. 

The court gave a cautionary instruction to the jury that the 

document was created by the detective himself. During 

deliberations, the jury asked for both the raw data and Detective 

Daly’s spreadsheets. It is clear that the spreadsheet was not so 

prejudicial such that it inflamed the jury to render its verdict based 

upon something other than the legal propositions relevant to the 

instant case. . . .

(Trial Ct. Op., at 33-34) (record citation omitted). 
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly 

determined that the spreadsheet could “assist the jury in understanding the 

evidence[.]” Rickabaugh, supra at 837 (citation omitted). Additionally, the 

court issued an appropriate cautionary instruction, which the jury is presumed 

to have followed. See Talbert, supra at 542 (“Jurors are presumed to follow 

the trial court’s instructions.”) (citation omitted). Therefore, we discern no

abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of the spreadsheet. See id.

at 539. Appellant’s third issue would not merit relief, even if it were not 

waived.

Finally, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay 

evidence, in the form of a cell phone address-book contact entry of his alleged 

nickname, “Bop,” in Kareem Cooley’s cell phone, without an applicable 

exception. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 20-21). This issue is also waived.

Specifically, we agree with the Commonwealth’s assessment that 

Appellant’s two-paragraph argument on this issue is undeveloped, in that it 

contains no citation to or discussion of applicable legal authority, save a bald

reference to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 801(a). (See id.; see also

Commonwealth’s Brief, at 17-18). Therefore, Appellant has waived this claim. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (a)-(b); Buterbaugh, supra at 1262.
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Moreover, it would not merit relief.11 “Hearsay is an out-of-court 

statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”

Commonwealth v. Kuder, 62 A.3d 1038, 1055 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 114 A.3d 416 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.E. 801(c). 

A statement can be oral or written. See Pa.R.E. 801(a).

“As a general rule, hearsay is inadmissible, because such evidence lacks 

guarantees of trustworthiness fundamental to our system of jurisprudence.”

Kuder, supra at 1055 (citation omitted). However, “[w]hen an extrajudicial 

statement is offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of its contents, 

it is not hearsay and is not excludable under the hearsay rule.” Id. (citation 

omitted).

Here, the trial court determined that the cell phone contact entry at 

issue was not hearsay. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 35). Upon review, we agree. 

The entry was introduced, not for the truth of the matter asserted (i.e., that 

the listed phone number belonged to Appellant), but to show the relationships 

among the parties involved in the crime. Therefore, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the entry. See Talbert, supra

at 539; Kuder, supra at 1055. Appellant’s final issue would merit no relief, 

even if it were not waived. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

11 As previously noted, our standard of review relative to the admission of 

evidence is for an abuse of discretion. See Talbert, supra at 539.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/28/18