* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. MICHA TERRAGNA, Defendant - Appellant. No. 09-10211 D.C. No. 1:06-CR-00198-SOM

MEMORANDUM *

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. KEVIN BRUNN, Defendant - Appellant. No. 09-10212 D.C. No. 1:06-CR-00198-SOM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 09-10230 D.C. No. 1:06-cr-00198-SOM-1 

# FILED

JUL 26 2010 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 DOUGLAS GILMAN, Sr., Defendant - Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. DOUGLAS GILMAN, Jr., Defendant - Appellant. No. 09-10248 D.C. No. 1:06-cr-00198-SOM-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. WILLIAM GILMAN, Defendant - Appellant. No. 09-10257 D.C. No. 1:06-cr-00198-SOM-8

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii Susan Oki Mollway, Chief District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted June 17, 2010 Honolulu, Hawaii Before: B. FLETCHER, PREGERSON, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.3 This is the consolidated appeal of several convictions related to a cockfighting and gambling operation. Ther e are five appellants: Micha Terragna, Kevin Brunn, Douglas Gilman, Sr., Douglas Gilman, Jr., and William Gilman. Each raises several arguments. We affi rm on most issues, but we vacate William Gilman’s sentence and remand for resenten cing because the district court imposed a “manager or supervisor” enhancement in calculating the appropriate advisory guidelines range without resolving the factual dispute over the PSR’s assertion that William Gilman supervised another participant in the gambling business. I. Brunn’s and Terragna’s Motions to Suppress Terragna and Brunn argue that the district court should have suppressed certain statements that each made while the FBI was conducting a search of their home. As all parties agree, they had not been given warnings in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966). We review de novo the denial of a motion to suppress statements that may have been obtained in violation of Miranda and review any underlying factual de terminations for clear error. See United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez , 393 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2005). We give special deference to a district court’s credibility de terminations where, as in this case, a suppression hearing was held. See United States v. Craighead , 539 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 2008).4 Neither Brunn nor Terragna were in cu stody when they made the statements at issue. While the number of law enfor cement personnel that were present weighs in favor of determining that they were in custody, the remainder of the Craighead factors do not. See id. at 1084. Brunn and Terragna were repeatedly told that they were not under arrest and would not be pl aced under arrest at the conclusion of the search. Brunn, himself a police officer, wa s allowed to spend time freely at the scene with someone he knew. Neith er Terragna nor Brunn was physically restrained. And Terragna freely walked inand out of the house during the search and was able to feed her child. These ci rcumstances are far different from those in Craighead , where Craighead was “escorted to a back room and the door was closed behind him,” an armed and armored detective appeared to be blocking Craighead’s exit from the room, and Craighead’s “emotional support” was excluded from the room. See id. at 1084–89. II. The Sufficiency of the Indictment as to Brunn Brunn challenges the sufficiency of Counts 4–8 of the indictment. We review de novo. See United States v. Rodriguez , 360 F.3d 949, 958 (9th Cir. 2004). An indictment “must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense char ged. An indictment is sufficient if it contains the elements of the charged crime in adequate detail to inform the5 defendant of the charge and to enable him to plead double jeopardy.” United States v. Awad , 551 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2009) (cita tion and internal quotation marks omitted). The relevant counts of the indict ment were sufficient in this case. They adequately informed Brunn of the el ements of the charge—indeed, they reproduced those elements almost verbatim—and they would have enabled him to plead double jeopardy if such a plea were appropriate. Brunn makes four specific arguments, but none are persuasive. First, Brunn’s reliance on United States v. Cecil , 608 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1979), is misplaced. In Cecil , the only specific allegations in the indictment were that the defendants were conspirators and thatthe conspiracy took place in Arizona, Mexico, and elsewhere. Id. at 1296–97. Brunn’s indictment, in contrast, specified who took what from whom, and how and when, with detail. Second, it does not matter whether Brunn said, “whatever you like give me” or, “whatever you like imagine” when he was speaking to Charles Gilman. The threatening part of his statement was when he said, “just rememba, as you sitting in OCCC, you cannot do nothing, right?” Besides, liability for conspiracy requires only that one of the conspirators perform an overt act. See United States v. Mincoff , 574 F.3d 1186, 1198 (9th Cir. 2009). No matter what Brunn said to Gilman, the indictment charged that Brunn and Terragna entered into a conspiracy and listed6 several overt acts that Terragna performed in furtherance of that conspiracy. Even without the challenged statement, the indi ctment would have been sufficient, so Brunn suffered no prejudice from any transcription error. Third, that the indictment did not detail exactly which official acts Brunn did not perform after extorting money did not make it insufficient. An indictment need not set forth all of the evidence to be proved at trial; both implication and common sense may serve to fill any gaps. See United States v. Blinder , 10 F.3d 1468, 1476 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Buckley , 689 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 1982). The indictment was sufficient in that it alle ged that Brunn was a police officer, that he knew of Charles Gilman’s criminal activ ity, and that he both threatened Gilman and, in exchange for money, omitted someact that a police officer with knowledge of criminal activity would ordinarily perform. Finally, the indictment was sufficient despite not giving details about other conspirators who were “known and unknow n to the Grand Jury.” First, a conspiracy in which only Terragna and Brunn were involved would still be a conspiracy. Second, the Government’s “concession” that only Brunn and Terragna were involved was no such thing. The stat ements that “just Terragna and Brunn are charged” and that “just the two are charged” meant only that those two (and not the Gilmans) were charged. It did not mean that no one else was involved. The7 Government is not required to indict every conspirator. See, e.g. , United States v. Sangmeister , 685 F.2d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1982). III. The Batson Challenges All five defendants challenge the district court’s acceptance of the Government’s race-neutral justifications for its peremptory strikes of three prospective jurors. “[I]f the prosecutor offe rs a race-neutral explanation, the trial court must decide whether the defendant has proved the prosecutor’s motive for the strike was purposeful racial discrimination.” United States v. Guerrero , 595 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010). After a prosecutor has advanced a race-neutral explanation, “the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible.” Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003). This decision requires a “sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intentas may be available.” Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. , 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). We review the district court’s accep tance of a race-neutral justification for clear error. See Miller-El , 537 U.S. at 341. In this case, as in most cases, the be st evidence of the prosecutor’s intent is his demeanor. See id. at 339. The district court explicitly found the prosecutor credible. That finding is entitled to “great deference” by this court, id. at 341,8 because “evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.” Id. at 339 (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants offered no evidence to impugn the prosecutor’s credibility, and we conclude thatthe district court did not clearly err in crediting the prosecutor’s race-neutral e xplanations for his peremptory strikes. IV. The Timing of Brady Disclosures Under Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Government must disclose to the defense any “information in the possession of the prosecutor and his investigating officers that is helpful to the defendant.” United States v. Price , 566 F.3d 900, 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis omitted). “The three elements of a Brady violation are: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willf ully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued.” United States v. Williams , 547 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). “We review de novo claims of Brady violations.” Id. at 1202 n.12. Defendants claim that the Government committed a Bradyviolation by disclosing too late certain FBI intervie w reports (“302s”) revealing that John Saguibo, a key Government witness, wo rked as a confidential informant or9 confidential source for local police offi cers in an arguably related precursor investigation. We assume without d eciding that the relevant reports were impeachment material that the Government should have disclosed. See generally United States v. Ochoa-Sanchez , 676 F.2d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[D]efendant conducted a meaningful cross-examination using impeaching information that the witness was an info rmant and had assisted the government in other cases.”). Although we do not condone the piecemeal manner in which the prosecution disclosed the evidence, we conclude thatdefendants were not prejudiced in this case by the timing of the disclosure. The only specific prejudice defendants identified was their inability to consideran entrapment defense, but any such defense would have been highly implausi ble based on the evidence in this case. Even if defendants could have put on sucha defense, they were not prejudiced by the delayed disclosure of the FBI’s reports . For more than two years before trial, defendants had recordings of Saguibo’s wiretapped phone conversations that made clear he was a police informant. Defendants were provided with transcripts of those conversations more than a year befo re trial. At least one defense attorney stated before trial that Saguibo had gather ed intelligence for the police. In light of these facts, the district court’s finding that defendants had knowledge of Saguibo’s10 cooperation with the police before trial started was not clearly erroneous. The delayed production of cumulative evidence of that cooperation was not prejudicial. See Rhoades v. Henry , 598 F.3d 495, 504 (9th Cir. 2010). Moreover, when the Government tu rned over the evidence under court order, defendants still had time to prepar e for cross-examination. The Government need not turn over Brady evidence before trial as long as the disclosure is “made at a time when [the] disclosure woul d be of value to the accused.” United States v. Aichele , 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1991). In this case, the last of the FBI reports was turned over two weeks before Saguibo was cross-examined. We conclude that there was no Bradyviolation because defendants we re not prejudiced by the timing of the disclosure in this case. See Rhoades , 598 F.3d at 504. V. The Jencks Act Challenge Defendants argue that under the Je ncks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, the Government should have turned over 302s that the FBI produced following interviews with witness Charles Gilman , even though the Government had already produced the notes from which the reports were created—notes that Charles Gilman had adopted as his own statement. “A district court’s Jencks Act rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Cardenas-Mendoza , 579 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2009).11 On its own terms, the Jencks Act app lies only to a “statement . . . of the witness,” not a report derived from such a statement. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). In this case, Charles Gilman verified the notes as his own statement when they were read back to him, but he never adopted a 302 report based on those notes. We have held that the Government need not produce interview notes as long as it turns over a report based on those notes and the witn ess has adopted the report as his own

statement. See United States v. Reed , 575 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2009). The same reasoning applies, a fortiori , where the verified notes th emselves are turned over in lieu of any subsequently created reports that were not verified by the witness. See United States v. Boshell , 952 F.2d 1101, 1104–5 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that there was no Jencks Act violation where the re levant notes “were not a substantially verbatim recital of [the witness’s] oral statement, nor were they seen, signed or adopted by [the witness]”). Even if the district court had erred in declining to order the disclosure of the 302s, reversal would be inappropriate in the absence of prejudice to defendants. See Boshell , 952 F.2d at 1105. Because the interview notes that defendants received included Charles Gilman’s substantially verbatim st atements, defendants were not prejudiced by the Government’s failure to produce formal summaries of those statements. See United States v. Riley , 189 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1999)12 (“[W]e have not required that testimony be stricken where a substitute for the missing statement was available.”). VI. The Denial of Motions for a Continuance On several occasions, defendants move d for a continuance to obtain the impeachment evidence they sought from the Government or to process the evidence they had already received. We re view the district court’s denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. United States v. Orlando , 553 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir. 2009). That review requires us to consider four factors: (1) the extent of appellant’s diligence in his efforts to ready his defense prior to the date set for hearing, (2) how likel y it is that the need for a continuance could have been met if the continuan ce had been granted, (3) the extent to which granting the continuance would have inconvenienced the court and the opposing party, including witnesses, [and] (4) the extent to which the appellant might have suffered harm as a result of the district court’s denial. United States v. Mejia , 69 F.3d 309, 314 (9th Cir. 1995) (alterations omitted). The first and third factors weigh against defendants in this case, and the fourth factor—the requirement of prejudice—is d ecisive. “[I]n order to obtain a reversal, appellant must show at a minimum that he has suffered prejudice as a result of the denial of his request.” Id. at 314–15. Because the defendants suffered no prejudice from the timing or absence of the disclosures they sought under Bradyand the13 Jencks Act, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ motions for a continuance. VII. The Request for a Specific Unanimity Instruction Defendants argue that the district court should have specifically instructed the jury that to satisfy the statutory definition of an illegal gambling business under 18 U.S.C. § 1955, all members of the jury would have to agree that the same five participants were involved in the busine ss for the same 30-day period. Defendants did not request such an instruction, so the court’s decision not to issue one is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Treadwell , 593 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2010). “Usually a general unanimity instruction suffices.” United States v. Gilley , 836 F.2d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 1988). This case is no exception. The court’s decision not to issue a specific unanimity instruction sua sponte was not plainly erroneous, because this case was “sufficien tly simple and clear in its presentation that unanimity can be assumed ba sed on the general instruction,” United States v. Ferris , 719 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1983), quoted in Gilley , 836 F.3d at 1212. Unlike Gilley , this case posed no serious risk of jury confusion. This case dealt with one cast of characters involved in a single gambling business that operated (during the relevant time period) at justone location. Under those circumstances14 the district court’s decision not to issue a more specific unanimity instruction did not “prejudice[] the defendant[s’] substan tial right to a unanimous jury verdict as granted by Article III, § 2, and the Sixth Amendment.” Gilley , 836 F.3d at 1212. VIII. The District Court’s Response to the Jury’s Question Concerning Counts 5–8 The jury asked the district court to clarify its instruction concerning Counts 5–8, and both Brunn and Terragna objected to the district court’s response. We generally review a response to a jury’s inquiry for abuse of discretion, but we review de novo whether an instruction misstates the law or violates due process. See United States v. Verduzco , 373 F.3d 1022, 1030 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004). Brunn’s argument is that the district court’s instructions, as clarified by the court’s response, would have allowed the jury to “convict[] both Brunn and Terragna as aiding and abetting in th e substantive Hobbs Act counts without establishing that some principal had the requisite intent.” That is not true; the instructions on aiding and abetting to wh ich the district court referred the jury explicitly stated that the Government ha d to prove that the underlying offense had been “committed by someone.” Brunn’s argument therefore fails. See United States v. Vaandering , 50 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The jury instruction was not so misleading that the jury would have believed it could convict one or both15 defendants of aiding and abetting without believing that the law had been violated.”). Terragna’s argument is similarly problematic. She argues that the district court’s response to the jury’s query w ould have allowed the jury to convict Terragna of aiding and abetting without ever finding that a principal had committed the underlying offenses. But as mentioned above, the district court’s instructions required the Government to prove that the underlying offense had been committed. Moreover, the district court’s response stated that the jury could not convict Terragna of aiding and abetti ng Brunn unless they found that Brunn had “indeed committed the crime.” IX

. The Sufficiency of the Evidence against Terragna and Brunn Both Terragna and Brunn challenge th e sufficiency of the evidence to convict them of certain counts. We revi ew sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges in two steps. First, we “must consider the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” United States v. Nevils , 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). This requireme nt precludes the extensive reweighing and selective examination of facts in which both appellants’ briefs engage. Our second task is to determine whether the “eviden ce, so viewed, is adequate to allow ‘ any rational trier of fact [to find] the essential elements of the crime beyond a16 reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Terragna challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict her of Counts 1–3. To convict Terragna of each cons piracy count, Counts 1 and 3, the Government had to prove that she entered the conspiracy and that at least one conspirator performed at least one overt act in furtherance thereof. See Mincoff , 574 F.3d at 1198. To convict her of Count 2, the Government had to prove that she conducted, financed, managed, supervised, directed, or owned all or part of the illegal gambling business. See 18 U.S.C. § 1955. The evidence presented at trial, taken in the light most favorable to the Government, was sufficient to convict Te rragna on all three counts. Particularly relevant was Charles Gilman’s testimony th at he and Terragna had an agreement to open a cockfighting operation together, his testimony that Terragna received a fourth of the proceeds from the cockfights and $1000 out of every $4500 collected at the gate, John Saguibo’s testimony that Terragna was a partner in the cockfights, his testimony that Terragna anticipated be ing able to set up a new cockfighting operation if she broke away from Gilman , and his testimony that Terragna had advance notice of when the Narcotics/Vi ce gambling detail would be coming to the cockfights.17 Brunn challenges his convictions on Count s 3–8. Just as in Terragna’s case, to convict Brunn of each conspiracy, the G overnment had to prove that he entered the conspiracy and that at least one cons pirator performed at least one overt act in furtherance thereof. See Mincoff , 574 F.3d at 1198. To convict him of the four extortion charges, the Government had to prove that he (1) in any way or degree obstructed, delayed, or affected comme rce (2) by extortion, which is (3) the obtaining of property from another, (4) with his consent, (5) induced by wrongful use of (a) actual or threatened force, viol ence, or fear, or (b) under color of official right. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Just as with Terragna, the evidence against Brunn was sufficient to convict him. Particularly relevant was Charles Gilman’s testimony that Brunn sent a patrol vehicle to park in front of the cockfights to teach Charles Gilman a lesson, Charles Gilman’s testimony that he made paym ents to Terragna and Brunn because he feared that Brunn would send police to the cockfights to stop them, and John Saguibo’s testimony that Brunn attended a meeting with Charles Gilman and Bryson Apo where they discussed the cockfights and keeping quiet about bribes that were being paid to police officers.1 Terragna does not mention Wharton’s Ru le by name in her brief, but her attorney did so at the hearing concerning Terragna’s posttrial motion for acquittal. 18 X. Whether Count 4 Merged with Counts 5–8 as to Terragna Terragna argues that the district c ourt should have entered a judgment of acquittal for Counts 5–8 (which alleged that she aided and abetted Brunn’s extortion from Charles Gilman) because the jury found her not guilty of Count 4 (which alleged a conspiracy to extort money from Gilman). We review the denial of a motion for acquittal de novo. See United States v. Sutcliffe , 505 F.3d 944, 959 (9th Cir. 2007). In general, a defendant can be convict ed both for a conspiracy to commit a crime and for committing that crime. See Pinkerton v. United States , 328 U.S. 640, 643–44 (1946). Wharton’s Rule is a judicial presumption against dual prosecutions for conspiracy and certain substantive crimes: those that necessarily entail an agreement between two people, such as adultery, incest, bigamy, and dueling. See Iannelli v. United States , 420 U.S. 770, 773–74 & n.5, 782–83 (1975). Terragna argues that Wharton’s Rule should have precluded dual prosecutions for conspiracy and aiding and abetting. 1 But the rule does not apply to the crime of aiding and abetting. That crime does not requi re an agreement, so it can be charged19 and punished separately from conspiracy. See United States v. Huber , 772 F.2d 585, 591–92 (9th Cir. 1985). XI. Leadership Role Enhancements The Gilmans each challenge the senten ce enhancements they received for holding leadership roles in the gambling busin ess. We review “the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts of this case for abuse of discretion, and the district court’s factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Stoterau , 524 F.3d 988, 997 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Kimbrew , 406 F.3d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir. 2005)). The Gilmans argue that their se ntence enhancements resulted from impermissible double counting because both the crime of conducting an illegal gambling business and the adjustment for holding a leadership position in a criminal activity require at least fi ve participants. 18 U.S.C. § 1955; U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. The enhancement does not invol ve double counting because it includes an element distinct from the crime itself, namely a leadership role. “If . . . it is possible to be sentenced under a partic ular offense guideline without having engaged in a certain sort of behavior, su ch behavior may be used to enhance the offense level, for in this situation, the guideline’s base offense level will not20 necessarily have been set to capture th e full extent of the wrongfulness of such behavior.” United States v. Reese , 2 F.3d 870, 895 (9th Cir. 1993). A leadership role is not a necessary element of the crime of “conduct[ing], financ[ing], supervis[ing], direct[ing], or own[ing] all or part of an illegal gambling business.” 18 U.S.C. § 1955. It is possible, for example, to finance such a business without organizing, leading, managing, or superv ising it. Thus, the application of the leadership role adjustment does not involve impermissible double counting. Douglas Gilman, Sr., challenges the factual basis for the district court’s imposition of a four-point enhancement for hi s role as an “organizer or leader” of the gambling business. Even if Douglas G ilman, Sr., were correct that he did not own the business or receive the largest share of the proceed s, the enhancement would still be appropriate based on evidence inthe record that he directed Charles Gilman to set up the tent, ordered the payo ffs to Terragna, and parceled out to the workers tips from gamblers who sat in the sh ade of the tent. On this evidence, the district court’s finding that Douglas Gilm an, Sr., was an organizer or leader was not clearly erroneous. William Gilman also challenges the factual basis for his three-point “manager or supervisor” adjustment. The court relied on evidence that William operated dice tables, received proceeds fro m the chicken fights, and could choose2 The probation office recommended William Gilman’s “manager or supervisor” adjustment based on a disputedportion of the presentence report. The district court did not clearly rule on the dispute, but we conclude that the district court complied with Rule 32 by indicating that it would “proceed with the understanding that William Gilman was not involved in putting up or taking down . . . the equipment that was used at the chicken fights.” See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3) (allowing the district court to avoid ruling on a disputed portion of the presentence report by deciding that “the court will not consider the matter in sentencing”). 21 his method of payment. 2This evidence did not necessarily mean that he qualified for the “manager or supervisor” adjustment. “To qualify for an adjustment under [U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1], the defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants .” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2 (emphasis added). We must vacate a se ntence that imposes this enhancement absent evidence that the defendant supervised another participant. See United States v. Woods , 335 F.3d 993, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2003). In determining whether the requirement of supervising another participant has been met, “the court must focus on wh at the defendant did, in relation to at least one other participant, in the commission of the offense.” United States v. Jordan , 291 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Frankhauser , 80 F.3d 641, 655 (1st Cir. 1996)). The district court examined the evidence con cerning what William did in relation to the business’s customers, but pointed to no evidence th at he supervised another participant in the22 business. The customers who placed bets atWilliam’s table were not “participants” in the illegal gambling business. “A ‘participant’ is a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offens e, but need not have been convicted.” Woods , 335 F.3d at 1001 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.1). Thus, the district court erred by imposing the “manager or supervisor” enhancement in calculating the advisory guideline range for William. We vacate his sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing. See Jordan , 291 F.3d at 1099. XII. Cumulative Error The district court made no errors be yond applying a three-level enhancement to William Gilman’s offense level, as de scribed above. As a result, there was no prejudicial effect of mi nor errors to accumulate. See, e.g. , United States v. Jeremiah , 493 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2007). XIII. Conclusion We affirm in full as to Defendants Micha Terragna, No. 09-10211; Kevin Brunn, No. 09-10212; Douglas Gilman, Sr., No. 09-10230; and Douglas Gilman, Jr., No. 09-10248. We affirm William Gilman’s judgment of conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand his case, No. 09-10257, for resentencing. AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.