An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA14-926

Filed: 21 April 2015

Wayne County, Nos. 12 CRS 5176, 50514

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

RAYANNA L. PATIN

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 7 April 2014 by Judge Arnold O. 

Jones, II, in Wayne County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 January 

2015.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Torrey D. Dixon, 

for the State.

Winifred H. Dillon for defendant-appellant.

DIETZ, Judge.

Defendant Rayanna Patin appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation 

and activation of her sentences in two separate drug offense cases. After repeatedly 

violating the conditions of her probation and serving 90-day periods of incarceration, 

Patin tested positive for marijuana, violating a condition of her probation. The State 

sought to revoke her probation based on the failed drug test and her failure to pay 

her court debt. 
STATE V. PATIN

Opinion of the Court

- 2 -

The trial court revoked Patin’s probation in both cases, finding that she 

violated both conditions alleged by the State (the failed drug test and the failure to 

pay court debt). The court did not check the box on the judgment form indicating that 

each violation, standing alone, was sufficient in the trial court’s discretion to revoke 

Patin’s probation. 

Patin argues that the trial court erred because there was insufficient evidence 

to show that she failed to pay her court debt. We agree with respect to one of her two 

cases, where the probation violation report abruptly ends mid-sentence without 

including any details of the amount Patin owes in court debt. We also hold that the 

trial court erred in its calculation of jail fees in that case (an error the State concedes 

on appeal). We therefore vacate and remand that case for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. We affirm the revocation of Patin’s probation in the 

second of her two criminal cases.

Facts and Procedural History

On 29 February 2012, Rayanna Patin pleaded guilty to possession of 

pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine in Wayne 

County Case No. 12 CRS 50514. The trial court sentenced her to 13-25 months 

imprisonment, suspended her sentence, ordered her to serve 120 days in jail, and 

placed her on 36 months supervised probation. As conditions of her probation, the 

court ordered Patin to “[n]ot use, possess, or control any illegal drug or controlled 
STATE V. PATIN

Opinion of the Court

- 3 -

substance,” to submit to a substance abuse assessment, to not possess any drug 

paraphernalia, and to pay the necessary jail fees.

Seven months later, on 18 September 2012, Patin again pleaded guilty to

possession of pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine in 

Lenoir County Case No. 11 CRS 50728, which became Wayne County Case No. 12 

CRS 5176. The trial court sentenced Patin to 15-18 months imprisonment, suspended 

her sentence, ordered her to serve 120 days in jail, and placed her on supervised 

probation for 36 months. The court also gave her credit for 206 days of pretrial 

confinement.

On 17 October 2012, Patin’s probation officer filed two probation violation 

reports (one for each case) alleging that Patin violated her probation by residing with 

a person also on probation for the possession or distribution of a methamphetamine 

precursor. Patin admitted to violating the terms of her probation and the court 

ordered her to serve 90 days confinement with 19 days of credit. The court modified 

her probation, ordering her to six months of house arrest with electronic monitoring, 

to submit to drug screens, and to not test positive for drugs.

On 7 June 2013, Patin’s probation officer filed two probation violation reports 

alleging that Patin violated her probation by being in arrears on her court debt in 

both cases. Two days later, her probation officer filed additional violation reports 

alleging that Patin moved once in April, twice in May, and again in June without 
STATE V. PATIN

Opinion of the Court

- 4 -

notifying her probation officer. On 1 July 2013, the trial court found Patin violated 

the terms of her probation and ordered her to serve 90 days confinement with 21 days 

of credit.

Patin’s probation officer filed two more violation reports on 1 April 2014 

alleging that Patin violated the terms of her probation by testing positive for 

marijuana and being in arrears on her court debt. The trial court held a hearing on 

7 April 2014 and Patin waived her right to counsel. At the hearing, Patin admitted 

to testing positive for marijuana stating that she relapsed after suffering a 

miscarriage. The trial court found that Patin violated the terms of her probation as 

set out in the violation reports and revoked her probation. The court activated her 

sentences in each case and ordered them to run consecutively. The court also ordered 

the arrearages in each case be entered as civil judgments. Patin timely appealed.

Analysis

I. Jail Fees

Patin first argues that the amount of jail fees the court ordered her to pay as 

part of the judgment in Case No. 12 CRS 5176 exceeded the amount she was obligated 

to pay under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-313. The State concedes that the trial court erred 

in its calculation of jail fees and we agree.

After a conviction, a defendant may be assessed costs by the court, including 

jail fees. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-304(c) (2013). Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-313 (2013), 
STATE V. PATIN

Opinion of the Court

- 5 -

a person who is “lawfully confined in jail awaiting trial” is liable for costs “for each 24 

hours’ confinement, or fraction thereof.” Prior to August 2011, the jail fee was set at 

$5.00 per day. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-313 (2011). In 2011, the General Assembly 

amended the statute to raise the fee from $5.00 per day to $10.00 per day to be 

effective 1 August 2011. 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 145 § 31.26(e). 

Here, Patin pleaded guilty to possession of pseudoephedrine with the intent to 

manufacture methamphetamine and the court assessed her costs at $2,424.50, which 

included $2,060 in jail fees. The court gave her credit for 206 days of pretrial 

confinement. Thus, the court assessed Patin a jail fee of $10.00 per day for the entire 

206 days.

Patin was arrested on 18 March 2011 and confined in the Lenoir County Jail. 

On 12 August 2011, she posted bail and the court released her on bond. From 18 

March 2011 to 31 July 2011, 136 days of the 206 day credit, Patin was subject to the 

earlier version of N.C. Gen. Stat § 7A-313 effective prior to 1 August 2011 and the 

court should have assessed Patin a jail fee of $5.00 per day during this time. Because 

the court assessed a $10.00 per day fee for the entire 206 day credit, Patin’s jail fee 

exceeded the amount authorized by statute. Therefore, we vacate this portion of the 

trial court’s order and remand to the trial court for the proper jail fee assessment. 
STATE V. PATIN

Opinion of the Court

- 6 -

II. Jurisdiction to Revoke Probation

Patin next argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment 

revoking her probation in Case No. 12 CRS 5176 because the violation report in that 

case did not provide sufficient notice of the alleged violation. We disagree.

Before a court can revoke a defendant’s probation, it must hold a hearing. N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 15A-1345(e) (2013). “The State must give the probationer notice of the 

hearing and its purpose, including a statement of the violations alleged.” Id. The 

purpose of this notice “is to allow the defendant to prepare a defense and to protect 

the defendant from a second probation violation hearing for the same act. State v. 

Hubbard, 198 N.C. App. 154, 158, 678 S.E.2d 390, 393 (2009).

Here, the allegations of the probation violation report stated that Patin 

willfully violated:

1. Condition of Probation “Not use, possess or control 

any illegal drug or controlled substance unless it has been 

prescribed for the defendant by a licensed physician and is 

in the original container with the prescription number 

affixed on it . . .” in that

THE DEFENDANT TESTED POSITIVE [FOR] 

MARIJUANA ON 03/26/2014. JUDGE ARNOLD JONES 

ORDERED ON 11/05/2012, IF THE DEFENDANT TEST 

POSITIVE FOR ANY ILLEGAL DRUGS SHE IS TO BE 

ARRESTED UNDER A $30,000.00 BOND.

2. Condition of Probation “The defendant shall pay to 

the Clerk of Superior Court the “Total Amount Due” as 

directed by the Court or probation officer” in that
STATE V. PATIN

Opinion of the Court

- 7 -

Paragraph 2 in this probation revocation report abruptly ends after the words 

“in that.” Thus, the allegation is certainly incomplete in the sense that it is not a 

complete sentence. But our case law does not require the revocation notice to be 

completely grammatical; it need only contain sufficient information to permit Patin 

to prepare a defense for her hearing. See Hubbard, 198 N.C. App. at 158, 678 S.E.2d 

at 393. Here, the report alleged that Patin violated her probation by failing to pay 

the “‘Total Amount Due’ as directed by the Court or probation officer.” This statement

is sufficient to permit Patin to prepare a defense to the allegation and to prevent 

Patin from being subjected to a second violation hearing for the same alleged act. 

III. Revocation of Patin’s Probation

Finally, Patin argues that the trial court erred in revoking her probation

because the State presented no evidence that she actually was “in arrears on her 

court indebtedness.” With respect to the violation report in Case No. 12 CRS 5176,

described above, we are constrained to agree. We therefore vacate and remand 

Patin’s probation revocation in that case. However, we affirm the probation 

revocation in Case No. 12 CRS 50514. 

Under the Justice Reinvestment Act, a court ordinarily may revoke a 

defendant’s probation only if she commits a new crime or absconds. N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 15A-1344(a) (2013). If a defendant violates a condition of probation other than a 

new crime or absconding, “the court may impose a period of confinement of 90 
STATE V. PATIN

Opinion of the Court

- 8 -

consecutive days.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(d2). But after imposition of two 

separate 90-day periods of confinement under § 15A-1344(d2), the court may revoke 

a defendant’s probation for violating any condition of probation. See id.

Here, it is undisputed that the trial court previously had imposed two separate 

90-day periods of confinement for prior probation violations. Thus, if the trial court 

found that Patin again had violated any condition of probation, the court had the 

authority to revoke her probation and require that she serve her sentence.

Notably, Patin conceded that she violated a condition of her probation in both 

of her cases. As a condition of both terms of probation, Patin was required to be drug 

tested and to not test positive for illegal drugs. At the revocation hearing, Patin 

testified that she tested positive for marijuana, explaining that she “had a 

miscarriage and . . . relapsed . . . it’s the first drug test I failed.”

This violation, standing alone, is sufficient to permit the trial court, in its 

discretion, to revoke Patin’s probation. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(d2); State v. 

Kornegay, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 745 S.E.2d 880, 882 (2013). But the trial court also 

found in both cases that Patin violated a second, separate condition of probation 

requiring her to pay her court fees. In addition, the trial court did not check a box on 

the judgment form stating that “[e]ach violation is, in and of itself, a sufficient basis 

upon which this Court should revoke probation and activate the suspended sentence,”

nor did the court state at the hearing that it believed each violation, standing alone, 
STATE V. PATIN

Opinion of the Court

- 9 -

supported revocation. As a result, this Court cannot determine whether the trial 

court, in its discretion, would have revoked Patin’s probation based solely on the 

positive drug test, without also finding that Patin had failed to pay her court fees. 

Accordingly, we can uphold the revocation in each of Patin’s two revocation cases only 

if we determine that both grounds for revocation are supported by the record.

With respect to Case No. 12 CRS 50514, we hold that the trial court’s probation 

revocation is supported by competent evidence. A probation violation “need not be 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1345(e); State v. Tennant, 

141 N.C. App. 524, 526, 540 S.E.2d 807, 808 (2000). All that is required is “that the 

evidence be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge in the exercise of his sound 

discretion that the defendant has willfully violated a valid condition of probation or 

that the defendant has violated without lawful excuse a valid condition upon which 

the sentence was suspended.” State v. Young, 190 N.C. App. 458, 459, 660 S.E.2d 

574, 576 (2008). “The judge’s finding of such a violation, if supported by competent 

evidence, will not be overturned absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion.” 

Id.

In Case No. 12 CRS 50514, the State submitted a verified probation violation 

report in which the probation officer swore under oath that “the defendant is $825.00 

in arrears on her court indebtedness.” Our Supreme Court has held that a verified 

report of a state probation officer stating the alleged violations in detail is competent 
STATE V. PATIN

Opinion of the Court

- 10 -

evidence to support revocation. State v. Duncan, 270 N.C. 241, 246, 154 S.E.2d 53, 

58 (1967). Thus, the verified violation report in Case No. 12 CRS 50514 was 

competent evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that Patin violated the 

condition of her probation requiring her to pay her court debt. 

In Case No. 12 CRS 5176, by contrast, the probation violation report did not 

include any information concerning the actual amount of court debt that Patin owed. 

To be sure, the violation report indicated that Patin violated a condition of her 

probation by failing to pay the amount due. But after the words “in that,” which 

signaled that the report will provide further details of the violation, the allegations 

abruptly end. There is no other evidence in the record establishing the actual amount 

of court debt that Patin was required to pay. We are therefore constrained to hold 

that this probation violation is not supported by competent evidence. 

As noted above, on remand the trial court may enter judgment revoking Patin’s 

probation based solely on the finding that Patin tested positive for marijuana—a fact 

that Patin conceded at the revocation hearing. We vacate and remand only because 

we cannot determine whether the trial court, in its discretion, would have revoked 

Patin’s probation solely on that ground, without the accompanying finding that Patin 

failed to pay her court debt. 
STATE V. PATIN

Opinion of the Court

- 11 -

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment in Case No. 12 CRS 50514 but vacate and 

remand the judgment in Case No. 12 CRS 5176 for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.

Judges STEELMAN and INMAN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).