Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 236 / Wednesday, December 9, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 76379 

fewer losses on an aggregate basis than 

Class A interests, the Class B interests 

would not qualify as common equity 

tier 1 capital. However, where the 

membership interests provide for 

disproportionate allocation of profits, 

such as described in the example in 

paragraph (c)(4) of this section, and the 

reallocation of prior distributions would 

be limited to reversing the 

disproportionate portions of prior 

distributions, both the Class A and Class 

B interests could qualify as common 

equity tier 1 capital provided that they 

met all the other criteria in § 217.20(b). 

§ 217.502 Application of the Board’s 

Regulatory Capital Framework to Employee 

Stock Ownership Plans that are Depository 

Institution Holding Companies and Certain 

Trusts that are Savings and Loan Holding 

Companies. 

(a) Employee Stock Ownership Plans. 

Notwithstanding § 217.1(c), a bank 

holding company or covered savings 

and loan holding company that is an 

employee stock ownership plan is 

exempt from this part until the Board 

adopts regulations that directly relate to 

the application of capital regulations to 

employee stock ownership plans. 

(b) Personal or Family Trusts. 

Notwithstanding § 217.1(c), a covered 

savings and loan holding company is 

exempt from this part if it is a personal 

or family trust and not a business trust 

until the Board adopts regulations that 

apply capital regulations to such a 

covered savings and loan holding 

company. 

By order of the Board of Governors of the 

Federal Reserve System, December 4, 2015. 

Robert deV. Frierson, 

Secretary of the Board. 

[FR Doc. 2015–31013 Filed 12–8–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 23 

[Docket No. FAA–2015–3464; Special 

Conditions No. 23–272–SC] 

Special Conditions: Cirrus Aircraft 

Corporation, SF50; Auto Throttle 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the Cirrus Aircraft 

Corporation Model SF50 airplane. This 

airplane will have a novel or unusual 

design feature(s) associated with 

installation of an Auto Throttle System. 

The applicable airworthiness 

regulations do not contain adequate or 

appropriate safety standards for this 

design feature. These special conditions 

contain the additional safety standards 

that the Administrator considers 

necessary to establish a level of safety 

equivalent to that established by the 

existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: The effective date of these 

special conditions is December 9, 2015 

and are applicable on December 2, 2015. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeff 

Pretz, Regulations and Policy Branch, 

ACE–111, Federal Aviation 

Administration, Small Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification 

Service, ACE–111, 901 Locust, Room 

301, Kansas City, MO 64106; telephone 

(816) 329–3239, facsimile (816) 329– 

4090. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

On September 9, 2008, Cirrus Aircraft 

Corporation applied for a type 

certificate for their new Model SF50. On 

December 11, 2012 Cirrus elected to 

adjust the certification basis of the SF50 

to include 14 CFR part 23 through 

amendment 62. The SF50 is a low-wing, 

7-seat (5 adults and 2 children), 

pressurized, retractable gear, carbon 

composite airplane with one turbofan 

engine mounted partially in the upper 

aft fuselage. It is constructed largely of 

carbon and fiberglass composite 

materials. Like other Cirrus products, 

the SF50 includes a ballistically 

deployed airframe parachute. The SF50 

has a maximum operating altitude of 

28,000 feet and the maximum takeoff 

weight will be at or below 6,000 pounds 

with a range at economy cruise of 

roughly 1,000 nautical miles. 

Current part 23 airworthiness 

regulations do not contain appropriate 

safety standards for an Auto Throttle 

System (ATS) installation; therefore, 

special conditions are required to 

establish an acceptable level of safety. 

Part 25 regulations contain appropriate 

safety standards for these systems, 

making the intent for this project to 

apply the language in § 25.1329 for the 

auto throttle, while substituting 

§ 23.1309 and § 23.143 in place of the 

similar part 25 regulations referenced in 

§ 25.1329. In addition, malfunction of 

the ATS to perform its intended 

function shall be evaluated per the Loss 

of Thrust Control (LOTC) criteria 

established under part 33 for electronic 

engine controls. An analysis must show 

that no single failure or malfunction or 

probable combinations of failures of the 

ATS will permit the LOTC probability 

to exceed those established under part 

33 for an electronic engine control. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, 

Cirrus must show that the Model SF50 

meets the applicable provisions of part 

23, as amended by amendments 23–1 

through 23–62 thereto. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., 14 CFR part 23) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the SF50 because of a novel or 

unusual design feature, special 

conditions are prescribed under the 

provisions of § 21.16. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same or similar novel 

or unusual design feature, the special 

conditions would also apply to the other 

model under § 21.101. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the SF50 must comply with 

the fuel vent and exhaust emission 

requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the 

noise certification requirements of 14 

CFR part 36 and the FAA must issue a 

finding of regulatory adequacy under 

section 611 of Public Law 92–574, the 

Noise Control Act of 1972. 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance 

with § 11.38, and they become part of 

the type-certification basis under 

§ 21.17(a)(2). 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The SF50 will incorporate the 

following novel or unusual design 

features: An ATS as part of the 

automatic flight control system. The 

ATS utilizes a Garmin ‘‘smart’’ autopilot 

servo with a physical connection to the 

throttle quadrant control linkage. The 

auto throttle may be controlled by the 

pilot with an optional auto throttle 

control panel adjacent to the throttle 

lever. The auto throttle also provides an 

envelope protection function which 

does not require installation of the 

optional control panel. 

Discussion 

Part 23 currently does not sufficiently 

address auto throttle (also referred to as 

auto thrust) technology and safety 

concerns. Therefore, special conditions 

must be developed and applied to this 

project to ensure an acceptable level of 

safety has been obtained. For approval 

to use the ATS during flight, the SF50 

must demonstrate compliance to the 

intent of the requirements of § 25.1329, 


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76380 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 236 / Wednesday, December 9, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 

applying the appropriate part 23 

references to § 23.1309 (to include 

performing a functional hazard 

assessment or system safety assessment 

to determine the applicable Software 

and Airborne Electronic Hardware 

assurance levels, and compliance to 

DO–178C & DO–254, as required) and 

§ 23.143. 

In addition, a malfunction of the ATS 

to perform its intended function is an 

LOTC event, and may result in a total 

loss of thrust control, transients, or 

uncommanded thrust changes. The 

classification of the failure condition for 

an LOTC event on a Class II singleengine aircraft is hazardous for aircraft 

that stall at or below 61 knots. From 

publication AC 23.1309–1E, based upon 

failure probability values shown in 

Figure 2, an LOTC event would have to 

meet a probability of failure value not to 

exceed 1 × 10¥6. In-service data for 

LOTC in single-engine turbine aircraft 

shows LOTC events exceed this 

probability; therefore, part 33 

requirements for engine control 

probabilities will be accepted for the 

part 23 LOTC requirement. 

The probabilities of failure for an 

LOTC event on a turbine engine shall 

not exceed the following (see AC33.28– 

1 and ANE–1993–33.28TLD–R1 for 

further guidance): 

1. Average Events per Million Hours: 10 

(1×10¥05 per hour) 

2. Maximum Events per Million Hours: 100 

(1×10¥04 per hour) 

Note: The maximum events per flight hour 

are intended for Time Limited Dispatch 

(TLD) operation where the risk exposure is 

mitigated by limiting the time in which the 

aircraft is operated in the degraded 

condition. 

Discussion of Comments 

Notice of proposed special conditions 

No. 23–15–04–SC for the Cirrus Aircraft 

Corporation Model SF50 airplanes was 

published in the Federal Register on 

August 21, 2015 (80 FR 50808). No 

comments were received, and the 

special conditions are adopted as 

proposed. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the Model 

SF50. Should Cirrus apply at a later date 

for a change to the type certificate to 

include another model incorporating the 

same novel or unusual design feature, 

the special conditions would apply to 

that model as well. 

Under standard practice, the effective 

date of final special conditions would 

be 30 days after the date of publication 

in the Federal Register; however, as the 

certification date for the Cirrus Aircraft 

Corporation Model SF50 airplane is 

imminent, the FAA finds that good 

cause exists to make these special 

conditions effective upon issuance. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on one model 

of airplanes. It is not a rule of general 

applicability and it affects only the 

applicant who applied to the FAA for 

approval of these features on the 

airplane. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and 

symbols. 

Citation 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704, 14 CFR 21.16 and 14 CFR 

11.38 and 11.19. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for Cirrus Aircraft 

Corporation Model SF50 airplanes. 

1. Certification of Auto Throttle System 

Under Part 23 

a. Quick disengagement controls for 

the auto thrust functions must be 

provided for each pilot. The auto thrust 

quick disengagement controls must be 

located on the thrust control levers. 

Quick disengagement controls must be 

readily accessible to each pilot while 

operating the thrust control levers. 

b. The effects of a failure of the system 

to disengage the auto thrust functions 

when manually commanded by the pilot 

must be assessed in accordance with the 

requirements of § 23.1309. 

c. Engagement or switching of the 

flight guidance system, a mode, or a 

sensor may not cause the auto thrust 

system to affect a transient response that 

alters the airplane’s flight path any 

greater than a minor transient, as 

defined in paragraph (l)(1) of this 

section. 

d. Under normal conditions, the 

disengagement of any automatic control 

function of a flight guidance system may 

not cause a transient response of the 

airplane’s flight path any greater than a 

minor transient. 

e. Under rare normal and non-normal 

conditions, disengagement of any 

automatic control function of a flight 

guidance system may not result in a 

transient any greater than a significant 

transient, as defined in paragraph (l)(2) 

of this section. 

f. The function and direction of 

motion of each command reference 

control, such as heading select or 

vertical speed, must be plainly 

indicated on, or adjacent to, each 

control if necessary to prevent 

inappropriate use or confusion. 

g. Under any condition of flight 

appropriate to its use, the flight 

guidance system may not produce 

hazardous loads on the airplane, nor 

create hazardous deviations in the flight 

path. This applies to both fault-free 

operation and in the event of a 

malfunction, and assumes that the pilot 

begins corrective action within a 

reasonable period of time. 

h. When the flight guidance system is 

in use, a means must be provided to 

avoid excursions beyond an acceptable 

margin from the speed range of the 

normal flight envelope. If the airplane 

experiences an excursion outside this 

range, a means must be provided to 

prevent the flight guidance system from 

providing guidance or control to an 

unsafe speed. 

i. The flight guidance system 

functions, controls, indications, and 

alerts must be designed to minimize 

flight crew errors and confusion 

concerning the behavior and operation 

of the flight guidance system. Means 

must be provided to indicate the current 

mode of operation, including any armed 

modes, transitions, and reversions. 

Selector switch position is not an 

acceptable means of indication. The 

controls and indications must be 

grouped and presented in a logical and 

consistent manner. The indications 

must be visible to each pilot under all 

expected lighting conditions. 

j. Following disengagement of the 

auto thrust function, a caution (visual 

and auditory) must be provided to each 

pilot. 

k. During auto thrust operation, it 

must be possible for the flight crew to 

move the thrust levers without requiring 

excessive force. The auto thrust may not 

create a potential hazard when the flight 

crew applies an override force to the 

thrust levers. 

l. For purposes of this section, a 

transient is a disturbance in the control 

or flight path of the airplane that is not 

consistent with response to flight crew 

inputs or environmental conditions. 

(1) A minor transient would not 

significantly reduce safety margins and 

would involve flight crew actions that 

are well within their capabilities. A 

minor transient may involve a slight 

increase in flight crew workload or 

some physical discomfort to passengers 

or cabin crew. 

(2) A significant transient may lead to 

a significant reduction in safety 


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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 236 / Wednesday, December 9, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 76381 

margins, an increase in flight crew 

workload, discomfort to the flight crew, 

or physical distress to the passengers or 

cabin crew, possibly including non-fatal 

injuries. Significant transients do not 

require, in order to remain within or 

recover to the normal flight envelope, 

any of the following: 

i. Exceptional piloting skill, alertness, 

or strength. 

ii. Forces applied by the pilot which 

are greater than those specified in 

§ 23.143(c). 

iii. Accelerations or attitudes in the 

airplane that might result in further 

hazard to secured or non-secured 

occupants. 

It must also be demonstrated, through 

tests and analysis, that no single failure 

or malfunction or probable 

combinations of failures of the auto 

thrust system components results in the 

probability for LOTC, or un-commanded 

thrust changes and transients that result 

in an LOTC event, to exceed the 

following: 

(1) Average Events per Million Hours: 10 

(1×10¥05 per hour) 

(2) Maximum Events per Million Hours: 100 

(1×10¥04 per hour) 

Note: The term ‘‘probable’’ in the context 

of ‘‘probable combination of failures’’ does 

not have the same meaning as used for a 

safety assessment process. The term 

‘‘probable’’ in ‘‘probable combination of 

failures’’ means ‘‘foreseeable,’’ or those 

failure conditions anticipated to occur one or 

more times during the operational life of each 

airplane. 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on 

December 2, 2015. 

Patrick Mullen, 

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2015–31058 Filed 12–8–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2015–3783; Directorate 

Identifier 2015–SW–027–AD; Amendment 

39–18342; AD 2015–25–04] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Agusta 

S.p.A. Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta 

S.p.A. (Agusta) Model A109A and 

A109A II helicopters. This AD requires 

inspecting the slider assembly pitch 

control (slider) for play and replacing 

the slider if the play exceeds certain 

limits. This AD is prompted by a report 

of excessive slider play and wear that 

was detected during a scheduled 

inspection of a Model A109A II 

helicopter. These actions are intended 

to detect and prevent excessive wear 

and play on a slider, which could lead 

to loss of tail rotor pitch control and 

consequently loss of helicopter control. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

December 24, 2015. 

We must receive comments on this 

AD by February 8, 2016. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Docket: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: Send comments to the U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery: Deliver to the 

‘‘Mail’’ address between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2015– 

3783; or in person at the Docket 

Operations Office between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the European Aviation 

Safety Agency (EASA) AD, the 

economic evaluation, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for the Docket Operations 

Office (telephone 800–647–5527) is in 

the ADDRESSES section. Comments will 

be available in the AD docket shortly 

after receipt. 

For service information identified in 

this AD, contact AgustaWestland, 

Product Support Engineering, Via del 

Gregge, 100, 21015 Lonate Pozzolo (VA) 

Italy, ATTN: Maurizio D’Angelo; 

telephone 39–0331–664757; fax 39– 

0331–664680; or at http://

www.agustawestland.com/technicalbulletins. You may review the 

referenced service information at the 

FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, 

Southwest Region, Room 6N–321, 10101 

Hillwood Pkwy, Fort Worth, TX 76177. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Martin R. Crane, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, Safety Management Group, 

Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 10101 

Hillwood Pkwy, Fort Worth, TX 76177; 

telephone (817) 222–5110; email 

martin.r.crane@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

This AD is a final rule that involves 

requirements affecting flight safety, and 

we did not provide you with notice and 

an opportunity to provide your 

comments prior to it becoming effective. 

However, we invite you to participate in 

this rulemaking by submitting written 

comments, data, or views. We also 

invite comments relating to the 

economic, environmental, energy, or 

federalism impacts that resulted from 

adopting this AD. The most helpful 

comments reference a specific portion of 

the AD, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. To ensure the docket 

does not contain duplicate comments, 

commenters should send only one copy 

of written comments, or if comments are 

filed electronically, commenters should 

submit them only one time. We will file 

in the docket all comments that we 

receive, as well as a report summarizing 

each substantive public contact with 

FAA personnel concerning this 

rulemaking during the comment period. 

We will consider all the comments we 

receive and may conduct additional 

rulemaking based on those comments. 

Discussion 

EASA, which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Union, has issued EASA AD No. 2015– 

0097, dated June 1, 2015, to correct an 

unsafe condition for Agusta Model 

A109A and A109A II helicopters. EASA 

advises that during a scheduled 100- 

flight-hour inspection on a Model 

A109A II helicopter, unusual play was 

detected on a part number (P/N) 109– 

0130–11–7 slider. Further investigation 

revealed excessive wear of the slider 

broaching at the point of contact with 

the tail rotor shaft. However, the cause 

of the excessive play and wear has not 

been determined. 

This condition, if not detected and 

corrected, could lead to reduced control 

of the helicopter, EASA advises. EASA 

consequently requires repetitive 

inspections of slider P/N 109–0130–11– 

7 more frequently than those performed 

at the 100-flight-hour inspection and 

corrective actions depending on the 

findings. EASA advises that its AD is an 

interim measure and further AD action 

may follow. 


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