MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2020	ME 43 Docket: And

- 19

- 186 Argued: February	13,	2020 Decided: April	7,	2020
Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	MEAD,	GORMAN, * JABAR,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v. GABRIEL	J.	HANSEN
HUMPHREY,	J. [¶1]	 	 Gabriel	 J.	 Hansen	 appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 conviction	 of	 two counts	of	unlawful	sexual	contact	(Class	B),	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	255

- A(1)(E

- 1)	(2018), entered by	 the	 trial	court (Androscoggin	County, MG	Kennedy,	J. )	after	a	jury trial,	 and	 from the	 sentences	 imposed.	 	 We	 affirm	 both	 the	 judgment	 of conviction	and	the	sentence s .

* Although	not	available	at	oral	argument,	Justice	Gorman	participated	in	the	development	of	this opinion. See M.R.	App.	P.	12(a) (2) (“A	qualified	justice	may	participate	in	a	decision	even	though	not present	at	oral	argument.”).2 I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] We	view the	evidence	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	the	verdict

. T he jury	rationally	could	have	found	the	following	facts	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.
See State	v.	Ouellette ,	2019	ME	75,	¶	2,	208	A.3d	399. [¶ 3 ]		Hansen	was	a	longtime	friend	of	the minor victim’s	family,	having previously	dated	and	been	engaged	to	the	victim’s	aunt ,	who	is	the	sister	of	the victim’s	mother .		The	 victim	had	a	close	 relationship	with	her	aunt,	and	also maintained	 a	 close	 relationship	 with	 Hansen.	 	 Even	 after	 Hansen	 and	 the victim’s	 aunt	 ended	 their	 relationship,	 he continued	 to	 babysit the	 victim occasionally ,	sometimes	at	 the	victim’s mother ’s house	and	sometimes	at	his house

. [¶ 4 ]		On	more	than	one	occasion,	when	the	victim	was	alone	with	Hansen at	his	home,	he	brought	the	victim	to	his	bedroom,	where	he convinced	her to lie down	 on	 his	 bed,	 removed her pants,	 blindfolded her with	 a	 blanket or pillow,	got	on	the	bed	with	her,	and sexually touched her .		The	victim	could	not see	what	was	touching	her	because	she	was	blindfolded,	but	it	was	something that	felt	“hard	and	soft.”		During	one	of	these	incidents,	Hansen	forced	the	victim “[t]o	do	wh at	he	wanted	[her]	to	do.”		The	victim	was	six	years	old	the	last	time3 she	 was	 alone	 with	 Hansen	 at	 his	 house.	 	 She	 “thought	 it	 was	 a	 game	 [she] played	with	him.” [¶ 5 ]		Hansen	was	charged	by	indictment	with	two	counts	of	gross	sexual assault	(Class	A),	1 7

- A	M.R.S.	§	253(1)(C)	(2018),	and	two	counts	of	unlawful sexual	contact	(Class	B),	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	255

- A(1)(E

- 1). [¶ 6 ]	 	 At	 trial,	 the	 State	 called	 the	 victim	 and	 the	 victim’s	 mother	 as witnesses.		During	the	victim’s	testimony,	Hansen	objected	to leading questions asked	by the	prosecutor.		The	court	overruled	the	objection. As	t he	prosecutor continued	 to	 ask	 leading	 questions	 during	 direct	 examination	 of	 the	 victim, Hansen	 requested	 two	 different	 sidebar conferences .	 	 During	 these	 sidebar discussions ,	 the	 court	 explained	 that	 it	 was	 satisfied	 that	 the	 State’s questioning,	 although	 leading,	 was	 within	 permissible	 boundaries,	 given	 the age	of	the	victim	and	the	subject	matter	of	the	testimony. [¶ 7 ]	 	 After	 the	 State	 rested	 its	 case,	 Hansen	 moved	 for	 a judgment	 of acquittal	on	the	two	counts	of	gross	sexual	assault	(Class	A), arguing that	the evidence	was	insufficient	for the	jury to	find	him	guilty	of	th ose	offenses beyond a	reasonable	doubt.		The	State	opposed	the	motion.		The	court	determined	that the jury	could	rationally	find	that	the	evidence	was	sufficient	to	support	a	guilty verdict	on	those	counts	and	denied	Hansen’s	motion	for	a	judgment	of	acquittal.4 [¶ 8 ]	 	 The	 jury	 found	 Hansen	 guilty	 on	 both	 counts	 of	 unlawful	 sexual contact	(Class	B)	but	ac quitted	him	on	the	two	counts	of	gross	sexual	assault (Class	A). [¶ 9 ]		Hansen	was	sentenced	to	ten	years ’ imprisonment on	the	first	count of	unlawful	sexual	contact	(Class	B),	and	a	consecutive	ten	years,	all	suspended, with	 five	 years	 of	 probation	 on	 th e	 second	 count	 of	 unlawful	 sexual	 contact (Class	B). 1 [¶1 0 ]	 	Hansen	 timely filed both a	 notice	 of appeal	 from	 the	 judgment, 15 M.R.S.	 §	 2115	 (2018); M.R.	 App.	 P.	 2B(b),	 and an application	 for	 leave	 to appeal	 his	 sentence s , 15	 M.R.S.	 §§	 2151,	 2153	 (2018); M.R.	 App. P. 20.	 	 The Sentence	Review	Panel	granted	Hansen	leave	to	appeal	his	sentence. 15 M.R.S. §	2152	(2018); M.R.	App.	P.	20(g),	(h).
II.		DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency	of	the	Evidence [¶1 1 ]		Hansen	first	argues	that	the evidence	was	insufficient	to	support his	conviction s o n the	two	counts	of	unlawful	sexual	contact	(Class	B).

1 Hansen	was	also	ordered	 to	pay	 $70	 to	 the	Victims ’ Compensation	Fund. 5	M.R.S.	 §	3360

- I (2018)

.5 [¶1 2 ]	 	 “When	 a	 defendant	 argues	 that	 the	 evidence	 is	 insufficient	 to support	his	conviction,	we	view	the	evidence	in	the	light	most	favorable	to the State	to	determine	whether	the	fact

- finder	could	rationally	find	every	element of	 the	 offense	 beyond	 a	 reasonable	 doubt.” Ouellette ,	 2019	 ME	 75,	 ¶	 11,
208 A.3d	399	(quotation	marks	omitted).		The	jury	is	free	to	draw	all	reasonable inferences	from	th e	evidence	presented,	and	“we	will	vacate	a	judgment	only where	no	trier	of	fact	rationally	could	find	proof	of	guilt	beyond	a	reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation	marks	omitted). [¶1 3 ]	 	 The	 crime	 of	 unlawful	 sexual	 contact	 (Class	 B),	 17

- A	 M.R.S. § 255

- A(1) (E

- 1),	occurs	when	a	person	“intentionally	subjects	another	person to	any	sexual	contact	and	.	.	.	[t]he	other	person,	not	the	actor’s	spouse,	is	in	fact less	than	12	years	of	age	and	the	actor	is	at	least	3	years	older.”		“Sexual	contact” is	defined	as	“a ny	touching	of	the	genitals	or	anus,	directly	or	through	clothing, other	 than	 as	 would	 constitute	 a	 sexual	 act,	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 arousing	 or gratifying	sexual	desire	or	for	the	purpose	of	causing	bodily	injury	or	offensive physical	contact.”		17

- A	M.R.S. §	251(1)(D)	(2018). [¶1 4 ]	 	 On	 this	 record,	 when	 viewed	 in	 the	 light	 most	 favorable	 to	 the State,	 the	evidence	was	sufficient	 for	 the	jury	rationally to find	 that	 the	State proved	 each	 element	 of	 the charged offense s of	 unlawful	 sexual	 contact6 (Class B)	b eyond	a	 reasonable	doubt.		 The	parties	 stipulated	at	 trial	 that	 the victim	was	not	Hansen’s	spouse. See United	States	v.	Tkhilaishvili ,	926	F.3d	1, 18	(1st	Cir.	2019) (observing	that	when	a	defendant	“affirmatively	agree[s]	to not	put	the	government	to	its	proof	of	an	element	of	a	crime,”	he	“relinquishe[s] all	 other	 defenses,	 factual	 and	 legal,	 pertaining	 to	 the	 stipulated	 element” (quotation	marks	omitted) ); State	v. Brann ,	292	A.2d	173,	185	(Me.	1972).		The victim	testified	that	she	was	seven	years	old	at	the	time	of	trial,	and	the	victim’s mother	testified	that	the	last	time	the	victim	had	been	alone	at	Hansen’s	house was	in	the	summer	of	2017,	at	which	time	the	vic tim	w as six	years	old.		There is	no	dispute	 that	Hansen,	who	was	born	in	December	1977,	is	at	least	 three years	 older	 than	 the	 victim.	 	 The	 victim’s	 testimony	 that	 she	 felt	 something “hard	and	soft”	touch	her	while	she	was alone	with	Hansen	in	his	bedroom and blindfolded	with	her	pants	down	was	sufficient	for	a	jury	to	rationally	find	that Hansen	subjected	the	victim	to	sexual	contact.		17

- A	M.R.S.	§	251(1)(D). Finally, based	on	the	victim’s	testimony,	the	jury	could	have	reasonably	inferred	that when	Hans en sexually touched	the	victim,	he	did	so	“for	the	purpose	of	arousing or	gratifying	sexual	desire	or	for	the	purpose	of	causing

. . . offensive	physical contact.” Id. ; see	also	State	v.	Pozzuoli ,	1997	ME	91,	¶	7,	693	A.2d	745	( holding that	 a	 jury	 may	 con sider,	 in	 determining	 whether	 a	 defendant	 committed7 offensive	 physical	 contact , “what	 a	 reasonable	 person	 might	 perceive	 to	 be offensive	as	well	as	the	victim’s	subjective	interpretation	of	the	contact”). [¶1 5 ]		We	conclude	that	there	is	sufficient	eviden ce	in	the	record	for	the jury	 to	have	rationally	 found	every	element	of	 the	offense	of	unlawful	sexual contact	(Class	B)	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.
B. The	Prosecutor’s	Use	of	Leading	Questions [¶1 6 ]	 	 Hansen	 also	 contends	 that	 the	 prosecutor’s	 leading	 ques tions during	the	direct	examination	of	the child victim	compromised	his	right	to	a	fair trial. [¶1 7 ]		Trial judges have	“broad	discretion	in	determining	the	scope”	of the	 direct	 examination	 of	 a	 minor	 witness	 by	 the	 prosecution. See	 State	 v.
Roman ,	622 A.2d	96,	101	(Me.	1993)	(quotation	marks	omitted).		Similarly,	“the State	is	accorded	much	latitude	in	attempting	to	elicit	relevant	testimony	from a	child	witness.” Id. In	cases	involving	“embarrassing	sex	crimes,	where	a	child would	 be	 hesitant	 to	 testify,	 leading	 questions	 may	 be	 particularly appropriate.” Id. (quotation	marks	omitted). [¶1 8 ]		Although	the	victim	initially	struggled	to	describe	the	nature	of	the sexual contact to	which Hansen	subjected	her,	she	never	denied	 that	Hansen had	sexually	abused	her,	and	her	testimony	remained	internally	consistent	in8 many	 respects	 throughout. See	 State	 v.	 Spooner ,	 666	 A.2d	 863,	 865

- 66 (Me. 1995); Roman ,	 622	 A.2d	 at	 101 ; State	 v.	 Murray ,	 559	 A.2d	 361,	 362 (Me. 1989).	 	 To	 the	 extent that there	 were	 inconsistencies	 in	 the	 victim’s testimony	 that	 could	 cast	 doubt	 on	 her	 credibility,	 “[t]he	 responsibility	 for weighing	that	testimony	reside [d] with	the	jury.” Murray ,	559	A.2 d	at	362. [¶1 9 ]	 	 On	 this	 record,	 the	 trial	 court	 did	 not	 abuse	 its	 discretion	 in granting	 the	 State	 leeway	 to	 use	 leading	 questions	 in	 conducting	 its	 direct examination	of	the	child	victim,	and	the	State’s	leading	questions	did	not	violate Hansen’s	righ t	to	a	fair	trial. See,	e.g., Roman ,	622	A.2d	at	101	(discussing	the “broad	discretion”	afforded	trial	justices	and	the	“latitude”	given	to	prosecutors in	 cases	 involving	 testimony	 by	 a	 child	 victim	 of	 sexual	 abuse); Lisenba	 v. California ,	314	U.S.	219,	2 36	(1941) (“[D]enial	of	due	process	is	the	failure	to observe	that	fundamental	fairness	essential	to	the	very	concept	of	justice.		In order	 to	declare	a	denial	 of	it	we	must	 find	 that	 the	absence	 of	 that	 fairness fatally	 infected	 the	 trial;	 the	 acts	 compla ined	 of	 must	 be	 of	 such	 quality	 as necessarily	prevents	a	fair	trial.”)

. C. The	Mother’s “ First	Complaint ” Testimony [¶ 20 ]	 	 Hansen	 next	 argu es that	 the court	 allowed testimony by	 the victim’s	 mother	 that violated	 the	 first	 complaint	 rule and constituted9 inadmissible	 hearsay. Because	 Hansen	 never	 raised	 an	 objection	 to	 this testimony,	we	review the	trial	court’s	actions for	obvious	error. State	v.	Hall , 2017	 ME	 210,	 ¶ 2 5 ,	 172	 A.3d	 467.	 	 “ [ T ] o	 vacate	 a	 conviction	 based	 on	 the obvious	error	standard	of	rev iew,	there	must	be	(1)	an	error,	(2) that	is	plain, and	 (3)	 that	 affects	 substantial	 rights.	 	 If	 these	 conditions	 are	 met, we will
exercise our discretion	to	notice	an	unpreserved	error	only	if we also	conclude that	 (4)	 the	 error	 seriously	 affects	 the	 fair ness	 and	 integrity	 or	 public reputation	of	judicial	proceedings.” Id

. ¶	26	(quotation	marks	omitted). [¶ 2 1]		The	first	complaint	rule	“authorizes	the	admission	of	the	fact	of	a complaint	of	sexual	assault	and	the	reported	time	and	place	of	the	assault	fo r purposes	 of	 corroborating	 a	 victim’s	 testimony,	 but	 only	 to	 rebut	 the assumption	 that , without	 a	 complaint,	 no	 crime	 occurred.” State	 v.	 Fahnley , 2015	ME	82,	¶	21,	119	A.3d	727; see	also Commonwealth	v.	King ,	834	N.E.2d 1175,	1187

- 89	(Mass.	2005)

. Because	first complaint	testimony	is offered	only to	 corroborate	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 complaint	 was	 made,	 such	 testimony	 “is	 not offered	for	its	truth,	and	therefore	is	not	hearsay.” Fahnley ,	2015	ME	82, ¶	20, 119	A.3d	727. [¶ 22 ]		After	carefully	reviewing	th e	transcript,	we	are	satisfied	that	the statement	 Hansen	 challenges	 on	 appeal ,	 although	 graphic,	 did	 not	 identify10 Hansen, was	a	bare	statement	of	the	type	of	contact	alleged , and did	not	violate the	 first complaint	 rule

. See State	v.	Tripp ,	634	A.2d	1318, 1321	 (Me.	1994)

. Moreover,	 the	 details	 in	 the	 statement	 could	 be	 considered	 “necessary	 to identify	 the	 complaint	 as	 being	 relevant	 to	 the	 charge	 on	which	 the	 accused [wa] s	being	tried.” State	v.	Joel	H. ,	2000	ME	139,	¶	23,	755	A.2d	520 (quotation marks	 omitted)

. The trial	 court	 did	 not	 err	 in	 admitting	 this	 testimony	 in evidence. [¶ 23 ]		However,	we take	this	opportunity	to emphasize	that	when	first complaint	testimony	is	offered,	the	proponent	should	“be	allowed	to	lead	the
witness	to avoid	eliciting	testimony	regarding	any	details,”	and	should	“ask	the witness	 four	questions:	 (1)	Did	 the	 victim	 tell	 you	 that	 [ she	 or	he ]	had	been sexually	assaulted?	(2)	When	did	the	victim	tell	you?	(3)	Did	the	victim	tell	you where	 the	assault	occurre d?	and	(4)	Did	 the	victim	 tell	you	when	 the	assault occurred?” Fahnley ,	2015	ME	82, ¶	26,	119	A.3d	727.		This	constitutes	the	“best practice	for	offering	first	complaint	evidence.” Id.
D. Sentencing [¶ 24 ] Finally, Hansen	 argues	 that the	 sentences imposed	 are “disproportionate	and	extreme

. ” H e also	argues	that	the	court	did	not	conduct11 a	 proper	 sentencing	 analysis	 and	 failed	 to	 apply	 the	 relevant	 criteria	 in imposing	consecutive	sentence s . [¶ 25 ] O ur	review	of criminal sentence s is	guided	by	15 M.R.S.	§§	2154 and	 2155	 (2018). State	 v.	 Stanislaw ,	 2013	 ME	 43,	 ¶	 15,	 65	 A.3d	 1242 ( Stanislaw II ) .		When	determining	the	sentence	to	be	imposed	upon	conviction for	a	felony,	the	sentencing	court	must	conduct	a Hewey analysis,	a	three

- step sentencing analysis	codified	at	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1252

- C	(2018). 2 See	State	v.	Hewey , 622	A.2d	1151,	1154

- 55	(Me.	1993).
1. The Hewey Analysis [¶ 26 ]		The	first	step	of	th e analysis requires the	court	to	determine	a	basic term	of	imprisonment	based	on	 the	nature	and seriousness	of	 the	offense	as committed	by	the	defendant. See 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1252

- C(1). In	t he	second	step , the	 court must “determine	 the	 maximum period of	 imprisonment	 to	 be imposed	by	considering	all	other	relevant	sentencing	factors,	both	aggravating and	mitigating,	appropriate	to	th at case.” Id. §	1252

- C(2). At	the	third	step,	the

2 Substantial	portions	of	the	Maine	Criminal	Code in	Title	17

- A ,	including all of	its	sentencing provisions,	were	recently	repealed	and	replaced. P.L.	2019,	ch.	113 (effective	May	16,	2019). This matter	was	fully	litigated	and	Hansen	was	sentenced	prior	to	the	effective	date	of	the new sentencing provi sions.		Therefore,	all	citations	to	sentencing	statutes	in	this	opinion	are	to	the	repealed	2018 versions	in	effect	at	the	relevant	time. A s	they	apply	to	this	appeal,	t he	relevant	text	is	substantively unchanged	in	the	new versions	of	the	statutes

. See P.L.	2019,	ch.	113,	§	A

- 2	(to	be	codified	at	17

- A M.R.S.	§§	1501,	1602,	1604,	1608).12 court	 must	 “determine	 what	 portion,	 if	 any,	 of	 the	 maximum	 period	 of imprisonment	should	be	suspended	and,	if	a	suspension	order	is	to	be	entered, determine	the	appropriate	period	of	probation	to	accompany	that	suspension.” Id. §	1252

- C(3). [¶ 27 ]	 	 We	 review	 de	 novo	 for	 misapplication	 of	 principle	 the	 basic sentence	impose d	at	the	first	step	of	the	analysis,	and	we	review	the	maximum sentence	and	the	final	sentence	determined	at	steps	two	and	three	for	an	abuse of	discretion. Stanislaw	 II ,	2013	ME	43, ¶	17 ,	65	A.3d	1242 .		We	 review	 the sentencing	court’s	analysis	at	each	s tep	to	determine	“whether [ it ] disregarded the	relevant	sentencing	factors	or	abused	its	sentencing	power.” Id. [¶ 28 ] At	 step	 one,	 the	 court properly assess ed the	 nature	 and seriousness	of each offense

. See 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1252

- C(1) .		The	court considered the	victim’s	age , Hansen’s	age , the specific manner	in	which	the	offenses	were committed , and	the	fact	that	Hansen	was	a	familiar	and	trusted	person	in	the victim’s	life

. See State	v.	Parker ,	2017	ME	28,	¶¶	4,	8,	156	A.3d	118; Stanislaw
II

, 2013	ME	43,	¶ ¶	10, 22,	65	A.3d	1242 ; State	v. Soucy ,	2006	ME	8,	¶ 18,	890 A.2d	719 .		The	court	then	found	that Hansen’s conduct	was	“in	the	mid	to	high end	on	the	continuum”	of	severity,	and	set	the	basic	sentence	at five	to	ten	years on	 each	 count

. Cf.	 S oucy ,	 2006	 ME	 8,	 ¶¶	 7,	 18,	 890	 A.2d	 719	 ( finding	 no13 misapplication	of	principle	where basic	sentence was set	at	six	years	on each count	of Class	B	unlawful	sexual	contact). [¶ 29 ] T he	 maximum	 authorized	 sentence	 for a Class	 B offense is	 ten years.	 	 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 1252(2)(B)	 (2018). Although	 i t	 is	 rare	 for	 the	 basic
sentence “ to	 be	 appropriately	 set	 at	 or	 near	 the	 statutory	 maximum , ” a sentencing	court	may	properly	set	the	basic	sentence	at	or	near	the	maximum if	its	“analysis	demonstr ates	that	the	defendant’s	crime	was	considered	to	be among	the	most	serious	ways	in	which	the	crime	might	be	committed.” State	v. Stanislaw ,	2011	ME	67, ¶ ¶	12,	13,	21	A.3d	91	( Stanislaw	 I ) (quotation	marks omitted) .		One	factor	that	can	support a	basic	se ntence	at	or	near	the	maximum is	the	selection	of	“extremely	young	children	as	victims.” Id. ¶	12 ; see	also 17

- A M.R.S.	§ 1151(8)(A)	(2018). [¶ 30 ]		After	considering	the	victim’s	very	young	age	and	the	manner	in which	 the	 offenses	 were	 committed,	 the	 court	 stated that “it’s	 hard	 to imagine

. . . how	much	more	serious	it	could	have	been.” T he refore,	the court did	not	misapply	principle	in	setting	t he	basic	period	of	incarceration toward the	higher	end	of	the	spectrum , near	the	maximum term	of	ten	years

. See Soucy , 2006	ME	8,	¶¶	7,	18,	890	A.2d	719.14 [¶ 3 1]	 	 At	 the	 second	 step	 of	 the	 analysis,	 the	 court	 appropriately considered	 aggravating	 and mitigating	 factors ,	 including	 Hansen’s	 limited criminal	history,	likelihood	of	reoffending,	motivation	or	reason	for	engaging	in the	 criminal	 conduct, employment	 history,	 mental	 health	 issues,	 physical disabilities,	and	lack	of	compassion,	remorse , or	acce ptance	of	responsibility

. 17

- A	M.R.S.	 §	 1252

- C(2). The	 court	 also	 considered	 the effect that Hansen’s conduct had on	the	victim	and	the	victim’s	family. The	court	determined	that “the	 aggravating	 factors	 grossly	 outweigh [ed] the	 mitigating	 factors,”	 and concluded	that	the	maximum	sentence	would	be	in	“the	ten

- year	range.” The court	 did	 not	 abuse	 its	 discretion	 in	 setting	 the	 maximum	 period	 of incarceration	at	ten	years	for	each	count. Cf.	S oucy ,	2006	ME	8,	¶¶ 1, 10,	19,	890 A.2d	719	(finding	no	abuse	of	discretion	where	maximum	sentence	at	step	two was	 eight	 years	 on	 Class	 B	 unlawful	 sexual	 contact	 counts) ; see	 also	 Gall	 v. United	 States ,	 552	 U.S.	 38,	 51

- 53	 (2007)	 (discussing	 the	 “practical considerations”	 underpinning	 use	 of the	 abuse	 of	 discretion standard for review	of	sentences	by	appellate	courts). [¶ 32 ]		At	the	third	step	of	the	analysis,	after	considering	the	purposes	and goals	of	sentencing,	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1151 (2018) ,	and	observing	that	“[t]he	age	of the	victim	is	.	.	.	absolutely	paramount	in	this	case,”	the	court	determined	that15 the	final	sentence	would	be	ten	years ’ imprisonment on	the	first	count,	and	a
consecutive sentence	of ten	years,	all	suspended,	with	five	y ears	of	probation on	 the	 second	count. We	 find	 no	abuse	 of	discretion	at	 the	 third	 step of	 the analysis

. 2

. Excessive	or	Disproportionate Sentences [¶ 33 ] Article	 I, s ection	 9	 of	 the	 Maine	 Constitution	 provides	 that	 “all penalties	and	punishments	 shall be	proportioned	 to	 the	 offense.”		We	 assess whether	a	sentence	is	constitutionally	disproportionate	using	a	two

- part	test. Stanislaw	II ,	2013	ME	43,	¶	29,	65	A.3d	1242. First,	we compare	“the	gravity	of the	 offense	 with	 the	 severity	 of	 the	 sentence.” Id. (alteration	 omitted) (quotation	marks	omitted).		If	that	comparison	leads	to	“an	inference	of	gross disproportionality	 we	 then	 compare	 the	 defendant’s	 sentence	 with	 the sentences	received	by	other	offenders	in	the	same	jurisdiction.” Id. ( alteration

o mitted)	 ( quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 	 Only	 in	 rare	 cases	 will	 the	 threshold comparison	lead	to	an	inference	of	gross	disproportionality. See	State	v.	Ward , 2011	ME	74,	¶	20	n.5,	21	A.3d	1033	(citing Graham	v.	Florida ,	560	U.S.	48,	60 (2010)). [¶ 34 ] As	 to the	 gravity	 of	 the	 offense, Hansen	 had	 unlawful, inappropriate,	 and	 repeated	 sexual	 contact	 with	 an	 extremely	 young	 child,16 resulting	 in	 two	 convictions	 for	 Class	 B	 unlawful	 sexual	 contact. T he	 court found	 that in	 committing	 those	 crimes he	 violated	 the	 tr ust	 of	 not	 only	 the victim	but	also	the	victim’s	family,	who	had	permitted	him	to	act	as	a	babysitter and	supervise her

. [¶ 35 ]		We previously found	an	inference	 of	gross	disproportionality	in Stanislaw	II ,	2013	ME	43,	¶	33,	65	A.3d	1242. There,	the def endant	received three	 consecutive	 sentences	 of	 eight	 years ’ imprisonment	 with	 no time suspended,	 resulting	in	 a n unsuspended	 term	 of	 twenty

- four	 years	 on	 three counts	of Class	B	unlawful	sexual	contact. Id

. Although	we	found	an	inference of	 gross	 disproportionality,	we	 found	 “no	 error	in	 the	 court’s	 determination concerning	the	maximum	sentence	for	each	crime,	nor	in	its	determination	that the	sentences	.	.	.	should	be	imposed	consecutively.” Id. However, w e did take issue	with	the	sentencing	court’s	“fail[ure]	to	suspend	any	portion	of	the	three eight

- year	sentences	imposed	for	the	Class	B	convictions.” 3 Id. [¶ 36 ] Here,	 although	 the	 court	 imposed	 two	 consecutive	 ten

- year sentences,	 the	court	suspended	 t he	entire	 ten

- year	 term	of	imprisonment	on

3 In	 remanding	 that	 case for	 resentencing ,	 we	 observed	 that	 “an	 unsuspended	 sentence	 of one - third	to	one

- half	of	the	current	unsuspended	sentence	would comply	with	our	co nstitutional	and statutory	 proportionality	 requirements.” State	 v. Stanislaw , 2013	 ME	 43,	 ¶	 50,	 65	 A.3d	 1242 ( Stanislaw	 II )

. Applying	 t hat	 calculation to	 the	 Class	 B	 counts	 in Stanislaw II would yield an unsuspended	term	of	eight	to	twelve	years ; Hansen’s	sentence	falls neatly	in	the	middle of	this	range

.17 the	 second	 count. And	 d espite	 Hansen’s	 efforts	 to	 analogize	 this	 case	 to Stanislaw	II ,	the	unsuspended	term there was	nearly	two	and	a	half	times	longer than	 the	 unsuspended	 term	 here. Moreover, t he	 victim in	 th is	 case is significantly	younger	than	the	victims	in Stanisla w ,	who	ranged	in	age	from	ten to	 fourteen	 years. Id. ¶	 2. We can not find fault with the	 sentencing	 court ’s determination that the	 victim’s	 age	 is	 “ absolutely	 paramount	 in	 this	 case.”
See 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1151(8)(A). [¶ 37 ] C ompar ing the	gravity	of	the	offense s	committed with	the	severity of	 the	 sentence s imposed, we conclude	 that no inference	 of	 gross disproportionality is	warranted. See Stanislaw	 II ,	2013	ME	43, ¶	29 ,	65	A.3d
1242 .	 	 Therefore,	 we	 do	 not	 proceed	 to	 step	 two	 of	 the	 disproportionality analysis. Id. The	sentence s	are tailored	 to	serve	 the	purposes	of	sentencing,
17

- A M.R.S. § 1151,	 and are not	 constitutionally	 disproportionate,	 Me.	 Const. art.	I,	§ 9; cf.	Stanislaw	I I ,	2013	ME	43,	¶¶ 33, 49

- 50,	65	A.3d	1242. [¶ 38 ]	 	 Having	 determined	 that	 the	 sentences	 are	 not	 excessive	 or disproportiona te ,	we	finally	consider	whether	the	court	abuse d its	discretion in	imposing	consecutive	sentences

.18 3. Consecutive	Sentences [¶ 39 ]	 	 When	 sentencing	 a	 defendant	 for	 multiple	 offenses,	 “the sentencing	court	must	determine	whether	to	impose	consecutive	or	concurrent sentences.” Stanislaw	II ,	2013	ME	43,	¶	16,	65	A.3d	1242

. Although the	analysis begins	 with	 “the	 assumption	 that	 multip le sentences will run	 concurrently ,”
State	 v.	 Commeau ,	 2004	 ME	 78,	 ¶	 16,	 852	 A.2d	 70 , a court	 may	 impose consecutive	sentences	if	it	determines	“[t]hat	the	convictions	are	for	offenses based	 on	 different	 conduct	 or	 arising	 from	 different	 criminal	 episodes , ” s ee 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1256 ( 2 )(A) (2018). “If	the	court	decides	to	impose	consecutive sentences	for	various	convictions,	it	shall	state	its	reasons	for	doing	so	on	the record	 or	 in	 the	 sentences,”	 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 1256(4),	 and	 “it	 must	 perform	 a separate Hewey analysis	for	each	conviction,” Stanislaw	II ,	2013	ME	43,	¶	16,	65 A.3d	 1242.	 	We	 review the imposition	 of	 consecutive	 sentences for	 abuse	 of discretion

. Id. ¶	17. [¶ 40 ] T he trial court’s	findings	are	sufficient	to	support	a	determination “[t]hat	 the	convictions	 are	 for	 offenses	 based	 on	different	conduct	 or	arising from	different	criminal	episodes.” 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1256(2) (A) ; see	also State	v.
Powers ,	489	A.2d	4,	6	 (Me.	1985)	 (“Abs ent	a	 showing	 to	 the	contrary,	a	 trial judge	is	presumed	to	know	the	law	and	to	have	applied	it	correctly	in	any	given19 case.”)

. In	its	 analysis , the	court	 repeatedly	 referred	 to	Hansen’s	conduct	 as having	occurred	at	two	different	times	when	the	victim	wa s	five	and	six	years old,	although	the	incidents	involved	similar	criminal	conduct	against	the	same victim.		We	are	satisfied	that	the	court ’s independent	analy sis and	articulation of	 the	 facts of each occurrence provided	 sufficient	 justification	 for	 the imposition	of consecutive	sentences. See	State	v.	Downs ,	2009	ME	3,	¶	14,	962 A.2d	 950. T he court	 did	 not	 abuse	 its	 discretion	 in	 imposing	 consecutive
sentences. See	Stanislaw	II ,	2013	ME	43,	¶ ¶ 23, 33,	49, 65	A.3d	1242. The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.

James	P.	Howaniec,	Esq. (orally) ,	Lewiston,	for	appellant	Gabriel	J.	Hansen Andrew	 S.	 Robinson,	 District	 Attorney,	 and	 Lisa	 R.	 Bogue,	 Ass t. Att y . Gen

. (orally) ,	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Androsco ggin	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR

- 2018

- 2131 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY