[Cite as In re T.S., 2019-Ohio-886.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

In the Matter of: : 

 

T.S. et al., : No. 18AP-270 

 (C.P.C. No. 14JU-15264) 

[T.S., : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Appellant]. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on March 14, 2019 

 

On brief: Bringman Legal Co., L.P.A., and William Paul 

Bringman, for appellant. 

On brief: Robert J. McClaren, for appellee Franklin County 

Children Services. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch 

BROWN, J. 

{¶ 1} T.S., appellant and a minor child, appeals the judgment of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, in 

which the court granted the motion of Franklin County Children Services ("FCCS"), 

appellee, for permanent court commitment ("PCC"). 

{¶ 2} Given our ultimate disposition of the appeal, we need not discuss the 

underlying facts of this case in great detail. T.S. is the child at issue in the present case and 

was nine years old at the time of the hearing before the trial court. His mother is J.S., and 

his paternity was undetermined. In August 2016, the trial court granted temporary 

custody of T.S. to FCCS, pursuant to an abuse, neglect, and dependency proceeding. On 

July 14, 2017, FCCS filed the instant motion for PCC. On March 27, 2018, the trial court 
No. 18AP-270 2 

held an evidentiary hearing on the motion for PCC and, on May 11, 2018, the trial court 

granted FCCS's motion for PCC. Appellant presents the following assignment of error: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION 

OF APPELLEE, FRANKLIN COUNTY CHILDREN'S 

SERVICES, FOR PERMANENT COURT COMMITMENT OF 

THE CHILD, [T.S.], AS TO HIS MOTHER. 

{¶ 3} We must first address FCCS's argument that appellant does not have 

standing to appeal the judgment, and the appeal must be dismissed. FCCS argues that 

appellant's mother did not appeal the trial court's granting of PCC to FCCS and, thus, 

appellant lacks standing to raise an issue on behalf of a non-appealing party when that 

party could have appealed. Appellant claims he is pursuing this appeal on his own behalf 

and not on behalf of his mother, and that he has standing by virtue of having a right to be 

reared by his parents, lacking any finding by the trial court that his mother is unfit. 

{¶ 4} " 'Standing' is defined at its most basic as '[a] party's right to make a legal 

claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.' " Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of 

Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, ¶ 27, quoting Black's Law Dictionary

1442 (8th Ed.2004). If a party lacks standing, a court will not decide the merits of its 

dispute. Util. Serv. Partners v. Pub. Util. Comm., 124 Ohio St.3d 284, 2009-Ohio-6764, 

¶ 49. "A determination of standing necessarily looks to the rights of the individual parties 

to bring the action, as they must assert a personal stake in the outcome of the action in 

order to establish standing." Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio4275, ¶ 23, citing Ohio Pyro at ¶ 27. 

{¶ 5} An appellant whose rights or interests have been adversely affected by a 

lower court's final order is an aggrieved party and has standing to file an appeal. In re 

Estate of Shepherd, 9th Dist. No. 19239 (May 5, 1999). An appeal requires the appellant 

to be an aggrieved party because the purpose of an appeal is to correct errors that cause 

injury to an appellant and not to answer abstract questions. Ohio Contract Carriers Assn., 

Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm. of Ohio, 140 Ohio St. 160 (1942), syllabus. In order to be an 

aggrieved party, the "party must be able to show that he has a present interest in the 

subject matter of the litigation and that he has been prejudiced by the judgment of the 

lower court." In re Guardianship of Love, 19 Ohio St.2d 111, 113 (1969). 
No. 18AP-270 3 

{¶ 6} In the present case, we believe our decision in Hanna v. Hanna, 177 Ohio 

App.3d 233, 2008-Ohio-3523 (10th Dist.), is instructive. In Hanna, the father filed a 

motion to reallocate parental rights and responsibilities, which the magistrate 

recommended denying. Both the child and the father filed objections to the magistrate's 

decision; however, the father subsequently withdrew his objections, leaving only the 

child's objections pending before the trial court. The court then dismissed the child's 

objections, finding the child lacked standing to pursue the objections. 

{¶ 7} The child in Hanna appealed, arguing the trial court erred in finding he 

lacked standing to file objections to the magistrate's decision because the trial court's act 

of joining him as a "party defendant" and appointing him independent legal 

representation in the custody modification proceeding was significant because: (1) it 

conferred standing upon him as a "party" independent of his parents' standing, and 

(2) Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i) expressly authorized him, as a "party," to file objections to the 

magistrate's decision. In rejecting the child's argument and finding that the minor child 

could not maintain objections to the magistrate's decision after the father withdrew his 

own objections to the decision, we explained: 

The question is not whether the minor child has a personal 

interest in the proceedings relating to custody modification; 

without question, the minor child has an interest in 

proceedings that involve such significant matters as where 

the child resides or spends his time. See Schottenstein v. 

Schottenstein, Franklin App. No. 00AP-1088, 2001-Ohio3987, discretionary appeal not allowed, 98 Ohio St.3d 1210, 

2003-Ohio-1088, 784 N.E.2d 1182. The question is whether 

the minor child has an independent legal right, separate and 

apart from his or her parents, to commence or maintain an 

action requesting the court to modify its prior custody 

decrees and grant shared custody. We conclude the child 

does not. 

According to the plain language in R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(b), 

only plaintiff and defendant, as the minor child's parents, 

could invoke the court's continuing jurisdiction to modify a 

prior custody decree and grant shared parenting. The right of 

action is not in the child; it is in his parents and is 

jurisdictional. The minor child's status as a party is 

contingent upon (1) one or both of the minor child's parents 

bringing and maintaining the action under R.C. 

3109.04(E)(1)(b), and (2) the court's exercise of its 
No. 18AP-270 4 

continuing jurisdiction in the matter. Here, once plaintiff 

withdrew his own objections to the magistrate's decision that 

resolved and dismissed his motion requesting shared 

parenting, the minor child could no longer pursue his own 

objections to the magistrate's decision because he had no 

independent legal right to maintain the action. Accordingly, 

the trial court did not err in dismissing the minor child's 

objections. 

Even if we assume the trial court improperly dismissed the 

minor child's objections, the minor child has failed to 

explain, and the record does not demonstrate, how the trial 

court's failure to rule on his objections prejudiced him. 

Cf. All Climate Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Zee Properties, 

Inc. (May 17, 2001), Franklin App. No. 00AP-1141, 2001-

Ohio-2167 (determining an attorney, who was not a named 

party in the action, had standing to file objections to and 

appeal the magistrate's decision imposing sanctions against 

him). The minor child's interest in the proceedings was not 

coextensive with his parents' interest. His limited interest in 

expressing his wishes concerning custody, though important, 

was no longer at issue once plaintiff decided to forego his 

motion and withdraw his own objections. The minor child 

thus could suffer no prejudice when the trial court dismissed 

his objections to the magistrate's decision, as he had no 

interest that remained at issue.

Id. at ¶ 13-15. 

{¶ 8} Our holding in Hanna guides us in the present case. We do not believe the 

fact that Hanna addressed a child's standing to file objections to a magistrate's decision, 

as opposed to standing to appeal, undermines the core propositions set forth in Hanna. 

Here, appellant clearly has a "personal interest" in the present case, as the minor child 

subject to a motion for PCC. However, similar to the child in Hanna, appellant's interest 

in the present proceedings was not coextensive with his mother's interest. His limited 

interest in expressing his wishes to the court under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), though clearly 

important, was no longer at issue once his mother failed to appeal. Pursuant to this 

limited interest, appellant had the opportunity to express his desires to the court in an in 

camera interview to aid the court in its best-interest analysis and have his interests 

represented by separate counsel and a guardian ad litem at trial. 
No. 18AP-270 5 

{¶ 9} Furthermore, similar to our reasoning in Hanna that R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(b) 

permits only the minor child's parents to invoke the court's continuing jurisdiction to 

modify a prior custody decree, R.C. 2151.413 grants only a public children services agency 

or private child placing agency the right to file a motion for PCC. The right of the current 

PCC action was not in appellant; it was in FCCS. R.C. 2151.414(F) specifically 

acknowledges a parent's right to appeal a PCC determination after an adverse ruling, but 

makes no mention of a child's right to appeal. Thus, with neither FCCS nor mother 

appealing, appellant had no independent legal right, separate and apart from FCCS and 

mother, to pursue an appeal. Therefore, we find that appellant, as the minor child at issue 

in this PCC case, had no standing to maintain his own appeal when neither FCCS nor his 

mother appealed the trial court's granting of PCC. 

{¶ 10} Accordingly, appellant's appeal is dismissed based on lack of standing. 

Appeal dismissed. 

SADLER and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 

___________________