[J-98-2019] [MO: Dougherty, J.]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

KAREN HARRISON,

Appellee

v.

HEALTH NETWORK LABORATORIES 

LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS, AND LEHIGH 

VALLEY HEALTH NETWORK, INC.,

Appellants

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No. 51 MAP 2019

Appeal from the Order of the 

Superior Court at No. 365 EDA 2018 

dated December 12, 2018 Affirming 

in Part and Vacating in Part the 

Order of the Lehigh County Court of 

Common Pleas, Civil Division, at 

No. 2016-C-1469 dated December 

19, 2017 and Remanding

ARGUED: November 19, 2019

DISSENTING OPINION

JUSTICE DONOHUE DECIDED: June 16, 2020

By its express terms, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 P.S. 

§§ 951—959, is the exclusive state law remedy for a claim based on retaliatory discharge 

for opposing discrimination in the workplace. See 43 P.S. § 955(d) (prohibiting 

discrimination against “any individual because such individual has opposed any practice 

forbidden by [the PHRA]”). This is precisely the claim Harrison asserts. Therefore, she 

is precluded from proceeding in court under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, 43 P.S. 

§§ 1421—1427, and the trial court properly dismissed the claim. Accordingly, with all due 

respect to the Majority, I dissent because, in my view, the Majority misinterprets the PHRA

in reaching its contrary conclusion. 

The PHRA is a comprehensive statute specifically designed to deal with 

discriminatory practices. To that end, it declares, inter alia, that “[t]he opportunity for an 
[J-98-2019] [MO: Dougherty, J.] - 2

individual to obtain employment for which he is qualified . . . without discrimination 

because of race, color, familial status, religious creed, ancestry, handicap or disability, 

age, sex, [or] national origin . . . is hereby recognized as and declared to be a civil right 

which shall be enforceable as set forth in this act.” 43 P.S. § 953. As referenced, the 

PHRA specifically prohibits discrimination against an individual like Harrison because she 

has opposed discrimination in the work place. Id. at § 955(d).

At the heart of this appeal is the PHRA savings clause, which provides that:

nothing contained in this act shall be deemed to repeal or supersede any of 

the provisions of any existing or hereafter adopted municipal ordinance, 

municipal charter or of any law of this Commonwealth relating to 

discrimination because of race, color, familial status, religious creed, 

ancestry, age, sex, national origin or handicap or disability, but as to 

acts declared unlawful by section five of this act [relating to unlawful 

discriminatory practices] the procedure herein provided shall, when 

invoked, be exclusive and the final determination therein shall exclude any 

other action, civil or criminal, based on the same grievance of the complaint 

concerned. If the complaint institutes any action based on such grievance 

without resorting to the procedure provided in this act, such complainant 

may not subsequently resort to the procedure herein.

43 P.S. § 962(b) (emphasis supplied). 

No one disputes that Harrison’s claim is cognizable under the PHRA or that the 

PHRA provides her with an avenue of recourse. Moreover, the Majority, in part, correctly 

recognizes that:

where an aggrieved party chooses to pursue a remedial action under the 

PHRA, he or she is bound exclusively to the PHRA’s procedures, including 

the exhaustion of administrative remedies, and bound to the result; 

however, an aggrieved party may instead elect to pursue a remedy that 

exists under other municipal laws or laws of the Commonwealth and, by 

instituting such an alternative action, will then be precluded from restoring 

to the PHRA.

Maj. Op. at 14. What the Majority omits from this statement is that the other municipal 

laws or statutes of the Commonwealth must “relat[e] to discrimination because of race, 
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color, familial status, religious creed, ancestry, handicap or disability, age, sex, [or] 

national origin.” 43 P.S. § 962(b). The Whistleblower Law does not.

The Whistleblower Law is a general statute enacted as a “remedial measure 

intended to enhance openness in government and compel the government’s compliance 

with the law by protecting those who inform authorities of wrongdoing.” O’Rourke v. Dep’t 

of Corrections, 778 A.2d 1194, 1202 (Pa. 2001) (citation omitted). In contrast to the 

PHRA’s laser focus on the prohibition of and the provision of remedies for discrimination, 

the Whistleblower Law is not related to1the same subject matter. It is broad and general 

anti-retaliation legislation enacted for the express purpose of:

[p]roviding protection for employees who report a violation or suspected 

violation of State, local or Federal law, providing protection for employees 

who participate in hearings, investigations, legislative inquiries or court 

actions; and prescribing remedies and penalties.

Preamble, Act of Dec. 12, 1986, P.L. 1559, No. 169, Cl. 43, 43 P.S. §§ 1421–1428. While 

the claim of Harrison may be coincidentally captured by the Whistleblower Law, that law 

was clearly not enacted to prohibit discrimination or to provide the remedy for the violation 

of the right to be free from discrimination, a civil right expressly declared to be enforceable 

under the PHRA.

 

1

 “Relate to” is defined as, inter alia, “to be connected with (someone or something); to 

be about (someone or something).” Merriam Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, 

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/relate%20to. Accessed 20 Apr. 2020. 

Hartman v. City of Allentown, 880 A.2d 737 (Pa. Cmmwth. 2005) (PHRA not intended to 

be exclusive in the field of anti-discrimination as 962(b) makes clear that General 

Assembly intended to preserve anti-discrimination ordinances from pre-emption). See 

also SEPTA v. City of Philadelphia, 159 A3d 443 (Pa. 2017) (recognizing interplay 

between PHRA and other laws “related to” discrimination and discussing local ordinance 

in terms of the same subject matter as PHRA).
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The fact that an employee claims that she was disciplined for bringing a 

discriminatory policy or practice to light does not provide an end-around to the PHRA 

through the Whistleblower Law. By the Majority’s reading of Section 962(b), any claim of 

discrimination that can be shoehorned into a statute or law not specifically intended to 

prevent discrimination can be brought under the auspices of the other statute or law. But 

according to Section 962(b), it is the purpose of the statute, not the nature of the claim,

that permits an opt-out of the procedures and relief provided by the PHRA.

Harrison filed a retaliation claim after Health Network allegedly discharged her 

because she opposed race-based discriminatory practices against another employee in 

their workplace. 43 P.S. § 953. Because Harrison’s claim is based on workplace 

discrimination and the Whistleblower Law is not an anti-discrimination statute, the PHRA 

provides the exclusive remedy. Hence, I would reverse the Superior Court’s ruling.