UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-4313

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

ERIC DEWAUN BROWN, a/k/a Blaze, a/k/a Doughboy, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., 

Senior District Judge. (1:06-cr-00317-NCT) 

Submitted: May 28, 2009 Decided: June 19, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

John Clark Fischer, RANDOLPH & FISCHER, Winston-Salem, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Following a jury trial, Eric Dewaun Brown was 

convicted of two counts of distribution of cocaine base, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006). Brown was sentenced to 121 

months imprisonment. Counsel filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he asserts 

there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questions whether 

the indictment properly alleged the offenses and whether the 

evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Brown was 

notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, in 

response to which he filed two affidavits of additional evidence 

refuting his identity as the person who distributed the crack 

cocaine. The Government elected not to file a responsive brief. 

Finding no error, we affirm. 

 Counsel first questions whether the indictment 

properly alleged the offenses of which Brown was charged. 

Because this claim is raised for the first time on appeal, we 

review the sufficiency of the indictment for plain error. See

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002). An 

indictment must contain the elements of the offense and fairly 

inform the defendant of the charge against which he must defend, 

and it must also enable the defendant to plead an acquittal or 

conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. 

United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, ___, 127 S. Ct. 

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782, 788 (2007) (quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 

117 (1994) (internal brackets omitted)); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 

7(c)(1); see also United States v. Williams, 152 F.3d 294, 299 

(4th Cir. 1998) (“‘One of the principal purposes of an 

indictment is to apprise the accused of the charge or charges 

against him so he can prepare his defense.’”) (quoting United 

States v. Fogel, 901 F.2d 23, 25 (4th Cir. 1990)). 

 Here, the indictment charged that Brown “willfully, 

knowingly and intentionally did unlawfully distribute 52.1 grams 

(net weight) of a mixture and substance containing a detectible 

amount of cocaine base (“crack”). The indictment makes a 

similar charge in count 2 with respect to the February 2006 

distribution of 47.9 grams of crack. We find that the 

indictment was sufficient to allege violations of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841, to apprise Brown of the charges against him, and to allow 

him to prepare a defense. 

 Brown and his attorney both assert on appeal that the 

evidence was insufficient to support Brown’s conviction. The 

verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial 

evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to 

support it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). 

“[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of 

fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a 

conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

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United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en 

banc). 

 The government presented the testimony of Special 

Agent Robert Padgett of the State Bureau of Investigation and 

that of a confidential informant working with Agent Padgett that 

they conducted two controlled purchases of crack cocaine from a 

man they knew as “Blaze” or “Doughboy.” Both men identified 

Brown from his drivers license photo and identified him in court 

as the man from whom they purchased the crack cocaine. Brown’s 

defense was that he did not use the nicknames “Blaze” and 

“Doughboy” but that another man who lived in the area used those 

names. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government, we find that the evidence is sufficient to support 

the jury’s conclusion that Brown was the perpetrator of the drug 

sales, and thus the evidence supports Brown’s convictions on the 

two charges. See Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80. 

 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. Accordingly, we affirm Brown’s conviction and sentence. 

This court requires that counsel inform Brown, in writing, of 

his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Brown requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw from 

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representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Brown. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED