Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-250 | July 31, 2018 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Zachary J. Stock

Zachary J. Stock, Attorney at Law, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

T.L.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Petitioner.

July 31, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JV-250

Appeal from the Hendricks 

Superior Court 

The Honorable Karen M. Love, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

32D03-1712-JD-232

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-250 | July 31, 2018 Page 2 of 11

Case Summary and Issues

[1] Following T.L.’s admission to an act that would have constituted battery with a 

deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court 

placed T.L. in the care of the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). 

T.L. now appeals, raising two issues for our review: (1) whether the juvenile 

court committed reversible error when it decided T.L. would wear restraints 

during her combined admission and dispositional hearing, and (2) whether the 

juvenile court abused its discretion when it placed T.L. with the DOC. Finding 

no fundamental error in the fact that T.L. wore restraints during the combined 

hearing before the juvenile court and that the juvenile court acted within its 

discretion when it placed T.L. with the DOC, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 27, 2017, fifteen-year-old T.L. went to a park in Danville to 

confront A.S. about a pair of T.L.’s shoes that T.L. felt A.S. wrongfully 

possessed. The two had been arguing previously, and T.L. came to the park 

armed with a pair of brass knuckles in her pocket. T.L. and A.S. became 

involved in a physical altercation. T.L. struck A.S. in the face with the brass 

knuckles, causing A.S. to seek treatment at the hospital for an injury above her 

left eye. 

[3] On December 7, 2017, the State filed a petition alleging that T.L. was 

delinquent. The juvenile court issued an emergency detention order for T.L., 
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finding that there was evidence that she was a threat to public safety because 

she had a history of battery, she had another battery case pending at the time, 

and because the instant offense involved the use of a deadly weapon. 

[4] T.L. was detained on December 18, 2017, and remained in detention until her 

next hearing on January 8, 2018. T.L. was represented by counsel. At the 

beginning of the hearing, the juvenile court noted that T.L. wore restraints1

“since this is a crime of violence and I haven’t made a decision about what the 

outcome is going to be here.” Transcript, Volume 2 at 18-19. T.L. did not 

object to wearing restraints. 

[5] T.L.’s counsel acknowledged that it was unlikely that a residential facility 

would accept T.L. for treatment because T.L. had already had a residential 

placement and because her current adjudication was for a violent act. T.L. 

admitted that she had committed the acts alleged in the State’s delinquency 

petition. T.L. explained that her father had counseled her not to fight A.S., but 

her friends had encouraged her to do so. T.L. had possessed the brass knuckles 

for a number of months before her encounter with A.S. T.L. knew that brass 

knuckles were potentially lethal but maintained that she had not intended to 

injure A.S. 

[6] The juvenile court entered a true-finding, and the matter proceeded to 

disposition. The juvenile court noted that “the issue now is what – what is the 

 

1

 The record does not disclose the nature of the restraints or how T.L. came to be restrained. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-250 | July 31, 2018 Page 4 of 11

best and most appropriate, um, plan going forward in terms of how we – [T.L.] 

gets redirected.” Id. at 31. Dwight Stevenson of the Hendricks County 

Probation Department, who had twenty-four years of experience, provided the 

following information at T.L.’s dispositional hearing. T.L. had been referred 

for her first battery adjudication in 2016. As part of the resolution of that case, 

the State dismissed a pending illegal consumption of an alcoholic beverage 

case, and T.L. was placed on probation. T.L. was released from that probation 

due to being found to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”). T.L. was 

placed in a residential treatment facility for six months during the CHINS case. 

After she completed residential treatment, T.L. admitted that she was still using 

illegal substances. T.L. had been suspended from school for fighting and had 

school attendance issues. T.L. was referred in September of 2017 for a battery 

adjudication. Stevenson had just met with T.L. regarding that matter when she 

committed the acts that formed the basis for the instant adjudication. It was 

Stevenson’s opinion that T.L. would not comply with probation or home 

detention without electronic monitoring or some other form of direct 

supervision. 

[7] Lee Anne Owens, who had been T.L.’s court appointed special advocate in the 

CHINS case, also appeared at the dispositional hearing and testified to the 

following. Cross Systems of Care was a service offered through probation that 

T.L. had not yet been through, but T.L. would not be a suitable candidate for 

probation without being on house arrest or home detention. T.L. would not 

stay at home if not supervised when her father was at work. T.L. required a 
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“drastic intervention” and required an “enormous” amount of supervision. Id. 

at 40, 42. T.L. had significant unaddressed mental health issues but had been 

known to resist treatment in the past. During Owens’ testimony, T.L.’s counsel 

acknowledged that Hendricks County probation did not offer electronic 

monitoring. T.L.’s father confirmed that there was no one else in his home to 

supervise T.L. when he was at work during the day. 

[8] At the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court found that 

probation could not devise a plan for T.L. to meet her needs. In its written 

dispositional order, the juvenile court noted T.L.’s previous contacts with the 

juvenile justice system, her poor school performance, her need for substance 

abuse counseling, and her inability to cope with anger and frustration. 

Appellant’s Appendix, Volume II at 32-33. The juvenile court found that T.L.’s 

delinquent activity was accelerating and that she required a high level of 

supervision that she could not receive in the community. Id. at 33. The 

juvenile court found that without a structured and secure environment where 

T.L. could receive services to address her substance abuse, coping skills, anger 

management skills, and education, T.L. would continue to be a threat to public 

safety. Id. The juvenile court placed T.L. with the DOC for an indeterminate 

commitment. Id. at 34. 

Discussion and Decision
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I. Use of Restraints

[9] T.L. contends that we should reverse the juvenile court’s dispositional order 

because she wore restraints during the combined admission and dispositional 

hearing. As an initial matter, we note that T.L. did not object to wearing 

restraints at the hearing. As a general rule, issues raised for the first time on 

appeal are waived for our review. See In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 834 n.1 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2001) (holding that an allegation of a due process violation raised for 

the first time on appeal was waived). T.L. acknowledges the import of her 

failure to object to wearing restraints, and she urges us to examine this issue for 

fundamental error. See Appellant’s Brief at 8-9. “The ‘fundamental error’ 

exception is extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a 

blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is 

substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due 

process.” R.W. v. State, 975 N.E.2d 407, 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (examining 

the concept of fundamental error in a delinquency proceeding) (citation 

omitted), trans. denied. Fundamental error is defined as an error so prejudicial 

to the rights of a juvenile that a fair hearing is rendered impossible. Id. 

[10] The use of restraints in a juvenile proceeding is addressed in Indiana Code 

section 31-30.5-2-1(a), which provides that 

a juvenile shall not be restrained in court unless the court has 

determined on the record, after considering the recommendation 

of the sheriff or transport officer, that the juvenile is dangerous or 

potentially dangerous.
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Thus, in order to justify placing or maintaining a juvenile in restraints, the 

juvenile court must consider any recommendations from the authority 

transporting the juvenile to court and make a determination on the record that 

the juvenile is dangerous or potentially dangerous. In this case, there is nothing 

in the record that indicates that a recommendation for restraint by the 

transporting authority was made to, or considered by, the juvenile court, and 

the juvenile court did not make any determinations on the record that T.L. was 

dangerous or potentially dangerous. 

[11] However, we cannot conclude that T.L. was deprived of a fair hearing by the 

juvenile court’s failure to observe the procedure required by statute. A primary 

concern about having a defendant in a criminal trial appear in shackles or 

restraints before a jury is that it may dilute the presumption of innocence or 

cause the jury to base its verdict on extraneous factors. Ritchie v. State, 875 

N.E.2d 706, 718 (Ind. 2007). That concern is not implicated where, as here, a 

juvenile elects to admit to delinquency allegations before the juvenile court 

judge, who is presumed to be impartial. See Garland v. State, 788 N.E.2d 425, 

433 (Ind. 2003) (“The law presumes that a judge is unbiased and 

unprejudiced”). In addition, T.L. does not argue that there was a nexus 

between her admission to the delinquency allegations and the fact that she wore 

restraints at her admission and dispositional hearing. Although the statutes do 

not permit, and we do not condone, the prophylactic use of restraints in a 

juvenile delinquency proceeding, we find that T.L.’s substantial rights were not 
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substantially impacted, and, thus, we will not disturb the juvenile court’s 

delinquency order. 

II. Least Restrictive Placement

[12] T.L. also argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it placed her 

with the DOC because other less-restrictive options existed. See Appellant’s Br.

at 10-12. “The choice of the specific disposition of a juvenile adjudicated a 

delinquent child is a matter within the discretion of the juvenile court and we 

will reverse a dispositional order only if there has been an abuse of that 

discretion.” D.C. v. State, 935 N.E.2d 290, 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d on 

trans., 958 N.E.2d 757 (Ind. 2011). 

[13] Indiana Code section 31-37-18-6 provides the following:

If consistent with the safety of the community and the best 

interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional 

decree that:

(1) is:

(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate 

setting available; and

(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest

and special needs of the child;

(2) least interferes with family autonomy;

(3) is least disruptive of family life;
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(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the 

child’s parent, guardian, or custodian; and

(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the 

child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.

[14] Therefore, although the statute generally requires that the juvenile court choose 

the least restrictive placement available, it only requires the least restrictive 

placement that is consistent with the safety of the community and the best 

interests of the juvenile. In some instances, a more restrictive placement is 

appropriate in light of those considerations. J.S. v. State, 881 N.E.2d 26, 28-29 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 

[15] T.L. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion because it rejected the 

possibility of probation and informal home detention for her and assumed that 

the DOC was the only option. See Appellant’s Br. at 11-12. However, by the 

time of the instant matter, T.L. was fifteen years old and had already received 

probation for another battery true-finding in 2016. T.L. had also had six 

months of treatment in a residential facility. Despite having had the benefit of 

those services, T.L. had two additional contacts in quick succession with the 

juvenile justice system for battery. Indeed, T.L. had just met with Stevenson 

regarding one battery matter when she committed the act which resulted in her 

current adjudication, which was for an act that would have been battery with a 

deadly weapon if committed by an adult. Thus, not only had T.L. failed to 

redirect her behavior through probation and residential treatment, but the 

seriousness of her violence was escalating. 
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[16] In addition, T.L. had been suspended from school for fighting, she had school 

attendance issues, she continued to abuse substances, and she had unaddressed 

mental health and impulse control issues. Stevenson and Owens both indicated 

that T.L. could only succeed on probation and home detention if she were 

intensively supervised. However, Hendricks County did not provide electronic 

monitoring, and T.L.’s father worked during the day, leaving no one in the 

home to monitor T.L. as intensively as she required. Therefore, contrary to 

T.L.’s assertion on appeal, the juvenile court had more than an 

“unsubstantiated belief” that probation and home detention were not a 

possibility for T.L. See Appellant’s Br. at 11. In addition, T.L.’s argument that 

the juvenile court should have considered residential treatment as a less 

restrictive placement, see id. at 12, is inconsistent with her counsel’s

acknowledgment at the hearing that such a placement was unlikely. Given 

that, even after having received probation and residential treatment in the past, 

T.L.’s pattern of violence had continued and escalated, the lack of options for 

supervision in the community, and that T.L. continued to require services, the 

juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that DOC was the 

most appropriate placement option for T.L.

Conclusion

[17] Concluding that T.L.’s substantial rights were not prejudiced by the wearing of 

restraints at her combined admission and dispositional hearing and that the 

juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering T.L. committed to the 
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DOC rather than to a less restrictive placement, we affirm the juvenile court’s 

dispositional order. 

[18] Affirmed. 

Najam, J., and Altice, J., concur.