[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 12-13365

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 4:11-cr-00278-WTM-GRS-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RICHARD LOUIS WILLIAMS, 

a.k.a. Ace, 

a.k.a. Ace Bouvier, 

a.k.a. Taz, 

a.k.a. Akashi Iman, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

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(February 19, 2013)

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Before CARNES, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

After pleading guilty, Richard Louis Williams appeals his 37-month 

sentence for mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Defendant Williams’s 

offense involved using stolen rewards points from loyalty programs, such as Delta 

Airlines SkyMiles, American Airlines AAdvantage Program and Hilton Hotel’s 

HHonor Program, to purchase airline tickets, hotel rooms and merchandise. On 

appeal, Defendant Williams argues that the district court erred in: (1) finding a 

total loss amount of $46,773.56, which supported a six-level increase in his offense 

level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(D); (2) applying a two-level increase for 

use of sophisticated means, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C); and (3) 

denying Williams a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant 

to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). After review, we affirm.

The district court did not clearly err when it found that Defendant 

Williams’s offense resulted in a total loss of $46,733.56 and imposed 

§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(D)’s enhancement of six levels when a loss is greater than $30,000 

but less than $70,000. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(D). At sentencing, Defendant 

Williams did not object to some of the fraudulent purchases (12 flights, 2 hotel 

stays and 16 merchandise deliveries) the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) 

attributed to him, which totaled $24,744 in losses. Furthermore, while the district 

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court heard evidence of a larger conspiracy to fraudulently acquire and use 

frequent flyer and hotel loyalty points resulting in losses of over $400,000, the 

district court held Defendant Williams accountable only for those losses for which 

the government presented evidence showing links to Williams. Specifically, the 

government’s evidence tying loss amounts of $46,733.56 (listed in the PSI) to 

Defendant Williams included the following: (1) the majority of the airline tickets 

and hotel rooms redeemed with the fraudulently acquired points were in 

Williams’s own name or a slight variation thereof, and government-issued 

identification would have been required to redeem the tickets and bookings; (2) 

witnesses told investigators that Williams redeemed some of the disputed airline 

tickets and merchandise; and (3) many of the disputed purchases were linked 

through common email addresses, IP addresses, phone numbers and mailing 

addresses to other purchases Williams admitted.

Given this evidence, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the 

government had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that at least $30,000 in 

losses were attributable to Defendant Williams. See United States v. Renick, 273 

F.3d 1009, 1025 (11th Cir. 2001) (providing that, upon challenge, the government 

must prove the loss amount with reliable and specific evidence). That some of the 

government’s evidence was circumstantial does not render the district court’s loss 

estimation unreasonable or speculative. See United States v. Dominguez, 109 F.3d 

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675, 676 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that although the district court must not 

speculate as to the existence of a fact that would permit a more severe sentence, it 

may make a reasonable estimate of the loss involved); see also U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, 

cmt. n.3(C). Accordingly, the district court did not err in applying the six-level 

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(D).

Nor did the district court clearly err in finding that Defendant Williams’s 

fraud involved sophisticated means and thus applying U.S.S.G. 

§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)’s two-level enhancement. The PSI’s undisputed facts 

established that; (1) the fraud scheme, which operated for at least a year prior to 

Williams’s indictment, involved more than 46 victims and Williams’s fraudulent 

access to 43 secured accounts; and (2) Williams used multiple shipping addresses 

in both Georgia and South Carolina to receive shipments of fraudulently obtained 

merchandise in an effort to conceal his criminal conduct. Although Williams 

contends that his individual acts were not sophisticated, the district court 

concluded that “the totality of the scheme” was sophisticated, considering both 

Williams’s use of multiple aliases, credit cards, email accounts, IP addresses and 

shipping addresses, and the sophistication required to gain access to victims’ 

accounts, which was sufficient to support the enhancement. See United States v. 

Ghertler, 605 F.3d 1256, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding that “[t]here is no 

requirement that each of a defendant’s individual actions be sophisticated[;] 

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[r]ather, it is sufficient if the totality of the scheme was sophisticated”); U.S.S.G. 

§ 2B1.1, cmt. n.8(B) (defining sophisticated means as “especially complex or 

especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of 

an offense” and citing as examples the use of multiple jurisdictions or the hiding of 

transactions through the use of fictitious entities).

Finally, the district court did not clearly err when it denied Defendant 

Williams a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Even though 

Defendant Williams pled guilty, his plea did not entitle him to a reduction of his 

offense level as a matter of right, particularly when the evidence before the 

sentencing court showed that Williams’s conduct was inconsistent with an 

acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.3. Specifically, 

undisputed facts in the PSI established that Williams made false statements to 

federal agents during the investigation (denying his involvement in the fraud 

scheme) and then made false statements to the probation officer conducting the 

presentence investigation (denying he was arrested and convicted of prior felony 

forgery and escape offenses). Further, evidence presented during the sentencing 

hearing indicated that Williams falsely denied responsibility for almost half of the 

offense conduct through his objections to the loss calculation. Even if we consider 

only Williams’s conduct after he was indicted, as Williams argues, that conduct—

making false statements to the probation officer and falsely denying a significant 

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portion of the underlying offense conduct—is a sufficient basis to deny the 

acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. See United States v. Castillo-Valencia, 917 

F.2d 494, 500 (11th Cir. 1990) (explaining that we will overturn a district court’s 

acceptance-of-responsibility determination only if “it is without foundation”).

For all these reasons, we affirm Defendant Williams’s 37-month sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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