Filed 5/18/21 In re S.A. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re S.A. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D078500

 (Super. Ct. Nos. J520221A-C)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Marian F. Gaston, Judge. Affirmed. 

Nicole Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Office of County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel, 

and Lisa M. Maldonado, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent. 
2

In this juvenile dependency proceeding involving his three children, 

J.A. (Father) appeals an order made at his six-month review hearing

pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (e).1

At that hearing, the court found, inter alia, that the reunification services 

provided to Father were reasonable. He contends that the San Diego County 

Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) unreasonably relied on 

ineffective referrals for services to an agency in Mexico, where he was 

residing, and failed to facilitate in-person visits with his daughters based on 

unreasonable concerns about the risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. We 

conclude that the juvenile court did not err in making its ruling and therefore 

affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

In December 2019, the Agency petitioned the juvenile court under 

section 300, subdivision (b), on behalf of four-year-old S.A., two-year-old D.A., 

and one-month-old G.A. The Agency alleged that when G.A. was born, she 

tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. S.R. (Mother) also 

tested positive at the time of birth and again weeks thereafter.3 Father 

denied knowledge of Mother’s drug use, leading the Agency to allege that his 

inability to identify whether Mother was using illegal substances undermined 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code. 

2 “In accord with the usual rules on appeal, we state the facts in the 

manner most favorable to the dependency court’s order.” (In re Janee W. 

(2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1448, fn. 1.) 

3 Mother has not appealed and the details of her involvement in the 

proceedings post are not relevant to the issues raised on appeal. Accordingly, 

this opinion does not discuss Mother unless relevant to the issues raised by 

Father on appeal. 
3

his ability to protect his children and placed them at substantial risk of 

serious physical harm or illness. 

In the detention report, the Agency explained that after G.A. was born, 

she was placed in the neonatal intensive care unit due to her in utero 

exposure to methamphetamine. Years earlier, Mother had tested positive for 

methamphetamines while she was pregnant with S.A. The Agency also 

learned that law enforcement suspected Father of selling controlled 

substances while his daughters were in his care. Mother denied any history 

of methamphetamine use, but subsequently tested positive on multiple 

occasions. 

Father allowed Mother near the children while she was under the 

influence apparently due to his stated inability to determine whether Mother 

was using methamphetamine. Based on Mother’s drug use, Father’s inability 

to protect the children, and the concern that Father, who tested negative for 

controlled substances, was selling methamphetamine, the Agency concluded 

there was a substantial danger to the children’s health if they remained in 

their parent’s care. The Agency recommended that the children be placed in 

out-of-home care while their parents addressed their protective issues. 

At the detention hearing in December 2019, the juvenile court found 

the Agency had made a prima facie showing that the three children were 

persons described by section 300, subdivision (b), and ordered them detained 

in out-of-home care. The court gave the Agency discretion to place the girls 

with Father with the concurrence of minors’ counsel. The court directed that 

services be provided and allowed for supervised visits. 

In its jurisdiction/disposition report, the Agency noted that Mother and 

Father had both been arrested by United States Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement due to allegedly being unauthorized immigrants. Father was 
4

detained in federal custody. The Agency noted that Father did not have 

access to services while in custody and his future status was unknown. In an 

addendum report filed in February 2020, the Agency stated that Father was 

still detained and all visits were prohibited due to “concerns with the flu.” 

Based on the initial court closures associated with the COVID-19 

pandemic, the jurisdiction/disposition hearing was continued to July 2020. 

Before that hearing, Father was deported to Mexico and was living in 

Tijuana. The Agency was able to contact Father, who reported that although 

he was not able to reenter the United States, he had been having virtual 

visits with S.A. and D.A. In late April 2020, the Agency took the initial steps 

to initiate services for Father in Mexico. The Agency’s initial case plan for

Father included individual therapy and parenting education. The Agency 

noted that the Mexican agency that assisted in providing services to parents, 

known as “DIF,” had been closed since March 2020 due to the pandemic and 

did not anticipate resuming services until late July 2020.4 Similarly, the 

Mexican Consulate, which typically would arrange visits at the border, was 

closed until late July 2020. The Agency reported that the border was closed 

at that time to people attempting to cross for family visits. 

At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in July 2020, both parents 

attended remotely but offered no affirmative evidence. At the hearing, the 

Agency noted the difficulties in obtaining services for Father and 

acknowledged he was “doing the best he can to stay engaged.” Noting the 

many barriers to obtaining services, the Agency told the court that “to the

extent possible, the Agency will keep all of this on its radar and work with 

DIF to ensure father can engage in services as soon as possible.” Father’s 

4 “DIF” is an acronym for Desarrollo Integral de la Familia. (In re N.O. 

(2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 899, 903.) 
5

counsel asked the court to allow unsupervised visits and to include 

attendance at either “NarAnon or NA group” in lieu of individual therapy. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court sustained the allegations of 

the petition under section 300, subdivision (b). The court order supervised 

visitation with Father but gave the Agency discretion to allow unsupervised 

or overnight visits. The court asked “everybody [to] get creative about 

whether or not there might be some online services that he could complete 

that would mitigate the safety concern in this case” given the closure of many 

service providers and Father’s inability to legally cross the border. The court 

set a review hearing in six months. 

In advance of the six-month review hearing, the Agency reported that

the children had been placed with their maternal grandmother and were 

“happy, healthy and enjoy being surrounded by family.” Father was still in 

Mexico but had not started any services. The Agency had provided Father 

with a referral to DIF and a person to contact, but DIF had not been able to 

provide any services to Father. Father expressed that he would like to 

participate in services but was struggling to receive a response from DIF. 

Father continued to have daily virtual visits with his daughters, but visits at 

the border were still unavailable. Accordingly, the Agency’s status report 

asked for more time to continue to provide reunification services. The Agency 

recommended that Father’s reunification services continue for another six 

months. 

In an addendum report filed in January 2021, the Agency 

acknowledged it was relying on DIF to provide services, but due to pandemicrelated delays, it had “started considering other options.” The Agency 

determined it was possible for Father to attend virtual parenting classes and 

requested a referral for Father. The Agency also referred Father to virtual 
6

“Nar Anon” meetings. By January 2021, Father had begun parenting classes. 

The Agency was also attempting to obtain a home evaluation to allow visits, 

but DIF informed the Agency that it had cancelled all home evaluations due 

to the pandemic until late January. The Agency inquired about family 

members who could take the girls to Mexico for a visit, but the available 

family members expressed concern about COVID-19 exposure. 

At the six-month review hearing, Father’s counsel asked the court to 

find that the Agency failed to provide reasonable services. Counsel asserted 

that the Agency relied too heavily on DIF to provide services despite the 

evidence that DIF was closed due to the pandemic and was unable to provide 

any services. She further asserted that the Agency unreasonably declined to 

allow the children to travel to Mexico with relatives to visit Father in person. 

In response, the Agency acknowledged the difficulties in obtaining services 

and the delays caused by the pandemic, but maintained that the Agency had 

been diligent and maintained contact with Father. Regarding visits, the 

Agency asserted that its concern was centered on the risk to the children and 

caregivers from COVID-19 exposure when traveling for visits. 

The juvenile court found that reasonable services had been provided 

“under the circumstances and facts of this case.” The court concluded that 

the Agency does not fail to provide reasonable services when it “declines to 

offer San Diego-based services via video to a parent residing outside the 

United States.” The court noted that participation in services was not a 

“huge priority” for Father because he acknowledged the children would likely 

be returned to Mother because he could not return to the United States. The 

court considered the “complications of the pandemic” to have interfered with 

the Agency’s typical practice of relying on DIF to coordinate services with 

parents in Mexico, but found that Agency did make the referrals and could 
7

not control DIF’s failure to act. Thus, the court concluded that even though 

the Agency “dropped the ball” for two months by not finding a “creative 

solution” to providing Father with individual therapy, the Agency 

nevertheless made reasonable efforts to provide services “under the 

circumstances.” Regarding visitation, the court concluded that while it 

appreciated Father’s frustration, it did not find the Agency acted 

unreasonably by not providing in-person visits given the risks posed by the 

pandemic. The court also noted that the Agency indicated it would be 

providing 18 months of services in this case given the difficulties in 

connecting Father with services. 

Accordingly, the court found that the Agency had provided reasonable 

services, ordered they continue, and set a 12-month review hearing. Father 

appealed. 5 

DISCUSSION

I

“The purpose of the California dependency system is to protect children 

from harm and to preserve families when safe for the child. (§ 300.2; In re 

Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) The focus during the 

reunification period is to preserve the family whenever possible. [Citation.] 

Until services are terminated, family reunification is the goal and the parent 

is entitled to every presumption in favor of returning the child to parental 

custody. (§§ 366.21, 366.22; [citation].)” (Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 

202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1424 (Tracy J.).) Reasonable services during the 

5 As the Agency concedes, the order is appealable and Father’s challenge 

to the juvenile court’s reasonable services finding is cognizable on appeal. 

(See Wanda B. v. Superior Court (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1395; see also 

In re A.G. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994 (A.G.).) 
8

reunification period are statutorily required, though there is “no 

constitutional ‘entitlement’ to these services.” (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 

Cal.App.4th 470, 475.) 

“At each review hearing, if the child is not returned to the custody of 

his or her parent, the juvenile court is required to determine whether 

reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent in overcoming the 

problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the 

child have been offered or provided to the parent . . . . (§ 366.21, subds. (e), 

(f).)” (In re J.P. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 108, 121.) In making its 

determination, the juvenile court considers the appropriateness of services 

offered, the extent to which the agency facilitated utilization of those services, 

and the extent to which the parent availed him or herself of the services 

provided. (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.) 

“The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that 

might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were 

reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 

538, 547 (Misako R.).) Reunification services “should be tailored to the 

particular needs of the family.” (Tracy J., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1425.) 

The adequacy of the plan and the Agency's efforts must be judged according 

to the circumstances of the particular case. (In re Taylor J. (2014) 223 

Cal.App.4th 1446, 1451.) 

The Legislature has recognized that parents may be deported, but a 

parent’s removal from the country does not preclude the provision of 

reunification services during a dependency proceeding. (A.G., supra, 12 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1003.) If a parent has been deported to the parent’s country 

of origin, the court may still provide reunification services and when

determining the content of those services, “the court shall consider the 
9

particular barriers to a[ ] . . . deported parent’s access to those courtmandated services and ability to maintain contact with the child, and shall 

document this information in the child’s case plan.” (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1).) 

The Agency must make “[r]easonable efforts to assist parents who have been 

deported to contact child welfare authorities in their country of origin, to 

identify any available services that would substantially comply with case 

plan requirements, to document the parents’ participation in those services, 

and to accept reports from local child welfare authorities as to the parents’

living situation, progress, and participation in services.” (Id. at subd. 

(e)(1)(E).) 

We review a reasonable services finding for substantial evidence.6 

(Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) “In reviewing 

the reasonableness of the services provided, this court must view the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent. We must indulge in all 

legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the verdict. If there is 

substantial evidence supporting the judgment, our duty ends and the 

judgment must not be disturbed.” (Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 545; 

see also Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598.) 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s 

ruling, as we must, we conclude the finding of reasonableness is supported by 

substantial evidence and that the court did not err in finding the Agency 

6 Father contends that we must adjust our analysis to reflect the higher 

burden of proof placed on the juvenile court to find clear and convincing 

evidence to support its finding that the services were reasonable. The Agency 

disagrees, asserting that although the juvenile court expressed it was 

applying the clear and convincing evidence standard, it was only legally 

required to apply the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof. Under 

either standard, however, our conclusion that the trial court’s reasonable 

services finding is supported by substantial evidence would be the same. 
10

provided reasonable services. “To support a finding that reasonable services 

were offered or provided to the parent, ‘the record should show that the 

supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, 

offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable

contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made 

reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved 

difficult. . . .’ ” (A.G., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1001.) 

Father does not contend that the Agency failed to identify the problems 

leading to the loss of custody. The Agency determined that Father’s inability 

to safeguard the children when Mother was under the influence placed them 

at substantial risk. Similarly, Father does not challenge the Agency’s 

determination that to remedy this problem, Father should receive parenting 

classes and individual therapy.7 

At most, Father challenges the adequacy of the Agency’s facilitation of 

visitation, which was entirely virtual during the six-month review period. 

Earlier in the reunification period, the Agency cited the closure of the 

Mexican Consulate, border restrictions, and the children’s lack of passports

as the reasons why Father did not have in-person visits. By the time of the 

six-month review hearing, the Agency focused solely on the risk to the 

children of COVID-19 exposure associated with a trip in a car with relatives 

7 As the Agency concedes, despite a social worker’s mistaken belief that 

Father was subject to drug testing, his case plan did not involve any drug 

testing. Early in the proceeding, Father tested negative for controlled 

substances and, despite a suggestion he may have sold methamphetamine, 

there was no indication that the Agency was concerned about Father’s 

possible drug use. 
11

across the border.8 The court acknowledged that it appreciated Father’s 

frustration with the lack of in-person visits, but noted “it’s a frustration 

shared by many, many people who have not seen their children, or seen their 

parents or their grandparents for a year.” 

Father suggests that the Agency did not provide reasonable services 

“because it failed to provide any visitation.” However, the record 

demonstrates that Father has daily virtual video visits with his children. 

Although virtual visits are certainly less than ideal, Father offers no 

authority to support the position that visitation must be in person or that

video or voice visits are, as a matter of law, inadequate.9 Especially in light 

of the risk to the children posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, we cannot 

conclude that the Agency acted unreasonably in restricting cross-border 

travel to facilitate in-person visits. While visitation is a critical element of 

the reunification process, “[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of 

the children.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B).) In the absence of evidence to the 

contrary, we conclude that, in the limited circumstances presented in this 

8 Despite Father’s suggestions to the contrary on appeal , neither the 

Agency nor the juvenile court were focused only on the risk posed by exposure 

to Father. Instead, the court primarily expressed concern with the exposure 

that would arise during the cross-border journey to Father. 

9 At most, Father relies on Emergency Rules of Court, rule 6(c)(7), which 

prohibits a suspension of visitation solely because of the COVID-19 pandemic, 

but rather requires the Agency and the court to “balance the public health 

directives and best interest of the child, and take into consideration whether 

in-person visitation may continue to be held safely.” Here, the court 

considered the unique circumstances of this case, which would have required 

the children to travel in an automobile with relatives they did not normally 

reside with to cross the border to visit Father at an unknown location. 
12

case, the Agency acted reasonably when it was only able to provide virtual 

visits rather than cross-border in-person visits with Father.10 

For the remainder of his case plan, consisting of parenting classes and 

individual therapy, Father’s focus on appeal is not the adequacy of the case 

plan, but rather whether the Agency “ ‘maintained reasonable contact with 

the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable 

efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult. . . .’ ” 

(A.G., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1001.) Our review of the record supports 

the conclusion that the juvenile court’s finding of reasonableness is supported 

by substantial evidence.11 

As Father notes, “[t]ime is always of the essence in dependency 

proceedings, especially when children younger than three are involved.” (T.J. 

v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1242.) At least one court has 

concluded that significant delays caused by placing parents on waitlists of six 

months to a year without seeking alternatives is a sufficient ground for 

finding that reasonable services were not provided. (Id. at pp. 1242-1244.) 

Delays in locating service providers and providing contact information to the 

parents for those provides may similarly preclude a finding that reasonable 

services were provided. (In re T.W.-1 (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 339, 346.) 

However, when a parent is located out of California, the ability to provide 

services often becomes more difficult and any delays caused by the parent’s 

10 On appeal, Father cites an online article regarding family visitation 

during the COVID-19 pandemic. The record does not reflect that the juvenile 

court considered the article and Father makes an inadequate showing that it 

is a matter appropriate for judicial notice. We therefore decline to consider 

the article on appeal. 

11 The Agency asserts, based on a cursory argument, that Father forfeited 

his challenge of the reasonableness of the case plan. We disagree. 
13

location should be considered within the context of the unique circumstances 

of each case when considering the reasonableness of the Agency’s actions. 

(See, e.g., id. at p. 348.) 

Here, although the Agency’s attempts to connect Father with services 

were beset with delays caused by his location in Mexico and the COVID-19 

pandemic, the Agency continued to maintain contact and worked to find 

services providers. With regard to parenting classes, the Agency immediately 

began looking for services in Mexico following Father’s deportation in April 

2020. At that time, Father did not have a computer, making it difficult for 

him to attend any virtual classes. The Agency intended to follow its typical 

procedure of coordinating services with DIF, the Mexican agency. At that 

time, DIF was closed and did not plan to resume services until July 22, 2020. 

When DIF did not reopen as planned, the Agency contacted Father in early 

August and again in September, when Father appears to have expressed a 

willingness to attend online classes. The Agency continued to contact both 

Father and DIF throughout 2020 in an attempt to coordinate services. By 

December 2020, the Agency had shifted its focus and, instead of relying on 

DIF, the social worker arranged virtual classes for Father with a San Diego 

provider. By the time of the six-month review hearing, Father had begun 

participating in those classes. Although the arduous path to locate a service 

provider was less than ideal, the evidence establishes that the Agency’s 

actions were reasonable under the circumstances. 

Similarly, the evidence demonstrates that the Agency remained in 

contact with Father regarding individual therapy services. By July 2020, the 

Agency again noted the delays caused by the closure of DIF, but assured the 

court it would continue to work with DIF “to ensure the father can engage in 

services as soon as possible.” Father’s counsel acknowledged the difficulty in 
14

scheduling services with DIF and suggested the court allow Father to 

participate in “NarAnon or NA” in lieu of therapy. Over the next several 

months, the Agency maintained contact with Father and continued to 

attempt to arrange therapy services, either through DIF or a provider in the 

United States. After these attempts were unsuccessful, the court ordered the 

Agency to assist Father “in connecting . . . with Al-Anon or Nar-Anon that 

can be done virtually, that’s free.” Following that order, the Agency sent 

Father information about Nar-Anon, which provides a program for family 

and friends of an addicted person. Father, however, did not enroll in NarAnon by the time of the six-month review hearing. While the Agency may 

have “dropped the ball” at some point, as the juvenile court found, it 

ultimately was able to provide Father with contact information for Nar-Anon 

meetings, which the court suggested would be helpful in demonstrating 

Father was addressing the issues identified in his case plan. The record 

reflects that the Agency maintained contact and continued assisting Father 

in obtaining therapy services. Given the circumstances, the juvenile court 

correctly concluded that the Agency acted reasonably despite the delays. 

Father compares this case to A.G., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th 994, which 

similarly involved a challenge on appeal to the juvenile court’s finding that 

reasonable services were provided to a father deported to Mexico. (Id. at 

pp. 997-998.) In A.G., after the Agency arranged for services through DIF, 

the father initially indicated he was no longer interested in reunification 

services, but then changed his mind again to request services. (Id. at pp. 998-

999.) After several delays in obtaining services, the Agency recommended 

returning the children to the mother’s care at the 12-month review hearing 

and suggested it would provide discretionary services to father. (Id. at 
15

pp. 999-1000.) The juvenile court found the Agency had offered reasonable 

services, despite father’s inability to begin services, and placed the blame on 

father for being deported and then refusing services. (Id. at p. 1000.) On 

appeal, this court reversed, holding that the juvenile court’s finding that 

father declined services was not supported by substantial evidence and the 

conclusion that father was responsible for the Agency’s failure to provide 

services because he was deported was “legally indefensible.” (Id. at p. 1002.) 

A.G. is inapposite. Here, the juvenile court did not blame Father for 

his deportation and recognized that Father had steadfastly expressed an 

interest in receiving reunification services, even if Father had suggested that 

Mother would be primarily responsible for engaging in services. Unlike the 

Agency’s actions in A.G., the Agency here continued to engage with Father to 

find service providers despite the difficulties presented by Father being in 

Mexico. Our conclusion that the juvenile court correctly found the Agency 

provided reasonable services is predicated on the Agency’s response to these 

difficulties, which demonstrate that the Agency was committed to providing 

Father with services during the reunification period. Unlike the juvenile 

court in A.G., the court below did not attempt to rely upon a “Go to Mexico, 

lose your child” rule. (A.G., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1003.) Instead, the 

court recognized the barriers to providing services and asked the Agency to 

be “get creative” in finding alternatives. Given these differences, the decision 

in A.G. provides little guidance beyond reflecting that the provision of family 

reunification services in Mexico by DIF can often involve delays. The Agency 

appears to be well aware of these issues and committed to connecting Father 

with services. 
16

When considering the reasonableness of the services provided by the 

Agency, we must consider the Agency’s actions in the context of the specific 

circumstances presented in each case. (Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 547.) Here, those unique circumstances involved a parent in Mexico who 

could not legally cross the border combined with the COVID-19 pandemic, 

which forced the closure of service providers and precluded cross-border 

visitation due to the concomitant health risk to the children. Applying the 

appropriate deferential standard of review, we conclude substantial evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s determination that the Agency provided 

reasonable services to Father in the context of the difficult circumstances 

present in this proceeding. 

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. 

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

O'ROURKE, J.