UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 97-4820

GERALD STEPHEN KINNISON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.

James R. Spencer, District Judge.

(CR-97-133)

Submitted: June 9, 1998

Decided: September 14, 1998

Before NIEMEYER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and

HALL, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

John C. Ivins, Jr., Chandra D. Lantz, HIRSCHLER, FLEISCHER,

WEINBERG, COX & ALLEN, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.

Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, N. George Metcalf, Assistant

United States Attorney, W. Barry Montgomery, Third Year Law Student, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

At issue in this case is whether agents of the United States Secret

Service had probable cause to search Gerald Kinnison's car after they

arrested him for credit card fraud. We find that the agents had probable cause to search Kinnison's car and thus affirm his conviction.

On March 28, 1997, secret service agents arrested Kinnison while

he was visiting his probation officer at the United States Court House

Annex in Richmond, Virginia. Agents then transported Kinnison to a

nearby field office for questioning. Due to an ongoing investigation

the agents had reason to believe that Kinnison had been obtaining

credit cards in the names of other individuals, and that he used one

such credit card to pay for repairs and to buy one set of custom

wheels for his 1995 Honda Accord. Following Kinnison's arrest,

Secret Service special agent Greg Regan searched the area surrounding the courthouse in an effort to find Kinnison's car. Regan found

the Honda, and special agent Gerard Gaughran seized the car and

parked it in a parking garage under the building in which the Secret

Service field office is located.

Agent Gaughran then applied for search warrants to search Kinnison's residence, his 1995 Honda Accord, a personal computer that

Kinnison had recently sold, and two U-Haul storage lockers allegedly

leased by Kinnison. Gaughran's affidavit and application accompanying the search warrant for Kinnison's car recited Gaughran's extensive experience investigating credit card fraud crimes, the facts

relating to his investigation of Kinnison's alleged fraudulent activities, and that he suspected that a search of Kinnison's car would

reveal evidence of Kinnison's fraudulent activities. The affidavit specifically noted that an investigation had uncovered evidence that

credit cards issued in other people's names had been sent to Kinnison's address, and that Kinnison had used the credit cards to pay for

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service repairs and to buy a set of custom wheels for his 1995 Honda

Accord. The magistrate judge issued Gaughran a warrant to search

Kinnison's car, and a subsequent search of the car uncovered a gun

inside a locked gun case in the trunk.

Kinnison was then indicted on charges of mail fraud, credit card

fraud and unlawful possession of a handgun. He filed a motion to suppress the gun found in the trunk of his car as the fruit of an illegal

search and seizure.* The district court found that the search warrant

for the car was supported by probable cause and denied the motion.

Kinnison then pled guilty to aiding and abetting credit card fraud in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1029(a)(2) (1994), and possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),

924(e)(1) (1994). His plea agreement preserved the right to appeal the

district court's order denying his suppression motion. This appeal followed.

A district court's determination of probable cause under the Fourth

Amendment is an issue of law that this court reviews de novo. United

States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 118 (4th Cir. 1996). In reviewing

whether probable cause existed for the issuance of a warrant, "[g]reat

deference is to be given a magistrate's assessment of the facts" and

the "inquiry is directed to whether the magistrate had a substantial

basis for his conclusion that probable cause existed." See United

States v. Williams, 974 F.2d 480, 481 (4th Cir. 1992). This court has

adopted a standard for assessing probable cause which "allows a magistrate to review the facts and circumstances as a whole and make a

common sense determination of whether `there is a fair probability

that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular

place.'" See Williams, 974 F.2d at 481 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462

U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).

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*Kinnison also moved to suppress evidence uncovered in searches of

his residence, the U-Haul lockers, and his personal computer. The district

court denied his suppression motion with respect to his residence and his

computer, and granted his motion with respect to the U-Haul lockers. On

appeal Kinnison only contests the validity of the search of his car, and

thus we express no opinion on the legality of these other searches.

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The affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant for Kinnison's car contained specific allegations that Kinnison obtained credit

cards through fraudulent means and then used these credit cards to

repair and buy new wheels for his car. The affidavit and the application itself stated that it was the agent's belief that a search of the car

would uncover evidence related to Kinnison's fraudulent credit-card

activities. Considering that Kinnison was alleged to have used the

credit cards to pay for repairs on and to buy new wheels for the very

car the agents sought to search, we find entirely reasonable the magistrate judge's determination that there was a fair probability that a

search of the car would uncover evidence of Kinnison's alleged fraudulent activities.

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the search of Kinnison's car was supported by probable cause and thus affirm his conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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