* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-20523 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee v. EDGAR FERNANDO BLANCO PUERTA, also known as Commandant Emilio Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:02-CR-714-4
Before WIENER, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * This is an appeal in a criminal case. Defendant-Appellant Edgar Fernando Blanco Puerta pleaded guilty to conspiracy to “provide material support or resources toa foreign terrorist organization,” in violation of18 U.S.C. § 2339B, and to conspiracy with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. The District Court United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D October 2, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 06-20523

2 applied a sentencing enhancement for an offense involving or promoting a “federal crime of terrorism.” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4(a). Puerta did not object to the
sentencing enhancement in the District Court. Nevertheless, Puerta now appeals the sentencing enhancement. We affirm. We review the decision of the District Court for plain error. See United States v. Villegas,404 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that the plain error standard applies when a defendant fails to object to a sentencing enhancement) (citations omitted). We find plain error only when “(1) there was an error; (2) the
error was clear and obvious; and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” I d

. (citations omitted). If all three conditions are met, we have “discretion to notice a forfeited error but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation ofjudicial proceedings.” Id

. at 358-59 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). There is no plain error in this case. A “‘federal crime of terrorism” is “an offense that – (A) is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct; and (B) is a violation of

... [18 U.S.C. §] 2339B.” 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5); s ee U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3A1.4 cmt. (n.1) (2004) (“For the purposes of this guideline, ‘federal crime of terrorism’ has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5).”). Puerta’s conviction falls squarely within the definition ofa“federal crime of terrorism” in § 2332b(g)(5). Puerta pleaded guilty to violating § 2339B. Specifically, Puerta and his co-conspirators sought to trade drugs and money for weapons to supply the United Self Defense Force of Colombia, a designated foreign terrorist organization that opposes theColombian government. Puerta’s argument that § 2332b(g)(5) applies only to the government ofthe United States is unavailing. The relevant text refers broadly to “government,” §2332b(g)(5), in contrast to other subsections which specify “the United States Government,”No. 06-20523

3 §2332b(b)(1)(c). See United States v. DeAmaris, 406 F. Supp. 2d 748, 749-51 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that “theword ‘government’ as used in § 2332b(g)(5)(a) includes foreign governments and is not limited tothe government ofthe United States”). Accordingly, we find no plain error in the District Court’s decision to apply the sentencing enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4(a).

AFFIRMED