Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1503-CR-110 | September 23, 2015 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Ellen M. O’Connor

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Tyler G. Banks

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Charles Arnold,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

September 23, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A05-1503-CR-110

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Shatrese M. 

Flowers, Judge

The Honorable Peggy Hart, 

Commissioner

Trial Court Cause No.

49G20-1408-F4-38278

Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1503-CR-110 | September 23, 2015 Page 2 of 10

Case Summary

[1] Appellant-Defendant Charles Arnold engaged in an argument with Cynthia 

Bell during the early morning hours of August 4, 2014. Arnold interfered when 

Bell approached Eddie Williams and asked for assistance. Despite Arnold’s 

threatening demeanor, Williams helped Bell get away from Arnold. A few 

hours later, Arnold spotted Williams, who had fallen asleep in his vehicle. 

Arnold, in an aggressive and threatening manner, demanded that Williams tell 

him where he had taken Bell. As Williams attempted to flee from Arnold, 

Williams heard two gunshots. Immediately after Williams heard the gunshots,

he noticed that something had shattered the back window of his vehicle and 

punctured his left rear tire. 

[2] Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (the “State”) subsequently charged 

Arnold with a number of crimes, including unlawful possession of a firearm by 

a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony, and attempted battery by means of a 

deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony. Following a jury trial, Arnold was found 

guilty as charged. On appeal, Arnold challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

sustaining his convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious 

violent felon and attempted battery by means of a deadly weapon. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On the morning of August 4, 2014, Arnold and Cynthia Bell engaged in an 

argument. During the course of the argument, Bell “slashed” Arnold’s tires and 
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Arnold called the police. State’s Ex. 35-A, 5:44-5:50. At some point, Bell left 

the scene and approached a white SUV which was being driven by Eddie 

Williams. Williams observed that Bell appeared to be “distressed” and 

appeared to be “trying to get away from [ ] Arnold.” Tr. p. 49. 

[4] After Williams agreed to give Bell a ride, Arnold “jumped” in front of 

Williams’s vehicle to try to block the vehicle’s exit route. Tr. p. 50. Williams 

then “gunned [his] vehicle[,]” causing Arnold to move from the vehicle’s path. 

Tr. p. 51. As Williams drove away, he observed Arnold “thr[o]w his hand 

behind his back like [he was] going to draw a weapon.” Tr. p. 51. Williams, 

however, did not actually see a weapon at this time. Williams gave Bell a ride 

to the intersection of 18th Street and Meridian Street. 

[5] After dropping Bell off, Williams drove to Graceland Avenue between 36th and 

37th Streets, where he feel asleep in his vehicle. Williams was subsequently 

awakened by Arnold yelling at him from the passenger seat of a burgundy 

Buick that was being driven by Cory Mills. At Arnold’s request, Mills had 

stopped the Buick to the left of Williams’s vehicle. Arnold exhibited a 

“threatening” demeanor as he questioned Williams about Bell. Tr. p. 54. 

Arnold was acting “real aggressive, wanting to know what [Williams] had did 

[sic] with [Bell].” Tr. p. 54. Believing that Arnold might be armed, Williams 

attempted to flee the encounter by pulling away from Mills’s Buick. As he 

pulled away, Williams heard two gunshots. Immediately after Williams heard 

the gunshots, he noticed that something had shattered the back window of his 

vehicle and punctured his left rear tire. The bullet that shattered Williams’s 
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back window came to rest in “the second seat headrest right behind 

[Williams’s] head.” Tr. p. 57. Williams proceeded to a nearby restaurant and 

reported the incident to the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department. 

[6] Detective Stephen Fippen responded to Williams’s call. After conducting an 

initial conversation with Williams, Detective Fippen transported Williams to 

Arnold’s home which was located just north of the intersection of 36th Street 

and Kenwood Avenue. Once at Arnold’s home, Williams identified Arnold as 

the individual whom he had encountered both when initially approached by 

Bell and when he was awakened in his vehicle and shot at. Based on the facts 

known to Detective Fippen coupled with Williams’s identification of Arnold, 

Detective Fippen obtained a search warrant for Arnold’s home.

[7] During a subsequent search of Arnold’s home, Detective Fippen discovered a 

holster that would fit a “large model frame Smith and Wesson [.]40 caliber 

handgun.” Tr. p. 202. In addition, investigating officers recovered two spent 

shell casings from the site of the shooting. These shell casings were in “pristine 

condition” when recovered, enabling the investigating officers to identify the 

casings from .40 caliber Smith and Wesson cartridges. Tr. p. 119. It was later 

determined that the only possible weapon that could have fired the shells was a 

Smith and Wesson firearm.

[8] On August 5, 2014, the State charged Arnold with Count I – unlawful 

possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony; Count II –

attempted battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony; Count III –
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criminal recklessness, a Level 5 felony; and Count IV – possession of 

paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court conducted a two-day 

jury trial on December 9-10, 2014. Following the conclusion of trial, the jury 

found Arnold guilty as charged. At sentencing, the trial court merged Counts II 

and III and sentenced Arnold to an aggregate twelve-year sentence. This 

appeal follows.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Arnold contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for 

unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and attempted 

battery by means of a deadly weapon.1 

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative 

evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is 

the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess 

witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether 

it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, 

when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, 

they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. 

Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence 

overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The 

 

1 Arnold does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for Class A 

misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.
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evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn 

from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (citations, emphasis, and 

quotations omitted). “In essence, we assess only whether the verdict could be 

reached based on reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence 

presented.” Baker v. State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012) (emphasis in 

original). Upon review, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or assess 

the credibility of the witnesses, Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind. 2002), 

as the jury, acting as the trier-of-fact, is “‘free to believe whomever they wish.’” 

Klaff v. State, 884 N.E.2d 272, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting McClendon v. 

State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)). 

[10] “[A] conviction may be based purely on circumstantial evidence.” Hayes v. 

State, 876 N.E.2d 373, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Moore v. State, 652 

N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)), trans. denied. “‘On appeal, the circumstantial 

evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’” Id. 

(quoting Moore, 652 N.E.2d at 55). “It is enough if an inference reasonably 

tending to support the conviction can be drawn from the circumstantial 

evidence.” Id. (citing Moore, 652 N.E.2d at 55). Thus, where circumstantial 

evidence is used to establish guilt, “‘the question for the reviewing court is 

whether reasonable minds could reach the inferences drawn by the jury; if so, 

there is sufficient evidence.’” Klaff, 884 N.E.2d at 274-75 (quoting Maxwell v. 

State, 731 N.E.2d 459, 462 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)).
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[11] Furthermore, “[e]ven though one’s mere presence at the crime scene with the 

opportunity to commit a crime is not a sufficient basis on which to support a 

conviction, one’s presence at the scene in connection with other circumstances 

tending to show one’s participation may raise a reasonable inference of guilt.” 

Id. at 275 (citing Brink v. State, 837 N.E.2d 192, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. 

denied). For instance, a defendant’s course of conduct before, during, and after 

the offense, may raise a reasonable inference of guilt. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 

1065, 1068 (Ind. 2015) (citing Maul v. State, 731 N.E.2d 438, 439 (Ind. 2000)).

I. Unlawful Possession of a Handgun by a Serious 

Violent Felon

[12] Indiana Code section 35-47-4-5(c) provides that “[a] serious violent felon who 

knowingly or intentionally possesses a firearm commits unlawful possession of 

a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony.” Arnold admitted below 

that he qualified as a serious violent felon. As such, he does not challenge the 

sufficiency of the evidence proving that he was a serious violent felon on 

appeal. Arnold merely challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that 

he knowingly or intentionally possessed a firearm. 

[13] In the instant matter, the evidence most favorable to the jury’s finding of guilty 

demonstrates that Arnold exhibited threatening behavior toward Williams 

during two separate encounters. During Williams’s first encounter with 

Arnold, Williams did not actually see a weapon, but saw Arnold “thr[o]w his 

hand behind his back like [he was] going to draw a weapon.” Tr. p. 51. During 

the second encounter, Williams, who had fallen asleep in his vehicle, was 
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awakened by Arnold yelling at him. Arnold exhibited a “threatening” 

demeanor as he questioned Williams about Bell. Tr. p. 54. Arnold was acting 

“real aggressive, wanting to know what [Williams] had did [sic] with [Bell].” 

Tr. p. 54. Because he believed from their earlier encounter that Arnold might 

be armed, Williams attempted to flee the encounter by pulling away from 

Arnold. As he pulled away, Williams heard two gunshots. Immediately after 

Williams heard the gunshots, he noticed that something had shattered the back 

window of his vehicle and punctured his left rear tire. The bullet that shattered 

Williams’s back window came to rest in “the second seat headrest right behind 

[Williams’s] head.” Tr. p. 57. 

[14] Further, while Mills testified at trial that he did not see Arnold with a gun on 

the day in question, the State attempted to impeach Mills by casting Mills’s 

credibility into doubt. In impeaching Mills, the State questioned him about his 

prior statement to Detective Fippen that he watched as Arnold “came out of his 

back pocket with a gun and started shooting.” Tr. p. 73. The jury, acting as the 

trier of fact, was in the best position to judge Mills’s credibility and to decide 

whether to believe Mills’s trial testimony. See Stewart, 768 N.E.2d 435; Klaff, 

884 N.E.2d at 274. 

[15] We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to reasonably infer 

Arnold’s guilt. Arnold’s claim to the contrary is effectively an invitation to 

reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Stewart, 768 N.E.2d at 435.
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II. Attempted Battery by Means of a Deadly Weapon

[16] Indiana Code sections 35-42-2-1(b)(1) provides that a person who knowingly or 

intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner

commits battery, a Class B misdemeanor. However, the offense is a Level 5 

felony if it is committed with a deadly weapon. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(f)(2). 

Furthermore, “[a] person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the 

culpability required for commission of the crime, the person engages in conduct 

that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime.” Ind. Code 

§ 35-41-5-1(a). “An attempt to commit a crime is a felony or misdemeanor of 

the same level or class as the crime attempted.” Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1(a).

[17] As is discussed above, the evidence most favorable to the jury’s finding of guilt 

demonstrates that Williams was awakened by Arnold yelling at him. Arnold 

exhibited a “threatening” demeanor as he questioned Williams about Bell. Tr. 

p. 54. Arnold was acting “real aggressive, wanting to know what [Williams] 

had did [sic] with [Bell].” Tr. p. 54. When Williams attempted to flee the 

encounter, Williams heard two gunshots. Immediately after Williams heard 

the gunshots, he noticed that something had shattered the back window of his 

vehicle and punctured his left rear tire. The bullet that shattered Williams’s 

back window came to rest in “the second seat headrest right behind 

[Williams’s] head.” Tr. p. 57. The evidence demonstrates that the trajectory of 

the cartridges recovered form Williams’s vehicle was consistent with the gun 

being fired by Arnold and the record is devoid of any indication that there was 
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some other individual present at the scene that could have shot the gun in the 

direction of Williams’s vehicle.

[18] We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to reasonably infer 

Arnold’s guilt. Arnold’s claim to the contrary is effectively an invitation to 

reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Stewart, 768 N.E.2d at 435.

[19] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

May, J., and Crone, J., concur.