UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

GREGORY LANGLEY,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v. No. 97-7692

A. D. ROBINSON,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.

David G. Lowe, Magistrate Judge.

(CA-97-338-R)

Submitted: September 10, 1998

Decided: September 28, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Gregory Langley, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Thomas Judge, OFFICE

OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Gregory Langley appeals the magistrate judge's order denying

relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 &

Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the magistrate judge's

opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

In this case, the magistrate judge concluded that Langley's petition

was barred by the one-year limitations period of 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2244(d)(1) (West Supp. 1998). Langley's conviction became final

on May 9, 1995, and his attempt at state habeas relief was finally

denied on November 20, 1995. The magistrate judge concluded that

this petition, received in the district court on April 17, 1997, was

unreasonably delayed. See Peterson v. Demskie , 107 F.3d 92, 93 (2d

Cir. 1997). The magistrate judge did not have the benefit of our recent

opinion in Brown v. Angelone, ___ F.3d ___, 1998 WL 389030 (4th

Cir. July 14, 1998) (Nos. 96-7173, 96-7208), in which we concluded

that a limitation date of April 23, 1997, provided habeas petitioners

with a reasonable period in which to file new § 2254 petitions. As a

result, Langely's petition should not have been dismissed as time

barred.

Notwithstanding our conclusion that the petition was timely, the

magistrate judge did not commit reversible error in dismissing the

petition. Langley claimed only that his state conviction for abduction,

robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony was not

supported by sufficient evidence. Because this claim was adjudicated

on the merits in the state courts, a federal court may not grant an

application for a writ of habeas corpus unless the decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of a clearly established

Supreme Court decision, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Neither the record nor

Langley's petition contain a hint of error of this magnitude on the part

of the state courts. The state court's rejection of Langley's claim that

the victim's positive identification of Appellant as the perpetrator was

insufficient to support his conviction does not amount to an unreasonable determination of fact or law. Consequently, the appeal of the

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magistrate judge's order dismissing Langley's petition is dismissed on

this reasoning. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475-76 n.6

(1970). We deny Langley's motion for the appointment of counsel

and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

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