Affirmed and Opinion Filed April 20, 2015 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-01502-CV 

$8,074.68 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY; 40 "8 LINER" MACHINES; 3 WALMART 

GIFT CARDS; AND MISC. PAPERS, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District Court 

Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 380-02636-2013 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Francis and Myers, and Chief Justice Thomas, Retired1

Opinion by Chief Justice Thomas, Retired 

This is a civil forfeiture case. Interested party Jack Fairchild appeals the trial court’s final 

judgment forfeiting $8,074.68 in United States currency, forty “8 liner” machines, three Walmart 

gift cards, and miscellaneous paperwork to the State as gambling proceeds, devices, equipment, 

and paraphernalia. In one issue, Fairchild asserts the trial court erred in overruling his objection 

to the State’s evidence at the show cause hearing. Because all dispositive issues are settled in 

law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial 

court’s judgment. 

Sergeant Jeff Brownrigg investigated gambling-related offenses and illegal gambling 

enterprises for the Collin County Sheriff’s office. On June 13, 2013, Brownrigg applied for a 

 

1

 The Honorable Linda Thomas, Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas—Dallas, Retired, sitting by assignment. 
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search and seizure warrant to search the Triple Crazy Game Room, located at 865 Audie Murphy 

Parkway, Farmersville, Texas, for gambling devices, equipment, and paraphernalia used in the 

commission of an offense. In support, Sergeant Brownrigg attached a sworn affidavit, providing 

facts and circumstances personally known to him and other law enforcement officers that led him 

to believe that gambling devices or evidence of gambling offenses would be found at that 

location. The trial court found that Brownrigg’s affidavit demonstrated probable cause for his 

belief that gambling offenses were being committed at the Triple Crazy Game Room, and issued 

a search and seizure warrant. Brownrigg executed the warrant the same day, seizing forty “8 

liners,” United States currency, gift cards, and various documents from the Triple Crazy Game 

Room. 

On July 9, 2013, the State filed its motion for forfeiture of gambling proceeds, devices, 

equipment, and paraphernalia. The motion also provided written notice that the State would not 

seek prosecution for offenses related to the seizure. The trial court sent notice to the person 

found in possession of the seized property, stating that anyone interested in contesting forfeiture 

should appear and show cause why the seized property should not be forfeited or destroyed. 

Fairchild entered an appearance and filed an answer as an interested person, opposing the 

forfeiture. 

At the show cause hearing, the State offered a certified copy of the search and seizure 

warrant, the affidavit for search warrant, and the return and inventory (collectively State’s 

Exhibit 1), and argued the burden had shifted to Fairchild to show cause why the seized property 

should not be forfeited or destroyed. In response, Fairchild challenged the existence of probable 

cause for the search warrant because Brownrigg’s affidavit was not based on personal 

knowledge. He also argued that State’s Exhibit 1 was inadmissible because Brownrigg’s 

affidavit was based on speculation, conjecture, and hearsay. Fairchild further argued that 
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because State’s Exhibit 1 was not admissible evidence, the State had not met its burden of proof 

and the burden of proof had not shifted to Fairchild to prove the property was not subject to 

forfeiture. The trial court overruled Fairchild’s objection and admitted State’s Exhibit 1 into 

evidence. Neither side presented any further evidence, and the trial court ordered the forfeiture 

of the seized items. Fairchild now appeals the trial court’s judgment. 

In a single issue, Fairchild contends the trial court erred by admitting State’s Exhibit 1 

into evidence at the show cause hearing because the affidavit constituted hearsay and was not 

competent, admissible evidence. Fairchild further contends that because State’s Exhibit 1 was 

the only evidence offered by the State at the show cause hearing, the trial court erred in ordering 

the property forfeited. Importantly, Fairchild does not challenge the trial court’s decision to 

issue the search warrant and does not ask that we review the trial court’s decision to issue the 

warrant. 

A civil forfeiture proceeding under chapter 18 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 

is an in rem proceeding. Hardy v. State, 102 S.W.3d 123, 127 (Tex. 2003) (citing State v. 

Rumfolo, 545 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex. 1976)). Article 18.18(b) authorizes forfeiture when the 

person found in possession of the property has not been convicted or prosecuted following a 

seizure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.18(b) (West Supp. 2014). As such, it is an 

action against the property itself, not against the owner, and does not involve the conviction of 

the owner or possessor of the property seized. See Hardy, 102 S.W.3d at 127. In Hardy, the 

Texas Supreme Court explained how the burden of proof is allocated at each stage of a civil 

forfeiture proceeding under chapter 18. 102 S.W.3d at 127–30. 

A forfeiture proceeding is initiated when the State obtains a search warrant based on a 

sworn affidavit averring sufficient facts to satisfy the issuing magistrate that probable cause 

exists for its issuance. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.01(b) (West Supp. 2014); see 
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also Hardy, 102 S.W.3d at 129; In re Seizure of Gambling Proceeds and Devices, 261 S.W.3d 

439, 444 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied). In the context of civil forfeiture, 

probable cause is a reasonable belief that “a substantial connection exists between the property to 

be forfeited and the criminal activity defined by the statute.” State v. Ninety Thousand Two 

Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars and No Cents in U.S. Currency and 2000 Black Lincoln Navigator 

VIN: 5LMPU28A7YLJ10865, 390 S.W.3d 289, 293 (Tex. 2013) (quoting United States v. 

$364,960.00 in U.S. Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981)). The facts submitted for the 

magistrate’s probable cause determination are those contained within the four corners of the 

affidavit, and they are to be read in a common-sense and realistic manner. State v. McLain, 337 

S.W.3d 268, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). A magistrate may draw reasonable inferences from 

the facts stated in the affidavit. Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55, 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

“Once the State has established probable cause to initiate a forfeiture proceeding, the State has 

met its burden under article 18.” Hardy, 102 S.W.3d at 129. At that point, the burden shifts to 

the interested party to prove that the property is not subject to forfeiture under article 18.18(f). 

Id. 

In this case, the State filed a sworn affidavit, and the magistrate issued the warrant. Once 

the State satisfied the magistrate that it had probable cause for the warrant, the State’s burden 

was met. See id. at 130. The burden then shifted to Fairchild to prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the property seized was not illegal gambling proceeds, devices, equipment, and 

paraphernalia. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.18(f); Hardy, 102 S.W.3d at 129. 

At the show cause hearing, Fairchild first argued that the search warrant should be 

reviewed because the affidavit on which it was based was “replete with hearsay statements from 

the Affiant.” When the State offered State’s Exhibit 1 into evidence, Fairchild’s counsel 

objected, pointed out various hearsay statements in the affidavit, and argued that the affidavit 
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should not be admitted into evidence at the show cause hearing. On appeal, Fairchild discusses 

the requirements for a proper affidavit; however, Fairchild limits his discussion to the rules of 

civil procedure dealing with summary judgment affidavits, and cases involving affidavits 

provided in support of summary judgment and other civil motions. Fairchild fails to address 

what is required of an affidavit in support of a search and seizure warrant. 

Brownrigg’s affidavit for search warrant states that Brownrigg received information 

regarding the Triple Crazy Game Room from other police officers. Several officers informed 

Brownrigg they personally observed gambling devices at the location; other officers provided 

Brownrigg with information regarding gambling activities at the location. In presenting the facts 

supporting an affidavit for a search warrant, a police officer does not have to rely solely on his 

own personal knowledge but can reasonably rely upon a trustworthy source to conclude that 

evidence of a crime may presently be found in a specified place. See Cassias v. State, 719 

S.W.2d 585, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). “Observations of fellow officers of the Government 

engaged in a common investigation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant.” Moreno v. State, 

415 S.W.3d 284, 288 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 

102, 110–11 (1965)). Even double hearsay may be used to show probable cause if the 

underlying circumstances indicate a substantial basis for crediting each level of hearsay. Lowery 

v. State, 843 S.W.2d 136, 140 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ ref’d). We find no legal support 

for Fairchild’s argument that the search affidavit should be stricken merely because it consisted 

of hearsay statements. See Cassias, 719 S.W.2d at 587; Allen v. State, 899 S.W.2d 296, 299 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ dism’d). Furthermore, as discussed above, the 

State did not have a burden to show probable cause at the show cause hearing. See Hardy, 102 

S.W.3d at 130. Probable cause was established when the trial court issued the search and seizure 

warrant. Id. Thus, any alleged defect in the State’s evidence at the show cause hearing was 
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harmless. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Fairchild’s 

objection to the admissibility of State’s Exhibit 1 at the show cause hearing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 

44.2(b) (if an error does not affect substantial rights, it must be disregarded); see also Bourque v. 

State, 156 S.W.3d 675, 676–77 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d). 

Fairchild had the burden of proof at the show cause hearing. See Hardy, 102 S.W.3d at 

129; see also State v. One Super Cherry Master Video 8-Liner Machine, 102 S.W.3d 132, 133 

(Tex. 2003). Article 18.18(f) provides that unless the interested party “proves by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the property or proceeds is not gambling equipment, altered 

gambling equipment, gambling paraphernalia, gambling device, gambling proceeds . . . and that 

he is entitled to possession, the magistrate shall dispose of the property or proceeds . . . .” TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.18(f). Fairchild readily admits he did not introduce any 

evidence to show why the seized property should not be forfeited. Accordingly, we conclude the 

trial court did not err in ordering the forfeiture of the property. See Hardy, 102 S.W.3d at 129. 

 We overrule Fairchild’s issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

131502F.P05 

 

/Linda Thomas/ 

LINDA THOMAS 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

$8,074.68 IN UNITED STATES 

CURRENCY; 40 "8 LINER" MACHINES; 

3 WALMART GIFT CARDS; AND MISC. 

PAPERS, Appellant 

No. 05-13-01502-CV V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District 

Court, Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 380-02636-2013. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Thomas. 

Justices Francis and Myers participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee THE STATE OF TEXAS recover its costs of this appeal 

from JACK FAIRCHILD. 

Judgment entered April 20, 2015.