J-S57017-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF E.J.O., MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: C.M., MOTHER

No. 1537 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree April 21, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2013-A0133

_____________________________________________________________

IN RE: ADOPTION OF S.L.O., MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: C.M., MOTHER

No. 1538 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree April 21, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2013-A0132

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OTT, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 28, 2015

C.M. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees entered April 21, 2015, in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, which involuntarily 

terminated her parental rights to her minor daughter, S.L.O., born in 
J-S57017-15

- 2 -

February of 2010, and to her minor son, E.J.O., born in January of 2011 

(collectively, “the Children”).1 We affirm.

This appeal arises from the petitions for involuntary termination filed 

by Mother’s father, R.M. (“Maternal Grandfather”), and his wife, C.M. 

(collectively, “Appellees”), on July 26, 2013.2 As discussed in greater detail, 

infra, the Children have been in the custody of Appellees since August of 

2011, as a result of severe physical abuse inflicted on E.J.O. by Father. 

Mother faced criminal charges in connection with this abuse, due to placing 

E.J.O. in the care of Father, and then failing to seek out medical treatment 

for his injuries. The Children initially were subject to a no-contact order with 

Mother. The order was lifted with respect to S.L.O. in October of 2012, and 

with respect to E.J.O. in approximately December of 2013.

A termination hearing was held on March 10, 2015, March 12, 2015, 

and April 20, 2015. During the hearing, Appellees presented the testimony 

of Detective Michael R. Begley; Montgomery County Office of Children and 

Youth (“OCY”) caseworker, Alison Karpowich; Maternal Grandfather; 

Maternal Grandfather’s former spouse and Mother’s mother, J.M.B.; Dr. 

Melissa Kennedy, who provided medical treatment for E.J.O., both before 

____________________________________________

1 The parental rights of the Children’s father, J.O. (“Father”), were 

terminated by separate decrees entered that same day. Father is not a 

party to the instant appeal.

2 Appellees filed amended termination petitions on January 17, 2014.
J-S57017-15

- 3 -

and after his injuries; and Mother’s current husband, J.N. (“Husband”). 

Appellees also called Mother to testify on cross-examination. The Children’s 

guardian ad litem presented the testimony of Erica Paige Hesselson, who 

supervised visits between Mother and the Children on August 21, 2014, and 

August 27, 2014. Finally, Mother testified on her own behalf, and presented 

the testimony of Father’s mother, C.O.; Mother’s therapist, Billie Lee 

Orenbuch; and Mother’s sister, D.M. 

The evidence presented during the hearing revealed that Mother has a 

history of serious behavioral issues, which began when she was sixteen 

years old, as well as a history of violent and tumultuous relationships.3 N.T., 

3/10/2015, at 126-43. Mother began dating Father in the fall of 2008. Id.

at 144. In January of 2009, Father attacked Mother, “grabbed her hair, 

dragged her down the steps of the front porch, kicked her in the stomach in 

the front yard, jammed dirt in her mouth, [and] tore her blouse open.” Id.

at 144-45. Despite this incident, Mother’s relationship with Father 

continued. Id. at 148-49. In January of 2011, about a week after E.J.O. 

was born, Mother and Father had “a blowup” in front of the Children, during 

which Father kicked in a door, put a hole in the wall, and “was throwing 

things indiscriminately around the room.” Id. at 153-56. Father also 

“scooped [S.L.O.] up and was threatening to take her.” Id. at 156. Mother 

____________________________________________

3 Mother was born in June of 1980, and was thirty-four years old at the time 

of the termination hearing. N.T., 3/12/2015, at 143.
J-S57017-15

- 4 -

obtained a temporary protection from abuse order (PFA) against Father, 

effective January 31, 2011. Exhibit P-5 (Temporary Protection from Abuse 

Order) at 1. A final PFA order was entered on April 12, 2011. Exhibit P-5 

(Final Protection from Abuse Order) at 1. By the summer of 2011, Mother 

had a new boyfriend, R.L. N.T., 3/10/2015, at 158. Despite the PFA order, 

Father continued to spend time in Mother’s residence. Id. 

On the evening of August 12, 2011, at about 10:00 or 11:00 p.m., 

Mother went out to a bar to see R.L., and left E.J.O., then age seven 

months, in the care of Father. N.T., 3/12/2015, at 114-15. S.L.O. was not 

in the residence at the time, because she was visiting with Appellees. N.T., 

3/10/2015, at 184-85. When Mother returned to her residence at 

approximately 3:00 a.m. on August 13, 2011, an argument ensued between 

her and Father. N.T., 3/12/2015, at 115-16. Mother called 911 to report 

that Father was in her residence and would not leave, in violation of the PFA 

order. N.T., 3/10/2015, at 22, 32. The police arrived, but Father already 

had departed. Id. at 39-40. Mother then sent text messages to R.L. for a 

period of about an hour. N.T., 3/12/2015, at 118. During this time, Mother 

observed drops and splatters of blood throughout her residence. Id. at 119. 

When Mother checked on E.J.O., she observed that his diaper was on 

backwards, and that there was “something wrong with his anus . . . .” Id. 

Despite this discovery, Mother did not seek immediate medical attention for 

E.J.O. Id. at 121. Instead, at approximately 4:45 a.m., Mother sent a text 

message to Maternal Grandfather, in which she stated, “Just come over 
J-S57017-15

- 5 -

when you get this. [T]here is no way [I] can explain anything. [Y]ou need 

to come. [W]hat [I] have to show you is not good.” N.T., 3/10/2015, at 

184; Exhibit P-6 (picture of text message). Mother then went to sleep. N.T., 

3/12/2015, at 119-22.

Maternal Grandfather noticed Mother’s text message about five hours 

later, at 10:10 a.m., and drove to Mother’s residence with S.L.O. N.T., 

3/10/2015, at 185. “After a few minutes,” Mother brought Maternal 

Grandfather to E.J.O. Id. at 186-87. Along the way, Maternal Grandfather 

observed a mattress with blood on it, as well as blood on a changing table. 

Id. A trash can in Mother’s kitchen was “the most dramatic. It was filled to 

overflowing with wipes, paper towels, diapers. They were all bloody. There 

was blood on the kitchen floor.” Id. at 187. Finally, Maternal Grandfather 

observed E.J.O., who “had a piece of skin hanging out of him,” and 

immediately was alarmed. Id. at 188. Maternal Grandfather demanded 

that Mother take E.J.O. to the hospital. Id. Mother “absolutely refused,” 

stating that “[i]f I take him to the hospital, they will take my children.” Id. 

Maternal Grandfather insisted, and Mother finally permitted Maternal 

Grandfather to take E.J.O. Id. at 188-89. Before Maternal Grandfather left, 

Mother informed him that E.J.O. had not eaten “for days.” Id. at 189. 

Maternal Grandfather rushed E.J.O. to the hospital. Id. at 191-92. Once 

there, it was determined that E.J.O had suffered serious injuries, which 

required that part of his intestines be removed. Id. at 194-95. 
J-S57017-15

- 6 -

As a result of these events, Mother and Father were arrested and 

charged with a variety of offenses. Mother pled guilty to endangering the 

welfare of children and recklessly endangering another person. Exhibit P-41 

(criminal docket for Mother) at 3-4. On October 26, 2012, Mother received 

an aggregate sentence of eleven to twenty-three months’ incarceration, 

followed by three years of probation. Id.; Exhibit P-7 (sentencing 

transcript) at 59-61. Father pled guilty to aggravated indecent assault of a 

child, aggravated assault, and endangering the welfare of children. Exhibit 

P-4 (criminal docket for Father) at 5-6. On September 26, 2014, Father 

received an aggregate sentence of fifteen to thirty-five years’ incarceration. 

Id.

Meanwhile, the Children were adjudicated dependent by orders dated 

August 30, 2011, and placed in the custody of Appellees. Exhibit P-8 

(shelter care orders and orders of adjudication and disposition). By order 

dated November 27, 2012, the juvenile court relinquished jurisdiction with 

respect to S.L.O., because the child was in “the physical and legal custody of 

a fit and willing relative, specifically [Appellees].” Exhibit P-8 (Order for 

Termination of Court Supervision).4 Id. 

____________________________________________

4 The record does not contain an order relinquishing jurisdiction with respect 

to E.J.O. Nevertheless, there is no evidence in the record that the juvenile 

court maintained E.J.O.’s adjudication.
J-S57017-15

- 7 -

Beginning in February of 2013, Maternal Grandfather facilitated visits 

between Mother and S.L.O., which took place biweekly while Mother was 

furloughed from jail. N.T., 3/10/2015, at 213. Mother was unable to visit 

with E.J.O., as she was subject to a no-contact order as part of her criminal 

sentence.5 Exhibit P-41 (criminal docket for Mother) at 4; Exhibit P-7 

(sentencing transcript) at 60. Mother’s visits ended in June of 2013, 

because Mother stopped receiving furloughs. Id. at 214.

Mother was released from incarceration on August 19, 2013, about 

three weeks after Appellees filed their involuntarily termination petitions. 

N.T., 3/12/2015, at 226. On August 30, 2013, Mother filed a petition for 

modification of custody, in which she requested shared legal and supervised 

physical custody of the Children.6 Id. at 222-23; Exhibit RM-18 (Petition for 

Modification of Custody Order). In addition, on September 9, 2013, Mother 

filed a petition to modify conditions of parole, in which she requested that 

the no-contact order with E.J.O. be lifted. Exhibit RM-19 (Petition to Modify 

____________________________________________

5 Mother initially was subject to a no-contact order with respect to both of 

the Children as part of her bail conditions. Exhibit P-8 (orders of 

adjudication and disposition).

6 The record reveals that, by agreed upon order dated January 3, 2013, 

Appellees and the Children’s paternal grandparents were awarded shared 

legal custody of the Children. Further, Appellees were awarded primary 

physical custody, and the paternal grandparents were awarded partial 

physical custody on alternating Sundays. Mother’s Answer to Petition for 

Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 9/27/2013, at Exhibit B. 
J-S57017-15

- 8 -

Conditions of Parole), at 3. By order dated December 23, 2013, the 

orphans’ court granted Mother four weekly supervised visits with the 

Children, which the court subsequently extended. The record indicates that 

there were no visits from sometime in June of 2014, until August 18, 2014, 

when the court entered an order again granting weekly supervised visits. 

Soon thereafter, on September 4, 2014, the court suspended visitation. 

Following the termination hearing, on April 21, 2015, the orphans’ 

court entered decrees involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to 

the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b). Mother timely 

filed notices of appeal on May 18, 2015, along with concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

Mother now raises the following issues for our review:

(1) Whether the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt erred in terminating Mother’s 

parental rights when it determined the existence of clear and 

convincing evidence that Mother lacked the capacity to provide 

the [C]hildren with essential parental care necessary for their 

well-being?

(2) Whether the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt erred in terminating Mother’s 

parental rights when it determined the existence of clear and 

convincing evidence that Mother would be unable to remedy the 

causes and conditions of the incapacity within a reasonable 

amount of time?

(3) Whether the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt erred when it determined the 

existence of clear and convincing evidence that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights would promote the [C]hild[ren’s] needs?

Mother’s brief at 6. 

We review this appeal according to the following standard: 
J-S57017-15

- 9 -

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis:

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating 

parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the 

parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). 

Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511). The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of 
J-S57017-15

- 10 -

parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 

2009).

Instantly, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent. 

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 
J-S57017-15

- 11 -

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted)). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the 

contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to 

perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 

2002) (citations omitted). 

With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has explained the requisite 

analysis as follows: 

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” 

In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a 

bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no 

bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 

2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis 

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case. 

Id. at 63.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

On appeal, Mother argues that the orphans’ court failed to properly 

weigh her efforts to “rehabilitate herself and reestablish a bond with her 

children.” Mother’s brief at 23-24, 26-27. Mother insists that the court 

placed too much weight on other evidence, including evidence of events that 
J-S57017-15

- 12 -

occurred when Mother was a minor.7 Mother’s brief at 22-23. Mother 

further contends that the Children’s needs and welfare would be promoted 

by allowing her to maintain her parental rights. Id. at 29. Mother asserts, 

inter alia, that she has a significant bond with the Children. Id. at 28. 

At the conclusion of the termination hearing on April 20, 2015, the 

orphans’ court explained its decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights on 

the record in open court.8 N.T., 4/20/2015, at 166-84. The court 

emphasized that Mother has a history of relationships with violent men, and 

that she also has committed acts of domestic violence. Id. at 177-78. The 

court lamented Mother’s severe lack of judgment on August 13, 2011, and 

found that Mother’s poor judgment continues to the present day. Id. at 

178-81. Finally, the court concluded that Mother will not be able to remedy 

____________________________________________

7

In her brief, Mother suggests that the evidence of events which took place 

when she was a minor was unfairly prejudicial and irrelevant. Mother’s brief 

at 22. We note that Mother has waived any challenge to the admission of 

this evidence, as she failed to include this claim in her statement of 

questions involved, and in her concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal. See Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pa., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. 

Super. 2006) (“We will not ordinarily consider any issue if it has not been set 

forth in or suggested by an appellate brief's statement of questions involved, 

and any issue not raised in a statement of matters complained of on appeal 

is deemed waived.”) (citations omitted).

8 The orphans’ court did not issue a written opinion. Instead, the court 

entered orders on June 5, 2015, in which it indicated that the reasons for its 

decision could be found in the termination hearing transcripts.
J-S57017-15

- 13 -

her poor judgment within a reasonable period of time. Id. at 182. The 

testimonial evidence supports the court’s findings, as follows. 

Mother testified that she allowed Father to stay in her home as often 

as three nights per week prior to the events of August 13, 2011, despite the 

fact that she had a PFA order against him. N.T., 3/12/2015, at 107-08. 

Mother claimed that, when she discovered E.J.O.’s injury, she was 

“confused” by what she saw, and was “not in the right state of mind.” Id. at 

120-21. Mother stated that she cries every day, and has spent the last 

three years trying to figure out “why I didn’t react in a normal way . . . .” 

Id. at 120, 123. Mother conceded that there was “no excuse” for her 

actions. Id. at 120. Mother explained that she now sees a psychiatrist each 

month and attends therapy weekly. Id. at 164. Mother also reported that 

she has completed parenting classes, and that she is “a better mom” and “a 

different mom.” Id. at 221-22. 

Mother further testified that she began dating Husband in April of 

2012. Id. at 123-24. They married on October 24, 2012, and Mother gave 

birth to a son, K.N., in September of 2013. Id. at 127. Mother admitted 

that she recently faced additional criminal charges as a result of an incident 

of domestic violence involving Husband in August of 2014. Id. at 127-28. 

Husband testified that the incident involved Mother “trying to grab the keys 

from me” while he was holding K.N, and that he “got hit” during the tussle. 

Id. at 115. However, Husband also admitted there was “some macaroni 
J-S57017-15

- 14 -

thrown and some orange juice thrown,” during the incident, that a window 

was broken, and that Mother threw a bottle at a wall, which ricocheted and 

hit Husband. Id. at 110-113, 118. Mother pled guilty to two counts each of 

harassment and disorderly conduct and, on January 29, 2015, received an 

aggregate sentence of 360 days of probation. Exhibit P-41 (criminal docket 

for Mother) at 3-4.

Thus, the testimonial evidence supports the findings of the orphans’ 

court that Mother’s poor judgment renders her incapable of parenting the 

Children, and that Mother cannot, or will not, remedy this incapacity. 

Mother has a history of engaging in violent and dangerous activities, which 

culminated in the events of August 13, 2011. Moreover, it is clear that 

Mother’s irresponsible behavior has continued, as evidenced by the incident 

of domestic violence between Mother and Husband in August of 2014. We 

discern no abuse of discretion by the orphans’ court, and we conclude that 

Mother’s conduct warrants termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

Having determined that the orphans’ court properly terminated 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), we now review the 

decrees pursuant to Section 2511(b). 

The orphans’ court concluded that it would be in the Children’s best 

interests to be adopted by Appellees. See N.T., 4/20/2015, at 182-83. The 

court found that terminating Mother’s parental rights would not sever any 

bond between Mother and the Children, and explained that, “I think your 
J-S57017-15

- 15 -

children responded well on play dates with you as they would have probably 

responded on a play date with me even though they’ve never seen me 

before because I know how to play with kids. And that’s not the same thing 

as a bond.” Id. at 183. Again, the testimonial evidence supports the court’s 

decision.

Maternal Grandfather testified that, following the events of August 13, 

2011, Appellees cared for E.J.O., and assisted him in his recovery. N.T., 

3/10/2015, at 201-210. E.J.O. was “doing just great” by the following 

summer, “with the exception of the potential long-term problems which still 

aren’t taken care of . . . .” Id. at 210. Specifically, Maternal Grandfather 

stated that E.J.O. may never have full control over his bowels due to the 

injuries he suffered at the hands of Father. Id. at 273. S.L.O. also has 

been doing well. Id. at 211.

Maternal Grandfather further testified that he supervised visits 

between Mother and S.L.O. while Mother was furloughed from jail. Id. at 

227. S.L.O. enjoyed her visits with Mother. Id. at 227-28. However, since 

beginning visits with Mother in February of 2013, S.L.O. has “become more 

concerned as to where people were, where they were going, when they were 

coming back.” Id. at 216. Maternal Grandfather reported that “every single 

night since [visits] began, [S.L.O.] wakes up during the night; she comes in 

not horribly upset, I think it’s just to check in, be comforted for a few 

minutes, goes back to sleep.” Id. at 216. These behaviors have not 
J-S57017-15

- 16 -

subsided since Mother’s visits were ended. Id. at 216-17. Maternal 

Grandfather stated that S.L.O. does not ask about Mother. Id. at 220. 

Ms. Erica Paige Hesselson testified that she is a licensed social worker, 

who is employed part-time at the Assurance Group. N.T., 3/12/2015, at 64. 

Ms. Hesselson explained that that she supervised two-hour visits between 

Mother and the Children on August 21, 2014 and August 27, 2014. Id. at 

64. Ms. Hesselson noted that the Children were “comfortable” with Mother 

during the visits, and that the Children smiled. Id. at 67. During the visit 

on August 21, 2014, S.L.O. appeared happy to see Mother, and they hugged 

and kissed when they greeted each other. Id. at 69. E.J.O. was less 

familiar with Mother, and asked Mother if she was “mommy [C.]” Id. at 69-

70. On August 27, 2014, Mother and the Children hugged and kissed when 

they greeted each other, and hugged and kissed when the visit was over. 

Id. at 70. However, the Children did not appear to be sad when either visit 

ended. Id. at 67-68. 

Mother testified that her visits with the Children went well, and that 

“[w]e got closer and closer.” Id. at 228. Mother stated that it did not take 

long for her to bond with E.J.O. Id. at 236. She explained that, “[m]aybe 

I’m not their caregivers, and maybe they have a stronger bond with my dad 

and [C.M.] But there was a bond after not knowing me that I never thought 

that would be [sic] instantly.” Id.
J-S57017-15

- 17 -

Based upon the forgoing evidence, we discern no abuse of discretion 

by the orphans’ court in terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children 

pursuant to Section 2511(b). At the time the Children were removed from 

Mother’s care in 2011, S.L.O. was one and a half years old, while E.J.O. was 

seven months old. Since then, the Children have resided with Appellees, 

who have cared for them, and assisted E.J.O. with his recovery. Thus, the 

record supports the conclusion of the orphans’ court that the Children would 

not have a strong attachment or bond with Mother. See K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 

764 (observing that the relationship between K.Z.S. and his mother “must 

be fairly attenuated,” given that K.Z.S. had been in foster care for most of 

his young life, and given that he had only limited contact with the mother 

during this time). Indeed, the record reflects that E.J.O. was not even sure 

who Mother was during one of their most recent visits. While there may be 

a greater attachment between Mother and S.L.O., it is clear that any bond is 

outweighed in the instant matter by S.L.O.’s need for permanence and 

stability. See In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1220 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (concluding that the appellant mother’s bond with C.D.R was 

outweighed by the mother’s “repeated failure to remedy her parental 

incapacity,” and by C.D.R.’s need for permanence and stability).
J-S57017-15

- 18 -

Accordingly, we affirm the decrees involuntarily terminating Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2) and (b).

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/28/2015