In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-1921

Robert Del Raso,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

United States of America,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern

Division.

No. 98 C 4542--William J. Hibbler, Judge.

Argued November 15, 2000--Decided March 20,

2001

 Before Posner, Easterbrook, and Kanne,

Circuit Judges.

 Kanne, Circuit Judge. While visiting a

friend stationed at the United States

Army Post at Fort Bragg, North Carolina,

civilian Robert Del Raso fell off a horse

and allegedly injured his back. Believing

that his fall was caused by the failure

of a stable employee to tighten his

saddle, Del Raso sued the United States

under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28

U.S.C. sec. 1346(b). The district court

granted summary judgment in favor of the

government because it found that Del Raso

released the United States of liability

for the negligence of the stable’s

employee. We affirm.

 The Fort Bragg Riding Stables is a

federal facility administered by Fort

Bragg that provides recreational

equestrian services for military

personnel and their families and friends.

On September 4, 1994 Del Raso and two

friends decided to go riding at the

stables while visiting a friend at the

post. As Del Raso entered the stables, an

employee behind the front counter
instructed him to wait in line and "sign

the waiting list." The "waiting list" was

an 8 by 14 inch document entitled

"RELEASE AND HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT--

FORT BRAGG RIDING STABLES COMMUNITY

RECREATION DIVISION FACILITY, FORT BRAGG,

NC 28307-5000" with seven paragraphs of

text underneath the title and a grid with

columns for printed names, signatures,

phone numbers, amounts paid, and other

information. The first three paragraphs

announced that the document was a release

of liability, that a participant’s

signature was required to ride a horse,

and that the information provided would

not be shared with third parties. The

remaining paragraphs stated the terms of

the release, specifying that it was meant

to hold the United States harmless from

any and all causes of action, including

personal injury . . . arising from the

use, enjoyment, and control over the said

horse, saddle, and bridle, including any

and all causes of action . . . arising

out of the saddle or bridle becoming

loose or breaking or the saddle falling

from the horse or the rider being thrown

from the horse by reason of the saddle

becoming or being loose or the bridle

breaking or the nature of the actions of

the horse or the rider or any other

person or animals whatsoever.

This release is intended to cover all

injuries . . . of every name, type, kind

or nature . . . which might be sustained

or suffered from any cause whatsoever

connected with or arising out of or by

reason of the use of said horse, bridle,

or saddle.

 Del Raso and two friends, one in front

and the other behind, entered the line

behind 20 or so other patrons waiting to

sign this document. When Del Raso reached

the counter, he felt pressured to move

out of the way of the persons waiting

behind him, so he glanced at the document

for what he described as "two seconds"

and quickly printed and signed his name

on the sixth line. He and his friends

then waited for about one hour for the

horses to arrive and their ride to begin.

During that time the document remained on

the counter, but Del Raso made no

attempts to read it nor did he ask

questions about it. When the horses

arrived, an employee referred to the

document to call out the names of the
next group of riders.

 After his name was called, Del Raso, who

has a prosthetic leg, requested

assistance in mounting his horse and

placing his feet in the stirrups. While

employee Mark Rossignol assisted him, Del

Raso stated that the saddle felt loose

and asked Rossignol to tighten it.

Rossignol, believing that Del Raso was

simply nervous and inexperienced with

horseback riding, neither checked nor

secured the saddle. During the ride,

however, the saddle slipped and Del Raso

fell to the ground with his prosthetic

leg caught in the stirrup. The horse

dragged him for a short distance, and Del

Raso fractured several vertebrae. He

claims that he now cannot work.

 Del Raso believed that his injury

resulted from Rossignol’s failure to

properly secure the saddle and submitted

a $300,000 claim to the Department of the

Army. The Army Claims Service denied

relief in writing in January 1998, and

Del Raso timely sued the United States

under the FTCA in the Northern District

of Illinois./1 Following discovery, the

United States moved for summary judgment

on the basis that the release barred Del

Raso’s claim. In his response, Del Raso

admitted that he signed the release and

that such releases are generally valid in

North Carolina. Del Raso asserted,

however, that the release should not be

enforced against him because the employee

behind the counter fraudulently induced

him to sign by referring to the release

as a "waiting list" and that both he and

the employee were mutually mistaken as to

its contents and effect. The district

court construed the release to completely

bar Del Raso’s claim and granted summary

judgment in the government’s favor.

 We review de novo the district court’s

order granting summary judgment, drawing

all reasonable inferences from the record

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Stratmeyer v. United

States, 67 F.3d 1340, 1345 (7th Cir.

1995). Summary judgment is appropriate

when, after an adequate time for

discovery, the non-moving party fails to

establish the existence of a genuine

issue of material fact for trial, Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c), or make a showing

sufficient to prove an element essential

to his case on which he will bear the
burden of proof at trial, Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

Because the alleged tort occurred in

North Carolina, the substantive law of

that state applies, 28 U.S.C. sec.

1346(b); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478

(1994); Stratmeyer, 67 F.3d at 1345, and

we review de novo the district court’s

determination of the content of state

law, Keller v. United States, 58 F.3d

1194, 1197 (7th Cir. 1995).

 A release-and-hold-harmless agreement

based on valuable consideration is a

complete defense to personal injury

action for damages in North Carolina.

Caudill v. Chatham Manufacturing Co., 128

S.E.2d 128, 130 (N.C. 1962); Cunningham

v. Brown, 276 S.E.2d 718, 723 (N.C. Ct.

App. 1981). North Carolina courts, like

those of many other states, do not favor

contracts releasing parties from

liability for their future negligence,

but will nevertheless enforce such

clauses unless they violate a statute,

are gained through an inequality of

bargaining power, or contravene public

policy. Hall v. Sinclair Refining Co., 89

S.E.2d 396, 397 (N.C. 1955); Fortson v.

McClellan, 508 S.E.2d 549, 551 (N.C. Ct.

App. 1998); Johnson v. Dunlap, 280 S.E.2d

759, 763 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981); Andrews v.

Fitzgerald, 823 F. Supp. 356, 378

(M.D.N.C. 1993).

 North Carolina courts have long required

contracting parties to act with

reasonable prudence by reading before

signing a document. See Davis v. Davis,

124 S.E.2d 130, 133 (N.C. 1962); Ward v.

Heath, 24 S.E.2d 5, 9 (N.C. 1943).

Failure to read a contract before signing

it is not grounds for rescission unless

the failure to read the contract is

justified by special circumstances. See

Caudill, 128 S.E.2d at 130; Spartan

Leasing Inc. v. Pollard, 400 S.E.2d 476,

479 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). Special

circumstances justifying rescission

include fraudulent inducement, Richardson

v. Webb, 460 S.E.2d 343, 344 (N.C. Ct.

App. 1995), and mutual mistake of fact,

Wyatt v. Imes, 244 S.E.2d 207, 208 (N.C.

Ct. App. 1978). The party seeking to

avoid a release that he has admittedly

signed bears the burden of proving

grounds for rescission. Caudill, 128

S.E.2d at 130.

 Del Raso did not dispute the general
validity of the release in the district

court and does not challenge it here.

Instead, he claims that whether the

employee behind the stable’s counter

fraudulently induced him into signing the

release by referring to it only as a

"waiting list" and he and the employee

mistakenly believed that the document was

only a waiting list and not a release are

genuine material issues of fact for a

jury to decide. To establish fraudulent

inducement under North Carolina law, Del

Raso had to prove (1) stable employees

falsely represented or concealed a

material fact; (2) in a manner reasonably

calculated to deceive him; (3) with the

intent to deceive him; (4) and that he

was in fact deceived; (5) to his

detriment. See Myers & Chapman, Inc. v.

Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 385,

391 (N.C. 1988) (citing Odom v. Little

Rock & I-85 Corp., 261 S.E.2d 99, 103

(N.C. 1980)). Del Raso and his friends

testified at their depositions that the

employee behind the counter never once

disclosed that the document was a release

rather than a waiting list. This

characterization, Del Raso claims,

reflects the employee’s intent to

deceive, particularly when considered in

combination with the number of persons

waiting to sign, the pressure Del Raso

felt to move away from the counter, and

the fact that patrons were not supplied

with a copy of the release. And since he

is the beneficiary of all reasonable

inferences as the party opposing summary

judgment, he argues, he has raised a

genuine issue of material fact for trial.

 But even assuming that the reference to

the document as a waiting list was indeed

a misrepresentation--which appears not to

be the case because the employees

actually did use it as a waiting list--it

is the only evidence in the record that

Del Raso identifies as proof of the

employee’s fraudulent intent. North

Carolina courts will not infer fraudulent

intent from misrepresentation or reckless

disregard for the truth alone. Myers &

Chapman, 374 S.E.2d at 391; Eastern Steel

Prod. Corp. v. Chestnutt, 113 S.E.2d 587,

593 (N.C. 1960); Bolton v. T.A. Loving

Co., 380 S.E.2d 796, 807 (N.C. Ct. App.

1989). Moreover, Del Raso has not

demonstrated that he was in fact deceived

or that he reasonably relied on the

misrepresentation. The document was

titled "RELEASE AND HOLD HARMLESS
AGREEMENT," Del Raso had ample time after

exiting the line to examine the document

yet chose not to do so, and has not cited

to anything in the record suggesting that

the employees prevented him from reading

the document. Because Del Raso could have

read the release but did not, and has not

identified any evidence reasonably

suggesting that the employee behind the

counter prevented him from reading it, he

had imputed knowledge of its contents.

Spartan Leasing, 400 S.E.2d 479-80. Del

Raso has not suggested that he would not

have signed the document if he had been

told that it was a release, and therefore

summary judgment was appropriate on this

claim.

 We likewise reject his contention that

he and the stable employee were mutually

mistaken that the document was a waiting

list rather than a release agreement. A

mutual mistake of fact is a mistake

common to the parties to a contract

concerning the contract’s content or

legal effect that, by reason of the

mistake, induces each party to do what

neither intended. See Creech v. Melnik,

495 S.E.2d 907, 912 (N.C. 1998); Sykes v.

Keiltex Industries, Inc., 473 S.E.2d 341,

344 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). Even if Del

Raso and the stable employee were

similarly mistaken as to the document’s

legal effect, there was no mutual mistake

because the stable employee was not a

party to the contract. The United States

was the released party, and it knew that

the document was a release. Therefore,

Robert Del Raso has not met his burden of

showing that a genuine issue of material

fact exists for trial. The judgment of

the district court is

AFFIRMED.

/1 FTCA claims may be brought in the district where

either the alleged tort occurred or the plaintiff

resides. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1402(b).