MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2020	ME	43

Docket: And-19-186

Argued: February	13,	2020

Decided: April	7,	2020

Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	MEAD,	GORMAN,* JABAR,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v.

GABRIEL	J.	HANSEN

HUMPHREY,	J.

[¶1]	 	 Gabriel	 J.	 Hansen	 appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 conviction	 of	 two	

counts	of	unlawful	sexual	contact	(Class	B),	17-A	M.R.S.	§	255-A(1)(E-1)	(2018),	

entered	by	 the	 trial	court (Androscoggin	County,	MG	Kennedy,	J.)	after	a	jury	

trial,	 and	 from the	 sentences	 imposed.	 	 We	 affirm	 both	 the	 judgment	 of	

conviction	and	the	sentences.

 *

		Although	not	available	at	oral	argument,	Justice	Gorman	participated	in	the	development	of	this	

opinion.		See M.R.	App.	P.	12(a)(2) (“A	qualified	justice	may	participate	in	a	decision	even	though	not	

present	at	oral	argument.”).
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I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]		We	view the	evidence	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	the	verdict. The	

jury	rationally	could	have	found	the	following	facts	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.		

See	State	v.	Ouellette,	2019	ME	75,	¶	2,	208	A.3d	399.		

[¶3]		Hansen	was	a	longtime	friend	of	the	minor	victim’s	family,	having	

previously	dated	and	been	engaged	to	the	victim’s	aunt,	who	is	the	sister	of	the	

victim’s	mother.		The	 victim	had	a	close	 relationship	with	her	aunt,	and	also	

maintained	 a	 close	 relationship	 with	 Hansen.	 	 Even	 after	 Hansen	 and	 the	

victim’s	 aunt	 ended	 their	 relationship,	 he	 continued	 to	 babysit the	 victim	

occasionally,	sometimes	at	 the	victim’s	mother’s	house	and	sometimes	at	his	

house.	

[¶4]		On	more	than	one	occasion,	when	the	victim	was	alone	with	Hansen	

at	his	home,	he	brought	the	victim	to	his	bedroom,	where	he	convinced	her to	

lie down	 on	 his	 bed,	 removed	 her pants,	 blindfolded	 her with	 a	 blanket or	

pillow,	got	on	the	bed	with	her,	and	sexually touched	her.		The	victim	could	not	

see	what	was	touching	her	because	she	was	blindfolded,	but	it	was	something	

that	felt	“hard	and	soft.”		During	one	of	these	incidents,	Hansen	forced	the	victim	

“[t]o	do	what	he	wanted	[her]	to	do.”		The	victim	was	six	years	old	the	last	time	
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she	 was	 alone	 with	 Hansen	 at	 his	 house.	 	 She	 “thought	 it	 was	 a	 game	 [she]	

played	with	him.”		

[¶5]		Hansen	was	charged	by	indictment	with	two	counts	of	gross	sexual	

assault	(Class	A),	17-A	M.R.S.	§	253(1)(C)	(2018),	and	two	counts	of	unlawful	

sexual	contact	(Class	B),	17-A	M.R.S.	§	255-A(1)(E-1).		

[¶6]	 	 At	 trial,	 the	 State	 called	 the	 victim	 and	 the	 victim’s	 mother	 as	

witnesses.		During	the	victim’s	testimony,	Hansen	objected	to	leading	questions	

asked	by	the	prosecutor.		The	court	overruled	the	objection.		As	the	prosecutor	

continued	 to	 ask	 leading	 questions	 during	 direct	 examination	 of	 the	 victim,	

Hansen	 requested	 two	 different	 sidebar	 conferences.	 	 During	 these	 sidebar	

discussions,	 the	 court	 explained	 that	 it	 was	 satisfied	 that	 the	 State’s	

questioning,	 although	 leading,	 was	 within	 permissible	 boundaries,	 given	 the	

age	of	the	victim	and	the	subject	matter	of	the	testimony.		

[¶7]	 	 After	 the	 State	 rested	 its	 case,	 Hansen	 moved	 for	 a	 judgment	 of	

acquittal	on	the	two	counts	of	gross	sexual	assault	(Class	A),	arguing	that	the	

evidence	was	insufficient	for	the	jury	to	find	him	guilty	of	those	offenses	beyond	

a	reasonable	doubt.		The	State	opposed	the	motion.		The	court	determined	that	

the jury	could	rationally	find	that	the	evidence	was	sufficient	to	support	a	guilty	

verdict	on	those	counts	and	denied	Hansen’s	motion	for	a	judgment	of	acquittal.		
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[¶8]	 	 The	 jury	 found	 Hansen	 guilty	 on	 both	 counts	 of	 unlawful	 sexual	

contact	(Class	B)	but	acquitted	him	on	the	two	counts	of	gross	sexual	assault	

(Class	A).		

[¶9]		Hansen	was	sentenced	to	ten	years’ imprisonment on	the	first	count	

of	unlawful	sexual	contact	(Class	B),	and	a	consecutive	ten	years,	all	suspended,	

with	 five	 years	 of	 probation	 on	 the	 second	 count	 of	 unlawful	 sexual	 contact	

(Class	B).1		

[¶10]	 	Hansen	 timely	filed	both a	 notice	 of	 appeal	 from	 the	 judgment,	

15 M.R.S.	 §	 2115	 (2018);	 M.R.	 App.	 P.	 2B(b),	 and	 an	 application	 for	 leave	 to	

appeal	 his	 sentences,	 15	 M.R.S.	 §§	 2151,	 2153	 (2018);	 M.R.	 App.	P.	20.	 	 The	

Sentence	Review	Panel	granted	Hansen	leave	to	appeal	his	sentence.		15 M.R.S.	

§	2152	(2018);	M.R.	App.	P.	20(g),	(h).

II.		DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency	of	the	Evidence

[¶11]		Hansen	first	argues	that	the	evidence	was	insufficient	to	support	

his	convictions on the	two	counts	of	unlawful	sexual	contact	(Class	B).		

 1		Hansen	was	also	ordered	 to	pay	 $70	 to	 the	Victims’ Compensation	Fund.		5	M.R.S.	 §	3360-I	

(2018).		
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[¶12]	 	 “When	 a	 defendant	 argues	 that	 the	 evidence	 is	 insufficient	 to	

support	his	conviction,	we	view	the	evidence	in	the	light	most	favorable	to the	

State	to	determine	whether	the	fact-finder	could	rationally	find	every	element	

of	 the	 offense	 beyond	 a	 reasonable	 doubt.”	 	 Ouellette,	 2019	 ME	 75,	 ¶	 11,	

208 A.3d	399	(quotation	marks	omitted).		The	jury	is	free	to	draw	all	reasonable	

inferences	from	the	evidence	presented,	and	“we	will	vacate	a	judgment	only	

where	no	trier	of	fact	rationally	could	find	proof	of	guilt	beyond	a	reasonable	

doubt.”		Id.	(quotation	marks	omitted).

[¶13]	 	 The	 crime	 of	 unlawful	 sexual	 contact	 (Class	 B),	 17-A	 M.R.S.	

§ 255-A(1)(E-1),	occurs	when	a	person	“intentionally	subjects	another	person	

to	any	sexual	contact	and	.	.	.	[t]he	other	person,	not	the	actor’s	spouse,	is	in	fact	

less	than	12	years	of	age	and	the	actor	is	at	least	3	years	older.”		“Sexual	contact”	

is	defined	as	“any	touching	of	the	genitals	or	anus,	directly	or	through	clothing,	

other	 than	 as	 would	 constitute	 a	 sexual	 act,	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 arousing	 or	

gratifying	sexual	desire	or	for	the	purpose	of	causing	bodily	injury	or	offensive	

physical	contact.”		17-A	M.R.S. §	251(1)(D)	(2018).

[¶14]	 	 On	 this	 record,	 when	 viewed	 in	 the	 light	 most	 favorable	 to	 the	

State,	 the	evidence	was	sufficient	 for	 the	jury	rationally	to	find	 that	 the	State	

proved	 each	 element	 of	 the	 charged	 offenses of	 unlawful	 sexual	 contact	
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(Class B)	beyond	a	 reasonable	doubt.		 The	parties	 stipulated	at	 trial	 that	 the	

victim	was	not	Hansen’s	spouse.		See	United	States	v.	Tkhilaishvili,	926	F.3d	1,	

18	(1st	Cir.	2019) (observing	that	when	a	defendant	“affirmatively	agree[s]	to	

not	put	the	government	to	its	proof	of	an	element	of	a	crime,”	he	“relinquishe[s]	

all	 other	 defenses,	 factual	 and	 legal,	 pertaining	 to	 the	 stipulated	 element”

(quotation	marks	omitted));	State	v. Brann,	292	A.2d	173,	185	(Me.	1972).		The	

victim	testified	that	she	was	seven	years	old	at	the	time	of	trial,	and	the	victim’s	

mother	testified	that	the	last	time	the	victim	had	been	alone	at	Hansen’s	house	

was	in	the	summer	of	2017,	at	which	time	the	victim	was six	years	old.		There	

is	no	dispute	 that	Hansen,	who	was	born	in	December	1977,	is	at	least	 three	

years	 older	 than	 the	 victim.	 	 The	 victim’s	 testimony	 that	 she	 felt	 something	

“hard	and	soft”	touch	her	while	she	was	alone	with	Hansen	in	his	bedroom	and	

blindfolded	with	her	pants	down	was	sufficient	for	a	jury	to	rationally	find	that	

Hansen	subjected	the	victim	to	sexual	contact.		17-A	M.R.S.	§	251(1)(D).		Finally,	

based	on	the	victim’s	testimony,	the	jury	could	have	reasonably	inferred	that	

when	Hansen	sexually	touched	the	victim,	he	did	so	“for	the	purpose	of	arousing	

or	gratifying	sexual	desire	or	for	the	purpose	of	causing . . . offensive	physical	

contact.”		Id.;	see	also	State	v.	Pozzuoli,	1997	ME	91,	¶	7,	693	A.2d	745	(holding	

that	 a	 jury	 may	 consider,	 in	 determining	 whether	 a	 defendant	 committed
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offensive	 physical	 contact, “what	 a	 reasonable	 person	 might	 perceive	 to	 be	

offensive	as	well	as	the	victim’s	subjective	interpretation	of	the	contact”).

[¶15]		We	conclude	that	there	is	sufficient	evidence	in	the	record	for	the	

jury	 to	have	rationally	 found	every	element	of	 the	offense	of	unlawful	sexual	

contact	(Class	B)	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.

B. The	Prosecutor’s	Use	of	Leading	Questions

[¶16]	 	 Hansen	 also	 contends	 that	 the	 prosecutor’s	 leading	 questions	

during	the	direct	examination	of	the	child victim	compromised	his	right	to	a	fair	

trial.		

[¶17]		Trial	judges have	“broad	discretion	in	determining	the	scope”	of	

the	 direct	 examination	 of	 a	 minor	 witness	 by	 the	 prosecution.	 	 See	 State	 v.	

Roman,	622 A.2d	96,	101	(Me.	1993)	(quotation	marks	omitted).		Similarly,	“the	

State	is	accorded	much	latitude	in	attempting	to	elicit	relevant	testimony	from	

a	child	witness.”		Id.		In	cases	involving	“embarrassing	sex	crimes,	where	a	child	

would	 be	 hesitant	 to	 testify,	 leading	 questions	 may	 be	 particularly	

appropriate.”		Id.	(quotation	marks	omitted).

[¶18]		Although	the	victim	initially	struggled	to	describe	the	nature	of	the	

sexual	contact	to	which	Hansen	subjected	her,	she	never	denied	 that	Hansen	

had	sexually	abused	her,	and	her	testimony	remained	internally	consistent	in	
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many	 respects	 throughout.	 	 See	 State	 v.	 Spooner,	 666	 A.2d	 863,	 865-66	

(Me. 1995);	 Roman,	 622	 A.2d	 at	 101;	 State	 v.	 Murray,	 559	 A.2d	 361,	 362	

(Me. 1989).	 	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 there	 were	 inconsistencies	 in	 the	 victim’s	

testimony	 that	 could	 cast	 doubt	 on	 her	 credibility,	 “[t]he	 responsibility	 for	

weighing	that	testimony	reside[d] with	the	jury.”		Murray,	559	A.2d	at	362.		

[¶19]	 	 On	 this	 record,	 the	 trial	 court	 did	 not	 abuse	 its	 discretion	 in	

granting	 the	 State	 leeway	 to	 use	 leading	 questions	 in	 conducting	 its	 direct	

examination	of	the	child	victim,	and	the	State’s	leading	questions	did	not	violate	

Hansen’s	right	to	a	fair	trial.		See,	e.g., Roman,	622	A.2d	at	101	(discussing	the	

“broad	discretion”	afforded	trial	justices	and	the	“latitude”	given	to	prosecutors	

in	 cases	 involving	 testimony	 by	 a	 child	 victim	 of	 sexual	 abuse);	 Lisenba	 v.	

California,	314	U.S.	219,	236	(1941) (“[D]enial	of	due	process	is	the	failure	to	

observe	that	fundamental	fairness	essential	to	the	very	concept	of	justice.		In	

order	 to	declare	a	denial	 of	it	we	must	 find	 that	 the	absence	 of	 that	 fairness	

fatally	 infected	 the	 trial;	 the	 acts	 complained	 of	 must	 be	 of	 such	 quality	 as	

necessarily	prevents	a	fair	trial.”).

C. The	Mother’s	“First	Complaint” Testimony

[¶20]	 	 Hansen	 next	 argues that	 the	 court	 allowed	 testimony	 by	 the	

victim’s	 mother	 that	 violated	 the	 first	 complaint	 rule	 and	 constituted	
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inadmissible	 hearsay.	 	 Because	 Hansen	 never	 raised	 an	 objection	 to	 this	

testimony,	we	review	the	trial	court’s	actions	for	obvious	error.		State	v.	Hall,	

2017	 ME	 210,	 ¶ 25,	 172	 A.3d	 467.	 	 “[T]o	 vacate	 a	 conviction	 based	 on	 the	

obvious	error	standard	of	review,	there	must	be	(1)	an	error,	(2) that	is	plain,	

and	 (3)	 that	 affects	 substantial	 rights.	 	 If	 these	 conditions	 are	 met,	 we will	

exercise	our discretion	to	notice	an	unpreserved	error	only	if	we also	conclude

that	 (4)	 the	 error	 seriously	 affects	 the	 fairness	 and	 integrity	 or	 public	

reputation	of	judicial	proceedings.”		Id. ¶	26	(quotation	marks	omitted).

[¶21]		The	first	complaint	rule	“authorizes	the	admission	of	the	fact	of	a	

complaint	of	sexual	assault	and	the	reported	time	and	place	of	the	assault	for	

purposes	 of	 corroborating	 a	 victim’s	 testimony,	 but	 only	 to	 rebut	 the	

assumption	 that, without	 a	 complaint,	 no	 crime	 occurred.”	 	 State	 v.	 Fahnley,	

2015	ME	82,	¶	21,	119	A.3d	727;	see	also Commonwealth	v.	King,	834	N.E.2d	

1175,	1187-89	(Mass.	2005).		Because	first complaint	testimony	is	offered	only

to	 corroborate	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 complaint	 was	 made,	 such	 testimony	 “is	 not	

offered	for	its	truth,	and	therefore	is	not	hearsay.”		Fahnley,	2015	ME	82, ¶	20,	

119	A.3d	727.

[¶22]		After	carefully	reviewing	the	transcript,	we	are	satisfied	that	the	

statement	 Hansen	 challenges	 on	 appeal,	 although	 graphic,	 did	 not	 identify	
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Hansen,	was	a	bare	statement	of	the	type	of	contact	alleged, and	did	not	violate	

the	 first complaint	 rule.		See	State	v.	Tripp,	634	A.2d	1318, 1321	 (Me.	1994).		

Moreover,	 the	 details	 in	 the	 statement	 could	 be	 considered	 “necessary	 to	

identify	 the	 complaint	 as	 being	 relevant	 to	 the	 charge	 on	which	 the	 accused	

[wa]s	being	tried.”		State	v.	Joel	H.,	2000	ME	139,	¶	23,	755	A.2d	520 (quotation	

marks	 omitted).	 	 The	 trial	 court	 did	 not	 err	 in	 admitting	 this	 testimony	 in	

evidence.

[¶23]		However,	we	take	this	opportunity	to	emphasize	that	when	first

complaint	testimony	is	offered,	the	proponent	should	“be	allowed	to	lead	the	

witness	to avoid	eliciting	testimony	regarding	any	details,”	and	should	“ask	the	

witness	 four	questions:	 (1)	Did	 the	 victim	 tell	 you	 that	 [she	 or	he]	had	been	

sexually	assaulted?	(2)	When	did	the	victim	tell	you?	(3)	Did	the	victim	tell	you	

where	 the	assault	occurred?	and	(4)	Did	 the	victim	 tell	you	when	 the	assault	

occurred?”		Fahnley,	2015	ME	82, ¶	26,	119	A.3d	727.		This	constitutes	the	“best	

practice	for	offering	first	complaint	evidence.”		Id.

D. Sentencing

[¶24]	 	 Finally,	 Hansen	 argues	 that	 the	 sentences	 imposed	 are	

“disproportionate	and	extreme.”		He also	argues	that	the	court	did	not	conduct	
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a	 proper	 sentencing	 analysis	 and	 failed	 to	 apply	 the	 relevant	 criteria	 in	

imposing	consecutive	sentences.		

[¶25]		Our	review	of	criminal	sentences is	guided	by	15	M.R.S.	§§	2154	

and	 2155	 (2018).	 	 State	 v.	 Stanislaw,	 2013	 ME	 43,	 ¶	 15,	 65	 A.3d	 1242	

(Stanislaw II).		When	determining	the	sentence	to	be	imposed	upon	conviction	

for	a	felony,	the	sentencing	court	must	conduct	a	Hewey	analysis,	a	three-step	

sentencing	analysis	codified	at	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1252-C	(2018).2		See	State	v.	Hewey,	

622	A.2d	1151,	1154-55	(Me.	1993).		

1. The	Hewey Analysis

[¶26]		The	first	step	of	the analysis	requires	the	court	to	determine	a	basic	

term	of	imprisonment	based	on	 the	nature	and	seriousness	of	 the	offense	as	

committed	by	the	defendant.		See	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1252-C(1).		In	the	second	step,

the	 court	 must	 “determine	 the	 maximum	 period of	 imprisonment	 to	 be	

imposed	by	considering	all	other	relevant	sentencing	factors,	both	aggravating	

and	mitigating,	appropriate	to	that case.”		Id.	§	1252-C(2).		At	the	third	step,	the	

 2		Substantial	portions	of	the	Maine	Criminal	Code in	Title	17-A,	including	all of	its	sentencing	

provisions,	were	recently	repealed	and	replaced.		P.L.	2019,	ch.	113 (effective	May	16,	2019).		This	

matter	was	fully	litigated	and	Hansen	was	sentenced	prior	to	the	effective	date	of	the	new sentencing	

provisions.		Therefore,	all	citations	to	sentencing	statutes	in	this	opinion	are	to	the	repealed	2018	

versions	in	effect	at	the	relevant	time.		As	they	apply	to	this	appeal,	the	relevant	text	is	substantively	

unchanged	in	the	new	versions	of	the	statutes.		See	P.L.	2019,	ch.	113,	§	A-2	(to	be	codified	at	17-A	

M.R.S.	§§	1501,	1602,	1604,	1608).
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court	 must	 “determine	 what	 portion,	 if	 any,	 of	 the	 maximum	 period	 of	

imprisonment	should	be	suspended	and,	if	a	suspension	order	is	to	be	entered,	

determine	the	appropriate	period	of	probation	to	accompany	that	suspension.”		

Id.	§	1252-C(3).

[¶27]	 	 We	 review	 de	 novo	 for	 misapplication	 of	 principle	 the	 basic	

sentence	imposed	at	the	first	step	of	the	analysis,	and	we	review	the	maximum	

sentence	and	the	final	sentence	determined	at	steps	two	and	three	for	an	abuse	

of	discretion.		Stanislaw	 II,	2013	ME	43, ¶	17,	65	A.3d	1242.		We	 review	 the	

sentencing	court’s	analysis	at	each	step	to	determine	“whether	[it] disregarded	

the	relevant	sentencing	factors	or	abused	its	sentencing	power.”		Id.		

[¶28]	 	 At	 step	 one,	 the	 court	 properly	 assessed the	 nature	 and	

seriousness	of	each	offense.	 See	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1252-C(1).		The	court considered	

the	victim’s	age, Hansen’s	age, the	specific	manner	in	which	the	offenses	were	

committed, and	the	fact	that	Hansen	was	a	familiar	and	trusted	person	in	the	

victim’s	life.		See	State	v.	Parker,	2017	ME	28,	¶¶	4,	8,	156	A.3d	118; Stanislaw	

II,	2013	ME	43,	¶¶	10, 22,	65	A.3d	1242;	State	v.	Soucy,	2006	ME	8,	¶ 18,	890	

A.2d	719.		The	court	then	found	that	Hansen’s	conduct	was	“in	the	mid	to	high	

end	on	the	continuum”	of	severity,	and	set	the	basic	sentence	at	five	to	ten	years

on	 each	 count.	 	 Cf.	 Soucy,	 2006	 ME	 8,	 ¶¶	 7,	 18,	 890	 A.2d	 719	 (finding	 no	
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misapplication	of	principle	where	basic	sentence	was	set	at	six	years	on each	

count	of	Class	B	unlawful	sexual	contact).

[¶29]	 	 The	 maximum	 authorized	 sentence	 for	 a Class	 B	 offense is	 ten	

years.	 	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 1252(2)(B)	 (2018).	 	 Although	 it	 is	 rare	 for	 the	 basic	

sentence “to	 be	 appropriately	 set	 at	 or	 near	 the	 statutory	 maximum,”	 a	

sentencing	court	may	properly	set	the	basic	sentence	at	or	near	the	maximum	

if	its	“analysis	demonstrates	that	the	defendant’s	crime	was	considered	to	be	

among	the	most	serious	ways	in	which	the	crime	might	be	committed.”	 State	v.	

Stanislaw,	2011	ME	67,	¶¶	12,	13,	21	A.3d	91	(Stanislaw	 I) (quotation	marks	

omitted).		One	factor	that	can	support	a	basic	sentence	at	or	near	the	maximum

is	the	selection	of	“extremely	young	children	as	victims.”		Id. ¶	12;	see	also	17-A	

M.R.S.	§ 1151(8)(A)	(2018).

[¶30]		After	considering	the	victim’s	very	young	age	and	the	manner	in	

which	 the	 offenses	 were	 committed,	 the	 court	 stated	 that	 “it’s	 hard	 to	

imagine . . . how	much	more	serious	it	could	have	been.”		Therefore,	the court	

did	not	misapply	principle	in	setting	the	basic	period	of	incarceration	toward	

the	higher	end	of	the	spectrum, near	the	maximum term	of	ten	years.		See	Soucy,	

2006	ME	8,	¶¶	7,	18,	890	A.2d	719.
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[¶31]	 	 At	 the	 second	 step	 of	 the	 analysis,	 the	 court	 appropriately	

considered	 aggravating	 and	 mitigating	 factors,	 including	 Hansen’s	 limited	

criminal	history,	likelihood	of	reoffending,	motivation	or	reason	for	engaging	in	

the	 criminal	 conduct,	 employment	 history,	 mental	 health	 issues,	 physical	

disabilities,	and	lack	of	compassion,	remorse, or	acceptance	of	responsibility.		

17-A	M.R.S.	 §	 1252-C(2).	 	The	 court	 also	 considered	 the	effect that	Hansen’s	

conduct	had on	the	victim	and	the	victim’s	family.		The	court	determined	that	

“the	 aggravating	 factors	 grossly	 outweigh[ed] the	 mitigating	 factors,”	 and	

concluded	that	the	maximum	sentence	would	be	in	“the	ten-year	range.”		The	

court	 did	 not	 abuse	 its	 discretion	 in	 setting	 the	 maximum	 period	 of	

incarceration	at	ten	years	for	each	count.		Cf.	Soucy,	2006	ME	8,	¶¶	1,	10,	19,	890	

A.2d	719	(finding	no	abuse	of	discretion	where	maximum	sentence	at	step	two	

was	 eight	 years	 on	 Class	 B	 unlawful	 sexual	 contact	 counts);	see	 also	 Gall	 v.	

United	 States,	 552	 U.S.	 38,	 51-53	 (2007)	 (discussing	 the	 “practical	

considerations”	 underpinning	 use	 of the	 abuse	 of	 discretion	 standard	 for	

review	of	sentences	by	appellate	courts).

[¶32]		At	the	third	step	of	the	analysis,	after	considering	the	purposes	and	

goals	of	sentencing,	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1151 (2018),	and	observing	that	“[t]he	age	of	

the	victim	is	.	.	.	absolutely	paramount	in	this	case,”	the	court	determined	that	
15

the	final	sentence	would	be	ten	years’ imprisonment on	the	first	count,	and	a	

consecutive	sentence	of	ten	years,	all	suspended,	with	five	years	of	probation	

on	 the	 second	count.		We	 find	 no	abuse	 of	discretion	at	 the	 third	 step of	 the	

analysis.

2. Excessive	or	Disproportionate Sentences

[¶33]	 	 Article	 I,	 section	 9	 of	 the	 Maine	 Constitution	 provides	 that	 “all	

penalties	and	punishments	 shall	be	proportioned	 to	 the	 offense.”		We	 assess	

whether	a	sentence	is	constitutionally	disproportionate	using	a	two-part	test.		

Stanislaw	II,	2013	ME	43,	¶	29,	65	A.3d	1242.		First,	we compare	“the	gravity	of	

the	 offense	 with	 the	 severity	 of	 the	 sentence.”	 	 Id. (alteration	 omitted)	

(quotation	marks	omitted).		If	that	comparison	leads	to	“an	inference	of	gross	

disproportionality	 we	 then	 compare	 the	 defendant’s	 sentence	 with	 the	

sentences	received	by	other	offenders	in	the	same	jurisdiction.”		Id. (alteration	

omitted)	 (quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 	 Only	 in	 rare	 cases	 will	 the	 threshold	

comparison	lead	to	an	inference	of	gross	disproportionality.		See	State	v.	Ward,	

2011	ME	74,	¶	20	n.5,	21	A.3d	1033	(citing	Graham	v.	Florida,	560	U.S.	48,	60	

(2010)).

[¶34]	 	 As	 to	 the	 gravity	 of	 the	 offense, Hansen	 had	 unlawful,	

inappropriate,	 and	 repeated	 sexual	 contact	 with	 an	 extremely	 young	 child,	
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resulting	 in	 two	 convictions	 for	 Class	 B	 unlawful	 sexual	 contact.	 	 The	 court	

found	 that	 in	 committing	 those	 crimes	 he	 violated	 the	 trust	 of	 not	 only	 the	

victim	but	also	the	victim’s	family,	who	had	permitted	him	to	act	as	a	babysitter	

and	supervise	her.		

[¶35]		We	previously	found	an	inference	 of	gross	disproportionality	in	

Stanislaw	II,	2013	ME	43,	¶	33,	65	A.3d	1242.		There,	the defendant	received	

three	 consecutive	 sentences	 of	 eight	 years’ imprisonment	 with	 no time

suspended,	 resulting	in	 an	 unsuspended	 term	 of	 twenty-four	 years	 on	 three

counts	of	Class	B	unlawful	sexual	contact.		Id.		Although	we	found	an	inference	

of	 gross	 disproportionality,	we	 found	 “no	 error	in	 the	 court’s	 determination	

concerning	the	maximum	sentence	for	each	crime,	nor	in	its	determination	that	

the	sentences	.	.	.	should	be	imposed	consecutively.”		Id.		However, we	did	take

issue	with	the	sentencing	court’s	“fail[ure]	to	suspend	any	portion	of	the	three	

eight-year	sentences	imposed	for	the	Class	B	convictions.”3 Id.		

[¶36]	 	 Here,	 although	 the	 court	 imposed	 two	 consecutive	 ten-year	

sentences,	 the	court	suspended	 the	entire	 ten-year	 term	of	imprisonment	on	

 3

 In	 remanding	 that	 case for	 resentencing,	 we	 observed	 that	 “an	 unsuspended	 sentence	 of	

one-third	to	one-half	of	the	current	unsuspended	sentence	would	comply	with	our	constitutional	and	

statutory	 proportionality	 requirements.”	 	 State	 v.	 Stanislaw, 2013	 ME	 43,	 ¶	 50,	 65	 A.3d	 1242

(Stanislaw	 II).	 	 Applying	 that	 calculation	 to	 the	 Class	 B	 counts	 in	 Stanislaw II would yield an	

unsuspended	term	of	eight	to	twelve	years;Hansen’s	sentence	falls	neatly	in	the	middle of	this	range.
17

the	 second	 count.	 	 And	 despite	 Hansen’s	 efforts	 to	 analogize	 this	 case	 to	

Stanislaw	II,	the	unsuspended	term	there	was	nearly	two	and	a	half	times	longer	

than	 the	 unsuspended	 term	 here.	 	 Moreover,	 the	 victim	 in	 this	 case is	

significantly	younger	than	the	victims	in	Stanislaw,	who	ranged	in	age	from	ten	

to	 fourteen	 years.	 	Id.	¶	 2.	 	We	 cannot	find fault	with the	 sentencing	 court’s	

determination that the	 victim’s	 age	 is	 “absolutely	 paramount	 in	 this	 case.”	

See 17-A	M.R.S.	§	1151(8)(A).	

[¶37]		Comparing the	gravity	of	the	offenses	committed	with	the	severity	

of	 the	 sentences imposed,	 we	 conclude	 that no inference	 of	 gross	

disproportionality is	warranted.		See	Stanislaw	 II,	2013	ME	43, ¶	29,	65	A.3d	

1242.	 	 Therefore,	 we	 do	 not	 proceed	 to	 step	 two	 of	 the	 disproportionality	

analysis.		Id.		The	sentences	are tailored	 to	serve	 the	purposes	of	sentencing,	

17-A M.R.S. § 1151,	 and	 are not	 constitutionally	 disproportionate,	 Me.	 Const.	

art.	I,	§ 9;	cf.	Stanislaw	II,	2013	ME	43,	¶¶	33,	49-50,	65	A.3d	1242.

[¶38]	 	 Having	 determined	 that	 the	 sentences	 are	 not	 excessive	 or	

disproportionate,	we	finally	consider	whether	the	court	abused its	discretion	

in	imposing	consecutive	sentences.
18

3. Consecutive	Sentences	

[¶39]	 	 When	 sentencing	 a	 defendant	 for	 multiple	 offenses,	 “the	

sentencing	court	must	determine	whether	to	impose	consecutive	or	concurrent	

sentences.”		Stanislaw	II,	2013	ME	43,	¶	16,	65	A.3d	1242.		Although	the	analysis	

begins	 with	 “the	 assumption	 that	 multiple	 sentences	will run	 concurrently,”

State	 v.	 Commeau,	 2004	 ME	 78,	 ¶	 16,	 852	 A.2d	 70, a court	 may	 impose	

consecutive	sentences	if	it	determines	“[t]hat	the	convictions	are	for	offenses	

based	 on	 different	 conduct	 or	 arising	 from	 different	 criminal	 episodes,”	 see	

17-A	M.R.S.	§	1256(2)(A) (2018).		“If	the	court	decides	to	impose	consecutive	

sentences	for	various	convictions,	it	shall	state	its	reasons	for	doing	so	on	the	

record	 or	 in	 the	 sentences,”	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 1256(4),	 and	 “it	 must	 perform	 a	

separate	Hewey analysis	for	each	conviction,”	Stanislaw	II,	2013	ME	43,	¶	16,	65	

A.3d	 1242.	 	We	 review	the imposition	 of	 consecutive	 sentences for	 abuse	 of	

discretion.		Id.	¶	17.

[¶40]		The	trial	court’s	findings	are	sufficient	to	support	a	determination	

“[t]hat	 the	convictions	 are	 for	 offenses	 based	 on	different	conduct	 or	arising	

from	different	criminal	episodes.”	 17-A	M.R.S.	§	1256(2)(A);	see	also State	v.	

Powers,	489	A.2d	4,	6	 (Me.	1985)	 (“Absent	a	 showing	 to	 the	contrary,	a	 trial	

judge	is	presumed	to	know	the	law	and	to	have	applied	it	correctly	in	any	given	
19

case.”).		In	its	 analysis, the	court	 repeatedly	 referred	 to	Hansen’s	conduct	 as	

having	occurred	at	two	different	times	when	the	victim	was	five	and	six	years	

old,	although	the	incidents	involved	similar	criminal	conduct	against	the	same	

victim.		We	are	satisfied	that	the	court’s independent	analysis	and	articulation	

of	 the	 facts	 of each	 occurrence provided	 sufficient	 justification	 for	 the	

imposition	of consecutive	sentences.		See	State	v.	Downs,	2009	ME	3,	¶	14,	962	

A.2d	 950.	 	 The court	 did	 not	 abuse	 its	 discretion	 in	 imposing	 consecutive	

sentences.		See	Stanislaw	II,	2013	ME	43,	¶¶ 23, 33,	49, 65	A.3d	1242.

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.

James	P.	Howaniec,	Esq. (orally),	Lewiston,	for	appellant	Gabriel	J.	Hansen

Andrew	 S.	 Robinson,	 District	 Attorney,	 and	 Lisa	 R.	 Bogue,	 Asst. Atty. Gen.

(orally),	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Androscoggin	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR-2018-2131

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY