Appellants’ Motion for Rehearing Overruled; Memorandum Opinion of 

December 9, 2014 Withdrawn; Affirmed and Substitute Memorandum 

Opinion filed April 21, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00459-CV

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, ALLSTATE INDEMNITY 

COMPANY, ALLSTATE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE 

COMPANY, ALLSTATE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 

AND ALLSTATE FIRE & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Appellants

V.

REHAB ALLIANCE OF TEXAS, INC. D/B/A STEEPLECHASE FAMILY 

HEATLHCARE AND STEEPLECHASE PAIN MANAGEMENT &

SURGICAL ASSOCIATES, SHEILA SMITH F/K/A SHEILA GOYER, 

DENNIS SMITH, D.C., THE DIAGNOSTIC & INJURY CENTER OF 

HOUSTON, LLC AND IHSAN SHANTI, M.D., 

Appellees

On Appeal from the 11th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2009-81354A

S U B S T I T U T E M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
2

We overrule appellants’ motion for rehearing, withdraw our memorandum 

opinion issued December 9, 2014, and issue this substitute memorandum opinion.

Appellants, Allstate Insurance Company, Allstate Indemnity Company, 

Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company, Allstate County Mutual 

Insurance Company, and Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Company (“Allstate”) 

appeal an order granting summary judgment in favor of Rehab Alliance of Texas, 

Inc. d/b/a Steeplechase Family Healthcare and Steeplechase Pain Management & 

Surgical Associates, Sheila Smith f/k/a/ Sheila Goyer, Dennis Smith D.C., The 

Diagnostic & Injury Center of Houston, L.L.C., (“Rehab Alliance”) and Ihsan 

Shanti, M.D. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Allstate is an insurance company which has issued automobile policies in 

Texas since January 2004. Rehab Alliance is a chiropractic clinic which provided 

services including chiropractic care, orthopedic and pain management, epidural 

steroid injections, and radiologists’ services to persons injured in car accidents. As 

part of its services, Rehab Alliance also provided reports to attorneys outlining 

injuries and treatment plans for its patients in order to facilitate settlements of their 

claims for damages. 

Allstate claims that Rehab Alliance solicited referrals from attorneys 

representing such claimants. In those situations, Rehab Alliance would treat the 

injured parties under a “letter of protection” with the patients’ attorneys. 

According to Allstate, these letters provided that Rehab Alliance would seek to 

recover payment of its bills from its patients only if there were a recovery reached 

by way of settlement or judgment; that is, the patients were released from financial 

responsibility for health care services if there was no settlement or judgment with 

an insurer. Allstate alleged these “letters of protection” were concealed from it 
3

because they were not included as a part of the settlement packages that attorneys 

for the various patients (claimants) presented to Allstate.

Allstate sued Rehab Alliance and Shanti for fraud, conspiracy, and unjust 

enrichment, alleging that since 2004, Rehab Alliance made material 

misrepresentations, including: 

 Providing services as if a medical doctor had performed the service, 

when a nurse practitioner had performed the service

 Sending bills for services and other consultations incurred by the 

patient, when the contract for such procedures was based on a fee 

splitting agreement with lay persons and, thus, represented the 

unauthorized and corporate practice of medicine

 “Upcoding” or improperly coding treatment, representing that a 

patient incurred health care costs and remained financially liable, 

when an agreement releasing him or her from liability was concealed 

from Allstate

 Stating various charges were made as if the service were attended by a 

medical professional, but was in fact, unattended

 Noting that MRIs, surgical injection procedures, and other referrals 

for further treatment were medically necessary, when they were not, 

and that MRI reports often included false identification of bulges or 

herniations to vertebral discs 

 Medical doctors and Rehab Alliance and/or other diagnostic clinics 

had “fee splitting” arrangements or other payment arrangements 

which were not authorized. 

 Failing to disclose that medication prescriptions and refills were made 

by unauthorized persons, yet the costs for such medications were 

billed as if made by a medical doctor 

 Concealing patient notes showing that medications were often 

prescribed or refilled by lay persons, using the name of a medical 

doctor under contract, or otherwise compensated, through Rehab 

Alliance.

Allstate asserted that had it “been made aware of these methods and

practices, it would not have considered such billings in settling the claims” of the 
4

injured persons treated by Rehab Alliance. Specifically, Allstate claimed certain of 

the sums charged were included in the medical and billing records which were a 

part of over 100 demand packages which various attorneys presented to Allstate in 

order to settle their clients’ claims. These claims were for personal injury 

damages, settled between the years 2004 and 2008. Allstate filed suit in December 

2009, seeking to recover the sums it paid for services for which the patients were 

released from liability and which it claims were improperly billed or coded, 

improperly supervised, or not medically reasonable or necessary, and which were 

included as part of the total package which Allstate considered in settling the 

claims. 

In 2012, Rehab Alliance filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment. 

It urged there was no evidence to support the injury element of Allstate’s fraud 

clam. Rehab Alliance urged that conspiracy failed because it required proof of the

underlying tort of fraud, conspiracy failed.

1

 Shanti joined in Rehab Alliance’s 

motion. Shanti also filed both a no-evidence2 and traditional motion for summary 

judgment. Shanti urged, inter alia, that Allstate’s unjust enrichment claim failed

because there is no evidence Shanti received a benefit from Allstate. Rehab 

Alliance joined in Shanti’s motion as well. Allstate responded to both motions. 

On December 13, 2012, the trial court signed an order granting summary 

judgment without specifying the grounds. Allstate appealed the order.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the movant must state the 

 

1

In 2010, Rehab Alliance previously filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment 

which the trial court denied. Shanti did not file a motion for summary judgment at that time.

2

Shanti urged a no-evidence motion for summary judgment as to Allstate’s standing to 

prosecute this suit. A no-evidence motion cannot be used to challenge a trial court’s subject 

matter jurisdiction. See Green Tree Serv., LLC v. Woods, 388 S.W.3d 785, 792–94 (Tex. 2012).
5

specific element or elements of each cause of action on which it urges there is no 

evidence. Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 207 (Tex. 2002). 

In reviewing the no-evidence motion, we consider only those grounds set forth in 

the motion. See Johnson v. Felts, 140 S.W.3d 702, 706 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). To defeat a no-evidence motion, the non-movant is 

not required to marshal all of its proof, but it is required to point to evidence 

raising a fact issue on the challenged elements of the cause of action. Johnson, 140 

S.W.3d at 207. Where, as here, the trial court’s order does not specify the grounds 

for its ruling, we must affirm the summary judgment if any of the grounds 

presented to the trial court are meritorious. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. 

Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003).

We review the motions de novo. See Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 

S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). When reviewing a summary judgment, we take as 

true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and we indulge every reasonable 

inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Fraud and Conspiracy

In its petition, Allstate contended:

Defendants [Rehab Alliance and Shanti] intended Allstate to act upon 

these misrepresentations, and Allstate was damaged when it relied on 

the representations and paid sums in settlements of the claims. Had 

Allstate been aware of these methods and practices, Allstate would not 

have considered such billings in settling the claims. 

. . . 

Defendants willfully combined, conspired, and agreed with each other 

and others to defraud Plaintiffs. . . . As a direct and proximate result of 

Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiffs have paid sums in regard to the 
6

automobile collisions in which the claimant went to a Rehab Alliance 

clinic, to which Defendants were not legally entitled.

(Emphasis added).

Thus, Allstate’s claim of “injury” arising out of its claim of fraud is the 

portion of the “sums in settlements of the claims” paid to claimants which were 

made as a result of the alleged fraud of Rehab Alliance and Shanti. 

As noted above, by virtue of the motions and the motions in which both 

parties joined, Rehab Alliance and Shanti challenge the injury element of the fraud 

claim, and challenge the conspiracy claim, asserting if there is no underlying tort of 

fraud, there can be no claim for conspiracy. While Shanti’s no-evidence motion 

did not identify a specific element of the claims on which there is no evidence,

Rehab Alliance urged Allstate had no evidence of any injury that is not merely 

speculative because Allstate had no evidence to show what amounts it should not 

have paid.

3

 Rehab Alliance asserted that while Allstate:

. . . alleges it was injured by offering settlement amounts that 

considered bills it would no longer consider, Allstate admits that it 

cannot point to reduced settlement amount that would have been 

offered and accepted by any of the 100+ claimants in the underlying 

personal injury claims. Thus, . . . Allstate’s purported injury is 

entirely speculative and cannot support a claim for fraud.

To prove fraud, Allstate must establish proof of each of the following 

elements: (1) a material representation was made; (2) the representation was false;

(3) at the time it was made, Shanti and/or Rehab Alliance knew the representation 

was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a 

positive assertion; (4) Shanti and/or Rehab Alliance made the representation with 

 

3 We have carried with the case Rehab Alliance’s Motion to Supplement the Record with 

Exhibits 3–5 it claims were provided to the trial court at the time it filed its motion for summary 

judgment, but which were not contained in the file and not contained in the record on appeal. 

We overrule the motion to supplement.
7

the intent that Allstate would act on it; (5) Allstate acted in reliance on the 

representation; and, (6) Allstate suffered injury. See Italian Cowboy Partners v. 

Prudential Ins., 341 S.W.3d 323, 337 (Tex. 2011); Moore v. Altra Energy 

Technologies, Inc., 321 S.W.3d 727 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no 

pet.). 

The elements of civil conspiracy are: (1) two or more person; (2) an object 

to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of minds on the object or course of action; (4) 

one or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) damages. Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 

672, 681 (Tex. 1996). A claim of conspiracy necessarily implicates liability for an 

underlying tort. See Trammell Crow Co. No. 60 v. Harkinson, 944 S.W.2d 631, 

635 (Tex. 1997); Carroll v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 592 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. 

1979). Where summary judgment is proper on fraud as the underlying tort, it is 

likewise proper on conspiracy to commit fraud. See Wolstein v. Aliezer, 321 

S.W.3d 765, 775 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).

The damages under the fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud claim would 

be the portion of Allstate’s out-of-pocket payments that were made based on the 

alleged misrepresentations, which (as explained in Part III.B. below) would be the 

same on this record as the amount of any monetary benefit unjustly retained under 

the unjust enrichment theory. It is this element which Rehab Alliance challenged 

in its no-evidence motion for summary judgment; that is, if there was no evidence 

of injury to support the fraud claim, the claim failed on this basis. Additionally, if 

the fraud claim does not survive, then the conspiracy claim also failed because it 

must be based on an underlying tort. With these principles in mind, we examine 

the summary judgment evidence.

1. Allstate’s Evidence.

Responding to this no-evidence challenge, Allstate referenced a May 2009 
8

letter informing Allstate of questions concerning Shanti’s contractual arrangement 

with Rehab Alliance, and causing Allstate to question his charges. The letter stated 

Shanti performed procedures in a “pain suite” at Rehab Alliance, he did not 

participate in billing, and his remuneration was not based on billing. The letter 

concluded that upon Rehab Alliance’s discovery of a question of his practice 

methods, Shanti’s employment was terminated. Another letter with which Allstate 

became aware was the patients’ letters of protection, as one was inadvertently 

included in a demand package presented to Allstate by an attorney representing 

one of Rehab Alliance’s patients. 

Allstate then summarized the impropriety of various charges and procedures 

included in the Rehab Alliance bills, and referred to the 2010 affidavits of six 

Allstate claims representatives. All stated they were unaware of the 

misrepresentations as to services provided, billing methods, supervision of patients 

and other matters summarized above, and that no audit tools would detect such 

misrepresentations. They further stated that had they known of the 

misrepresentations and the patients’ release of financial liability, they “would view 

the [settlement of bodily injury] claims with higher scrutiny.” 

Allstate also offered the 2010 affidavit of Aaron Patterson, SIU (“special 

investigation unit”) analyst for Allstate, with its attached spreadsheets, and offered 

various portions of his 2012 deposition. Patterson testified he was familiar with 

the claims files, containing documents generated by Rehab Alliance. These 

documents were provided to Allstate claims representatives for consideration of 

settlement. Patterson also testified the claims representatives were unaware of the 

matters relating to patient release of liability, billing, compensation and “fee 

splitting” arrangements, how and by whom services were performed, and that 

computer tools Allstate uses to audit claims cannot identify such misrepresented 
9

charges. Patterson and the claims representatives testified they were unaware of 

the many different practices which Allstate viewed as part of Rehab Alliance’s 

routine, many of which are enumerated above, including “any practice of the 

providers to withhold . . . documents showing release of financial responsibility for 

clinic bills . . . and attorney direction of the treatment and diagnosis tests the 

patient was to receive.”4 

Patterson testified he was made aware of questions concerning Shanti’s 

performance and compensation, he learned patients were not financially 

responsible for bills, and “patient update” sheets were withheld from Allstate. He 

stated if a patient is released from any financial responsibility, the amounts of 

health care charges would not be included in a bodily injury settlement offer. 

Other charges, such as those for medications and charges for services of medical 

doctors, would not be included when they were not performed by a medical doctor 

or other appropriate medical personnel, or when the physician was involved in a 

“fee splitting” agreement. Patterson also stated, as did the claims representatives, 

that had Allstate been made aware that charges for service “did not correspond to 

the time actually spent with a patient . . . such charges would not be included in 

bodily injury settlement offers.” Patterson further testified Allstate learned there 

were treatments which were performed when they were not medically necessary. 

Finally, Patterson referred to two spreadsheets, stating they included figures 

of over one hundred “total settlement amounts, and allowed amounts for various 

 

4

The claims representatives’ affidavits also included testimony that they were not aware 

of other practices, such as requiring up-front partial payment for some surgical injection 

procedures, having agreements with medical doctors performing consultation examinations and 

splitting the fees with Rehab Alliance, and billing of fees at the rate of a medical doctor when the 

services were performed by nurse practitioners or physician’s assistants, and were unaware that 

non-medical employees were prescribing medication to patients using the name of a medical 

doctor to do so.
10

procedures and tests, such as epidural steroid injections . . . .” The spreadsheet 

also included a summary of bills submitted under Rehab Alliance invoices, “clinic 

allowed amount,” and “ESI/surgery allowed amount.” Patterson testified certain 

referrals for further testing and procedures, along with the charges for them, were 

unnecessary and excessive; however, he did not know what amounts Rehab 

Alliance received from the actual settlements. He testified that the total amount of 

damages Allstate sought to recover was $415,744.13. Patterson explained the 

spreadsheets did not reflect what amounts were actually received by claimants 

because he had no knowledge of the claimants’ fee arrangement with their 

respective attorneys. 

In his 2012 deposition, Patterson outlined the factors which claims adjusters 

take into account in determining what offer to extend in settlement. Those 

included liability facts, property damage of the injured party’s vehicle, the actual 

injury of the party, medical bills, pre-existing conditions, medical conditions, loss

of earnings, extent of medical treatment, and the adjuster’s independent judgment. 

The claims representatives also utilized computer tools, such as Colossus and the 

Mitchell Expert Claim Summary (“Mitchell”). Patterson explained that Colossus 

helps the claims adjuster determine the overall value of a claim, the amount of 

damages, medical bills, pre-existing conditions, and medical offsets where multiple 

claims are involved. Mitchell, a computer audit system, reviews the amount of 

actual charges input into the system. In making their decisions, the claims 

representatives or adjusters do not rely solely on Colossus and Mitchell. Rather, 

they maintain and utilize independent judgment in assessing each claim. 

Patterson acknowledged that arriving at a settlement figure involved a 

significant amount of judgment, taking into consideration what is logical for 

Allstate and the claimant. He also stated that had the claims not settled, Allstate 
11

would have incurred additional litigation expenses. Patterson testified he had not 

reviewed the claims to determine whether policy limits would have been offered 

on those claims, if Allstate had been made aware of the misrepresentations. Stated 

differently, Patterson never testified Allstate may not have offered policy limits, or 

any other sum, to settle the claims had it been made aware of questions with regard 

to medical bills, providers, and the patients’ release of financial liability. 

Further, he testified he did not know whether claims would have been 

handled differently, whether they would have settled, or would have settled for a 

lesser amount, had the charges Allstate questioned not been included. Patterson

could not state a different amount would have been offered and accepted by a 

claimant, had Allstate been made aware of the alleged misrepresentations prior to 

making and finalizing the offers of settlement. In sum, Patterson’s testimony as to 

damages was a quantification of the amounts Allstate alleges it would not have 

included in a settlement offer had they been made aware of false or misrepresented 

facts. He did not quantify the amounts Allstate would have saved in overall 

settlements paid, if any, or in litigation expenses it did not incur because it settled 

the claims, and he did not estimate the amount of litigation expenses Allstate may 

have incurred if claims had not been settled.

2. Application of Law to the Evidence.

A claim of injury or damages cannot be sustained when based on an 

“entirely hypothetical, speculative bargain that was never struck and would not 

have been consummated.” Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Engineers and 

Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 50 (Tex. 1998). If damages are too remote, 

uncertain or based purely on conjecture, they cannot support recovery and 

summary judgment is proper. See Reardon v. LightPath Techs., Inc., 183 S.W.3d 

429, 439 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
12

As explained above, Rehab Alliance contended Allstate had no evidence to 

support the requisite elements of “injury” (damages) on its fraud claim and 

unconscionable benefit on its unjust enrichment claim and, because the fraud claim 

failed, conspiracy necessarily failed. The damages Allstate sought to recover are 

sums it had paid based on what it alleged to have been misrepresentations by 

Rehab Alliance and the medical providers with whom Rehab Alliance worked. As 

outlined above, Allstate’s evidence in support of the theory of injury is: (a) 

affidavit testimony about Allstate’s settlement procedures; and (b) spreadsheets 

that show “total settlement amounts, and allowed amounts for various procedures 

and tests, such as epidural steroid injections, ‘attended’ electrical stimulation, and 

services purportedly provided by Dr. Covington.”

Allstate’s theory of injury is not tied to any specific claim or claims that 

form the basis of the suit. First, Allstate’s injury theory supposes that: (1) if 

Allstate had known about the alleged fraud or deception of the appellees, it would 

not have offered as much in settlement to the personal injury claimants—

nonparties here; (2) if Allstate had offered less to the personal injury claimants, the 

claimants would have taken the lesser settlement offer; or, (3) if Allstate had 

offered less to the personal injury claimants, and the claimants had refused the 

offer, the dispute would have proceeded to trial and Allstate or the Allstate 

insureds would have prevailed; and (4) the differential between what Allstate 

offered and the amount it would have offered or ultimately paid is, Allstate posits, 

the amount of injury Allstate has suffered. To recover under any of these 

scenarios, Allstate would be forced to either seek to unwind the settlements with 

the 107 claimants, and begin the process again, or it would be required to quantify 

the value of the settlements with each individual claimant, without the questioned 

charges being included. Allstate is not seeking to unwind the settlements and is 
13

making no effort to link its theory of damage to any actual claim. 

While the Allstate affiants testified if Allstate had known of appellees’

alleged fraud, Allstate “would not have included” certain categories of deceptive 

billings within the total settlements offered to the various 107 claimants, neither 

Allstate’s affiants nor spreadsheets purports to identify a single claimant to whom 

Allstate offered an excessive sum. See El Dorado Motors, Inc. v. R.E. Koch, 168 

S.W.3d 360, 367–68 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.) (holding spreadsheet 

and accompanying testimony which failed to establish how losses were calculated 

and making no comparisons to other expenses is no evidence of out-of-pocket 

damages); see also Household Finance Corp. v. DTND Sierra Investments, LLC, 

No. 04-13-00033, 2013 WL 5948899, at * 11 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 6, 

2013, no pet.) (mem. op) (concluding testimony was speculative and conclusory 

where the defendant “merely gave totals” and did not explain how he arrived at the 

totals, other than by general reference); Blue Hill Chiropractic Group, Inc. v. 

Encompass Ins. Co., Nos. SUCV 200502075, SUCV 200502076, 

SUCV200502077 and SUCV2005200605269, 2011 WL 3672049, at *3–8 (Mass. 

Super. May 5, 2011) (allowing summary judgment on insurer’s claims where there 

was evidence of a fraudulent scheme involving clinics and chiropractors and 

spreadsheets identifying specific patient claims, summarizing medical and business 

records and revealing precise amounts paid). The affiants, claims representatives, 

would simply have “viewed the claims with higher scrutiny.” None testified the 

claims would not have been settled and none offered testimony as to how the 

exclusion of these charges would have impacted the viability of the settlements, or 

how, if at all, the exclusion of these charges would have impacted the total amount 

of each settlement. 

The question unanswered and unaddressed in the summary judgment 
14

evidence is how the alleged fraud impacted the settlements at issue in this case. 

We agree with Allstate that it was not required to establish the amount of its 

damages in response to the summary judgment motions. However, this failing in 

Allstate’s evidence, we conclude, concerns the fact of legal damages. “Uncertainty 

as to the fact of legal damages is fatal to recovery, but uncertainty as to the amount

will not defeat recovery.” McKnight v. Hill & Hill Exterminators, 689 S.W.2d 

206, 207 (Tex. 1985) (citing Southwest Battery Corp. v. Owen, 115 S.W.2d 1097, 

1099 (Tex. 1938)) (Emphasis added). Here, Allstate presented evidence to support 

its theory of injury; however, it did not present evidence on the fact of legal 

damages resulting from the inclusion of allegedly fraudulent charges as well as 

valid charges in certain claims, which is fatal to its recovery. Cf. State Farm 

Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Giventer, 212 F.Supp.2d 639, 650–53 (N.D. Tex. 2002) 

(holding insurer is entitled to recover under RICO and common law fraud because

the record contained evidence of the amount of expenses paid due to fraud and 

wilful conduct resulting from the scheme of intentionally-caused automobile 

accidents). 

Other cases on which Allstate relies are distinguishable given their 

procedural context and do not support Allstate’s recovery under the facts here. See 

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Seigel, 312 F.Supp.2d 260, 269–270 (D.C. Conn. 2004) 

(denying certain portions of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in a RICO and state law fraud 

action where Allstate pleaded sufficient facts in order to obtain recovery of 

expenses incurred in reviewing, adjusting, investigating and litigating false and 

fraudulent claims resulting from a physician’s reports on patients involved in 

automobile accidents. The Court’s task “in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is 

merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of 

the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.”); State Farm Mutual
15

Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kugler, No. 11-80051, 2011 WL 4389915, at *8 (S.D. Fla. 2011) 

(denying motion to dismiss RICO and fraud claims on the basis that State Farm, as 

the party directly injured by the alleged fraudulent conduct, was entitled to recover 

damages to the extent its “settlement decision making was influenced and distorted 

by false billings generated by the defendants”) (citing State Farm Mutual Auto. 

Ins. Co. v. Lincow, 715 F.Supp.2d 617 (E.D. Pa. 2010)) (in insurance fraud case 

where victims of automobile accidents inflated the costs of medical care, the court 

concluded there was sufficient evidence that treatment and testing was fraudulent 

and that insurer made payments in reliance on the fraudulent medical records). 

In other words, Allstate argues that its evidence of injury due to fraud is not 

speculative because it is included in the amount it paid to appellees via the 

settlement agreements. Allstate alleged it discounted the amount offered the 

claimants on their claim as a whole, but Allstate would have offered the claimants 

nothing on the medical bills from appellees. This theory assumes that had Allstate 

offered the claimants less, the claimants would have accepted that lesser amount in 

settlement. Hence, the injury Allstate claims it suffered by the fraud is the total 

amount that Allstate offered and paid, less the amounts it claims it would not have 

offered. This argument does not account in any way for the amount Allstate would 

have actually paid on each claim under the scenario it poses. In the absence of 

evidence to support Allstate’s contention of what it would have paid, there is no 

evidence that Allstate suffered an actual injury by not having had the opportunity 

to offer the claimants less. 

Allstate’s evidence in this case suffers from the same speculative infirmity 

as evidence on analogous facts in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Receivable Finance 

Company, L.L.C., 501 F.3d 398, 411–12 (5th Cir. 2007). We recognize the 

procedural posture of that case is different from the present one; however, we 
16

believe the rationale assists. In reviewing a judgment rendered in favor of Allstate, 

the Fifth Circuit reversed a jury verdict for fraud, holding Allstate had no evidence 

of actual reliance on misrepresentations because it had no evidence that adjusters 

relied on the allegedly fraudulent medical records in deciding whether to settle a 

claim: 

As to settlements, we also note that there are a whole host of 

reasons—other than reliance on reports from the adverse party’s 

doctors, that might lead a part to settle, viz: “[S]everal factors other 

than reliance on the truth of an opponent’s allegations may influence a 

party’s ultimate decision to settle disputed claims in a lawsuit, 

including the nature of the liability facts, the nature of the damages, . . 

. discovery, trial preparation, and trial itself.” 

(citing Atlantic Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Butler, 137 S.W.3d 199, 227 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied)). Id. at 412.

Further, the court held there was “no evidence introduced regarding what the 

defendants-appellants obtained through fraud as opposed to their legitimate 

provision of health care, the amount of the award could only be based on mere 

conjecture or speculations. Thus, it cannot be sustained.” Id. The court was 

“sympathetic” and “deeply shocked and saddened at the dishonest practices” of 

many parties, but stated it was “not within our discretion to create a new Texas 

cause of action . . . .” Id. at 411.

Because there is no evidence that Allstate suffered actual legal injury

through fraud, the no-evidence motions for summary judgment were proper on 

Allstate’s fraud claim. Given that Allstate’s conspiracy claim depended on its 

fraud claim, summary judgment was also proper on the conspiracy claim.

B. Unjust Enrichment.

In its petition, Allstate incorporates the factual background set forth above 

and asserts Shanti and Rehab Alliance were enriched by obtaining the sums made 
17

part of the settlements. Specifically, Allstate alleges: 

Defendants have unjustly obtained a benefit from Plaintiffs, namely 

payment for health care expenses that were unreasonable and 

unnecessary . . . . Plaintiffs have paid sums, and Defendants have 

been benefited from those payments, in connection with the treatment, 

billing, and referral practices arising from automobile collisions at 

issue.

Unjust enrichment is an equitable theory which allows for the recovery of 

damages to prevent a party from obtaining a benefit from another by fraud, duress 

or undue advantage. See Industrial III, Inc. v. Kenneth Burns, et al, No. 14-13-

00386, 2014 WL 4202495, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 26, 2014, 

pet. filed) (mem. op.) (citing Heldenfels Bros., Inc.v. City of Corpus Christi, 832 

S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1992)); Walker v. Cotter Props., Inc., 181 S.W.3d 895, 900 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). Unjust enrichment occurs when a person has 

wrongfully secured or passively received a benefit which would be unconscionable 

to retain. Tex. Integrated Conveyor Sys., Inc. v. Innovative Conveyor Concepts, 

Inc., 300 S.W.3d 348, 367 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Recovery under 

the unjust enrichment theory is, in essence, the right to recover on an implied 

contract to repay benefits which were unjust to retain. See Bransom v. Standard 

Hardware, Inc., 874 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, writ denied)

(citing Fun Time Centers, Inc. v. Continental Nat. Bank of Ft. Worth, 517 S.W.2d 

877, 884 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1974, writ ref’d)) (holding claim of restitution is 

generally a claim for money paid which is unjust to retain)). Thus, it is axiomatic 

there must be some proof of damages. See City of Harker Heights, Tex. v. Sun 

Meadows Land, Ltd., 830 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ) 

(approving submission of unjust enrichment issue because there was evidence of 

specific amounts of money retained).
18

As to unjust enrichment, Allstate’s complaint is the same as its claim of 

fraud; specifically, it paid more on claims than it should have. Rehab Alliance and 

Shanti sought summary judgment on this claim, arguing there was no evidence 

either received an unjust benefit from Allstate. To support its unjust enrichment 

claim, Allstate relied on the evidence it presented to support its fraud and 

conspiracy claims, and further urged Rehab Alliance and Shanti failed to disclose 

the nature of “fee-splitting” agreements between the two (and other physicians who 

were involved), the amount of various billings, how matters were coded (which 

would change the sums charged), who approved certain procedures, and in what 

facilities and for what cost those procedures were performed. 

However, none of Allstate’s evidence shows that Rehab Alliance and Shanti 

actually received an unjust benefit from Allstate. First, as part of the original 

claims, Allstate admits that it never paid the entire claim as presented to it. 

Second, Allstate adduced no evidence of the value of the services rendered by 

Rehab Alliance and Shanti. Finally, Allstate supplied no evidence of what, if 

anything, each claimant paid to Rehab Alliance and Shanti. In the absence of these 

three components, there is nothing from which to conclude that Rehab Alliance 

and Shanti were unjustly benefited. Given the lack of evidence on this element of 

the unjust enrichment claim, the trial court did not err in granting no-evidence 

summary judgment as to this claim.

Having concluded Allstate failed to present any evidence on the fact of 

injury, or any evidence of what portion of the settlements constituted a benefit 

which was unjust for Rehab Alliance or Shanti to retain, we conclude the trial court 

did not err in granting appellees’ no-evidence motions for summary judgment. 

Therefore, we need not address the remaining issues presented by Allstate’s issue 

or appellees’ cross point. We overrule Allstate’s sole issue and affirm the 
19

judgment of the trial court.

/s/ John Donovan

Justice

Panel consists of Justices McCally, Busby, and Donovan.