UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Tenth Circuit

Byron White United States Courthouse

1823 Stout Street

Denver, Colorado 80294

(303) 844-3157

Patrick J. Fisher, Jr. Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk Chief Deputy Clerk

June 5, 2000

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE OPINION

RE: 98-2265, Weitz v. Lovelace Health System Inc.

Filed on May 31, 2000

The slip opinion, filed on May 31, 2000, contains a typographical error on

page three, in the first sentence of section “I. BACKGROUND.” The date, “January

21, 1991” is corrected to read “January 21, 1992.” Please make the correction to

your copy of the opinion. 

Sincerely,

Patrick Fisher, Clerk of Court

By: Keith Nelson

Deputy Clerk
F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

MAY 31 2000

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

LORRAINE L. WEITZ, Personal

Representative of the Estate of Arlene

Gutierrez, Deceased, and Personal

Representative of the Estate of Loretta

Gutierrez, Deceased,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LOVELACE HEALTH SYSTEM,

INC., doing business as Lovelace

Medical Center; LOVELACE

MENTAL HEALTH PARTNERSHIP;

TIM STROGIN, PH.D.; GENEVIEVE

DAVIDGE, LCSW; J. BARRY

RUMBLES, LCSW,

Defendants-Appellees.

 and

CIGNA CORPORATION; CIGNA

HOLDINGS, INC.; CIGNA HEALTH

CORPORATION; CIGNA

HEALTHCARE INC.;

CONNECTICUT GENERAL

CORPORATION; UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA,

 Defendants.

No. 98-2265

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Mexico

(D.C. No. CIV 94-1286 MV)
1

 These other defendants were voluntarily dismissed at the summary

judgment hearing and are not parties on appeal.

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Richard D. Barish, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Gary L. Gordon, Albuquerque, New Mexico (Robin A. Goble, with him on the

briefs), for Defendants-Appellees.

Before EBEL, HOLLOWAY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Lorraine Weitz (“Weitz”) filed an action on behalf of

her sister, Arlene Gutierrez (“Arlene”), and her niece, Loretta Gutierrez

(“Loretta”) in federal district court against the United States, Lovelace Health and

several of its employees and business affiliates (collectively, “Lovelace”) (a

mental health provider), and various other defendants.1 Weitz filed suit against

the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), the Federal Tort Claims Act,

alleging negligence. Weitz also brought claims of negligence against Lovelace

pursuant to New Mexico state law. The district court had pendent jurisdiction

over the New Mexico state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The district

court dismissed the United States as a party pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
- 3 -

Procedure 12(b) and granted summary judgment for Lovelace on the New Mexico

state law claims.

Weitz appealed the order of the district court. This court dismissed the

United States from this appeal by order entered March 4, 1999. Thus, Lovelace is

the only appellee and the New Mexico state law claims are the only claims

remaining in this case. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 21, 1992, Edward Gutierrez (“Eddie”), husband of Arlene

Gutierrez and father of Loretta, shot Arlene and Loretta and then took his own

life. Eddie was an Air Force Staff Sergeant stationed at Kirtland Air Force Base

in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Lovelace provided mental health care services to

Air Force personnel and their families at Kirtland.

Eddie and Arlene began having marital problems in the early 1990s. They

attended counseling sessions in connection with these problems in December

1991. They were seen jointly on December 4 by J. Barry Rumbles, a

psychotherapist employed by Lovelace who referred them to a therapist for

counseling. Eddie and Arlene were then seen jointly on December 9 by Dr. Cal

Bolinder. Bolinder was apparently employed by Adlerian Therapy Services, not

Lovelace. Bolinder saw Eddie individually on December 12 and Arlene
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individually on December 11 and 20. Bolinder also had telephone conversations

with Arlene on a number of occasions. Arlene expressed concern about Eddie’s

violent tendencies during these conversations. Bolinder told Arlene at the

December 20 session and on the phone on December 30 that she should try to

keep herself and Loretta away from Eddie.

Eddie asked Arlene to come to his home on December 29 to discuss their

marriage and Arlene agreed to go. When Arlene arrived with Loretta, Eddie was

drunk. Arlene and Eddie discussed divorce, and Eddie said that he would disown

Loretta so that he would not have to pay child support. After Arlene told Eddie

she was leaving, Eddie pulled out a handgun. Arlene managed to wrestle the gun

away from Eddie. Eddie at that time threatened suicide. Arlene reported the

incident the following day to Col. Richard Haupt, Eddie’s commanding officer. 

Haupt made an appointment for Eddie to be evaluated by the mental health clinic. 

When Eddie told Haupt that he felt an examination was unnecessary, Haupt

ordered Eddie to go to the clinic.

Although Eddie had an appointment to see Capt. Sally Kroner, a

psychiatrist and Air Force officer, he arrived late for his appointment and could

not be seen by Kroner because she had another appointment. Eddie was instead

seen by Genevieve Davidge, a licensed clinical social worker employed by

Lovelace. Davidge observed that Eddie was anxious and that he was unsure of
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his ability to handle his emotions should he and Arlene divorce. Davidge

concluded that Eddie was not an immediate threat to himself or others but

scheduled an appointment for Eddie to return the following day for further

examination. Haupt ordered Eddie to go to the December 31 appointment. After

meeting with Eddie a second time, Davidge concluded that Eddie was improved. 

Davidge recommended continued outside counseling, but none was arranged and

Eddie never received additional counseling.

During the December 30 meeting between Haupt and Eddie, Haupt asked

Eddie if he would be willing to turn over his weapons to Sgt. Keith Yekel. Eddie

gave his weapons to Yekel on December 31. Two weeks later, Yekel returned the

guns to Eddie after Eddie asked for the guns back so that he could go “plinking,”

i.e., shooting cans. On January 21, Arlene went to Eddie’s home to pick up

Loretta, whom he had been babysitting. Eddie shot and killed Arlene and Loretta

and then took his own life. 

Weitz filed this action against the United States, CIGNA (the parent

company of Lovelace), Lovelace, and other individuals. As indicated above,

CIGNA was voluntarily dismissed as a party at trial and this court dismissed the

United States by an order entered on March 4, 1999, pursuant to a stipulation by

the parties. Weitz’s remaining claims alleged that Lovelace had acted negligently

by: (1) failing to adopt adequate policies for the evaluation of airmen who had
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threatened suicide or murder; (2) failing to warn the United States that it had

inadequate policies in this regard; (3) failing to provide an adequate system for

evaluating troubled airmen who threatened suicide or murder; (4) failing to

properly train their personnel; (5) failing to provide competent personnel to

perform evaluations; (6) failing to adopt adequate policies to supervise personnel;

and (7) failing to adequately supervise personnel. The district court granted

Lovelace’s motion for summary judgment, holding that: (1) Lovelace had no duty

to control Eddie (i.e., prevent Eddie from harming another) because he was

merely an outpatient; and (2) Lovelace had no duty to warn Arlene or Loretta

because Arlene and Loretta were fully aware of Eddie’s violent propensities.

II. Discussion

A. Timeliness

We must first address whether we have jurisdiction to review the district

court’s summary judgment order, or whether our review is confined to the district

court’s denial of Appellant’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. Because we

find that Appellant did not timely file her notice of appeal with respect to the

court’s summary judgment order, we may only consider whether the district court

abused its discretion in denying her motion for reconsideration.
2

 Excluding intervening weekends, any motion to alter or amend under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 59(e) was due by June 10, 1997.

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On May 27, 1997, the district court entered its order granting summary

judgment and dismissing Weitz’s claims with prejudice. On June 10, 1997,2

Weitz filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Motions Pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 59(e) to Reconsider Judgment Entered May 27, 1997 Dismissing

Plaintiff’s Claims. That motion requested an extension of time until June 20,

1997. On June 13, 1997, the court entered an order granting this motion and

extending Weitz’s time until June 20, 1997, to file a Rule 59(e) motion. On June

20, 1997, Weitz filed a Rule 59(e) Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Lovelace

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, to Certify the

Question of Duty to the Supreme Court of New Mexico. On July 31, 1998, the

district court denied Weitz’s motion. Weitz then filed her notice of appeal on

September 28, 1998.

Generally, a party has thirty days from the entry of the district court’s order

or judgment within which to file a notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(1)(A). When the United States or its officer or agency is a party to the case,

the time is extended to sixty days. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). The appeal

period is tolled, however, when a party timely files either a motion to alter or

amend the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (filed no later than ten days after
- 8 -

entry of judgment), or a motion for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (provided that

the Rule 60 motion is filed within ten days of entry of the judgment). See Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv), (vi). In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Appellant did

not file a notice of appeal until more than a year after the district court entered

summary judgment in favor of Appellee. The question before us, therefore, is

whether Appellant’s post-judgment motion, filed on June 20, 1997, successfully

tolled the period for filing a notice of appeal.

We must first examine whether it is proper to view Appellant’s postjudgment motion as a Rule 59 motion. Generally, this court will construe a

motion to alter or amend or to reconsider the judgment that is served more than

ten days after the judgment is entered as a motion for relief under Rule 60(b). 

See Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1992). 

Appellant filed her Rule 59(e) Motion to Reconsider on June 20, 1997, which was

more than ten days after the district court entered its order granting summary

judgment. Under most circumstances, we would therefore treat this as a Rule

60(b) motion filed more than ten days after the judgment was entered, which thus

failed to toll the time period for filing a notice of appeal from the summary

judgment order.

In rare cases, however, these time limits can be extended where the party

makes a showing of “unique circumstances” justifying the delay. See Thompson
- 9 -

v. INS, 375 U.S. 384 (1964) (announcing the “unique circumstances” exception). 

Appellant contends that because she filed a motion for additional time to file a

59(e) motion within ten days of entry of summary judgment and because the

district court granted that motion, this case presents such unique circumstances. 

We disagree.

It is clear that the district court was not empowered to grant Appellant

additional time to file her 59(e) motion. Rule 59(e) specifies that “[a]ny motion

to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the

judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Rule 6(b) grants the district court limited

authority to extend various time limits under the rules. That rule provides,

however, that the court “may not extend the time for taking any action under

Rule[] . . . 59(b), (d) and (e), . . . except to the extent and under the conditions

stated [therein].” Id.; see also Collard v. United States, 10 F.3d 718, 719 (10th

Cir. 1993) (“Rule 6(b) expressly prohibits a trial court from extending the time to

file [a Rule 59(e)] motion.”). Rule 59 provides no exceptions to the ten-day rule. 

Thus, the district court lacked authority to grant Appellant’s motion for additional

time to file her Rule 59(e) motion.

In Stauber v. Kieser, 810 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1982), this court held that a

district court’s unauthorized grant of additional time to file a Rule 59(e) motion

would constitute unique circumstances. There, the motion was filed more than
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ten days after the judgment, but within the thirty-day time period for an appeal,

and we said that the appellant had relied to his prejudice on the order granting the

extension of time to file a Rule 59(e) motion by not otherwise filing an appeal

within the required thirty days. However, several years later the Supreme Court

in Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169 (1989), adopted a narrow

interpretation of the unique circumstances test. The Osterneck Court declared

that “Thompson [(the Court’s decision announcing the unique circumstances test)]

applies only where a party has performed an act which, if properly done, would

postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and has received specific assurance by

a judicial officer that this act has been properly done.” Id. at 179. Osterneck thus

casts significant doubt on the continuing validity of our decision in Stauber. 

 One of our post-Osterneck decisions suggests that Stauber is no longer

good law. In Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. Evans, 896 F.2d 1255

(10th Cir. 1990), we held that a district court’s decision to grant a thirty-day

extension for filing a notice of appeal (under circumstances where the rules

authorize only a ten-day extension) did not rise to the level of unique

circumstances. See id. at 1257-58. In that case, a party requested an extension of

time in which to file a notice of appeal after the initial thirty-day period for doing

so had expired. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) authorized a ten-day

extension upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, but the court
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granted an additional thirty days in which to file. See id. at 1256-57. We

dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the district court’s

erroneous ruling did not present unique circumstances. See id. at 1258. We held

there, inter alia, that “an appellant has a duty to familiarize himself with the

appellate rules,” and therefore the party’s “reliance on the extension was [not]

reasonable.” Id. By asking the court for an extension that the rules expressly

prohibit, the party invited the ensuing error. Id. Thus, Certain Underwriters

holds that a case does not present unique circumstances where a plain reading of

the rules would have allowed the party to avoid the error. 

In the present case, Appellant’s counsel could have avoided this mistake by

reading Rules 59(e) and 6(b) prior to filing the motion for an extension of time. 

In light of the clear prohibition of the extension, we cannot say that Appellant’s

reliance on the court’s order was reasonable. In this regard, the present case is

similar to Certain Underwriters, where we held that even a manifestly erroneous

ruling by the district court did not constitute a specific assurance by the court that

the request was properly made. See also Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1243 n.3 (noting

that a district court’s consideration on the merits of an untimely Rule 59(e)

motion does not present unique circumstances in the absence of affirmative

assurances by the court that the motion was timely); Wollan v. United States

Dep’t of the Interior, No. 98-1219, 1999 WL 398744 at *2 (10th Cir. June 16,
- 12 -

1999) (unpublished disposition) (holding that granting a motion for extension of

time is not the “specific assurance” required by Osterneck, and stating that “under

Rule 6(b), the district court had no authority to extend the time for filing a Rule

59(e) motion, and plaintiff’s reliance on the extension of time [to toll the period

for filing a notice of appeal] was unreasonable”); cf. Fox v. Noram Energy Corp.,

No. 98-6141, 1999 WL 961226 at *3 (10th Cir. Oct. 21, 1999) (unpublished

disposition) (holding that a district court’s acceptance of an untimely resubmitted

Rule 59(e) motion after appellant had remedied a defect in its timely motion did

not constitute unique circumstances). 

Moreover, Osterneck limited the application of the unique circumstances

rule to instances “where a party has performed an act which, if properly done,

would postpone the deadline for filing his appeal.” 489 U.S. at 179. In the case

at bar, the rules expressly forbid granting an extension for a Rule 59(e) motion, so

by definition the motion to extend could never be “properly done.” Unlike a

situation where some extension of time was permissible, here the rules

specifically and directly prohibit courts from granting any extensions for Rule

59(e) motions. Thus, the present case does not fit within the confines of

Osterneck because no such extension would ever be proper under the rules. 

In the present case, the rules expressly forbid any extensions for Rule 59(e)

motions, and even a passing reference to the rules will reveal this fact. 
- 13 -

Consequently, the mere fact that a court has granted such an extension does not

justify reliance that is clearly at odds with the text of the rules. 

It makes great practical sense to require the parties to comply with clearly

mandated requirements in the Federal Rules. Otherwise, we would be encouraging

litigants to invite courts to commit easily avoidable errors. District courts today

suffer under a burdensome caseload, and a certain degree of cooperation and

assistance from litigants is essential to the judicial system’s effective operation. 

Just as we require attorneys to certify that all arguments presented to the court

have legal and factual bases, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), we likewise impose upon

attorneys the duty to make sure that their requests are not expressly forbidden

under the rules.

“In the case of an intervening Supreme Court ruling, a single panel is

permitted to reconsider a previous Tenth Circuit decision to the extent the new

case law invalidates our previous analysis.” Hurd v. Pittsburg State Univ., 109

F.3d 1540, 1542 (10th Cir. 1997). Osterneck and subsequent decisions by this

court make clear that an extension of time granted by the court but clearly

prohibited entirely by the Federal Rules does not constitute unique circumstances

salvaging an untimely notice of appeal. Thus, we expressly overrule Stauber to

the extent it is inconsistent with Osterneck and Certain Underwriters. See

Lichtenberg v. Besicorp Group Inc., 204 F.3d 397, 404 (2d Cir. 2000) (“And
- 14 -

though a timely motion under Civil Rule 59(e) would have postponed the appeal

deadline, any request by [the party] for an extension of the time to move under

that Rule would have been a request that, given the prohibition in Civil Rule 6(b),

could not properly be made.”); Pinion v. Dow Chemical, 928 F.2d 1522, 1532

(11th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a notice of appeal as untimely even though the district

court had granted an extension of time to file a 59(e) motion just two days after

entry of judgment and noting that “the crucial jurisdictional question becomes:

Was it reasonable for [appellant] to rely upon the district court’s improper

extension of the time for filing post-trial motions, in spite of the explicit language

of Rule 6(b) prohibiting the district court from granting such an extension? . . .

[W]e must answer ‘No’”). The failure of Appellant’s counsel to determine

whether it was within the authority of the district court to grant additional time

negates Appellant’s claim that this case presents unique circumstances.

Consequently, Appellant is not entitled to the tolling provision of Rule

59(e), and thus her ultimate notice of appeal with regard to the district court’s

summary judgment order was untimely. We therefore lack jurisdiction over that

claim. As a result, our review is limited to whether the district court properly

denied Appellant’s motion to reconsider, which we construe as a Rule 60(b)

motion because it was filed more than ten days after judgment was entered.

B. Standard of Review
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“We review . . . the disposition of Rule 60(b) motions for an abuse of

discretion. . . . Under this standard, we will not reverse unless the trial court has

made ‘an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment.’”

Woodworker’s Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 170 F.3d 985, 992

(10th Cir. 1999) (quoting FDIC v. Oldenburg, 34 F.3d 1529, 1555 (10th Cir.

1994)) (citations omitted).

C. Merits

Under New Mexico law, Lovelace cannot be held liable for the deaths of

Arlene and Loretta unless Appellant can show that Lovelace owed a duty of care

to Arlene and Loretta Gutierrez. See Calkins v. Cox Estates, 792 P.2d 36, 39

(N.M. 1990). In Wilschinsky v. Medina, 775 P.2d 713 (N.M. 1989), the New

Mexico Supreme Court stated that a health care provider may owe a duty of care

to third parties under three circumstances. First, a doctor may be held liable when

he exerts control over a patient (duty to control). See id. at 715. Second, the

Wilschinsky court noted, under the line of cases stemming from Tarasoff v.

Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), a doctor may be

held liable if he fails to warn or disclose his patient’s threats against a specific,

identifiable third party to the authorities or the individual (duty to warn). See

Wilschinsky, 775 P.2d at 715-16. Finally, the court held that a doctor owes a duty

of care to third parties if he has given an outpatient an injection of drugs that
3

 Following Wilschinsky, we treat separately situations where a patient

(continued...)

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could clearly impair the patient’s ability to reason and operate a motor vehicle. 

Id. at 716. It is clear that this third situation has no relevance to the case at bar.

1. Duty to Control

Weitz argues the district court erred when it concluded that Lovelace had

no duty to protect Arlene and Loretta from Eddie’s violent propensities. The New

Mexico Supreme Court has explained:

In the control cases, courts have relied upon Section 315 of the

Restatement (Second) of Torts to find a special relationship between

doctor and patient, which creates a special duty to control that

patient's actions. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965). This

doctrine, holding institutions and doctors potentially liable for

patients with known “dangerous propensities” has been recognized in

New Mexico. See Kelly v. Board of Trustees, 87 N.M. 112, 529 P.2d

1233 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 111, 529 P.2d 1232 (1974);

see also Stake v. Woman's Div. of Christian Serv., 73 N.M. 303, 387

P.2d 871 (1963). 

Wilschinsky, 775 P.2d at 715.

At present, New Mexico law states that the duty to control “must stem from

the doctor’s control over his offices . . ., not from a duty to control a patient with

known dangerous propensities.” Wilschinsky, 775 P.2d at 715. New Mexico

apparently has not established whether a health care provider can owe a duty to

third parties arising from control where the individual is being treated on an

outpatient basis.3 The strong weight of authority suggests that New Mexico
3

(...continued)

receives an injection of powerful medications on an outpatient basis.

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would not find such a duty exists under these circumstances. As the court below

aptly noted, at least five states considering the matter have declined to find a duty

under similar circumstances. See Boulanger v. Pol, 900 P.2d 823, 834 (Kan.

1995); Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So. 2d 785, 787 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989);

Wagshall v. Wagshall, 538 N.Y.S.2d 597, 598 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); King v.

Smith, 539 So.2d 262, 264 (Ala. 1989); Hinkelman v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 403

N.W.2d 547, 551 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). But see Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield

Family Counseling Ctr., 673 N.E.2d 1311 (Ohio 1997). In most instances, the

relationship a psychiatric outpatient has with the health care provider is less

involved than that of an inpatient. In the latter circumstance, the medical

professional is typically both responsible for and able to administer almost all

aspects of the patient’s well-being. By contrast, the outpatient relationship

usually requires that the treated individual care for most of his or her daily needs,

and affords the health care provider only limited opportunity to supervise the

patient. As a result, imposing a duty to control in the outpatient context would

require providers to exercise a degree of care and oversight that would be

practically unworkable.
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The facts of the present case indicate that New Mexico most likely would

not impose such a duty on Lovelace. Lovelace treated Eddie on an outpatient

basis, and it did so on only three occasions. In addition, some three weeks had

elapsed between Eddie’s last encounter with Lovelace and the murders of his wife

and daughter. Relative to a situation where a patient is in the custodial or longterm care of a health care provider, Eddie’s contact with Lovelace was minimal in

both duration and degree. Thus, it would be unreasonable to conclude that

Lovelace had the sort of substantial relationship with Eddie giving rise to a duty,

much less the practical ability, to control him.

2. Duty to Warn

Appellants further suggest that Lovelace owed a duty to warn Arlene and

Loretta of Eddie’s violent propensities. New Mexico has noted that many courts

recognize “a duty to warn when a specific, identifiable third party [victim] was

known to the doctor,” Wilschinsky, 775 P.2d at 716, although it does not appear

that the state has resolved this question for itself. It is unnecessary to decide the

applicability of Tarasoff in New Mexico, however, because it is probable that

New Mexico would not impose such a duty in any event where the victim was

already subjectively aware of the patient’s violent tendencies and specific threats.

Other jurisdictions considering the matter have held that a victim’s

awareness of the potential harm negates the health care provider’s duty to warn. 
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See, e.g., Boulanger, 900 P.2d at 835 (“The duty to warn does not arise when the

victim already knows of the danger.”); Leonard v. Latrobe Area Hosp., 625 A.2d

1228, 1231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (“It is a curious lapse in logic on plaintiffs’ part

to claim that [the doctor] should have warned them of information they already

had, and with which they were familiar.”). In the products liability context, New

Mexico has evidenced its agreement with the common-sense proposition that a

duty to warn does not arise where the danger is known. See Perfetti v. McGhan

Med., 662 P.2d 646, 651 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (“In this case there would be no

duty to warn the [victim] if he actually knew of the danger.”). The case law thus

supports the proposition that a potential victim’s awareness of the specific threats

and violent tendencies of an outpatient obviates the health care provider’s duty to

warn that potential victim.

In the present case it is clear that Arlene was aware of both Eddie’s threats

against her and his propensity for violence. Records from a counseling session

Arlene attended December 20 indicate that she was aware of Eddie’s violent

tendencies and the possibility that he might harm her and her daughter. At that

session, Arlene agreed with the therapist to avoid situations where Eddie might

“be in a position to do harm to either one of them.” Following the December 29th

incident in which Eddie pointed a gun at Arlene, Arlene told her sister that she
4

 Lovelace alleged that Arlene’s awareness of Eddie’s threats relieved

Lovelace of any duty to warn Arlene or Loretta. Appellant has not argued to this

court that Arlene’s awareness is insufficient to impute the same state of mind to

her daughter. Thus, although it is unclear how New Mexico would resolve this

issue, see Rider v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 923 P.2d 604 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996),

Appellant has waived any argument that Arlene’s knowledge does not impute to

Loretta, see FDIC v. Noel, 177 F.3d 911, 917 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999). Even were

Arlene’s knowledge somehow ineffective in giving notice to Loretta, we do not

believe that New Mexico would find a duty to warn existed under these facts.

- 20 -

was afraid he would kill her. The therapist’s records confirm Arlene’s awareness

of the threat:

A major turning point happened when Eddie threatened Arlene and

her daughter with a gun. . . . Once she got out of the house she knew

that it was not safe to be around Eddie, ever again. She knew she

could not trust him. . . . The threat of death directed towards Arlene

and her daughter convinced me that things had definitely gotten out

of hand. . . . After some discussion I told Arlene the following: She

must keep both herself and her daughter away from Eddie no matter

how skillful he is at attempting to get them alone with him.

Thus, there can be no doubt that Arlene was fully aware of Eddie’s potential for

violence against her and her daughter.4 As a result, we believe New Mexico

would conclude on these facts that Lovelace did not have a duty to warn Arlene

and her daughter.

Under the deferential standard of review to be applied to rulings on a Rule

60(b) motion, we cannot find that the district court committed error.
- 21 -

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Appellant’s post-judgment

motion should be treated as one under Rule 60(b), and that the district court did

not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Under these facts, Lovelace had

neither a duty to control Eddie nor a duty to warn Arlene or Loretta, and therefore

Lovelace cannot be held responsible for Eddie’s conduct. Accordingly, the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.