### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d onBr ie fs N ove m be r 29, 200 6
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. MA URICE L EON AR D and KEN NET H SHON DA LE M AS ON
Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Bedf ord County No. 15860, 15861 Lee R ussell, Ju dge

No. M2006- 00136-CCA -R3-C D - F iled March 27, 2007

In this consolidated appea l, the Appellants, Maurice L eonar d and Ke nneth Shondale Mason, a ppeal their convic tions by

a B edfor d County

jury . Followinga joint trial, L eo n ar d and Mason were
c onvic te d o f a g g ra

vate d bur g lary , att e mpt e d rob be ry , ass a ult , an d fa lse imp ri so nme nt. As a re su lt of these c onvictions, L eonar d rec eived a n eff ective sentence of four

y ear s, as a Rang e I

offe nder, a

nd Mason re ceive d an ef

fec tive sentenc e of sixteen y ear s as a Rang e I I offe nder. On appe al, L eonar d and Mason e ach r aise two issues for our re view: (1) whether

the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support the convictions; and (2) whether the sentenc es imposed by the trial cour

t are excessiv e. F ollowing revie w, we a ffirm the judg ments of conviction and r esulting se ntence s.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nts of the Circ uit Court Aff

irm ed

D AVI D G. H AYES , J

. , delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which A L AN E. G L EN N and D. KELLY T HOMAS , J R ., J J ., joined.

Michae l Coll ins, Assistant P ubl i c Defende r, Shelby ville, Tennesse e, for

the Appellant, Ma

urice L eonar d; and Richard D ug g er, Shelby ville, Tennesse e, for the Appellant, Kenneth Shondale Ma son.
Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Pr e sto n Sh ipp , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; W. Mi chae l M cC o wn, Dis trict Attorney Gene ral; and Micha el D. Randles, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound At approximately

10:00 p.m. on the evening of J une 5, 2005, the vi ctim, Richard Ha rris, and his girlf riend, Cher

yl Mc Kinzie, ha d retire d to the ir bedroom in the ir home at 509 Knob Cree k Road in Be dford Count y

. The victim was awake ned by McKinzie, who informed him that someone w as knockingon the door a

nd ring ing the doorbell. Not initially rec og nizi ng the late- night visitor, the victim opened the door

and sawthe Appellant Ma son standing in the door way . At the same time,-2-

the victim saw the Appe llant L eonar d runningtowards the f ront door with a pist ol in his hand. The vict i m at t em pted to shut the door, but L eonar d manag ed to g et his arm and ha nd, which held the pistol, t hroug h the doorwa y . As the two strug g led, the gun d i s ch ar ged cl o se to the victim’s fac e, with the bullet lodg ing in a near by bedroom door. During the ensuingstrug g le, the victim slipped
on the ru ghe wa s stand ing on , a nd L e on ard wa s a ble to f or c e his wa

y int o th e re sid e nc e . T he vic tim , howeve r, wa s succe ssful in closing the door befor e Mason c ould enter.

Once in s id e , L e o n ar d , s ti ll in p o s s e s s io n o f th e h an d g un , b e g an w av in g th e g un in the direc tion of the victim’s fac e and beg an scre aming at the victim, “ Where’s my fuckingmoney ,” “I ’m g oing to kill y ou,” “I ’m g oing to beat y ou,” and “I want my mother fucking money .” S oon there afte r, L e on ard op e ne d th e do or , all ow ing Ma so n into the re sid e nc e . The tw o th e n o rd e re d th e vic timto g ive them $250, which the victim stated he did not have. Upon lea rningthat the victim did not have the money , L eon ar d i n fo rm ed the victim that they would take him to his bank and g et the money from an A TM. The plan devised by L eonar d called f

or L eonar d to acc ompany

the victim to the bank and for Mason t o rema in with McKinzie. Duringthis period, Mason was se arc hing thr oug h various draw ers in the home. When the victim wa s dressing to g o to the bank with L eonar d, Mason hit the victim in the head with his fist, stating “don’ t y ou disrespec t me.” The victim r elated that he fe are d for his life dur ing the se eve nts.
Whe n M s. Mc Ki nzie he ard the g un dis c ha

rg e a t the do or , s he imm e diate ly g ra bb e d h e r c e ll ph on e , l ock ed h e rs e lf

ins ide the bathr oo m, a

nd c a lle d 9 11 fr om h e r c e ll p ho ne . Wh ile sh e wa s in the bathroom, L eonar d attempted to kick in the door, a nd Mason attempted to talk her into coming out. Soon af

ter she called 911, la

w enf orce ment office rs ar

rived. Upon he aringthem arr ive, L eonar d told the victim to go outside and tell the off icer s that “it was a mistake .” Howe ver, the victim, upon
re a c hin gsa fe ty

outsi de , in fo rm e d th e of

fi c e rs wh a t was oc c ur

ri ngins ide the ho me . T he de putie s, by means of a

l o u d s p eaker, instructe d the Appellants to step outside. B oth Mason and L eonar d
c omp lie d a

nd we re pla c e d und e r a

rr e st. No we a

po n was f

ound in e ith e r o f t

he Ap pe lla

nts ’ possession. Howeve r, upon sear ching the pre mises, the deputies found the pistol used by L eonar d hidden in a shoppingbagin the front bedr oom of the house.

The victim was a cquainted w ith both of the Appellants. He admitted that he owe d L eonar d money for cocaine , which he ha d purcha sed fr om L eonar d three wee ks ear lier. Howe ver, he stated that only $100 was owe d for the coca ine. Reg ardle ss, both the vi ctim and McKinz ie wer e ada mant that neither of

the Appellants wer e invited into the residenc e that eveningto collect any money owed.

On J u l y 1 8 , 2 0 0 5 , th e A p p el l an t s we re i n d i ct edi ns ep ar at e f o ur- co un ti n d i ct m en t s ch ar gi n g: (1) a g g ravated burg lary

of a ha bi t at i o n ; (2 ) criminal attempt to commit ag g ravated robbe ry ; (3) ag g ravated assault by

use of a deadly wea pon; and (4 ) fa l s e imprisonment. A joint trial was conducte d on October

11 and 12, 2005, afte r which the Appellants we re c onvicted of: (1) ag g ravated burg lary ; (2) attempted robber y , as a le sser off

ense of attempted ag g ravated robbe ry ; (3) assa ult, as a lesser offe nse of a g g ravated assault; and ( 4) fa lse imprisonm en t

. A sentenc ing he aringwas subsequen t l y

h el d o nDe ce mb er

1 , 2 0 0 5

. Fo l l o wi n g th e p re s en t at i o no f e v i d en ce , th e c o urt s en tence d L eonar d, as a Rang e I

offe nder, to four y ear s for ag g ravated burglar y , two y ear s and six months for-3-

atte mp ted ro bb e ry , a

nd e le ve n mo nth s and

tw e nty da y s f or e a c h o f t

he a ssa ult and fa lse imprisonment c onvictions. The court further order ed that the sentenc es wer e t o b e s erve d
c o n c ur r e n t l y f o r a n e f f e c t i v e s e n t e n c e o f

f o ur y e ar s

. T h e c o urts e n t e n c e d M a s o n , a s a

R an g e II offe nder, to nine year s for a g g ravated burg lary and seve n y ear s for attempted robber y

. Mason was
se nte nc e d to e le ve n months and tw e nty -n ine da y s fo r e a c h o f t

he mis de me ano r c onvic tio ns of a ssa ult and fa lse imprisonment. T h e court fur ther orde red that the ag g ravated burg lary and attempted robber y sentenc es be se rved c onsecutively for a n eff ective sixteen-y ear

sentenc e. F o l l o wi ngthe denial of the ir respe ctive motions for newtrials, timely appea ls were filed.

Ana lys is

In this consolidated appea l, the Appellants raise two issues for our r eview: ( 1) whe ther the evidenc e pre sented is suffic ient to support their convictions; and (2) whether the sentenc es imposed
are excessive.

I. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence
A s n o t e d , th e Ap p e l l an t s w e r e e a c hc o n v i c t e d o f a g g r av a t e d

b ur g l ar y, a C l a s s C f

e l o n y, attempted robbe ry , a Class D fe lony , as s au lt, a Class A misdemeanor, a nd false imprisonment, a Cla ss A misd e me ano r. In the ir re sp e c tiv e br ie fs , ea c h ar g ue s that the e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt a s a matter of law to suppor

t the convictions. In consideringthis iss ue, we apply the rule that where the sufficie ncy

of the evidence is challeng ed, the releva nt question for the re viewingcourt is “whe ther, afte r viewingthe evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the [S tate], any ra tio na l trie r o f f

a c t c ou ld have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a re asonable doubt.” J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U. S. 30 7, 31 9, 99 S. Ct . 2 78 1, 27 89 (1 97 9) ; se e als o Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( e ). Mo re ov e r, the State is entitled to the s trong est leg itimate view of the evidence and all rea sonable inferenc es which may be dra wn there from. Sta tev . H

arris , 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). All questions involvi ng the
cre dibilit y

of witnesses, t h e we i gh t an dvalue to be g iven the evide nce, a nd all fac tual issues are resolved by

the trier of

fac t. State v. Pappas , 75 4 S.W. 2d 62 0, 62 3 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 87 ). Th is court will not rewe igh or

ree valuate the evidenc e pre sented. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978)

. “A guilty verdic t by

the jury , approve d by

the trial judg e, ac cre dits the testimony of the witnesses for

the State and r esolves all conflicts in favor of the the ory of the State.” State v. Grac e , 49 3 S.W.2 d 474 , 476 (T e nn . 197 3)

. A jur y c onvic tio n re mov e s the pr e sumpt ion of inn oc e nc e wi th which a de fenda

nt is ini tially

cloake d and repla ces it with one of guilt, so t hat on appe al, a c onvicted defe ndant has the bur den of de monstrating that the evide n ce is insufficient. Sta tev . Tu gg le , 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982) . These r ules are applicable to finding s of guilt predicate d upon direc t evidenc e, cir cumstantial evidenc e, or a combination of both. Sta te v . M att he ws , 805 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Ten n . Crim. App. 1990). The we ight to be g iven to both direct a nd circ umstantial evidence and “the infere nces to be drawn from such evidenc e, and the ex tent to which the circumstance s are consistent with guilt and inconsistent w ith innocence , are questions primarily for the jur

y .” Ma ra ble
v . S tate , 313 S.W .2d 451, 457 (Tenn. 1958) (citations omitted).T he r ecor d re f l ect s t hat t he j ur y was proper l y i ns t r uct ed wi t h r ega r d t o t he l aw of cr i mi nal r es po ns i bi l i t y bas ed 1
up o n t he co nd uct of ano t her.
-4- Initially , we a

re c onstrained to note that a lthou gh Ap pellant L eonar d frames his issue as challeng ing a ll fo u r o f h is convictions, his argument encompa sses only the suffic iency

of the evidenc e with re g ard to his conviction for ag g ravated burg lary . Acc ording ly , we c onclude that L eonar d’s challeng e to his conviction for attempted robber y and the two misdemea

nor convic tions is waived for

failure to present pr oper a rgument and citation to authorities. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24 & 27.

Moreove r, the Appe llant Mason appea rs to asser

t a g ener al cha lleng e to the convict i ng e vid e nc e , a

rguin g that th e State fa ile d to pr ov e the me nta l e le me nt o f e a c h c ri me wi th re g ard to a ll four of his convictions. He conte nds that the evidenc e of L eonar d’s “state o f m ind,” which wa s a dd uc e d at tr ia l, c ann ot b e imp ute d to him be c a us e “ the re wa s no evi de nc e re g ard ing c on sp ir a c y to allow the same intent to attach to Mr. Mason.” This argument ignor es t h e princ iple that criminal responsibility

may be im posed based upon “the person’s own conduct, by the conduc t of another

for which the pe rson is criminally responsible, or both.” T.C.A. § 39-11-401(a) (2 006). Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 39-11-402( 2) (2006) provides that an a ppellant is criminally

responsible for the conduc t of another

when, “ [a] ctingwith intent to promote or assist the commission of the of fe ns e , o r to be ne fi t in the pr oc e e ds or re su lts of the of fe ns e , [the a

pp e lla nt] soli c its , d ir e c ts, a ids , or attempts to aid another person to commit the offe nse[.] ” When an ap p el l an t i s awa re of the 1 intentions of his co-def

endants a nd proce eds to aid or attempt to aid in the endea vor, the a ppellant is responsible for a ll natural and pr obable co n s eq u en ces of his co-def endant’ s actions duringthe commission of the crime. State v. Richm ond , 9 0 S. W.3 d 6 48 , 6 54 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . T hu s, it i s immaterial which of

the two Appellants in this case actua lly committed the s pecif ic ac ts as both were actively eng ag ed in committing the c rimes and wer e, therefor e, each responsible for the actions of the oth e rs . M a so n’ s argume nt i s, the re fo re , mi sp la c e d a s the e vid e nc e e sta bli sh e s that he wa s c le arl y awa re of L e on ard ’s int e nt to e nte r the ho me to c oll e c t the mon e y and pr oc e e de d to a id L e on ard in the c omm iss ion

of the of fe ns e s.
a. Atte m pted Robbery Robbery is defined a s the “intentional or knowingtheft of pr operty from the pe rson of
ano the r b y

vio le nc e or

putti ngthe pe rs on in fe ar. ” T. C.A

. § 3 9- 13 -4 01 (a ) ( 20 06 ). Th e ft of pr op e rt y occur s when a

person, a cting with the intent to de prive the owner of proper ty , knowing ly

obtains or
exer c is e s c o n tr o l o v e r

th e p r o p e rty

w it h o u t t h e o w n e r ’ s e f

f e c ti v e c o n s e n t. T

. C. A

. § 3 9

- 14-103 (2006). Criminal attempt, as applicable to the fac ts in this c ase, is c ommitt ed when a person, “ acting with the culpability

otherwise r equire d for the of fense : . . . (2) [a]cts with i ntent to cause a re sult that is a n element of the offe nse, and believes the conduct will ca use the re sult without further conduct on the per son’s part.” T.C.A. § 39-12-101( a)( 2) (2006)

. Mason asser

ts that the State failed to esta blish a material e lement of robbe ry , i.e. , theft of proper ty , beca use the evidenc e esta

blished that the ac tions taken by him and his co-def

endant we reAl t h ou g h n ei t h er Appel l an t a s s er t ed at t r i al t h e af f i r mat i v e def

en s e of “ cl ai m of

r i g h t , ” a s pr ov i ded by 2
T enn es s ee C od e Annot at ed s ect i on 39- 13

- 10 7 (2006 ) , as not ed abo ve , o n ap p ea l , M as on ar gu es t hat “ Leonar d was ent i t l ed t o recei ve p ayment f o r go o d s he had previ o usl y s up p l i ed t o [t he vi ct i m ]” and M ason had acco m p ani ed Leo nard

on l y f or t h i s pu r pos e. I n 1989, ou r cr i mi n al code wa s ame n ded t o i n cl u de T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on 39- 14- 107, whi ch provi des t hat “ [ i ] t i s an af f i r mat i ve def

ens e t o pros ecu t i on .

. . [ f or t hef t i f ]

. . . t he pers on: ( 1) [ a] ct ed un der an h o n e st c la im o f righ t to the p ro p e rty o r se rv ic e inv o lve d [.]” T .C .A . § 3 9 -1 4 -1 0 7 (1 ) (2 0 0 3 ). H o w e v e r, in a p p lying this

s t at ut e, i t i s i mp ort ant t o di s t i ng ui s h bet ween t hos e s i t uat i ons wh er e a per s on us es s el f

- hel p t o re cover a s peci f i c c hat t el to w h ic h he ha s the rig h t t o im m e d ia te p o sse ssio n a n d situa tio n s w h e re a p e rs o n a ttem p ts to c o llec t a d e b t o u t o f an o the r’s

m o ney wi t h no pret ense o f o wnershi p ri ght s i n t he specif i c b i l l s and co i ns. In t he f o rme r s i t uat i o n, num erous jur i sdi ct i o ns have hel d that t he i nt ent t o s t eal i s ab sent when a p ers o n ret akes wrongf ul l y hel d s p eci f

i c p ers o nal pro p ert y t o whi ch he h a s the r igh t t o im m e d ia te p o sse ssio n

. S ta te v . M a rtin , 5 1 6 P .2 d 7 5 3 , 7 5 5 (O r. C t. A p p . 1 9 7 3 ); se e a lso M o y e rs v . S ta te , 1 9 7 S .E . 8 4 6 (G a . 1 9 3 8 ); St at e v

. P i er ce , 4 9 0 P .2 d 5 8 4 (K S . 1 9 7 1 ); E d w a rd s v . S ta te , 49 W i s. 2 d 10 5 , 11 3

- 1 4 (W I. 1 9 7 0 ). W e reco gni ze t hat a pa nel of t hi s co urt , i n E lli o tt v . S ta te , 45 4 S. W

. 2d 18 7 ( T enn

. C r i m. Ap p. 197 0), he l d t hat t he ri gh t o f

p o ssessi o n o f

, o r t i t l e to t he p ro p erty t ak en , i s no t t he i ssue i n a ro b b ery o f f en se, rather the g i st o f

t he o f f en se i s t he f el o ni o us and f

o rci b l e t aki ng f

rom t he p ers o n of ano t her goo d s o f v a lue b y p u tti n g hi m i n f ear. H o wever, t he ho l d i ng i n E lli o ttpr e c e d e d t he st at ut o ry i ncl usi o n of t he af f i rma t i ve d ef

ense of “ cl ai m of ri ght ” no w co nt ai ned i n our current c ri m i nal c o d e. N o net hel ess , it is c l ear in t he p res ent c ase t hat a c l ai m o f ri ght d ef ense i s no t ap p l i cab l e when t he d e fen d a n t i s o n ly atte m p ting to c o llec t m o n e y o w e d to him

. See C a nnon , 6 6 1 S .W .2 d a t 8 9 9 ; A n th o n y M u rff , N o. W 2 0 0 1 -0 1 4 5 9 -C C A -R 3 -C D

.

-5- mere ly an attempt to re cover

money due L eonar d by

the victim. He conte nds that there “was no evidenc e pre sented that Mr[.] Mason ever attempted to exercise c ontrol over a ny proper ty belong ing to [the victim] nor that he even intended to g ain control of any proper ty .” Mason’ s argument ignor es established law that one may not collect a debt i n this state, reg ardle ss of its legitimacy , by forc e or vio le nc e . It is the “ mann e r i n w hic h p ro pe rt y is t ake n, rathe r t

ha n to wh om i t la

wf ull y be lon g s, [which] is the issue in robbery offe nses.” Sta tev . A nth on y Mu rff , No. W20 01 -0 14 59 -C CA -R 3- CD (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. atJ ac k s o n , J un e 1 1 , 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Sta te v. Cannon , 661 S.W .2d 893, 899 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983)). 2
At trial, the evide nce e stablished that the Appellants e ntere d the victim’s home by forc e and thr e ate ne d to kil l th e vic timun le ss h e g ave the Ap pe lla nts $2 50 . Cl e arl y , th ese fact s p e rm it a rational juror

to find that both Appellants had the intent to take the money from the victim without his c on se nt, by

vio le nc e or

by putti ngthe vic timin f

e ar. Th e y we re on ly

pr e ve nte d f

ro m do ingso by the fa ct that the victim did not have any m o n ey i n t h e h ome and that the tr ip to the bank was int e rr up te d b y the arr iva l of

law e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs . T he e vid e nce pres ent ed is su ff ic ie nt t o support Mason’s convic tion for cr iminal attempt to commit robber y

. b. Aggravate d Bu rglary A p e rs on c omm its a g g ra

vate d b ur g lary

wh o, wi tho ut t

he e ffecti ve c on se nt o f t

he pr op e rt

y owner , enter s a habitation and c ommits or attempts to commit a felony , theft, or assault. T.C.A. § 39-14-402( a), - 403(a) (2006). Appe llant L eonar d contends that the State f ailed to ca

rry its burden to suppor t th is c o n v ic ti o n b e c a

u s e th e e v id e n c e e s ta

b li s h e d th a t h e h a d p e r

mi s s io n to b e in the victi m ’s h o m e. Appellant Mason a lso contends that the evide nce show s “that Mr. Mason e ither thought he had per

mission t o enter

the prope rty , or that he e ntere d with the intent to rece ive pay ment-6-

fr om p re vio us g oo ds pr ov ide d to [the vic tim ].” He fu rt he r as se rt s that the pr oo f doe s n ot e sta bli sh that he ente red “ with the intent to commit a felony , a thef t or an a ssault.”

Th e Ap pe lla

nts ’ con tention

that th e y

ha d p e rm iss ion

to e nte r t

he re sid e nc e is d ir e c tly contra dicted by

the testimony

of both the victim a

nd Ms. Mc Kinzie. The evidenc e prese nted at trial established that Mason knoc ked on the vi ctim’s door at approximately 10:00 p.m. on J une 5. Upon openingthe door, the victim sa w L eonar d advanc ing towards the door arme d with a handgun. The vic timimm e diate ly

atte mpt e d to c los e the do or to p re ve nt e ntr y to t he tw o intr

ud e rs . N on e the le ss, L e on ard wa s a ble to f or c e his wa

y int o th e ho me wh e re he th en dema nd e d c a shfr om t

he vic tim wh ile br and ish ingthe g un and thr e ate nin g to k ill him . It w a s L e on ard wh o let Ma so n into the ho me afte r the Appe llant had closed the door pre venting his entry

. Clearly , at this point, Mason was a war e o f t h e p resence of

the gun and the nature a

nd char acte r of the a ctions which he a nd L eonar d wer e undertaking. The proof overwhelmingly establishes t hat t he Appellants enter ed the victim’s home, wi tho ut h is e ff

e c tiv e c on se nt, and atte mpt e d to r ob the vic timof $2 50 . T his iss ue is w ith out me ri t.

c . A ssa ult

“ A pe rs on c omm its a ssa

ult wh o: ( 1) [i]nte nti on a lly , k no wi ng ly or re c kle ssl y

c a us e s b od ily injury to another ; [or] (2) [ i] ntentionally or knowingly cause s another to rea sonably fea r imminent bodily injury [.] ” T.C.A. § 39-13- 101(a) (1), ( 2) (2006). Wit h reg ard to the assault conviction, Mason contends that the “ fac ts do not support a finding that Mr. Mason assaulted [ the vi ctim] while i n the residenc e as the testimony place d him at the bathroom door spe akingwith Ms. McKinzi e.” A fter revie w, we c onclude that the e vidence is sufficient to support the convic tion.

The victim testified at trial that while he was attempting to put on his shoe s to acc ompany L eonar d to the bank, Mason struc k him in the head with his fist. The jury hear d this testim ony and obviously acc redited the victim’s statement. See Pappas , 754 S.W .2d at 623. This issue is without
me ri t.

d. F als e im pr iso nm e nt “A pe rson commits the offe nse of f alse imprisonment who knowing ly remove s or conf

ines another unlawfully

so as to inter fer e substantially with the other’s liberty .” T.C.A. § 39-13-302( a) (2 00 6)

. Ma so n ague s th at th e fa c ts d o n ot s up po rt a fi nd ing“ that Mr . M a so n e ve r k no wi ng ly he ld any party ag ainst their will.” The proof

established that whe n the victim informed L eonar d that he did not have $250, L eonar d then t old the victim that he would have to go to the ba nk and g et the money . Mason was pr e se nt a nd “ watc hin g e ve ry

mov e [the vic timma de ]” d ur ingthi s d isc us sio n. Th e v i c t i m s p e c if ic a lly testified at trial that he did not feel fr ee to lea ve under the circ umstances. Clea

rly , based upon the joi nt a c tio ns of

the Ap pe lla

nts , th e vic tim ’s lib e rt

y wa s subs tanti a lly int e rf

e re d with

. Th is issu e is wi tho ut m e ri t.O n a p p e a l, L e o n a rd c o n te sts o n ly his se n te n c e fo r a g g ra v a te d b u rg la ry. 3

E ff e c tive J u n e 7 , 2 0 0 5 , T e n n e sse e C o d e A n n o ta te d se c tio n s 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 4 a n d 4 0 -3 5 -2 1 0 w e re re w ritten in the ir 4

e n tire ty. See 2 0 0 5 T e n n . P u b . A c ts, ch . 3 5 3 , § § 5 , 6 . T h e r e c e n tly e n a c te d s e n te n c ing p ro v isio n s a re n o t a p p lica b le to t he A p p ell an t s, ho w e v e r , a s th e i r crim es w ere co m m i t t ed o n J un e 5 , 2 0 0 5 , an d no “wa i ve r o f

. . . d efen d an t ’ s ex p o st fac to p ro te c tio n s” is i n c lud e d in the re c o rd b e fo re us

. See T .C .A . § 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 4 , C o m p iler ’s N o te s.

-7- II. Se nt e nc ing a. Appellan t Leonard The Appe llant L eonar d asser ts that the sentence imposed by the trial cour

t is ex cessive a

nd contra ry to the law bec ause the sentenc e impo s ed b y the cour t “does not fit the cr ime or the offe nder. ” Specifica lly , he ar g ues that the trial c ourt “should have g iven less weig ht” to the enhanc ement fa ctor of pr ior criminal history since his one prior “f

elony conviction was f

rom 1988, about seve nteen year s ag o.” He contends that he “should have been se ntence d to three year s at 30% on the ag g ravated burg lary , . . .” as oppose d to the four- y ear sentenc e which w as imposed. When 3

an a c c us e d c ha lle ng e s th e le ng th, ra ng e , or the mann e r o f s e rv ic e of a se nte nc e , th is c ourt

ha s a duty to conduct a de novo revie w of the se ntence with a presumption that the deter minations made by

the tr ia l c ourt are c or re c t. T .C. A. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ) ( 20 03 ); State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). This presumption is “conditioned upon the a ffirmative showing in the rec ord t hat the trial court c onsidered the sentenc ing pr inci p l es and all re levant fa cts and c ircumstance s.” Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. When conductinga de novo revie w of a sentenc e, this court must consider: (a ) the evidenc e, if a

ny , rec eived at the trial and the sentenc ing hear ing; (b) the pre- sentenc e repor t; ( c) the principles of se ntencingand ar g uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (d) the nature and
c ha ra c te ri sti c s o f t

he c ri min a l c on du c t invo lve d; ( e ) a ny statut or y mit ig a tin g or

e nh anc e me nt f

a c tor s; (f) any statement that the Appe llant made on his own behalf ; a nd (g ) the potential or lack of potential fo r re ha bil itatio n or tr e atme nt. T. C.A . §§ 40- 35 -1 02 , -10 3, -2 10 (2 00 3) ; Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 168.

L e o n ar d w a s c o n v i c t e d , a s a

R an g e I o f

f e n d e r , o f a g g r av a t e d

b ur g l a ry , a C l a s s C f

e l o n y, which ca rries a sentenc e ra

ng e of thre e to six y ear s. T

. C.A. § 40-35-112(a )(3) (2003). The presumptive sente nce to be imposed by the trial court for a cla ss C felony is the minim um sentence within the applicable r ang e unle s s there are enhanc ement or mitig ating fac tors prese nt. T.C.A. § 40-35-2 1 0 ( c ) . When there a re e nhance ment fac tors and no mitigating f actor s, the court may

sentenc e above the minimum in t h e ra ng e. T.C.A. § 40-35- 210(d). I f both enha nceme nt and mitigating fac tors are prese nt, the court must start a t t h e m i nimum sentence, e nhance as appr opriate f or e nh anc e me nt fa c tor s, and the n r e du c e the se nte nc e a s a pp ro pr iate fo r a

pp lic a ble mit ig a tin g fa c tor s. T.C.A. § 40-35-210( e). 4

In imposing a sente nce of four year s for the a g g ravated burg lary conviction, the trial c ourt found one e nhance ment and no mitigating fac tors. The court noted: “I do find that enhanc ing f actor No. 1 is prese nt, his previous history of cr iminal convictio n s o r co nviction. I t is a very serious conviction, ag g ravated burg lary , and it is also a ver y long time a go , 1 9 8 8 , b u t I do find that-8-

enhanc ing f

actor to b e p re s en t .” The pre- sentenc e re port ref lects that L eonar d has only one prior
c onvic tio n f

or an a g g ra vate d b ur g lary wh ic h oc c ur re d in 1988

. Ac c or din g to the pr e -s e nte nc e re po rt , the sentenc e in that ca se wa s orig inally suspended but wa s later r evoked. On appeal, L eonar d argues onl y that the weight applied to the enhancingfac tor by the trial court “ did not comply

with the ‘purpose s and principles’ of the a ct” be cause of the a g e of the conviction. Howeve r, the we ight to be a ssigne d to appropriate enha nceme nt and mitigatingfac tors falls within the sound discretion of the tr ial court so longas that court complies with the purposes and princ i p l es o f t he 1989 Sentenc ing A ct and its finding s are supported by the re cord. State v. Boggs , 932 S.W .2d 467, 475 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) . The trial c ourt, while re cog nizi ng that the prior convic tion was “a very long time ag o,” st ill found it t o be a “ very serious convic tion.” Review
o f t h e re cord r evea ls that the trial court c onsidered a ll the releva nt fac tors and princ iples of sentenc ing in se tting the leng th of L eonar d’s s entenc e. According ly , no sentenc ing e rror is shown.
b. App ellant Mason Next, the Appellant Mason contends that t h e trial court err ed in imposing c onsecutive
se nte nc e s. Hi s e nti re argume nt i s a s f oll ow s:
Th e c ourt in s e nte nc ing Mr [.] Ma so n fou nd him to be a Rang e I Iof fe nd e r g ive n h is pr ior a du lt c onvic tio ns fo r s imi lar o ff e ns e s. Ho we ve r t he c ourt us e d juve nil e offe nses to run his sentenc es conse cutive to ea ch other . That base d on the sentenc ing g uidelines, the appe llant submi t s t h at all sentenc es should the cour t uphold the
c onvic tio n, sh ou ld h ave be e n r un c on c ur re nt. As argued by

the State, the Appellant Mason has subjected this issue to w aiver by his failure to c ite t o any

re le va nt a uth or ity in s up po rt

of his a rgume nt a

nd his fa ilure to c ite to a

pp ro pr iate
re ference s to the rec ord. See T e n n

. R. Ap p

. P. 2 7 ( a ) ( 7 ) ; T e n n

. Ct

. Cr im

. Ap p

. R. 10( b). Nonethele ss, we ele ct to revie w the issue. Followingthe s entenc ing hear ing, the trial court ordere d that Mason’s nine-y ear sentenc e for
a g g r av at e d

b ur g l ar y an d h i s s e v e n
- ye ar

s e n t e n c e f

o r at t e mp t e d

r o b b e ry b e s e r v e d c o n s e c u t i v e l y. Initially , we note that the Appellant d o es n ot challeng e the leng th of the re spective se ntence s im p o s ed , and we conclude that no err or occ urre d in the trial court’ s application of va rious
e nh anc e me nt f

a c tor s. In im

po sin g c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing , th e c ourt fo un d a s f

oll ow s:
There is a presumption in favor of conc urre nt sentencing , unless one of se ven fac tors is present. I

find that the sec ond fac tor, . . . which is an ex tensive cr iminal
re c or d, is c e rt a inl y

pr e se nt i n th is c a se . A nd fo r t hat r e a so n, Iam g oin g to i mpo se consec utive sentenc es to this ex tent: T h e “C ” fe lony sentenc e and the “D” felony sentenc e will be consec utive to one another

. The two misdemeanor convictions, I ’m g oing to have be c oncurr ent with the fe lon y co n v i ct i on, so we’r e looking at a total eff ective se ntence of 16 y ear s.-9-

A trial cour

t may impose consec utive sentenc ing upon a deter mination that one or more of the c ri te ri a

se t f or th i n T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 15 (b ) exis ts. Th is s e c tio n p e rm its the trial cour

t t o i m p ose conse cutive sente nces if the court finds, among othe r cr iteria, that “ [t ]he defe ndant is an offender whose recor d of criminal activity is extensive[ .]” T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b) (2) (2003). The leng th of the sentenc e, when c onsecutive in nature, must be “justly deser ved in re lation to the se ri ou sn e ss of the of fe ns e ” and “ no g re a te r tha n that de se rv e d” un de r the circumst anc e s. T.C.A. § 40-35-102( 1), -103( 2). Additionally , whether sentenc es ar e to be se rved c oncurr ently or consec utively

is a matter a ddresse d to the s ound discretion of the t rial court. State v. Hastings , 25 S.W .3d 178, 181 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)

. On appe al, Mason conte nds that consec ut ive sentenc ing w as improper only beca use “the
co u rt u s ed j u v enile off

enses to run his sente nces c onsecutive to e ach othe r.” Initially , we a re co n s tra i n edt o n o t e t h atM as o n ’s ar gu m en ti s m i s p l a c e d as n o th i n g i nth e t ri al co urt ’s fi n d i n gs indicate that the c ourt did in fact r ely upon Mason’s prior juve nile co n v i ct i o n s in imposi ng consec utive sentenc es. Reg ardle ss, this court has rec ently upheld t h e i m p o s ition of consecutive sentenc ing ba sed in part on a defe ndant’s juvenile r ecor d. State v. Marc us E. Robinson , No. M2005- 00670-CCA-R3-CD (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Apr. 5, 2006) , perm. to appeal denied , (Tenn. Oct. 2, 2006). The pre -sentenc e re port submitted in thi s case indicates that the A p pellant Mason has the followi n g p ri or convic tions: (1) three c onvictions for misdemeanor theft; (2) one conviction for robber y ; (3) four

convictions for r esisting a rre st; (4) four c onvictions for drivingon a revoked license; (5) one convic tion for ca sual ex ch an ge, coca ine; (6) one conviction for posse ssion of marijuana ; (7) one c onviction for cr iminal impersonation; and (8 ) o n e conviction for a ttempted ag g ravated robbe ry . These c onvictions are in a ddition to M ason’s juvenile a djudications for two delinquent acts of aggrava ted robbery , one delinquent act of a g g ravated assault, and one delinquent
a c t o f p e ti t l ar c e n y

. Cl e ar ly , th e r e c anb e n o d is p u te th a t t h e Ap p e ll an t M a s o nh a s ane xte n s ive criminal history . Thus, we f ind no error

in the imposit ion of consec utive sentenc es.
CO NC LU SION

B a s e d u p o nth e f o r e g o i n g , th e Ap p e l l a

n tM a s o n ’ s c o n v i c t i o n s o f a g g r av a t e d

b ur g l ar y, criminal attempt to c ommit robbe ry , assault, and false imprisonment, a nd the resulting sentenc es ar e aff irmed. Additionally , L eonar d’s conviction and s en t ence for a g g ravated burg lary are aff irmed.

___________________________________ DAVI D G. HAY ES, J UDGE