J-A10042-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

CHESTER VERNON ROBERTS

Appellant No. 1278 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 26, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-31-CR-0000353-2012

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED APRIL 17, 2015

Chester Vernon Roberts files this direct appeal from his judgment of 

sentence for rape by forcible compulsion.1 We affirm. 

The relevant procedural history is as follows. On August 3, 2011, the 

police filed a criminal complaint charging Roberts with rape and other 

offenses.2 Roberts was not arrested until June 25, 2012. On January 4, 

2013, Roberts filed a motion to dismiss under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. Following a 

hearing, the trial court denied the Rule 600 motion. On November 13-14, 

2013, the case proceeded to trial. A jury found Roberts guilty of rape, and 

the trial court sentenced Roberts to 77-240 months’ imprisonment, a fine of 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(a)(1).

2 All charges other than rape by forcible compulsion were dismissed before 

trial.
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$1,000.00 and restitution in the amount of $750.00. Roberts filed timely 

post-sentence motions, all of which the trial court denied except for a motion 

to modify Roberts’ sentence. On June 26, 2014, the trial court re-sentenced 

Roberts to the same terms of imprisonment and restitution but removed his 

fine. Roberts filed a timely notice of appeal, and both Roberts and the trial 

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

The trial court summarized the evidence against Roberts as follows:

[Roberts], who is 32 years of age, testified that he 

spent the evening of May 25, 2011, drinking beer at 

the Friendly Tavern in downtown Huntingdon. He 

was at the time separated from his girlfriend, Jerrica 

Spell, the half-sister of [S.M.], the victim in this 

case. [Roberts] left the Friendly around 11:00 and 

walked several blocks to his sister’s residence where 

he planned to spend the night. He said he was 

‘buzzed’ but not drunk and his intention was to sleep 

a couple hours before meeting his brother to go to 

Williamsport to do a roofing job. At his sister’s he 

reported changing into his work clothes and then 

laying down on a bed.

At 12:02 a.m., May 26 [] Roberts texted [S.M.] 

‘what’s up’. At 12:03 [S.M.] responded ‘not much 

why?’. [Roberts] answered ‘my cousin, Kenny, wants 

to meet you, l told him about you and don’t tell 

Zack.’ [S.M.], who was 19 years of age on the date 

of the incident, lived with her boyfriend, Zack 

Hydrick, several blocks from [Roberts]’s sister’s 

residence. She testified that she knew [Roberts] 

since she and her sister, Jerrica, were very close and 

‘hung out’ every day with Jerrica’s baby. She said 

that while she didn’t like Vernon, she had no reason 

not to trust him and that’s why she responded to his 

text which she admitted she found weird.

At 12:06 [S.M.] texted ‘who is your cousin, Kenny, 

and why does he wanna meet me lol’. [Roberts] 
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answered at 12:09 ‘he is cool and if you want to 

meet him tell Zack you have to walk somewhere and 

meet us in the alley from where you live, trust me 

you will like him’. [S.M.] decided to go out and see 

what was going on. She told her boyfriend what she 

was doing and they agreed to keep in contact. She 

was wearing, she said, a blue tank top, a pair of jean 

shorts and flip-flops. She had a messenger bag.

Outside she found [Roberts] waiting and the two 

started walking in the direction of the J. C. Blair 

Hospital since [Roberts] had told her that Kenny 

lived near the hospital. At 12:33 [S.M.] texted Zack 

‘Everything seems okay ... I’ll text you.’ At the 

intersection of 12th Street and Warm Springs 

Avenue there is a path that leads to houses near the 

top of a hill that is adjacent to the hospital. 

[Roberts], [S.M.] said, told her that his cousin lived 

in one of the houses and [S.M.] testified she could 

see lights on in one of the houses. They started up 

the path and [S.M.] indicated it was dark in a text to 

Zack. She testified that the path was kind of paved 

and then it stopped and started getting rough with 

leaves and stuff. She said she questioned [Roberts] 

as to whether or not there was a front way up to the 

house. She said she started to turn around to go 

back down the path when [Roberts] grabbed her 

from behind and pushed her onto the ground. She 

tried to stand up, she said, when he grabbed her 

around the face. She grabbed his free hand and 

testified there was something in it. At first she said 

she didn’t know what the object was so she held on. 

The object was a knife and she asked him what he 

was going to do. He told her, she said, that if she 

yelled he would stick her. She promised not to yell 

and he loosened his grasp and pulled the knife out of 

her hand. Although, [S.M.] said, she never saw the 

instrument, she is certain it was a knife because her 

hand was cut. 

[Roberts] started pulling her shorts off and kept 

telling her he had always wanted her. Her glasses 

got knocked off and she said she was in shock. It 

was a grassy area she said, but [Roberts] was 
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unsuccessful in getting her clothes off. She lost an 

earring but eventually stood up and managed to go 

back down the hill a couple steps toward the streets. 

She was however pulled down again, she said, and 

this time he was able to pull her pants off. He turned 

her around, she said, and attempted anal sex with 

no success. He turned her around again and made 

her touch him which made it possible for him to have 

vaginal intercourse with her. She didn’t know, she 

said, if he had a condom and she could not say if he 

ejaculated inside her. He penetrated her, she said, 

three (3) or four (4) times over a thirty (30) second 

period. The area where the actual intercourse 

occurred, she testified, was leaf covered. 

[Roberts] stood up then and got dressed. He couldn’t 

find his phone. [S.M.] said she tried to act normal 

and with the use of her cell phone helped him find 

his. Her phone, she said, started ringing and she 

answered. It was Zack calling and she did not tell 

him what had just happened. They walked out and 

with the benefit of street lights she saw her hand 

was bleeding. He was wearing dark jeans, sneakers 

and a grey sweatshirt, she said. Also, she said, he 

was wearing work gloves.

At home she told Zack what had happened. At 1:16 

[Roberts] texted her ‘l am sorry please believe me 

on Nevaeh[‘s] life’. Nevaeh is the baby [Roberts] and 

Jerrica have together. [S.M.] responded at 1:19 

‘IDK.’ At 1:23 [Roberts] texted ‘Please don’t hate 

me will you text me tomorrow’. Curiously at 1:24 

[S.M.] texted ‘Yes’ to which at 1:25 [Roberts] 

responded ‘Do you hate me’.

[S.M.] and Zack then went to her mother’s home 

and from there to the J.C. Blair Hospital where they 

arrived at 1:45 a.m. At 2:04 ER staff at the hospital 

notified the Huntingdon Borough Police. The hospital 

records indicated that [S.M.] presented ‘tearful, 

covered in dirt, leaves in hair. No shoes. Blood on 

clothing and holding blood covered paper towels in 

left hand’. [S.M.]’s statement to the ER personnel as 
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to what happened was remarkably consistent with 

her testimony at trial.

Ms. Stephanie Stratton, a sexual assault nurse 

examiner, testified she was called from home to do 

an evaluation. She arrived at the hospital at 2:50 to 

do her examination which she allowed is quite 

intrusive. 

Nurse Stratton reported that [S.M.] was physically, 

visibly upset, crying, disheveled. She had leaves, she 

said, and bruises and abrasions on her body. In this 

regard, she noted on her report that above her right 

eye she had redness and an abrasion and laceration. 

Also, the nurse documented a laceration to the 

bottom lip and that the patient was complaining that 

her jaw was sore. A bruise on her right arm and left 

elbow was charted and, according to the nurse, both 

breasts had abrasions and lacerations. Nurse 

Stratton testified she saw and documented a right 

bruise on her lower leg as well as abrasions and 

lacerations to the left leg. Both knees, she said, were 

red and bruised. Finally, Ms. Stratton reported that 

the left hand of [S.M.] had been sutured by Dr. Delp, 

the ER doctor that evening.

As noted, the Huntingdon Borough Police became 

involved at 2:04 a.m. Cpl. John Stevens, a twentyeight (28) year veteran of the department, testified 

that he secured the scene of the incident at 3:11 

a.m. The Pennsylvania State Police were notified and 

a trooper who specializes in forensically collecting 

evidence and diagraming scenes was sent to assist 

the Huntingdon Borough Police. The scene, he said, 

was divided into two (2) areas. Cpl. Stevens 

described the first area as grassy and with a slight 

slope uphill. Cpl. Stevens reported that three (3) 

items of evidence were recovered in this area. They 

were a condom, an earring and grass with possible 

bloodstains. The second area that was identified and 

marked on a map was near a retaining wall and was 

covered with leaves. In that area Stevens said they 

recovered a glove, a flip-flop shoe, a belt, a condom 
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wrapper, a tampon and leaves with possible blood on 

them.

Officer Shannon Gummo, the prosecutor in the case, 

testified and indicated she met the victim at the J. C. 

Blair Hospital, and took a brief statement. The 

following day, she said, [S.M.] came to the station 

and provided a twelve (12) page written statement. 

Officer Gummo also testified that she participated in 

taking a statement from [Roberts] on May 26 at the 

police offices. Present were an assistant district 

attorney, the chief public defender, Chief of Police 

Rufus Brenneman, [Roberts] and Officer Gummo. 

The process began at 10:00 a.m. and was tape 

recorded. Without objection, the taped statement 

was played at trial. In it [Roberts] admitted sex with 

[S.M.] and the fact that he lured her out of her 

house with a bogus story about his cousin, Kenny.

But, he was adamant that the sex was consensual 

and equally certain that he had no knife. 

Sara Harner, an employee of the Pennsylvania State 

Police, testified and was accepted as an expert in 

DNA analysis. She expressed an opinion that blood 

found on the glove recovered at the scene matched 

the DNA profile of [S.M.]. [Roberts] testified and his 

testimony dovetailed in most respects to his taped 

statement taken May 26, 2011. He acknowledged 

that he initiated contact with [S.M.] that morning 

and that he fabricated as a reason for meeting a 

desire on the part of his cousin, Kenny, to meet 

[S.M.]. He testified however that [S.M.] was a willing 

partner that morning and that he in no way forced 

her to have sex. He said he had no knife and saw no 

blood. Nor did she, according to [Roberts], complain 

of any injury. He allowed that there was a possibility 

he had work gloves in his back pocket that early 

morning, but, he said, he didn’t wear a glove. He 

explained his text messages after the sex as guilt 

and the fact he didn’t want [S.M.] mad at him. 

On these facts, the jury convicted [Roberts] of the 

crime of rape.
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Memorandum Sur Roberts’ Motion For Post-Sentence Relief, June 5, 2014, 

pp. 2-10 (incorporated by reference into Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion). 

Roberts raises three issues in this appeal:

Did the trial court err in denying [Roberts’] Motion to 

Dismiss per Pa.R.Crim.P. 600?

Did the trial court err in denying [Roberts’] Motion 

For Judgment of Acquittal based on the insufficiency 

of the evidence in establishing each and every 

element of the charge of Rape - Forcible 

Compulsion?

Did the trial court err in denying [Roberts’] Motion in 

Arrest of Judgment and For a New Trial in that the 

weight of the evidence did not support the guilty 

verdict as to the charge of Rape - Forcible 

Compulsion?

Brief for Appellant, p. 6.

Roberts first argues that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial 

motion to dismiss the rape charge against him under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, 

Pennsylvania’s speedy trial rule. We disagree. 

Our standard and scope of review in evaluating Rule 600 claims are 

well-settled:

‘Our standard of review in evaluating Rule 600 issues 

is whether the trial court abused its discretion ...’ 

‘The proper scope of review in determining the 

propriety of the trial court’s ruling is limited to the 

evidence on the record of the Rule [600] evidentiary 

hearing and the findings of the lower court. In 

reviewing the determination of the hearing court, an 

appellate court must view the facts in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party.’
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Commonwealth v. Matis, 710 A.2d 12, 15 (Pa.1998); Commonwealth v. 

Bowes, 839 A.2d 422, 424 (Pa.Super.2003).

A speedy trial analysis typically involves a two-step inquiry: “(1) 

whether the delay violated [Rule 600]; and, if not, then (2) whether the 

delay violated the defendant’s right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article I, Section 9 of 

the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Commonwealth v. DeBlase, 665 A.2d 

427, 431 (Pa.1995). Where the first inquiry is answered in the affirmative, 

or where the constitutional dimension of a speedy trial issue is not raised (as 

is the case, here), there is no need to engage in the latter. Id.

Rule 600 provides in relevant part:

(A)(2)(a) Trial in a court case in which a written 

complaint is filed against the defendant, when the 

defendant is at liberty on bail, shall commence no 

later than 365 days from the date on which the 

complaint is filed.

...

(B) For the purpose of this rule, trial shall be 

deemed to commence on the date the trial judge 

calls the case to trial, or the defendant tenders a 

plea of guilty or nolo contendere.

(C) In determining the period for commencement 

of trial, there shall be excluded therefrom:

(1) the period of time between the filing of the 

written complaint and the defendant’s arrest, 

provided that the defendant could not be 

apprehended because his or her whereabouts were 

unknown and could not be determined by due 

diligence;
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(2) any period of time for which the defendant 

expressly waives Rule 600;

(3) such period of delay at any stage of the 

proceedings as results from:

(a) the unavailability of the defendant or the 

defendant’s attorney;

(b) any continuance granted at the request of the 

defendant or the defendant’s attorney.

Id. There is a three-step process for determining whether there has been a 

Rule 600 violation. Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1103 

(Pa.Super.2007) (en banc). The first step is to determine the mechanical 

run date, i.e., the 365th day after the filing of the criminal complaint. Id. 

The second step is determining the amount of excludable and excusable 

delay. Id. Excludable delay includes any delay attributable to defendant or 

his counsel. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(c)(3)(a); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 907 

A.2d 468, 474 (Pa.2006) (any delay attributable to defendant’s requests or 

conduct is excludable from 365-day period in which trial must commence). 

Excusable delay is delay that occurs as a result of circumstances beyond the 

Commonwealth’s control and despite its due diligence. Ramos, 936 A.2d at 

1103. Periods of delay which are attributable to court congestion constitute 

excusable delay. Commonwealth v. Frye, 909 A.2d 853, 859 

(Pa.Super.2006).

The third step is adding excludable and excusable delay to the 

mechanical run date to arrive at an adjusted run date. Ramos, 936 A.2d at 
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1103. A Rule 600 violation occurs if trial does not begin before the adjusted 

run date. Id. 

Here, on August 3, 2011, the police filed a criminal complaint against 

Roberts. Trial commenced on November 13, 2013, 866 days later. The 

record demonstrates, however, that there were 522 days of excludable and 

excusable time. As a result, the adjusted run date was later than November 

13, 2013, and Roberts’ trial was timely under Rule 600.

In chronological order, there were four periods of excludable and 

excusable time:

1. 327 day delay between the filing of the complaint, August 3, 2011, 

to the date of Roberts’ arrest, June 25, 2012. The period of time between 

the filing of the complaint and the defendant’s arrest is excludable, provided 

that the defendant could not be apprehended because his or her

whereabouts were unknown and could not be determined by due diligence. 

Comment, Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. “Due diligence” in this context is “fact-specific, 

to be determined case-by-case; it does not require perfect vigilance and 

punctilious care, but merely a showing the Commonwealth has put forth a 

reasonable effort.” Commonwealth v. Selenski, 994 A.2d 1083, 1089 

(Pa.2010). To determine whether the police acted with due diligence, the 

court employs a balancing test where, 

using a common sense approach, [it] examines the 

activities of the police and balances this against the 

interest of the accused in receiving a fair trial. The 

actions must be judged by what was done, not by 
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what was not done. The efforts need only be 

reasonable; lack of due diligence should not be found 

simply because other options were available or, in 

hindsight, would have been more productive.

Commonwealth v. Ingram, 591 A.2d 734, 737 (Pa.Super.1991) (internal 

citations omitted). In other words, “it is simply not required that the 

Commonwealth exhaust every conceivable method of locating a defendant. 

Rather, reasonable steps must be taken.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 389 

A.2d 1167, 1170 (Pa.Super.1978).

The police exercised due diligence in their attempts to locate Roberts 

following the filing of the criminal complaint. Officer Shannon Gummo of the 

Huntingdon Borough Police Department attempted numerous times to 

contact Mary Bumgardner, mother of Roberts’ paramour. N.T. 1/13/13, at

8. Officer Gummo also (1) contacted the Lewistown Police Department in 

neighboring Mifflin County based upon a tip that Roberts was residing with 

an acquaintance in that jurisdiction, Id.; (2) contacted the Mount Union 

Police Department in Huntingdon County and the State Police, Id. at 9, 12; 

(3) contacted Roberts’ sister on several occasions, Id. at 9; (4) checked job 

sites of Roberts’ employer to see if Roberts was present, Id.; and (5) 

entered Roberts’ name into the NCIC system, as well as what is known as 

the BOLO (“Be On Look Out”) system, Id. at 11-12. Trooper Eric Glunt of 

the Pennsylvania State Police and his colleagues went to the residence of 

Roberts’ relative, where he was believed to be staying. Id. at 20. They 

found indicia of Roberts’ occupancy, but Roberts was not present. Id. They 
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returned to that address one other time but to no avail, and they looked for 

Roberts at his mother’s residence on two occasions. Id. Trooper Glunt also 

(1) spoke to neighbors of Roberts’ mother, who said they had not seen 

Roberts at that address, Id.; (2) investigated another address at which 

Roberts was reported to be residing, Id.; (3) repeatedly checked the 

address of Roberts’ paramour, Id.; and (4) went to another location on 

information from the FBI that Roberts had applied for assistance benefits 

using that address. Id. at 22. Finally, Trooper Glunt went to the post office 

and discovered that Roberts had his mail forwarded to his sister’s address. 

Id. at 23. Trooper Glunt searched his sister’s residence without success. 

Id. Trooper Glunt estimated that he attempted to serve the arrest warrant 

for Roberts eight or nine times. Id. at 24. 

These efforts to apprehend Roberts were at least as diligent as efforts 

that we have found adequate in other speedy trial cases. See 

Commonwealth v. Gratkowski, 430 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa.Super.1981) 

(Commonwealth acted with due diligence in locating and arresting 

defendant, where police attempted to locate defendant at his last known 

address, recurrently asked about him at restaurant where he was last known 

to be employed, and contacted other police agencies concerning his 

whereabouts); Commonwealth v. Laurie, 483 A.2d 890, 892 

(Pa.Super.1987) (Commonwealth acted with due diligence where police 

made only one telephone call to defendant’s last known address, contacted 
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his family and Department of Welfare, placed an advertisement in local 

newspaper containing his photograph and description, and entered his name 

into national and local crime databases).

2. 14 day delay due to defense counsel’s request for continuance. 

After Roberts’ arrest, defense counsel requested and obtained a continuance 

of the preliminary hearing from July 3, 2012 to July 17, 2012, a period of 

fourteen days. This delay was excludable under Rule 600. Commonwealth 

v. Jones, 886 A.2d 689, 701 (Pa. Super. 2005) (delay of 80 days between 

date of defendant’s originally-scheduled preliminary hearing and date of 

rescheduled preliminary hearing, resulting from defense counsel’s requests 

for two continuances, was excludable).

3. 125 day delay due to Roberts’ pretrial motion to dismiss under Rule 

600. The docket demonstrates that the court originally scheduled trial for

January 7, 2013, but due to Roberts’ pretrial motion to dismiss under Rule 

600, the court continued trial until March 4, 2013. On January 31, 2013, the 

court held a hearing on the Rule 600 motion. After the hearing, the court 

rescheduled trial for March 20, 2013. On March 2, 2013, the court again 

continued trial until May 6, 2013. On March 13, 2013, the court denied 

Roberts’ Rule 600 motion. 

The period of 69 days from the filing of the Rule 600 motion on 

January 4, 2013 until its denial on March 13, 2013 is excludable time. 

Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1191 (Pa.Super.2005) (time 
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between filing of defendant’s Rule 600 motion and court’s denial of motion 

was excludable). The 56 day delay from the denial of the Rule 600 motion 

on March 13, 2013 to the next available jury selection date of May 6, 2013 

was excusable as well. Commonwealth v. Frye, 909 A.2d 853, 859 

(Pa.Super.2006) (delay resulting from court congestion constitutes 

excusable delay). 

4. 56 day delay due to Roberts’ motion for funds to hire an expert and 

motion for continuance. On April 29, 2013, one week before the scheduled 

trial date of May 6, 2013, Roberts filed a motion for funds with which to hire 

an expert in DNA analysis and a motion for continuance. The court granted 

the motions and continued trial until July 1, 2013, 56 days after May 6th. 

This delay was excludable under Rule 600. Jones, 886 A.2d at 701.

These four periods of excludable or excusable delay total 522 days. 

Only 344 of the 866 days of delay are chargeable to the Commonwealth, 

within Rule 600’s boundary of 365 days. Thus, the trial court properly 

denied Roberts’ Rule 600 motion.

In his second argument on appeal, Roberts challenges the sufficiency 

of the Commonwealth’s evidence with regard to his conviction for rape by 

forcible compulsion. Roberts insists that the evidence demonstrates that he 

had consensual intercourse with S.M. We disagree.

Our standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence 

is well-settled:
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[W]hether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at 

trial in the light most favorable to the 

[Commonwealth as the] verdict winner, there is 

sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find 

every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not 

weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts 

and circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility 

of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s 

guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a 

matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn 

from the combined circumstances. The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving 

every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Troy, 832 A.2d 1089, 1092 (Pa.Super.2003) (citations 

omitted).

The crime of rape by forcible compulsion has three elements: (1) the 

defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with the complainant; (2) the 

defendant procured intercourse by using force or the threat of force; and (3) 

intent. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121. “[P]enetration, however slight,” of the female 

genitals with the penis is necessary to establish the element of sexual 

intercourse. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101. A victim’s testimony, even uncorroborated, 

as to penetration is sufficient to establish the element of “sexual 

intercourse”. Commonwealth v. Wall, 953 A.2d 581, 584 (Pa.Super.2008). 

“Forcible compulsion” means “something more” than mere lack of consent. 

Commonwealth v. Smolko, 666 A.2d 672, 676 (Pa.Super.1995). “Where 

there is a lack of consent, but no showing of either physical force, a threat of 
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physical force, or psychological coercion, the ‘forcible compulsion’ 

requirement ... is not met.” Id. Finally, intent may be inferred from the 

actions and of the defendant in light of all the attendant circumstances. 

Commonwealth v. Chance, 458 A.2d 1371, 1374 (Pa.Super.1983).

Construed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, S.M.’s 

testimony establishes all of these elements. She testified that Roberts 

grabbed her from behind, pushed her to the ground and told her to “get 

down”. N.T. 11/13/2013 at 165. When she tried to get back up, Roberts 

tried to hold her down and grabbed her around the face and neck. Id. S.M. 

testified she thought Roberts was going to try to suffocate her, so she 

grabbed Roberts’s other hand. Id. In that hand, the victim felt what she 

realized was a knife; the knife cut her hand. Id. Roberts told the victim 

that if she yelled, he would “stick” her. Id. at 167. He started pulling S.M.’s 

shorts off, and S.M. said she “didn’t want to do this.” Id. at 168. She was 

able to stand up, pull her shorts up, and move a few steps away before 

Roberts again pushed her to the ground. Id. at 171. Roberts pulled the 

victim’s shorts off, pulled his pants down and penetrated her vagina with his 

penis “three or four” times for about “30 seconds” altogether. Id. at 172, 

174. These facts are sufficient to establish the “forcible compulsion”, 

“sexual intercourse” and “intent” elements of the crime of rape. 

In his third and final argument, Roberts challenges the weight of the 

evidence adduced during trial. The law pertaining to weight of the evidence 
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claims is well-settled. The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for 

the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Commonwealth v. 

Forbes, 867 A.2d 1268, 1273–74 (Pa.Super.2005). A new trial is not 

warranted because of “a mere conflict in the testimony” and must have a 

stronger foundation than a reassessment of the credibility of witnesses. 

Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 665 (Pa.Super.2007). Rather, the 

role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, 

certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give 

them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice. Id.

On appeal, “our purview is extremely limited and is confined to 

whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the jury verdict 

did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a weight claim 

consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion, not a review of 

the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence.” Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 732, 738 (Pa.Super.2012). 

An appellate court may not reverse a verdict unless it is so contrary to the 

evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. Forbes, 867 A.2d at 1273–74.

Roberts contends that several facts demonstrate that the verdict was 

against the weight of the evidence. He claims: (1) S.M. left her home and 

boyfriend at midnight after a call from Roberts, her sister’s ex-boyfriend, 

and readily agreed to take a walk with him; (2) Roberts and S.M. walked to 
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a dark nearby area, while she texted her boyfriend to make sure he was still 

back at their house; (3) S.M. had her cellphone in her hand throughout the 

entire incident, stated that she could text without looking at the keyboard, 

and did not call for help from her boyfriend, police, or family members 

during or after the incident; (4) although the site of the sexual encounter 

was within close proximity to six houses and the emergency room entrance 

for J.C. Blair Memorial Hospital, S.M. did not try to call for help or run away 

to these buildings; (5) after the sexual encounter, S.M. took a phone call 

from her boyfriend and fabricated a story as to why she was still out with 

Roberts; and (6) the knife found at the scene of the sexual encounter 

belonged to the alleged victim, given the testimony of S.M.’s sister that S.M. 

owned and used knives and even practiced self-cutting, so S.M. most likely 

cut herself on her own knife instead of being cut by Roberts. 

While this evidence might have facilitated a spirited defense, we 

cannot say that it warrants a new trial. This case boiled down to the 

credibility of S.M. and Roberts. Both sides had full and fair opportunity to 

present their versions of events to the jury, but the jury had the final say on 

their credibility. The jury chose to believe S.M. and find Roberts guilty. 

Based on the cold record, we find that the trial court acted within its 

discretion by concluding that the verdict did not shock its conscience. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
J-A10042-15

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/17/2015