UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

B.J.G., individually a nd as Heir of the Estate of Jonathan L. Graves, deceased, a minor by and through the guardian of her Estate: The Trust Company of Oklahoma, Inc.; F.B.M., individually and as Heir of the Es tate of Jonathan L. Graves, deceased, a minor by and through the guardian of her Estate: Melissa S. Kirk, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA, DIVISION IV, by and through its Judges; THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF OKLAHOMA, by and through its Judges, Defendants-Appellees,

and ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, INC., a Delaware corporation,

Defendant.

---------------------- THE TRUST COMPANY OF OKLAHOMA, Interested Party. No. 12-5199 (D.C. No. 4:11-CV-00262-GKF-TLW) (N.D. Okla.) FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### June 26, 2013

Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TYMKOVICH , ANDERSON , and MATHESON , Circuit Judges.

This case began with a wrongful death products liability action in Oklahoma

state court. Defendant Rockwell Automation won a jury verdict in its favor, but then the trial court granted plain tiffs’ motion for a new trial. On appeal by Rockwell, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court’s order. Plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari review of the de cision, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court denied the petition. Plaintiffs then fi led a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, the Oklahoma Supreme Court and Rockwell. The district court dismissed pl aintiffs’ claims against the state judicial defendants as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and we affirm ed that dismissal. See B.J.G. v. Rockwell Automation, Inc ., 497 F. App’x 807, 8 08-09 (10th Cir. 2012),

cert. denied , 133 S. Ct. 1268 (2013). Due to th e jurisdictional nature of the dismissal, however, we direct ed the district court to m odify the dismissal of the claims to be without prejudice. See id . at 810.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this pane l has determined unanimously that oral argument would not mate rially assist the de termination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.- 3 - After our decision issued, plaintiffs filed a motion for l eave to amend their complaint. The pro posed amended complaint elimin ated Rockwell and the Oklahoma Supreme Court as defendants. The clai ms against the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, however, remained unchanged. T hose claims alleged that plaintiffs’ due process rights were violated when the C ourt of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court’s order granting plaintiffs ’ request for a new trial. Compare Aplt. App. at 70, ¶ 92 (Amended Complaint), with Dist. Ct. R., Doc. 2 at ¶ 99 (Original Complaint). The claims further alleged that the Cour t of Civil Appeals “failed to follow the standard of review imposed by the Supr eme Court of the State of Oklahoma on appellate courts when considering the correct ness of the decision of a trial judge who both granted the new trial and presided over th e trial of the case.” Aplt. App. at 70, ¶92; Dist. Ct. R., Doc. 2 at ¶99. Both co mplaints sought a declar ation that plaintiffs

were entitled to a new tria l against Rockwell due to th e Court of Civil Appeals’

constitutional violations. See Aplt. App. at 71, ¶ 93; Dist. Ct. R., Doc. 2 at ¶ 100.

The district court denied the motion for leave to amend the co mplaint, stating, “[t]he claims asserted in the proposed amend[ed] co mplaint are—like the claims previously asserted by plaintiffs—barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Aplee. App. at 88. As we explaine d in our prior decision, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “applies to cases brought by state-court lo sers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendere d before the district cour t proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments

. ” B.J.G ., 497 F. App’x- 4 - at 809 (internal quotation marks omitted). And we conclude d that plaintiffs’ claims were “exactly the sort of claim precluded by Rooker-Feldman .” Id

. Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint did nothing to cure the jurisdictional defect we identified in our previous decisi on. The district c ourt therefore properly denied leave to amend the complaint. Th ere was no reasoned basi s for the plaintiffs to appeal from the district court’s order since the issue had already been litigated and resolved by our previous decision. Accordi ngly, we dismiss this appeal as frivolous.

Entered for the Court

Stephen H. Anderson Circuit Judge