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Filed 4/16/15 P. v. Lingor CA1/5 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FIVE 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

JULIE ANN LINGOR, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 A140996 

 (Alameda County 

 Super. Ct. No. C161045) 

 In this appeal, Julie Ann Lingor challenges an order revoking her probation. Her 

sole contention is that the trial court erred in failing to suspend the probation revocation 

proceedings so that it could conduct a hearing to determine her competency. (Pen. Code, 

§ 1368, subds. (a), (c).)1 After a careful examination of the record, we conclude the 

evidence before the trial court did not require it to order a competency hearing. 

Accordingly, we will affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 In April 2009, Lingor pushed her elderly mother to the ground and threw water on 

her. Lingor pleaded guilty to elder abuse (§ 368, subd. (b)(1)) and was granted probation. 

In the succeeding years, her probation was revoked and reinstated following various 

probation violations. In May 2013, Lingor assaulted a process server, and the Alameda 

County District Attorney filed a petition to revoke her probation. 

 

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 All statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
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 The trial court heard the petition on September 25, 2013. Lingor testified about 

the charge at the hearing. After the close of the evidence, her counsel informed the court 

that he was “beginning to entertain doubt as to [his] client’s competency.” Counsel 

stated he wished to have a further conversation with Lingor before the court made a 

ruling. The trial court explained it was prepared to rule and that “[w]e’ve had the 

hearing.” 

 Defense counsel then stated, “I do want the Court to know that I believe my client 

is incompetent.” He told the court he had not been certain of her incompetence at the 

beginning of the hearing but argued her incompetence “was abundantly clear from her 

conduct[.]” He did admit, however, that “reasonable minds would differ.” As evidence 

of his client’s incompetence, counsel cited Lingor’s “nonresponsiveness, her request 

whether we’re in a civil court or criminal court, [and] her repeated questions about the 

welfare of her mother.” 

 The trial court ruled that to the extent Lingor’s counsel had moved to declare a 

doubt under section 1368 concerning her competence to participate in criminal 

proceedings, it was “having a real problem at the end of this thinking that I’m supposed 

to seriously consider that.” The court explained that Lingor “has a history of mental 

health issues, but she understands what’s going on as far as the Court can tell.” Although 

she had not been totally cooperative with her counsel, the court found, “She knows 

what’s going on.” The court then found Lingor in violation of her probation. 

 The trial court revoked Lingor’s probation on December 12, 2013, and sentenced 

her to three years’ imprisonment. Lingor later filed a notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

 Lingor contends the trial court erred by not suspending the probation revocation 

hearing when her counsel declared a doubt as to her competency. She argues this 

violated her statutory and constitutional rights. Furthermore, she asserts that the court’s 

failure to suspend proceedings when presented with what she claims is “substantial 

evidence of a doubt as to appellant’s competency ‘divested [the trial court] of jurisdiction 
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to proceed pending express determination of the competency issue.’ ” For the reasons 

that follow, we conclude the trial court did not err. 

I. Governing Law and Standard of Review 

 California law presumes a defendant is competent and places on the defendant the 

burden of demonstrating otherwise. (§ 1369, subd. (f).) A defendant is mentally 

incompetent if, “as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant 

is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the 

conduct of a defense in a rational manner.” (§ 1367, subd. (a).) The trial or conviction of 

a mentally incompetent defendant violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California 

Constitution. (People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1281 (Hayes).) In addition, 

section 1367, subdivision (a) provides: “A person cannot . . . have his or her probation 

. . . revoked while that person is mentally incompetent.” Thus, these statutory and 

constitutional provisions apply to probation revocation proceedings such as the one 

before us. (People v. Hays (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 755, 759.) 

 “Under both the federal Constitution and state law, the trial court must suspend 

criminal proceedings and conduct a competency hearing if presented with substantial 

evidence that the defendant is incompetent. [Citations.] Substantial evidence of 

incompetence exists when a qualified mental health expert who has examined the 

defendant states under oath, and ‘with particularity,’ a professional opinion that because 

of mental illness, the defendant is incapable of understanding the purpose or nature of the 

criminal proceedings against him, or of cooperating with counsel.” (People v. Mai

(2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1032-1033 (Mai).) 

 “[D]efense counsel’s expressed belief that defendant might be mentally 

incompetent does not automatically trigger a section 1369 competency trial.” (People v. 

Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 465 (Sattiewhite).) While counsel’s assertion of a 

belief in his client’s incompetence is given “some weight,” it is insufficient on its own to 

require the court to hold a competency hearing. (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1033 

[“counsel’s assertion that his or her client is or may be incompetent does not, in the 
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absence of substantial evidence to that effect, require the court to hold a competency 

hearing”].) To trigger the court’s obligation to hold a competency hearing, “defense 

counsel must present expert opinion from a qualified and informed mental health expert,

stating under oath and with particularity that the defendant is incompetent, or counsel 

must make some other substantial showing of incompetence that supplements and 

supports counsel’s own opinion. Only then does the trial court have a nondiscretionary 

obligation to suspend proceedings and hold a competency trial.” (Sattiewhite, supra, at 

p. 465, italics added.) Although a defendant’s demeanor and irrational behavior may 

constitute substantial evidence of incompetence, “disruptive conduct and courtroom 

outbursts by the defendant do not necessarily demonstrate a present inability to 

understand the proceedings or assist in the defense.” (Mai, supra, at p. 1033.) 

 “[A]bsent a showing of ‘incompetence’ that is ‘substantial’ as a matter of law, the 

trial judge’s decision not to order a competency hearing is entitled to great deference, 

because the trial court is in the best position to observe the defendant during trial. 

[Citation.] ‘ “An appellate court is in no position to appraise a defendant’s conduct in the 

trial court as indicating insanity, a calculated attempt to feign insanity and delay the 

proceedings, or sheer temper.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at 

p. 1033.) Consequently, we may not overturn the trial court’s refusal to hold a 

competency hearing unless we conclude either that the record raises a reasonable doubt 

as to the defendant’s mental competence as a matter of law or that the trial court has 

abused its discretion. (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 740 (Welch).) 

II. The Evidence Before the Trial Court Did Not Require it to Hold a Competency 

Hearing. 

 Lingor contends there was substantial evidence of her incompetence before the 

trial court, and thus its failure to suspend the probation revocation proceedings to 

determine her competence was error. She points to a probation report stating she suffered 

from schizophrenia and to an assessment by the Office of Collaborative Court Services 

opining she was “significantly impacted by her mental health challenges . . . .” In 

addition, she refers to her behavior at the September 25, 2013 probation revocation 
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hearing. During that hearing, she asked whether her mother had died while she was in 

custody, testified despite her counsel’s recommendation that she not do so, and inquired 

whether she was in civil court. Lingor also notes she appeared confused, had difficulty 

with her recollection, and gave incoherent responses. 

 Initially, we note that defense counsel did no more than state his belief that his 

client was incompetent. Counsel made no claim he would be able to offer any proof of 

Lingor’s incompetence. (See People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1154 [in absence of 

specific offer of proof, court could not assume proffered testimony of psychiatrist would 

establish incompetence].) He did not even specifically ask for a hearing on the issue, but 

rather said only that he wanted more time to speak to his client about the matter.2

 Since 

counsel presented no actual evidence of Lingor’s incompetence, the trial court was under 

no duty to hold a hearing. (See Sattiewhite, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 465 [where counsel 

only requested hearing on competency but presented no evidence of incompetence, trial 

court did not err in denying motion to suspend proceedings].) 

 Since counsel presented no particularized proof on the competency issue, Lingor 

must rely on the existing record. After examining that record, we cannot conclude it is 

sufficient to show Lingor’s incompetence as a matter of law. (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th 

at p. 740.) Looking first at the references to her schizophrenia in the probation report, we 

find that one of them is a quotation from a letter written by the district attorney. Another 

simply reports Lingor’s own statement that she had been diagnosed with schizophrenia. 

And the third appears to be the probation officer’s evaluation. Obviously, neither the 

district attorney’s hearsay statement nor the defendant’s own statements to the probation 

officer are sufficient to establish substantial evidence of incompetence. (See People v. 

Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 32-33.) Nothing in the probation report qualifies as the 

 

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 The trial court alluded to counsel’s failure to make a formal request for a hearing. In 

finding Lingor in violation of probation, the court stated, “[I] [h]aven’t heard any other 

motions, so I’m not ruling on any other motions.” 
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kind of expert opinion that constitutes substantial evidence of incompetence.3

 (Mai, 

supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 1032-1033 [“Substantial evidence of incompetence exists when a 

qualified mental health expert who has examined the defendant states under oath, and 

‘with particularity,’ a professional opinion that because of mental illness, the defendant is 

incapable of understanding the purpose or nature of the criminal proceedings against him, 

or of cooperating with counsel.”].) Indeed, the report makes no mention of competency 

at all. 

 Lingor’s questions about whether the proceeding was civil in nature likewise did 

not raise reasonable doubts about her competency. The question did not unequivocally 

show she was unable to understand the charges against her. (See People v. Koontz (2002) 

27 Cal.4th 1041, 1070 [self-represented defendant’s expression of perplexity at 

courtroom procedure reflected lack of legal knowledge, not incompetency].) At the 

hearing, Lingor was able to recall earlier proceedings in the case and told the court she 

was “still on a court probation.” She testified on her own behalf and denied assaulting 

the process server. Nothing in her courtroom behavior suggested she was incompetent. 

“ ‘[T]o be entitled to a competency hearing, “a defendant must exhibit more than bizarre 

. . . behavior, strange words, or a preexisting psychiatric condition that has little bearing 

on the question of whether the defendant can assist [her] defense counsel. [Citations.]” 

[Citations.]’ ” (Sattiewhite, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 464-465; see Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th 

at p. 1033 [“disruptive conduct and courtroom outbursts by the defendant do not 

necessarily demonstrate a present inability to understand the proceedings or assist in the 

defense”].) Nothing of the kind occurred here. 

 Nor did Lingor’s questions about her mother’s suggest she was incompetent. Her 

mother was quite elderly at the time of the hearing, and appellant might simply have been 

concerned about her welfare. If anything, given that Lingor was initially placed on 

 

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 The fact that Lingor may have been suffering from schizophrenia was not enough, in 

and of itself, to establish her incompetence as a matter of law. (See People v. Blacksher

(2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 798 [psychiatrist’s belief that defendant suffered from paranoid 

schizophrenia did not establish incompetence as a matter of law].) 
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probation after admitting to committing elder abuse against her mother, her questions 

might be read as reflecting her understanding that the elder abuse charge was the genesis 

of the criminal proceedings. 

 Finally, although Lingor may have had some difficulty answering the questions 

put to her, that did not necessarily reflect incompetence. Her own counsel conceded that 

reasonable minds might differ about whether her conduct showed she was incompetent. 

If reasonable minds could differ about the issue, it is difficult for us to conceive how the 

trial court’s decision could be termed an abuse of discretion. 

 Since the record does not contain a showing of incompetence that is substantial as 

a matter of law, the trial court’s decision is entitled to great deference. (Mai, supra, 57 

Cal.4th at p. 1033.) As an appellate court, we are in no position to second guess the trial 

court’s evaluation of Lingor’s competence, and the evidence of incompetence to which 

Lingor directs us falls far short of that which the California Supreme Court has held 

sufficient to qualify as substantial. (Cf. People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 525 [no 

substantial evidence of incompetence even though defense counsel declared doubt about 

defendant’s competence, psychologist submitted letter stating defendant’s brain 

functioning was abnormal, and defendant exhibited irrational and counterproductive 

behavior at trial].) Because we cannot conclude either that the record raises a reasonable 

doubt as to the defendant’s mental competence as a matter of law or that the trial court 

has abused its discretion, we must affirm. (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 740.) 

DISPOSITION

 The judgment is affirmed. 
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 _________________________ 

 Jones, P.J. 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

Needham, J. 

_________________________ 

Bruiniers, J.