NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In the Matter of: 

DANETTE MILLER, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

THOMAS A. MILLER, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 14-0110 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2007-008371

The Honorable Veronica W. Brame, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Danette Miller, Phoenix

Petitioner/Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maurice Portley delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.
MILLER v. MILLER

Decision of the Court

2

P O R T L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Danette Miller (“Mother”) appeals the denial of her request 

for an award of attorneys’ fees. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the 

order denying Mother’s fee request.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Thomas Miller (“Father”) was found in contempt of the 

family court in 2012 for failing to comply with a support order. The court 

ordered Father to pay his support obligation by February 1, 2012. When 

Father failed to comply, he was again found in contempt and the court 

instructed Mother to submit a fee affidavit. Following the court’s direction, 

Mother submitted a motion for attorneys’ fees and fee affidavit without 

objection by Father. Inexplicably, the court denied Mother’s fee request 

without comment and Mother appealed from the denial of her fee request

(“2013 appeal”). 

¶3 After considering the 2013 appeal, this court vacated the order 

denying Mother fees and remanded the case to allow the court to “consider 

what amount of fees and costs are reasonable for Mother’s attempts to 

enforce the valid support orders.” Miller v. Miller, 1 CA-CV 12-0567/12-

0679 (consol.), 2013 WL5708197, at *3, ¶ 17 (July 25, 2013) (mem. decision). 

On remand, Mother merely resubmitted her July 2012 affidavit for 

attorneys’ fees, but this time Father responded.

1 The court again denied 

Mother’s request in a signed order.

¶4 Mother filed a timely notice of appeal. Father did not file an 

answering brief. In the exercise of our discretion we decline to treat this as 

a confession of error. See Gonzales v. Gonzales, 134 Ariz. 437, 437, 657 P.2d 

425, 425 (App. 1982) (“Although we may regard [the] failure to respond as 

a confession of reversible error, we are not required to do so.”). We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 

12-2101(A)(1).

2 

 

1 There was some confusion on remand because the 2013 appeal involved 

the remand of three different rulings: one by the commissioner (at issue in 

this appeal) and two by the superior court judge (not at issue in this appeal). 

See Miller, id. at *1, ¶¶ 2-5. Ultimately, the matters were resolved.

2 We cite to the current version of the statute unless otherwise noted.
MILLER v. MILLER

Decision of the Court

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DISCUSSION

¶5 We review the denial of attorneys’ fees for an abuse of 

discretion. See Democratic Party of Pima Cnty. v. Ford, 228 Ariz. 545, 547, ¶ 6, 

269 P.3d 721, 723 (App. 2012). The family court may award attorneys’ fees 

and costs to one party after “considering the financial resources of both 

parties and the reasonableness of the positions each party has taken 

throughout the proceedings.” See A.R.S. § 25-324. 

¶6 This court previously determined that it was an abuse of 

discretion to deny Mother’s fee request in its entirety because “Mother’s 

financial resources in 2012 were substantially less than Father’s” and the 

record did not “indicate any position Mother took that warranted a 

complete denial of her fees and costs.” Miller, 1 CA-CV 12-0567/12-0679, at 

*2, 3, ¶¶ 13, 15. Mother contends the court failed to follow the mandate by

denying her fee request. We disagree. The mandate directed the court to 

determine what amount of fees were reasonable for Mother’s attempts to 

enforce the support orders. Id. at *3, ¶ 17. Although this court determined 

Mother had substantially less financial resources than Father, the mandate

did not direct the court to award fees regardless of the reasonableness of 

Mother’s positions. See, e.g., Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Revenue, 196 Ariz. 5, 7, ¶ 7, 992 P.2d 5, 7 (App. 1999). The court had 

discretion to consider the reasonableness of Mother’s fee request.

¶7 On remand, Father asserted that Mother is a paralegal and the

fee affidavit did not specify that her attorney, and not Mother, performed 

the work billed. Father also alleged that unspecified entries included 

inflated time. Father, however, did not make the objections when Mother 

first requested fees in 2012. Because Mother only resubmitted her 2012 

request on remand and did not add any additional information, Father’s 

objections are untimely. Moreover, there is no indication that any fees for 

paralegal services were billed in 2012 and the original fee affidavit stated 

that Mother’s attorney billed $250 per hour.

¶8 This court instructed the court to “consider what amount of 

fees and costs are reasonable for Mother’s attempts to enforce the valid 

support order.” Miller, at *3, ¶ 17. On remand, the court listed several 

pleadings considered in ruling on the mandate. Although those pleadings

were considered and ruled on when the court initially denied Mother’s fee 

request in 2012, Mother’s fee request did not include charges for those 
MILLER v. MILLER

Decision of the Court

4

pleadings. Therefore, those pleadings are not relevant in determining the 

reasonableness of Mother’s positions in the contempt proceedings.

3

¶9 Mother has a right to enforce support orders and need not 

wait months to do so. Nonetheless, the court implied that the filings in this 

case are duplicative and needlessly contentious. We agree. Mother’s 

amended motion for contempt sought relief on issues not before the court, 

i.e., the foreign judgment, a new reimbursement request, and health 

insurance coverage. The additional information needlessly confused the 

record, expanded the issues, and increased the amount of time and 

resources spent in the proceedings. The cited motions also requested the

same relief previously requested in other proceedings. For example, 

Mother filed multiple pleadings seeking relief from Father’s failure to 

comply with the court’s January 5, 2012 order: a pretrial statement filed 

with the superior court judge on February 6, 2012; and the contempt 

motions filed with the court on March 2, 2012 and May 21, 2012. It was 

unreasonable for Mother to raise the same issue before two different judicial 

officers, which also needlessly confused the proceedings and resulted in 

duplicated efforts by the parties as well as court staff. The record supports 

the court’s conclusion that Mother took unreasonable positions in her 

contempt proceedings.4

¶10 We do not condone Father’s repeated failure to pay support 

orders, which are enforceable by contempt proceedings. However, in her 

attempt to enforce that obligation, Mother needlessly expanded and 

 

3 Specifically, the following pleadings listed in the court’s order were not 

included in Mother’s fee request: (1) Mother’s Affidavit of Attorneys’ Fees 

and Costs filed March 20, 2012, and Father’s response thereto; Judge 

Whitten’s denial of the same and Mother’s unsuccessful motion for 

reconsideration; (2) Mother’s Objection to Filed Arrears Calculation filed 

June 25, 2012; (3) Mother’s Affidavit of Non-Compliance and Request for 

Arrest Warrant filed July 11, 2012; (4) Mother’s Supplemental Affidavit of 

Non-Compliance and Request for Arrest Warrant filed August 2, 2012; and 

(5) Father’s purge receipt filed July 27, 2012.

4 The court indicated that Mother’s motion for contempt was filed less than 

a month after Judge Whitten entered judgment and requested relief for 

Father’s failure to pay support for the single month of February 2012. 

However, Mother’s motion for contempt argued that Father was in 

contempt of the commissioner’s enforcement judgment/order filed January 

10, 2012, and was not based on Judge Whitten’s February 10, 2012 judgment 

(filed March 7, 2012).
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Decision of the Court

5

confused the contempt proceedings. Therefore, the court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying her request for attorneys’ fees. 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL

¶11 Mother requests an award of fees and costs on appeal 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. Mother represented herself on appeal and,

therefore, is not entitled to attorneys’ fees. See Connor v. Cal-Az Props., Inc., 

137 Ariz. 53, 56, 668 P.2d 896, 899 (App. 1983) (recognizing that party filing 

pro per cannot claim attorneys’ fees due to the absence of an attorney-client 

relationship). We also deny Mother’s request for costs on appeal pursuant 

to A.R.S. § 25-324(A) because she was not the successful party. A.R.S. § 12-

342(A) (authorizing award of costs to successful party on appeal). 

CONCLUSION

¶12 We affirm the order denying Mother’s July 2012 request for 

attorneys’ fees and costs.