Filed 4/27/15 P. v. Willis CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TYLER HOLLAND WILLIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B257107

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 4PH02232)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

Donald S. Kennedy, Commissioner. Affirmed. 

Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Blythe J. Leszkay and 

Nathan Guttman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________
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Following his convictions on two felony counts of child molestation in 2009, 

Tyler Holland Willis was sentenced to state prison and subsequently released on parole, 

subject to multiple special conditions. After Willis was found to have violated his parole 

conditions, his parole was revoked and restored with an additional special condition 

prohibiting him from possessing any device capable of having access to the internet. On 

appeal, Willis challenges that condition of parole as overbroad and unreasonable. We 

affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Plea and Sentence in Underlying Offense 

In April 2009, Willis sold Xanax to a 13-year-old girl. After the girl had ingested 

some Xanax, Willis forced her to orally copulate him. He then forcibly digitally 

penetrated her vagina. Willis was arrested and charged in a two-count information with 

committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. 

(a)) and forcible oral copulation (Pen. Code, § 288a (c)(2)). Willis pleaded not guilty. 

In a negotiated agreement, Willis waived his right to a jury trial on October 27, 

2009, pleaded no contest to both counts and was sentenced to concurrent three-year state

prison terms. 

2. Release on Parole and Special Conditions

Willis was homeless when he was paroled on June 5, 2013. Among the special 

conditions of his parole were that Willis submit to continuous electronic monitoring 

(Global Positioning System (GPS) technology), refrain from using the computer for any 

purpose which might further sexual activity (i.e., accessing or possessing sexually 

explicit material electronically or physically) (condition 90), refrain from regularly 

entering the property of others, except in certain enumerated circumstances (condition 

109) and submit to a search of any electronic device (condition 95). 
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3. Parole Violation Hearings 

Willis waived his right to counsel and represented himself at two separate parole 

violation hearings. 

a. First Parole Violation Hearing

At the conclusion of the hearing on February 20, 2014, the court found Willis had 

violated the parole condition he refrain from regularly entering the property of others 

(condition 109), when he stayed several nights at an apartment without the permission of 

his assigned parole agent Javier Mata in December 2013. The court revoked and restored 

Willis’s parole with the added condition that he serve 180 days in county jail. 

b. Second Parole Violation Hearing

According to the evidence presented at the second parole violation hearing on 

May 9, 2014, Willis’s computer was seized when he was arrested in December 2013. In 

March 2014, Parole Agent Mata asked Willis for the password to access the computer. 

Willis provided a password, but it did not work. After several attempts to access the 

computer using that password, Mata asked Willis to enter the password himself. Willis 

turned to another parole agent and said, “I do not want Agent Mata looking at my 

personal stuff on my computer.” A third parole agent used forensic software to access 

the computer without using Willis’s password. That agent discovered the computer had 

been used to visit several pornographic websites and contained 12 videos of Willis and an 

unknown woman engaged in sexual intercourse. 

At the conclusion of the second hearing, the court found that Willis, by possessing 

pornography on his computer, had violated the condition of his parole that he refrain 

from using the computer for any purpose which might further sexual activity (condition 

90). The court also found by refusing to give parole agents access to his computer, Willis 
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had violated the condition that he submit to the search of any electronic device (condition 

95) 1. 

Pertinent to the appeal are the following statements by the court, the prosecutor, 

Willis’s parole agent, and Willis during the May 9, 2014 hearing:

“Court: Parole supervision is revoked and restored on the same terms and 

conditions as previously ordered. [P] You’re the parole agent. Any additional 

conditions?

“Agent Mata: There is.

Court: Than what was originally given to him?

Agent Mata: I’d like to impose a condition that prohibits him from having 

possession or access to a laptop computer, or a cell phone with any type of –

Prosecutor: A condition of no access to a computer or access to the internet.

Willis: I object, your Honor. It’s unrelated to my commitment offense.

Court: How is it unrelated? And I ask that only because, according to the petition, 

the original offense is lewd and lascivious acts with a child; and as a result of that there 

was a restriction on access to pornography, or anything to do with pornography, and it 

appears that you have violated that condition.

Willis: Yes, your Honor. But the original commitment offense has nothing to do 

with the computer. This is a violation of parole.

Court: Okay. I can understand your argument, but I disagree with the logic and 

the outcome. And you are not to possess any electronic device with access to the 

internet, and that’s as long as parole deems necessary. So I’m making the order, but it’s 

up to parole.

Prosecutor: You Honor, the parole agent is asking if it can be no access to the 

internet, as well as no laptop or computer. He can have a phone, but as long as it doesn’t 

access –

 

1 Willis timely filed separate notices of appeal challenging the findings of each 

parole violation hearing. We granted Willis’s motion to consolidate the appeals. 
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Court: I said any electronic device.

Prosecutor: Just specifically computer or laptop, as well, since it was used to 

record and create the sexually explicit videos. So no computer, no laptop, or other 

computer-like device, and as well as access to the internet. Thank you.

Court: Any computer, laptop, or other electronic device capable of having access 

to the internet.” 

DISCUSSION

1. The Special Condition Expressed In The Minute Order Prevails Over The

Court’s Oral Pronouncement

Relying on the court’s oral pronouncement at the conclusion of the second parole 

violation hearing, Willis contends prohibiting him from possessing any electronic device 

“capable” of internet access is unreasonable and overbroad. However, the People rely 

instead on the internet restriction as it is appears in the minute order, which prohibits 

Willis from possessing “any electronic device with access to the internet, computer or 

laptop, as long as parole deems necessary.” The People argue this written condition 

governing Willis’s parole is neither unreasonable nor overbroad and Willis does not 

contend otherwise. The threshold issue then is whether the internet restriction as orally 

pronounced or as expressed in the minute order controls in this case. 

While ordinarily an oral pronouncement controls “[w]hen there is a discrepancy

between the minute order and the oral pronouncement of judgment” (People v. Gabriel

(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1073), this is not an inflexible “mechanical rule.” (People 

v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599. “‘It may be said ... as a general rule that when, as in 

this case, the record is in conflict it will be harmonized if possible; but where this is not 

possible that part of the record will prevail, which, because of its origin and nature or 

otherwise, is entitled to greater credence [citation]. Therefore whether the recitals in the 

clerk’s minutes should prevail as against contrary statements in the reporter’s transcript, 

must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.’” (Smith at p. 599; see 

People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 768 [minute order prevails over oral 
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pronouncement of one-year prior prison term enhancement, which was never charged in 

the information]; People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 226 [minute order prevails 

over reporter’s transcript, which misspelled defense counsel’s name].) 

Here, we conclude the May 9, 2014 minute order indicating Willis was prohibited 

from possessing “any electronic device with access to the internet, computer or laptop, as 

long as parole deems necessary” controls in light of what occurred at the May 9, 2014 

hearing. After finding Willis in violation of his parole, the court solicited the opinion of 

Willis’s parole agent Mata as to any additional conditions that should be imposed. In 

light of the violation of previous conditions, Mata and the prosecutor focused on a 

condition that would prevent Willis from downloading pornographic videos from internet 

websites as well as creating, recording and possibly posting his own pornographic videos. 

The use of electronic devices would only serve prohibited purposes if they connected to 

the internet; the mere capacity to be connected is not relevant to the conduct to be 

prohibited. The court could thus reasonably conclude Willis should be precluded from 

possessing any electronic device with internet access. We therefore conclude that the 

May 9, 2014 minute order, but not the transcript, accurately sets forth the internet 

restriction the court intended to imposed as an additional special condition of parole. 

(See People v. Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 768.)

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. 

ZELON, J. 

We concur: 

PERLUSS, P. J. FEUER, J.*

 

*

Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.