UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4054

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LYNN T. EDMONDS, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr., 

District Judge. (3:08-cr-00317-JAG-2)

Submitted: June 19, 2013 Decided: July 18, 2013

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and DUNCAN and KEENAN, Circuit 

Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. 

Pratt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, 

Robert J. Wagner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF 

THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. 

Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia; 

Michael A. Jagels, Special Assistant United States Attorney, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Lynn T. Edmonds, Jr. appeals his eighteen-month sentence 

for violating a condition of his supervised release. Edmonds 

argues that the district court impermissibly considered the 

seriousness of the release violations when the court imposed his 

sentence. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the district 

court’s judgment.

Edmonds was convicted in 2008 of possession with intent to 

distribute cocaine base, and received a sentence of 71 months’ 

imprisonment1 for that offense. His sentence also included a 

four-year term of supervised release. As a condition of that 

supervised release, the district court ordered that Edmonds 

participate in an approved substance abuse treatment program. 

Seven months after his release from prison, Edmonds’ 

probation officer filed a “petition on supervised release” (the 

petition). The petition alleged that Edmonds had violated 

several conditions of his supervision, resulting from: (1) his 

commission of the felony offense of possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon; and (2) his commission of three misdemeanor 

offenses, including the sale and distribution of marijuana, 

 1 Edmonds’ sentence of imprisonment was eventually reduced 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), and he served a total of 47 

months in prison. 
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driving with a suspended license,2 and leaving the judicial 

district without receiving the permission of his probation 

officer. The probation officer later filed an addendum to the 

petition alleging that Edmonds also had “fail[ed] to 

satisfactorily participate in a substance abuse treatment 

program.” 

The district court considered the petition and addendum at 

a hearing held in January 2013. The court found Edmonds guilty 

of two charged violations of supervised release, which resulted 

from his acts of driving without a license and of failing to 

satisfactorily complete a substance abuse treatment program. 

The court found Edmonds not guilty of the remaining alleged 

violations. The court held that there was insufficient evidence 

to support the firearm and drug-related allegations. 

Additionally, the court concluded that “there would be no 

reason” for Edmonds to have known that he had left the judicial 

district when he merely had traveled to a nearby town, and, 

therefore, the court found Edmonds not guilty of the alleged 

supervised release violation of leaving the judicial district 

without permission.

 2 At the violation hearing, defense counsel clarified that 

Edmonds had been convicted of driving without a license, rather 

than driving with a suspended license, as alleged in the 

petition. 
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Before imposing the sentence, the district court stated 

that the violation for Edmonds’ failure to complete the 

substance abuse treatment program was “very serious,” and 

observed that Edmonds’ original offense was drug-related. The 

court sentenced Edmonds to an eighteen-month term of

imprisonment (the revocation sentence), an upward variance from 

the six-to-twelve month advisory range established by the United 

States Sentencing Guidelines. 

Edmonds concedes that the applicable standard of review on 

appeal is for plain error, based on his failure to object in the 

district court to the matters he raises here. We agree, and 

therefore we review for plain error the district court’s 

reference to the seriousness of the release violation. See

United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 199-200 (4th Cir. 2012). 

Accordingly, Edmonds must establish that the district court 

erred, that the error was “plain,” and that the error affected 

his substantial rights. Id. at 200 (citing United States v. 

Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)). 

To determine whether the district court erred, we consider 

whether the revocation sentence is “plainly unreasonable.” 

Bennett, 698 F.3d at 200; United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 

436-38 (4th Cir. 2006). We first evaluate whether the sentence 

was unreasonable, “follow[ing] generally the procedural and 

substantive considerations that we employ in our review of 
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original sentences,” making certain modifications to “take into 

account the unique nature of supervised release revocation 

sentences.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39. In doing so, we adhere 

to “a deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact 

and the exercise of discretion.” Id. at 439 (citation omitted). 

If we conclude that a revocation sentence is unreasonable, we 

then consider whether the sentence was plainly, or clearly, 

unreasonable. Id.

When imposing a revocation sentence, a district court is 

directed to consider certain enumerated statutory factors that 

also are required for consideration of sentences imposed in the 

first instance. These factors include “the nature and 

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics 

of the defendant,” the need for deterrence and to protect the 

public, the defendant’s need for various correctional 

treatments, any guidelines or policy statements issued by the 

United States Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid 

unwarranted sentence disparities with other defendants, and 

restitution for victims. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (citing 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a)). 

We note, however, that “some of the sentencing factors 

listed in § 3553(a) applicable to original sentences are not 

applicable to revocation sentences,” including “whether the 

revocation sentence reflects the seriousness of the offense, 
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promotes respect for the law, and provides just punishment for 

the offense.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39 (citing 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(2)(A)) (internal alterations and quotation marks 

omitted). We thus have emphasized that punishment for new 

criminal conduct is not the primary purpose of a revocation 

sentence. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 437-38 (citation omitted). 

Rather, we view “the defendant’s failure to follow the courtimposed conditions of supervised release as a breach of trust.” 

Id. at 437 (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); 

see also U.S.S.G. App’x § 3(b) (“[A]t revocation the court 

should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while 

taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the 

underlying violation and the criminal history of the 

violator.”). 

Edmonds’ only contention on appeal is that the district 

court procedurally erred when it “considered an unauthorized 

statutory factor” in imposing his sentence, namely, the 

seriousness of the supervised release violation. Edmonds points 

to various statements the district court made at the violation 

hearing, including the court’s statement that it considered 

Edmonds’ failure to attend substance abuse treatment to be “a 

very serious violation,” which was “very troubling.” 

We conclude that the district court did not plainly err in 

articulating its reasons for imposing the eighteen-month 
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sentence. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) and § 3553(a)(1), the court 

was permitted to consider “the nature and circumstances of the 

offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” 

The transcript of the violation hearing indicates that the 

district court found Edmonds’ failure to participate in 

substance abuse treatment “troubling” and “serious,” because 

that condition of supervised release gave Edmonds “a chance to 

take care of the [drug] problem that got him [to court] in the 

first place.” This reasoning relating to the circumstances of 

Edmonds’ release violation and to his personal characteristics 

was plainly within the permissible factors set forth in Section 

3583(e). 

Moreover, the district court found that Edmonds exhibited a 

lack of respect for his probation officer and the conditions of 

supervision when Edmonds falsely told his probation officer that 

Edmonds’ substance abuse counselor had allowed him to stop 

treatment. These findings were proper, because they related 

directly to Edmonds’ breach of the court’s trust and reflected a 

central purpose of revocation sentences. See Crudup, 461 F.3d 

at 437.

Finally, the district court entered an order following the 

violation hearing memorializing its findings. The order 

provided in part:
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The Court considered the policy statements in Chapter 

Seven of the United States Sentencing Guidelines and 

the factors in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) & 3583(e). Based 

on the defendant’s breach of trust and his 

misstatements to the Court and the probation officer 

about his substance abuse treatment, the Court 

SENTENCES the defendant to 18 months of imprisonment 

with no supervised release to follow. 

These stated findings further support our conclusion that the 

district court relied on proper factors in imposing Edmonds’ 

revocation sentence.

District courts have “substantial latitude in devising 

revocation sentences for those defendants who violate [the 

court’s] orders governing their conduct during supervised 

release.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438. In light of the record and 

the deference owed to the district court, we affirm Edmonds’ 

sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this Court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED