United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued October 7, 2015

Decided October 16, 2015

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 14-3238

Appeal from the

NAJAH DAWAJI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MORAD ASKAR and

SUNNEY KOHLHOSS,

Defendants-Appellees.

United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 13 C 6404

Gary S. Feinerman,

Judge.

O R D E R

Najah Dawaji appeals the dismissal of her suit alleging that her ex-husband, 

Morad Askar, and his divorce attorney, Sunney Kohlhoss, prosecuted a baseless 

criminal-contempt proceeding against her to scare her into accepting an unfavorable

financial settlement in the divorce. The district court determined that her suit was barred 

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Dawaji appeals, arguing that Rooker-Feldman does not 

apply because, she says, her injuries stem from Askar and Kohlhoss’s actions, not the

state-court judgment. We disagree and affirm the judgment dismissing the suit for lack 

of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the state-court judgment is the source of Dawaji’s 

alleged injuries, Rooker-Feldman applies.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 14-3238 Page 2

I. Background

Dawaji and Askar divorced in 2011. They agreed to joint custody of their two 

children, and the terms of the agreement were set forth in a Joint Parenting Agreement 

and Custody Judgment. The Illinois state court overseeing the divorce left for later 

determination the contested financial issues: child support, maintenance, and the 

division of marital assets.

While the dispute over financial issues remained open, Askar petitioned the state 

court to find Dawaji in criminal contempt of court. He accused Dawaji of violating the 

Joint Parenting Agreement by, for example, refusing to respond to his e-mails and 

complaining about him in front of their children. The local prosecutor declined to 

prosecute, so the court appointed Kohlhoss, Askar’s attorney, as “special prosecutor” for 

the contempt proceeding. Dawaji’s lawyer objected to the appointment, but raised no 

allegations or evidence of fraud. On Dawaji’s motion the court transferred the contempt 

case to another judge.

While the contempt prosecution was pending, the judge presiding in the divorce 

case returned to the remaining issues. Trial commenced, but after two days the parties 

settled the financial dispute. As part of the settlement, Askar and Kohlhoss agreed to 

dismiss the criminal-contempt petition. In exchange Dawaji agreed to accept $2,200 per 

month for 24 months as maintenance and child support; to accept $7,000 as a property 

settlement; to move to Chicago from Moline, Illinois; and to share custody of the 

children equally. The court approved the settlement. Dawaji did not appeal.

One month later, Dawaji sued Askar and Kohlhoss in federal court under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that they coerced her into accepting the financial settlement.

(Kohlhoss, as the special prosecutor, is the alleged state actor for § 1983 purposes.) 

Adding details not raised in state court, Dawaji asserted that Askar and Kohlhoss 

brought a fraudulent contempt petition to convince the state court to appoint Kohlhoss 

as special prosecutor and to pressure Dawaji into accepting less in the financial 

settlement. Dawaji alleges that had she not been “terrified” of the criminal-contempt 

prosecution, she “would have been able to make a record which would entitle her 

[to] ... $750,000[] in marital assets, as well as child support and maintenance in an 

amount in excess of $5,000 per month.”

The district court dismissed Dawaji’s claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 

(1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). The judge concluded that Dawaji’s 
No. 14-3238 Page 3

injury and damages arose directly from the state-court order approving the financial 

settlement—and were therefore barred—because “there is little difference between 

awarding Dawaji the monetary value of the divorce settlement she claims she would

have received absent Defendants’ misconduct and re-opening the order itself.”

II. Analysis

On appeal Dawaji challenges the district court’s application of Rooker-Feldman. 

She maintains that her suit focuses not on the state-court judgment but on Askar and 

Kohlhoss’s fraudulent criminal-contempt petition, which they used to force her into the 

unfavorable financial settlement that the state court approved. But if a federal plaintiff 

alleges that a fraud produced an adverse state-court decision, then the judicial decision 

is the source of injury for Rooker-Feldman purposes. See Iqbal v. Patel, 780 F.3d 728, 730 

(7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that “fraud (no matter how described) does not permit a 

federal district court to set aside a state court’s judgment in a civil suit”); Harold v. Steel, 

773 F.3d 884, 885 (7th Cir. 2014) (applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because when 

false statements to a state court produce an adverse decision, “the state court’s judgment 

is the source of the injury of which plaintiffs complain in federal court”). 

Dawaji’s injury comes from the state-court judgment. Without that judgment 

approving the settlement, and the earlier decision to appoint the special prosecutor, 

Askar and Kohlhoss’s fraud scheme would have flopped, and Dawaji would have had 

no injury or damages to claim. Because the harm did not materialize until the adverse 

state-court judgment, that judgment, not the alleged misconduct that preceded the 

judgment, is the source of the injury. See Harold, 773 F.3d at 885–86 (rejecting claim that 

the injury arose from a party’s false statements in a wage-garnishment suit and ruling 

instead that the injury arose from the state-court’s order garnishing plaintiff’s wages

because “[n]o injury occurred until the state judge ruled against [plaintiff]”); Golden v. 

Helen Sigman & Assocs., Ltd., 611 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying Rooker-Feldman

because injuries from a lawyer’s actions during divorce and custody proceedings 

“flow[ed] directly from the fruit of [lawyer]’s efforts: state-court custody orders 

favorable to [plaintiff’s ex-wife]”); Kelley v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 604–05

(7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the contention that an injury arose from a party’s false statement

that it was entitled to attorney’s fees rather than from the judgment granting those fees

and explaining: “[b]ecause defendants needed to prevail in state court in order to 

capitalize on the alleged fraud, the [tort] claims that plaintiffs bring ultimately require us 

to evaluate the state court judgments”). Although Rooker-Feldman may not apply if 

Dawaji was prevented from raising her fraud allegations in state court, see Long v. 
No. 14-3238 Page 4

Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 558–59 (7th Cir. 1999), she does not make that claim.

Under these circumstances Rooker-Feldman applies and divested the district court of 

jurisdiction.

Rooker-Feldman applies for the additional reason that despite Dawaji’s assertions 

to the contrary, the relief she seeks would require that we nullify the state-court 

judgment. Dawaji’s request for damages is the amount that she would have received had 

she not been coerced into accepting the settlement. She thus wants the federal court in 

effect to negate the state-court order approving the agreed-upon child support, 

maintenance, and property settlement. Rooker-Feldman cannot be circumvented in this 

way. See Taylor v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that a 

claim seeking the value of plaintiff’s foreclosed home (plus interest and punitive 

damages) would effectively undo the state-court foreclosure judgment); Maple Lanes, 

Inc. v. Messer, 186 F.3d 823, 825–26 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying Rooker-Feldman where the 

relief requested—the monetary value of a revoked liquor license—would “effectively 

reverse the state court judgment upholding the revocation of the liquor license”). 

There is another jurisdictional defect that neither party discusses: the 

domestic-relations exception to federal subject-matter jurisdiction also bars Dawaji’s 

suit. The domestic-relations exception precludes federal jurisdiction when a plaintiff 

seeks “one or more of the distinctive forms of relief associated with the domestic 

relations jurisdiction: the granting of a divorce or an annulment, an award of child 

custody, a decree of alimony or child support.” Friedlander v. Friedlander, 149 F.3d 739, 

740 (7th Cir. 1998); see Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 306 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he

domestic-relations exception ... denies federal jurisdiction to grant a divorce or exercise 

the other characteristic powers of a domestic-relations court ... .”). As just discussed, 

Dawaji’s complaint, in effect, asks the federal court to adjudicate the financial phase of a 

divorce proceeding. If a district court adjudicated her request for damages, it would 

have to evaluate the merits of her request for larger payments for child support and 

maintenance and additional marital assets. But decisions about the allocation of 

domestic assets run afoul of the domestic-relations exception to federal jurisdiction. See 

Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 701–02 (1992). Thus, for this additional reason, the 

district court had no jurisdiction. 

AFFIRMED.