Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1409-CR-600 | April 20, 2015 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Timothy J. Burns

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Richard C. Webster

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Joel Hoke,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

April 20, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1409-CR-600

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Linda E. Brown, 

Judge

The Honorable Christina Klineman, 

Commissioner

Case No. 49F10-1312-CM-80905

Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1409-CR-600 | April 20, 2015 Page 2 of 6

Case Summary

[1] Joel Hoke appeals his conviction for class A misdemeanor operating while 

intoxicated with endangerment. He challenges the trial court’s admission of 

statements he made to police and claims that the evidence is insufficient 

without those statements. Finding that he was not in custody when he made 

the statements and that the statements were properly admitted, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Just after midnight on Christmas 2013, Marion County Sheriff’s Department 

Reserve Deputy Clarence White was in his open garage when he heard a 

crashing sound. He walked around the corner and saw a vehicle in the front 

yard of a residence. The vehicle was damaged on the side and front end and 

appeared to have struck a tree and a mailbox. He saw a female exit the 

passenger side of the vehicle and heard her yell in an angry voice. The vehicle 

pulled backward and forward and eventually exited the yard and drove away. 

[3] Deputy White quickly returned to his home and prepared to follow the driver in

his squad car. He did not take time to put on his uniform or to retrieve his 

service weapon and badge. He pursued the driver, and within a few minutes, 

he spotted the damaged vehicle parked on the side of a cul-de-sac. A small 

group of people were standing around the vehicle, and Deputy White exited his 

squad car and asked who had been driving the vehicle. Hoke immediately 

responded that he was the driver, and the deputy told him that he had left the 

scene of a property damage accident and needed to return. Deputy White 
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instructed Hoke to re-enter his vehicle and drive to the accident site. Hoke did 

so, and the deputy followed in his squad car. When they reached the scene and 

were conversing, the deputy noticed that Hoke smelled of an alcoholic 

beverage.

[4] Minutes later, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Ricardo 

Flores arrived in response to a dispatch concerning a “crash with a possible 

intoxicated person.” Id. at 37. After briefly conferring with Deputy White, 

Officer Flores asked Hoke what happened. Hoke said that he “was showing off 

driving a little too fast and lost control of the vehicle and [the] vehicle went up

into the yard.” Tr. at 45. The officer described Hoke as smelling like an 

“alcoholic beverage emitting from his breath or person,” with eyes that were 

“glassy,” “watery,” and “red,” and “sway[ing] slightly [though not] out of 

control.” Id. Hoke admitted that he had consumed five beers. Officer Flores 

then administered three field sobriety tests, all of which Hoke failed. He read 

the implied consent information to Hoke and called a certified officer to 

conduct a chemical breath test, which showed a blood alcohol concentration 

(“BAC”) of .08%.

[5] The State charged Hoke with class A misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle 

while intoxicated (“OWI”) with endangerment and class C misdemeanor 

operating a motor vehicle with a BAC of .08 to .14%. At trial, the parties 

stipulated to the admission of the chemical test results; however, Hoke objected 

to the introduction of his statements to Officer Flores, claiming that he was in 

custody at the time he made them and was not read his Miranda rights. The 
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trial court admitted the statements and found him guilty as charged. The trial 

court merged the convictions and entered judgment on class A misdemeanor 

OWI with endangerment.1 Hoke now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

[6] Hoke maintains that the trial court erred in admitting his statements to Officer 

Flores. Because a trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility 

of evidence, we review its rulings using an abuse of discretion standard. Turner 

v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ind. 2011). An abuse of discretion occurs 

when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts 

and circumstances before it. Id.

[7] Hoke specifically asserts that he was in custody when he made the challenged 

statements to Officer Flores and had not been Mirandized. See Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (prohibiting introduction of any statement, 

whether inculpatory or exculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of 

defendant without first informing defendant of his right to remain silent and 

right to an attorney and warning that statements he makes can be used as 

evidence against him). “Whether a person was in custody depends upon 

objective circumstances, not upon the subjective views of the interrogating 

 

1

 See Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(b) (stating that a person who operates a vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that 

endangers a person commits OWI with endangerment, a class A misdemeanor). 
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officers or the subject being questioned.” Gauvin v. State, 878 N.E.2d 515, 521 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied (2008).

Although the circumstances of each case must certainly influence 

a determination of whether a suspect is “in custody” for purposes 

of receiving of Miranda protection, the ultimate inquiry is simply 

whether there is a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of 

movement” of the degree associated with a formal arrest.

California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v.

Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).

[8] Here, the objective circumstances do not support Hoke’s argument that he was 

in custody when he made the statements to Officer Flores. First, we note that 

Deputy White never placed him in custody, either by the cul-de-sac or back at 

the crash site. Instead, when the deputy first inquired about the driver of the 

damaged vehicle and Hoke admitted that he was the driver, the deputy did not 

place him in handcuffs or order him into his squad car. Instead, he merely 

stated that Hoke had left the scene of a property damage accident at the stated 

address and instructed him to return to the crash site. Hoke drove himself 

there, and the deputy followed behind. 

[9] When the two men returned to the crash site, the deputy detected a smell of 

alcohol on Hoke’s breath. Officer Flores was then dispatched to the crash site

on a report of a “crash with a possible intoxicated person.” Tr. at 37. After he 

arrived, he spoke briefly with the deputy and then asked for Hoke’s version of 

the events. Hoke told the officer that he had driven too fast and crashed into 

the yard. The officer observed Hoke’s red, watery eyes and the smell of an 
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alcoholic beverage on his breath and asked him if he had been drinking. Hoke 

said that he had consumed five beers. At that time, Officer Flores had neither 

handcuffed him nor physically restrained him in any way. Instead, the officer

administered field sobriety tests and ordered a breathalyzer test. In short, 

Hoke’s verbal account of the crash and his alcohol consumption was not given 

as part of a custodial interrogation. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting this evidence.

[10] Hoke also raises a sufficiency of evidence claim. However, this claim is 

premised solely on the admissibility of his statements to Officer Flores 

concerning his identity as the driver, which were properly admitted.2 As such, 

we affirm.

[11] Affirmed. 

Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

 

2

 Even if Hoke’s statements had been the product of an improper custodial interrogation, such error would 

be harmless, since his conviction is supported by independent, properly admitted evidence. Combs v. State, 

895 N.E.2d 1252, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied (2009). Hoke had already given a more general 

admission to Deputy White concerning his identity as the driver. He made this admission just minutes after 

the crash, when he and his companions were standing beside the damaged vehicle. To the extent that he 

claims that such an admission applied only to that exact moment, we find this argument unpersuasive, since 

no person was inside the vehicle at that exact moment and the crash had just occurred. Hoke’s actions after 

he admitted to being the driver indicate ready access to the vehicle as well as a familiarity with the crash 

location, as he had the means to start the vehicle and he drove it directly to the stated address.