2015 IL App (3d) 121014

Opinion filed April 21, 2015 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2015 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

AARON M. ARBUCKLE, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 13th Judicial Circuit,

Bureau County, Illinois, 

Appeal No. 3-12-1014 

Circuit No. 11-CF-37 

Honorable 

Cornelius J. Hollerich, 

Judge, Presiding. 

_____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justice Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

 Justice Lytton specially concurred, with opinion.

 OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant, Aaron M. Arbuckle, was charged with aggravated domestic battery (720 

ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West 2010)) and aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(1) (West 2010)). At 

defendant's plea hearing, the court informed defendant that he was eligible for extended-term 

sentences on each count. Defendant did not object and did not later raise the issue in a 

postsentencing motion. The court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 51⁄2 and 4 years' 

imprisonment on the two counts, respectively. Among the aggravating factors cited by the court 

was the degree of harm defendant inflicted upon the victims. Defendant appeals his sentence on 

the grounds that (1) the court erroneously found him extended-term eligible; (2) counsel was 
2 

ineffective for failing to raise the issue of defendant's extended-term eligibility; (3) the court's 

consideration of the harm done to the victim constituted an improper double enhancement where 

"great bodily harm" was an element of the charged offense; and (4) the court failed to consider 

certain mitigating factors, resulting in an excessive sentence. We affirm.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 On June 9, 2011, the State charged defendant with aggravated domestic battery (count I) 

(720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West 2010)) and aggravated battery (count II) (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(1) 

(West 2010)). With respect to count I, the State alleged in the aggravated domestic battery 

information that defendant struck his girlfriend, Kayla Zimmerlein, with a golf club, resulting in 

great bodily harm. On count II, the State alleged that defendant stabbed Nicole Reuter with a 

broken golf club. 

¶ 4 Defendant entered an open guilty plea on September 22, 2011. While admonishing 

defendant, the court informed him that the maximum prison term for aggravated domestic 

battery, a Class 2 felony, would be 14 years' imprisonment. Defendant was eligible for an 

extended-term sentence due to a prior Class 2 conviction. He was also not eligible for probation. 

The court also informed defendant that he was extended-term eligible on the aggravated battery 

charge, a Class 3 felony: "The maximum prison sentence normally would be five years for a 

Class 3 felony. But because of the prior Class 2 conviction in 2005 in Lee County, you would be 

eligible for extended term ***. The maximum prison sentence could be ten years rather than 

five." 

¶ 5 The factual basis established that defendant lived with his girlfriend, Zimmerlein, in an 

apartment. Reuter lived in an adjacent apartment, and a get-together was held in the common 

patio area of the apartments. After an altercation between defendant and another male, 
3 

Zimmerlein took defendant back to their apartment. She returned to the gathering. When 

Zimmerlein later returned to the apartment, defendant struck Zimmerlein with a golf club, 

breaking her arm. Zimmerlein called for help, at which point Reuter entered the apartment. 

Defendant then struck Reuter with the club, leaving a puncture mark on her torso. The court 

accepted the guilty plea and scheduled the matter for sentencing. 

¶ 6 The sentencing hearing was held on November 28, 2011. Defendant's brother, 

grandmother, and friend testified on his behalf. Each testified that defendant had a problem with 

alcohol. Defendant also made a statement. He explained that he had been drinking on the night 

in question. He began hallucinating and thought he was being attacked. "I thought I was 

actually protecting when what I was doing was the exact opposite." 

¶ 7 The court also considered the presentence investigation report (PSI). The PSI indicated 

that defendant had been convicted of burglary—a Class 2 felony—in 2005. It also showed 

multiple convictions for domestic battery (in 2006 and 2009) as well as a conviction for driving 

under the influence. The PSI also indicated that defendant had previously been diagnosed with 

bipolar disorder and alcohol dependence. Attached to the PSI were letters from defendant and 

other family members. Each letter addressed defendant's problems with alcohol. 

¶ 8 At the sentencing hearing, the State submitted the victim impact statements of 

Zimmerlein and Reuter, as well as Zimmerlein's medical records. In Zimmerlein's letter, 

received more than four months after the battery, she described the injury as follows: 

 "The ulna bone in my left arm was pretty *** shattered except 

for a piece by my wrist and a piece by my elbow. The rest was just 

crushed fragments. The doctor had to scrape and clean all the tiny 
4 

little pieces that were left. He the[n] had to put in a plate and five 

screws just to keep my arm together."

Zimmerlein also wrote that she had amassed more than $25,000 in medical expenses. She was 

unable to lift more than five pounds with her arm, which affected her ability to work.

¶ 9 Zimmerlein wrote that the injury was worse than her doctor originally expected. 

Following the initial surgery, the doctor informed her there was no sign of bone growth. 

Zimmerlein was put on a bone stimulation system, which did not work. She was to undergo 

further surgery to correct the problem. Zimmerlein claimed that if that surgery was unsuccessful, 

her arm "could be like this for the rest of [her] life." She still suffered from daily pain in her arm. 

¶ 10 Medical reports classified Zimmerlein's injury as a "Grade I open left ulna shaft fracture 

with comminution involving greater than 5 pieces." The reports also detailed the "nonunion" of 

the fracture, as well as the lack of progress with a bone stimulator. The last medical report in the 

PSI, dated October 14, 2011, indicated that Zimmerlein would need surgery to remove a bone 

graft. The doctor noted that he did not discern "any progression at all in the fracture gap."

¶ 11 At argument, the State posited that defendant was extended-term eligible on both counts. 

The State asked for sentences of seven and five years' imprisonment on count I and count II, 

respectively. Defendant asked for a recommendation of impact incarceration.

¶ 12 After a recess, the court stated that it had considered the victim impact statements, letters 

written on behalf of defendant, and the PSI, including all attached reports. The court also 

"reviewed the factors in mitigation and aggravation." The court opined that the only applicable 

factor in mitigation was that defendant's conduct was clearly the result of his intoxication. The 

court considered this a "substantial ground[] tending to excuse or justify the defendant's criminal 

conduct" but failing to establish a defense. Addressing other statutory factors in mitigation, the 
5 

court pointed out that there was no evidence that incarceration would affect defendant's 

dependents; the court did not find defendant was unlikely to commit further crime. 

¶ 13 In aggravation, the court noted the seriousness of the injuries inflicted. The court also 

emphasized defendant's extensive list of prior convictions and the need to deter others from 

committing the same crime. The court concluded: "But clearly the factors in aggravation 

outweigh the factors in mitigation, for whatever that's worth. But I have reviewed all of those 

factors, even if I haven't specifically mentioned them here in court."

¶ 14 In delivering the sentence, the court mentioned that it was "struck by both injuries" in the 

present case. The court pointed out that one of the injuries "could be an injury about which 

nothing can be done." The court found defendant eligible for impact incarceration, but decided 

that such a sentence would "deprecate the seriousness of the two offenses here." The "extent of 

the injuries here" also affected the court's decision not to recommend impact incarceration.

¶ 15 The court reiterated that the State had informed the court that defendant was eligible for 

extended-term sentences on each count. The court sentenced defendant to a term of 51⁄2 years' 

imprisonment on the count of aggravated domestic battery and a term of 4 years' imprisonment 

on the count of aggravated battery. The court found that consecutive sentences were necessary 

to protect the public. 

¶ 16 Defendant subsequently filed a motion to reconsider sentence. In the motion, defendant 

argued that he had been subjected to an improper double enhancement when the sentencing court 

considered the physical injury caused as an aggravating factor. He also argued that the court 

failed to consider, as a mitigating factor, that defendant did not "contemplate that his criminal 

conduct would cause or threaten serious physical harm to another." The court denied the motion. 

¶ 17 On appeal, this court remanded the matter due to an error with the Illinois Supreme Court 
6 

Rule 604(d) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) certificate. People v. Arbuckle, No. 3-12-0285 (Aug. 16, 2012) 

(dispositional order). On remand, defendant was granted leave to file a second motion to 

reconsider sentence. That motion was denied following a hearing. Defendant appeals.

¶ 18 ANALYSIS

¶ 19 I. Extended-Term Eligibility

¶ 20 Defendant argues that he was not eligible for an extended sentence on the count of 

aggravated battery. He contends that a trial court may only impose an extended-term sentence 

for the most serious offense committed during a single course of conduct. Because defendant 

raises this issue for the first time on appeal, he urges that we review the issue under the rubric of 

plain error.

¶ 21 The nonextended permissible sentence range for a Class 3 felony is not less than two and 

not more than five years' imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-40(a) (West 2010). The permissible 

sentencing range for an extended-term eligible defendant convicted of a Class 3 felony is a term 

of not less than 5 and not more than 10 years' imprisonment. Defendant here was sentenced to a 

term of four years' imprisonment, a sentence within the nonextended range. 

¶ 22 A. Plain Error 

¶ 23 To preserve a claim of sentencing error, both a contemporaneous objection and a written 

postsentencing motion raising the issue are required. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 544 

(2010). As defendant has failed to take either of these steps, he has forfeited his claim. As a 

result, we may only review the claim if defendant has established plain error. Id. at 545. 

¶ 24 Our supreme court has clarified on many occasions that the plain error doctrine is a 

narrow and limited exception to the general forfeiture rule. E.g., id.; People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 

2d 167, 177 (2005) (listing supreme court cases holding the same). To obtain relief under the 
7 

plain error exception, a defendant must first demonstrate that a "clear or obvious error" has 

occurred. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). From there, a defendant must 

satisfy one of two prongs. "In the sentencing context, a defendant must then show either that (1) 

the evidence at the sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or (2) the error was so egregious as 

to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing." Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. Should a defendant 

fail to meet his burden at any point, the procedural default must be honored. Id. 

¶ 25 1. Clear or Obvious Error 

¶ 26 The first step in any plain error analysis is determining whether any clear or obvious error 

has occurred. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. In the present matter, defendant contends that the 

trial court's belief that he was eligible for an extended-term sentence for aggravated battery was 

such an error. 

¶ 27 Section 5-8-2(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections governs the imposition of an 

extended-term sentence and provides: 

"A judge shall not sentence an offender to a term of imprisonment 

in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by Article 4.5 of 

Chapter V for an offense or offenses within the class of the most 

serious offense of which the offender was convicted unless the 

factors in aggravation set forth in Section 5-5-3.2 or clause 

(a)(1)(b) of Section 5-8-1 were found to be present." 730 ILCS 

5/5-8-2(a) (West 2010). 

Our supreme court has interpreted this section to mean that "a defendant who is convicted of 

multiple offenses may be sentenced to an extended-term sentence only on those offenses that are 

within the most serious class." People v. Bell, 196 Ill. 2d 343, 350 (2001). Only when charges 
8 

of differing class offenses arise from "unrelated courses of conduct" may a court sentence a 

defendant to extended-term sentences on offenses in different classes. Id. 

¶ 28 The Bell court adopted the "single course of conduct" standard for determining whether a 

defendant is eligible for an extended-term sentence on a lesser charge.1

 Bell, 196 Ill. 2d at 352. 

Under this standard, multiple offenses arise from unrelated courses of conduct—triggering 

extended-term eligibility—when there is a " 'substantial change in the nature of [defendant's] 

criminal objective.' " Id. at 351 (quoting 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1998)). 

¶ 29 Because the issue of defendant's extended-term eligibility was never raised, the record is

not well developed as to whether defendant's actions constituted a single course of conduct. The 

factual basis offered by the State at the plea hearing only established that Reuter was struck

sometime after Zimmerlein had called for help. The State does not contest defendant's assertion 

on appeal that he was not extended-term eligible. We will therefore assume, for the sake of 

argument, that defendant was not extended-term eligible. 

¶ 30 However, assuming that defendant was not extended-term eligible does not end our 

analysis. An error is committed only where it appears that a trial court's misapprehension 

arguably influenced its sentencing decision. People v. Hurley, 277 Ill. App. 3d 684, 687 (1996). 

In the present case, the court informed defendant that he was extended-term eligible at the plea 

hearing. The court's only comment on the subject at sentencing was a reference to the State's

belief that defendant was extended-term eligible. Indeed, despite myriad aggravating factors, the 

court sentenced defendant to a term of imprisonment significantly below the extended-term 

 1

 The standard is the same applied under section 5-8-4 of the Unified Code of Corrections 

to determine the aggregate maximum and minimum sentences when consecutive sentences are 

imposed. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(f)(2) (West 2010).
9 

range—indicative that the court did not consider defendant extended-term eligible.

¶ 31 In People v. Myrieckes, 315 Ill. App. 3d 478 (2000), this court found plain error where 

the trial court was under the mistaken impression that the defendant was extended-term eligible. 

The facts of Myrieckes are distinguishable from those in the case at hand and help illustrate why 

no such error was committed here. In Myrieckes, unlike here, it was plainly clear that the 

defendant was not extended-term eligible: the trial court instructed the defendant that his charges 

raised the possibility of an extended-term sentence if the complainant was " '12 years or under,' " 

while the controlling statute actually read " 'under 12 years of age.' " (Emphasis in original.) Id. 

at 480, 483. Both victims in Myrieckes were precisely 12 years old. Further, at sentencing, the 

court apparently reiterated its belief that the defendant was extended-term eligible. Myrieckes, 

315 Ill. App. 3d 478. The trial court sentenced the defendant to the maximum nonextended term 

of 30 years' imprisonment; the reviewing court, reasoning that it could not be sure whether the 

court's mistaken belief affected the sentence, remanded for resentencing. Id. 

¶ 32 Here however, it is far from clear that the trial court was operating under any mistaken 

impression as to defendant's extended-term eligibility. As discussed supra, the ultimate 

sentences imposed tend to indicate that the court, at the time of sentencing, did not believe 

defendant to be extended-term eligible. That the court found consecutive sentences necessary, 

yet still sentenced defendant within the nonextended range, further evidences this point. And 

unlike in Myrieckes, we can be reasonably sure that even if the court here did believe that 

defendant was extended-term eligible, this mistaken belief did not affect the sentencing decision. 

We find that the trial court did not commit any "clear or obvious" error. 

¶ 33 2. Second Prong of Plain Error 
10 

¶ 34 Even if the trial court erroneously believed defendant to be extended-term eligible, it 

would not rise to the level of plain error. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a) allows that "Plain 

errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to 

the attention of the trial court." Our supreme court has held this rule provides criminal 

defendants with two possible avenues for relief with respect to unpreserved errors. See 

Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565; see also Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 178 ("The plain-error doctrine, as it 

has developed in Illinois, allows a reviewing court to reach a forfeited error affecting substantial 

rights in two circumstances.").

¶ 35 Under the first prong of the plain error doctrine, a reviewing court may address an 

otherwise forfeited issue when a defendant shows that "a clear or obvious error occurred and the 

evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against 

the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error." Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. In the 

context of sentencing, this prong is satisfied when a defendant demonstrates that the evidence at 

a sentencing hearing was closely balanced. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. In the present case, 

defendant does not contend that the evidence at sentencing was closely balanced and does not 

assert that the issue of his extended-term eligibility is reviewable pursuant to this first prong.

¶ 36 Our supreme court has held that the second prong of the plain error doctrine is triggered 

where "the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged 

the integrity of the judicial process." Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187; see also Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 

at 565 (using the same language). The court has referred to this as the "substantial rights" prong. 

Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186. At sentencing, the second prong is triggered where "the error was so 

egregious as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing hearing." Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. 

¶ 37 In recent years, the supreme court has elaborated on the meaning of the second prong of 
11 

plain error analysis, equating the second prong with the concept of "structural error." People v. 

Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613-14 (2010). In Thompson, the court described a structural error as 

one which erodes the integrity of the judicial process and undermines the fairness of a trial—

language almost identical to the court's formulation of the second prong of plain error. Id. More 

recently, the court has simply held that "[i]n order to obtain relief [under the second prong of 

plain error], defendant must demonstrate not only that a clear or obvious error occurred 

[citation], but that the error was a structural error." People v. Eppinger, 2013 IL 114121, ¶ 19. 

Errors such as denial of counsel, trial before a biased judge, denial of self-representation at trial, 

and trial by a biased jury fall into the category of a "structural error." Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 

608-09 (listing cases of structural error).

¶ 38 Defendant relies primarily on Myrieckes, 315 Ill. App. 3d 478, in arguing that the present 

issue is reviewable under the second prong of plain error. While Myrieckes is distinguishable on 

its facts from the present case, that court's decision that the error committed triggered secondprong plain error analysis is relevant here. On appeal in that case, the State argued that the issue 

of defendant's extended-term eligibility had been waived. The court decided that it could be 

reviewed under plain error: "[B]ased upon our review of the record in this case, we find that a 

substantial right of defendant has been affected. [Citation.] Therefore, we will review the 

alleged error under the plain error doctrine." Id. at 483. In Hurley, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 686, the 

Second District found the same error reviewable under similar facts. Defendant contends that, 

"[f]ollowing the reasoning in Myrieckes," the issue of the court's misapprehension of his 

extended-term eligibility is reviewable under the second prong of plain error. 

¶ 39 Neither Myrieckes and Hurley, however, offers any justification for the finding that the 

issue was reviewable. In each case, the courts baldly assert that the trial court's mistaken belief 
12 

affected a substantial right of the defendants. Neither court explained how the trial court's error 

affected the fairness of the proceedings or challenged the integrity of the judicial process. 

Indeed, following Herron, the mere affecting of a substantial right is not a justification for 

review under the second prong. See Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177 (finding that plain error doctrine 

"is not 'a general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting substantial rights' " 

(quoting People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 (1978))). To the extent that Myrieckes is applicable to 

the case at hand, we refuse to follow it and find that the error in this case does not trigger review 

under the second prong of plain error. 

¶ 40 The court here sentenced defendant within the standard sentencing range for a Class 3 

felony. In fact, defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment well within that range. 

Despite the numerous aggravating factors identified by the court, including multiple prior 

convictions for domestic battery and a Class 2 burglary conviction, the court sentenced defendant 

only to a term of four years' imprisonment. This term of imprisonment is one year (or 20%) less 

than the maximum nonextended sentence. Given the restraint shown by the trial court, we 

cannot find that its belief that defendant was extended-term eligible "was so egregious as to deny 

the defendant a fair sentencing hearing." Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. 

¶ 41 It is also important to point out that Myrieckes and Hurley were decided 14 and 18 years 

ago, respectively, and plain error jurisprudence has evolved significantly in the intervening 

years. Only in the last five years has our supreme court clarified that the second prong of plain 

error should be equated with the concept of structural error. Structural errors tend to be those 

egregious errors where a fundamental right has been violated, such as the right to counsel. While 

any error in a criminal trial may be said to affect a "substantial right"—the defendant's right to 

freedom—the supreme court has significantly narrowed the second prong by holding that only 
13 

structural errors constitute plain error. A court's belief that a defendant is extended-term 

eligible—where the defendant is ultimately sentenced to a term of imprisonment well within the 

nonextended range—does not rise to the intolerable level of structural error.

¶ 42 Finally, we must heed our supreme court's advice that the plain error doctrine is to be 

invoked only in limited circumstances. "A fair trial *** is different from a perfect trial[,]" and 

plain error should not act as a general saving clause. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177. Indeed, plain 

error is a narrow path to relief, narrowed even further by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) 

(eff. Feb. 6, 2013), which requires a defendant who pleads guilty to file certain postsentence 

motions to perfect any appeal. To find second-prong plain error in the situation here presented 

would be to completely undermine the requirements of contemporaneous objection and 

postsentencing motion, including those requirements codified in Supreme Court Rule 604(d). It 

would turn the plain-error exception into a general saving clause. If any error were committed in

this case, it would not constitute plain error; we will honor defendant's forfeiture. 

¶ 43 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

¶ 44 Defendant also argues that the assistance he received from counsel was ineffective for 

counsel's failure to raise the issue of defendant's extended-term eligibility. Whether counsel 

provided ineffective assistance turns on the well established two-pronged test of Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). See also People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526-27 

(1984) (adopting the Strickland test in Illinois). To establish that counsel was ineffective, a 

defendant must show that: (1) counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable; and (2) the 

defendant suffered prejudice as a result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The failure to satisfy either 

prong of the Strickland test precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. 

Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 135 (2007). 
14 

¶ 45 To satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must demonstrate that 

there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In the present case, 

defendant would have to show that, had counsel objected to the proposition that defendant was 

extended-term eligible, a reasonable probability exists that defendant would have received a 

lesser sentence. Defendant has not met that burden. 

¶ 46 Defendant used a broken golf club to stab Reuter, who had come to her friend's aid. For 

this, defendant was sentenced only to a term of four years' imprisonment. This was despite a list 

of aggravating factors that the trial court found to greatly outnumber any mitigating factors. As 

discussed supra, the four-year sentence was not in the extended range, nor was it even the 

maximum allowable sentence within the standard sentencing range. We find no reasonable 

probability that the trial court could have been any more lenient in its sentencing. 

¶ 47 II. Great Bodily Harm

¶ 48 Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in considering the harm done to 

Zimmerlein as an aggravating factor at sentencing. Because "great bodily harm" is a necessary 

element of aggravated domestic battery,2

 defendant argues, consideration of the harm as an 

aggravating factor serves as an improper double enhancement. Whether a court relied on an 

improper factor at sentencing is a question of law that we review de novo. People v. Mauricio, 

2014 IL App (2d) 121340, ¶ 15. The weight given to any aggravating factor, however, is a 

 2

 Aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West 2010)) is committed when 

"[a] person who, in committing a domestic battery, intentionally or knowingly causes great 

bodily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement." 
15 

matter of the trial court's sound discretion, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that 

discretion. See People v. Gooch, 2014 IL App (5th) 120161, ¶ 11. 

¶ 49 In People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256 (1986), our supreme court addressed this issue 

directly. The court stated:

"Certain criminal conduct may warrant a harsher penalty than other 

conduct, even though both are technically punishable under the 

same statute. Likewise, the commission of any offense, regardless 

of whether the offense itself deals with harm, can have varying 

degrees of harm or threatened harm. The legislature clearly and 

unequivocally intended that this varying quantum of harm may 

constitute an aggravating factor." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 269. 

Furthermore, the court found: 

"[T]he severity of the sentence depends upon the degree of harm

caused to the victim and as such may be considered as an 

aggravating factor in determining the exact length of a particular 

sentence, even in cases where serious bodily harm is arguably 

implicit in the offense for which a defendant is convicted." 

(Emphases in original.) Id.

¶ 50 The Saldivar court nevertheless found that the trial court, in sentencing the defendant for 

voluntary manslaughter, improperly considered the death of the victim as an aggravating factor. 

Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d at 272. Defendant relies on the result in Saldivar, rather than the supreme 

court's expression of the law, in making his argument here.
16 

¶ 51 Saldivar, however, is distinguishable from the case at bar, just as the offense of voluntary 

manslaughter is distinguishable from aggravated domestic battery. The offense of voluntary 

manslaughter is plainly one in which the harm caused—that is, death of the victim—does not 

occur in varying degrees. Great bodily harm, on the other hand, can certainly exist in varying 

degrees. There is great bodily harm and then there is great bodily harm.

¶ 52 Apparently recognizing that "great bodily harm" may come in varying degrees, defendant 

argues that the harm he caused in the present case is not of a sufficient degree to merit 

consideration at sentencing. Defendant cites to People v. Rader, 272 Ill. App. 3d 796, 808 

(1995), in support of the proposition that injuries must "far exceed" the statutory definition of 

great bodily harm in order to be properly considered as an aggravating factor. In Rader, the 

victim suffered from legal blindness, loss of hearing, partial paralysis, brain damage, and 

seizures.

¶ 53 We agree that the degree of great bodily harm must rise above a baseline level before a 

court may consider the harm as an aggravating factor. We do not agree, however, that the 

grievous injuries suffered by the victim in Rader somehow sets this standard. In the present 

case, defendant shattered Zimmerlein's arm with a golf club. Zimmerlein's own description of 

the injury, confirmed by medical reports, was graphic and compelling. The bone had failed to 

mend despite extensive treatment and therapy. Zimmerlein suffered from continued pain that 

affected her on a day-to-day basis, and the injury still required further surgery. The court's 

finding that Zimmerlein's injury constituted a degree of harm beyond what is required to fall 

under the aggravated domestic battery statute was neither an abuse of discretion, nor against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 54 III. Mitigating Factors
17 

¶ 55 Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred by ignoring certain mitigating factors 

at sentencing, resulting in an excessive sentence. Specifically, defendant argues that the court 

failed to consider that defendant did not contemplate that his conduct would cause physical 

harm, nor did it consider his employment history or family ties. Defendant asks that we reduce 

his "excessive" sentence.

¶ 56 A trial court has broad discretion in sentencing a criminal defendant, and its sentencing 

decisions are given great deference. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). Such 

deference is necessary because the trial court is in a far better position than the reviewing court 

to weigh certain factors. " 'The trial judge has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the 

defendant's credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, 

and age. [Citations.] Consequently, the reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that 

of the trial court merely because it would have weighed these factors differently.' " Id. at 213 

(quoting People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000)). "A sentence will be deemed an abuse of 

discretion where the sentence is 'greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or 

manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.' " Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212 (quoting 

Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 210). 

¶ 57 "There is a presumption that a trial court considered all relevant factors in determining a 

sentence, and that presumption will not be overcome without explicit evidence from the record 

that the trial court did not consider mitigating factors." People v. Flores, 404 Ill. App. 3d 155, 

158 (2010). In the present case, defendant is unable to make such a showing. The trial court 

stated explicitly that it had reviewed all reports, statements, and the PSI. It also reviewed all 

factors in aggravation and mitigation, including those which it did not single out for extended 
18 

discussion at the sentencing hearing. Each of the mitigating factors defendant identifies here as 

being ignored were, in fact, covered in the trial court's review. 

¶ 58 We also note that defendant argues that his problems with alcohol should be considered 

in mitigation, as his intoxication at the time of the batteries prohibited him from contemplating 

the harm that he was inflicting. Alcohol abuse, however, may be properly be considered as an 

aggravating factor. People v. Scott, 225 Ill. App. 3d 938, 941 (1992) ("A defendant's history of 

alcoholism may also be considered as evidence that his conduct is likely to recur."). Further, 

though defendant claimed his alcohol-induced hallucinations caused him to think he was 

protecting his girlfriend, he still knew that swinging the golf club would cause serious harm. The 

hallucination would merely tend to justify or excuse his actions, a mitigating factor the court did

discuss.

¶ 59 CONCLUSION

¶ 60 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Bureau County is affirmed.

¶ 61 Affirmed. 

¶ 62 JUSTICE LYTTON, specially concurring.

¶ 63 I concur in the judgment affirming defendant's sentence because the trial court did not 

commit error in sentencing defendant, even though the court mistakenly believed defendant was 

extended-term eligible. However, I write separately to indicate my concern with the majority's 

implied position that where the defendant is not sentenced to an extended term, enhancedeligibility sentencing errors do not fall into the category of a "structural error." See Thompson, 

238 Ill. 2d at 608-09. 

¶ 64 In People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173 (2009), our supreme court defined a "structural 

error" as "a systemic error which serves to 'erode the integrity of the judicial process and 
19 

undermine the fairness of the defendant's trial.' " Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 197-98 (quoting Herron, 

215 Ill. 2d at 186). The sentencing issue here was not error, but enhanced-eligibility sentencing 

errors may be systemic, structural errors, reviewable under plain error. See People v. McBride, 

395 Ill. App. 3d 204, 208 (2009) (improper increase in sentencing in a matter affecting 

substantial rights); People v. Lindsay, 247 Ill. App. 3d 518, 535 (1993) (court imposed an 

unauthorized extended-term sentence reviewable under plain error); People v. Fuergeson, 132 

Ill. 2d 86, 99 (1989) (imposition of an extended-term sentence constituted improper double 

enhancement subject to plain error review). I do not agree with the majority's assertion that in 

light of recent "structural error" case law, issues involving improper consideration of enhancedsentencing eligibility, in which substantial rights are impacted, are not reviewable under the 

second prong of plain error. 

¶ 65 In Myrieckes and Hurley, the trial court mistakenly believed that the defendant was 

extended-term eligible. In both cases, the appellate court determine that a substantial right of the 

defendant had been affected and that it was necessary to remand for resentencing because the 

reviewing court could not say with certainty that the improper factor (the court's 

misapprehension as to extended-term sentencing eligibility) did not affect the sentence imposed. 

Myrieckes, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 483; Hurley, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 686. 

¶ 66 Here, the trial court's statements at the sentencing hearing demonstrated that the trial 

court sentenced defendant based on the nature and seriousness of the two crimes, particularly the 

seriousness of the injury to Zimmerlein. The court mentioned the State's argument that 

defendant was extended-term eligible, but did not rely on that factor in determining an 

appropriate sentence for each offense. By contrast, in Myrieckes and Hurley, the court's 

misapprehension that the defendant was extended-term eligible could not be ruled out as a factor 
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that may have been considered in sentencing. Consideration of such a factor, even if the 

defendant is not sentenced to an extended term, serves to erode the integrity of the judicial 

process. See People v. Conover, 84 Ill. 2d 400 (1981); see also Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186. We 

may be presented with other cases in which the trial court's misapprehension as to extended-term 

eligibility was a factor that influenced the sentencing decision, or at least arguably so, although 

the defendant was sentenced to a nonextended term. In such cases, the holdings in Myrieckes

and Hurley are still good law and should be followed.