SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1671-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LAWRENCE W. LAPCZYNSKI,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Argued January 6, 2022 – Decided March 9, 2022

Before Judges Alvarez, Mawla, and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 18-02-

0178.

Elizabeth C. Jarit, Deputy Public Defender, argued the 

cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, attorney; Elizabeth C. Jarit, of counsel and 

on the briefs).

Lila B. Leonard, Deputy Attorney General, argued the 

cause for respondent (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting 

Attorney General, attorney; Lila B. Leonard, of counsel 

and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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PER CURIAM

After defendant Lawrence Lapczynski's motion to suppress evidence

seized without a warrant was denied, he pled guilty to the only charge against 

him, third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b). 

On November 18, 2019, the Law Division judge sentenced him to three days' 

time served and parole supervision for life, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4. Defendant 

appeals the denial of the motion. We affirm.

The following is drawn from the testimony and exhibits introduced during 

the suppression hearing. Before defendant's arrest, he and Justin Obuch had 

been roommates for approximately seven years, first in an apartment, and then 

in Obuch's house. Defendant paid Obuch rent and initially lived upstairs. As 

members of Obuch's family moved in, including his wife and child, defendant 

relocated to the basement. He shared the common areas of the house, such as 

the kitchen and the upstairs bathroom. Defendant created office space for 

himself in the shared basement laundry room and maintained his computers 

there.

The router for the home internet, listed under Obuch's name, was 

connected to defendant's desktop computer. Obuch, who worked in IT, used

defendant's computer to maintain the internet system and troubleshoot any 
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problems. Defendant acknowledged leaving his desktop computer screen open, 

and that others could have accessed the computer. 

On the day in question, Obuch went downstairs to work on the internet 

connection because the home system was down. While making the adjustments, 

Obuch opened a folder on defendant's screen labeled "pictures." He found a 

trove of pornographic images of underage adolescents and children, some 1,725

pages in all. Obuch viewed only a few of the photos, called his wife, and 

immediately called police. When the officers arrived, Obuch led them 

downstairs to show them the pictures. The two officers asked Obuch to show 

them what he had seen. After viewing approximately five photographs, they 

instructed Obuch to stop.

Defendant was away on business that weekend. Obuch could not recall 

whether he obtained defendant's permission before using his computer on three 

or four past occasions, including this instance. When Obuch asked the officers 

how he should explain the fact police had taken defendant's computer and related 

devices, they told him to make up a story. Defendant, who the motion judge 

found not credible, claimed Obuch told him the police had arrived unannounced 

with a warrant. Obuch acknowledged he might have said as much, but because

two years had passed, he simply could not remember.
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Police asked defendant to come to the station for questioning upon his 

return. The record does not indicate whether police transported him or he drove 

himself. He was not handcuffed. At 9:50 in the morning, Detective George 

Stilwell of the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office and Detective Robert Wei 

of the Piscataway Police Department conducted the recorded interview, which 

the judge watched during the suppression hearing.

The officers began by reading defendant his Miranda1rights, which 

defendant waived. Stilwell asked defendant about the child pornography on his 

computer: "it's a matter of, you know, you explaining what it's doing there." 

Defendant responded: "I would imagine -- I don't want to call it that, but I would 

call it, you know, teen underage, you know, artistic stuff. And the -- I guess I've 

got a problem. I guess I -- I (indiscernible) did it for a while." Defendant denied 

sharing the materials or having "do[ne] anything." Defendant then added, "[i]t's 

just -- it's a fantasy." Stilwell responded that if defendant "need[ed] some type 

of help, I mean, that is -- that's the first -- you know, that's the first step."

The officers inquired about websites, forums, and whether others were 

involved. Stilwell said: "You know, through this, maybe, you know, we can 

get you some help, maybe. . . . [Y]ou can, you know, seek some help, like that. 

1

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Right now, if -- I'm going to ask you for consent to go through your 

computers[.]" Stilwell explained the consent would include all of defendant's 

devices. Stilwell left the room for a few minutes, and upon his return asked 

whether defendant had ever gotten images from the "dark web," about his high 

school coaching, and whether he spent "private time" with his nieces and 

nephews. Defendant insisted his activities were limited to the possession of 

pornographic material and that it was a "private fetish." He acknowledged that 

the internet at the home, and the IP address, were under Obuch's name.

Stilwell left the interview room a second time to obtain the consent form. 

The detective had defendant read the following language out loud before signing

the form:

Having been . . . informed of my constitutional 

rights, first, that I may require that a search warrant be 

obtained prior to any search being made; second, that I 

may refuse to consent to any search; third, that anything 

which may be found as a result of a search which is 

subject to seizure and can and will be seized and used 

against me in a criminal prosecution; fourth, that I may 

revoke my consent to search at any time; fifth, that I 

may consult with anyone of my choosing before I make 

a decision to waive my rights by consenting to this 

search. I hereby authorize a complete search of the 

property under my control described as -- listed.

At 10:42 a.m., defendant signed the consent.
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At the suppression hearing, defendant testified he only signed the consent 

because Obuch told him the police had a warrant. He had therefore assumed 

signing the form was not important. 

Now, on appeal, defendant raises the following points:

POINT I

THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE 

DEFENDANT'S PERSONAL COMPUTER BY THE 

LANDLORD AT THE DIRECTION OF THE POLICE 

VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND 

ARTICLE I, PARAGRAPH 7, REQUIRING 

SUPPRESSION.

A. The State conducted a warrantless search of 

[defendant's] personal computer where no 

exception to the warrant requirement applied.

B. The later-signed consent form did not purge the 

taint of the unlawful search and seizure.

POINT II

SUPPRESSION IS ALTERNATIVELY REQUIRED 

BECAUSE THE CONSENT PROVIDED TO 

CONDUCT A FORENSIC SEARCH OF THE 

COMPUTER EQUIPMENT WAS NEITHER 

KNOWING NOR VOLUNTARY WHERE THE 

POLICE FRAMED THE CONSENT AS A STEP 

TOWARDS GETTING THE DEFENDANT "HELP" 

AND WHERE THE DEFENDANT BELIEVED THE 

POLICE ALREADY HAD A WARRANT TO 

SEARCH HIS PROPERTY.
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I.

Appellate courts reviewing motions to suppress defer to trial courts' 

factual findings if "supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." 

State v. Jessup, 441 N.J. Super. 386, 389 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting State v. 

Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015)). But whether those facts "satisfy the 

applicable legal standard is a question of law subject to plenary review on 

appeal." Id. at 389-90 (quoting State v. Cleveland, 371 N.J. Super. 286, 295 

(App. Div. 2004)). We review legal conclusions de novo. Id. at 390.

Police may only search pursuant to a warrant or an exception to the 

warrant requirement. State v. DeLuca, 168 N.J. 626, 631 (2001). The State 

must meet that burden by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Elders, 192 

N.J. 224, 246 (2007). Where unlawful police misconduct occurs, evidence is 

suppressed. In re J.A., 233 N.J. 432, 446-47 (2018); see also State v. Hamlett, 

449 N.J. Super. 159, 176 (App. Div. 2017).

Both the federal and New Jersey constitutions enshrine an objectively 

reasonable expectation of privacy. See State v. Hinton, 216 N.J. 211, 236 

(2013). "[A] policeman does not trespass when he enters the common areas [of 

a multi-resident dwelling] in discharge of his duties." State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 

481, 496 (1962); see also State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 209 (2002) (Johnson 
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I) ("none of the occupants [of a multi-occupancy premises] can have a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in areas that are also used by other 

occupants.").

Defendant does not challenge the mere presence of the police in the shared 

laundry room. Instead, he contends his computer's mere presence in the laundry 

room did not justify police intrusion into its contents. He also contends Obuch 

had no right to show police the "pictures" folder.

The rule against unreasonable searches and seizures, however, only 

applies to state action. In re J.A., 233 N.J. at 451-52. A private person acting 

"as an arm of the police" may be treated as a state actor for constitutional 

purposes. Id. at 452 (quoting State v. Scrotsky, 39 N.J. 410, 416 (1963)). In 

contrast, a private person who independently obtains a defendant's property and 

gives it to police is not a state actor, and such evidence need not be suppressed. 

Ibid.

The court must exclude evidence obtained by a private party's search and 

seizure when "the government ha[d] pre[-]knowledge of and yet acquiesce[d] 

in" a search that the government "could not have undertaken" itself. State v. 

Sanders, 185 N.J. Super. 258, 265 (App. Div. 1982) (quoting United States v. 

Clegg, 509 F.2d 605, 609 (5th Cir. 1975)). "[W]here [government] officials 
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actively participate in a search being conducted by private parties or else stand 

by watching with approval as the search continues, [government] authorities are 

clearly implicated in the search and it must comport with [constitutional] 

requirements." Id. at 266 (quoting United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 

1327 (5th Cir. 1975)).

Further, "the private search doctrine cannot apply to private dwellings." 

State v. Wright, 221 N.J. 456, 476 (2015). And generally, "a landlord does not 

have the authority to consent to a search of a tenant's private living space." Ibid. 

The private search doctrine recognizes the "special status of the home under 

federal and state constitutional law . . . ." Id. at 477. "If private parties tell the 

police about unlawful activities inside a person's home, the police can use that 

information to establish probable cause and seek a search warrant." Id. at 478. 

"But law enforcement cannot accept a landlord's invitation to enter a home 

without a warrant unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies." Ibid. 

However, Wright does not "cast doubt on the private search or third-party 

intervention doctrine in its original form. When the police reexamine property 

that has been searched by a private actor and presented to law enforcement in a 

non-residential context, neither the Fourth Amendment nor the State 

Constitution requires a warrant." Id. at 479.
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Where a private actor performed the initial search, police may perform a 

subsequent search that "does not exceed the scope of the private search" so long 

as the police do not violate any constitutional privacy right "that had not already 

been frustrated as a result of the private conduct." State v. Shaw, 237 N.J. 588,

608 (2019) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 126 (1984)).

"A co-habitant who possesses common authority over or has a sufficient 

relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected may voluntarily 

consent to a lawful search." State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 315 (2014). 

The authority which justifies the third-party consent 

does not rest upon the law of property, with its 

attendant historical and legal refinements[,] but rests 

rather on mutual use of the property by persons 

generally having joint access or control for most 

purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any 

of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the 

inspection in his own right and that the others have 

assumed the risk that one of their number might permit 

the common area to be searched.

[Id. at 316 (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 

164, 171 n.7 (1974)).]

Obuch did not function as a state actor by opening the child pornography 

file and contacting law enforcement. He wanted to turn responsibility for the 

images over to police. The officers did not ask him to open the computer to 

perform the initial search; defendant allowed Obuch to use the computer. Police
11 A-1671-19

viewed no more than the photographs Obuch had already seen. Even if this 

constituted a search, it did not exceed the boundaries of what Obuch had already 

observed. 

Furthermore, Obuch had sufficient authority over his roommate's 

computer to consent to the officers' search. Defendant's computer controlled the 

home's internet, and Obuch had previously accessed it without incident for 

maintenance. The computer was left open without password protection. 

Additionally, the folder containing the materials lacked password protection.

Defendant therefore assumed the risk his crime would be discovered. His

actions led Obuch to believe he had the right to be in that common area and 

exercise control over the computer. And it is unsurprising that a person using 

another's computer would look at the contents.

Defendant and Obuch's relationship went beyond that of landlord and 

tenant. They had been roommates and friends for years. Defendant kept his 

computer open, which meant anyone could use it. Because he made the device 

available to others in the home, defendant had no objectively reasonable 

expectation of privacy. If such a reasonable expectation of privacy existed, 

which it did not, the home's other occupants—Obuch specifically—could waive 

his rights.
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Wright's restrictions do not apply to this search. Defendant's computer 

sat in a common space and could be freely accessed by Obuch when necessary. 

Therefore, it was constitutionally permissible for police to view the photographs 

Obuch had already seen. The search was lawful.

II.

Defendant challenges the validity of the consent to search on two grounds. 

First, he claims the illegal search could not be made lawful by virtue of the later 

consent. Second, he contends the consent was not knowing or voluntary because

the police "framed [it] as a step towards getting the defendant 'help' and where 

the defendant believed the police already had a warrant to search . . . ." Since 

we have found that the police constitutionally viewed the contents of the 

computer, we address only the voluntariness of defendant's written consent.

Consent is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973); State v. Coles, 218 

N.J. 322, 337 (2014). Consent searches "are afforded a higher level of scrutiny" 

under New Jersey law than federal law. State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 639 (2002). 

Namely, the State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

consenting defendant acted knowingly and voluntarily and "knew that he or she 

'had a choice in the matter.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 354 
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(1975) (Johnson II)). Courts must examine the "totality of the circumstances" 

to determine whether a finding of consent is "supported by sufficient credible 

evidence in the record." Shaw, 237 N.J. at 619. Specifically, the following 

factors tend to indicate coerced consent:

(1) that consent was made by an individual already 

arrested; (2) that consent was obtained despite a denial 

of guilt; (3) that consent was obtained only after the 

accused had refused initial requests for consent to 

search; (4) that consent was given where the subsequent 

search resulted in a seizure of contraband which the 

accused must have known would be discovered; [and] 

(5) that consent was given while the defendant was 

handcuffed.

[State v. Hagans, 233 N.J. 30, 39 (2018) (alteration in 

original) (quoting State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53 

(1965)).]

In contrast, the following factors tend to indicate that consent was given 

voluntarily: "(1) that consent was given where the accused had reason to believe 

that the police would find no contraband; (2) that the defendant admitted his 

guilt before consent; [and] (3) that the defendant affirmatively assisted the 

police officers." Id. at 39-40 (alteration in original) (quoting King, 44 N.J. at 

353). Both sets of factors are mere "guideposts," and no one factor is 

dispositive. Id. at 40.
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"[F]alse promises of leniency" that could "overbear a suspect's will" may 

also indicate coerced consent. State v. L.H., 239 N.J. 22, 44 (2019). The 

promise must undermine the defendant's ability to choose for himself so as to 

render his consent involuntary. Id. at 45. Additionally, "[o]nce a search has 

begun, there is no effective right to refuse. Therefore, consent given after the 

search has begun is neither voluntary nor meaningful." Hornberger v. Am. 

Broad. Cos., 351 N.J. Super. 577, 600 (App. Div. 2002).

Defendant's claim the consent was not knowing or voluntary is not 

supported by the record. Defendant admitted possessing child pornography 

before Stillwell ever suggested getting "help" for defendant's "problem." In 

other words, defendant incriminated himself long before the suggestion of 

getting help, which in turn was made well before defendant signed the consent.

Nor were the officers' statements coercive. It bears noting that the officers 

did not offer to obtain the help for defendant; they merely suggested he could 

get help for himself. When asked for written consent, defendant immediately 

agreed. He knew that police already possessed the damning materials. 

Additionally, the officers thoroughly reviewed the consent form with defendant, 

even asking him to read it out loud.
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Defendant also contends he only signed the written consent because he 

believed the police had obtained a warrant. This too lacks support in the record. 

The judge specifically found defendant incredible when he testified Obuch told 

him that officers had come with a warrant. Obuch, whom the judge found 

credible, only recalled that the officers told him he could lie about the reason

the devices were missing. Although Obuch said it was possible he told 

defendant the officers had a warrant, it is wholly speculative to conclude 

defendant's consent was given under that misapprehension. It seems selfevident that if the officers already had a warrant, they would not have asked

defendant for consent.

Thus, the detectives who interviewed defendant did not deceive him about 

having a warrant or getting him "help" in exchange for the consent to search. 

There is nothing coercive or deceitful about the circumstances in which 

defendant signed the written consent. From the inception of the interview,

defendant eagerly answered questions and appeared willing to cooperate with 

the investigation.

Affirmed.