Opinion issued April 21, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

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NO. 01-15-00288-CR

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EX PARTE KEITH WILSON GOODSON, Appellant

On Appeal from the 184th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1457737

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an appeal from a bail proceeding. See TEX. R. APP. P. 31. Appellant 

Keith Wilson Goodson has been charged with the felony offense of theft over 

$200,000. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §31.03(e)(7) (West Supp. 2014). Pretrial 

bail was initially set at $5 million, and Goodson filed an application for writ of 

habeas corpus seeking bail reduction. Prior to the hearing on the habeas 
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application, the trial court reduced bail to $750,000. Following the hearing, the 

court denied Goodson’s application for writ of habeas corpus and bail remained at 

$750,000. Goodson appeals from the denial of his application for writ of habeas 

corpus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 31. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion and therefore affirm.

Background

Goodson was charged with stealing $2,790,000 in checks from his employer 

and depositing them into his personal bank account. According to the State, 

Goodson partially admitted to the theft in a statement obtained as part of his 

employer’s investigation and later admitted to the theft in a voluntary statement 

obtained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; however, none of the money has 

been recovered. Bail initially was set at $5 million. Goodson filed an application 

for writ of habeas corpus claiming that he “has only minimal financial resources” 

and requesting that bail be reduced to an amount between $20,000 and $100,000. 

Prior to the hearing on the application, the trial court reduced bail to $750,000. 

Although Goodson did not testify at the hearing on his application, he presented 

testimony from his wife and a bail bondsman to argue that the bail amount should 

be reduced. In arguing that the bail amount was proper, the State provided 

testimony from a fraud examiner and introduced evidence demonstrating, among 

other things, over $117,000 in purchases from Goodson’s account as well as 
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$526,246.48 in unaccounted cash withdrawals from January 2007 to February 

2014.

Goodson first presented testimony from Woodley Fisher, a licensed bail 

bondsman. Fisher testified that: (1) Goodson would only qualify for a bond of 

about $75,000, based on the information from his wife and additional cosigners,

(2) he did not believe that Goodson was a flight risk, and (3) he has never issued a 

$750,000 bond in Harris County. On cross-examination, Fisher testified that he 

was not aware of certain other bank accounts identified by the State as being held 

by Goodson and admitted that his opinion on the appropriate bail amount would 

change if Goodson has $500,000 in cash that has not been accounted for in any of 

the records provided to Fisher.

Goodson then presented testimony from his wife, Misti, who testified that 

she does not believe her husband is a flight risk because: (1) he has lived in 

Houston his entire life, (2) he is actively involved with his three children, and (3) 

he is currently employed and is the sole source of his family’s income. She further 

testified that Goodson could not post bail at $750,000, but could post a bond, with 

help from family members, if the amount was reduced to $75,000. On crossexamination, Misti testified that she does not know what happened to the 

$526,246.48 in cash withdrawals and did not know about specified large purchases 

from the account. She further testified on cross-examination that: (1) Goodson
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handled the family’s finances while she took care of the household, (2) they 

currently have three cars, an ATV, a recreational vehicle, and a house appraised at 

$230,000, (3) they added a pool and installed hardwood floors to their home, (4) 

over the years, they have sold their boat, motorcycles, jet skis, 4-wheelers, and a 

second house, and (5) they have traveled outside of the country.

The State presented testimony from Brian Quijano, a fraud examiner with 

the Harris County District Attorney’s Office, who reviewed records from 

Goodson’s bank account. Quijano prepared exhibits that were introduced into 

evidence identifying $2,250,886.40 in unauthorized checks deposited by Goodson 

into his account from January 2007 to February 2014 and $526,246.48 in cash 

withdrawals during the same time period. Quijano testified that people who steal 

large amounts of money sometimes store cash, and there is no way to determine 

with certainty whether such defendants have a large amount stored away. In 

reviewing Goodson’s account, Quijano found evidence of potential other 

unidentified accounts. On this point, the State introduced evidence of wire transfers

from Goodson’s account to other accounts with different financial institutions, 

including one which indicated purpose of the transfer was “[s]ending to self.” On 

cross-examination, Quijano admitted that these accounts could be either bank 

accounts or loans. Finally, the State introduced into evidence a list of purchases 

from Goodson’s account for certain “large items.” Quijano testified that he was 
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able to verify these purchases in the Goodson’s account records and that the 

purchases totaled over $117,000, suggesting assets of that amount.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the writ of habeas corpus 

and held that the bail remained at $750,000. Goodson filed a timely notice of 

appeal.

Analysis

An applicant seeking a writ of habeas corpus bears the burden of proving 

facts that would entitle him to relief and ensuring that a sufficient record is 

presented to show error requiring reversal. See Ex parte Kimes, 872 S.W.2d 700, 

703–04 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). In reviewing the trial court’s order, we view the 

facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and we uphold the ruling 

absent an abuse of discretion. See Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2006).

Both the federal and state constitutions prohibit excessive bail. The Eighth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Excessive bail shall 

not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 

inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see also id., amend. XIV; Schilb v. Kuebel, 

404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S. Ct. 479, 484 (1971) (applying Eighth Amendment 

prohibition of excessive bail to the States). Likewise, the Bill of Rights contained 

within the Texas Constitution provides that “[a]ll prisoners shall be bailable by 
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sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses, when the proof is evident; but this 

provision shall not be so construed as to prevent bail after indictment found upon 

examination of the evidence, in such manner as may be prescribed by law.” TEX.

CONST. art. I, § 11. The Texas Bill of Rights further specifies that “Excessive bail 

shall not be required . . . .” Id., art. I, § 13.

The primary purpose for setting bail is to secure the presence of the 

defendant in court at his trial. See Ex parte Vasquez, 558 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1977); Golden v. State, 288 S.W.3d 516, 519 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d). The amount of bail should be set sufficiently high to 

give reasonable assurance that the accused will comply with the undertaking, but 

should not be set so high as to be an instrument of oppression. See Ex parte Bufkin, 

553 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Montalvo v. State, 315 S.W.3d 588, 

593 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.).

When reviewing a trial court’s determination regarding the amount of bail 

set, appellate courts apply an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Ex parte Rubac, 

611 S.W.2d 848, 849–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (reviewing bail pending appeal 

for abuse of discretion); Montalvo, 315 S.W.3d at 592; Cooley v. State, 232 

S.W.3d 228, 233 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). In the exercise of 

its discretion, a trial court should consider the following factors set forth in 
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Article 17.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure in setting a defendant’s bail 

before trial:

1. The bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the 

undertaking will be complied with.

2. The power to require bail is not to be so used as to make it an instrument 

of oppression.

3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was 

committed are to be considered.

4. The ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken upon 

this point.

5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the community 

shall be considered.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15 (West Supp. 2014); see Ludwig v. State, 

812 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Montalvo, 315 S.W.3d at 592. In 

addition to these factors, courts should also consider the defendant’s work record, 

family ties, residency, criminal record, conformity with previous bond conditions, 

and aggravating factors involved in the offense. See Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 

849–50; Montalvo, 315 S.W.3d at 596.

A defendant carries the burden of proof to establish that bail is excessive. 

See Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849; In re Hulin, 31 S.W.3d 754, 759 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.). In reviewing a trial court’s ruling for an 

abuse of discretion, an appellate court will not intercede as long as the trial court’s 

ruling is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Cooley, 232 S.W.3d at 

234; Ex parte Beard, 92 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d) 
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(citing Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). An 

abuse-of-discretion review in this context requires more of the appellate court than 

simply deciding that the trial court did not rule arbitrarily or capriciously. See

Cooley, 232 S.W.3d at 234. The appellate court must instead measure the trial 

court’s ruling against the relevant criteria by which the ruling was made. See id.

I. Nature and circumstances of the offense

The defendant’s potential sentence and the nature of the crime are “primary 

factors” for us to consider. See Ex parte Hunt,138 S.W.3d 503, 506 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d); see also Montalvo, 315 S.W.3d at 593 (noting that 

consideration of nature and circumstances of offense requires us to consider range 

of punishment permitted in event of conviction). When the nature of the offense is 

serious and a lengthy sentence following trial is probable, bail should be “set 

sufficiently high to secure the presence of the accused at trial because the 

accused’s reaction to the prospect of a lengthy prison sentence might be not to 

appear.” In re Hulin, 31 S.W.3d at 761; see also Hunt, 138 S.W.3d at 506 (“Given 

the serious nature of the offenses and the potential for a lengthy sentence, the trial 

court could properly have concluded that the amounts of the bonds were 

reasonable.”).

Goodson is charged with theft of over $200,000, which is a first-degree 

felony offense carrying a punishment range of five to ninety-nine years or life 
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imprisonment, plus a fine of up to $10,000. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32

(first degree felony is punishable by imprisonment for five years to ninety-nine 

years, or life, and a fine not to exceed $10,000); id. § 31.03(e)(7) (theft is firstdegree felony if value of property stolen is $200,000 or more).

The $750,000 bail amount set in this case is within the range of bail amounts 

that have been upheld for other first-degree felonies. See, e.g., O’Brien v. State, 

No. 01–12–00176–CR, 2012 WL 2922545, at *1–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] July 5, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (no abuse of 

discretion in refusal to reduce bail set at $750,000 for first-degree felony charge of 

theft of property valued at over $200,000); Ex parte Cuevas, Jr., No. 11–03–

00402–CR, 2004 WL 527960, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar.18, 2004, no 

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (approving bail set at $1,000,000 

in case involving offense of engaging in organized criminal activity to commit 

theft of farm equipment worth over $150,000); Ex parte Waddell, No. 14–02–

01237–CR, 2003 WL 21403545, *1–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 19, 

2003, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding pretrial bail of 

$1,600,000 was not excessive where appellant was charged with engaging in 

organized crime involving theft of automobiles worth approximately $788,000, 

could be sentenced to between five to ninety-nine years in prison, and presented 

evidence that he could only raise a bond of $50,000); see also Tran v. State, No. 
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01–06–00035–CR, 2006 WL 1771815, at *1–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

June 29, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (upholding bail 

set at $800,000 for cocaine possession and $500,000 for marijuana possession); 

Maldonado v. State, 999 S.W.2d 91, 95-96 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

1999, pet. ref’d) (upholding $2.5 million bond where police recovered 721 kilos of 

cocaine).

II. Sufficiency of bail and whether bail is being used as an instrument of 

oppression

Because Goodson is complaining that the bail amount of $750,000 is 

excessive, and the State asked the trial court continue to set bail at that amount, 

there is no dispute that the bail set by the trial court is sufficiently high to give 

reasonable assurance that Goodson would appear in court as required in the future.

See Montalvo, 315 S.W.3d at 593; see also Wilson v. State, No. 01-13-00048, 2013 

WL 655263, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist. Feb. 21, 2013, no pet.) (mem. 

op., not designated for publication). Beyond arguing that the bail was “excessive,” 

Goodson presented no argument that bail was being used as an instrument of 

oppression in this case and nothing in the record suggests that the trial court set 

bail at an excessively high level solely to prevent Goodson from posting bail. See 

Montalvo, 315 S.W.3d at 596 (“Our independent review of the habeas corpus 

record likewise does not suggest that the trial court deliberately set bail at an 

excessively high level solely to prevent [appellant] from posting bail.”).
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III. Ability to make bail

Although the ability to make bail is one of the factors to be considered, it is 

not controlling and will not alone render the bail amount excessive. See Wright v. 

State, 976 S.W.2d 815, 820 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (“[T]he 

ability of an accused to make bail does not itself control the amount of bail, even if 

the accused is indigent.”); Clemons v. State, 220 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 2007, no pet.) (citing Ex parte Charlesworth, 600 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1980)). “To show that he is unable to make bail, a defendant generally 

must show that his funds and his family's funds have been exhausted.” Milner v. 

State, 263 S.W.3d 146, 149 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). 

Goodson did not testify at the hearing and his application for writ of habeas 

corpus presented no documentary evidence of his assets and financial resources. 

See Ex parte Castillo-Lorente, 420 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The testimony from Fisher regarding the largest bond amount 

that he believed Goodson could obtain was insufficient to demonstrate an inability 

to post bail. See Ex parte Ruiz, 129 S.W.3d 751, 754 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (bail bondsman’s testimony of “largest bond” defendant could 

make did not carry burden to establish inability to make bail); Ex parte CastilloLorente, 420 S.W.3d at 889 (testimony that appellant’s family and friends spoke 

with bail bondsman and learned largest amount they could post was insufficient to 
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carry burden of demonstrating inability to make bail). Although Fisher indicated 

that Goodson had multiple persons willing to co-sign his bond, no information was 

provided regarding the extent of the financial assistance that they could provide. 

The testimony of Misti Goodson focused on whether she believed Goodson to be a 

flight risk and similarly provided few details regarding either Goodson’s finances. 

In contrast to the dearth of evidence presented by Goodson regarding his 

finances, the State offered evidence suggesting significant assets in the form of 

vehicles and property, funds received from prior sales of various assets, and over 

$500,000 in unaccounted cash withdrawals. Because Goodson offered little 

evidence supporting his claimed inability to make bail, the trial court properly 

could have concluded that the amount of bail was reasonable under the 

circumstances. See Ex parte Scott, 122 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2003, no pet.) (in affirming trial court’s refusal to lower bond, court cited as a 

factor absence of evidence regarding defendant’s ability to make bond when 

defendant’s evidence consisted of his testimony that he and his family lacked 

sufficient assets or financial resources to post the bond, but did not detail either his 

or his family’s specific assets and financial resources nor efforts to furnish bond); 

Balawajder v. State, 759 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, pet. 

ref’d) (noting that vague references to inability to make bond do not justify a 

reduction in the amount set).
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IV. Future safety of complainants and the community

Neither Goodson nor the State addressed the future safety of the 

complainants and the community, and no evidence was presented at the hearing 

regarding the issue. However, when questioned by the trial court regarding whether 

Goodson had a criminal record, the State mentioned that Goodson had a previous 

deferred adjudication for the felony offense of injury to a child that he successfully 

completed.

V. Other factors

In addition to the considerations enumerated in the Code of Criminal 

Procedure, courts also consider the defendant’s work record, family ties, residency, 

criminal record, conformity with previous bond conditions, and aggravating factors 

involved in the offense. See Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849–50. Evidence was 

presented that Goodson has resided in Houston his entire life, is currently 

employed, has three children with whom he is actively involved, and voluntarily 

surrendered to authorities. Although these factors weigh in favor of bail reduction, 

they are offset by the other factors and we cannot conclude that the trial court 

abused its discretion.

This Court has also considered the Harris County District Court Bail 

Schedule as a factor in reviewing the amount of bail for various offenses. See, e.g., 

Ex parte Bogia, 56 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no 
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pet.). The bail schedule is not binding on district courts either inside or outside of 

Harris County. See Ex parte Sabur–Smith, 73 S.W.3d 436, 441 n.5 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Still, the bail schedule provides some indication 

of the propriety of bail for various types of offenses, just as case law arising from 

other counties provides some evidence that the bail set is reasonable. See id.

Goodson argues that the $750,000 bail set in his case is excessive because 

the Harris County District Court Bail Schedule sets bail at $30,000 for defendants 

charged with a first-degree felony with one previous felony, and his bail was set at 

25 times that amount. See District Court Bail Schedule, Harris County 

Administrative Offices of the District Courts (effective Jan. 1, 2007), 

http://www.justex.net/BailBondSchedule.aspx. However, as Goodson

acknowledges, the bail schedule also provides for bail to be set at twice the amount 

stolen in theft cases involving large amounts of property. Goodson relies on our 

opinion in Bogia to argue that this Court has held such an amount to be 

“unreasonable in light of similar factors considered.” In Bogia, we found the 

schedule’s formula setting bail at double the amount stolen in a high-value theft 

case to be unreasonable, but also provided that the bail amount could be justified 

based on the extraordinary circumstances of the case rather than the formula set 

forth in the schedule. See Ex parte Bogia, 56 S.W.3d at 838-39 (“If a $360,000 bail 

can be justified here, it will not be because of any formula. On the contrary, it 
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would have to be justified by extraordinary facts in this particular case.”). Here, the 

trial court departed from the bail schedule by setting bail at an amount significantly 

lower than that scheduled for a high-value theft case (bail was set at approximately 

27% of the $2,790,000 in checks alleged to have been stolen by Goodson rather 

than 200% of the amount). As discussed above, given the specific circumstances of 

this case, we cannot say that setting bail at $750,000 was unreasonable.

Conclusion

Based on the evidence before the trial court in this case and in light of the 

foregoing analysis, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

refusing to reduce bail below $750,000. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s 

denial of the application for writ of habeas corpus.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Massengale.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).