J-A29022-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

KATRINA BOROWSKI,

Appellant No. 759 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 16, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-51-CR-0002998-2016

MC-51-CR-0005222-2016

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., PLATT, J.,* and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2018

Appellant, Katrina Borowski, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on December 16, 2016, following her bench conviction of theft by 

deception, and receiving stolen property.1 On appeal, Appellant challenges 

the sufficiency and weight of the evidence and the discretionary aspects of her 

sentence. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm. 

We take the underlying facts and procedural history in this matter from 

the trial court’s May 2, 2017 decision and our independent review of the 

certified record.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3922(a)(1) and 3925(a), respectively.
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Complainant, Raymond Dronsfield, a 60-year-old man, was 

living alone at 3254 Tilton Street in the area of Port Richmond in 

Philadelphia in August and September 2015. Between late August 

and early September, [Appellant] visited Dronsfield on four 

occasions at his house under the guise of renewing her friendship 

with him, and was the only other person at his house during that 

time period. Dronsfield was the only person with access to his 

house because no one else had a key to the property. On or about 

late August and early September, [Appellant] took Dronsfield’s 

jewelry box and the items contained inside it from his bedroom 

without his permission. Although Dronsfield had in the past, 

occasional contact with [Appellant] on the occasions after he 

visited his daughter and her mother, who lived approximately 

three or four doors down from the house where [Appellant]

resided, [Appellant] had never visited Dronsfield at his house 

before the period in question. 

On or about one evening in late August and early 

September, [Appellant] first appeared at Dronsfield’s house, 

knocked on his door, and greeted him with “[h]ello, neighbor” 

when he answered. After some conversation, Dronsfield invited 

her inside and asked her if she wanted a drink or snack. After 

accepting this invitation, a conversation ensued. At some point, 

[Appellant] asked Dronsfield if she could use the bathroom. She 

then brought a pocketbook with her upstairs where the bathroom 

was located in Dronsfield’s house. [Appellant] subsequently 

returned downstairs and left Dronsfield’s house a few minutes 

later. 

A few days later, [Appellant] returned to Dronsfield’s house, 

and Dronsfield invited her inside and offered her water or a snack. 

Again, [Appellant] went upstairs with a pocketbook after

indicating to Dronsfield that she needed to use the bathroom. 

Dronsfield testified that she was “up there for a while.” When 

[Appellant] returned downstairs, she ate a snack before departing. 

This same sequence of events of [Appellant]’s previous visits 

occurred approximately two or three days later on a third 

occasion, [Appellant]’s snacking, excusing herself with a 

pocketbook to use the bathroom, and eventually departing upon 

her return downstairs. 

On a fourth occasion, two or three days later, when 

[Appellant] returned to Dronsfield’s house, he again offered her a 

snack. They had a brief conversation, then [Appellant] excused
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herself to the upstairs by claiming she needed to use the 

bathroom. While [Appellant] was upstairs with her pocketbook, 

Dronsfield heard no noises or running water coming from the

bathroom until he suddenly heard something fall that alerted him 

to the floor above. Due to the sudden noise, he started for the 

steps. As Dronsfield was walking up the stairs, he observed

[Appellant] exiting from inside the middle bedroom. He asked 

[Appellant] “what she was doing” in his bedroom. She had a pillow 

in her hand and responded that she “was bringing it down so” she 

could relax and watch television. They returned downstairs, and 

[Appellant] left Dronsfield’s house a few minutes later after telling 

him that friends were picking her up. At trial, Dronsfield testified 

that he never saw anybody arrive on location to retrieve her. 

At the time of her departure on this fourth occasion, 

Dronsfield first realized that his jewelry box containing multiple 

items was missing from the bureau in the middle bedroom of his

home because he returned to investigate the location of the sound 

that he heard while [Appellant] was upstairs. His jewelry box had 

always remained on the bureau in that particular location since it 

was given to him during his childhood. Dronsfield immediately 

drove to where [Appellant] lived at her grandparent’s house in 

search of her and the missing jewelry box. However, he was 

unable to locate her. Later that night and again on the following 

day, Dronsfield also sent [Appellant] a text message in which he 

informed [Appellant] that either she must return the items or he 

would go to the police. 

Approximately a week or two later, Dronsfield again 

attempted to locate [Appellant] at her grandfather’s house, and 

he never received a response from her to his text messages. He 

then reported the items missing to police and gave a statement to 

Detective Carlton[2] on September 22, 2015, because no items 

were ever returned to him. 

At trial, Dronsfield testified that at the time of the theft, he 

believed [Appellant]’s visits were friendly in nature. He also 

stated that the size of the pocketbook that [Appellant] had with

her on each occasion was approximately [eight] inches wide and 

[eleven] inches in length and was rectangular in shape. Dronsfield 

described the jewelry box as square in shape, and according to

____________________________________________

2 Detective Carlton’s first name does not appear in the certified record.
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him, it was smaller than the pocketbook and could have easily fit 

inside that purse. 

The jewelry box contained a wedding band, an engagement 

ring and signet ring among various other rings inside it, a bracelet, 

several watches, pins, and cuff links. Many of these items were 

heirlooms Dronsfield received from family members (some 

deceased). Dronsfield testified at trial that excluding any 

sentimental value, the total value of all of the missing items was 

in excess of $15,000[.00]. His testimony on the value of the items 

was consistent with his testimony at the preliminary hearing and 

with the statement he gave to Detective Carlton. Based on his 

police statement and testimony at trial and the preliminary 

hearing, Dronsfield’s estimations constructed a range from 

$2,000[.00] minimally, to upwards of $15,000[.00], in his 

consistent valuations of all of the items. 

Defense counsel attempted to establish an alibi and impeach 

Dronsfield with [Appellant]’s records of her incarceration from 

August 31, to September 4, of 2015, and September 9, 2015, to

February 23, 2016, as stipulated. Nevertheless, the trial court 

found that Dronsfield was credible and that his testimony was 

consistent with his preliminary hearing testimony and statements 

in his police interview. At all times, Dronsfield stated that 

[Appellant]’s visits occurred on or about late August and early 

September, even though he was unable to recall the exact dates 

on which [Appellant] visited and the crimes occurred, as he 

candidly admitted. Moreover, [Appellant] introduced no evidence 

of motive or bias on the part of Dronsfield to fabricate his 

testimony.

(Trial Court Opinion, 5/02/17, at 1-4) (record citations and footnotes 

omitted).

Following a bench trial on June 10, 2016, the trial court convicted 

Appellant of the aforementioned offenses. On December 16, 2016, after 

receipt of a Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI), the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to an aggregate term of incarceration of not less than three nor 

more than six years to be followed by a one year term of probation. On 
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December 27, 2016, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial 

court denied on January 9, 2017. The instant, timely appeal followed. On 

February 14, 2017, the trial court directed Appellant to file a concise statement 

of matters complained on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). After being granted 

several extensions of time, Appellant filed a timely Rule 1925(b) statement on 

March 8, 2017. See id. On May 2, 2017, the trial court issued an opinion. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

On appeal, Appellant raises the following questions for our review:

A. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the guilty verdicts 

where there was insufficient evidence to prove that the stolen 

jewelry was worth more than $2,000[.00] or that it was the 

[A]ppellant who stole the jewelry?

B. In addition to the foregoing reasons, were the verdicts against 

the weight of the evidence where the complaining witness’ 

testimony was not credible due to material inconsistencies and 

where the [A]ppellant was incarcerated at the time the theft 

took place?

[C.] Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion by fashioning a 

sentence that greatly exceeded that which is necessary to 

protect the public as [A]ppellant was convicted of non-violent 

crimes and is a non-violent offender, and where the court failed 

to properly consider [A]ppellant’s familial support, being the 

mother of a young child, and need for rehabilitation?

(Appellant’s Brief, at 7, 16).

In her first issue, Appellant claims the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain her conviction. Specifically, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth 

failed to prove that the jewelry was worth more than $2000.00, and that it 

was Appellant who took the items. (See id. at 10). We disagree.
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Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well 

settled:

We must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, 

and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in 

a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict 

winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find 

every element of the crime has been established beyond a 

reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.

The evidence established at trial need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all, 

part, or none of the evidence presented. It is not within the 

province of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and substitute our 

judgment for that of the fact-finder. The Commonwealth’s burden 

may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt 

about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder 

unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter 

of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined 

circumstances.

 

Commonwealth v. Tarrach, 42 A.3d 342, 345 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted) (emphasis added).

 Prior to addressing the merits of Appellant’s claim, we must determine 

if it is properly before us. Here, Appellant’s argument is undeveloped. Her

argument consists of approximately two pages of general boilerplate law, 

which does not include the elements of the crimes, and a single, brief 

paragraph of actual argument. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 10-13). Further, 

Appellant’s argument disregards our standard of review, which requires that 

we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as 

verdict winner, because Appellant only discusses the evidence in the light most 

favorable to her and ignores all other evidence. (See id. at 12). Appellant 
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overlooks the fact that this Court does not re-weigh the evidence, nor do we 

engage in credibility determinations. (See id.). Moreover, Appellant fails to 

cite to any relevant legal authority in support of her propositions. (See id.). 

Accordingly, Appellant has waived her sufficiency of the evidence claims. See 

Commonwealth v. Liston, 941 A.2d 1279, 1285 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en 

banc), affirmed in part and vacated in part, 977 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2009); 

Pa.R.A.P. 2101. In any event, her claims lack merit. 

A defendant commits the crime of theft by deception when “he 

intentionally obtains or withholds property of another by deception.” 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3922(a). We define deception as intentionally: (1) creating or 

reinforcing a false impression; (2) “prevent[ing] another from acquiring 

information which would affect his judgment of a transaction;” or (3) fail[ing]

to correct a false impression which the deceiver previously created or 

reinforced[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3922(a)(1)-(3). The crime is finished at the 

time the defendant communicates the intentional deception to the property 

owner. See Commonwealth v. Pappas, 845 A.2d 829, 837 (Pa. Super. 

2004), appeal denied, 862 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 2004). Circumstantial evidence 

can be sufficient to prove any or all of the elements of theft by deception. See 

Commonwealth v. Quel, 27 A.3d 1033, 1037-38 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

In order to convict a defendant for receiving stolen property, the 

Commonwealth must prove: “(1) the property was stolen; 

(2) the defendant was in possession of the property; and (3) the defendant 
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knew or had reason to believe the property was stolen.” Commonwealth v. 

Foreman, 797 A.2d 1005, 1011 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citing Commonwealth 

v. Matthews, 632 A.2d 570, 571 (Pa. 1993)). We define “receiving” as 

“acquiring possession, control or title, or lending on the security of the 

property.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(b). A person who is the original 

misappropriator of property can be convicted as the receiver of that property. 

See Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 420 A.2d 722, 726 (Pa. Super. 1980).

Lastly, “[t]he Commonwealth is not required to establish the precise 

market value of the stolen property. Rather the Commonwealth must present 

evidence from which a reasonable jury may conclude that the market value 

was at least a certain amount.” Commonwealth v. Reiss, 655 A.2d 163, 

168 (Pa. Super. 1995), aff'd, 672 A.2d 784 (Pa. 1996) (citation omitted)

(holding that testimony by witnesses as to value of stolen items was sufficient 

evidence from which jury could make reasonable determination of value of 

items in question); Commonwealth v. Hanes, 522 A.2d 622, 625 (Pa. 

Super. 1987) (opining that testimony of owner is admissible to establish 

market value of stolen property).

In its opinion, the trial court aptly disposed of Appellant’s sufficiency of 

the evidence claim as follows:

In Quel, [supra,] the Superior Court found sufficient 

evidence that the appellant stole the missing funds from the bank 

deposit envelopes to satisfy the possession requirement for the 

“obtain property of another” element under Section 3922(a) 

where multiple people handled and had access to the deposit 

envelopes and there was no evidence that anyone saw her remove 
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the money. [See Quel, supra,] at 1034, 1038-41. The Quel

court reasoned that the opportunity of theft as the last individual 

who handled and had access to the funds established “through an 

abundance of uncontradicted circumstantial evidence” the 

appellant’s possession of the stolen money that the appellantbookkeeper intentionally and deceptively removed and withheld 

from the deposit envelopes that belonged to the school district. 

[I]d. at 1041.

In the case at bar, the record established that [Appellant]

possessed and withheld from Dronsfield his jewelry box and the 

items it contained without his permission. Dronsfield’s

observations of [Appellant] emerging from his bedroom, his 

discovery of the missing jewelry box, and [Appellant’s] rushed 

departure on the same day confirms that [Appellant] was present 

in the particular bedroom where the items disappeared from on 

the day of the theft or about that time. The fact that Dronsfield 

was living alone, was the only person with a key to the property, 

and that [Appellant] was the only guest who visited him and had 

four opportunities to steal from his house since she had a purse 

with her in the upstairs of Dronsfield’s house on all of her visits, 

are strong circumstantial evidence that further corroborates that 

[Appellant] removed the jewelry box because she was the only 

non-resident with access to it and who was at the house at the 

time of the theft regardless of which visit it actually occurred.

The renewal of any past friendship with the complainant by 

[Appellant], and the claim that [Appellant] needed to utilize the 

bathroom with her pocketbook in tow on every visit to Dronsfield’s 

house were deceitful and false because she utilized these 

representations to steal his items. On or about late August and 

September 2015, [Appellant] appeared on four occasions at

Dronsfield’s house where she acted as though it was her intention 

to befriend him. [Appellant’s] greeting to Dronsfield of “Hello 

neighbor” on her first visit demonstrates her intent to create the

impression of friendship, and her subsequent visits and actions 

over the course of that period reinforced that false impression in 

Dronsfield’s state of mind as to her intention and reason for her 

visits. While acting as a friend to Dronsfield, she caused him to 

be relaxed in permitting her entry to his house and access to the 

upstairs area inside it. As a result of her false representations, 

[Appellant’s] deception caused her to obtain the items that 

belonged to Dronsfield while at his house. Her deceitful acts are 

further substantiated by the fact that [Appellant], who had never 
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before visited Dronsfield, within four subsequent visits acquired 

his items without his permission or with no intent to return them 

despite his multiple attempts to contact her.

Based upon the foregoing evidence, there is more than 

sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

[Appellant] intentionally obtained Dronsfield’s property by

deception.

* * *

In the matter at hand, [Appellant] is the misappropriator 

and receiver of the stolen items because she unlawfully obtained 

and retained the jewelry box and its contents that all belonged to 

Dronsfield. For the same reasons as stated above concerning the 

conviction for theft by deception, there is sufficient evidence to 

support [Appellant's] conviction for receiving stolen property.

* * *

Lastly, [Appellant’s] assertion that there was no evidence to 

prove the value of the stolen jewelry exceeded $2,000[.00], is 

incorrect because the Commonwealth presented evidence that

surpassed that value that [Appellant] never refuted. Theft by 

deception and receiving stolen property are graded as a felony of 

the third degree when the amount involved exceeds $2000[.00]. 

See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3903(a.1). Based upon Dronsfieid’s 

uncontroverted testimony that the value of all the items stolen 

from his house was approximately $15,000[.00], [Appellant’s]

conviction was properly graded as a felony of the third degree.

(Trial Ct. Op., at 6-10). 

Here, the evidence at trial, as summarized above by the trial court, 

clearly demonstrated that Appellant, under the guise of befriending Dronsfield, 

tricked her way into his home on several occasions, ultimately stealing a 

jewelry box containing over $2,000.00 worth of jewelry, which she refused to 

return to Dronsfield. This evidence was clearly sufficient to sustain Appellant’s 
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convictions. See Quel, supra at 1038-41; Reiss, supra at 168; Shaffer, 

supra at 726. Appellant’s first claim is both waived and lacks merit.

In Appellant’s second claim she argues that her conviction was against 

the weight of the evidence. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 13-14). Specifically, in 

her two sentences of argument, Appellant claims that “the complainant’s 

testimony varied greatly as to when the theft actually took place, claiming 

anywhere between the end of August 2015 to September 22, 2015. 

Additionally, the [A]ppellant [claims that she] was incarcerated at the time 

this theft took place.” (Id. at 14). We disagree.

Our scope and standard of review of a weight of the evidence claim is 

as follows: 

The finder of fact is the exclusive judge of the weight of the 

evidence as the fact finder is free to believe all, part, or none of 

the evidence presented and determines the credibility of the 

witnesses.

As an appellate court, we cannot substitute our judgment 

for that of the finder of fact. Therefore, we will reverse a jury’s 

verdict and grant a new trial only where the verdict is so contrary 

to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. A verdict is 

said to be contrary to the evidence such that it shocks one’s sense 

of justice when the figure of Justice totters on her pedestal, or 

when the jury’s verdict, at the time of its rendition, causes the 

trial judge to lose his breath, temporarily, and causes him to 

almost fall from the bench, then it is truly shocking to the judicial 

conscience.

Furthermore, where the trial court has ruled on the weight 

claim below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the 

underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight 

of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether 

the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight 

claim.
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Commonwealth v. Boyd, 73 A.3d 1269, 1274-75 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Thus, the trial court’s denial 

of a motion for a new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least 

assailable of its rulings.” Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 879-80 

(Pa. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1106 (2009) (citation omitted).

Here, the trial court rejected Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim. 

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained that as the finder of fact,

it found that Dronsfield was credible:

because the minor discrepancies between his police statement, 

preliminary hearing testimony, and trial testimony were neither 

contradictory nor rendered impossible the evidence presented. . . 

. [H]is credible and consistent testimony established the time 

period of the theft, during which [Appellant] was not incarcerated 

and committed it, and the value of the stolen items. In light of 

the overwhelming evidence discussed above, the verdict was not 

contrary to the evidence, nor would it shock the conscience.

(Trial Ct. Op., at 9-10). 

We agree. The record reflects that the trial court sitting as finder-offact chose to credit the testimony of the Commonwealth’s witnesses and chose 

to reject the defense witnesses. The finder-of-fact was free to believe the 

Commonwealth’s witnesses and to disbelieve the defense. See 

Commonwealth v. Griscavage, 517 A.2d 1256, 1259 (Pa. 1986). Thus, 

Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim is without merit.
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In her third issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of her

sentence.3 Specifically, she maintains that the trial court’s sentence was 

“significantly greater than what was needed to protect the public and vindicate 

the impact on the victim, and did not truly take into consideration many 

mitigating factors.” (Appellant’s Brief, at 17; see id. at 18-21). We disagree.

The right to appeal the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not 

absolute. See Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super. 

2004), appeal denied, 860 A.2d 122 (Pa. 2004). When an appellant 

challenges the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed, he must present 

“a substantial question as to the appropriateness of the sentence[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 A.2d 1013, 1017 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citations omitted). An appellant must, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 2119(f), articulate “a colorable argument that the 

sentence violates a particular provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary 

to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing scheme.”

4

Commonwealth v. Kimbrough, 872 A.2d 1244, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 887 A.2d 1240 (Pa. 2005) (citation omitted); see 

____________________________________________

3 We note that Appellant preserved her discretionary aspects of sentence claim 

by filing a timely post-sentence motion for reconsideration of sentence. See 

(Post-Sentence Motions, 12/27/16, at unnumbered pages 7-9); see also 

Commonwealth v. McAfee, infra at 275.

4 Appellant has included a Rule 2119(f) statement in her brief. (See

Appellant’s Brief, at 15).
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Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). If an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement meets these 

prerequisites, we have found that a substantial question exists. See 

Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 727-28 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 759 A.2d 920 (Pa. 2000). “Our inquiry must focus on 

the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying 

the appeal, which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Id.

at 727 (emphases in original).

Here, Appellant claims that her sentence was harsh and excessive, that 

the trial court failed to consider the mitigating circumstances and her

rehabilitative needs, and failed to provide sufficient reasons for sentencing her 

outside the guideline range. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 18-21). These 

contentions raise a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. JohnsonDaniels, 167 A.3d 17, 27 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal denied, 174 A.3d 1029

(Pa. 2017); see also Commonwealth v. Rodda, 723 A.2d 212, 214 (Pa. 

Super. 1999) (en banc).

Our standard of review is settled.

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 731 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal 

denied, 125 A.3d 1198 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted).
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Appellant complains that the sentencing court sentenced her outside the 

guidelines without placing sufficient reasons on the record. (See Appellant’s 

Brief, at 20-21). We have stated that:

When evaluating a challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of sentence . . . it is important 

to remember that the sentencing guidelines are 

advisory in nature. If the sentencing court deems it 

appropriate to sentence outside of the guidelines, it 

may do so as long as it offers reasons for this 

determination. [O]ur Supreme Court has indicated 

that if the sentencing court proffers reasons indicating 

that its decision to depart from the guidelines is not 

unreasonable, we must affirm a sentence that falls 

outside those guidelines.

A sentencing court, therefore, in carrying out its duty to 

impose an individualized sentence, may depart from the 

guidelines when it properly identifies a particular factual basis and 

specific reasons which compelled [it] to deviate from the guideline 

range.

Commonwealth v. Schull, 148 A.3d 820, 836 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original). 

Here, the trial court had the benefit of a PSI, a mental health report, 

and a sentencing memorandum from the Commonwealth. (See N.T. 

Sentencing, 12/16/16, at 4-5). It acknowledged that Appellant had both 

mental health and drug and alcohol issues. (See id. at 26). The court 

specifically noted that Appellant committed the instant offense while under 

supervision. (See id. at 11). Further, the trial court expressed its concerns 

that, while the sentencing guidelines accounted for Appellant’s prior record, it 

did not account for the fact that she committed at least seven identical 
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offenses, always against elderly victims, several of them in their nineties. 

(See id. at 17, 25-26). Immediately prior to imposing sentence, the trial 

court explained, in detail, the basis for the sentence. (See id. at 25-27). 

Therefore, Appellant’s claim that the sentencing court abused its 

discretion in sentencing her outside the guidelines without expressing 

sufficient reasons on the record is meritless. See Commonwealth v. Walls, 

926 A.2d 957, 966-68 (Pa. 2007) (so long as trial court imposed individualized 

sentence that was reasonable there was no abuse of discretion); 

Commonwealth v. Davis, 737 A.2d 792, 799 (Pa. Super. 1999) (affirming 

sentence outside guidelines where trial court was informed of PSI, heard 

testimony, and allowed defendant to speak before imposing sentence); 

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. Super. 1988) (finding 

statement of reasons sufficient where trial court had PSI and was presumed 

to have been aware of and weighed defendant’s history, character, and 

mitigating factors). 

Further, we reject Appellant’s claim that the sentence was excessive 

because the trial court did not consider mitigating factors or her rehabilitative 

needs. Here, as discussed above, the trial court had the benefit of the PSI, a 

mental health evaluation, and a sentencing memorandum. The trial court 

explained, in detail, its reasons for imposing the sentence. Clearly, the gist 

of Appellant’s argument is not that the sentencing court did not consider the 

relevant sentencing factors, but rather that the court did not weigh them as 
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much in her favor as she wished. Our review of the record does not show that 

the sentencing court abused its discretion or that it entered a manifestly 

unreasonable sentence. See Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 112 A.3d 656, 662 

(Pa. Super. 2015) (holding sentence not manifestly unreasonable where 

sentencing court considered PSI, details of crime, and explained reasons for 

sentence); see also Commonwealth v. Treadway, 104 A.3d 597, 600 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (holding that sentence of not less than one hundred nor more 

than two hundred years not manifestly excessive in light of defendant’s 

conduct of child molestation). Appellant’s claim lacks merit. 

Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we find that Appellant’s 

issues are either waived or lacking in merit. Therefore, we affirm the 

judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/27/18