In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 17-3493 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

SCOTT BOOKS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 1:16-cr-10037 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2018 — DECIDED JANUARY 29, 2019 

____________________ 

Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. 

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. On trial for bank robbery, Scott

Books chose not to testify in his own defense and was found 

guilty and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. He now 

challenges two pretrial decisions by the district court. The 

first allowed eyewitness testimony at trial from the two bank 

tellers that Books alleged based their identification of him as 

the robber not on personal knowledge, but rather on information improperly supplied by a police detective. The sec-
2 No. 17-3493 

ond ruling would have allowed the government, had Books 

chosen to testify at trial, to impeach him with physical evidence directly tying him to the robbery—evidence the police 

learned of (and then recovered) only as a result of a confession the district court separately had determined was unlawfully coerced. 

Neither challenge succeeds. The district court did not err 

in finding the eyewitness identifications reflected the tellers’ 

firsthand knowledge of Books, and thus allowing their testimony at trial was entirely proper. Nor can we conclude 

that the district court’s conditional impeachment ruling, 

even if wrong on the law, mandates reversal in light of the 

overwhelming weight of evidence against Books. So we 

affirm. 

I 

A 

On July 28, 2016 a man robbed the Land of Lincoln Credit 

Union in Normal, Illinois. Dressed in a black hooded sweatshirt, wearing a mask and neon gloves, the robber approached the counter and, while motioning toward the 

drawer with what appeared to be a black handgun, demanded “all the money.” The robbery lasted all but 20 seconds, with the offender making off with $18,000 and fleeing 

in a Buick SUV. 

Two tellers recognized the robber’s voice and mannerisms and immediately identified him as Scott Books—a longtime customer of the credit union. Holly Bateman told her 

supervisor (and later the police) she was 99% certain Books 

was the robber because she had interacted with him on at 

least six prior occasions. The second teller, Susan Phelps, 
No. 17-3493 3

agreed with Bateman’s identification of Books as the offender. A third witness, James Teidman, was driving by the bank 

when he saw the robber running from the bank with a gun, 

only then to speed away in a Buick SUV. 

The police arrested Books the next day. After waiving his 

Miranda rights and agreeing to an interview, he confessed to 

the robbery, while also telling the police where they could 

find the gloves, clothing, and fake gun he used. The police 

found these items exactly where Books described, and in 

time a grand jury indicted Books for the robbery. 

B 

The district court held a series of pretrial hearings to determine the admissibility of evidence contested by Books. 

Three of those rulings are significant to this appeal. 

First, the district court suppressed Books’s confession, 

finding that the police officers overstepped and overcame 

Books’s will by threatening to arrest his wife and take his 

children into custody if he did not own up to his role in the 

robbery—rendering the confession involuntary. The court 

suppressed both the confession and its physical fruits—

specifically, the clothing, gloves, and fake gun the police recovered based upon Books telling them where to look. 

Second, the district court denied Books’s motion to prevent the two bank tellers (Bateman and Phelps) from testifying at trial. Books had sought to exclude their testimony on 

the basis that the police detective who investigated the robbery improperly tainted their identifications when, a day after the robbery, he allegedly told both witnesses that Books 

had confessed to the crime. The government disagreed, taking the position that the detective in no way revealed 
4 No. 17-3493 

Books’s confession and thus in no way influenced the tellers’ 

clear and definitive identification of Books as the robber. The 

district court held a hearing, received testimony from the 

tellers and detective, and found it “clear from th[e] record 

that [both tellers] have a truly independent source of identification of [Books] other than any suggestion that would 

have been put in their mind by the officer.” Accordingly, the 

district court permitted the tellers to testify at trial. 

Third, the district court considered but reserved definitively ruling until trial on the government’s motion for permission to impeach Books with the fruits of his confession in 

the event he chose to testify. Books opposed the motion and 

urged the district court to hold that the price for the police 

unlawfully coercing his confession should be the suppression of all incriminating evidence (his admission and the 

physical fruits) for all purposes, including impeachment. The 

district court said it was inclined to allow some impeachment but reserved a final ruling unless and until Books 

chose to testify and the government sought to impeach him 

on cross-examination with his prior statements describing 

the whereabouts of the clothing he wore during the robbery. 

The district court cast its ruling this way: “[I]f and when we 

get to that point [of the trial], any questions that the government wished to ask the defendant if he testifies, I would 

have to hear exactly what the questions are outside the presence of the jury so there could be specific objections.” 

 
No. 17-3493 5

C 

In the end, Books chose not to testify at trial, and thus 

neither his coerced confession nor the resulting physical 

fruits came into evidence. The government nonetheless presented a strong case, including testimony from these witnesses: 

 Bank teller Holly Bateman identified Books 

as the robber. She testified that she knew 

Books from her work at the credit union 

and immediately recognized him as the 

robber—so much so that she almost said 

“Scott, can you remove your mask?” 

Bateman told the jury that she “instantly” 

recognized Books’s voice and likewise 

knew it was Books from his distinct 

mannerisms. Asked at trial about her 

confidence level that Books committed the 

robbery, Bateman testified that she was 

110% sure because the incident had 

replayed over and over in her mind. 

 Susan Phelps, the second bank teller, also 

identified Books as the robber. While not as 

fast as Bateman to recognize Books during 

the robbery, Phelps testified she was confident Books was the offender based on his 

unique mannerisms, including his walk and 

jittery disposition. 

 Phillip Meyer, a friend and former coworker of Books, testified that he had received a 

text message from Books on the day of the 
6 No. 17-3493 

robbery or the day before asking, “I wonder 

what bank I should rob today?” 

 Todd Hogan, the bank’s vice president, testified that he remembered teller Holly 

Bateman calling him immediately after the 

robbery to tell him she was 99% sure the 

robber was Books. Hogan also explained 

that Books’s business account had been 

flagged in the bank’s system on multiple 

occasions due to attempts to deposit checks 

backed by insufficient funds. 

 James Teidman testified that he was driving 

by the credit union when the robbery occurred and saw a Buick SUV, the same 

model later tracked to Books’s residence, 

flee the scene. 

While Books chose not to testify, his counsel vigorously 

cross-examined the government’s witnesses. When it came 

to tellers Bateman and Phelps, defense counsel challenged 

their recollection of the robbery, probed the reliability of 

their identifications of Books and the getaway car, and examined their memory of the robber’s dress, voice, and mannerisms—all in an effort to question their overall confidence 

that Books was the offender. At no point during the trial did 

Books’s counsel or the government refer to Books’s confession or to the police detective’s (allegedly impermissible) interaction with the two tellers. The jury returned a guilty verdict. 
No. 17-3493 7

II 

A 

Books challenges the district court’s pretrial ruling denying his motion to preclude the two tellers from testifying at 

trial on the basis that the police detective allegedly tainted 

their eyewitness identifications by telling them that he had 

confessed to the robbery. This misconduct, Books contends, 

violated his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. He further argues that the district court’s pretrial ruling too circumscribed his Sixth Amendment right to 

cross-examine the tellers at trial. The facts belie both contentions. 

While all agree that our review of legal issues is de novo, 

the parties dispute the legal standard that governs the admission at trial of the bank tellers’ identification testimony. 

Books invites us to follow Kastigar v. United States, and 

thereby place the burden on the government to show that 

the tellers’ testimony was “derived from legitimate independent sources” and, as a result, not unduly influenced by 

the police detective. See 406 U.S. 441, 461–62 (1972). The 

government, on the other hand, urges us to read Kastigar as 

more narrowly applying to, and not beyond, the setting that 

gave rise to its holding—circumstances in which a witness 

testifies pursuant to a grant of immunity. See id. The government instead asks us to employ the less onerous, dueprocess based standard found in cases like Neil v. Biggers, 

409 U.S. 188 (1972), where the focus is more simply on the 

reliability of in-court identification testimony with the defendant (not the government) bearing the initial burden of 

showing that the government did something to taint the 

identification. See also, e.g., United States v. L’Allier, 838 F.2d 
8 No. 17-3493 

234, 239 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the defendant bears 

the burden of showing that the challenged identification was 

unduly suggestive). 

The proper reach and application of the Kastigar rule has 

not gone unnoticed by other courts. See, e.g., United States v. 

Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 90 n.121 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[I]t is not clear 

whether all involuntary statements or all compelled 

statements should be subjected to the strong medicine 

prescribed in Kastigar, or whether some other doctrine 

should govern in certain circumstances.”); United States v. 

Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 199 n.24 (4th Cir. 1976) (discussing 

uncertainty over Kastigar’s application to coerced 

confessions). 

We have not had a case requiring us to choose sides, and 

this appeal does not either. We can comfortably resolve the 

case on narrower grounds, because under either Kastigar or 

Biggers (or hybrids of either standard), the evidence was 

more than sufficient to show that the two tellers, Bateman 

and Phelps, identified Books based on their prior dealings 

and first-hand familiarity with him, without regard to any 

information supplied by the police detective. At no point did 

the tellers, and most especially Holly Bateman, ever waiver 

in their confidence that Books was the robber. So, whether 

assessed under Kastigar or a lesser standard, Books’s challenge to the district court’s admission of the tellers’ testimony cannot succeed. 

Books fares no better when contending that the district 

court’s ruling on the tellers’ testimony also violated the Sixth 

Amendment by limiting his ability to confront and crossexamine these witnesses. A fulsome cross-examination, 

Books posits, would have entailed questioning how the wit-
No. 17-3493 9

nesses arrived at their identification testimony—a line of 

questioning, as Books sees it, that necessarily would have 

exposed that the police improperly told both tellers that he 

had confessed to the robbery. We cannot agree, as Books’s 

position misfires on the law and facts. 

A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses is not absolute, but instead subject to reasonable limitations imposed by the district court. See United States v. 

Saunders, 166 F.3d 907, 918 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Delaware v. 

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)). The limitation Books 

challenges came from the district court’s pretrial ruling suppressing his coerced confession. This ruling favored Books 

and, beyond precluding the government from using the confession as evidence, naturally limited how he would approach cross-examining government witnesses, for he rightly wanted to avoid the jury learning that he had confessed to 

the robbery. But accepting a necessary and proper limitation 

on cross-examination does not, without more, run afoul of 

the Confrontation Clause, especially where, as here, Books 

was able as a practical matter to adequately, and indeed vigorously, cross-examine both bank tellers. See United States v. 

Sasson, 62 F.3d 874, 882 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the 

Confrontation Clause “guarantees only an opportunity for a 

thorough and effective cross-examination, ‘not crossexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish’”) (quoting Delaware v. 

Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)). And Books was able to do 

so without ever insinuating, much less revealing, that he had 

confessed to the robbery. The Confrontation Clause required 

no more. 
10 No. 17-3493 

B 

This brings us to Books’s Fifth Amendment challenge to 

the district court’s pretrial impeachment ruling. Books argues that the ruling—allowing the government, if he chose 

to testify, to cross-examine him with the fruits of his coerced 

confession—created an unconstitutional predicament and 

catch-22: he was forced to either forfeit his right to testify in 

his own defense, or, if he did take the stand, face a surefire 

conviction once the government impeached him with the 

fruits of his confession. 

Books may be right in his contention that the district 

court, even though reserving a final ruling until after seeing 

whether he chose to testify and what questions the government wanted to ask on cross-examination, committed legal 

error in concluding, however conditionally, that some impeachment with the physical fruits of a coerced confession 

may be permissible. While that proposition is not settled in 

the law, Books’s position is not without some support. See, 

e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003) (plurality 

opinion) (emphasizing, albeit in dicta, that “those subjected 

to coercive police interrogations have an automatic protection 

from the use of their involuntary statements (or evidence derived from their statements) in any subsequent criminal trial”). 

The government urges us to avoid answering this question. Pointing to Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984), the 

government says that Books waived any challenge to the district court’s ruling by not testifying at trial. The government’s position finds substantial, if not dispositive, support 

in our decision in United States v. Wilson, 307 F.3d 596, 600–

01 (7th Cir. 2002), where the defendant chose not to testify at 
No. 17-3493 11

trial and, as a result, we declined to review the merits of his 

claim that a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of particular 

impeachment testimony violated his Fifth Amendment right 

to remain silent. 

The whole point of the rule announced in Luce, which we 

extended to the domain of a Fifth Amendment claim in 

Wilson, is that courts should refrain from reviewing claims 

that a particular line of cross-examination would have 

violated a defendant’s right against self-incrimination when 

the defendant in fact never testified at trial and thus never 

underwent cross-examination. Any other course, the 

reasoning runs, would require too much speculation on how 

the testimony and related questioning would have played 

out at trial. See Wilson, 307 F.3d at 600–01. 

Even if we agreed with Books that Wilson should be read 

more narrowly, our ensuing reasoning would not travel a 

path that resulted in an award of relief. Both parties agree 

that the ultimate merits of Books’s Fifth Amendment claim is 

subject to harmless error review. Indeed, the doctrine of 

harmless error finds straightforward application on the evidence presented at Books’s trial. 

Not every constitutional error automatically requires the 

reversal of a defendant’s conviction. Instead, as the Supreme 

Court has explained, “if the government can show ‘beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained,’ ... then the error is deemed 

harmless and the defendant is not entitled to reversal.” 

Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (quoting 

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). This precise 

standard would apply if Books had testified and was subjected to certain impermissible impeachment. See Arizona v.
12 No. 17-3493 

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991) (holding that the doctrine of harmless error applies to the violation of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 

through the admission at trial of an involuntary confession). 

And the same analysis would apply if we accept Books’s 

contention that the district court’s ruling constructively foreclosed his decision to take the stand. See Ortega v. O’Leary, 

843 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying harmless error 

analysis to the denial of the right to testify); Alicea v. Ganon, 

675 F.2d 913, 925 (7th Cir. 1982) (reaching the same conclusion). 

In reviewing the trial record, our obligation is to determine whether any error was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt, and we do so in no small part by evaluating the overall strength of the prosecution’s case. See Jones v. Basinger, 

635 F.3d 1030, 1052 (7th Cir. 2011). On this front, Books faces 

an insurmountable burden because the evidence against him 

at trial was overwhelming: the eyewitness testimony of the 

two bank tellers, the text message to a friend indicating his 

desire to rob a bank, the identification of his car as the getaway vehicle, and the testimony of over a dozen other witnesses—all in the broader context of his financial difficulties 

and prior disputes with the Land of Lincoln Credit Union. 

On this record, any error in the district court’s pretrial ruling 

on the scope of permissible impeachment was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

III 

Two other matters warrant attention. First, relying on 

Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), Books argues that the 

district court’s impeachment ruling deprived him of the 

“guiding hand of counsel” by undermining his attorney’s 
No. 17-3493 13

ability to make informed and independent decisions about 

the best trial strategy, including whether Books should take 

the stand in his own defense. Id. at 612. But Brooks provides 

no refuge, for there the Supreme Court considered a state 

statute that required a defendant, if he chose to put on a defense at trial, to be the first defense witness to testify, forcing 

a preemptive decision to take the stand absent “a full survey 

of all the case.” Id. at 608. Books, in contrast, faced only the 

uncertainty that often accompanies an unfavorable (and 

perhaps even incorrect) pretrial ruling on the scope of impeachment. Whatever limitations this may have imposed on 

the strategic choices of Books’s defense, they were far afield 

from the extreme circumstances defense counsel confronted 

in Brooks.

Finally, we reject Books’s invitation to overturn his conviction on the basis of cumulative error. We have reviewed 

the record carefully and cannot get anywhere near concluding that there are “multiple errors [that] so infected the jury’s 

deliberation that they denied the petitioner a fundamentally 

fair trial.” United States v. Allen, 269 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir. 

2001). The bottom line is that Books’s cumulative error argument cannot overcome the overwhelming evidence presented against him at trial. 

For these reasons, we AFFIRM.