NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________ No. 1 3

- 1756

______________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. JONATHAN TRIMINIO,

Appellant

______________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Crim

. No. 2

- 1 2

- 00698

- 001 ) Honorable Katherine S. Hayden , District Judge

______________ Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 8 , 2013
BEFORE: FUENTES , GREENBERG , and BARRY , Circuit Judges

(Fi led: October 23, 2013 )

______________ OPINION OF THE COURT

______________ GREENBERG, Circuit Judge

. This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered on March 13, 2013, on the basis of appellant Jonathan
Trimi nio’s plea of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single count of unlawful2

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The
District Court sentenced Triminio to a 73

- month custodial term to be followed by a thr e e year term of supervised release. T he Court calculat ed that Triminio had a final offense
level of 25 with 8 criminal history points, making an advisory sentencing range of 84 to
105 months. The offense level included a 4

- level enhancement under U.S.S.G. §
2K 2.1 (b) (6)(B) for unlawful possession of body armor. Triminio appeals only from the use of this enhancement in calculating his offense
level as he claims that its use violated his due process rights because he was not
convicted of a body armor offense and he did not stipulate that he had possession of body

armor . He principally relies on Alleyne v. United States , 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), United
States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (200 4 ), and Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000 ). He does not contend, however, that , in terms , the enhancement could not be applie d to his possession of body armor, though he does contend that his plea agreement did not contemplate the use of the enhancement in the calculation of his sentencing level

. The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Although , here , as in most

case s , we exercis e an abu se of discretion standard in reviewing a sentence , Triminio
contends that the District C ourt erred as a matter of law by including the 4

- level body armor enhancement in calculating his offense level and thus , to the extent of considering that argument , we exercis e plenary review.3

We will affirm. Triminio complains that the District Court , by finding as a fact that he had possession of body armor , violated the rule that he contends that the cases he
cites established . But clearly the Court d id not violate the principles recognized in those cases. Although possession of body armor could have been charged as a separate offense so that if a jury convicted him of that offense he could have been sentenced for it s commission , the government did not make any suc h charge

. Rather, the government referred to the body armor only as a basis for enhancement of Triminio’s guidelines
offense level and , in doing so , in no way permitted an increase in the statutory sentence
that c ould have been imposed on him or in any ot her way affect ed any mandatory
minimum or maximum sentence applicable to him. Here the maximum sentence

– with
or without the 4

- level enhancement

– was ten years and the enhancement did not increase any mandatory minimum that the Court was obliged to impo se. Accordingly , the Court by the use of the enhancement simply increased the advisory but not binding sentencing range to which Triminio was subject. Th us, United States v. Grier , 475 F.3d 556 , 559 ( 3d
Cir. 2007) (en banc), which held “that facts releva nt to the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines need not be submitted to a jury” is controlling here and we are
constrained to affirm

. We make three additional comments. First , as we note d above , Triminio relies on the very recent case of Alleyne v. United States , 13 3 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). But that case holds that “any fact that increase s the mandatory minimum [ sentence for an offense ] is an ‘element’ [of the offense] that must be submitted to the jury.” Id. at 2155. Thus , it is the counterpoint to Apprendi which held the same thing with respect to increases in the4

statutory maximum sentence for an offense. But Alleyne , like Apprendi , is not applicable
here because the body armor enhancement did not increase any mandatory minimum

sentenc e to which Triminio was subject. Second, we see nothing in the record that in any way made it unfair for the District Court to use the enhancement i n calculating his offense level. To the contrary when the Court calculated his sentencing range it acted consistently with the provisions of Triminio’s plea agreement.
Our final comment is that if Triminio is correct it is difficult to understand how a district court ever can make a finding that is the basis for a guidelines sentencing level
enhancement. It is ironi c t hat Triminio is making his argument in a case in which he does not even claim that the District Court erred in its finding that he possessed body armor as he does not deny being in possession of i t. For the foregoing reasons the order entered on March 13, 2013, will be affirmed.