### No. 14956 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980

IN 

### RE THE MARRIAGE OF JAY F. OWEN, Petitioner and Respondent,

IDALENE OWEN, a/k/a IDALENE L. OWEN, Respondent and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, HonorableAlfred B. Coate, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Berger, Anderson,Sinclair & 

### Murphy, Billings, Montana For Respondent: 

### William F. Meisburger, Forsyth,Montana

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## - * LC. 

### -?.C!:? 

### Filed: P 

### Submitted on briefs: February 

### 27, 1980 Decided:

## APR

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# - f9@Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This 

### is an appeal from a judgment entered inthe Rosebud County DistrictCourt, Sixteenth Judicial District, disposing of the marital property of the parties. The parties herein 

### weremarried on November 30, 1948. Atthe 

### timeof themarriage the husband owned a ranch near Ashland, Montana. This ranch was sold after the parties' marriage and the proceeds used to acquire the parties' current ranch property from the wife's parents. The ranch was purchased inthe joint names of the parties in 1949. During themarriage the parties worked together on thisranch. In 1952 an additional 172 acres was purchased asan addition to the ranch. A house was built on thisproperty during the



### same year. InMarch 1978 respondent husband petitioned for dissolution of the marriage. The dissolution 

### was granted without contest, but the 

### District Court in

### its decree reserved the property division for later adjudication. Trial was held

on thismatter on April 16, 1979. After making findings of fact and conclusions of law, the District Court entered judgment on May 25, 1979, effectively rendering a 60/40 percent splitof the marital property, respectively between the husband and wife. From thisjudgment the wife appeals. The issues presented to thisCourt for review are as follows: 1. Did the DistrictCourt 

### err in

### its findings and conclusions that the husband had contributed 60 percent and the wife 40 percent to the accumulated marital assets? 2. Did the DistrictCourt 

### err by not giving sufficient weight to the contributions of appellant?3. Did the 

### District Court 

### err by abusing 

### its discretion inconcluding, asa matter of law, the method of purchase of the

### marital estate, or in failing to allow appellant the benefit of meeting 

### a good faithparty purchase offer? 

### 4. Did the DistrictCourt 

### err infailing to consider respondent's dissipation of assets? 5. Did the DistrictCourt err infailing to award attorney fees to appellant? The substance of this appeal 

### iswhether the District Court abused 

### its discretion inthe distribution of the marital estate. "It

### iswell settled inMontana that a district court has far reaching discretion inresolving property divisions and 

### itsjudgment 

### willnot be altered unless 

### a clear abuse of that discretion is shown. 

# . 

# . The criteria for reviewing the districtcourt's discretion 

### is: Did the districtcourt inthe exercise of 

### its discretion act arbitrarilywithout employment of conscientiousjudgment, or exceed the bounds of reason inview of 

### all the circumstances." (Citations omitted.) Zell

### v. Zell (1977), 172Mont. 496, 570 P.2d 33, 35. Appellant contends that 

### it

### was an abuse of discretion for the District Court toonly award her 40 percent of the marital property instead of the one-half interest she sought. She contends that her contributions as

### a homemaker, 

### as 

### well

as ranch hand and handy person, when coupled with respondent's dissipation of marital assets, entitleher to a 50 percent shareof the marital property. "Although the DistrictCourt may equally divide themarital assets, such a distribution isnot mandated by section 40-4-202, MCA. 

# .

# . Section 40-4-202 

### is flexible and it vests a good deal of discretion inthe District Court 

# . . . We have stated, before and after the adoption of the statute, that each casemust be looked at individually, with an eye toitsunique circumstances. 

# . ." (Citationsomitted.) In ReMarriage of Aanenson (1979)r Mont. 

### - 598 P.2d 1120, 1123, 36 St.Rep. 1525.The duty of the 

### District Court 

### is to consider the statutory 

### criteria and equitably apportion the marital assets. To accomplish this, 

### it should consider the duration of themarriage and the age, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, and the liabilitiesand needs of each party. In ReMarriage of Aanenson, supra, 598 P.2d at1123. We find that the DistrictCourt here properly followed the dictates of section 40-4-202, MCA. The findings of a 

### trial judge 

### willnot be disturbed on appeal where they are based on substantial though conflicting evidence, unless there 

### is

### a clear preponderance of evidence against such findings. Cameron v. Cameron (1978), 

### -Mont. 

## , 587 P.2d 939, 35 St-Rep. 1723. Here, the findings 

### of the DistrictCourt arebased on substantial evidence and the evidence does not preponderate against them. The 

### District Court, therefore, did not abuse 

### its discretion inapportioning themarital estate. Appellant's next contention essentially questions the DistrictCourt's valuation and method of purchase of the marital property. Appellant seeks to preserve and maintain the family ranch and submits that this Court has approved the desirabilityof allowing her to do so, most recently in In Re Marriage of Jacobson (1979), 

### -Mont. 

### - 

## , 600 P.2d 1183, 36 st.~ep.1773. She argues that the 

### District Court's distribution of the marital property and valuation thereof prevent her from purchasing the ranch. A court indistributing the property of the marriage is to consider the current value of allproperty acquired during themarriage. Kruse v. Kruse (1978), 

### -Mont. I 586 P.2d 294, 298, 35 St.Rep. 1502. The ~istrict court didprecisely that here. It accepted testimony, albeit conflicting, as to the current value of the property before concluding the property was worth $566,200. We find that this procedure 

### was not unreasonable. Appellant 

### is correct thatMontana 

### cases have accepted the premise that 

### a ranch or farm should be kept intact and operated asa unit. This policy 

### isreflected inthe following decisions involving the disposition of farming and ranchingproperty: In Re Marriage of Jacobson, supra; In Re Marriage of Brown (1978), Mont

# . , 587 P.2d 361, 35 St.Rep. 1733; Biegalke 

### v. Biegalke (1977), 172Mont. 311, 564 P.2d 987; Hunnewell v. Hunnewell (1972), 160 Mont. 125, 500 P.2d

"Itmust be remembered that the primary right tobe considered indisposing of marital property 

### is the right of each party to an equitable apportionment of themarital assets. While 

### it 

### is the policy of the courts of this 

### state to avoid splitting up a ranch or forcing 

### its 

### sale where there 

### isany reasonable alternative, that policy, however commendable, cannot be used to override [a party's] right to an equitable share of the marital property." In ReMarriage of Jacobson, supra, 600 P.2d 

### at 1187-88. In the present case both parties were given the option tobuy the other's respective share of the ranch provided that the rightbe exercised within sixmonths of the judgment. Other than this condition, it was leftup to the parties to reach their own terms on 

### a purchase. We can find no abuse of discretion inthe District Court's methods. The final contention of appellant 

### is that the District Court erred in failing to award her attorney fees. Section 40-4-110, MCA, provides: "The court from time to

### time, after considering the financial resources of both parties, may order a party topay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or

### defending any proceeding under Chapters 1 and 

### 4 of this title and for attorney's fees, including sums for legal services rendered and costs incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding or after entry of judgment 

# . . 

# ."

Here the District Court, after considering the financial

resources of both parties, determined that each should bear their own legal costs. Itwas not an abuse of discretion to do so. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Justice

# dbyWe concur:

Chief ~usti%e



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# 0. Justices