If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

FOR PUBLICATION

March 23, 2023

9:00 a.m.

v No. 360094

Manistee Circuit Court

CHRISTOPHER LEHMAN TADGERSON, LC No. 20-005067-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and MARKEY and BORRELLO, JJ.

MARKEY, J.

Defendant, Christopher Lehman Tadgerson, appeals by leave granted the judgment of 

sentence after having entered a conditional plea of no contest to the offense of being a prisoner in 

possession of a controlled substance (PPCS), MCL 800.281(4). Defendant was in his prison cell 

when another inmate passed defendant’s cell and thrust a crumpled piece of paper through a slot 

in defendant’s cell door. Defendant grabbed it; however, a corrections officer who witnessed the 

conduct promptly ordered defendant to give the officer the paper. Inside the crumpled paper were 

two strips of a controlled substance. The gravamen of defendant’s argument is that although this 

Court in People v Ramsdell, 230 Mich App 386; 585 NW2d 1 (1998), held that PPCS under MCL 

800.281(4) is a strict-liability offense, it should now be construed as having a scienter requirement 

or mens rea element pursuant to Michigan Supreme Court precedent issued after Ramsdell and in 

light of MCL 8.9, which was enacted under 2015 PA 250 after Ramsdell was released. The trial 

court disagreed, and defendant entered the no-contest plea conditioned upon preserving his right 

to appeal and present his argument to this Court. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2015, defendant was sentenced to 58 months to 15 years’ imprisonment after being 

convicted by a jury of resisting and obstructing a law enforcement officer causing injury, MCL 

750.81d(2). This Court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence. People v Tadgerson, 

unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 13, 2016 (Docket No. 

327187). 
-2-

With respect to this case, Corrections Officer Shawn Larson testified at the preliminary 

examination that he observed another prisoner “hesitate[] a few times walking back and forth” and

then pull something out of his pocket and drop it into defendant’s cell through a slot in the cell 

door. Officer Larson immediately approached defendant’s cell and asked for the object, which 

appeared to be “a crumpled-up piece of paper.” According to Officer Larson, defendant asserted 

that it “was just a note with some words on it.” The officer responded that, if true, it “won’t be a 

big deal.” Officer Larson then asked to read it first, but defendant refused and began opening the 

paper himself. The officer immediately proceeded to enter defendant’s prison cell and obtained 

the crumpled piece of paper. Officer Larson testified that defendant had initially refused to hand 

him the crumpled paper, but after watching a video recording of the event captured by a 

surveillance camera, the officer agreed that after he opened defendant’s cell door, defendant 

handed him the paper. When Officer Larson opened the paper, he discovered two orange strips of

what he believed to be Suboxone. He next took the paper and strips back to “the bubble” where 

officers were stationed, and, in the process, defendant shouted an expletive at Officer Larson.1

Officer Larson wrote up a misconduct for defendant and secured the suspected contraband 

in a locker. In following up on the misconduct, Officer Larson was informed that defendant had 

claimed a belief that candy had been tossed into his prison cell. Officer Larson testified that he 

had not found or seen any candy in defendant’s cell, nor was there candy on defendant’s person. 

At the time the contraband was discovered, the officer did not personally know defendant or the

prisoner involved in the conveyance or whether they had any kind of prior relationship. Officer 

Larson was not involved in writing the ensuing incident report. He testified that a prisoner would 

 

1 This Court has been provided with a DVD containing two video recordings of the incident at 

issue. Neither video has sound. Both videos are two minutes and 57 seconds long, and they depict 

the same events from different angles. They show a hallway with blue doors on both sides, all of 

which have horizontal slots at the bottom that flip open. At the outset, there are prisoners sweeping 

and cleaning the hall, and a corrections officer, presumably Officer Larson, is standing in the 

hallway. Approximately 13 seconds into the video, a prisoner walking through the halls ducks 

down and tosses a small object into the slot for cell door 19. It appears that the object did not make 

it all the way into the cell, and a hand, presumably belonging to defendant, quickly reaches out to 

grab the object. The corrections officer then approaches the cell and speaks to the occupant 

through an upper vertical slot in the cell door from approximately 28 seconds into the video until 

about 55 seconds into the video. At that time, the officer produces a set of keys and begins 

unlocking the cell door. At approximately one minute and two seconds into the video, the prisoner 

hands the officer a small object, and the officer shuts the cell door. The officer then walks slowly 

down the hall and spends most of the rest of the video apparently pondering the object (he is out 

of view of one of the cameras for a portion of that time). In one of the videos, it appears that the 

prisoner is standing at the door to his cell, looking out through the vertical slot; the prisoner has 

some exchanges with other prisoners in the hall during that time. At approximately two minutes 

and twenty seconds, the officer walks back past the cell and seemingly has some kind of brief 

exchange with the occupant before walking out of view.
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typically be drug-tested after the kind of incident at issue, but Officer Larson had no personal 

knowledge whether defendant was actually tested.

Michigan State Police Detective Sergeant Steve Arendt testified that he was responsible 

for emptying the lockers at the prison and that he was the investigator assigned to look into the 

matter. He retrieved the two orange strips found in the crumpled piece of paper and sent them to 

the crime laboratory for testing. The strips tested positive for buprenorphine, otherwise known as 

Suboxone, a Schedule III controlled substance. Sergeant Arendt was informed that defendant did 

not have a prescription for that drug. The sergeant explained that defendant had been tested for 

the presence of drugs in his system and that although the initial test revealed a positive screen, the 

sample taken from defendant was then retested at the laboratory and found to be negative.

Defendant was charged with PPCS. At the preliminary examination, defendant argued that 

he should not be bound over because the evidence demonstrated that he did not knowingly come 

into possession of a controlled substance when the strips of Suboxone were thrust into his cell. 

The district court did not comment on whether MCL 800.281(4) had a mens rea requirement or 

element, but it did opine that defendant’s initial reluctance to hand the crumpled paper to Officer 

Larson followed by the expletive that defendant hurled at the officer constituted sufficient evidence 

of knowledge for purposes of establishing probable cause. Consequently, the district court bound 

defendant over to the circuit court for trial. The prosecutor filed notice of a fourth-offense habitual 

offender enhancement. At defendant’s arraignment, defendant entered a plea of not guilty.

Defendant next filed a motion that essentially sought to add a scienter requirement or mens 

rea element to the offense of PPCS for purposes of jury instructions at a future trial. As indicated 

earlier, defendant contended that although this Court in Ramsdell held that PPCS is a strict-liability 

offense with no need to prove a culpable mental state, it should now be construed as having a 

scienter requirement or mens rea element pursuant to Michigan Supreme Court precedent issued 

after Ramsdell and in light of MCL 8.9, which was enacted under 2015 PA 250 after Ramsdell was 

released. At a hearing on defendant’s motion, the trial court expressed doubt that it could disregard 

binding caselaw, i.e., Ramsdell. Ultimately, the court denied defendant’s motion, ruling that it 

remained bound by the caselaw and that it would be inappropriate to imply a scienter requirement 

with respect to a statute governing a penal environment. 

Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal, but this Court denied the application 

“for failure to persuade the Court of the need for immediate appellate review.” People v 

Tadgerson, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 18, 2021 (Docket No. 

356035). Thereafter, the parties negotiated a conditional no-contest plea that preserved 

defendant’s right to appeal the issue concerning whether MCL 800.281(4) is a strict-liability 

crime.2 The plea agreement also resulted in dismissal of the fourth-offense habitual offender 

 

2 MCR 6.301(C)(2) provides:

A defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, nolo contendere, guilty 

but mentally ill, or not guilty by reason of insanity. A conditional plea preserves for 

appeal a specified pretrial ruling or rulings notwithstanding the plea-based 
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enhancement and a recommendation that defendant’s minimum sentence not exceed 14 months. 

The trial court ensured that defendant understood the nature and consequences of the no-contest

plea, and the plea was entered. The court apparently used the incident report to establish the factual 

basis for the no-contest plea. The trial court sentenced defendant to 14 months to five years’

imprisonment to be served consecutively to defendant’s resisting-and-obstructing sentence. 

Defendant appeals by leave granted. People v Tadgerson, unpublished order of the Court of 

Appeals, entered March 18, 2022 (Docket No. 360094). 

II. ANALYSIS

A. DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL

Defendant argues that he is entitled to have a jury instructed on all material defenses 

supported by the evidence and in accordance with applicable law. Defendant contends that strictliability crimes are disfavored and that a mens rea element will be inferred unless the Legislature 

clearly indicated that there is no culpable-mental-state component of an offense. Defendant 

additionally maintains that MCL 800.281(4) contains no clear expression that it is a strict-liability 

crime. Therefore, according to defendant, pursuant to MCL 8.9 and precedent from our Supreme 

Court, a requirement that a prosecutor prove that a prisoner knowingly possessed a controlled 

substance must be implied. Defendant asserts that because Ramsdell predated MCL 8.9 and 

pertinent Supreme Court precedent, the trial court erred by relying on Ramsdell. Furthermore, 

defendant claims that Ramsdell was legally unsound even at the time that it was issued. He argues 

that because there is a significant penalty for violating MCL 800.281(4)—it is a felony punishable 

by up to five years’ imprisonment, MCL 800.285(1)—strict liability is wholly inappropriate. 

Finally, defendant contends that prisoners generally have no reasonable expectation of privacy; 

therefore, construing MCL 800.281(4) as a strict-liability offense is unnecessary to maintaining 

security and chills any rehabilitative potential offered by interactions between prisoners.

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

We review de novo issues of statutory construction. People v Pinkney, 501 Mich 259, 267; 

912 NW2d 535 (2018). When interpreting a statute, this Court first focuses on the plain language 

of the statutory provision, striving to accomplish the goal of giving effect to the intent of the 

Legislature. Id. at 268. We must read individual words and phrases in the context of the entire 

legislative scheme, examining the statute as a whole. Id. When the language of a statute is clear 

and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written, and no further judicial construction is 

required or permitted. Id. If at all possible, every word in a statute should be given meaning and 

no word should be rendered nugatory or treated as surplusage. Id. at 288. When there is a potential 

conflict between statutes, this Court must, to the extent reasonably possible, harmonize them to 

 

judgment and entitles the defendant to withdraw the plea if a specified pretrial 

ruling is overturned on appeal. The ruling or rulings as to which the defendant 

reserves the right to appeal must be specified orally on the record or in a writing 

made a part of the record. The appeal is by application for leave to appeal only.
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give effect to the intent of the Legislature. People v Allen, 507 Mich 597, 609 n 19; 968 NW2d 

532 (2021).

C. DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION

Defendant was charged with and pleaded no contest to a violation of MCL 800.281(4), 

which provides, subject to an inapplicable exception, that “a prisoner shall not possess any 

alcoholic liquor, prescription drug, poison, or controlled substance.” Defendant asserts that the 

statutory provision must be construed as requiring proof that he knowingly possessed the 

Suboxone, even though the provision is silent in regard to scienter.

3

 In Ramsdell, 230 Mich App 

at 392, this Court discussed its view of the elements of PPCS, stating:

First, a prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

is, in fact, a “prisoner.” Second, a prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant “possessed” a controlled substance (or other item proscribed by 

MCL 800.281[4]), i.e., that the defendant had actual physical control of the 

controlled substance. It is undisputed on the record that the prosecutor in this case 

proved both of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. There were no other 

elements for the prosecutor to prove. The word “knowingly” is absolutely absent 

from the statute as enacted by the Legislature and signed into law by the Governor.

With respect to Supreme Court precedent concerning strict-liability crimes, citing People 

v Rice, 161 Mich 657, 664; 126 NW 981 (1910), and People v Quinn, 440 Mich 178, 187; 487 

NW2d 194 (1992), our Supreme Court in People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446, 451; 697 NW2d 494 

(2005), observed that criminal intent is normally an element of a crime and that statutes that create 

strict liability are not favored. Some indication of legislative “intent, express or implied, is 

required to dispense with mens rea as an element of a crime.” Id. at 455 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted; emphasis added). As traceable to the common law, there exists a longstanding 

presumption that unless otherwise reflected in a statute, the Legislature intends for a defendant to 

possess a culpable mental state relative to the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise 

innocent conduct. People v Magnant, 508 Mich 151, 167; 973 NW2d 60 (2021). 

The basic guiding principles in the preceding paragraph, which were enunciated by our 

Supreme Court before and after Ramsdell, were essentially acknowledged and accepted by the 

Ramsdell panel. Ramsdell, 230 Mich App at 398. The Court in Ramsdell, id., also recognized and 

quoted the following language from People v Lardie, 452 Mich 231, 239, 246; 551 NW2d 656 

(1996), overruled on other grounds by People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 422; 703 NW2d 774 

(2005):

In order to determine whether a statute imposes strict liability or requires 

proof of a mens rea, that is, a guilty mind, this Court first examines the statute itself 

and seeks to determine the Legislature’s intent. In interpreting a statute in which 

the Legislature has not expressly included language indicating that fault is a 

 

3 Proof of scienter refers to evidence “that a person knowingly violated” a criminal statute. People 

v Schumacher, 276 Mich App 165, 167; 740 NW2d 534 (2007). 
-6-

necessary element of a crime, this Court must focus on whether the Legislature 

nevertheless intended to require some fault as a predicate to finding guilt.

* * *

Where the offense in question does not codify the common law and omits 

reference to the element of intent, this Court will examine the Legislature’s intent 

in enacting the legislation to determine whether there is a mens rea requirement. 

Employing this language from Lardie and comparing MCL 800.281(4) to general drug 

offenses, the Ramsdell panel held:

As explained above, a conclusion that the Legislature sub silentio intended 

to impose a “knowledge” requirement as part of the prisoner in possession of 

contraband statute at issue in this case is untenable in light of the differing language 

between the statute at hand, MCL 800.281(4), which includes no reference to 

knowingly or intentionally possessing contraband, and the general statute regarding 

possession of controlled substances, MCL 333.7403, which proscribes only

“knowingly or intentionally” possessing a controlled substance. Inasmuch as one 

must presume that (1) the Legislature was familiar with existing laws regarding the 

subject of possession of controlled substances when it enacted MCL 800.281(4) in 

its current form in 1982, and (2) the general statute regarding possession of 

controlled substances had been in effect—with the pertinent “knowingly or 

intentionally” language—since 1978, it follows that the Legislature did not intend 

to include a requirement of knowing or intentional possession in MCL 800.281(4).

Thus, no “knowledge” element should be “read into” MCL 800.281(4). Rather, 

given that the Legislature included no express intent element in MCL 800.281(4) 

in the face of such an element being present in the general statute against possession 

of controlled substances, we conclude that the Legislature intended for MCL

800.281(4) to be a strict liability crime. [Ramsdell, 230 Mich App at 398-399 

(citations omitted).]

This Court in Ramsdell effectively ruled that our Legislature implicitly indicated an intent to 

dispense with a mens rea element with respect to an offense under MCL 800.281(4).

Michigan Supreme Court precedent issued after Ramsdell—setting forth pertinent 

principles that had already existed long before Ramsdell was decided and that Ramsdell 

recognized—did not explicitly or implicitly modify or overrule Ramsdell. See MCR 7.215(J)(1) 

(“A panel of the Court of Appeals must follow the rule of law established by a prior published 

decision of the Court of Appeals issued on or after November 1, 1990, that has not been reversed 

or modified by the Supreme Court, or by a special panel of the Court of Appeals as provided in 

this rule.”). 

Moreover, although Ramsdell did not rely on the language in reaching its holding, we note 

that MCL 800.281(2) provides that “a person who knows or has reason to know that another person 

is a prisoner shall not sell, give, or furnish, either directly or indirectly, any . . . controlled substance 

to that prisoner anywhere outside of a correctional facility.” (Emphasis added.) Our “Legislature 
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is presumed to be familiar with the rules of statutory construction, and when it is promulgating 

new laws it is presumed to be aware of the consequences of its use or omission of statutory 

language.” People v Kosik, 303 Mich App 146, 158; 841 NW2d 906 (2013) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). When enacting MCL 800.281, the Legislature expressly included, in part, a 

mens rea requirement in subsection (2) of the statute, which covers an offense separate from the 

one at issue here, but wholly omitted a mens rea requirement in subsection (4) of that very same 

statute. Indeed, subsection (2) of MCL 800.281 specifically contains the exact culpable mental 

state that defendant wishes to imply for purposes of subsection (4)—a “knowing” or “knowingly”

requirement. In our view, this plainly demonstrated that the Legislature intended MCL 800.281(4) 

to be a strict-liability offense. 

After Ramsdell was decided in 1998, the Legislature enacted MCL 8.9 pursuant to 2015 

PA 250, and MCL 8.9 provides, in relevant part:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person is not guilty of a 

criminal offense committed on or after January 1, 2016 unless both of the following 

apply:

(a) The person’s criminal liability is based on conduct that includes either a 

voluntary act or an omission to perform an act or duty that the person is capable of 

performing.[

4

]

(b) The person has the requisite degree of culpability for each element of 

the offense as to which a culpable mental state is specified by the language defining 

the offense.

(2) If the statutory language defining a criminal offense does not specify 

any degree of culpability and plainly imposes strict criminal liability for the conduct 

described in the statute, then culpability is not required for a person to be guilty of 

the offense. The fact that a subsection of a statute plainly imposes strict liability for 

an offense defined in that subsection does not by itself plainly impose strict criminal 

liability for an offense defined in another subsection of that statute that does not 

specify a degree of culpability.

 (3) Except as provided in subsection (4), if statutory language defining an 

element of a criminal offense that is related to knowledge or intent or as to which 

mens rea could reasonably be applied neither specifies culpability nor plainly 

imposes strict liability, the element of the offense is established only if a person 

acts with intent, knowledge, or recklessness.

 

4

Involuntary acts provide a defense against the actus reus element of a crime. People v Likine, 

492 Mich 367, 393; 823 NW2d 50 (2012). “The common thread running through . . . 

‘involuntariness’ defenses is that the act does not occur under the defendant’s control, and thus the 

defendant was powerless to prevent its occurrence and cannot be held criminally liable for the act.” 

MCL 8.9(1)(a) would protect defendant against some of the concerns that he raises on appeal.
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(4) Subsection (3) does not relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving 

the culpable mental state required by any definition incorporated into the offense.

* * *

(9) The mere absence of a specified state of mind for an element of a 

covered offense shall not be construed to mean that the legislature affirmatively 

intended not to require the prosecution to prove any state of mind.

Clearly, given the enactment of MCL 8.9, the question whether MCL 800.281(4) is a strict-liability 

offense is now governed by MCL 8.9, which reflects the Legislature’s decision to set the criteria

regarding the analysis of whether an offense includes a scienter requirement or mens rea element. 

MCL 800.281(4) must be analyzed under MCL 8.9. But to the extent that MCL 8.9 incorporates

and codifies caselaw principles recognized and applied by this Court in Ramsdell, we do believe 

that it is appropriate to consider and honor Ramsdell’s application of those principles to MCL 

800.281(4). See People v Morris, 314 Mich App 399, 409; 886 NW2d 910 (2016) (legislative 

codification of a judicially-defined requirement without the Legislature defining it itself gives rise 

to a logical conclusion of a legislative intent to adopt the judiciary’s construction of that 

requirement). 

MCL 8.9(1)(b) requires a degree of culpability for the elements of an offense, but only 

where “a culpable mental state is specified by the language defining the offense.” MCL 800.281(4) 

does not specify a culpable mental state; therefore, MCL 8.9(1)(b) cannot serve as a basis to 

incorporate a mens rea element into the offense of PPCS. MCL 8.9(2) indicates that culpability is 

not required when statutory language “does not specify any degree of culpability and plainly 

imposes strict criminal liability.” No culpable mental state is included in MCL 800.281(4), leaving 

the question whether MCL 800.281(4) plainly imposes strict liability. Ramsdell ruled that the 

Legislature intended PPCS to be a strict-liability offense, but it did not specifically frame its 

decision in terms of MCL 800.281(4) plainly imposing strict liability. We conclude, however, on 

the strength of the reasoning and analysis in Ramsdell comparing the general drug-possession 

statute to MCL 800.281(4), along with our observation that subsection (2) of MCL 800.281 

expressly includes a scienter requirement yet MCL 800.281(4) does not, that MCL 800.281(4) 

plainly imposes strict liability.

With respect to MCL 8.9(3), we agree there is an argument that “mens rea could reasonably 

be applied” to the “possession” element of PPCS. But because we have found that MCL 800.281(4) 

“plainly imposes strict liability,” MCL 8.9(3) is not implicated and thus does not require proof of 

“intent, knowledge, or recklessness” in connection with PPCS.5 Finally, in relation to MCL 8.9(9)

and as detailed earlier, our holding today is not based on “[t]he mere absence of a specified state 

of mind for an element of [the] covered offense[.]” Rather, we have also taken into consideration 

 

5 We also note that MCL 8.9(3), when read in conjunction with subsection (4), could be interpreted 

as solely addressing statutory offenses that provide definitions for its elements. And there are no 

statutory definitions with regard to the elements in MCL 800.281(4); the term “possess” or 

“possession” is not statutorily defined. 
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the inclusion of a mens rea requirement in the general drug-possession statute, as alluded to and 

relied on in Ramsdell, as well as the inclusion of a mens rea element in subsection (2) of MCL 

800.281. We conclude that reversal is unwarranted; consequently, the no-contest plea is fully 

enforceable.

We affirm.

/s/ Jane E. Markey

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello