COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

DONALD LOUIS DAVIDSON 

v. Record No. 0662-95-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

KATHY L. NORMILE DAVIDSON SEPTEMBER 26, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROANOKE COUNTY 

Kenneth E. Trabue, Judge Designate 

 (Sam Garrison; Richard Lee Lawrence & 

Associates, on briefs), for appellant. 

 (Ellen S. Weinman, on brief), for appellee. 

 Donald Louis Davidson (husband) appeals the decision of the 

circuit court. Husband argues the circuit court erred when it 

ruled an agreement signed by husband and Kathy L. Normile 

Davidson (wife) was an enforceable property settlement agreement. 

 Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude 

that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily 

affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. 

 Evidence in this matter was heard by the trial court ore

tenus. "Property settlement and support agreements are subject 

to the same rules of construction and interpretation applicable 

to contracts generally." Fry v. Schwarting, 4 Va. App. 173, 180, 

355 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1987). "[O]n appeal if all the evidence 

which is necessary to construe a contract was presented to the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

trial court and is before the reviewing court, the meaning and 

effect of the contract is a question of law which can readily be 

ascertained by this court." Id. 

 The trial court ruled that the agreement was unambiguous and 

enforceable. We agree. "The fact that the parties attribute to 

the same terms variant meanings does not necessarily imply the 

existence of ambiguity where there otherwise is none." Smith v. 

Smith, 3 Va. App. 510, 513-14, 351 S.E.2d 593, 595 (1986). 

"Where there is no ambiguity in the terms of a contract, we must 

construe it as written, and we are not at liberty to search for 

the meaning of the provisions beyond the pertinent instrument 

itself." Id. at 514, 351 S.E.2d at 596. 

 The terms of a property settlement agreement are presumed to 

be independent and, absent evidence to the contrary, will be 

construed as such. See Eschner v. Eschner, 146 Va. 417, 422-23, 

131 S.E. 800, 802 (1926); Gloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 549, 153 

S.E. 879, 891 (1930); Lindley and Parley, Lindley on Separation 

Agreements and Anti-Nuptial Agreements, Vol. 2 § 25.02 at 25-7 to 

25-8. A reading of the agreement in this case, confined to its 

four corners, fails to support the husband's contention that it 

is void under Kelley v. Kelley, 248 Va. 295, 449 S.E.2d 55 

(1994). Unlike the agreement in question in Kelley, the parties 

here did not attempt to limit the court's "continuing 

jurisdiction to change or modify its decree relating to the 

maintenance and support of minor children." Id. at 298, 449 
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S.E.2d at 56. 

 Moreover, the parties have acted in accordance with the 

agreement since it was signed in 1991, and husband admitted that 

he had received benefits under its terms. "[T]he interpretation 

placed upon an agreement by the parties themselves is entitled to 

the greatest weight." Id. at 518, 351 S.E.2d at 598. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.