### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A pr il 3, 200 7 S es sio n
IN RE D .Y .H.
Appeal by Per m ission from the Court of Appeals, Wester n Section

Circuit Courtfor Madison County No. C-04- 445 Roy B. Morgan, Jr., Judge

No. W2005-00684-SC- R11-CV- F iled on May 24, 2007

The fathe r was g rante d custody of his minor child in juve nile court a fter the court found the daug hter to be depe ndent and neg lected. Three y ear s afte r t he order was enter ed, the mother filed a petition for chang e of custody in juve nile court, which was denied. The mother appe aled the juve nile court’s order to circ uit court. The circuit court dism issed the appeal concluding that it lacke d jurisdiction to hear the appe al bec ause the petition filed by the mother wa s n o t a p ar t of the de pendenc y and neg lect proc eeding

. The Court of Appea ls a ffirme d the circ uit court. We reve rse the judg ment of the Court of Appe als and hold that the subseque nt custody decision wa s a part of the depe ndency and neg lect proc eedingso that it is properly appea lable to circ uit court for a de novo hea

ring

. Tenn. R. App . P . 11; Judgme nt of th e Courtof Ap peals is Reverse d; Case Re m anded

W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C.J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J AN I C E M. H OL DER , C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , and G AR Y R. W ADE , J J ., joined.

Jeanie M. To dd , Jac ks on , T e nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lla nt, She lly B ry ant.

B ob C. H oo pe r, Jac ks on , T e nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lle e , Jua

n H un t. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a

nd Reporter ; Michael E. M o o re , Solicitor Genera l; and Doug las E. Dimond, Senior Counsel, for the a micus curiae , the State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

I. Fac ts a nd P

ro c e dural H

ist or y On April 7, 1999, Juan Hunt (the “F ather ”) filed a pe tition for custody in the J uvenile Court for Ma dison County

alleg ing that Shelly

Br y ant (the “ Mother”) had abuse d their minor daug hter by hitting her

with a switch. Afte r a he aring on May 18, 1999, the j uvenile cour t found the child to beI n i t s A ugust 12 , 19 9 9 O rder, t he juveni l e co urt f o und that the chil d ha d b rui ses and s cab s o n her ar m s and 1 le g s a s a re su lt o f t h e M o the r w h ip p ing the c h ild w ith a sw itch

. -2- depende nt and neg lecte d an d awa rded te mporary

custody to the Father. The c ourt prohibited 1 corpor al punishment of the child, g rante d the Mother visitation, and orde red both parents to attend pare nting c lasses.

On J uly 22, 2002, the Mother f

iled a petition for a chang e of custody in juvenile cour t stating that she had c omplied with the require ments of the juvenile co u rt ’s o rder and that the c hild had expressed a pref

ere nce to live with the Mother. The court denied the Mother’s peti t i o n , l eaving temporar y custody with the Father. The Mother filed a pe tition t o rec onsider, which w as denie d by the juvenile cour

t in an order

enter ed on September 24, 2004. The court found that “there has not be e n s ignif

ic ant c ha ng e in c ir c ums tanc e s to wa rr ant a c ha

ng e in c us tod

y .” Th e Mo the r a

pp e a le d th is decision to the Circuit Court for Madison County . The circuit court dism issed the M other’s a ppeal ruling that the pe t i t i o n fo r a chang e in custody was unre lated to the depe ndency and neg lect pr oc e e din g , a

nd , a c c or din g ly , a

ny a pp e a l shoul d be f

ile d in the Court

of Ap pe a ls p ur su ant t o Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 37-1-159(g ) (2005) . The Court of Appea ls a ffirme d the ruling of the c ircuit court.

II. Stan dard of Revie w “[R] eview of

finding s of fa ct by

the trial cour

t i n ci v i l actions shall be de novo upon the
rec ord of the tr ial court, a ccompa nied by a pre sumption of the corr ectne ss of t he finding, unless the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is otherwise .” Te nn. R. App. P. 13(d). We revie w of c onclusions of law de novo w ithout a presumption of corr ectne ss. Stewart v. S ewe ll, 215 S.W .3d 815, 821 (Tenn. 2007).

III . Ana ly sis

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 37-1-159 g overn s ap p eals fr om juvenile court pr oc e e din g s. I t pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s: (a) The juvenile court s hall be a c ourt of re cord; a nd any appea l from any

final orde r or jud g me nt i n a

de lin qu e nc y

proceeding , f

ile d und e r t

his c ha pte r, e xce pt a proce edingpursuant § 37-1- 134, may be made to the criminal court or cour t having criminal jurisdiction that shall hear the testimony

of witnesses a

nd try th e ca se de novo; and any appeal from any

final order or judgment in an unruly child proceeding or depende nt and neglec t proc eeding, filed unde r this c hapter, may be made to the
c irc uit c ou rt that shall hear

the testimony

of witnesses and try

the ca se de novo. The appea l shall be perf

ecte d within ten (10) day s, excluding nonjudicial day s, following the juvenile cour

t’s dispositi on. . . .

. . . .-3-

(g ) Appe als in all other c ivil matters hear d by the juvenile cour

t shall be g overne d by the Tenne ssee Rules of A ppellate Proc edure

. (Emphasis adde d.)

I t is clea r fr om the statute that appe als from a juvenile cour

t’s final orde r or judg ment in a unruly child or depe ndency

and neg lect proc eedingare to be made to c ircuit court. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159 (a ). Appea ls in all other civil matters hea rd by a juvenile c ourt are g overne d by the Tenne ssee Rules of A

ppellate Proc edure , which provide that civil appea ls are t o b e made to the Court of Appea ls. Tenn. R. App. P

. 3; see, e.g ., Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s S ervs. v. T.M.B.K., 197 S.W .3 d 282, 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) ( providing that appea ls in termination cases a re a ppeale d direc tly to the Court of Appea ls).

I n th is c a se , th e ini tia l pr oc e e din g wa s o ne fo r d e pe nd e nc y and ne g le c t. T he F a the r i n h is April 7, 1999 petition alleg ed that the M other had abused the child, and af ter a hear ing on the matter, the juvenile cour

t entered an order

finding the child to be depe ndent and ne g lected a nd awa rded
c us tod y to t he F a the r. Ha d th e Mo the r a pp e a le d th a t or de r, the a

pp e a l w ou ld h ave been to c ir c uit court. See Tenn. Code Ann. 37- 1-159(a ). Howe ver, the re w as no appe al at that ti me. The or der that the Mother did a p p ea l was a subse quent orde r in which the c ourt had de nied her J uly 22, 2002 petition for a c hang e of c ustody

. The Court of Appe als held that the July 22, 2002 petition was not part of the depende ncy and neg lect proc eeding , and, ther efor e, pursua nt to Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 37-1-159( g ) the proper court to hea

r the a ppeal wa s the Court of Appea ls. Th e court rea soned that bec ause the Mother’s pe tition for a cha ng e of custody was filed over three y ear s afte r the fina l order w as ente red in the depende ncy and neg lect proce eding g ranting custody to the Father, the petition c onstitut ed a
new a ction and wa s not related to the ear lier dependenc y and neg lect proc eeding . The c ourt reje cted the Mother’ s argum en t t h at t h e J uly 22, 2002 petition was in substance a petition to modi fy

the pr e v i o u s o r d e r u n d e r T e n n e s s e e R u l e o f Juv e n i l e P r o c e d

ur e 3 4 , n o t i n g th a t th e p e t i t i o nfa ile d to alleg e any err ors in the depe ndency and neg lect proc eeding

. I n concluding that the J uly 22, 2002 petition was a ne w ac tion and not part of the de pendenc y and neg lect proc eeding , the Court of Appea ls f ocused too na

rrowly on the fac e of the July 22, 2002 petition.

I n a ll c a se s in

juv e nil e c ourt in vo lvi nga c us tod y de te rm inatio n th e re mus t be so me underl yin g p r o c e e d in g th a t g iv e s th e c o urt s u b je c t m a tt e r

ju r is d ic ti o n

. U n li k e c ir c u it o r c h an c e ry courts, which a

re c ourts of g ener al jurisdiction, juvenile cou rt s i n T ennessee ar e cour ts of limit edA rtic le V I, se c tio n 1 o f th e T e n n e sse e C o n stitutio n giv e s the L e g islatu re the p o w e r to c re a te c o u rts o f ge n e ra l, 2

s peci al , or l i mi t ed j ur i s di ct i on. St at e e x r el

. W ar d v. M ur r el l , 90 S. W

. 2d 94 5, 94 6 ( T enn

. 19 36 )

. Co mp ar e T enn es s ee C o d e A nno t at ed s ect i o n 16

- 1 0

- 1 0 1 (gr ant i ng ci rcui t co urt s general juri sdi ct i o n o ver cases) , wi t h sect i o ns 3 7

- 1

- 1 0 3 and 3 7 -1 -1 0 4 (g ra n ting ju v e n ile c o u rts j u risd ic tio n in c e rta in p ro c e e d ing s)

. -4- jur isd ic tio n. Stamba

ug h v . Pr ic e , 53 2 S.W. 2d 92 9, 93 2 (T e nn

. 19 76 ). Juve nil e c ourt s ma y e xer c ise 2 only such jurisdiction and powe rs as have bee n confe rre d on them by statute. In re S

. L

. M

. , 207 S.W .3d 288, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing State ex re l. H y att v. Boma r, 358 S.W .2d 295, 296 (Tenn. 1962) ). The two pr imary statutes that confe r jurisdiction on juvenile cour ts are T ennesse e Code Annotated se ction 37-1-103 (2005), which def ines are as of e x clusive orig inal jurisdiction, and section 37-1- 104 (2005), whic h define s are as of c oncurr ent jurisdiction.

Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 3 7- 1- 10 3 p ro vid e s in re le va nt p art : (a) The juvenile c ourt has exclu s i v e o ri g inal jurisdiction of the following pr oc e e din g s, wh ic h a

re g ov e rn e d b y

thi s p art : (1) Proc eeding s in which a c hild is a lleg ed to be de linquent, unruly or depende nt and negle cted, or to have c ommitt ed a juve nile traff ic offe nse as define d in § 37-1-146;

. . . . (c) W h en j u r isdiction has been acquired unde r the provisions of this part, such jurisdiction s hall continue until the case ha s been dismissed, or until the custody deter mination is transfe rre d to a nother juvenile, circ uit, or chancer y o r general sessions court exercisingdomestic relations jurisdi cti o n , o r until a petition for
a do pti on is f ile d r e g ard ingthe c hil d in qu e sti on a s set out in § 36- 1- 11 6( f)

. . . . In a ll other c ases, jurisdiction shall continue unti l a per son rea ches the ag e of e ighte en (18) , except that the court may extend jurisdiction for the limited purposes set out in § 37- 1-102(b) (4)( B) until the person re ache s the ag e of nine teen ( 19). (Emphasis added)

. Thus, when a juvenile court acquir es jurisdiction f rom a depende ncy

and neg lect proce eding , its ex clusive orig inal jurisdiction continues until one of following events oc cur: (1 ) t he c a se is d ism iss e d; (2 ) t he c us tod y de te rm inatio n is tr ans fe rr e d to ano the r c ourt ; (3) a petition for adoption is filed; or (4) the c hild reac hes the a g e of e ighte en. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37- 1-103(c ); see a lso Toms v. Toms, 98 S

. W

. 3 d 1 4 0 , 1 43-34 (Te nn. 2003) (holding that the juvenile cour t l o s t its ex clusive orig inal jurisdiction when it dismi ssed the depende ncy

and neg lect petition).-5-

Section 37-1-104 c onfer s juvenile courts with concur rent jurisdi ction including c oncurr ent jurisdiction with circuit and cha ncer y courts to terminate pare ntal rig hts, to order child support, and to determine the pater

nity and custody of children born out of we dlock. I t also confe rs conc urre nt jur isd ic tio n w ithpr ob a te c ourt s to tr e a t a de ve lop me nta lly

dis a ble d a nd me nta lly il l chi ld and

to deter mine the custody

or appoint a guardia

n of a c hild.

I n Tenne ssee Depa

rtment of Children’s Service s v. Owens, 129 S.W .3d 50 (Tenn. 2004) , we clar ified that any

custody decision that is made dur ing a depe ndency and neg lect proc eedingis a part of the de pendenc y

and neg lect proc eedingand appea lable to c ircuit court. I d. at 55. In Owens, the Depa rtment of Children’s Ser

vices (“ DCS”) filed a

petitio n i n t h e J u venile Court for H ay wood County to d e c lare a

min or c hil d to be de pe nd e nt an d ne g le c te d. I d. a t 52. T he c hil d’ s a un t and un c le filed a petition to intervene and for custody

. I d. Whil e these petitions were pe nding, D CS filed a petition to terminate pare ntal rig hts. I d. The juvenile court ter minated par ental rig hts and awa rded g uardia nship to DCS . I d. at 53. The court also denied the aunt and uncle’ s petition f or custody . I d. T h e a u n t a n d u n c l e a

p p e a l e d t h e j u v e n i l e c o urt ’ s o r d e r t o t h e C i r c u i tC o urtf

o r H ayw o o d

C o u n ty, which dismissed the appe al for la ck of jurisdiction. I d.
We concluded that the appea l was prope rly made to cir cuit court be cause t h e o rd erwas connec ted to the depe ndency and neg lect proc eeding . 129 S.W .3d at 54. W e s t at ed that “[t]he
natur e and su

bs tanc e of a pr oc e e din g c ann ot be tr ans fo rm e d s imp ly by the fi lin g of

a pe tit ion wi th a diffe rent c aption.” I d. Recog nizi ng that the aunt and uncle’s petit ion for custody was before the juvenile court i n t he depe ndency and neg lect hea

ring , we he ld that the appea l arose out of the de pe nd e nc y

and ne g le c t pr oc e e din g , rathe r tha n fr om the te rm inatio n p ro c e e din g , a nd wa s p ro pe rl y perf ecte d to circuit cour

t pursuant to Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 37-1-159(a ). I d. at 55.

I n thi s c a se , we are c on fr on te d wi th a sit uatio n sim ila

r to that in Ow e ns in wh ic h the juv e nil e court’s jurisdiction wa s acquire d by the filing of a de pendenc y and neg lect petition. After a hea ring on the Father’s A

pril 7, 1999 petition, the juvenile court dete rmined that the c hild was depe ndent and neg lected a

nd awa rded c ustody

to the Father. On April 22, 2002, the M other filed a petiti on for a chang e of c ustody . Havingacquir ed jurisdiction over the child by the fil ing of the depe ndency

and neg lect petition and havingfound the child to be depende nt a nd neg lected, the juvenile court he ard the Mother’ s J uly

22, 2002 petition pursuant to its continui ng depende ncy and negle ct jurisdiction. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 37-1-103( c); see also Tenn. Dep’t of Human S ervs. v. Gouvitsa, 735 S.W .2d 452, 455-56 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that “once a juvenile court has enter tained jurisdiction
ov e r a c hil d [in a de pe nd e ncy and neglec t pr oc e e din g ] that c ourt mus t take a ff

ir mativ e a c tio n to dispose of the c ase in one of the wa y s provided by

statute befor e jurisdiction can te rminate” ).
We hold that in these circumstance s without an int err upting e vent under

section 37-1- 103(c) , a su bs e qu e nt de c isi on

by the juv e nil e c ourt

on wh e the r t o mo dif

y an in iti a l c us tod

y or de r w ill a lso arise f rom and be a par

t of the dependency and negle ct proceeding

. This is true even if a pe tition for
a ch ange of

custody does not ref

ere nce the depende ncy

and neg lect hea

ring and eve n if it is filed y ear s after the final order is enter ed. Acc ording ly , any appea l from such a custody decision is to be made to cir cuit court. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37- 1-159(a ); In re T.M.C., No. M2004-02653- COA-W hi l e u npubl i s hed opi ni ons ar e n ot cons i dere d c ont r ol l i ng aut hor i t y exc ept bet ween t he part i es t o t he cas e, 3
t hey are co nsi d ered pe rs uasi ve aut ho ri t y
. T enn. S. C t

. R

. 4(H )( 1 ); M cC o nnel l v. Stat e, 1 2 S.W

. 3 d 79 5 , 79 9 n. 5 (T enn. 2 0 0 0 ) (c iti n g A llstate In s. C o . v. W a tts, 8 1 1 S .W .2 d 8 8 3 , 8 8 6 n.2 (T e n n . 1 9 9 1 ))

. -6- R3-J V, 2005 WL3555542, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2005) (holding that a custody proce eding 3 in j uv e nil e c ourt oc c ur

ri ng su bs e qu e nt to a de pe nd e nc y and ne g le c t f ind ingwa s p ro pe rl y

a pp e a la ble to c ircuit court); see also L okey v. Griff in, 322 S.W .2d 239, 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958) (holding that
a ft e r t he c ourt a c qu ir e s d e pe nd e nc y and ne g le c t jur isd ic tio n, “ any futur e or de r m a de by the Juve nil e Court . . . conce rning the car e, custody and support of the se childre n . . . will be subject to revie w by appea l to the Circuit Court”).
There fore , the Mother’ s petition for a chang e of custody was a part of the depende ncy and neg lect proc eeding , and the juvenile c ourt’s orde r deny ing the petition was a

p p e alable to c ircuit court for a de novo hea

ring . Tenn. Code Ann. § 37- 1-159(a ). The Circuit Court for Madison Count y err ed in d ism iss ingthe Mo the r’ s a pp e a l and in c on c lud ingthat it

la c ke d ju ri sd ic tio n to he ar t

he a pp e a l.

IV . Conclu sion
We hold that the circuit court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the Mother’ s appea l from the juvenile cour

t’s order denying he r petition for c hang e of c ustody . The judg ment of the Court of Ap pe a ls i s r e ve rs e d. Th is c a se is r e mand e d to c ir c uit c ourt fo r a de no vo he ari ngof

the a pp e a l.
Costs of this appea l are taxed to the appellee, Juan Hunt, and h i s sureties, for which execution may

issue if nec essar

y
.

___________________________________

WI L L I AM M. B ARKE R, C HI EF JUSTI CE