Filed 4/15/15 Perez v. Navman USA CA4/1 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

BENJAMIN PEREZ, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

 v. 

NAVMAN USA, INC. et al., 

 Defendants and Respondents. 

_____________________________________ 

BENJAMIN RAMIREZ et al., 

 Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

v. 

NAVMAN USA, INC. et al., 

 Defendants and Respondents. 

 D066857 

 (Super. Ct. Nos. RIC1100165, 

 RIC1100355) 

(Super. Ct. No. RIC 1100355) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Matthew C. 

Perantoni, Judge. Affirmed. 

 McNulty Law Firm, Peter J. McNulty and Brett L. Rosenthal for Plaintiffs and 

Appellants Benjamin Ramirez and Celia Ramirez. 
2 

 Law Offices of Ryan & Associates, Timothy J. Ryan; Dewsnup, King & Olsen 

and David R. Olsen for Plaintiff and Appellant Benjamin Perez. 

 Thompson & Colgate, Mary L. Frederickson; Hayes, Scott, Bonino, Ellingson & 

McLay, Mark G. Bonino and Lauren M. Case for Defendants and Respondents. 

 Benjamin Perez was injured when the car he was riding in struck a tractor-trailer. 

Benjamin and Celia Ramirez (together Ramirez) were parents of Oscar Ramirez (Oscar), 

a passenger in the same car as Perez. Oscar was killed in the accident. In separate suits 

that were eventually consolidated, Perez and Ramirez (together Appellants) sued Navman 

USA, Inc., Navman Wireless North America, and Absolute Wireless, Inc. (collectively 

Respondents). Respondents manufactured, supplied, warranted, or were otherwise 

involved in the production and sale of a certain GPS unit that was used by the driver of 

the tractor-trailer. Appellants alleged that the GPS unit provided the wrong directions to 

the driver of the tractor-trailer, which ultimately caused the accident. 

 Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, which the superior court 

granted against all of Appellants' claims. Appellants appeal the ensuing judgment, 

contending a triable issue of material fact exists as to causation. We agree with the 

superior court that no such triable issue of material fact exists. Therefore, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Frank Perez (Frank), a professional truck driver employed by KLX Inc., was 

driving an empty tractor-trailer from Bakersfield to Moreno Valley to pick up cargo. 

Before leaving Bakersfield, Frank entered the destination address on Globe Street into the 

truck's GPS unit. 
3 

 Frank was in the middle lane of three northbound lanes on Perris Boulevard as he 

approached Globe Street. The audio directions from the GPS unit in his rig instructed 

Frank to turn left onto Globe Street. Frank activated his left turn signal, but noticed on 

the street sign at the right of the upcoming intersection that the correct turn was to the 

right, not to the left. 

 Frank then changed his turn signal to the right and began the move into the righthand lane on Perris Boulevard. After he made the decision to turn right, Frank no longer 

consulted the GPS unit. When Perez looked to make sure the right lane was clear before 

merging, he saw a passenger car (an Acura) come "outta [sic] nowhere, driving fast." 

Perez saw the Acura swerving from lane to lane at a high rate of speed and was 

concerned that the car might hit his tractor-trailer no matter what lane he was in.1

 Frank attempted to avoid the collision by turning his wheel back to the left so as to 

remain in the middle lane on Perris Boulevard. The car hit the rear end of the trailer on 

its left rear corner.2 The impact of the collision took the roof off the car and damaged its 

right front end. 

 

1 There was no evidence in the record that the tractor-trailer completely moved out 

of the middle lane. 

2 At oral argument, representations were made that the Acura was traveling 70 to 75 

miles per hour at the time of the accident while the tractor-trailer was traveling 25 to 30 

miles per hour. However, the record is clear regarding the actual speeds of the two 

vehicles. According to various California Highway Patrol (CHP) witness interviews, the 

speed of the Acura ranged from 50 to 75 miles per hour with the CHP's time and distance 

analysis calculating the Acura's speed at 62 miles per hour. In regard to the tractortrailer, there is evidence that it was traveling from 5 to 45 miles per hour with the CHP's 

time and distance analysis calculating the speed at 27 miles per hour. 
4 

 Perez was severely injured in the accident, and Oscar died from his injuries. The 

driver of the Acura was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 

(Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a).) 

 Ramirez and Perez filed separate complaints against Respondents. The two 

actions were consolidated and Perez's complaint was designated the lead case. Both 

operative complaints included causes of action for products liability. In addition, Perez 

alleged a claim for negligence and Ramirez brought a wrongful death claim. 

 Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, focusing on the lack of a 

triable issue of material fact as to the issue of causation. Appellants opposed the motion 

for summary judgment, arguing that an issue of fact existed as to causation based on 

Frank's deposition testimony; Frank's testimony in a previous, related lawsuit; the 

declaration of a third party eyewitness (Jonathan Rangel, Jr.); and the declaration of 

expert witness Dr. Frank Drews. 

 Respondents filed a reply to the Appellants' opposition. As part of the reply, 

Respondents objected to some of the evidence submitted by Appellants, including 

portions of Rangel's and Drews's respective declarations. 

 After hearing oral argument and considering the pleadings and evidence, the 

superior court granted the motion for summary judgment. In doing so, the court 

explained: "The Court finds that Defendants have met their initial burden of producing 

evidence to show that causation cannot be established. The court finds that Plaintiff[s] 

ha[ve] not met [their] burden to show that a triable issue of fact exists." Included in the 

order, the court sustained and overruled certain of Appellants' objections to evidence as 
5 

well as Respondents' objections to evidence. The court did not explain the basis for these 

rulings. 

 The court entered judgment based on its order granting summary judgment. 

Appellants timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION 

 Appellants claim the superior court committed reversible error in granting 

Respondents' motion for summary judgment. They contend a triable issue of material 

fact exists as to the element of causation, which is essential to the three causes of action 

at issue. (See Artiglio v. Corning Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 604, 614 [negligence]; Soule v. 

General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 572 [strict products liability]; Quiroz v. 

Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1263 [elements of cause of action for 

wrongful death are the tort (negligence or other wrongful act), the resulting death, and the 

damages, consisting of the pecuniary loss suffered by the heirs].)3

I 

THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

A. Standard of Review 

 "On appeal after a motion for summary judgment has been granted, we review the 

record de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition 

papers except that to which objections have been made and sustained." (Guz v. Bechtel 

National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334 (Guz).) Generally, if all the papers submitted 

 

3 Ramirez's wrongful death claim was based on the torts of negligence and strict 

products liability. 
6 

by the parties show there is no triable issue of material fact and the "moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" (Code Civ. Proc.,4 § 437c, subd. (c)), the court 

must grant the motion for summary judgment. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 

25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) 

 In performing our independent review, we apply the same three-step process as the 

trial court. "Because summary judgment is defined by the material allegations in the 

pleadings, we first look to the pleadings to identify the elements of the causes of action 

for which relief is sought." (Baptist v. Robinson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 151, 159 

(Baptist).) 

 We then examine the moving party's motion, including the evidence offered in 

support of the motion." (Baptist, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 159.) A defendant moving 

for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing that a cause of action lacks merit 

because one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or there is a 

complete defense to that cause of action. (§ 437c, subd. (o); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 

p. 850.) 

 If the defendant fails to make this initial showing, it is unnecessary to examine the 

plaintiff's opposing evidence and the motion must be denied. However, if the moving 

papers make a prima facie showing that justifies a judgment in the defendant's favor, the 

burden shifts to the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable 

 

4 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise 

indicated. 
7 

issue of material fact. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850; Kahn v. 

East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1002-1003.) 

 In determining whether the parties have met their respective burdens, "the court 

must 'consider all of the evidence' and 'all' of the 'inferences' reasonably drawn therefrom 

[citation], and must view such evidence [citations] and such inferences [citations], in the 

light most favorable to the opposing party." (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) 

"There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a 

reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the 

motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof." (Id. at p. 850, fn. omitted.) 

Thus, a party "cannot avoid summary judgment by asserting facts based on mere 

speculation and conjecture, but instead must produce admissible evidence raising a triable 

issue of fact." (LaChapelle v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 977, 

981.) 

B. Respondents Established No Triable Issue of Fact as to Causation 

 Appellants only challenge the superior court's finding that no triable issue of fact 

exists as to the element of causation. Here, Respondents maintain that the evidence was 

insufficient to establish a "factual causal link" between the defective GPS unit, which 

provided incorrect directions, and the accident between the Acura and the tractor-trailer. 

Respondents provided evidence that the GPS unit instructed Frank to turn left, but he 

determined that he should turn right, believing it safe to do so. Further, Respondents 

assert from that moment moving forward, all decisions regarding the operation of the 
8 

tractor-trailer and the Acura were made by the subject drivers and not influenced or 

otherwise controlled by the GPS unit. 

 Respondents maintain the evidence shows before Frank moved to the right, he 

noticed the Acura approaching from behind, swerving between lanes. The driver of the 

Acura, who was under the influence of alcohol and drugs, hit the tractor-trailer on the 

back left corner of the trailer while the tractor-trailer was in the middle lane. 

 Based on this evidence, we conclude that Respondents, as the moving parties, 

carried their burden on the motion for summary judgment. Therefore, we move on to 

examine Appellants' evidence to see if they established a triable issue of material fact. In 

doing so, we look at three sources of evidence offered by Appellants: Dr. Drews's 

declaration, Frank's deposition testimony, and the Rangel declaration. However, before 

we evaluate this evidence, we must consider Respondents' objections to evidence. 

C. Respondents' Objections to Evidence5

 Although a review of a judgment following the granting of a summary judgment 

requires an independent review, "[a] different analysis is required for our review of the 

trial court's . . . rulings on evidentiary objections. Although it is often said that an 

appellate court reviews a summary judgment motion 'de novo,' the weight of authority 

holds that an appellate court reviews a court's final rulings on evidentiary objections by 

applying an abuse of discretion standard." (Carnes v. Superior Court (2005) 126 

 

5 Although Appellants objected to evidence as well, the superior court's rulings on 

Appellants' objections are not challenged on appeal. As such, we omit any discussion of 

these objections and only consider evidence submitted by Respondents that the court 

admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment. 
9 

Cal.App.4th 688, 694; see Miranda v. Bomel Construction Co, Inc. (2010) 187 

Cal.App.4th 1326, 1335.)6

 Here, Respondents made a total of 38 objections to evidence. The court sustained 

Respondents' objections to evidence numbers 31 and 33 through 38. It overruled all of 

Respondents' other objections. 

 Appellants challenge the superior court's evidentiary ruling, focusing on objections 

to Drews's declaration (objection nos. 33 through 36). First, Appellants claim that the 

court provided no basis for the exclusion of portions of Drews's declaration, and as such, 

the exclusion was arbitrary. Appellants, however, provide no authority for this 

proposition. Our independent research has uncovered none. Moreover, we would not 

create a rule requiring such on the record here. For each of the objections at issue, 

Respondents presented the evidence objected to as well as the basis of the objection. 

Appellants therefore are not left to guess on what grounds the court sustained the 

objections. (Cf. Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 255 

[concluding the trial court erred in issuing a blanket ruling sustaining all but one of the 

defendants' 764 objections to evidence, noting "[s]ome of the sustained objections did not 

even assert any basis for the objection!").] 

 

6 Our high court, however, has not weighed in on the issue. (See Reid v. Google, 

Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 535 ["we need not decide generally whether a trial court's 

rulings on evidentiary objections based on papers alone in summary judgment 

proceedings are reviewed for abuse of discretion or reviewed de novo"].) However, 

under either standard, we find no error in the superior court's exclusion of portions of 

Drews's declaration. 
10 

 Second, Appellants complain that they were not afforded the opportunity to "be 

heard on the evidentiary objections." Appellants' argument, however, is not supported by 

the record. During the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the court informed 

counsel that it saw "a real causation problem." Perez's counsel and Ramirez's counsel 

both emphasized the evidence they believed showed a triable issue of fact as to proximate 

cause, focusing on Frank's reliance on the GPS unit. In response, Respondents' counsel 

attacked the admissibility of Drews's declaration, making reference to Respondents' 

objections to evidence while arguing the evidence did not allow Drews "in any kind of 

evidentiary way . . . to connect his theory of distracted driving and the accident that 

happened." In addition, Respondents' counsel also referenced the objections to Rangel's 

declaration. 

 The court then allowed both Ramirez's counsel and Perez's counsel to respond, but 

they did not address Respondents' objections. Thus, the court provided Appellants with a 

chance to discuss Respondents' objections to evidence at the hearing on the summary 

judgment motion, but counsel declined to do so. 

 Finally, Appellants maintain that the superior court improperly ignored Drews's 

"ultimate opinion" on causation because Respondents did not object to it. This opinion 

was "[g]iven the evidence summarized herein, it is my professional opinion that the 

misdirection to turn left given by the [GPS unit] was a substantial contributing factor in 

causing the subject accident and plaintiffs' resulting injuries." Appellants characterize 

Drews's opinion as uncontroverted, and contend for purposes of opposing the motion for 

summary judgment, the court had to rely upon it. We disagree, noting the court sustained 
11 

objections to the foundational portions of Drews's declaration. In the absence of those 

segments, Drews's causation opinion lacks the necessary foundation. Further, and more 

importantly, we determine that the court was correct, under Evidence Code section 801, 

to implicitly disregard Drews's "ultimate opinion." 

1. The Objections to Drews's Declaration 

 Drews was an expert witness for Perez who was "retained . . . to investigate and 

advise on the causative factors involved in the . . . [subject] accident." Drews's 

declaration was submitted in support of Perez's opposition to the motion to summary 

judgment. In response to that declaration, Respondents' objected to a portion of 

paragraph 8 of the declaration, all of paragraphs 9 and 10, and a portion of paragraph 11. 

 In paragraph 8, Drews declared: "Based upon the foregoing facts and materials 

and upon my training and experience in the field of human factors and safety in the use of 

data displays and equipment and in the field of driver distraction, I can render the 

following professional opinions. Frank Perez relied on the navigation instructions given 

by the [GPS unit], turned on his left-turn signal, and started to move to the left to make a 

left-hand turn, whereupon he was distracted by (a) seeing the Acura vehicle approaching 

from behind, and (b) at the same time, he became confused by the contradictory 

information provided by the [GPS unit] and the street signs." (Italics added.) 

Respondents objected to Drews's use of the phrase "at the same time" in the last sentence 

on the grounds that it misstates the evidence and was contrary to an earlier portion of 

Drews's declaration. The court sustained this objection. 
12 

 In paragraph 9 of his declaration, Drews stated: "A professional truck driver who 

has relied on the [GPS unit's] directions without incident for approximately 1,000 trips, 

will have followed literally tens of thousands of turn-by-turn instructions from the system 

without being misdirected, and can reasonably be expected to come to rely on the device 

to reliably direct him to his destination. Given the evidence summarized herein and 

based on my experience in the field of human factors psychology and safety in the use of 

data displays and equipment and in the field of driver distraction, a driver under such 

conditions can reasonably be expected to develop a complacency to automation, i.e., the 

driver relies blindly on the system. This reliance makes a driver ill-prepared to respond 

to incorrect instructions. Although a system which provides auditory cues as well as 

visual cues will somewhat relieve a driver from excessive 'heads down' time engrossed in 

the device, nevertheless, due to the complacency to automation associated with repeated 

successful use of the system, a driver given misdirections or contradictory instructions 

will not be able to maintain sufficient situation awareness with regard to surrounding 

traffic to correctly predict other vehicles [sic] actions and to correctly position his vehicle 

to avoid a collision." Respondents objected to this entire paragraph on the grounds of 

lack of foundation and speculation to the extent that the paragraph was attempting to 

explain Frank's actions in driving the tractor-trailer or how he would act in a particular 

circumstance. The court sustained this objection. 

 In paragraph 10 of his declaration, Drews declared: "A driver who encounters the 

conditions shown by the evidence summarized herein is required to multi-task and 

respond quickly to solve the navigation problem and make a decision on how to proceed. 
13 

Given the high level of cognitive processing demanded by this situation, it is to be 

expected that a driver in these conditions will decide to change directions from the leftturn direction given by the navigational system, turn to the right in response to the street 

sign directing the driver to the right, and then take avoidance maneuvers in response to 

the threats he has created from traffic approaching from behind." Respondents objected 

to this entire paragraph on the grounds of lack of foundation and speculation to the extent 

that the paragraph was attempting to explain Frank's actions in driving the tractor-trailer 

or how he would act in a particular circumstance. The court sustained this objection. 

 In paragraph 11, Drews stated: "Given the evidence summarized herein, it is my 

professional opinion that the misdirection to turn left given by the [GPS unit] was a 

substantial contributing factor in causing the subject accident and the plaintiffs' resulting 

injuries. Just prior to the subject accident, Frank Perez prepared to make a left turn 

consistent with the auditory and visual navigation cues provided the [GPS unit], which he 

discovered were incorrect upon seeing the conflicting street signs. The evidence shows 

that as a direct result of the misdirection supplied by the [GPS unit], [Frank] was 

confused by the conflicting information from the street signs, and acted in a reasonably 

foreseeable manner in seeking to correct the mistaken directions by moving to the right, 

whereupon he was confronted with yet another foreseeable hazard, a speeding driver 

coming upon [Frank's] tractor-trailer rig from behind, whereupon he moved back to the 

left, resulting in the collision." (Italics added.) Respondents objected to the phrase 

"acted in a reasonably foreseeable manner" on the grounds of lack of foundation for a 

legal conclusion. The court sustained the objection. 
14 

 As a threshold matter, we note that Appellants only argue that the superior court 

abused its discretion in excluding portions of Drews's declaration when it failed to 

provide: (1) any reasoning in support of its sustaining the objections or (2) Appellants 

the opportunity to address the objections. As we discuss above, we find no merit in either 

of these conditions. Moreover, these contentions do not challenge the substance of the 

objections, but instead, deal with the procedure the superior court used in ruling on the 

objections. Appellants thus have not articulated any other reason why the superior court's 

ruling on the objections was incorrect. Thus, they have waived any issue concerning the 

correctness of these specific evidentiary rulings. (Villa v. McFerren (1995) 35 

Cal.App.4th 744, 739, fn. 4.) We therefore consider all such evidence to have been 

properly excluded. (See Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 

545-546 [not the proper function of Court of Appeal to search the record on behalf of 

appellants or to serve as "backup appellate counsel"].) 

2. Drews's Opinion on Causation 

 Appellants maintain even if we conclude that the superior court did not abuse its 

discretion in sustaining the objections to portions of Drews's declaration, enough of 

Drews's declaration was admitted into evidence to create a triable issue of fact. 

Appellants insist that the majority of Drews's opinion about causation from paragraph 11 

was admitted into evidence and was uncontroverted. Therefore, Appellants assert a 

triable issue of fact exists. We disagree. 

 At the outset, we note Appellants do not address the impact of the superior court's 

exclusion of paragraphs 9 and 10 of Drews's declaration on Drews's opinion contained in 
15 

paragraph 11. The exclusion of those two paragraphs eviscerated most of the substance 

of Drews's opinion in paragraph 11, which relied on the conclusions reached in the two 

excluded paragraphs. For this reason alone, we find no error. However, even if we 

analyze the substance of Drews's causation opinion without reference to paragraphs 9 and 

10, we would conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in disregarding it.7 

 Evidence Code section 801 provides: "If a witness is testifying as an expert, his 

testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to such an opinion as is: [¶] (a) Related to 

a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert 

would assist the trier of fact; and [¶] (b) Based on matter . . . that is of a type that 

reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to 

which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter 

as a basis for his opinion." "Subdivision (b) clearly permits a court to determine whether 

the matter is of a type on which an expert may reasonably rely." (Sargon Enterprises, 

Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770 (Sargon).) "[T]he 

matter relied on must provide a reasonable basis for the particular opinion offered, and 

that an expert opinion based on speculation or conjecture is inadmissible." (Lockheed 

Litigation Cases (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 558, 564; see Sargon, supra, at p. 770.) 

 Evidence Code section 801 is not the only statute that governs a superior court's 

consideration of expert witness testimony. It must also consider Evidence Code section 

802. (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 771.) Evidence Code section 802 provides: "A 

 

7 We would reach the same result if we independently reviewed Drews's causation 

opinion. 
16 

witness testifying in the form of an opinion may state . . . the reasons for his opinion and 

the matter . . . upon which it is based, unless he is precluded by law from using such 

reasons or matter as a basis for his opinion. The court in its discretion may require that a 

witness before testifying in the form of an opinion be first examined concerning the 

matter upon which his opinion is based." "This section indicates the court may inquire 

into the expert's reasons for an opinion. It expressly permits the court to examine experts 

concerning the matter on which they base their opinion before admitting their testimony. 

The reasons for the experts' opinions are part of the matter on which they are based just 

as is the type of matter. Evidence Code section 801 governs judicial review of the type of 

matter; Evidence Code section 802 governs judicial review of the reasons for the 

opinion." (Sargon, supra, at p. 771, italics omitted.) 

 "Thus, under Evidence Code sections 801, subdivision (b), and 802, the trial court 

acts as a gatekeeper to exclude expert opinion testimony that is (1) based on matter of a 

type on which an expert may not reasonably rely, (2) based on reasons unsupported by 

the material on which the expert relies, or (3) speculative. Other provisions of law, 

including decisional law, may also provide reasons for excluding expert opinion 

testimony." (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 771-772.) 

 "The trial court's preliminary determination whether the expert opinion is founded 

on sound logic is not a decision on its persuasiveness. The court must not weigh an 

opinion's probative value or substitute its own opinion for the expert's opinion. Rather, 

the court must simply determine whether the matter relied on can provide a reasonable 
17 

basis for the opinion or whether that opinion is based on a leap of logic or conjecture." 

(Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 772.) 

 Against this backdrop, we conclude the trial court did not err in implicitly 

rejecting Drews's opinion on causation. Drews opines "as a direct result of the 

misdirection supplied by the [GPS unit], [Frank] was confused by the conflicting 

information from the street sign, and acted in a reasonably foreseeable manner in seeking 

to correct the mistaken directions by moving to the right." Drews reached this opinion by 

asserting, as a general principle, that a driver who frequently has used a navigational 

device can come to rely on the navigational device and can "reasonably be expected to 

develop a complacency to automation." 

 Drews maintained that the complacency results in a driver who, when confronted 

with incorrect or contradictory instructions, is unable to maintain situational awareness 

relative to predicting what other vehicles might do or positioning his own vehicle to 

avoid a collision. Drews further concludes without stating a basis that "it is to be 

expected that a driver in these conditions will decide to change directions from the leftturn direction given by the navigational system, turn to the right in response to the street 

sign directing the driver to the right, and then take avoidance maneuvers in response to 

the threats he has created from traffic approaching from behind." 

 Drews's opinion is based on layers of speculation. He assumes Frank developed a 

"complacency to automation." There is no evidence in the record to support his 

conclusion. Drews presumes that Frank was incapable of maintaining situational 

awareness. Again, no evidence supports this presumption. To the contrary, it appears 
18 

that Frank maintained situational awareness by using his indicators, noticing the speeding 

and swerving Acura approaching from behind, and mostly staying in the number 2 lane. 

In addition, Drews's opinion appears to rest on the belief that Frank was confused while 

he was changing lanes. Appellants, however, do not cite to any evidence that established 

that Frank ever caused his tractor-trailer to change lanes out of the number 2 lane and that 

he was confused when he did so. Our independent review of the record leads us to 

determine that the evidence was ambiguous at best. Frank denied that he ever got into 

the number 1 lane. Frank also testified that he did not recall if he ever moved into the 

number 3 lane. In addition, Frank testified that he decided not to move lanes, but to stay 

in the number 2 lane to avoid being hit by the Acura, which he saw swerving back and 

forth from the number 1 to the number 3 lane. 

 Drews's opinion is speculative and conclusory. He had no evidence that Frank had 

grown complacent by his overuse of the GPS device, or that he would blindly rely on the 

GPS device, or that somehow Frank's complacency or blind reliance led him to be unable 

to perceive the situation (i.e., he became confused) and react appropriately. Drews's 

opinion does nothing more than opine that " 'something could be true if certain assumed 

facts are true,' " and is therefore devoid of foundation. (See Dee v. PCS Property 

Management, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 390, 404.) 

 In short, in providing his opinion on causation, Drews speculated both as to what a 

driver like Frank would have done, and to how Frank himself would have reacted to the 

situation. The opinion offered by Drews is not reasonably based on Frank's deposition 
19 

testimony or any other evidence in the record.8 As such, the superior court was correct to 

disregard it. (See Wise v. DLA Piper LLP (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1188 

["speculation is not evidence, less still substantial evidence."].) 

D. Proximate Cause 

 Even if Drews's opinion is disregarded, Appellants claim the court erred in 

granting summary judgment because a triable issue of fact exists as to proximate cause. 

Appellants point us to two other sources of evidence on proximate cause: Frank's 

deposition testimony and Rangel's declaration. We independently reviewed this evidence 

and conclude that no triable issue of fact exists as to proximate cause. 

 Proximate cause involves two elements: (1) cause in fact, and (2) the extent to 

which public policy considerations limit a defendant's liability for its acts. (PPG 

Industries, Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 310, 315-316.) Cause in fact 

asks whether the defendant's conduct was the " 'necessary antecedent' " to the injury, 

without which no injury would have occurred. (Maupin v. Widling (1987) 192 

Cal.App.3d 568, 573.) In other words, the actor's conduct must be a " 'substantial 

 

8 Drews stated that he read and relied on the Rangel declaration. In that declaration, 

Rangel claimed to have seen Frank's tractor-trailer swerving and moving lane to lane: 

"The tractor-trailer combination swerved from right to left, then back to the right, then 

back to the left again." Even accepting Rangel's declaration as true, there still exists a 

substantial gap in Drews's opinion for explaining Frank's supposed erratic driving. In 

other words, even relying on Rangel's declaration, Drews's opinion still speculates as to 

the cause of Frank changing lanes, and thus, the opinion was properly excluded. (See 

Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 776.) Moreover, Drews's opinion describes the movement 

of the tractor-trailer inconsistently with the description of the tractor-trailer's movement 

in the Rangel declaration. Thus, it does not appear that Drews relied on Rangel's account 

of Frank's driving of the tractor-trailer. 
20 

factor' " in bringing about the harm. (See Nola M. v. University of Southern California

(1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 421, 427.) A substantial factor, for purposes of causation, is 

something that is more than " 'a slight, trivial, negligible, or theoretical factor in 

producing a particular result.' " (Espinosa v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital (1995) 31 

Cal.App.4th 1304, 1314.) The second element of proximate cause is " ' "concerned, not 

with the fact of causation, but with the various considerations of policy that limit an 

actor's responsibility for the consequences of his conduct." ' " (Ferguson v. Lieff, 

Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1037, 1045.) 

 "[T]he question of proximate cause . . . becomes one of law where the facts are 

uncontroverted and only one deduction or inference may reasonably be drawn 

therefrom." (Whinery v. Southern Pac. Co. (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 126, 128.) " 'A mere 

possibility of . . . causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure 

speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the 

duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant.' [Citation.]" (Saelzler v. Advanced 

Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 775-776; italics omitted.) 

 According to Appellants, Frank's deposition testimony established, based on 

erroneous directions provided by the GPS unit, Frank "moved over" to turn left, realized 

he needed to turn right when he saw the street signs, became confused, decided to turn 

right, began to merge right into the number 3 lane when he noticed the Acura "come from 

behind his truck at a high rate of speed," and Frank tried to avoid a collision with the 

Acura by turning the steering wheel to the left. Put differently, Appellants maintain that 

Frank testified to a series of lane changes initiated by the wrong directions provided by 
21 

the GPS unit, which caused the Acura to hit the back of the tractor-trailer. However, 

Frank's testimony does not establish that the GPS unit's wrong directions were a 

substantial factor in causing the accident. There is no support for Appellants' claim that 

Frank was confused when he decided to turn right, put on his right indicator, and then 

prepared to merge into the right lane when he saw the Acura. Frank does admit that he 

was "somewhat confused" when he saw the street signs conflicted with the directions 

provided by the GPS unit. Nevertheless, after realizing that he needed to turn right, there 

is no evidence that Frank remained confused, acted erratically, or otherwise drove 

dangerously. In fact, the evidence suggests that Frank drove cautiously and carefully 

when he determined he needed to turn right. He put on his right indicator, checked his 

mirrors, and was traveling at about 25 to 30 miles per hour. Moreover, he admits that he 

was not relying on the GPS unit at that time. 

 In addition, Appellants' position relies on their claim that Frank was moving in and 

out of lanes. Yet, Frank's testimony on this point is much more ambiguous than 

Appellants admit. For example, during Frank's deposition, the following exchange took 

place: 

"Q: Mr. Greenberg confirmed for me that you related the story, 

which is very similar to what appears to have been related by you to 

the police officer investigating the case, that immediately prior to the 

collision you were relying on the [GPS unit] to direct you where to 

make a left-hand turn; is that correct? 

"A: Correct. 

"Q: And that in reliance on that device you were following its 

instructions and had moved over believing that you could make a 

left-hand turn; is that correct? 
22 

"A: Correct. 

"Q: And then at some point you realized that the device was giving 

you the wrong information; it was not giving you an accurate 

position and giving you accurate information in terms of what you 

could do and you then elected to make a right-hand turn; correct? 

A: Correct. 

Although Frank agrees that he "moved over" there is no context provided in the portion 

of the deposition in the record establishing that Frank meant that he changed lanes into 

the number 1 lane. In the portion of that deposition testimony provided to the court, there 

is no indication that it was established what lane Frank was in, where and when he moved 

the tractor-trailer from one lane to another (if at all), or if Frank moved back from the 

number 1 lane into the number 2 lane if Frank actually moved into the number 1 lane at 

some point. As such, this deposition testimony requires the court to speculate to find that 

it establishes Frank was moving lane to lane because of the improper directions provided 

by the GPS unit. Thus, without more, Frank's agreement that he "moved over" does not 

establish or even call into question whether he moved into the number 1 lane or moved 

back to the number 2 lane and ultimately caused the accident based on the GPS unit's 

wrong directions. The deposition does not contain the necessary foundation to establish 

what was meant by the term "moved over" or what occurred following this apparent 

move. Also, during his deposition, Frank denied that he ever changed lanes into the 

number 1 lane. Indeed, the question of whether Frank moved the tractor-trailer into the 

number 1 lane was asked multiple times during the deposition and Frank answered 

consistently each time that he did not move the tractor-trailer into the number 1 lane. 
23 

 The same is true regarding Frank moving into the number 3 lane. At best, the 

testimony suggests that Frank was beginning to merge into the number 3 lane, when he 

saw the Acura swerving from lane to lane, traveling at great speed, coming up behind the 

tractor-trailer.9 At that point, Frank elected to stay in the number 2 lane and the Acura 

hit the back left portion of the trailer. 

 The evidence in the record shows that Frank believed he was supposed to turn left 

because of the directions provided by the GPS unit. He was traveling in the number 2 

lane. He turned on his left indicator and prepared to move to the left into the number l 

lane. However, he surmised from the street signs that he really needed to turn right. So 

he did not move into the number 1 lane, but instead, put on his right indicator and 

prepared to merge into the number 3 lane on the right. At that time, he saw the Acura 

come from behind at a great rate of speed and swerving from lane to lane. To avoid a 

potential collision, Frank turned the steering wheel left to stay in the number 2 lane and 

the Acura collided with the back left corner of the trailer. Although the GPS unit's 

directions caused Frank to believe he needed to turn left, and, in reliance on the directions 

provided by the GPS unit, put on the left indicator, it would be pure conjecture to 

conclude the wrong directions were a causal factor in the accident that followed after 

Frank decided to turn right and put on his right indicator. This is especially true here 

where the evidence shows the Acura was speeding from behind the tractor-trailer, 

 

9 Frank provided conflicting testimony about when he first sees the Acura. He 

originally testified that he saw the Acura as he was preparing to turn left. Later in his 

deposition, after having his recollection refreshed, Frank agreed that he did not see the 

Acura until he was preparing to turn right. 
24 

swerving from lane to lane, with an intoxicated driver behind the wheel. Moreover, there 

is nothing in Frank's testimony that would allow the trier of fact to determine that he was 

confused, unaware of his situation, or otherwise hindered in his driving ability by the 

wrong directions provided by the GPS unit. To the contrary, the evidence shows that he 

acted reasonably, safely, and carefully, by putting on his right indicator and checking his 

mirrors before merging. When he saw the Acura speeding up from behind, changing 

lanes, he decided to stay in his current lane. The Acura then hit the left back corner of 

the trailer. Based on this evidence, the wrong directions provided by the GPS unit are 

nothing more than a slight, trivial, or negligible factor in producing the accident. (See 

Espinosa v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.) 

 In addition, Rangel's declaration does not support Appellants' position here. 

Rangel stated that he observed the tractor-trailer swerving from lane to lane and move in 

front of the Acura, causing the Acura to hit it. Nevertheless, Rangel's declaration does 

not establish why the tractor-trailer was swerving. In other words, it does not establish 

that the wrong directions provided by the GPS unit caused Frank to swerve both left and 

right and ultimately in front of the Acura. As such, Rangel's declaration, even when 

considered with Frank's deposition testimony, does not create a triable issue of fact as to 

whether the GPS unit's wrong directions were a substantial factor of the accident. 

 Because we conclude this is the rare case where only one inference may be drawn 

from the undisputed facts (see Whinery v. Southern Pac. Co., supra, 6 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 128), we do not evaluate the public policy element of proximate cause. That said, we 

struggle to contemplate any public policy that would support finding liability as to 
25 

Respondents on the facts in the record before us. The wrong directions provided by the 

GPS unit were simply too remote to be anything more than a trivial factor in the 

unfortunate accident. 

 We find no error. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on this appeal. 

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J. 

WE CONCUR: 

 HALLER, J. 

 McINTYRE, J.