NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AHUD CHAZIZA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

STAMMERJOHN, Caseworker; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 19-17506 

D.C. No. 

3:17-cv-00247-MMD-WGC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 3, 2021

Pasadena, California

Before: OWENS and LEE, Circuit Judges, and SIMON,** District Judge.

Ahud Chaziza appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

dismissing his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Chaziza alleges that defendants 

violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause when 

they improperly calculated his parole eligibility date in Nevada. The district court 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Michael H. Simon, United States District Judge for the 

District of Oregon, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAY 26 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

held that Chaziza possessed no constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole 

eligibility. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Moser 

v. Las Vegas Metro Police Dep’t, 984 F.3d 900, 904 (9th Cir. 2021). We affirm.

A Nevada prisoner “may be paroled when the prisoner has served the 

minimum term or minimum aggregate term of imprisonment imposed by the 

court.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 213.120(2). “When a prisoner becomes eligible for 

parole . . . the Board shall consider and may authorize the release of the prisoner on 

parole as provided in this chapter.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 213.140(1). “No person,” 

however, “has a right to parole,” nor does parole “create any such right or interest 

in liberty or property.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 213.10705. 

Nevada awards prisoners 20 days of good-time credit for each month a 

prisoner commits “no serious infractions” and “performs in a faithful, orderly and 

peaceable manner the duties assigned to the offender.” Nev. Rev. Stat. 

§ 209.4465(1). Good-time credits are “deducted from the maximum term or the 

maximum aggregate term imposed by the sentence,” id. § 209.4465(7)(a), and 

“[a]pply to eligibility for parole unless the offender was sentenced pursuant to a 

statute which specifies a minimum sentence that must be served before a person 

becomes eligible for parole.” Id. § 209.4465(7)(b). 

In 2015, the Nevada Supreme Court explained in an unpublished opinion

that, when calculating the parole eligibility date of a prisoner sentenced to a 
3 

“minimum-maximum” sentence, the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC)

must deduct the prisoner’s good-time credits from his minimum sentence. 

Vonseydewitz v. LeGrand, 131 Nev. 1360, at *2 (2015). In 2017, the Nevada 

Supreme Court reiterated this holding in a published decision. Williams v. State 

Dep’t of Corr., 133 Nev. 594, 595 (2017).

In 2009, Chaziza pleaded guilty to first degree kidnapping and robbery. A 

state trial court sentenced Chaziza to a “minimum-maximum” term of 

imprisonment for 60 to 80 months for each offense, to be served consecutively.

Chaziza completed his first sentence in April 2014 and immediately began serving 

his second sentence. In April 2016, Chaziza asked defendants, based on 

Vonseydewitz, to deduct Chaziza’s good-time credits from his minimum sentence 

for count two when calculating his parole eligibility date. Defendants denied 

Chaziza’s request, noting that Vonseydewitz was an unpublished decision. Chaziza 

made the same request in a state habeas petition, which a state trial court denied.

After the Nevada Supreme Court’s published decision in Williams, the state 

trial court reconsidered Chaziza’s petition and ruled that the NDOC must deduct 

Chaziza’s good-time credits from his minimum sentence to determine his parole 

eligibility date. In March 2018, the NDOC adjusted Chaziza’s sentence, resulting 

in a parole eligibility date in February 2016, rather than April 2019. The parole 

board held a hearing for Chaziza in May 2018 but denied Chaziza parole.
4 

Chaziza argues that the district court erred in finding that he failed to 

establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 

states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 

of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. A state violates the Fourteenth Amendment 

when it deprives a person “of a constitutionally protected liberty or property 

interest” without affording “adequate procedural protections.” McQuillion v. 

Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of 

Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

“[A] liberty interest may arise from the Due Process Clause or be created by 

state law . . . .” Smith v. Noonan, 992 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 1993). Whether due 

process protections exist for a plaintiff’s claimed interest depends on the “nature of 

the interest at stake,” specifically, whether a person has “a legitimate claim of 

entitlement to the interest,” rather than “an abstract need or desire for” or 

“unilateral expectation” of the interest. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-

71, 577 (1972); accord. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974).

“The Constitution does not, itself, guarantee a liberty interest in parole.” 

Miller v. Or. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 642 F.3d 711, 714 (9th 

Cir. 2011); see also Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S 216, 220 (2011). State law, 

however, may establish a liberty interest in parole when the state statutes or 

regulations create an “expectation of parole.” See, e.g., Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 
5 

482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 

442 U.S. 1, 12, (1979); Miller, 642 F.3d at 714. 

Because Nevada has explicitly disclaimed a liberty interest in parole, see 

Moor v. Palmer, 603 F.3d 658, 660-62 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Nevada law does not 

create a liberty interest in parole . . . .”); see also Nev. Rev. Stat. § 213.10705, 

Chaziza argues that he possesses a liberty interest in parole eligibility. Supreme 

Court precedent, however, precludes Chaziza’s argument. “Process is not an end in 

itself.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983). If the substantive interest a 

person seeks to vindicate (here, parole) is left to the state’s unfettered discretion, 

state statutes creating formal procedures (here, parole eligibility) surrounding that 

unfettered discretion do not create a liberty interest. Id.; see also Dist. Att’y’s 

Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 67-68 (holding that a prisoner lacked a liberty 

interest in “procedures available to vindicate an interest in state clemency” because 

clemency is discretionary).

A “state-created right can, in some circumstances, beget yet other rights to 

procedures essential to the realization of the parent right.” Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. 

Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 463 (1981). Even then, however, “the underlying right 

must have come into existence before it can trigger due process protection.” Id. 
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Here, Chaziza possesses no constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole 

eligibility in Nevada.

1

AFFIRMED.

1 We also grant Chaziza’s Motion for Judicial Notice (Dkt. 31).