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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

July 25, 2017

v No. 333073

Leelanau Circuit Court

DEREK JOSEPH BAILEY, LC No. 15-001878-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: MARKEY, P.J., and RONAYNE KRAUSE and BOONSTRA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals by right his conviction of two counts of second-degree criminal sexual 

conduct (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c (multiple variables). The trial court sentenced defendant to 

concurrent prison terms of 120 months to 180 months. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

PT, defendant’s stepdaughter, testified that beginning when she was 10 or 11 years old, 

defendant began to sexually assault her. She described incidents of sexual touching, manual 

stimulation, and oral penetration. She also testified that defendant had her watch pornography in 

his presence. PT’s sister and defendant’s other stepdaughter, DT,1 testified that defendant used 

social media to facilitate sexual activity between the two when they were in different locations in 

the same house. DT also testified that he used his laptop to broadcast her performing oral sex on 

him. Several electronic devices were seized and analyzed during the course of the investigation.

II. ANALYSIS

A. RAPE-SHIELD STATUTE

Defendant appeals two evidentiary rulings based on disallowed cross-examination of DT

pursuant to the rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j. Defendant makes no argument, nor does the 

record show, that this testimony was relevant to his being convicted for conduct against PT. 

 1 The victim in Docket No. 332984.
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Thus, defendant’s arguments on this point, including his claims that exclusion of this testimony 

violated his right to due process and his right to confrontation, are moot. See Madson v Jaso, 

317 Mich App 52, 67 n 9; 893 NW2d 132 (2016) (“An issue is moot and generally will not be 

reviewed if this Court can no longer fashion a remedy for the alleged error.”); see also People v 

Baugh, 249 Mich App 125, 129; 641 NW2d 283 (2002) (moot issues generally not reviewed).

B. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Defendant argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by improperly vouching for 

the credibility of PT, DT, and their mother and by attacking his credibility. Defendant did not 

preserve this issue below, so we review it for plain error that affected his substantial rights. 

People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 453-454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004).

We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct on a case-by-case basis, viewing the 

alleged misconduct in context to determine whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial 

trial. People v Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1, 32; 880 NW2d 297 (2015), lv gtd on other grounds 

499 Mich 934 (2016). A prosecutor may argue a witness’s credibility or lack thereof based on 

the facts in evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. Id. at 

33. Nonetheless, a prosecutor must “refrain from suggesting or implying that he or she has 

special knowledge regarding whether a witness is worthy of belief.” Id. 

The prosecutor’s remarks in this case were not improper because they were responsive to 

defense counsel’s attack on the credibility of prosecution witnesses in his closing argument, and 

they followed from the evidence. Defense counsel argued in closing that PT said she wanted to 

be a fantasy writer and suggested that she did just that on the stand. He further described DT’s 

disclosures to her friends as “camp stories” and likened both girls to the accusers in the Salem 

witch trials. The prosecutor did characterize defendant as lying when he denied the allegations, 

but this is implicit in the prosecution itself. See id. at 33-34 (concluding that the “prosecutor’s 

characterization of defendant’s account of the criminal episode as a lie or a ‘story’ did not 

deprive defendant of a fair and impartial trial”).

Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that it must evaluate the evidence, including 

whether it believed the witnesses, that the lawyers’ statements and arguments were not evidence, 

and that the jury should evaluate witness credibility. “[J]urors are presumed to follow their 

instructions.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 235; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). 

C. SENTENCING

1. OFFENSE VARIABLES

Defendant challenges the scoring of offense variables (OVs) 9, 10, and 14.

We agree with defendant that the trial court erroneously scored OV 9 at 10 points for 

placing two victims in danger where the charged offense conduct did not endanger DT. “Offense 

variable 9 is number of victims.” MCL 777.39(1). Placing two to nine victims “in danger of 

physical injury” adds ten points to the total OV score. MCL 777.39(1)(c), (d). PT’s testimony 

about the two incidents underlying the convictions gives no indication that DT was present or 

otherwise in “danger of physical injury” when either incident occurred.
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We disagree, however, that the trial court incorrectly scored OV 10 and OV 14. “Offense 

variable 10 is exploitation of a vulnerable victim.” MCL 777.40(1). Fifteen points can be scored 

for “predatory conduct,” defined as “preoffense conduct directed at a victim . . . for the primary 

purpose of victimization.” MCL 777.40(1)(a), (3)(a). The trial court rejected defendant’s 

challenge to the scoring of OV 10 at 15 points rather than 10 points, finding “that the massive 

age difference, the role as a stepfather,” and the behavior “occurring within the home” 

constituted “predatory conduct” justifying a score of 15 points for predatory conduct.

The trial court’s remarks about defendant’s and PT’s relative ages and domestic 

relationship, in addition to the conduct having occurred in their home, reflect the circumstances 

of the preoffense conduct that facilitated defendant’s ability to exploit PT’s vulnerability. PT

testified to one incident in her bedroom when defendant was putting her to bed. Defendant 

created the setting for the other incident by letting PT stay up and watch television with him. 

During both encounters, defendant took advantage of PT’s young age and their isolation in 

different parts of the home to sexually abuse her. See People v Witherspoon, 257 Mich App 329, 

333-336; 670 NW2d 434 (2003) (affirming the scoring of OV 10 at 15 points for predatory 

conduct because “the timing of the assault (when no other persons were present) and its location

(in the isolation and seclusion of the basement) are evidence of preoffense predatory conduct”).

Defendant argues that the three facts identified by the trial court—the age difference 

between defendant and PT, defendant’s role as PT’s stepfather, and conducting the behavior 

inside the home—warrant only 10 points under MCL 777.40(1)(b). Defendant’s argument fails 

to recognize that the conduct listed in § § 40(1)(b) can also support a score of 15 points under

§ 40(1)(a) where, as here, the conduct meets the definition of predatory conduct.

Ten points can be scored for OV 19 when the defendant “interfered with the 

administration of justice.” MCL 777.49(1)(c). “[B]ecause the circumstances described 

in OV 19 expressly include events occurring after the completion of the sentencing offense, 

scoring OV 19 necessarily is not limited to consideration of the sentencing offense.” People v 

Smith, 488 Mich 193, 195; 793 NW2d 666 (2010).

Two of the electronic devices seized and examined were iPads, one an iPad mini. The

iPad mini was reset on the morning the police obtained and executed the search warrant, which 

was sometime after defendant admittedly became aware of a warrant out for his arrest. 

Similarly, defendant’s presentence investigation report states that information on the iPad was

“wiped” by defendant and was not recoverable. Defendant admitted to resetting the iPad mini 

and did not challenge the accuracy of the relevant statements in the PSIR about the iPad. See 

People v Ratkov (After Remand), 201 Mich App 123, 125; 505 NW2d 886 (1993) (“The contents

of the presentence report are presumptively accurate if unchallenged by the defendant.”). We 

conclude that resetting the iPads constituted interfering with the administration of justice. 

Because rescoring OV 9 does not alter the sentencing guidelines range, MCL 777.64; the 

error is harmless. See People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89 n 8; 711 NW2d 44 (2006) (“Where a 

scoring error does not alter the appropriate guidelines range, resentencing is not required.”).

2. UPWARD DEPARTURE SENTENCE
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Defendant also challenges the trial court’s upward departure from the guidelines. The 

sentencing guidelines range was 36 to 71 months. The Court reviews a “defendant’s sentence for 

reasonableness.” Steanhouse, 313 Mich App at 42. The governing standard for assessing 

reasonableness and whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing a defendant is “the 

principle of proportionality” described in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 650-661; 461 

NW2d 1 (1990). Id. at 47-48. “The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls 

outside the range of principled outcomes or when it erroneously interprets or applies the law.” 

People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 51; 862 NW2d 446 (2014). 

For a sentence to be reasonable under the principle of proportionality, the sentence should 

“ ‘be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the 

offender’ and should take ‘into account the nature of the offense and the background of the 

offender.’ ” Steanhouse, 313 Mich App at 45, quoting Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636, 651. Trial 

courts may depart from the guidelines in either direction if the recommended guidelines range 

does “ ‘not adequately account for important factors legitimately considered at sentencing,’ ” but 

a departure that relies on factors already reflected in the guidelines range may signal an abuse of 

discretion. Id. at 45-46, quoting Milbourn, 435 Mich at 659-660. “ ‘Even where some departure 

appears to be appropriate, the extent of the departure (rather than the fact of the departure itself) 

may embody a violation of the principle of proportionality.’ ” Id. at 46, quoting Milbourn, 435 

Mich at 659-660. 

In departing from the guidelines, the trial court discussed defendant’s “lack of candor,” 

“lack of admission,” “lack of remorse,” and “lack of empathy for the victims.” The trial court 

described defendant as “narcissistic” and “self-centered.” It stressed he could not “answer a 

simple question without going on and on about” himself. Even, when the trial court twice asked 

defendant to talk about his daughters at sentencing, defendant twice answered, “I’m getting 

there” while continuing to describe his own experience of the trial, the police handling of the 

investigation, and his own parents and sons. The court also highlighted defendant’s inability to 

“acknowledge the behavior.” See People v Houston, 448 Mich 312, 323; 532 NW2d 508 (1995) 

(approving of the trial court’s reliance, in part, on the defendant’s lack of remorse when 

departing upward from the guidelines). 

Defendant maintains that the departure sentence was unreasonably harsh because he had 

no criminal history. This argument ignores the fact that the guidelines scored PRVs 1 through 6 

at zero points, which reflects the absence of a criminal history.2

The trial court also expressed its “clear understanding and belief” that defendant was “a 

predator,” “a pedophile if not some sort of a sexual addict,” and “dangerous to other people.” In 

light of the fact that defendant was convicted in Docket No. 332984 of sexually abusing DT, for 

 2 MCL 777.51 (prior high severity felony convictions), MCL 777.52 (prior low severity felony 

convictions), MCL 777.53 (prior high severity juvenile adjudications), MCL 777.54 (prior low 

severity felony convictions), MCL 777.55 (prior misdemeanor convictions or prior misdemeanor 

juvenile adjudications), and MCL 777.56 (relationship to criminal justice system).
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which defendant was sentenced the same day as the instant case, we conclude that the trial court

properly justified the extent of the departure in this case. Steanhouse, 313 Mich App at 45-46. 

We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences. 

/s/ Jane E. Markey 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause 

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra