*This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except

under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and

collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation

of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may

be cited under the terms and conditions of Tenth Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 7/1/96

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

______

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff-Appellee, )

)

v. ) No. 96-6049

) (D.C. No. CIV-92-2239-A)

RENEE ARMSTRONG SANDERS, ) (W. Dist. of Okla.)

)

Defendant-Appellant. )

______

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

______

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

______

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not

materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.

App. P. 34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered

submitted without oral argument.

Renee Armstrong Sanders (Sanders) appeals from an order of the

district court denying her motion to vacate, set aside, or correct

her sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Sanders was charged along with ten other individuals in a 60-

count superseding indictment filed on June 8, 1988. Specifically,

Sanders was charged with one count of racketeering in violation of
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18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), one count of conspiracy to engage in a

criminal racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1962(d), one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 846, three counts of money laundering in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(I), and one count of using a telephone

to facilitate a conspiracy to distribute heroin in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 843(b).

Sander’s motion to sever her trial from that of her husband

and co-defendant, Johnny Lee Sanders, was denied. Trial to a jury

commenced on October 18, 1989, and concluded on November 9, 1989.

The jury found Sanders guilty as charged except for acquittal on

one money laundering charge and the telephone facilitation charge.

The court denied Sander’s motion for a mistrial. Sanders was

sentenced to thirteen years imprisonment on each count, the

sentences to be served concurrently, together with five years

supervised release and a special assessment of $50.00 per count. 

On appeal, Sanders alleged that: the district court erred in

denying her motions for a severance and mistrial; the evidence was

insufficient to support her money laundering, racketeering, and

conspiracy to distribute heroin convictions; and the district court

misapplied the sentencing guidelines in determining the quantity of

drugs to be used in arriving at her base offense level. 

In reversing in part, affirming in part, and remanding, we

held that: the district court did not abuse its discretion in
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denying Sander’s motions for a mistrial and severance, United

States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466, 1469 (10th Cir. 1991); there was

insufficient evidence to support two of the money laundering

charges, id. at 1470-73; Sander’s substantivie rackerteering

conviction “must also be vacated because this conviction is no

longer supported by two racketeering acts [money laundering],” id.

at 1473; Sander’s conviction for conspiracy to distribute heroin

was insufficient to support her conviction for conspiracy to engage

in a criminal racketeering enterprise, id.; there was sufficient

evidence to support Sander’s conspiracy conviction to distribute

heroin, id. at 1474; and the district court properly employed a

quantity of 8,624 grams of heroin in arriving at Sander’s base

offense level under the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 1474-76. 

 Sanders subsequently filed her § 2255 motion herein in which

she alleged that: the minimum mandatory sentence provision of 21

U.S.C. § 841(b) does not apply to pre-November 18, 1988, § 846

offenses; the court erred in calulating the amount of drugs

distributed; she was penalized for going to trial; the government

violated the double jeopardy clause; the district court erroneously

imposed a sentence of supervised release for a pre-November 15,

1988, conspiracy; she was denied effective assistance of counsel at

sentencing; and her due process rights were violated when the

government estimated the cutting agent without testing the drug for

purity. (R., Vol. I, Tab 1387 at 2). 
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On January 30, 1996, the district court entered its Order,

concluding:

The court finds that defendant’s claims, with one

exception, are procedurally barred or without merit. The

court holds, however, that defendant’s sentence

improperly included a period of supervised release, and

that her sentence must be corrected to remove any such

penalty. 

(R., Vol. I, Tab 1387 at 11).

On appeal, Sanders contends that: she was improperly sentenced

under the sentencing guidelines; the district court erred in

calculating her base offense level on 8,624 grams of heroin; the

district court erred in allowing her to be penalized for exercising

her constitutional right to stand trial; her money laundering

conviction violated the double jeopardy clause; she was denied

effective assistance of counsel at sentencing; and she was denied

due process when the government was allowed to estimate the cutting

agent without testing the heroin for purity.

We review de novo the district court’s rulings on legal

questions in § 2255 proceedings. United States v. Kissick, 69 F.3d

1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 1995). Findings of fact made by the district

court in applying the sentencing guidelines must be upheld unless

they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Bauer, 995 F.2d 182,

183 (10th Cir. 1993). 

Applying these standards, we affirm substantially for the

reasons set forth in the district court’s Order of January 30,

1996.
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AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court:

James E. Barrett,

Senior United States

Circuit Judge