[Cite as State v. Wells, 2014-Ohio-1855.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. 

 : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

CHRISTOPHER G. WELLS, JR. : Case No. 13 CAA 07 0057 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common 

 Pleas, Case No. 13 CR I 01 0019 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: May 1, 2014 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

MARK C. SLEEPER STEPHEN P. HARDWICK 

140 North Sandusky Street 250 East Broad Street 

Third Floor Suite 1400 

Delaware, OH 43015 Columbus, OH 43215 
Delaware County, Case No. 13 CAA 07 0057 2 

Farmer, J. 

{¶1} On January 18, 2013, the Delaware County Grand Jury indicted appellant, 

Christopher Wells, on five counts of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12, eighteen 

counts of theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02, three counts of breaking and entering in 

violation of R.C. 2911.13, and one count of criminal damaging in violation of R.C. 

2909.06. One of the theft counts was subsequently dismissed. 

{¶2} On April 17, 2013, appellant filed a motion to dismiss on speedy trial rights 

under R.C. 2945.71. Hearings were held on April 22, and May 1, 2013. By judgment 

entry filed May 1, 2013, the trial court denied the motion. 

{¶3} On May 2, 2013, appellant pled no contest to five counts of burglary. The 

remaining counts were dismissed. By judgment entry filed May 16, 2013, the trial court 

found appellant guilty. By judgment entry filed June 14, 2013, the trial court sentenced 

appellant to an aggregate term of seven and a half years in prison. 

{¶4} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for 

consideration. Assignment of error is as follows: 

I 

{¶5} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MR. WELLS'S MOTION TO 

DISMISS." 

I 

{¶6} Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on 

speedy trial violations. We disagree. 
Delaware County, Case No. 13 CAA 07 0057 3 

{¶7} R.C. 2945.71 governs time within which hearing or trial must be held. 

Subsection (C)(2) states a "person against whom a charge of felony is pending: [s]hall 

be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after the person's arrest." 

{¶8} Appellant was arrested on June 22, 2012 and charged in the municipal 

court with breaking and entering. Appellant was held in jail until July 2, 2012 when the 

charge was dismissed without prejudice because it was going to be presented to the 

Delaware County Grand Jury. On January 18, 2013, the indictment was filed charging 

appellant with five counts of burglary, eighteen counts of theft, three counts of breaking 

and entering, and one count of criminal damaging. One of the breaking and entering 

charges was the offense from the municipal court case. Appellant was arrested on the 

indictment on February 21, 2013. Appellant argues the time between the dismissal of 

the offense in the municipal court and the subsequent indictment of the same offense 

cannot be tolled. 

{¶9} It is undisputed that 234 days lapsed between the dismissal of the 

municipal court offense and appellant's arrest after indictment. The gravamen of this 

appeal is whether these 234 days can be tolled against the time for which appellant 

should have been brought to trial. 

{¶10} Appellant acknowledges the Supreme Court of Ohio's holding in State v. 

Broughton, 62 Ohio St.3d 53 (1991), but argues it has been modified by their dicta in 

State v. Ramey, 132 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-2904. 

{¶11} In its syllabus at paragraphs one and two, the Broughton court specifically 

addressed the tolling time between dismissed and subsequently indicted offenses: 
Delaware County, Case No. 13 CAA 07 0057 4 

1. For purposes of computing how much time has run against the 

state under R.C. 2945.71 et seq., the time period between the dismissal 

without prejudice of an original indictment and the filing of a subsequent 

indictment, premised upon the same facts as alleged in the original 

indictment, shall not be counted unless the defendant is held in jail or 

released on bail pursuant to Crim.R. 12(I). 

2. The arrest of a defendant, under a subsequent indictment which 

is premised on the same underlying facts alleged in a previous indictment, 

is the proper point at which to resume the running of the speedy-trial 

period. (R.C. 2945.71 et seq., construed and applied.) 

{¶12} The Broughton court at 259 explained the following: 

In considering which of the above approaches to adopt, we 

recognize "the public's interests not only in the prompt adjudication of 

criminal cases, but also in obtaining convictions of persons who have 

committed criminal offenses against the state." Bonarrigo, supra, 62 Ohio 

St.2d at 11, 16 O.O.3d at 6-7, 402 N.E.2d at 534; see, also, State v. 

Calhoun (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 373, 376, 18 OBR 429, 432, 481 N.E.2d 

624, 627. We explained in Bonarrigo that "[i]t was not the General 

Assembly's sole purpose in enacting the speedy trial statutes to reward 

those accused of criminal conduct for a prosecutor's lack of diligence." 

Id., 62 Ohio St.2d at 10, 16 O.O.3d at 6, 402 N.E.2d at 534. Therefore, 
Delaware County, Case No. 13 CAA 07 0057 5 

we are persuaded that the majority view (tolling the speedy-trial statute 

between dismissal and reindictment) is sound in light of our previous 

holdings in Bonarrigo, supra, Cougill, supra, and Spratz, supra, and the 

legislative intent behind the speedy-trial statute. 

{¶13} Appellant argues the Supreme Court of Ohio in Ramey, supra, in 

reviewing the issue of tolling time because of a co-defendant's pre-trial motions, 

modified and rejected the syllabus law of Broughton: 

R.C. 2945.72 does not include the filing of pretrial motions by a codefendant as an event that automatically extends a defendant's speedytrial time. In construing a statute, we may not add or delete words. State 

ex rel. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Indus. Comm., 52 Ohio St.3d 144, 148, 

556 N.E.2d 467 (1990). We are, therefore, compelled to conclude that a 

co-defendant's filing of pretrial motions does not automatically toll the time 

in which a defendant must be brought to trial. 

{¶14} R.C. 2945.72 language has not changed since the Broughton opinion. In 

Ramey, there was no time when the criminal charge was not pending against the 

defendant, including the time of the pretrial motions filed by the co-defendant. The 

Ramey court specifically addressed R.C. 2945.72(H) which states: "The time within 

which an accused must be brought to trial, or, in the case of felony, to preliminary 

hearing and trial, may be extended only by the following:***The period of any 
Delaware County, Case No. 13 CAA 07 0057 6 

continuance granted on the accused's own motion, and the period of any reasonable 

continuance granted other than upon the accused's own motion." 

{¶15} The facts and dicta of Ramey are completely opposite to the facts sub 

judice. We find Ramey has no effect on the syllabus law of Broughton.

{¶16} Our decision is further supported by the unambiguous statutory language 

of R.C. 2945.71(A) which states: "Subject to division (D) of this section, a person 

against whom a charge is pending in a court not of record, or against whom a charge of 

minor misdemeanor is pending in a court of record, shall be brought to trial within thirty 

days after the person's arrest or the service of summons." 

{¶17} The statute speaks of charges pending. In this case, charges were not 

pending against appellant during the 234 days hiatus, and appellant was not imprisoned 

on any of the offenses. In State v. Azbell, 112 Ohio St.3d 300, 2006-Ohio-6552, ¶ 21-

27, Justice O'Donnell in his concurring opinion emphasized that the statutory language 

speaks of charges pending and essentially concurs with the majority opinion: 

R.C. 2945.71 sets forth the statutory right to a speedy trial in Ohio 

and catalogs three classifications of persons against whom a charge is 

pending, dependent upon the degree of the offense with which the person 

is charged. Subdivision (A) pertains to "a person against whom a charge 

is pending in a court not of record, or against whom a charge of minor 

misdemeanor is pending in a court of record." (Emphasis added.) 

Subdivision (B) pertains to "a person against whom a charge of 

misdemeanor, other than a minor misdemeanor, is pending in a court of 
Delaware County, Case No. 13 CAA 07 0057 7 

record." (Emphasis added.) And, thirdly, insofar as is relevant here, 

subsection (C) specifies: 

"A person against whom a charge of felony is pending: 

"* * * 

"(2) Shall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after 

the person's arrest." (Emphasis added.) 

Reading the statute in its entirety in order to discern the legislative 

intent, it is apparent to me that this statute applies only to persons against 

whom charges are pending. 

{¶18} Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion 

to dismiss on speedy trial violations. 

{¶19} The sole assignment of error is denied. 

 
Delaware County, Case No. 13 CAA 07 0057 8 

{¶20} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Ohio is 

hereby affirmed. 

By Farmer, J. 

Hoffman, P.J. and 

Delaney, J. concur. 

 

 

 

 

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