Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 44A04-1407-CR-379 | April 21, 2015 Page 1 of 18

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Special Assistant to the State Public 

Defender

Plainfield, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Katherine Modesitt Cooper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jeremy Ellis,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

April 21, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

44A04-1407-CR-379

Appeal from the LaGrange Circuit 

Court

The Honorable J. Scott VanDerbeck, 

Judge

Cause No. 44C01-1305-FD-82

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Jeremy Ellis appeals his convictions and sentence for theft and attempted theft, 

both as Class D felonies, following a jury trial. Ellis raises three issues for our 

review. First, he asserts that his two convictions violate Indiana’s prohibitions 
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against double jeopardy either because the prosecutor told the jury that it 

should consider Ellis’ first offense as evidence of Ellis’ intent to commit the 

second offense or because the prosecutor expressly stated that the State was 

seeking only one conviction against Ellis. The first statement is not problematic 

under Indiana’s Double Jeopardy Clause. And while we do not approve of the 

entry of multiple convictions when the prosecutor does not request it, 

nonetheless Ellis was charged with multiple offenses and the evidence 

demonstrated multiple offenses. Thus, the error here, if any, is not an error 

under the actual evidence test of Indiana’s Double Jeopardy Clause.

[2] Ellis also appeals his sentence. In particular, he asserts that his aggregate term 

of two and one-half years, with six months suspended to probation, for the theft 

of about $30 worth of goods for each offense is inappropriate. For support of 

this argument, Ellis cites the current version of Indiana’s criminal code, which 

was not in effect at the time he committed his offenses. We reject Ellis’ attempt 

to use Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) to give retroactive effect to the new criminal 

code.

[3] Finally, Ellis asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for 

additional credit time. But Ellis has not supported this argument with citations 

to any part of the appendix or record on appeal that demonstrates his claims 

regarding time served and credit time. Thus, we are obliged to reject this 

argument.

[4] We affirm Ellis’ convictions and sentence.
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Facts and Procedural History

[5] On May 13, 2013, Nathaniel Burkey was working at Schlemmer’s Hardware

Store (“the store”) in LaGrange when he observed Ellis, who had been inside 

the store, exit through the store’s north doors while carrying a bag of fertilizer 

and a can of drain opener. Burkey approached Ellis at Ellis’ car, which was

parked “directly north of the north doors,” and he asked Ellis if he had paid for 

the items he was carrying. Tr. at 18. Ellis said he had, and Burkey asked to see 

a receipt. Ellis then produced a receipt from a CVS pharmacy. Burkey took 

possession of the two items and informed Ellis that he would have to come 

back inside and pay for the items if he wanted them. Ellis went back inside 

with Burkey and asked another employee to charge the items to an account 

under the last name of “Ellis.” Id. at 20-21. But because the only account 

under such a name was for a person not related to Ellis, the employee refused to 

charge the account. Ellis then left without the items. The store’s owner 

informed the local sheriff’s department of the incident immediately after Ellis 

had left.

[6] About thirty minutes later, another store employee observed Ellis return to the 

store, and she alerted the other employees and the owner. The owner contacted 

the sheriff’s department. Burkey, who was standing by the cash registers on the 

south side of the store, observed Ellis walk past the cash registers and out the 

store’s west entrance with a bag of fertilizer and a can of drain opener. Ellis did 

not stop at the cash registers and did not pay for the two items. The total cost 

of the two items was between $29 and $30.
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[7] While Ellis was on his way to his car, LaGrange County Sheriff’s Deputy 

Derek Baldridge arrived and engaged Ellis. Deputy Baldridge asked Ellis if he

had paid for the two items, and Ellis stated that he had. Deputy Baldridge then 

asked Ellis to go inside with him. Inside, the store’s employees informed 

Deputy Baldridge that Ellis had not paid for the items. Deputy Baldridge then 

arrested Ellis.

[8] On May 15, 2013, the State charged Ellis with theft, as a Class D felony. More 

than a year later, on May 22, 2014, the State added a second charge for 

attempted theft, also as a Class D felony. Both charges were for the removal of 

a bag of fertilizer and a can of drain opener from the store on May 13, 2013. At 

the ensuing jury trial in June of 2014, the State’s opening argument and 

presentation of evidence explained the sequence of events at the store on May 

13, 2013, but did not specifically relate the State’s evidence to one charge or the 

other. 

[9] In its closing argument, the State informed the jury that two distinct crimes had 

occurred on May 13, 2013:

there’s two crimes here. He’s charged—one is theft, one is 

attempted theft, okay. So when we initiated this case, I think, 

“Man, this is pretty obvious, he walks out of the store not once, 

but twice with the goods.” That’s theft.

The other thing though I’m thinking this is a—maybe somebody 

says, “Well, he didn’t get all the way out. He didn’t even make it 

out of the parking lot.” And you know, I don’t think that Derek 

Baldridge should have to sit in his squad car . . . and watch that 

guy get in his car and speed away. . . . [B]ut if you do, if . . . you 
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think he should have to wait that long, then the crime is 

attempted theft. I think it would [be] a lot easier if you just said it 

was a theft . . . .

Id. at 98-99. But then the State created confusion as to whether it was seeking 

one conviction or two:

we’ll give [Ellis] a mulligan on the first trip; he got caught. Store 

got its goods back, no big deal.

But . . . it’s really kind of bullish to come back 30 minutes later 

and try to do the same thing . . . .

* * *

If you think . . . he had to get out of the parking lot . . . then I 

guess you would find him guilty of attempted theft.

Id. at 103-04. 

[10] Defense counsel seized on this confusion in his closing argument to the jury 

and emphasized it:

I guess we’re only talking about this second trip, not the first trip, 

according to the Prosecutor’s final argument there. [Ellis] got a 

pass on that. He came back in and gave the merchandise . . . 

back, tried to pay for it on a charge account that [Ellis] thought 

was there and wasn’t there and left. So he’s not charged with 

theft or attempted theft on that occasion. We’re talking about the 

second occasion when he walked out the west door and then was 

stopped by Officer Baldridge.

Id. at 107.
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[11] In its rebuttal, the State clarified its position on this point as follows:

Mr. Ellis’s first entrance into the store is not what he’s being 

charged with. [Defense counsel] is right.

But that doesn’t mean you can . . . compartmentalize all these 

little facts and ignore them. I want you to judge Jeremy Ellis on

the whole picture on what he did during this 30 to 60 minute 

transaction, okay?

And you don’t have to agree with me on this, but when he comes 

back, the point that he breaks the law is probably when he walks 

out that west door and doorbells go . . . off. Because at that 

point, he’s made a conscious decision that “I’m not going to pay 

for this $29 to $30 worth of goods.” He said, “I’m going to try 

this again.”

* * *

So I mean . . . I agree with [defense counsel] in that [Ellis is] not 

charged based upon the first transaction, but the first transaction 

is helpful because it helps to tell you what his intention is, what 

was going on up here in his mind, okay?

* * *

When he came back into that store and he picked up the drain 

cleaner and he picked up the fertilizer and headed out the side 

door, that’s a substantial step. That is. That tells you what he’s 

thinking based upon what he’s done just before that and what he 

did the 30 or 45 minutes before when he came in the first time.

* * *

. . . I think if you add all those things up . . . it’s a theft . . . . I 

think it’s a theft when he walks out the west door with these 

items in his hands and he hasn’t paid for them.
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. . . So I think that’s a theft, but if you don’t think that’s quite 

enough, then at least grant me that . . . he’s trying to get away 

without paying, and that[,] therefore, it’s attempted theft.

Id. at 110-13. 

[12] However, in its jury instructions, the court informed the jurors that they were 

“to consider the law and the evidence as it may apply to each count 

individually and separately from the other counts.” Id. at 128. Ellis did not 

object to this instruction or tender an alternative instruction. The jury then 

found Ellis guilty of both theft and attempted theft in separate verdicts,

1 and, 

again without objection, the trial court entered its judgment of conviction on 

both counts. 

[13] During the ensuing sentencing hearing, the State argued that the instant 

offenses were part of “a pattern of behavior by [Ellis]” that “revolved around 

methamphetamine.” Sent. Tr. at 7. The trial court found as an aggravating 

circumstance that “there are several pending cases with offense dates after this 

pending case involving alleged manufacturing or possession of 

methamphetamines.” Appellant’s App. at 51. The court also found that Ellis’ 

criminal history was an aggravating circumstance. The court then ordered Ellis 

to serve an aggregate term of two-and-one-half-years, with six months 

 

1

 It is not clear which of the two events the jury concluded was the completed theft and which was the 

attempted theft.
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suspended to probation. Thereafter, Ellis filed a motion to apply additional 

credit time to his sentence, which the trial court denied. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Double Jeopardy

[14] On appeal, Ellis first asserts that his two convictions violate Indiana’s 

prohibitions against double jeopardy. Although Ellis did not object on double 

jeopardy grounds below, questions of double jeopardy implicate fundamental 

rights and, as such, may be raised for the first time on appeal, or even by this 

court sua sponte. See Smith v. State, 881 N.E.2d 1040, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 

Whether convictions violate double jeopardy is a pure question of law, which 

we review de novo. Rexroat v. State, 966 N.E.2d 165, 168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), 

trans. denied.

[15] Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution prohibits double jeopardy, 

providing that “[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” 

As our supreme court has explained:

In Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999)[,] this Court 

concluded that two or more offenses are the same offense in 

violation of article 1, section 14 if, with respect to either the 

statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence 

used to obtain convictions, the essential elements of one 

challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another 

challenged offense. Under the actual evidence test, we examine 

the actual evidence presented at trial in order to determine 

whether each challenged offense was established by separate and 

distinct facts. Id. at 53. To find a double jeopardy violation 

under this test, we must conclude that there is “a reasonable 
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possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to 

establish the essential elements of one offense may also have 

been used to establish the essential elements of a second 

challenged offense.” Id. The actual evidence test is applied to all 

the elements of both offenses. “In other words . . . the Indiana 

Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated when the evidentiary 

facts establishing the essential elements of one offense also 

establish only one or even several, but not all, of the essential 

elements of a second offense.” Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 

833 (Ind. 2002).[2]

Our precedents “instruct that a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the 

jury used the same facts to reach two convictions requires 

substantially more than a logical possibility.” Lee v. State, 892 

N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (Ind. 2008) (citing cases). The reasonable 

possibility standard “fairly implements the protections of the 

Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause and also permits convictions for 

multiple offenses committed in a protracted criminal episode 

when the case is prosecuted in a manner that insures that 

multiple guilty verdicts are not based on the same evidentiary 

facts.” Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 53 n.46. The existence of a 

“‘reasonable possibility’ turns on a practical assessment of 

whether the [fact finder] may have latched on to exactly the same 

facts for both convictions.” Lee, 892 N.E.2d at 1236. We 

 

2

 Shortly after our supreme court’s opinion in Spivey, this court, discussing Spivey, stated:

the Richardson actual evidence test, as applied by our Supreme Court, has found double 

jeopardy to be violated where the evidentiary fact(s) establishing one or more elements of 

one challenged offense establish all of the elements of the second challenged offense. For 

there to be a double jeopardy violation it is not required that the evidentiary facts 

establishing all of the elements of one challenged offense also establish all of the essential 

elements of a second challenged offense.

Alexander v. State, 772 N.E.2d 476, 478 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (emphases in original), trans. denied. Of course, 

this language from Alexander is inconsistent with our supreme court’s statement in Spivey that “the Indiana 

Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated when the evidentiary facts establishing the essential elements of one 

offense also establish only one or even several, but not all, of the essential elements of a second offense.” 

Spivey, 761 N.E.2d at 833 (emphasis added). As our supreme court later succinctly stated: “The actual 

evidence test is applied to all the elements of both offenses.” Garrett, 992 N.E.2d at 719.
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evaluate the evidence from the jury’s perspective and may 

consider the charging information, jury instructions, and 

arguments of counsel. Id. at 1234.

Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 719-20 (Ind. 2013) (last alteration original).3

[16] Ellis’ two convictions do not violate the actual evidence test of Indiana’s 

Double Jeopardy Clause. Each conviction was established by separate and 

distinct evidentiary facts. For one conviction, the State demonstrated the 

following: Ellis removed items from the store without authorization; he exited 

the store through its north doors; and he proceeded to his car, only to be 

stopped there by a store employee. For the other conviction, the State 

separately demonstrated the following: about thirty minutes after the first 

offense, Ellis again removed items from the store without authorization; he

exited the store through its west doors; and he proceeded to his car, only to be 

stopped there by a police officer. The State’s evidence plainly delineated two 

events, and there is no reasonable possibility that the jury “latched on to exactly 

the same facts for both convictions.” Lee, 892 N.E.2d at 1236.

[17] Moreover, the State’s opening argument clearly described two separate events. 

The State’s initial statement to the jury in its closing argument was that “there’s 

two crimes here.” Tr. at 98. And the trial court instructed the jury to consider 

the evidence for “each count individually and separately from the other 

counts.” Id. at 128.

 

3

 Ellis does not challenge the validity of his convictions under either the Fifth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution or under the statutory elements test of the Indiana Constitution.
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[18] Nonetheless, on appeal Ellis zeroes in on other comments made by the State 

during its closing argument, namely, its statement in its rebuttal that the jurors 

should consider the first offense as evidence of Ellis’ intent to commit the 

second offense. But the State’s comment does not demonstrate a double 

jeopardy violation under the actual evidence test. To the contrary, at most the 

State asked the jury to use the evidentiary facts underlying the first offense to 

establish “only one . . . , but not all, of the essential elements of a second 

offense,” namely, Ellis’ intent. Spivey, 761 N.E.2d at 833. This is not sufficient 

to establish a violation of Indiana’s Double Jeopardy Clause. Id.; see also 

Garrett, 992 N.E.2d at 719 (“The actual evidence test is applied to all the 

elements of both offenses.”).

[19] In his reply brief, Ellis takes a different tack and instead argues that the State on 

appeal is estopped from disclaiming the local prosecutor’s apparent concession 

during closing that “[Ellis is] not charged based upon the first transaction.” Tr. 

at 110-11. But Ellis raised the issue of double jeopardy in his brief on appeal, 

and the State is permitted to respond to that argument in its brief. Thus, insofar 

as Ellis’ reply brief asserts that the State may not respond to the argument raised 

by Ellis on appeal, Ellis’ assertion is not well taken.

[20] Moreover, insofar as Ellis’ argument in his reply brief is a new argument on 

appeal—namely, that one of his convictions must be reversed in accordance 

with the prosecutor’s apparent concession during his closing argument—we 

note that Ellis did not object to the trial court’s instructions that the jury 

consider the evidence for “each count individually and separately from the 
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other counts,” id. at 128; Ellis did not proffer his own jury instructions to hold 

the State to its apparent concession; and he did not object to the trial court’s 

entry of multiple convictions against him. He may not raise these arguments

for the first time on appeal, let alone in a reply brief, and we will not allow Ellis 

to use a double jeopardy claim to salvage an argument that he did not preserve 

with a proper objection in the trial court.

[21] All of this is not to say that we approve of the entry of two convictions when 

the prosecutor stated in his closing argument that the State was seeking only 

one conviction. But, as the jury here was instructed, the “final arguments are 

not evidence”; rather, they are an “attempt to persuade you to a particular 

verdict. You may accept or reject these arguments as you see fit.” Voir Dire 

Tr. at 69. The jury here plainly rejected the prosecutor’s argument in his 

rebuttal and instead found Ellis guilty of the two crimes demonstrated by the 

evidence.

[22] In sum, the only argument properly raised by Ellis on appeal is an issue of

double jeopardy, and the error here, if any, does not violate double jeopardy 

under the actual evidence test. As such, we affirm Ellis’ convictions for theft 

and attempted theft.

Issue Two: Ellis’ Sentence

[23] Ellis next asserts that his sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate 

Rule 7(B). Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution “authorize[] 

independent appellate review and revision of a sentence imposed by the trial 
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court.” Roush v. State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (alteration 

original). This appellate authority is implemented through Indiana Appellate 

Rule 7(B). Id. Revision of a sentence under Rule 7(B) requires the appellant to 

demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his 

offense and his character. See Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B); Rutherford v. State, 866 

N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We assess the trial court’s recognition or 

non-recognition of aggravators and mitigators as an initial guide to determining 

whether the sentence imposed was inappropriate. Gibson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 

142, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). However, “a defendant must persuade the 

appellate court that his or her sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard 

of review.” Roush, 875 N.E.2d at 812 (alteration original).

[24] Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate 

sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should 

receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222, 1224 

(Ind. 2008). The principal role of appellate review is to attempt to “leaven the 

outliers.” Id. at 1225. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the 

end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the 

severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that 

come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. Pursuant to the law in effect at the 

time Ellis committed his offenses, the sentencing range for a Class D felony was 

between six months and three years, with an advisory term of one and one-half 

years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 (2012). Thus, Ellis faced a potential maximum 

executed term of six years for his two Class D felony convictions.
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[25] Ellis asserts that his aggregate term of two and one-half years, with six months 

suspended to probation, is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 

because the value of the items he stole or attempted to steal was about $30 on 

each occasion. He argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his 

character because, “had he committed the offense today, he would be facing 

one year in prison, even with an extensive criminal history.” Appellant’s Br. at 

7. We cannot agree with Ellis’ arguments on appeal.

[26] Ellis’ sentence is not inappropriate. Although the value of the items Ellis 

removed from the store is not substantial, that was not the only legitimate 

concern before the trial court. Rather, regarding the nature of the offenses, 

within thirty minutes of the first offense Ellis committed the second offense, 

which, as the State noted to the jury, was “bullish.” Tr. at 103. The items Ellis 

removed from the store were, as the State argued to the trial court and again on 

appeal, “commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine.” Appellee’s Br. at 

14. And, upon being caught by a store employee, Ellis attempted to have the 

items placed on the account of a third party who happened to share Ellis’ last 

name. Ellis also attempted to deceive Burkey by producing a CVS receipt, and 

he lied to Deputy Baldridge when the deputy approached Ellis after the second 

offense.

[27] Neither is Ellis’ sentence inappropriate in light of his character. Ellis has an 

extensive criminal history, including a prior felony conviction for forgery, as a 

Class C felony. At the time of the sentencing hearing he had numerous 

methamphetamine-related charges pending against him. And Ellis’ bullish and 
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deceptive behavior during his commission of the instant offenses demonstrates 

his indifference to the law.4

[28] We also reject Ellis’ argument that the sentencing scheme currently in effect is 

somehow informative of the sentence Ellis should have received. On this point, 

Ellis asserts (notably, without citation) that the sentencing statutes that would 

apply to him had he committed the instant offenses after June 30, 2014, rather 

than before that date, allow for a maximum term of one year on these facts. See

I.C. §§ 35-43-4-2 (2014); 35-50-3-2 (2014). But it is well established that “[t]he 

sentencing statute in effect at the time a crime is committed governs the 

sentence for that crime.” Harris v. State, 897 N.E.2d 927, 928-29 (Ind. 2008). 

Indeed, Indiana Code Section 1-1-5.5-22(b) explicitly states that “[t]he general 

assembly does not intend the doctrine of amelioration . . . to apply to any 

SECTION of [the new criminal code].” And we have repeatedly recognized 

that the new criminal code does not apply retroactively. E.g., Marley v. State, 17 

N.E.3d 335, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. We will not use our 

authority under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) to, in effect, give retroactive effect 

to the new criminal code. Cf. Hobbs v. State, ___ N.E.3d ___, 2015 WL 409469 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that he was entitled to 

a sentence modification by applying the new criminal code instead of the 

 

4

 We need not consider the State’s additional arguments against Ellis’ character, which include letters Ellis 

wrote to the trial court judge.
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relevant provisions of the code in effect at the time of his offense), not yet 

certified.

[29] In sum, we cannot say that Ellis’ aggregate term of two and one-half years, with 

six years suspended, is inappropriate. We affirm Ellis’ sentence.

Issue Three: Credit Time

[30] Ellis’ final argument on appeal is that the trial court miscalculated his credit for 

time served while he awaited his trial. Specifically, Ellis claims that he should 

have received thirty-eight days credit for time he served in the Allen County 

Jail, which was for another charge but while Ellis was out on bail for the instant 

offenses. Ellis claims that the thirty-eight days is credit for nineteen days 

actually served, namely, from February 21, 2014, when the LaGrange Circuit 

Court placed a hold on Ellis after he had failed to appear for a hearing on the 

instant offenses, through March 11, 2014, when Ellis was released from the 

Allen County Jail after he had pleaded guilty to the Allen County offense. Ellis 

further claims that, for the Allen County offense, he was sentenced to ninety 

days executed, but he was in the Allen County Jail for 105 days.

[31] We are obliged to conclude that Ellis has waived this argument for our review 

because he does not support his claims with appropriate citations to the 

appendix or record on appeal. Specifically, in relevant part Ellis first cites page 

60 of the Appellant’s Appendix, but that page does not exist.5 Even if it did 

 

5

 We note that the State also cites page 60 of the Appellant’s Appendix in its brief.
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exist, however, according to the parties’ explanations this document was simply 

Ellis’ motion for additional credit time and his own assertions regarding the 

validity of his request; it was not an independently created record that 

demonstrated time Ellis actually did or did not serve in Allen County.

[32] Ellis also cites the “Jun. 11, 2014 PSI, pg. 5,” see Appellant’s Br. at 8, which is 

an unnumbered page6in a stack of unnumbered and confidential pages separate

from the Appellant’s Appendix. While we were able to locate this document

despite the conspicuous lack of consecutive pagination, it is not clear how the 

cited portion supports Ellis’ argument on appeal. That information simply 

states that a charge against Ellis was filed in the Allen Superior Court on 

December 4, 2013, that it was disposed of on the sentencing date, which was 

March 11, 2014, and that Ellis pleaded guilty to a Class A misdemeanor, for 

which he received ninety days incarceration. The document does not state the 

time Ellis spent in the Allen County Jail or whether the ninety-day sentence 

was for time actually served or included credit time.

[33] Without information that demonstrates both the dates Ellis was incarcerated in 

the Allen County Jail and how the Allen Superior Court did or did not allocate

his time served in that jail to his Allen County offense, we cannot review the 

trial court’s denial of Ellis’ request for additional credit time for the instant 

 

6

 To be sure, it is internally numbered as page 5, but that is hardly helpful when it is buried in a stack of 

other documents, some of which are internally numbered and some of which are not, and it is not numbered 

relative to the other documents within that stack.
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offenses. Thus, we hold that Ellis has waived this argument for our review, and 

we must affirm the trial court’s denial of his request for additional credit time.

Conclusion

[34] In sum, Ellis’ two convictions do not violate Indiana’s Double Jeopardy 

Clause, his sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses 

and his character, and we cannot say that the trial court erred when it denied 

Ellis’ motion for additional credit time. Thus, we affirm Ellis’ convictions and 

sentence.

[35] Affirmed.

[36] Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.