An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1213

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 5 August 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Mecklenburg County

No. 12 CRS 200756

ROBERT DELIMION GRIFFIN

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 19 September 2012 

by Judge Eric L. Levinson in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 April 2014.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Staci T. Meyer, Special 

Deputy Attorney General, for the State.

Irving Joyner for defendant-appellant.

DAVIS, Judge.

Defendant Robert Delimion Griffin (“Defendant”) appeals 

from his conviction of felonious possession of stolen property. 

On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to dismiss the charge against him based on the 

insufficiency of the evidence. After careful review, we 

conclude that Defendant received a fair trial free from error.

Factual Background
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The State presented evidence at trial tending to establish 

the following facts: On 5 January 2012, Mariana Rojas (“Ms. 

Rojas”) left her apartment for work between 9:00 a.m. and 9:15 

a.m. She closed and locked all of her doors before she left.

Later that morning at approximately 11:00 a.m., Officer 

Christopher Lyon (“Officer Lyon”) of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 

Police Department was patrolling the East Boulevard/Remount Road 

area of Charlotte and running registration checks on traveling 

motorists. While at this location, a Lincoln Town Car driven by 

Defendant passed Officer Lyon. Officer Lyon ran a registration 

check on the Lincoln and determined that it had an inspection 

violation. He then began to pursue the vehicle in order to 

perform a traffic stop. However, Officer Lyon had difficulty

catching up to the vehicle, which was traveling in excess of 60 

miles per hour in a 45 miles per hour zone, causing him to lose 

sight of Defendant’s vehicle.

When Officer Lyon finally caught up to the Lincoln, the 

vehicle had turned into the driveway of a residence located at 

2712 Kenihill Road. At 11:37 a.m., he performed a traffic stop 

by turning on his blue lights and pulling behind Defendant’s

vehicle, which was stopped in the residence’s driveway.
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Officer Lyon could see inside the Lincoln from his vantage 

point directly behind the vehicle. He observed that the vehicle 

had two occupants and saw the passenger reach under his seat.

Because of this observation, he called for backup, and, as a 

result, two other officers were dispatched to his location.

Before either officer arrived, Officer Lyon approached 

Defendant — who was sitting in the driver’s seat — and asked for 

his driver’s license and registration. In response to Officer 

Lyon’s inquiry, Defendant stated that he was “bringing stuff 

over to his dad's house [and] that he was coming from Southside 

Homes.” Officer Lyon then asked if there were any guns in the 

vehicle. Defendant responded “no” but added that Officer Lyon 

could “look at my TV and my DVD player. I am going to put them 

in my room.”

Once the other officers arrived, Officer Lyon explained to 

one of them that he had stopped the vehicle for an inspection 

violation and that the car had been speeding. Officer Lyon also 

told the other officer that he had observed the passenger of the 

vehicle place something under the passenger seat. Officer Lyon 

proceeded to write Defendant a ticket for the inspection 

violation and asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle so that 

he could explain the citation. After doing so, Officer Lyon 
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asked if he could search the vehicle as well as conduct a search 

of both Defendant and Defendant’s passenger. Both Defendant and 

the passenger gave their consent to the searches.

When Defendant’s passenger stepped out of the vehicle, a 

“silver check card or credit card [with] . . . the name of 

Marina [sic] Rojas” fell down from the passenger seat. Officer 

Lyon then searched the vehicle and “found a silver Mac laptop 

under the passenger's seat and a flat screen TV in the back seat 

as well as a Blue Ray type of DVD player.” He also found two 

more credit cards with Ms. Rojas’s name printed on them.

Officer Lyon asked Defendant who the credit cards belonged 

to and Defendant responded that “it was his girlfriend's . . .

[and] her name was Marina.” Officer Lyon then returned to his 

patrol car and ran the name as it appeared on the card on his 

onboard computer. The computer search revealed that in 2008,

Ms. Rojas had reported a car break-in in which her purse, credit 

card, and several other items had been stolen.

Officer Lyon then returned to Defendant’s vehicle and asked 

Defendant once again the name of his girlfriend. Defendant 

responded that her name was “Marina.” Officer Lyon stated that 

he wanted to call Ms. Rojas to confirm that Defendant was in 

lawful possession of the credit card. Defendant responded that 
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Ms. Rojas’s number was stored on his cell phone but that “the 

phone was dead.” Officer Lyon retrieved the phone from 

Defendant and found that it had simply been manually “turned 

off.” Defendant then got out a second cell phone and directed 

Officer Lyon to a contact listed as “wifey,” which he stated was 

how Ms. Rojas was listed in the phone. Officer Lyon dialed that

telephone number, which resulted in no answer.

Officer Lyon returned to his patrol car, retrieved Ms. 

Rojas’s phone number from the 2008 incident report, and dialed 

that number. When she answered, he explained why he was calling 

and described the items that he had found during the traffic 

stop. Ms. Rojas — who was at work — confirmed that the items 

belonged to her, including the laptop. She identified the 

laptop by providing Officer Lyon with a password, which 

successfully started the computer. Ms. Rojas also told Officer 

Lyon that she had never dated Defendant and did not know him. 

She also told Officer Lyon that she had never given anyone 

permission to enter her apartment or take the property that had 

been found in Defendant’s vehicle. After speaking with Officer 

Lyon, she left work and returned home. Officer Lyon then placed 

Defendant under arrest.
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When Ms. Rojas arrived at her home, she was met by two 

officers. She noticed that her kitchen door — which she had 

shut and locked before leaving that morning — was open. One

officer stayed with Ms. Rojas while the other officer searched 

the home. She then entered the residence and identified the 

items recovered from Defendant’s vehicle during the traffic stop

as the missing items from her home.

Defendant was charged with larceny after breaking and 

entering and felonious possession of stolen goods, and a trial 

was held on 17 September 2012 in Mecklenburg County Superior 

Court. At the close of all the evidence, Defendant moved to 

dismiss the two charges based on the insufficiency of the 

evidence. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion.

The jury found Defendant guilty of both charged offenses,

and the trial court arrested judgment on the larceny conviction. 

Defendant was sentenced to an active term of imprisonment of 8 

to 19 months. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.

Analysis

Defendant's only argument on appeal is that the trial court 

erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of felonious 

possession of stolen property based on the insufficiency of the 

evidence. Whether the evidence is sufficient to withstand a 
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motion to dismiss is a question of law that is reviewed de novo

on appeal. State v. Bagley, 183 N.C. App. 514, 523, 644 S.E.2d 

615, 621 (2007). A defendant's motion to dismiss should be 

denied if there is substantial evidence of (1) each essential 

element of the offense charged; and (2) defendant being the 

perpetrator of the offense. State v. Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 595, 

573 S.E.2d 866, 868 (2002). “Substantial evidence is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78–79, 

265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court is 

required to view all the evidence — whether direct, 

circumstantial, or both — in the light most favorable to the 

State, making all reasonable inferences from the evidence in 

favor of the State. State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 473, 573 

S.E.2d 870, 889 (2002). Contradictions and discrepancies are for 

the jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal. State v. 

Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980).

“The essential elements of felonious possession of stolen 

property are: (1) possession of personal property, (2) which was 

stolen pursuant to a breaking or entering, (3) the possessor 

knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe the property to 
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have been stolen pursuant to a breaking or entering, and (4) the 

possessor acting with a dishonest purpose.” State v. McQueen,

165 N.C. App. 454, 459, 598 S.E.2d 672, 676 (2004) (internal 

citation omitted), disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 285, 610 S.E.2d 

385 (2005).

First, Defendant contends the State did not present 

substantial evidence that he was in “either possession or 

constructive possession of stolen property.” We disagree.

“[P]ossession of stolen goods . . . may be either actual or 

constructive. Constructive possession exists when the 

defendant, while not having actual possession of the goods, . .

. has the intent and capability to maintain control and dominion 

over the[m].” State v. Szucs, 207 N.C. App. 694, 698, 701 

S.E.2d 362, 365 (2010) (citation, quotation marks, and brackets 

omitted). However, mere presence at an area where contraband is 

located does not, in and of itself, establish constructive

possession unless there is a “close juxtaposition to the 

contraband as to raise a reasonable inference of control.”

State v. Privette, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 721 S.E.2d 299, 309 

(citation and quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, ___ 

N.C. ___, 724 S.E.2d 532 (2012).
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Defendant contends that he “did not have exclusive control 

of [the] property and the fact that he was the driver of the car 

in which the property was discovered, without more, was 

insufficient to establish the possession element.” Defendant’s 

argument lacks merit.

The stolen goods — the laptop, television, and DVD player —

were all found in the backseat and under the front passenger 

seat of Defendant’s car when he was stopped by Officer Lyon. 

Our Supreme Court has held that “one who has the requisite power 

to control access to and use of a vehicle . . . has also the 

possession of the known contents thereof.” State v. Eppley, 282 

N.C. 249, 254, 192 S.E.2d 441, 445 (1972). Moreover, Defendant 

conceded he was aware that the goods were in the backseat of his 

vehicle. He told Officer Lyon that he was moving “my stuff” 

into his father’s house, referred to the stolen property as “my 

T.V. and my DVD player,” and stated that he was going to put 

them in his room. Therefore, Defendant’s control of the vehicle 

and acknowledgment of the goods’ presence inside the vehicle are 

sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that Defendant was in 

possession of the stolen property.

Second, Defendant contends the State failed to present 

substantial evidence that Defendant “knew or should have known 
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that the possession or presence of this property, which was in 

his car, resulted from a breaking or entering of an apartment. . 

. .” We disagree.

“The doctrine of recent possession is a rule of law 

creating the presumption that a person in possession of recently 

stolen property is guilty of its wrongful taking and of the 

unlawful entry associated with that taking.” McQueen, 165 N.C. 

App. at 459, 598 S.E.2d at 676. We have held that the doctrine 

of recent possession is applicable to the crime of felonious 

possession of stolen property. Id. at 459–60, 598 S.E.2d at 

676–77. “When the doctrine of recent possession applies in a 

particular case, it suffices to repel a motion for nonsuit and 

defendant's guilt or innocence becomes a jury question.” State 

v. Milligan, 192 N.C. App. 677, 682, 666 S.E.2d 183, 187 (2008)

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

In order for the doctrine of recent possession to apply, 

the State must show “(1) the property was stolen, (2) defendant 

had possession of the property, subject to his control and 

disposition to the exclusion of others, and (3) the possession 

was sufficiently recent after the property was stolen, as mere 

possession of stolen property is insufficient to raise a 
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presumption of guilt.” McQueen, 165 N.C. App. at 460, 598 

S.E.2d at 676-77.

Here, as discussed above, the State presented substantial 

evidence from which the jury could find that Defendant possessed 

stolen property and that he had sole control of it. 

Furthermore, the State also presented evidence that Ms. Rojas

left her home for work at 9:00 a.m. on the morning of 

Defendant’s arrest and locked all of her doors. Then, 

approximately two hours later, Defendant was found in possession 

of items stolen from her residence. Upon being contacted by 

Officer Lyons, Ms. Rojas then returned home to find her front 

door wide open, and she identified the items that were found in 

possession of Defendant as items missing from her home.

We believe the doctrine of recent possession applies and 

serves to establish that Defendant knew or had reasonable 

grounds to believe the items at issue were stolen pursuant to a 

breaking or entering. Therefore, the trial court did not err in 

denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Defendant 

received a fair trial free from error.

NO ERROR.
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Judges ELMORE and McCULLOUGH concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).