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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

MARY STIRNEMANN, Personal Representative 

of the Estate of CRANDALL SUTTON, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 

UNPUBLISHED 

December 8, 2015 

v No. 323832 

Oakland Circuit Court 

WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL, ROYAL 

OAK SURGICAL ASSOCIATES PC, and 

ROBERT JURY, 

LC No. 2012-126706-NH 

 Defendants-Appellants/CrossAppellee, 

and 

KASIF QURESHI, also known as QURESHI 

KASIF, 

 Defendant. 

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and METER and RIORDAN, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendants, William Beaumont Hospital (Beaumont), Royal Oak Surgical Associates, 

PC, and Robert Jury,1

 appeal as of right an order entering judgment in favor of plaintiff. 

Plaintiff2 cross-appeals an order denying her motion for additur. We affirm in part, and reverse 

in part, the order entering judgment in favor of plaintiff, and we affirm the trial court’s order 

denying plaintiff’s motion for additur. 

 

1

 Beaumont, Royal Oak Surgical Associates, PC, and Robert Jury will be referred to as 

defendants as they are the only relevant defendants to this appeal. 

2

 Plaintiff refers to Mary Stirnemann, the decedent’s personal representative. 
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 This appeal arises out of the death of Crandall Sutton (Crandall). When Crandall was 81 

years old, he suffered from a sore right knee and decided to have knee replacement surgery. 

Prior to undergoing knee replacement surgery, Crandall was cleared to have the surgery by his 

cardiologist and his internal medicine physician, despite having atrial fibrillation, 

tachyarrhythmia, and hypertension. On March 18, 2009, Crandall had a successful knee 

replacement surgery. 

 After surgery, Crandall was discharged from Beaumont and went to Heartland 

Rehabilitation Facility on March 21, 2009. The following day, Crandall began experiencing 

difficulty in breathing, abdominal pain, abdominal distension, nausea, and vomiting. As a result, 

Crandall went to the emergency room at Beaumont on March 23, 2009. 

 Dr. Kasif Qureshi was the admitting physician. Robert Jury, a general surgeon at Royal 

Oak Surgical Associates, provided a general surgery consultation upon Crandall’s admission to 

the emergency room at Beaumont. Crandall was diagnosed with postoperative ileus, which 

involves “the lack of motility of the bowel.” Dr. Jury recommended bowel rest and IV fluids and 

examined Crandall every day and assisted with Crandall’s care from March 23, 2009 to March 

28, 2009. Rina Shah, a physician’s assistant under the supervision of Dr. Jury, also assisted in 

the care of Crandall. On March 28, 2009, Crandall died as a result of multisystem organ failure. 

 Plaintiff later filed the instant medical malpractice action, alleging that Crandall suffered 

injury resulting from a breach of the applicable standard of care by defendants during Crandall’s 

postsurgical care.3

 Relevant to this appeal, plaintiff alleged that Jury was negligent for failing to 

properly treat Crandall’s postoperative ileus. Specifically, plaintiff claimed that Jury should 

have either scheduled or performed a decompressive colonoscopy, or given the drug 

Neostigmine to Crandall to treat the postoperative ileus. 

 At trial, plaintiff’s medical expert, Leonard Francis Milewski opined Crandall suffered 

from a specific type of ileus, Ogilvie’s Syndrome. Ogilvie’s is a type of ileus that affects the 

colon. The signs and symptoms of Ogilvie’s include a distended abdomen, abdominal pain, 

nausea, and vomiting. Evidence was presented that when Ogilvie’s is left untreated, the colon is 

filled with air and gas and it continues to enlarge. The method of treatment for Ogilvie’s is to 

decompress the colon. In order to decompress the colon, a general surgeon would order a 

decompressive colonoscopy or provide the medication Neostigmine. Milewski opined that it 

was a breach of the standard of care for failing to decompress the colon on March 26. Milewski 

opined that a decompressive colonoscopy or Neostigmine would have prevented Crandall’s 

death, and that Jury breached the standard of care by continuing only conservative measures, i.e., 

bowel rest and IV fluids, while caring for Crandall. Milewski testified that Crandall had a 

remaining life expectancy of 7.6 years had he not died. 

 

3

 Dr. Querishi was subsequently dismissed from the lawsuit. 
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 On the other hand, defendants maintained that Jury adhered to the applicable standard of 

care when providing postsurgical care to Crandall. Specifically, Jury opined that he adhered to 

the standard of care and did not give Crandall Neostigmine because he had a history of cardiac 

arrhythmia and Neostigmine could cause cardiac arrest. Jury believed that giving Crandall 

Neostigmine would have been “dangerous.” This opinion was bolstered by Scott Dulchavsky, 

defendant’s expert witness, who also opined that Jury would have breached the standard of care 

if he gave Crandall Neostigmine because the drug can be dangerous to patients with cardiac 

issues. 

 Dr. Jury also testified that performing a decompressive colonoscopy would have required 

giving Crandall sedatives, which would have put Crandall at risk of needing ventilator support. 

Dulchavsky opined that performing a decompressive colonoscopy would have been a “relatively 

high-risk procedure.” 

 Along with maintaining that Jury was not professionally negligent, defendants 

maintained that his conduct was not the cause of Crandall’s death. According to Jury and 

Dulchavsky, there were a “number of medical issues” that were “complicating, contributing 

factors” to Crandall’s death. Dr. Jury believed that Crandall died as a result of an infection in the 

knee or from bronchopneumonia. Dulchavsky, along with another expert Timothy Nostrant, 

opined that a decompressive colonoscopy or Neostigmine would not have saved Crandall’s life. 

 After the close of proofs, closing arguments, and jury instructions, the jury rendered a 

verdict in plaintiff’s favor. The jury awarded plaintiff $22,000 for past economic damages for 

medical and funeral expenses, and awarded $11,000 per year for eight years for loss of financial 

support. With regard to noneconomic damages, the jury awarded $15,000 for loss of 

companionship for the year of 2014, but did not award any damages for loss of companionship 

for any other year. The jury did not award plaintiff any damages for pain and suffering. 

 After trial, plaintiff filed a motion for additur, arguing that the damages awarded were 

inadequate and against the great weight of the evidence. In opposition, defendants argued that 

the trial court defer to the judgment of the jury regarding damages. After listening to arguments, 

the trial court stated that it would not rewrite the jury verdict and subsequently entered an order 

denying plaintiff’s motion for additur. 

 Before entering judgment in favor of plaintiff, the trial court held a collateral source 

hearing, pursuant to MCL 600.6303, to determine if any of plaintiff’s economic damages were 

paid or payable by a collateral source. At the hearing, defendants argued that plaintiff 

acknowledged in her answer to interrogatories that all economic losses were payable or had been 

paid by a collateral source. However, plaintiff argued that the trial testimony established that 

prior to Crandall’s death, the Sutton family’s household income was $39,000, and after his death, 

the household income decreased to $28,000. Ultimately, the trial court found that plaintiff had 

suffered $11,000 in economic loss in the years following Crandall’s death and that the amount 

was not paid or payable by a collateral source, so it entered an order denying defendants’ request 

to reduce the jury award. This appeal ensued. 

II. DEFENDANTS’ APPEAL 
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A. ADMISSIBILITY OF RENA SHAH’S DEPOSITION 

1. HEARSAY 

 Defendants argue that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the deposition of 

Rana Shah on the basis that she was not available pursuant to the Michigan Rules of Evidence 

governing hearsay. We conclude that defendants have waived this issue. 

 “A party waives an issue by affirmatively approving of a trial court’s action.” Muci v 

State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 267 Mich App 431, 443; 705 NW2d 151 (2005), rev’d on other 

grounds 478 Mich 178 (2007). Moreover, a litigant may not harbor error, to which he or she 

consented, as an appellate parachute. Clohset v No Name Corp (On Remand), 302 Mich App 

550, 567; 840 NW2d 375 (2013). 

 At trial, defendants attempted to admit into evidence the deposition of Rena Shah, who 

had since moved to Minnesota. Plaintiff objected on the basis that Shah’s deposition was 

inadmissible hearsay. In response to plaintiff’s hearsay objection, defendants contended that the 

Shah deposition was admissible because the rules of evidence specifically permit deposition 

testimony when a witness is not available. Ultimately, the trial court held that the deposition 

testimony was inadmissible hearsay because defendant was unable to establish that Shah was 

unavailable pursuant to MRE 804(a). After the trial court made its ruling, the trial court 

provided defendant an opportunity to review the Michigan Rules of Evidence. After the short 

recess, defendants’ attorney stated, “I apologize, Judge, I can’t prove unavailability according to 

the Rules. Plain and simple. And so, I apologize, I’m sorry I got excited about it, but I can’t - - 

per that I can’t do it. All I can say is what happened.” Given that defendants acknowledged that 

they were unable to prove that Shah was unavailable and approved the trial court’s ruling that the 

deposition was inadmissible hearsay, defendants cannot now complain about the admissibility of 

the deposition under the hearsay rules as their own unequivocal conduct waived this right. 

Marshall Lasser, PC v George, 252 Mich App 104, 109; 651 NW2d 158 (2002). Because 

defendants waived this issue, the waiver eliminated any error and appellate review is precluded. 

The Cadle Co v City of Kentwood, 285 Mich App 240, 255; 776 NW2d 145 (2009). 

2. RULE OF COMPLETENESS 

 Defendants also argue, for the first time on appeal, that they were entitled to admit the 

entirety of Shah’s deposition pursuant to MRE 106. This unpreserved claim of error is reviewed 

for plain error affecting substantial rights. Lima Twp v Bateson, 302 Mich App 483, 503; 838 

NW2d 898 (2013). To satisfy the plain error test, (1) error must have occurred, (2) the error 

must be plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and (3) the plain error affected substantial rights. Kern v 

Blethen-Coluni, 240 Mich App 333, 336; 612 NW2d 838 (2000). 

 The “rule of completeness” is contained in MRE 106, which provides: 

When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an 

adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any 

other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered 

contemporaneously with it. 
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 Defendants’ principal contention is that the rule of completeness required the admission 

of Shah’s deposition testimony to provide clarification to Shah’s medical notes plaintiff admitted 

at trial. However, defendants have not established that fairness required Shah’s deposition to be 

considered contemporaneously with her medical notes as Shah’s medical notes were complete 

without the introduction of her deposition testimony. While Shah’s deposition testimony may 

have explained her medical notes, her medical notes were not incomplete and spoke for 

themselves. Furthermore, although plaintiff questioned many of the witnesses regarding Shah’s 

medical notes that were admitted into evidence, no portion of Shah’s deposition was admitted at 

trial or read into the record before the jury. As a result, defendants were not entitled to request 

that plaintiff introduce any other part of the deposition testimony. MRE 106. As such, no error 

occurred. 

B. SUPPLEMENTAL JURY INSTRUCTION 

 Defendants next argue that reversal is required as the trial court gave an erroneous 

supplemental jury instruction. A trial court’s determination with regard to a supplemental jury 

instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and this Court “will not reverse a trial court’s 

decision regarding supplemental instructions unless failure to vacate the verdict would be 

inconsistent with substantial justice.” Guerrerro v Smith, 280 Mich App 647, 660; 761 NW2d 

723 (2008), quoting Grow v W A Thomas Co, 236 Mich App 696, 702; 601 NW2d 426 (1999). 

 Jury instructions are reviewed in their entirety and “[e]ven if somewhat imperfect, 

instructions do not create error requiring reversal if, on balance, the theories of the parties and 

the applicable law are adequately and fairly presented to the jury.” Case v Consumers Power 

Co., 463 Mich 1, 6; 615 NW2d 17 (2000). “When the standard jury instructions do not 

adequately cover an area, the trial court is obligated to give additional instructions when 

requested if the supplemental instructions properly inform the jury of the applicable law and are 

supported by the evidence.” Stoddard v Manufacturers Nat’l Bank of Grand Rapids, 234 Mich 

App 140, 162; 593 NW2d 630 (1999). A supplemental jury instruction, which is to be modeled 

as nearly as practicable after the standard jury instructions, “must be concise, understandable, 

conversational, unslanted, and nonargumentative.” Id. at 163. Reversal is warranted where 

instructional error resulted in such unfair prejudice to the complaining party that the failure to 

vacate the jury verdict would be inconsistent with substantial justice. Case, 463 Mich at 6. 

 To establish a cause of action for medical malpractice, a plaintiff must prove that the 

defendant’s breach of the applicable standard of care proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries. 

Lockridge v Oakwood Hosp, 285 Mich App 678, 684; 777 NW2d 511 (2009). The disputed 

instruction in this case was intended to aid the jury in determining whether plaintiff’s injuries 

were the proximate result of the defendant’s breach of the applicable standard of care. 

 After the close of proofs, the trial court instructed the jury, in relevant part: 

When I use the words “proximate cause,” I mean first that the negligent conduct 

must have been a cause of Plaintiff’s injuries and second, that the plaintiff’s 

injuries must have been a type that is a natural and probable result of the negligent 

conduct. There may be more than one proximate cause. To be a proximate cause, 

the claimed negligence need not be the only cause nor the last cause. A cause 
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may be proximate, although it and other cause – it and another cause act at the 

same time or in a combination to produce the occurrence. 

* * * 

The Plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following: First, that the 

Defendant was professionally negligent in one or more of the ways claimed by the 

Plaintiff as stated in these instructions. Two, that the plaintiff has sustained 

injuries and damages. There, that the professional negligence or malpractice of 

the Defendant was the proximate cause of the injury and damages to the Plaintiff. 

Your verdict will be for the Plaintiff if the Defendant was negligent and such 

negligence was a proximate cause to the Plaintiff’s injuries and if there were 

damages. Your verdict will be for the Defendant if the Defendant was not 

professionally negligent or did not commit malpractice, or if the Defendant was 

professionally negligent or did commit malpractice, but such professional 

negligence or malpractice was not a proximate cause of the Plaintiff’s injuries or 

damages, or if the Plaintiff was not injured or damaged. 

 The following day, after the trial court read the deadlocked jury instruction and suggested 

that the jury list the issues that “divide or confuse” them, the jury wrote a note to the trial court 

that provided, “We are unable to -- we are unable to decide on question number 3 [on the verdict 

form].” Question 3 on the verdict form stated, “Was the defendants’ professional negligence a 

proximate cause of injury and/or damages to Crandell [sic] Sutton and/or his surviving family 

members?” 

 After receiving the note from the jury, the trial court subsequently instructed the jury: 

 And I’m going to instruct you that in order for the Plaintiff to establish the 

requisite proximate causation in this medical malpractice action, she must show 

specific facts that would support a reasonable inference of a logical sequence of 

cause and effect. The evidence need not negate all other causes, but the evidence 

must convince you by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Jury’s negligent 

conduct was a cause of Mr. Sutton’s death, and that Mr. Sutton’s death was a 

natural and probable result of Dr. Jury’s negligent conduct. 

 Having reviewed the jury instructions, the trial court’s instructions concerning proximate 

cause were adequate. The supplemental jury instruction required plaintiff to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Robert Jury’s conduct was a cause of Crandall’s death, that 

plaintiff was required to set forth facts that would support a reasonable inference of a logical 

sequence of cause and effect, and that Robert Jury’s conduct was a natural and probable result of 

Robert Jury’s negligent conduct, all in accordance with applicable law. See Craig v Oakwood 

Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 87; 684 NW2d 296 (2004) (stating “a plaintiff establishes that the 

defendant’s conduct was a cause in fact of his injuries only if he sets forth specific facts that 

would support a reasonable inference of a logical sequence of cause and effect.”) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted); Lockridge, 285 Mich App at 689 (holding a plaintiff must prove that 

the plaintiff’s damages and injuries are a natural and probable result of a defendant’s 

negligence.). While the trial court’s supplemental instruction did not contain the phrase “but the 
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evidence must exclude other reasonable hypotheses with a fair amount of certainty,” the trial 

court’s supplemental instruction was responsive to the jury’s request; was concise, 

understandable, conversational, unslanted, and nonargumentative; and defendants suffered little 

prejudice from the phrase being omitted because the trial court nevertheless instructed the jury 

that plaintiff was required to prove proximate cause by the preponderance of the evidence by 

showing specific facts that would support a reasonable inference of a logical sequence of cause 

and effect. The court adequately instructed the jury to protect against the possibility that the 

verdict was rendered upon a mere possibility or plausible explanation of causation. See Craig, 

471 Mich at 87. 

 Defendants’ main contention is that the supplemental jury instruction “cannot be 

considered unslanted” because it interfered with the jury’s role in determining whether Dr. Jury 

was professionally negligent. Despite defendants’ contention, neither the jury verdict form nor 

the trial court’s instructions indicated that the jury was required to find that Dr. Jury was 

negligent. More importantly, the record shows that the jury was past the question of Dr. Jury’s 

negligence at the time they considered the supplemental instruction. In fact, Question 1 on the 

jury verdict form specifically asked, “Was the defendant, Robert Jury, M.D., professionally 

negligent?” The verdict form then instructed the jury not to answer subsequent questions if it 

responded negatively to Question 1. Because jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, 

Zaremba Equip, Inc v Harco Nat’l Ins Co, 302 Mich App 7, 25; 837 NW2d 686 (2013), the jury 

would have already determined that Robert Jury was professionally negligent because the jury 

had proceeded to Question 3. Thus, the jury instruction did not interfere with the jury’s role in 

determining whether Dr. Jury was professionally negligent, as that determination was already 

made by the jury at the time the trial court provided the jury with the supplemental instruction. 

After reviewing the jury instructions in their entirety, we discern no error demanding relief. 

C. COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE 

 Defendants also challenge the trial court’s factual findings concerning economic 

expenses that were paid or payable by a collateral source. We review a trial court’s findings of 

fact for clear error. Chapdelaine v Sochocki, 247 Mich App 167, 169; 635 NW2d 339 (2001).

“Clear error exists where, after a review of the record, the reviewing court is left with a firm and 

definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” Marshall Lasser, PC, 252 Mich App at 110. 

A trial court’s interpretation and application of the collateral source rule, as set forth in MCL 

600.6303, is reviewed de novo. Shivers v Schmiege, 285 Mich App 636, 653; 776 NW2d 669 

(2009). MCL 600.6303 provides, in relevant part: 

 In a personal injury action in which the plaintiff seeks to recover for the 

expense of medical care, rehabilitation services, loss of earnings, loss of earning 

capacity, or other economic loss, evidence to establish that the expense or loss 

was paid or is payable, in whole or in part, by a collateral source shall be 

admissible to the court in which the action was brought after a verdict for the 

plaintiff and before a judgment is entered on the verdict. Subject to subsection 

(5), if the court determines that all or part of the plaintiff's expense or loss has 

been paid or is payable by a collateral source, the court shall reduce that portion 

of the judgment which represents damages paid or payable by a collateral source 

by an amount equal to the sum determined pursuant to subsection (2). 
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“Collateral source” means benefits received or receivable from an insurance policy; benefits 

payable pursuant to a contract with a health care corporation, dental care corporation, or health 

maintenance organization; employee benefits; social security benefits; worker’s compensation 

benefits; or Medicare benefits. MCL 600.6303(4). 

The trial court clearly erred in finding that plaintiff had economic damages not paid or 

payable by a collateral source. Attached to defendants’ request for a collateral source hearing 

was plaintiff’s answer to interrogatories. Plaintiff’s interrogatory answers state, in relevant part: 

 30. Do you admit that the amount claimed by you for lost income, lost 

wages, or lost earning, medical bills, hospital expenses or any other amounts 

claimed as out-of-pocket expenses have been paid or are payable by a collateral 

source such as benefits received or receivable from an insurance policy, 

healthcare corporation, dental care corporation, health maintenance organization, 

employee benefits, social security benefits, worker’s compensation and/or 

Medicare benefits? 

ANSWER: YES 

31. If your answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the negative, 

please identify with specificity the exact amount of the lost income, lost wages or 

lost earning, medical expenses, hospital bills to date which were not paid or are 

not payable by a collateral source and state with specificity the exact nature of 

your computation to reach that figure if any. (See MCLA 600.6303). 

ANSWER: Not applicable.

 At the collateral source hearing, plaintiff argued that the trial testimony demonstrated that 

plaintiff suffered an $11,000 loss in financial support per year upon Crandall’s death. Further, 

plaintiff submitted social security and pensions statements to the trial court to substantiate the 

amount of loss in financial support for the years after Crandall’s death and to demonstrate that 

plaintiff’s economic loss was not paid or payable by social security or Crandall’s pension. 

Although plaintiff presented evidence that the economic loss was not paid or payable by social 

security or Crandall’s pension (employee benefits), plaintiff still failed to present evidence that 

the economic loss was not paid or payable by any other of the collateral sources set forth in MCL 

600.6303(4), which was required to rebut her admission in her interrogatory answer. See Bachus 

v West Traverse Twp (On Remand), 122 Mich App 557, 559-562; 332 NW2d 535 (1983) 

(holding that the trial court clearly erred in its factual findings when a party did not rebut the 

admission contained in their answer to interrogatories at an evidentiary hearing). Therefore, the 

trial court clearly erred in finding, on this record, that plaintiff had economic damages that were 

not paid or payable by a collateral source. Id. Because plaintiff stated in her answers to 

interrogatories that all economic damages were paid or payable by a collateral source, the trial 

court, on remand, shall reduce that portion of the judgment which represents damages paid or 

payable by a collateral source. MCL 600.6303. 

III. PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL 
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 Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiff’s motion 

for additur. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the jury’s award for loss of companionship is 

inadequate and against the great weight of the evidence. “This Court reviews a trial court’s 

decision on a motion for additur or a new trial for [an] abuse of discretion.” Taylor v Kent 

Radiology, PC, 286 Mich App 490, 524; 780 NW2d 900 (2009). A court abuses its discretion 

when its decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes. Pontiac Fire Fighters Union 

Local 376 v City of Pontiac, 482 Mich 1, 8; 753 NW2d 595 (2008). 

 A motion for new trial is supportable when, the verdict was “clearly or grossly 

inadequate or excessive,” or the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. See MCR 

2.611(A)(1)(d) and (e). The party asserting a claim has the burden of proving damages with 

reasonable certainty. Berrios v Miles, Inc, 226 Mich App 470, 478; 574 NW2d 677 (1997). This 

Court will defer to the judgment of the jury with regard to the weight to be accorded to the 

evidence concerning damages and “the jury is free to credit or discredit any testimony.” Taylor, 

286 Mich App at 525. 

 At trial, plaintiff presented testimony concerning noneconomic loss. With regard to loss 

of companionship, evidence was presented that Crandall was very involved in his children and 

grandchildren’s lives. Crandall’s daughters, plaintiff and Linda Kuhn, along with Crandall’s 

wife, Carrie Sutton (Carrie), engaged in a variety of activities with Crandall prior to his death. 

Further, evidence was presented that Carrie has been “very lonely” since Crandall’s death. 

Although the testimony at trial could have supported some measure of damages for loss of 

companionship for the years of 2009 to 2013 and from 2015 to 2016, a reasonable jury could 

have concluded that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof for those time periods. 

Particularly, the jury could have discredited part of the testimony from plaintiff, Kuhn, and 

Carrie. Taylor, 286 Mich App at 525. Accordingly, we will defer to the judgment of the jury in 

this regard. Id. 

 Plaintiff also asserts that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence 

because the jury failed to award damages for loss of society and companionship for the years 

ranging from 2009 to 2013 and 2015 to 2016, but awarded damages for loss of financial support 

for those same years. However, “no legal principle requires the jury to award one item of 

damages merely because it has awarded another item.” Kelly v Builders Square, Inc, 465 Mich 

29, 39; 632 NW2d 912 (2001). Simply put, the jury was not required to award damages for loss 

of society and companionship merely as a result of awarding damages for loss of financial 

support because the jury might have evaluated the evidence on pain and suffering differently 

from the evidence concerning other proof of damages. Id. Therefore, the trial court’s denial of 

plaintiff’s motion for additur or a new trial was not outside the range of reasonable and 

principled outcomes. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part, and reverse in part, the order entering 

judgment in favor of plaintiff, and we affirm the trial court’s order denying plaintiff’s motion for 

 
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additur. No costs, as neither party fully prevailed on appeal. MCR 7.219(A). 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ Patrick M. Meter 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan