UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

B.J.G., individually and as Heir of the 

Estate of Jonathan L. Graves, deceased, 

a minor by and through the guardian of 

her Estate: The Trust Company of 

Oklahoma, Inc.; F.B.M., individually 

and as Heir of the Estate of Jonathan L. 

Graves, deceased, a minor by and 

through the guardian of her Estate: 

Melissa S. Kirk, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS 

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, DIVISION 

IV, by and through its Judges; THE 

SUPREME COURT STATE OF 

OKLAHOMA, by and through its Judges,

 Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, INC., 

a Delaware corporation, 

 Defendant. 

---------------------- 

THE TRUST COMPANY OF 

OKLAHOMA, 

 Interested Party. 

No. 12-5199 

(D.C. No. 4:11-CV-00262-GKF-TLW) 

(N.D. Okla.)

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

June 26, 2013

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before TYMKOVICH, ANDERSON, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. 

 

 This case began with a wrongful death products liability action in Oklahoma 

state court. Defendant Rockwell Automation won a jury verdict in its favor, but then 

the trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial. On appeal by Rockwell, the 

Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court’s order. Plaintiffs 

petitioned for certiorari review of the decision, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court 

denied the petition. Plaintiffs then filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the 

Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, the Oklahoma Supreme Court and Rockwell. 

The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against the state judicial defendants as 

barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and we affirmed that dismissal. See B.J.G. 

v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 497 F. App’x 807, 808-09 (10th Cir. 2012), 

cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1268 (2013). Due to the jurisdictional nature of the 

dismissal, however, we directed the district court to modify the dismissal of the 

claims to be without prejudice. See id. at 810. 

 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 
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 After our decision issued, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend their 

complaint. The proposed amended complaint eliminated Rockwell and the Oklahoma 

Supreme Court as defendants. The claims against the Oklahoma Court of Civil 

Appeals, however, remained unchanged. Those claims alleged that plaintiffs’ due 

process rights were violated when the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial 

court’s order granting plaintiffs’ request for a new trial. Compare Aplt. App. at 70, 

¶ 92 (Amended Complaint), with Dist. Ct. R., Doc. 2 at ¶ 99 (Original Complaint). 

The claims further alleged that the Court of Civil Appeals “failed to follow the 

standard of review imposed by the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma on 

appellate courts when considering the correctness of the decision of a trial judge who 

both granted the new trial and presided over the trial of the case.” Aplt. App. at 70, 

¶92; Dist. Ct. R., Doc. 2 at ¶99. Both complaints sought a declaration that plaintiffs 

were entitled to a new trial against Rockwell due to the Court of Civil Appeals’ 

constitutional violations. See Aplt. App. at 71, ¶ 93; Dist. Ct. R., Doc. 2 at ¶ 100. 

 The district court denied the motion for leave to amend the complaint, stating, 

“[t]he claims asserted in the proposed amend[ed] complaint are—like the claims 

previously asserted by plaintiffs—barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Aplee. 

App. at 88. As we explained in our prior decision, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

“applies to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by 

state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and 

inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” B.J.G., 497 F. App’x 
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at 809 (internal quotation marks omitted). And we concluded that plaintiffs’ claims 

were “exactly the sort of claim precluded by Rooker-Feldman.” Id. 

 Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint did nothing to cure the jurisdictional 

defect we identified in our previous decision. The district court therefore properly 

denied leave to amend the complaint. There was no reasoned basis for the plaintiffs 

to appeal from the district court’s order since the issue had already been litigated and 

resolved by our previous decision. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal as frivolous. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Stephen H. Anderson 

 Circuit Judge