Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A02-1707-CR-1502 | January 31, 2018 Page 1 of 34

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jane H. Ruemmele

Hayes Ruemmele, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

James B. Martin

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Donald G. Karr, Jr.,

Appellant-Defendant/Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff/Respondent.

January 31, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

29A02-1707-CR-1502

Appeal from the

Hamilton Superior Court

The Honorable

William J. Hughes, Judge

The Honorable

Wayne A. Sturtevant, Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

29D03-1505-F6-4047

29D05-1703-PC-1576

Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Following a jury trial, Donald G. Karr, Jr. (“Karr”) was convicted of Level 6 

felony domestic battery committed in the presence of a child less than sixteen 

years of age1 and two counts of Level 3 felony rape.

2

 The trial court sentenced

Karr to two and one-half years for the battery conviction. For the two rape 

convictions, the trial court imposed concurrent fifteen-year sentences, with five 

years suspended on each, and ordered the rape sentences to be served 

consecutive to the battery sentence, for an aggregate executed sentence of 

twelve and one-half years. Karr filed a motion for a new trial, alleging 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and the trial court denied his motion. 

Karr appealed, but then sought a remand to the trial court in order to pursue 

post-conviction relief. We granted his request and dismissed his appeal without 

prejudice pursuant to Davis v. State, 267 Ind. 152, 368 N.E.2d 1149 (1977) and 

Hatton v. State, 626 N.E.2d 442 (Ind. 1993), allowing Karr to later file a new 

notice of appeal and raise both the issues that he would have raised in the 

original appeal along with new issues created by the post-conviction court’s 

ruling on the petition for post-conviction relief.

3

 Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 33.

 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3.

2

See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1).

3 This procedure is referred to by Indiana courts as a Davis/Hatton procedure and involves a termination or 

suspension of a direct appeal already initiated, upon appellate counsel’s motion for remand or stay, to allow a 

post-conviction relief petition to be pursued in the trial court. Talley v. State, 51 N.E.3d 300, 302 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2016), trans. denied; see also Ind. Appellate Rule 37(A) (“At any time after the Court on Appeal obtains 

jurisdiction, any party may file a motion requesting that the appeal be dismissed without prejudice or 

temporarily stayed and the case remanded to the trial court . . . for further proceedings. The motion must be 

verified and demonstrate that remand will promote judicial economy or is otherwise necessary for the 
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[2] Karr filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel, and the trial court denied Karr’s petition, finding that 

it was barred by res judicata. Karr initiated this consolidated appeal and presents

the following reordered and restated issues:

I. Whether sufficient evidence supports Karr’s domestic battery 

conviction and two rape convictions;

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing 

Karr; 

III. Whether the trial court erred when it found that Karr 

received effective assistance from trial counsel and, therefore,

denied Karr’s request for a new trial; and

IV. Whether the post-conviction court erred when, by summary 

denial, it denied Karr’s petition for post-conviction relief on the 

basis that his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were 

barred by res judicata.

[3] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] In May 2015, Karr and his then-girlfriend, A.P., along with her three children 

(“Children”), ages six, five, and three years old, were living in a residence that 

 

administration of justice.”). The procedure is useful where a defendant needs to develop an evidentiary 

record to support a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Talley, 51 N.E.3d at 303.
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Karr and A.P. leased. Karr and A.P. shared a bedroom that was located off the 

same hallway as a bedroom that the three Children shared. On the evening of 

May 5, 2015, A.P. was home with the Children, and she put them to bed 

around 8:00 p.m. As A.P. left the Children’s room and closed the door behind 

her, Karr came home from work. He was “agitated” and asked her what she 

was doing. Tr. Vol. II at 35. He walked from the front door to the back door 

and looked outside, and he accused her of having someone in the house before 

he got home. She told him that was not the case, and he became angry and 

took her phone from her as she sat on the living room couch, which according 

to A.P. was positioned right next to the opening to the hallway, leading to the

Children’s bedroom. Karr believed that A.P. was lying, and his voice got 

louder as he accused her. He asked her “to deny it again[,]” and when she did, 

he hit her across the cheek with an open hand. Id. at 38. He pulled her off the 

couch by her hair, and she fell to the floor. Karr then told A.P. to get up, 

saying that she was going to “suck his dick” every day and every night. Id. at 

39. 

[5] At some point, A.P.’s oldest child (“Child”) came out of her bedroom, and as 

she opened the door, Karr went into the hallway and confronted her. Child 

said she needed to go to the bathroom, and Karr told her “no” and to go back 

to bed. A.P. heard Child begin to cry as she went back into the bedroom, and 

Karr closed the door. He returned to A.P., who had gotten herself up from the 

floor and was on the couch. He unbuckled his pants, and A.P. put her feet up 

“and tried to kick him away” from her. Id. at 40. At that point, A.P. began to 
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have abdominal pains from a preexisting ovarian cyst condition, so A.P. told 

Karr that she needed to call her doctor. 

[6] He initially refused, but he eventually agreed to let her call her doctor or go to 

the emergency room. After A.P. vomited in the bathroom, Karr woke the 

Children and told them they were all leaving and taking A.P. to the hospital. 

At A.P.’s request, they dropped the Children off at A.P.’s parents’ home on the 

way. When A.P. was asked at trial if, when they dropped off the Children at 

her parents’ house, she had told her parents that Karr had beaten her and pulled 

her hair, A.P. explained that she did not, because at that time her “main focus 

was getting the kids away from [Karr] and . . . getting them someplace safe.” 

Id. at 42. She feared that saying anything would put herself and the Children in 

“more danger.” Id. Once at the hospital, she and Karr walked to the 

registration area, and A.P. suggested to him that he go and park the car, and 

when she “felt he was out of earshot,” she told the nurse, “I need you to get a 

police officer because he’s hitting me.” Id. at 43-44. Karr returned, and they sat 

together in an examination room, but then the nurse told Karr that A.P. needed 

an ultrasound and he could not go, so she left and went to an ultrasound room, 

where Officer Craig Denison (“Officer Denison”) of the Noblesville Police 

Department (“NPD”) was waiting for her. 

[7] A.P. told Officer Denison what had happened, and he took some pictures. She 

also removed from her pocket and showed Officer Denison hairs that had come

loose and fallen out of her head when she was on the couch and Karr was 

telling the Child to go back to bed. Officer Denison advised A.P. that he did 
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not believe he could make an arrest of Karr at that time because there was no 

immediate bleeding or bruising, but he offered to speak to Karr and to drive 

A.P. home or wherever she needed to go. Believing that Karr had calmed, and 

deciding “it would be better to just go home and . . . deal with everything the 

next morning[,]” A.P. went back home with Karr. Id. at 48-49. A.P. called her 

parents to let them know “what was going on” with her trip to the emergency 

room,4 and because it was so late, after midnight, the Children stayed with 

A.P.’s parents. Id. at 49.

[8] When A.P. and Karr arrived home, she went into the bathroom to get ready for 

bed and put on pajamas, and he went to the kitchen. He became angry that she 

had purchased “the wrong orange juice” and told her that she “needed to be 

doing what he told [her] to do.” Id. at 51. He hit her across her face, and she 

fell on the hallway floor. Karr took off his pants and underwear and told her 

she was going to “suck his dick.” Id. at 52. He forced himself into her mouth, 

but at some point stopped and “lectured” her about the rules he was setting for 

her. Id. at 53. Eventually, Karr said he wanted to go to bed, so A.P. got into 

bed. When he came into bed, he said he needed to masturbate. According to 

A.P., he searched his phone for a pornographic video and told her to put her 

hand on his penis. She complied because “every time I told him no[,] I was 

either hit or forced to do something anyway[.]” Id. at 54. He later asked her to 

 

4 We note that, after talking to Officer Denison, but before leaving the hospital, A.P. received an ultrasound 

associated with the cysts. 
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perform oral sex, which she did “[o]ut of fear of what would happen if I said 

no.” Id. During this time, she saw a light behind her; she turned her head and 

saw it was his cell phone “so I assumed he was taking a video.” Id. at 55. Karr 

ejaculated on A.P., and both of them fell asleep.

[9] Karr went to work the next day, and, after she showered, A.P. went to a 

doctor’s appointment. At her appointment, the doctor had already received 

record of A.P.’s emergency room visit. The doctor asked A.P. to tell her “what 

had happened,” referring to the situation with Karr. Officer Michael Boudreau 

(“Officer Boudreau”) of NPD came and met A.P. at the doctor’s office, and at 

A.P.’s request, an advocate from Prevail, a victim’s assistance agency, also met 

with A.P. to help her prepare a request for a protective order. A.P did not go 

home after the appointment because she was admitted to the hospital for pain 

associated with the ovarian cysts. A.P. called her parents and asked her mother 

to take the Children “someplace away from the house” and asked her father to 

pick up her car from the hospital. Id. at 58. Meanwhile, Karr and A.P. 

exchanged some casual text messages throughout the day. However, Karr 

became angry when A.P. stopped responding to him. Officer Boudreau 

prepared a probable cause affidavit, and Karr was arrested during a traffic stop. 

[10] Before being released from the hospital, A.P. met with a forensic nurse, who 

examined her, and took pictures of areas where Karr had hit A.P. and pulled 

her hair. After being discharged, A.P. met with Detective Michael Haskett 

(“Detective Haskett”) of NPD. Within the next week or two, A.P. and her 

Children were interviewed by Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). 
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[11] On May 28, 2015, the State filed an amended information charging Karr with 

Counts 1 through 5, as follows: Count 1, Level 6 felony domestic battery; 

Count 2, Level 3 felony rape; Count 3, Level 3 felony rape; Count 4, Level 6 

felony strangulation; and Count 5, Level 6 felony intimidation. A jury trial was 

conducted on the charges in August 2016. 

[12] A.P. was the first witness. She described the layout of the home where she, 

Karr, and the Children resided. She said that the bedroom she shared with 

Karr and the Children’s bedroom were both located off “a very small hallway,”

were “maybe six feet apart” in the hall, and, generally, she would be able to 

hear the Children talking in their room after she put them to bed in the 

evenings. Tr. Vol. II at 34. As to the night in question, she described that Karr 

believed she had secretly had someone else in the house right before he got 

home and sent the person out the front door as he came in the back. He 

became very angry at her, and, after he first hit her, he “continued to hit [her] 

several times again, both with an open hand and with a closed fist” on both 

sides of her face and on her head. Id. at 39. She said that when he pulled her 

off the couch by her hair, “It hurt a lot. I could feel and hear hair ripping out of 

my head.” Id. A.P. said that she was on the floor, kneeling in front of the 

couch, when her oldest Child came out of her room, and Karr went and told 

Child to go back to bed. A.P. described that Child’s voice sounded “timid and 

a little scared.” Id. at 40. A.P. explained that she went home from the hospital 

later that night with Karr because “I was looking for some kind of protection 

and if he wasn’t going to be arrested at that point then I felt that my only other 
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course of action would be to file for a protective order and I wasn’t going to be 

able to do that until the next morning[.]” Id. at 49. 

[13] A.P. stated that the trip home from the hospital was uneventful, but that, when 

they got home, Karr became angry that she got the wrong juice and demanded 

that she perform oral sex on him. When she tried to avoid it, he threatened to 

carve “C-U-N-T” into her forehead. Id. at 52. She described that she was 

crying and choking and gagging when he forced his penis in her mouth. Id. 

[14] On cross examination, defense counsel asked A.P. why she went home with 

Karr that night from the hospital after he had beaten her and why she did not 

leave once he fell asleep. She explained that she went home with him so that he 

would not know she had told her story at the hospital or to a police officer and

that she planned to seek a protective order the next day. She said she did not 

leave after he fell asleep because she was afraid of waking him or of him 

following her. She did not go to a neighbor’s house because she did not know 

her neighbors. She was asked, and denied, that at any time she removed her 

hair from either the shower drain or her hair brush. 

[15] Among other witnesses, Officers Denison and Boudreau also testified for the 

State. Officer Denison testified to meeting with A.P. at the hospital when she 

was in the E.R. He did not observe any injuries to her at that time, but noted 

that “sometimes bruises, scratches, abrasions, swelling doesn’t show up until a 

later date.” Id. at 154. Officer Denison characterized her demeanor as serious, 

but she was “not frantic or crying.” Id. at 147. According to Officer Denison, 
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A.P. did not want him to speak with Karr or her Children, telling him that she 

“didn’t believe that her kids had witnessed any of the actual assault that 

occurred,” and “it was just the verbal part that they had witnessed or heard.” 

Id. at 150. He stated that A.P. seemed fearful or had concerns about possessing 

the Prevail documents that he had given her, which he found was not unusual 

in cases of domestic abuse. A.P. told Officer Denison she planned to obtain a 

protective order the next day. 

[16] Officer Boudreau testified that he was dispatched to the hospital on May 6, 

2015, to take a report of a sexual assault. A Prevail representative was also 

present during his interview with A.P. He did not observe any injuries to A.P. 

and did not collect evidence from her. He was aware of a sexual assault 

examination being conducted later in the day, and the following day, Officer 

Boudreau wrote a probable cause affidavit for Karr’s arrest. 

[17] Forensic nurse examiner Nakia Bowens (“Bowens”) testified that she examined 

A.P. on May 7, 2015. She described A.P. as calm at times, but “tearful” at 

other times. Id. at 182. She observed “redness and tenderness” in A.P.’s scalp 

area and tenderness on her jawbone and redness to her chin, and an injury to 

the inside of her lip. Id. at 185-86, 190-91, 203. She also had petechiae, or 

“small red dots that indicate blood has burst,” on the roof of her mouth. Id. at 

191. One of the causes of petechiae is blunt force trauma. Id. at 191-92.

Bowens testified that a penis striking the roof of the mouth could cause 

petechiae. Pictures taken of A.P. by Bowens were admitted into evidence. 
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[18] Detective Haskett met with A.P. on May 8 at the police station to get a formal 

statement from her. He described her demeanor as “collected and matter-offact,” but tearful at times. Id. at 215. He did not observe any injuries to her at 

that time. Id. at 221. Sergeant Matt McGovern (“Officer McGovern”) of NPD

testified that, pursuant to a search warrant, he conducted a forensic analysis of

Karr’s cell phone. Officer McGovern testified that “sometimes” law 

enforcement is able to retrieve deleted content, but it depends on the make and 

model of the cell phone. Id. at 226. 

[19] At the conclusion of the presentation of the State’s evidence, Karr moved for

and was granted a directed verdict on Count 5, Level 6 felony intimidation. Id.

at 242. Thereafter, the defense presented the testimony of DCS employee

Marshall Despain (“Despain”). In May 2015, Despain was an assessment 

worker, who was assigned to investigate allegations of domestic violence 

between A.P. and Karr and determine “how it affected the [C]hildren.” Tr. Vol. 

III at 3. Despain testified to interviewing A.P. in May 2015, then consulting 

with law enforcement, reviewing reports, and interviewing the Children. He 

also tried to contact Karr for an interview. DCS ultimately determined that the 

report “was unsubstantiated against both [A.P.] and [] Karr[,]]” meaning that 

there was no evidence that the Children were affected or had “any knowledge 

of anything every happening between them[.]” Id. at 2-3. He explained that his 

purpose was not to determine if something happened between the parents; he 

was to assess if the Children were affected and to make sure they were safe. 
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[20] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on Count 1, 

Level 6 felony domestic battery, Count 2, Level 3 felony rape, and Count 3, 

Level 3 felony rape; it returned a verdict of not guilty on Count 4, strangulation. 

[21] The parties appeared on September 2, 2016, for a sentencing hearing, but by 

that point, Karr’s trial counsel, Joshua Taylor (“Taylor”), had filed a motion to 

withdraw. Karr appeared in person at the September 2 hearing, along with 

Taylor and replacement defense attorney Jane Ruemmele (“Ruemmele”), who 

sought leave to file an appearance for Karr and a continuance of the sentencing 

hearing. Id. at 78. The trial court granted both Taylor’s request to withdraw 

and Karr’s request to continue the sentencing hearing. 

[22] The day before the scheduled September 2 sentencing hearing, Karr also had 

filed a motion for a new trial based upon ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

Ruemmele noted to the court at the September 2 hearing that Karr’s ineffective 

assistance claims were still preliminary and would later be supplemented

because Karr did not yet have a copy of the trial transcript or A.P.’s medical 

records, including any medications A.P. was taking or had received at the E.R.,

which information Ruemmele argued would have been relevant to A.P.’s 

memory of the alleged incidents, and thus, the ineffective assistance claims 

would be supplemented upon review of those materials. On September 2, Karr 

proceeded to present Taylor’s testimony relative to Karr’s ineffective assistance 

of counsel claims as alleged in his motion for a new trial. Among other things, 

Taylor testified as to what medical records he requested or did not request, 

what witnesses he called or did not call, and why he did not explore alleged 
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drug use by A.P., explaining that his actions were based upon strategic 

decisions and assessments. He also discussed having made a motion in limine, 

making certain objections, and his decision not to request a mistrial at one point 

because he believed “things were going about as well as they could have at that 

point,” and Taylor believed “there was a decent chance the jury would find Mr. 

Karr not guilty[.]” Id. at 97. Taylor testified that, both before and during trial, 

Karr and Taylor had discussed whether to have Karr testify and the risks 

associated with him doing so, noting his concern that having Karr testify would 

provide a chance for “fairly harmful” evidence to come into evidence. Id. at 99. 

In closing the hearing, the trial court directed that a trial transcript be prepared 

for Karr’s use and review in preparing for the hearing on a motion for a new 

trial, and took the motion for a new trial under advisement. 

[23] On September 19, 2016, the trial court conducted an additional evidentiary 

hearing on Karr’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, as alleged in his 

motion for a new trial, presenting testimony of: A.P.; a male neighbor; Officer 

McGovern; and Taylor. A.P. was questioned about what prescriptions she had 

filled on or before May 5, the night in question, and if she received intravenous 

medications while at the E.R. During her testimony, A.P. stated that she was 

not impaired before or during the incident and any medications taken did not 

affect her ability to recall the events. Id. at 135. When on cross-examination 

Karr’s counsel asked A.P. why she showered before being examined by the 

forensic nurse, A.P. explained, “I was trying to carry on with the day as if it

was normal. Also had no expectation of being examined by anyone for 
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anything. At that time my understanding was that nothing was going to be 

done and my only plan for the day was to file for a protective order.” Id. at 

132. Officer McGovern, who had conducted a forensic analysis of Karr’s cell 

phone and recovered videos, searches, texts and other information from it, 

testified that he did not find any evidence of searches or viewing of 

pornographic videos, as A.P. had testified to at trial, and he found no videos of 

A.P. performing sex acts, contrary to A.P.’s testimony that she thought Karr 

was videotaping her when she saw his cell phone light behind her. Upon crossexamination by the State, Officer McGovern testified that he is not always able 

to recover deleted content from a phone. Id. at 141. 

[24] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Karr’s motion for a new 

trial, and it also issued a written order, stating, “The Court being duly advised 

finds that the Defendant, has failed to establish that trial counsel Joshua Taylor 

was ineffective at trial by either error or omission or commission and has 

further failed to establish that any conduct by Mr. Taylor prejudiced the case of 

the Defendant.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III at 7. 

[25] In November 2016, the trial court held a sentencing hearing, sentenced Karr to 

two and one-half years on the battery conviction and to fifteen years with five 

years suspended for each rape conviction, and ordered the sentences for the 

rape convictions to run concurrent with one another and consecutive to the 

term imposed on the battery conviction. Karr timely filed a notice of appeal.
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[26] On January 6, 2017, Karr filed a Davis/Hatton petition with this court, seeking 

to suspend his initial appeal and pursue post-conviction remedies. We granted

his request, and, on March 3, 2017, Karr filed a petition for post-conviction 

relief, alleging that Taylor, his trial counsel, was ineffective by: (1) failing to use 

phone records that showed that Karr’s phone did not contain photos or videos 

of A.P. performing oral sex, although A.P. testified that Karr may have been 

photographing or videotaping her; (2) failing to use phone records that showed 

that Karr’s phone did not contain evidence that he accessed pornographic sites, 

although A.P. had testified that he searched for pornography when she told him 

she did not want to engage in oral sex; (3) failing to obtain medical records of 

A.P. to discover whether she had been administered anesthesia at the E.R. in 

the hours prior to the alleged acts that formed the basis of the rape charges; (4) 

failing to obtain A.P.’s prescription records to determine if she had filled a 

prescription for narcotics the same day as the alleged battery; (5) failing to offer 

during trial text messages showing conversations between Karr and A.P. that 

indicated A.P had filled a prescription for Narco on May 5, 2015; (6) failing to

offer at trial a text message sent by A.P. to someone, in which she stated that 

she had received an IV and felt better, which Karr asserted “establish[es] that 

she was under the influence of narcotics.” Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 3-4. 

[27] After filing his motion for post-conviction relief, Karr filed a motion for change 

of judge, which was granted on March 20, 2017. In May 2017, the State filed a 

Motion for Summary Denial of Karr’s petition for post-conviction relief, 

asserting that the claims raised in Karr’s petition had already been litigated and 
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adjudicated by the trial court pursuant to Karr’s motion for new trial. Id. at 18-

22. Following briefing, the post-conviction court granted the State’s request 

and issued an order on June 13, 2017. The order stated that evidence was heard 

during two hearings on Karr’s motion for a new trial that alleged ineffective 

assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court’s order further stated, in 

part:

13. Although the Petitioner has abandoned two grounds of 

alleged ineffectiveness of counsel originally raised in the trial 

court, the allegations now raised in the Petitioner’s Petition for 

Post-Conviction Relief are otherwise the same. All of the

grounds alleged in the pending Petition were directly argued, 

were available to be argued from the evidence and/or were 

available to be raised at the time of the hearing on Petitioner’s 

Motion for a New Trial.

14. In his Motion for a New Trial, the Petitioner sought to have 

his convictions for Domestic Battery and Rape vacated based 

upon the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. This is the 

exact same relief requested in the Petitioner’s Petition for PostConviction Relief, and that relief is sought based upon the exact 

same grounds that were raised or could have been raised and 

determined under Petitioner’s Motion for a New Trial.

15. Finally, and most obviously, the parties to the controversy in 

the current matter are the same as those who were the parties to 

the original criminal case.

16. A court may grant a motion by either party for summary 

disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief when it appears 

that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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17. In this case, there is no genuine issue of material fact because 

the evidentiary issues now raised by the Petitioner have already 

been heard and decided against Petitioner in the original trial 

court.

Id. at 129-132. Karr filed a motion to reconsider, which the post-conviction

court denied. Karr now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[28] Karr contends that the State presented insufficient evidence for the jury to 

conclude that he was guilty of domestic battery and two counts of rape.

5

 Our 

standard of review is deferential to the factfinder, and we consider only the 

evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither 

reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility. Taylor v. State, 86 

N.E.3d 157, 163 (Ind. 2017). We will reverse only if no reasonable factfinder 

could find the defendant guilty. Id. at 164. The evidence is not required to 

overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and is sufficient if an 

inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict. Drane v. 

State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007).

 

5 We note that in both his issue statement and his argument section, Karr claims that his “conviction” 

(singular) is not supported by sufficient evidence, which suggests to us that he is appealing only one 

conviction. Appellant’s Br. at 2, 41. However, Karr later urges in his brief that, for the reasons argued, we 

vacate his “convictions” (plural). Id. at 44. We thus infer that he is challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence as to all three of his convictions.
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[29] To prove Karr committed Level 3 felony rape, the State was required to present 

sufficient evidence that he caused A.P. to “perform or submit to other sexual 

conduct” when she was “compelled by force or imminent threat of force[.]” 

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1). Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-221.5 defines 

“other sexual conduct” as “an act involving ... a sex organ of one person and 

the mouth or anus of another person.” Karr argues, “There was no forensic 

evidence establishing that a sex act occurred[,]” noting that officers did not 

observe physical injuries, Officer McGovern did not find pornographic videos 

on Karr’s phone, nor any videos or pictures of A.P. performing oral sex. 

Appellant’s Br. at 20. 

[30] We reject Karr’s argument. First, it ignores that nurse Bowens found evidence 

of physical injuries to A.P., including an injury to the inside of her lip and 

petechiae on the roof of A.P.’s mouth, and Bowens testified that a penis striking 

the roof of the mouth could cause petechiae. Second, there does not need to be 

“forensic evidence establishing that a sex act occurred” to support the 

convictions. “A rape conviction may rest solely on the uncorroborated 

testimony of the victim.” Carter v. State, 44 N.E.3d 47, 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) 

(citing Potter v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1127, 1136 (Ind. 1997)). 

[31] Karr also contends that, as to the Level 6 felony domestic battery conviction, 

there was no evidence that any battery occurred within the presence of a child.6 

 

6

Pursuant to the version of Indiana Code section 35-42-2-1.3, under which Karr was charged and convicted, 

the offense of domestic battery is a Class A misdemeanor, but becomes a Level 6 felony, “if the person who 
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Indiana courts have recognized, “[T]he critical question in determining whether 

a child is ‘present’ for purposes of the statute is whether a reasonable person 

would conclude that the child might see or hear the offense; not whether the 

child is in the same room as where the offense is taking place.” Manuel v. State, 

971 N.E.2d 1262, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012); see also True v. State, 954 N.E.2d 

1105, 1111 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“presence” for purposes of Indiana Code

section 35-42-2-1.3(b)(2) is “defined as knowingly being within either the 

possible sight or hearing of a child”). 

[32] In support of his position, Karr points to the fact that A.P. had already put the 

Children to bed in their own bedroom by the time he came home on the night 

in question. Karr also notes that A.P. told Officer Denison that she did not 

think that the Children had witnessed the battery. Tr. Vol. II at 150. However, 

the inquiry is not whether any of the Children witnessed the battery; it is whether 

it was committed in their presence, including within their possible hearing. 

Here, Officer Denison’s testimony was that A.P. told him that she “didn’t 

believe that her kids had witnessed any of the actual assault that occurred,” and 

“it was just the verbal part that they had witnessed or heard.” Id. Further, the 

State presented evidence that (1) the couch was positioned next to the “very 

small hallway” off of which the Children’s bedroom was located, and (2) A.P. 

generally could hear the Children talking after she put them to bed in the 

 

committed the offense . . . committed [it] in the physical presence of a child less than sixteen years of age, 

knowing that the child was present and might be able to see or hear the offense.”
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evenings, allowing the inference that they, too, could hear what was happening 

outside of their room. Id. at 34. Evidence was also presented that, during the 

time that Karr was yelling at A.P. and telling her to “suck his dick,” the oldest 

Child opened her bedroom door. Karr confronted Child at her door and told 

her to go back to bed, at which point A.P. heard Child begin to cry and go back 

into her own bedroom. Id. at 39. Based on the record before us, we find that 

the State presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably 

infer that the battery was committed within the presence of a child.

[33] Karr also argues that A.P.’s testimony as to the battery and the rape allegations

is not to be believed because she was questioned about, but could not recall,

certain details before, during, and after, the incidents, including whether she 

was taking pain medication(s), if she had filled a certain prescription, or for 

what period of time the incidents lasted. Appellant’s Br. at 41-42. Karr asserts, 

“Her lack of memory could have been that she consumed drugs that day, was 

administered drugs that day, or both, or was simply fabricating the events.” Id. 

at 43. He argues that her testimony showed that “she had significant 

deficiencies in her ability to recall the details of her allegations,” and her 

testimony was incredibly dubious and should not be believed. Id.

[34] The incredible dubiosity rule allows an appellate court to impinge upon the factfinder’s assessment of witness credibility when the testimony at trial was so 

“unbelievable, incredible, or improbable that no reasonable person could ever 

reach a guilty verdict based upon that evidence alone.” Moore v. State, 27 

N.E.3d 749, 751 (Ind. 2015). Incredible dubiosity is a difficult standard to 
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meet, requiring ambiguous, inconsistent testimony that “runs counter to human 

experience.” Carter, 44 N.E.3d at 52. Our Supreme Court has reiterated the 

limited scope of the rule and set out three requirements for its application: (1) a 

sole testifying witness; (2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, 

or the result of coercion; and (3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence. 

Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 756.

[35] Here, A.P. related her version of events to at least the following: Officer 

Denison at the E.R., her doctor the next day, Officer Boudreau, a victim’s 

advocate from Prevail, Detective Haskett, and nurse Bowens. Her testimony 

was not inherently contradictory or equivocal, and there is no evidence or 

assertion that it was the result of coercion. Thus, the incredible dubiosity rule is 

inapplicable. Further, the rule requires a complete absence of circumstantial 

evidence. In this case, Bowens testified to the injuries that she observed to 

A.P.’s scalp, lip, and mouth, which were consistent with A.P.’s description of 

what happened with Karr. Karr’s claim that A.P.’s testimony was not credible 

is a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do on appeal. 

Carter, 44 N.E.3d at 54. The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain 

Karr’s three convictions.

II. Sentencing

[36] Karr challenges his sentence of an executed twelve and one-half years, claiming 

it is excessive, and he asks us to remand for a new sentencing hearing or, 

alternatively, reduce it. Initially, we note that Karr makes the assertion that his 

sentence “is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and [his]
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character[,]” Appellant’s Br. at 46, but he does not specifically make any 

argument or analysis as to either the nature of the offense or the character of the 

offender. Thus, he has waived any inappropriateness argument under Indiana

Appellate Rule 7(B). Perry v. State, 921 N.E.2d 525, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)

(failure to make cogent argument regarding the nature of defendant’s offense 

and defendant’s character results in waiver of appropriateness claim).

[37] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are 

reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. Kubina v. State, 997 N.E.2d 

1134, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). A trial court abuses its discretion if its 

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 

before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn 

therefrom. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490, clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 

218 (Ind. 2007). A trial court may be found to have abused its discretion by 

failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; entering a sentencing statement 

that explains its reasons for imposing a sentence where such reasons are not 

supported by the record or are improper as a matter of law; or entering a 

sentencing statement that omits reasons which are clearly supported by the 

record and advanced for consideration. Id. at 490-91. “[R]egardless of the 

presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, a trial court 

may impose any sentence authorized by statute and permissible under the 

Indiana Constitution.” Kubina, 997 N.E.2d at 1137 (citing Indiana Code 

section 35-38-1-7.1, providing non-exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances court may consider).
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[38] The range of penalties for a Level 6 felony is a fixed term of between six months 

and two and one-half years, with the advisory sentence being one year. Ind. 

Code § 35-50-2-7. The range of penalties for a Level 3 felony is a fixed term of 

between three and sixteen years, with the advisory sentence being nine years. 

Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5. Here, Karr received two and one-half years on the 

domestic battery conviction and fifteen years, with five years suspended, on 

each of the rape convictions. In sentencing Karr, the trial court found as 

aggravating factors that Karr had a history of criminal behavior and that his 

record reflected that he engaged in what the trial court termed a “pattern” of 

similar behavior, committing a battery after a breakup or as a relationship was 

ending. Tr. Vol. III at 232-33. The trial court recognized as mitigating that his 

incarceration would result in unusual circumstances and hardship for his 

parents, who relied on him for financial support. 

[39] On appeal, Karr argues that the trial court should also have recognized as a 

mitigating circumstance that he suffered multiple concussions in his life. The 

record reflects that, at the sentencing hearing, Karr’s parents testified that Karr 

suffered a concussion on four occasions, and they described that he had 

resulting dizziness, memory issues, and increased agitation or frustration. No 

medical evidence was presented, nor any suggested connection as to how those 

concussions affected his actions on the day in question. It is well recognized 

that a trial court is not obligated to find a circumstance mitigating because it is 

advanced as such by the defendant. Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 893 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Karr also takes issue with the fact that the trial 
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court stated, “[Y]ou are guilty of having raped . . . [A.P.] . . . and having 

battered her rather severely in the presence, physical presence of her daughter. 

These are serious crimes.” Tr. Vol. II at 233. He urges that there was no 

evidence of “severely” beating A.P., and the trial court erred when it used that 

circumstance as an aggravator. Upon review of the record, we find that, 

contrary to Karr’s claim, the trial court did not use this as an aggravator, and, 

rather, as the State suggests, it was a comment that was part of the court’s 

discussion of the jury’s verdict. The trial court did not rely on the severity of 

the battery as an aggravating circumstance. Karr has failed to establish that the 

trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

[40] Karr claims that the trial court erred when it determined that he did not receive 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel and, so finding, denied his motion for a 

new trial, which sought relief on that basis. To succeed on a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show not only that his trial counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, but also that 

the deficient performance resulted in prejudice. Manzano v. State, 12 N.E.3d 

321, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603 

(Ind. 2001)) (quotations omitted), trans. denied, cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 2376 

(2015). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that counsel’s errors 

were so serious as to deprive him of a fair trial because of a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have 
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been different. Id. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

[41] There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and 

made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 

judgment. Id. Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy 

and tactics, and these decisions are entitled to deferential review. Id. Isolated 

mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not 

necessarily render representation ineffective. Id. at 325-26. We do not second 

guess counsel’s strategic decisions requiring reasonable professional judgment 

even if the strategy or tactic, in hindsight, did not best serve the defendant’s 

interests. Elisea v. State, 777 N.E.2d 46, 50 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). If it is easier to 

dispose of an ineffectiveness claim by analyzing the prejudice prong alone, that 

course should be followed. Manzano, 12 N.E.3d at 326.

[42] Karr asserts that, at trial, “defense counsel’s theory was that the allegations 

were fabricated[,]” and “Thus, it was incumbent on trial counsel to present all 

readily available sources of evidence to prove that these event[s] did not occur.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 31. Karr maintains that Taylor should have but failed to 

present evidence of drug consumption by A.P. at or near the time of the 

incidents, through investigation and discovery of medical information such as 

A.P.’s prescriptions that she was taking or had been prescribed or the E.R. 

records on the night in question. He suggests that if the jury knew of A.P.’s 

prescribed pain and anxiety medication, trial counsel could have effectively 
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impeached her regarding her ability to remember and recount the events in 

question. 

[43] At the hearing on Karr’s motion for a new trial, Taylor was asked about why he 

“did not explore [A.P.’s] drug use prior to or during the first offense[,]” and he 

replied that Karr would be the only person who would have been able to testify 

to that, and Karr did not testify. Tr. Vol. II at 97. Karr argues that Taylor could 

have requested her prescription medication or “asked A.P. when she testified.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 33. A pharmacy bag was admitted during the hearing on 

Karr’s motion for a new trial indicating that A.P. filled a prescription for Narco 

on May 5, 2015. Also admitted at the hearing were medical records from 

A.P.’s doctor’s visit on May 7, 2015, which reflected that A.P. reported taking 

hydrocodone. Tr. Vol. III at 122; Ex. Vol. IV at 122. Karr urges that “[t]he jury 

never heard this evidence because trial counsel did not present it.” Appellant’s 

Br. at 34. 

[44] Effective representation requires adequate pretrial investigation and 

preparation, but we resist judging an attorney’s performance with the benefit of 

hindsight. McKnight v. State, 1 N.E.3d 193, 200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 

Accordingly, when deciding a claim of ineffective assistance for failure to 

investigate, we give a great deal of deference to counsel’s judgments. Id. at 201. 

Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to 

plausible options are virtually unchallengeable, and strategic choices made after 

less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that 

reasonable professional judgments support the limitation on investigation. Id.
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In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to 

make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. 

Id.

[45] Here, A.P. testified at the hearing that she may have filled a prescription earlier 

in the day, but did not recall for certain if or where she did so, and she testified 

that she was not impaired due to drug consumption and her memory was not 

affected by any medication. A.P.’s testimony was clear and detailed, and there 

was no evidence suggesting she did not remember the events in question. She 

was consistent with what she told Officer Denison at the E.R. that night, and 

there was no evidence that she exhibited signs of impairment. Karr has failed 

to show that he was prejudiced by Taylor’s decision not to obtain and present 

medical records evidence concerning any drugs A.P. may have consumed prior 

to the domestic battery. 

[46] Karr also asserts that trial counsel should have obtained medical records from 

the E.R. as to what medications she received at the hospital, as that would have 

affected her memory of what happened thereafter, including the forced oral sex 

supporting the rape charges. He argues, “Whether she was under the influence 

of anesthesia and dreaming or imagining the events was important to explore”

and “had trial counsel properly impeached her with her drug consumption of 

opiates and anesthesia administered at the ER . . . the outcome would have 

been different.” Appellant’s Br at 33, 43. Initially, we note that there is no 

evidence in this record that A.P. was given “anesthesia” at any point. Upon 

Karr’s questioning at the hearing on his motion for a new trial, A.P. 
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acknowledged that she sent a text while at, or before leaving, the hospital to 

someone, stating “I got an IV for meds so I’m feeling a lot better.” Tr. Vol. III

at 124. However, she also stated, “I'm not sure whether I actually received the 

IV medications or if I just told him that.” Id. Furthermore, A.P. testified that 

at no time was she impaired, and she had no issues with remembering what 

Karr did to her. As the State observes, “[T]he totality of the evidence . . .

supports only that A.P. was clear of thought and speech at all relevant times[,]”

including in her interviews with nurse Bowens, who characterized A.P. as calm 

but tearful at times, with Officer Denison, who described her as calm and 

composed but concerned, and Detective Hackett, who said she was “matter of 

fact” but sometimes would “tear up” while describing what happened. 

Appellee’s Br. at 30; Tr. Vol. II at 146-47, 160, 182, 214-15. Furthermore, Taylor 

testified at the hearing that it was his strategic decision not to obtain the 

records. Tr. Vol. III at 124. Karr has failed to show that Taylor’s tactical 

decision to not try to obtain A.P.’s prescription and medical records, which 

may or may not have been discoverable or admissible,7 was unreasonable or 

that Karr was prejudiced by trial counsel’s choice. 

[47] On appeal, Karr also contends that Taylor was ineffective for failing to present 

to the jury that Officer McGovern conducted a forensic analysis of Karr’s 

 

7

“To make a sufficient showing that [rape victim’s] prescription drug records were discoverable, [the 

defendant] must demonstrate that his request was particular and material.” Williams v. State, 819 N.E.2d 381, 

386 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. “[W]hile generally evidence of drug use may be excluded at trial, 

evidence of drug use affecting a witness’s ability to recall underlying events is admissible.” Id. 
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phone, but did not find any evidence that Karr (1) had accessed pornographic 

videos, as A.P. had stated in her testimony, and (2) had photographed or 

videotaped A.P., as she suspected when she saw the light of his phone behind 

her. He argues, “Trial counsel never presented this affirmative evidence to the 

jury[,]” which “was in the possession of the State and readily available,” and it 

“showed that A.P.’s story could not be corroborated.” Appellant’s Br. at 38. 

[48] As an initial matter, we disagree that A.P.’s story “could not be corroborated”;

as discussed above, the injuries and redness observed by nurse Bowens were

consistent with the reports that A.P. made to police. Regardless, even if the 

trial counsel had presented the evidence, and the jury was persuaded that A.P. 

was incorrect when she said that Karr was viewing pornography and recording 

her acts with his cell phone, such evidence would not necessarily undermine her 

account of the incidents, i.e., Karr has not established that he was prejudiced by 

the failure to present the cell phone evidence. 

[49] We further note that Karr was charged with five counts. Taylor successfully 

argued for and received a directed verdict on one count and successfully 

received an acquittal on one of the remaining counts. Several pieces of 

evidence were excluded from evidence based upon Taylor’s objections, and he 

thoroughly cross-examined witnesses, including A.P. We conclude that Karr 

has not established either deficient performance or prejudice stemming from 

trial counsel’s representation. The trial court correctly determined that Taylor

had not provided ineffective assistance and, therefore, appropriately denied 

Karr’s motion for a new trial.
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IV. Denial of Post-Conviction Relief

[50] After the trial court denied his motion for a new trial, Karr filed a notice of 

appeal with this court, which pursuant to his request, we dismissed without 

prejudice, allowing him to file a petition for post-conviction relief, which he 

did, also requesting and receiving a change of judge. The State filed a motion 

for summary denial of Karr’s petition for post-conviction relief, which motion 

the trial court granted on the basis that Karr was raising the same ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims that that he had asserted in his motion for a new 

trial – which had already been heard and decided – such that his postconviction claims were barred by res judicata. Karr asserts that the postconviction court’s denial of his petition was erroneous and asks us to vacate the 

decision and remand to the post-conviction court for a hearing.

[51] A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief bears the burden of establishing 

grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Post-Conviction Rule

1(5). A post-conviction court is permitted to summarily deny a petition for 

post-conviction relief if the pleadings conclusively show the petitioner is entitled 

to no relief. P-C.R. 1(4)(f). “‘An evidentiary hearing is not necessary when the 

pleadings show only issues of law; [t]he need for a hearing is not avoided, 

however, when a determination of the issues hinges, in whole or in part, upon 

facts not resolved.’” Kuhn v. State, 901 N.E.2d 10, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)

(quoting Godby v. State, 809 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied). 

On appeal, “A petitioner who is denied post-conviction relief appeals from a 

negative judgment, which may be reversed only if the evidence as a whole leads 
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unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the postconviction court.” Collins v. State, 14 N.E.3d 80, 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[52] Karr’s petition for post-conviction relief asserted that Taylor provided 

ineffective assistance in the following summarized ways: (1) he failed to offer at 

trial phone records showing that Karr’s phone (a) did not contain photos or 

videos of A.P. during the oral sex and (b) did not contain evidence that he 

accessed pornographic sites; (2) he failed to obtain medical records of A.P. to 

discover whether she had been administered anesthesia at the E.R. and failed to 

obtain A.P.’s prescription records to determine if she had filled a prescription 

for narcotics the same day as the alleged battery; and (3) he failed to offer at 

trial a text message written by A.P. showing that (a) she filled a prescription for 

Narco on May 5, 2015, and (b) she sent a text message to someone from the 

hospital before leaving the E.R. stating that she had received an IV and felt 

better. Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 3-4.

[53] The post-conviction court determined that these issues were litigated at the two 

hearings on Karr’s motion for a new trial and were barred by claim preclusion. 

Id. at 130. We agree. “‘Res judicata, whether in the form of claim preclusion or 

issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel), aims to prevent repetitious 

litigation of disputes that are essentially the same, by holding a prior final 

judgment binding against both the original parties and their privies.’” M.G. v. 

V.P., 74 N.E.3d 259, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Becker v. State, 992 

N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind. 2013)). “‘Claim preclusion applies when the following 

four factors are present: (1) the former judgment was rendered by a court of 
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competent jurisdiction; (2) the former judgment was rendered on the merits; (3) 

the matter now at issue was, or could have been, determined in the prior action; 

and (4) the controversy adjudicated in the former action was between parties to 

the present suit or their privies.’” Id. (quoting Dawson v. Estate of Ott, 796 

N.E.2d 1190, 1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). When claim preclusion applies, all 

matters that were or might have been litigated are deemed conclusively decided 

by the judgment in the prior action. Id. 

[54] Here, the record reflects that, at the first hearing on Karr’s motion for a new 

trial, held on September 2, 2016, Karr presented testimony from trial counsel, 

Taylor, and, among other things, Taylor testified as to what medical records he 

requested or did not request, what witnesses he called or did not call, and why 

he did not explore alleged drug use by A.P., explaining that his actions were 

based upon strategic decisions and assessments. Understanding that Karr’s 

counsel, Ruemmele, needed a trial transcript to further explore ineffectiveness 

issues, the trial court scheduled a second hearing, and it directed that a trial 

transcript be prepared promptly for Ruemmele’s use. The second hearing was 

held September 19, at which Karr presented the testimony of four witnesses, 

including A.P., who testified that she was not impaired and her memory was 

not affected by any medications. Officer McGovern testified that, while his 

forensic analysis of Karr’s cell phone did not show that Karr accessed 

pornographic sites or had taken pictures or video of A.P., he also testified that it 

is not always possible to recover deleted material from a phone. Karr also 

presented seven exhibits, including a prescription bag from CVS pharmacy for a 
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hydrocodone-acetaminophen prescription for A.P. and medical records from 

Community North from her E.R. visit. Ex. Vol. IV at 119, 121-22 (Def. Exs. D, 

E).

[55] Karr refers us to the recognized principle that “[a]n issue previously considered 

and determined in a defendant’s direct appeal is barred for post-conviction 

review on grounds of prior adjudication - res judicata[,]” and urges that, here,

“Because Karr has not challenged the adequacy of his trial representation on 

direct appeal, his ineffective assistance claims are not waived.” Appellant’s Br. at 

26-27 (citing Conner v. State, 711 N.E.2d 1238, 1244 (Ind. 1999), cert. denied, 531 

U.S. 829 (2000), and Overstreet v. State, 877 N.E.2d 144, 178 (Ind. 2007), cert. 

denied, 555 U.S. 972 (2008)). We do not find that Karr’s claims are waived; we 

find that his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have already been raised, 

heard, and decided. To the extent that Karr is arguing that only those claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel that were raised on direct appeal may be barred 

by res judicata, we disagree with his suggestion that direct appeal is the exclusive 

basis for rendering the ineffectiveness assistance claims barred. We find that, in 

the unique posture and context of this case,8it was not error for the postconviction court to find that Karr was not entitled to relitigate the claims, and 

 

8 The State suggests that Karr’s petition for post-conviction relief was the functional equivalent to a 

successive petition “because it raised only the same claims previously presented to the trial court for 

adjudication[,]” and our Supreme Court has explained that, “[A] defendant is entitled to one post-conviction 

hearing and one post-conviction opportunity to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the 

absence of newly discovered evidence or a Brady violation.” Appellee’s Br. at 27 (citing Daniels v. State, 741 

N.E.2d 1177, 1184-85 (Ind. 2001)). Our holding today is consistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning.
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we find no error with its decision to grant the State’s request for summary 

denial of Karr’s petition for post-conviction relief.9

[56] Affirmed.

[57] Bailey, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

 

9 We also reject Karr’s claim that – due to trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness, combined with the trial 

court’s comment during the hearing on the motion for a new trial, where the trial court stated that it was 

“pretty certain” that it would not have granted any request by trial counsel for A.P.’s prescription records, Tr. 

Vol. III at 102 – he was denied his right to explore bias and motive, was thereby denied his right to 

confrontation and a fair trial, and was entitled to post-conviction relief. Reply Br. at 14.