In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 06-3312

CHARLES J. GRIFFIN AND JULIA A. YARDEN,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

SISTERS OF SAINT FRANCIS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 02 C 329—Richard L. Young, Judge.

____________

ARGUED APRIL 17, 2007—DECIDED JUNE 6, 2007

____________

Before KANNE, WOOD, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Charles Griffin and Julia Yarden were

fired from their jobs at Michaela Farm in Oldenburg,

Indiana. The farm is owned and run by the Sisters of

Saint Francis (“SOSF”), an order of Catholic nuns. Griffin,

who had worked on the farm for nearly four years, and

Yarden, who had been there for just a few months, believed that they were terminated because Yarden was

pregnant, and they sued SOSF under the Pregnancy

Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (“PDA”). They

lost on summary judgment, and on appeal, Griffin and

Yarden—who proceed pro se—argue that they provided
2 No. 06-3312

ample evidence that their supervisor knew of Yarden’s

pregnancy, fired the couple for that reason, and offered

pretextual reasons for the decisions. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Griffin began living and working at Michaela Farm in

December 1996 and became Farm Manager the following

year. In addition to doing general farm work, Griffin

planned the farm’s planting and harvesting, purchased

farm equipment, and oversaw the interns who began

working on the farm in 1998. He was hired and supervised

by the director of the farm, Sister Anita Brelage.

In early 1999, Griffin met Yarden, a volunteer at the

farm, and the two began dating. Shortly thereafter, in

May 1999, Sister Carol Ann Sundermann told Brelage that

she had heard that Yarden was pregnant. Brelage approached Griffin and asked if that was true; he replied

that Yarden was not pregnant. The plaintiffs allege that

Brelage told them that an out-of-wedlock pregnancy would

be disastrous for the farm. Yarden in fact had become

pregnant around that time but suffered a miscarriage. She

did not tell Brelage or anyone else at the farm about that

pregnancy until August 2000.

A few times in 1999 and 2000, Brelage approached

Griffin and Yarden about what she perceived as the

couple’s lack of discretion and its effect on the morale of

other workers at the farm. She emphasized the importance of their being “discreet” in their personal relationship. When Griffin challenged Brelage to explain what

she meant, she replied that, for example, driving the

tractor around the farm with Yarden on his lap, as she had

seen him do, was not discreet. In June 2000, Brelage

encountered Yarden outside Griffin’s apartment on the
No. 06-3312 3

farm some time after 10 p.m., and once again she asked

the couple to be more discreet. She explained that the

farm was under scrutiny because neighbors had complained to the Archdiocese about certain activities on the

farm such as Tai Chi lessons and “hippies” working on a

construction project. Brelage feared that the Archdiocese

would shut down the farm if it learned, from more complaints from people in the community, that behavior

contrary to Roman Catholic teachings occurred on the

farm. She noted that Griffin would be out of job if that

happened. Yarden perceived this statement as a threat

to fire Griffin because of his relationship with her.

Griffin also came under scrutiny for his treatment of the

interns he was charged with training and supervising. In

1999 and 2000, four female interns spoke to Brelage

about Griffin. They complained that Griffin treated male

and female interns differently in work assignments and

reported that he inappropriately touched and made sexual

comments to female interns. After one such complaint,

Brelage asked Griffin to get a psychological evaluation.

Griffin complied, and the psychologist reported back that

Griffin did not intend any sexual harassment and was

not a threat to other workers. At a staff meeting in May

2000, one intern proclaimed that she would leave the

farm if Griffin stayed. When it was clear that Griffin

wasn’t leaving, she quit. After this incident, Griffin

complained to Brelage that she had not stuck up for him

at the meeting. Brelage informed Griffin that other staff

members were questioning her leadership because she

continued to support him. Shortly thereafter, the farm’s

“core staff” decided to suspend the intern program.

Despite what appeared to be ongoing tension between

Brelage and Griffin and Yarden, in June 2000 Brelage

acceded to Griffin’s suggestion that she hire Yarden.

Yarden was offered a part-time position (16 hours per

week) to begin with a 90-day trial period. Yarden’s pri-
4 No. 06-3312

mary responsibility was to market the farm’s organic

produce to restaurants and stores. Yarden began her job

on June 3, 2000. A short time later, she and Griffin

announced their engagement at a farm banquet.

Later in the summer, Griffin and Yarden were both

fired. On August 15, 2000, Griffin dropped by Brelage’s

office unannounced to discuss whether she was upset with

him. The two spoke about Brelage’s concerns about the

farm’s direction, including the intern program, which

recently had been discontinued as a result of problems

with retaining the interns. Brelage told Griffin that she

was uncomfortable hosting female interns on the farm.

Although she had not planned to fire Griffin before this

meeting, Brelage agreed with Griffin when he suggested

that she did not want him around anymore. Griffin then

stated that he wanted severance pay if he left the farm.

Brelage agreed. Griffin also stated that he wanted it

clear for the record that he had not quit. Brelage told

him that she would record his separation from the farm as

a termination effective on August 16.

Brelage called an emergency meeting of the farm’s core

staff on the evening of August 15. She related her conversation with Griffin, and the staff members unanimously

supported her decision to terminate Griffin. The following

day, Griffin and Yarden met (together) with Brelage.

Griffin asked Sister Brelage why he was being fired, and

she repeated her concern that she could not have a meaningful internship program on the farm as long as she felt

uncomfortable with Griffin supervising female interns.

Brelage also told Yarden that she was fired because her

services were no longer needed at the farm. Yarden then

told Brelage that she had had a miscarriage two weeks

earlier. This was the first time Yarden had mentioned her

pregnancy to Brelage, who “had not observed that Ms.

Yarden was pregnant at any time in 2000.” Yarden then

informed Brelage for the first time that she also had a

miscarriage in 1999.
No. 06-3312 5

Griffin challenged his termination through an internal

grievance process, and his termination was upheld by

Brelage’s superiors. He also sought unemployment benefits. In the context of proceedings on that claim, an

administrative law judge concluded that Griffin had been

terminated without “just cause” within the meaning of

Indiana Code § 22-4-15-1(d).

After exhausting their administrative remedies, Griffin

and Yarden filed a multicount complaint against SOSF

in federal district court. They claimed that they had been

discriminated against on the basis of religion and sex

and brought state-law claims of breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. They later

amended their complaint to include a claim of discrimination based on pregnancy in violation of the PDA. They

asserted that SOSF fired both of them “for the sole reason

that Plaintiff Yarden was pregnant out-of-wedlock with

Plaintiff Griffin’s child.”

The district court granted summary judgment for SOSF

on the pregnancy-discrimination claim, which is the only

subject of this appeal. Although SOSF argued that Griffin’s

claim failed because he was not protected by the PDA, the

district court assumed for purposes of its decision that he

could assert a claim as someone “who was treated differently ‘because of pregnancy.’” But, the court determined,

Griffin and Yarden could not make out a prima facie case

of discrimination because they did not present evidence

that similarly situated coworkers were treated more

favorably. The court also concluded that the reasons SOSF

gave for firing the two—that Griffin had “relational difficulties” with other employees and that Yarden’s services were

no longer needed—were not pretextual.
6 No. 06-3312

II.

On appeal, Yarden and Griffin argue that the district

court’s decision was erroneous, primarily because, in their

view, SOSF has not supported its stated reasons for firing

them, and the reasons therefore are pretext for unlawful

discrimination. They also challenge the district court’s

conclusion that they did not make out a prima facie case

of discrimination; they assert that numerous similarly

situated employees were treated more favorably. SOSF of

course defends the district court’s conclusion that the

plaintiffs neither made out a prima facie case of discrimination nor established pretext. However, SOSF also

continues to press its argument that Griffin’s claim fails

as a matter of law because, under the facts of this case,

he is not protected by the PDA. The plaintiffs disagree;

they assert that the PDA protects men and women equally

against discrimination for exercising their “reproductive

rights.” Because we have not had occasion to decide

whether a male plaintiff can state an employment discrimination claim based on an adverse employment action

allegedly taken because of a partner’s pregnancy, and

because there is no need to analyze Griffin’s claim any

further if it fails as a matter of law, we address this

issue before turning to the parties’ other arguments.

The PDA amends Title VII to define discrimination

“because of sex” to include discrimination “because of or on

the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical

conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The statute further

states that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or

related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all

employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not

so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.”

Id. (emphasis added). We have described the PDA as a

statute that “brought discrimination based on pregnancy

within a woman’s protections against sex discrimination.”

Hunt-Golliday v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist., 104 F.3d
No. 06-3312 7

1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added); see Dormeyer

v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579, 583 (7th Cir.

2001) (explaining that the PDA forbids “discrimination

against an employee on account of her being pregnant”);

Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 1999)

(“Congress amended Title VII in 1978 to explicitly extend

protection to pregnant women.”). Other courts likewise

have characterized the PDA as a statute recognizing, in

effect, that pregnancy is a proxy for gender and, therefore,

discrimination against pregnancy is discrimination against

women. See, e.g., Armindo v. Padlocker, Inc., 209 F.3d

1319, 1320 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The analysis required for a

pregnancy discrimination claim is the same type of

analysis used in other Title VII sex-discrimination suits.”);

Urbana v. Cont’l Airlines, 138 F.3d 204, 208 n.2 (5th

Cir. 1998) (“The PDA merely specifies that under Title VII

an employer must not discriminate on the basis of a

woman’s pregnancy.”).

That is not to say that all claims relating to pregnancy

must be brought by women, but male plaintiffs, like their

female counterparts, must prove that they suffered

adverse employment actions because of their sex. For

example, male plaintiffs who challenged an employeebenefits plan that afforded greater benefits to female

employees who became pregnant than to the pregnant

wives of male employees prevailed under Title VII because the policy discriminated against men. Newport

News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,

676 (1983) (“[P]etitioner’s plan is unlawful, because the

protection it affords to married male employees is less

comprehensive than the protection it affords to married

female employees.”). In this case, however, Griffin does

not assert that he was fired because of his sex.

Instead, the plaintiffs argue that the PDA prohibits

employers from taking “any negative employment action

based on reproductive rights” and protects females and
8 No. 06-3312

males equally. This interpretation, however, lacks support, and it ignores that pregnancy discrimination is, by

statutory definition, discrimination “because of sex,” not

sexual activity or reproductive capacity. See Saks v.

Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 2003)

(“Because reproductive capacity is common to both men

and women, we do not read the PDA as introducing a

completely new classification of prohibited discrimination

based solely on reproductive capacity. Rather, the PDA

requires that pregnancy, and related conditions, be

properly recognized as sex-based characteristics of

women.”) (emphasis added); Piantanda v. Wyman Ctr.,

Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining that

PDA’s protection does not extend to “gender-neutral

status potentially possessible by all employees”).

The plaintiffs’ interpretation also ignores the history of

the PDA. In 1976, the Supreme Court held that Title VII’s

prohibition of discrimination based on sex did not extend

to pregnancy. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125

(1976). Its conclusion rested in part on the premise that

not every classification based on pregnancy is a sex-based

classification. See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 677 n.12.

Congress quickly responded by passing the PDA. The

Court has since recognized the PDA as an explicit repudiation of “both the holding and reasoning” of Gilbert. See id.

at 678. The Court went on to state that the PDA “has

now made clear that, for all Title VII purposes, discrimination based on a woman’s pregnancy is, on its face,

discrimination because of her sex.” Id. at 684. The plaintiffs do not allege that Griffin was fired because of his sex,

and so his claim fails.

Because Griffin does not state a claim under the PDA,

we address the district court’s decision on summary

judgment only as it applies to Yarden. As with other Title

VII claims, the plaintiff may prove discrimination through

either the direct or the indirect method. Miller v. Am.
No. 06-3312 9

Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 997, 1004-05 (7th Cir. 2000).

Yarden pursued both paths in the district court but now

concedes that “the evidence offered under the direct

evidence method did not meet the requirements” of

establishing discriminatory animus. She argues, however,

that the district court reached the wrong conclusion under

the indirect method, which requires her to prove that:

(1) she was pregnant and her employer knew she was

pregnant; (2) she was performing her duties satisfactorily;

(3) she was fired; and (4) similarly situated employees not

in the protected class were treated more favorably. Clay v.

Holy Cross Hosp., 253 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 2001). If

Yarden makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to

SOSF to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing her. Id. Once such a reason is given, Yarden

can survive summary judgment only by showing that the

reason is pretext for intentional discrimination. Id.

Although the initial prong of the prima facie case

generally requires proof that the plaintiff was pregnant

and that the employer knew of the pregnancy, the parties

gloss over the undisputed fact that Yarden was not

pregnant when she was fired on August 16, 2000. There

are circumstances under which a pregnancy discrimination claim might be based on an adverse employment

action taken against a woman who is not currently pregnant; for example, the PDA protects women from discrimination based on their capacity to become pregnant. See

UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991);

Kocak v. Cmty. Health Partners of Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466,

469-70 (6th Cir. 2005). But Yarden claims that her termination was due to her pregnancy in the summer of 2000.

We need not resolve the matter, however, because an

issue of fact remains as to the first prong because, as the

district court concluded, there is a dispute over whether

Brelage knew that Yarden had become pregnant. Yarden

admits that she did not tell Brelage until after Brelage
10 No. 06-3312

fired her. But she asserts that she was visibly pregnant

starting in June 2000; she says that she was wearing

maternity clothes and “could no longer conceal my second

pregnancy by Charles Griffin.” And indeed, Yarden

miscarried on July 28 at 22 weeks pregnant, so it is

possible that her pregnancy was visible. There is also a

question as to whether another farm employee, Sister

Quinn, told Brelage that Yarden might be pregnant. Quinn

asserted that she discussed with Brelage the possibility

that Yarden was pregnant, but she could not remember

whether that occurred in 1999 or 2000. Nevertheless,

Brelage swore that she did not know about the pregnancy

until Yarden told her in August 2000. Because of the

conflicting testimony on this point, the district court

correctly concluded than an issue of fact remained regarding Brelage’s knowledge of the pregnancy.

The other point of contention in terms of Yarden’s prima

facie case is whether she provided evidence that similarly

situated employees were treated more favorably than she.

Yarden argues that the district court erred in concluding

that she had not, because, she asserts, there were “10

female and 12 male employees . . . that had similar work

responsibilities and were supervised by the same personnel,” and who were “allowed to work full time, and given

Yarden’s job responsibilities” after she was fired. But there

is scant evidence in the record to support Yarden’s assertion.

If, however, Yarden’s case is viewed as single-discharge

or “mini-reduction-in-force” case, she would not be required to point to similarly situated employees. See

Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 495 (7th Cir.

2000). When an employee in a unique position is terminated and her position is not filled, but employees outside the protected class assume the fired employee’s

responsibilities, the employer has effectively replaced the

employee. See Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc.,
No. 06-3312 11

1 For example, it appears that only Yarden was working part

time and completing a 90-day trial period. And only Yarden was

charged with marketing the farm’s goods to local businesses.

209 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2000); Bellaver, 200 F.3d at

495. To guard against the danger that the employer can

hide a discriminatory motive for terminating the employee

simply by stating that the job was eliminated, the plaintiff

is not required to show that similarly situated employees

were treated more favorably. Instead, she needs only to

establish that her duties were absorbed by employees

outside the protected class. Michas, 209 F.3d at 693.

Yarden’s claim resembles a mini-RIF case because, as far

as the record demonstrates, she was uniquely situated

among the farm workers1

 and was told she was being

fired because her services were no longer needed. But

Yarden’s claim fails even if she is required to demonstrate

only that her responsibilities were taken up by a nonpregnant employee because she does not dispute that

marketing to commercial accounts—her primary function—ceased after her termination. She stated in her

deposition that the farm “discontinued all commercial

accounts . . . upon [her] firing” and that she had to inform

her customers that “there was going to be no more service.”

Finally, Yarden challenges the district court’s decision

that she did not establish that the reason SOSF gave for

firing her was pretextual. Although we do not believe she

made out a prima facie case, we address her argument in

the interest of completeness. An employer’s proffered

reason for a termination is pretextual if it is not the true

ground. Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Co., 453 F.3d 416, 417

(7th Cir. 2006). Yarden asserts that SOSF’s reason for

firing her—that her services no longer were

needed—cannot be bona fide because, although she was

hired for “commercial account development,” she was
12 No. 06-3312

occupied with general farm work in the summer of 2000,

and that work continued after her termination. But, again,

Yarden admitted that corporate marketing ceased after

her departure, although the farm’s community sponsored

agriculture program and its booth at the local farmers’

market continued to operate. Yarden also attempted to

demonstrate pretext by showing that the farm lost

money as a result of the decision to fire her and Griffin.

However, “the question is never whether the employer

was mistaken, cruel, unethical, out of his head, or downright irrational in taking the action for the stated reason,

but simply whether the stated reason was his reason.” Id.

Whether Yarden’s discharge was smart or advisable has

no bearing on the pretext inquiry.

III.

Because Griffin’s claim is untenable and Yarden has not

supplied sufficient evidence from which a finder of fact

could infer that she was terminated for becoming pregnant, we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment for

SOSF.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—6-6-07