IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs October 25, 2011

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. SCOTTY LYNN EDMONDS

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 92957 Mary Beth Leibowitz, Judge

No. E2011-00380-CCA-R3-CD - Filed April 23, 2012

The Defendant, Scotty Lynn Edmonds, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI),

first offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and violation of the implied consent law, a Class C

misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401, -406. The trial court sentenced the

Defendant to 11 months and 29 days with all but 5 days to be served on probation. In this

appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion

to suppress evidence; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for

DUI, first offense. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court are

Affirmed.

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JERRY L. SMITH and

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JJ., joined.

Mark E. Stephens, District Public Defender; Nathaniel H. Evans, Assistant Public Defender

(at trial); and Gianna M. Maio, Assistant Public Defender (at trial and on appeal), for the

appellant, Scotty Lynn Edmonds.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Assistant Attorney

General; Randall Eugene Nichols, District Attorney General; and Kyle Hixson, Assistant

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As a result of an incident that occurred during the early morning hours of October 23,

2008, the Defendant was indicted for DUI, violation of the implied consent law, failure to
stop at a stop sign, speeding, and failure to drive within a single lane of traffic. The

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Defendant filed a motion to suppress “all evidence gained as a result of his October 23, 2008

arrest” because the “seizure and search were done without warrant or probable cause.” The

State filed a response to the Defendant’s motion noting that the motion to suppress failed “to

allege any facts that would support the suppression of any evidence in this case.” The State

requested that the Defendant file an amended motion stating with particularity the facts

supporting his motion to suppress. The Defendant filed a second motion to suppress arguing

that the Defendant’s arrest “was the product of an unlawful stop because the officers had

insufficient information to justify a stop, and [their] observations . . . were insufficient for

a stop.”

At the suppression hearing, Sergeant Stanley Cash of the Knoxville Police Department

(KPD) was the only witness. Sgt. Cash testified that at approximately 1:30 a.m. on October

23, 2008, he and KPD Officer Khan Dururvurur were working “DUI enforcement” in west

Knoxville. Sgt. Cash’s cruiser was parked, with its headlights off, facing “a four-way stop”

at the intersection of Nubbins Ridge and Morrell Road. Sgt. Cash testified that he observed

the Defendant’s “vehicle just disregard[] the stop sign” and drive “right through the

intersection.” Sgt. Cash further testified that the Defendant’s vehicle made no attempt to

slow down as it passed through the intersection. As Sgt. Cash began to pursue the

Defendant, he saw the Defendant’s taillights “leave the southbound lane and curve and cross

over into the northbound lane and then come back.” Sgt. Cash also testified that he

established that the Defendant was speeding based on “the speed [he] had to go to catch” the

Defendant. Sgt. Cash testified that the speed limit on that section of Morrell Road was 35

miles an hour and that he estimated that the Defendant was driving in excess of 50 miles an

hour. Sgt. Cash testified that he eventually caught up with the Defendant when the

Defendant’s truck stopped at a red light at the intersection of Morrell Road and Northshore

Drive. Sgt. Cash identified the Defendant as the driver of the truck.

On cross-examination, Sgt. Cash admitted that his cruiser video did not capture the

Defendant’s vehicle crossing over into the opposite lane. Sgt. Cash explained that the

recorder was “in standby mode” and was recording “every other second to save space on the

hard drive.” Sgt. Cash also explained that while he was able to see the Defendant’s taillights,

the cruiser video camera was focused straight ahead and the Defendant was going around a

curve when he crossed into the opposite lane of traffic. Sgt. Cash stated in the warrant that

he “paced” the Defendant’s vehicle to establish his speed. However, on cross-examination,

Sgt. Cash admitted that he was not able to actually “pace” the Defendant because he could

not maintain an equal distance between his cruiser and the Defendant’s vehicle. Instead, Sgt.

Prior to trial, the State dismissed the charges of failure to stop at a stop sign, speeding, and failure to drive 1

within a single lane of traffic. 

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Cash explained that despite the fact he was going in excess of the speed limit, the Defendant

“was definitely pulling away from [the officers]” and “accelerating beyond” them. Sgt. Cash

testified that he did not think he would have caught up to the Defendant if it “hadn’t been

[for] the stop light.” Sgt. Cash also admitted on cross-examination that he was “not sure”

how fast he was going while pursuing the Defendant.

Sgt. Cash’s cruiser video was played for the trial court at the suppression hearing. The

video showed Sgt. Cash positioning his cruiser on Nubbins Ridge facing the intersection with

Morrell Road. Almost immediately after Sgt. Cash turned off his headlights, the Defendant’s

headlights can be seen going through the intersection without stopping. The video then

showed Sgt. Cash pursuing the Defendant. The Defendant was significantly ahead of Sgt.

Cash, and there were portions of the video where the Defendant’staillights could not be seen.

When Sgt. Cash eventually caught up to the Defendant, the Defendant was stopped in the left

turn lane at a red light at the intersection of Morrell Road and Northshore Drive. Based upon

the foregoing evidence, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress and stated

that Sgt. Cash had a reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant once he observed the

Defendant’s failure to stop at a stop sign.

At trial, Sgt. Cash’s testimony about what he observed prior to stopping the Defendant

closely matched his previous testimony at the suppression hearing. Sgt. Cash testified that

the Defendant’s “truck just blew through the stop sign. It didn’t make any attempt to stop

at all.” According to Sgt. Cash, as he was turning right onto Morrell Road, he saw the

Defendant cross over into the opposite lane of traffic. Sgt. Cash also testified that he was

going “greater than 50 miles an hour” trying to catch up to the Defendant but the Defendant

“was still accelerating away from [him].” Based on this, Sgt. Cash estimated the Defendant’s

speed to be “between 50 and 55” miles an hour. The Defendant’s truck was stopped at the

red light at the intersection of Northshore Drive and Morrell Road when Sgt. Cash caught

up to it. Sgt. Cash testified that he then “[i]nitiate[d] a traffic stop,” noticed that the

Defendant’s “eyes were glassy,” and “detected some slurred speech.” Sgt. Cash asked the

Defendant “if he had been drinking” and the Defendant said “no.” The Defendant consented

to take a field sobriety test.

Sgt. Cash testified that he had the Defendant step out of his truck, that he patted down

the Defendant, and then placed the Defendant in his cruiser. Sgt. Cash took the Defendant

to a nearby gas station to perform the field sobriety tests while Officer Dururvurur moved the

Defendant’s truck. Sgt. Cash explained that he took the Defendant to the gas station as “a

safety precaution” because he “didn’t want to be in the middle of an intersection or on the

side of the road” while performing the field sobriety tests. Sgt. Cash testified that he had the

Defendant attempt two field sobriety tests, the “nine step walk-and-turn” and the “one leg

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stand.” Sgt. Cash testified that he gave the Defendant instructions for each of the tests and

Officer Dururvurur demonstrated each of the tests before the Defendant attempted them.

Sgt. Cash explained to the jury that the “nine step walk-and-turn” test was designed

to test a person’s “divided attention.” Sgt. Cash further explained that the test begins by

asking the driver “to stand on [a] line, put one foot in front of the other touching heel to toe,”

and to stand with his hands to the side while the officer gives the instructions. The driver is

then to take “nine heel to toe steps walking in a straight line” and on the ninth step “take a

series of small steps, turn around, [and] take nine heel to toe steps back to the original point,

counting each step.” Sgt. Cash testified that the Defendant “performed poorly on the test.”

Sgt. Cash told the jury that the Defendant did not “touch heel to toe,” that he stepped off the

line, and that he raised his arm during each set of steps. Sgt. Cash also testified that the

Defendant “seemed to have difficulty keeping his feet on the line during the instruction

phase.”

With respect to the “one leg stand” test, Sgt. Cash explained that it was designed to

measure “divided attention,” balance, and motor skills. Sgt. Cash testified that during the

test, the driver is asked to stand on one leg with the opposite leg raised “six inches off the

ground.” The driver is to look down at his toe and count until told to stop. Sgt. Cash

testified that this test lasts for about 30 seconds. Sgt. Cash told the jury that the Defendant

performed poorly on this test and swayed, raised his arms, and put his foot down during the

test. Based on the Defendant’s performance on both the “nine step walk-and-turn” and the

“one leg stand,” Sgt. Cash concluded that the Defendant was intoxicated and not fit to drive

a motor vehicle.

Sgt. Cash arrested the Defendant and explained to him Tennessee’s implied consent

law. Sgt. Cash testified that he explained to the Defendant the possible consequences if he

refused to submit to a blood-alcohol test. Sgt. Cash told the jury that the Defendant refused

to give him a straight answer about whether he would submit to a blood-alcohol test. The

Defendant eventually asked Sgt. Cash what would happen if he refused to submit to a bloodalcohol test. Sgt. Cash told the Defendant that he would “be charged with implied consent”

and the Defendant responded by saying “[w]ell, charge me.” Sgt. Cash also testified that

while the Defendant was in the backseat of his cruiser, he “admitted to drinking a beer.”

On cross-examination, Sgt. Cash admitted that there was no evidence of alcohol in the

Defendant’s truck and that the Defendant had “an orderly appearance.” Sgt. Cash testified

that he thought the Defendant was resistant to him because he “had to ask [the Defendant]

questions over and over and over and over and over again.” However, Sgt. Cash admitted

that the Defendant eventually answered his questions and that he was able to understand what

the Defendant was saying. Sgt. Cash also testified on cross-examination that when he first

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spoke to the Defendant, he did not smell alcohol, but when he “got closer to [the

Defendant,]” he “got a moderate odor of alcohol.” Sgt. Cash further testified on crossexamination that the Defendant “stumbled” while walking back to the cruiser. However, Sgt.

Cash admitted that he was “not falling down” or “noticeably having difficulty walking.”

Officer Dururvurur testified at trial that he was working with Sgt. Cash on October

23, 2008. Officer Dururvurur testified that as they escorted the Defendant from his truck to

the police cruiser, the Defendant “had problems or issues trying to balance himself,” and at

one point, the Defendant held “the bed of the truck to balance himself.” Officer Dururvurur

recalled for the jury that he demonstrated both field sobriety tests to the Defendant and that

the Defendant’s performance on the tests was unsatisfactory. Officer Dururvurur also

testified that he smelled alcohol on the Defendant’s breath when the Defendant asked

questions about the instructions for the field sobriety tests. Based on the Defendant’s

performance on the field sobriety tests, Officer Dururvurur concluded that the Defendant was

intoxicated that night.

The jury was shown Sgt. Cash’s cruiser video at trial. In addition to the portion of the

video shown at the suppression hearing, the jury was also shown portions of the video

dealing with Sgt. Cash’s initial contact with the Defendant, the field sobriety tests, and the

Defendant’s subsequent arrest. The video showed that the Defendant was unsteady as he

walked to and from the police cruiser. During the “nine step walk-and-turn,” the Defendant

was unable to stand still during the instructions, he was unable to walk in a straight line, and

he was unable to walk heal to toe. During the “one leg stand,” the Defendant put his foot

down at least twice, swayed, and raised his arms. Once inside the cruiser, the Defendant

responded to Sgt. Cash’s questions about whether he would submit to a blood-alcohol test

by repeatedly asking if he was under arrest for DUI. Ultimately, the Defendant told Sgt.

Cash “to charge” him because he was “not drunk.”

The Defendant told Sgt. Cash that he was “speeding, but not drunk.” The Defendant

then asked what his “probable cause” was. Sgt. Cash explained that he pulled the Defendant

over for running a stop sign, speeding, and crossing into the opposite lane of traffic. The

Defendant asked Sgt. Cash how fast he had been going. Sgt. Cash explained to the

Defendant that he estimated his speed to be over 50 miles an hour. The Defendant then

became belligerent and insisted that because Sgt. Cash did not know his exact speed, he did

not have the right to stop the Defendant. The Defendant demanded that the officers tell him

his exact speed approximately 100 times while he was in the backseat of the cruiser. When

asked for his phone number and other simple biographical information, the Defendant

responded by asking, “How fast was I going?” The Defendant’s speech was noticeably

slurred during portions of the video. The Defendant told Sgt. Cash that he suffered from no

illnesses or injuries that “he knew of.” When later asked by Sgt. Cash what he had to drink,

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the Defendant responded that he had “one beer,” a “tall boy,” but that did not “make [him]

drunk.”

At trial, the Defendant testified that on October 22, 2008, he worked a ten-hour day

at a mobile home dealership. After the Defendant returned home from work and had dinner,

he went to his girlfriend’s apartment between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m. The Defendant testified

that while he was at his girlfriend’s apartment, he ate some leftover pizza and had “one beer

from a six pack.” The Defendant explained to the jury that he had gone to his girlfriend’s

apartment to end their relationship and “try to comfort her.” The Defendant testified that he

planned on staying the night at his girlfriend’s apartment but she became “emotional,” so he

decided to go home sometime after 1:00 a.m. The Defendant admitted that he “rolled

through the stop sign” at the Morrell Road and Nubbins Ridge intersection. The Defendant

explained that it was late, he “was tired,” and that it was “fairly common” for people not to

stop at the intersection. On cross-examination, the Defendant admitted that he had “been

known to roll through that stop sign” on prior occasions. The Defendant also admitted that

he was speeding that night and testified that he “was driving probably a few miles over 35.”

The Defendant denied crossing into the opposite lane of traffic.

The Defendant admitted that he lied to Sgt. Cash when he told him he had not had

anything to drink that night. The Defendant explained his decision to lie by telling the jury

that he “had laid down . . . to take a nap” before he left, that he “was sleepy,” and that he was

“an emotional wreck” because he had “just told the woman that [he] loved that [they were]

not going to be together anymore.” The Defendant claimed that he was “scared” that he

would be “wrongly convicted of DUI” and “lose [his] license to sell” if he told Sgt. Cash that

he had consumed one beer that night. The Defendant explained that his poor performance

on the field sobriety tests was due to the fact that he was wearing “a pair of new cowboy

boots” that night, that he had an undiagnosed condition that caused his feet to “burn” and

“hurt,” and that he had rolled up socks under the arches of his feet as “homemade. . . arch

supports.” The Defendant testified that he did not tell Sgt. Cash about the problems with his

feet because he was embarrassed. The Defendant also explained that he thought the

instructions to the tests were unclear and that he was nervous because “everything [he]

own[ed] literally [was] riding” on the outcome of the field sobriety tests. The Defendant also

told the jury that he was “tired, emotionally distraught, just a horrible day, mentally,

physically exhausted” when he performed the field sobriety tests.

The Defendant testified that he behaved the way he did after his arrest because he had

a “militant” and “persistent” personality. The Defendant told the jury that he refused to

submit to a blood-alcohol test because, at the time, he “didn’t see how it would benefit [him]

at all to do it.” The Defendant also testified that he refused a blood-alcohol test because he

was “scared” and he did not see how him “having a needle stuck in [his] arm and . . . another

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four or five hours of questioning” would have helped him. The Defendant explained that he

asked the officer what his exact speed was approximately 100 times because he “thought

with so much riding on that . . . [he] deserved . . . a clear answer” and not an estimation. The

Defendant also explained to the jury what he meant when he told Sgt. Cash that he had a “tall

boy.” The Defendant testified that he “was referring to” one beer out of a six pack of beer

in his girlfriend’s refrigerator that was “taller than a regular can.” The Defendant testified

that he was not intoxicated when he was stopped by Sgt. Cash. The Defendant explained that

someone was “under the influence” when they had “slurred speech, . . . the inability to make

. . . wise decisions, . . . [and] usually a lot of people are angry, confrontational.” However,

the Defendant explained that he was not intoxicated because he was “215 pounds and [he]

had dinner before [he] left [his] home. [He] had eaten pizza. One beer wouldn’t” cause him

to be intoxicated.

Based upon the foregoing evidence, the jury convicted the Defendant of DUI, first

offense. The trial court found that the Defendant violated the implied consent law and

revoked the Defendant’s driving privileges for a period of one year. Following a sentencing

hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to 11 months and 29 days. Because the

Defendant had a prior conviction for reckless driving, the trial court ordered the Defendant

to serve five days in confinement with the remainder of his sentence to be served on

probation. The Defendant filed a timely motion for new trial alleging that his arrest “was the

product of an unlawful stop because the officers had insufficient information to justify a

stop” and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for DUI, first offense.

The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion for new trial, and this appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Suppress

The Defendant contends that “the officers did not have [a] reasonable suspicion to

justify” stopping him. The Defendant argues that the traffic violations observed by the

officers were “legally insufficient to provide” a reasonable suspicion that the Defendant had

committed a crime. The Defendant asserts that it was “a common practice” to “roll through”

the stop sign at the intersection of Morrell Road and Nubbins Ridge; that despite the

testimony of the officers, there was no evidence that his truck crossed into the opposite lane

of traffic; and that the officers could not establish that he was speeding because they were

unable to “pace” his vehicle. The State responds that the officers “had not only reasonable

suspicion but also probable cause to stop the [D]efendant and issue a citation after witnessing

him fail to stop at a stop sign.”

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A trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress are conclusive on appeal unless

the evidence preponderates against them. State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tenn. 2000).

Questions about the “credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and

resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of

fact.” State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). Both proof presented at the

suppression hearing and proof presented at trial may be considered by an appellate court in

deciding the propriety of the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress. State v. Henning,

975 S.W.2d 290, 299 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Perry, 13 S.W.3d 724, 737 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1999). However, the prevailing party “is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the

evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate

inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23. Furthermore,

an appellate court’s review of the trial court’s application of law to the facts is conducted

under a de novo standard of review. State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of

the Tennessee Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any

warrantless search or seizure is presumed to be unreasonable and requires the State to prove

by a preponderance of the evidence that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to an

exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Simpson, 968 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Tenn. 1998).

However, a police officer may make an investigatory stop based upon reasonable suspicion,

supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be

committed. Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); Binette, 33 S.W.3d at 218.

A police officer must have such a reasonable suspicion in order to stop a vehicle

without a warrant. State v. Randolph, 74 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Tenn. 2002). Our supreme court

has stated that “when an officer turns on [his] blue lights,” a seizure has occurred. State v.

Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tenn. 1993). Reasonable suspicion is determined by an

examination of the totality of the circumstances. Binette, 33 S.W.3d at 218. Circumstances

relevant to an analysis of reasonable suspicion include “the officer’s objective observations

[and any] [r]ational inferences and deductions that a trained officer may draw from the facts

and circumstances known to him.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 632 (Tenn. 1997).

Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-149(c) provides that:

Every driver of a vehicle . . . approaching a stop sign shall stop before entering

the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or in the event there is no

crosswalk, shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, then at the point

nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver . . . has a view of

approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering the

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intersection, except when directed to proceed by a police officer or traffic

control signal.

A violation of this section is a Class C misdemeanor. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-149(d). This

court has previously concluded that a defendant’s failure to stop atstop sign provides officers

with “probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor has been committed.” State v. Baker,

966 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); see also State v. Damond Lavonzell Macon,

No. W2001-02706-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 925265, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 3, 2002)

(Wade, J.) (concluding that the defendant’s failure to stop at a stop sign provided “sufficient

basis to warrant the stop”). Both officers testified that the Defendant went through the

intersection without making any attempt to stop at the stop sign, and the cruiser video shows

the Defendant’s vehicle going through the intersection at a high rate of speed. As such, the

officers had a sufficient basis to stop the Defendant after witnessing him fail to stop at a stop

sign, regardless of whether the State could prove the remaining traffic violations.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the Defendant’s motion

to suppress.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction

for DUI, first offense. The Defendant argues that he “was cooperative and had an orderly

appearance,” there was no alcohol in his vehicle, and his “performance on the field sobriety

tests . . . [was] not indicative of someone who [was] intoxicated”; therefore, the evidence was

insufficient to sustain his conviction. The State responds that the evidence was sufficient to

sustain the Defendant’s conviction.

An appellate court’s standard of review when the defendant questions the sufficiency

of the evidence on appeal is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The court

does not reweigh the evidence; rather, it presumes that the jury has resolved all conflicts in

the testimony and drawn all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the state.

See State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984); State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d

832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Questions regarding witness credibility, conflicts in testimony, and

the weight and value to be given to evidence were resolved by the jury. See State v. Bland,

958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997).

A guilty verdict “removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a

presumption of guilt, and [on appeal] the defendant has the burden of illustrating why the

evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.” Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659; State v.

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Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). “This [standard] applies to findings of guilt

based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of [both] direct and

circumstantial evidence.” State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1999). To that end, the duty of this court “on appeal of a conviction is not to contemplate

all plausible inferences in the [d]efendant’s favor, but to draw all reasonable inferences from

the evidence in favor of the State.” State v. Sisk, 343 S.W.3d 60, 67 (Tenn. 2011).

The Defendant was convicted of DUI in violation Tennessee Code Annotated section

55-10-401. The statute states, in pertinent part:

(a) It is unlawful for any person to drive or to be in physical control of any

automobile or other motor driven vehicle on any of the public roads and

highways of the state, or on any streets or alleys, or while on the premises of

any shopping center, trailer park or any apartment house complex, or any other

premises that is generally frequented by the public at large, while:

(1) Under the influence of any intoxicant, marijuana, controlled

substance, drug, substance affecting the central nervous system or

combination thereof that impairs the driver’s ability to safely operate a

motor vehicle by depriving the driver of the clearness of mind and

control of himself which he would otherwise possess.

This court has held that in DUI cases, a police officer’s testimony, by itself, is sufficient

evidence to convict a defendant of DUI. See State v. Vasser, 870 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1993) (stating that the State did not need more than the deputy’s testimony to

prove its DUI case).

Here, both officers testified that they witnessed the Defendant run a stop sign, cross

into the opposite lane of traffic, and speed prior to being stopped. Sgt. Cash testified that

when he spoke to the Defendant, the Defendant’s eyes were glassy and his speech was

slurred. Both officers testified that the Defendant was unsteady on his feet as he approached

the police cruiser and that he smelled of alcohol. The Defendant performed poorly on two

field sobriety tests. During the “nine step walk-and-turn,” the Defendant was unable to stand

still during the instructions, he was unable to walk in a straight line, and he was unable to

walk heal to toe. During the “one leg stand,” the Defendant put his foot down at least twice,

swayed, and raised his arms. Based upon this, both officers testified that they believed the

Defendant was intoxicated. The Defendant refused a blood-alcohol test and became

belligerent once he was placed in the backseat of the cruiser. The Defendant’s speech was

noticeably slurred during portions of the cruiser video. The Defendant eventually admitted

to Sgt. Cash that he had a “tall boy” beer that night. It was well within the purview of the

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jury to accredit the officers’s testimony over the Defendant’s. Based upon the foregoing, we

conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for DUI, first

offense. See State v. Troutman, 327 S.W.3d 717, 726 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) (concluding

that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for DUI, first offense,

where police officer had to “waive down” the defendant to get him to stop at a roadblock,

the defendant’s speech was slurred, the defendant smelled of alcohol, the defendant failed

three field sobriety tests, and the defendant admitted to drinking a “hot beer” that night).

CONCLUSION

Upon consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgments of the

trial court are affirmed.

________________________________

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JUDGE

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