I 

. . 

M MAllOX 

Attorney General 

~~feme cewl BUllOlng 

P. 0. Box 12548 

‘.rrtin. TX. 7.9711. 2540 

W75-2501 

**1*x QlolS71-1367 

Telecopier 51214754l2S6 

, A Jackson. Sulle 700 

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-’ Paso. TX. 799052793 

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>usIo”. TX. 77002.3111 

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Lubbwk. TX. 79401-3479 

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MeAllen. TX. 7s5o1-lw5 

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an Antonio. TX. 782052797 

ra22Ylsl 

The Attome)’ General of Texas 

December 20, 1984 

I 

Ronorable Mergeret Moore 

Travis County Attoruc!)~ 

P. 0. Box 1740 

Austin, Tex*s 7876’~ 

Dear Ms. Moore: 

You have asked 11s to construe 

Opinion No. JH-281 

Re: When a county msy charge the 

optional $5.00 vehicle reglstration fee 

article 6675a-9a. V.T.C.S., with 

regard to the time 111: which the optional county vehicle registration 

fee may be imposed an license plate renewals. The statutory language 

about which you IoquLre reads as follow: 

(b) A county may impose a fee under this 

section onl:y to take effect beginning January 1 of 

a year ending In a ‘5’ or a ‘0’. (Emphasis added). 

Section 3 of the same act, Rouse Bill No. 965. whose first section 

added article 6675a-9a. provides that 

A fee imposed by s county under Section 

9a . . . applies to a registration period that 

begins on or after the date the fee takes effect. 

(Emphasis added). 

Acts 1983, 68th Leg., ch. 022. st 4710. Essentially. you ask vhen it 

is eppropriate for a county to begin charging the extra $5.00 fee. We 

conclude that e eaunty Vhose comissloners court has adopted the 

optional county vehicle registretion fee in compliance vith article 

6675e-9a may begin ctlarging such fee only on January 1. 1985 and only 

with regard to veh:lc:les which. under the established administrative 

construction, becow! eligible for registration renewal on that date or 

thereafter. 

The uncertainty which has led to your Inquiry appears to have 

been engendered because article 6675a-9a has been imbedded in a 

statutory scheme of gear-round vehicle registration. which replaced a 

system that for fility years contained a uniform annual registration 

running from April :I to March 31. Art. 6675a-1 et seq. You have 

sugge~sted that either. the extra $5.00 fee should be assessed only on 

all registration renewals purchased on or after January 1. 1985. or 
gonorablr Nargsret Noore - Pagtr 2 (rn-281) 

thst the extra $5.00 fee sh#xJld be assessed on all registrations 

expiring on or after Dscembc’r 31, 1984, even if the renewal is 

purchased during the tvu months prior to January 1. 1985. Hovever, 

the well-•etablfshed rule of Lw that statutes vhfch fix fess are to 

be strictly construed against allowing a fee by implication militntes 

agslnst your suggested couclur~ion. Moore v. Sheppard, 192 S.W.Zd 559 

(Tex. 1946); UcLennan County v, BOggsSb. 137 S.W. 346 (Tex. 1911). 

Tour second suggested anrlyels , that the optloual fee is meant to 

apply to all regfstratlons exl,!iring on or after December 31. 1984. Is 

based on the tvo mouth time period during which you believe a renewal 

may be purchased prior to its expirstion. Section 5 of article 

6675a-3e provides that: 

license plates may tme purchased during the month 

preceding the datl? on which the registration 

expires. 

Article 6675a-4(a) provides t’kat: 

Each registration ye.ar . . . shall . . . expire on 

the last day of ,:he last calendar month in a 

registration period. 

As an orfgifd matter. we might conclude that the “month” referred to 

in article 6675a-3s. section !i , was only the calendar month, 55 Tex. 

Jur. 2d Time 13 (1964). pramding the close of business on the last 

day of thzery month ia vhf,ch the registration expired. However. we 

agree with you that chew is sufficient ambiguity that it is 

reasouable to reach the concl.u.sion that the time period during vhich a 

renaval may be purchased is the two months preceding the date on vhich 

- 

the registration expires. 

Indeed, that is the conclusiou arrived at by the Texas Department 

of Highvays, es demonstrated. by the testimony of gr. Robert Townsly. 

Director of Motor Vehicle DQr:Lsion of the Texas Ugbway Department. at 

a hearing before the Rouse Transportation Cocmittee wherein he 

indicated that renewal notices would be sent out in the “month 

preceding the month in vhict. the registration is due.” Bill Analysis 

to House Bill No. 1924. (84 th Leg., Legislative Reference Library 

(1975). Llkavise, the curwut manual issued to county tax assessorcollectors by the Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation refers to 

a tvo-month registration renewal period - the 

month in which t’,w current registration expire5 

and the month immc:d.lately preceding the expiration 

month. 

p. 121r3 
Uonotablo Narpret Moor. - Pallo 3 (JW281) 

State of Texas Lava and Saguiations Relating to the gcgistration of 

Vehiclea Sec. 3.(b) II (1982). See also &, 23s et seq. Mile the 

interpretation* of statutea ude by l gcociea charged vith their 

administration are not con~~ls1~1~0~ they should be given substantiel 

weight. ?!x Parte Roloff. 310 S.Y.Zd 913 (tes. 1974). Nevertheleaa. 

-pi-t d mtqgp&ub -lanw~r:ufira. w. LM -&+ul ~mllbx % 

vitiatea the plain meaning of’ the vordr “take effect” in section (b) 

of article 667Sa-9a. Article 10. V.T.C.S.. requires that uorde 

routinely be given their “ortllnary signification.” See Jones v. Del 

Anderson and Aasociateo, 539 S.U.Zd 346 (fex. 1976).Webeter’r New 

ColJegiate Dictionary define11 the term “tahe effect” as “to become 

operative.” Therefore, the optional fee mey be chrrged only on and 

after January 1. 1985. 

your first suggested analyale of the timing of the implementation 

of the optiooal fee accept8 this conclusion. but results in a strained 

l ppllcation of your construc:r,ion of the phrase “registration period” 

in article 6675a-4 to section 1 in House Bill No. 965, n Therein 

“regirtration period* appears to aean the rpan of tims of not more 

than twelve months for vhich a regintratioa is valid. Its usage in 

that provlsien seems to be the product of the fact that the Texas 

Department of Highways YE,I authorized to establish different 

registration years for different claeslfications of vehicles end to 

prorate annual registration f,css on a monthly basia. If the phrase 

“registration period” means the same thing in article 6675a-4 aa in 

section 3 of llouse Bill No. 965. it produces the follcuing l nomalous 

results: (1) for the firat web registration “period” to begin on or 

after January 1, 1985. the two month period for the reneuel of 

registretions expired on Del:emher 31, 1984; end (2) the tvo month 

period for the reneual of registratloaa for the next such registration 

“period” extends from Decembw 1, 1964. to January 31. 1985. and thus 

reneuals of registraclonr exl~%ring on January 31 would not be rubject 

to the extra $5.00 fee if Dnrchased before January l.but vould be 

subject to that fee if purcha,ccd after December 31. 

Ye think ic uoreasonablc to attribute an intent to create such 

absurd results to the l~gisleture. especially when a simple, 

strolghtfonard explanation of the plain meaning of the l na c twnt 

(sections 1 and 3 of House B,L:Ll No. 965) is readily apparent. If the 

phrase “registration period” .Ln section 3 is taken to mean the period 

for reneual of registrations, then all tegistmtlone which are to 

expire on February 28, 1965, would be subject to the extra $5.00 fee 

during the entire period of t:heir eligibility for renewal (January 1 

through February 26). Such an lnterpretatlon causes no l nomelous 

results snd is soundly groundSed in the princlplc that the leginlaturc 

kncv the established administrative construction of rrticle 667Sa-3e. 

section 5. 

p. 1244 
Wmorablo Uaryret lIooro - PawI 4 (Jb281) 

A eo unuhc y ihc oh l e do p ttha d opt-1 $5.00 

vehicle re8iatrathw fea uy be8in cbaqin8 it 

oely on Jau~ry 1, 19885, end only for the reneud 

of relistratiooo which expire oo Iebnury 28. 

1985. 

JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General of Texas 

TOI4GRN6N 

pirrt Aoaiatant Attoraey Genewl 

DAVID 1. RIGHARDS 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

PlQ( GILpIN 

t3drman. Opinion ColiCtee 

Prepared by Colin Carl 

Asaiatant Attonwy General 

APpPsOvm: 

OPINION CGIDIITTEE 

Rick Gilpin, Glmirun 

Colin Gal 

Suaan Garrison 

Tony Guillory 

JimHoelliqer 

Jennifot RIGGS 

Nancy Sutton