NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JENNIFER CHRISTIAN, FKA Jennifer Havemen,
Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. UMPQUA BANK,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 18

- 35522
D.C. No. 3:16

- cv - 01938

- BR

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Anna J. Brown, Senior District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted November 5, 2019

Portland, Oregon Before: PAEZ and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and KOBAYASHI, * * District Judge. Plaintiff Jennifer Christian (“Christian”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Defendant Umpqua Bank (“Umpqua”) , on her clai ms of gender harassment and retaliation in violation of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable Leslie E. Kobayashi, United States District Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

DEC 31 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Title VII and the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”)

. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de novo the grant of summary judgment. Ray v. Henderson , 217 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 2000). We address Christian’s harassment claims in a contemporaneously filed opinion. As to her retaliation claims, we hold that Christian satisfied her prima facie burden

. W e
reverse and remand the retaliation claims to the district cou rt to determine whether Umpqua has proffered a legitimate nonretaliatory reason for the adverse actions alleged and , if so, whether Christian has offered sufficient evidence of pretext for a jury to find in her favor

. Under Title VII and the WLAD , 1 it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because the employee has opposed an unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

- 3(a); Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.210(1). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show
that (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal link between her protected activity and the adverse employm ent action. See Ray , 217 F.3d at 1240 ; Cornwell v. Microsoft Corp. , 430 P.3d 229, 234 ( Wash. 2018).

1 “Because Washington courts look to federal law when analyzing retaliation claims, we consider [Christian’s] Washington state law claim and federal claim together.” Stegall v. Citadel Broad

. Co. , 350 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2003) , as amended (Jan. 6, 200 4) ; see also Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc. , 301 F.3d 958, 969 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended (Jan. 23, 2002)

.3

1. First, as to protected activity, t he district court erred in determining that
Christian’s failure to establish actual discrimination defeated her cla im that she opposed discrimination. Th at is not the standard for evaluating retaliation claims

. “It is unnecessary that the employment practice actually be unlawful; opposition thereto is protected when it is based on a reasonable belief that the employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice. ” Little , 301 F.3d at 969 (internal quotation ma rks omitted) . Th is is so regardless of whether the underlying harassment is perpetrated by an employee or a third party , such as a customer. S ee ,
e.g., Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass’n Inc. , 41 F.3d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1994). We
conclude that Christian’s comp laints of harassment and Umpqua’s failure to take
effective remedial action were based on a reasonable belief that Umpqua engaged in an unlawful employment practice. 2 Thus, Christian established protected activity.
2. Second, Christian has offered evide nce that she was subjected to adverse employment action s . A forced transfer or reduction in job duties may both
establish an adverse action. See Ray , 217 F.3d at 1241 (transfer); Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prod s ., Inc. , 212 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir. 2000) , as amended (Apr. 27, 2000) ( reduction in job responsibilities )

. The record evidence

2 Indeed, we hold in our concurrently filed opinion that the record evidence is more than sufficient for a jury to find that Umpqua did in f act violate Title VII and the WLAD by ratifying or acquiescing in the harassment Christian experienced

.4

reflects that Christian was transferred to a different bank branch, where her job
dutie s we re reduced. For instance, Christian testified that her supervisor told her
that she “was no longer allowed to do sales and lending and open new accounts , ”
which Christian explained had comprised part of her job previously, and that she was no longer able to earn incentive bonuses as a result . Christian also stated that
her co - workers were instructed to “audit and review” her work, contrary to what Christian identified as customary bank practice. Christian has offered triable
issues of fact that she was s ubjected to adverse employment actions.
3. Finally, Christian has offered circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a causal link between her protect ed activit ies and the a dverse actions

. “[C] ausation can be inferred from timing alone where an adverse employment action follows on the heels of protected activity.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air,

Inc. , 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Passantino , 212 F.3d at 507

. Christian’s protected acti vit ies occurred in September and October 2014; the transfer and reduction in job duties took place in October and November 2014. Crediting th is close temporal proximity, as well as the record evidence of
Christian’s supervisors ’ alleged knowledge of these complaints , 3 a reasonable trier

3 For instance, Christian testified that one of her supervisors , Naomi Camargo, told her that she had heard about Christian’s “reputation” ; when asked what she meant by “reputation , ” Camargo described an error Christian had made “and other things that [ Camargo ] didn’t want to talk about[.]” Another supervisor , Lori Wick, testified that she was aware at the time of Christian’s first transfer that Christi an5

of fact could infer retaliatory intent. See, e.g., Davis v. Team Elec. Co. , 520 F.3d 1080, 1094 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We have found a prima facie case of causation when termination occurred fifty

- nine days after [the protected activity], and when adverse employment actions were taken more than two months after the [protected activity]

. . . .”) (citations omitted)

. Because Christian has satisfied each element of her prima facie case , w e
remand for the district court to consider whether Umpqua has met its burden to articulate a nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment actions and, if so, whether Christian has satisfied her burden to show pretext

. REVERSED and REMANDED.

had been harassed by a customer , and that Umpqua managers at the various bank branches commonly spoke to each other about their employees.