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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI 

---o0o---

________________________________________________________________

STATE OF HAWAIʻI, 

Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. 

PAOLA IBARRA,

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant,

and

GUSTAVO FERREIRA,

Respondent/Co-Defendant-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

SCWC-19-0000697

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(CAAP-19-000697; 1CPC-17-0001646)

MARCH 15, 2023

McKENNA, WILSON, AND EDDINS, JJ., AND

RECKTENWALD, C.J., DISSENTING, WITH WHOM NAKAYAMA, J., JOINS

OPINION OF THE COURT BY WILSON, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises from Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant 

Paola Ibarra’s (“Ibarra”) jury conviction for promoting 

prostitution in violation of Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-19-0000697

15-MAR-2023

11:44 AM

Dkt. 24 OP
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712-1203(1) (2016).1,2 After the jury returned its verdict of 

guilty, Ibarra filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, or in 

the alternative, for a new trial, that was denied. At issue is 

whether a reasonable juror could have concluded that Ibarra 

“profit[ed] from prostitution” within the meaning of HRS § 712-

1201 (2016).3

Because there was insufficient evidence that the 

defendant gained some benefit or value from another’s 

prostitution activity, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment 

of conviction and the ICA’s judgment on appeal affirming the 

conviction. 

 

1 The versions of the statutes applicable to this case are those 

that went into effect in October 2017 (incorporating amendments from 2016). 

2 HRS § 712-1203(1) (2016) provides: “A person commits the offense 

of promoting prostitution if the person knowingly advances or profits from 

prostitution.”

3 HRS § 712-1201 (2016) provides:

(1) A person “advances prostitution” if, acting other than as a 

prostitute or a patron of a prostitute, the person knowingly 

causes or aids a person to commit or engage in prostitution, 

procures or solicits patrons for prostitution, provides persons 

for prostitution purposes, permits premises to be regularly used 

for prostitution purposes, operates or assists in the operation 

of a house of prostitution or a prostitution enterprise, or 

engages in any other conduct designed to institute, aid, or 

facilitate an act or enterprise of prostitution.

(2) A person “profits from prostitution” if, acting other than as 

a prostitute receiving compensation for personally-rendered 

prostitution services, the person accepts or receives money or 

other property pursuant to an agreement or understanding with any 

person whereby the person participates or is to participate in 

the proceeds of prostitution activity.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. Circuit Court Proceedings

1. Charges 

On November 15, 2017, the State charged Ibarra and codefendant Gustavo Ferreira (“Ferreira”) with sex trafficking in 

violation of HRS § 712-1202(1)(a) and kidnapping in violation of 

HRS § 707-720(1)(e). 

2. Jury Trial 

At trial, both Ibarra and the complaining witness 

(“CW”) testified that they flew from Oakland, California to 

Honolulu, Hawaiʻi together on October 31, 2017.4 Ibarra paid for 

her own and CW’s airfare. Once in Hawaiʻi, Ibarra and CW stayed 

in hotel rooms in Waikiki together, which Ibarra also paid for.

CW testified that it was her understanding that she

and Ibarra were going to Hawaiʻi to “strip and dance” and that CW

was going to repay Ibarra for her share of the airfare and hotel 

rooms as CW made money while in Hawaiʻi. Ibarra testified that 

CW characterized the trip as a “paycation[,]” meaning that they 

were on vacation but still getting paid. Samantha King 

 

4 CW testified that the reason her and Ibarra planned the trip to 

Hawaiʻi was because CW reached out to Ibarra after seeing Instagram posts of 

Ibarra in Hawaiʻi. CW explained that she asked Ibarra to take her along next 

time Ibarra went to Hawaiʻi. CW further testified that she “had an idea” that 

Ibarra was involved in prostitution when she reached out to Ibarra. 

The dissent states that “CW and Ibarra arranged over Instagram to 

travel together to Hawaiʻi[,]” but omits the detail that it was CW who reached 

out to Ibarra on Instagram in order to initiate the trip to Hawaiʻi. 
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(“King”), a long-time friend of CW’s, testified that CW was

“fully” aware that she was going to Hawaiʻi to engage in 

prostitution, and not just to strip and dance. 

After arriving in Hawaiʻi, Ibarra paid for and posted 

prostitution advertisements for her and CW on a website called 

Backpage. Ibarra took photographs of CW, and CW took 

photographs of Ibarra for the advertisements. Each of the 

advertisements indicated that it was for a “two-girl special.” 

Calls from potential customers would go to Ibarra and CW’s cell 

phones individually. CW came to Hawaiʻi with two cell phones and 

had control over both at all times. CW testified that she set 

the prices for her own prostitution dates. Ibarra testified 

that she and CW would go on prostitution dates together for 

safety, but that she and CW would not engage in sexual acts with 

a customer together. CW testified that she and Ibarra 

participated in sexual acts together on “maybe two or three” 

prostitution dates. 

Ibarra testified that she and co-defendant Ferreira 

had an intermittent romantic relationship. Ibarra explained 

that they broke up in mid-September of 2017 when Ferreira 

discovered that Ibarra engages in prostitution, and that they 

were not “boyfriend, girlfriend” at the time of the trip to 

Hawaiʻi. 
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Ferreira joined Ibarra and CW in Hawaiʻi on November 3, 

2017. CW testified that between October 31 and November 2, it 

was her choice to answer her phone, to make dates, set prices, 

and engage in sexual acts for money. CW further testified that 

she was not scared of Ibarra and that she had a good time in 

Hawaiʻi when it was just her and Ibarra. However, CW stated that 

“the vibe chang[ed]” when Ferreira arrived.5 

CW testified that before Ferreira arrived, she gave 

Ibarra all of the money that she made from engaging in 

prostitution activities because “[n]ot only did [Ibarra] ask, 

but it only felt right because [Ibarra] had paid [CW’s] way to 

come to Hawaiʻi.”6 After Ferreira arrived, CW testified that she 

gave all of the money that she made from prostitution activities 

directly to Ferreira. According to Ibarra, Ibarra told CW that 

Ibarra would front the costs of the trip, and that CW “would 

just pay [Ibarra] back once [CW] made the money.” Ibarra 

further testified that CW did not give Ibarra money that CW made 

 

5 CW testified that she witnessed Ferreira “slapping [Ibarra]

around” a few times and “slamming her on the ground” while in Hawaiʻi. Ibarra 

testified that Ferreira never hit her. 

CW also stated that there was “more pressure” to go on prostitution 

dates after Ferreira arrived, but “[n]ot necessarily force.” 

6 The dissent states that “CW attested that though there was no 

agreement, she paid Ibarra because she felt obligated.” It is important to 

note that it was not Ibarra’s behavior that made CW feel obligated to repay 

her. Rather, CW testified that if she chose not to repay Ibarra, she would 

have “[b]een greedy” and that she “gave [Ibarra] the money because [she] 

thought that was right[.]” 
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from prostitution activities “[o]ther than what...our 

arrangement was[.]” 

3. Verdict 

On October 22, 2018, the jury returned a verdict of 

guilty against Ibarra for the lesser included offense of 

promoting prostitution in violation of HRS § 712-1203(1). The 

jury found Ferreira not guilty on all charges. 

4. Ibarra’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, or in 

the alternative, Motion for New Trial Is Denied

On October 30, 2018, Ibarra filed a motion for 

judgment of acquittal, or in the alternative, a motion for new 

trial. As noted, in order to be convicted of promoting 

prostitution under HRS § 712-1203(1), a person must “knowingly 

advance[] or profit[] from prostitution.” Ibarra argued that 

she cannot be convicted of promoting prostitution under HRS § 

712-1203 because she neither advanced nor profited from CW’s 

prostitution. 

Ibarra noted that the definition of “advances

prostitution” in HRS § 712-1201(1) excludes a person that is

“acting as a prostitute” themself from being found guilty. 

Ibarra argued that she was acting as a prostitute herself at all 

times, and thus cannot be convicted of advancing the 

prostitution of CW. That is, “[t]he taking of the photographs, 

the preparation of advertisements [], the posting of the 
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advertisements [], the accompaniment on the prostitution dates, 

[and] the prostitution dates all involved [] Ibarra, as well as 

CW [], acting as prostitutes.” 

Ibarra also contended that she did not “profit from 

prostitution” as defined in HRS § 712-1201(2) because the money 

she received from CW was for reimbursement only. 

Finally, Ibarra pointed to the legislative history of 

HRS §§ 712-1201 and 712-1203 reflecting that the legislature was 

intending to target those who benefit the most from 

prostitution, such as sex traffickers and pimps, not prostitutes 

themselves. Ibarra noted that CW “confirmed that she 

voluntarily and willingly engaged in prostitution, . . . that 

Ibarra did not use force, threats, fraud or intimidation” and 

that CW “never told Ibarra that she did not want to engage in 

prostitution[.]” 

The circuit court denied Ibarra’s motion for judgment 

of acquittal, or in the alternative, motion for new trial. The 

circuit court agreed that Ibarra was barred from conviction for 

promoting prostitution under the “advancement” alternative

pursuant to HRS § 712-1201(1). The circuit court concluded that 

“the definition of advances prostitution” exempts from 

conviction “those acting as prostitutes[.]” In light of the 

evidence adduced at trial, the circuit court found that “no 

reasonable juror could have found that [Ibarra] did not fall 
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within the statutory exception” because Ibarra herself was 

acting as a prostitute at all times that she was advancing CW’s

prostitution. 

However, the circuit court found that a reasonable 

juror could find Ibarra guilty of promoting prostitution under 

the “profit” alternative pursuant to HRS § 712-1201(2). 

Specifically, the circuit court held that a reasonable juror 

“could have found that [Ibarra] and [CW] had an agreement or 

understanding that [CW] would pay [Ibarra] back for any airfare 

and/or half of the hotel room costs.” The circuit court also 

found that a reasonable juror could have concluded that Ibarra 

knew the money paid to her by CW was from CW’s prostitution 

activities, personally rendered by CW and not by Ibarra. Under 

this analysis, the circuit court concluded that the jury found 

Ibarra guilty of promoting prostitution under the “profit” 

alternative and denied Ibarra’s motion for judgment of acquittal 

or in the alternative, motion for new trial. 

5. Judgment of Conviction 

On September 11, 2019, the circuit court entered its 

judgment of conviction. Ibarra was sentenced to a five-year 

term of probation and required to register as a sex offender 

pursuant to HRS § 846E-1. 
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B. ICA Proceedings

On appeal, the ICA affirmed Ibarra’s conviction in a 

Summary Disposition Order (“SDO”) filed May 27, 2022. The ICA 

found that substantial evidence supported the finding that 

Ibarra profited from prostitution because Ibarra testified that 

she and CW had an agreement that CW would pay money to Ibarra 

that CW earned by rendering services as a prostitute. The ICA 

explained that “profits from prostitution” in HRS § 712-1201(2) 

is not defined in the financial accounting sense of profit, but 

rather, a defendant “profits from prostitution” if they

“accept[] or receive[] money” other than for prostitution 

services the defendant personally renders.

C. Supreme Court Proceedings 

Ibarra filed a timely application for writ of 

certiorari, contending that she could not have profited from 

prostitution where CW simply paid Ibarra back for CW’s airfare 

and CW’s share of the hotel rooms. 

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

The test on appeal regarding sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether there is substantial evidence to support the 

conclusion of the trier of fact. See State v. Mattiello, 90 

Hawaiʻi 255, 259, 978 P.2d 693, 697 (1999) (internal citations 

omitted). “Substantial evidence” is “credible evidence which is 
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of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of 

reasonable caution to support a conclusion.” Id. (brackets and 

citations omitted). Additionally, “evidence adduced in the 

trial court must be considered in the strongest light for the 

prosecution when the appellate court passes on the legal 

sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction.” Id.

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Statutory Interpretation 

“The interpretation of a statute is a question of law 

which this court reviews de novo.” Labrador v. Liberty Mut. 

Group, 103 Hawaiʻi 206, 211, 81 P.3d 386, 391 (2003) (citations, 

internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. To profit from prostitution within the meaning of HRS § 

712-1201(2), a defendant must obtain value, or benefit 

from, another’s prostitution activity

Ibarra was convicted of promoting prostitution in 

violation of HRS § 712-1203(1), which provides that “[a] person 

commits the offense of promoting prostitution if the person 

knowingly advances or profits from prostitution.” (emphasis 

added). HRS § 712-1201(1) defines what constitutes “advanc[ing] 

prostitution”: 

[a] person “advances prostitution” if, acting other than as a 

prostitute or a patron of a prostitute, the person knowingly 

causes or aids a person to commit or engage in prostitution, 

procures or solicits patrons for prostitution, provides persons 

for prostitution purposes, permits premises to be regularly used 

for prostitution purposes, operates or assists in the operation 

of a house of prostitution or a prostitution enterprise, or 
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engages in any other conduct designed to institute, aid, or 

facilitate an act or enterprise of prostitution.

(emphasis added). In the order denying Ibarra’s motion for 

judgment of acquittal, or in the alternative, for a new trial,

the circuit court’s unchallenged finding of fact (“FOF”) No. 12 

states “that in all instances where [Ibarra] took action to 

advance prostitution[,] she herself was also acting as a 

prostitute” and thus, a reasonable jury could not find Ibarra 

guilty of promoting prostitution under the “advancement” 

alternative. 

However, the circuit court concluded that a reasonable 

juror could find Ibarra guilty of promoting prostitution under 

the “profit” alternative. A person “profits from prostitution” 

if “acting other than as a prostitute receiving compensation for 

personally-rendered prostitution services, the person accepts or 

receives money or other property pursuant to an agreement or 

understanding with any person whereby the person participates or 

is to participate in the proceeds of prostitution activity.” 

HRS § 712-1201(2). Despite the circuit court’s finding that 

Ibarra was merely paid back for expenses that she fronted, the 

circuit court held that reimbursement constitutes “profit[ing]” 

within the meaning of the statute, because Ibarra knew that she 

was reimbursed from the proceeds of CW’s prostitution activity. 

The circuit court’s interpretation of “profits from 

prostitution” is overbroad because it does not account for the 
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ordinary definition of the term “profit.” The ordinary meaning 

of the term “profit” in HRS § 712-1201(2) is “a valuable 

return,” “gain” or “the excess of returns over expenditure in a 

transaction or series of transactions[.]” Profit, MerriamWebster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/profit (last 

visited Dec. 8, 2022). Put another way, a person “accept[ing] 

or receiv[ing] money or other property” must be benefitting or 

obtaining something of value, in order to come within the scope 

of the statute. HRS § 712-1201(2). Otherwise, the term 

“profit” itself would be meaningless. Indeed, there is no 

ordinary definition of “profit” which includes mere

reimbursement.

The legislative intent of HRS §§ 712-1203 and 712-1201 

supports interpreting the language “accepts or receives money or 

other property” in light of the plain meaning of “profit.” HRS 

§ 712-1201(2). When interpreting a statute, “[a] court may 

examine [] sources [other than the language itself], including a 

statute’s legislative history, in order to discern the 

underlying policy [that] the legislature sought to promulgate in 

the enactment of the statute.” O’Grady v. State, 141 Hawaiʻi 26, 

28, 404 P.3d 292, 294 (2017) (citations and quotations omitted).

As Ibarra points out, in the 2011 amendments to the statute, the 

legislature stated that the purpose was to target “those who 

benefit most from [] prostitution[,]”:
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Your Committee finds that prostitution remains a concern within 

Hawaii communities, not only for the prostitution activity 

itself, but also for the criminal conduct that it can bring to 

the area within which it occurs. However, there are also concerns 

that some of those engaged in prostitution are victims of human 

traffickers or others and are thus coerced into prostitution. 

Accordingly, it is incumbent on the State to craft legislation 

that combats those who benefit most from the prostitution, the 

traffickers and pimps, while providing protection to victims of 

traffickers who step forward seeking safety, and addresses the 

demand for prostitution by assuring that habitual patrons are 

penalized when they engage in this conduct. Your Committee 

believes that thoughtful legislation in those areas will act to 

protect those victimized by prostitution, including those coerced 

into prostitution and residents of sensitive communities that 

must grapple with the effects of prostitution and related 

criminal activities. 

Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1137, in 2011 Senate Journal, at 1284-85. 

(emphases added). Thus, the apparent legislative intent was to 

target those who benefit from prostitution without engaging in 

prostitution themselves (e.g., pimps and sex traffickers). 

Given the legislative intent to target those who 

“benefit most” from prostitution, a defendant who is merely 

reimbursed for expenses has not “profit[ed] from prostitution” 

within the intended meaning of HRS § 712-1201(2). The ordinary 

definition of the term “benefit” is “to be useful or profitable 

to” or “to receive help or an advantage[.]” Benefit (verb), 

Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/

benefit (last visited Dec. 22, 2022). The circuit court’s 

unchallenged FOF No. 15 states that a reasonable juror could 

have found that there was an agreement or understanding only 

that CW would pay Ibarra “back for any airfare and/or half of 

the hotel room costs.” That is, Ibarra did not derive any 
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benefit from CW’s prostitution activity; reimbursement is not 

“profitable” nor does it constitute an “advantage[.]” Id. 

Rather, reimbursement is the simple act of paying someone back,

and “implies a return of money that has been spent for another’s 

benefit.” Reimburse, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/reimburse (last visited Dec. 22, 2022). 

Given that Ibarra was merely reimbursed, and derived no profit 

or benefit (i.e., did not receive any value or an advantage) 

from CW’s prostitution activities, the legislature did not 

intend Ibarra’s conduct to come within the scope of HRS § 712-

1201(2).7

The phrase “agreement or understanding” in HRS § 712-

1201(2) must also be interpreted in light of the plain meaning 

 

7 The dissent cites to a comment to HRS § 712-1204 (1972), which is 

“functionally identical to the present HRS § 712-1203[,]” to argue that 

Ibarra’s actions were like those of a taxicab driver, bartender, or hotel 

clerk who engage in “small scale acts of trafficking that the provision was 

intended to target.” But the record is clear that unlike those small scale 

promoters, CW, not Ibarra, made the arrangements for CW's dates. The comment 

provides:

This section strikes at the small scale promoter. The 

taxicab driver who pimps for a prostitute, the bartender 

who sets up customers for a prostitute, and the hotel clerk 

who regularly furnishes the prostitute and his or her 

customer with accommodations would all come within the 

ambit of this provision. 

Ibarra’s conduct in the instant case is distinct from the listed examples. 

Ibarra did not “pimp” for CW, as did the taxicab driver. Ibarra did not set 

CW up with customers as did the bartender; CW answered her own phone and set 

her own dates. And Ibarra did not arrange accommodations for CW to engage in 

prostitution like the hotel clerk; CW made the arrangements for her own 

prostitution dates. CW answered “[y]es” when asked if it would “be fair to 

say...that when [she] would get either a call or text on [her] phone, that 

[she] would make the date arrangement [her]self.” 
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of the term “profit” and the legislature’s intent to target 

those who benefit most from prostitution without engaging in 

prostitution themselves. Ibarra and CW had an “understanding” 

that CW would reimburse Ibarra for the airfare and hotel rooms, 

and Ibarra knew that she was reimbursed from the proceeds of 

CW’s prostitution activities.8,9 However, there was no 

 

8 The circuit court’s unchallenged FOF’s No. 15 and 16 state: 

15. In this case, based on the evidence adduced at trial, a

reasonable juror could have found that the Defendant and 

complaining witness had an agreement or understanding that the 

complaining witness would pay the Defendant back for any airfare 

and/or half of the hotel room costs.

16. In this case, based on the evidence adduced at trial, a 

reasonable juror could have further found that Defendant knew 

that the money paid to the Defendant by the complaining witness 

arose from the complaining witness’s prostitution activities.

Thus, the circuit court did not find that Ibarra and CW had an “agreement or 

understanding” that CW was to specifically reimburse Ibarra with the proceeds 

of CW’s prostitution activity. Rather, the circuit court found that CW and 

Ibarra had a general agreement or understanding that CW would pay Ibarra back 

for the airfare and half of the hotel room costs, and that Ibarra knew, after 

the fact, that the money CW used to reimburse Ibarra was from the proceeds of 

CW’s prostitution activity. 

9 The dissent states “that there was a pre-existing agreement that 

CW would repay [Ibarra] from the proceeds of [CW’s] dates” and it was “within 

the province of the jury to credit Ibarra’s testimony and find there was such 

an understanding.” However, as noted above (supra n. 8), the circuit court’s 

FOF’s No. 15 and 16 state only that (i) there was an agreement that CW was to 

reimburse Ibarra for fronting the costs of the trip to Hawaiʻi and (ii) that 

Ibarra knew, after the fact, that she was reimbursed from the proceeds of 

CW’s prostitution activity. These findings were not challenged on appeal, 

and thus “are binding on the appellate court.” Okada Trucking Co. v. Bd. of 

Water Supply, 97 Hawaiʻi 450, 458, 40 P.3d 73, 81 (2002); see also Kawamata 

Farms v. United Agri Prods., 86 Hawaiʻi 214, 252, 948 P.2d 1055, 1093 (1997) 

(defendants “have waived any challenge regarding the findings of fact that 

support the circuit court’s denial of their motion for a new trial[.]”). 

Assuming arguendo that this court could disregard FOF’s No. 15 and 16, an 

agreement requires “[a] mutual understanding between two or more persons 

about their relative rights and duties[.]” Agreement, Black’s Law Dictionary 

(11th ed. 2019). CW explicitly testified that there was no agreement that 

she would repay Ibarra. Accordingly, there was no mutual understanding 

continued...
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“agreement or understanding” that Ibarra was to benefit (i.e., 

gain value or an advantage) from CW’s prostitution activity. 

Interpreting the language “agreement or understanding” in light 

of the associated term “profits” requires that there must be an 

“agreement or understanding” that the defendant will indeed 

benefit or gain value from another’s prostitution activity. See

Advertiser Publishing Co. v. Fase, 43 Haw. 154, 161, (1959) 

(“There is a rule of construction embodying the words noscitur a 

sociis which may be freely translated as ‘words of a feather 

flock together,’ that is, the meaning of a word is to be judged 

by the company it keeps.”). The State did not prove that Ibarra 

and CW had an agreement or understanding whereby Ibarra was to 

gain value or benefit from CW’s prostitution activity.

The interpretation of “profits from prostitution” 

relied upon by the circuit court and the ICA would broaden the 

scope of the statute beyond the meaning intended by the 

legislature.10 The legislature explicitly intended to craft 

 

. . . continued

between Ibarra and CW that CW was going to reimburse Ibarra from “the 

proceeds of [CW’s] prostitution activity[,]” as required by HRS § 712-

1201(2). Thus, even under the dissent’s interpretation, where HRS §§ 712-

1201(2) and 712-1203 penalize “any agreement or understanding to receive the 

proceeds of another person’s prostitution activities[,]” Ibarra’s conduct 

does not fall within the scope of the statute. 

10 Ibarra notes that if her conduct falls within the scope of HRS § 

712-1201(2), then if CW paid Ibarra back for a pack of gum, it would 

constitute “profiting from prostitution” as well. The dissent dismisses this 

argument, contending that it “ignores the language specifying that the 

continued...
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legislation targeting only “those who benefit most from the 

prostitution” and not prostitutes themselves. Stand. Comm. Rep. 

No. 1137, in 2011 Senate Journal, at 1284-85. (emphasis added). 

Accordingly, the State failed to prove that Ibarra “profit[ed]

from prostitution,” within the meaning of HRS § 712-1201(2).11,12

 

. . . continued

receipt of money must be “pursuant to an agreement or understanding.”” The 

fact that “there must be a preexisting agreement or understanding wherein 

both parties agree that one party will engage in prostitution and that some 

or all of the proceeds will go to the other party” does not refute the point. 

As an example, person X and person Y are long-time friends that both engage 

in prostitution. X does not have money for lunch, so Y agrees to pay for X’s 

meal, pursuant to an understanding that X will reimburse Y from the proceeds 

of the prostitution date that X independently scheduled for later that day. 

Under the dissent’s interpretation of HRS § 712-1201(2), Y would be guilty of 

promoting prostitution. 

11 The dissent asserts that interpreting HRS § 712-1201(2) to 

require the defendant obtain value from another’s prostitution activity risks 

creating a safe harbor for traffickers. Specifically, the dissent states 

that sex traffickers may provide funds or assistance, which the victim agrees 

to repay, but if “the loan proves prohibitively difficult to repay, [] the 

victim is trapped in a coercive dynamic.” However, because the criminal 

conduct the dissent is concerned would receive safe harbor protection is 

criminalized elsewhere in Hawaiʻi law, there is no such safe harbor created 

for traffickers who provide coercive loans to victims. HRS § 712-1203, for 

example, provides that a person is guilty of “promoting prostitution” if they 

“advance[] prostitution” or “profit[] from prostitution.” Under the 

advancement alternative, a person is guilty if the person “knowingly causes 

or aids a person to commit or engage in prostitution, procures or solicits 

patrons for prostitution, provides persons for prostitution purposes, permits 

premises to be regularly used for prostitution purposes, operates or assists 

in the operation of a house of prostitution, or a prostitution enterprise, or 

engages in any conduct designed to institute, aid or facilitate an act or 

enterprise of prostitution.” HRS § 712-1202(1) also provides that a person 

is guilty of sex trafficking if they knowingly advance prostitution “by 

compelling or inducing a person by force, threat, fraud, coercion, or 

intimidation to engage in prostitution[.]” Thus, the dissent’s concern about 

creating a safe harbor is not a reason to contradict legislative intent and 

criminalize reimbursement between friends from funds gained from 

prostitution. 

Moreover, the dissent’s interpretation, which would seemingly result in 

finding that a person is guilty of profiting from prostitution where they are 

knowingly reimbursed from the proceeds of another’s prostitution activity, 

risks criminalizing the conduct of those like Ibarra, in cases where “the 

continued...
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V. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the ICA’s June 20, 2022 

judgment on appeal, the circuit court’s September 11, 2019 

judgment of conviction, and the circuit court’s October 21, 2019 

order denying Ibarra’s motion for judgment of acquittal, are 

reversed.

Myron H. Takemoto /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

for Petitioner

/s/ Michael D. Wilson

Brian R. Vincent

for Respondent /s/ Todd W. Eddins

 

. . . continued

equities” do not favor conviction, as the circuit court explicitly 

acknowledged. Convicting Ibarra of promoting prostitution because she 

received funds for reimbursement of a personal debt from a friend who earned 

the money as a prostitute, and requiring her to register as a sex offender 

serves no public safety purpose, but limits her professional opportunities 

and makes it more likely that she will continue to engage in prostitution. 

Adopting the dissent’s interpretation could lead to the criminalization of 

landlords, personal friends, retail establishments, grocery stores and day 

care centers who receive money from people – including single parents — if 

they believe the money was earned through prostitution. The legislature did 

not intend to so cripple the welfare of those seeking to survive through 

prostitution. 

12 Ibarra also contends that the circuit court erred in failing to 

ensure that Ibarra’s waiver of her right not to testify was knowing, 

intelligent and voluntary. The ICA was correct to conclude that the circuit 

court was not required to engage Ibarra in a Tachibana colloquy prior to her 

testimony. State v. Lewis, 94 Hawaiʻi 292, 296, 12 P.3d 1233, 1237 (2000) 

held that an ultimate Tachibana colloquy is not required in cases where the 

defendant testifies. Although State v. Torres, 144 Hawaiʻi 282, 285, 439 P.3d 

234, 237 (2019) held that a Tachibana colloquy must be given in all trials, 

including where a defendant testifies, this requirement was imposed 

prospectively only. Because Torres was decided after Ibarra’s trial, Lewis

is controlling, and the circuit court was not required to engage Ibarra in a 

Tachibana colloquy.