J-S04037-15

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

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ALEXANDER BERRIOS,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1093 MDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 16, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-06-CR-0002713-2011

BEFORE: BOWES, ALLEN, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED APRIL 21, 2015

Alexander Berrios (Appellant) appeals from the June 16, 2014 order 

which dismissed his petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the background underlying this matter as 

follows.

On December 12, 2012, a jury convicted [Appellant] of 

possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and 

possession of a controlled substance. On January 14, 2013, 

[Appellant] was sentenced to serve an aggregate sentence of not 

less than forty-two (42) months nor more than ten (10) years, 

with credit for 617 days time served. [Appellant] was 

represented by Jacob Gurwitz, Esquire[, (trial counsel)] through 

pretrial, trial, and sentencing. No post-sentence motions were 

filed on [Appellant’s] behalf. No direct appeal was taken.

On July 9, 2013, [Appellant] filed a pro se petition under 

the [PCRA]. On August 14, 2013, [the PCRA court] appointed 

Lara Glenn Hoffert, Esquire, (PCRA counsel) to represent 
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[Appellant] in the disposition of his PCRA proceedings. PCRA 

counsel was directed to file an amended PCRA petition pursuant 

to [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 905 detailing [Appellant’s] eligibility for relief 

or to file a “no-merit” letter requesting to withdraw from 

representation pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 

213 (Pa. Super. 1988) [(en banc)] and Commonwealth v. 

Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988). On or about November 7, 

2013, [Appellant], through counsel, filed an amended petition for 

relief. An evidentiary hearing was held on [Appellant’s] PCRA 

petition on April 14, 2014.

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/8/2014, at 1-2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

Following the hearing, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. 

Appellant presents one issue for our consideration: “Whether the 

PCRA [c]ourt erred in denying Appellant’s [p]etition for [r]elief ... where trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to ... fully consult with Appellant regarding 

the filing of an appeal and/or perfect an appeal when requested ... to do 

so ... .” Appellant’s Brief at 4. In support of this issue, Appellant contends 

that he asked trial counsel to file an appeal, as evidenced by the testimony 

he and Lyndsey Leh1 provided at the PCRA hearing, and that trial counsel 

failed to do so.2 Appellant argues that trial counsel did not contradict their 

 

1 Ms. Leh is Appellant’s girlfriend, who, along with Moises Rodriguez, paid for 

Appellant’s legal expenses.

2 To the extent Appellant argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

consult with Appellant about filing an appeal, Appellant raises this issue for 

the first time on appeal. Accordingly, it is waived. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues 

not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first 

time on appeal.”); see also Commonwealth v. Watson, 835 A.2d 786, 
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testimony at the hearing; rather, according to Appellant, trial counsel merely 

“indicated that he did not recall what happened in this case other than that 

Appellant was unhappy with the result.” Appellant’s Brief at 10.

Preliminarily, we note that when reviewing an order dismissing a PCRA 

petition, we must determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is 

supported by record evidence and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v.

Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2010). “Great deference is granted 

to the findings of the PCRA court, and these findings will not be disturbed 

unless they have no support in the certified record.” Commonwealth v.

Carter, 21 A.3d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). 

In reviewing the PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, we bear in mind that counsel is presumed to be 

effective. Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010). To 

overcome this presumption, Appellant bears the burden of proving the 

following: “(1) the underlying substantive claim has arguable merit; (2) 

counsel whose effectiveness is being challenged did not have a reasonable 

basis for his or her actions or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered 

prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance.” Id. Appellant’s 

claim will be denied if he fails to meet any one of these three prongs. Id.

 

791 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“[A] party cannot rectify the failure to preserve an 

issue by proffering it in response to a Rule 1925(b) order.”).
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“Article V, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees a 

direct appeal as of right.” Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 571

(Pa. 1999). “It is well settled that when a lawyer fails to file a direct appeal

requested by the defendant, the defendant is automatically entitled to 

reinstatement of his direct appeal rights.” Commonwealth v. Markowitz, 

32 A.3d 706, 714 (Pa. Super. 2011). “[W]here there is an ‘unjustified 

failure to file a requested direct appeal,’ counsel is per se ineffective as the 

defendant [i]s left with the functional equivalent of no counsel.” Id. at 715 

(quoting Lantzy, 736 A.2d at 572). “The petitioner has the burden of 

proving that he requested a direct appeal and that his counsel heard but 

ignored or rejected the request.” Commonwealth v. Maynard, 900 A.2d 

395, 398 (Pa. Super. 2006).

At the PCRA hearing, Appellant and Ms. Leh testified at length as to 

their purported requests for trial counsel to file an appeal and other 

discussions related thereto. N.T., 4/14/2014, at 5-7, 9-10, 12-15, 17, 20-

25, 27. In contrast, trial counsel both denied that he was asked to file an 

appeal and stated that he did not recall that Appellant or Ms. Leh requested 

that he file an appeal on Appellant’s behalf. Id. at 29, 33-36, 38. 

Moreover, trial counsel testified to his practice as it pertains to handling 

appeal requests and client communication, including, inter alia, reviewing 

appellate rights, taking notes, speaking with family members, following up 
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on the requests, receiving messages through voicemail or his firm’s 

secretary, returning calls, using an Outlook program for scheduling 

purposes, and including clients on distribution lists. Id. 30-34, 36-41.

The PCRA court concluded that no timely request to file an appeal was 

made. PCRA Court Opinion, 6/16/2014, at 7. In this regard, the PCRA court 

found trial counsel’s testimony to be credible and rejected as not credible 

Appellant’s and Ms. Leh’s testimony to the extent that it was inconsistent 

and directly contradicted trial counsel’s testimony. Id. at 6. The PCRA 

observed that, based on trial counsel’s testimony regarding “his orderly 

methods of practice and his fixed, routine note-taking,” the PCRA court 

“believed that had [trial counsel] been asked to file a direct appeal, then he 

would have moved forward with such a request.” Id. at 6-7. 

The record supports the PCRA court’s findings, and this Court is bound 

by the PCRA court’s credibility determinations. Commonwealth v. 

Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277, 284 (Pa. 2011) (“The PCRA court’s credibility 

determinations are binding on this Court when they are supported by the 

record.”). Therefore, we conclude that the PCRA court did not err in 

dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition.
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Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/21/2015