Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 87A04-1701-CR-74 | August 29, 2017 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Melissa J. Haley

Boonville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Jesse R. Drum

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jeffery Heuring,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 29, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

87A04-1701-CR-74

Appeal from the Warrick Superior 

Court

The Honorable J. Zach Winsett, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

87D01-1505-F4-197

Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Jeffery Heuring appeals his convictions for dealing in methamphetamine, 

possession of methamphetamine, maintaining a common nuisance, and 

possession of paraphernalia. He argues that the trial court erred by allowing the 

State to use evidence obtained during two searches, which he contends were 

conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 

Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In May 2015, Heuring was living in the basement of his parents’ house in 

Chandler. Next to the house was a pole barn. On May 27, John Williams, 

who said he had been involved in a love triangle with Heuring (and Williams’s

wife), told Officer Cole Georges of the Chandler Police Department and 

Detectives Matt Young and Tim Pierce of the Warrick County Sheriff’s Office 

that he had seen a methamphetamine lab and precursors in the barn three 

weeks earlier. Williams then agreed to accompany the three of them to the 

property. When they pulled into the driveway, Heuring was standing in one of 

the barn’s doorways. Williams said, “[T]here’s really only one reason why he’s 

usually in that barn.” Tr. Vol. II p. 130. 

[3] As the men approached each other, Detectives Young and Pierce both smelled 

a chemical odor that they associated with manufacturing methamphetamine. 

Officer Georges then said that he saw smoke coming from behind the barn. 
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Detective Young ran around the barn, saw a burn barrel, and looked inside, 

where he saw what he believed to be a meth lab on fire. Detective Young 

reported what he had seen to Detective Pierce, who grabbed a fire extinguisher 

and put out the fire. When Detective Young told Heuring that a meth lab was 

burning in the barrel, Heuring nodded affirmatively.

[4] Based on Williams’s tip, the observations at the property, and Heuring’s 

acknowledgement that there was a meth lab in the burn barrel, Detective Pierce 

applied for and received a search warrant. Searches of the barn, the burn barrel, 

the basement of the house, and Heuring’s car turned up methamphetamine 

precursors, manufacturing supplies, paraphernalia, and methamphetamine 

residue. 

[5] The State charged Heuring with dealing in methamphetamine, possession of 

methamphetamine, maintaining a common nuisance, and possession of 

paraphernalia.

1

 Heuring filed a motion to suppress, arguing that Detective 

Young violated the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, 

Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution when he went behind the barn and 

looked into the burn barrel without a warrant authorizing him to do so and that 

all evidence obtained by virtue of that violation—including the evidence seized 

 

1 The State also filed four other charges that did not result in convictions: possession of anhydrous ammonia 

or ammonia solution with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine or amphetamine (found not guilty by 

jury); possession of two or more chemical reagents or precursors with the intent to manufacture a controlled 

substance (dismissed by the State); obstruction of justice (directed verdict); and possession of marijuana 

(dismissed by the State).
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pursuant to the subsequent warrant—should be excluded. The trial court 

denied Heuring’s motion, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. Heuring again 

objected to the State’s use of the evidence from the searches, and the trial court 

again disagreed. The jury found Heuring guilty on the charges listed above, 

and the trial court sentenced him to eight years.

[6] Heuring now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] On appeal, Heuring renews his argument that the searches violated the Fourth 

Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and asserts 

that the trial court erred by allowing the State to use the evidence obtained from 

the searches. The constitutionality of a search is a question of law that we 

review de novo. Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 2016). The trial 

court did not explain its rationale for rejecting Heuring’s argument, but we will 

affirm a trial court’s decision to admit evidence if it is sustainable on any basis 

in the record. Barker v. State, 695 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ind. 1998), reh’g denied. 

I. Fourth Amendment

[8] Heuring’s primary contention on appeal is that Detective Young violated the 

Fourth Amendment when he ran behind the barn and looked in the burn barrel. 

The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
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shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 

or things to be seized.

It is undisputed that Detective Young did not have a warrant authorizing him 

to go behind the barn or to look into the barrel. However, the State argues that 

the warrantless search was justified by an exigent circumstance, namely, “a 

serious safety threat.” Appellee’s Br. p. 13. We agree.2

[9] The State directs us to our Supreme Court’s decision in Holder v. State, 847 

N.E.2d 930 (Ind. 2006). There, the Court held that law enforcement did not 

violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights when they walked up to his 

house and sniffed outside a cracked window in an effort to determine the source 

of the smell of ether, which is commonly used in the manufacture of 

methamphetamine. The Court noted that one of “the exigencies that may 

properly excuse the warrant requirement” is a “threat[] to the lives and safety of 

officers and others” and concluded that the strong odor of ether, “a known 

explosive and flammable chemical,” suggests the existence of such a threat. Id. 

at 937.

 

2 The State also argues that the warrantless search was permissible under the Fourth Amendment because of 

the possibility that evidence was being destroyed and, alternatively, because the burn barrel was outside the 

“curtilage” of the house. Given our agreement with the State on the safety-threat issue, we need not address 

these arguments.
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[10] We see little daylight between the Holder officer’s act of sniffing next to the 

defendant’s house to determine the source of the smell of ether and Detective 

Young’s act of going behind Heuring’s barn to determine the source of the 

smoke. Detective Young, who had been told by Williams that Heuring had 

been manufacturing methamphetamine on the property and who had 

personally smelled a chemical odor associated with such manufacturing,

testified that such activity involves “highly flammable items” and could lead to 

“explosions” and that meth labs are “dangerous” because they can “burn,” 

“blow up,” and “knock houses off foundations.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 39, 41, 127. 

Far from being an unreasonable intrusion on Heuring’s privacy, Detective 

Young’s brief trip to the back side of the unenclosed barn to search for the 

source of the smoke, followed immediately by Detective Pierce’s 

extinguishment of the fire, strikes us as sound police practice. Heuring’s Fourth 

Amendment rights were not violated. 

II. Article 1, Section 11

[11] Heuring also asserts that even if the evidence was admissible under the Fourth 

Amendment, it should have been excluded under Article 1, Section 11 of the 

Indiana Constitution. The language of that provision is virtually identical to 

that of the Fourth Amendment, but claims under the Indiana Constitution are 

analyzed differently. “The legality of a governmental search under the Indiana 

Constitution turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct 

under the totality of the circumstances.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 

(Ind. 2005). The reasonableness of a search turns on a balance of (1) the degree 
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of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, (2) the degree 

of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s 

ordinary activities, and (3) the extent of law-enforcement needs. Id. at 361. 

[12] Heuring’s one-paragraph argument in this regard has not left us convinced that 

Detective Young acted unreasonably when he went behind the barn and looked 

in the burn barrel. Given Williams’s tip, the chemical odor near the barn, and 

the smoke coming from behind the barn, the degree of suspicion of illegal 

activity was high. The degree of intrusion was low, as Detective Young did not 

have to go into an enclosed area to view the burn barrel. And in light of the 

known danger of meth manufacturing, the need was high to immediately 

investigate the source of the odor and the smoke. There was no violation of 

Article 1, Section 11.

[13] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Crone, J., concur.