# FILED
Ap ril 23, 1997 Cecil W. Crowson Ap pellate Cou rt Clerk DORIS M. DARDEN, ) ) Petitioner/Appellant, ) ) Davidson Chancery ) No. 95-41 7-III VS. ) ) Appeal No. ) 01A01-9610-CH-00458 ALVIN C. YORK, MEDICAL CENTER, ) and BILLY J. STOKES, Commissioner of the ) Tennessee Department of Employme nt Security, )

) Respondent

s/Appellee

s. )
IN THE COURT OF AP PEALS OF

TENNESSEE MIDDLE SECT ION AT NASHV ILLE
APPEAL FROM THE DAVIDSON CHANCERY COURT

AT NASHVILL E, TENNESSEE
HONORABLE R OBERT S. BRAN DT, CHANC ELLOR
Doris M. Darden 3226 Masonwood Drive Nashville, TN 37207 ATTORNEY FOR PLAI

NTIFF/APPEL

LANT Jeffrey E. Wilson 500 James Robertson Parkway 12th Floor Nashville, TN 37245-0100 ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPEL LEE 

### AFFIRMED A ND REMAND ED

HENRY F. TODD PRESIDING

JUDGE, MIDDL

E SECTION

CONCURS: BEN H. CANTRELL , JUDGE
CONCURS IN SEPARATE OPINI ON: WILL IAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE-2-

DORIS M. DARDEN, ) ) Petitioner/Appellant, ) ) Davidson Chancery ) No. 95-41 7-III VS. ) ) Appeal No. ) 01A01-9610-CH-00458 ALVIN C. YORK, MEDICAL CENTER, ) and BILLY J. STOKES, Commissioner of the ) Tennessee Department of Employme nt Security, )

) Respondent

s/Appellee

s. ) 

### O P I N I O N
The petitioner, Doris M. Darden, has appealed from the non-jury judg ment of the Trial Court dismissing her petition for certiorari, and affirming the decision of the Board of Review denying petitioner’s claim for unemploy ment benefits.

The claim was denied by the

Board upon the following findings of fa ct and conclusions of law: FIN

DIN GS OF FA CT: Claiman t’s most recent emp loyment prior to filing this claim was for the VA Medical Center, Murfr eesboro, TN from Oct ober 13, 1989 until F

ebruar y 8, 1994 when

she volunt

arily resigned. The claimant quit her employ ment because of stress and depress ion. She ma

de doctor ’s appoin

tments in N ashville f

or 2:00 p.m
. on two separate day s. The claimant and her supervisor disagreed about how much s ick leav e time the claimant could tak e for the appointme

nts. The claimant wanted to take all day and the supervisor wanted her to take one-half day

of sick leave, and if she wished to be absent all day , to take the remaining hours as annual leave . This conformed with the employer’s policy

and with normal practice. The claimant felt stressed and harassed about this and filed an EEO complaint ag ainst her supervisor and against several other employ ees. When she began to give information about her complaint to the employe r’s EEO officer, the claimant began sobbing loudly , said that she couldn’t take it any more, and threw herself aga

inst walls a

nd window s. A staff

psy chiatris t sedated her and referred her to her own psy chiatrist as soon as possible. The claimant’s ow n psy chiatris t, after consulta tion with the claima

nt an d h er hu sb an d a bo ut th e c la im an t’ s w or k, he al th , a nd th e f am il y financial condition, recommended that the claimant not continue her employ ment. The

psy chiatris t diagno sed the c laimant a s suffer ing fro m stress and depression, and, based on his conversations with he claimant, said that her work was possibly a factor. Claimant then submitted a resignation.-3- CONCLUSIO NS OF LAW: After car efully considering

the entire record in this cas e, the B oard of R eview finds that th

is claim f or benef its should be d

enied und er TCA § 5 0-7-303( a)(1). We find tha t the claimant left her employme

nt voluntarily and without good ca use connected with work. She quit her employment on the a dvice of her psy chiatrist because of st re ss an d d ep re ss io n. Wh il e, as no te d b y he r p syc hi at ri st , w or k m ay have been a factor, the stress fr om work appears only

to have been an aggr avating factor rather than the p

rimary cause of the claimant’s co ndition. The c laimant w as very upset bec ause her

supervis or would o nly allow her one-half day

of sick leave for a doctor’s appointment at 2:00 p.m., and if the claimant wanted to take the entire day , was going to require her to take the remainder a s annual leave. In our opinion, it was not unr eas ona bl e fo r th e su per vi sor to req ui re t he c lai man t t o do th is . If the claimant had to quit employment bec ause of such situations, the problem a

ppears t o have been more within the c laimant th an it was connected with work. We note that the employer was in the process of taking i nformati on from the claima nt in orde

r to inves tigate

her complaints ag ainst the e

mploy er when

the claimant beca

me so ag itated tha

t she required sedation and attention from a psy chiatrist. This was a good faith effort by

the employer to addr

ess the claimant’s concerns.

The memor

andum of t

he Trial Judge sta tes: The petitioner worked at the VA Medical Center fr om October 13, 1989 until February

8, 1994, when she voluntarily re signed upon her doctor’s advice. Ms. Darden quit her job due to depre ssion brought on by job-relate d stress. The petitioner had a history of problems with her employe r regarding what she felt to be harassment and discrimination by different employ ees at the hospital. As the result of an agreement with her employer re garding the p

rior pro blems, Ms. Darden

was assig

ned to a di ffere

nt department, the library , with a new supervisor. At about th

e same tim

e that she

was tran sferre d, the pet itioner’ s doctor notified Ms. Darden that she was suffering from depression resulting from job- related

stress. H er docto

r presc ribed anantidepressant medicine and scheduled an appointment for psy chiatric couns eling. She and her new supervisor then had a dispute about how much sick ti me sh e c ou ld ta ke on th e d ays sh e h ad do ct or ’s ap po in tm en ts . T he y had several disagreements about this, and Ms. Da rden testified that she felt her supervisor refused to let her kee p her appointments on two occasio ns. The petitioner had notified her EEO officer a bout her problem getting time off for doctor’s appointments and she met with the officer on January 27, 1994. About ten minutes into this meeting, the petitioner had a so- called “ nervous b reakdown,” hamme

ring the windowpa

nes with her h ands and

slamming

herself into the wa

lls, shrie king “I can’t take it anymore”

and sobbing loudly. An e mergency medical alert was called and a staff psy

chiatrist at the Medical Center gave Ms. Dar den medication to calm her. Her husband then took her home.-4- The petitioner saw her own doctor on January 28 and he diagnosed that she s uffere d from man ic-depr essive sy ndrome. He advise d that her breakdown and prior illness were job-re lated and that she needed to leave her job to recover. The petitioner then f axed a resignation letter to her supervisor on February 8, 1994. Since Ms. D arden di d voluntar ily r esign, t he only issue in thi s case is whethe

r the pet itioner qu

it her job f

or “go od cause

connec ted to work.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-303(a)(1). Since the term “good cause connected to work” is nowhere defined in the statute, the Court must look to case law to determine its meaning. I n Cawthron v. Scott , 400 S.W.2d 2

40 (Tenn . 1966), th

e Tenne ssee Supr

eme Court interpreted “good cause connected to work” in a situation such as th is to mean, “that the

connec tion with the employ ment must be one of cause and effect in cases of illness and disability. That is to say , a causa

l connec tion between the em ploy ment and t

he illness... is required.” Supreme Court held that a woman who had a pr eexisting bronchial condition which was aggra vated by air- conditioning at work was not entitled to unemployment benef its. The petitioner in that case, like Ms. Da

rden, quit her job o n the advi ce of he r doctor . The Cour

t in Co oper s pecifi cally fou nd th at, “[ t]he fact t hat th e air-c ondi tion ing in her office aggr

avated the preexisting bronchial condition is not a cause which can be laid to her employ ment. 429 S.W.2d at 427. This Court’ s review

is limited to

the rec ord and th

e Boar d’s decision may not be re

versed i f it is suppo

rted “by evidenc e which is both substantial and material in light of the entire record.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 50-7-304(I)(2) (E) (1995 Supp.). However, the determination of whether the e

mploy ee left t

heir emp loyment with or without good cause is a question of law. Cooper at 426. Unfortun ately

for the p etitioner , her situ ation is al most identi cal to that in the Cooper case. T he pet itio ner su ffered from a preex isti ng illness, ma

nic-dep ressive syn drome, which was aggr avated b y st

ress at work. There is no evidence in the recor d that the petitioner’s job caused the manic -depre ssive sy

ndrome. T

herefo re, she d oes not me et the test set out in Cawthron and Cooper to com e with in th e meani ng of “good cause connecte d to work.” For this reason, the decision of the Board must be af firmed.
On appeal, petitioner presents the following issue: Did the Cou

rt err in its finding

that the Pe

titioner v oluntaril

y left her employme

nt without good cause.

The above quotations indicate that both the Board and the Trial Court found against the petitioner because a p re existing c ondition ( manic de pression ) was ag grava

ted by job stress
.-5-

Petitioner’s p hysician di d indicat e underl ying manic

depress ion, but did

not indica

te that its origin predated petitioner’s employ ment which began in 1989.
The applicable s tatute, T CA § 50-7- 303(a)( 1) read s as follow s: Disqualification for benefits , - (a) Disqualify ing Events. A claimant shall be d

isqualifi ed for be

nefits. (1) If the commissioner finds that the cla imant has left such claimant’s most recent work voluntarily without good cause connec ted with su ch claima nt’s work . Such disq

ualifica tion shall be for the durati on of the e nsuing p eriod of

unemploy

ment and u

ntil such claimant has secured subsequent employ ment covered by

an unemployment compensation law of this state, or another state, or of the United States, and was paid wages there by ten (10) times such claimant’s weekly

benefit amount. No disqualification shall be made hereunder, however, if such c laimant presents evidence supported by compete

nt medical proof that such claimant was forced to leave such cla imant’s mo st rece

nt work because su ch claima nt was sick or disabled and notified such claimant’s employ er of that fact as soon as it was reasonably practical to do so, and retu rned to th at employ er and of fered t o work as soon as suc

h claiman t was ag ain able to work, and to perform such claimant’s former duties . (Emphas is supplied)
It appears that the focal issue before the administrative ag ency a nd the Trial Court was whether the emplo ye e “left c laimant’ s most rec ent work -- withou t good c ause con

nected with claimant’s work.” Pe

titioner i nsisted, a

nd insists to

this Court, thatshe left w ork involu ntarily because of good cause connected with her work, i.e. “job stress.” The employer insisted and now insists that the underlying cause was manic depressive sy ndrome not co nnecte d with the employees wor

k and the “job stress” was merely an aggravating

factor.

It appears that neither the Board nor the Trial Court considered

the portion of the quoted statute which delays e

ntitlement to benefits until the sick or disabled employee ha s recovered and applied f or reins tatement .

Ca wthon v. Scott, 217 Tenn. 668, 400 S.W.2d 240 (1965) involved two ladies whos e claims were consolidated and determined toge ther. On e resigned because, af ter gall bladder
su rg er y, she w as una ble to sleep because of the hours of her employ ment. The other resigned-6-

because an injury suffe

red off the job caused her work to be pa inful. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of unemploy ment benefits and said: The disqualifying

provision of the statute under consideration is that a claimant will be eligible for unemploy ment insurance unless, “he has left his most recent work voluntarily without cause connected with his work.” We think it is reasonable to say this means that the connection with employment must be one of cause and effect in case s of illness or disability. That is to say , a causal connection between the employ ment and the illness or disability is required. In the records unde

r consideration there is no connection shown between the illness or disability of the claimants and their work. Mrs. Cawthon underwent a gall bladder ope ration. Prior to and after the operation she was nervous and una ble to sleep during the day . Petitioner Mrs. West, suffered the injury to her wrist while off from work.

In Thach v. S

cott , 219 Tenn. 390, 410 S.W.2d 173 (1966), a mec ha nic was discharged because he was unable to do part of his work due to a congenital double-curvature of the spine. The Supre

me Court up

held the d enial of unemploy

ment bene

fits.

In Guffey v . Scott , 21 7 Tenn. 707, 400 S.W.2d 705, (1966), claimant was terminated because of her

pregn ancy . The Supr

eme Court aff

irmed the denial of unemploy

ment bene

fits.

In Cooper v. Burson , 221 Tenn. 621, 429 S.W.2d 42 4 (1968), the claimant volunt arily terminatedher

employment in 1966 because the air conditioning in her work place agg ravated
a recurring bronchial condition which had a fflictedher since 1964. Her claim was denied by

the Board because the

claimant had not returned to work as required by the statut e. The Sup

reme Court affirmed the decision of the Board and sa id: In the present case the facts, a s contained in the r ecord, will not sustain a finding that the termination of employ ment by Mrs. Cooper was either involuntary

or was with good cause connected with her work. The fact that the air conditioning in her off ice aggravate d the preexisting bronchial condition is not a cause which can be laid to her employ ment. The statute provides that the employ ee is entitled to unemployment compensation if he cannot obtain employ ment from his employer upon prompt re applica

tion, once the caus e of ter

mination is arrested. This-7- prompt reapplication prerequisite has been held to be manda tory. Guffey v . Scott

(1966) 217 Tenn. 707, 400 S.W.2d 705. In the present case, Mr s. Cooper

claims tha

t her disa blement isstill existing. If this is true, she is not entitled to unemployment compensation at the present time. When she is able to comply with the provisions of the medical exception to sec. 50-1324, subd. A--or when s he can o therw ise re move t he dis quali ficat ion b y obtaini ng other employment for the period required by

sec. 50-1324, subd. he r s it ua ti on wo ul d t he n b e m at ur e for re ap pl ic at io n f or un em pl oyment compensation in a proper case.

In the present case, the Board and the Trial Court were of the opi nion that th

e “job str ess” connected

with petitioner’s work was an “ ag gravating cause,”but that “manic depression syndrome” the underlying and real cause of departure was pre-existing and

unconne cted ca

use as the recurrent bronchial condition in Cooper v. Burson, su pra .

In Cooper v. Burson, the Supr eme Court did assume that a “recurrent bronchial condition” was not

a work-induced injury , butthe failu re to re -apply

for employme

nt was als o cited as grounds for the decision.
In the present case , petitioner testified: Ms. Alexis: Now, when was the next time that you visited y our psychiatrist, Dr. B aird? Ms. Darden: February

the 2nd of ‘94. Ms. Alexis: Now, you have a copy of tha

t medical record also. Ms. Darden: Yes, I do. Ms. Alexis: And on that day wha t diagnosis did the doctor give you ag ain? Ms. Darden: He said that I was under stress - it was job stress and I wa s having

manic de pressive episodes
. Her phy sician’srecord

reflec ts: Problem #1 Manic Depressive Episode Problem #2

Job Stress-8- Absent specific evidence on the issue, this Court prefers not to dispose of this appea l upon the a ssumption th at the man ic depre ssion sy

ndrome di d or did not

origina te in petitioner’s work.
A more satisfactory

basis for disposition of the appeal lies in the lack of evidence that petitione r has re covere d from he

r disability a

nd has off ered to r eturn to w ork. As sta

ted in Cooper v. Burson, su

pra , when she is able to comply with the provisions of the statute, her situation would then be mature for reapplication for unemploy ment compensation. No judgment is made at this time as to her rights in event of such rea pplication.
The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are taxed against the appella nt. The c ause is r

emanded to the Tri al Court f

or further nece ssary

procee dings. 

### AFFIRMED A ND REMAND ED

___________________________________ HENRY F. TODD PRESIDING

JUDGE, MIDDL

E SECTION

CONCURS:

_______________________________ BEN H. CANTRELL , JUDGE

CONCURS IN SEPARATE OPINI ON: WILL IAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE