J-A02032-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MAUREEN HORESH IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

DAVID A. GARRISON

Appellee No. 1946 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered June 11, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Domestic Relations at No(s): 00764N2013

 PACES NO. 328113980

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and WECHT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED AUGUST 28, 2015

Appellant, Maureen Horesh (“Mother”), proceeding pro se, seeks 

review of the trial court’s child support order, and challenges the trial court’s 

determination of her earning capacity. We affirm.

Mother and Appellee, David A. Garrison (“Father”), married on October 

16, 1993. They have two children, one born in 1998 and the other in 1995. 

The parties separated in May 2012. The children live with Mother; Father has 

occasional contact with the children. 

Mother has an undergraduate degree in English from the University of 

Pennsylvania, a certificate in Real Estate Development from New York 

University, a Six Sigma certification,1and a certificate in horticulture. 

____________________________________________

1 Six Sigma is a set of techniques and tools for process improvement. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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During the marriage, she owned and managed five real estate properties 

containing many rental units. In addition, Mother was employed full-time 

throughout the marriage until 2008. Father is an attorney with a solo 

environmental law practice. 

On May 20, 2013, Mother filed a counseled complaint seeking support 

for herself and the children. On July 1, 2013, the court ordered Father to pay 

interim child support for $1,184.00 per month, effective June 20, 2013.2 No 

support for Mother was ordered. Mother’s counsel was allowed to withdraw, 

and Mother has proceeded pro se ever since. 

After their son’s 18th birthday, the parties stipulated to his 

emancipation, and the court reduced the interim support order to $542.50 

per month effective September 10, 2013. The court set arrears at 

$1,624.55, and ordered that they be paid in full immediately. 

On April 8, 2014, the court held a hearing on Mother’s support 

complaint. The parties’ joint 2012 tax return was admitted into evidence. 

Mother testified that she works 30 to 45 hours per week managing her now 

seven properties. She further testified that prior to 2008, she earned 

$60,000 to $100,000 annually in salary, commissions, and bonuses from her 

employment with GE Health Care and her other sales jobs. Mother did not 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

2 The interim support award was based on the court’s determination that 

Mother’s monthly net income was $9,353.47 and Father’s monthly net 

income was $10,006.13. Arrears were to be determined later.
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provide competent evidence of her 2013 or 2014 financial records, despite a 

court order to do so. She also failed to provide adequate documentation of 

the expenses of operating and maintaining her real estate holdings.3

Denise Cordes, a vocational expert who had interviewed Mother at 

defense counsel’s request, testified extensively with regard to Mother’s 

earning capacity. She stated that Mother had informed her that, throughout 

the marriage and up to 2008, she had worked in various full-time positions, 

including as a mortgage lender, a rental agent, an agent for GE Fleet, and a 

sales person of medical equipment for GE Healthcare. While at GE, Mother 

obtained her Six Sigma certification. Mother managed five rental properties 

at the same time that she was employed full-time. Ms. Cordes also testified 

that GE Healthcare terminated Mother’s employment at the end of 2007. 

With her severance payment, Mother purchased two more rental properties 

and then decided to take time off from working full-time to tend to her 

house and children. She attended horticulture school and became certified as 

a horticulturalist. At the time of the interview, Mother was working part-time 

and seasonally as a horticulture assistant at a garden center, earning $17.00 

per hour at maximum 32 hours per week.4 Ms. Cordes opined that with 

____________________________________________

3 Mother did submit a log in which she recorded her activities and time 

allegedly spent in managing her properties.

4 Mother informed the court in April 2014 that she had resigned from her 

horticulture job, allegedly to manage her properties and tend to the 

children’s needs. See Appellant’s Brief at 12.
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Mother’s extensive background in mortgage lending, sales, and real estate 

management, and considering her break in relevant employment, her

earning capacity was in the median range of $32,870 to $47,250 annually. 

See Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”) Hearing, 4/8/14, at 64; Vocational Analysis, 

dated 4/6/14, at 5-6. 

On June 11, 2014, the court concluded that Mother has an earning 

capacity of $47,250 per year, in addition to the income she derives from her 

rental properties. See Trial Court Opinion, dated 6/11/14, at 7. Using the 

parties’ joint 2012 Federal tax return as a “baseline,” the court opined that 

Mother’s gross income in 2013 was $192,532, and projected it to be 

$216,157.00 in 2014. Id., at 3. After consideration of Father’s profit and 

loss statements for 2013 and the parties’ 2012 tax return, the court 

concluded that Father’s gross income was $139,307.02, in 2013, and 

projected that it would be the same for 2014. The court also determined that 

an upward deviation of 30% from the support guidelines was warranted due 

to Father’s lack of custodial time with the children. Thus, applying the child 

support guidelines, Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2 and 1910.16-3, the court ordered 

Father to pay $1,484.74/month ($1,142.11 + 30%) for two children for the 

period May 20, 2013 to September 9, 2013, and $1,056.38 per month 

($812.60 + 30%) for the period September 20, 2013 to December 31, 2013. 

The court ordered Father to pay $1,030.72 per month ($792.86 + 30%) for 

the support of one child, effective January 1, 2014, with “[a]rrears, if any, to 

be paid at the rate of $50.00 per month.” Trial Court Order, entered 
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6/11/14. The court denied Mother’s request for spousal support. After the 

denial of her post-hearing motion, Mother appealed to this Court.5

Mother raises the following questions for our resolution.

a. Whether the lower court abused its discretion and committed 

an error of law in calculating the mother’s earning capacity?

b. Whether the lower court abused its discretion and committed 

an error in imputing additional income to the mother contrary 

to the overwhelming evidence before the court?

Appellant’s Brief at 7-8.

Our standard of review of support orders is well-settled. A support 

order will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court failed to consider 

properly the requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing actions 

for support or abused its discretion in applying those rules. See Morgan v. 

Morgan, 99 A.3d 554, 559 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 113 A.3d 280 

(Pa. 2015). “We will not interfere with the broad discretion afforded the trial 

court absent an abuse of discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the 

support order.” Id. (citation omitted).

____________________________________________

5 After Mother filed an appeal, this Court issued an order in which we 

concluded that, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1), only issues 

regarding the child support portion of the order were immediately appealable 

because a divorce decree has not been entered and all economic claims have 

not been resolved. See Order, 8/20/14 (citing Fried v. Fried, 501 A.2d 211 

(Pa. 1985) (holding that issues are reviewable after entry of a divorce 

decree and resoluation of all economic issues); Hrinkevich v. Hrinkevich, 

676 A.2d 237 (Pa. Super. 1996) (holding that notwithstanding a pending 

divorce action, child support orders are immediately reviewable)).
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“Both parents have an equal obligation to support their children in 

accordance with the capacity and ability of each to do so.” Sutliff v. Sutliff,

489 A.2d 764, 771 (1985) (citations omitted). 

[A] person’s support obligation is determined primarily by the 

parties’ actual financial resources and their earning capacity. 

Although a person’s actual earnings usually reflect his earning 

capacity, where there is a divergence, the obligation is 

determined more by earning capacity than actual earnings. 

Earning capacity is defined as the amount that a person 

realistically could earn under the circumstances, considering his 

age, health, mental and physical condition, training, and 

earnings history.

Baehr v. Baehr, 889 A.2d 1240, 1244-45 (Pa.Super. 2005 (citation 

omitted). See also Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(4) (setting forth factors for 

consideration so that the trier of fact may impute an income equal to the 

party’s earning capacity if it determines that the party has willfully failed to 

obtain or maintain appropriate employment). “Where a party assumes a 

lower paying job or willfully fails to obtain appropriate employment, the 

support obligation is determined by his [or her] assessed earning capacity.” 

Baehr, 889 A.2d at 1245 (citation omitted).

Mother avers that the trial court abused its discretion in determining 

her annual earning capacity to be $47,250, in addition to the income she 

receives from her rental properties. She argues that because she manages 

seven properties containing 55 rental units, she does not have time to obtain 

and hold a full-time job, manage the home, and care for the children. See 

Appellant’s Brief at 24.
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The trial court made the following observations with respect to 

Mother’s earning capacity.

The objective evidence is that [Mother] was gainfully employed 

outside the marital residence during 1995-2008[.] ... She had 

child care and household duties to meet in addition to the work 

requirements of her employers. Additionally, she found/made

time to manage her rental properties. Clearly, [Mother] is an 

accomplished multi-tasker.

Now that she is separated, has an emancipated son and a 16-

year-old daughter, she asserts that she should not be required 

to revert to her former multi-tasking self. In fact, she recently 

quit her part-time job on the ground that she could not work and 

meet her other obligations to the household, etc.

[Mother] was evaluated by vocational specialist, Ms. Cordes. 

When afforded the opportunity to reveal her current involvement 

in leasing and managing real estate, she failed to do so. 

Accordingly, Ms. Cordes’s report ... was flawed as she envisioned 

[Mother] as needing some degree of job retooling. Once Ms. 

Cordes was made aware of [Mother’s] extensive background, 

she opined that the wage estimates she had given were wrong 

and should be much higher. 

Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(4), I find that [Mother] has 

additional earning capacity at least equal to the median amount 

set by Ms. Cordes, to wit, $47,250.00. [citing Vocational 

Analysis, dated April 5, 2014, at 6]. I so conclude as:

a) [Mother] is 50 years old, appears to be in good health and 

functions at a high level intellectually;

b) She has specialized and hands on training in real estate 

development;

c) She has hands on experience in leasing and managing real 

estate;

d) She has a history of full[-]time employment while 

overseeing her personal real estate investments and the 

needs of her household and children;
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e) Her 16[-]year[-]old daughter does not, in my view, 

present any child care issues that preclude full[-]time 

employment; [and]

f) She has chosen not to work solely for personal reasons.

I see no reason why [Mother] should exert less effort in 

maximizing her income for the benefit of her children post 

separation than she did pre separation.

Trial Court Opinion, entered 6/11/14 at 3-4.

Our review of the certified record indicates that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in setting Mother’s earning capacity at $47,250 annually. 

The court considered the factors of age, education, training, health, work 

experience, earnings history, and child care responsibilities as set forth in 

Pa.R.C.P. 1910-16-2(d)(4). Based on Mother’s prior experience, the court 

rejected Mother’s testimony and other evidence that she could not work at a 

full-time job as long as she was managing her rental properties. Because the 

trial court properly considered the requirements of Rule 1910.16-2(d), we 

may not disturb its determination. See Morgan, 99 A.3d at 559 (declining 

to reverse a support order because the trial court had properly consider the 

requirements of Rule 1910.1 et seq.).6

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6

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court stated that arrears had not been 

set at the time of its June 11, 2014 order and requested that we remand so 

that it could adjust the payment of arrears from $50.00 per month to “a 

more reasonable recoupment amount.” Trial Court Opinion, entered 

8/11/14, at 2. Mother identified the issue of arrears in her Rule 1925(b) 

statement, see Rule 1915(b) statement, 8/5/14, at ¶ 3 but did not raise this 

issue in her appellate brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 7 n.1 (“Mother will not 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/28/2015

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

presently address this issue in this brief....”). Mother is under the impression 

that the trial court’s statement about the arrears in its opinion resolves the 

issue in her favor. See id. That is a mistaken impression. See, e.g., 

Durning v. Balent/Kurdilla, 19 A.3d 1125, 1127 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(finding issues raised in Rule 1925(b) statement, but not raised in appellate 

brief waived); Branch Banking and Trust v. Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939, 

942 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“As our supreme court has explained, any layperson 

choosing to represent herself in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable 

extent, assume the risk that her lack of expertise and legal training will 

prove her undoing.”). As Mother did not raise an issue about arrears, nor 

even present any argument on this issue, it is not before us. We therefore 

cannot comply with the trial court’s request.