alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Billy Gene MARSHALL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. F-74-293.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Sept. 26, 1973.

Cecil G. Drummond, Pawhuska, for appellant.

Larry Derryberry, Atty. Gen., James L. Swartz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Byron L. Wil-hite, Legal Intern, for appellee.

OPINION

BUSSEY, Judge:

Appellant, Billy Gene Marshall, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was charged, tried and convicted in the District Court, Osage County, Case No. CRF-73-394, for the offense of Robbery by Fear, After Former Conviction of a Felony in violation of 21 O.S.1971, § 797. His punishment was fixed by jury at a term of ten (10) years imprisonment, and from said judgment and sentence, a timely appeal has been perfected to this Court.

We do not deem it necessary to recite the statement of facts inasmuch as the case must be reversed.

The defendant’s second proposition of error asserts that the prosecutor’s closing argument contained certain remarks on defendant’s failure to testify in his own behalf and that those remarks impose a penalty on the free exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed privilege against self-incrimination. One of the remarks of which the defendant now complains is as follows:

> “MR. MATTINGLY: * * * What happened from Pawhuska — from Tulsa to Pawhuska, the statement was taken at Seven-fifteen P.M. and didn’t get over here until One A.M. What happened? Marshall knows what happened. Frye knows what happened. Did you hear a word from Marshall or Frye? You didn’t hear a word.

> “MR. DRUMMOND: We object.” (Tr. 723).

The defendant’s contention that this statement is a comment upon the failure of the defendant to testify is well taken.

The Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against self-incrimination through the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids comment by the prosecutor either directly or indirectly. This rule of law has been recog*178nized in Oklahoma by statute and case precedent. See 21 O.S.1971, § 701; Lime v. State, Okl.Cr., 479 P.2d 608 (1971); Garner v. State, Okl.Cr., 500 P.2d 865 (1972).

We have carefully reviewed the closing arguments of both parties. We are of the opinion that the remarks of the prosecutor of which the defendant now complains were in fact, an appeal to the prejudice of the jurors, thus effectively denying the defendant a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed to him by the constitution of the United States and the State of Oklahoma (Const.U.S. Amend. 6; Const.Okl. art. 2, § 20). We thus hold these remarks not to be within the scope of permissible comment.

For the reasons herein stated the case is reversed and remanded for a new trial.

BLISS, P. J., and BRETT, J., concur.
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 227 (Tuesday, November 28, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Page 83128]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-26204]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM


Change in Bank Control Notices; Acquisitions of Shares of a Bank 
or Bank Holding Company

    The notificants listed below have applied under the Change in Bank 
Control Act (Act) (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)) and Sec.  225.41 of the Board's 
Regulation Y (12 CFR 225.41) to acquire shares of a bank or bank 
holding company. The factors that are considered in acting on the 
applications are set forth in paragraph 7 of the Act (12 U.S.C. 
1817(j)(7)).
    The public portions of the applications listed below, as well as 
other related filings required by the Board, if any, are available for 
immediate inspection at the Federal Reserve Bank(s) indicated below and 
at the offices of the Board of Governors. This information may also be 
obtained on an expedited basis, upon request, by contacting the 
appropriate Federal Reserve Bank and from the Board's Freedom of 
Information Office at https://www.federalreserve.gov/foia/request.htm. 
Interested persons may express their views in writing on the standards 
enumerated in paragraph 7 of the Act.
    Comments regarding each of these applications must be received at 
the Reserve Bank indicated or the offices of the Board of Governors, 
Ann E. Misback, Secretary of the Board, 20th Street and Constitution 
Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20551-0001, not later than December 13, 2023.
    A. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (Colette A. Fried, Assistant 
Vice President) 230 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois 60690-1414. 
Comments can also be sent electronically to 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#91d2fefcfcf4ffe5e2bff0e1e1fdf8f2f0e5f8feffe2d1f2f9f8bff7e3f3bffee3f6"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="aae9c5c7c7cfc4ded984cbdadac6c3c9cbdec3c5c4d9eac9c2c384ccd8c884c5d8cd">[email protected]</span></a>:
    1. JFG Control, LP, IPJ 2012 JFG Trust, as general partner, and 
Helen P. Johnson-Leipold, as trustee, all of Racine, Wisconsin; to join 
the Johnson Family Control Group, a group acting in concert, to acquire 
voting shares of Johnson Financial Group, Inc., and thereby indirectly 
acquire voting shares of Johnson Bank, both of Racine, Wisconsin.
    2. Kenneth F. Whitmore GST Exempt Marital Trust, Lynn Whitmore as 
trustee, Lynn Whitmore, Scott Whitmore, and Cynthia Alvarez, all of 
Clarinda, Iowa; to join the Whitmore Family Control Group, a group 
acting in concert, to retain voting shares of Whitmore Company and 
thereby indirectly retain voting shares of PCSB Bank, both of Clarinda, 
Iowa.

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Yao-Chin Chao,
Deputy Associate Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 2023-26204 Filed 11-27-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
EX-32.1





SECTION
      906 CERTIFICATION








CERTIFICATION





Pursuant
      to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002:





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Franklin lake Resources Inc. ("Company")
      on Form 10-QSB for the Fiscal Quarter Ended  April 30, 2007, as filed
      with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof ("Report"),
      I,
      Father Gregory Ofiesh, as Chief Executive Officer and Acting Chief Financial
      Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted
      pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)  the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Sec. 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)   the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date: June
      13, 2008      /s/
      Father Gregory
      Ofiesh


Father
      Gregory
      Ofiesh


President
&
CEO
      and
      Acting


Chief
      Financial
      Officer
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 95-60599

Summary Calendar

_______________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ROBERT A. CARTER, SR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

_________________________________________________________________

July 24, 1996

Before JOLLY, JONES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Robert A. Carter, Sr., appeals his conviction of

conversion of government property. He contends that the district

court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal and

by imposing restitution in the amount of the insurance proceeds he

converted.

The deed of trust gave the Veterans Administration (V.A.)

control over the disposition of Carter’s insurance proceeds; the

second deed of trust with Southern Federal did not diminish the 
2

V.A.’s control. The V.A. attempted to exercise its control by

electing to apply the proceeds to Carter’s indebtedness. The V.A.

contemplated and manifested control of the proceeds. See United

States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 472 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439

U.S. 870 (1978). Carter’s challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence to support his conviction thus is unconvincing.

The property at issue in Carter’s case was the insurance

proceeds of $33,259.50; the district court imposed restitution in

that amount. The foreclosure and subsequent sale of the insured

real estate, while not necessarily irrelevant to restitution, were

found by the trial court not to have been adequately proved in the

PSR. The court was entitled to conclude also that the real estate

and the mortgages related to it were not the properties forming the

basis of Carter’s conviction. Carter converted $33,259.50 in funds

rightfully belonging to the V.A. to his own use. The V.A. lost at

least that amount. Carter’s argument for a net restitution amount

of $8,795.50 make no sense. The restitution portion of Carter’s

sentence was not an abuse of discretion. United States v. Reese,

998 F.2d 1275, 1282 (5th Cir. 1993).

AFFIRMED
#### Murray Tobin, Appellant, *v.*W. T. Grant Company, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department,

January 23, 1959.

*John F. Coffey*and *Eugene J. Brannigan*for appellant.

*Robert J. Kelly*and *Sidney M. Offer*for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

Under the circumstances existing at or about the time of the fire, defendant was chargeable with the negligence of an employee who was responsible for the fire in the *518elevator pit. The record establishes that the defendant’s manager knew of prior similar incidents where fires were caused by the act of an employee in throwing a lighted cigarette into the elevator pit and that with such knowledge the manager nevertheless failed to adequately supervise the work of the same employees in or about the pit. The plaintiff himself was free from contributory negligence in connection with the death of the chinchillas.

The judgment should be unanimously reversed on the law and facts with $30 costs and judgment directed in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $3,200 together with appropriate costs in the court below.

Concur — Pette, Hart and Di Giovanna, JJ.

Judgment reversed, etc.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, we deny

Windham’s multiple motions for oral argument. 

09-15584

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SAMUEL WINDHAM, JR.,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 09-15584

D.C. No. 2:05-cv-00954-GEBGGH

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Garland E. Burrell, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 25, 2010** 

Before: CANBY, THOMAS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

Samuel Windham, Jr., a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the

district court’s summary judgment for defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action

alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations related to defendants’

FILED

JUN 22 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 09-15584

placement of metal restraints on his burn-damaged wrists and ankles, his transfer

from one prison to another and his medical treatment at the new prison. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Sorrels v. McKee, 290

F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2002), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Windham’s

deliberate indifference claims because he failed to raise a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether or not the defendants knew of, and disregarded, an excessive risk

to his health or safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (“[T]he

official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”). 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Windham’s due

process claims challenging his transfer to administrative segregation at CSPSolano because prisoners generally have no protected liberty interest in being

incarcerated at a particular prison or against placement in administrative

segregation. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225-27 (1976) (holding

prisoners have no due process interest protecting against transfer from one

institution to another); May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997)

(recognizing that “the Ninth Circuit explicitly has found that administrative
3 09-15584

segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a

sentence”).

Because Windham did not establish that his placement in administrative

segregation violated his due process rights, the district court properly granted

summary judgment for defendants on Windham’s conspiracy claim derived from

his underlying constitutional claims. See DeGrassi v. City of Glendora, 207 F.3d

636, 647-48 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal of conspiracy to violate civil

rights, where the challenged conduct had been held not to violate plaintiff’s civil

rights).

Windham’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 32.b



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Boston Capital Tax Credit Fund III L.P. (the "Fund") on Form 10-Q for the period ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Marc N. Teal, Principal Financial Officer of the general partner of the general partner of the Partnership's general partner, C&M Management Inc., certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge, after due inquiry:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)-15 or 15(d)-15 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and                        
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                        
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Partnership.



|Date:             |  |                            
|----------------- |  | ---------------------------
|February 23, 2007 |  | /s/ Marc N. Teal           
|                  |  |                            
|                  |  | Marc. N. Teal              
|                  |  | Principal Financial Officer



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other

document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Fund and will be retained by the Fund and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
December 17, 1998

21595

#### Martinez v. State

Affirmed
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> UT
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
STATEMENT OF INCOME, STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS AND BALANCE SHEET AND IS QUALIFIED
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFEREENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000762129
<NAME> CILCORP INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                      873,420
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                    173,781
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                         232,521
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                        33,218
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,312,940
<COMMON>                                       192,853
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                            0
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                            142,685
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                 335,538
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           22,000
<PREFERRED>                                     44,120
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                           285,552
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                              55,600
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                  40,600
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                   13,027
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                      1,703
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                   478
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>                 514,322
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                1,312,940
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                    1,228,675
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                             5,435
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                   1,172,435
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                   1,177,870
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                         50,805
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                               1,013
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                  49,792
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                        30,288
<NET-INCOME>                                    19,504
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                      3,194
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                   16,310
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                        33,482
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                       22,702
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                          68,310
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.20
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.19
        

</TABLE>
#### STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John Donald PETERS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 14177.

Supreme Court of Utah.

May 19, 1976.

Stephen R. McCaughey, of Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.

Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Earl F. Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.

HENRIOD, Chief Justice:

Appeal from a jury trial conviction of violation of Title 76-5-404 (Forcible Sexual Abuse), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, — a third-degree felony.

Defendant urges that the trial court erred in not requiring the State to prove absence of rape and attempted rape, — both third-degree felonies, — as a condition precedent to conviction of the 76-5^104 offense charged, which reads:

> A person commits forcible sexual abuse if, *under circumstances not amounting to rape ... or attempted rape*[or other specified acts, etc.]

Counsel cites only two cases to support his urgence: *Mullaney v.*Wilbur1 and *State v. McCoy.**2*

The *Mullaney*case is not in point, since it has to do with a Maine statute that put the burden of proof *on the defendant*to show he committed a lesser offense to prove he did not commit murder. The court simply said such a statute was unconstitutional as wanting in due process, —as obviously and correctly it should have done.

In the *McCoy*case3 it was said the State had the burden of showing there was not a lesser crime before convicting for the *greater.*That case obviously favors the accused and may result in his conviction of a lesser offense or an acquittal. The problem there is not before us and is one we need not decide.

In the instant case the reverse is true. Counsel would have us require the State to prove there was no rape, — a *greater*crime, — in order to prove a *lesser*crime. Such a course, in logic, obviously is inimical to the interests of the accused.

It is our belief and conclusion that the only rule that is realistic and makes sense is that the State need prove only that which it has charged and should be able to ignore *200proof as to lack of any greater offense to which the accused just may be required to respond.4

ELLETT, TUCKETT, CROCKETT and MAUGHAN, j J., concur.

1

. 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975).

2

. 521 P.2d 1074 (1974).

3

.Which was decided not by the Oregon Supreme Court, but an intermediate Oregon court.

4

. For a kindred but not identical situation, see *State v. Porter,*28 Utah 2d 364, 502 P.2d 1147 (1972).
1 

### Hunt, Jeff

From: Robert Ukeiley [rukeiley@igc.org]

Sent: Monday, March 10, 2014 10:55 AM

To: R10-Public Comments

Cc: Jessica Yarnall Loarie; Hunt, Jeff; Jan Hasselman; Aubrey Baldwin;

nathaniel.shoaff@sierraclub.org

Subject: RE: Washington: Kent, Seattle, and Tacoma Second 10-Year PM10 Limited Maintenance

Plan, Docket #: EPA-R10-OAR-2013-0713

Attachments: Ex 3 Fugitive-Coal-Dust-Emissions-in-Canada-2001.pdf

Dear Mr. Hunt:

Attached is Exhibit 3 to the previously submitted Sierra Club comments.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert Ukeiley

Law Office of Robert Ukeiley

507 Center Street

Berea, KY 40403

Tel: 859

‐ 986

‐ 5402

rukeiley@igc.org

Counsel for Sierra Club

From: Robert Ukeiley [ mailto:rukeiley@igc.org ]

Sent: Monday, March 10, 2014 1:49 PM

To: 'R10-Public_Comments@epa.gov'

Cc: Jessica Yarnall Loarie ( jessica.yarnall@sierraclub.org ); hunt.jeff@epa.gov ; Jan Hasselman

( jhasselman@earthjustice.org ); Aubrey Baldwin ( abaldwin@lclark.edu ); nathaniel.shoaff@sierraclub.org

Subject: Washington: Kent, Seattle, and Tacoma Second 10-Ye ar PM10 Limited Maintenance Plan, Docket #: EPA–R10–

OAR–2013–0713

Dear Mr. Hunt:

Attached, please find Sierra Club’s comments on EPA’s proposed approval of the second 10

‐ year PM10 maintenance

plan for Kent, Seattle and Tacoma. Ex. 3 to the attached comments is a very large filel so I send that in a separate email.

If you have an difficulties with these documents or have any other questions, please do not hesitate to ask.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert Ukeiley

Law Office of Robert Ukeiley

507 Center Street

Berea, KY 40403

Tel: 859

‐ 986

‐ 5402

rukeiley@igc.org

Counsel for Sierra Club
EXHIBIT A

Trial Court Order

EXHIBIT B

State’s Motion for Disclosure of Trial 

Files













EXHIBIT C

Harris’s Response to State’s Motion 

for Disclosure of Trial Files