This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A16-0994 Tim Johnson, et al., Appellants, Michael Johnson, Trustee for the Ne xt of Kin of Karen Johnson, Appellant,

vs. Ironshore Indemnity, Inc., Respondent. Filed December 12, 2016 Affirmed Reyes, Judge Steele County District Court File No. 74CV16282 Mark M. Walbran, Walbran & Furness, Ch td., Owatonna, Minnesota (for appellants Tim Johnson, et al.) Keith L. Deike, Patton, Hove rsten & Berg, P.A., Waseca, Mi nnesota (for appellant Michael Johnson) Paula Duggan Vraa, Anthony J. Novak, Larson  King, L.L.P., St. Paul, Minnesota; and Lisa F. Mickley, Hall & Evans, L.L. C., Denver, Colorado (for respondent) Considered and decided by Reyes, Pres iding Judge; Ross, Judge; and J. Smith, Judge. *

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.2 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N REYES , Judge In this insurance-coverage dispute, Appe llants Tim Johnson, Trevor Johnson, and Michael Johnson, as trustee for th e next of kin of Karen Johnson, 1 challenge the district court’s order granting summary judgment fo r respondent Ironshore Indemnity, Inc. (Ironshore). Because the exclusion at issue in the Johnsons’ autom obile insurance policy (the Ironshore policy) is both enforceable and applicable under the facts of this appeal, we affirm. FACTS At all relevant times, Tim and Karen were married and resided with their son, Trevor, in Owatonna, Minnesota. Tim and Karen purchased the Ironshore policy, which afforded liability coverage to the Johnsons for a number of th eir classic automobiles. The Ironshore policy insures Tim and Karen as “named insureds,” and Tim, Karen, and Trevor as “insureds.” Trevor was involved in a single-vehicle accident while driving a Ford Model T on vacation in Utah. Karen sustained fatal inju ries as a passenger. Tim and Karen owned the Model T, which was insured under the Ironshore policy. Unde r a wrongful-death theory, Michael, as trustee, demanded th e $500,000 general-liability limit under the Ironshore policy. Ironshore asserted that Ex clusion A.13., a drop-do wn provision in the Ironshore policy, reduces the generally ava ilable $500,000 liability limit to the minimum

1 Because appellants share the same last na me, this opinion will use first names when referring to individuals and “the Johnsons” when referring to appellants collectively.3 limit required under Minnesota la w, $30,000 per person and $60,000 per accident, when
an insured is liable fo r injuries to a “family member” as defined in the Ironshore policy. 2 The drop-down provision is included in an endorsement to the Ironshore policy’s main form and provides:
E. The following Exclusion (A.13.) is added: We do not provide Liab ility Coverage for any “insured”: 13. For “bodily inju ry” to you or any “family member” to the extent that the limits of liability for this coverage exceed the minimum limits of liability required by the financial responsibility law of Minnesota. In addition, the endorsement containing th e drop-down provision defines “minimum limits” as follows:
B. The following defin ition is added: Throughout the policy, “minim um limits” refers to the following limits of liability , as required by Minnesota law, to be provided unde r a policy of automobile liability insurance: a. $30,000 for each person, subject to $60,000 for each accident, with resp ect to “bodily injury[.]” Also, because the accident in question occurred in Utah, the parties dispute the applicability and effect of the Ironshore policy’ s “Out of State Coverage” provision (outof-state provision), which states: If an auto accident to which th is policy applies occurs in any state or province other than the one in which “your covered classic” is principally garaged, we will interpret your policy for that accident as follows: A. If the state or province has: 1. A financial responsibility or similar law

2 Karen is within the scope of the “family member” definition.4 specifying limits of liab ility for “bod ily injury” or “property damage” higher than the limit shown in the Declarations, your policy will provide the higher specified limit. 2. A compulsory insurance or similar law requiring a nonresident to maintain Insurance whenever the nonresident uses a vehicle in that state or province, your policy w ill provide at least the required minimum amounts and types of coverage. The Johnsons filed a declaratory judgme nt action against Ironshore to determine the liability limit of the Irons hore policy. The parties f iled cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted su mmary judgment for Ironshore and determined that: (1) the drop-down provision is not am biguous and does not violate the reasonableexpectations doctrine; (2) under the Ironsho re policy’s terms and conditions, the correct liability limit is Minnesota’s statutory mi nimum of $30,000; and (3) pursuant to Minnesota and Utah law, Ironshore is re quired to provide Minnesota’s statutory minimum coverage. This appeal follows. D E C I S I O N
I. The drop-down provision is enforceable and does not violate the reasonableexpectations doctrine. The Johnsons argue that the drop-down provision is unenforceable because it violates the reasonable-expectations doctrine and, therefore, Minnesota public policy. “Whether an insurance policy ex clusion is valid and enforceabl e is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.” Frey v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n , 743 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn. App. 2008) (citation omitted). “The doctrine of ‘reasonable expectati ons’ protects the ‘objectively reasonable5 expectations’ of insureds ‘even though pain staking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations.’” Jostens, Inc. v. Northfield Ins. Co. , 527 N.W.2d 116, 118 (Minn. App. 1995) (quoting Atwater Creamery v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. , 366 N.W.2d 271, 277 (Minn. 1985)), review denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 1995). “In determining the reasonable expectations of the insured, a cour t considers (1) ambiguity in the language of the contract; (2) whether the insured was to ld of important, but obscure, conditions and exclusions or the placement of major exclus ions is misleading; and (3) whether the particular provision is one k nown by the public generally.” Frey , 743 N.W.2d at 342-43 (citing Atwater , 366 N.W.2d at 278). “The doctrine does not automatically remove from the insured a responsibility to read the policy.” Atwater , 366 N.W.2d at 278. “It does, however, recognize that in cert ain instances, such as where major exclusions are hidden in the definitions section, the insured should be he ld only to reasonab le knowledge of the literal terms and conditions.” Id. A. Ambiguity Under the first Atwater factor, we must determine whether the drop-down provision is ambiguous. Policy language “is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations.” Carlson v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 749 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. 2008) (citation omitted). “Whe n insurance policy language is clear and unambiguous, ‘the language used must be given its usual and accepted meaning.’” Lobeck v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 582 N.W.2d 246, 249 (Minn. 1998) (quoting Bobich v. Oja , 258 Minn. 287, 294, 104 N.W.2d 19, 24 (1960)). In Frey , we determined that the drop-6 down provision in disp ute was not ambiguous. 3 743 N.W.2d at 342-43. The Johnsons argue that, unlike the provision in Frey , the specific dollar amount under the Minnesota liability limits is not presented directly in the drop-down provision, which renders it ambiguous. However, the Johnsons do no t present any reasonable, alternative interpretation of the drop-down provision. We rejected a similar argument in Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Am. Family Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. , 519 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. App. 1 994), which involved a rental-car company’s efforts to limit li ability in rental contracts. The provision at issue in Agency provided coverage to “settle or defe nd . . . up to the MINIMUM dollar amount required . . . in accordance with the applicable motor vehicle financial responsibility laws of the state [of execution.]” Id. at 485. We determined su ch language clearly limited “coverage to the minimum required under Minnesota law.” Id. at 487. Because the Johnsons have not presented a reasonable, alternative interpretation, and in light of our prior analysis of simila r provisions, we conclude that the drop-down provision is not ambiguous.
B. Hidden or misleading exclusions

3 The drop-down exclusion at issue in Frey provided: C. There is no coverage for [bodily injury] for which a covered person becomes legally responsibl e to pay a member of that covered person’s family residi ng in that covered person’s household. This excl usion applies only to the extent that the limits of liability for this cove rage exceed $30,000 for each person or $60,000 fo r each accident. 743 N.W.2d at 341.7 The Johnsons argue that the drop-down provision’s two-part structure, where (1) exclusionary language is located in the drop-down provision but (2) the minimum dollar amounts under Minnesota law are found in the definition of “minimum limits,” makes the provision hidden or misleading. In addition, the Johnsons argue that the dropdown provision’s failure to place parentheses around “minimum limits” to indicate it as a defined term is mislea ding. We disagree. Under the second Atwater factor, we consider “whether the insured was told of important, but obscure, conditions and exclusi ons or [whether] the placement of major exclusions is misleading.” Frey , 743 N.W.2d at 343. In Atwater , the supreme court deemed the exclusion at issue, which was lo cated within one of the policy’s definitions, unenforceable because it was hidden. 366 N.W.2d at 276-79. However, in Frey , we determined the drop-down clause at issue wa s not hidden or misleading. 743 N.W.2d at 343. We noted that, “[i]n order to fully u nderstand what the provision means, the reader of the policy must refer to the policy de finitions” for multiple terms, but, “[m]ore important[ly], the drop-down provision is in the section that is clearly labeled ‘exclusions;’ it is not hidden.” Id. Here, the Ironshore policy’s drop-down provisi on is identified as an exclusion, and the language used is concise and accessibl e. And, as discussed above, we have previously deemed a similar drop-down provision enforceable where reference was made to Minnesota’s statutory minimum withou t presenting a specific dollar amount. Agency , 519 N.W.2d at 487. We conclude that the drop-down provision is not hidden or misleading.8 C. General public awareness The third Atwater factor addresses whether the par ticular provision is one known by the public generally. “We do not disagree with the district court that the drop-down in liability coverage may be a surpri se to most policy holders.” Frey , 743 N.W.2d at 343. Therefore, because such a prov ision is not known by the pu blic generally, this factor weighs in the Johnsons’ favor. We have “previously held that in the absence of an ambiguity, a hidden major exclusion, or other special circumstances, the doctrine of reasonable expectations is inapplicable.” Id. (citing Levin v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. , 465 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 1991); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Zylberberg , 422 N.W.2d 18, 23 (Minn. App. 1988); Merseth v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , 390 N.W.2d 16, 18 (Minn. App. 1986), review denied (Minn. Aug. 13, 1986)). Such is the case here. The drop-down provision is not ambiguous or hidden and no other special circumstances apply. Therefore, we conclude that the dist rict court did not err in determining that the drop-down provision is enforceable and does not violate the reasonable-expectations doctrine.
II. The Ironshore policy’s out-of-state provision does not alter the application of the drop-down provision. The Johnsons next argue that they are entitled to the full $500 ,000 liability limit under the Ironshore policy’s out-o f-state provision. Specifically, with regard to the outof-state provision, the Johnsons argue th e following: (1) Utah has a financial responsibility law, which implicates paragr aph A.1. of the out-of-state provision;9 (2) Utah’s financial-responsi bility law specifies a liability limit for bo dily injury; and (3) the general liability limit of $500,000 under the Ironshore policy is higher than the limit specified by Utah’s financia l responsibility law. Since th e parties previously agreed that Ironshore would prevail under paragrap h A.2., the Johnsons argue that paragraph A.1. applies. “An insurance policy is a contract to wh ich general principles of contract law apply.” Terminal Transp., Inc. v. Minn. Ins. Guar. Ass’n , 862 N.W.2d 487, 489 (Minn. App. 2015) (citation omitted), review denied (Minn. June 30, 2015). “This court reviews the district court’s interpretation of a contra ct as a question of law subject to de novo review.” Id. (citation omitted). Paragraph A.1. of the Ironshore policy pr ovides that when an insured is involved in an accident in another state, Ironshore w ill provide the greater of either (1) the amount available under the Ironshore policy (“the lim it shown in the Declarations”) or (2) the amount required under the law of the state in which the accident occurred. In short, the out-of-state provision is intended to ensure the Ironshore policy does not run afoul of another state’s law in the event an accident occurs outside Minnesota. The Johnsons argue that paragraph A.1. refers to the $500,000 liability limit presented in the Ironshore policy’ s declarations table. But th at table also incorporates
“ENDORSEMENTS MADE PART OF THIS PO LICY AT THE TIME OF ISSUE” and says “[s]ee attached endorsement s.” “Endorsements . . . attach ed to an insurance contract are part of the contract, and the endorsements and the policy must be construed together.” Bobich , 258 Minn. at 294, 104 N. W.2d at 24. The Johnsons acknowledge this reference10 to the endorsements, which incl udes the drop-down provision. Because we conclude that the drop-down provision is enforceable, paragrap h A.1.’s reference to “the limit shown in the Declarations” must implicate Minnesot a’s $30,000 statutory minimum under the drop-down provision. The Johnsons’ contrary assertion, that the $500,000 liability limit is available under paragraph A.1., impermi ssibly renders meaningless the declarations’ reference to, and incorporation of, the drop-down provision. See id. (advocating holistic contract constructi on and giving effect to all provisions). The final step is to determine which is gr eater: (1) Minnesota’s $30,000 statutory minimum established under the drop-down pr ovision or (2) the statutory minimum under Utah law. Utah law provides: “Policies containing motor vehicle liability coverage may not limit the insurer’s liability under that cove rage below . . . $25,000 because of liability for bodily injury to or death of one person, arising out of th e use of a motor vehicle in any one accident.” Utah Code A nn. § 31A-22-304(1)(a ) (2014). As a result, the Ironshore policy entitles the Johnsons to the $30,000 amount under the drop-down provision because that amount is greater than the $25,000 limit established under Utah law. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that the Ironshore policy’s out-of-state provision does not alter the application of the drop-down provision. Affirmed.