Filed 4/21/15 P. v. Robinson CA4/3

 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CIERRA MELISSA ROBINSON,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G048941

 (Super. Ct. No. 13WF0628)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,

M. Marc Kelly, Judge. Affirmed. 

Steven J. Carroll, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney 

General, Eric A. Swenson and Michael Pulos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 

and Respondent.
2

 Appellant Cierra Melissa Robinson was convicted of one count each of 

pandering for prostitution and human trafficking. (Pen. Code, §§ 266i, subd. (a)(1), 

236.1, subd. (c)(1).)1 Her primary argument on appeal is that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction over her crimes because they occurred exclusively in Arizona. She also 

contends the court committed instructional error, and reversal is required under the lesser 

included offense doctrine. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment. 

FACTS

At the tender age of 14, Jane Doe ran away from her Arizona home and 

started working as a stripper at a club in Scottsdale called “Skins.” Appellant worked in 

the area around the club as a prostitute. One day she approached Doe and told her she 

could make more money working as a prostitute than a stripper. Doe told appellant she 

was not interested. 

A couple of nights later, on February 22, 2013, appellant and her pimp 

Chuncey Garcia contacted Doe as she was leaving Skins. After speaking briefly with 

Garcia, Doe accompanied him and appellant to a nearby motel room. Doe thought Garcia 

was going to offer her a job answering phones, but that wasn’t the case. Instead, he told 

her he wanted her to become one of his prostitutes. He explained how she should handle 

customers and what to charge them. He also told her she was not allowed to tell anyone

she worked for him. Although Doe did not want to become a prostitute, she went along 

with what Garcia was saying and joined his operation because she feared him. 

That night, appellant, who was known as Garcia’s “head bitch,” acquired a 

cell phone for Doe and posted her phone number on the internet. The next day, Doe 

began receiving calls from men who were looking for sex. However, she did not accept 

any of their propositions. When Garcia asked about the calls, Doe lied and told him they 

were from other pimps, not potential customers. 

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
3

A day or two later, Garcia, appellant, Doe, and a woman named “Baby” left 

Scottsdale and drove to California in Garcia’s Cadillac. Along the way, they stopped at a 

truck stop and a McDonald’s restaurant. Garcia made appellant and Baby turn tricks

during the stops, but Doe did not engage in any prostitution during the trip. 

That changed when the group arrived in Orange County. Working out of 

an Anaheim motel, Garcia required Doe and the others to each bring in at least $200 a 

day from prostitution activity. Appellant gave Doe tips on how to meet that quota. At 

Garcia’s direction, appellant also bought clothes for Doe and posted sexually explicit 

pictures of her on the internet in order to get her clients. However, the operation did not 

last long. On March 1, 2013 – just one week after Doe first met Garcia in Scottsdale –

the police arrested Garcia and appellant following a traffic stop. During the stop, Doe 

initially lied to the officers about her name and age, but she eventually came clean about 

everything. 

Appellant and Garcia were tried separately. Although Doe was unavailable 

for appellant’s trial, a videotape of her sworn conditional examination was played for the 

jury. After appellant was convicted of pandering and human trafficking, the court 

sentenced her to the low term of five years in prison for the latter offense and stayed 

sentence on the pandering count pursuant to section 654. 

I

Appellant argues California lacked jurisdiction over her crimes, but we 

disagree. Although the offenses were completed in Arizona for purposes of establishing 

appellant’s culpability, they continued after Doe was transported to California. 

Therefore, jurisdiction in this state was proper. 

Appellant was charged with two distinct, but interrelated crimes, pandering 

and human trafficking. The pandering charge alleged appellant procured Doe for the 
4

purpose of prostitution in violation of section 266i, subdivision (a)(1).

2 The trafficking 

charge alleged appellant induced Doe, a minor, to engage in prostitution with the intent to 

effect or maintain a violation of section 266i. (§ 236.1, subd. (c).)3 

At the end of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, appellant moved to dismiss 

both counts for lack of jurisdiction on the basis the evidence failed to establish that any of 

the underlying acts occurred in California. The motion was premised on the belief the 

charged offenses were completed in Arizona once Doe agreed to become a prostitute, and 

although appellant assisted Doe’s prostitution activities in California, the pandering and 

trafficking offenses were not ongoing crimes. Therefore, California did not have 

jurisdiction to try her for those offenses. The trial court disagreed. It believed there was 

evidence of ongoing procurement in California and that appellant endeavored to support 

and maintain Doe’s prostitution activity in this state. It denied appellant’s motion to

dismiss. 

“It long has been established that a state will entertain a criminal 

proceeding only to enforce its own criminal laws, and will not assume authority to 

enforce the penal laws of other states or the federal government through criminal 

 

2 Section 266i, subdivision (a) states pandering occurs when a person does any of the following:

“(1) Procures another person for the purpose of prostitution.

“(2) By promises, threats, violence, or by any device or scheme, causes, induces, persuades, or 

encourages another person to become a prostitute.

“(3) Procures for another person a place as an inmate in a house of prostitution or as an inmate of 

any place in which prostitution is encouraged or allowed within this state.

“(4) By promises, threats, violence, or by any device or scheme, causes, induces, persuades, or 

encourages an inmate of a house of prostitution, or any other place in which prostitution is encouraged or allowed, to 

remain therein as an inmate.

“(5) By fraud or artifice, or by duress of person or goods, or by abuse of any position of 

confidence or authority, procures another person for the purpose of prostitution, or to enter any place in which 

prostitution is encouraged or allowed within this state, or to come into this state or leave this state for the purpose of 

prostitution.

“(6) Receives or gives, or agrees to receive or give, any money or thing of value for procuring, or 

attempting to procure, another person for the purpose of prostitution, or to come into this state or leave this state for 

the purpose of prostitution.” 

3 Despite its name, the “trafficking” charge did not require appellant to transport Doe from one 

place to another; it simply required inducement with the intent to effect or maintain prostitution activity. (§ 236.1, 

subd. (c).) 
5

prosecutions in its state courts. [Citation.]” (People v. Betts (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1039, 

1046.) However, the narrow common law rule which limited jurisdiction to a single state 

no longer governs jurisdictional issues in California. (Ibid.) In recognition of the fact 

criminal activity often spans more than one state, California has enacted various statutes 

which are designed to extend jurisdiction over those whose conduct affects persons in or 

interests of this state, provided it is just and reasonable to do so. (Id. at p. 1047; People v. 

Renteria (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1118.)

In particular, section 27 authorizes California to assume jurisdiction over 

any defendant whose crime was committed “in whole or in part” in this state. (§ 27, 

subd. (a)(1).) And, section 778 gives California jurisdiction over any defendant whose 

crime was “commenced” outside the state, so long as it was “consummated” in California

by means proceeding directly from the defendant. (§ 778.) As we now explain,

appellant’s crimes fell within the terms of both of these statutes.

Looking at section 778 first, it is clear the crimes of pandering for 

prostitution and human trafficking were commenced in Arizona when appellant and 

Garcia induced Doe to become a prostitute. However, while the acts necessary to trigger 

liability occurred in Arizona, the objective of appellant’s crimes was not fulfilled until 

Doe actually started working as a prostitute, which was in California. Appellant fails to 

recognize this distinction. In focusing on the acts necessary to trigger liability, appellant 

overlooks the fact section 778 is not so much concerned with where the underlying acts 

of the crime took place as where the result of those acts occurred. (Hageseth v. Superior 

Court (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1418.) Because the result of appellant’s pandering 

and trafficking activity, i.e., Doe’s prostitution, occurred in this state, the crimes were 

consummated here for purposes of section 778, and jurisdiction was proper under that 

statute. (See generally People v. Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 970-971 [while the 

language of the pandering statute focuses on inducing and encouraging, the ultimate 

purpose of the statute is to deter prostitution activity].) 
6

Our analysis under section 27 follows a similar track. As noted above, that 

statute is satisfied if the subject offense was committed in whole or in part in California. 

It is true that pandering has been described as a “one-act offense,” given it is technically 

accomplished when the defendant procures a person for the purpose of prostitution. 

(People v. White (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 143, 151 (White).) That description would also 

fit the crime of human trafficking under section 236.1, subdivision (c), since it focuses on 

the act of inducing a minor to engage in prostitution. But while the acts of procuring and 

inducing are sufficient to trigger liability, it does not mean these crimes are over when 

those acts initially occur. Rather, courts have treated these crimes as continuous, ongoing 

offenses in a variety of contexts. 

For example, in White, supra, the court determined that for jury unanimity 

purposes, the prosecution was not required to elect among the many acts of prostitution 

the victim of the defendant’s pandering carried out after he recruited her. After noting 

the pandering statute is designed to discourage people from increasing the supply of 

available prostitutes, the court stated “once the female is procured for a house of 

prostitution, the one offense becomes ongoing as long as the female plies her trade in 

such house.” (White, supra, 89 Cal.App.3d at p. 151.)4 

Similarly, in People v. Leonard (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 465, 488-491

(Leonard), the court determined pandering is an ongoing offense for purposes of 

determining the scope of aiding and abetting liability. Even though the defendant did not 

assist his codefendant in carrying out any of the initial acts that led the victim to become 

a prostitute, he was liable for pandering because he helped his codefendant ensure the 

victim continued in that line of work. (Ibid.) Following White, the Leonard court ruled 

that despite the fact the crime of pandering is complete once the victim is encouraged to 

 

4 In White, the defendant was charged with procuring for another person a place as an inmate in a 

house of prostitution under former section 266i, subdivision (c). That offense is currently set forth in section 266i, 

subdivision (a)(3). 
7

become a prostitute, “it continues as long as the intended prostitution continues.” 

(Leonard, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 490.)

Appellant attempts to distinguish Leonard on the basis the initial pandering 

in that case occurred in California, not out of state. In other words, she feels Leonard is 

inapt because it did not address the issue of jurisdiction for interstate offenses. However, 

at its core, Leonard addressed the same basic question at issue in this case: Under what 

circumstances is it fair and reasonable for California to extend criminal liability to people 

who get others to work in the prostitution trade? If a person who is not involved in the 

initial pandering can be held liable for persuading the victim to remain in the trade, as in 

Leonard, it makes imminent sense to extend jurisdiction over appellant because she not 

only facilitated Doe’s prostitution activity and encouraged her to remain in the trade, she 

was actively involved in Doe’s initial recruitment. In fact, she is the one who lured Doe 

into Garcia’s clutches and laid the groundwork for Doe’s transformation from stripper to 

prostitute. 

People v. Osuna (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 528, on which appellant relies, 

does not compel a different result. In that case, the court held the crime of procuring a 

female to work in a place of prostitution is complete once the defendant induces the 

victim to work in such a place, irrespective of whether she actually does so. (Id. at pp. 

531-532.) However, in so holding, Osuna was simply concerned with the threshold 

question of whether the defendant’s conduct was sufficient to trigger liability for 

pandering in the first place. The court had no reason to consider the issue before us, 

which is whether, once technically started, pandering is a continuing offense for purposes 

of establishing the scope of a person’s liability for that offense. 

As explained above, these are two different issues. While appellant’s 

crimes were technically accomplished in Arizona, they continued in California because 

that is where Doe actually started working as a prostitute and that is where, with 

appellant’s assistance, the labor of appellant’s crimes began to bear fruit. At bottom, we 
8

are satisfied California’s interest in curbing the sexual exploitation of minors and 

curtailing prostitution activity as a whole gives it jurisdiction to prosecute appellant for 

her role in procuring Doe to work as a prostitute in this state. There is no basis for 

disturbing the trial court’s ruling in that regard. 

II

Appellant also contends the trial court wrongfully denied her request to 

instruct the jury that, in order to convict her of the charged offenses, it must find she 

committed the alleged acts in California. However, it is well established the question of 

jurisdiction – which is unrelated to the defendant’s guilt or innocence – is a legal issue for 

the court, not a factual question for the jury. (People v. Betts, supra, 34 Cal.4th at 

p. 1054.) Therefore, appellant had no right to have the issue of jurisdiction decided by 

her jury. (Ibid.; Hageseth v. Superior Court, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 1408.) 

III

Lastly, appellant argues her conviction for human trafficking must be 

reversed because that offense is a necessarily included offense of pandering. Again, we 

disagree. 

A defendant may not be convicted of multiple charged offenses if one is 

necessarily included in the other. (People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1227.) “[I]f 

the statutory elements of the greater offense include all of the statutory elements of the 

lesser offense, the latter is necessarily included in the former” and must be reversed. 

(Ibid.) 

Appellant was convicted of pandering for procuring “another person for the 

purpose of prostitution” (§ 266i, subd. (a)), and she was convicted of human trafficking 

for inducing a minor to engage in prostitution with the intent to effect or maintain a 

violation of the pandering statute (§ 236.1, subd. (c).) As appellant admits, a pandering 

victim can be any age, so if she had procured an adult for prostitution, she would have
9

been guilty of pandering but not trafficking a minor. Therefore, the latter offense is not 

necessarily included in the former. 

Nevertheless, appellant argues her trafficking offense was a necessarily 

included offense of pandering in this case because of the manner in which the latter 

offense was charged. In particular, she relies on the fact the prosecution not only charged 

her with pandering in violation of section 266i, subdivision (a)(1), it also alleged she 

pandered to a person who was under the age of sixteen. However, this charging language 

only affected appellant’s potential punishment, it did not change the elements of her 

underlying crimes.

5 Because the age of appellant’s victim was only a sentencing factor, 

it is not relevant for purposes of applying the necessarily included offense test. (People 

v. Izaguirre (2007) 42 Cal.4th 126, 128; People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 100-

101.) 

More fundamentally, our Supreme Court has made it clear that when 

determining whether multiple convictions for charged offenses is proper, we must 

consider only the statutory elements of the subject offenses and not the facts alleged in 

the accusatory pleading. (People v. Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1231; People v. Ramirez

(2009) 45 Cal.4th 980, 984-985.) As we have explained, trafficking a minor is not a 

necessarily included offense of pandering under the statutory elements test, and thus 

appellant was properly convicted of both offenses.6

 

5 Whereas the punishment for violating section 266i, subdivision (a)(1) is three, four or six years in 

prison, the punishment for violating that provision when the victim is under sixteen years of age is three, six or eight 

years in prison. (§ 266i, subd. (b)(2).) 

6 In light of this conclusion, we need not consider respondent’s argument human trafficking could 

not be a lesser included offense in this case because it carried a greater punishment than the pandering offense. 

(Compare the punishment for pandering set forth in fn. 5 above with section 236.1, subd. (c)(1), which prescribes a 

punishment of five, eight or twelve years in prison for trafficking a minor.) However, the argument would probably 

not have much traction even if we did. (See People v. Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1230 [positing that murder could 

be a lesser included offense of robbery in certain circumstances].) 
10

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

BEDSWORTH, J.

WE CONCUR:

RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.

THOMPSON, J.