This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-1363

State of Minnesota,

Respondent, 

vs. 

Arthur Charles Huffman, 

Appellant.

Filed April 20, 2015

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Smith, Judge

Wabasha County District Court

File No. 79-CR-14-131

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Nordstrom, Wabasha County Attorney, Wabasha, Minnesota (for respondent) 

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and 

Chutich, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

SMITH, Judge

We affirm appellant’s convictions of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, 

domestic assault by strangulation, and terroristic threats because the district court did not 

err by admitting evidence regarding appellant’s incarcerations, the prosecutor did not 
2

commit prejudicial misconduct during her closing argument, and appellant’s pro se 

arguments regarding errors at his trial lack merit. But we reverse and remand for the 

district court to correct the erroneous warrant of commitment and resentence appellant 

based on the correct criminal history scores and the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.

FACTS

Appellant Arthur Charles Huffman met M.J. over Memorial Day weekend in 

2013, and the couple soon developed a sexual relationship. In fall 2013, Huffman began 

serving a jail sentence in New Hampshire. He and M.J. called each other and sent letters 

back and forth until his release in February 2014.

On February 10, 2014, Huffman and M.J. went grocery shopping and stopped at a 

bar. According to M.J., she drank three beers, but Huffman drank “quite a bit.” They 

were at the bar from 1:00 to 7:00 p.m., and Huffman became upset with M.J. as he drank. 

As she was driving them home, M.J. became concerned that Huffman was going to hit 

her.

M.J. testified that, as she was putting away the groceries, Huffman grabbed her by 

the hair and told her to get in the bedroom. Huffman undressed, and M.J. took off her 

pants and underwear. M.J. explained that she “thought it would be easier to have sex and 

he would pass out, and it would be over with.” During vaginal intercourse, Huffman 

started slapping her “continually,” which lasted a few minutes. He then pulled M.J.’s 

head back by her hair, spit in her face, hit her, and bit her face. M.J. told Huffman to stop 

several times. Huffman then forced M.J. to perform oral sex on him and said that if she 

hurt him, he would “make it worse for [her].” After about one minute, Huffman punched 
3

M.J. in the back of the head and ribs and started strangling her. M.J. tried to yell that she 

could not breathe and thought she was going to die. She punched Huffman until they fell 

off the bed and he hit the nightstand. M.J. ran to the kitchen, but Huffman followed her, 

grabbed her hair, and pushed her back into the bedroom.

According to M.J., Huffman then told her to get on her knees. Huffman began 

having vaginal intercourse with M.J., but thought it was anal intercourse. After 

discovering this, he told M.J. he was “going to hurt [her] so bad.” He pulled her head 

back and put his fingers in her rectum. Huffman then shoved his fingers in M.J.’s mouth 

and “started performing anal sex on [her].” M.J. kicked her feet until Huffman lost his 

balance and fell off the bed. M.J. grabbed a coat and ran outside into the snow. She 

flagged down a passing car and used her neighbor’s cell phone to call police.

Huffman was charged with eight counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, 

one count of domestic assault by strangulation, and three counts of making terroristic 

threats. Following testimony in the jury trial, the state dismissed four first-degree 

criminal-sexual-conduct charges and two terroristic-threats charges. The jury then found 

Huffman guilty of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, domestic assault 

by strangulation, and making terroristic threats, and not guilty of the remaining charge of 

first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The jury also found that Huffman used force and 

coercion in the commission of the three criminal-sexual-conduct offenses. 

At sentencing, the district court imposed 360 months in prison on one charge of 

first-degree criminal sexual conduct and concurrent sentences of 33 months each on the 

domestic-assault and terroristic-threats charges.
4

D E C I S I O N

I.

Huffman first argues that the district court erred by allowing the admission of 

evidence that he was incarcerated both before and after the charged offenses. 

“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the [district] court and will not be 

reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn.

2003). The erroneous admission of evidence does not require reversal unless the error 

“substantially influence[d] the jury’s decision.” State v. Nunn, 561 N.W.2d 902, 907 

(Minn. 1997).

While references to a defendant’s prior incarceration “can be unfairly prejudicial,” 

there is no “general rule that it is prejudicial for the jury to learn that a defendant is in jail 

for the crime for which he or she is on trial.” State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 506 

(Minn. 2006). The evidence at trial included phone calls and text messages from 

Huffman to M.J. following his arrest, during which Huffman appeared to blame M.J. and 

to suggest that he was innocent “because they record these calls.” The references to 

Huffman’s location during the calls and texts only confirmed jurors’ understanding of the 

“standard law enforcement practice” of incarcerating a defendant after filing charges 

against him. See id. at 506-07 (“Generally, jurors’ knowledge that a defendant is in 

custody pending the outcome of a . . . trial is likely to have been seen for just what it is—

standard law enforcement practice.” (quotation omitted)); see also State v. Anderson, 

391 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. App. 1986) (stating that a jury could know that a defendant 

“would remain in custody for at least a few days after arrest for three aggravated 
5

robberies” and declining to find reversible error for two inadvertent references to the 

defendant’s post-offense incarceration). As the district court concluded, Huffman’s postoffense incarceration was “pretty obvious from the context.” Because the references to 

Huffman’s post-offense incarceration were obvious to the jury and relevant to its

understanding of Huffman’s phone calls and text messages, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.

During M.J.’s direct examination, the prosecutor did not mention Huffman’s prior 

incarceration, but referred only to a separation between fall 2013 and February 2014. 

The prosecutor questioned M.J. about the content of three letters she wrote to Huffman 

during this separation. On cross-examination, Huffman’s attorney attempted to introduce 

another letter from M.J. to Huffman “for purposes of impeachment.” This letter 

contained an explicit story with references to biting and ripping off clothing during sex. 

The district court allowed Huffman’s attorney to introduce the letter but explained that 

“you’re opening the door to allowing her to explain the circumstances and the meaning of 

it.” On redirect, M.J. stated that she sent the letter to Huffman while he was in jail. The 

district court overruled Huffman’s objection to this statement because M.J. was entitled 

to explain that she wrote the letter at Huffman’s request and because the fact that 

Huffman was in jail was “relevant and material” to M.J.’s explanation.

M.J.’s statement that she sent the letter to Huffman while he was in jail was 

generally inadmissible. See Manthey, 711 N.W.2d at 506 (explaining that references to a 

defendant’s prior incarceration “can be unfairly prejudicial”). But by introducing M.J.’s 

explicit letter, Huffman opened the door to M.J.’s explanation. “Opening the door occurs 
6

when one party by introducing certain material creates in the opponent a right to respond 

with material that would otherwise have been inadmissible.” State v. Valtierra, 

718 N.W.2d 425, 436 (Minn. 2006) (quotations omitted). Huffman introduced the letter 

to bolster his argument that M.J. consented to the sexual activities. M.J.’s explanations 

for the letter were relevant and provided context for the couple’s sexual relationship. See

Minn. R. Evid. 401 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make 

the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 

probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”). Because Huffman 

opened the door and gave M.J. the right to explain the letter’s context, the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in allowing reference to Huffman’s prior incarceration.

The references to Huffman’s incarcerations did not influence the jury’s decision. 

When “a reference to a defendant’s prior record is of a passing nature, or the evidence of 

guilt is overwhelming, a new trial is not warranted because it is extremely unlikely that 

the evidence in question played a significant role in persuading the jury to convict.” State 

v. Clark, 486 N.W.2d 166, 170 (Minn. App. 1992) (quotations omitted). M.J. provided 

extensive testimony about her relationship with Huffman and the events of February 10, 

2014. Because the other evidence of Huffman’s guilt was strong, we cannot conclude 

that the references to Huffman’s incarcerations persuaded the jury to convict. See id. at 

170-71 (declining to order a new trial for two brief references to the defendant’s prior 

record when the other evidence of guilt was strong).
7

II.

Huffman next challenges three statements in the prosecutor’s closing argument.

Statement One:

In her closing argument, the prosecutor stated:

Is it consent freely given when at the end of this rough, 

adventurous sex, the victim feels the need to run from the 

house naked in February holding a coat, a spring coat no less? 

I would suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that that is not 

consent freely given, and you would have to be on a different 

planet to think it was.

Huffman’s attorney objected to this statement, and the district court overruled the 

objection, explaining that the statement involved permissible “hyperbole.”

When analyzing objected-to prosecutorial misconduct, we apply a harmless error 

test that “varies based on the severity of the misconduct.” State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 

378, 389 (Minn. 2007). We “will reverse only if the misconduct, when considered in 

light of the whole trial, impaired the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” State v. Powers, 

654 N.W.2d 667, 678 (Minn. 2003). “If the misconduct was serious, the misconduct is 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the verdict rendered was surely unattributable to 

the error. For less serious misconduct, the standard is whether the misconduct likely 

played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.” Id. (quotations and citations 

omitted).

Huffman is correct that the prosecutor’s statement “was directed at the heart of the 

defense—whether M.J. consented.” We conclude that the prosecutor improperly 

disparaged the defense with her statement that the jury “would have to be on a different 

planet” to agree with the defense that M.J. consented. See State v. Griese, 565 N.W.2d 
8

419, 427 (Minn. 1997) (stating that “it is improper to disparage the defense in closing 

arguments”). But we also conclude that the prosecutor’s misconduct was not serious and 

did not influence the jury’s decision. See Powers, 654 N.W.2d at 678. M.J.’s testimony 

provided ample evidence of Huffman’s guilt, and a review of the prosecutor’s entire 

closing argument does not reveal additional misconduct. See id. (explaining that we 

consider the closing argument as a whole and review prosecutorial misconduct “in light 

of the whole trial”). Huffman is not entitled to a new trial based on the prosecutor’s one 

disparaging statement.

Statement Two:

In rebuttal, the prosecutor challenged the defense’s “act of desperation” in 

pointing out in closing that the doctor who examined M.J. and testified at trial was 

acquainted with the prosecutor’s husband. She called this “[s]omething else to be thrown 

at the wall to distract you.” The defense attorney did not immediately object, but 

requested surrebuttal on the basis that the prosecutor “belittl[ed] the defense.” The 

district court denied surrebuttal.

Contrary to Huffman’s contention on appeal, the prosecutor was not commenting 

on “the evidence presented by Huffman.” Huffman’s attorney attacked the doctor’s 

findings in his closing, in part based on the doctor’s acquaintance with the prosecutor and 

her husband. Rather than belittling the defense, the prosecutor was responding to the 

defense’s insinuations. This statement did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct and 

did not influence the jury’s decision. See id.

Statement Three:
9

Huffman also challenges the following section of the prosecutor’s rebuttal:

There seems to be a portion of [defense counsel’s] closing 

argument where he almost seems to suggest that he wants you 

to abandon common sense and seems to tell you that common 

sense is not a substitute for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 

No, common sense is just part of the instruction. It’s just part 

of all that language. So you don’t abandon your common 

sense. You use your common sense. That’s part of the 

instruction for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Huffman’s attorney did not object.

When analyzing unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct, “we apply a modified 

plain error test.” Wren, 738 N.W.2d at 389. We reverse “only if there is (1) error, 

(2) that is plain, and (3) the error affects the defendant’s substantial rights.” State v. Hill, 

801 N.W.2d 646, 654 (Minn. 2011). If the defendant “demonstrates that the prosecutor’s 

conduct constitutes an error that is plain,” the burden shifts to the state to show that the 

error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 

302 (Minn. 2006).

Huffman has not met his burden to demonstrate an error, much less a plain error. 

See State v. Starkey, 516 N.W.2d 918, 927 (Minn. 1994) (finding no error when a 

prosecutor stated that the defense would “divert your attention from the real facts, the real 

logic and the real common sense of this case”). This challenged statement did not 

improperly disparage the defense, but simply urged the jury to use common sense. See 

id. (stating that a prosecutor properly urged jurors to use common sense in anticipation of 

a defense argument). In addition, the statement mirrored the district court’s instruction to 

weigh witness testimonies based on the jury’s “own experience, good judgment and 

common sense.”
10

III.

Huffman next raises several issues regarding his convictions and sentencing. We 

review sentencing challenges based on legal issues de novo. State v. DeRosier, 

719 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Minn. 2006). “[A]n appellant does not waive claims of multiple 

convictions or sentences by failing to raise the issue at the time of sentencing.” Spann v. 

State, 740 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. 2007).

First, Huffman argues that the district court erred under Minn. Stat. § 609.04 

(2012) by entering convictions on all three first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct charges. 

Section 609.04 “prevent[s] the state from convicting a defendant twice of the same 

offense or of a greater and a lesser-included offense on the basis of the same act or course 

of conduct.” State v. Dudrey, 330 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Minn. 1983). In Dudrey, the 

supreme court held that a defendant charged with multiple counts of criminal sexual 

conduct based on different types of penetration during the same behavioral incident may 

be convicted of only one count. Id. But the different types of penetration can “be 

considered in making the determination whether to depart from the presumptive 

sentence.” Id. at 722. At sentencing, the district court correctly determined that, under 

Dudrey, it could only sentence Huffman on one count of first-degree criminal sexual 

conduct. See id. at 721.

But the warrant of commitment states that Huffman was convicted of three counts 

of criminal sexual conduct. A written judgment of conviction provides “conclusive 

evidence of whether an offense has been formally adjudicated.” Spann, 740 N.W.2d at 

573 (quotation omitted). Because the warrant of commitment shows that Huffman was 
11

convicted of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and because two 

convictions were improper under Dudrey, we reverse and remand for the district court to 

vacate two of Huffman’s first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct convictions.

Second, Huffman argues that the district court erred under Minn. Stat. § 609.035 

(2012) by entering convictions on both the domestic-assault and terroristic-threats 

charges. In general, “if a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the 

laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses.” Minn. Stat. 

§ 609.035, subd. 1. But section 609.035 contains an exception where a conviction of 

criminal sexual conduct committed “with force or violence is not a bar to conviction of or 

punishment for any other crime committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct.” 

Id., subd. 6. Here, the jury concluded that Huffman committed criminal sexual conduct 

with force and coercion, so the exception applies and allows additional convictions.

Huffman argues that the exception under subdivision 6 permits his conviction for 

only one additional crime. We disagree. Subdivision 6 allows an additional conviction 

for “any other crime committed by the defendant.” Id. (emphasis added). It does not 

allow conviction for “another crime.” In addition, the statute explains the effect of 

consecutive sentences when an offender “is punished for more than one crime.” Id.

(emphasis added). This language does not suggest that a district court can convict an 

offender of only one crime in addition to criminal sexual conduct. See State v. Williams, 

771 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Minn. 2009) (“[I]f a defendant commits one of these offenses [in 

the statutory exceptions], he or she may be convicted and sentenced for other offenses

that arise out of the same behavioral incident.” (emphasis added)). Because the plain 
12

language of section 609.035, subdivision 6 allows conviction for other crimes committed 

during the same conduct as criminal sexual conduct, the district court did not err by 

convicting Huffman of both domestic abuse by strangulation and terroristic threats. 

Third, Huffman challenges the criminal history scores used to calculate his 

domestic-abuse and terroristic-threats sentences. He does not challenge his criminal 

history score for the remaining criminal-sexual-conduct conviction. “[W]e will not 

reverse the district court’s determination of a defendant’s criminal history score absent an 

abuse of discretion.” State v. Stillday, 646 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Minn. App. 2002), review 

denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2002). But Huffman is correct that reversal and remand is 

required because the district court improperly increased Huffman’s criminal history 

scores by adding points for the two criminal-sexual-conduct convictions that must be 

vacated. “In order for a felony conviction to be included in a defendant’s criminalhistory score, the sentence for that conviction must have been stayed or imposed before 

the current sentencing.” Williams, 771 N.W.2d at 521 (quotation omitted). The district 

court erred by increasing Huffman’s criminal history score based on two charges for 

which the district court stated that it was not imposing conviction.

“[W]hen a defendant is sentenced for multiple offenses on the same day, a 

conviction for which the defendant is first sentenced is added to his or her criminalhistory score for another offense for which he or she is also sentenced.” Id. Huffman 

had one criminal history point before being sentenced for first-degree criminal sexual 

conduct. The first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction added three criminal 

history points. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.1.b, 4.B (2012) (showing that an A-level 
13

offense on the sex-offender grid is three points and that first-degree criminal sexual 

conduct falls in level A). When he was sentenced for domestic assault by strangulation, 

Huffman should have had four criminal history points, rather than seven. The domesticassault conviction then added one criminal history point to Huffman’s total. See Minn. 

Sent. Guidelines 2.B.1.a (2012) (showing that a severity-level four offense adds one 

point). Huffman therefore should have had five points for the terroristic-threats sentence, 

rather than eight. 

Given the errors in Huffman’s criminal history scores, we reverse and remand 

Huffman’s sentences for domestic assault and terroristic threats for the district court to 

resentence Huffman based on the correct criminal history scores.

Finally, Huffman argues in his pro se supplemental brief that his aggravated 

sentence for the remaining first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction violated 

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Under Blakely, “any fact 

that is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts 

established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted to by the defendant or 

proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436, 440 

(Minn. 2006).

Before sentencing, the state moved the district court to order consecutive 

sentences for the three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and requested a 

sentence of 374 months in prison. But the maximum sentence for first-degree criminal 

sexual conduct is 30 years (or 360 months). Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 2(a) (2012). At 

the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor explained that, under the presentence investigation, 
14

the maximum sentence was 360 months, and that she had requested 374 months because 

she “forgot that the points would accumulate through separate worksheets.” Based on 

this statement, the prosecutor seems not to have understood that she was requesting an 

aggravated sentence. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.B (showing that the presumed 

sentence for first-degree criminal sexual conduct with one criminal history point is 156 

months with a range from 144 to 187 months). As a result, the prosecutor failed to 

provide written notice of an intent to seek an aggravated sentence. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 

7.03 (requiring written notice at least seven days before the omnibus hearing). We agree 

with Huffman that this lack of notice infringed his right to request or waive a jury trial on 

sentencing factors. See Osborne, 715 N.W.2d at 443 (explaining in a case pending when 

Blakely was decided that the defendant was not advised of his right to have a jury trial on 

sentencing factors and so did not waive that right).

The district court determined that it could impose an upward departure because the 

jury found that Huffman committed multiple forms of sexual penetration against M.J. 

“[T]he fact that the defendant has penetrated a victim in two or more different ways as 

part of the same behavioral incident can . . . be considered in making the determination 

whether to depart from the presumptive sentence.” Dudrey, 330 N.W.2d at 721-22. But 

“[a] district court must order the presumptive sentence provided by the sentencing 

guidelines unless there are ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ to warrant an 

upward departure.” State v. Grampre, 766 N.W.2d 347, 350 (Minn. App. 2009) (quoting 

Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D), review denied (Minn. Aug. 26, 2009). The district court 

made no finding that there were substantial and compelling circumstances showing that 
15

Huffman’s conduct was significantly more serious than the conduct typically involved in 

first-degree criminal sexual conduct. In addition, the district court did not find that there 

were “severe aggravating circumstances,” but imposed a “greater-than-double departure 

from the presumptive sentence.” See State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 140 (Minn. 

2005) (“Only in cases of severe aggravating circumstances may the district court impose 

a greater-than-double departure from the presumptive sentence; in such cases the only 

absolute limit on duration is the maximum provided in the statute defining the offense.” 

(quotation omitted)).

Because Huffman received no notice of the state’s intent to seek an aggravated 

sentence and because the district court imposed the maximum statutory sentence, greater 

than double the presumptive sentence, without finding “severe aggravating 

circumstances,” see id., we reverse Huffman’s aggravated sentence for first-degree 

criminal sexual conduct and remand for resentencing.

IV.

Huffman raises several additional arguments in his pro se supplemental brief.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:

Huffman argues that his trial attorneys were ineffective. But Huffman is incorrect 

that his attorneys failed to argue that he was too intoxicated to commit the charged 

offenses. Huffman’s attorneys disclosed their intent to introduce an intoxication defense 

and discussed Huffman’s intoxication extensively during closing argument. Because 

Huffman’s attorneys introduced an intoxication defense, as Huffman wanted, there is no 

evidence that their performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See 
16

State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003) (“To prevail on such a claim, an 

appellant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness . . . .” (quotation omitted)).

In making his other ineffective-assistance arguments, Huffman cites facts we 

cannot review because they are not in the record. See State v. Alvarez, 820 N.W.2d 601, 

626 (Minn. App. 2012) (“[A]n ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim should typically be 

raised by a postconviction petition for relief.”), aff’d sub. nom. State v. Castillo-Alvarez, 

836 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2013). Because there is no record evidence regarding 

Huffman’s communications with his attorneys, we decline to consider Huffman’s other 

arguments. We also decline to consider Huffman’s arguments because they challenge 

trial strategy. See Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Minn. 2013) (explaining that 

appellate courts do not review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that are based 

on trial strategy).

DNA Evidence:

Huffman challenges the district court’s exclusion of DNA evidence. The state 

moved to exclude the DNA evidence, and the district court granted the motion because 

Huffman was raising a consent defense and the evidence’s prejudice would outweigh its 

probative value. Under Minnesota’s rape-shield law, only evidence of the victim’s 

previous common scheme or plan of similar sexual conduct and evidence of previous 

sexual conduct with the accused are admissible when consent of the victim is a defense. 

Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 3 (2012). The excluded DNA evidence in this case falls 

under neither of those exceptions. As a result, the district court did not abuse its 
17

discretion in excluding the DNA evidence. See Amos, 658 N.W.2d at 203 (“Evidentiary 

rulings rest within the sound discretion of the [district] court and will not be reversed 

absent a clear abuse of discretion.”).

Prosecutorial Misconduct:

In addition to the prosecutorial-misconduct issues raised by his appellate attorney, 

Huffman argues that the prosecutor improperly aligned herself with the jury during jury 

selection. During voir dire, the prosecutor asked one potential juror whether he thought 

he could be prosecuted for burglarizing a house that was left unlocked. The potential 

juror responded, “[h]e just better hope that he’s not there when I get home,” and the 

prosecutor replied that the man and her husband “would get along really well.” The man 

was then selected for the jury. Because Huffman does not cite legal authority or explain 

how this exchange prejudiced him, we decline to consider this issue. See State v. 

Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008) (“We will not consider pro se claims on appeal 

that are unsupported by either arguments or citations to legal authority.”).

Huffman also argues that the prosecutor improperly referred to evidence of blood 

on the bed sheets. But we can find no reference to blood in the prosecutor’s opening 

statement and no evidence that the issue came up “throughout the course of the trial,” as 

Huffman suggests. There is also no record evidence that Huffman requested analysis of a

blood sample. Given the record and the fact that Huffman did not object to the 

prosecutor’s statements at trial, Huffman has not met his burden to demonstrate a plain 

error. See Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302.
18

Trial Issues and Sequestration:

Finally, Huffman challenges the timing and venue of his trial. To the extent that 

Huffman challenges the actions of his trial attorneys, we decline to consider this issue as 

a matter of trial strategy. See Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 13. We also note that there is no 

record evidence of defense counsel asking Huffman whether he had additional questions 

for M.J., as Huffman alleges.

Huffman also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to sequester the 

jury. The district court denied Huffman’s motion for sequestration because there had 

only been one news article about the case in one local newspaper three weeks before the 

trial and because the local papers only published once a week so they were unlikely to 

print any editions until after the trial had ended. The district court must only order 

sequestration “if the case is of such notoriety or the issues are of such a nature that, in the 

absence of sequestration, highly prejudicial matters are likely to come to the jurors’ 

attention.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 5(2). Huffman identifies no facts that suggest 

the case was notorious or that he was prejudiced by the lack of sequestration. See State v. 

Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 81 (Minn. 1985) (explaining under a previous version of rule 

26.03 that lack of sequestration “does not raise a presumption of prejudice” and a 

defendant must show prejudice in the form of private communications, contacts, or other 

suspicious circumstances). Given the record, we conclude that the district court did not 

err by determining that the case was not of such notoriety that sequestration was required. 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.