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*********************************************** 
A BETTER WAY WHOLESALE AUTOS, INC. v.

JAMES SAINT PAUL ET AL.

(SC 20386)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,

Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, an automobile dealership, sought to vacate an arbitration award

that was issued in favor of the defendants in connection with their

purchase of a vehicle from the plaintiff. The parties had entered into a

financing agreement that contained an arbitration clause providing, inter

alia, that any arbitration between the parties would be governed by the

Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) and not by any state law

concerning arbitration. After the arbitrator ruled in favor of the defendants, the plaintiff filed an application to vacate the arbitration award

in the trial court. The defendants opposed the plaintiff’s application to

vacate, claiming that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because

the plaintiff’s application was untimely under the state statute (§ 52-420

(b)) that imposed a thirty day limitation period for applications to vacate

an arbitration award. The court agreed and rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s application to vacate as untimely. The plaintiff appealed

to the Appellate Court from the trial court’s judgment, contending that

its application to vacate was not untimely because the arbitration agreement specified that the Federal Arbitration Act would govern any arbitration between the parties and the limitation period for a motion to vacate

an arbitration award under the applicable provision of that act (9 U.S.C.

§ 12) was three months. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s

judgment, and the plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to

this court. Held:

1. The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s application to vacate an

arbitration award as untimely under § 52-420 (b), and, accordingly, the

Appellate Court properly affirmed the trial court’s judgment: this court

had repeatedly held that § 52-420 (b) unambiguously implicates a trial

court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and, therefore, the expiration of the

limitation period in § 52-420 (b) deprives a trial court of subject matter

jurisdiction over an application to vacate an arbitration award filed

pursuant to that statute; moreover, the plaintiff’s reliance on federal

cases for the proposition that § 52-420 (b) is not necessarily jurisdictional

was misplaced because those cases concerned the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts with respect to certain federal statutes, not

Connecticut courts with respect to § 52-420 (b); furthermore, because

§ 52-420 (b) implicates a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the

private agreement between the parties could neither confer subject

matter jurisdiction on the trial court nor cure the jurisdictional defect

arising from the plaintiff’s late filing.

2. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claims that § 52-420 (b) was preempted

by the Federal Arbitration Act and that the trial court’s dismissal of its

application to vacate an arbitration award conflicted with the obligation

imposed on state courts by a provision of that act (9 U.S.C. § 2) to

enforce arbitration agreements: § 52-420 (b) did not stand as an obstacle

to the accomplishment of the federal policy to enforce arbitration agreements, as both parties had postarbitration rights to seek judicial enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate under the Connecticut statutory

scheme, and the plaintiff did not argue that the thirty day limitation

period in § 52-420 (b) was prohibitively short such that a challenging

party lacks a meaningful opportunity to seek to vacate an arbitration

award; moreover, the application of § 52-420 (b) to the plaintiff’s application to vacate did not treat an arbitration agreement differently from

any other contract, which was consistent with the purpose of the Federal

Arbitration Act; furthermore, this court found persuasive a federal case

that examined the relationship between § 52-420 (b) and the Federal

Arbitration Act and found no conflict preemption, and the plaintiff’s

reliance on Haywood v. Drown (556 U.S. 729), a case in which the

United States Supreme Court struck down a New York law that divested
state courts of jurisdiction over actions brought against correction officers pursuant to federal statute (42 U.S.C. § 1983), was unavailing, as

the relevant policy concern underlying the Federal Arbitration Act was

significantly different from the policy concerns underlying 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, and the challenged state law in Haywood also was distinguishable

from § 52-420 (b).

Argued October 15, 2020—officially released April 15, 2021*

Procedural History

Application to vacate an arbitration award, brought to

the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury,

where the defendants filed motions to confirm the

award and for attorney’s fees, and to dismiss the application to vacate the award; thereafter, the case was

tried to the court, M. Taylor, J.; judgment dismissing

the application to vacate and granting the motions to

confirm and for attorney’s fees, from which the plaintiff

appealed to the Appellate Court, DiPentima, C. J., and

Lavine, Keller, Elgo, Bright and Moll, Js., with Sheldon

and Lavery, Js., dissenting, which affirmed the trial

court’s judgment, and the plaintiff, on the granting of

certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Kenneth A. Votre, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Richard F. Wareing, with whom was Daniel S. Blinn,

for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

McDONALD, J. This certified appeal requires us to

determine the statutory time limitation applicable to a

motion to vacate an arbitration award brought in state

court when review of the underlying arbitration is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.

§ 1 et seq., pursuant to a private arbitration agreement.

This determination presents two issues. First, we consider whether the Connecticut thirty day time limitation

applicable to a motion to vacate an arbitration award,

General Statutes § 52-420 (b),1

implicates the subject

matter jurisdiction of our courts. Second, we consider

whether this state’s law is preempted by the FAA as a

result of an actual conflict between the different time

limitations contained in the two statutes.

The plaintiff, A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc.,

appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court,

which affirmed the trial court’s judgment and concluded, among other things, that the plaintiff’s application to vacate an arbitration award rendered in favor

of the defendants, James Saint Paul and Julie J. Saint

Paul, was untimely under § 52-420 (b). See A Better

Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Saint Paul, 192 Conn.

App. 245, 247, 257, 217 A.3d 996 (2019) (en banc). On

appeal, the plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court

incorrectly concluded that its application to vacate the

arbitration award was governed by the thirty day time

limit set forth in § 52-420 (b) in contravention of a private agreement between the parties.

The Appellate Court’s decision sets forth the facts and

procedural history; id., 247–50; which we summarize in

relevant part. In 2015, the defendants bought a motor

vehicle from the plaintiff, and the parties entered into

an agreement to finance the purchase. The financing

agreement contained an arbitration clause that provided, among other things, that any dispute arising from

the defendants’ purchase of the vehicle would be

resolved by binding arbitration. The arbitration clause

contained a choice of law provision, which provided in

relevant part: ‘‘Any arbitration under this [a]rbitration

[p]rovision shall be governed by the [FAA] . . . and not

by any state law concerning arbitration. . . .’’ (Citation

omitted.) The clause further provided in relevant part:

‘‘Any court having jurisdiction may enter judgment on

the arbitrator’s award. . . .’’

Later that year, the defendants initiated an arbitration

proceeding, claiming, among other things, that the

plaintiff failed to disclose certain charges in violation

of the federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et

seq., and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act,

General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. On July 21, 2016, the

arbitrator ruled in favor of the defendants with respect

to the Truth in Lending Act claim and awarded damages,

attorney’s fees, and costs.
On August 26, 2016, the plaintiff filed an application

to vacate the arbitration award in the Superior Court

pursuant to the FAA, claiming that the arbitrator

exceeded his powers. The defendants opposed the

plaintiff’s application to vacate on the ground that the

trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the defendants argued that the plaintiff’s application was untimely under § 52-420 (b), which imposes a

thirty day limitation period to seek to vacate an arbitration award. The trial court agreed with the defendants

and dismissed the plaintiff’s application to vacate as

untimely under § 52-420 (b). The plaintiff appealed from

the trial court’s judgment of dismissal to the Appellate

Court. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that its application to vacate was not untimely because the arbitration

agreement specified that the FAA—and not any state

law provision—would apply, and the limitation period

for a motion to vacate an arbitration award under the

FAA is three months. See 9 U.S.C. § 12 (2012).

A three judge panel of the Appellate Court heard oral

argument. A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Saint

Paul, supra, 192 Conn. App. 250 n.3. Thereafter, pursuant to Practice Book § 70-7 (b), the court, sua sponte,

ordered reargument en banc. Id. The Appellate Court

also ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs

addressing, among other things, the applicability of that

court’s decision in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Searl,

179 Conn. App. 577, 180 A.3d 996 (2018), overruled in

part by A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Saint

Paul, 192 Conn. App. 245, 217 A.3d 996 (2019) (en banc).

See A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Saint Paul,

supra, 250 n.3. The Appellate Court subsequently

affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id., 265. Relevant to this appeal, it concluded that parties cannot,

‘‘as a matter of law, agree to have the FAA’s three

month limitation period set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 12 apply

to a vacatur proceeding filed in Connecticut state court

so as to supplant or override the thirty day limitation

period in § 52-420 (b).’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 252.

It reasoned that this court has repeatedly held that the

thirty day limitation period in § 52-420 (b) is subject

matter jurisdictional. Id., 255. It also noted that ‘‘parties

cannot agree to confer subject matter jurisdiction on

a court . . . [or] waive the lack of subject matter jurisdiction.’’ Id., 257. Finally, the Appellate Court overruled

Doctor’s Associates, Inc., ‘‘insofar as [that decision

stood] for the proposition that, as a matter of contract

interpretation, parties can agree to have’’ the FAA’s

three month limitation period supplant the thirty day

limitation period prescribed by § 52-420 (b). Id., 260.

Two members of the en banc court dissented. The

dissent conceded that the FAA did not preempt § 52-

420 (b); id., 269 (Lavery, J., dissenting); but explained

that it would nevertheless apply the three month limitation period to give effect to the FAA’s bedrock principle
of contractual freedom. See id., 268–69, 275 (Lavery,

J., dissenting). The dissent noted that ‘‘the parties

agreed to be bound by the FAA in its entirety,’’ including

the time limitation period contained in 9 U.S.C. § 12.

Id., 267 (Lavery, J., dissenting). Finally, the dissent

reasoned that the thirty day limitation period in § 52-

420 (b) was not properly characterized as subject matter

jurisdictional because it ‘‘could be considered an element necessary to establish a right, and, therefore, substantive in nature.’’ Id., 272–73 (Lavery, J., dissenting).

Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a petition for certification to appeal, which we granted, limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude

that parties to an arbitration agreement did not avoid

Connecticut’s thirty day statutory deadline for filing an

application to vacate an arbitration award set forth in

. . . § 52-420 (b) by including in their agreement a

choice of law provision stating that any arbitration shall

be governed by the [FAA] . . . which contains a three

month deadline for filing a motion to vacate?’’ (Citation

omitted.) A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Saint

Paul, 333 Conn. 935, 218 A.3d 593 (2019).

On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the arbitration

clause contained in the parties’ financing agreement

requires the application of the FAA in all respects,

including its three month limitation period for filing a

motion to vacate. See 9 U.S.C. § 12 (2012). Specifically,

the plaintiff contends that we should reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court because § 52-420 (b) is not

subject matter jurisdictional. The plaintiff also argues

that, even if we were to conclude that § 52-420 (b) is

subject matter jurisdictional, reversal is required

because that statute is preempted by the FAA. The

defendants disagree and contend that the Appellate

Court correctly determined that state law governs the

timeliness question because § 52-420 (b) is subject matter jurisdictional. The defendants also argue that the

FAA does not preempt § 52-420 (b).

As the Appellate Court noted, whether the plaintiff’s

application to vacate was untimely ‘‘depends on

whether state or federal law controls the limitation

period in which the plaintiff was required to file such

application.’’ A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v.

Saint Paul, supra, 192 Conn. App. 252. This question

is a legal one, as are the incorporated issues concerning

the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction and federal

preemption of a state statute. Therefore, our review is

plenary. ‘‘We have long held that because [a] determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction

is a question of law, our review is plenary. . . . Moreover . . . [s]ubject matter jurisdiction involves the

authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. . . . [A] court

lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over

which it is without jurisdiction . . . .’’ (Footnote omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bloomfield v.

United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of

America, Connecticut Independent Police Union,

Local 14, 285 Conn. 278, 286, 939 A.2d 561 (2008). Furthermore, ‘‘[j]urisdiction of the [subject matter] is the

power [of the court] to hear and determine cases of

the general class to which the proceedings in question

belong. . . . A court has subject matter jurisdiction if

it has the authority to adjudicate a particular type of

legal controversy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Rayhall v. Akim Co., 263 Conn. 328, 339, 819 A.2d 803

(2003). In addition, the question of preemption ‘‘is a

question of law and, therefore, our review is plenary.’’

Hackett v. J.L.G. Properties, LLC, 285 Conn. 498, 503,

940 A.2d 769 (2008).

We begin with the plaintiff’s contention that § 52-420

(b) is not subject matter jurisdictional. This question

requires an examination of the state law procedures

governing a motion to vacate an arbitration award in

state court. Section 52-420 (b) provides: ‘‘No motion to

vacate, modify or correct an award may be made after

thirty days from the notice of the award to the party

to the arbitration who makes the motion.’’ We have

explained that ‘‘[a] proceeding to vacate an arbitration

award is not a civil action, but is rather a special statutory proceeding. . . . Section 52-420 (b) requires that

a motion to vacate an arbitration award be filed within

thirty days of the notice of the award to the moving

party.’’ (Citations omitted.) Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Castellano, 225 Conn. 339, 344, 623 A.2d 55 (1993).

We have repeatedly held that § 52-420 (b) unambiguously implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

For example, in Middlesex Ins. Co., we stated: ‘‘If the

[application to vacate the arbitration award] is not filed

within the thirty day time limit, the trial court does not

have subject matter jurisdiction over the [application].’’

Id., citing Vail v. American Way Homes, Inc., 181 Conn.

449, 452–53, 435 A.2d 993 (1980). In addition, we have

reasoned that the expiration of the limitation period

deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction

over any ground to vacate the arbitration award, even

if the ground to vacate is raised by way of an opposition

to the prevailing party’s timely filed application to confirm the arbitration award. See Wu v. Chang, 264 Conn.

307, 309–10, 313–14, 823 A.2d 1197 (2003). Most

recently, we have held that a trial court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over an untimely motion to vacate

when the substantive claim was based in common law

rather than the statutory scheme governing arbitration;

see Bloomfield v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine

Workers of America, Connecticut Independent Police

Union, Local 14, supra, 285 Conn. 279–80; because the

‘‘broad language [of § 52-420 (b)] plainly states that the

[limitation] period applies regardless of the grounds for

the motion to vacate.’’ Id., 287. Accordingly, there is an

abundance of authority stating that a trial court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over a motion to vacate an

arbitration award that is filed outside the thirty day

time limit. See, e.g., id., 280, 284; Wu v. Chang, supra,

312; Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Castellano, supra, 225 Conn.

344; see also, e.g., Vail v. American Way Homes, Inc.,

supra, 452–53; cf. Middletown v. Police Local, No. 1361,

187 Conn. 228, 231, 445 A.2d 322 (1982) (plaintiff

invoked statutory jurisdiction of trial court when it filed

application to vacate arbitration award). In this case,

the plaintiff filed its application to vacate the arbitration

award on August 26, 2016, more than thirty days after

it received notice of the award on July 21, 2016. Therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

over the plaintiff’s motion.

The plaintiff does not contend that we should overrule this line of cases stating that § 52-420 (b) is subject

matter jurisdictional. Rather, the plaintiff asserts that

§ 52-420 (b) is not necessarily jurisdictional merely

because it contains a time limitation. In support of this

argument, the plaintiff relies on two cases from federal

courts that interpreted federal statutes. In the first case,

the United States Supreme Court evaluated the thirty

day time period in the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28

U.S.C. § 2412 (d) (1) (B), that limits an application for

attorney’s fees when the applicant prevailed in an action

against the government. Scarborough v. Principi, 541

U.S. 401, 405, 413, 124 S. Ct. 1856, 158 L. Ed. 2d 674

(2004). The court held that this limitation period did not

implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal

courts. Id., 414. In the second case, the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia held that the

three month limitation period on a motion to vacate an

arbitration award contained in § 12 of the FAA was

nonjurisdictional. Equitas Disability Advocates, LLC

v. Daley, Debofsky & Bryant, P.C., 177 F. Supp. 3d

197, 218 (D.D.C.), aff’d sub nom. Equitas Disability

Advocates, LLC v. Feigenbaum, 672 Fed. Appx. 13 (D.C.

Cir. 2016).

The plaintiff’s reliance on these cases is unpersuasive. Both cases concerned the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts with respect to certain federal

statutes, not Connecticut state courts with respect to

the particular statute at issue in this case, § 52-420 (b).

Consequently, the nonjurisdictional nature of the limitation periods in those two federal statutes does not persuade us that the thirty day limitation period contained

in § 52-420 (b) is likewise nonjurisdictional. Moreover,

the plaintiff does not explain how either case counsels

overruling this court’s holdings in Middlesex Ins. Co.,

Wu, and Bloomfield that § 52-420 (b) is subject matter

jurisdictional.2

Necessarily following our conclusion that § 52-420

(b) implicates a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,

we likewise conclude that the choice of law provision

contained in the parties’ private agreement could nei-
ther enlarge the trial court’s jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s application nor waive the jurisdictional defect. ‘‘It

is hornbook law that the parties cannot confer subject

matter jurisdiction on a court by consent, waiver,

silence or agreement.’’ Hayes v. Beresford, 184 Conn.

558, 562, 440 A.2d 224 (1981). ‘‘A conclusion that a time

limit is subject matter jurisdictional has very serious

and final consequences. It means that . . . a subject

matter jurisdictional defect may not be waived . . .

and that subject matter jurisdiction, if lacking, may not

be conferred by the parties, explicitly or implicitly.’’

(Citations omitted.) Williams v. Commission on

Human Rights & Opportunities, 257 Conn. 258, 266,

777 A.2d 645 (2001). Because the parties’ private agreement could neither confer subject matter jurisdiction

on the trial court nor cure the jurisdictional defect arising from the plaintiff’s late filing, the trial court properly

dismissed the plaintiff’s application to vacate as untimely.

In addition, the Appellate Court properly overruled Doctor’s Associates, Inc., ‘‘insofar as [that decision stood]

for the proposition that, as a matter of contract interpretation, parties can agree to have ‘the procedure for

moving to vacate an arbitration award [in Connecticut

state court] governed by federal law.’ ’’ A Better Way

Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Saint Paul, supra, 192 Conn.

App. 260, quoting Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Searl, supra,

179 Conn. App. 586.

Notwithstanding our conclusion that the trial court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s

application to vacate because it was untimely under

§ 52-420 (b), the plaintiff claims that this statutory provision is preempted by the FAA. Specifically, the plaintiff

points to § 2 of the FAA, which provides in relevant

part that a written agreement to arbitrate ‘‘shall be valid,

irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds

as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any

contract.’’ 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). The plaintiff argues that

the trial court’s dismissal of its application to vacate

conflicted with the obligation imposed on state courts

by § 2 of the FAA to enforce arbitration agreements.

‘‘The question of preemption is one of federal law,

arising under the supremacy clause of the United States

constitution.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Hackett v. J.L.G. Properties, LLC, supra, 285 Conn. 504.

The supremacy clause of the United States constitution

provides in relevant part that federal law ‘‘shall be the

supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State

shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution

or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’’

U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. The United States Supreme

Court has recognized three forms of preemption that

derive from the supremacy clause: express preemption,

whereby a federal statute expressly states Congress’

intent to preempt state law; field preemption, whereby

a federal statute ‘‘so thoroughly occupies a legislative

field as to make reasonable the inference that Congress
left no room for the [s]tates to supplement it’’; and

conflict preemption, whereby state law actually conflicts with federal law. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516,

112 S. Ct. 2608, 120 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1992).

The United States Supreme Court has stated that

‘‘[t]he FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision,

nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the

entire field of arbitration.’’ Volt Information Sciences,

Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior

University, 489 U.S. 468, 477, 109 S. Ct. 1248, 103 L.

Ed. 2d 488 (1989). The plaintiff’s argument therefore

rests on conflict preemption. Under this form of preemption, ‘‘state law may nonetheless be pre-empted to

the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law—

that is, to the extent that it stands as an obstacle to the

accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and

objectives of Congress.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id.; see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.

624, 631, 102 S. Ct. 2629, 73 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1982) (‘‘[o]f

course, a state statute is void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a valid federal statute . . . and [a]

conflict will be found [when] compliance with both

federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility

. . . or [when] the state law stands as an obstacle to

the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes

and objectives of Congress’’ (citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted)).

A review of the purposes of the FAA informs our

analysis of whether it preempts our state law as a result

of an actual conflict between the statutes. Congress’

primary purpose in enacting the FAA was ‘‘to overrule

the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate . . . and place such agreements [on]

the same footing as other contracts . . . .’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland

Stanford Junior University, supra, 489 U.S. 474. Section 2 of the FAA ‘‘establishes an equal-treatment principle: A court may invalidate an arbitration agreement

based on ‘generally applicable contract defenses’ like

fraud or unconscionability, but not on legal rules that

‘apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning

from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.’

AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339,

131 S. Ct. 1740, 179 L. Ed. 2d 742 (2011). The FAA

thus preempts any state rule discriminating on its face

against arbitration . . . .’’ Kindred Nursing Centers

Ltd. Partnership v. Clark, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 1421,

1426, 197 L. Ed. 2d 806 (2017). ‘‘There is no federal

policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the

enforceability, according to their terms, of private

agreements to arbitrate.’’ Volt Information Sciences,

Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior

University, supra, 476.
Moreover, ‘‘[a]s for jurisdiction over controversies

touching arbitration, the [FAA] does nothing, being

something of an anomaly in the field of [federal court]

jurisdiction in bestowing no federal jurisdiction but

rather requiring an independent jurisdictional basis.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581–82, 128 S.

Ct. 1396, 170 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2008). Therefore, ‘‘[g]iven

the substantive supremacy of the FAA, but [its] nonjurisdictional cast, state courts have a prominent role to

play as enforcers of agreements to arbitrate.’’ Vaden v.

Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 59, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 173 L.

Ed. 2d 206 (2009).

We conclude that § 52-420 (b) does not stand as an

obstacle to the accomplishment of the federal policy to

enforce arbitration agreements.3 Under the Connecticut

statutory scheme, both parties have postarbitration

rights to seek judicial enforcement of the agreement to

arbitrate. General Statutes § 52-417 provides the prevailing party one year to seek confirmation of the award;

§ 52-420 (b) provides the challenging party thirty days

to seek to vacate or modify the award. The plaintiff

does not argue that thirty days is prohibitively short

such that a challenging party lacks a meaningful opportunity to seek to vacate an arbitration award. Therefore,

the thirty day time limitation contained in § 52-420 (b)

does not interfere with the plaintiff’s right to challenge

the arbitration award and, in doing so, to enforce the

arbitration agreement. Indeed, far from standing as an

obstacle, the time limitation actually furthers the FAA’s

‘‘national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited [judicial] review needed to maintain arbitration’s

essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.’’

Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., supra, 552

U.S. 588.

Moreover, consistent with the purpose of the FAA,

application of § 52-420 (b) to the plaintiff’s application

to vacate does not treat an arbitration agreement differently from any other contract. See Volt Information

Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford

Junior University, supra, 489 U.S. 474 (purpose of FAA

is to ‘‘place such agreements [on] the same footing as

other contracts’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The well established rule that a jurisdictional defect

may not be waived applies equally to a purported waiver

arising during litigation and to a purported waiver contained in a private agreement. See Hayes v. Beresford,

supra, 184 Conn. 562 (‘‘[i]t is hornbook law that the

parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on

a court by . . . agreement’’). Therefore, the parties’

contractual provision specifying that the FAA would

govern the arbitration agreement could not serve to

waive a subject matter jurisdictional defect in state

court resulting from noncompliance with § 52-420 (b).

In this way, § 52-420 (b) does not discriminate against
arbitration agreements; rather, it equates them with

certain contract actions brought in state court that are

subject to jurisdictional limitation periods under

state law.

In addition, we are persuaded by the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,

which examined the relationship between § 52-420 (b)

and the FAA and found no conflict preemption. See

Ekstrom v. Value Health, Inc., 68 F.3d 1391, 1393, 1396

(D.C. Cir. 1995). In that case, the parties’ arbitration

agreement specified that Connecticut law would govern

any disputes, but the plaintiffs’ petition to vacate was

filed in the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia outside the thirty day time limitation contained in § 52-420 (b).4

Id., 1393. The District of Columbia Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the

FAA preempted § 52-420 (b), reasoning that ‘‘Connecticut law surely does not conflict with the FAA’s ‘primary

purpose.’ ’’ Id., 1396. Although the choice of law provision in Ekstrom provided that Connecticut law, and

not federal law, governed the agreement, the court’s

preemption analysis applies with equal force here.

Our conclusion is also consistent with those of two

other state supreme courts. The Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania held that the FAA did not preempt a state

statute that provided for a thirty day limitation period

on a petition to vacate an arbitration award filed in

state court. Moscatiello v. J.J.B. Hilliard, W.L. Lyons,

Inc., 595 Pa. 596, 603, 939 A.2d 325 (2007). The court

reasoned that the state law time limitation ‘‘provide[s]

for the enforcement of arbitration of contract and other

disputes, [and, therefore] [it] foster[s] the federal policy

favoring arbitration enforcement.’’ Id. The court further

reasoned that ‘‘[t]he FAA does not preempt the procedural rules governing arbitration in state courts, as that

is beyond its reach.’’ Id.

Similarly, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that

the FAA did not preempt state procedural law applicable to a motion to vacate an arbitration award filed in

state court. Atlantic Painting & Contracting, Inc. v.

Nashville Bridge Co., 670 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Ky. 1984).

The court reasoned that ‘‘[t]he [FAA] covers both substantive law and a procedure for federal courts to follow

[when] a party to arbitration seeks to enforce or vacate

an arbitration award in federal court. The procedural

aspects are confined to federal cases.’’ (Emphasis in

original.) Id. These cases support our conclusion that

a state law time limitation applicable to a motion to

vacate an arbitration award brought in state court, such

as that set forth in § 52-420 (b), does not stand as an

obstacle to the accomplishment of any policy underlying the FAA.

The plaintiff argues that the United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729,

129 S. Ct. 2108, 173 L. Ed. 2d 920 (2009), supports its
contention that the FAA preempts § 52-420 (b).5

In that

case, the court struck down a New York law that

divested jurisdiction from state courts over actions

brought against correction officers under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Id., 731, 741–42. The court reasoned that a state

court ‘‘cannot employ a jurisdictional rule to dissociate

[itself] from federal law because of disagreement with

its content or a refusal to recognize the superior authority of its source.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 736. In other words, ‘‘[a] jurisdictional rule cannot

be used as a device to undermine federal law, no matter

how evenhanded it may appear.’’ Id., 739. The plaintiff

argues that this principle applies with equal force here:

Connecticut courts cannot employ § 52-420 (b), despite

its subject matter jurisdictional nature, to decline to

enforce the FAA and undermine attendant federal policy.

The plaintiff’s reliance on Haywood is unpersuasive.

The federal statute at issue in Haywood, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, ‘‘create[d] a remedy for violations of federal

rights committed by persons acting under color of state

law.’’ Id., 731. The relevant policy concern underlying

the FAA—equal enforcement of private agreements to

arbitrate legal disputes—is so different in kind from

the policy concerns underlying § 1983 as to render Haywood inapposite. Indeed, as we previously noted, the

FAA carries ‘‘no federal policy favoring arbitration

under a certain set of procedural rules . . . .’’ Volt

Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of

Leland Stanford Junior University, supra, 489 U.S. 476.

In addition, the challenged state law in Haywood is

also distinguishable from § 52-420 (b) because the New

York law was ‘‘effectively an immunity statute cloaked

in jurisdictional garb,’’ entirely divesting state courts of

jurisdiction over certain actions. Haywood v. Drown,

supra, 556 U.S. 742. In contrast, § 52-420 (b) contains

a conventional jurisdictional time limitation, which

effectively furthers both state and federal policy

favoring finality of arbitration judgments. It does not

prevent a party from challenging an arbitration award

in state court; it merely limits a party’s ability to challenge an arbitration award to thirty days, a period of

time that is not prohibitively short. Section 52-420 (b)

bears no resemblance to the state statute at issue in

Haywood, and, therefore, it does not implicate analogous concerns. Indeed, the majority in that case

expressly limited its holding to ‘‘the unique scheme

adopted by the [s]tate of New York’’ in response to

the dissent’s concern that the case would be broadly

applied to strike down all state jurisdictional rules.

Id., 741.

In sum, we conclude that the thirty day limitation

period set forth in § 52-420 (b) applies to the plaintiff’s

application to vacate.6

It is undisputed that the plaintiff’s

application was filed more than thirty days after the
plaintiff received notice of the arbitration award.

Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed the

plaintiff’s application to vacate as untimely under § 52-

420 (b).

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* April 15, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 Throughout the opinion, we refer to both a ‘‘motion’’ to vacate an arbitration award and an ‘‘application’’ to vacate an arbitration award. The relevant

statutes employ both terms in different provisions. Section 52-420 (b) sets

a thirty day time limit for both an application to vacate filed by the party

that lost in the underlying arbitration, as well as a motion or opposition

filed by such party in response to the prevailing party’s application to confirm

the arbitration award. See Wu v. Chang, 264 Conn. 307, 309–11, 823 A.2d

1197 (2003). We employ both terms as appropriate for technical precision;

however, there is no substantive distinction between them.

2 Additionally, the plaintiff repeats the suggestion raised by the dissent

in the Appellate Court that the time limitation in § 52-420 (b) ‘‘could be

considered an element necessary to establish a right, and, therefore, substantive in nature.’’ (Emphasis added.) A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v.

Saint Paul, supra, 192 Conn. App. 272–73 (Lavery, J., dissenting). In support

of this proposition, the plaintiff cites to Baxter v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 230

Conn. 335, 644 A.2d 1297 (1994), in which we considered whether an Oregon

statute of repose was properly classified as substantive, and therefore subject matter jurisdictional, or procedural under Connecticut choice of law

principles. See id., 338–39. However, the plaintiff does not articulate the

consequence of this suggestion, the relevance of our choice of law holding

in Baxter, or why the Appellate Court dissent’s sparse language on this

point counsels overruling our unequivocal holdings in Middlesex Ins. Co.,

Wu, and Bloomfield that § 52-420 (b) is subject matter jurisdictional.

3 The dissenting Appellate Court judges agreed with this conclusion: ‘‘I

do not mean to say that the FAA preempts the General Statutes regarding

arbitration. That would be contrary to clear United States Supreme Court

precedent.’’ A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Saint Paul, supra, 192

Conn. App. 269 (Lavery, J., dissenting).

4 The federal District Court in the District of Columbia had diversity

jurisdiction over the action. See Ekstrom v. Value Health, Inc., supra, 68

F.3d 1392–94. The District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the thirty

day time limitation in § 52-420 (b), properly characterized as jurisdictional

under Connecticut law, applied to the plaintiffs’ petition to vacate pursuant

to the arbitration agreement provision for Connecticut law. Id., 1395. This

conclusion is not inconsistent with our holding here: although the parties’

arbitration agreement in the present case specified that federal law and not

state law would govern, the plaintiff filed its application to vacate in state

court, which is bound by § 52-420 (b) regardless of the governing substantive

law. Together, Ekstrom and our holding here stand for the proposition that

§ 52-420 (b) applies to (1) an application to vacate an arbitration award

brought under Connecticut state law in any court, and (2) an application

to vacate an arbitration award brought under any law in a Connecticut state

court. In addition, Ekstrom and our holding in the present case establish

that in neither circumstance is § 52-420 (b) preempted by the FAA.

5 The plaintiff also argues that a case from the United States District

Court for the District of Massachusetts supports its contention that the FAA

preempts § 52-420 (b). In Kiewit/Atkinson/Kenny v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 103, AFL-CIO, 43 F. Supp. 2d 132, 133 (D.

Mass. 1999) (Kiewit), the plaintiff brought an action to vacate an arbitration

award in federal court under the FAA. The District Court, exercising diversity

jurisdiction, rejected the defendant’s argument that the timeliness of the

action was governed by a thirty day limitation period contained in a substantively related state law. Id. The plaintiff in the present case argues that the

FAA’s three month time limitation should govern because, like in Kiewit,

the plaintiff brought the application to vacate under the FAA. The plaintiff,

however, disregards a crucial difference between Kiewit and the present

case, namely, that the action to vacate in Kiewit was brought under federal

law in federal court. The plaintiff here brought its application under federal

law in state court. As a result, the plaintiff is required to comply with the

jurisdictional requirements that bind the state court.
6 The parties disagree as to whether the plaintiff could have brought the

application to vacate in federal court rather than in state court. As we

discussed, it is undisputed that the FAA does not create subject matter

jurisdiction in federal courts. Therefore, a federal court must have an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction over an FAA claim. See, e.g.,

Vaden v. Discover Bank, supra, 556 U.S. 59; Hall Street Associates, LLC v.

Mattel, Inc., supra, 552 U.S. 581–82. An independent basis of jurisdiction

may be established, among other ways, through (1) diversity of citizenship;

see, e.g., Equitas Disability Advocates, LLC v. Daley, Debofsky & Bryant,

P.C., supra, 177 F. Supp. 3d 204; Kiewit/Atkinson/Kenny v. International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 103, AFL-CIO, 43 F. Supp. 2d 132,

135 (D. Mass. 1999); or (2) federal question jurisdiction over the underlying

dispute pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See, e.g., Vaden v. Discover Bank,

supra, 59–60; see also, e.g., id., 62 (approving ‘‘ ‘look through’ ’’ approach

to determine whether federal court has federal question jurisdiction under

FAA). The plaintiff argues that state court was its only avenue to vacate

the arbitration award because a federal court would not have had diversity

jurisdiction. The defendants argue that the underlying dispute, which concerned the plaintiff’s obligations under the federal Truth in Lending Act,

would have supported federal question jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s application to vacate had it been filed in federal court. We express no opinion

on the question of whether a federal court could have exercised jurisdiction

over the plaintiff’s application.