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Filed 4/21/15 P. v. Land CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

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THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DENNIS DAVID LAND, SR., 

Defendant and Appellant.

C077476

(Super. Ct. No. 14F03906)

In 1985, defendant Dennis David Land, Sr., pled guilty to sodomy with a person 

under the age of 14 and 10 years younger than him (Pen. Code,1 § 286, subd. (c)) and oral 

copulation with a person under the age of 18 (§ 288a, subd. (b)(1)) and was placed on 

formal probation for eight years. Defendant filed a petition for a certificate of 

rehabilitation and pardon (§ 4852.01) in June 2014. The petition contained no documents 

 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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or specific factual allegations regarding defendant’s conduct since his conviction or 

regarding his character. It did contain a photocopy of People v. Tirey (2014) 

225 Cal.App.4th 1150, review granted August 20, 2014, S219050, which held that 

persons convicted of violating section 288, subdivision (a), were not statutorily barred 

from receiving such a certificate. 

At the hearing on the petition, the trial court noted that review was granted on 

Tirey and there were no factual allegations that would support granting the petition. 

Defense counsel suggested the defense may wait to see what the Supreme Court did in 

Tirey and then submit another petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. The 

trial court denied the petition, finding defendant’s convictions rendered him statutorily 

excluded from filing a petition of rehabilitation and pardon, and in addition, defendant 

failed to present any facts justifying a grant had he been eligible. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition, contending it was an 

abuse of discretion. His contention is frivolous.

Section 4852.01 states in pertinent part: “(a) Any person convicted of a felony 

who has been released from a state prison or other state penal institution or agency in 

California, whether discharged on completion of the term for which he or she was 

sentenced or released on parole prior to May 13, 1943, who has not been incarcerated in a 

state prison or other state penal institution or agency since his or her release, and who 

presents satisfactory evidence of a three-year residence in this state immediately prior to 

the filing of the petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon provided for by this 

chapter, may file the petition pursuant to the provisions of this chapter. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] 

(d) This chapter shall not apply to persons serving a mandatory life parole, persons 

committed under death sentences, persons convicted of a violation of Section 269, 

subdivision (c) of Section 286, Section 288, subdivision (c) of Section 288a, Section 

288.5, Section 288.7, or subdivision (j) of Section 289, or persons in military service.”
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The period of rehabilitation starts “upon the discharge of the petitioner from 

custody due to his or her completion of the term to which he or she was sentenced or 

upon his or her release on parole or probation, whichever is sooner.” (§ 4852.03, 

subd. (a).) For crimes not otherwise specified, the defendant must be rehabilitated for 

seven years before filing the petition. (§ 4852.03, subd. (a)(3).) “Unless and until the 

period of rehabilitation, as stipulated in this section, has passed, the petitioner shall be 

ineligible to file his or her petition for a certificate of rehabilitation with the court. Any 

certificate of rehabilitation that is issued and under which the petitioner has not fulfilled 

the requirements of this chapter shall be void.” (§ 4852.03, subd. (b).) “The person shall 

live an honest and upright life, shall conduct himself or herself with sobriety and 

industry, shall exhibit a good moral character, and shall conform to and obey the laws of 

the land.” (§ 4852.05.)

Defendant is statutorily excluded from filing a petition for rehabilitation and 

pardon because he was convicted of violating section 286, subdivision (c). Defendant’s 

opening brief contains a single section addressing the trial court’s decision, labeled “THE 

SUPERIOR COURT’S DENIAL OF APPELLANT’S CERTIFICATE FOR 

REHABILITATION UNDER PENAL CODE §4852.01(D) WAS AN ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION BY THE COURT.” Defendant points out that equal protection is 

guaranteed by the state and federal Constitutions. Defendant also notes that review was 

granted in Tirey with briefing put on hold pending the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Johnson v. Department of Justice, S209167. From this, he concludes that the statutory 

prohibition on filing a petition for rehabilitation and pardon violates his equal protection 

rights. 

Defendant’s perfunctory assertions without meaningful analysis and citation to 

supporting authority forfeit his contention. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 

793.) Even if he was not precluded from filing a petition for rehabilitation and pardon, 
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defendant’s petition would fail on the merits, as he has not presented any evidence that 

would support granting his petition.2

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

 ROBIE , J.

We concur:

 RAYE , P. J.

 BLEASE , J.

 

2 After defendant filed his opening brief, the California Supreme Court decided 

Johnson and held that it did not violate equal protection to distinguish between types of 

sex offenses when imposing mandatory or discretionary sex offender registration. 

(Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 874-875.) In his reply brief, 

defendant asks us to defer our opinion in his appeal until Johnson and Tirey are final.) 

We decline the offer. Even if the Supreme Court adopts a rule favorable to 

defendant’s equal protection claim in Tirey, defendant would not prevail because he has 

not presented any evidence of his rehabilitation since his conviction.