November 20, 1951 

Hon. A. W. Walker 

County Attorney 

Dickens County 

Dickens, Texas 

ODinion No. v-1350. 

Re: Several questions regarding 

the proper authorities to 

maintain en action to recover funds q isapproprieted 

by a coordinator of 8 county veteranat vocetional 

Dear Sir: school. 

Your letter states in substance as follows: 

The board of county school trustee,g balieves, that a former coordinator of the county~vocatlonal schools (veterans' schools) has 

misappropriated some of the school money. 

The board has voted to sue the coordinator 

and his bondsman for the sum of misappropriated funds. Pursuant thereto, a member of 

that board requested you to represent the 

board In such civil suit in your capacltg as 

county attorney. 

You express the opinion that you, in 

your capacity as county attorney, are not required to represent the county school board 

in this matter. You submit the following 

questions for an opinion of this office: 

1. Is the county attorney required to 

represent the Board of County School Trustees 

of his county In a suit to recover funds alleged to have been mlsap 

er coordinator (employee P 

ropriated by a formof veterans' vocational schools of such county which are authorized and operated under Article 2683Q, 

V.C.S.? 

2. Is the Attorney General of Texas required to represent a county school board in 

this type of suit? 
Hon. A. W. Walker, page 2 (v-1350) 

3. 

Trustees, 

Does the Board of County School 

itself, have the authority to 

maintain the suit indicated? 

Article 2683b, V.C.S., provides as follows: 

"Sec. 2. The county school trustees 

of every county in the State of Texas are 

hereby authorized to maintain, operate and 

administer special schools in their respective counties and establish classes therein 

for the education and vocational training 

of veterans of World War II and also for 

any other educational benefits which may be 

provided by law for such veterans, all such 

schools and classes to be conducted under 

the jurisdiction and supervision of the respective county school boards in their respective counties. . . .' 

"Sec. 3. The State Board for Vocational Education is hereby authorized to allocate and pay to the respective county boards 

of trustees of the respective counties in 

this state, snd such county trustees are 

hereby authorized te receive, such money ss 

well as any private donations male for t'he 

same purpose and shall stand cl~~i~;ed with 

the power and duty to maintain, oper:?te and 

administer the same for tile purposes above 

stated. 

"Sec. 4. The county school trustees 

are authorized to employ instructors, as 

they may deem necessary, and to do and perform all things which they deem proper for 

the successfu.1 operation of such schools, 

and pay for all such by warrants drswn on 

funds received by them for the purpose." 

Attorney General's Opinion V-759 (1943) points 

out that the costs for the operation of the "special 

schools" authorized by that law sre paid by the State 

Board of Vocational Education to county boards of trustees operating such schools out of Federal funds received by the State Board in accordance with a State 

plan and contract adopted by the Board and the Veterans 

Administration. The Federal funds so received and placed 
Hon. A. W. Walker, Page 3 (V-1350). 

in the State Treasury have been appropriated 'to the 

specific purpose authorized by the Government. The 

State Board of Vocational Education, acting under Section 3 of Article 2683b, allocates and authorize8 to 

be paid to each respective county board of trustees 

budgeted amounts needed for thFs program. A State 

warrant in lump sum for approved amounts is forwarded 

to participating county boards, which J.n turn draw 

warrants on these funds received and deposited by them 

for this purpose. Sec. 4, Art. 268313, V.C.S. 

ArtFcle 2683 provides in part as follows: 

"The county school trustees of each 

county shall constitute a body corporate, 

by the name of the county school trustee8 

Of County, State of Texas, 

and in that name mas acquire land hold real 

and personal property, sue and be,sued, and 

may receive bequests and doII.ati.On8 or other 

moneys or funds coming legally into their 

hands, and may perform ot'her acts for the 

promotion of education in the county. . . ." 

The genera1 authority oT a c&ntg attorney, 

illsofar aa civil actions are concerned, is derived from 

the Constitution and statutes of this State. Section 

21 of Article V of the Constitution provides as follows: 

I, . . The county nttortieys sixoIl Inepresent the State in all cases in the District and inferior courts in their respective counties;. . .' 

The principal purpose of this constitutional 

provision creating the office of county attorney was 

to make its main function the Drosecution of criminal 

cases. Bredy v. Brooks, 99 Tex. 366, 89 S.W. 1052 

(1905); 15 Tex. Jur. 395, Dlstrlct and Prosecuting 

Attorneys, Sec. 11. This provision has been construed 

as not prescribing any duties for county attorneys other 

than such 88 are required to be performed for the State. 

Spencer v. Galveston County, 56 Tex. 384 (1882). Nor 

does it give to the county attorney authority to Lnstitute a proceeding unless he is given that power by 

stat;u",e. Wexler v. State, 241 S.IJ. 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 

1922); Chicago, R.I. & G. Ry. Co. v. State, 264 S.W. 

127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). 
Hon. A. W. Walker, page 4 (V-1350) 

But the Legislature has, from time to time, 

conferred additional duties upon the county attorneys. 

The statutes governing county attorneys generally and 

providing for their duties are Articles 329-341, V.C.S. 

In your letter you refer to Articles 334 and 339, V.C.S. 

Article 334 provides that district and county 

attorneys shall advise and give opinions to the various 

county and precinct officers. But this statute does 

not require a county attorney to file a civil suit for 

a county school board, nor does it mean that the county 

attorney has the right to represent the county or its 

county school board in all such suits. 

a-3656 (1941). 

Att'y Gen. Op. 

Article 339 provides that when it comes to the 

knowledge of any district or county attorney that any 

officer in his district or county entrusted with the 

collection or safekeeping of any public fund8 is neglecting or abusing the trust confided in him or is failing to discharge his duties under the law, he shall institute such proceeding8 as are necessary to compel the 

performance of such duties and to preserve and protect 

the public interests. Eut it is clear, in the light of 

the provisions of Articles 2683 and 268313, that a coordinator, an employee of w county veterans' school, is 

not a county officer entrusted with the collection or 

safekeeping of any public funds of such s&ecisl schools 

of the county, within the meaning of Article 339. See 

Looscan v. Harris Count& 58 Tex. 511 (l%%); Ee:.:ar 

County v. Davis, 223 S. 1. 558 (Tex. Civ. P3$p.m, 

error ref.mt'y Gen. Ops. O&r,34 (1945) 3113 v-759, 

supra. 

While there are other statutes which authorize 

suit by the county attorney in particular cases, as for 

example, Article 6716, V.CS. (damages to public roads), 

we find no statutory authority or directicn for his representing the county school board in civil proceedings 

of the nature involved in your fact situation. Accordingly, we agree that you may not properly bring the suit 

mentioned on your own initiative as county attorney, nor 

does the law require you to institute such suit as county attorney at the request of the county school board. 

See Att'y Gen. Op. O-225 (1939). 

Section 22 of Article IV of the Texas Constitution contains the following provision with reference 

to the Attorney General: 
. 

,Bon. A. W. Walker, Page 5 (v-1350) * 

"He shell represent the Stats in 011 

suits end pleas in the Supreme Court of the 

State in uhioh the State may be 8 party 

. . . end perform such other duties ~8 aey 

be 7?equii-0a by law.” 

We have been unable to find any provision in 

the~lews applicable to the office of Attorney General 

which authorizes or requires that officer to represent 

the 254 county school boards of this State Ln civil 

suits of the nature involved in the submltted fact situation. 

In vFew of the provlslon of Article 2683, 

hereinabove quoted, which constitutes the county school 

board e body corporate end vests it .with the power to 

sue or be sued in that capacity, it is our opinion thet 

the county school board Ftaelf would have authority to 

meintaln the suit lndlceted and to emolw an attorney 

to represent the board. See Arrin@oh v: Jones, lqlS.W. 361 (Tex. Civ. App. 1 17): St 

endent School Dist., 13 z 

euert v. Newton InS.W.2d 429 (Tex. Clv. App. 

9). Loerd v. Como, 137 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 

0,'erromndependent School District No. 1 v. 

Common school District No. 1, 55 P.2a 144 (Idaho Sup. 

936). , 

Neither a county attorney nor the Attorney General 1s required or authorized by law 

to institute a civil suit at the request of a 

county school board against a coordinator of 

special veterans' vocational schools of the 

county for recovery of school funds allocated 

' to and received by the county board under artlcle 2783b, V.C.S., and subsequently misappropriated by the coordinator. Under Article 

2783, V.C.S., the county school board itself 

may mefntaLn such a suit against the coordinator and his bondsman, and may employ an attorney in Its behalf. 

APPROVRD: 

'J. C. Davis, Jr. 

County Affair8 Dlvlslon 

Jesse 9. Luton, Jr. 

Reviewing Assistant 

gw%:i*t:"ws : 

CRO:wh 

Yours very truly, 

PRICE DANIEL 

Attorney General 

By&-= fcbChester E. Ollison 

Assistant