FILED

July 23, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

JUNE 1998 SESSION

VINCENT DELANO HADLEY, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9710-CR-00414

)

Appellant, )

) SHELBY COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. JOSEPH B. BROWN, JR.,

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE

)

Appellee. ) (Post-conviction)

ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 

CRIMINAL COURT OF SHELBY COUNTY

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

MARK A. MESLER JOHN KNOX WALKUP

200 Jefferson Ave., Ste. 1250 Attorney General & Reporter

Memphis, TN 38103

PETER M. COUGHLAN

Asst. Attorney General

 425 5th Ave. N.

2nd Fl., Cordell Hull Bldg.

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

WILLIAM L. GIBBONS

District Attorney General

KEVIN RARDIN

Asst. District Attorney General

Criminal Justice Complex, Suite 301

201 Poplar Street

Memphis, TN 38103

OPINION FILED:____________________

AFFIRMED

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
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O P I N I O N

The Defendant was indicted for first-degree murder. He pleaded guilty to the

charge pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement and received a sentence of life

imprisonment with the possibility of parole. In this post-conviction proceeding filed

in January 1995, the Defendant contends that his guilty plea must be set aside

because it was not entered voluntarily and because he received ineffective

assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief.

We affirm.

The Defendant’s murder conviction was for the killing of a two-year-old child,

who died after a severe beating. The Defendant gave a statement in which he

admitted that he had beaten the child because she had urinated on the couch.

At the post-conviction hearing, the Defendant and one of his two trial lawyers

testified. The Defendant claimed that he had pleaded guilty because he was

“scared” and “confused.” He testified that the police had threatened him into giving

two statements, that the police had then “changed” his statements to appear as

confessions, and that he had been severely beaten by jail inmates a few days after

having given his second statement. He pleaded guilty approximately one year later

but “took the guilty plea because [he] was scared and confused.” He admitted that

he had known he was facing the death penalty if he went to trial. He further

testified that his legal representation was ineffective due to inadequate

investigation,inadequate communication, insufficient zealousness, misinformation,

failure to move for change of venue, and failure to prepare a defense strategy. 
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Lead counsel for the Defendant at trial testified that she and another lawyer

from the public defender’s office had been assigned to the case, as well as two

investigators. She testified that she had filed thirty-six motions, including a motion

to suppress the Defendant’s statements. The motion to suppress was denied. She

explained that she had concluded a change of venue would not necessarily be in

her client’s best interest. Her records reflected twenty jail visits as well as

additional phone calls and correspondence with the Defendant. She explained

that, under the facts of the case, “There was not much strategy that could be had,”

and that she had advised her client “to try to enter a plea rather than to go to trial,

because they were seeking the death penalty against him.”

In a ruling from the bench, the trial court found the Defendant “not very

credible . . . in terms of his assertions” and that “performance of counsel was

adequate and reasonable under the circum stances.” We agree. In this postconviction relief proceeding, the Defendant had the burden of proving the

allegations in his petition by a preponderance of the evidence. McBee v. State,

655 S.W.2d 191, 195 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). Furthermore, the factual findings

of a trial court after an evidentiary hearing “are conclusive on appeal unless the

evidence preponderates against the judgment.” State v. Buford, 666 S.W.2d 473,

475 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). In this case, upon our review of the evidentiary

hearing as well as the transcripts from the guilty plea and motion to suppress, the

Defendant has simply failed to carry his burden of proof as to both of his alleged

grounds for relief. The judgment below is accordingly affirmed.
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____________________________

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE

CONCUR:

_________________________

PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE

_________________________ 

JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE