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*********************************************** 
RUSSELL JORDAN ET AL. v.

JON D. BILLER ET AL.

(AC 40314)

Keller, Prescott and Bright, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs sought to recover damages for, inter alia, trespass, in connection with an incident in which the defendants removed approximately

eighty trees from the plaintiffs’ property in an area of a direct sight

line from the defendants’ house to the water. Pursuant to a previously

executed license and view easement that had been granted to previous

owners of the defendants’ property, permission from the plaintiffs was

required before any trees could be thinned or cut down. The defendants,

who did not request permission form the plaintiff before cutting down

the trees, claimed that they enjoyed the benefits of an appurtenant view

easement over the plaintiffs’ property, which gave them the right to cut

down the trees. Following a trial to the court, the trial court rendered

judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that the view easement

granted to previous owners of the defendants’ property was a right

personal to them and did not run with the land, such that the defendants

did not enjoy a view easement over the plaintiffs’ property. On the

defendants’ appeal to this court, held:

1. The trial court properly determined that the view easement granted to

the previous owners of the defendants’ property was a right personal

to them and did not run with the land; the view easement does not

expressly convey rights to heirs and assigns of the grantee, which created

a presumption that the easement was personal to the previous owners

to which it was granted and not appurtenant to the subject property,

and given that the defendants did not provide a basis to conclude that

the view easement had such sufficient value to demonstrate that it was

intended to run with the land, as it was not shown that the view easement

enhanced the value of the defendants’ property by adding any monetary

value, that there was a lack of historical usage of the easement, and

that the intent of the parties expressed in the language of a bond for

deed and license and view easement evidenced only a personal right

instead of an appurtenant easement that was intended to run with the

land, the defendants did not overcome the presumption that the view

easement was not appurtenant.

2. Because the defendants’ claim that the trial court erred in awarding the

plaintiffs damages was predicated on their claim that they enjoyed the

rights to the view easement, and because this court determined that

the view easement was not appurtenant, the defendants’ claim failed;

moreover, even if the defendants enjoyed the rights of an easement

appurtenant, they needed to obtain the plaintiffs’ permission before

cutting down or trimming any trees, which they failed to do, and, thus,

their failure to obtain such permission provided further support for the

court’s award of damages.

Argued May 16—officially released September 18, 2018

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, trespass,

and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the

judicial district of Waterbury, where the court, BrazzelMassaro, J., granted the plaintiffs’ motion to transfer to

the judicial district of Middlesex; thereafter, the court,

Aurigemma, J., granted the defendants’ motion for nonsuit for failure to plead; subsequently, the court, Aurigemma, J., set aside the entry of nonsuit; thereafter, the

defendants filed a counterclaim for, inter alia, injunctive

relief; subsequently, the matter was tried to the court,

Aurigemma, J.; judgment for the plaintiffs, from which
the defendants appealed to this court; thereafter, the

court, Aurigemma, J., denied the plaintiffs’ motion for

reconsideration as to damages, and the plaintiffs cross

appealed to this court; subsequently, the plaintiffs withdrew their cross appeal. Affirmed.

Karen L. Dowd, with whom were Brendon P. Levesque and, on the brief, Joseph Musco, for the appellants (defendants).

David S. Doyle, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Opinion

KELLER, J. The defendants, Jon and Jacqueline

Biller, appeal from the judgment of the trial court in

favor of the plaintiffs, Russell Jordan and Lorraine

Jorsey. The defendants claim that the court improperly

determined that a view easement granted to previous

owners of their property was not appurtenant to their

land. The defendants also claim that the court erred in

awarding the plaintiffs damages. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the court, are relevant to our resolution of the defendants’ appeal. The

plaintiffs’ property, on the bank of the Salmon River,

is located at 2 Cove Road, East Haddam. The defendants

are the owners of 6 Cove Road, which abuts the plaintiffs’ property.

In its memorandum of decision, the court stated: ‘‘The

2 Cove Road property was part of a 101 acre parcel of

land . . . owned by Paul and Mary Campbell . . . .

‘‘[Paul and Mary Campbell] lived in a ranch house at

6 Cove Road on the 101 acre parcel of property. In 1986,

Paul and Mary Campbell sold the house [along] with

[eighty-nine] acres of that property to Damon and Brian

Navarro, who were real estate developers.’’ The Campbells retained 2 Cove Road, which was the remainder

of their original 101 acre property, located along the

Salmon River. The court further found: ‘‘During the

negotiations to purchase the property from the Campbells, Damon and Brian Navarro asked the Campbells

to grant them a view easement over [2 Cove Road to

benefit] 6 Cove Road. Richard Shea, Jr., the Navarros’

counsel, requested language in the purchase and sale

contract for the property, which provided that the view

easement would run with the property and be binding

upon the [Campbells’ (sellers’)] heirs, successors, and

assigns. The Campbells refused to grant a view easement which ran with the property, or bound their successors or assigns. The sales contract, or bond for deed,

dated June 23, 1986, stated: ‘This right is personal to

the buyers and the spouses of the buyers.’

‘‘The Campbells conveyed the property via warranty

deed to Damon and Brian Navarro on September 25,

1986. At the same time the parties executed a document

[titled] License and View Easement, which provides, in

pertinent part:

‘‘ ‘This agreement is made and entered into [on September 25, 1986], by and between Paul J. Campbell and

Mary E. Campbell, both of the town of Punta Gorda

. . . Florida, hereinafter referred to as ‘‘Sellers,’’ or

‘‘Owners’’ and Damon Navarro, of the town of Marlborough . . . Connecticut, and Brian Navarro, of the town

of Hartford . . . Connecticut, hereinafter referred to

as the ‘‘Buyers’’ or ‘‘Licensees.’’
‘‘ ‘2. View Easement: Sellers also hereby grant to the

Buyers the right to thin and trim the trees on the land

retained by the Sellers lying west of the land purchased

by the Buyers to permit a view of Salmon Cove from

the ranch house on the land purchased by the Buyers.

The area in which the Buyers shall have such right is

on that portion of [the] Sellers’ retained land which lies

between the extension westerly of the northerly and

southerly boundary lines of the meadow as the same

is now constituted on the land purchased by the Buyers,

which meadow lies to the west of said ranch house and

is approximately [250] feet in width from its northerly

to its southerly boundary lines. The Buyers hereby agree

to bear the total cost of such tree trimming and tree

removal, to perform or have performed the work in a

good and workmanlike manner, and to remove or have

removed any wood resulting from the thinning and/or

trimming from the Sellers’ land immediately after the

said thinning and/or trimming. It is strictly agreed and

understood, however, that no thinning and/or trimming shall be performed without the agreement of the

Sellers, which agreement shall not be unreasonably

withheld.’ ’’ (Emphasis in original.) This license and

view easement was recorded in the East Haddam land

records in Volume 219, Page 201.1

The court stated further: ‘‘Damon and Brian Navarro

subdivided the property [that they purchased from the

Campbells] as part of a subdivision known as Scoville

Landing. In 1989, Damon and Brian Navarro quitclaimed

a thirty acre portion of the property identified as Lot

19 of Scoville Landing to Anne Navarro. In 1992, Anne

Navarro sold that property to Rolf H. Olson and Sioux

S. Olson by a warranty deed.2

. . . [T]he warranty deed

contained the property description which referred to

the property as 6 Cove Road and included the following

language after the property description: ‘Together with

any and all assignable rights of Grantor to a license

and view easement from Paul J. Campbell and Mary E.

Campbell to Damon Navarro and Brian Navarro dated

September 25, 1986, and recorded in the East Haddam

land records in Volume 219, Page 201.’

‘‘[The plaintiffs inherited the property retained by the

Campbells, 2 Cove Road] via a quitclaim deed from the

estate of Mary Campbell, their mother. That deed is

dated December 22, 2010, and recorded at Volume 879,

Page 85 of the East Haddam land records . . . .

* * *

‘‘In 2012, Sioux [S.] Olson sold the 6 Cove Road property to the defendants . . . via warranty deed, dated

August 1, 2012. . . . [T]he warranty deed contained

the following language after the property description:

‘Together with any and all assignable rights of Anne W.

Navarro to a license and view easement from Paul J.

Campbell and Mary E. Campbell to Damon Navarro and
Brian Navarro [dated] September 25, 1986, and recorded

in Volume 219 at Page 201 of the East Haddam land

records.’ . . .

‘‘There was no evidence that at any time between

1986 and the date on which the [defendants] purchased

the 6 Cove Road property that any other owner of that

property had thinned or cut any trees on the 2 Cove

Road property, now owned by the plaintiffs. . . .

‘‘In the late fall of 2012, the defendants removed

approximately [eighty] trees from the plaintiffs’ property in the area of the direct sight line from the house

at 6 Cove Road to . . . Salmon Cove. Approximately

[fifty] of the felled trees had trunk diameters of more

than [six] inches. The area from which the trees were

removed is approximately 100 feet by 225 feet. Prior

to the removal of the trees, the plaintiffs’ house was

surrounded by [seventy to eighty] year old forest.’’ After

the defendants cut down the trees, the plaintiffs no

longer had the same levels of privacy they previously

enjoyed.

‘‘The defendants did not request permission from the

plaintiffs prior to cutting down the trees. Jon Biller . . .

had not even read the license and view easement prior

to cutting down all the trees . . . . He . . . did not

realize that [the] document required the person cutting

down trees to obtain permission before doing so.

[Because] the plaintiffs did not reside at the 2 Cove

Road property, they were not aware that the trees had

been cut down until several months later.’’ (Footnote

added.) The defendants’ trimming diminished the value

of the plaintiffs’ property by reducing a portion of the

forest into the ‘‘botanical equivalent of a bomb site.’’

On October 31, 2013, the plaintiffs commenced the

underlying action against the defendants. In the four

count operative complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that

they were entitled to damages because ‘‘the defendants

unlawfully came upon the plaintiffs’ property without

their permission or knowledge and cut down and/or

damaged a substantial number of trees and/or shrubbery.’’ The plaintiffs’ complaint contained counts

sounding in temporary trespass, negligence, and violations of General Statutes §§ 52-560 and 25-102a through

25-102g.3 On January 19, 2016, the defendants answered,

denying the plaintiffs’ allegations, and raising several

special defenses and counterclaims. The gist of the

defendants’ special defenses and counterclaims was

that they enjoyed the benefits of an appurtenant view

easement over the plaintiffs’ property and this afforded

them the right to cut down the trees.

The matter was tried to the court, and, on March 24,

2017, the court issued a memorandum of decision. The

court found in favor of the plaintiffs on their trespass

and negligence counts. The court also found in favor

of the plaintiffs on the defendants’ counterclaim on the
ground that the view easement granted to the Navarros

‘‘was a right personal to them,’’ did not run with the

land, and that the defendants do not enjoy a view easement over the plaintiffs’ property. The court awarded

the plaintiffs $446,660 in damages.4 This appeal

followed.

I

The defendants claim that the court improperly determined that the view easement was not appurtenant to

their land. The following additional facts are relevant

to this claim. In 1986, the Campbells and Navarros

signed two documents, a bond for deed and the license

and view easement. The license and view easement was

recorded in the East Haddam land records at volume

219, page 201. The bond for deed, by its terms, was not

to be recorded. In addition to the previously stated

provision pertaining to the view easement, the license

and view easement contained a section titled ‘‘License.’’

This section provides that the ‘‘Sellers as Licensors

hereby grant to the Buyers as Licensees a pedestrian

right of way to Salmon Cove over land retained by the

Sellers lying west of the land purchased by the Buyers.

. . . Said license may be exercised only by the Buyers

and members of their families who reside with the Buyers and by the invited guests of the Buyers when accompanied by the Buyers or said members of the Buyers’

families.’’

The unrecorded bond for deed also contains a section

titled ‘‘View Easement.’’ This section provides: ‘‘The

parties hereto agree that the Buyers shall be granted

the right to thin and trim the trees on said other land

of the Sellers adjacent to and westerly of the Property.

The area in which the Buyers shall have such right

is on that portion of [Sellers’] said property which is

between the extension westerly of the northerly and

southerly boundary lines of the meadow as the same

is now constituted on the Property, which meadow is

approximately two hundred fifty (250) feet in width

from its northerly to its southerly boundary lines. This

right is personal to the Buyers and the spouses of the

Buyers. The Buyers shall bear the total cost of such

tree trimming and tree removal, shall perform or have

such work performed in a good and workman like manner and shall immediately remove any wood resulting

therefrom from [Sellers’] said land.’’ (Emphasis added.)

The recorded license and view easement contains

the following introductory clause: ‘‘Whereas, the Sellers

and the Buyers had agreed in the [bond for deed] that

the Sellers would grant to the Buyers at the time of

transfer of title both a pedestrian right of way and a

view easement upon the terms and conditions hereinafter more particularly set forth.’’

In addition, the plaintiffs presented the testimony of

Shea, the Navarros’ attorney during the negotiations
to purchase the property from the Campbells. Shea

testified that he sent a proposed revision of the bond

for deed to the representative of the Campbells. In this

proposal, which was admitted into evidence, Shea suggested amending the portion of the bond for deed pertaining to the view easement by removing the clause

that stated the view easement would be personal to the

buyers, the Navarros, and adding: ‘‘This right shall run

with the Property and shall be binding upon the Sellers,

their heirs, successors and assigns . . . .’’ According

to Shea, the Campbells rejected this change.

The defendants make two principal arguments in support of their proposition that the view easement is

appurtenant. First, the defendants assert that the value

of the view easement is so great that it evinces an intent

to run with the land. Specifically, the defendants state

that ‘‘prior owners, when advertising [6 Cove Road] for

sale, stressed that it had water views demonstrating

the value of such a view to the property. . . . [T]he

[defendants] testified the view easement was critical

to their purchase of the home. . . . [T]he house itself

demonstrates the value of the view easement to the

land, not just to the original owners. The ranch house

on 6 Cove Road is situated on a slope overlooking the

cove and is designed in a U shape to maximize the

view.’’ (Citations omitted.) Secondly, the defendants

argue that the language in the license and view easement executed by the Campbells and the Navarros

evinces that the view easement was meant to be appurtenant. They assert that the phrase the ‘‘[s]ellers . . .

grant to the Buyers the right to thin and trim the trees

on the land retained by the Sellers . . . to permit a

view of Salmon Cove from the ranch house on the land

purchased by the Buyers,’’ when compared to a clause

in the pedestrian right-of-way that limits the use of it

to ‘‘only by the Buyers and members of their families,’’

supports the conclusion that the view easement is

appurtenant because the pedestrian right-of-way contains limiting language and the view easement does not.

We now turn to our standard of review. ‘‘Although

in most contexts the issue of intent is a factual question

on which our scope of review is limited . . . the determination of the intent behind language in a deed, considered in the light of all the surrounding circumstances,

presents a question of law on which our scope of review

is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deane

v. Kahn, 317 Conn. 157, 166, 116 A.3d 259 (2015).

The following legal principles guide our determination of whether an easement is personal or appurtenant.

‘‘All easements, whether express or implied, are classified as either easements appurtenant or easements in

gross. In an easement appurtenant, the easement

belongs to and benefits the dominant estate, and burdens the servient estate.’’ Powers v. Grenier Construction, Inc., 10 Conn. App. 556, 559, 524 A.2d 667 (1987).
‘‘An easement in gross belongs to the owner of it independently of his ownership or possession of any specific

land. Therefore, in contrast to an easement appurtenant, its ownership may be described as being personal

to the owner of it.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Saunders Point Assn., Inc. v. Cannon, 177 Conn. 413,

415, 418 A.2d 70 (1979).

‘‘It is well settled that [i]f the easement makes no

mention of the heirs and assigns of the grantee, a presumption is created that the intent of the parties was

that merely a personal right-of-way was reserved. This

presumption, however, is not conclusive. A reservation

will be interpreted as creating a permanent easement

if, from all the surrounding circumstances, it appears

that that was the intention of the parties. . . . One

circumstance which must be given great weight in the

ascertainment of the intent of the parties is . . . [if the

easement] is of value to the property to which it is

appurtenant and will continue to be of value [to] whoever may own the property, that is strong evidence that

the parties intended a permanent easement. . . . Also

significant is whether the owner of the servient estate

recognized the right of the subsequent owners of the

dominant estate to exercise the easement. . . . Finally,

we will look to the actual language of the reservation

clause itself.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Deane v. Kahn, supra, 317 Conn.

171–72.

‘‘The burden of proof rests upon [the party claiming

appurtenance] to show the existence of all facts necessary to prove the right-of-way was created as an appurtenance, although our review of the trial court’s

conclusion as to whether the parties to a conveyance

intended it to be appurtenant is plenary.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 172.

The defendants concede that the view easement does

not expressly convey rights to heirs and assigns of the

grantee. The absence of an express grant creates a

presumption that the easement was personal to the

Navarros and not appurtenant to 6 Cove Road. The

question is whether the defendants can overcome that

presumption based on the value of the easement to

the property, historical usage of the property, and the

language of the view easement executed by the Campbells and the Navarros.

The defendants argue that the view easement has

significant value, suggesting that it was intended to be

appurtenant. When the easement ‘‘will continue to be

of value [to] whoever may own the property, that is

strong evidence that the parties intended a permanent

easement.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Leabo

v. Leninski, 182 Conn. 611, 614–15, 438 A.2d 1153

(1981); see also Irving v. Firehouse Associates, LLC,

95 Conn. App. 713, 729–30, 898 A.2d 270 (value of rightof-way great enough to support conclusion easement
ran with land when property would be landlocked without it), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 903, 907 A.2d 90 (2006).

Although our case law does not precisely define what

constitutes value for the purpose of determining

whether an easement is appurtenant or in gross, the

claimed easement must be more than a convenience to

the owner of the dominant estate. See Stiefel v. Lindemann, 33 Conn. App. 799, 808–809, 638 A.2d 642 (rightof-way to access service entrance was convenience

when other means of access to property available), cert.

denied, 229 Conn. 914, 642 A.2d 1211 (1994). In the

present case, the only evidence that the defendants

provided with respect to value to the property is their

own testimony that they deemed the view easement

valuable because sightlines to the river factored into

their decision to purchase the 6 Cove Road property.

There was no evidence as to any added monetary value

due to having a view of the river. In addition, there was

photographic evidence that, even after cutting down

the trees, the defendants still could only view a narrow

sliver of the cove from their home. Thus, we conclude

that the defendants have not provided a basis to conclude that the view easement has such sufficient value

to demonstrate that it was intended to run with the land.

An easement also can be found to be appurtenant

when ‘‘the owner of the estate to be burdened recognized that subsequent owners of the estate to be benefitted would have a right to exercise the easement.’’

(Emphasis in original.) Stiefel v. Lindemann, supra, 33

Conn. App. 809. In the present case, this factor supports

the conclusion that the view easement is not appurtenant because neither the plaintiffs nor the Campbells

ever recognized that the previous owners of the defendants’ property could thin trees to take advantage of

the view easement; nor was there any evidence that

the previous owners of 6 Cove Road requested or

attempted to ‘‘ever cut or [thin] a single tree.’’

Lastly, we turn to the language of the license and

view easement to examine whether the easement was

meant to run with the land. ‘‘The meaning and effect

of the reservation are to be determined, not by the

actual intent of the parties, but by the intent expressed

in the deed, considering all its relevant provisions and

reading it in the light of the surrounding circumstances

. . . .’’ Taylor v. Dennehy, 136 Conn. 398, 402, 71 A.2d

596 (1950). As previously stated, the defendants argue

that the language in the section setting forth the ‘‘view

easement’’ supports the conclusion that the view easement is appurtenant because it lacks a clause limiting

the right to the Navarros, unlike the section granting

the license to the pedestrian right-of-way. We are not

persuaded.

The evidence pertaining to the negotiations that

occurred between the Campbells and the Navarros is

helpful in interpreting the intent expressed in the view
easement. Specifically, the relevant evidence includes

two documents, the unrecorded bond for deed and

Shea’s unaccepted proposed revisions to that deed,5

and Shea’s testimony. The unrecorded bond for deed

contains a provision that the view easement is a right

‘‘personal to the Buyers and the spouses of the Buyers.’’

Shea’s proposed revisions to that document reveal that

the Navarros sought an appurtenant easement, but the

Campbells refused to grant it.

Viewing the license and view easement in light of the

negotiations that occurred between the Campbells and

Navarros, we conclude that the language of the easement granted the Navarros only a personal right. First,

the license and view easement acknowledges that the

bond for deed reflects the parties’ agreement regarding

the granting of both the pedestrian right-of-way and the

view easement. Second, the intent expressed in the

view easement, which grants ‘‘the Buyers the right,’’ is

that the benefit was not intended to run with the land.

This is well supported by the evidence that the term

‘‘Buyers’’ is defined as and limited to Brian Navarro and

Damon Navarro in the first paragraph of the license

and view easement, that the parties agreed the easement was personal in the unrecorded bond for deed,

and that Shea testified that the Campbells rejected an

appurtenant easement. As a result, by defining the term

‘‘Buyers’’ as Brian Navarro and Damon Navarro, and

acknowledging the nature of the parties’ agreement in

the bond for deed, the view easement does contain the

sufficient limiting language that the defendants argue

is lacking.

On the basis that the view easement has not been

proven to enhance the value of the defendants’ property, the lack of historical usage of the easement, and

the intent of the parties expressed in the bond for deed

and the license and view easement, we conclude that

the defendants do not enjoy the rights of an appurtenant

easement. The defendants cannot overcome the presumption that the view easement is not appurtenant. It

was an easement in gross granted only to the Navarros.

Therefore, their claim must fail.

II

The defendants’ second claim is that the court erred

in awarding the plaintiffs damages. Specifically, the

defendants argue that ‘‘[i]f this [c]ourt finds that the

defendants have rights under the view easement, then

any award of damages must be reversed.’’ The defendants do not take issue with the method the court used

to calculate damages. Instead the defendants’ claim is

predicated on the defendants enjoying the rights to the

view easement, and because we have decided that the

view easement was not appurtenant, we conclude that

this claim warrants no further discussion. Even if we

were to conclude that the defendants enjoy the rights

of an easement appurtenant, in accordance with the
terms of the view easement, the defendants needed to

obtain the plaintiffs’ permission before cutting down

or trimming any trees. Their undisputed failure to obtain

such permission from the plaintiffs provides further

support for the court’s damages award.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The bond for deed contemplated that the Campbells would provide the

Navarros with a warranty deed, but no warranty deed for the transaction

is in evidence.

2

In the warranty deed granted to the Olsons, although the property description attached as Schedule A refers to a utility company easement, an emergency access easement, and a well easement, there is no mention of the

view easement.

3 The court concluded that the plaintiffs abandoned their statutory causes

of action because ‘‘[t]he plaintiffs have specifically stated that they are not

proceeding under . . . § 52-560’’ and ‘‘[t]hey have not addressed [their §§ 25-

102a through 25-102g claims] in their posttrial memorandum.’’

4 The plaintiffs’ expert, Michael DiFranco, an arborist, testified that the

cost to replace the trees would be at least $396,660 and estimated that it

would cost $50,000 to clean up the debris left behind after the tree work.

The court did not base its award on the plaintiffs’ evidence that the tree

cutting diminished the value of their property.

5 The defendants claim that the unrecorded bond for deed and the license

and view easement should have been precluded because they are parol

evidence. This claim was preserved because the defendants filed a motion

in limine to preclude these documents from being admitted into evidence

on the ground that they were inadmissible parol evidence and renewed this

objection in a timely manner at trial. Nevertheless, in accordance with

Practice Book § 67-4 (d), claims on appeal must be divided into separate parts

and each point must include a separate brief statement of the appropriate

standard of review in order to be adequately briefed. As the defendants have

not provided this, we are not required to review this claim. See Carmichael

v. Stonkus, 133 Conn. App. 302, 308–309, 34 A.3d 1026, cert. denied, 304

Conn. 911, 39 A.3d 1121 (2012).

Regardless, ‘‘[a]lthough the parol evidence rule prohibits the introduction

of evidence that varies or contradicts an exclusive written agreement . . .

that rule does not bar the use of extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation

of contractual language.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hare v. McClellan, 234 Conn. 581, 596, 662 A.2d 1242 (1995). As previously stated, the license and view easement is ambiguous because it does

not expressly state whether the right is appurtenant or in gross. Additionally,

interpretation of an easement requires reading it in light of the surrounding

circumstances. Accordingly, these documents were properly admitted

into evidence.