Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

CRAIG A. DECHERT ROBERT J. HENKE

Kokomo, Indiana Indiana Department of Child Services

Indianapolis, IN 

ALICIA C. CRIPE

Indiana Department of Child Services

Kokomo, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF THE PARENT )

CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF D.T.: )

)

S.T., )

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 34A05-1205-JT-228

)

THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF )

CHILD SERVICES, )

)

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE HOWARD CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Lynn Murray, Judge 

Cause No. 34C01-1112-JT-00439 

November 9, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

PYLE, Judge
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

S.T. (“Mother”) appeals the involuntary termination of the parent-child relationship 

with her son, D.T.1

We affirm.

ISSUE

Whether there was clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of 

Mother’s parental rights to D.T.

FACTS

On August 5, 2010, then seventeen-year-old Mother gave birth to D.T. Three weeks 

later, on August 27, 2010, the Howard County office of the Indiana Department of Child 

Services (“DCS”) received a report from the Kokomo Police Department that Mother had 

punched D.T. in his stomach and had twisted his right leg. The incident was captured on 

videotape by Mother’s father and step-mother, with whom she lived (“Grandparents”). 

Grandparents were concerned about D.T.’s safety while in Mother’s care and had installed 

video equipment in their home. D.T. was taken to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with 

a right tibia fracture, a left femur fracture, and a possible adrenal hemorrhage. Mother was 

arrested for aggravated battery if committed by an adult and placed in a juvenile detention 

facility. 

 

1 A father was named as alleged father in the initial CHINS petition and other CHINS documents, but paternity 

was never established. Thus, there is no father involved in this appeal.
3

DCS removed D.T. from Mother’s care, placed him in therapeutic foster care,2and 

filed a petition alleging that he was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). During the factfinding hearing, Mother stipulated that D.T. was a CHINS due to her incarceration and 

continued inability to care for D.T. The trial court determined him to be a CHINS and later 

appointed a court appointed special advocate (“CASA”). The trial court ordered Mother—

once released from incarceration—to cooperate and maintain contact with DCS and parenting

service providers; attend therapy sessions; obtain employment and housing; participate in 

supervised visitation; and refrain from illegal activity. The trial court also ordered Mother to 

keep DCS updated on the status of her pending criminal charges. 

Mother was waived to adult court and was charged with class D felony neglect of a 

dependent. Mother pled guilty to the charge, and the trial court imposed a three (3) year 

sentence, all of which was suspended to supervised probation. Mother was then released 

from incarceration on April 1, 2011.

After her release from jail, Mother did not maintain consistent contact with her DCS 

family case manager and service providers and failed to fully comply with services. In April 

2011, DCS set up parenting and family education services for Mother. These services 

included helping Mother obtain services in the community, such as Medicaid, food stamps, 

and birth control; assisting Mother with learning organization and time management skills; 

and providing some parenting education skills. When Mother attended these service 

sessions, she had productive sessions, but Mother’s attendance was sporadic. At times, 

 

2 Later, in October 2010, D.T. was placed in relative care.
4

Mother “would be gone for like a week” and have no contact with her family education 

provider. (Tr. 7). 

Also in April 2011, the trial court ordered that Mother could begin supervised 

visitation after she started participating in therapy and received a recommendation from the 

therapist that supervised visitation would be appropriate. Mother did not show up for her 

initial therapy assessment, which was scheduled for May 2011. When Mother ultimately 

attended her therapy assessment in July 2011, the therapist recommended that Mother 

participate in group therapy. Mother started group therapy, but she did not fully participate 

and did not have consistent attendance. 

Mother also did not comply with programs that she was supposed to attend as part of 

her probation for her neglect of a dependent conviction. Mother was supposed to receive 

services through the Gilead House, but she was ultimately discharged from the Gilead House 

because of her noncompliance.

Additionally, Mother failed to refrain from illegal activity. Within two months of 

being released from jail to probation, Mother was charged with conversion. Additionally, 

Mother, who was required to submit to drug screens as part of her probation for her neglect 

of a dependent conviction, tested positive for cocaine and opiates within three months of 

being released from jail. 

Thereafter, the trial court, in July 2011, ordered Mother to submit to random drug 

screens and to participate in an intensive outpatient program (“IOP”). Mother cooperated 

with the random drug screens and did not have any positive drug screens. Mother attended a 
5

few IOP sessions, but she did not fully cooperate and was ultimately released from the 

program. 

Thereafter, DCS arranged for Mother to attend individual therapy. Mother attended 

an initial assessment with a psychiatrist in the Fall of 2011. The psychiatrist was not able to 

make an informed diagnosis because Mother was “not being forthcoming with information” 

and gave “inconsistent answers.” (Tr. 24). The psychiatrist recommended neurological 

testing, which was scheduled but ultimately did not occur because Mother became 

incarcerated on new charges in January 2012. No psychiatrist or therapist ever recommended 

that Mother have supervised visitation with D.T.

Mother also failed to maintain stable housing. After Mother was released from jail, 

Mother was initially housed at a shelter, but she remained there for approximately one week. 

Thereafter, she fluctuated between staying at her boyfriend’s house3 when he was not 

incarcerated and staying at her aunt’s house.

On December 28, 2011, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to 

then sixteen-month-old D.T. 

On January 4, 2012, Mother was arrested and charged with false reporting and 

resisting law enforcement, which apparently resulted in the State filing a motion to revoke 

Mother’s probation from her neglect of a dependent suspended sentence.

The trial court held a termination hearing on February 20, 2012. At the time of the 

hearing, Mother remained incarcerated but attended the hearing. Following the termination 

 

3 This boyfriend was not the person who was alleged to be D.T.’s father.
6

hearing, the trial court issued an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to D.T. The trial 

court concluded, in part, that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in D.T.’s removal or the reasons for his placement outside the home would not be 

remedied and entered the following relevant findings and conclusions:

11. The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is a 

reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the removal of the 

child from the mother’s custodial care and the reasons for the child’s 

placement outside of his mother’s care and custody will not be remedied for 

the reasons more specifically stated herein.

* * * * *

24. Since the child’s removal, the Mother has made no progress towards her 

ability to provide for the child. The Mother has been unable to demonstrate a 

consistent ability to parent and provide for the child with a safe, appropriate 

home, free from illegal activity, in order to be reunified with the child.

25. The Mother has not been consistently participating in services and failed to 

attend assessment appointments delaying her necessary therapy so that 

visitation could be arranged between the Mother and the Child.

26. At three weeks of age, on August 27, 2010, [D.T.] was removed from 

Mother after she struck and harmed the child, causing him serious bodily 

injuries. Due to this behavior, Mother was incarcerated on juvenile and 

criminal cha[r]ges until April 2011. Approximately two months later, on June 

24, 2011, Mother was arrested and charged with the offense of conversion. On 

January 4, 2012, Mother was arrested and charged with false reporting and 

resisting law enforcement. As of the fact-finding hearing held February 20, 

2012, Mother was incarcerated on these pending charges and [had] a petition 

to revoke her probation. 

27. When Mother had been out of jail, she was inconsistent in participating in 

services and had been difficult to get a hold of at times. Her living 

arrangements have been unstable. Upon her release from jail in April 2011, 

Mother moved into the Open Arms shelter. She left after only six days, and 

thereafter, stayed with a boyfriend or relatives. Mother had to stay with 

relatives when her boyfriend was periodically arrested and incarcerated. 
7

28. After Mother’s release from jail in April 2011, the DCS made 

arrangements for Mother to participate in therapeutic treatment. Mother 

missed her first appointment, and did not start to attend an IOP at Howard 

Community Hospital Regional System until July 2011. Thereafter, Mother 

missed group appointments, was late to group, uncooperative and ultimately 

dropped from the program as non compliant in late August 2011.

29. Thereafter, DCS arranged for Mother to participate in psychiatric 

evaluation and treatment recommendations with Psychiatrist Anu Thumuluri. 

Mother met with Dr. Thumuluri on November and December 19, 2011; 

however, Dr. Thumuluri was not able to complete her evaluation and treatment 

recommendation without further neurological testing. The testing was 

scheduled for February 17, 2012; however, Mother was unable to participate 

due to her prior arrest and incarceration on criminal charges. At Mother’s last 

appointment with Dr. Thumuluri, the psychiatrist reported the need for further 

evaluation and a recommendation that any visitation, even supervised, between 

[D.T.] and Mother not take place.

* * * * *

35. In this case, the Mother has shown a pattern of conduct in choosing a 

criminal lifestyle over her child. The child was removed from the Mother due 

to the Mother physically abusing the child and causing a possible adrenal 

hemorrhage, a broken right tibia bone and a broken left femur bone. The 

Mother was initially charged with Aggravated Battery in Juvenile Court and 

was subsequently charged with Neglect of a Dependent once she was waived 

to Adult Court. The Mother pled guilty to the Neglect of a Dependent charge 

and was given a suspended sentence. Once released from incarceration, 

Mother was charged with Conversion and most recently charged with False 

Reporting and Resisting Law Enforcement. A Petition to Revoke Mother’s 

Suspended Sentence was recently filed and is pending.

* * * * *

37. The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is reasonably 

probable that the conditions that led to the removal and that led to placement 

outside the home, namely the Mother’s abuse of her child, her mental health 

concerns, her commission of illegal acts, and her instability, will not be 

remedied to the degree that she will be able to provide the child with the 

nurturing, safe, stable, and appropriate care and environment that he requires 

on a long term basis.
8

(App. 7, 12-16).4 Mother now appeals.5 Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DECISION

Mother argues that the trial court erred by ordering the involuntary termination of her 

parent-child relationship with D.T.

“Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for 

termination of these rights when parties are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibility as 

parents.” In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 720 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); see also In re I.A., 934 

N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010). The purpose of termination of parental rights is not to punish 

parents but to protect children. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g 

denied, trans. denied, cert. denied. 

In reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will neither reweigh the evidence 

nor judge the credibility of witnesses. I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1132. We consider only the 

evidence most favorable to the judgment. Id. Where the trial court has entered findings of 

fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Id. We must 

determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support 

 

4 The record on appeal does not include documents that were mentioned during the termination hearing. For 

example, the DCS family case manager, Jennifer Boston, testified that she had attached a letter from Mother’s 

therapist regarding the recommendation that visitation not occur. Boston’s report and the letter were not 

included in the record on appeal. However, it is clear that it was considered by the trial court because the trial 

court referenced the recommendation from Dr. Thumuluri in its termination order. Additionally, the CASA, 

Keith Land, testified that he filed a CASA report on February 3, 2012, but the record before us contains only 

the CASA reports that were filed in July 2011 and September 2011. 

5

Prior to briefing in this case, DCS filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal for Failure to Perfect Appeal. The 

Motions Panel of this Court reviewed and denied DCS’s motion. 
9

the judgment. Id. We will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only 

if it is clearly erroneous. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support 

the conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

When DCS seeks to terminate parental rights, it must plead and prove, in relevant 

part:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted 

in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home 

of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parentchild relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a 

child in need of services . . . .

Ind. Code § 31–35–2–4(b)(2).6These allegations must be established by clear and 

convincing evidence. I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1133. If the trial court finds the allegations in a 

petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parentchild relationship. I.C. § 31–35–2–8(a) (emphasis added). 

Mother argues that the DCS failed to prove that there was a reasonable probability that 

the conditions that resulted in D.T.’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home 

will not be remedied.7 Specifically, Mother contends that termination was not appropriate 

 

6

Indiana Code § 31–35–2–4 was amended by Public Law No. 48–2012 (effective July 1, 2012). The changes 

to the statute became effective after the filing of the termination petition involved herein and are not applicable 

to this case. 

7 Mother also argues that the trial court erred by finding that the continuation of the parent-child relationship 

would pose a threat to the well-being of D.T. Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B), which is written in the 

disjunctive, required DCS to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence a reasonable probability that 

either: (1) the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of 
10

because she was never able to have visitation with D.T. after his removal from her care.

To determine whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a 

child’s continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must judge 

a parent’s fitness to care for the child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into 

consideration any evidence of changed conditions. A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d at 721. The trial court 

must also evaluate the parent’s habitual pattern of conduct to determine whether there is a 

substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. A trial court may properly 

consider evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of 

neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate employment and housing. McBride 

v. Monroe County Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 

Additionally, the trial court can properly consider the services offered by DCS to the parent 

and the parent’s response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be 

remedied. Id. “A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate 

 

the parents will not be remedied, or (2) the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the 

well-being of the child. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s 

conclusion that a reasonable probability exists that the conditions that led to D.T.’s removal and reasons for 

placement outside the home will not be remedied, we need not review whether the evidence supports the trial 

court’s conclusion that a reasonable probability exists that the continuation of the parent-child relationship 

poses a threat to D.T.’s well-being. See Bester v. Lake County Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 

148 n.5 (Ind. 2005).
11

with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a 

finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change.” L.S., 717 

N.E.2d at 210. 

Here, then three-week-old D.T. was removed from Mother’s home after Mother broke 

the infant’s leg and punched him in the stomach. Mother was incarcerated and later pled 

guilty to class D felony neglect of a dependent. Mother remained incarcerated during the 

first eight months of D.T.’s life. After Mother was released from jail to probation, the trial 

court ordered that Mother could begin supervised visitation with D.T. after she started 

participating in therapy and received a recommendation from the therapist that supervised 

visitation would be appropriate. Mother, however, did not fully complete her various therapy 

assignments, which included group therapy, an IOP, and individual therapy. As a result, 

Mother was not able to get a recommendation for visitation. Mother also had sporadic 

participation in and failed to fully comply with parenting and family education services. 

Additionally, Mother engaged in additional illegal activity. Indeed, at the time of the 

termination hearing, Mother was incarcerated on pending charges and had a pending petition 

to revoke her probation on her three-year suspended sentence from her neglect of a 

dependent conviction. 

We acknowledge that Mother did not have visitation prior to the termination 

proceeding, but we cannot overlook her pattern of conduct and failure to do what was 

necessary to be reunified with D.T. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in 

determining that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in D.T.’s 
12

removal or the reasons for placement outside the home will not be remedied.

We conclude there was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s 

decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights to D.T. We reverse a termination of parental 

rights “only upon a showing of ‘clear error’ — that which leaves us with a definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made.” Egly v. Blackford County Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 

592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992). We find no such error here and, therefore, affirm the 

trial court.

Affirmed.

FRIEDLANDER, J., and BROWN, J., concur.