COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Koontz, Elder and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

JONATHAN ALEXANDER GRANGER 

v. Record No. 2580-93-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA JULY 18, 1995 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG 

Richard S. Miller, Judge 

 James Hingeley (Office of the Public Defender, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General (James S. 

 Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for 

appellee. 

 Jonathan Alexander Granger (appellant) was convicted in a 

bench trial of murder and attempted rape. On appeal, he argues 

that the trial court erred in denying his request for funds to 

hire a medical expert to examine the cause of the victim's death. 

 Finding no error, we affirm the convictions. 

 On July, 26, 1993, Joyce Abrams (the victim) and Calvin 

Spriggs (Spriggs) were visiting appellant at his home in the City 

of Lynchburg. Spriggs and the victim had sex on the living room 

sofa while appellant sat in a nearby chair. When Spriggs got off 

the sofa, appellant got out of his chair and pushed the victim 

back down on the sofa. She resisted and yelled for him to stop. 

 During the struggle, the inside pane of the window near the sofa 

was broken. At 5:00 p.m., appellant's neighbor heard a window 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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break and saw the bleeding victim lying just below appellant's 

living room window. Appellant leaned out the front door and 

yelled: "Don't come back in the house again." 

 When the police and rescue team arrived, the medic noted "a 

deep gash to the groin area that went up into the chest cavity" 

and applied pressure to stop the severe bleeding from the right 

femoral artery. The victim died on July 27, 1993. 

 Before trial, on September 13, 1993, appellant filed a 

motion requesting funds to hire a medical expert to advise him 

concerning other possible causes of the victim's death. The 

medical examiner's report indicated the cause of death as 

"diffuse or disseminated intravascular coagulation secondary to 

malicious wounding of right femoral vessels," and hospital 

records listed cause of death as cardiac arrest. Appellant 

argued that there was a discrepancy between the medical records 

and the medical examiner's report. The trial judge denied the 

motion but stated: 

 [A]t this point you have not . . . even 

talked to or determined whether or not there 

is a discrepancy between the two people that 

saw the body of the victim as to the cause of 

death. So at this point I say that I can't 

say that there's a reasonable request. . . . 

 If there's a timely showing of some details, 

I may reconsider. 

 Appellant filed a second motion on September 24, 1993. 

Appellant asserted that he had found an expert who thought that 

the victim's death raised "reasonable medical questions meriting 
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examination by a medical expert." The trial judge denied the 

motion because he had "not heard anything that would indicate 

. . . that any sort of another medical examination should be 

performed." 

 Code § 19.2-163 provides as follows: 

 The circuit or district court shall direct 

the payment of such reasonable expenses 

incurred by such court-appointed attorney as 

it deems appropriate under the circumstances 

of the case.

(Emphasis added). See Singleton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 

841, 842-43, 433 S.E.2d 507, 508 (1993) (holding that 

authorization for expert expenses is within the trial court's 

discretion). An indigent defendant has "no constitutional right 

requiring the Commonwealth to provide funding of this type of 

expert assistance." O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 686, 

364 S.E.2d 491, 499, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988). See also

Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 332, 362 S.E.2d 650, 664 

(1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 971 (1988). 

 Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for 

expert assistance. Appellant failed to establish the necessity 

of a court-appointed expert because there was no showing of a 

discrepancy as to the victim's cause of death. He never spoke to 

the two doctors who examined the victim as instructed by the 

court and merely presented a potential expert who thought that 

the victim's death raised "reasonable medical questions." At 
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trial, both the medical examiner and the hospital doctor agreed 

that the laceration in the groin area was the cause of the 

victim's death. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.