In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-13-00205-CR

WILLIE LEE HARPER, JR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 5th District Court

Cass County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2011F00168

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
2

O P I N I O N

Willie Lee Harper, Jr., failed in his pretrial motion to suppress crack cocaine found in his 

possession in Cass County during a routine traffic stop.1 At his subsequent jury trial on two 

crack-related charges,

2 each time the State tendered the cocaine or a certain related item into 

evidence, Harper’s counsel affirmatively stated that he had “no objection” to the item being 

admitted into evidence.3

In his sole issue on appeal, Harper argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion 

to suppress the crack cocaine. Specifically, Harper argues that the search of his person was 

improper because the officer had no “reason to believe that he [wa]s dealing with an armed and 

dangerous individual.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). Because Harper failed to preserve 

his sole issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Generally, to preserve error on appeal after a pretrial motion to suppress evidence is 

overruled, the defendant need not later object at trial to the same evidence. Thomas v. State, 408 

S.W.3d 877, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Moraguez v. State, 701 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1986). But when a defendant affirmatively asserts during trial that he or she has no 

objection to the admission of the complained-of evidence, he or she forfeits any error in the 

 1

It is undisputed that the traffic stop was lawful.

2

The charge addressed in this appeal alleged that Harper tampered with some of the crack cocaine. The other 

charge, handled in appeal numbered 06-13-00206-CR decided today, alleged that Harper possessed 2.11 grams of 

crack cocaine. The jury found Harper guilty of both offenses. Pursuant to a finding of “true” to the State’s 

enhancement allegations, Harper was sentenced to twenty-five years’ imprisonment on each charge, to run 

concurrently.

3

Among the exhibits, which were admitted after Harper affirmatively stated “no objection” to admitting each, were a 

video recording of the encounter, a photograph of crack cocaine Harper had “stomped” into the pavement, a pill 

bottle containing other crack cocaine, and the laboratory report establishing the substance as crack cocaine weighing 

2.11 grams.
3

admission of the evidence despite the pretrial ruling unless the “record as a whole plainly 

demonstrates that the defendant did not intend, nor did the trial court construe, his ‘no objection’

statement to constitute an abandonment of a claim of error that he had earlier preserved for 

appeal.” Thomas, 408 S.W.3d at 885–86 (holding that “if from the record as a whole the 

appellate court simply cannot tell whether an abandonment was intended or understood,” an 

“affirmative ‘no objection’ statement will, by itself, serve as an unequivocal indication that a 

waiver was both intended and understood”); see Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 302 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2005); Jones v. State, 833 S.W.2d 118, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Moraguez, 701 

S.W.2d at 904.

Here, the trial court denied Harper’s suppression motion after a full evidentiary pretrial 

hearing, and then a jury trial was conducted on the issue of guilt. During his opening statement, 

Harper described the damning evidence which he had previously sought to suppress. At the 

trial’s commencement, Harper (1) agreed that a controlled substance was found during the 

officer’s search, (2) asked the jury to consider whether cocaine was being consumed only for 

personal use,4 and (3) informed the jury that they would see the video recording of the arrest, 

which depicted the stomping motion made by Harper after the cocaine fell to the ground. At 

trial, Harper affirmatively represented to the court that he had no objection to the admission of 

the four items demonstrating his attempt to destroy certain crack cocaine in his possession and 

his possession of other crack cocaine. 

 4

Counsel stated in opening, “I submit to you that it’s going to be—the evidence is going to show that it was a very 

small quantity, about two grams.” 
4

Harper did not inform the trial court that his acquiescence to the admission of these items 

of evidence was subject to the arguments he had previously made in his suppression motion. 

The trial court did not state anywhere that it understood the suppression issue to be preserved for 

appeal in spite of Harper’s affirmative statement that he had “no objection” to the admission of 

the State’s evidence. Our review of the entire record reveals nothing contradicting Harper’s 

apparent intention to fully relinquish his previous challenge to the evidence and nothing 

inconsistent with the trial court’s acceptance of that full relinquishment. See Robinson v. State, 

No. 06-09-00225-CR, 2012 WL 6518935, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Dec. 13, 2012, no pet.) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication).5

 In fact, Harper’s trial tactic of emphasizing the 

relatively small amount of cocaine in the pill bottle lends support to such full relinquishment.

 5

Although this unpublished case has no precedential value, we may take guidance from it “as an aid in developing 

reasoning that may be employed.” Carrillo v. State, 98 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, pet. ref’d).
5

Because defense counsel specifically stated that he had no objection to the admission of 

the State’s evidence and because the record does not plainly indicate an intention not to abandon 

the claim of error, the issue has not been preserved for review.6 Consequently, we affirm the 

trial court’s judgment.7

Josh R. Morriss, III

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: August 19, 2014

Date Decided: August 29, 2014

Publish

 6

Harper argued that the State’s evidence was illegally obtained in his closing argument to the jury, and the issue of 

the legality of the search was submitted to the jury. Even though an affirmative statement of “no objection” waives 

the right to complain of the admissibility of evidence, the defendant may still receive a jury instruction under Article 

38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure if the evidence raises a contested factual issue that is material to the 

lawfulness of obtaining evidence. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (West 2005); Holmes v. State, 248 

S.W.3d 194, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The issue involved in a motion to suppress is distinct from the issue 

submitted to the jury; “one is a legal question of admissibility for the judge and the other is a question of disputed 

fact for the jury’s consideration and resolution.” Holmes, 248 S.W.3d at 196; see Robinson, 2012 WL 6518935, at 

*2, n.1. Therefore, Harper’s argument and jury submission did not revive the issue of whether the search was illegal 

as a matter of law. 

7

After trial, Harper filed a “Motion for Reconsideration/Motion for New Trial” in an attempt to revive the arguments 

made in his suppression motion. A trial judge may always reconsider a previous ruling. However, because Harper’s 

motion for reconsideration was overruled by operation of law, it was insufficient to show that the trial judge did not 

construe a “no objection” response as a waiver of Harper’s objections to the admission of the evidence. See 

Robinson, 2012 WL 6518935, at *2 (distinguishing Bouyer v. State, 264 S.W.3d 265, 268 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

2008, no pet.)).