IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

KIONA PARK ESTATES, a Washington No. 54477-6-II

non-profit corporation, 

Respondent,

v.

PUBLISHED OPINION

AVERA LEE DEHLS and “JANE DOE”

DEHLS, husband and wife; JACQUELINE

DEHLS and “JOHN DOE” DEHLS, wife and

husband, and JEFF SHELTON, as his separate

estate, 

Appellants.

SUTTON, J. — Avera Dehls appeals the superior court’s judgment and order granting

summary judgment to the Kiona Park Estates Association (Association) to enforce a recorded lien 

for Dehls’s unpaid annual homeowners association (HOA) dues from 2002 to 2018. This case 

presents an issue of first impression: Which statute of limitations applies to an action to enforce a 

HOA’s lien where chapter 64.38 RCW, the governing chapter for HOAs, does not contain a 

limitations period. 

We hold that the applicable statute of limitations is six years under RCW 4.16.040 because 

the governing documents are written agreements. We further hold that each annual HOA dues 

assessment is a discreet claim. Accordingly, based on the six-year limitations period, the 

Association is entitled to collect unpaid dues for Dehls for only the time period 2013 to 2018. 

Thus, we hold that the superior court erred by granting the Association summary judgment for the 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

July 7, 2021
No. 54477-6-II

2

entire amount of unpaid dues from 2003 to 2018. We reverse the court’s judgment and order 

granting summary judgment and we remand to the superior court to vacate the judgment and order 

and enter an amended judgment and order consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

The Association is a Washington non-profit corporation. It was formed to, among other 

things, collect dues and assessments from its membership and to enforce the covenants and 

restrictions in a development known as Kiona Park Estates. 

The Association’s governing documents are the original Declaration of Protective 

Covenants and Easements, the 1986 Restated Declaration of Protective Covenants and Easements

(collectively “Declarations”), and the Articles of Incorporation; the Restated Declaration has been 

amended during the relevant time period.

1

 Articles C and D of the Declarations grant authority to 

the Association to assess dues against each member of the Association for maintenance, and 

provide that any unpaid dues become a lien. The dues are required to be paid in January of each 

year. The dues amount was $150 per year in 2002, $200 per year from 2003 to 2017, and $250 

per year beginning in 2018. 

Section C(2)(a) of the Declarations states, in relevant part, “Any dues that remain unpaid 

for a period of ninety (90) days shall become a lien against the defaulting lot owner’s property 

enforceable as any other real estate lien in the State of Washington.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 85, 

 

1 We consider a corporation’s governing documents, including articles of incorporation and 

bylaws, “correlated documents” to be construed together as a whole. Roats v. Blakely Island 

Maint. Comm’n, Inc., 169 Wn. App. 263, 274, 279 P.3d 943 (2012).
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98, 115. The Association’s Articles of Incorporation state, “Delinquent dues and assessments will 

constitute a lien upon the parcel(s) of real property owned by the delinquent member of the 

corporation,” consistent with the provisions of the Declarations. CP at 133. Article E, section 2 

states that the “parties in interest” have the right to enforce the Declarations. CP at 60, 72, 99-100. 

Association bylaws adopted in 2001 and amended in 2017 also support the HOA’s right and ability 

to assess an owner for dues and take enforcement action against an owner for unpaid dues in the 

form of a lien or collection. 

Dehls purchased real property in the Kiona Park Estates development in 1989 and is a 

member of the Association. Since 2001, Dehls has failed to make payments to the Association as 

required by the Declarations, and he became delinquent beginning in January 2002. The 

Association filed and recorded liens against Dehls’s property in 2003, 2006, and 2018. The 2003 

lien was for dues owed for 2002 and 2003. The 2006 lien referred only to dues owed in 2004 and 

2005, as well as attorney fees. The 2018 lien aggregated all the dues Dehls owed beginning in 

2002, stating that Dehls was “in arrears of annual membership dues and assessments, interest, 

and/or late charges in the amount of $10,041.67” plus attorney fees in the amount of $368.02, for 

a total owed of $10,409.69. CP at 38.

II. PROCEDURAL FACTS

The Association filed a complaint against Dehls in November 2018, seeking damages and 

foreclosure on all the past liens and past due balances. Dehls answered the complaint and asserted 

the affirmative defense of statute of limitations. 

In June 2019, the Association filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that Dehls 

breached his duties under the Declarations. In support of its motion, the Association filed 
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declarations from its attorney, treasurer, and president. The Association filed, among other 

documents, the Declarations in their current and past versions, the Articles of Incorporation, and 

the Association’s ledger outlining the amounts Dehls owed plus interest accrued, for a total amount 

due of $7,101.00. Dehls opposed this motion and argued that the Association could not collect the 

past dues from 2002 because the Declarations are contracts and thus, the six-year statute of 

limitations under RCW 4.16.140 applied. The Association replied that it was not subject to a sixyear statute of limitations because the Declarations and Articles of Incorporation were not 

“contracts,” but were either more akin to an open account under RCW 4.16.150 or were subject to 

a ten-year statute of limitations under RCW 4.16.120. 

The superior court granted the Association’s motion for summary judgment. The court 

awarded the Association $7,101.00 for past dues, as well as $7,143.74 in attorney fees and 

$1,046.00 in costs. Dehls filed a motion for reconsideration, which the superior court denied. 

Dehls appeals the superior court’s judgment and order granting the Association’s motion 

for summary judgment and denying Dehls’s motion for reconsideration.

ANALYSIS

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Dehls argues that the superior court erred by granting the Association’s motion for 

summary judgment because the Declarations constitute a contract or written agreement, and thus,

the six-year statute of limitations under RCW 4.16.140 applies, barring the Association’s claim to 

enforce liens prior to 2013. We hold that the six-year statute of limitations in RCW 4.16.040 

applies because the debt arose from the Declarations, which are written agreements. Thus, the 
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superior court erred by granting summary judgment in the Association’s favor for dues owed for 

the period of 2002 to 2012.

A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

1. Summary Judgment

We review summary judgment decisions de novo. Zonnebloem, LLC v. Blue Bay Holdings, 

LLC, 200 Wn. App. 178, 182, 401 P.3d 468 (2017). Summary judgment is appropriate where the 

pleadings, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). 

Here, the materials facts are undisputed.

2. Governing Documents

A HOA’s governing documents are interpreted in accordance with accepted rules of 

contract interpretation. See Bangerter v. Hat Island Community Ass’n, 14 Wn. App. 2d 718, 735, 

472 P.3d 998 (2020); see also RCW 64.38.010(10). Contract interpretation is a question of law 

that we review de novo. Dave Johnson Ins. v. Wright, 167 Wn. App. 758, 769, 275 P.3d 339 

(2012). “The purpose of contract interpretation is to determine the parties’ intent.” Roats v.

Blakely Island Maint. Comm’n, Inc., 169 Wn. App. 263, 274, 279 P.3d 943 (2012). Washington 

courts follow the context rule of contract interpretation, which allows a court, while viewing the 

contract as a whole, to consider extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent. Roats, 169 Wn. 

App. at 274. We consider a corporation’s governing documents, including articles of incorporation 

and bylaws, “correlated documents” to be construed together as a whole. Roats, 169 Wn. App. at 

274.
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Contractual language generally must be given its ordinary, usual, and popular meaning. 

Jensen v. Lake Jane Estates, 165 Wn. App. 100, 105, 267 P.3d 435 (2011). “An interpretation of 

a contract that gives effect to all provisions is favored over an interpretation that renders a provision 

ineffective.” Snohomish County Pub. Transp. Benefit Area Corp. v. FirstGroup Am., Inc., 173 

Wn.2d 829, 840, 271 P.3d 850 (2012). And “[w]here one construction would make a contract 

unreasonable, and another, equally consistent with its language, would make it reasonable, the 

latter more rational construction must prevail.” Byrne v. Ackerlund, 108 Wn.2d 445, 453-54, 739 

P.2d 1138 (1987). Here, the relevant governing documents are the Declarations as amended.

3. Restrictive Covenants 

Dehls argues that the governing documents constitute a restrictive covenant. A “restrictive 

covenant” is an agreement or promise between two or more parties that limits permissible uses of 

land. See Hollis v. Garwall, Inc., 137 Wn.2d 683, 690, 974 P.2d 836 (1999); RESTATEMENT 

(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.3, at 23 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). When the covenant “runs 

with the land,” it burdens a particular parcel with the duty of complying with the restriction and 

benefits of a particular parcel with the right to enforce the restriction. Deep Water Brewing, LLC 

v. Fairway Res. Ltd., 152 Wn. App. 229, 257-58, 215 P.3d 990 (2009); 17 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK 

& JOHN W. WEAVER, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: REAL ESTATE: § 3.2 (2d ed. 2004). “The doctrine 

of ‘running’ is analogous to the contract doctrines of assignment of rights and delegation of duties;

it is a doctrine whereby remote parties are bound or benefited by contractual covenants made by 

the original parties.” 17 STOEBUCK & WEAVER, § 3.2, at 126.
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Between the original parties to the covenant, enforcement is a matter of contract law. Deep 

Water Brewing, 152 Wn. App. at 257. If the covenant runs with the land, it may also be enforced 

by the original parties’ successors in interest. Deep Water Brewing, 152 Wn. App. at 257-58.

4. Statute of Limitations and Accrual of an Action

A statute of limitations is designed to protect individuals and courts from stale claims. 

Burns v. McClinton, 135 Wn. App. 285, 293, 143 P.3d 630 (2006). As an affirmative defense, the

statute of limitations is a matter on which the defendant bears the burden of proof. See Haslund v. 

City of Seattle, 86 Wn.2d 607, 620-21, 547 P.2d 1221 (1976). Where the underlying facts are not 

in dispute, whether a case was filed within the statute of limitations period is a question of law to 

be determined by a judge. Goodman v. Goodman, 128 Wn.2d 366, 373, 907 P.2d 290 (1995). We 

review questions of law de novo. Filmore LLLP v. Unit Owners Ass’n of Centre Pointe 

Condominium, 184 Wn.2d 170, 173, 355 P.3d 1128 (2015).

HOAs are governed by chapter 64.38 RCW. However, the legislature has imposed no 

statute of limitations to dictate actions arising out of this chapter. In contrast, the legislature 

imposed a three-year statute of limitations for actions arising out of the Condominium Act,2and 

later imposed a six-year statute of limitations for actions arising out of the Uniform Common 

Interest Ownership Act.3 RCW 64.34.364(8); RCW 64.90.485(9). 

RCW 4.16.040 states that “[a]n action upon a contract in writing, or liability express or 

implied arising out of a written agreement” has a six-year statute of limitations. “A cause of action 

generally accrues for purposes of the commencement of the statute of limitations when a party has 

 

2 Chapter 64.34.

3 Chapter 64.90.
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a right to apply to court for relief.” Bush v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 23 Wn. App. 327, 329, 596 

P.2d 1357 (1979).

B. ANALYSIS

It is undisputed that the Declarations are the governing HOA documents. Accordingly, the 

governing documents are interpreted via contract rules. See Bangerter, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 735; 

RCW 64.38.010(10). And the parties’ intent was that members of the Association would pay dues 

in order to receive the benefit of certain maintenance and easements. Roats, 169 Wn. App. at 274. 

This is clear from the plain meaning of the contractual language. Jensen, 165 Wn. App. at 105. 

The Association, as the HOA, sued Dehls to enforce the Declarations, which are written 

agreements. Because this action arises out of a written agreement—the Declarations—RCW 

4.16.040 applies, and the statute of limitations to enforce a HOA lien or unpaid HOA dues is six 

years. 

The Association argues that RCW 4.16.020 applies. RCW 4.16.020 establishes a ten-year 

statute of limitations for recovery of an interest in real property. This does not apply here because 

it was not an action for recovery of an interest in real property. The Association does not seek to 

recover Dehls’ property; rather, it only seeks to recover the dues owed to it by Dehls. 

The Association also argues that RCW 4.16.150, which deals with open and mutual 

accounts, applies. RCW 4.16.150 provides:

In an action brought to recover a balance due upon a mutual open and 

current account, where there have been reciprocal demands between the parties, the 

cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued from the time of the last item 

proved in the account on either side, but whenever a period of more than one year 

shall have elapsed between any of a series of items or demands, they are not to be 

deemed such an account.
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“An open account is one in which some item of contract is not settled by the parties. Typically, 

the account results from ongoing sales of goods, supplies, or materials, but may also result from 

ongoing rendition of services or advancement of money, comprising mutual credits between the 

parties.” 27 MARJORIE D. ROMBAUER, WASHINGTON PRACTICE CREDITORS REMEDIES—

DEBTORS’ RELIEF § 5.47, at 522-23 (1998) (footnote omitted). And “[a]n account is not mutual if 

it consists of items provided on separate contracts without reciprocal demands.” 27 ROMBAUER, 

at 523 n.7 (citing Hills v. City of Hoquiam, 94 Wn. 63, 161 P. 1049 (1916).

RCW 4.16.150 does not apply here because Dehls unpaid dues is not an open and mutual 

account. This was not a matter of a contract remaining unsettled by a party. Rather, each yearly 

dues assessment was a discreet amount owed to the Association. The dues assessment was due on 

a yearly basis, and the amount of the dues periodically increased. The dues owed each year were 

for services to be provided by the Association in the coming year. 

Articles C and D of the Declarations provide for common expenses owed by each member 

of the Association annually, and any unpaid expenses become a lien. The dues are due each year 

in January. In 2002, the dues were $150 per year, and from 2003 to 2017, the dues were $200 per 

year. The dues went up to $250 per year beginning in 2018. Discreet annual dues amounts were 

due 90 days after each year’s dues were assessed; on the 91st day, the cause of action accrued and 

the statute of limitations began to run on each discreet dues assessment. 

Dehls does not dispute that the Association had the authority through the governing 

documents to seek enforcement of the 2013 to 2018 dues. Since 2002, Dehls never paid his annual 

dues and the Association filed and recorded three liens against his property in 2003, 2006, and 

2018. At the time the Association filed this lawsuit in 2018, Dehls dues totaled $7,101.00, plus
No. 54477-6-II

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interest accrued from 2003 on. But because the six-year statute of limitations began to run each 

year on the 91st day after Dehls received his due statement, the Association can only seek 

enforcement of the unpaid annual dues for the years 2013 through 2018. 

Therefore, the superior court erred by granting summary judgment to the Association in 

regard to the 2002-2012 dues, but it properly granted summary judgment to the Association in 

regard to the 2013-2018 unpaid dues. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the superior court 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

II. APPELLATE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

Both parties argue that they are entitled to an award of reasonable appellate attorney fees 

and costs. Because neither party can be perceived as the prevailing party on appeal, we deny both 

parties’ requests.

RAP 18.1(a) authorizes a party to recover reasonable attorney fees and expenses so long 

as the party “request[s] the fees or expenses” and “applicable law grants to [the] party the right to 

recover.” The party must do so in a separate section of his or her opening brief. RAP 18.1(b). 

We will award attorney fees to the prevailing party “only on the basis of a private agreement, a 

statute, or a recognized ground of equity.” Equitable Life Leasing Corp. v. Cedarbrook, Inc., 52 

Wn. App. 497, 506, 761 P.2d 77 (1988). “When both parties to an action are afforded some 

measure of relief and there is no singularly prevailing party,” neither party is entitled to attorney 

fees. Marine Enterprises, Inc. v. Security Pacific Trading Corp., 50 Wn. App. 768, 772, 750 P.2d 

1290 (1988).
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The Declarations provide a right to attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party in any 

legal actions. Because there is no prevailing party on appeal, we deny both parties’ requests for 

attorney fees and costs on appeal.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the court’s judgment and order granting summary judgment, and we remand to 

the superior court to vacate the judgment and order and enter an amended judgment and order 

consistent with this opinion.

SUTTON, J.

We concur:

LEE, C.J.

WORSWICK, J.