UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ LEROY HAYES, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. WARDEN BEAR, Respondent - Appellee. No. 18-6112 (D.C. No. 5:18- CV-00391-D) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *

________________ _________________ Before PHILLIPS , McKAY , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Leroy Hayes, a state pri soner proceeding pro se, 1 seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge t he district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. He also moves to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). We deny Hayes a COA, and we deny his IFP motion.

* This order is not binding preced ent, except under the doctrine s of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 We construe a pro se appella nt’s complaint liberally. Gaines v. Stenseng , 292 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 2002). But we won’t serve as his adv ocate. Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### September 4, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 BACKGROUND On April 11, 1996, Hayes entered a blind guilty plea to state-c ourt charges including indecent or lewd acts w ith a child under sixteen, exh ibition of obscene or lewd materials to a minor, procu ring a minor for child pornogra phy, possession of child pornography, and solicitati on to commit murder. He also e ntered a blind guilty plea to forcible oral sodomy. H e received life sentences on eac h count, with some to be served concurrently and othe rs to be served consecutively. On August 25, 1999, Hayes filed his first state-court post-conv iction-relief application. The state trial c ourt denied his application on Oc tober 14, 1999. Hayes appealed that denial to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, which dismissed his appeal. On April 24, 2018, Hayes filed th is 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. In his petition, he alleged that he wasn’t allo wed to directly appeal his convic tions due to his “disabilities and counsels [sic] r efusal to file one,” R. at 8; that all of his “sentences have been discharged under Okla. U niform Jury Instruction 10-13 -B, and 1997 legislative” action, id. at 9, and that Oklahoma lacked j urisdiction over his criminal case. Hayes alleged he timely f iled his petition because “actua l innocence claims can not be time barred”; because “juri sdictional claims can not be waived or time barred”; because “state impedime nts to filing [his petition] we re lifted only in 2017”; and because the “predicate for [his] claims could not have been discovered before 8/8/2017, when 10th Cir. App eals Court recognized them,” id. at 16.3 The district court dismissed Hayes’s § 2254 pe tition as time-ba rred because the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) on e-year statute of limitations had expired no later th an July 2, 1997. And the dis trict court concluded that Hayes failed to allege suff icient factual allegations to j ustify equitable tolling. The district court declined to i ssue Hayes a COA and denied Hay es’s motion to proceed IFP on appeal, finding th at any appeal wouldn’t be take n in good faith. Hayes now appeals.
DISCUSSION Before Hayes’s appeal may pro ceed, he must obtain a COA. Slack v.
McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484–85 (2000). To do so, he must make a “substa ntial showing of the denial of a cons titutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2 253(c)(2). “Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is corre ct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude [] that the district court erred in dismissing the petition[.]” Slack , 529 U.S. at 484. AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations period for hab eas petitions filed by persons in cu stody under the authority of a state-cour t judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). That limitation pe riod runs from the date the sta te-court judgment becomes final by conclusion of d irect review or the date when t he time to seek such review expires, among other date s not relevant to this appeal. Id. State petitions for post-conviction relief filed with in AEDPA’s one-year limitation toll the statute of limitations. § 2244(d)(2); Clark v. Oklahoma , 468 F.3d 711, 714 (10th Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling can also provide relief from AEDPA’s one-year limitation period.4 Holland v. Florida , 560 U.S. 631, 634 (2010). Hayes is entitled to equitable toll ing if he can show (1) that he has dili gently pursued his rights, and (2) that extraordinary circumstances blocked him from timely filing. Id. at 649 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo , 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). Having reviewed the record, we ag ree that no jurist of reason c ould conclude that Hayes timely filed his § 2254 petition within AEDPA’s one- year statute of limitations. AEDPA became effectiv e April 24, 1996, after Hayes had been convicted. From AEDPA’s effectiv e date, absent tolling, Hayes h ad one year, that is, until April 24, 1997, to file his § 2254 petition. He did so 20 years too late. We also agree with the district court th at Hayes has failed to allege s ufficient facts to support any equitable tolling. So we deny Hayes a COA. We deny Hayes’s IFP motion. His inmate-savings a ccount shows a balance sufficient to prepay the $505 appellate filing fee.
CONCLUSION We deny Hayes a COA and we deny his IFP motion.

Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge