J-S16033-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.J.C., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

APPEAL OF: C.C., FATHER

No. 1794 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree September 29, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 1370 of 2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED APRIL 17, 2015

C.C. (“Father”) appeals the decree entered September 29, 2014, in the 

Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas, involuntarily terminating his 

parental rights to his son, D.J.C. (“Child”), born in May of 2011.1 On appeal, 

Father argues the trial court erred in finding Lancaster County Children and 

Youth Services (“CYS”) met its burden of proving termination of his parental 

rights was warranted pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and 

(b). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.2

____________________________________________

1

 By the same decree, the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated the 

parental rights of Child’s mother, A.W. (“Mother”), not only to Child, but also 

to his half-sister. Mother did not file a notice of appeal.

2

 Although the record and the November 16, 2014, opinion sur appeal 

identify the parties by their full names, “we will identify the parties in both 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On July 3, 2014, CYS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of 

Father to Child. A preliminary decree was issued the same day, scheduling a 

hearing for August 11, 2014. The hearing was continued and then held on 

September 29, 2014. The underlying factual history was taken from the 

September termination proceeding, which is set forth as follows:

[Child] was born [in May of 2011]. The history of his 

involvement with the Lancaster County Children and Youth 

Service Agency (Agency) goes back to 2012, after the Agency 

received a report concerning drug use by Father and [Child]’s 

mother, [A.W.] (Mother). Although the caseworker found 

Mother and Father to be drug free on a first visit, reports 

continued to be received by the Agency, and Mother refused to 

discuss these reports with the caseworker. On November 9, 

2012, Father tested positive for opiates at a probation 

appointment. Mother, who had accompanied him, tested 

positive also and admitted to heroin use. The Agency put a 

safety plan in place. In February of 2013, Mother, who had not 

maintained consistent contact with the Agency, was in danger of 

eviction and had welfare fraud charges pending. She was not 

complying with the safety plan. Father, who had been 

imprisoned from November 9, 2012, to March 20, 2013, and 

from September 4, 2013 to October 9, 2013, was again in jail as 

of September 17, 2014 for two pending theft charges and a 

probation violation. He has a criminal history consisting of 

burglary, theft by unlawful taking and drug possession. There 

are outstanding warrants for his arrest in Tennessee and in 

Florida, where the county child services had taken his other two 

children, of whom he has never regained custody. He was 

indicated for physical abuse against his sister in 1998.

Since Mother was uncooperative with the Agency and 

Father was in prison at the beginning of 2013, the Agency 

decided to remove [Child] and his sibling[, K.E.S., (“Sister”)] 

from their home. Physical custody of [Child] was taken on 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

the caption and in this memorandum by their initials to preserve their 

privacy.” E.W. v. T.S., 916 A.2d 1197, 1199 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2007).
J-S16033-15

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February 25, 2013; he was found to be dependent and legal 

custody was obtained on March 11, 2013 by court order. 

[Child], was placed with his paternal aunt and uncle, where he 

remains. [Sister] was placed with him[.]

Both parents were given permanency plans with a goal of 

reunification, but neither completed his or her plan. Father 

never completed his mental health goal. He has not remained 

free from drugs and misuse of alcohol. His case with Family 

Alternatives was closed because he failed to make a required 

contact with the organization. He has not remained crime free, 

has been in prison three separate times, and has had four 

probation violations. He will have two additional years of 

probation after he is released from his latest incarceration. He 

has not completed his goal of remaining free from domestic 

violence. He has not completed his goal of learning and using 

good parenting skills; he did not start the program prior to his 

incarceration and is not in a position to do so without a positive 

recommendation from both the mental health and the drug and 

alcohol treatment providers. His goal of being financially stable 

is incomplete because of his incarceration, and the outstanding 

warrants in Florida and Tennessee make him ineligible for work 

release. As for his goal of commitment to his child, while not in 

prison he attended five visits with [Child]. The visits went well. 

While incarcerated, he wrote to the caseworker several times to 

inquire about the child’s status. He never wrote directly to 

[Child] or sent him anything, and testified at [the] hearing that 

no one ever told him he could do so and his mother thought that 

it would be better if he did not.

Upon being released from prison, he will be working at a 

Halfway house for at least three months. He told the court that 

he believed he would then be able to provide appropriate care 

for the children, just like he did after his prior releases from 

prison. 

[Child] is doing very well with his aunt and uncle. His 

sister ... also lives in the household with him. He is attending 

Head Start and fits in well with the family, which is a permanent 

resource for him.

Opinion Sur Appeal, 11/16/2014, at 1-3 (footnotes and record citations 

omitted).
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A decree was issued the same day as the hearing, terminating Father’s 

parental rights to Child. Father timely filed a notice of appeal and a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i).

On appeal, Father presents two issues:

I. Did the Court err and abuse its discretion in terminating 

the parental rights of Appellant Father in that the Appellant 

Father was incarcerated during a significant period of time 

during the pendency of the underlying juvenile dependency 

action, but Appellant Father nevertheless utilized the 

resources available to him in continuing a relationship with 

his child, as Appellant Father forwarded written 

correspondence to the Children and Youth Agency case 

worker that inquired about the well being his child?

II. Did the Court err and abuse its discretion in terminating 

the rights of the Appellant Father, as termination of his 

parental rights is not in the best interests of the child and 

will not promote the physical, mental, or emotional well 

being of the child, as the Appellant Father will in the near 

future be released from prison and within a reasonable 

time be capable of performing parental duties and 

providing permanency for his child?

Father’s Brief at 7.

We review this appeal according to the following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 

A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36 

A.3d [567,] 572 [(Pa. 2011) (plurality)]. As has been often 

stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because 
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the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. 

Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 

34 A.3d 1, 51 ([Pa.] 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 

634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying 

an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We 

observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not 

equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 

1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, 165, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis:

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating 

parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the 

parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). 

Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 
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paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511). The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of 

parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 

2009).

Instantly, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to the following provisions:

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either 

has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim 

to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical 

or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

* * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by 

the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a 

period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent 

cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable 

period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to 

the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period 
J-S16033-15

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of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve 

the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by 

the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 

months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or 

placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement 

of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the 

basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. “Parental rights may be involuntarily terminated where 

any one subsection of Section 2511(a) is satisfied, along with consideration 

of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. 

Super. 2010).

With respect to Section 2511(b), the requisite analysis is as follows: 

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” 

In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 
J-S16033-15

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attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a 

bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no 

bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 

2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis 

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case. 

Id. at 63.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines 

certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide 

for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements 

within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be 

considered unfit and may properly have ... [his] rights terminated.” In re

B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2001).

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good 

faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order 

to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of ... [his] 

ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all 

available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and 

must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed 

in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental 

rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while 

others provide the child with [the child’s] physical and emotional 

needs. Where a parent is incarcerated, the fact of incarceration 

does not, in itself, provide grounds for the termination of 

parental rights. However, a parent’s responsibilities are not 

tolled during incarceration. The focus is on whether the parent 

utilized resources available while in prison to maintain a 

relationship with...her child. An incarcerated parent is expected 

to utilize all available resources to foster a continuing close 

relationship with ... [his] children.

In re N.M.B., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 872 

A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted).
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After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Lesley 

Gorbey, we conclude Father’s issues merit no relief. The orphans’ court 

opinion comprehensively discusses and disposes of the questions presented. 

See Opinion Sur Appeal, 11/16/2014, at 6-9 (finding: (1) Father was in jail 

three times for approximately 17 months cumulatively during Child’s 3-1/2 

year life; (2) Father’s efforts to remain connected with Child are lacking, in 

which he wrote to the caseworker a number of times to ask about Child but 

he did not communicate with Child by way of messages, cards, or gifts, and 

he “seems to be concerned about his relationship with the Agency rather 

than with [Child;]”3(3) Father made no effort to remind Child of his 

existence or maintain a psychological bond with Child; (4) Father has not 

finished his reunification plan and certain parts cannot be started until other 

sections are completed; (4) Father is a repeat criminal offender and once 

released from prison, Father has not demonstrated that he will not be in 

realistic position to care and provide stability for Child; and (5) termination 

of Father’s parental rights is in Child’s best interests because (a) Child barely 

knows Father, (b) Child knows his aunt and uncle very well since they have 

been providing for him during much of his short life, and (c) they provide a 

____________________________________________

3

 Opinion Sur Appeal, 11/16/2014, at 6.
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“loving and stable family”4). We agree with the court’s rationale while 

emphasizing the court’s concern that despite Father’s numerous promises 

that he will put his life together once he is released from jail, “a child’s life 

simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the 

ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 

726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted).5,6 

Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the orphans’ court opinion.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/17/2015

____________________________________________

4

 Id. at 9.

5

 It bears mentioning that while Father does not specifically attack any 

provision of Section 2511(a), the court’s analysis satisfies Subsection 

2511(a)(8).

6

 Furthermore, we note Child’s Guardian ad Litem filed an appellate brief, 

joining in the appellee brief filed by CYS, requesting that this Court affirm 

the termination order on appeal.
1 

1The parental rights of ~mother, A .. 't.91 were also terminated In this action, not only to 

~ but to his half-sister,~ did not af)pea[ 

2AII citations to transcript pages In this opinion refer to the hearing of September 29, 2014 only. 

Factual History 

~ r.-was born on Mayl 2011. (N.T. 4)2 The history of his 

involvement with the Lancaster County Children and Youth Social Service Agency 

(Agency) goes back to 2012, after the Agency received a report concernlnq drug use by 

Father and~ mother, P4111111t~(Mother). Although the caseworker 

found Mother and Father to be drug free on a first visit, reports continued to be received 

.. 

appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court on October 22, 2014, pursuant to which 

appeal this Opinion is being written.1 

preliminary Decree was lssued the same day scheduling a hearing for August 11, 2014. 

That hearing was continued and was held on September 29, 2014. A decree was 

issued the same day terminating Father's parental rights to~· Father filed an 

his son, D I JI Jtllla C I I I (~) was filed on July 30, 2014, and a 

A Petition to terminate the parental rights of C E••Jt ~(Father) to 

Procedural History 

OPINION SUR APPEAL 

By: Leslie Gorbey, Judge 

SUPER CT. NO.: 1794 MDA 2014 

IN THE INTEREST OF: Docket No.: 1370 of 2014 

cmll-c91111· a minor 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

ORPHANS' GOU RT DIVISION 

Circulated 03/23/2015 09:31 AM
by the Agency. and Mother refused to discuss these reports with the caseworker. (N.T. 

11-12). On November 9, 20121 Father tested positive for opiates at a probation 

appointment. Mother, who had accompanied him, tested positive also and admitted to 

heroin use. The Agency put a safety plan in place. (N.T., 12-13) In February of 2013, 

Mother, who had not maintained consistent contact with the Agency, was in danger· of 

eviction and had welfare fraud charges pending. She was not complying with the safety 

plan. Father, who had been imprisoned from November 9, 2012, to March 20, 2013, 

and from September 4, 2013 to October 9, 2013, was again in jail as of September 17, 

2014 for two pending theft charges and a probation violation. He has a criminal history 

consisting of burglary, theft by unlawful taking and drug possession. There are 

outstanding warrants for his arrest in Tennessee and in Florida, where the countychild 

services had taken his other two chltdren, of whom he has never regained custody. He 

was indicated for physical abuse against his sister in 1998. (N.T. 14) 

Since Mother was uncooperative with the Agency and Father was in prison at the 

beginning of 2013, the Agency decided to remove DI B and his sibling K9, from 

their home. Physical custody of D 11 ( was taken on February 251 2013; he was 

found to be dependent and legal custody was obtained on March 111 2013 by court 

order. D ( J , was placed with his paternal aunt and uncle. where he remains. Kwas placed with him (N.T. 15) 

Both parents were given permanency plans with a goal of reunification, but 

neither completed his or her plan. (N.T. 14-15) Father never completed his mental 

health goal. He has not remained free from drugs and misuse of alcohol. His case with 

F amlly Alternatives was closed because he failed to make a required contact with the 

2 

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3 

31n his 1925{b) statement, Father contended he sent correspondence to the caseworker asking about the 

child or intended for the child. The latter contention was directly contradicted by his testimony. 

DC S is doing very well with his aunt and uncle. 

the household with him. He is attending Head Start and fits in well with the family, 

which is a permanent resource for him. (N.T. 23) 

(N.T. 19-23, 33-35) 

appropriate care for the children, just like he did after his prior releases from prison. 

least three months. He told the court that he believed he would then be able to provide 

Upon being released from prison, he will be working at a Halfway house for at 

While incarcerated, he wrote to the caseworker several times to inquire about the 

child's status. He never wrote directly to~ or sent him anything, and testified at 

hearing that no one ever told him he could do so and his mother thought that it would 

be better if he did not. (N.T. 32)3 

is incomplete because of his incarceration, and the outstanding warrants in Florida and 

Tennessee make him ineligible for work release. As for his goal of commitment to his 

child, while not in prison he attended five visits with Diij I f. The visits went well. 

health and the drug and alcohol treatment providers. His goal of being financially stable 

using good parenting skills; he did not start the program prior to his incarceration and is 

not in a position to do so without a positive recommendation from both the mental 

remaining free from domestic violence. He has not completed his goal of learning and 

after he is released from his latest incarceration. He has not completed his goal of 

and has had four probation violations. He will have two additional years of probation 

organization. He has not remained crime free, has been in prison three separate times, 

Circulated 03/23/2015 09:31 AM
4 

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or 

under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six 

months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions 

within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably 

(2) The repeated and continued Incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the 

parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control 

or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot 

or will not be remedied by the parent. 

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months 

immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a 

settled purpose of rellnquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duUes. 

. (a) GENERAL RULE.-THE RIGHTS OF A PARENT IN REGARD TO A CHILD 

MAY BE TERMINATED AFTER A PETITION FILED ON ANY OF THE 

FOLLOWING GROUNDS: 

provides as follows: 

Analysis 

Parental rights to D- ~ were terminated pursuant to the 

Pennsylvania Adoption Statute. The pertinent statutory section, 23 Pa. C.S.A. §2511, 

plan after he left there. 

to be in a halfway house for some unspecific period after his release from prison, but 

had no specific job, money or settled plans to complete his reunification permanency 

his various incarcerations, had four probation violations during that time, was planning 

cumulatively during his son's life, maintained no direct connection with the child during 

terminated when Father was incarcerated for approximately seventeen months 

Whether a parent's parental rights to his three year old son were appropriately 

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5 

Father contends in his 1925(b) statement that the Court erred in terminating his 

parental rights under these statutory sections. The Court does not agree. 

Child M., 681 A.2d 793 (Pa. Super 1996) 

whether that conduct justifies a termination of parental rights. In Re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 

847, 854-855 (Pa. Super. 2004). Grounds for termination can consist of lack of 

capacity and not just affirmative misconduct. A parent who is incapable of performing 

parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties. In re 

2000). In a termination proceeding, the focus is on the conduct of the parent and 

1024, 1030 (Pa. Super. 2001), citing In Re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." In Re Adoption of J.M.M., 782 A.2d 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear convictions, without 

The party seeking the termination of parental rights bears the burden of establishing 

clear and convincing evidence to do so. In Re C;M.S., 832 A.2d 457 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

Clear and convincing evidence is testimony that is so "clear, direct, weighty and 

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or 

under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have 

elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led 

to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination 

of parental rights wold best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

(b) Other considerations.- The court in tenninatlng the rights of a parent shall 

give primary consideration- to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child .... 

available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time 

and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child. 

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6 

interest to the caseworker was in no way the same as maintaining the bond with his 

chlld. c9II was only two years old at the time of Father's last incarceration and had 

question." In re z.e., 994 A.2d 1108, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2010); In re A.O., 2014 PA 

Super 119, 93 A.3d 888 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) Father did not try very hard. Proving his 

wishing to reestablish his parental responsibilities bears the burden of proof on this 

close relationship with his children. In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa Super 1992)" An 

examination of Father's efforts to remain connected with ~shows a substantial 

lack of effort. He wrote to the caseworker a number of times to ask if t1m" was 

okay. He did not communicate with the child by way of messages or cards or gifts. He 

seems to have been concerned about his relationship with the Agency rather than with 

t9I The Superior Court has been adamant that "to be legally significant, the 

[post-abandonment] contact must be steady and consistent over a period of time, 

contribute to the psychological health of the child, and must demonstrate a serious 

intent on the part of the parent to recultivate a parent child relationship and must also 

demonstrate a willingness and capacity to undertake the parental role. The parent 

. 

whatever resources are available to him while in prison in order to foster a continuing 

maintaining a secure bond with a child. An incarcerated parent is expected to utilize 

D911was born on May.2011. Father was in jail three times for 

approximately seventeen months cumulatively during~ 3-1/2 year life. During 

the year prior to the hearing, Father clearly had no easy avenue of contact with 

ctlllllbecause of his incarceration. But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has said 

that "lncarceratlon does not obviate a parent's duty to exercise reasonable firmness in 

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7 

no contact with him for a year. Father made no effort to remind the child of his 

existence or maintain a psychological bond with the child. 

Father assured the Court that upon his release that after 90 days In a halfway 

house, he would be in a position to provide exemplary parenting for his son. There is 

no indication of that in the record. Father will be on probation for two years; he has 

violated prior probations four times, achieving returns to prison. He has not finished his 

reunification plan and certain parts cannot even be started until other sections are 

completed. Even if Father should be able to reach a position to have his child returned, 

that position will not come soon or easily. The Superior Court has said that a child's life 

"simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the abjlity to 

handle the responsibilities of parenting." Id. at 1125. ttlll has already been in care 

for 18 months. Even where the parent makes earnest efforts, the "court cannot and will 

not subordinate indefinitely a child's need for permanence and stability to aparent's 

claims of progress and hope for the future. In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502 (Pa 

Super 2006) Father has not for the past year showed the requisite indication that he 

was willing and/or able to act to the best of his ability as a parent, even given his 

incarceration. All he had to offer the court was rosy predictions and an unsupported 

belief that he could adequately care for his child in the future. The Court does not 

accept his unrealistic beliefs and finds that Father's parental rights fail the necessary 

standards for maintenance of his parental rights under the above-cited sections of the 

adoption statute. 

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Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties or a settled 

purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: 

(1) the parent's explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment 

contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination of 

parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b). In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 

730 (Pa. Super. 2008) The answers to inquires (1) and (2) are obvious. Father was (1) 

in jail and (2) had no contact with Cllllll As to the effect of a termination, the 

emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include 

"[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and etabillty." In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 

(Pa. Super. 2012). In In re EM., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)1, the Superior Court 

held that the determination of the child's "needs and welfare" requires consideration of 

the emotional bonds between the parent and chlld, The "utmost attention" should be 

paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. In 

re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). Father contends in 

his 1925(b} statement that termination of his parental rights is not in ctlllll's best 

interest and wlll not promote the physical, mental or emotional well-being of the child. 

Father's assertion is inaccurate. 

Ctlll barely knows his Father. He knows his aunt and uncle well, because 

they have been his parents during much of his short life. It may be possible that Father 

could parent him adequately after some period of time, but there is a more reaHstic and 

serious risk of his repeating his history, violating his probation, and disappearing into 

prison - again. Except for Father's unsupported optimism at hearing, the Court has no 

evidence before it to indicate that Father is capable of controlling his actions so as to 

8 

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30 

9 

Copies to: 

Albert J. Meier, Esquire 

David E. Alspach, Esquire 

John P. Stengel, Esquire 'tlllllVvlll Mother 

BY THE COURT: ~wkf 

DATED: November 61 2014 LESLIE GORBEY, JUDGE 

~c~~1~ Attest: 

For the reasons and law stated above, the Court finds that it appropriately 

terminated the parental rights of c-cmmto his son lllllJIIII 

sees only benefit and no additlonal harm to the child in severing Father's parental 

relationship and leaving ctllllllwith people he considers to be his loving parents. 

The Court believes and holds that there is no negative effect on the child of 

permanently severing any remaining parental bond between ctllll and his father 

and that it is in olllllll's best interest to terminate Father's parental rights and allow 

~ to be part of a loving and stable family. 

Conclusion 

avoid further criminal acts or probation violations or finish his plan. Therefore, the Court 

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