alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 96-4075MN

_____________ United States of America, * * Appellee, *

* v. * * Jesus Ramirez-Castillo, also known as * Hector Vinicio Arias, also known as * Jesus Ramirez, also known as Jesus * Cortez, also known as Pedro Meyer, * also known as Jose Luis Cortes, * * Appellant. * Appeals from the United States

_____________ District Court for the District of Minnesota. No. 97-1352MN

_____________ [UNPUBLISHED] United States of America, * * Appellee, *

* v. * * Izaida Villaneuva-Ramirez, also known * as Izaida Cortez-Villaneuva, Izaida * Cortez, Izaida Ramirez, Izaida Ramirez- * Cortez, Charol Matos, * * Appellant. *-2- _____________ Submitted: October 21, 1997

Filed: October 30, 1997

_____________ Before FAGG, WOLLMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

_____________ PER CURIAM. Jesus Ramirez-Castillo and Izaida Villaneuva-Ramirez appeal their drug-related convi ctions. Ramirez-Castillo and Villaneuva-Ramirez contend the evidence wa s insufficient

to establish that Ramirez-Castillo carried a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Ramirez-Castillo also raises a plain error contenti on that the district court improperly admitted evidence that Ra mirez-Castillo shot an intruder during a drug-related robbery. Additionally , Villa neuva-Ramirezraises contentions related to the admissibility of evidence o f uncharged drug dealing offered by the government, the suf ficiency of the evidence, and the district court's plain error instruction about the section 924(c) firearm count. A review of the record shows the parties' claims are without merit. Because the appeal involves the straightforward application of settl ed principles of law, a discussion of the issues will serve no useful purpose. We thus affirm the convictions of Ramirez-Castillo and Villaneuva-Ramirez without an extended opinion. See8th Cir. R. 47B. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
20668

#### State v. Niles

Affirmed
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-8002

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CLIFTON J. TUCKER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior

District Judge. (3:09-cr-00373-REP-1)

Submitted: May 22, 2014 Decided: May 28, 2014

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Clifton J. Tucker, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Arlen Jagels, 

Special Assistant United States Attorney, Stephen Wiley Miller, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Clifton J. Tucker appeals the district court’s order

denying relief on his motion for reduction in sentence pursuant 

to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2012). We have reviewed the record and 

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the 

reasons stated by the district court. United States v. Tucker, 

No. 3:09-cr-00373-REP-1 (E.D. Va. Sept. 11, 2013). We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
The State of TexasAppellee/s

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

April 14, 2015

No. 04-14-00549-CR

Leopoldo Cortez-LEIJA,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 216th Judicial District Court, Kendall County, Texas

Trial Court No. 5438

Honorable N. Keith Williams, Judge Presiding

ORDER

The State’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief is hereby GRANTED. The 

State’s brief is due May 6, 2015. No further extensions will be granted.

_________________________________

Karen Angelini, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 14th day of April, 2015.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
28540

#### Hawaii Reserves, Inc. v. Hawaii Farm Fresh Seafood, LLC

Affirmed in Part,Vacated in Part and Remanded
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-40436 Summary Calendar

ANDREW WALKER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus WILLIAM A HALTER, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:98-CV-75

-------------------- March 13, 2001 Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and JONES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Andrew Walker (“Walker”) appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming the denial of his application for disability insurance benefits. He argues (1) that the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) determination that he possessed the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work is not supported by substantial evidence; (2) that the ALJ improperly relied on determinations that he was noncompliant in his medical regimen and he was a cocaine-user; and (3) that the ALJ failed toNo. 00-40436 -2- give adequate weight to the opinions of treating physicians, Dr. Stan Griffin and Dr. M. E. Sutherland. The ALJ’s determination that Walker could perform his past relevant work as a corrections officer is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ considered Walker’s RFC to perform light work, as limited by certain circumstances, and considered the demands of the past relevant work. See Jones v. Bowen , 829 F.2d 524, 527 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1987). “[A]dministrative law judges must consider findings of State agency medical . . . consultants as opinion evidence.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2)(i). The July 9, 1992, and August 7, 1995, opinions of state agency medical consultants support the ALJ’s determination. This court will not consider Walker’s arguments that the ALJ improperly relied on determinations that he was noncompliant in his medical regimen and he was a cocaine-user because he did not make these arguments in the district court. See Chaparro v.

Bowen , 815 F.2d 1008, 1011 (5th Cir. 1987); James v. Bowen , 793 F.2d 702, 704 (5th Cir. 1986). The ALJ’s decision to give little or no weight to the opinions of Dr. Griffin and Dr. Sutherland is supported by substantial evidence because the opinions are relatively unsupported when considered in conjunction with the opinions Walker’s treating physician, Dr. John F. Cramer. See Leggett v. Chater , 67 F.3d 558, 566 (5th Cir. 1995). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 91.2

                Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
                    As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the
                          Sarbanes - Oxley Act of 2002

     In  connection  with  the  Quarterly  Report of AFG Investment Trust A (the
"Trust"),  on  Form  10-Q  for  the period ended June 30, 2002 as filed with the
Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on  the  date  hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned,  the  Principal  Financial  and  Accounting  Officer of the Trust's
Managing  Trustee,  hereby  certifies  pursuant  to  18  U.S.C.  1350 as adopted
pursuant  to  Section  906  of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002  that:
(1)     the Report of the Trust filed today fully complies with the requirements
of  Section  13(a)  or  15  (d)  of  the  Securities  Exchange  Act of 1934; and
(2)     the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results  of  operations of the Trust.

                    /s/  Michael  J.  Butterfield
                    -----------------------------
                    Michael  J.  Butterfield
Treasurer  of  AFG  ASIT  Corporation,  the  Managing  Trustee  of  the  Trust
(Principal  Financial  and  Accounting  Officer)
                    August  19,  2002
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 233 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 233

 Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that Iran should 
immediately release the three United States citizens that it holds, as 
  well as provide all known information on any United States citizens 
               that have disappeared within its borders.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 29, 2015

  Mr. Kildee (for himself, Mr. Huffman, Mr. Deutch, Mr. Labrador, Mr. 
Engel, and Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) submitted the following resolution; which 
            was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
 Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that Iran should 
immediately release the three United States citizens that it holds, as 
  well as provide all known information on any United States citizens 
               that have disappeared within its borders.

Whereas three United States citizens have been held captive in Iran, some of 
        them for multiple years;
Whereas one United States citizen disappeared in Iran over eight years ago; and
Whereas Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has stated that his government wishes 
        to engage in a constructive interaction with the world: Now, therefore, 
        be it
    Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that 
Iran should release all detained United States citizens immediately and 
provide any information it possesses regarding any United States 
citizens that have disappeared within its borders.
                                 <all>
```
IIB 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 960 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 24, 2016 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

AN ACT 

Designate the Department of Veterans Affairs communitybased outpatient clinic in Newark, Ohio, as the Daniel 

L. Kinnard VA Clinic. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


emcdonald on DSK9F6TC42PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 960 RFS 

1 SECTION 1. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress finds the following: 

3 (1) Daniel L. Kinnard was born on October 21, 

4 1949, in Mount Vernon, Ohio. 

5 (2) While residing in Newark, Ohio, Daniel L. 

6 Kinnard enlisted in the Army at Fort Hayes, Ohio, 

7 on November 14, 1966, and served as a Specialist 

8 Fourth Class in the 101st Airborne Division. 

9 (3) Specialist Kinnard was awarded the Na10 tional Defense Service Medal, Vietnam Service 

11 Medal, Vietnam Campaign Medal, Parachutist 

12 Badge, Sharpshooter Badge with Rifle Bar, Bronze 

13 Star for Valor, Purple Heart, Good Conduct Medal, 

14 and the Combat Medical Badge. 

15 (4) Specialist Kinnard’s citation for the Bronze 

16 Star said, ‘‘For heroism in combat against a hostile 

17 force in the Republic of Vietnam on 17 February 

18 1968. Specialist Four Kinnard distinguished himself 

19 while attached as a medic on a combat operation 

20 near Quang Tri, Republic of Vietnam. The point 

21 platoon made contact with enemy positions in a 

22 hedgerow and two of the point men were seriously 

23 wounded. Without hesitation, Specialist Kinnard 

24 rushed through the heavy volume of enemy fire to 

25 reach the wounded men. With complete disregard for 

26 his own personal safety, Specialist Kinnard remained 


emcdonald on DSK9F6TC42PROD with BILLS
3 

HR 960 RFS 

1 exposed to enemy fire while he treated the wounded 

2 men. Once he administered first aid to the wounded, 

3 Specialist Kinnard organized their evacuation under 

4 fire. His personal bravery and devotion to duty were 

5 in keeping with the highest traditions of the military 

6 service and reflect great credit upon himself, his 

7 unit, and United States Army.’’. 

8 (5) Specialist Kinnard was killed in action on 

9 March 9, 1968, while rendering aid to his fellow 

10 paratroopers. 

11 SEC. 2. DANIEL L. KINNARD VA CLINIC. 

12 (a) DESIGNATION.—The Department of Veterans Af13 fairs community-based outpatient clinic located in New14 ark, Ohio, shall after the date of the enactment of this 

15 Act be known and designated as the ‘‘Daniel L. Kinnard 

16 VA Clinic’’. 

17 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg18 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

19 States to the Department of Veterans Affairs community20 based outpatient clinic referred to in subsection (a) shall 


emcdonald on DSK9F6TC42PROD with BILLS
4 

HR 960 RFS 

1 be deemed to be a reference to the Daniel L. Kinnard VA 

2 Clinic. 

Passed the House of Representatives May 23, 2016. 

Attest: KAREN L. HAAS, 

Clerk. 


emcdonald on DSK9F6TC42PROD with BILLS
<PAGE>   1

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

EDIFY CORPORATION                                                 EXHIBIT 11.01
STATEMENT OF NET INCOME (LOSS) PER SHARE
(In thousands, except per share data)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                                            Three Months Ended            Six Months Ended
                                                                                June 30,                      June 30,
                                                                           ---------------------     ----------------------
                                                                             1997         1996           1997        1996
                                                                           --------     --------      --------     -------- 
<S>                                                                        <C>          <C>           <C>          <C>      
Net income (loss) ....................................................     $    865     $   (484)     $  1,460     $ (1,051)
                                                                           ========     ========      ========     ========

Computations of weighted average common and dilutive common equivalent
   shares outstanding:

   Weighted average common shares outstanding (1) ....................       16,339       15,077        16,290       13,418

   Shares relating to SAB No. 64 and 83 ..............................           --           --            --          926

   Common equivalent shares from stock options .......................        1,614           --         1,658           -- 
                                                                           --------     --------      --------     -------- 

Shares used in computing net income (loss) per share amounts .........       17,953       15,077        17,948       14,344
                                                                           ========     ========      ========     ========
Net income (loss) per share ..........................................     $   0.05     $  (0.03)     $   0.08     $  (0.07)
                                                                           ========     ========      ========     ========
</TABLE>



--------------
       (1)  Includes convertible preferred stock (if converted method).
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

694 

KA 14-00064 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CARNI, SCONIERS, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSE G. JOHNSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

THE LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO, INC., BUFFALO (SHERRY A. CHASE OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

FRANK A. SEDITA, III, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (SYDNEY V. PROBST OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court (Michael F.

Pietruszka, J.), rendered October 28, 2013. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon

in the second degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him

upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the

second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). We reject defendant’s

contention that County Court erred in refusing to suppress the handgun

seized from him as he stood on the porch of his cousin’s residence. 

Contrary to defendant’s contention, the police conduct “was justified

in its inception and at every subsequent stage of the encounter”

(People v Nicodemus, 247 AD2d 833, 835, lv denied 92 NY2d 858). The

officer had an “objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative

of criminality,” to approach defendant to request information (People

v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 498; see People v DeBour, 40 NY2d 210, 223;

People v Bracy, 91 AD3d 1296, 1297, lv denied 20 NY3d 1060). The

officer’s level of suspicion and the justification for increasingly

intrusive police action escalated when defendant turned and the

officer observed the outline of a handgun in the pocket of defendant’s

windbreaker jacket. Based on that observation, the officer had at

least a “founded suspicion that criminal activity [was] afoot” to

support his common-law right to inquire whether the object was a gun

(DeBour, 40 NY2d at 223; see People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 184-185). 

When defendant gave an affirmative response, the officer was entitled

to pat down defendant, seize the handgun (see People v Trott, 105 AD3d

1416, 1417, lv denied 21 NY3d 1020), and arrest defendant (see People 
-2- 694 

KA 14-00064 

v Forbes, 244 AD2d 954, 954, lv denied 91 NY2d 941).

Entered: June 12, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
#### Everett T. REID, Claimant, and State Industrial Court, Respondents-Appellees, v. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, a corporation, Petitioner-Appellant.

No. 46932.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Jan. 21, 1975.

Elmore A. Page, Tulsa, for respondents-appellees.

Lloyd G. Minter, C. J. Roberts, Bartles-ville, Edward J. Fauss, Galen E. Ward, Oklahoma City, for petitioner-appellant.

DOOLIN, Justice.

This is a proceeding to review a State Industrial Court en banc order vacating a *341trial judge’s order, and remanding the cause for further proceedings.

Claim for compensation alleged accidental personal injury resulting from automobile collision, during course of covered employment as a floorman-driver for petitioner, hereafter the respondent.

Respondent answered denying claimant sustained compensable injury or suffered any disability. Respondent specifically denied engagement in hazardous employment at time of injury, and alleged any disability resulted from pre-existing condition.

After hearing, a trial judge entered an order denying a claim for compensation for the reason at time of injury claimant was not engaged in hazardous employment as defined by the Act, 85 O.S.1971 § 3(1).

Claimant appealed this order and decision to State Industrial Court en banc. Upon review that court vacated, set aside, and held for naught the order of denial, and remanded the cause for trial de novo. This proceeding for review attacks correctness of that order on grounds of failure of State Industrial jurisdiction to enter any order, and because void for lack of eviden-tiary support.

The dispositive issue has not been presented for review. State Industrial Court duty on en banc appeal is to review the record and enter such order as is deemed proper, just, and equitable between the parties. Bell v. J. H. Rose Trucking Co. (Okl.), 452 P.2d 141; 85 O.S.1971 § 77. The case may be remanded to the trial judge for further proceedings. N. D. Crutcher Const. Co. v. Harbin (Okl.), 434 P.2d 881.

 Only those decisions which grant or deny an award to an employee, or otherwise affect final determination of the rights of the parties, are reviewable. 85 O.S.1971 § 29. This order submitted for review neither granted nor denied an award of compensation, but left the cause pending for final adjudication in a subsequent proceeding. This was merely an interlocutory order, which lacked attributes of finality and may not be reviewed by this Court in a proceeding instituted under § 29, supra; Dawson v. Ferguson (Okl.), 398 P.2d 820.

Petition for review dismissed.

All Justices concur.
<PAGE>   1


                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1


                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


         We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statement (Form S-8 No. 33-92906) pertaining to the Second Amended and Restated
Stock Option Plan of Standard Management Corporation, the Registration Statement
(Form S-8 No. 333-41119) pertaining to the Amended and Restated Stock Option
Plan of Standard Management Corporation and the Registration Statement (Form S-8
No. 333-41117) pertaining to the Standard Management Corporation Savings Plan,
of our report dated February 9, 2001, with respect to the consolidated financial
statements and schedules of Standard Management Corporation and subsidiaries, as
amended, included in this Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2000.

                                           /s/ Ernst & Young LLP



Indianapolis, Indiana
July 23, 2001
Order entered October 26, 2017

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-17-00830-CV

KASEY KRUMMEL, Appellant

V.

LEEZA GABRIELLA VAYNMAN, Appellee

On Appeal from the 360th District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 360-615418-17

ORDER

Before the Court is appellant’s October 24, 2017 motion to extend time to file appellant’s 

brief. We GRANT the motion to the extent that appellant’s brief shall be filed within THIRTY 

DAYS of the date of this order. 

/s/ CAROLYN WRIGHT

CHIEF JUSTICE
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-51492

Summary Calendar

PAUL JAMES KOUMJIAN

Petitioner-Appellant

v.

NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION

Respondent-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:05-CV-221

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and, HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Paul James Koumjian, Texas prisoner # 1039181, appeals from the district

court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as time barred. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244. The district court found that Koumjian filed no state habeas

applications before the expiration of the limitations period. However, there is

a factual dispute regarding whether Koumjian filed a state habeas application

in March 2003 in the state trial court, case number 20010D00128-120-2.

Because this application is not part of the state court record, a review of the

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 24, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-51492

2

record is not a sufficient means of resolving whether the instant § 2254 petition

is untimely or, if it is untimely, whether equitable tolling would be warranted

under the circumstances. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

VACATED and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion. 

All outstanding motions are DENIED.