No. 01-14-00434-CR

In the 

Court of Appeals 

For the 

First District of Texas 

At Houston 



No. 1368857

In the 339th District Court 

Of Harris County, Texas 



ALEX GONZALEZ 

Appellant 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

Appellee 



STATE’S APPELLATE BRIEF 



DEVON ANDERSON

District Attorney 

Harris County, Texas 

ERIC KUGLER

Assistant District Attorney 

Harris County, Texas 

TBC No. 796910 

kugler_eric@dao.hctx.net 

JOHN LEWIS

ADETAYO ADEYIGA

Assistant District Attorneys 

Harris County, Texas 

1201 Franklin, Suite 600 

Houston, Texas 77002 

Tel: (713) 755-5826 

FAX: (713) 755-5809 

Counsel for Appellee

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED ONLY IF GRANTED TO APPELLANT

ACCEPTED

01-14-00434-CR

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

1/13/2015 10:45:19 AM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 1/13/2015 10:45:19 AM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
i

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 39, the State requests oral argument only if oral 

argument is granted to the appellant.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES

Counsel for the State:

Devon Anderson  District Attorney of Harris County

Eric Kugler  Assistant District Attorney on appeal

John Lewis; Adetayo Adeyiga  Assistant District Attorneys at trial

Appellant or criminal defendant:

Alex Gonzalez

Counsel for Appellant:

Nicole DeBorde  Counsel on appeal

Gary Polland  Counsel at trial

Trial Judge:

Hon. Leslie Brock Yates  Presiding Judge
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................................i

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES ....................................................................i

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................................................................1

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................1

REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR.........................................2

A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant 

evaded from the police in a motor vehicle.............................................................2

CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE .............................................6
iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Brooks v. State, 

323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)...............................................................3

Burgess v. State, 

14-13-00219-CR, 2014 WL 4823781 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 30, 2014, no pet.) ........................................................4

Chambers v. State, 

805 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)...............................................................3

Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307319 (1979).........................................................................................3

Johnson v. State, 

871 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)...............................................................3

King v. State, 

29 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).................................................................3

Rogers v. State, 

832 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. App.—

Austin 1992, no pet.)..............................................................................................4

Troff v. State, 

No. 01-00-01173-CR, 2002 WL 31087321 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.)..........................................................................4

STATUTES

TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04 (West 2010).....................................................................3

RULES

TEX. R. APP. P. 39....................................................................................................... i
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The appellant was charged with evading detention in a motor vehicle 

committed on November 23, 2012 (CR – 13). He pled “not guilty” to the charge, 

and the case was tried to a jury (CR – 152). The jury found him guilty, and the 

trial court thereafter assessed punishment at 25 years in prison on May 22, 2014 

(CR – 152). The appellant filed notice of appeal that same day, and the trial court 

certified that he had the right to appeal (CR – 156-157).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On November 23, 2012, J. Laird with the Harris County Sheriff’s Office was 

dispatched to the Christus St. Catherine Hospital in response to an assault call (RR. 

III – 12-13). He spoke with the victim and learned that the appellant was the 

suspect in the assault and would be returning to the hospital (RR. III – 13). When 

the appellant pulled up to the emergency room exit, Deputy Laird approached him 

in full uniform (RR. III – 15). Two other peace officers were behind the appellant 

in their patrol car with their emergency lights already flashing (RR. III – 14-15)

(St. Ex. 1). Nevertheless, the appellant accelerated away and took off through the

parking lot (RR. III – 15). 
2

Deputy B. Luce was one of the officers in the patrol car, and he took over 

the pursuit of the appellant, which lasted for more than two minutes (RR. III – 22-

25, 26). Three patrol cars were involved in the chase (RR. III – 31). As Luce 

followed the appellant, he observed that the appellant failed to stop at a few stop 

signs as well as at a red light (RR. III – 25) (St. Ex. 1). The appellant finally 

stopped when he was surrounded by the officers and had nowhere else to go (RR. 

III – 31). The officers discovered that there was a one-or-two-year-old child in the 

appellant’s vehicle (RR. III – 26-27). 

REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR

The appellant claims in his sole point of error that the evidence was 

insufficient to prove that he evaded the police (App’nt Brf. 8-11). This issue lacks 

merit because any rational jury could have found the appellant guilty of evading 

based on the mountain of testimonial and direct evidence. 

A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the appellant evaded from the police in a motor vehicle.

The standard of review in the present case is whether, after viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 

could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant intentionally or 
3

knowingly fled from Deputy Luce in a motor vehicle while Luce was attempting to 

detain him (CR – 13); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Brooks v. 

State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04

(West 2010). The jury was the sole judge of the weight of the evidence under this 

review and could choose to believe all, some, or none of it. Chambers v. State, 805 

S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 

Evidence can be legally sufficient for a conviction even if it is entirely 

circumstantial. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The 

standard of review for circumstantial and direct evidence is the same. Id. It is not 

necessary that every fact point directly and independently to the defendant’s guilt; 

it is enough if the conclusion is warranted by the combined and cumulative force 

of all the incriminating circumstances. Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

In the present case, the evidence showed that the appellant was a suspect in 

an assault when he drove up to the hospital’s emergency room exit (RR. III – 12-

15). Deputy Laird approached the appellant in full uniform while other officers 

pulled in behind the appellant with their emergency lights flashing (RR. III – 14-

15). Nevertheless, the appellant took off and led the police on a chase that lasted 

until they were able to box him in (RR. III – 15, 22-25, 26, 31). Three patrol cars 
4

were involved, and the appellant failed to stop at stop signs and a red light along 

the way (RR. III – 25, 31) (St. Ex. 1). 

From the above evidence, any jury would have been rationally justified in 

finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Rogers v. State, 832 S.W.2d 442, 444 

(Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no pet.) (holding evidence sufficient to support 

conviction for evading arrest where uniformed officer motioned for driver to pull 

over and where driver accelerated and was traveling approximately 95 miles per 

hour and passed two vehicles in no passing zones before being pulled over); Troff 

v. State, No. 01-00-01173-CR, 2002 WL 31087321, *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding evidence legally and 

factually sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for evading arrest where 

officer noticed defendant weaving in and out of traffic, changing lanes without 

signaling, tailgating, and flashing his lights at other drivers and where behavior 

continued after officer turned on his lights and siren and where defendant stopped 

only when traffic ahead of him came to a standstill); Burgess v. State, 14-13-

00219-CR, 2014 WL 4823781 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 30, 2014, 

no pet.) (holding evidence sufficient for evading arrest with a motor vehicle

conviction, where officer activated his lights and siren while only a few car lengths 

behind defendant with no vehicles in between them, defendant accelerated and led 

officer on a high-speed chase while weaving through feeder traffic and attempted 
5

to flee onto another street and stopped only when forced to do so by another police 

car and where defendant and his passengers had just committed a robbery). 

The appellant claims that the “deputies did not have to block Appellant’s car 

in order to get him to stop.” (App’nt Brf. 9). But Deputy Luce testified that the 

appellant had nowhere else to go (RR. III – 31-32). Moreover, the patrol car video 

clearly shows the appellant fleeing from Deputy Luce, hitting a speed bump at a 

high clip, driving through a red light without stopping, and blowing through some 

stop signs all while the emergency lights of the pursuing patrol car are reflected in 

the appellant’s rear license plate (St. Ex. 1). Therefore, the evidence was sufficient 

to sustain the conviction. Rogers, 832 S.W.2d at 444; Troff, 2002 WL 31087321, 

*2; Burgess, 2014 WL 4823781 at *2. The appellant’s sole point of error should 

be overruled.
6

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that all things are regular and the conviction 

should be affirmed.

DEVON ANDERSON

District Attorney

Harris County, Texas

/s/ Eric Kugler

ERIC KUGLER

Assistant District Attorney

Harris County, Texas

1201 Franklin, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77002-1923

(713) 755-5826

kugler_eric@dao.hctx.net

TBC No. 796910

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE

This is to certify that: (a) the word count function of the computer program 

used to prepare this document reports that there are 1,590 words in it; and (b) a 

copy of the foregoing instrument will be served by efile.txcourts.gov to:

Nicole DeBorde

Attorney at Law

712 Main Street, Suite 2400

Houston, Texas 77002

Nicole@BSDLawFirm.com

/s/ Eric Kugler

ERIC KUGLER

Assistant District Attorney

Harris County, Texas

1201 Franklin, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77002-1923

(713) 755-5826

TBC No. 796910

Date: January 13, 2015