NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 16a0154n.06

Case No. 15-1875

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

REBECCA HERNANDEZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 

MICHIGAN

OPINION

BEFORE: SILER, COOK, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. The Commissioner of Social Security 

denied Rebecca Hernandez’s (“Hernandez”) application for Supplemental Security Income 

benefits. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Hernandez sought judicial review of that decision in

the district court, which affirmed the denial of benefits. She now appeals, asserting that the 

administrative law judge committed a number of errors in reviewing her application. For the 

following reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

I.

Hernandez, now twenty-seven years old, has a family history of mental illness. At a very 

young age, she was diagnosed with major depression and anxiety. She took a variety of 

prescription medications in connection with these disorders throughout her childhood and 
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teenage years. Hernandez eventually dropped out of high school but was able to obtain a GED. 

Still, she has never held a job or looked for employment.

A.

The record details Hernandez’s long journey in managing her major depression and 

bipolar II disorder. On March 27, 2007, when she was eighteen years old, Hernandez was 

hospitalized for depression and suicidal thoughts. She denied having taken any medication for 

her disorders in the past two years. The attending physician referred her to the Adult Mental 

Health unit of the hospital, where she stayed until her father discharged her on March 29 against 

medical advice. Her medical chart indicates that she seemed to stabilize psychologically once 

the hospital had begun administering medication.

After her discharge, Hernandez sought treatment from Mesa Counseling Services and Dr. 

Denise Dittemore through 2011. During their sessions, Dr. Dittemore generally noted that 

Hernandez was “good” about taking her medications. In 2012, Hernandez saw Dr. Marissa

Mejia, who also worked out of Mesa Counseling Services. Dr. Mejia’s treatment notes indicate 

that Hernandez was “fair” about taking her medications. From 2007 to 2012, Hernandez 

periodically received Global Assessment of Functioning scores, which ranged from 25 to 55.1

B.

On September 9, 2011, Hernandez filed an application for Supplemental Security Income 

(“SSI”) benefits. She filed for reconsideration after initially being denied. When her application 

 

1 A Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 55 indicates “moderate symptoms and 

moderate difficulty in social, occupational or school functioning.” DeBoard v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 211 F. App’x 411, 415 (6th Cir. 2006). It is a subjective evaluation of a claimant’s overall 

functional ability. Id. We have previously noted that “the Commissioner has declined to 

endorse the [GAF] score for use in the Social Security and Supplemental Security Income 

disability programs, and has indicated that [GAF] scores have no direct correlation to the 

severity requirements of the mental disorders listings.” Id. (quoting Wind v. Barnhart, 133 F. 

App’x 684, 692 n.5 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and alternations omitted).
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was again denied, she submitted a written request for a hearing. Hernandez appeared before an 

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) on October 26, 2012. There, she testified that when she turned 

twenty-one years old, she was diagnosed with bipolar II disorder along with her major 

depression and anxiety. She was prescribed several medications to deal with her disorders. 

Those medications caused her to lack concentration, have occasional short term memory loss,

and be drowsy. She explained that she spends a lot of time at home on the computer; that she 

rarely contributes to managing the household; that she will only go grocery shopping if she is

accompanied by another individual; that she does not drive; and that she can sit, stand, and walk 

normally. Hernandez also testified that she does not work because her bipolar II disorder causes 

her to have depressive states and lack motivation. She elaborated that she has hypomania, which 

causes her to occasionally have energy, but she still regularly fails to complete projects or stay 

focused. 

Dr. Dittemore completed a medical source statement (“MSS”), dated September 26,

2011, in support of Hernandez’s application. The MSS is a form that asks physicians to check

various boxes that describe different types of mental limitations. Dr. Dittemore noted that 

Hernandez was not limited with respect to five categories.2 However, she indicated that 

Hernandez’s limitations were moderate in three categories,

3 marked in nine categories,4

and 

 

2 Dr. Dittemore marked that Hernandez had no limitation with respect to her ability to remember 

locations and work-like procedures; ability to understand and remember very short and simple 

instructions; ability to carry out very short and simple instructions; ability to make simple workrelated decisions; and ability to be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions.

3 A moderate degree of limitation is one where “[t]he individual will have intermittent difficulty 

performing in [the] area.” R. 9-7, PageID #273. Dr. Dittemore indicated that Hernandez had a 

moderate degree of mental limitation with respect to her ability to sustain an ordinary routine 

without special supervision; ability to work in coordination with or in proximity to others 

without being distracted by them; and ability to maintain socially appropriate behavior and to 

adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness. 
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extreme in at least five categories.5 She also indicated that Hernandez would likely have four 

absences from work per month but that she could also manage any benefits in her own best 

interest. Dr. Dittemore did not elaborate in the sections below that requested “support” for a

given assessment. R. 9-7, PageID #273-75.

In addition to the MSS, Hernandez’s SSI application included several supporting 

documents. She submitted her treatment notes from Dr. Dittemore, Dr. Mejia, and her 

2007 hospitalization. Hernandez also completed an Adult Function Report, where she stated that 

she can prepare simple meals, do laundry, wash dishes, and clean her home. Her answers largely 

track her testimony at the hearing. The record also includes two medical opinions from state 

agency medical and psychological consultants. These doctors concluded, both originally and 

upon reconsideration, that Hernandez was not disabled. They explained that she could perform 

non-public, unskilled work.

 

4 A marked degree of limitation is one that “is [a] serious limitation,” where the “individual 

cannot generally perform satisfactorily in [that] area.” R. 9-7, PageID #273. Dr. Dittemore 

checked “marked” with respect to Hernandez’s ability to understand and remember detailed 

instructions; ability to carry out detailed instructions; the ability to perform activities within a 

schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances; ability to 

perform at a consistent pace with a standard number and length of rest periods; ability to ask 

simple questions or request assistance; ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to 

criticism from supervisors; ability to get along with coworkers or peers without distracting them 

or exhibiting behavioral extremes; the ability to respond appropriately to changes in the work 

setting; and the ability to set realistic goals or make plans independently of others.

5 An extreme limitation is described as “major,” where an individual has “no useful ability to 

function in this area.” R. 9-7, PageID #273. According to Dr. Dittemore’s MSS, Hernandez had 

an extreme limitation in her ability to complete a normal workday without interruptions from 

psychologically based symptoms; ability to complete a normal workweek without interruptions

from psychologically based symptoms; ability to interact appropriately with the general public; 

and ability to travel in unfamiliar places or use public transportation. The form also seems to

indicate that Dr. Dittemore believes Hernandez has an extreme limitation when in reference to 

her ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, but it is difficult to 

confirm due to poor photocopying.
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A vocational expert also testified at the ALJ hearing. She explained that a significant 

number of jobs existed in Hernandez’s community and throughout the country that were 

unskilled and had occasional social interaction. Conversely, she testified that neither the national 

nor the local economy contained jobs that had only occasional contact with a supervisor; that had 

no social interaction; that were limited to repetitive tasks; and that would allow an employee to 

be off-task at least twenty percent of the time. 

The ALJ determined that Hernandez was not disabled. He concluded that Hernandez was 

not engaged in substantial gainful activity and that her impairments (bipolar disorder and 

anxiety) were severe. However, the ALJ found that Hernandez “does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed 

impairments in” 20 C.F.R., Subpart (P), Appendix 1. R. 9-2, PageID #86. This was because he 

determined that Hernandez had no restrictions in her daily living activities, moderate difficulties 

with social functioning, moderate difficulties with concentration, and no episodes of 

decompensation. Thus, the ALJ concluded that Hernandez had a “residual functional capacity 

[“RFC”] to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following 

nonexertional limitations: simple, repetitive tasks; and only occasional interaction with the 

public.” Id. at 87.

In connection with his RFC decision, the ALJ found Hernandez’s testimony lacking 

credibility insofar as she described “the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her 

symptoms.” Id. at 88. He also determined that the Adult Third Party Function Report filled out 

by Hernandez’s boyfriend, Isaac James Drew (“Drew”), lacked credibility due to Drew’s

inherent bias interest and because Drew’s assertions conflicted with other objective evidence in 

the record. The ALJ also declined to give controlling weight to Dr. Dittemore’s MSS, as it “was 
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not supported by the objective medical evidence.” Id. at 90. Finally, the ALJ also gave little 

weight to the state agency’s determinations, as they “were not supported by the record.” Id. 

Because Hernandez had never worked before, the ALJ consulted the vocational expert’s 

findings. Based on her assertion that unskilled, occasionally social jobs existed in the economy, 

the ALJ determined that Hernandez was not disabled. On June 17, 2014, the Appeals Council 

denied Hernandez’s request for review. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Hernandez filed suit in 

the district court, seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. The district court affirmed the 

ALJ’s denial of benefits on June 4, 2015. Hernandez timely appeals. 

II.

We apply a de novo standard of review to cases involving applications for SSI benefits. 

Shilo v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 600 F. App’x 956, 957 (6th Cir. 2015). The burden is on the 

plaintiff to prove that she is disabled within the meaning of the regulations, and we are limited to 

reviewing the record before the ALJ. Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 

2010); Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F. App’x 543, 550 (6th Cir. 2010). That being said, 

we may only consider “whether the Commissioner’s decision ‘is supported by substantial 

evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.’” Ealy, 594 F.3d at 512 (quoting 

Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)). “The substantial-evidence 

standard is met if a ‘reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004)). We may affirm even if 

evidence in the record supports the opposite conclusion. See Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 

(6th Cir. 1997). 
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Hernandez first asserts that the ALJ erred in declining to give controlling weight to Dr. 

Dittemore’s MSS under the treating physician rule. She further contends that the ALJ erred in 

declining to give sufficient weight to the two state agency medical and psychological 

consultants. Second, she claims that substantial evidence does not exist in the record to support 

the ALJ’s finding that she is not disabled because he declined to consider any of the medical 

opinions in the record. Lastly, she challenges the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination

against her and her boyfriend, Drew. We review each issue in turn.

A.

The treating physician rule requires agencies making a disability determination to 

generally 

give more weight to opinions from treating sources, since these sources are likely 

to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal 

picture of [] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the 

medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings 

alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative 

examinations or brief hospitalizations.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Treating physicians’ opinions are given “controlling weight” when 

their opinions are “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques and [are] not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 

Id. If an ALJ declines to give controlling weight to a treating physician, he must “always give 

good reasons.” Id. In other words, “it is not enough to dismiss a treating physician’s opinion as 

‘incompatible’ with other evidence of record; there must be some effort to identify the specific 

discrepancies and to explain why it is the treating physician’s conclusion that gets the short end 

of the stick.” Friend, 375 F. App’x at 552. An ALJ must also determine what weight—if not 

controlling—to give the treating physician’s opinion, by “apply[ing] certain factors—namely, the 

length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of 
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the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the 

record as a whole, and the specialization of the treating source.” Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). 

If an ALJ fails to give good reasons for declining to give a treating physician’s opinion 

controlling weight, “[w]e will reverse and remand a denial of benefits, even though ‘substantial 

evidence otherwise supports the decision of the Commissioner.’” Friend, 375 F. App’x at 551 

(quoting Wilson, 378 F.3d at 543-46). “[A]n ALJ cannot simply invoke the criteria set forth in 

the regulations if doing so would not be ‘sufficiently specific’ to meet the goals of the ‘good 

reason’ rule.” Id. At the same time, we may conclude that an insufficient discussion may be 

harmless error if 

(1) a treating source’s opinion is so patently deficient that the Commissioner 

could not possibly credit it; (2) if the Commissioner adopts the opinion of the 

treating source or makes findings consistent with the opinion; or (3) where the 

Commissioner has met the goal of § 1527(d)(2)—the provision of the procedural 

safeguard of reasons—even though she has not complied with the terms of the 

regulation. 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wilson, 378 F.3d at 547). If we may clearly infer 

the reasons the ALJ declined to give controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, “strict 

compliance with the rule may sometimes be excused.” Id.

Here, the ALJ rejected the MSS, determining that it was not supported by the objective 

medical evidence in the record, “as discussed above.” R. 9-2, PageID #90. The previously 

mentioned objective medical evidence includes the 2007 hospitalization for suicidal thoughts; a 

treatment note from May 16, 2011, that indicates that Hernandez felt her medication was helping 

her; and treatment notes from May 21, 2012 and July 25, 2012 that indicate that Hernandez 

either was not routinely taking her medications or was not taking the right dosages of her 

medications. The ALJ also specifically mentioned Hernandez’s ability to handle financial 
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matters, ability to prepare simple meals, and desire to move to Michigan to live with Drew. 

Lastly, the ALJ also rejected the MSS because it stated conclusions reserved for the 

Commissioner.

Although the ALJ did not specifically identify the previously discussed objective medical 

evidence, it is clear which evidence he was referring to and thus strict compliance with the 

regulations is not necessary in this instance. See Friend, 375 F. App’x at 551. Still, Hernandez 

argues that the objective medical evidence is not inconsistent with Dr. Dittemore’s indicated

limitations on her mental functioning. However, it is nearly impossible to analyze whether that 

is true because Dr. Dittemore’s check-box analysis is not accompanied by any explanation. For 

example, she does not explain whether these boxes reflect Hernandez’s limitations when she is 

taking her medication or if these boxes reflect when she is not taking her medication. We have 

previously declined to give significant weight to rudimentary indications that lack an 

accompanying explanation. See Keeton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 583 F. App’x 515, 525 (6th Cir. 

2014) (quoting SSR 96-2p, at *1, which states that “[a] case cannot be decided in reliance on a 

medical opinion without some reasonable support for the opinion”); see also Mason v. Shalala, 

994 F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Form reports in which a physician’s obligation is only to 

check a box or fill in a blank are weak evidence at best.”). Even if the ALJ erred in failing to 

give good reasons for not abiding by the treating physician rule, it was harmless error because 

the MSS here is “weak evidence at best” and meets our patently deficient standard. See Friend, 

375 F. App’x at 551.

Furthermore, this is not a case where the ALJ is substituting his “own interpretation of 

medical records for that of a physician who has examined the records.” Brown v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 602 F. App’x 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2015). The ALJ properly discussed objective 
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evidence in the record that demonstrates that Hernandez’s symptoms lessen when she is 

compliant with her medication, that she frequently has issues taking the right medication at the 

right time, and that she can tolerate certain limited social interactions, such as shopping and 

interacting with her boyfriend. To the extent that Dr. Dittemore’s check-box analysis conflicts 

with such evidence, the ALJ properly discounted the MSS. The conflicting objective evidence 

and the absence of any elaboration regarding Hernandez’s purported limitations properly 

constitute “good reasons” for rejecting the MSS. 

Hernandez also contends that the ALJ wrongfully gave “little weight” to the examining 

state agency medical and psychological consultants’ analysis, who indicated that Hernandez 

should be limited to non-public, unskilled work. R. 9-3, PageID #141. When evaluating the 

weight of a non-treating physician, the regulations require an ALJ to consider “the consultant’s 

medical specialty and expertise in [the benefits] rules, the supporting evidence in the case record, 

supporting explanations the medical or psychological consultant provides, and any other factors 

relevant to the weighing of the opinions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(ii). Such opinions are 

entitled to less deference than controlling treating-physician opinions, but more deference than 

non-treating, non-examining opinion sources. See Norris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 461 F. App’x 

433, 439 (6th Cir. 2012).

The only difference between the ALJ’s determination and the consultants’ conclusion is 

whether Hernandez can handle occasional interaction with the general public or whether she 

should be limited to non-public jobs. In the Adult Function Report, to which the ALJ refers, 

Hernandez indicated that she can go out alone but that “usually” someone accompanies her. R. 

9-6, PageID #239. She also indicated that she shops two to three times per month and that she 

goes on family outings once per month. The ALJ, however, failed to acknowledge that 
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Hernandez reported that she felt extremely uncomfortable and that she shakes during each of her

experiences in public. Moreover, she only ventures out alone because she has to in order to 

attend her therapy sessions or pick up her medications. He also failed to note that she indicated 

that she could not go out in public for more than an hour. Instead, the ALJ explained that the 

consultants’ conclusion was not supported by the record, as Hernandez herself admitted that “she 

had a boyfriend and could shop in [] stores.” R. 9-2, PageID #90. However, evidence of seldom 

shopping and interacting with her boyfriend does not support the conclusion that Hernandez can 

“do any of these activities on a sustained basis, which is how the functional limitations of mental 

impairments are to be assessed.” Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 377 (6th Cir. 

2013). The ALJ did not discuss any additional reasons for affording the consultants’ conclusions

“little weight.”

Still, any error was harmless. While the consultants’ review acknowledged that 

Hernandez had been prescribed several medications, they never discuss whether she consistently 

takes those medications. They also never discuss what effect those medications have on 

Hernandez and her symptoms. In fact, no doctor opines on whether Hernandez would exhibit the 

same mental limitations that she complains of, even if she maintained compliance with her 

medication regiment. In this way, like the MSS, the consultants’ findings are of limited value. 

Therefore, the ALJ’s finding that they are entitled to “little weight” is harmless error.

B.

Second, Hernandez argues that the ALJ’s RFC decision was not supported by any 

medical opinion, as he rejected or gave little weight to the ones in the record. In making this 

argument, Hernandez cites to numerous district court cases, suggesting that they stand for the 

proposition that an ALJ’s decision cannot be upheld if he rejects all underlying medical opinions. 
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See, e.g., Ritchie v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:14-cv-286, 2015 WL 46121, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Jan 

2, 2015) (noting that “[c]ases in which an ALJ has independently determined an RFC, while 

rejecting or giving ‘little weight’ to virtually all of the medical opinion evidence, may not always 

reflect error, but naturally invite closer scrutiny”); Steadman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:10-

cv-801, 2011 WL 6415512, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 14, 2011) (explaining that “[t]he ALJ failed 

to articulate the basis for his RFC opinion and to link his RFC determination with specific 

evidence in the record”). 

Bearing in mind that it is the plaintiff who must prove that she is disabled, the ALJ in this 

case did not “fashion an RFC out of whole cloth.” Steadman, 2011 WL 6415512, at *13. 

Consistent with the state agency medical consultants’ opinion, he determined that Hernandez 

was able to complete simple, repetitive work. The ALJ also pointed to objective evidence in the 

record aside from the doctors’ opinions: Hernandez’s own testimony and admissions as well as 

hospitalization records and treatment notes. Even though the ALJ’s decision might invite further 

scrutiny due to its limited reliance on doctors’ opinions, nothing suggests that the ALJ quilted 

together solely subjective determinations in fashioning the RFC.

C.

Lastly, Hernandez challenges the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination regarding her 

and her boyfriend, Drew. Credibility is properly evaluated by the ALJ, not the reviewing court. 

Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247. While in theory we will not “disturb” an ALJ’s credibility 

determination without a “compelling reason,” Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 2001), 

in practice ALJ credibility findings have become essentially “unchallengeable,” Payne v. 

Commissioner of Social Security, 402 F. App’x 109, 113 (6th Cir. 2010). When a credibility 

determination regarding a claimant’s subjective complaint is at issue, we affirm if the ALJ’s 
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determination is “reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 249. 

In other words, 

[w]henever a claimant’s complaints regarding symptoms, or their intensity and 

persistence, are not supported by objective medical evidence, the ALJ must make 

a determination of the credibility of the claimant in connection with his or her 

complaints based on a consideration of the entire case record. The entire case 

record includes any medical signs and lab findings, the claimant’s own complaints

of symptoms, any information provided by the treating physicians and others, as 

well as any other relevant evidence contained in the record. Consistency of the 

various pieces of information contained in the record should be scrutinized.

Id. at 247 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The ALJ determined that Hernandez was less than fully credible, as “[i]t appears the 

limited range of daily activities is a lifestyle choice and not due to any established impairment.” 

R. 9-2, PageID #88. The ALJ stated that Hernandez might be experiencing symptoms as she 

describes, but he also explained that the symptoms were potentially due to Hernandez’s failure to 

take medication as prescribed.

Substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s credibility determination, and no 

compelling reason exists to overturn that decision. Contrary to Hernandez’s assertions, the ALJ 

is not simply regurgitating boilerplate language in explaining his reasoning for finding her less 

than fully credible. See Cox v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 254, 260 (6th Cir. 2015) 

(explaining that there is a risk that “an ALJ will mistakenly believe it sufficient to explain a 

credibility finding” to recite boilerplate language); see also Forrest v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

591 F. App’x 359, 366 (6th Cir. 2014) (declining to find that the ALJ had simply reiterated 

boilerplate language where the ALJ had explained his reasons for finding an individual not fully 

credible elsewhere in the opinion). Here, the ALJ points to instances in the record where 

Hernandez was inconsistent about taking her medication, which she admitted affected her 

symptoms. Additionally, Hernandez concedes that she has the ability to handle financial matters,
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perform household chores, maintain her personal hygiene, occasionally shop in public for short 

periods of time, maintain focus on a project for up to a day at a time, and prepare simple meals. 

The ALJ explained that Hernandez responds well to medication and that any issues she faces in 

accomplishing these tasks might be alleviated by proper adherence to her medication regiment. 

Nothing in the record contradicts this observation. Accordingly, the ALJ’s determination is 

reasonable and reflects the substantial evidence in the record. Hernandez has not demonstrated a 

compelling reason to disturb the credibility determination against her.

With respect to Drew’s Adult Third Party Function Report, the ALJ also concluded that 

he was less than fully credible. In making that determination, the ALJ noted that he was a 

layperson, financially and emotionally biased, and, “[m]ost importantly,” the information he 

presented was inconsistent with the objective medical evidence. R. 9-2, PageID #89. To the 

extent that Drew’s opinion of Hernandez’s abilities was inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC

assessment, the ALJ found those statements not credible.

Because the ALJ relied on objective evidence in the record, including Hernandez’s own 

assessment of her limitations, there is no compelling reason to overturn the ALJ’s credibility 

determination. See Ritchie v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 540 F. App’x 508, 511-12 (6th Cir. 2013) 

(refusing to disturb a credibility determination when the determination was based on “both the 

medical record and plaintiff’s own assessment of his abilities and limitations”); see also Morgan 

v. Barnhart, 142 F. App’x 716, 724-25 (4th Cir. 2005) (declining to overturn a credibility 

determination when an ALJ concluded that there was inherent familial bias “because the ALJ did 

not, in fact, discredit the observations of [the claimant’s] family members solely because of 

inherent familial bias”). We therefore decline to do so.
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III.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.