*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 29, 2007*

Decided January 9, 2008

Before

 Hon. JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 06-3542

JAMES HOSKINS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF MILWAUKEE, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of

Wisconsin

No. 03-C-0334

Charles N. Clevert, Jr., 

Judge.

O R D E R

James Hoskins sued the City of Milwaukee and four of its police officers

(collectively “the City”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that they violated various

constitutional provisions when they arrested him while investigating a domestic

violence call by his then girlfriend, Theresa Turner. The district court granted

summary judgment for the City, and we affirm.

On appeal Hoskins first contends that he was prejudiced in responding to the

motion for summary judgment because the City improperly withheld discovery

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 06-3542 Page 2

materials. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f). Curiously, the district court accepted Hoskins’s

assertion that Officers Clark and Phillips did not answer his interrogatories and the

City concedes the point on appeal. We say curiously because our review of the

record shows that Officer Clark did timely answer Hoskins’s interrogatories. In

any event, we may not address this argument on appeal because Hoskins never

raised it in the district court. Omega Healthcare Investors, Inc. v. Res-Care, Inc.,

475 F.3d 853, 858-59 (7th Cir. 2007). Even if he had properly raised the argument,

the district court would have been correct to deny any request for further discovery

because Hoskins never explained what extra information he hoped to obtain from

the interrogatory answers he sought or why not having that information actually

prejudiced him. See Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 686 (7th Cir. 2005).

The only discovery issue available for review is the district court’s denial of

Hoskins’s motion for sanctions against the defendants who he claimed had not

answered his interrogatories. The district court refused to impose sanctions,

finding that any answers by Officers Clark and Phillips would be irrelevant because

the undisputed evidence showed that they were not involved in the investigation or

arrest of Hoskins. Because we agree with that analysis, the district court’s refusal

to order sanctions was not an abuse of discretion. Muzikowski v. Paramount

Pictures Corp., 477 F.3d 899, 908-09 (7th Cir. 2007).

The remainder of Hoskins’s brief presents a rehashing of his understanding

of the facts surrounding his constitutional claims interspersed with citations to a

few cases that are marginally relevant. Mindful of our duty to liberally construe

pro se filings, see McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 890 (7th Cir. 2006), we read

Hoskins’s brief as contesting the district court’s legal conclusions under the Fourth

Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Our de novo review of the district

court’s legal conclusions, Belcher v. Norton, 497 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2007),

however, does not reveal any error.

We understand Hoskins’s challenge to the district court’s Fourth Amendment

holding to be that because Turner’s statements to the police accusing him of

attacking her were untrue, the police lacked probable cause to arrest him. But he

does not dispute that Turner made those statements to the police or that her body

showed evidence of a physical altercation. Thus, the district court was correct that

there was no factual dispute about whether the police had probable cause to arrest

Hoskins. See Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 996 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e

have consistently held that an identification or a report from a single, credible

victim or eyewitness can provide the basis for probable cause.”). 

Hoskins’s claim of gender discrimination under the Equal 

Protection Clause also fails because he has not identified a similarly situated

female who was treated differently. See Sides v. City of Champaign, 496 F.3d 820,
No. 06-3542 Page 3

827 (7th Cir. 2007). Turner is the closest such individual, but she is hardly

similarly situated. She called the police, cooperated with them, told them Hoskins

struck her, and admitted that she scratched him in self-defense. Hoskins was

uncooperative and did not allege that Turner was the aggressor until after his

arrest. Cf. id. Thus, the district court correctly concluded that no defendant

violated the Equal Protection Clause during the investigation and arrest of

Hoskins.

AFFIRMED.