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CONNECTICUT NATIONAL MORTGAGE COMPANY

v. LISE-LOTTE KNUDSEN ET AL.

(SC 19672)

Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa, Robinson and Lavine, Js.

Argued November 16—officially released December 13, 2016

Lise-Lotte Knudsen, self-represented, the appellant

(named defendant).
Benjamin T. Staskiewicz, for the appellee (plaintiff

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The original plaintiff, Connecticut

National Mortgage Company, commenced this action

in 1989 seeking to foreclose a mortgage on a parcel of

real property that is owned by the named defendant,

Lise-Lotte Knudsen, and is located in the town of Redding.1 Although the trial court had rendered a judgment

of foreclosure in 1994, that judgment has been opened

and modified several times over the years. Eventually,

on August 20, 2012, the plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

was substituted as the plaintiff.2 On June 8, 2015, the

trial courtrendered a new judgment of strictforeclosure

that extended the defendant’s law day to August 4,

2015. On June 17, 2015, the defendant filed a motion for

permission to file a motion to vacate the new judgment,

which was denied on June 18, 2015. The defendant

appealed to the Appellate Court on June 26, 2015, within

the twenty day appeal periods3

triggered by both the

new judgment and the denial of the defendant’s subsequent motion.4

The Appellate Court, acting on its own motion, then

ordered the parties to appear ‘‘and give reasons, if any,

why [the] appeal should not be dismissed as moot

because title vested in the plaintiff by the passing of

the law days and the defendant’s appeal following the

denial of her [motion] on June 18, 2015, did not stay

the passing of the law days. See . . . Practice Book

§ 61-11 (g).’’5

(Citations omitted.)

Practice Book § 61-11 (g)6 became effective on October 1, 2013. That provision was enacted to put a stop to

the ‘‘ ‘perpetual motion machine’ ’’

7 and accompanying

appellate litigation generated when a defendant files

serial motions to open a judgment of strict foreclosure

and, each time a motion to open is denied, files a new

appeal from the judgment denying the motion to open.8

Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp. v. Christiansen,

163 Conn. App. 635, 639, 137 A.3d 76 (2016). When no

automatic appellate stay is in effect, there is nothing to

prevent the law days from passing, rendering a pending

appeal from a judgment of strict foreclosure moot.

Argent Mortgage Co., LLC v. Huertas, 288 Conn. 568,

574–75, 953 A.2d 868 (2008).

It is undisputed that the defendant’s June 17, 2015

motion was a ‘‘subsequent contested motion’’ as contemplated by § 61-11 (g), and that it was unaccompanied

by an affidavit of good cause. The Appellate Court dismissed the defendant’s appeal on January 13, 2016,9

apparently determining that, because no automatic

appellate stay was triggered on the denial of that

motion, no appellate stay prevented the law day from

passing on August 4, 2015, such that title had vested

irrevocably in the plaintiff and the defendant’s appeal

was therefore moot.

The plaintiff sought reconsideration of the judgment
of dismissal. The Appellate Court dismissed the motion

for reconsideration on January 29, 2016. On March 9,

2016, we granted the defendant’s petition for certification based on the following question: ‘‘Did the Appellate

Court properly dismiss the appeal in this matter as

moot?’’ Connecticut National Mortgage Co. v. Knudsen, 320 Conn. 926, 926–27, 133 A.3d 458 (2016).

In the present case, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to open the judgment on June 8, 2015,

and extended the law day to August 4, 2015. On June

26, 2015, the defendant filed an appeal to the Appellate

Court, which was within twenty days of the trial court’s

June 8, 2015 decision. The defendant’s appeal was filed

prior to the law day and title never passed to the plaintiff. Moreover, the defendant’s appeal was timely

because it was filed within the applicable twenty day

appeal period. See Practice Book § 63-1 (a). The Appellate Court apparently characterized this appeal as one

taken from the judgment denying the defendant’s June

17, 2015 motion which, pursuant to Practice Book § 61-

11 (g), did not give rise to an automatic stay. However,

this appeal was filed within the twenty day appeal

period for both the order denying the defendant’s June

17, 2015 motion and the June 8, 2015 judgment that set

a new law date. The June 8, 2015 judgment triggered

an automatic stay because it was an appealable final

judgment, and the defendant’s filing of this appeal

within twenty days of that judgment continued the stay

‘‘until the final determination of [this appeal].’’ Practice

Book § 61-11 (a).10

Both parties have argued that the Appellate Court’s

order of dismissal should be reversed and that the case

should be remanded to that court for further proceedings. We agree. An ‘‘automatic’’ appellate stay of proceedings to enforce the judgment went into effect on

June 8, 2015, when the trial court rendered a new judgment of strict foreclosure setting a law date of August

4, 2015. See Practice Book § 61-11 (a). Because the

defendant appealed within twenty days of that judgment, the automatic stay was in effect on August 4,

2015, and will continue in effect until the ‘‘final determination of the [appeal].’’ Practice Book § 61-11 (a). Since

the appellate stay prevented title from vesting in the

plaintiff by operation of law when the defendant failed

to exercise her right of redemption on August 4, 2015,

the case should not have been dismissed by the Appellate Court as moot.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and

the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings according to law.

1 We note that Knudsen’s name has changed during the pendency of this

action. See Lind-Larsen v. Fleet National Bank of Connecticut, 84 Conn.

App. 1, 3 n.1, 852 A.2d 799, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 940, 861 A.2d 514 (2004).

We also note that, although additional parties with interests in the property

subordinate to the mortgage at issue have also been named as defendants

in the present case, these parties are not relevant to this appeal. In the

interest of consistency with the original pleadings, we hereinafter refer to
Knudsen as the defendant.

2 We note that, although several other parties have been substituted as

the plaintiff in the present action as the result of successive assignments,

none of those parties are relevant to the present appeal. In the interest of

simplicity, we hereinafter refer to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as the plaintiff.

3 Practice Book § 63-1 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[u]nless a different

time period is provided by statute, an appeal must be filed within twenty

days of the date notice of the judgment or decision is given. . . .’’

4 This is the defendant’s sixth appeal in this foreclosure action.

5 The Appellate Court’s order also cited General Statutes § 49-15, which

provides in relevant part that a judgment of strict foreclosure shall not be

opened ‘‘after the title has become absolute in any encumbrancer . . . .’’

Finally, the order cited Appellate Court precedent establishing that an appeal

from a judgment of strict foreclosure is rendered moot when, during the

pendency of the appeal, the law days pass and title lawfully vests in the

foreclosing party. See Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB v. Charles, 95 Conn. App.

315, 321–25, 898 A.2d 197, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 909, 902 A.2d 1069 (2006);

Barclays Bank of New York v. Ivler, 20 Conn. App. 163, 166–68, 565 A.2d

252, cert. denied, 213 Conn. 809, 568 A.2d 792 (1989). Supreme Court precedent also establishes that an appeal from a judgment of strict foreclosure

is moot when the law days pass, the rights of redemption are cut off, and

title becomes ‘‘ ‘unconditional’ ’’ in the plaintiff. Argent Mortgage Co., LLC

v. Huertas, 288 Conn. 568, 574–75, 953 A.2d 868 (2008).

6 Practice Book § 61-11 (g) provides in relevant part: ‘‘In any action for

foreclosure in which the owner of the equity has filed, and the court has

denied, at least two prior motions to open or other similar motion, no

automatic stay shall arise upon the court’s denial of any subsequent contested motion by that party, unless the party certifies under oath, in an

affidavit accompanying the motion, that the motion was filed for good cause

arising after the court’s ruling on the party’s most recent motion. . . .’’

7

‘‘Prior to [the effective date of Practice Book § 61-11 (g)], a defendant

in a foreclosure action could employ consecutive motions to open the judgment in tandem with Practice Book §§ 61-11 and 61-4 ‘to create almost the

perfect perpetual motion machine.’ ’’ Citigroup Global Markets Realty Corp.

v. Christiansen, 163 Conn. App. 635, 639, 137 A.3d 76 (2016).

8 The denial of a motion to open a judgment of strict foreclosure is an

appealable final judgment itself and distinctly appealable from the underlying

judgment. See Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Sullivan, 216 Conn.

341, 356 n.10, 579 A.2d 1054 (1990).

9 A hearing on the Appellate Court’s ‘‘own motion’’ was scheduled on

January 13, 2016, and the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal after both

the defendant and the plaintiff failed to appear.

10 Practice Book § 61-11 (a) provides in relevant part that ‘‘proceedings

to enforce or carry out the judgment or order shall be automatically stayed

until the time to file an appeal has expired. If an appeal is filed, such

proceedings shall be stayed until the final determination of the cause. . . .’’