* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept

under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicat a, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order andjudgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of Tenth Ci r. R. 36.3. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 7/1/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

______ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 96-6049 ) (D.C. No. CIV-92-2239-A) RENEE ARMSTRONG SANDERS, ) (W. Dist. of Okla.) ) Defendant-Appellant. )

______ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

______ Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

______ After examining the briefs and the appellate record , this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. SeeFed. R. App. P. 34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is t herefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Renee Armstrong Sanders (Sanders) appeals from an o rder of the district court denying her motion to vacate, set as ide, or correct her sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Sanders was charged along with ten other individual s in a 60- count superseding indictment filed on June 8, 1988. Specifically, Sanders was charged with one count of racketeeringin violation of- 2 -

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), one count of conspiracy to eng age in a criminal racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), one count of conspiracy to distribute coca ine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, three counts of money launderin g in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(I), and one count of u sing a telephone to facilitate a conspiracy to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). Sander’s motion to sever her trial from that of herhusband and co-defendant, Johnny Lee Sanders, was denied. Trial to a jury commenced on October 18, 1989, and concluded on Nov ember 9, 1989. The jury found Sanders guilty as charged except foracquittal on one money laundering charge and the telephone facil itation charge. The court denied Sander’s motion for a mistrial. S anders was sentenced to thirteen years imprisonment on each co unt, the sentences to be served concurrently, together with five years supervised release and a special assessment of $50. 00 per count. On appeal, Sanders alleged that: the district court erred in denying her motions for a severance and mistrial; t he evidence was insufficient to support her money laundering, racke teering, and conspiracy to distribute heroin convictions; and th e district court misapplied the sentencing guidelines in determiningthe quantity of drugs to be used in arriving at her base offense le vel. In reversing in part, affirming in part, and remand ing, we held that: the district court did not abuse its dis cretion in- 3 -

denying Sander’s motions for a mistrial and severan ce, United States v. Sanders , 929 F.2d 1466, 1469 (10th Cir. 1991); there was insufficient evidence to support two of the money l aundering charges, id . at 1470-73; Sander’s substantivie rackerteering conviction “must also be vacated because this convi ction is no longer supported by two racketeering acts [money la undering],” id
. at 1473; Sander’s conviction for conspiracy to dist ribute heroin was insufficient to support her conviction for cons piracy to engage in a criminal racketeering enterprise, id .; there was sufficient evidence to support Sander’s conspiracy conviction to distribute heroin, id . at 1474; and the district court properly employeda quantity of 8,624 grams of heroin in arriving at Sa nder’s base offense level under the sentencing guidelines. Id . at 1474-76. Sanders subsequently filed her § 2255 motion herei n in which she alleged that: the minimum mandatory sentence pr ovision of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) does not apply to pre-November 18, 1988, § 846 offenses; the court erred in calulating the amount of drugs distributed; she was penalized for going to trial; the government violated the double jeopardy clause; the district c ourt erroneously imposed a sentence of supervised release for a pre- November 15, 1988, conspiracy; she was denied effective assistan ce of counsel at sentencing; and her due process rights were violate d when the government estimated the cutting agent without test ing the drug for purity. (R., Vol. I, Tab 1387 at 2).- 4 -

On January 30, 1996, the district court entered its Order, concluding:

The court finds that defendant’s claims, with one exception, are procedurally barred or without merit . The court holds, however, that defendant’s sentence improperly included a period of supervised release, and that her sentence must be corrected to remove any s uch penalty. (R., Vol. I, Tab 1387 at 11). On appeal, Sanders contends that: she was improperl y sentenced under the sentencing guidelines; the district court erred in calculating her base offense level on 8,624 grams o f heroin; the district court erred in allowing her to be penalize d for exercising her constitutional right to stand trial; her money laundering conviction violated the double jeopardy clause; she was denied effective assistance of counsel at sentencing; and she was denied due process when the government was allowed to esti mate the cutting agent without testing the heroin for purity. We review denovothe district court’s rulings on legal questions in § 2255 proceedings. United States v. Kissick , 69 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 1995). Findings of fact made by the district court in applying the sentencing guidelines must be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Bauer , 995 F.2d 182, 183 (10th Cir. 1993). Applying these standards, we affirm substantially f or the reasons set forth in the district court’s Order of January 30, 1996.- 5 -

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court:

James E. Barrett, Senior United States Circuit Judge