alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EBER ODAHIR RIVERA-JIMENEZ,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 10-70010

Agency No. A098-592-796

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 11, 2014** 

Pasadena, California

Before: D.W. NELSON, PAEZ, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Eber Odahir Rivera-Jimenez (“Rivera-Jimenez”), a native of Honduras,

petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)

denying his motion to reconsider a May 28, 2009 decision affirming an

Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of

FILED

MAR 24 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Reviewing

the BIA’s denial of the motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion, Ghahremani v.

Gonzales, 498 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2007), we deny the petition for review. 

Rivera-Jimenez argues that the BIA abused its discretion in conducting an

independent analysis of Rivera-Jimenez’s social group claim. This argument is

without merit. The BIA is permitted to review de novo questions of law in appeals

from the decision of an IJ. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii); Brezilien v. Holder, 569

F.3d 403, 412 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009). Where the BIA conducts a de novo review,

“[a]ny error committed by the IJ will be rendered harmless by the Board’s

application of the correct legal standard.” Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1430 (9th

Cir. 1995). Here, the BIA acted well within its authority to review RiveraJimenez’s social group claim de novo and did not abuse its discretion in denying

Rivera-Jimenez’s motion to reconsider on this ground. 

Rivera-Jimenez also argues for the first time on appeal that the IJ and BIA

erred in failing to review his claim of past persecution from the perspective of a

child, as required by Hernandez-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir.

2007). Although Rivera-Jimenez was a minor when he was allegedly persecuted,

he failed to raise this argument before the BIA when he filed his motion to

reconsider. Accordingly, Rivera-Jimenez has not exhausted this legal claim and

2
the court is without jurisdiction to review it. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); see also

Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding there is no

jurisdiction to review legal claims not presented by the petitioner before the BIA).

PETITION DENIED.

3
89 P.3d 533

SUPREME COURT OF HAWAI'I

May 12, 2004

23445

#### State v. Miller

Vacated
#### Robert B. HANSEN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PETROF TRADING COMPANY, INC., Defendant and Appellant.

No. 13276.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Oct. 11, 1974.

Gerald H. Kinghorn, Kinghorn, Ober-hansly & O’Connell, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.

Mark A. Madsen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.

HENRIOD, Justice:

Appeal from a dismissal of a counterclaim, asserted against plaintiff, incident to an attorney’s suit for fees, in which he received a judgment. Affirmed, with no costs awarded.

Petrof, in lengthy pleadings, affidavits and statements, said the plaintiff, who had to sue for, and obtained judgment for his fees, was compensatorily guilty of malpractice. After hearing the evidence, the trial court said that the pleaded four year limitations statute barred the counterclaim. The chronology of the alleged negligence and filing of Petrof’s counterclaim supported the trial court. Petrof, however, said the statute was inapropos since he did not discover the negligence until a time within which the statute was inapplicable. The trial court countered with a finding of fact that if any negligence occurred, which was not conceded by the court or anyone else save Petrof, it “occurred more than four years prior to the filing of said counterclaim *and should have been discovered prior to that time.”*The evidence sufficiently supported such conclusion, which under familiar principles of appellate review, we respect, without further burdening this decision by detailing the quite voluminous record.

We further conclude that the trial court committed no prejudicial error in refusing to grant plaintiff any relief as to any additional amount of hourly compensation or interest, urged on cross-appeal to be reimbursable.

CALLISTER, C. J., and CROCKETT and TUCKETT, JJ., concur.

ELLETT, Justice

(concurring in the result) :

I concur in the result because I do not think the counterclaim states a cause of action. The fact that pretrial depositions *117were not used at trial does not in and of itself show negligence or malpractice.

While this point was not raised on appeal, we may notice it in order to *affirm*the trial judge.1

However, I cannot agree that the statute of limitations had run on the claim. While it is true that the statutory period had run from the time of the alleged negligence at the time of filing the counterclaim, it had not run from the date of termination of the services of the plaintiff as counsel for defendant in the case wherein the negligence is claimed to have occurred.

I think that so long as a lawyer is trying a case for his client that it would be improper to permit or require the client to begin a separate action against his attorney every time he thought the attorney had erred in a trial tactic. The cause of action, if any there be, should ripen and the statute of limitation begin to run only upon termination of services of the attorney in that particular case.

1

. 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1464 (1); Goodsel v. Dept. of Business Regulation, Utah, 523 P.2d 1230 (1974).
## NUMBER 13 - 2 1 - 00 381 - C V COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI

– EDINBURG

IN THE INTEREST OF E.F

. IV , A CHILD
On appeal from the 92nd District Court of Hidalgo C ounty, Texas.



## MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Benavides , Hinojosa, and Silva Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
On August 19 , 2020, a default order in a suit to modify the parent

- child relationship was entered against appellee, E.F. III

. 1 On June 28, 2021, E .F. III filed a petition for bill of review, seeking to vacate th e order. On August 3, 2021, the trial court granted the petition for bill of review a nd vacated its prior order. Appellant C.Z. file d a notice of appeal seeking to overturn the order granting the bill of review.

1 On our own motion, we identify the parties by their initials only

. See T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. § 109.002(d).2

As a general rule, courts of appeals have jurisdiction only over appeals taken from final judgments

. Lehmann v. Har

- Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). “A bill of review which sets aside a prior judgment but does not dispose of the case on the merits is interlocutory and not appealable.” Jordan v. Jordan , 907 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex. 1995) (first citing Tesoro Petroleum v. Smith , 796 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1990); and then citing Warren v. Walter

, 414 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. 1967))

. The trial court has ordered the case reinstated on its docket , indicating that the issues in the underlying modification case are now pending before it

. S ee id. On June 10 , 2022, we notified C.Z. that the order from which she was attempting to appeal was not an appealable order. We informed her that unless she cured this defect within ten days, her appeal would be subject to dismissal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.3

. C.Z. did not file a response. Consequently, on our own motion, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See id. ; see also Am. K

- 9 Detection Servs., LLC v. Freeman , 556 S.W.3d 246, 260 (Tex. 2018) ( holding that appellate court s ha ve a duty to raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte )

. GINA M. BENAVIDES Justice Delivered and filed on the 30 t h day of June , 202 2

.
August 30, 2001

22447

#### State v. Powers

Affirmed
April 16, 2003

24511

#### State v. Lindsey

Affirmed
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDGMENT

No. 04

- 12

- 00673

- CV

Oscar REYES , Jr.,

Appellant

v.

Roberto M. BARRASA

, Appellee

From the 288th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2012

- CI

- 04799

Honorable Janet P. Littlejohn, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE STONE

, JUSTICE MARION , AND JUSTICE ALVAREZ

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is

AFFIRMED. It is ORDERED that appellee, Roberto M. Barrasa, recover his costs of this appeal

from appellant, Oscar Reyes, Jr.

SIGNED September 11, 2013.

_____________________________ Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
In the Missouri Court of Appeals

Eastern District

DIVISION FIVE

DEBORAH BODE, ) No. ED102648

)

Claimant/Appellant, )

)

vs. ) Appeal from the Labor and

) Industrial Relations Commission

PROFESSIONAL REHABILITATION )

SERVICES and DIVISION OF )

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, )

) Opinion Filed: April 21, 2015

Respondents. )

Claimant, Deborah Bode, has filed a notice of appeal from the Labor and Industrial 

Relations Commission's (Commission) decision concerning her claim for unemployment 

benefits. We dismiss the appeal.

A deputy of the Division of Employment Security (Division) concluded that Claimant

was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Claimant appealed to the Appeals 

Tribunal of the Division, which dismissed her appeal. The Division then made a determination 

that Claimant had been overpaid benefits. She appealed that determination to the Appeals 

Tribunal, which affirmed the Division’s decision. Claimant then filed an application for review 

with the Commission seeking review of both decisions. The Commission affirmed the orders of 

the Appeals Tribunal. The Commission mailed its decision to Claimant on January 14, 2015. 

Claimant filed a notice of appeal to this Court.
2

The Commission has filed a motion to dismiss Claimant’s appeal, contending that it is 

untimely. Claimant has not filed a response. 

The notice of appeal to this court was not filed within the time limits set forth in section 

288.210, RSMo 2000, which provides: “Within twenty days after a decision of the commission 

has become final, the director or any party aggrieved by such decision may appeal the decision to 

the appellate court . . . .” The Commission’s decision becomes final ten days after it is mailed to 

the parties. Section 288.200.2, RSMo 2000. Here, the Secretary to the Commission certified she 

mailed its decision to Claimant on January 14, 2015. Under Chapter 288, Claimant’s notice of 

appeal to this Court was due on or before February 13, 2015. Sections 288.200.2, 288.210. 

Claimant mailed the notice of appeal to the Commission on February 19, 2015. Thus, the notice 

of appeal is untimely. 

The unemployment statutes fail to provide a procedure for filing a late notice of appeal. 

Ross v. Division of Employment Sec., 332 S.W.3d 922 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). While there are 

procedures for filing a late notice of appeal in other civil matters, such procedures do not apply 

to special statutory proceedings, such as unemployment matters under Chapter 288. Heffner v. 

Division of Employment Sec., 345 S.W.3d 393, 394 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). Therefore, this 

court’s only option is to dismiss Claimant’s appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

__________________________________

ANGELA T. QUIGLESS, CHIEF JUDGE

LISA VAN AMBURG, J. and 

PHILIP M. HESS, J., Concurs.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FRANSEN FERI WIJAYA, a.k.a. Sen

Hwee Oei,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 11-73583

Agency No. A095-634-597

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 14, 2013** 

Before: SCHROEDER, GRABER, PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

Fransen Feri Wijaya, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying her motion to

reconsider and motion to reopen removal proceedings. Our jurisdiction is

governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial

FILED

AUG 16 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 11-73583

of a motion to reopen or motion to reconsider. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d

785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for

review. 

In light of our conclusions in Wijaya v. Holder, No. 08-70270, (9th Cir. Jan.

10, 2011), the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider

in order to apply the disfavored group analysis set forth in our decision in

Tampubolon v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2010). 

The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Wijaya’s motion to

reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s

final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Wijaya’s new evidence fails to

demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii);

Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating standards

governing motions to reopen).

Finally, we lack jurisdiction over any challenge to the BIA’s decision not to

reopen sua sponte. See Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 823-24 (9th Cir.

2011).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
September 30, 2005

26422

#### Doe v. Doe

Affirmed
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

QUINN CRUZ, JR., 

 

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 State.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-14-00058-CR

Appeal from the

205th District Court

of El Paso County, Texas 

(TC# 20060D00581)

O R D E R

The Court GRANTS the Appellant’s third motion for extension of time within which to 

file the reply brief until May 3, 2015. NO FURTHER MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 

TO FILE THE APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT.

It is further ORDERED that the Hon. Ruben P. Morales, the Appellant’s attorney, 

prepare the Appellant’s reply brief and forward the same to this Court on or before May 3, 2015.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 21st day of April, 2015.

PER CURIAM

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez and Hughes, JJ.
# EUR-Lex - 21998D0709(13) - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 21998D0709(13)

**Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 96/97 of 28 November 1997 amending Annex VI (social security) to the EEA Agreement **

*
Official Journal L 193 , 09/07/1998 P. 0052 - 0052 *

DECISION OF THE EEA JOINT COMMITTEE No 96/97 of 28 November 1997 amending Annex VI (social security) to the EEA Agreement

THE EEA JOINT COMMITTEE,

Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, as adjusted by the Protocol adjusting the Agreement on the European Economic Area, hereinafter referred to as 'the Agreement`, and in particular Article 98 thereof,

Whereas Annex VI to the Agreement was amended by Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 82/97 (1);

Whereas recommendation No 21 of 28 November 1996 concerning the application of Article 69(1)(a) of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 to unemployed persons accompanying their spouses employed in a Member State other than the competent State, adopted by the Administrative Commission of the European Communities on social security for migrant workers (2), is to be incorporated into the Agreement,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

The following point shall be inserted after point 4.7 (Recommendation No 20) in Annex VI to the Agreement:

'4.8. 97/C 67/03: Recommendation No 21 of 28 November 1996 concerning the application of Article 69(1)(a) of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 to unemployed persons accompanying their spouses employed in a Member State other than the competent State (OJ C 67, 4.3.1997, p. 3)`.

Article 2

The texts of recommendation No 21 in the Icelandic and Norwegian languages, which are annexed to the respective language versions of this Decision, are authentic.

Article 3

This Decision shall enter into force on 1 December 1997, provided that all the notifications under Article 103(1) of the Agreement have been made to the EEA Joint Committee.

Article 4

This Decision shall be published in the EEA Section of and in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Communities.

Done at Brussels, 28 November 1997.

For the EEA Joint Committee

The President

E. BULL

(1) OJ L 134, 7. 5. 1998, p. 11.

(2) OJ C 67, 4. 3. 1997, p. 3.
-78 -76 -74 -72

 38

 40

★

▲

▲

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▲

★ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲

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 1000

 1500

 100

18 12 06 00

07/20

NOAA HYSPLIT MODEL

 Backward trajectory ending at 2300 UTC 20 Jul 06

 EDAS Meteorological Data

Source

★ at 38.86 N 77.06 W Meters AGL
**Exhibit 21**

 

**SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT**

 

At January 31, 2004, consolidated, wholly-owned subsidiaries ofCascade Corporation were as follows:

 
| **Name of Subsidiary**                             |   |   | **Place of  Incorporation** |
|----------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|-----------------------------|
|                                               |   |   |                        |
| Cascade Xiamen Forklift Truck Attachment Co., Ltd. |   |   | Peoples Republic of China   |
| Cascade (Africa) Pty. Ltd.                         |   |   | South Africa                |
| Cascade Korea Limited                              |   |   | South Korea                 |
| Cascade (U.K.) Limited                             |   |   | United Kingdom              |
| Cascade NV                                         |   |   | The Netherlands             |
| Cascade (Scandinavia) Hydraulik A.B.               |   |   | Sweden                      |
| Cascade Hispania S.A.                              |   |   | Spain                       |
| Cascade (France) S.A.R.L.                          |   |   | France                      |
| Cascade GmbH                                       |   |   | Germany                     |
| Cascade (Japan) Limited                            |   |   | Oregon                      |
| Cascade (Canada) Ltd.                              |   |   | Ontario, Canada             |
| Cascade Kenhar Ltd.                                |   |   | United Kingdom              |
| Nuova SAR s.r.l.                                   |   |   | Italy                       |
| Cascade Kenhar, Inc.                               |   |   | Delaware                    |
| Hyco-Cascade Ltd. (N.Z.)                           |   |   | New Zealand                 |
| CNS Nova Scotia                                    |   |   | Nova Scotia, Canada         |
| Cascade (Australia) Pty. Ltd.                      |   |   | Australia                   |
| Hyco Cascade Pty. Ltd.                             |   |   | Australia                   |
| Cascade IFSC Ltd.                                  |   |   | Ireland                     |
| Cascade Europe Ltd.                                |   |   | United Kingdom              |
| Cascade (Ontario) Inc.                             |   |   | Ontario, Canada             |
| Roncari S.r.l.                                     |   |   | Verona, Italy               |

 

The names of certain subsidiaries have been omitted because whenconsidered in the aggregate as a single subsidiary they would not, as ofJanuary 31, 2004, constitute a “Significant Subsidiary” as defined in Rule1-02(w) of Regulation S-X.

 

1

----
Exhibit 32
                             LASERSIGHT INCORPORATED




      Certifications of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
            Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

      Pursuant to U.S.C. Section 1350, as created by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersigned officers of LaserSight
Incorporated (the "Company") does hereby certify, to the best of such officer's
knowledge, that:

      1. The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly
      period ended June 30, 2003 (the "Report") fully complies with the
      requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

      2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
      the Company.



                                                   / S Danghui ("David") Liu
Dated: March 22, 2005
                                                   -----------------------------
                                                        Danghui ("David") Liu,
                                                        Chief Executive Officer



                                                    / S Dorothy M. Cipolla
Dated: March 22, 2005
                                                    ----------------------------
                                                          Dorothy M. Cipolla,
                                                        Chief Financial Officer

      The certifications set forth above are being furnished as an exhibit
solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and shall not
be deemed to be "filed" for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended, nor shall they be deemed incorporated by reference in
any filing under the Securities Act of 1934, as amended.

      A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or
other document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature
that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written
statement required by Section 906, has been provided to LaserSight Incorporated
and will be retained LaserSight Incorporated and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
19019

#### State v. ADLRO

Affirmed
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Consumer Product Safety Commission

# TIME AND DATE: 

Wednesday, November 29, 2023-10:00 a.m.

# PLACE: 

Room 420, Bethesda Towers, 4330 East West Highway, Bethesda, MD.

# STATUS: 

Commission Meeting—Open to the Public.

# MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:

## Decisional Matter

                    Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Infant Support Cushions. A live webcast of the meeting can be viewed at the following link:                     *https://cpsc.webex.com/​weblink/​register/​r6d47fc122f8e9168bd8587d051fc5ec8.*

# CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: 

Alberta E. Mills, Office of the Secretary, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 4330 East West Highway, Bethesda, MD 20814, 301-504-7479 (Office) or 240-863-8938 (Cell).

Dated: November 20, 2023.

Elina Lingappa,

Paralegal Specialist.

[FR Doc. 2023-26120 Filed 11-22-23; 11:15 am]

BILLING CODE 6355-01-P