2015 IL App (3d) 130457

Opinion filed April 17, 2015 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2015 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

TERRELL D. GEIGER, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 21st Judicial Circuit,

Kankakee County, Illinois, 

Appeal No. 3-13-0457 

Circuit No. 08-MR-518 

Honorable 

Clark E. Erickson, 

Judge, Presiding. 

_____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE WRIGHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justice O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

 Justice Lytton dissented, with opinion. 

_____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶ 1 The State prosecuted Terrell D. Geiger for direct criminal contempt for his refusal to 

testify against Javar Hollins during Hollins’ 2008 retrial for charges arising out of two drugrelated double homicides that occurred in March of 1999. The trial court found Geiger guilty of 

the offense of direct criminal contempt due to his refusal to testify against Hollins. The trial 

court sentenced Geiger to serve 20 years’ imprisonment, but the supreme court reversed the 

sentence and remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing. People v. Geiger, 2012 IL 

113181. On remand, the trial court resentenced defendant to 10 years’ imprisonment. Defendant 
2 

now appeals the 10-year sentence on the grounds that the punishment was grossly 

disproportionate to the nature of the offense and asks this court to reduce the sentence to time 

served. We affirm. 

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 On March 18, 1999, police discovered the bodies of Lazerick Martin and Michael Cox. 

Both men had been fatally shot. Geiger, who was 15 years old at the time of the 1999 shootings, 

provided a statement to the police concerning the events that preceded the shootings. However, 

Geiger was not arrested or prosecuted for any offense directly related to the murders. 

¶ 4 Instead, the State charged Dana Dixon, Joseph Mason, and Javar Hollins with offenses 

related to the March 18, 1999, shooting deaths. Over the course of many years, Dixon, Mason, 

and Hollins were convicted of criminal offenses related to the March 18, 1999, murders in 

proceedings conducted by Judge Clark Erickson. Judge Erickson sentenced Dixon, Mason, and 

Hollins separately for their roles in the double homicide. 

¶ 5 Multiple appeals have resulted from Mason’s and Hollins’ convictions for murder and 

Geiger’s related conviction for direct criminal contempt. The summary of facts below has been 

compiled by this court from both the record in this appeal, together with the summary of facts 

compiled by each reviewing court in the following appellate and supreme court decisions: 

People v. Mason, No. 3-00-0894 (2002) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23); 

People v. Hollins, 366 Ill. App. 3d 533 (2006); People v. Hollins, 2011 IL App (3d) 090126-U; 

People v. Hollins, 2014 IL App (3d) 120806-U; People v. Geiger, 2011 IL App (3d) 090688; 

People v. Geiger, 2012 IL 113181. 

¶ 6 Shortly after the homicides, both Geiger and Hollins gave statements to the police. The 

authorities interviewed Hollins before Geiger. Hollins was interviewed by the authorities on 
3 

April 1, 1999, and again on April 2, 1999. During the first interview, Hollins told the police he 

was not involved in the shootings and that Mason, Dixon, and Geiger committed the crimes. 

During the second interview, Hollins said he acted as a lookout while Mason, Dixon, and Geiger

murdered the two victims. 

¶ 7 A few days later after the police spoke to Hollins, the investigators questioned 15-yearold Geiger on April 8, 1999. Geiger’s statement to the police in April of 1999 blamed Hollins 

for shooting both Martin and Cox. Geiger told the police that Hollins confessed to Geiger by 

admitting Hollins shot Martin in the leg. Geiger also told the police that Hollins admitted to 

Geiger that Hollins shot Cox with a pistol grip “Mosseberg” shotgun.1 According to Geiger’s 

statement, Hollins also told Geiger that Mason fired two shots into Martin’s head on March 18, 

1999. 

¶ 8 Hollins was arraigned on his criminal charges on April 5, 1999. A few weeks later, 

Hollins initiated contact with the prosecutor, on May 22, 1999, by writing a letter to the 

prosecutor. Hollins’ letter provided a third version that differed from his two previous 

statements to the police officers. In the letter, Hollins explained that Mason shot Martin both in 

the leg and head. Hollins also indicated in writing that both Mason and Dixon fired shots into 

the car where Cox was waiting.

2

 

 1 The police report used the “Mosseberg” spelling; however, the firearm manufacturer 

spelling of this shotgun is “Mossberg.” 

2 The facts summarized by Justice O’Brien in this court’s most recent decision involving 

Hollins’ murder convictions (Hollins, 2014 IL App (3d) 120806-U), indicate Hollins learned 

about the details of the shooting from Geiger.
4 

¶ 9 I. Proceedings Related to the Murder Convictions 

¶ 10 A. Dixon’s Conviction

¶ 11 Dixon was the first of the three men to be convicted for his role in the double homicide. 

The State charged 19-year-old Dixon with four counts of murder and two counts of armed 

robbery for the March 18, 1999, shootings. However, Dixon entered a guilty plea to one count 

of murder before Judge Erickson on July 11, 2000. Judge Erickson sentenced Dixon to serve 23 

years of incarceration.

¶ 12 B. Mason’s Conviction 

¶ 13 Joseph Mason was the second person to be convicted of offenses related to the double 

homicide. Judge Erickson presided over Mason’s jury trial. During Mason’s trial, which began 

on September 27, 2000, Geiger testified for the State. Geiger testified that a couple of hours 

after Hollins and Mason left a room at the Avis Motel on March 18, 1999, Hollins returned first, 

acting both excited and happy. According to Geiger’s testimony, Mason returned to the same 

motel room a few minutes later acting normally. Geiger told the jury that, after returning to the 

motel room, Mason and Hollins went into the bathroom together. When both men emerged from 

the bathroom, Hollins said, “Let’s go get the guns.” Mason said, “Go get them.” Consequently, 

Geiger left the motel room with Hollins and a person Geiger knew as “Terry.” Geiger testified 

that Geiger accompanied Hollins and “Terry” to an address about five houses away from 203 

South Elm. At that location, Geiger watched Hollins pick up a shotgun. Geiger testified that he 

personally picked up a handgun and then gave the handgun to “Terry.” 

¶ 14 The State’s witnesses who testified against Mason stated that Mason and others planned 

to commit an armed robbery of Lazerick Martin and Michael Cox because Mason had had drugs 
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and $4,000 in cash stolen from him a few days before.3

 Judge Erickson presided over Mason’s 

trial and sentencing hearing. Following Mason’s conviction, Judge Erickson ordered Mason to 

serve a life sentence. 

¶ 15 C. Hollins’ First Trial

¶ 16 The third person found guilty of offenses related to the murders of Martin and Cox was 

Javar Hollins. Hollins’ first jury trial began on April 29, 2004, with Judge Erickson presiding. 

Geiger did not testify during this trial. The jury found Hollins guilty, but these convictions were 

set aside due to problems with the jury venire and this court remanded the matter for a new trial 

in 2006. See Hollins, 366 Ill. App. 3d 533. 

¶ 17 II. Proceedings Involving Geiger

¶ 18 After our court’s 2006 decision reversing Hollins’ conviction and remanding the matter 

for a new trial for Hollins, the State arrested and charged Geiger with the Class X felony offense 

of delivery of cocaine, committed on June 20, 2007, in Kankakee County case, People v. Geiger, 

case No. 07-CF-385. On July 18, 2007, Judge Erickson sentenced Geiger to serve six years’ 

incarceration for this Class X felony offense. Consequently, when Hollins’ second murder trial 

commenced in 2008, Geiger was serving the six-year sentence imposed by Judge Erickson in

case No. 07-CF-385. 

¶ 19 A. Hollins’ Second Trial

¶ 20 Once again, Judge Erickson presided over Hollins’ second jury trial, which began in 

November 2008, nine years after the murders. This time, the State subpoenaed Geiger to testify 

before the jury as a State’s witness against Hollins. However, once in court, Geiger informed 

 3

 During Hollins’ April 1, 1999, statement to police officers, Hollins said some drugs and 

money were stolen from Dixon’s room shortly before March 18, 1999. However, during 

Mason’s trial, Geiger said Mason told him someone stole the drugs and money from Mason.
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Judge Erickson that Geiger was asserting his fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination. On this basis, Geiger refused to testify against Hollins. Judge Erickson advised 

Geiger, at that time, that Geiger’s testimony was no longer privileged under the fifth amendment 

because he gave statements to the police and previously testified at Mason’s trial. The trial court 

further admonished Geiger that he could be charged with a direct criminal contempt charge and, 

if found guilty, be sentenced to serve several years in prison on that charge. After a lunch recess, 

the State filed criminal contempt charges and also offered Geiger immunity for his testimony, so 

nothing Geiger testified about could be used against him. However, Geiger still refused to testify 

against Hollins. 

¶ 21 Hollins testified in his own defense and recanted the substance of his April 2, 1999, 

statement to the police and his May 22, 1999, letter to the prosecutor. Hollins testified that the 

first statement he provided to police on April 1, 1999, indicating Hollins was not present when

Geiger, Mason, and Dixon participated in the murders, was the truthful version of the events. 

Following Hollins’ second jury trial, the jury found Hollins guilty on all counts. Judge Erickson 

sentenced Hollins to serve life without parole. 

¶ 22 B. Geiger’s Contempt Proceedings

¶ 23 During a recess in Hollins’ second trial, the State formally charged Geiger with direct 

criminal contempt and Geiger still refused to testify. Approximately six weeks after Hollins’ 

trial, Judge Erickson presided over Geiger’s criminal contempt proceedings. At the contempt 

bench trial, defense counsel argued that defendant had a fifth amendment right to refuse to 

testify. The court rejected this argument and found defendant guilty of direct criminal contempt, 

set the matter for a sentencing hearing, and ordered a presentence investigation. At the first 

sentencing hearing, the trial court noted that defendant seemed defiant when he refused to testify 
7 

and that defendant did not seem afraid of retaliation for his testimony. Based on those factors 

and defendant’s criminal history, on July 20, 2009, the court imposed a sentence of 20 years’ 

incarceration. The court ordered the sentence to be served consecutively with a six-year 

sentence already being served by Geiger for an unrelated drug offense, People v. Geiger, case 

No. 07-CF-385. 

¶ 24 On appeal, this court affirmed defendant’s 20-year sentence. Geiger, 2011 IL App (3d) 

090688. The supreme court granted leave to appeal and found that a less onerous sentence was 

required and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. Geiger, 2012 IL 113181. 

¶ 25 The record in this appeal reveals, on April 15, 2013, the case was called for resentencing

before Judge Erickson following remand. The State argued that a 10-year sentence was 

appropriate, given the seriousness of the underlying case in which defendant refused to testify 

and defendant’s defiance. 

¶ 26 Defense counsel argued defendant’s refusal to testify against Hollins was based solely on 

Geiger’s mistaken, but reasonable, belief that he had a fifth amendment privilege to remain 

silent. Further, defense counsel stressed that Geiger’s silence had no impact on the outcome of 

the trial, since Hollins was convicted without Geiger’s testimony. Defense counsel also argued 

that if defendant had been prosecuted for obstructing justice or perjury, he would have received a 

sentence between 2 and 5 years’ imprisonment or, if an extended-term sentence were imposed, 

up to 10 years’ imprisonment and urged the trial court to impose a sentence of 2 years’ 

imprisonment for contempt. 

¶ 27 In allocution before the court in 2013, defendant apologized for “anything [he had] done 

as far as court-wise with this case.” Defendant stated he did not testify because he could not 

remember any of the events regarding the case. The court found that defendant’s refusal to 
8 

testify was not openly contemptuous, but described defendant’s refusal to testify as an “assault” 

on the criminal justice system. The court concluded that a lengthy sentence was warranted 

because defendant’s conduct could have caused serious consequences in the underlying case. 

The court also considered defendant’s young age and extensive criminal history of felony 

offenses. The court resentenced defendant to 10 years’ imprisonment with day-for-day credit. 

The court was unsure of the effect the new sentence would have on defendant’s release date. 

The clerk asked if defendant’s sentence was consecutive, and the court responded “[w]ell, the 

sentence it was consecutive to is pretty much over. But it–yeah. The–all right.” The court readmonished defendant of his appeal rights. 

¶ 28 On April 25, 2013, the court received a letter from defendant. In the letter, defendant 

stated that the Department of Corrections had erroneously set his release date for June 20, 2015. 

Defendant argued, that with the credit for time served from July 20, 2009, his release date should 

be November 20, 2013. 

¶ 29 After reviewing the recording of defendant’s resentencing hearing, the court developed 

concerns that its order was silent regarding whether defendant’s 10-year sentence was to run 

concurrently or consecutively to defendant’s sentence in case No. 07-CF-385. Consequently, the 

court set the matter for a hearing.

¶ 30 At the beginning of the June 20, 2013, hearing, the trial judge indicated he caused some 

confusion by failing to specify whether defendant’s sentence would be concurrent or 

consecutive. The court acknowledged that it suggested to defendant, off the record, that 

defendant could be released in late 2013. However, the court advised the parties that this underestimation resulted from the court’s misunderstanding of the status of defendant’s sentence in 

case No. 07-CF-385. The court incorrectly believed defendant had finished or was close to 
9 

finishing that sentence in case No. 07-CF-385 at the time it imposed the 10-year contempt 

sentence in case No. 08-MR-518, the instant case. 

¶ 31 The State argued that consecutive sentencing was mandatory because defendant was 

incarcerated for case No. 07-CF-385 when he committed the contemptuous conduct in case No. 

08-MR-518. 

¶ 32 The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that it was required to impose consecutive 

sentencing. However, on June 20, 2013, the trial judge stated, if the law did not mandate that the 

sentence in case No. 08-MR-518 would not begin until after the sentence in case No. 07-CF-385 

was completed as a consecutive sentence, he would have made the 10-year sentence imposed on 

remand to be served concurrently because he thought defendant was a “different person” and had 

“changed” since the date of the original contempt sentence in 2009. 

¶ 33 On June 20, 2013, the court advised defendant of his appeal rights and defense counsel 

made an oral motion to reconsider the 10-year consecutive sentence. The court denied the 

motion and defendant requested a notice of appeal. 

¶ 34 The court directed the clerk to prepare a notice of appeal and informally told defendant, 

“[Y]ou can appeal the sentence of 10 years too. They might reduce it to time-served.” Defense 

counsel asked to include that basis in the notice of appeal, but the State advised the court that 

more than 30 days had passed since the resentencing date and that basis had been forfeited. The 

court agreed, and the notice of appeal was limited to the consecutive sentencing issue. 

¶ 35 ANALYSIS

¶ 36 I. Jurisdiction

¶ 37 In this appeal, Geiger raises one issue for this court to review. Specifically, even though 

the trial court reduced his 20-year sentence by half, Geiger contends the 10-year sentence for 
10 

direct criminal contempt is excessive. The State responds that this court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider the propriety of the 10-year sentence and also lacks jurisdiction to reduce the sentence 

to time served. In support of this argument, the State asserts defendant forfeited review of the 

issue because the notice of appeal does not identify the April 15, 2013, order that imposed the 

sentence.

¶ 38 We begin by reviewing the unusual procedural posture of this case. Originally, the trial 

court imposed a 20-year sentence for contempt, which was ordered to be served consecutively to 

the 6-year sentence in case No. 07-CF-385. After remand from our supreme court, the court 

conducted a new sentencing hearing for contempt in this case (case No. 08-MR-518) on April 

15, 2013. On remand, the court ordered defendant to serve 10 years’ imprisonment for direct 

criminal contempt. Within the next few days, Geiger submitted a pro se, ex parte letter to the 

trial judge on April 25, 2013. After reviewing this ex parte communication, the trial court

properly brought the ex parte letter to the attention of both parties. 

¶ 39 Within 30 days of the court’s April 15, 2013, sentencing hearing, the court sua sponte

scheduled another hearing. The court reassembled the parties and received arguments regarding 

whether the 10-year sentence should be served concurrently or consecutively with respect to 

Geiger’s 6-year sentence imposed by Judge Erickson in Kankakee County case No. 07-CF-385. 

Based on these events, we conclude the trial court did not enter a final judgment in this case until 

the date of the amended judgment order clarifying the consecutive nature of the 10-year 

sentence, which was dated June 20, 2013. 

¶ 40 Defendant argues the 10-year sentence for contempt was grossly disproportionate to the 

nature of the offense. We review defendant’s sentence for an abuse of discretion. People v. 

Perez-Gonzalez, 2014 IL App (2d) 120946, ¶ 34. “A court abuses its discretion when a sentence 
11 

varies greatly from the spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the 

nature of the offense.” Id. 

¶ 41 Here, Judge Erickson found defendant’s refusal to testify in Hollins second murder case 

was an “assault” on the judicial system. Judge Erickson was uniquely qualified to make this 

observation for several reasons. First, Judge Erickson was personally present in 2000 when 

Geiger presented detailed testimony during Mason’s criminal trial that implicated Hollins in the 

murders. According to Geiger’s testimony against Mason, which was presented during Hollins’ 

codefendant’s jury trial before Judge Erickson, Geiger joined Hollins and a man named “Terry” 

at “203 South Elm,” an address about five houses away from the location of the murders. Geiger 

testified before the jury in Mason’s trial that Geiger personally witnessed Hollins pick up a 

shotgun. This version of events, described by Geiger under oath during Mason’s trial, put both 

Geiger and Hollins in close proximity to the murder scene, but placed the shotgun in Hollins’ 

hands. 

¶ 42 Thus, Judge Erickson was fully aware that Geiger had previously surrendered his fifth 

amendment rights concerning matters discussed on the record during Mason’s trial. When 

Geiger initially refused to testify in 2008, Judge Erickson advised Geiger that Geiger’s testimony 

was no longer privileged under the fifth amendment because Geiger waived his rights and gave 

statements to the police and previously testified at Mason’s trial. Additionally, the judge told 

Geiger that the State offered him immunity for his testimony against Hollins on that date. 

¶ 43 Further, Judge Erikson personally observed Geiger’s demeanor when Geiger insisted he 

would not testify against Hollins in spite of the court’s admonishments that the fifth amendment 

rights no longer applied. During Geiger’s first sentencing hearing in 2009, the trial court found 

defendant seemed defiant when he refused to testify and that defendant’s refusal to testify did not 
12 

seem based on a fear of retaliation from Hollins or other codefendants. Based on those factors 

and Geiger’s criminal history, Judge Erickson originally sentenced Geiger to 20 years’ 

imprisonment to be served consecutively after completion of Geiger’s 6-year sentence imposed 

in case No. 07-CF-385, on July18, 2007. We note Geiger did not challenge the consecutive 

nature of this sentence in the previous appeal. Geiger, 2011 IL App (3d) 090688. 

¶ 44 Significantly, in 2013, Judge Erickson listened to Geiger change his explanation for his 

refusal to testify against Hollins in 2008. Originally, Geiger refused to testify in 2008 based on 

his fifth amendment right, but in 2013 Geiger told the court he refused to testify against Hollins 

because Geiger could not remember the events of March 18, 1999. 

¶ 45 In addition, we note it is apparent from the record that Judge Erickson carefully read the 

decision of our supreme court prior to resentencing Geiger in 2013. Geiger, 2012 IL 113181. It 

is also clear Judge Erickson was aware of the “time served” option discussed in Justice 

Freeman’s separate decision. Id. at ¶ 36 (Freeman, J., specially concurring). Nonetheless, after 

carefully considering the language and directive of the supreme court, this jurist, who had been 

involved in proceedings involving this double homicide for more than a decade, from 2000 to 

2013, resentenced Geiger to complete a sentence of 10 years’ incarceration, rather than imposing 

a sentence of “time served” as of April 15, 2013. 

¶ 46 Finally, Judge Erickson had another opportunity to reconsider the sentence when he 

reassembled the parties to address whether the law required the 10-year sentence to be a 

consecutive sentence. On this occasion, Judge Erickson stood firm. Had Judge Erickson felt the 

proper sentence for Geiger’s misconduct should be less than 10 years’ incarceration because it 

would remain a consecutive punishment based on the statutory scheme, he could have imposed a 

sentence of time served either on April 15, 2013, or later on June 20, 2013. It is significant to 
13 

this court that Judge Erickson did not do so and ordered a 10-year sentence that must be served 

consecutively based on existing law.

¶ 47 We note, as defense counsel argued before the trial judge, had defendant been prosecuted 

for obstructing justice or perjury, he could have received an extended-term sentence of 10 years’ 

imprisonment for perjury or obstructing justice based on his extensive criminal history of felony 

offenses. Upon our review of the second sentencing hearing after remand from our supreme 

court, we conclude that the 10-year sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the nature of the 

contemptuous act when considered in light of defendant’s previous criminal history. For the 

reasons set forth above, we affirm the consecutive 10-year sentence imposed by Judge Erickson 

on June 20, 2013. 

¶ 48 CONCLUSION

¶ 49 The judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.

¶ 50 Affirmed. 

¶ 51 JUSTICE LYTTON, dissenting.

¶ 52 I respectfully dissent from the majority's affirmation of defendant's 10-year criminal 

contempt sentence. While I agree that Judge Erickson was very familiar with this defendant and 

the role his testimony played in the trials of Joseph Mason and Javar Hollins, I do not agree that 

defendant's sentence represented the " ' "least possible power adequate" ' " to punish defendant. 

Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 280 (1990) (quoting Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 

364, 371 (1966), quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821)). A contempt 

sentence is an exercise of the court's discretion; however, this discretion is not unfettered. See

Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 206-07 (1968) (noting that the recurrent need to set aside 

criminal contempt punishments as unauthorized or too harsh demonstrated the "unwisdom" of 
14 

vesting the judiciary with completely untrammeled power to punish contempt). In Bloom, 391 

U.S. at 206-07, the Supreme Court observed that there had been a recurring necessity to set aside 

punishments for criminal contempt as too harsh and criminal contempt cases had evolved to 

mirror ordinary criminal cases with extremely serious penalties.4

 Our supreme court has 

expressed similar concerns in this case. People v. Geiger, 2012 IL 113181. 

¶ 53 I believe that one way to limit this tendency is to use statutory sentences in similar 

criminal cases to assist trial judges in finding a reasonable sentence for the contempt offense. A 

direct criminal contempt charge based on a refusal to testify is comparable to the offense of 

perjury (720 ILCS 5/32-2 (West 2008)). See United States v. Gracia, 755 F.2d 984, 990 (2d Cir. 

1985) (comparing contempt sentence for failure to testify to possible sentence for perjury); 

United States v. Leyva, 513 F.2d 774, 780 (5th Cir. 1975) (comparing contempt sentence for 

refusal to testify to possible perjury sentence); In re the Finding of Contempt Against Gardner, 

713 N.E.2d 346, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (perjury comparison used in reduction of defendant's 

contempt sentence); see also United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 393 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding 

a four-year criminal contempt sentence for failure to testify before the grand jury was 

proportionate to sentences imposed for the offenses of perjury and obstruction of a criminal 

investigation). In Illinois, perjury is a Class 3 felony, which carries a sentencing range of two to 

 

4

 Since the Supreme Court's observation, federal and state courts have continued to set aside 

lengthy contempt sentences. See United States v. Gomez, 553 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1977) (per 

curiam) (15-year criminal contempt sentence for refusing to testify before grand jury reduced to 

2 years); Leyva, 513 F.2d 774 (35-year contempt sentence for refusing to testify before grand 

jury reduced to 2 years); Gardner, 713 N.E.2d 346 (111⁄2-year contempt sentence for refusing to 

testify reduced to 3 years). In contrast, shorter contempt sentences for a defendant's refusal to 

testify have been upheld on appeal. See United States v. Lach, 874 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1989) 

(upholding defendant's 42-month contempt sentence imposed on two separate contempt 

charges); Patrick, 542 F.2d 381 (defendant's four-year contempt sentence was not abuse of 

discretion). Defendant's 10-year contempt sentence is inconsistent with other jurisdictions that 

have addressed this issue. 
15 

five years' imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-40 (West 2008). Where appropriate, an extendedterm sentence for perjury of 5 to 10 years' imprisonment may be imposed. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-

40(a) (West 2008). 

¶ 54 Here, defendant's 10-year contempt sentence was twice the length of the maximum 

nonextended perjury sentence. A trial court's power to sentence a defendant for contempt is not 

without limit. In an effort to better ensure the reasonableness of contempt sentences, I believe 

Illinois courts should be guided by the sentences applicable to criminal offenses that are 

analogous to a defendant's contumacious behavior. Criminal sentencing terms provide 

boundaries in which a court may craft an appropriate contempt sentence that does not run afoul 

of our supreme court's concerns. Applying this framework, I would reduce defendant's sentence 

to five years' imprisonment. Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)(4). 

¶ 55 Generally, a trial court's sentence is subject to review for an abuse of discretion. Geiger, 

2012 IL 113181, ¶ 27. However, the Supreme Court has advised that the punishment for 

contempt is guided by the doctrine that " 'a court must exercise "[t]he least possible power 

adequate to the end proposed." ' " Spallone, 493 U.S. at 280 (quoting Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 371, 

quoting Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 231). Our supreme court echoed this sentiment in the 

Geiger decision when it admonished the courts of this state to be mindful that "[t]he contempt 

power is an extraordinary one that should be used sparingly and with the utmost sensitivity." 

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geiger, 2012 IL 113181, ¶ 25. Reference to criminal 

sentencing laws provides useful guidelines for courts to apply when considering criminal 

contempt sentences. Indeed, federal sentencing guidelines specifically reference criminal law 

sentences as a useful tool to help guide judges in the determination of an appropriate criminal 

contempt sentence. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2J1.1 cmt. nn. 1, 2 (2011). 
16 

Defendant's contumacious behavior was nonviolent and based on an honest and reasonable, 

albeit mistaken, belief that he had a fifth amendment right to remain silent and did not seriously 

hinder the State's ability to prosecute Hollins. See Geiger, 2012 IL 113181, ¶¶ 29-31. Although 

defendant's refusal to testify in a murder case was an affront to the judicial system, a 10-year 

contempt sentence does not represent the least possible power adequate to punish defendant. See 

Spallone, 493 U.S. at 276.