IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-30123

Summary Calendar

LANDRY DIXON, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

AMERICREDIT FINANCIAL SERVICES, INCORPORATED, misnamed as 

General Motors Financial Corporation, doing business as GM Financial; 

DANIEL E. BERCE; STEVEN P. BOWMAN; CHRIS A. CHOATE; EUNICE 

PONCE; ROBBIE BROWN, 

 Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:17-CV-4492

Before DENNIS, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc., d/b/a GM Financial (“GM 

Financial”), repossessed Landry Dixon’s car on the night of November 30, 2016,

because Dixon had defaulted on his lease. Dixon, acting pro se, filed suit 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 9, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 19-30123

2

against GM Financial and several of its individual officers alleging a number 

of claims based on this repossession. The district court dismissed all of Dixon’s 

claims with prejudice. The claims against the individual defendants were 

dismissed at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage; the claims against GM Financial were 

dismissed on summary judgment. The district court entered final judgment on 

November 19, 2018. Dixon then timely filed a motion to reconsider under Rule 

59(e), which the district court denied on January 11, 2019. Dixon appeals. We 

affirm. 

As an initial matter, we must define the scope of this appeal. In his notice 

of appeal, Dixon designated only the January 11 order denying his 

reconsideration motion as the order being appealed. He did not name the final 

judgment. Consequently, we review only the January 11 order. See FED. R.

APP. P. 3(c)(1)(B) (noting that the notice of appeal must “designate the 

judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed”); see also Woodward v. Epps, 

580 F.3d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 2009).

We generally review a decision on a Rule 59(e) motion for an abuse of 

discretion, but if the decision turns on an issue of law, we review de novo. Lamb 

v. Ashford Place Apartments, LLC, 914 F.3d 940, 943 (5th Cir. 2019). “A motion 

to alter or amend [under Rule 59(e)] must clearly establish either a manifest 

error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence.” Id. (quotation 

omitted).

The crux of Dixon’s argument on appeal is that the district court erred 

by refusing to reconsider its decision rejecting his attempt to add new claims 

under La. Rev. Stat. §§ 6:965(C)(4) and 6:966(A)(2). We find no error in the 

district court’s decision—the amendment to the complaint would have been 

futile. 

Section 6:965(C)(4) states that a “default” on a secured transaction

requiring monthly payments occurs after the “nonpayment of two consecutive 

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payments on the date due.” Only if payments are required more frequently

than on a monthly basis is “default” defined as “nonpayment of a period of sixty 

days.” La. Rev. Stat. § 6:965(C)(4). Section 6:966(a)(2) states that a creditor 

must “send notice to all debtors in writing at the last known address of the

debtors, of the right of the secured party to take possession of the collateral 

without further notice upon default as defined in [§ 6:965(C)].”

GM Financial submitted the following unrebutted summary-judgment 

evidence showing it complied with these requirements before repossessing 

Dixon’s car: Dixon’s car lease—proving that it was a month-to-month lease. 

Dixon’s payment record—establishing that he missed both the April and May 

payments in 2015. And a letter sent to Dixon in November 2015 to the same 

address where GM Financial repossessed Dixon’s car a year later—proving 

that GM Financial informed him of his default and warned him of its intent to 

repossess if the default was not cured.1 Dixon never made the payments. 

Dixon seems to think that he has a valid claim because he was in default 

for only 55 days. If Dixon’s lease required payments to be made more 

frequently than on a monthly basis, he may be correct. But as explained, 

Dixon’s car lease is a monthly lease, and he can therefore be in default by 

missing two payments— even if the two months add up to less than 60 days. 

To sum up, as any claims based on §§ 6:965(C)(4) and 6:966(A)(2) would 

be futile, the district court did not err in refusing to reconsider its correct 

decision to not allow Dixon’s proposed amendment to his complaint.

AFFIRMED. 

 

1 Dixon argues—without any citation to legal authority—that the district court erred 

in admitting this evidence into the summary-judgment record. This argument is abandoned 

for inadequate briefing. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993). 

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