NO. 08-15-00015-CR

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

TOMMY JAMES LEWIS,

Appellant, 

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee.

Appealed from the 109th Judicial District Court

of Andrews County, Texas

Honorable Martin B. Muncy, Judge Presiding

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

FIVECOAT & ROGERS, P.L.L.C.

Raymond K. Fivecoat

State Bar No. 24010024

214 W. Texas Ave., Ste. 811

Midland, Texas 79701

(432) 620-8774 (Telephone)

(432) 620-9945 (Facsimile)

ray@fivecoatlaw.com

Attorney for Appellant

TOMMY JAMES LEWIS

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 

08-15-00015-CR

ACCEPTED

08-15-00015-CR

EIGHTH COURT OF APPEALS

EL PASO, TEXAS

4/20/2015 12:36:08 PM

DENISE PACHECO

CLERK

 FILED IN 8th COURT OF APPEALS EL PASO, TEXAS 4/20/2015 12:36:08 PM DENISE PACHECO Clerk
i

IDENTIFY OF THE PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(a), Appellant TOMMY JAMES LEWIS, 

certifies that the following is a complete list of the names and addresses of the 

parties to the final judgment of the trial and their counsel:

APPELLANT

TOMMY JAMES LEWIS RAYMOND K. FIVECOAT

6315 Ladera Dr. Fivecoat & Rogers, P.L.L.C.

Houston, Texas 77083 214 W. Texas Ave., Ste. 811

Midland, Texas 79701

Appellate Counsel

LANE HAYGOOD

Attorney at Law

522 N. Grant Ave.

Odessa, Texas 79761

Trial Counsel

APPELLEE

STATE OF TEXAS TIM MASON

Andrews County District Attorney

121 NW Ave. A

Andrews, Texas 79714

Trial/Appellee Counsel

TRIAL COURT JUDGE JUDGE MARTIN B. MUNCY

109th Judicial District Court

Andrews County Courthouse

201 N. Main, Rm. 201

Andrews, Texas 79714
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL..........................................................i

TABLE OF CONTENTS..........................................................................................ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES....................................................................................iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............................................................................1-2

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.......................................................................3

STATEMENT OF FACTS...................................................................................4-10

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT......................................................................11

ARGUMENT.....................................................................................................12-14

ISSUE ONE: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 

DENYING APPELLANT THE LESSER-INCLUDED 

OFFENSE INSTRUCTION OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS.

ISSUE TWO: THE EVIDENCE WAS BOTH LEGALLY AND 

FACTUALLY INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT 

APPELLANT COMMITTED THE ACT OF BURGLARY 

OF A BUILDING – ENTRY WITH COMMISSION OF 

THEFT.

CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................15

PRAYER.................................................................................................................15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE................................................................................16

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.......................................................................16
iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Brooks v. State,

323 S.W.3d 893 894-894, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)................................13

Day v. State, 

532 S.W.2d 302, 306

(Tex. Crim. App. 1975, overruled on other grounds by Hall v. State)............9

Hall v. State, 

225 S.W.3d 524,535-36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)......................................8

Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)..............13

King v. State, 

29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).......................................13

King v. State, 

895 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)......................................13

Rules and Statutes:

Tex. Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 37.09...............................................................................9

Tex. Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. §2.05.............................................................................15

Tex. Pen. Code. §30.02........................................................................................8, 14

Tex. Pen. Code. §30.05..............................................................................................9
1

NO. 08-15-00015-CR

TOMMY JAMES LEWIS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee.

Brief of the Appellant

Appellant, TOMMY JAMES LEWIS, submits his brief. Appellants will be 

referred to as “Appellant”, and “Appellee” will be referred to as “State”.

Statement of the Case and Procedural History

On June 5, 2011, Appellant was indicted for the state jail felony offense of 

burglary of a building – entry with commission of theft. (CR, Pg. 5). Appellant’s 

case was called for trial on the merits before a jury in the 109th Judicial District 

Court of Andrews County, Texas on or about January 13, 2015. (RR 2, Pg. 5-6). 

On January 13, 2015, after the close of evidence and argument, the jury 

returned a guilty verdict, as indicated by the signature of the presiding juror on the 

jury charge. (CR, Pg. 21-28).

The punishment phase of this case immediately proceeded before the Trial 

Court. (RR 2, Pg. 222). The Trial Court sentenced Appellant to serve two (2) years 

in the T.D.C.J. – State Jail Division. (RR 2, Pg. 224). (CR, Pg. 53-56). Appellant 

filed his Notice of Appeal in this case. (CR, Pg. 58-59). 
2

Issues Presented on Appeal

ISSUE ONE: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 

DENYING APPELLANT THE LESSER-INCLUDED 

OFFENSE INSTRUCTION OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS.

ISSUE TWO: THE EVIDENCE WAS BOTH LEGALLY AND 

FACTUALLY INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT 

APPELLANT COMMITTED THE ACT OF BURGLARY 

OF A BUILDING – ENTRY WITH COMMISSION OF 

THEFT.
3

Statement of Facts

Appellant's case was called for trial on January 13, 2015. (RR 2, Pg. 5-6). 

Upon the reading of the indictment, Appellant entered a plea of not guilty. (RR 2, 

Pg. 100-101).

As its first witness, the State called Jacqueline Neighbors. (RR 2, Pg. 112). 

Ms. Neighbors testified that on the morning of May 11, at approximately 4:00 

a.m., she was awake, unable to sleep at her residence in Andrews County, Texas. 

(RR 2, Pg. 112-113.)

Ms. Neighbors testified that her dog suddenly began barking so she woke up 

her husband to investigate. (RR 2, Pg. 113-114). Ms. Neighbors called the 

Sheriff's Department to report a break in (RR 2, Pg. 114). Mrs. Neighbors testified 

that she did not see the Appellant, except after he was speaking with her husband. 

(RR 2, Pg. 121). Additionally, Mrs. Neighbors did not see the Appellant inside of 

the building constituting their game room, nor did she see him step outside of the 

door. (RR 2, Pg. 122).

Wayne Waldrop, a patrolman with the City of Andrews Police Department, 

testified next in regards to responding to the emergency call at the Neighbor's 

residence. (RR 2, Pg. 123-124). Waldrop testified that upon arrival he attempted 

to go into the backyard because a woman was shouting about a man pinned under 

the air conditioner, but the officer did not locate anyone there. (RR 2, Pg. 125). 
4

Waldrop testified that based upon the information he was given by Mr. Neighbors, 

he located the Appellant at the Appellant's trailer next door. (RR 2, Pg. 127-128). 

Waldrop testified that upon encountering the Appellant, who indicated that he had 

been on the Neighbor's property as part of the Neighborhood Watch, and had seen 

lights inside of the building prompting him to investigate what was going on. (RR 

2, Pg. 132). Waldrop testified that Appellant admitted to being inside of the 

building. (RR 2, Pg. 132). Waldrop further testified that he did not find any signs 

of foul play on the door, did not dust for fingerprints, or photograph any of the 

scene, including the open door to the game room. (RR 2, Pg. 138).

The State then called Andrews County Deputy Sheriff Aaron Villalobos. 

(RR 2, Pg. 141). When Villalobos arrived on scene, Villalobos testified he made 

contact with the Appellant, who indicated that he had gone across the street 

because he had saw some lights in the storage building and thought someone 

needed help. (RR 2, Pg. 144). Villalobos further testified that he did not observe 

the Appellant on the Neighbor's property, did not dust for fingerprints, photograph 

any of the scene, did not observe any damage to any type of lock on the game 

room door or conduct any type of investigation other than driving out the scene 

(RR 2, Pg. 152).

The State's last witness was Mr. Boyd Neighbors. (RR 2, Pg. 154). Mr. 

Neighbors testified that his wife woke him early one morning due to the belief that 
5

someone was in their game room and the dog was going ballistic. (RR 2, Pg. 156). 

Mr. Neighbors went outside and headed to the game room, assuming someone was 

in the building. (RR 2, Pg. 157). As Mr. Neighbors reached for the game room 

door, he observed somebody on the patio, who had been crouched down to avoid 

the dog. (RR 2, Pg. 157). Upon encountering Appellant, Mr. Neighbors called off 

the dog and began to ask Appellant questions. (RR 2, Pg. 158) Appellant told 

Neighbors that someone was in his building smoking and indicated he had been in 

there inside of the building himself. (RR 2, Pg. 159) When Mr. Neighbors 

specifically asked Appellant why he was in the building, Appellant responded that 

he saw lights in inside the building and then came up to investigate. (RR 2, Pg.

159). Neighbors further testified earlier in the evening there had been a gathering 

of people at his game room consuming alcohol, but he could not recall if he drank 

any alcohol at that party that night before he went to bed. (RR 2, Pg. 175). Lastly, 

Neighbors testified that nothing had been taken from the game. (RR 2, Pg. 177).

With that, the State rest. (RR 2, Pg. 178). After making a Motion For 

Instructed Verdict outside the presence of the jury, which was denied by the Trial 

Court, the defense rest. (RR 2, Pg. 187, 194).

After hearing the argument of counsel, the jury went back to deliberate 

regarding guilt and innocence. (RR 2, Pg. 216). The jury returned a guilty verdict 

against Appellant. (Clerk's Record Pg. 23 24) (RR 2, Pg. 222). After hearing 
6

arguments of counsel, the Trial Court sentenced appellant to serve 2 years in the 

State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, probated for 2 

years, with a $2,500.00 fine. (RR 2, Pg. 224).
7

Summary of the Argument

Appellant asserts that the Trial Court committed reversible error in its 

refusal to grant Appellant’s request for the inclusion of a lesser-included offense 

instruction for the offense of criminal trespass in the jury charge.

Further, Appellant asserts that the evidence presented by the State of Texas 

was insufficient to support a finding of guilt for the felony offense of burglary of a 

building.
8

Arguments and Authorities

ISSUE ONE: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 

DENYING APPELLANT THE LESSER-INCLUDED 

OFFENSE INSTRUCTION OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS.

1. Standard of Review

The relevant standard for determining whether or not a lesser-included 

offense instruction should be included within a jury charge is the two-part

“cognate-pleadings” approach outlined in Hall. Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 

535-36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

2. First Step of Hall Analysis

Under Hall, the first step is to compare the elements of the offense as alleged 

in the charging instrument with the elements of the potential lesser-included 

offense, and apply the provisions of Tex. Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.09. 

The elements of burglary of a building, as alleged in the indictment, are: (1) 

the defendant; (2) on or about May 11, 2014; (3) with the intent to commit theft; 

(4) enter a building or a portion of a building; (5) not open to the public; (6) 

without the effective consent of the owner. Tex. Pen. Code §30.02.

The Appellant requested a lesser-included offense of criminal trespass. (CR, 

Pg. 31-36; RR 2, Pg. 179-192). The elements of criminal trespass are: (1) the 

defendant; (2) without the effective consent of the owner; (3) enters or remains on 

the property or in the building of another; (4) intentionally, knowingly, or 
9

4

recklessly; (5) with notice that entry was forbidden. Tex. Pen. Code §30.05.

Article 37.09 provides that an offense is a lesser-included offense if: (1) it is 

established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish 

commission of the offense charged or (2) it consists of an attempt to commit the 

offense charged or an otherwise included offense. Tex. Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 

37.09. In this case, there is only one element that is different between the indicted 

offense, and the requested lesser-included offense of criminal trespass. The 

different element is the requirement of proof of “intent to commit theft” as required 

in the burglary of a building statute. 

In Day v. State, 532 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975, overruled on 

other grounds by Hall), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that criminal trespass 

was a lesser-included offense of burglary of a building. Although Hall otherwise 

modified the type of test used to determine whether an offense is a lesser-included 

offense, it did not overrule the prior holding of Day, such that criminal trespass 

still remains a lesser-included offense of burglary of a building. 

3. Second Step of Hall Analysis

The second part of the cognate-pleadings approach requires this Court to 

determine whether there is evidence that supports giving the instruction to the jury. 

It is undisputed in the evidence presented by the State’s own witnesses that 

Appellant entered into the game room belonging to victim without permission. A 
10

police officer, Sheriff’s Deputy and the victim each testified that the Appellant 

admitted to being in the game room. The victim testified as well that Appellant did 

not have permission to enter the game room. However, each of these witnesses 

further testified as to the Appellant’s stated intent when he entered the game room. 

Both officers and the victim testified that, while the Appellant admitted entering 

the building, that he did so because he had saw a light and had concerns that 

someone was inside the building. There is no testimony given at trial to the 

contrary. Instead, the testimony at trial is that the Appellant was “real friendly and 

cordial,” and had expressed concerns about his neighbor’s property being tampered 

with. (RR 2, Pg. 132, 144, 159, 163). Additionally, the investigation established 

that there were no signs of forced entry, burglary tools, fingerprints, or DNA. (RR 

2, Pg. 138, 152, 163). 

Therefore, there was sufficient evidence that Appellant may have only been 

guilty of the lesser charge of criminal trespass. While the Appellant may be 

"guilty" of entering into the building without permission, if he had a meritorious 

reason for being there, and did not have the intent to commit a theft as alleged, 

then he would be guilty only of the lesser charge of criminal trespass. Therefore, it 

would be proper under the Hall analysis for the Trial Court to grant the requested 

lesser-included instruction.

4. Argument and Analysis
11

First, the evidence in this case clearly supports a possible finding of the 

Appellant’s guilt as only to the requested lesser-included offense of criminal 

trespass. The evidence sufficiently meets the requirements of the Hall analysis. 

Therefore, the trial court erred in denying the requested instruction and this case 

should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Second, the harm of the denial of this request is clear on the record in this 

case. Not only was the evidence insufficient, as well as non-existent, as to the 

Appellant’s alleged intent to commit a theft, the jury in this case clearly had 

questions and concerns about the Appellant’s culpability for the indicted offense. 

Otherwise, there would be no reason for a jury to request statutes on trespass. 

(Jury Note: CR, Pg. 44). 

The jury had to make an assumption that the Appellant intended to commit 

theft in order to convict the Appellant of this charge, since there was no evidence 

of such intent to commit a theft, only conjecture and speculation. To the contrary, 

the uncontroverted evidence is that the Appellant entered in an effort to investigate 

a perceived wrong doing that Appellant thought he observed occurring in the 

victim’s game room. 

In the event that the jury felt the Appellant had committed wrong doing by 

entering the premises without permission, but did not find that Appellant had any 

intent to commit theft, the jury could not hold the Appellant responsible for the 
12

alleged criminal trespass due to the Trial Court’s denial of the requested instruction 

on the lesser included offense. The intent of the jury to find the Appellant guilty of 

only the lesser-included offense is best evidenced by the jury’s note when the jury 

requested the “relevant statutes of trespassing”. (Jury Note: CR, Pg. 44). 

Specifically, the jury felt the Appellant was on the premises without permission, 

but questioned the intent element, as shown through their note. Therefore, to hold 

the Appellant responsible for the trespass, they had to assume an element not 

proven by the State. 

For the jury to make such an assumption that is to be upheld on appeal, the 

jury charge would need to have included language about presumed facts in 

accordance with Tex. Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. §2.05. There is no such language 

about presumed facts in the jury charge in this case. As it is improper for the jury 

to assume facts not in evidence, the Appellant in this case was convicted on 

unsubstantiated evidence, which falls short of the required proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt for the element of “with the intent to commit a felony, theft or 

assault”. 

Therefore, Appellant was convicted of a greater offense solely due to the 

Trial Court’s denial of the requested lesser-included offense. Not only did the Trial 

Court commit error in its denial of the requested instruction, but the Appellant was 

clearly harmed by this error.
13

ISSUE TWO: THE EVIDENCE WAS BOTH LEGALLY AND 

FACTUALLY INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT 

APPELLANT COMMITTED THE ACT OF BURGLARY 

OF A BUILDING – ENTRY WIH COMMISSION OF 

THEFT.

1. Standard of Review

The relevant standard for judging the sufficiency of the evidence is outlined 

by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2010). The Brooks Court adopts the approach outlined in Jackson v. 

Virginia1. Specifically, the standard of review requires the appellate court to 

review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and then 

determine whether or not any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson, 443 U.S. 307, 319; 

Brooks, 323 S.W. 3d at 899).

Under this standard of review, the jury is the sole judge of the weight and 

credibility of the witness testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 894-895. As such, an 

appellate court must review the evidence at trial to be certain that the jury reached 

a rational verdict, without substituting their own judgment for that of the fact 

finder. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). This is the 

same standard, whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial evidence. King v. 

State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 

 1 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
14

Appellant asserts, under this standard, that the evidence presented by the 

State of Texas at trial was insufficient to establish that he committed the offense of 

Burglary of a Building – Entry with the Commission of Theft. 

A person commits the offense of burglary of a building with the intent to 

commit theft when someone, with the intent to commit theft, enters a building not 

open to the public, without the consent of the owner. Tex. Pen. Code. Ann. §30.02.

2. The State’s Evidence Was Insufficient to Prove Appellant 

Committed the Act of Burglary of a Building – Entry with 

Commission of Theft.

Based upon the evidence presented by the State and the defense in this case, 

the evidence is clearly insufficient to support a verdict in this case. The evidence 

presented by the State lacks the proof beyond a reasonable doubt necessary to 

establish that Appellant committed any theft, or intended to commit a theft. The 

only evidence beyond a reasonable doubt regarding the theft element is the 

testimony of the victim that nothing was stolen. (RR 2, Pg. 177).

As far as the intent to commit theft, there is absolutely no evidence that the 

Appellant intended to commit theft. Both officers and the victim testified that, 

while the Appellant admitted entering the building, that he did so because he had 

saw a light and had concerns that someone was inside the building. There is no 

testimony given at trial to the contrary. Instead, the testimony at trial is that the 

Appellant was “real friendly and cordial,” and had expressed concerns about his 
15

neighbor’s property being tampered with. (RR 2, Pg. 132, 144, 159, 163). 

Additionally, the investigation established that there were no signs of forced entry, 

burglary tools, fingerprints, or DNA. (RR 2, Pg. 138, 152, 163). Further, the 

Appellant was not arrested for being intoxicated or impaired, nor was there any 

testimony to that extent by law enforcement.

There is no evidence that the Appellant is ever observed in the building. 

There is no evidence of any theft. The only evidence of any intent to commit theft 

is that the Appellant was present at night, in a building, without permission. 

However, the Jury Charge in this case did not include an instruction about any 

presumed fact in accordance with Tex. Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. §2.05, that would 

allow for the jury to assume that nighttime entry without permission is done with 

the intent to commit theft. Tex. Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. §2.05. In fact, the Jury 

Charge defines “With Intent to Commit a Felony, Theft or an Assault” as “[a] 

person intends to commit a felony, theft or an assault when the person has the

conscious objective or desire to commit the felony, theft or assault.” (CR, Pg. 49). 

Absent this instruction, the jury cannot find Appellant intended to commit a theft 

based upon the evidence presented, absent making an assumption, which is not 

allowed under the charge.

Clearly, the jury had to make an assumption that the Appellant intended to 

commit theft in order to convict the Appellant of this charge, since there was no
16

evidence of such intent to commit, only conjecture and speculation. Also, if the 

jury felt the Appellant had committed wrong doing by entering a premises without 

permission, but without an intent to commit theft, the jury could not hold the 

Appellant responsible for the alleged wrong-doing in any other manner, as the 

Court did not provide a lesser-included offense of trespassing in the jury charge. 

The intent of the jury is best evidenced by the jury’s note when the jury requested 

the “relevant statutes of trespassing”. (Jury Note: CR, Pg. 44). Specifically, the 

jury felt the Appellant was on the premises without permission, but questioned the 

intent element, as shown through their note. Therefore, to hold the Appellant 

responsible for the trespass, they had to assume an element not proven by the State.

Therefore, the evidence presented by the State is wholly insufficient to 

support a finding of guilt of the greater offense in this case. No evidence is 

provided about the Appellant’s intent to commit a theft, specifically, there is no 

evidence outlining or identifying the Appellant’s conscious objectives or desire to 

commit a felony or theft or assault. Quite to the contrary, the only evidence as to 

his intent is from the State’s witnesses testifying that the Appellant specifically 

expressed that his intent was to investigate perceived problems at the victim’s 

game room. Absent an instruction in accordance with Tex. Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 

§2.05 that the jury may presume certain facts to be true (i.e. nighttime entry into a 

building without permission is per se intent to commit theft absent other evidence), 
17

the evidence actually presented by the State at this trial is wholly insufficient to 

support a legal verdict of guilt in this case.

The job of the reviewing court is to determine whether or not the jury 

reached a rational verdict based upon the evidence it received and the instructions 

it was given in the jury charge. Under these circumstances, the verdict is not 

reasonable, nor rational, and is clearly against the weight of the actual evidence 

presented at trial, especially in light of the jury charge given to the jury in this case.

Conclusion

As set forth above, Appellant was convicted by a jury on evidence legally 

insufficient to support any conviction in this case. The net result is that the 

Appellant now has been convicted of a felony and has been sentenced to serve two 

(2) years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice – State Jail Division, all 

based upon insufficient evidence. Additionally, as a result of this insufficient 

verdict, Appellant is subjected to two years of monitoring and compliance with the 

terms and conditions of community supervision.

This case should be reversed and rendered due to a lack of evidence to 

substantiate guilt in this case as outlined above. In the alternative, this case should 

be reversed, and a new trial granted, due to the Trial Court’s failure to properly 

instruct the jury in the jury charge about the requested lesser-included offense of 

criminal trespass.
18

Prayer

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant requests that this 

Appellate Court reverse the jury’s verdict, and remand this case to the Trial Court. 

Respectfully submitted, 

FIVECOAT & ROGERS, P.L.L.C.

214 W. Texas Ave., Ste. 811

Midland, Texas 79701

(432) 620-8774 (Telephone)

(432) 620-9945 (Facsimile)

ray@fivecoatlaw.com

 

Raymond K. Fivecoat

State Bar No. 24010024

Attorney for Appellant, 

TOMMY JAMES LEWIS

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on this the 20th day of April, 2015, a true and correct 

copy of the foregoing Brief of the Appellant was forwarded, by first class mail, 

postage prepaid, to counsel of record, as follows:

Tim Mason

Andrews County District Attorney

121 NW Ave. A

Andrews, Texas 79714

 

Raymond K. Fivecoat
19

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this document was prepared using MS Word and contains 4130

words (counting all parts of the document). The body text of the entire document is 

in 14 point font, Times New Roman, and the footnote text is in 12 point font, 

Times New Roman. Said document was converted to pdf format for filing using 

MS Word.

 

Raymond K. Fivecoat