**_______________________________** Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices: Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly 

# Opinion

Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

**FILED NOVEMBER 8, 2005**
**COUNTY ROAD ASSOCIATION OF MICHIGAN and CHIPPEWA COUNTY**  **ROAD COMMISSION, Plaintiffs-Appellees**  **and MICHIGAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION,**  **ANN ARBOR TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, CAPITAL AREA**  **TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, and SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR**  **REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION, Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants,** 

**v No.**  **125665 GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, DIRECTOR OF**  **THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,**  **DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,**  **DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, STATE BUDGET DIRECTOR,**  **STATE TREASURER, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, SECRETARY OF STATE, and**  **STATE OF MICHIGAN, Defendants-Appellees.** 

**PER CURIAM. This case involves the authority of the Governor,**  **exercised in Executive Order No. 2001-9, to reduce the Legislature’s allocation of general sales taxes to the**  **Comprehensive Transportation Fund (CTF) by $12,750,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2002, and to transfer**  **those revenues to the state’s general fund. Appellants claim that the general sales tax revenues allocated to the**  **CTF are “constitutionally dedicated” funds within the meaning of Const 1963, art 9, § 9, and therefore immune to**  **the Governor’s power to balance the budget, Const 1963, art 5, § 20.**  **The Court of Appeals concluded that art 9, § 9, which it found to be ambiguous, does not dedicate any portion of**  **the general sales tax revenues for comprehensive transportation purposes. 260 Mich App 299; 677 NW2d 340**  **(2004). We agree with the Court of Appeals that the revenues at issue are not constitutionally dedicated and**  **that the Governor had the authority to reduce the Legislature’s allocation of general sales tax revenues to**  **the CTF in EO 2001-9. We disagree, however, that art 9, § 9 is ambiguous. In affirming the Court of Appeals, we rely**  **on the plain meaning of the constitutional provision.**

2**I. Facts and Procedural History**  **To alleviate a budget shortfall for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2002, the Governor implemented EO**  **2001-9. The order transferred $12,750,000 in general sales tax revenues from the CTF to the general fund.**  **Plaintiffs sought and obtained a preliminary injunction from the Ingham Circuit Court to enjoin the**  **transfer. Plaintiffs maintained that the general sales tax revenues allocated to the CTF were “constitutionally**  **dedicated” within the meaning of Const 1963, art 9, § 9 and immune to the Governor’s power to reduce the expenditure**  **and balance the budget under Const 1963, art 5, § 20. In a published decision, the Court of Appeals**  **reversed. 260 Mich App 299; 677 NW2d 340 (2004). The Court of Appeals found the language of the constitutional**  **provision ambiguous, and examined the historical development of art 9, § 9 in determining whether the**  **allocation to the CTF was “constitutionally dedicated.” We granted oral argument on the application. 471 Mich 887**  **(2004).**

**II. Standard of Review**  **Constitutional issues are reviewed de novo.** Wayne Co v Hathcock **, 471 Mich 445, 455; 684 NW2d 765 (2004).**

3**Our first inquiry, when interpreting constitutional provisions, “is to determine the text’s original meaning to**  **the ratifiers, the people, at the time of ratification.”** Id. **at 468. This is accomplished by “applying each term’s plain meaning at the time of ratification.”**  Id. **at 468 -**  **469. See also**  Silver Creek Drain Dist v Extrusions Div,

Inc **, 468 Mich 367, 375; 663 NW2d 436 (2003).**

**III. Analysis**  **The Governor’s authority to reduce state expenditures is found in art 5, § 20, which states:**  **No appropriation shall be a mandate to spend. The governor, with the approval of the**  **appropriating committees of the house and senate, shall reduce expenditures authorized by**  **appropriations whenever it appears that actual revenues for a fiscal period will fall below the**  **revenue estimates on which appropriations for that period were based. Reductions in**  **expenditures shall be made in accordance with procedures prescribed by law.**  The governor may not reduce expenditures of the legislative and judicial branches or from funds constitutionally dedicated for specific purposes **. [Emphasis added.]**  **The disputed issue in this case is whether the general sales tax revenues that the Legislature allocated to the**  **CTF are “constitutionally dedicated for specific purposes,” and therefore immune from the Governor’s authority to**  **reduce expenditures. The answer to this question is found in art 9, § 9, which states, in relevant part:** 

4**All specific taxes,** except general sales and use taxes and regulatory fees **, imposed directly or indirectly on fuels sold or used to propel**  **motor vehicles upon highways and to propel aircraft and on registered motor vehicles and**  **aircraft shall, after the payment of necessary collection expenses, be used exclusively for**  **transportation purposes as set forth in this section.** 
*** * *** **Amount used for transportation purposes. The balance, if any, of the specific taxes,**  except general sales and use taxes and regulatory fees **, imposed directly or indirectly on fuels sold or used to propel motor vehicles upon**  **highways and on registered motor vehicles, after the payment of necessary collection expenses;**  **. . . and** not more than 25 percent of the general sales taxes **, imposed directly or indirectly on fuel sold to propel motor vehicles upon highways,**  **on the sale of motor vehicles, and on the sale of the parts and accessories of motor vehicles . . .**  shall be used exclusively for the transportation purposes of comprehensive transportation purposes as defined by law **. [Emphasis added.] [1]**  **While construing the wording of art 9, § 9 might require effort, the provision’s meaning is clear. The**  **provision limits the amount of general sales taxes that the Legislature can allocate to comprehensive transportation to** 

1 **The manner in which any funds allocated under this provision to “comprehensive transportation purposes” will**  **be distributed is set forth in the General Sales Tax Act, MCL 205.51**  et seq **. For fiscal year 2001-2002, MCL 205.75(4) apportioned only 27.9 percent of the 25 percent**  **of revenues to the CTF. The balance of the general sales tax revenues described in art 9, § 9 was directed to the**  **state general fund.**

5**“not more than 25 percent of the general sales taxes . . . .” In doing so, it places a ceiling on the amount of**  **general sales tax revenues that can be used “exclusively for . . . comprehensive transportation purposes . . . ,”**  **but does not dedicate any specific amount of general sales taxes to be used for comprehensive transportation purposes.**  **The only conclusion that can be drawn from art 9, § 9 is that the general sales tax revenues described in that**  **provision are not constitutionally dedicated funds. When construing art 9, § 9, the Court of Appeals**  **mistakenly found that the constitutional provision was subject to alternative interpretations, and then**  **unnecessarily considered its history and purpose and the circumstances under which it was written and later amended.**  **See 260 Mich App 307-311. As described above, the Court should have looked no further than the plain language of**  **art 9, § 9 to determine that the general sales tax revenues allocated by the Legislature to the CTF were not**  **constitutionally dedicated funds. Our obligation is to give the words of our Constitution a reasonable**  **interpretation consistent with the plain meaning understood by the ratifiers.**  Hathcock **, 471 Mich at 468-469. Text that may require reasonable effort to parse is not for that**  **reason ambiguous.**

6**IV In sum, we conclude that art 9, § 9 is unambiguous,**  **and we agree with the Court of Appeals that, with respect to the reduction of the general sales tax revenues**  **allocated to the CTF by EO 2001-9, the executive order was a lawful exercise of the Governor’s constitutional**  **authority under art 5, § 20. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals resolution of**  **this issue in favor of the defendants. In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied because we are not**  **persuaded that the remaining questions should be reviewed by this Court. This case is remanded to the trial court**  **for entry of a judgment in favor of defendants on the merits.**  **Clifford W. Taylor Maura D. Corrigan**  **Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman**  **CAVANAGH, J. I concur in the result only.**  **Michael F. Cavanagh**

7**_______________________________ v**  **S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N**
**SUPREME COURT**

**COUNTY ROAD ASSOCIATION OF MICHIGAN and CHIPPEWA COUNTY**  **ROAD COMMISSION, Plaintiffs-Appellees**  **and MICHIGAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION,**  **ANN ARBOR TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, CAPITAL AREA**  **TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, and SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR**  **REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION, Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants,** 

**No. 125665**  **GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,**  **DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF**  **MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND**  **BUDGET, STATE BUDGET DIRECTOR, STATE TREASURER, DEPARTMENT OF**  **TREASURY, SECRETARY OF STATE, and STATE OF MICHIGAN,**  **Defendants-Appellees.**

**WEAVER, J. (** concurring **). I concur in the result of the opinion per curiam because I agree that the revenues at**  **issue are not constitutionally dedicated and that the Governor had the authority to reduce the Legislature’s** **allocation of general sales tax revenues to the Comprehensive Transportation Fund. As noted by the**  **majority opinion, Const 1963, art 9, § 9 places a ceiling on the amount of general sales tax revenues that can be**  **used for comprehensive transportation purposes, but it does not dedicate any specific amount of general sales tax**  **revenues to be used for comprehensive transportation purposes. I also agree with the majority that art 9, § 9**  **is not ambiguous. I write separately because I cannot join some of the**  **principles of constitutional interpretation, as they are articulated and applied in the opinion per curiam,**  **including the standard of review section of the opinion, which relies on cases in which I concurred in part and**  **dissented in part. See** Wayne Co v Hathcock **, 471 Mich 445, 485; 684 NW2d 765 (2004) (Weaver, J. concurring in part and**  **dissenting in part), and** Silver Creek Drain Dist Extrusions Div, Inc, **468 Mich 367, 382; 663 NW2d 436 (2003) (Weaver, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). In**  **each of these cases, I disagreed with the method by which the majority attempted to carry out our mandate that we** 

2 v**interpret a constitutional provision according to the “common understanding” that the people would give it**  . **1 Further, although I agree that the Court of Appeals**  **was wrong to conclude that art 9, § 9 is ambiguous, I would not be unduly critical of the Court of Appeals for**  **considering the history and purpose of the amendment.** Ante **at 6. A court may “also consider the circumstances surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision and**  **the purpose sought to be accomplished by it” when the common understanding of the provision is questioned.**  Wayne Co, supra **at 487 (citing** Traverse City School Dist, supra

**1 As described by Justice Cooley, the rule of “common**  **understanding” means:**

**“A constitution is made for the people and by the people.**  The interpretation that should be given it is that which reasonable minds, the great mass of the people themselves, would give it. **‘For as the Constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed, but from**  **the people who ratified it,** the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, **and it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any dark**  **or abstruse meaning in the words employed,** but rather that they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common understanding, **and ratified the instrument in the belief that that**  **was the sense designed to be conveyed.’” [**  Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General, **384 Mich 390, 405; 185 NW2d 9 (1971), quoting Cooley’s Const Lim 81 (emphasis in**  Traverse City School Dist **).]**

3**at 405). Moreover, when interpreting a constitution, “the technical rules of statutory construction do not apply.”**  Traverse City School Dist, supra **at 405. For these reasons, I concur in the result of the**  **opinion per curiam. Elizabeth A. Weaver** 

4**_______________________________ v**  **S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N**
**SUPREME COURT**

**COUNTY ROAD ASSOICATION OF MICHIGAN and CHIPPEWA COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION,**  **Plaintiffs-Appellees, and**  **MICHIGAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION, ANN ARBOR TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,**  **CAPITAL AREA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, and SUBURBAN MOBILITY**  **AUTHORITY FOR REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION, Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants,** 

**No. 125665**  **GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,**  **DEPARTMENT OF TRANSORTATION, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND**  **BUDGET, DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, STATE BUDGET DIRECTOR, STATE**  **TREASURER, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, SECRETARY OF STATE, and STATE OF**  **MICHIGAN, Defendants-Appellees.** 

**KELLY, J. (**  concurring in the result only **). I concur with the majority that general sales tax**  **revenues are not constitutionally dedicated funds for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals opinion. The**  **Governor has the authority to reduce the Legislature’s allocation of general sales tax revenues to the**  **Comprehensive Transportation Fund. I write separately because, unlike the majority on**  **this Court, I agree with the Court of Appeals that Const 1963, art 9, § 9 is ambiguous. It is ambiguous because it**  **reasonably has “several possible meanings or interpretations.”**  **1 The Court of Appeals panel accurately explains the**  **nature of the ambiguity: [The section] unequivocally exempts**  all **general sales taxes from the restrictions imposed on specific taxes but then simultaneously**  **subjects** up to twenty-five percent **of general sales taxes to the very same restrictions.” [260**  **Mich App 299, 306; 677 NW2d 340 (2004) (emphasis in original).]**  **When interpreting an ambiguous constitutional provision, it is proper for a court to consider its history**  **and purpose. The Court of Appeals did not err when it looked outside the text to the section’s history and**  **purpose to determine which of the text’s several possible meanings was intended. The majority’s criticism of this**  **approach is misplaced. For these reasons, I concur only in the result of the**  **majority opinion. Marilyn**  **Kelly**

**1 This is the first definition of “ambiguous” found in**  **the** Random House Webster's College Dictionary **(2001). 2**