Anne Arundel County, Maryland v. Steve Bell, No. 29, September Term, 2014

Zoning—Comprehensive Zoning—Legislative Action—Litigation—Standing 

Plaintiffs wishing to challenge in Maryland courts the legislative action adopting a 

comprehensive zoning ordinance are required to demonstrate taxpayer standing—a 

standing doctrine required for challenges to legislation. The doctrine of property owner 

standing (i.e., a proximity-driven standing doctrine) is not the appropriate basis upon 

which a judicial challenge to a comprehensive zoning legislative action may be 

maintained. 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 

Case No.: C-11-163163 

Argued: 5 December 2014 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 

MARYLAND 

No. 29 

September Term, 2014 

 

ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, 

MARYLAND, et al. 

v. 

STEVE BELL, et al. 

 

 

 Barbera, C.J., 

 Harrell,

Battaglia, 

 Greene,

 Adkins,

 McDonald,

 Watts, 

 JJ.

 

Opinion by Harrell, J.

Battaglia, Adkins, and McDonald, JJ., 

dissent. 

 

 

Filed: April 21, 2015 
Respondents in this matter, as plaintiffs, challenged in the Circuit Court for Anne 

Arundel County the adoption in 2011 by the County Council for Anne Arundel County of 

a comprehensive zoning ordinance for a large portion of Anne Arundel County. In order 

to maintain their litigation, they must demonstrate appropriate standing to do so. 

Respondents assert that property owner standing principles apply to a judicial challenge 

to comprehensive zoning legislation and that they satisfied those principles. We disagree. 

Plaintiffs wishing to challenge in Maryland courts the legislative action adopting a 

comprehensive zoning are required to demonstrate taxpayer standing. Respondents do 

not allege facts sufficient to meet the correct standing requirement. Thus, the dismissal 

by the Circuit Court of the two suits in the present case was correct. The contrary 

position taken by the Court of Special Appeals in this case must be reversed. 

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

 Bill 12-11, a comprehensive zoning ordinance adopted in 2011 by the County 

Council for Anne Arundel County (“the County”), embraced Councilmanic Districts I 

and IV, comprising approximately 59,045 individual parcels or lots totaling 4,265 acres 

in area. The two Districts include most of the property in the vicinity of the 

Baltimore/Washington International/Thurgood Marshall Airport and all of the property 

along the Baltimore-Washington Parkway corridor in Anne Arundel County. Of those 

59,045 individual parcels or lots, Bill 12-11 changed the previous zoning classifications 

of 264 parcels or lots and maintained essentially the pre-existing zoning of the rest. Bill 

12-11 was the culmination by local government of a 5-year comprehensive and thorough 

consideration of the zoning in the Districts. 
2

Bill 12-11 was challenged by various Anne Arundel County property owners and 

community associations (“the Citizens”),1

 who objected to some, but not all, of the 

rezonings. Two suits were filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, which 

were consolidated ultimately. Titled In the Matter of Steve Bell, et al., C-11-161930, the 

Citizens filed on 14 June 2011 an Amended Petition for Judicial Review or, in the 

Alternative, for a Writ of Administrative Mandamus (“Amended Petition for Judicial 

Review”). Styled as Steve Bell, et al. v. Anne Arundel County, Maryland, C-11-163163, 

the Citizens filed on 5 August 2011 a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, in which they 

challenged the rezoning of multiple parcels of land, alleging that the County engaged in 

illegal spot and contract zoning with regard to those rezonings and failed to provide the 

public with the required notice of the proposed zoning changes.2

 Several Anne Arundel 

County property owners and ground leaseholders whose properties had been rezoned to 

 

1

 The Respondents are comprised of the following individuals and entities: Steve Bell, 

William Chapin, Maria Murphy, Leslie Dolan, Sharon Miles, Rosie Shorter, Sandra 

Bowie, Robert Smith, Jerry Ballman, the Patuxent Riverkeeper, Canter Farms Home 

Owners Association, Inc., the Greater Crofton Council, Inc., and Crofton First (which 

may or may not be incorporated (see infra note 25)).

2

 The Citizens challenged the legality of Amendment 25 to Bill 12-11 and three rezoning 

proposals that were included in the original Bill: Proposals 4-4, 4-12, and 4-17. In part, 

Amendment 25 reclassified land from open space, rural agricultural, and low density 

residential zoning to mixed-use residential zoning. Proposals 4-4 and 4-12 reclassified 

land from low-density rural and low-density residential zoning to commercial zoning. 

Also, Proposal 4-17 reclassified a portion of one parcel from rural agricultural zoning to 

residential zoning. 

At the hearing on Petitioners’ motion to dismiss, the Citizens agreed ultimately to 

dismiss their claim that the County enacted Bill 12-11 without proper notice. As a result, 

United Properties, LLP, BWI Technology Park Phase III, LLC, Sincaltom Associates, 

and David Callahan, whose properties had been reclassified by Bill 12-11 and who had 

intervened as defendants, withdrew as parties from the case. 
3

classifications desired by them (collectively, with the County, referred to as 

“Petitioners”)3

intervened to protect their interests. Petitioners moved to dismiss the 

Citizens’ suit, arguing, inter alia,

4

that the Citizens lacked standing. Following a hearing, 

the Circuit Court granted Petitioners’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the Citizens 

lacked standing because they failed to meet the burden of proving special aggrievement. 

Suggesting that being an adjoining, confronting, or nearby property owner is “[o]ne 

means of establishing a prima facie case of aggrievement in Maryland,” the trial court

emphasized that it could not find any reported Maryland cases in which “a party in a 

declaratory judgment action has been found to have prima facie aggrievement or standing 

to challenge comprehensive rezoning legislation based on ownership of property nearby 

or in proximity to property that was rezoned.” Therefore, the Circuit Court concluded 

that the Citizens did not have prima facie standing to challenge Bill 12-11 through a 

declaratory judgment action. The hearing court also concluded that the Citizens’ claims 

that the select rezonings would result in increases in traffic, decreases in property values, 

and changes in the character of the neighborhoods were insufficient to show special 

aggrievement because the court “fail[ed] to find that [the Citizens’] interests in the matter 

[were] any different than the interests of a member of the general public.” 

 

3

 The following parties intervened as defendants: BBSS, Inc., WACH, LLC, Towser 

Developers, Inc., South Shores Development Company, Inc., BWI Technology Park 

Phase III, LLC, Sincaltom Associates, David Callahan (the General Partner in Sincaltom 

Associates), and United Properties, LLP.

4

 Petitioners also argued that the Citizens failed (1) to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted, (2) to exhaust administrative remedies, and (3) to join all necessary parties. 
4

On direct appeal, the Court of Special Appeals disagreed with the Circuit Court, 

concluding that the Citizens enjoyed property owner standing to challenge Bill 12-11. 

Bell v. Anne Arundel County, 215 Md. App. 161, 79 A.3d 976 (2013). The Court of 

Special Appeals, relying on 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor and City Council of 

Baltimore, 407 Md. 253, 964 A.2d 662 (2009) [“Superblock I”] and Long Green Valley 

Association v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 205 Md. App. 636, 46 A.3d 473, aff’d on other 

grounds, 432 Md. 292, 68 A.3d 843 (2013), rejected the County’s contention that the 

prima facie aggrievement standard only applies to challenges to administrative land use 

decisions, concluding instead that it also applies to comprehensive zonings like Bill 12-

11. Bell, 215 Md. App. at 180, 79 A.3d at 987; see id. at 179, 79 A.3d at 987 (“[W]e 

perceive no logical or practical reason why we should remove this case from the 

application of the principles espoused in [Superblock I] and Long Green Valley simply 

because [protestants] have challenged a comprehensive zoning ordinance, as opposed to 

another form of land use regulation or governmentally-imposed development control.”). 

The intermediate appellate court determined that the property owner prima facie standard 

of presumed special aggrievement applies to judicial challenges to comprehensive zoning 

legislative actions, as well as quasi-judicial and other administrative land use actions 

generally. 

The intermediate appellate court applied, in two stages, the prima facie 

aggrievement standard to Parcel 114 on Tax Map 37 (“Parcel 114”), which was 

reclassified from a lower density residential zone to one allowing commercial offices and 

similar uses. First, the court concluded that properties belonging to two of the Citizens 
5

(William Chapin and Steve Bell) were close enough by distance to support “almost prima 

facie aggrievement” because they were located within approximately 500 feet of Parcel 

114. Bell, 215 Md. App. at 184, 79 A.3d at 989–90. Second, the court examined whether 

the Citizens’ “personal or property rights ha[d] been specially and adversely affected by 

the rezoning in a way different from those of the general public—what the Ray court 

called ‘plus factors.’” Bell, 215 Md. App. at 183, 79 A.3d at 989 (citing Ray v. Mayor 

and City Council of Baltimore, 430 Md. 74, 85, 59 A.3d 545, 551–52 (2013)). 

Acknowledging that an increase in traffic, by itself, is insufficient to establish property 

owner standing, the court discussed the difference between an injury based on noise from 

increased traffic and an injury based on increased traffic in general, and concluded 

ultimately that the noise emanating from projected increased traffic and increased 

commercial activity was sufficient to show that the Citizens were specially aggrieved. 

Bell, 215 Md. App. at 186, 79 A.3d at 991. 

Because that court concluded that at least one of the Citizens was prima facie

aggrieved, based solely on the proximity of his/her property to a single property rezoned 

in Bill 12-11, all of the Citizens had standing with respect to the select parcels rezoned in 

Bill 12-11. See Bell, 215 Md. App. at 180–81, 79 A.3d at 987–88; see State Center, LLC 

v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 550, 92 A.3d 400, 458 (2014) (quoting 

Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Smallwood, 327 Md. 220, 233 n.7, 608 A.2d 1222, 

1228 n.7 (1992) (quoting Board of License Commissioners v. Haberlin, 320 Md. 399, 

404, 578 A.2d 215, 217 (1990) (“[W]here there exists a party having standing to bring an 

action or take an appeal, we shall not ordinarily inquire as to whether another party on the 
6

same side also has standing.”))). The Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgment of 

the Circuit Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Bell, 215 Md. App. at 

192–93, 79 A.3d at 994–95. 

Petitioners, in their successful petition for a writ of certiorari to us, asked us to 

consider three questions:

1. Whether the prima facie aggrievement standard 

established in [Bryniarski v. Montgomery County Board of 

Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 230 A.2d 294 (1967)] should be 

expanded beyond challenges to administrative land use 

decisions to include challenges to comprehensive zoning? 

2. Whether the “almost prima facie” standard as established 

in [Ray v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 430 Md. 

74, 59 A.3d 545 (2013)] should be expanded beyond 

challenges to administrative land use decisions to include 

challenges to comprehensive zoning?

3. Whether noise from a predicted increase in traffic 

constitutes “special damages”?

Anne Arundel County v. Bell, 437 Md. 422, 86 A.3d 1274 (2014) (granting certiorari). 

We answer the first two questions in the negative. Accordingly, no answer to the third 

question is necessary. 

 The first two questions are, at their core, one and the same: are the principles of 

property owner standing applicable to plaintiffs maintaining a judicial challenge to the 

adoption of a comprehensive zoning ordinance, as has been the standard by which 

judicial challenges to quasi-judicial and other administrative “land use” actions have been 

measured? We conclude that extending property owner standing to challenges to 

comprehensive zoning legislative actions is contrary to our case law, and unprudential as 
7

well. The principles underlying property owner standing, heretofore applied to judicial 

review actions and other modalities of judicial challenges to quasi-judicial and other 

administrative land use decisions, should not be extended to apply to challenges to 

comprehensive zoning legislative actions. Comprehensive zoning on the one hand, and 

quasi-judicial or administrative land use actions on the other, are not similar sufficiently 

in process or justification to warrant extension by analogy of property owner standing 

principles from the latter to the former. Rather, taxpayer standing is the correct standing 

doctrine which Respondents/Plaintiffs must satisfy before they may be allowed to 

maintain a judicial challenge to comprehensive zoning legislation.5

 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We will treat the Circuit Court’s grant of the County’s motions to dismiss as a 

grant of summary judgment because the trial court considered materials (specifically, 

affidavits) outside the complaints (i.e., the complaints and documents attached thereto). 

See Maryland Rule 2-322(c); see also Ray, 430 Md. at 91, 59 A.3d at 555 (treating a 

motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment because the trial court considered 

materials outside of the pleadings); Converge Services Group, LLC v. Curran, 383 Md. 

462, 475, 860 A.2d 871, 879 (2004) (noting that the “universe of ‘facts’ pertinent to the 

 

5

 It is well-established that a judicial review action is not available as a vehicle to 

challenge a comprehensive zoning legislative action. See MBC Realty, LLC v. Mayor 

and City Council of Baltimore, 403 Md. 216, 240–42, 941 A.2d 1052, 1066–67 (2008);

Anderson House, LLC v. Mayor and City of Rockville, 402 Md. 689, 707, 939 A.2d 116, 

126–27 (2008); Maryland Overpak Corp. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 395 

Md. 16, 50, 909 A.2d 235, 255 (2006). Thus, we are left to consider here the modalities

of administrative mandamus and declaratory judgment. 
8

court’s analysis of the motion [to dismiss] are limited generally to the four corners of the 

complaint and its incorporated supporting exhibits, if any”). “Whether summary 

judgment as granted properly is a question of law. The standard of review is de 

novo . . . .” Lightolier, A Division of Genlyte Thomas Group v. Hoon, 387 Md. 539, 551, 

876 A.2d 100, 108 (2005). 

III. QUASI-JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAND USE DECISIONS 

VERSUS COMPREHENSIVE ZONING: 

A COMPARISON

The zoning process, broadly viewed, is designed to implement growth 

in a manner that allows for the expansion of economic 

activities and opportunities in the area or region for the 

benefit of its residents, while at the same time attempting to 

maintain the quality of life of the region, all without unduly 

disturbing the reasonable expectations of the citizenry as to 

the permissible uses they may make of real property. 

Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. 514, 532, 814 A.2d 

469, 479 (2002). Decisions whether to zone or rezone properties are made by local 

zoning authorities in Maryland through three primary processes: establishment of original 

zoning through adoption of a zoning map, comprehensive rezoning of substantial areas of 

the jurisdiction through a legislative-type process initiated by the local government, and 

piecemeal rezoning of individual properties (by application of the owner or contract 

purchaser) through a quasi-judicial process. See id. Original and comprehensive zoning 

are accomplished solely through legislative processes culminating in legislative acts, 

while piecemeal rezoning is achieved through a quasi-judicial process leading to a 

technical legislative act. Id. 
9

A. Comprehensive Zoning 

Comprehensive zoning “is fundamentally legislative and no significant quasijudicial function is involved.” Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 

Md. 686, 713, 376 A.2d 483, 498 (1977), see Rylyns Enterprises, 372 Md. at 532, 814 

A.2d at 479. As comprehensive zoning encompasses a large geographical area, the 

process is initiated generally by a local government, rather than by a property owner or 

owners. Rylyns Enterprises, 372 Md. at 535, 814 A.2d at 481. When local zoning 

authorities devise comprehensive zoning ordinances, the “focus is not on a single piece of 

property, but rather on a considerable number of properties as they relate to each other 

and to the surrounding area.” Woodward & Lothrop, 280 Md. at 713, 376 A.2d at 498. 

These “are not adjudicative determinations affecting one property owned by one person, 

but instead are classically legislative determinations designed to affect local and regional 

needs and all property owners within the planning area.” Id. (emphasis added). During 

the comprehensive zoning process, the local zoning authority (which typically is 

comprised of local legislators wearing perhaps a different governmental “hat” when 

acting as the local zoning body) considers broad policy considerations, including 

“whether the comprehensive rezoning takes into account future public needs and 

purposes; whether it is designed to provide an adequate potential for orderly growth in 

the future and to satisfy local and regional needs; and ultimately whether it bears the 

requisite relationship to the public health, safety and general welfare.” Id. 

Comprehensive rezonings “are limited only by the general boundaries of . . . appropriate 

procedural and due process considerations.” Rylyns Enterprises, 372 Md. at 533, 814 
10 

A.2d at 480 (quoting White v. Spring, 109 Md. App. 692, 696–97, 675 A.2d 1023, 1025 

(1996)). In order for an act of zoning to “qualify as proper comprehensive zoning” it 

must: 

1) cover a substantial area; 2) be the product of careful study 

and consideration; 3) control and direct the use of land and 

development according to present and planned future 

conditions, consistent with the public interest; and, 4) set 

forth and regulate all permitted land uses in all or 

substantially all of a given political subdivision, though it 

need not zone or rezone all of the land in the jurisdiction. 

Rylyns Enterprises, 372 Md. at 535, 814 A.2d at 481. Once an act of comprehensive 

zoning is enacted properly, the “motives or wisdom of the legislative body” in adopting 

the zoning “enjoy a strong presumption of correctness and validity” and are not changed 

easily.6

 Rylyns Enterprises, 372 Md. at 535–36, 814 A.2d at 481. 

B. Quasi-Judicial Processes and Administrative Land Use Actions

Administrative land use actions, whether reached via quasi-judicial or executive 

processes, encompass a wide variety of things, including piecemeal rezonings, special 

exceptions, variances, and nonconforming uses, whether granted by local administrative 

 

6 Zoning, so established, may be changed thereafter 

by the zoning authority only by the adoption of a subsequent 

comprehensive rezoning, or, in the case of a piecemeal 

Euclidean zoning application, upon a showing that there was 

a mistake in the prior original or comprehensive zoning or 

evidence that there has been a substantial change in the

character of the neighborhood since the time the original or 

comprehensive zoning was put in place. 

Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. 514, 535–36, 814 

A.2d 469, 481 (2002). 
11 

hearing officers, boards of appeal, or the local legislative body by donning its land use 

authority “hat”;

7

 as well as licenses and permits issued by state and local administrative 

agencies. 

Original or comprehensive zoning may be changed only by a subsequent 

comprehensive zoning or by a subsequent piecemeal zoning. Rylyns Enterprises, 372 

Md. at 538, 814 A.2d at 483. Piecemeal zoning is accomplished by local zoning 

authorities through a quasi-judicial process. Anderson House, LLC v. Major of Rockville, 

402 Md. 689, 708 n.17, 939 A.2d 116, 127 n.17 (2008). Notably, the act or decision 

reached through this quasi-judicial process is “on individual, as opposed to general, 

grounds, and scrutinizes a single property.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The piecemeal zoning process is decidedly un-legislative in nature, 

except at the end: it includes typically a deliberative fact-finding process, which entails 

the holding of at least one evidentiary hearing (generally), factual and opinion testimony, 

documentary evidence, cross-examination of the witnesses, and objections to the 

weighing of evidence. See id. This process results in a particularized set of written 

findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the zoning proposal for the parcel or 

assemblage in question. In piecemeal zoning applications seeking Euclidian zones, 

including those involving potential conditional zoning (where lawful to do so), the 

 

7

 Special exceptions, variances, and nonconforming uses granted by local administrative 

hearing officers, boards of appeal, or legislative bodies were designed as a response to 

“the imperfect nature of planning and zoning and the need for greater flexibility in 

responding to the impacts of these imperfections.” Rylyns Enterprises, 372 Md. at 536–

37, 814 A.2d at 482. 
12 

ultimate task of the zoning authority is to “make a factual determination, based on the 

evidence of record, as to whether there has been a change in the physical character of the 

neighborhood where the property is located or a mistake was made in the original 

zoning.” Woodward & Lothrop, 280 Md. at 712–13, 376 A.2d at 498; see Rylyns 

Enterprises, 372 Md. at 539, 814 A.2d at 483–84. This rule, referred to as the “changemistake rule,” does not apply to changes in zoning made in a comprehensive zoning or 

the piecemeal grant of a planned unit development (or “floating zone”). Rylyns 

Enterprises, 372 Md. at 539, 814 A.2d at 483–84. The grant of a floating zone requires 

usually written findings of fact and conclusions of law explicating (in terms of evidence 

or record) how the application conforms to the statutory pre-requisites for the particular 

zone. See Aubinoe v. Lewis, 250 Md. 645, 653, 244 A.2d 879, 884 (1968). 

 Bearing in mind these differences between comprehensive zoning and 

administrative land use decisions and the processes through which they are reached, we

turn now to examine the two standing doctrines available to complainants by which they 

might maintain suits regarding land use actions generally: the doctrines of property owner 

standing and taxpayer standing. As we shall demonstrate, property owner standing is

reserved for challenges to land use decisions reached through quasi-judicial or 

administrative/executive processes, and taxpayer standing is the appropriate doctrine 

applied to available modalities of judicial challenges to land use actions reached via a 

purely legislative process, such as comprehensive zoning actions. 
13 

IV.THE “AGGRIEVEMENT STANDARDS” OF PROPERTY OWNER STANDING

 Taxpayer and property owner standing provide the “cause of action” standing 

sufficient for justiciability: “when asserted properly, [the doctrines] provide both the 

cause of action (or claim) and the right of the individual to assert the claim in the judicial 

forum.” State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 517–18, 92 

A.3d 400, 439 (2014). The “principles of property owner standing in Maryland stem 

from the State’s statutory zoning laws, which grant an ‘aggrieved person’ the right to 

challenge many zoning actions.” State Center, 438 Md. at 522–23, 92 A.3d at 442. The 

property owner standing doctrine recognizes that certain owners of real property may be 

“‘specially harmed’ by a decision or action (usually related to land use) in a manner 

different from the general public.” State Center, 438 Md. at 519, 92 A.3d at 440. Unless 

a complainant alleges a sufficient “special aggrievement,” or is presumed to be aggrieved 

specially because of the subject property’s location, he, she, or it has no standing to 

challenge the act but is instead “merely ‘generally aggrieved,’ in a similar manner as the 

rest of the public.” State Center, 438 Md. at 521, 92 A.3d at 441. 

We shall explain in greater depth the requirements of the property owner standing 

doctrine in Part IV.A of this opinion. Although we noted in 2014 in State Center that 

principles of zoning laws “permit eligible plaintiffs to invoke the jurisdiction of the 

courts to challenge a greater variety of ‘land use decisions’ and actions than thought to be 

the case previously,” State Center, 438 Md. at 523, 92 A.3d at 442, this was not an 

invitation to hyper-extend property owner standing principles, but merely to recognize an 

evolving understanding of what may be deemed an administrative or executive land use 
14 

decision or action, beyond the traditional notion of the grant of a piecemeal application 

for rezoning, special exception, or the like. We elaborate on the outer limits of the 

variety of land use decisions to which property owner standing applies in Part IV.B. In 

Part IV.C, we explain why further expansion of the property owner standing doctrine to 

the purely legislative process and act of comprehensive zoning is unsupported by law and 

ill-advised. 

A. Property Owner Standing: What It Is 

 We discussed recently and at length property owner standing in several opinions. 

See, e.g., State Center, 438 Md. 451, 92 A.3d 400, Ray v. Mayor and City Council of 

Baltimore, 430 Md. 74, 59 A.3d 545 (2013). In Ray, after the Baltimore City Council 

approved, pursuant to an owner-initiated application, a Planned Unit Development 

(“PUD” or floating zone), for an assemblage of parcels in Baltimore, a group of objecting 

Petitioners filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to 

block the PUD, which included a proposed Wal-Mart Supercenter. Ray, 430 Md. at 77–

78, 59 A.3d at 547. We analyzed property owner standing in the context of the initial 

grant of the PUD under Maryland Code (1957, 2010 Repl. Vol.), Article 66B, 

§ 2.09(a)(1)(ii),8

 which provided that an appeal may be filed by any “person . . . 

aggrieved by: (i) [a] decision of the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals; or (ii) [a] 

zoning action by the City Council.” Ray, 430 Md. at 80, 59 A.3d at 548. In determining 

 

8

 This statute was recodified ultimately at Maryland Code (2012), § 10-501 of the Land 

Use Article. The requirement for “aggrievement” appears in various other section of the 

Land Use Article, as well as various local zoning ordinances.
15 

what is meant in the statute by a person “aggrieved,” we turned to Bryniarski v. 

Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 144, 230 A.2d 289, 294 (1967). 

Ray, 430 Md. at 81, 59 A.3d at 549. Bryniarski provides two general principles that 

underlay any discussion of “special aggrievement”: 

First, “[a]n adjoining, confronting or nearby property owner 

is deemed, prima facie, to be specially damaged and, 

therefore, a person aggrieved.” Second, “[a] person whose 

property is far removed from the subject property ordinarily 

will not be considered a person aggrieved . . . [unless] he 

meets the burden of alleging and proving . . . that his personal 

or property rights are specially and adversely affected.” 

Ray, 430 Md. at 81, 59 A.3d at 549 (citations omitted) (quoting Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 

145, 230 A.2d at 294–95). Examining those principles in Ray, we observed that the 

“standard is flexible in the sense that it is based on a fact-intensive, case-by-case 

analysis.” Ray, 430 Md. at 81, 59 A.3d at 549. Reviewing comprehensively the facts of 

prior cases discussing property owner standing, Ray determined that proximity is “the 

most important factor to be considered” in such cases. Ray, 430 Md. at 82–83, 59 A.3d at 

550. Although there is “no bright-line rule” for determining the perfect proximity for a 

property to be presumed to be specially aggrieved, Ray, 430 Md. at 83, 59 A.3d at 550, 

we provided two (perhaps three9

) categories of protestants: “those who are prima facie

 

9

 We noted in Ray that dicta in Maryland cases suggests “a third, poorly-defined category 

of protestants with standing who, despite being ‘far removed from the subject property,’ 

may nevertheless be able to establish ‘the fact that his personal or property rights are 

specially and adversely affected by the board’s action.’” Ray v. Mayor and City Council 

of Baltimore, 430 Md. 74, 85–86, 59 A.3d 545, 552 (2013). While this point has been 

repeated in various other Maryland cases, we have yet to find this “‘Higgs boson 

particle,’ or determine even whether it exists in the material world.” State Center, LLC v. 

 (Continued...)
16 

aggrieved and those who are almost prima facie aggrieved.” Ray, 430 Md. at 85, 59 A.3d 

at 551. Otherwise, protestants are “generally aggrieved” and do not have standing. Ray, 

430 Md. at 85, 59 A.3d at 552. A protestant is prima facie aggrieved “when his 

proximity makes him an adjoining, confronting, or nearby property owner.” Id.; 59 A.3d 

at 551. A protestant is almost prima facie aggrieved when “she is farther away than an 

adjoining, confronting, or nearby property owner, but is still close enough to the site of 

the rezoning action . . . and offers ‘plus factors’ supporting injury.” Id.; 59 A.3d at 551–

52. The category of almost prima facie aggrieved protestants has been found in our cases 

to apply only to those who have lived between 200 to 1000 feet away from the subject 

property, although there is no bright-line rule delineating such boundaries. Ray, 430 Md. 

at 91, 59 A.3d at 555. 

B. Property Owner Standing: When It Applies 

As noted above, principles of zoning laws “permit eligible plaintiffs to invoke the 

jurisdiction of the courts [under the doctrine of property owner standing] to challenge a 

greater variety of ‘land use decisions’ and actions than thought to be the case previously.” 

State Center, 438 Md. at 523, 92 A.3d at 442. This recent evolution may be traced to 

three opinions decided over the last six years where we pondered how expansively those 

principles justified applying the doctrine. The evolutionary extension of the applicability 

of property owner standing begins with the zombie-esque trilogy of Superblock cases. 

 

(...continued)

Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 536, 92 A.3d 400, 450 (2014); see Ray, 430 

Md. at 86 n.8, 59 A.3d at 552 n.8 (listing the cases which, as of that time, repeated the 

comment). 
17 

See Superblock I, 407 Md. 253, 964 A.2d 662, and 120 West Fayette St., LLLP v. Major 

and City Council of Baltimore, 426 Md. 14, 43 A.3d 355 (2012) [hereinafter “Superblock 

III”] (collectively, along with 120 West Fayette St., LLLP v. Major and City Council of 

Baltimore, 413 Md. 309, 992 A.2d 459 (2010) [hereinafter “Superblock II”], the 

“Superblock Trilogy”). 

The basic facts underlying the Superblock Trilogy are as follows: In 1999, the 

Baltimore City Council (the “City”) adopted an urban renewal plan for the westside of 

downtown Baltimore. Superblock I, 407 Md. at 258, 964 A.2d at 665. In the process of 

implementing the urban renewal plan,10 the City entered into a land disposition 

agreement (“LDA”) with a developer that provided for the sale and development of 

approximately five blocks of properties in the westside of downtown Baltimore, 

collectively referred to as the “Superblock.” Superblock I, 407 Md. at 259, 964 A.2d at 

665. 120 West Fayette St., LLLP (“120 West Fayette”) is a taxpaying entity owning 

property outside of, but immediately adjacent to, the Superblock area. Id. It is no 

exaggeration to say that, over the course of the Superblock Trilogy, 120 West Fayette 

fought “tooth and nail” to forestall (or re-shape) the fruition of the City’s urban renewal 

implementation efforts. 

 

10 To implement the urban renewal plan, the Baltimore Board of Estimates delegated 

various “ministerial and administrative” functions to a nonprofit corporation called the 

Baltimore Development Corporation, Inc. (the “BDC”). 120 West Fayette St., LLLP v. 

Major and City Council of Baltimore, 407 Md. 253, 259, 964 A.2d 662, 665 (2009). The 

City asserted that it instructed the BDC to “work with developers and interested groups 

regarding the development of the westside, prepare and issue requests for development 

proposals, arrange and attend meetings between developers and business owners, and 

coordinate financial assistance.” Id. 
18 

In Superblock I, 120 West Fayette sought a declaratory judgment against the City, 

alleging that the LDA was illegal and ultra vires. Superblock I, 407 Md. at 259–60, 964 

A.2d at 665. Critically, 120 West Fayette alleged that the City violated its Charter and 

laws by entering into an illegal LDA; 120 West Fayette did not challenge the adoption a 

decade earlier of the urban renewal plan itself, a purely legislative act. Superblock I, 407 

Md. at 258, 964 A.2d at 664. The City moved to dismiss the complaint, and the Circuit 

Court granted the City’s motion, concluding that 120 West Fayette failed to establish 

standing. Superblock I, 407 Md. at 260, 964 A.2d at 665. 120 West Fayette appealed.11

 

Id.; 964 A.2d at 666. 120 West Fayette made two main appellate arguments: first, that 

they enjoyed taxpayer standing, and second, that they enjoyed property owner standing, 

being situated immediately adjacent to the Superblock properties. Superblock I, 407 Md. 

at 265, 964 A.2d at 668. The Court analyzed these arguments in two parts, addressing 

first the question of whether they had taxpayer standing to challenge the LDA.12 

Superblock I, 407 Md. at 265–69, 964 A.2d at 668–71. We concluded that the allegations 

contained in 120 West Fayette’s complaint were sufficient to establish taxpayer standing 

as a matter of law because the complaint alleged that the City engaged in illegal or ultra 

 

11 120 West Fayette filed timely an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Before that 

court could consider the case, we issued a writ of certiorari. Superblock I, 407 Md. at 

260, 964 A.2d at 666 (citing 120 West Fayette v. Baltimore, 405 Md. 290, 950 A.2d 828 

(2008) (granting certiorari)). 

12 As a preliminary matter, we considered whether the Circuit Court treated the City’s 

motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. Superblock I, 407 Md. at 261–65, 

964 A.2d at 666–68. 
19 

vires acts and that such acts would cause potentially 120 West Fayette pecuniary harm or 

an increase in taxes. Superblock I, 407 Md. at 269, 964 A.2d at 671. 

In the next part of the opinion, the Court considered the property owner standing 

argument. Superblock I, 407 Md. at 269–73, 964 A.2d at 671–73. The Majority held 

“[a]lternatively” that 120 West Fayette enjoyed property owner standing as well. 

Superblock I, 407 Md. at 270, 964 A.2d at 671. This part of the Majority’s opinion in 

Superblock I recognized the “common law requirement of personal and specific damage 

or ‘aggrievement’ [that] is embodied in Maryland’s statutory [z]oning laws” and 

discussed the meaning of the term “aggrievement.” Superblock I, 407 Md. at 270–71, 

964 A.2d at 672. Relying on Sugarloaf Citizens Ass’n v. Department of Environment, 

344 Md. 271, 297, 686 A.2d 605, 618 (1996), the Majority in Superblock I noted that the 

doctrine of property owner standing pertains to “actions for judicial review of 

administrative land use decisions.” Superblock I, 407 Md. at 271, 964 A.2d at 672. 

Analogizing implicitly actions taken under urban renewal and procurement ordinances to 

administrative land use decisions, “[b]ecause land use . . . is at least one of the prime 

considerations with which an urban renewal plan is reasonably sure to be concerned,” the 

Majority determined that “the principles that confer standing upon an adjoining, 

confronting or neighboring property owner to seek judicial review of land use decisions, 

logically extend to an adjoining, confronting or neighboring property owner that is 

challenging a municipalities’ [sic] allegedly illegal avoidance of urban renewal and 
20 

procurement ordinances.”

13

 Superblock I, 407 Md. at 272, 964 A.2d at 673 (ellipses in 

original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). This point bears 

repeating: the Court determined that the principles underlying the doctrine of property 

owner standing justified extending the doctrine to certain property owners wishing to 

challenge the executive or administrative actions of a municipality as it went about 

purportedly implementing an urban renewal plan. The Court did not determine that those 

same principles justified extending the doctrine to property owners wishing to challenge 

the legislative act of adopting the urban renewal plan. See Superblock I, 407 Md. at 258, 

964 A.2d at 665; see id. n.1, 964 A.2d at 665 n.1. 

 

13 In relating its understanding of this quotation from Superblock I, the Dissent in the 

present case emphasizes the words “land use.” Dissent Slip Op. at 1. The Dissent 

admits, however, that the Court “applied proximity standing because the protestants were 

challenging land use decisions.” Dissent Slip Op. at 1 (italics in original) (underline 

added).

 The existence of a “decision” by an executive, administrative, or quasi-judicial 

body was critical to the Court’s holding in Superblock I. The phrase “land use” must be 

read in the context of the rest of the discussion, where the Court limited its holding to 

instances where property owners challenged a municipality’s allegedly illegal avoidance 

of legislation pertaining to land use. To interpret Superblock I otherwise is an overextension of the limited holding of the Court. 

The Dissent here concludes its discussion of Superblock I by stating, “[t]he Court 

did not ground its decision on the administrative nature of the land use decisions 

approving the Land Disposition Agreement.” Dissent Slip Op. at 2. This conclusion 

summarizes a portion of Superblock I without regard for the context of the Court’s 

antecedent discussion. Superblock I did not need to specify that the prima facie

aggrievement standard was applicable only because land use decisions were not 

executive, administrative, or quasi-judicial in nature because the Court had limited 

already its holding to situations in which a property owner challenged a municipality’s 

allegedly illegal avoidance of urban renewal and procurement ordinances. Superblock I, 

407 Md. at 272, 964 A.2d at 673. 
21 

In the Third Act of the Superblock Trilogy, the Court limited the holding of 

Superblock I. See State Center, 438 Md. at 524, 92 A.3d at 443. 120 West Fayette 

attempted in Superblock III to challenge the execution of a Memorandum of Agreement 

(the “MOA”) between the City and the Maryland Historical Trust (the “Trust”) relating to 

the treatment of historic properties within the urban renewal area. Superblock III, 426 

Md. at 17, 43 A.3d at 357. The plaintiffs sought in the Circuit Court a declaration of 

rights regarding the terms of the MOA. Id. The City, along with other Appellees, moved 

to dismiss 120 West Fayette’s complaint, suggesting that 120 West Fayette did not have 

standing to bring the action, as it was neither a party to nor an intended beneficiary of the 

MOA, as a contract. Superblock III, 426 Md. at 17–18, 43 A.3d at 357. The Circuit 

Court agreed with the City and dismissed the complaint. Superblock III, 426 Md. at 18, 

43 A.3d at 357. 120 West Fayette argued on appeal, among other things,14 that it had 

standing to seek a declaration of rights with regard to the MOA because it retained the 

same taxpayer and property owner standing that it did when it challenged the LDA in 

Superblock I. Superblock III, 426 Md. at 25–35, 43 A.3d at 361–68. 

120 West Fayette argued in Superblock III that it retained the same taxpayer 

standing from Superblock I because it paid City and State taxes and challenged executive 

acts taken by government officials that were illegal and ultra vires. Superblock III, 426 

Md. at 25, 43 A.3d at 362. The Court disagreed, determining that Superblock I was 

 

14 120 West Fayette argued also that it had “leftover” standing based on a footnote in 

Superblock II. Superblock III, 426 Md. 14, 26–27, 43 A.3d 355, 362 (2012). The Court 

did not find this argument persuasive. Superblock III, 426 Md. at 27, 43 A.3d 363. 
22 

“fundamentally distinguishable” from Superblock III because the complaint in

Superblock III did not allege a violation of a City ordinance or the City Charter, but 

instead claimed a breach of a contractual provision of the MOA.15

 Superblock III, 426 

Md. at 27–29, 43 A.3d at 363–64. Because 120 West Fayette did not allege a violation of 

legislative law, it was not eligible for taxpayer standing. Id. 

Having determined that 120 West Fayette did not possess taxpayer standing, the 

Court in Superblock III turned to the plaintiff’s property owner standing argument. 120 

West Fayette argued that execution and interpretation of the MOA was a unique kind of 

action affecting land use because it provided a quasi-administrative body (the Trust) with 

control over demolition (or not) of historic (or arguably historic) structures in a 

 

15 The Court in Superblock III characterized the allegation of a violation of law as 

“necessary” to the holding in Superblock I that 120 West Fayette had taxpayer standing 

and the “alternative holding” that it had property owner standing as well. Superblock III, 

426 Md. at 27–28, 43 A.3d at 363 (citing, from the section on taxpayer standing, 

Superblock I, 407 Md. at 268, 964 A.2d at 670 (“In our view, the allegations contained in 

120 West Fayette’s complaint are also sufficient to establish taxpayer standing . . . . 120 

West Fayette’s complaint specifically alleges that the LDA agreement is in derogation of 

the Charter and laws of the City.” (emphasis added in Superblock III) (internal quotations 

omitted)) and citing, from the section on property owner standing, Superblock I, 407 Md. 

at 272, 964 A.2d at 673 (“[W]e conclude that the principles that confer standing upon an 

adjoining . . . property owner to seek judicial review of land use decisions, logically 

extend to an adjoining . . . property owner that is challenging . . . illegal avoidance of 

urban renewal and procurement ordinances.” (emphasis added in Superblock III))). 

Superblock I should not be read to suggest that allegations of a violation of statutory law 

are necessary to maintain property owner standing. Such an understanding would be to 

add an element to the “test,” contrary to our case law on the requirements of property 

owner standing. See supra Part IV.A. Rather, the allegation of a violation of statutory 

law was necessary to Superblock I’s analysis of property owner standing in the sense that 

the allegedly illegal executive implementation by the City through the MOA of a piece of 

legislation (adoption of the urban renewal plan) gave 120 West Fayette something to 

challenge. Superblock I, 407 Md. at 272, 964 A.2d at 673. 
23 

designated historic area. Superblock III, 426 Md. at 26, 43 A.3d at 362. As the execution 

of the MOA was a decision affecting land use, so the argument went, the alleged 

violation of its terms in turn allegedly “derive[d] from a quasi-land use decision.” 

Superblock III, 426 Md. at 25–26, 43 A.3d at 362. Thus, 120 West Fayette’s property 

being located adjacent to the development site, it retained property owner standing, á la 

Superblock I. Id. 

The Court determined that the principles in Superblock I extending property owner 

standing to challenge the LDA executed in furtherance of the adopted urban renewal plan 

did not justify extending property owner standing to 120 West Fayette in Superblock III 

as the MOA was not a land use action by any means. Superblock III, 426 Md. at 30, 43 

A.3d at 365. The Court, for standing analysis purposes, defined a land use decision 

“generally” as “a decision (typically an ordinance or regulation) enacted or promulgated 

by a legislative or administrative body for the purposes of directing the development of 

real estate.” Id. (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 958 (9th ed. 2009)). The Court noted that 

in each instance in which either property owner standing or taxpayer standing was 

recognized as attributable to a complainant, the matter involved a “land use decision”: 

[O]ur research discloses not a single case of this Court 

approving the grant of tax-payer or adjacent landowner 

standing to an individual or entity in any context other than a 

challenge to or pursuant to a land use decision, as that term is 

generally understood. Indeed, in every case of this Court that 

we have found, the land use decision a party was seeking to 

challenge or enforce was either an ordinance, variance, 

reclassification, or special exception provided by a local 

zoning body, or a permit or license issued by an 

administrative agency. 
24 

Superblock III, 426 Md. at 30–31, 43 A.3d at 365 (emphasis added). The Majority 

opined that the MOA could not be considered a land use decision because it was “not an 

ordinance, variance or permit,” it “[bound] only two parties (as opposed to the general 

public),” it “was not enacted by a legislative or administrative body,” and, “most 

important, the MOA does not direct the use or development of real estate in the 

Superblock.” Superblock III, 426 Md. at 33, 43 A.3d at 366. The Majority opinion 

catalogued all of the ways in which the MOA could not be considered a land use 

decision, in order to demonstrate, generally speaking, that the MOA fell outside of the 

defined category of circumstances in which either property owner standing or taxpayer 

standing might be implicated.16 The Majority in Superblock III did not state that all land 

use decisions would provide complainants necessarily with either property owner 

standing, taxpayer standing, or both. Rather, the opinion referred cursorily to a large and 

varied category of “land use decisions” to illustrate that the MOA was not numbered 

among them and no further—more careful—analysis was necessary to determine which 

type of standing—if either—120 West Fayette might have enjoyed. Stating that the 

MOA is not a land use decision (and thus not amenable to property owner or taxpayer 

standing analysis) is not the equivalent of stating that all “land use decisions” (as 

generally and vaguely defined in Superblock III) are eligible for both property owner and

 

16 The Dissent in the present case reads incorrectly Superblock III as “adopt[ing] a broad 

definition of ‘land use decision,’” which included legislative actions, concluding in turn 

that “proximity standing is not limited to administrative land use decisions, but also 

applies to legislative land use decisions like comprehensive zoning.” Dissent Slip Op at 

2–3. As demonstrated above, Superblock III referred instead “generally” to a category of 

land use decisions in which either property owner standing or taxpayer standing applied. 
25 

taxpayer standing. Ultimately, the Majority concluded that 120 West Fayette did not 

have standing to request a declaratory judgment regarding interpretation and enforcement 

of the terms of the MOA. Superblock III, 426 Md. at 37, 43 A.3d at 369. 

 A thorough consideration of the Superblock Trilogy figured in our reasoning in 

State Center, 438 Md. 451, 92 A.3d 400. State Center concerned the State Center 

Project, a $1.5 billion, multi-phase redevelopment project intended to replace aged and 

obsolete State office buildings with new facilities for significant State government office 

use and to revitalize an approximately 25-acre property owned by the State of Maryland 

in midtown Baltimore, all without burdening unduly the State’s capital budget. State 

Center, 438 Md. at 473, 92 A.3d at 413. The Maryland Department of General Services 

(“DGS”) and the Maryland Department of Transportation (“MDOT”) (collectively, the 

“State Agencies”) issued a Request for Qualifications (“RFQ”) soliciting a Master 

Developer who would receive the exclusive right to negotiate with the State for the entire 

project and receipt of a long-term leasehold interest. State Center, 438 Md. at 475, 92 

A.3d at 414. After extensive negotiations between DGS, MDOT, and the State Center, 

LLC, a prospective developer (collectively, the “appellants”), three main sets of 

agreements were executed: the Master Development Agreement (the “MDA”), the First 

Amendment to the MDA, and a collection of ground and occupancy leases between the 

State and State Center, LLC. State Center, 438 Md. at 474, 92 A.3d at 413. Fifteen 

plaintiffs (all taxpayers of the State and property owners in downtown Baltimore, many 

with available office space for rent) (hereinafter the “appellees”) filed suit seeking a 

declaratory judgment against the State Agencies that the formative contracts for the 
26 

Project were void and an injunction to halt the Project. Id. In a “novella-length” opinion, 

State Center, 438 Md. at 472 n.**, 92 A.3d at 412 n.**, we considered, among a number 

of issues, whether the appellees had standing under either the property owner or taxpayer 

standing doctrines to maintain their suits. State Center, 438 Md. at 474, 92 A.3d at 413. 

We concluded ultimately that the appellees did not enjoy standing under the property 

owner doctrine, State Center, 438 Md. at 538, 92 A.3d at 451, but did as taxpayers.17

 

State Center, 438 Md. at 583, 92 A.3d at 479. 

Appellants in State Center argued that property owner standing was not available 

to the appellees because such standing is available “only to challenges of pure-bred landuse decisions, such as zoning and nuisance claims.” State Center, 438 Md. at 522, 92 

A.3d at 442. Because the claim did not concern a land-use decision, but was instead 

grounded on an alleged violation of the State Procurement statutory scheme, as the 

argument went, property owner standing did not apply. Id. We noted that, pursuant to 

the holdings and reasoning of the Superblock Trilogy, property owner standing was only 

applicable in instances of “land use decisions.” State Center, 438 Md. at 525, 92 A.3d at 

443–44. We then considered whether the MDA, the First Amendment, or the collection 

of ground and occupancy leases fell within the category of land use decisions implicating

the doctrine of property owner standing. Id. We determined ultimately that the MDA 

 

17 Ultimately, we concluded that the claims of the plaintiffs were before the Circuit Court 

improperly, as barred by the doctrine of laches. State Center, 438 Md. at 610, 92 A.3d at 

495. 
27 

and First Amendment were land use decisions for the purpose of property owner standing 

analysis, but that the occupancy and ground leases were not. Id. 

We reasoned that, although the MDA and First Amendment were not “traditional 

land use regulations or ordinances,” they were “formative contracts” that “govern[ed] the 

development of real estate at the State Center.” State Center, 438 Md. at 525, 92 A.3d at 

444. The principles that justified applying the property owner standing doctrine in 

Superblock I compelled us to extend property owner standing to matters such as where 

the MDA governed the development of real estate. Id. (quoting Superblock I, 407 Md. at 

272, 964 A.2d at 673 (“[T]he principles that confer standing upon an adjoining, 

confronting or neighboring property owner to seek judicial review of land use decisions, 

logically extend to an adjoining, confronting or neighboring property owner that is 

challenging a [Government’s] allegedly illegal avoidance of . . . procurement ordinances 

[or statutes].” (alterations added in State Center) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) 

(internal quotation marks omitted))). Critically, negotiation and execution of the MDA 

(and, accordingly, the First Amendment) was considered rightly an executive function, 

being an agreement entered into by the State Agencies. In contrast, we suggested that the 

ground and occupancy leases did not constitute land use decisions as such because they 

did not “direct the development of any real property.” State Center, 438 Md. at 526, 92 

A.3d at 444. Just as in Superblock III, this comment does not endorse the conclusion that 

just “land use decisions” “direct[ing] the development of any real property” warrant 

testing according to property owner standing; rather, the comment suggests that the 
28 

ground and occupancy leases simply fall outside of the universe in which the doctrine of 

property owner standing might be implicated. Id. 

As demonstrated by Superblock I, Superblock III, and State Center, the doctrine of 

property owner standing may apply to administrative land use decisions and other land 

use actions undertaken as executive functions. We have not applied heretofore the 

doctrine to purely legislative processes and actions, nor does our body of case law on the 

subject warrant applying the doctrine to judicial challenges to legislative acts reached 

through solely legislative processes. 

C. Property Owner Standing: Why Extending It Further Is Ill-Advised 

It takes scant imagination to foresee the problems that would arise if complainants 

may satisfy the judicial requirement of standing based on the doctrine of property owner 

standing when challenging comprehensive zoning ordinances. As noted above, the 

comprehensive zoning ordinance at issue here examined approximately 59,045 discrete 

parcels or lots spread across 4,265 acres of Anne Arundel County. Of those 59,045 

parcels or lots, the pre-existing zoning classifications for 264 individual parcels or lots 

were changed. If one of those reclassifications were found to be improper, do all fall 

because the overall process was a comprehensive one? How might severability be 

approached, if at all?18 If the Citizens’ understanding of property owner standing was 

 

18 There is no severability provision in Bill 12-11. It is unclear whether § 1-210 of the 

General Provisions Article of the Maryland Code (or its immediate predecessor, Md. 

Code (1957, 2011 Repl. Vol.), Article 1, § 23), although applicable to state statutes, 

applies to ordinances enacted by local governments. Maryland Code (2014), General 

Provisions Article, § 1-210(b) (“When part of statute found to be unconstitutional or 

 (Continued...)
29 

correct, a protestant who wishes to challenge a comprehensive zoning ordinance would 

be deemed “specially aggrieved” merely because the person or entity owns property 

“adjoining, confronting or nearby” a target property (prima facie aggrieved) or owns 

property slightly farther away (generally speaking, between 200 to 1000 feet away from a 

 

(...continued)

void.—The finding by a court that part of a statute is unconstitutional or void does not 

affect the validity of the remaining portions of the statute, unless the court finds that the 

remaining valid provisions alone are incomplete and incapable of being executed in 

accordance with the legislative intent.”). Section 1-210 appears to be merely a 

codification of the common law principle that courts presume that an enactment is 

severable unless it appears that the legislative body intended otherwise. See Park v. 

Board of Liquor License Com’rs for Baltimore City, 338 Md. 366, 382, 658 A.2d 687, 

695 (1995); see also Board of Supervisors of Elections of Anne Arundel Co. v. 

Smallwood, 327 Md. 220, 245–46, 608 A.2d 1222, 1234–35 (1992). The common law 

principle has been applied by courts in cases where local ordinances were involved, see 

Montrose Christian School Corp. v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 596–97, 770 A.2d 111, 129–30 

(2001) (severing a portion of a Montgomery County ordinance regarding discrimination); 

City of Baltimore v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 226 Md. 379, 390–93, 174 A.2d 153, 158–60 

(1961) (discussing severability of a Baltimore City ordinance regarding bail bonds); State 

v. Phillips, 210 Md. App. 239, 268–69, 63 A.3d 51, 68–69 (2013) (noting that portions of 

a Baltimore City ordinance regarding gun registration could be severed if found to be 

invalid), but none involved legislation adopting a comprehensive zoning. 

 Thus, the question lingers—is the comprehensive nature of the inter-related policy 

decisions underlying a comprehensive zoning a contra-indication that the legislative body 

did not intend severability to be available? 

The Anne Arundel County Code contains a severability provision in the 

“Definitions; Rules of Construction; Citation” title of the General Provisions Article 

similar to that of the Maryland Code discussed above. Anne Arundel County Code 

(2005), Article 1, § 1-1-106 (“Severability. If any word, phrase, clause, sentence, 

paragraph, or section of this Code is declared invalid or unconstitutional by a court of 

competent jurisdiction, the invalidity or unconstitutionality shall not affect any of the 

remaining words, phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs, or sections of this Code 

because the remaining language would have been enacted without the incorporation in 

this Code of the invalid or unconstitutional word, phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph, or 

section.”). This portion of the County Code falls victim to the same outstanding 

questions regarding the legislative intent to be inferred from comprehensive zoning 

actions.

We shall leave completion to fruition of this rhetorical exercise for another day. 
30 

target property), but with additional “plus factors” (almost prima facie aggrieved). See

Ray, 430 Md. at 81–91, 59 A.3d at 549–54. This could mean, practically speaking, that 

the owners of 59,045 parcels or lots in Councilmanic Districts I and IV, along with other 

property owners located adjoining, confronting, or nearby the external boundaries of 

those Districts, as well as other property owners located between 200 to 1000 feet from 

the borders of the Districts (so long as they allege additional “plus factors”) may all have 

standing to challenge Bill 12-11. Hypothetically, thousands of plaintiffs with the benefit 

of property owner standing could have standing to challenge comprehensive zoning 

legislation.

19

 This would be unworkable entirely.20 This Court has been reticent in the 

 

19 The Dissent accuses us of hyperbolizing, and counters that “[o]nly those property 

owners living in very close proximity to the 260 parcels that underwent zoning changes 

under Bill 12-11 could have standing to challenge the comprehensive rezoning.” Dissent 

Slip Op. at 3–4 (emphasis added). The Dissent appears to introduce a fourth category of 

protestants with standing who, despite being removed from the subject property, may be 

able nevertheless to establish the fact that he, she, or its personal or property rights are 

specially and adversely affected by rezoning legislation. See supra note 9 and 

accompanying text; Ray, 430 Md. at 85–86, 59 A.3d at 552. 

20 The Dissent refers to this concerning result as the “floodgates” argument. Dissent Slip 

Op. at 3. First, the Dissent asserts baldly that “the Bryniarski special aggrievement 

standard, as further explicated in Ray, will effectively limit the class of plaintiffs entitled 

to judicial relief.” Dissent Slip Op. at 4 (footnotes omitted). As discussed above, 

however, there is no reason to think that the application of property owner standing to 

comprehensive zoning legislation will limit the class of potential plaintiffs—indeed, it 

will expand the class exponentially. 

Next, the Dissent suggests: 

There is no reason to think that most comprehensive 

rezonings, which are adopted by elected officials, will be so 

offensive to property owners that, as the Majority projects, 

thousands (or even hundreds) of them will pursue judicial 

relief. Surely, the costs of conducting such a lawsuit, together 

 (Continued...)
31 

extreme to construe standing doctrines so broadly, out of the reasonable fear that to do so 

would eviscerate altogether the distinct doctrines. 

In Ray, two individual residents located approximately 0.4 miles away from an 

approved PUD argued that they were specially aggrieved in a manner different from the 

general public in their attempt to challenge judicially the PUD’s approval. Ray, 430 Md. 

at 78–80, 59 A.3d at 547–48. On direct appeal, the Court of Special Appeals concluded 

that the two residents’ aggrievement was the same as that of the general public, so they 

did not have property owner standing. Ray, 430 Md. at 79–80, 59 A.3d at 548. Before 

us, the petitioners argued that the intermediate appellate court compared improperly them 

to other residents of the neighborhoods which they asserted the PUD would impact. Ray, 

430 Md. at 86, 59 A.3d at 552. In essence, the two residents asked the Court to “define 

[their] two [respective] neighborhoods as the aggrieved class.” Ray, 430 Md. at 87, 59 

 

(...continued)

with the dismal prospects for success on the merits, will be 

unpalatable to most. 

 Even with standing secured, property owners face a 

precipitous up-hill battle to win a declaration that a 

comprehensive rezoning ordinance is invalid. 

Dissent Slip Op. at 5 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). We take little comfort in 

the proffered notion that expanding radically the applicability of the doctrine of property 

owner standing will have little practical impact because few property owners will take 

advantage of the new standing rules.

Finally, the Dissent suggests that the cost of the potential increase in declaratory 

judgment actions “is justified by the need to provide a judicial means to challenge an 

illegal legislative action injurious to a property interest.” Dissent Slip Op. at 7. As we

discuss above, however, taxpayer standing is available to complainants wishing to 

challenge comprehensive zoning legislation. Ironically, the Dissent cites, in support of 

this argument, a portion of Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 375, 395 

(1869), which discusses the purposes and function of taxpayer standing. Id.
32 

A.3d at 552. We noted that “the creation of a class of aggrieved persons is done on an 

individual scale and not based on delineations of city neighborhoods.” Ray, 430 Md. at 

88, 59 A.3d at 553. We continued: 

Creating a bright-line rule, under which each person in the 

entire neighborhood qualifies as a member of the specially 

aggrieved class in every PUD case, as [p]etitioners propose, 

would be tantamount to abandoning the Bryniarski rule that 

the facts and circumstances of each case would govern. We 

decline to adopt such a bright-line rule. Instead, we will 

examine the specific facts alleged to show aggrievement in 

this case and compare that injury to harm suffered by the 

general public. 

Ray, 430 Md. at 90, 59 A.3d at 554 (footnote omitted). This analysis reflects an 

unwillingness to extend standing to large swaths of neighborhoods or districts 

simultaneously simply by virtue of relative location, without regard for specific facts and 

circumstances showing special aggrievement. 

 Similar policy concerns underscore the analysis of standing in State Center. In 

considering whether appellees there alleged sufficient facts for “special aggrievement” to 

confer property owner standing, we considered first whether they constituted prima facie

aggrieved property owners. State Center, 438 Md. at 528–33, 92 A.3d at 446–48. 

Owning properties between 0.57 and 0.84 miles distant from the State Center Project, and 

therefore too far away to be prima facie aggrieved, State Center, 438 Md. at 530–31, 92 

A.3d at 447, appellees struggled to demonstrate how they were specially aggrieved in a 

manner different from the general public. State Center, 438 Md. at 531, 92 A.3d at 447. 

They turned to an argument that the entire Transit-Oriented Development (“TOD”) area, 

within which the State Center project was contained, was the affected area. Id. We 
33 

rejected that argument, reasoning, “[u]sing the TOD area to define the affected area 

would provide virtually every property owner in the City with standing. This Court has 

held multiple times that similarly sweeping definitions of ‘proximity’ destroy the very 

concept of ‘special aggrievement.’” Id. (referencing Ray, 430 Md. at 87–90, 59 A.3d at 

552–54). 

Appellees in State Center attempted to distinguish themselves from the petitioners 

in Ray by explaining that the TOD area simply expanded the area of the State Center 

Project, not the class of aggrieved persons. State Center, 438 Md. at 532, 92 A.3d at 448. 

We concluded that that argument, although framed differently than in Ray, 

similarly fails . . . to explain how such a definition would 

support the notion of a “special aggrievement.” At the core 

of this argument (and that rejected in Ray) is the failure to 

recognize that such a wide sweep is not consistent with the 

“roots” of this concept of special aggrievement . . . . 

Id. (emphasis in original). The “roots” of the property owner standing doctrine to which 

we referred are the laws pertaining to the tort action of public nuisance. State Center, 

438 Md. at 520–21, 92 A.3d at 441. In Ray, we explained: 

[T]he “special damage” rule was an outgrowth of the law of 

public nuisance. Inasmuch as public nuisance was an 

offense against the state and, accordingly, was subject to 

abatement on motion of the proper governmental agency, 

an individual could not maintain an action for public 

nuisance unless he suffered some special damage from the 

public nuisance. 

Ray, 430 Md. at 82, 59 A.3d at 549 (emphasis added in Ray) (quoting 4 Edward H. 

Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning § 63:14 (2012) (quoting SkaggsAlbertson’s v. ABC Liquors, Inc., 363 So.2d 1082, 1088 (Fla. 1978))). Ever wary of 
34 

over-expanding a class of aggrieved persons, we concluded that appellees in State Center

failed to allege how the State Center Project would cause them any special kind of harm 

different from that suffered by the general community. State Center, 438 Md. at 533, 92 

A.3d at 448. Accordingly, we declined the invitation to satisfy proximity based on the 

entire TOD area. Id. 

Imposing limitations on the numerical class of potential claimants is consistent 

with the point of standing laws generally. As noted by the venerable scribe of all things 

involving Maryland zoning and land use, Stanley D. Abrams, Esquire, the standing 

requirement is 

based upon the necessity of limiting the parties to the 

proceeding to those who are uniquely affected by the decision 

which is being appealed and precluding frivolous appeals, 

harassment, or merely crowding the courts with litigation 

instituted by or involving those persons who are not specially 

affected by the decision and have no statutory right of appeal. 

Stanley D. Abrams, Guide to Maryland Zoning Decisions, § 4.01 (5th ed. 2012). 

Extending the doctrine of property owner standing to challenges to the legislative process 

of adopting comprehensive zoning ordinances runs afoul of the narrowing principles 

articulated in Ray and State Center and is inconsistent with our prior cases as explained 

above. 

The Dissent expresses concern that property owners believing themselves 

impacted negatively by select rezonings with a comprehensive zoning would have no 

judicial recourse to challenge judicially such legislative action unless their ability to 
35 

maintain a challenge were measured by property owner standing principles.21 Dissent

Slip Op. at 7 (“Even if declaratory judgment actions do modestly increase, that cost is 

justified by the need to provide a judicial means to challenge an illegal legislative action 

injurious to a property interest.”). The Dissent is incorrect to conclude that the doctrine 

of property owner standing is the only meaningful22 platform for complainants with “a 

special interest in the subject-matter of the suit distinct from that of the general public” to 

challenge comprehensive rezoning legislative actions. State Center, 438 Md. at 519, 92 

A.3d at 440. The doctrine of taxpayer standing—already available to some complainants 

challenging administrative land use decisions—is the appropriate standing doctrine that 

complainants challenging comprehensive zoning legislation must satisfy. 

V. TAXPAYER STANDING: THE APPROPRIATE DOCTRINE TO APPLY

Challengers to comprehensive zoning ordinances, i.e., legislation such as Bill 12-

11, are required to satisfy the requirements of taxpayer standing, rather than property 

owner standing. 

A. Taxpayer Standing: What Is It?

We discussed the doctrine of taxpayer standing at length in State Center. 438 Md. 

at 538–83, 92 A.3d at 451–79. This common law standing doctrine “permits taxpayers to 

 

21 The Dissent notes that, in Anne Arundel County, property owners may challenge 

comprehensive zoning by petitioning the ordinance to referendum. Dissent Slip Op. at 7 

n.7. Because the requirements for petitioning ordinances to referendum necessitate some 

effort (i.e., the challenger must obtain signatures from 10% of the qualified voters in the 

County), the Dissent determines that this procedure is too burdensome. Id.

22 See supra note 23. 
36 

seek the aid of courts, exercising equity powers, to enjoin illegal and ultra vires acts of 

public officials where those acts are reasonably likely to result in pecuniary loss to the 

taxpayer.” State Center, 438 Md. at 538, 92 A.3d at 451. The doctrine exists to ensure 

that governments act within the bounds of the law: 

In this state the Courts have always maintained with jealous 

vigilance the restraints and limitations imposed by law upon 

the exercise of power by municipal and other corporations; 

and have not hesitated to exercise their rightful 

jurisdiction for the purpose of restraining them within the 

limits of their lawful authority, and of protecting the citizen 

from the consequence of their unauthorized or illegal acts. 

State Center, 438 Md. at 539–40, 92 A.3d at 452 (quoting Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 375, 

395 (1869) (emphasis added in State Center)). Like the doctrine of property owner 

standing, taxpayer standing provides the “cause of action” standing sufficient for 

justiciability. See State Center, 438 Md. at 546, 92 A.3d at 456 (“[T]axpayer suits in this 

State do not require also a separate private right of action . . . .”). Neither the doctrines of 

taxpayer standing nor property owner standing provide unfettered access to the courts to 

citizens unhappy with all actions taken by state or local governing bodies, however. 

Under the taxpayer standing doctrine, as well as the property owner standing doctrine, 

“the complainant must have a special interest in the subject-matter of the suit distinct 

from that of the general public.” State Center, 438 Md. at 519, 92 A.3d at 440. 

Due to the “disorganized” and “seemingly contradictory” state of our earlier cases 

discussing the doctrine of taxpayer standing, the State Center opinion took some pain to 

examine the application of the doctrine, clarify it, and set it straight. State Center, 438 

Md. at 540–41, 92 A.3d at 453. A party satisfies the “special interest,” also called 
37 

“special damage,” standing requirement by alleging “both ‘1) an action by a municipal 

corporation or public official that is illegal or ultra vires, and 2) that the action may 

injuriously affect the taxpayer’s property, meaning that it reasonably may result in a 

pecuniary loss to the taxpayer or an increase in taxes.’” State Center, 438 Md. at 540, 92 

A.3d at 453 (quoting Kendall v. Howard County, 431 Md. 590, 605, 66 A.3d 684, 693 

(2013) (quoting Superblock I, 407 Md. at 267, 964 A.2d at 669–70)). After establishing 

those two general principles, the State Center opinion discussed preliminarily the 

“requisites for eligibility” to assert standing under the doctrine, State Center, 438 Md. at 

547–55, 92 A.3d at 457–62, and then discussed in depth the requirements to constitute a 

“special interest” distinct from that of the general public. State Center, 438 Md. at 556–

83, 92 A.3d at 463–79. 

To establish eligibility to maintain a suit under the taxpayer standing doctrine, a 

“complainant must allege two things: (1) that the complainant is a taxpayer and (2) that 

the suit is brought, either expressly or implicitly, on behalf of all other taxpayers.” State 

Center, 438 Md. at 547, 92 A.3d at 457; see id. (“[U]nder the taxpayer standing doctrine, 

a complainant’s standing rests upon the theoretical concept that the action is brought not 

as an individual action, but rather as a class action by a taxpayer on behalf of other 

similarly situated taxpayers.”). The second required allegation to establish eligibility to 

bring a suit under the taxpayer doctrine touches on a tension between the requirement that 

the suit be brought on behalf of other taxpayers and the requirement that the complainant 

have a special interest in the subject matter. We explored this tension in State Center, 

438 Md. at 552–55, 92 A.3d at 460–62, concluding that even if the complainant does not 
38 

allege expressly that he, she, or it brings their suit on behalf of other taxpayers situated 

similarly, 

[T]he doctrine may apply yet, if the action is, in fact, on 

behalf of the taxpayers as a class, by necessary implication 

from the nature of the alleged injury pleaded in the 

[complaint]. In other words, the allegations of the injury 

must apply to all taxpayers in the assumed class and not 

merely the plaintiffs as private complainants, in order for the 

taxpayer standing doctrine to apply. 

State Center, 438 Md. at 554–55, 92 A.3d at 462. 

 Once a complainant establishes eligibility to bring a suit, he, she, or it must allege, 

as noted above, both a governmental action that is illegal or ultra vires and that the action 

may affect injuriously the taxpayer’s property (meaning that it reasonably may result in a 

pecuniary loss to the taxpayer or an increase in taxes). See State Center, 438 Md. at 540, 

92 A.3d at 453. The “illegal or ultra vires” requirement “has been applied leniently and 

seems rather easy to meet”—the taxpayer need not be right ultimately in his, her, or its 

contention, so long as the allegation is advanced in good faith. State Center, 438 Md. at 

555–56, 92 A.3d at 462–63 (citing Funk v. Mullan Contracting Co., 197 Md. 192, 196, 

78 A.2d 632, 635 (1951)). The “specific injury” requirement is forgiving similarly and 

“‘has been interpreted repeatedly to require a showing that the action being challenged 

results in a pecuniary loss or an increase in taxes.’” State Center, 438 Md. at 556–57, 92 

A.3d at 463 (quoting Citizens Planning and Housing Ass’n v. County Executive of 

Baltimore County, 273 Md. 333, 339, 329 A.2d 681, 684 (1974) (citations omitted)); see 

State Center, 438 Md. at 557, 92 A.3d at 463 (“[T]he special interest that is distinct from 

the general public is the increased burden of taxation.” (emphasis in original)); see also
39 

Ruark v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 37, 157 Md. 576, 

589–90, 146 A. 797, 802–03 (1929). The facts alleged need not lead necessarily to the 

conclusion that taxes will increase; rather, the taxpayer must allege that he, she, or it will 

suffer pecuniary damage potentially. State Center, 438 Md. at 559, 92 A.3d at 464 

(quoting Inlet Associates. v. Assateague House Condo. Ass’n, 313 Md. 413, 441, 545 

A.2d 1296, 1310 (1988)). State Center analyzed at length what types of “harm” amount 

to a pecuniary loss in light of our precedent. State Center, 438 Md. at 560–72, 92 A.3d at 

465–72. We concluded that “the issue is not what ‘type’ of harm is sufficient necessarily, 

but rather a much more forgiving question of whether the type of harm is one that may 

affect the complainant’s taxes.” State Center, 438 Md. at 565, 92 A.3d at 468. 

Naturally, there must be a “nexus” between the showing of potential pecuniary 

damage and the challenged act. State Center, 438 Md. at 572–80, 92 A.3d at 472–77. 

This is “[p]erhaps the most frequent stumbling block” for complainants claiming 

taxpayer standing. State Center, 438 Md. at 572, 92 A.3d at 472. We concluded in State 

Center that 

[a] review of the cases reveals that the taxpayer must be 

asserting a challenge and seeking a remedy that, if granted, 

would alleviate the tax burden on that individual and others; 

otherwise, standing does not exist. The corollary to this 

requirement is also that taxpayers may challenge only certain 

statutes. In viewing other areas of law, we have not permitted 

taxpayers to enforce any statute unless it affects the 

taxpayers’ individual tax burden. 

State Center, 438 Md. at 572–73, 92 A.3d at 472 (footnote omitted). There must be 

therefore a connection between the alleged illegal or ultra vires act, the harm caused to 
40 

the taxpayer, and the potential for the remedy to alleviate the harm incurred. See State 

Center, 438 Md. at 573–75, 92 A.3d at 473–74. Furthermore, this nexus must be true not 

only for the complainant, but also all similarly situated taxpayers. See State Center, 438 

Md. at 575, 92 A.3d at 474 (“[T]he remedy sought, if granted, must alleviate all similarly 

situated taxpayers’ burden, not just the plaintiffs’ personal burdens.” (emphasis in 

original)). 

B. Taxpayer Standing: When It Applies

In light of its requirement that “an action by a municipal corporation or public 

official” be illegal or ultra vires, State Center, 438 Md. at 540, 92 A.3d at 453, taxpayer 

standing has been pled successfully in a number of cases pertaining to executive, 

administrative, or quasi-land use actions. See, e.g., State Center, 438 Md. at 583, 92 

A.3d at 479 (acknowledging taxpayer standing in a challenge of an executive action);

Superblock I, 407 Md. at 269–70, 964 A.2d at 671 (finding taxpayer and, alternatively, 

property owner standing in a challenge of executive actions taken by Mayor and City 

Council of Baltimore); Inlet Associates, 313 Md. at 440–43, 545 A.2d at 1310–11 

(alleging successfully taxpayer standing when seeking to enjoin an executive action 

conveying a public right-of-way and riparian rights purported to accrue as a result 

thereof); James v. Anderson, 281 Md. 137, 140, 377 A.2d 865, 868 (1977) (challenging a 

county executive’s expenditures of bond proceeds on the construction of a new 

courthouse); Citizens Planning, 273 Md. at 345, 329 A.2d at 687 (challenging an internal 

reorganization of the Baltimore County Office of Planning and Zoning as violating the 

Baltimore County Charter). Taxpayer standing has also been pled successfully in cases 
41 

challenging legislation generally. See, e.g., Ansell v. Howard County Council, 264 Md. 

629, 634, 287 A.2d 774, 776 (1972) (alleging successfully taxpayer standing when 

challenging a resolution authorizing the president of the Howard County Board of 

Education to enter into contracts relating to the construction and modernization of 

schools); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Keyser, 72 Md. 106, 19 A. 706 (1890) 

(challenging legislation that created a suburban sanitary district). 

Challenges to comprehensive zoning ordinances are brought often by parties 

whose properties were rezoned, usually to categories less desirable by the owner or 

contract purchaser than enjoyed previously. See, e.g., Anderson House, 402 Md. at 706, 

939 A.2d at 126 (“Anderson House is entitled to have the Circuit Court consider its 

claims as to Ordinance 7-03 because the C-T zone created by that legislation was applied 

to the Anderson House property through Ordinance 21-05. Thus, its rights were affected 

and the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to review the challenge to its enactment.”); Anne 

Arundel County v. Moushabek, 269 Md. 419, 306 A.2d 517 (1973); Ford v. Baltimore 

County, 268 Md. 172, 300 A.2d 204 (1973); Nottingham Village, Inc. v. Baltimore 

County, 266 Md. 339, 292 A.2d 680 (1972); County Commissioners of Queen Anne’s 

County v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967); Montgomery County v. Horman, 46 

Md. App. 491, 418 A.2d 1249 (1980).

Requiring taxpayer standing for challenges to comprehensive legislative 

enactments regulating land use is consistent with our case law. In Boitnott v. Mayor and 

City Council of Baltimore, 356 Md. 226, 738 A.2d 881 (1999), we considered the validity 

of a Baltimore City ordinance amending an urban renewal plan concerning the 
42 

development of a hotel in the Inner Harbor East section of Baltimore City. In that case, 

several taxpayers filed a “Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Motion for Interlocutory 

Injunction” against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore seeking to invalidate the 

ordinance. Boitnott, 356 Md. at 232, 738 A.2d at 884. The Circuit Court determined that 

the ordinance was valid. Boitnott, 356 Md. at 233, 738 A.2d at 885. The taxpayers 

appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed. Boitnott, 356 Md. at 234, 738 

A.2d at 885. The taxpayers petitioned this Court for certiorari, arguing that the ordinance 

was invalid for a number of reasons.23

 Id. 

Before addressing the taxpayers’ substantive arguments, the Court addressed first 

their standing. Id. Noting that “Maryland has gone rather far in sustaining the standing 

of taxpayers to challenge . . . alleged illegal and ultra vires actions of public officials,” the 

Court found that the taxpayers alleged appropriately taxpayer standing in filing their 

complaint. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Because the taxpayers alleged that the City 

of Baltimore expended twenty million dollars in developing the urban renewal area, they 

alleged sufficiently potential pecuniary damage by way of an increase in taxes to sustain 

taxpayer standing. Id. Of note to the present case, the Court in Boitnott did not 

determine that the taxpayers had standing because they owned property located adjoining, 

confronting or nearby the area to be re-developed; indeed, the opinion does not note 

 

23 The taxpayers offered three arguments in support of their contention that the ordinance 

was invalid: 1) the property may not be changed from private to public ownership after 

the adoption of an urban renewal plan; 2) zoning ordinances may not be incorporated into 

urban renewal plans by reference; and 3) the title of the ordinance was defective. 

Boitnott, 356 Md. at 234–35, 738 A.2d at 885–86. 
43 

whether the taxpayers owned any property at all, much less where it was located. 

Boitnott, 356 Md. at 232, 738 A.2d at 884. See also Miles, 246 Md. at 362, 228 A.2d at 

453 (alleging successfully taxpayer standing (without naming it as such) where taxpaying 

property owners sought a declaratory judgment challenging the validity of a county 

zoning ordinance and executive actions undertaken pursuant thereto); cf. Habliston v. 

City of Salisbury, 258 Md. 350, 355, 265 A.2d 885, 887 (1970) (granting property owner 

standing in a challenge to a piecemeal rezoning); Chatham Corporation v. Beltram, 252 

Md. 578, 854, 251 A.2d 1, 4 (1969) (granting property owner standing in a challenge to a 

piecemeal rezoning); Aubinoe v. Lewis, 250 Md. at 652, 244 A.2d at 883 (granting 

property owner standing in a challenge to a piecemeal rezoning); Richmark Realty Co. v. 

Whittlif, 226 Md. 273, 281–82, 173 A.2d 196, 200–01 (1961) (concluding that taxpaying 

property owners residing 200 feet from property rezoned by a piecemeal rezoning 

ordinance had standing to attack the validity of the ordinance, without referencing 

property owner standing as such); City of Baltimore v. NAACP, 221 Md. 329, 335, 157 

A.2d 433, 437 (1960) (concluding that taxpaying property owners adjacent to rezoned 

property had standing to attack the validity of a piecemeal rezoning ordinance and to seek

an injunction against new use of the subject property); Cassel v. Mayor and City Council 

of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 353, 73 A.2d 486, 488 (1950) (concluding, with minimal 

analysis, that property owners residing less than 100 feet from property rezoned by a 
44 

piecemeal rezoning ordinance had standing to attack the validity of the amending 

ordinance).24

C. Taxpayer Standing: How the Citizens’ Suit Fairs Here

 The Citizens here did not satisfy the requirements of the taxpayer standing 

doctrine in this case. At least two25 of the Plaintiffs listed on the Complaint for 

Declaratory Judgment are incorporated: Canter Farms Home Owners, Inc., and Greater 

 

24 Although all actions of rezoning result in adoption of an ordinance or resolution of 

some kind expressing the final decision to rezone (by whatever process leading to that 

decision), not all rezoning ordinances or resolutions are of the same nature, nor should 

they be treated the same for all purposes. None of the preceding cases (Habliston v. City 

of Salisbury, 258 Md. 350, 265 A.2d 885 (1970); Chatham Corporation v. Beltram, 252 

Md. 578, 251 A.2d 1 (1969); Aubinoe v. Lewis, 250 Md. 645, 244 A.2d 879 (1968); 

Richmark Realty Co. v. Whittlif, 226 Md. 273, 173 A.2d 196 (1961); City of Baltimore v. 

NAACP, 221 Md. 329, 157 A.2d 433 (1960); and Cassel v. Mayor and City Council of 

Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A.2d 486 (1950)) involved challenges to comprehensive 

zoning ordinances; rather, all of them involved piecemeal rezoning approvals. The 

Dissent offers nothing to the contrary, i.e., a case where property owner standing was 

applied to authorize a judicial challenge to a comprehensive zoning ordinance. That is 

because neither we nor the dissenters could find one. Thus, the trial judge here was 

correct.

The focus should be on the nature of the underlying process culminating in a 

rezoning action to determine its true character, not the fact that an ordinance results nor 

the modality by which the plaintiff sought judicial review. As discussed at length above, 

see supra pp. 8–12, comprehensive zoning and piecemeal rezoning actions (and the 

respective resulting ordinances) cannot be treated the same. 

25 Crofton First may also be an incorporated entity. Although it is named on the 

Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (originating in C-11-163163, Steve Bell, et al. v. 

Anne Arundel County, Maryland) “Crofton First,” on the Amended Petition for Judicial 

Review (originating in C-11-161930, In the Matter of Steve Bell, et al.) it is named 

“Crofton First, Inc.” 
45 

Crofton Council, Inc. We assume that those two Plaintiffs are taxpayers.26 Where one 

party has standing, we do not inquire typically as to whether another party on the same 

side also has standing. State Center, 438 Md. at 550, 92 A.3d at 458 (quoting Board of 

Supervisors of Elections v. Smallwood, 327 Md. 220, 233 n.7, 608 A.2d 1222, 1228 n.7 

(1992) (quoting Board of License Commissioners v. Haberlin, 320 Md. 399, 404, 578 

A.2d 215, 217 (1990))). 

In their Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, the Citizens alleged that the actions 

taken by the County in adopting “the zoning reclassification[s]” in Bill 12-11 

(specifically, Amendment No. 25 and Proposals No. 4-4, 4-12, and 4-17) constituted 

“illegal spot zoning.” The Citizens also must allege, however, that the illegal action will 

result in a pecuniary loss or an increase in taxes. The Citizens alleged in their Complaint 

for Declaratory Judgment27 that:

61. . . . A trade school will create constant traffic and will 

destroy a forest buffer screening the over-congested Crain 

Highway from Plaintiffs’ homes. . . . 

. . . 

68. Noise is a primary concern for Plaintiffs who live in close 

proximity to the land subject to Proposal Nos. 4-4 and 4-

12. . . . Proposal Nos. 4-4 and 4-12 will allow commercial 

land uses on land located closer to Plaintiffs than the 

businesses located on the Median of Route 3 and will 

 

26 In State Center, we assumed that various incorporated entities were taxpaying 

corporations based on their legal identities. See State Center, 438 Md. at 550–51, 92 

A.3d at 459; see id. at 551 n.59, 92 A.3d at 459 n.59. 

27 The Amended Petition for Judicial Review is extremely short and contains no 

allegations of harm of any kind to the Citizens. 
46 

drastically increase the already unreasonable noise pollution 

in Plaintiffs’ community. . . . 

. . . 

37.[28]

 Plaintiffs’ right to participation in zoning changes and 

in the enforcement of the orderly planning procedures 

specified in the County Code have been harmed.[29] 

Notably, the Citizens did not allege that their taxes would be increased or that the illegal 

action would result in any other form of pecuniary loss.30 The trial judge concluded 

 

28 The Complaint contains two paragraphs numbered 37 and 38. The second set 

(including the language quoted here) appears to have been inserted between paragraphs

number 86 and 87 and mis-numbered inadvertently. 

29 Paragraphs numbered 90 and 96 contain identical allegations to this one. 

30 Attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Opposition to Intervenor Defendants 

Sincaltom Associates, David Callahan, BWI Technology Park Phase III, LLC, and 

United Properties, LLP’s Motions to Dismiss and Request for a Hearing are Exhibits D, 

H, and I, consisting of the Affidavits of Rosie M. Shorter (“Shorter”), William S. Chapin 

(“Chapin”), and Stephen Bell (“Bell”), respectively. Shorter, a resident of 2566 Shorter 

Road, owns residential property that abuts two parcels (which were reclassified from 

open space and low density residential uses to a more intensive residential classification). 

She stated:

6. It is my opinion that my property value will be affected by 

Amendment No. 25’s zoning changes and that the tax 

assessment for my property will increase. 

7. It is my opinion that Amendment No. 25’s zoning changes 

will increase traffic on Route 3, which will make it more 

dangerous for me to access Route 3 from Capital Raceway 

Road. 

8. It is my opinion that Amendment No. 25’s zoning changes 

will alter the character of my neighborhood and the way that I 

live. The wooded environment and quite nature of my 

neighborhood will be destroyed. 

 (Continued...)
47 

rightly31 that “potential changes to the neighborhood, including increased traffic . . . are 

general problems and not problems specific to the Plaintiffs.” Frustration with increased 

traffic, annoyance with increased noise, and violations of a right (if any) to participate in 

zoning changes are not the sort of harms with which taxpayer standing is concerned. 

Even if these harms were within the purview of taxpayer standing, they are not unique to 

 

(...continued)

Chapin owns residential property located approximately 100 feet from one parcel of land 

which was reclassified from a residential to a commercial zone and 500 feet from 

another. He stated, inter alia: 

15. I am familiar with the property values in my 

neighborhood. My home is currently worth approximately 

$550,000. It is my opinion that Proposal Nos. 4-4 and 4-12 

will adversely affect my property value for reasons related to 

traffic, noise, privacy, and a change in the neighborhood. . . . I 

estimate that my property value will decline by 15-20% due 

to Proposal Nos. 4-4 and 4-12. 

Bell owns residential property situated approximately 80 feet from one 

parcel of land which was reclassified from a residential to a commercial 

zone and 500 feet from another. His statements echo those of Chapin. 

 As these statements were not made in support of allegations contained in the 

Complaint for Declaratory Judgment nor the Amended Petition for Judicial Review, they 

are not available to make out a prima facie showing of the “harm” required by taxpayer 

standing.

31 The trial judge considered that these problems were not specific to the Citizens in the 

context of discussing (apparently) property owner standing. Although she did not 

mention the standing doctrine as such, she discussed, inter alia, Bryniarski and Ray. 
48 

the Citizens, as opposed to the general public. Accordingly, the Citizens did not satisfy 

the requirements of taxpayer standing.32

VI.CONCLUSION

Property owner standing does not apply to judicial challenges to comprehensive 

zoning legislation. Rather, complainants must satisfy the requirements of taxpayer 

standing to challenge such legislation. Because the Citizens did not allege sufficiently 

the elements of taxpayer standing, the trial court granted appropriately Petitioners’ 

Motions to Dismiss. 

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 

SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; 

CASE REMANDED TO THAT 

COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO 

AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 

CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE 

ARUNDEL COUNTY; COSTS IN 

THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF 

SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID 

BY THE RESPONDENTS. 

 

32 Because the Citizens have not alleged properly that they would suffer the requisite 

harm, we need not determine whether the Citizens alleged sufficiently that their suit was 

brought on behalf of all other taxpayers similarly situated. 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 

Case No.: C-11-163163 

Argued: December 5, 2014 

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

OF MARYLAND 

 

No. 29 

September Term, 2014 

 

ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND, 

et al.

v. 

STEVE BELL, et al. 

 

Barbera, C.J. 

Harrell

Battaglia 

Greene

Adkins

McDonald

Watts, 

JJ.

 

Dissenting Opinion by Adkins, J., which

Battaglia and McDonald, JJ., join. 

 

Filed: April 21, 2015 
Respectfully, I dissent. Contrary to the Majority, I would hold that the property 

owner standing doctrine (“proximity standing”) applied in Bryniarski and Ray is

appropriate when a protestant challenges legislative comprehensive zoning. Use of this

doctrine will protect landowners who are specially aggrieved by a zoning change and will

not unduly burden either local governments or the courts. It is more consistent with our 

recent case law than the standard adopted by the Majority—taxpayer standing. The latter

doctrine, applicable to challenges to governmental expenditures of taxpayer dollars, is

unsuitable to address governmental land use decisions. 

In its attempt to disavow a trend towards broad use of proximity standing, the

Majority re-interprets our decisions in Superblock I,

1 Superblock III,2

and State Center,

3

imposing a new, more circumscribed reading than is justified. 

In Superblock I, we applied proximity standing because the protestants were

challenging land use decisions. We reasoned that “[b]ecause land use . . . is at least one of 

the prime considerations with which an urban renewal plan is reasonably sure to be 

concerned, . . . the principles that confer standing upon an adjoining, confronting or 

neighboring property owner to seek judicial review of land use decisions, logically extend

to an adjoining, confronting or neighboring property owner that is challenging a 

municipalit[y’s] allegedly illegal avoidance of urban renewal and procurement 

 

1 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor of Balt., 407 Md. 253, 964 A.2d 662 (2009). 

2 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor of Balt., 426 Md. 14, 43 A.3d 355 (2012).

3 State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 92 A.3d 400 

(2014).
2

ordinances.” Superblock I, 407 Md. 253, 272, 964 A.2d 662, 673 (2009) (first ellipses in

original) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The Court did not ground its

decision on the administrative nature of the land use decision approving the Land 

Disposition Agreement. See id. at 273, 964 A.2d at 673 (“The facts alleged by 120 West 

Fayette support its standing to bring its claim by virtue of its status as a property owner 

adjacent to the Superblock.”). The Majority’s claim that Superblock I stands for the

proposition that proximity standing is limited to challenges to a decision by an

administrative, executive, or quasi-judicial body is simply not supported by the language 

of the opinion. 

In Superblock III, this Court adopted a broad definition of “land use decision”: any 

ordinance or regulation “enacted or promulgated by a legislative or administrative body for 

the purpose of directing the development of real estate.” 426 Md. 14, 30, 43 A.3d 355, 365 

(2012) (citation omitted); see id. at 31, 43 A.3d at 365 (providing the following examples 

of “land use decisions”: ordinances, variances, reclassifications, special exceptions,

permits, and licenses). Recently, in State Center, we again endorsed that broad definition. 

438 Md. 451, 525, 92 A.3d 400, 444 (2014) (Harrell, J.) (concluding that “although not 

traditional land use regulations or ordinances,” the formative contracts for the State Center 

Project were land use decisions because they “govern the development of real estate”). 

Because we held in Superblock I that proximity standing applies to challenges to land use 
3

decisions,4and we confirmed in Superblock III and State Center that “land use decisions” 

are any decisions directing or governing the development of real estate, I deduce that 

proximity standing is not limited to administrative land use decisions, but also applies to

legislative land use decisions like comprehensive zoning. 

The Majority relies heavily on a “floodgates” rationale, arguing that because Bill 

12-11 encompassed the entirety of Councilmanic Districts I and IV, applying proximity 

standing to challenges to Bill 12-11 would arguably permit every property owner in these 

Districts to gain standing. The Majority hypothesizes as follows: 

This could mean, practically speaking, that the owners of 

59,045 parcels or lots in Councilmanic Districts I and IV, along 

with other property owners located adjoining, confronting, or 

nearby the external boundaries of those Districts, as well as

other property owners located between 200 to 1000 feet from 

the borders of the Districts (so long as they allege additional 

“plus factors”) may all have standing to challenge Bill 12-11. 

Hypothetically, thousands of plaintiffs with the benefit of 

property owner standing could have standing to challenge

comprehensive zoning legislation.

Maj. Slip Op. at 30 (emphasis in original). This projection is simply hyperbole. Only those 

property owners living in very close proximity to the 260 parcels that underwent zoning 

 

4 See Superblock I, 407 Md. at 272, 964 A.2d at 673 (“Because land use . . . is at

least one of the prime considerations with which an urban renewal plan is reasonably sure

to be concerned, . . . the principles that confer standing upon an adjoining, confronting or

neighboring property owner to seek judicial review of land use decisions, logically extend

to an adjoining, confronting or neighboring property owner that is challenging a 

municipalit[y’s] allegedly illegal avoidance of urban renewal and procurement 

ordinances.” (first ellipses in original) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)). 
4

changes under Bill 12-11 could have standing to challenge the comprehensive rezoning. 

This entire “floodgates” reasoning is unsound. 

Indeed, existing law already provides a dam against flooding. The Bryniarski5

special aggrievement standard, as further explicated in Ray,

6 will effectively limit the class

of plaintiffs entitled to judicial relief. All property owners must demonstrate special

aggrievement in order to gain standing to challenge a land use decision like a legislative

comprehensive rezoning. Ray v. Mayor of Balt., 430 Md. 74, 77, 59 A.3d 545, 547 (2013) 

(“As we have explained, to have standing to challenge a zoning reclassification, a person’s 

property interest ‘must be such that he is personally and specially affected in a way 

different from that suffered by the public generally.’” (quoting Bryniarski v. Montgomery 

Cnty. Bd. of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 144, 230 A.2d 289, 294 (1967))). Contrary to the 

Majority’s view, proximity standing does not eviscerate the special aggrievement

requirement, but rather allows protestants to demonstrate special aggrievement based on 

their proximity and other “plus factors.” See id. at 85, 59 A.3d at 551–52 (the prima facie

and almost prima facie aggrievement standards are based on special aggrievement). 

In Ray, we concluded that “proximity is the most important factor to be considered”

when determining whether a protestant has been specially aggrieved. Id. at 82–83, 59 A.3d

at 550. The importance of proximity to special aggrievement does not recede simply 

because a local government enacts a comprehensive rezoning ordinance. In this case, one 

 

5 Bryniarski v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 230 A.2d 289 

(1967).

6 Ray v. Mayor of Balt., 430 Md. 74, 59 A.3d 545 (2013).
5

of the Citizens, Rosie Shorter, owns property that adjoins or confronts property that Bill

12-11 rezoned from open space, rural agricultural, or low-density residential classifications 

to mixed-use residential. Banks, grocery stores, nursing homes, restaurants, taverns, office 

buildings, and health clubs are all permitted in zones classified mixed-use residential. See

Anne Arundel Cnty. Code § 18-8-301(b). The mechanism for a change in zoning 

classification of a property should not eliminate the presumption that Ms. Shorter is prima 

facie aggrieved based on her proximity to land now subject to a far more intensive use. See

Ray, 430 Md. at 81, 59 A.3d at 549 (“‘An adjoining, confronting or nearby property owner 

is deemed, prima facie, to be specially damaged and, therefore, a person aggrieved.’” 

(quoting Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 145, 230 A.2d at 294)). 

There is no reason to think that most comprehensive rezonings, which are adopted

by elected officials, will be so offensive to property owners that, as the Majority projects, 

thousands (or even hundreds) of them will pursue judicial relief. See Maj. Slip Op. at 30. 

Surely, the costs of conducting such a lawsuit, together with the dismal prospects for 

success on the merits, will be unpalatable to most. 

Even with standing secured, property owners face a precipitous up-hill battle to win

a declaration that a comprehensive rezoning ordinance is invalid. We have long recognized 

that comprehensive rezoning ordinances are entitled to a strong presumption of correctness. 

See, e.g., Howard Cnty., Md. v. Dorsey, 292 Md. 351, 355, 438 A.2d 1339, 1342 (1982) 

(“This Court has repeatedly recognized that there is a strong presumption of the correctness

of . . . comprehensive rezoning, and that ‘strong evidence’ of error is required to overcome 
6

that presumption.” (citation omitted)). According Respondents standing would not change 

the substantive law. 

As we said in Anderson House, LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Rockville: 

Zoning decisions which are made during a comprehensive 

rezoning process are strongly presumed to be correct. 

* * * 

Comprehensive rezoning is a vital legislative function, and in

making zoning decisions during the comprehensive rezoning 

process, a [zoning authority] is exercising what has been 

described as its ‘plenary’ legislative power. 

402 Md. 689, 723, 939 A.2d 116, 136 (2008) (alteration in original) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). We elaborated on the strength of the presumption of correctness:

Indisputably, [the challenger] carries the heavy burden of 

establishing, by clear and affirmative evidence, that [the 

Ordinance] is invalid. Even where reasonable doubt exists, the 

Ordinance must be sustained. “In other words, the legislature

is presumed to have acted within [its police powers] so that if

any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would

sustain [the Ordinance], the existence of that state of facts as a 

basis for the passage of the [regulation] must be assumed.” 

Id. at 724, 939 A.2d at 137 (citations and footnotes omitted); see also Dorsey, 292 Md. at

355, 438 A.2d at 1342 (“‘While, in recent years, we have had occasion to enunciate a 

number of important principles applicable to the law of zoning, perhaps none is more 

rudimentary than the strong presumption of the correctness of original zoning and of 

comprehensive rezoning.’” (citation omitted)). Applying proximity standing to

comprehensive rezoning would not jettison this strong presumption of correctness.
7

Even if declaratory judgment actions do modestly increase, that cost is justified by

the need to provide a judicial means to challenge an illegal legislative action injurious to a 

property interest.7

 See City of Balt. v. Gill, 31 Md. 375, 395 (1869) (“In this State the

courts have always maintained with jealous vigilance the restraints and limitations imposed 

by law upon the exercise of power by municipal and other corporations; and have not 

hesitated to exercise their rightful jurisdiction for the purpose of restraining them within 

the limits of their lawful authority, and of protecting the citizen from the consequence of 

their unauthorized or illegal acts.”). 

The Majority holds that “[t]he doctrine of taxpayer standing—already available to

some complainants challenging administrative land use decisions—is the appropriate 

standing doctrine that complainants challenging comprehensive zoning legislation must 

satisfy.” Maj. Slip Op. at 35. This doctrine, however, provides a more theoretical than real

remedy because as I explain below, its availability is severely limited. 

With taxpayer standing “there must be a ‘nexus’ between the showing of potential 

pecuniary damage and the challenged act.” Maj. Slip Op. at 39 (citing State Center, 438 

Md. at 572–80, 92 A.3d at 472–77). In State Center, we recently explained the nexus 

requirement, indicating that “the challenged act must affect potentially a tax that the

taxpayer-plaintiff pays.” 438 Md. at 572, 92 A.3d at 472. We also concluded that a 

 

7 Of course, a property owner may challenge a comprehensive rezoning without 

resorting to the courts by petitioning the ordinance to referendum. See Anne Arundel Cnty. 

Charter, § 308. For an individual property owner to challenge a comprehensive zoning

ordinance through the referendum power, however, he would have to obtain signatures 

from “ten per centum of the qualified voters of the County[.]” Id. This presents a 

formidable and costly challenge. 
8

thorough review of our precedent “reveals that the taxpayer must be asserting a challenge 

and seeking a remedy that, if granted, would alleviate the tax burden on that individual and 

others; otherwise, standing does not exist.” Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). We

then went on to demonstrate that “[m]any cases emphasize that standing cannot exist if the

remedy sought would not decrease the taxpayer’s monetary burden.” Id. at 573, 92 A.3d

at 472 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Citizens Comm. of Anne Arundel Cnty. Inc. v. Cnty. 

Comm’rs of Anne Arundel Cnty., 233 Md. 398, 197 A.2d 108 (1964) (plaintiffs challenging

laws authorizing licensed gambling failed to satisfy taxpayer standing because the remedy 

they sought, if granted, would not decrease their monetary burden as taxpayers); 

Kerpelman v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 261 Md. 436, 276 A.2d 56 (1971) (plaintiff 

challenging conveyances of state land failed to allege taxpayer standing because she did 

not allege that the remedy she sought would decrease her monetary burden). These cases 

reveal the paucity of the taxpayer standing remedy offered by the Majority. The 

inadequacy of that remedy is a compelling reason to extend to comprehensive rezonings 

our longstanding jurisprudence that property owners with sufficient proximity can

challenge zoning changes. 

In this case, several Respondents produced affidavits stating that their property 

values will decrease as a result of Bill 12-11. They cannot achieve taxpayer standing 

because, with reduced property values, their taxes will not increase. They would have 

proximity standing because they live no more than 1000 feet from the rezoned parcel, and

we have concluded that a depreciated property value is a “plus factor” supporting special 

aggrievement. See Habliston v. City of Salisbury, 258 Md. 350, 352, 354–55, 265 A.2d 
9

885, 885–87 (1970) (protestant was specially aggrieved based on proximity and lay 

testimony of decreasing property value); Chatham Corp. v. Beltram, 252 Md. 578, 579–

80, 584, 251 A.2d 1, 2, 4 (1969) (same). 

We have long held that protestants who are specially aggrieved have standing to

challenge land use decisions. See, e.g., Cassel v. Mayor of Balt., 195 Md. 348, 353, 73 

A.2d 486, 487–88 (1950) (“It is an established rule that a court of equity has the power to

restrain the enforcement of a void statute or ordinance at the suit of a person injuriously

affected.”); Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 144, 230 A.2d at 294 (protestant has standing to

challenge a zoning action if “he is personally and specially affected in a way different from 

that suffered by the public generally”); Ray, 430 Md. at 77–78, 59 A.3d at 547 (a protestant 

has standing to challenge a land use decision if he satisfies the special aggrievement test

articulated in Bryniarski). The prima facie and almost prima facie aggrievement 

standards—the two principal components of proximity standing—both predicate standing 

on special aggrievement. See Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 143–44, 230 A.2d at 294; Ray, 430 

Md. at 85, 59 A.3d at 551–52. Thus, applying proximity standing to challenges to

legislative comprehensive rezoning ensures that all protestants who are specially aggrieved 

by such rezoning have standing to challenge it in the courts. 

Finally, we have accorded standing to owners whose property classifications were 

changed as a part of a legislative comprehensive rezoning. See Maj. Slip Op. at 41; see,

e.g., Anderson House, 402 Md. at 706, 939 A.2d at 126 (“Anderson House is entitled to

have the Circuit Court consider its claims as to Ordinance 7-03 because the C-T zone 

created by that legislation was applied to the Anderson House property through Ordinance 
10 

21-05. Thus, its rights were affected and the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to review the

challenge to its enactment.”); Cnty. Comm’rs of Queen Anne’s Cnty. v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 

364, 228 A.2d 450, 454 (1967) (protestants had standing to challenge a comprehensive 

rezoning ordinance because they alleged that “the resale value of [their property], for 

development purposes, [was] decreased by its zoning [re]classification”). The Majority 

recognizes that these owners can challenge a comprehensive rezoning, but ignores the 

patent inequity of denying standing to their closest neighbors.

In conclusion, I would hold that proximity standing is the appropriate basis upon 

which a judicial challenge to a comprehensive zoning legislative action may be maintained. 

This conclusion is the one most consistent with our precedent, and it ensures that all

property owners who are specially aggrieved by an act of legislative comprehensive 

rezoning have a means to challenge it in the courts. 

Judge Battaglia and Judge McDonald authorize me to state that they join in the

views expressed in this opinion.