J-S42006-14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

DANNY LEE NIXON 

 Appellant No. 1154 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 13, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0001502-2012 

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., JENKINS, J., and MUSMANNO, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED SEPTEMBER 12, 2014

Appellant, Danny Lee Nixon, appeals from judgment of sentence 

entered on June 13, 2013, by the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny 

County. We affirm. 

On January 22, 2012, Sheila Robinson (the “victim”) and Nixon were 

having a party in their apartment. Sometime during the party, Nixon began 

to argue with the victim. The victim then asked Nixon to leave the party. 

Nixon refused. The victim then decided to leave the apartment, but Nixon 

blocked the apartment door and refused to let her leave. Nixon then threw a 

dining room table at the victim, which struck the victim’s legs causing 

bruising on her thigh. 

The victim then tried to escape the apartment through the bedroom. 

Nixon, however, pinned her down onto the bed and began to choke her. The 
J-S42006-14 

- 2 - 

victim’s nephew was able to pull Nixon off of the victim. Nixon followed the 

victim into the kitchen. Nixon then pulled out a butcher knife and meat 

cleaver and told the victim that he was going to kill her. The nephew of the 

victim then entered the kitchen and successfully disarmed Nixon. 

The victim then ran into the apartment bathroom where the bathtub 

was filled with hot water. Nixon attempted to push the victim into the water. 

The nephew was able to once again restrain Nixon while the victim ran back 

into the bedroom. Nixon next went to the bedroom and punched her four or 

five times in the ribs. The victim then testified that although she tried to 

leave the apartment seven times, she was unable to because of Nixon. The 

victim was ultimately able to leave the apartment and went to the UPMC 

Presbyterian Hospital. 

Nixon was convicted on January 31, 2013 of two counts of simple 

assault, one count of unlawful restraint, and one count of terroristic threats. 

Immediately following Nixon’s convictions the trial court imposed its 

sentence. Nixon subsequently filed a motion for post-sentence relief, which 

the trial court granted and issued a new sentencing order entered on June 

13, 2013. This timely appeal follows. 

We begin by addressing Nixon’s contention that the Commonwealth 

failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove that the trial court had subject 
J-S42006-14 

- 3 - 

matter jurisdiction over his criminal proceeding.1 A challenge to the trial 

court’s jurisdiction is a question of law for which our standard of review is de 

novo and the scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 

A.3d 254, 265. 

“All Courts of Common Pleas have original jurisdiction over criminal 

proceedings. The subject matter jurisdiction of a criminal court extends to 

the offenses committed within the county of trial.” Commonwealth v. 

McNeil, 665 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citations omitted). 

“The law is clear that the locus of the crime is always in issue, for the 

court has no jurisdiction [over] the offense unless it occurred within the 

county of trial, or unless, by some statute, it need not[.]” Commonwealth 

v. Boyle, 532 A.2d 306, 309-10 (Pa. 1987) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). In order for the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over a 

criminal proceeding, some overt act of the crime must have taken place 

within the county in which the trial court sits. See Elia, 83 A.3d at 265. 

Although the “Commonwealth bears the burden of proving facts 

sufficient to establish jurisdiction, it may rely upon circumstantial evidence 

to meet this burden.” Commonweatlh v. Passmore, 857 A.2d 697, 709 

____________________________________________ 

1

 The Commonwealth notes that Nixon never questioned the trial court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court. See Appellee’s Brief, at 11. In 

so doing, the Commonwealth does not maintain that the issue is waived, 

see generally Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), as a challenge to the trial court’s subject 

matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. See Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 

84 A.3d 736, 752 (Pa. Super. 2014). 
J-S42006-14 

- 4 - 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). The subject matter jurisdiction of the 

trial court can be established through the presentation of prima facie

evidence that a criminal act occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the 

trial court. See McNeil, 665 A.2d at 1251. 

Instantly, Nixon contends that the Commonwealth has failed to 

produce evidence that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over his 

criminal proceeding. Specifically, Nixon asserts that the Commonwealth 

failed to produce evidence that the crime took place in Allegheny County. 

There is sufficient evidence to find that the locus of Nixon’s alleged criminal 

acts took place in Allegheny County. 

 The trial court, sitting as the finder of fact, heard consistent testimony 

from the witnesses that the events of the alleged crime took place at 5518 

Broad Street Apartment #3, an address in Pittsburgh. See N.T., Bench Trial, 

1/31/13, at 8. The trial court also heard that the responding officer, Officer 

David Derbish, was an employee of the City of Pittsburgh and stationed in 

the “Zone 5” section of the city. Id. at 47. Furthermore, the trial court heard 

evidence that the victim was taken to UPMC Presbyterian Hospital, located in 

Pittsburgh, to treat her injuries. See id. at 48. Pittsburgh is, of course, 

located in Allegheny County. 

As the trial court was the factfinder, it was welcome to draw all 

reasonable inferences from this evidence. The trial court drew the 

reasonable inference that Officer Derbish responded to the scene of the 
J-S42006-14 

- 5 - 

crime within his lawful jurisdiction: the City of Pittsburgh, Zone 5. In 

conclusion, we find that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the trial 

court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. 

We next address Nixon’s challenge that the Commonwealth presented 

insufficient evidence to uphold his conviction of unlawful restraint. We first 

begin by noting our standard of review. A claim challenging the sufficiency of 

evidence is a question of law. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 853 A.2d 

1020, 1028 (Pa. Super. 2004). The evidence adduced at trial must be 

viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner to determine 

whether there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. 

Walker, 874 A.2d 667, 677 (Pa. Super. 2005). Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is 

so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may 

be drawn from the combined circumstances. See id. The Commonwealth is 

entitled to all reasonable inferences arising from the evidence and all facts 

which the Commonwealth’s evidence tends to prove are treated as admitted. 

See Commonwealth v. Hunter, 768 a.2d 1136, 1142 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

We must determine whether, “accepting as true all the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which, if believed, the jury could 

properly have based its verdict, it is sufficient in law to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime or crimes of which 
J-S42006-14 

- 6 - 

he has been convicted.” See Commonwealth v. Williams, 316 A.2d 888, 

892 (Pa. 1974). 

Nixon contends that the Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient 

evidence to prove that Nixon placed the victim under circumstances that 

placed her in danger of suffering serious bodily injury or detained the victim 

in a condition of involuntary servitude. The Crimes Code defines unlawful 

restraint as follows: 

(a) Offense defined – Except as provided under subsection (b)

or (c) a person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree 

if he knowingly: 

1. Restrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing 

him to risk of serious bodily injury; or 

2. Holds another in a condition of involuntary servitude. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2902(a). The Crimes Code defines serious bodily injury as 

“[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes 

serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of any 

bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301. 

 In order to determine if the defendant exposed a victim to risk of 

serious bodily injury, we may look at the totality of the circumstances. See 

Commonwealth v. Schilling, 431 A.2d 1088, 1092 (Pa. Super. 1981). In 

examining the totality of the circumstances, the Commonwealth must 

present evidence sufficient to show that the victim was exposed to an actual 

danger of serious bodily injury. See Commonwealth v. Melvin, 572 A.2d 

773, 775 (Pa. Super. 1990); Schilling, 431 A.2d at 1092. 
J-S42006-14 

- 7 - 

We find that there is sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction; it is 

clear that he exposed his victim to the risk of serious bodily injury. Nixon 

would have us find that the Commonwealth did not present sufficient 

evidence because there was no evidence that the victim sustained or that 

Nixon caused the victim to have an actual injury that meets the statutory 

definition of a “serious bodily injury.” Such an argument is meritless, 

however, as both the Crimes Code and our case law require that the 

defendant need only expose the victim to the risk of serious bodily injury in 

order to be convicted of the crime of unlawful restraint. 

 Here, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the victim was 

restrained in her apartment in a factual scenario that was without question 

inherently dangerous. The record indicates that Nixon threw a table at the 

victim, choked her to a point where she could not breathe, threatened to kill 

her at knifepoint (and with a meat cleaver), then attempted to push her into 

scalding water, and finally punched her several times in the mid-section. The 

victim sustained injuries. The record also indicates that Nixon was enraged 

and obviously truly determined to harm his victim. 

It further shows that the victim was so encumbered by Nixon that her 

nephew was needed on multiple occasions during this prolonged struggle to 

rescue her and subdue Nixon, lest Nixon cause graver injuries to the victim. 

All of this was done while Nixon restrained the victim from leaving the 

apartment as he chased her from room to room. 
J-S42006-14 

- 8 - 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/12/2014