alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 

NO. 01-15-00195-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON 

N.G., Appellant 

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 308th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 2008-32527 

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE BRIEF 

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: 

COMES NOW, N.G., Appellant, and files this her Motion for Extension of Time to 

File Brief and respectfully shows the Court as follows: 

1. This is an accelerated appeal. Appellant’s brief was due on April 20, 2015. 

2. Counsel is requesting an extension of time to file Appellant’s brief to May 20, 

2015. Opposing counsel with the Harris County Attorney’s Office is 

unopposed to this motion. 

3. Good cause exists to grant this extension. Counsel has moved both her office 

and her residence and has been ill. Further, a visiting court reporter took the 

testimony in this case and this has made it more difficult to quickly get a copy 

ACCEPTED

01-15-00195-CV

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

4/20/2015 10:52:09 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 4/20/2015 10:52:09 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
2

of the record from her. Counsel has also had court appearances and other trial 

court matters, and appellate matters during this period. Most importantly, the 

case involves special issues which has required additional communication 

with Appellant.

4. For all of the above reasons, Counsel requests an extension to confer with her 

client, and to adequately research and draft her brief.

WHEREFORE, Appellant prays that the Court grant an extension of time to 

file her brief on May 20, 2015.

Respectfully Submitted,

/S/ Lana Shadwick

Lana Shadwick

State Bar No. 00784951

12620 FM 1960 Rd. West

Ste. A4-102

Houston, Texas 77065

Phone: 713-392-8222 

Lana@LanaShadwick.com

Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hearby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been 

forwarded by electronic mail on this the 20th day of April, 2015 to:

Sandra D. Hachem

/S/ Lana Shadwick
<PAGE>
 
                               EXHIBIT 11

          AMERICAN BUSINESS INFORMATION, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
         STATEMENT REGARDING COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
    For the three and nine months ended September 30, 1995 and 1994
                (In thousands, except per share amounts)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                                       Three Months Ended        Nine Months Ended
                                                                          September 30              September 30
                                                                      --------------------      --------------------
                                                                        1995         1994         1995         1994
                                                                        ----         ----         ----         ----
 <S>                                                                  <C>          <C>          <C>          <C>
 Average shares outstanding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     20,768       20,678       20,725       20,676
 Net additional common equivalent shares . . . . . . . . . . . . .        639           92          469          132
                                                                      -------      -------      -------      -------
 Average number of common and common equivalent
   shares outstanding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     21,407       20,770       21,194       20,808
                                                                      =======      =======      =======      =======

 Net income for per share computation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    $ 4,104      $ 3,330      $10,301      $ 9,357
                                                                      =======      =======      =======      =======

 Net income per average common and common
    equivalent share outstanding (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    $  0.19      $  0.16      $  0.49      $  0.45
                                                                      =======      =======      =======      =======
</TABLE>
 ____________________

 (1)   This calculation is submitted pursuant to Regulation S-K item
       601(b)(11) although not required by footnote 2 to paragraph 14 of
       APB Opinion No. 15 because it will result in dilution of less
       than 3 percent.
EXHIBIT (24)17

                                   CERTIFICATE

         I,  Marilyn S.  Kirkland,  Secretary  of  Southwestern  Electric  Power
Company,  a Delaware  corporation (the  "Corporation"),  hereby certify that set
forth below is a complete and accurate copy of a certain  resolution  adopted by
the Board of Directors of the Corporation on this 26th day of January, 1999, and
that  such  resolution  is in  full  force  and  effect  as of the  date of this
certificate.


                       Southwestern Electric Power Company
                          Board of Directors Resolution
                                January 26, 1999

         RESOLVED,  that each officer of  Southwestern  Electric  Power  Company
listed at the end of this sentence is hereby authorized to make,  constitute and
appoint,  in his  respective  capacity,  a power  of  attorney  in  favor of the
person(s)  listed  directly after his name at the end of this  sentence,  as his
true and lawful  attorney(s)-in-fact and agent(s), with full power and authority
(and in the case of more than one attorney-in-fact, each attorney-in-fact acting
alone  and  without  the  other)  to  execute  in the name and on  behalf of the
officer, in any and all capacities, the Corporation's Annual Report on Form 10-K
for 1998 and any and all  amendments  thereto,  to be filed under the Securities
Exchange  Act of 1934,  as  amended,  and any other  documents  and  instruments
incidental  thereto,  and to file the same,  with all  exhibits  thereto and all
documents in connection therewith,  with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
and grant to such  attorney(s)-in-fact,  and  agent(s)  (and in the case of more
than  one  attorney-in-fact,   each  of  them),  full  power  and  authority  of
substitution  and  revocation in the premises and full power and authority to do
and perform each and every act and thing  requisite  and necessary to be done in
and about the  premises,  as fully and all intents  and  purposes as the officer
might or could do in person.
1.  Michael H. Madison is authorized to make, constitute and  appoint R. Russell
    Davis to be his attorney[s]-in-fact.
2.  R. Russell Davis  is authorized  to make,  constitute and appoint Michael H.
    Madison to be his attorney[s]-in-fact.


         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
Southwestern Electric Power Company this day, the 26th of January, 1999.



         /s/ Marilyn S. Kirkland
             Marilyn S. Kirkland
             Corporate Secretary


             COMPANY SEAL
# C_2016202EN.01015901.xml

| 7.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 202/159 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 202/159

---

Article 256

(ex Article 225 TEC)

(ex Article 225 TEC)

1.   The General Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine at first instance actions or proceedings referred to in Articles 263, 265, 268, 270 and 272, with the exception of those assigned to a specialised court set up under Article 257 and those reserved in the Statute for the Court of Justice. The Statute may provide for the General Court to have jurisdiction for other classes of action or proceeding.

Decisions given by the General Court under this paragraph may be subject to a right of appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law only, under the conditions and within the limits laid down by the Statute.

2.   The General Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine actions or proceedings brought against decisions of the specialised courts.

Decisions given by the General Court under this paragraph may exceptionally be subject to review by the Court of Justice, under the conditions and within the limits laid down by the Statute, where there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of Union law being affected.

3.   The General Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine questions referred for a preliminary ruling under Article 267, in specific areas laid down by the Statute.

Where the General Court considers that the case requires a decision of principle likely to affect the unity or consistency of Union law, it may refer the case to the Court of Justice for a ruling.

Decisions given by the General Court on questions referred for a preliminary ruling may exceptionally be subject to review by the Court of Justice, under the conditions and within the limits laid down by the Statute, where there is a serious risk of the unity or consistency of Union law being affected.

---
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection  with the Quarterly  Report of Wireless  Telecom Group,  Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending  September 30, 2003 as filed with
the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the  "Periodic
Report"), I, Edward Garcia, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Periodic  Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of section
     13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information  contained in the Periodic Report fairly  presents,  in
     all material respects,  the financial condition and result of operations of
     the Company.



                                        /s/ Edward Garcia
                                        -----------------
                                        Edward Garcia
                                        Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
                                        November 12, 2003









The foregoing  certification  is being  furnished  solely  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section  1350 and is not  being  filed as part of the  Report  or as a  separate
disclosure document.

                                                                              19
#### In the Matter of KEYES, Derrick, a child under 18 years of age, to-wit: 21⁄2 years.

No. 49718.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Dec. 20, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 8, 1978.

See also Okl., 574 P.2d 1026.

James H. Chafin, Tulsa, for appellant Wesley.

Charles Davis, Tulsa, for appellant Keyes.

Donald Lee Ritter, Department of Institutions, Social and Rehabilitative Services, Oklahoma City, for appellee State of Oklahoma.

BARNES, Justice:

This is an appeal by Appellant, Robert Wesley, from an order of the Trial Court terminating his parental rights and those of the natural mother, Ann Keyes, to their child, Derrick Keyes, age two and one-half years at the time of the hearing. This is a companion case to No. 49,717, styled “In the Matter of Derrick Keyes, a child under 18 years of age, to-wit: 21⁄2 years,” 574 P.2d 1026 (Okl.1977), also decided today. The relief sought and argument of Appellant, Robert Wesley, is basically the same.

The child in question, Derrick Keyes, was living in the care and custody of his natural mother, Ann Keyes, having earlier been adjudicated a dependent and neglected child, with custody in the Department of Institutions, Social and Rehabilitative Services (Department). It appears that Ann Keyes left the child in Appellant Wesley’s care while she went shopping. Upon her return, the child was passing blood in his stool, whereupon he was taken to a Tulsa hospital. The evidence strongly indicated anal abuse.

The State filed a motion asking that the parental rights of both Robert Wesley and *1036Ann Keyes be terminated to protect the physical and mental health and morals of the child. After a hearing, in which both parties were represented by counsel, Referee Helen Kannady of the Tulsa County District Court, Juvenile and Family Relations Division, filed a combined report that included findings which applied to Appellant Wesley and to the natural mother in the companion case, recommending termination of parental rights. The Trial Court confirmed the Referee’s report and ordered termination of the parental rights of Robert Wesley and Ann Keyes.

Appellant Wesley appeals. His propositions on appeal and authorities cited in support are identical to those in the companion case and were therein resolved.

Because of the decision in the companion case, we also affirm the Trial Court’s order in the instant case.

AFFIRMED.

HODGES, C. J., LAVENDER, V. C. J., and DAVISON, IRWIN, and BERRY, JJ„ concur.

WILLIAMS, SIMMS and DOOLIN, JJ„ dissent.

SIMMS, Justice,

dissenting.

For the reasons set forth in my dissent to the companion case, Okl., 574 P.2d 1026.

I must respectfully dissent to this decision.

I am authorized to state that WILLIAMS and DOOLIN, JJ., join with me in this dissent.
# C_2016202EN.01016401.xml

| 7.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 202/164 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 202/164

---

Article 268

(ex Article 235 TEC)

(ex Article 235 TEC)

The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction in disputes relating to compensation for damage provided for in the second and third paragraphs of Article 340.

---
EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. (S) 1350



(ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002)



In connection with the periodic report of Dynegy Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q
for the period ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Bruce A. Williamson, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify as of the date hereof,
solely for the purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code, that to the best of my knowledge:



|(1)    the |  | Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of
|---------- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1934, and



|(2) |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
|--- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods indicated.



|                      |  |  | 
|--------------------- |  |  | 
|Date: August 14, 2003 |  |  | 
|                      |  |  | 



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Dynegy Inc. and will be retained by Dynegy Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2650

___________________________

Beau Lee DuBois

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Dr. David Robert Ware, Medical Director, Corizon Medical, Hawkins Unit; Vesta

Mullins, Health Service Administrator, Hawkins Unit; Tenille Watts, R.N.

Director of Nursing, Corizon Medical; Alushia Robinson, LPN, Sick Call Nurse,

Corizon Medical

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

____________

 Submitted: April 15, 2015

Filed: April 21, 2015 

[Unpublished]

____________

Before BYE, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.
Inmate Beau Lee DuBois appeals following the district court’s adverse grant

1

of summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We conclude that the claims

against nurse Tenille Watts were properly dismissed without prejudice under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) for failure to serve, see Mack v. Dillon, 594 F.3d 620,

622 (per curiam) (plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis may not remain silent and

do nothing after receiving notice of failure to effectuate service; where Rule 4(m)

dismissal occurred 170 days after filing of complaint and plaintiff was warned of

dismissal should he not serve defendants, there was no abuse of discretion); that the

claims against Dr. David Robert Ware and Vesta Mullins were properly dismissed

without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, see King v. Iowa

Dep’t of Corr., 598 F.3d 1051, 1052-54 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review; level of

detail in grievance necessary to comply with procedure varies, but it is prison’s

requirements, not Prison Litigation Reform Act, that define boundaries of proper

exhaustion); and that summary judgment was warranted on the claims against LPN

Alushia Robinson, see Peterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594, 598 (8th Cir. 2014) (de novo

standard of review); Vaughn v. Gray, 557 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 2009) (to show that

defendant actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded, serious medical need,

plaintiff must establish mental state akin to criminal recklessness: disregarding

known risk to inmate’s health). Finally, the district court acted within its discretion

in declining supplemental jurisdiction over, and dismissing without prejudice, any

state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (district court may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims if court has dismissed all claims over

which it has original jurisdiction). The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the

1

Eastern District of Arkansas, adopting the report and recommendations of the

Honorable H. David Young, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District

of Arkansas.

-2-
Disease and Economic Burden of Exposure to Arsenic in 

Drinking Water

Abt Associates

2014

Document is undergoing final review and will be available in 

the docket at a later date
# C_2016202EN.01017301.xml

| 7.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 202/173 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 202/173

---

Article 293

(ex Article 250 TEC)

(ex Article 250 TEC)

1.   Where, pursuant to the Treaties, the Council acts on a proposal from the Commission, it may amend that proposal only by acting unanimously, except in the cases referred to in paragraphs 10 and 13 of Article 294, in Articles 310, 312 and 314 and in the second paragraph of Article 315.

2.   As long as the Council has not acted, the Commission may alter its proposal at any time during the procedures leading to the adoption of a Union act.

---
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 9, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 05-50783

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ALDO CRUZ-HERNANDEZ, also known as Ivan J.

Hernandez, also known as Aldo Ivan Cruz-Hernandez,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:05-CR-117-ALL

--------------------

Before REAVLEY, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Aldo CruzHernandez raises arguments that are foreclosed by AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held

that a prior conviction is a sentencing factor under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(b)(2) and not a separate criminal offense. The

Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
PAMELA LONG,

Appellant,

v.

SUNTRUST MORTGAGE, INC.,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D14-1176

_____________________________/

Opinion filed April 15, 2015.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Santa Rosa County.

John F. Simon, Jr., Judge.

Pamela Long, pro se, Appellant.

Florida Foreclosure Attorney, Boca Raton, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED as untimely. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540; see also State, Dep’t of 

Transp. v. Bailey, 603 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). 

WOLF, MAKAR, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., CONCUR.
ACCEPTED

14-15-00205-CV

FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

4/21/2015 5:53:37 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 14th COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 4/21/2015 5:53:37 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
Second, Regan argues that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying his motion to disqualify the Clark County District 

Attorney's Office because attorney Steven Wolfson, who represented him 

when he pleaded guilty, was subsequently appointed District Attorney of 

Clark County. On appeal, Regan does not dispute the adequacy of the 

screening procedures in place and instead contends that screening itself is 

inappropriate because Wolfson's title as District Attorney, as well as his 

personal participation in this case, creates a per se appearance of 

impropriety. We disagree. While it is true that the district attorney is 

responsible for deciding the overall policy of the office, consistent with 

NRS 252.070(1), the deputies appointed by the district attorney handle the 

day-to-day operations of the divisions of the office and make decisions 

regarding specific cases. Further, even though the district attorney's 

name appears on every document filed with the court, it is clear that the 

district attorney is not personally handling all of the cases filed by the 

district attorney's office, and that these cases are instead being handled by 

the deputy who is also listed on every document. Having carefully 

considered Regan's contention, we conclude that he fails to demonstrate 

that the district court abused its discretion by declining to disqualify the 

entire district attorney's office. See Collier v. Legakes, 98 Nev. 307, 310, 

646 P.2d 1219, 1221 (1982) (noting that disqualification of an entire public 

office is only warranted in "extreme cases" where "public trust and 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A < 

2 

%, . • ' 
confidence in our criminal justice system could not be maintained without 

such action"). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 1 

c-g-tt-N 

Hardesty 

J. 

cc: Hon. Michelle Leavitt, District Judge 

McDonald Adras LLC 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

1We note that the fast track statement contains no citation to the 

appendix. See NRAP 3C(e)(1)(C). We caution appellant's counsel, Patrick 

McDonald, that future failure to comply with the Nevada Rules of 

Appellate Procedure when filing briefs with this court may result in the 

imposition of sanctions. See NRAP 3C(n). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

3 

PTA,