Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 63859 

(g) Credit for Actions Previously Completed 

Incorporation of the changes contained in 

Sikorsky RFM SA S92A–RFM–003, Part 1, 

Revision No. 12, approved December 9, 2010, 

before the effective date of this AD is 

considered acceptable for compliance with 

the corresponding actions specified in 

paragraph (f) of this AD. 

(h) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Boston Aircraft 

Certification Office, FAA, may approve 

AMOCs for this AD. Send your proposal to: 

John Coffey, Flight Test Engineer, Boston 

Aircraft Certification Office, 12 New England 

Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; 

telephone (781) 238–7173; email: 

john.coffey@faa.gov. 

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 

CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 

14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that 

you notify your principal inspector, or 

lacking a principal inspector, the manager of 

the local flight standards district office or 

certificate holding district office before 

operating any aircraft complying with this 

AD through an AMOC. 

(i) Additional Information 

For service information identified in this 

AD, contact Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, 

Attn: Manager, Commercial Technical 

Support, mailstop S581A, 6900 Main Street, 

Stratford, CT, telephone (203) 383–4866, 

email address tsslibrary@sikorsky.com, or 

http://www.sikorsky.com. You may review a 

copy of this information at the FAA, Office 

of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 

2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, 

Texas 76137. 

(j) Subject 

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) 

Code: 2510 Flight Compartment Equipment. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on October 3, 

2014. 

Kim Smith, 

Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2014–25402 Filed 10–24–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–C 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 

Employment and Training 

Administration 

20 CFR Part 615 

RIN 1205–AB62 

Federal-State Unemployment 

Compensation Program; Implementing 

the Total Unemployment Rate as an 

Extended Benefits Indicator and 

Amending for Technical Corrections; 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

AGENCY: Employment and Training 

Administration, Labor. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking; 

request for comments. 

SUMMARY: The Employment and 

Training Administration (ETA) of the 

U.S. Department of Labor (Department) 

issues this notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to implement 

statutory amendments to the Extended 

Benefits (EB) program, which pays extra 

weeks of unemployment compensation 

during periods of high unemployment 

in a State. Specifically, this NPRM 

proposes a methodology for computing 

the Total Unemployment Rate (TUR) 

indicator which is an optional indicator 

used to measure unemployment in a 

state. We also propose amendments to 

make technical corrections to the 

current regulations and to correct minor 

mistakes. 

DATES: To be ensured consideration, 

comments must be submitted in writing 

on or before December 26, 2014. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, 

identified by Regulatory Information 

Number (RIN) 1205–AB62, by only one 

of the following methods: 

• Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Mail/Hand Delivery/Courier: 

Submit comments to Adele Gagliardi, 

Administrator, Office of Policy 

Development and Research (OPDR), 

U.S. Department of Labor, Employment 

and Training Administration, 200 

Constitution Avenue NW., Room N– 

5641, Washington, DC 20210. Because 

of security-related concerns, there may 

be a significant delay in the receipt of 

submissions by United States Mail. You 

must take this into consideration when 

preparing to meet the deadline for 

submitting comments. The Department 

will post all comments received on 

http://www.regulations.gov without 

making any changes to the comments or 

redacting any information, including 

any personal information provided. The 

http://www.regulations.gov Web site is 

the Federal e-rulemaking portal and all 

comments posted there are available 

and accessible to the public. The 

Department recommends that 

commenters not include personal 

information such as Social Security 

Numbers, personal addresses, telephone 

numbers, and email addresses that they 

do not want made public in their 

comments as such submitted 

information will be available to the 

public via the http://

www.regulations.gov Web site. 

Comments submitted through http://

www.regulations.gov will not include 

the email address of the commenter 

unless the commenter chooses to 

include that information as part of his 

or her comment. It is the responsibility 

of the commenter to safeguard personal 

information. 

Instructions: All submissions received 

must include the agency name and the 

RIN for this rulemaking: RIN 1205– 

AB62. Please submit your comments by 

only one method. 

Docket: All comments will be 

available for public inspection and 

copying during normal business hours 

by contacting OPDR at (202) 693–3700. 

You may also contact OPDR at the 

address listed above. As noted above, 

the Department also will post all 

comments it receives on http://

www.regulations.gov. Copies of the 

proposed rule are available in 

alternative formats of large print and 

electronic file on computer disk, which 

may be obtained at the above-stated 

address. The proposed rule is available 

on the Internet at the Web address 

http://www.regulations.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Adele Gagliardi, Administrator, OPDR, 

Employment and Training 

Administration, (202) 693–3700 (this is 

not a toll-free number) or 1–877–889– 

5627 (TTY). Individuals with hearing or 

speech impairments may access the 

telephone number above via TTY by 

calling the toll-free Federal Information 

Relay Service at (800) 877–8339. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

Preamble to this proposed rule is 

organized as follows: 

I. Background—provides a brief 

description of the development of the 

proposed rule. 

II. Section-by-Section Review of the 

Proposed Rule—summarizes and discusses 

proposed changes to the Federal-State 

Unemployment Compensation Program. 

III. Administrative Information—sets forth 

the applicable regulatory requirements. 

I. Background 

EB is payable in a State only during 

an EB period of unusually high 

unemployment in the State. Section 203 

of the Federal-State Extended 

Unemployment Compensation Act of 

1970 (EUCA), Public Law 91–373, 

provides methods for determining 

whether a State’s current 

unemployment situation qualifies as an 

EB period. EB periods are determined 

by ‘‘on’’ and ‘‘off’’ indicators (commonly 

referred to as triggers) in the State. 

Section 203(d), EUCA, provides for an 

‘‘on’’ indicator based on the insured 

unemployment rate (IUR). The IUR is 

computed weekly by the States using 

administrative data on State 

unemployment compensation claims 

filed and the total population of 

employed individuals covered by 

unemployment insurance. States trigger 

‘‘on’’ EB if the IUR trigger value for the 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
63860 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 

most recent 13-week period equals or 

exceeds 5 percent and equals or exceeds 

120 percent of the average of such 

trigger values for the corresponding 13- 

week period ending in each of the 

preceding two calendar years. The 

calculation of the relationship between 

the current rate and prior two years’ 

rates is commonly referred to as the 

‘‘look-back.’’ 

The Unemployment Compensation 

Amendments of 1992, Public Law 102– 

318, added Section 203(f), EUCA, to 

provide for an optional alternative 

indicator that States may use to trigger 

‘‘on’’ EB based on the TUR. That 

indicator requires that, for the most 

recent three months for which data for 

all States is published, the average TUR 

in the State (seasonally adjusted) for the 

most recent three-month period equals 

or exceeds 6.5 percent and the average 

TUR in the State (seasonally adjusted) 

equals or exceeds 110 percent of the 

average TUR for either or both of the 

corresponding three-month periods in 

the two preceding calendar years (lookback). The 1992 amendments also 

provided for a calculation of a ‘‘high 

unemployment period’’ when the TUR 

in a State equals or exceeds 8 percent 

and meets the 110 percent look-back 

described above, permitting the 

payment of additional weeks of EB. 

Section 203(f)(3), EUCA, provides that 

‘‘determinations of the rate of total 

unemployment in any State for any 

period . . . shall be made by the 

Secretary.’’ An EB period ends when the 

state no longer meets any of the ‘‘on’’ 

triggers provided for in State law. 

Regulations at 20 CFR 615 implement 

the provisions of EUCA relating to the 

IUR indicators, including how they will 

be computed. The regulation, at 20 CFR 

615.12, explains the IUR triggers and 

how the rates are computed. The 

regulation does not address the TUR 

indicator although the Department 

issued UIPLs No. 45–92 and No. 16–11, 

respectively, addressing the TUR 

indicator and its computation. To 

conform our regulations to current 

practice, the Department is issuing this 

proposed rule to describe how the TUR 

indicators are computed for purposes of 

determining whether a State meets the 

110 percent look-back requirements. 

In the absence of explicit guidance 

and regulation, the Department 

previously adapted a portion of the 

existing guidance for the IUR look-back 

as a basis for calculating the TUR lookback. Specifically, in computing the 

look-back percentage for the TUR trigger 

the procedure for determining the 

number of significant digits from the 

resulting fraction followed 20 CFR 

615.12(c)(3). 

The TUR indicator uses total 

unemployment rates determined by the 

Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). These 

rates are measured using sampled data 

and therefore are imprecise due to 

sampling error. TUR measured by BLS 

can be lower or higher than the true 

levels of unemployment and there is no 

systematic tendency in estimation. In 

order to ensure to the extent possible 

that the TUR indicator is measured with 

total unemployment rates that reflect 

the true levels of unemployment that 

can be often higher than the rates 

measured by BLS, the Department has 

determined that an appropriate 

methodology for computing the lookback on the TUR indicator is to switch 

from truncation to rounding to the 

nearest hundredth, or second decimal 

place. Additionally, rounding, rather 

than truncating, is consistent with BLS 

practices in treating the TUR data. UIPL 

No. 16–11, dated May 20, 2011, 

informed the SWAs that the full effect 

of this new rounding procedure was 

implemented retroactive to April 16, 

2011. 

The Tax Relief, Unemployment 

Insurance Reauthorization, and Job 

Creation Act of 2010, Section 502, 

permitted States to amend State law in 

order to make determinations of 

whether there is an ‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off’’ 

indicator by comparing current 

unemployment rates to the 

unemployment rates for the 

corresponding period in the three 

preceding years. Authority to use this 

three-year look-back applies only for 

weeks of unemployment beginning after 

December 17, 2010, and ending on or 

before December 31, 2013. 

General 

Section 3304(a)(11) of the Federal 

Unemployment Tax Act (26 U.S.C. 3301 

et seq.) (FUTA) requires, as a condition 

of employers in States receiving credits 

against the Federal unemployment tax, 

that the States’ unemployment 

compensation laws provide for the 

payment of extended unemployment 

compensation during periods of high 

unemployment to eligible individuals. 

EUCA established the EB Program by 

which, if certain conditions are met in 

a State under its law, extended 

unemployment compensation is 

provided to workers in the State who 

have exhausted their regular 

compensation during a period of high 

unemployment referred to as an EB 

period. EUCA provides methods for 

determining whether an EB period 

exists in the State. These methods are 

referred to as ‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off’’ indicators. 

There were two ‘‘on’’ and ‘‘off’’ 

indicators in existence before the 

enactment of the UC Amendments. 

These indicators were based on the IUR. 

The IUR indicator’s trigger value is, 

under section 203(e) of EUCA, the ratio 

of the average number of unemployment 

claims filed in a State during the most 

recent 13 weeks to the average monthly 

number of employed individuals 

covered by UC in that State during the 

first four of the last six completed 

calendar quarters. The first indicator has 

two conditions which must be met and 

is required to be in State law. Under 

section 203(d) of EUCA, the EB Program 

is activated if a State’s IUR trigger value 

(first condition) is at least 5 percent 

(referred to as the regular IUR trigger 

threshold with ‘‘look-back’’), and is at 

least 120 percent of the average of the 

trigger values in the prior two years for 

the corresponding 13-week calendar 

periods (second condition). The second 

condition—that the most recent 13-week 

period must be at least 120 percent of 

the average of the corresponding periods 

in the last two years—is commonly 

referred to as the ‘‘look-back’’ provision. 

The Tax Relief, Unemployment 

Insurance Reauthorization, and Job 

Creation Act of 2010, Public Law 111– 

312, allowed States to temporarily 

modify provisions in their EB laws to 

use the prior three years in applying the 

look-back. The look-back provision 

supports activation of a State’s EB 

Program only when the current 

unemployment rate is both high and 

increasing, which indicates that the 

State’s labor market is worsening and 

additional compensation is warranted. 

Under the second indicator, which is an 

option for a State, section 203(d) of 

EUCA provides the EB Program may be 

triggered ‘‘on’’ with an IUR trigger value 

of at least 6 percent regardless of its 

relation to the IUR trigger values in the 

preceding two years. The 6 percent 

value is referred to as the regular IUR 

trigger threshold without look-back. 

Alternative Indicator 

The UC Amendments amended the 

EUCA to permit States to adopt an 

alternative indicator based on the TUR 

to trigger ‘‘on’’ and ‘‘off’’ the EB 

Program. Specifically, paragraph (f) of 

section 203 of EUCA provides for a TUR 

indicator comprised of a Trigger Value 

and look-back provision. The Trigger 

Value for this indicator is the threemonth average of seasonally adjusted 

TURs for the most recent three months 

for which data for all States is 

published. The regular TUR trigger 

threshold is 6.5 percent. The look-back 

provision requires that the Trigger Value 

equals or exceeds 110 percent of the 

TUR Trigger Values for either or both of 

the corresponding three-month periods 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 63861 

in the two preceding calendar years (the 

Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance 

Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 

2010, Pub. L. 111–312, allowed States to 

temporarily modify provisions in their 

EB laws to use the prior three years in 

applying the look-back). The TUR 

Trigger Value is determined by the 

Department based on data from BLS. 

As with the IUR indicator, the lookback provision ensures that the State’s 

TUR Trigger Value is both high and 

increasing, indicating that the State’s 

labor market is worsening and 

additional compensation is warranted. 

A State will trigger ‘‘off’’ its EB Program 

when either the TUR Trigger Value falls 

below 6.5 percent, or the requirements 

pertaining to the look-back provision are 

not satisfied. 

Regardless of whether a State’s EB 

Program is triggered ‘‘on’’ based on the 

IUR or TUR indicators, sections 

203(d)(2) and 203(f)(1)(B) of EUCA 

provide that the EB period is triggered 

‘‘off’ when the conditions supporting 

the activation of the EB Program are no 

longer satisfied. Additionally, when the 

program triggers ‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off’’ EB 

payments, it must remain in the new 

status (‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off’’ EB payments) for 

a minimum of 13 weeks regardless of 

changes in future trigger values. 

The Department implemented EUCA’s 

provisions on the IUR indicator at 20 

CFR part 615, published in 53 FR 27928, 

Jul. 25, 1988. The Department 

implemented the alternative TUR 

indicator provided by the UC 

Amendments through guidance on 

August 31, 1993 (UIPL No. 45–92). The 

Department now proposes to place the 

TUR indicator into regulations. 

Payments of Additional Weeks of 

Extended Benefits 

The UC Amendments provided that 

States electing to use the new TUR 

indicator must also provide for the 

payment of additional weeks of EB 

during a ‘‘high unemployment period’’ 

that occurs during an EB period. These 

additional weeks of EB are available if 

State law provides for the use of the 

alternative TUR indicator. 

Consistent with EUCA § 203(b)(1), no 

EB period or high unemployment period 

may begin in any State by reason of a 

State ‘‘on’’ indicator before the 13-week 

minimum status period expires after the 

ending of a prior EB period with respect 

to such State. Conversely, no EB period 

or high unemployment period may end 

in any State by reason of a State ‘‘off’’ 

indicator before the 13-week minimum 

status period expires after the beginning 

of an EB period with respect to such 

State. 

EUCA originally provided for the 

establishment of an EB account, and the 

amount in the account is the least of one 

of three amounts which is payable for 

regular extended compensation. The UC 

amendments added a new paragraph to 

section 202(b) of EUCA that increases 

the amount in these accounts during a 

high unemployment period. The 

amount payable in a high 

unemployment period is equal to 

whichever of the following is the least 

and is referred to as ‘‘high 

unemployment extended 

compensation’’: 

—80 percent (as opposed to 50 percent 

in a ‘‘normal’’ EB period) of the total 

amount of regular UC (including 

dependent’s allowances) payable to 

the individual during the benefit year; 

—20 (as opposed to 13) times the 

individual’s weekly benefit amount; 

or 

—46 (as opposed to 39) times the 

individual’s weekly benefit amount, 

reduced by the regular UC paid (or 

deemed paid) during the benefit year. 

The term ‘‘high unemployment 

period’’ is defined in Section 

202(b)(3)(B), EUCA, as any period 

during which an EB Program would be 

in effect if the TUR indicator equaled or 

exceeded 8 percent and the TUR 

indicator equals or exceeds 110 percent 

of the TUR indicators for either or both 

the corresponding three-month periods 

in the two previous calendar years. 

Whether a high unemployment period 

exists in a State for a particular week is 

determined in accordance with 

provisions of State law implementing 

sections 202(b)(3) and 203(f) of EUCA 

and the seasonally-adjusted TUR 

indicator determined by BLS. When this 

determination is made, the State follows 

the requirements of sections 203(a) and 

(b) of EUCA for determining the first 

and last week for which high 

unemployment EB is payable. 

Specifically, a high unemployment EB 

period begins on the first day of the 

third calendar week after the TUR 

indicator requirements are satisfied, and 

ends on the last day of the third week 

after the first week for which the TUR 

indicator requirements are not met. 

However, as stated above, no EB period 

or high unemployment period may 

begin in any State by reason of a State 

‘‘on’’ indicator before the 13-week 

minimum status period expires after the 

ending of a prior EB period with respect 

to such State. 

Alternative Indicator Rounding 

Methodology 

Before April 16, 2011, in absence of 

explicit statutory guidance and 

regulation, the Department adapted a 

portion of the requirement (in 20 CFR 

615.12) for calculating the look-back 

percentage for the IUR indicator as a 

basis for determining the significant 

number of digits from the look-back 

percentage for the TUR indicator. 

Specifically, the quotient is computed to 

two decimal places and multiplied by 

100 with all numbers to the right of the 

decimal point being dropped (known as 

‘‘truncation’’). The result is expressed as 

a percentage. 

The UC Amendments provide for a 

State to trigger ‘‘on’’ EB using the TURs 

determined by BLS. As discussed above, 

because the TUR indicator uses 

unemployment rates determined by BLS 

using sampled data, the rates are 

imprecise due to sampling error. Total 

unemployment rates measured by the 

BLS can be lower or higher than the true 

levels of unemployment and there is no 

systematic tendency in estimation. In 

order to ensure to the extent possible 

that the TUR indicator is measured with 

total unemployment rates that reflect 

the true levels of unemployment that 

can be often higher than the rates 

measured by the BLS, the Department 

has determined that an appropriate 

methodology for computing the lookback on the TUR indicator is to switch 

from truncation to rounding to the 

nearest hundredth. In contrast, the IUR 

indicator values are computed from 

administrative data and thus represent 

the full universe. Because of these 

differences in the calculation of the 

insured and total unemployment rates, 

on May 20, 2011 the Department 

announced, in UIPL No. 16–11, that an 

appropriate methodology for computing 

the look-back percentage for the TUR 

indicator is to switch from truncation at 

the second decimal place to rounding to 

the second decimal place. 

UIPL No. 16–11 informed States of the 

new rounding methodology the 

Department now employs when 

computing the current trigger rate as a 

percent of the comparable trigger rates 

in prior years for the TUR indicator. 

Since TURs have been rounded, an 

expression of a ratio of two TURs must 

also be rounded. 

On a monthly basis, the three-month 

average of the seasonally adjusted TUR 

is divided by the same measure for the 

corresponding three months in each of 

the applicable two prior years (the Tax 

Relief, Unemployment Insurance 

Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 

2010, Pub. L. 111–312, allowed States to 

temporarily modify provisions in their 

EB laws to use the prior three years in 

applying the look-back). The resulting 

decimal fraction is then rounded to the 

hundredths place (the second digit to 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
63862 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 

the right of the decimal place). The 

resulting number is multiplied by 100, 

reported as an integer, and compared to 

the statutory threshold to determine if 

the State triggers ‘‘on’’ EB. UIPL No. 16– 

11 informed the SWAs that the full 

effect of this new rounding procedure 

was implemented retroactive to April 

16, 2011. 

II. Section-by-Section Review of the 

Proposed Rule 

We propose to update 20 CFR part 

615 so that it includes the TUR 

indicator. In addition, in updating Part 

615 to incorporate the TUR indicator, 

we propose to incorporate the rounding 

method adopted for the look-back. We 

also propose technical amendments to 

this part to update its provisions since 

the last regulatory revision and to 

correct minor errors in the text of the 

rule. 

First, we propose replacing all uses of 

the term ‘‘the Act’’ with ‘‘EUCA’’ to 

mean the Federal-State Extended 

Unemployment Compensation Act of 

1970. Additionally, we propose to 

replace all instances of the term 

‘‘Extended Benefits’’ with ‘‘extended 

unemployment compensation’’ to mean 

the funds actually paid out to UI 

recipients and to avoid confusion. 

We propose to amend § 615.1 

(Purpose) by clarifying that FUTA, 26 

U.S.C. 3304(a)(11), requires, as a 

condition of tax offset, that States’ 

unemployment compensation laws 

provide for the payment of extended 

unemployment compensation during 

periods of high unemployment to 

eligible individuals. We also propose to 

revise § 615.1 by deleting the reference 

to Extended Benefits and the Extended 

Benefit program at the end of the section 

to avoid confusion with the proposed 

definition of Extended Benefits in 

§ 615.2 (Definitions). 

We propose to amend 615.2 

(Definitions) by adding several new 

definitions for clarity and to implement 

parts of EUCA in the regulation. 

Furthermore, while ‘‘EUCA’’ is a new 

definition, it merely replaces ‘‘Act’’ as a 

defined term. The new definitions we 

propose to add to § 615.2 follow. 

Extended benefit period means the 

weeks during which extended 

compensation is payable in a State in 

accordance with § 615.11 (Extended 

Benefit Period or High Unemployment 

Period). 

Extended Benefits Program, or EB 

Program, means the entire program 

under which monetary payments are 

made to workers who have exhausted 

their regular compensation including 

during a high unemployment period. In 

contrast, ‘‘extended compensation’’ 

refers narrowly to the actual monetary 

payment made to individuals eligible 

for benefits under the EB Program. 

Under the EB Program, an individual 

may be eligible to receive payments 

under distinct statutory entitlements, 

which the statute refers to as ‘‘plans,’’ 

‘‘programs,’’ or ‘‘criteria,’’ that comprise 

the EB Program. For example, the 

regular EB Program can provide for 

compensation up to 50 percent of the 

benefit amount claimants were eligible 

for in the regular UI program. For States 

in a high unemployment period, the EB 

Program can provide for compensation 

up to 80 percent of the benefit amount 

claimants were eligible for in the regular 

compensation. 

Extended compensation account is 

the account established for each 

individual claimant for the payment of 

regular extended compensation or high 

extended compensation. 

Extended unemployment 

compensation means the funds actually 

paid out to UI recipients. To avoid 

confusion, we propose to replace all 

instances of the term ‘‘Extended 

Benefits’’ with ‘‘extended 

unemployment compensation.’’ 

High unemployment extended 

compensation means the benefits 

payable to an otherwise eligible 

individual for weeks of unemployment 

which begin in a high unemployment 

period, under those provisions of a State 

law which satisfy the requirements of 

EUCA and this part with respect to the 

payment of extended unemployment 

compensation, and, when so payable, 

includes compensation payable under 5 

U.S.C. chapter 85, but does not include 

regular compensation or additional 

compensation. Regular extended 

compensation (as defined in this 

section), together with high 

unemployment extended compensation, 

comprise Extended compensation. 

High unemployment period (HUP) 

means a period where the Department 

determines that the Trigger Value in a 

State, which has enacted the alternative 

TUR trigger in law, for the most recent 

three months for which data for all 

States is published, equals or exceeds 8 

percent, and such Trigger Value equals 

or exceeds 110 percent of such Trigger 

Values for either or both of the 

corresponding three-month periods 

ending in the two preceding calendar 

years (the Tax Relief, Unemployment 

Insurance Reauthorization, and Job 

Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111–312, 

allowed States to temporarily modify 

provisions in their EB laws to use the 

prior three years in applying the lookback). If a State triggers ‘‘on’’ to a HUP, 

it must remain ‘‘on’’ for at least 13 

weeks; if it triggers ‘‘off’’ a HUP, it must 

remain in a mandatory ‘‘off’’ period for 

at least 13 weeks. 

Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR) 

means the percentage derived by 

dividing the average weekly number of 

individuals filing claims for regular 

compensation in a State for weeks of 

unemployment in the most recent 

thirteen-consecutive-week period as 

determined by the State on the basis of 

State reports to the Secretary, by the 

average monthly employment covered 

under State law for the first four of the 

most recent six completed calendar 

quarters before the end of such 13- 

consecutive-week period. 

Regular extended compensation 

means the benefits payable to an 

otherwise eligible individual for weeks 

of unemployment which begin in an EB 

Period, under those provisions of a State 

law which satisfy the requirements of 

EUCA for the payment of extended 

unemployment compensation, and, 

when so payable, includes 

compensation payable under 5 U.S.C. 

chapter 85, but does not include regular 

compensation or additional 

compensation. Regular extended 

compensation, together with high 

unemployment extended compensation, 

comprises the monetary benefits 

payable under the Extended Benefits 

program. 

Regular EB period means a period 

during which a state is triggered ‘‘on’’ 

the EB Program because either the 

mandatory or optional IUR indicator 

satisfies the criteria to be ‘‘on’’ and the 

state is not in a 13-week mandatory 

‘‘off’’ period; or the state is triggered 

‘‘on’’ the EB Program because the TUR 

indicator’s Trigger Value is both at least 

6.5 percent, and at least 110 percent of 

the Trigger Value for the comparable 

three months in either of the prior two 

years. 

Total Unemployment Rate means the 

number of unemployed individuals in a 

State (seasonally adjusted) divided by 

the civilian labor force (seasonally 

adjusted) in the State for the same 

period. The calculation uses BLS data. 

Trigger Value or average rate of total 

unemployment means the ratio 

computed by adding three consecutive 

months of the level of seasonally 

adjusted unemployment in a State for 

the numerator and adding for the same 

consecutive three months the level of 

the seasonally adjusted civilian labor 

force in the State for the denominator. 

This ratio is an optional indicator used 

for triggering States ‘‘on’’ and ‘‘off’’ the 

EB Program and is added in 

§ 615.12(e)(2)–(e)(3)). 

In addition to these proposed new 

definitions, we propose to revise the 

existing definitions (with citations to 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 63863 

current regulations included), primarily 

for consistency: 

• 615.2(a)—We propose to revise the 

definition of Act by replacing it with 

EUCA. EUCA means the Federal-State 

Extended Unemployment Compensation 

Act of 1970, Public Law 91–373, 84 Stat. 

708 (codified in 26 U.S.C. 3304, note), 

as amended. We propose to replace all 

instances of the term ‘‘the Act’’ with 

‘‘EUCA.’’ 

• 615.2(c)(2)—We propose to revise 

the definition of ‘‘Applicable benefit 

year’’ to incorporate the concept that an 

individual’s EB claims may expire in 

either a regular EB period or a high 

unemployment period; 

• 615.2(j)(2)—We propose to revise 

the definition of ‘‘Department’’ to 

update the Secretary’s Orders which 

delegate authority under EUCA from the 

Secretary of Labor to the Assistant 

Secretary for Employment and Training. 

Specifically, we propose to insert 

Secretary’s Order No. 6–2010 (75 FR 

66268) and delete Secretary’s Order No. 

4–75 (40 FR 18515) and Secretary’s 

Order No. 14–75 in the definition 

because Secretary’s Order No. 6–2010 is 

the most up-to-date order delegating 

authority to the Assistant Secretary for 

Employment and Training under EUCA. 

• 615.2(g)—We propose to revise the 

definition of ‘‘extended compensation’’ 

to mean the funds payable to an 

individual for weeks of unemployment 

which begin in an extended benefit 

period or high unemployment period, 

under those provisions of a State law 

which satisfy the requirements of 

EUCA, and, when so payable, includes 

compensation payable under 5 U.S.C. 

chapter 85 (unemployment 

compensation for former Federal 

employees and ex-servicememebers), 

but does not include regular 

compensation or additional 

compensation. Throughout the current 

20 CFR 615, the term ‘‘extended benefits 

‘‘refers to both the program as a whole, 

and the benefits payable to claimants. 

The new terminology clarifies that for 

the purposes of this regulation, 

Extended Benefits refers to the whole 

program while extended compensation 

refers to benefits payable to claimants. 

• 615.2(h)—We propose to revise the 

definition of ‘‘Eligibility Period’’ to 

include references to a high 

unemployment period, in addition to 

the existing references to an EB period 

which we propose amending to ‘‘regular 

EB period.’’ 

• 615.2(i)—We propose to revise 

paragraph (1) of the definition of 

‘‘Sharable Compensation’’ by replacing 

the phrase ‘‘extended benefits’’ with 

‘‘extended compensation’’ to be 

consistent with proposed amendments 

made throughout the regulation text, 

and to clarify that this refers to the 

availability of up to 50 percent of the 

compensation available to the claimant 

in the regular program. In paragraph 

(1)(ii) of this definition, we propose 

replacing the phrase ‘‘extended 

benefits’’ with ‘‘regular extended 

compensation’’ to be consistent. We 

propose to add a new paragraph (2) to 

this definition that defines how the 

entitlement for an individual claimant is 

computed in the EB Program when the 

State has enacted the optional TUR 

indicator and the State is in a high 

unemployment period. Because of this 

proposed paragraph addition, we further 

propose to renumber what were 

paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 615.2(i) 

as paragraphs (3) and (4). 

• 615.2(m)—We propose to revise the 

definition of ‘‘Week’’ by replacing the 

word ‘‘benefits’’ with the term 

‘‘compensation.’’ Further, we propose to 

add the phrase ‘‘calendar week’’ to 

clarify that the time period used to 

compute trigger values may differ from 

a week as defined in State law for 

program implementation purposes. 

• 615.2(o)—Current § 615.2(o) defines 

a variety of terms used in operation of 

the EB Program. Section 615.2(o) makes 

a reference to section 202(a)(3) of EUCA. 

However, within the definitions in 

paragraphs (o)(1) through (o)(8), there 

are more specific citations to EUCA that 

render the general citation to 202(a)(3) 

in the header unnecessary. Therefore, 

we propose to remove the citation to 

section 202(a)(3) of EUCA in § 615.2(o) 

for clarity. In the definition for the 

‘‘Provisions of the applicable State law’’ 

in § 615.2(o)(7), we propose to replace 

the citation to Trade Act section 236(e) 

with section 236(d). Section 236(e) 

discusses ‘‘suitable employment.’’ Since 

the reference is to training in paragraph 

(o)(7), we propose to cite 236(d) which 

discusses training under the Trade Act. 

Similarly, in paragraph (o)(8)(v) of 

§ 615.2, which describes the 

requirements and conditions under 

which a claimant is entitled to extended 

compensation, we propose to replace 

the citation to Trade Act ‘‘section 

236(e)’’ with ‘‘section 236(d).’’ Section 

236(e) of the Trade Act refers to a 

definition of ‘‘suitable work.’’ Section 

236(d) refers to an adversely affected 

worker not being determined to be 

ineligible or disqualified because of 

training or other reasons. The change in 

section reference from section 236(e) to 

236(d) is made because section 236(d) is 

the proper reference as discussed above 

to the Trade Act in this paragraph. 

Furthermore, the proposed rule 

amends the existing definitions by 

removing the separate paragraph 

designations and re-ordering the 

definitions in alphabetical order for 

clarity. This proposed change makes 

any future amendments to the 

definitions easier to implement by 

removing concerns of paragraph citation 

changes. 

We propose to revise § 615.7 

(Extended Benefits; maximum amount) 

to include a reference to a high 

unemployment period to incorporate a 

term necessitated by the addition of the 

TUR indicator, in addition to the 

existing reference to an EB period. In 

§ 615.7(b), we propose to create a new 

paragraph (b)(3) to describe the method 

for computing the total monetary 

entitlement for claimants during a high 

unemployment period. Also, in 

paragraph (b)(2), we include a note 

providing how a State must re-compute 

the monetary eligibility of claimants at 

the conclusion of a high unemployment 

period if the State returns to a regular 

EB payable period. Also, we propose to 

replace all instances of the word 

‘‘totalling’’ with ‘‘totaling,’’ to correct a 

minor spelling error including instances 

in paragraphs (f)(1) and (g)(2). 

In § 615.8(e)(5)(iii), we propose to 

move the phrase ‘‘without regard to any 

exemption’’ from the middle of the 

sentence to the end, and also add the 

phrase ‘‘elsewhere in those laws’’ after 

it. This change would enhance clarity. 

In § 615.8(f)(2)(i), we propose to 

remove the reference to the acronym 

‘‘SUB’’ as it refers to ‘‘supplemental 

unemployment benefits’’ as defined in 

the Internal Revenue Code. The Internal 

Revenue Code definition has changed 

the wording of ‘‘supplemental 

unemployment benefits’’ to 

‘‘supplemental unemployment 

compensation benefits’’ (as defined in 

section 501(c)(17)(D)) of the Internal 

Revenue Code of 1986). Therefore, the 

acronym SUB is no longer correct. In 

paragraph (f)(2)(iii), we propose to add 

to the paragraph the phrase ‘‘or any 

applicable State or local minimum 

wage’’ after ‘‘the Fair Labor Standards 

Act of 1938’’ and before ‘‘without regard 

to any exemption elsewhere in those 

laws.’’ We propose this change to clarify 

that State minimum wage laws apply 

instead of Federal minimum wage laws 

in this instance. 

We propose to revise paragraphs 

615.8(h)(3)and (h)(4) to to add 

requirements that States must, 

respectively, inform claimants that they 

are required to apply for and accept 

suitable work, and inform claimants 

when they are disqualified for failing to 

apply for, to accept, or to actively seek 

work. This amendment would call 

attention to State responsibility to help 

ensure claimants understand their 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
63864 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 

responsibility to seek and accept 

suitable employment. 

We propose to revise § 615.11 

(Extended Benefit Periods) to include a 

reference to a high unemployment 

period (HUP), in addition to the existing 

reference to an EB period. We further 

propose to add, for clarity, that a 

payable period may not begin before the 

date of the most recent data released for 

the purposes of triggering States ‘‘on’’ 

and ‘‘off.’’ In addition, we propose to 

add, for clarity, two new paragraphs (e) 

and (f), to provide explicit guidance on 

which trigger values, the TUR indicator 

and the IUR indicator, will determine 

the status of the EB Program when 

States are concluding mandatory ‘‘on’’ 

and ‘‘off’’ periods. This is necessary 

because of differences in timing of the 

release of the different trigger values as 

there may be instances when one is 

‘‘on’’ and the other is ‘‘off’’ and this can 

be confusing. 

Specifically, proposed paragraph (e) 

provides details on determining when a 

State may continue an extended benefit 

period beyond the 13-week mandatory 

‘‘on’’ period. Proposed paragraph (e)(1) 

explains that if the IUR indicator 

triggers ‘‘off’’ by the end of the 13-week 

mandatory status period, but the TUR 

indicator triggers on by the 11th week 

of the 13-week period, then the 

extended benefit period continues. 

Proposed paragraph (e)(2) explains a 

similar scenario but, instead, the TUR 

indicator triggers ‘‘off’’ by the end of the 

13-week mandatory status period and 

the IUR indicator triggers ‘‘on’’ by the 

11th week of the 13-week period, 

allowing the extended benefit period to 

continue. 

Proposed paragraph (f) explains that a 

State will remain in a mandatory 13- 

week ‘‘off’’ period if the IUR indicator 

triggers ‘‘off’’ by the 11th week of the 

13-week period and the TUR indicator 

triggers ‘‘off’’ for at least 3 weeks before 

the last week of the mandatory 13-week 

‘‘off’’ period. 

Section 615.11(b), (c), and (d) would 

be amended to clarify that if a state 

enters a changed EB Program status, it 

remains in that changed status for at 

least 13 weeks even though an indicator 

may show the state satisfies the 

requirements for the status to be 

changed. The amendments also would 

provide guidance on what is the status 

of the EB Program in a state when 

different indicators reflect different EB 

Program status. 

Section 615.12 (Determination of 

‘‘on’’ and ‘‘off’’ indicators) describes the 

criteria for determining when States will 

begin and end payable periods in the EB 

Program, and the revisions to this 

section reflect the Department’s primary 

purpose in the NPRM, as noted above, 

to incorporate the TUR indicator and 

the methodology used for rounding in 

the look-back calculation. Accordingly, 

the proposed revisions largely function 

to update the regulations so that they 

accurately reflect the amendments to 

EUCA that were enacted in 1992 in the 

UC Amendments. 

We propose to replace the phrase 

‘‘standard State indicators’’ with 

‘‘required State indicators’’ in the title of 

paragraph 615.12(a) and the text of 

paragraph 615.12(a)(3) to more clearly 

reflect their mandatory nature, and to 

differentiate them from the optional 

indicators. The remaining triggers will 

continue to be described as optional 

triggers, with no change from the 

existing language. 

We propose to amend section 

615.12(a)(1) to clarify that revisions to 

BLS TUR data after the initial release 

will not change EB Program status once 

it has been determined using the 

initially released TUR data. 

We propose to add paragraph 

615.12(d)(3) to establish in these 

regulations a requirement that a state 

adopting an optional indicator may not 

enter into an ‘‘on’’ period before the 

later of the date of adoption of the 

indicator or its effective date. Further, 

an adopted optional indicator remains 

effective until the effective date cited in 

state law of repeal of the optional 

trigger. The current regulations do not 

prohibit implementation of an optional 

indicator on a date in the past, and this 

change does so. The IUR, defined at 20 

CFR 615.12, is a weekly measure, so 

there is no ambiguity about which IUR 

measure should be used for each week’s 

trigger value determinations. However, 

the monthly publication of TUR 

indicators means that it is not always 

clear which monthly rate should be 

used at the conclusion of a mandatory 

‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off’’ period when monthly 

releases of the TUR Trigger Values 

during the mandatory period show a 

change in status. The proposed 

amended language in § 615.12 clarifies 

which monthly TUR Trigger Value is to 

be used. 

TUR indicators are estimated and 

published monthly. The trigger notice 

published by the Department for any 

given week will show the most recent 

TUR indicator for each State. For 

consistency with paragraphs (a) and (b) 

of 20 CFR 615.12, the TUR indicator 

impacts the beginning and ending of EB 

periods in the third week following the 

release of a new TUR Trigger Value, i.e., 

an ‘‘on’’ period begins at the beginning 

of the third week following the TUR 

Trigger Value release if it equals or 

exceeds the TUR trigger threshold and 

satisfies the look-back condition, and an 

‘‘off’’ period ends at the end of the third 

week if either Trigger Value falls below 

the TUR trigger threshold or the lookback condition is not met. If the State is 

in a 13-week mandatory ‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off’’ 

period, that status continues until the 

conclusion of the mandatory period. 

We propose to move paragraph 

615.12(e) and designate it as paragraph 

615.12(f) because the required notices in 

the re-designated paragraph 615.12(f) 

will apply to a new paragraph (e) that 

we propose to add and which is 

addressed below. Also, we propose to 

change instances of the word 

‘‘Department’’ to the word ‘‘Secretary’’ 

for clarity and to be consistent with the 

title of the re-designated paragraph (f), 

which is ‘‘Notice to Secretary.’’ 

We propose to add paragraph 

615.12(e) to implement section 203(f) of 

EUCA, which establishes the TUR 

indicator. Proposed paragraph 

615.12(e)(1) describes the 6.5 percent 

TUR threshold and how it is used to 

determine a State’s EB Program status. 

Proposed paragraph 615.12(e)(2) 

describes the 8.0 percent TUR threshold 

and how it is used to determine whether 

a State is in a high unemployment 

period, as defined in § 615.2 

(Definitions), that can lead to the 

payment of high unemployment 

extended compensation. 

Paragraph (e)(2)(ii) of § 615.12 sets 

forth the method for computing the 

look-back percentage for the TUR 

indicator (as explained in the 

‘‘Background’’) most recently conveyed 

in guidance to the States in UIPL No. 

16–11. As discussed above, when the 

TUR indicator option was added to 

EUCA, and later adopted by a number 

of States, the regulations were not 

revised to include explicit instructions 

for the computation of the TUR 

indicator or its look-back component. 

Section 203(e)(3) of EUCA, added by the 

UC Amendments, set the threshold rates 

(6.5 percent and 8 percent) and the lookback percentage (110 percent) necessary 

for a State to become eligible to pay 

benefits under this program. It did not 

specify whether the quotient computed 

for the look-back percentage should be 

rounded, or instead truncated, to two 

decimal places before multiplying by 

100 to obtain the look-back percentage. 

For the reasons discussed in the 

Background section above, we propose 

to use rounding to two decimal places 

before multiplying by 100 in calculating 

the TUR. 

Finally, we propose to update 

nomenclature to help clarify the 

differences that can exist between the 

indicators and the benefit periods. If a 

State, under its State law, meets either 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 63865 

1Executive Order No. 12866, § 6(a)(3)(B). 

2Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 

1992, Public Law 102–318 (1992). This law added 

Section 203(f) to EUCA to provide for an optional 

alternative indicator that States may use to trigger 

‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off’’ EB based on the total unemployment 

rate. EUCA originally provided for an ‘‘on’’ 

indicator based only on the IUR. EUCA, § 203(d)– 

(e). 

of two criteria under the IUR indicator 

or the criterion using the 6.5 percent 

TUR Trigger Value, it will begin a 

‘‘regular EB period,’’ and provide 

benefits referred to as ‘‘regular extended 

compensation.’’ Similarly, if a State, 

under its State law, meets the criterion 

using the 8.0 percent TUR Trigger 

Value, it will begin a ‘‘high 

unemployment period,’’ and provide 

‘‘high unemployment extended 

compensation’’ as described above. 

Section 615.13 (Announcement of the 

beginning and ending of Extended 

Benefit Periods) provides for public 

notice of the start and end of payable 

periods in the EB Program. We propose 

to include a reference to a high 

unemployment period, in the title and 

individual sections, in addition to the 

existing reference to an EB period which 

would change to ‘‘EB payable period.’’ 

We propose to amend paragraph (a)(1) 

by adding that we will publish in a 

Federal Register notice any change in a 

State’s ‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off’’ status for the EB 

Program as determined by the TUR 

indicator. This is consistent with the 

current practice of publishing EB 

Program status changes determined by 

the IUR indicator. 

The proposed amendments to 

paragraph (b) require the States to notify 

the public through their local media, a 

procedure that is better suited given 

States’ knowledge of their jurisdictions. 

In paragraph (b), we propose to split the 

single existing requirement for public 

notification into three paragraphs. 

Proposed paragraph (b)(1) requires 

notification from States that trigger ‘‘on’’ 

or ‘‘off’’ via the IUR indicator. Proposed 

paragraph (b)(2) requires notification 

from States that trigger ‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off’’ via 

the TUR indicator. Proposed paragraph 

(b)(3) takes the existing requirements for 

public notification and applies them 

regardless of the indicator that caused 

the State to trigger ‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off.’’ The 

requirements of new paragraph (b) 

would ensure that all requirements for 

public notification will be met 

regardless of how the State begins or 

ends a payable period in the EB 

Program. 

In § 615.14 (Payments to States), we 

propose to include a reference to a high 

unemployment period, in addition to 

amending the existing reference to ‘‘EB 

period’’ to ‘‘extended benefit period.’’ In 

addition, references to ‘‘Extended 

Benefits’’ would be changed to 

‘‘extended compensation’’ in order to 

eliminate inconsistencies and to clarify 

meaning. In paragraph (b), we reduce 

the burden on the reader by providing 

the specific sections of 20 CFR part 615 

with which States must comply in order 

to receive the Federal share of 

compensation provided, rather than cite 

the pertinent sections of EUCA. This 

amendment eliminates the need for the 

reader to consult a separate document to 

determine the requirements a State must 

enforce in order to receive payment for 

the Federal share of compensation paid. 

In § 615.15 (Records and reports), we 

propose to revise paragraphs (a) and (b) 

for clarity by deleting unnecessary 

language regarding the Secretary’s 

authority to request EB Program reports 

and to appoint audit officials for those 

reports. Furthermore, we propose to 

delete paragraphs (c) and (d) which 

were not required by EUCA, but by 42 

U.S.C. 503(a)(6). The reporting 

instructions for the proper and timely 

submission of data are provided in ET 

Handbook No. 401, which governs UC 

required reporting. The ET Handbook is 

a more effective way to communicate 

reporting requirements because 

codifying the reporting requirements in 

paragraphs (c) and (d) of the regulation 

prevents the Department from adapting 

reporting instructions to changing 

conditions or needs. Furthermore, 

paragraph (d) existed during the 

implementation phase of the IUR 

indicator to ensure that States were 

consistent and comparable in their 

methods. With 30 years of experience, 

as well as numerous data validation and 

data quality programs in effect, it is 

unnecessary to compel State 

administrators to provide this 

information. Current reporting 

guidelines contained in UIPLs are clear 

enough that States continue to have 

clear standards about which claims are 

used for constructing totals used to 

compute trigger values, thus permitting 

the deletion of this paragraph. 

Request for Comments 

The Department looks forward to 

receiving comments on the proposed 

changes discussed in the NPRM. 

III. Administrative Information 

Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 

Executive Orders (E.O.) 13563 and 

12866 direct agencies to assess all costs 

and benefits of available regulatory 

alternatives and, if regulation is 

necessary, to select regulatory 

approaches that maximize net benefits 

(including potential economic, 

environmental, public health and safety 

effects; distributive impacts; and 

equity). E.O. 13563 emphasizes the 

importance of quantifying both costs 

and benefits, reducing costs, 

harmonizing rules, and promoting 

flexibility. 

Section 3(f) of E.O. 12866 defines a 

‘‘significant regulatory action’’ as an 

action that is likely to result in a rule 

that: (1) Has an annual effect on the 

economy of $100 million or more or 

adversely and materially affects a sector 

of the economy, productivity, 

competition, jobs, the environment, 

public health or safety, or State, local or 

Tribal governments or communities 

(also referred to as ‘‘economically 

significant’’); (2) creates serious 

inconsistency or otherwise interferes 

with an action taken or planned by 

another agency; (3) materially alters the 

budgetary impacts of entitlement grants, 

user fees, or loan programs or the rights 

and obligations of recipients thereof; or 

(4) raises novel legal or policy issues 

arising out of legal mandates, the 

President’s priorities, or the principles 

set forth in E.O. 12866. Regarding item 

(4), any novel legal or policy issues 

raised by this rule do not arise from 

legal mandates, Presidential priorities, 

or the principles set forth in E.O. 12866. 

For a ‘‘significant regulatory action,’’ 

E.O. 12866 asks agencies to describe the 

need for the regulatory action and 

explain how the regulatory action will 

meet that need, as well as assess the 

costs and benefits of the regulation.1 In 

the Unemployment Compensation 

Amendments of 1992 (UC 

Amendments), Congress adopted an 

optional indicator for the existing EB 

Program that is based on both the level 

of the TUR Trigger Value and the 

percentage the Trigger Value is of 

Trigger Values in comparable periods in 

each of the prior years (referred to as the 

look-back).2 Although the TUR indicator 

was implemented in the early 1990s, 

there was never any regulation put in 

place defining its computation and its 

application. We now propose to 

establish regulations for the TUR 

indicator which would interpret the law 

related to the TUR indicator and clarify 

the computation of its look-back 

provision. As discussed in more detail 

in the Background section above, we 

propose to use rounding to calculate the 

TUR because it is consistent with the 

BLS’s calculation of unemployment 

rates. Based on the economic impact 

analysis that follows, the Department 

believes this is not an economically 

significant regulatory action. 

EUCA, as amended by the UC 

Amendments, requires two conditions 

be met for a TUR-based ‘‘on’’ indicator 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
63866 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 

3EUCA, § 202(b)(3)(B). Meeting the 6.5 percent 

TUR indicator permits eligible claimants to receive 

up to an additional 50 percent of their regular 

entitlement during an EB period. Meeting the 8.0 

percent indicator permits eligible claimant to 

receive up to a total of 80 percent of their regular 

entitlement during a high EB period. 

4EUCA provides that ‘‘determinations of the rate 

of total unemployment in any State for any period 

. . . shall be made by the Secretary.’’ EUCA, 

§ 203(f)(3). 

5The process of look-back calculation is done in 

the Division of Fiscal and Actuarial Services, 

Employment and Training Administration of the 

U.S. Department of Labor, using data from the 

Bureau of Labor Statistics which calculates the 

trigger values. The operational procedure will 

remain exactly the same as done previously by State 

and Federal staff. 

to occur in a State: (1) For the most 

recent three months for which data for 

all States is published, the three-month 

average seasonally-adjusted TUR in the 

State equals or exceeds 6.5 percent, and 

(2) that the Trigger Value equals or 

exceeds 110 percent of the Trigger 

Values for either or both of the 

corresponding three-month periods in 

the two preceding calendar years (lookback). (The Tax Relief, Unemployment 

Insurance Reauthorization, and Job 

Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111–312, 

allowed States to temporarily modify 

provisions in their EB laws to use the 

prior three years in applying the lookback.) The UC Amendments also 

provide for a ‘‘high unemployment 

period’’ when the TUR Trigger Value in 

a State equals or exceeds 8 percent and 

meets the 110 percent look-back 

described above, permitting the 

payment of additional weeks of 

compensation.3 States that want to use 

the optional TUR indicator must have 

authority under State law which may 

require States to enact legislation that 

implements the Federal requirements. 

An EB period ends when the State no 

longer meets any of the ‘‘on’’ 

requirements provided for in State law. 

Under the original methodology by 

which the Department determined the 

look-back criterion for the optional TUR 

indicator, the indicator’s Trigger Value 

was divided by the indicator’s Trigger 

Value for the comparable period in the 

preceding year and second preceding 

year. Digits beyond the hundredths 

place (the second digit to the right of the 

decimal place) in the resultant decimal 

fractions were truncated and the results 

multiplied by 100 to determine the 

percent the current indicator Trigger 

Value was of the indicator Trigger Value 

in the comparable periods in the prior 

years. If the result was greater than or 

equal to 110 for one of the fractions, the 

look-back criterion was met. This 

approach paralleled the method used for 

the IUR look-back computation 

established in regulations at 20 CFR 

615.12(c)(3); however, neither the law 

nor regulations specify the method for 

computing the TUR indicator lookback.4

We propose to change the method for 

computing the TUR look-back by 

rounding to the hundredths place, 

rather than truncating. The TUR 

indicator uses total unemployment rates 

determined by BLS. These rates are 

measured using sampled data and 

therefore are imprecise due to sampling 

error. TUR measured by BLS can be 

lower or higher than the true level of 

unemployment and there is no 

systematic tendency in estimation. In 

order to ensure to the extent possible 

that the TUR indicator is measured with 

total unemployment rates that reflect 

the true levels of unemployment that 

can be often higher than the rates 

measured by BLS, the Department has 

determined that an appropriate 

methodology for computing the lookback on the TUR indicator is to switch 

from truncation to rounding to the 

nearest hundredth, or second decimal 

place. In contrast, IUR indicators are 

computed from administrative data and 

thus represent the full universe. Because 

of these differences in the computation 

of the insured and total unemployment 

rates, the Department has determined 

that an appropriate methodology for 

computing the look-back for the TUR 

indicator is to switch from truncation at 

the second decimal place, to rounding 

to the second decimal place. Rounding, 

rather than truncating, is consistent 

with BLS practices for TUR data. UIPL 

No. 16–11, dated May 20, 2011, 

informed the SWAs that the full effect 

of this new rounding procedure was 

implemented retroactive to April 16, 

2011. 

Proposed Rounding Change in the TUR 

Look-Back Computation 

Where: 

Three Mo. SATUR = three-month average 

seasonally-adjusted total unemployment 

rate. 

Three Mo. SATUR (¥1) = three-month 

average seasonally-adjusted total 

unemployment rate for the 

corresponding period in the prior year 

period. 

Potential Impacts 

Changing the look-back 

computational method will have a 

marginal economic impact because of 

the new rounding method and no 

increased operational burden because it 

would result in no change in claimant 

behavior or in procedure from the 

existing process.5 The TUR indicator 

and new rounding method are currently 

implemented for the States to use; 

however, because we propose to 

implement in regulations the TUR 

indicator as well as the new rounding 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALSEP27OC14.001</GPH>
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 63867 

6See Office of Management and Budget, Circular 

A–4: Regulatory Analysis, p. 46 (Sept. 17, 2003), 

available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/

circulars_default. 

7State trigger months are the number of months 

during high unemployment periods (see notes to 

Table 1) multiplied by the number of States, i.e., 53. 

During non-recessionary the percentage would be 

even less and close to zero. Extended Benefit 

Program data is found in the DOL ETA–394 annual 

report. http://www.workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/

unemploy/hb394.asp. 

8An additional feature of the TUR trigger that 

should be noted is that for claims beginning after 

December, 2010, Congress added a third year to the 

look-back calculation, so that if for the most recent 

three-month period the TUR equals or exceeds 6.5 

percent (or 8.0 percent) and the average TUR in the 

State equals or exceeds 110 percent of the average 

TUR for any or all three of the corresponding threemonth periods in the three preceding calendar 

years, then EB will trigger ‘‘on.’’ Tax Relief, 

Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job 

Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111–312, § 502 (Dec. 

17, 2010). This feature expired on January 1, 2012, 

and was not included in the impact analysis. 

method for the TUR look-back, we offer 

estimates of both impacts. 

The UI program is a transfer payment 

program. For the purposes of a costbenefit analysis under E.O.s 13563 and 

12866, transfer payments are not 

considered a cost. Therefore, the 

analysis will be on the possible 

redistribution of wealth that may take 

place, as opposed to any impact on 

aggregate social welfare.6 In this case, 

the redistribution is primarily one that 

takes place over time rather than 

between groups. More specifically, the 

UI program is structured to act as a 

counter-cyclical program in terms of its 

impact on the economy—during 

recessions increased benefit payments 

(much higher than taxes paid) provide 

temporary income support and greater 

economic stimulus which prevents 

greater economic distress, while during 

expansions the program acts through 

higher taxes to lower overall 

employment and demand levels. 

Because a State whose Trigger Value 

meets or exceeds the threshold and 

whose look-back falls short of meeting 

the requirement by 0.05 percentage 

point or less would trigger ‘‘on’’ under 

the proposed rounding computation 

while under the truncation method 

would keep the State ‘‘off,’’ the 

proposed change would marginally 

increase extended compensation as the 

TUR Trigger Value increases in a 

recession. A change to increase the 

duration of benefits during recessions 

will ultimately increase the countercyclical nature of the program by 

increasing stimulus during recessions 

while slightly decreasing economic 

activity during expansions. Following is 

an impact analysis which estimates the 

change in the level and timing of the UI 

benefits paid and taxes collected as a 

result of the proposed change for the 

look-back provision of the TUR 

indicator. 

The actual future impacts of changing 

the look-back calculation on the flow of 

UI benefits and taxes are dependent 

upon the unemployment rate in relation 

to the TUR trigger threshold and the 

number of States that have actually 

implemented the optional TUR 

indicator. Historically, the proportion of 

months that the EB Program has been in 

effect was extremely low, due primarily 

to a relatively high threshold in relation 

to the level of unemployment, 

unwillingness by States to adopt the 

optional indicators, and Federal 

emergency benefit programs that at 

times can and have supplanted the EB 

Program. For example, on average for 

the 1991 and 2001 high unemployment 

periods, State indicators were ‘‘on’’ in 

roughly 3 percent of the State trigger 

months.7 In contrast, this past recession 

a high unemployment period (2007– 

2011) has been quite unique: in over 40 

percent of the State trigger months, the 

EB Program has been ‘‘on,’’ due 

primarily to the large number of States 

adopting the optional TUR indicator 

once the Federal Government began 

paying 100 percent of the costs (see 

Table 1). However, the low number of 

States permanently enacting the 

optional TUR indicator will cause the 

number of States triggering ‘‘on’’ to the 

EB Program in the future to return to the 

historically low levels once the full 

Federal funding expires. 

TABLE 1—HOW OFTEN THE EXTENDED BENEFIT PROGRAM IS ‘‘ON’’ 

High unemployment periods State trigger 

months 

State trigger 

months EB 

was ‘‘on’’ 

Percent of 

trigger months 

EB was ‘‘on’’ 

(percent) 

1991–1994 1 ................................................................................................................................. 2,226 111 5.0 

2001–2004 2 ................................................................................................................................. 2,438 38 1.4 

2007–2011 3 ................................................................................................................................. 2,392 1,055 44 

1Period begins in July 1991 and goes to Dec. 1994 to include the post recessionary period of high unemployment. 

2Period begins in Mar. 2001 and goes to Dec. 2004 to include the post recessionary period of high unemployment. 

3Period begins in Dec. 2007 and goes to Sept. 2011 to include the post recessionary period of high unemployment. 

Only seven States adopted the 

optional TUR indicator upon its 

introduction in 1993. Then from 1994 

through 2008, only four more States 

added the TUR indicator to their State 

law, bringing the number to 11 at the 

start of 2009 (see Table 2). The number 

of States implementing the optional 

TUR indicator and how often the EB 

Program is actually activated are critical 

pieces of information for estimating the 

impacts of the proposed look-back 

rounding methodology change. In 2009, 

as part of the American Recovery and 

Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act), the 

Federal government began paying 100 

percent of extended compensation and 

high unemployment extended 

compensation, so the number of States 

that adopted the optional TUR indicator 

went up to 38 in 2009, then 39 in 2011.8

All of the 28 States that adopted the 

TUR indicator post-Recovery Act 

instituted the TUR indicator on a 

temporary basis—for as long as the 

Federal government was paying 100 

percent of the compensation for the EB 

Program. Therefore, the number of 

States that are expected to continue 

using the TUR indicator is anticipated 

to decrease back to 11 when the Federal 

financing provisions expire. 

TABLE 2—STATES THAT HAVE ADOPTED THE OPTIONAL EB TUR INDICATOR

Years ................................... 1993–1998 1999–2001 2002 2003–2004 2005–2008 2009–2010 2011 

Total TUR Indicator States .. 7 8 9 10 11 38 39. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
63868 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 

9The analysis does not include the computation 

of the three year look-back or the periods under 

which any State may have triggered ‘‘on’’ the EB 

Program by using the three year look-back. State 

data on adoption of the TUR trigger can be found 

on the weekly trigger notice at http://

www.workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/

claims_arch.asp . 

10The data for monthly seasonally adjusted State 

total unemployment rates is from Bureau of Labor 

Statistics LASST01000006 (http://data.bls.gov/

timeseries/LASST01000006). The total amount of 

monthly EB benefits paid is from the Division of 

Fiscal and Actuarial Services in the Employment 

and Training Administration of the Department of 

Labor report 394 can be found here: http://

www.workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/

hb394.asp. 

11The ‘‘on’’ period was computed for each state 

rather than using the actual historical outcome. 

12Under the new rounding of the look-back 

formulation there will only be cases when the look 

back percentage in either of the two years, will be 

higher than the original so the EB Program will turn 

‘‘on’’ while the original method will have the EB 

Program as ‘‘off.’’ 

TABLE 2—STATES THAT HAVE ADOPTED THE OPTIONAL EB TUR INDICATOR—Continued 

States .................................. Alaska 

Connecticut 

Kansas 

Oregon 

Rhode Island 

Vermont 

Washington 

New Hampshire North Carolina New Mexico New Jersey Alabama 

Arizona 

California 

Colorado 

Delaware 

District of Columbia 

Florida 

Georgia 

Idaho 

Illinois 

Indiana 

Kentucky 

Maine 

Massachusetts 

Michigan 

Minnesota 

Missouri 

Nevada 

New York 

Ohio 

Pennsylvania 

South Carolina 

Tennessee 

Texas 

Virginia 

West Virginia 

Wisconsin 

Maryland. 

Impact Assessment Methodology 

ETA used two distinct methodologies, 

a time-series simulation and a Monte 

Carlo-type simulation analysis (each 

explained more fully below), to provide 

quantitative impact estimates for the 

change in the level and timing of the UI 

benefits paid and taxes collected as a 

result of the proposed change in 

formulation of the TUR indicator. The 

specific goal of these two analyses is to 

provide a quantitative measure for: (1) 

The increased probability of a State 

turning ‘‘on’’ the EB Program under the 

new rounding rules, and (2) the likely 

change in the aggregate level of UI 

benefits and taxes with each instance of 

additional EB benefits paid. The results 

of these measures will allow a 

determination of the economic impact 

of that occurrence of additional EB 

benefits paid on the overall economy 

and on any subgroups. 

The time-series simulation estimates 

are developed using a historical 

simulation methodology: By first 

applying the existing TUR indicator 

computation, and then applying the 

new rounding rules to data from a 

specified period of time and measuring 

the difference in outcomes. To examine 

the impact on outcomes, the data used 

is from the introduction of the optional 

TUR indicator in 1993 through 

September 2011 when this analysis was 

completed. This period encompasses 

two recessions of varying severity, two 

complete economic cycles, and a large 

number of States turning ‘‘on’’ the EB 

Program. This period also includes the 

temporary period of 100 percent Federal 

reimbursement of EB benefit payments 

when a majority of States, 39, adopted 

the TUR indicator.9

The baseline case is considered to be 

the simulated outcomes under the 

current TUR look-back computation for 

the States that had adopted the optional 

TUR indicator. For each month during 

this historical period (January 1993 

through September 2011), the actual 

seasonally-adjusted three-month average 

TUR 10 was used as well as the actual 

look-back percentages for each State that 

had adopted the TUR indicator. The 

number of months in EB periods was 

then estimated for each state.11 The TUR 

look-back percentage was then 

computed using the new rounding 

methodology and the analysis rerun. 

These computations enabled 

measurement of the differences between 

the two types of trigger formulations in 

the number months when the EB 

Program is triggered ‘‘on,’’ and then the 

amount of extended benefits paid.12

Probability of Turning ‘‘On’’ EB. 

Using just the States that had adopted 

the TUR indicator, there were 2,271 

monthly observations in this simulation, 

of which there were 1,170 instances 

when a State triggered ‘‘on’’ the EB 

Program by using the TUR indicator 

under the current methodology. When 

the new rounding rules were applied 

there were 1,177 instances—only 7 

additional instances when a State would 

have triggered ‘‘on’’ EB, an increase of 

0.6 percent (see Table 3). 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 63869 

13Thirteen States were used as a number of States 

likely to maintain the TUR indicator in the future. 

The six States were randomly selected to insure a 

representative group from the remaining States. The 

six States randomly chosen were: Colorado; 

Delaware; Illinois; Kentucky; Maine; and Maryland. 14The mean and standard deviation were taken 

from actual monthly observations over the recession 

and post-recession periods of: 1980–1983; 1991– 

1993; 2001–2003; and 2008–2011. 

TABLE 3—EXTENDED BENEFIT PERIODS UNDER THE OLD AND NEW TUR INDICATOR 1

[1993–2011] 

Estimated # of 

instances of 

EB ‘‘on’’ 

Number of 

instances of 

EB w/TUR indicator ≥6.0% 

Number of 

instances of 

EB w/TUR indicator ≥8.0% 

Old Method .................................................................................................................................. 1,170 362 808 

New Method ................................................................................................................................. 1,177 365 812 

Source: Periods of EB are estimated using federal law and data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics seasonally adjusted Total Unemployment 

Rate series by State LASST01000006. 1 Data consists of measuring only the periods when the EB Program triggered ‘‘on’’ based on the TUR indicator and included only the States 

that had adopted the optional TUR indicator. The number of instances refers to the number of State months. 

The seven instances included six 

different States. In four of the instances, 

the State was triggering ‘‘on’’ because of 

the 8.0 percent high unemployment 

period. In none of the instances were 

there two consecutive months in which 

a State had a different EB triggering 

outcome under the new rounding 

methodology compared to the 

truncation method. Two of the instances 

when States triggered ‘‘on’’ EB due to 

the rounding calculation occurred 

following the 1991 recession, one 

occurred following the 2001 recession, 

and four occurred following the 2007 

recession when 39 States had adopted 

the optional TUR indicator (see Table 

4). In six of the seven occurrences, the 

difference in the look-back calculation 

occurred in the second prior year lookback calculation. 

TABLE 4—PERIODS WHEN EB WAS TRIGGERED ‘‘ON’’ UNDER THE NEW ROUNDING FORMULATION

State EB Trigger 

date 

Rounded 3- 

month SATUR 

First year lookback truncated 

Second year 

look-back 

truncated 

First year lookback rounded 

Second year 

look-back 

rounded 

Alaska ...................................................... 2/28/1993 8.0 86.02 109.58 86 110 

Connecticut .............................................. 5/31/1993 6.8 91.89 109.67 92 110 

Oregon ..................................................... 11/30/2003 8.0 106.66 109.58 107 110 

Alaska ...................................................... 1/31/2009 6.8 109.67 109.67 110 110 

Alabama ................................................... 3/31/2011 9.2 90.19 109.52 90 110 

Kansas ..................................................... 3/31/2011 6.8 94.44 109.67 94 110 

Georgia .................................................... 4/30/2011 10.0 98.03 109.89 98 110 

The 0.6 percent increase in the EB 

Program’s being ‘‘on’’ in this simulation 

represents the percentage likelihood 

change in the number of times that the 

EB Program would trigger ‘‘on’’ due 

solely to the change in formulation of 

the look-back mechanism for, on 

average, 13 States having the TUR 

indicator in place. Therefore, the 

likelihood of a State turning ‘‘on’’ the 

EB Program with the new rounding 

formulation may be represented by .04 

percent (.6/13). 

The time series estimates used the 

actual State unemployment rates as they 

occurred from 1993 through September 

2011 and include only the States which 

had adopted the optional TUR indicator. 

To provide further support for the 

estimate of the difference in the number 

of times the EB Program may trigger 

‘‘on’’ due to rounding in the look-back 

calculation during a recession, an 

additional analysis was employed based 

on a Monte Carlo-type methodology. 

The Monte-Carlo methodology allows 

the simulation of thousands of possible 

State TUR values rather than just the 

historical values used in the time series 

analysis. Thirteen States—the seven 

original States that adopted the optional 

TUR indicator and six additional 

randomly selected States—were 

chosen,13 and then, using the mean and 

standard deviation of their total 

unemployment rates during the past 

four recessions,14 one thousand TUR 

periods were created for each State 

using a random number generator with 

a normal distribution. The number of 

periods when the EB Program would 

trigger ‘‘on’’ by rounding (proposed 

method) as opposed to truncating 

(current method) was computed. Of the 

13,000 total State observation periods 

(each representing recessionary 

periods), the EB Program would have 

triggered ‘‘on’’ in 4,822 periods using 

the original method of truncation for the 

look-back computation, while the EB 

Program would have triggered ‘‘on’’ in 

4,903 periods using the proposed 

method of rounding, an increase of 81 

additional periods (see Table 5). 

TABLE 5—DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EB TRIGGER FORMULATIONS UNDER SIMULATED RECESSIONARY TURS

[For 1,000 simulations for each State] 

State 1

Mean TUR in 

recession 

periods (%) 2

Standard 

deviation of 

recession 

period 2

Instances 

when EB ‘‘on’’ 

w/truncating 

Instances 

when EB ‘‘on’’ 

w/rounding 

Difference 

% increase 

due to 

rounding 

Alaska ...................................................... 8.14 1.21 448 459 11 2.40 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
63870 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 

15Survival rate is the probability that a claimant 

will collect Unemployment Compensation from one 

week to the next. An exhaustee is a person 

collecting Unemployment Compensation who 

would be in their last week of compensation but for 

the EB Program. 

16ETA–5159 report includes monthly regular 

program exhaustees which were divided by the 

number of weeks in a month to get weekly data. 

17The weekly survival rate is the proportion of 

individuals claiming unemployment compensation 

in week n that will also claim unemployment 

compensation in week n+1. A weekly survival rate 

of 0.97 was used as a constant for each week of 

extended benefits. This level is derived from the 

Division of Fiscal and Actuarial Services State 

Benefit Forecasting Model. 

18State average weekly benefit is derived from the 

ETA–5159 monthly claims report: http://

www.workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/

finance.asp . 

TABLE 5—DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EB TRIGGER FORMULATIONS UNDER SIMULATED RECESSIONARY TURS—Continued 

[For 1,000 simulations for each State] 

State 1

Mean TUR in 

recession 

periods (%) 2

Standard 

deviation of 

recession 

period 2

Instances 

when EB ‘‘on’’ 

w/truncating 

Instances 

when EB ‘‘on’’ 

w/rounding 

Difference 

% increase 

due to 

rounding 

Colorado ................................................... 6.35 1.48 226 229 3 1.31 

Connecticut ............................................ 6.31 1.59 363 375 12 3.20 

Delaware .................................................. 6.23 1.80 367 371 4 1.62 

Illinois ....................................................... 8.22 1.98 499 507 8 1.58 

Kansas .................................................... 5.32 1.08 119 120 1 0.83 

Kentucky .................................................. 8.04 2.07 510 517 7 1.35 

Maine ....................................................... 6.70 1.48 418 425 7 1.65 

Maryland .................................................. 5.24 1.30 183 185 2 1.08 

Oregon .................................................... 8.53 2.03 512 521 9 1.73 

Rhode Island .......................................... 8.01 2.08 497 506 9 1.78 

Vermont ................................................... 5.66 1.21 221 223 2 0.90 

Washington ............................................. 8.06 1.95 459 465 6 1.29 

1Original seven States to adopt the optional TUR indicator are in bold. 

2The mean and standard deviation were taken from actual monthly TUR observations over the recession and post-recession periods of: 1980– 

1983; 1991–1993; 2001–2003; 2008–2011. 

Across the States this represents, on 

average, a 1.7 percent (81/4822) increase 

in the likelihood of turning ‘‘on’’ the EB 

Program under the new rounding rules 

(see Table 6). This also represents the 

cumulative difference of the 13 States, 

meaning that each State in this 

simulation could be considered to have 

added a 0.13 percent increase of an 

added instance of turning ‘‘on’’ the EB 

Program (1.7/13). This value will be 

used as the per-State increase in the 

likelihood of turning ‘‘on’’ the EB 

Program under the new rounding rules 

in this simulation. 

TABLE 6—MONTE CARLO-TYPE ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCE IN EB TRIGGER FORMULATION

[For 1,000 simulated monthly trigger values per State] 

State 

Number 

instances 

EB ‘‘on’’ 

w/truncating 

Number 

instances 

EB ‘‘on’’ 

w/rounding 

Difference % Difference 

13 States .......................................................................................................... 4,822 4,903 81 1.7 

Per State Average ........................................................................................... 371 377 6 ........................

Source: Computations made by U.S. DOL ETA/OUI/DFAS. 

Transfer to EB Recipients: Temporary 

Income Support (During Recession) 

The proposed revision to the TUR 

indicator computation methodology 

would result in increased benefits 

payments during a recession, which 

provide temporary income support and 

greater economic stimulus than would 

otherwise exist during that economic 

time period. This increased economic 

stimulus would prevent greater 

economic distress during a recession. 

This impact is not a true benefit of the 

proposed rule because, as explained 

above, the proposed TUR indicator 

formulation would redistribute existing 

transfer payments only over time. That 

is, a change to increase extended 

benefits during recessions will 

ultimately increase the counter-cyclical 

nature of the program by increasing 

stimulus during recessions while 

slightly decreasing economic activity 

during expansions. 

Increased Compensation. A value for 

the amount of additional extended 

compensation and number of people 

who would receive the extended 

compensation under the proposed 

rounding rules was estimated using a 

time-series methodology. The estimated 

total level of extended compensation 

that would have been paid under the 

proposed look-back computation was 

estimated using a weekly survival rate 

method. In this methodology, for each 

week that the EB Program is ‘‘on,’’ the 

number of State EB claimants is 

multiplied by the State average weekly 

benefit amount to get the weekly total 

benefit amount. To arrive at the weekly 

number of EB claimants, a weekly 

survival rate is applied for each week of 

EB to a beginning number of regular UI 

program exhaustees.15 This was done 

for each week of the EB period (either 

13 or 20 weeks) and aggregated to get 

total EB payments for the applicable 

period, i.e., the period during which 

each State was ‘‘on’’ EB. This 

computation is represented in the 

formula below. 

Computation of Total Extended 

Compensation Paid: 

Total Wkly Extended Compensation EB 

Benefits = 

S (Reg. Program Wkly Exhaustions 16 * 

Wkly Survival Rate 17) * Avg. Wkly 

Benefit 18

(Summed over each week of the EB 

period.) 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 63871 

19This amount is, of course, dependent on the 

size of the States, but it does represent a reasonable 

estimate since these are the States most likely to 

have the TUR indicator in the future. Also, this 

amount is considered a high estimate, since 4 of the 

States triggered on to 20 weeks of benefits, and the 

average is a reasonable expected value for the level 

of per State extended benefits. For all of the periods 

except one (Alaska, 1/2009) during the State EB 

period triggered on by the rounding calculation, 

there was no ‘‘on’’ period for the truncation 

calculation. The Alaska data was adjusted for the 

truncation period. 

20Total additional extended compensation from 

rounding, $294 million divided by the number of 

State periods, 7, and then divided by the total 

extended compensation for the entire period, 

$24,897 million. 

21The increase in first pays due to rounding, 

148,000, divided by the number of State periods, 7, 

and then dividing by the total number of EB first 

pays during the period of 9.6 million. 

22Historical balances of the EUCA fund can be 

found here: http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/

reports/tfmp/tfmp_utf.htm. 

23For applicable State triggering laws see 

Comparison of State UI Laws: http://

www.workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/

comparison2011.asp. 

24Recoupment rule of UI taxes in response to a 

compensation increase is from an Office of 

Unemployment Insurance, Division of Fiscal and 

Actuarial Services State Revenue model run over a 

range of scenarios, 12/2011. 

Applying this computation to the 

seven State periods that turned ‘‘on’’ the 

EB Program under the proposed 

rounding formulation in the time series 

simulation, it was estimated that in total 

$294 million 19 more would have been 

paid out in extended compensation, and 

there would be an increase of 148,000 

new first payments in the EB Program. 

This translates into an estimated 1.2 

percent increase ($294 million/$24,897 

million ¥ total extended compensation 

in the simulation) in extended 

compensation and a 1.5 percent increase 

($151,000/$9.6 million ¥ total EB first 

pays in the simulation) of EB first 

payments under the proposed rounding 

rules compared to the current 

methodology (i.e., truncating the lookback computation after two decimal 

places). 

TABLE 7—COMPENSATION PAID UNDER NEW ROUNDING FORMULATION DURING RECESSIONARY PERIODS

Period 1

Total extended 

compensation 

(mil.) 

Increase in 

extended 

compensation 

w/rounding 

(mil.) 

Total EB first 

pays 

(mil.) 

Increase in 

first pays 

w/rounding 

Recession 2001–2003 ..................................................................................... $478 $66 1.1 30,385 

Recession 2007–2011 ..................................................................................... 23,844 201 5.7 91,362 

Source: U.S. DOL ETA/OUI/DFAS—computations from constructed database. 

1 Recessionary periods for this purpose are defined as beginning with the start of the official recession and ending with the end of any Federal 

Emergency benefit program or a subjective determination for the end of the high unemployment period. 

Again, dividing these results into the 

per State added percentage point 

increase for each instance of triggering 

‘‘on’’ the EB Program means there 

would be a 0.17 percent increase in 

extended compensation paid 20 and a 

0.22 percent increase 21 in first 

payments. 

In terms of how the increased 

extended compensation paid would be 

distributed among subgroups of EB 

recipients, attempting to disaggregate 

this level of benefits into numerically 

small select subgroups of claimants 

such as low-wage workers, or minority 

claimants, would mean working with 

monetary flows of very little statistical 

consequence. Therefore, the Department 

has determined that no distributional 

analysis is necessary. 

Transfer From State Unemployment 

Insurance Accounts: Increased 

Employer Taxes (During Expansions) 

The proposed revision to the TUR 

indicator computation methodology 

would result in increased economic 

stimulus during recessions, while 

dampening overall activity with higher 

taxes during expansions. In particular, a 

significant increase in extended 

compensation may result in a State UI 

tax increase on employers. An increased 

UI tax on employers might result in 

dampened overall economic activity as 

employers postpone equipment 

purchases or hiring. This impact does 

not represent a true cost of the proposed 

rule because it is associated with a 

corresponding transfer of payments to 

EB recipients during recessions. That is, 

the proposed regulation would result in 

redistribution of wealth over time 

(based on the counter-cyclical nature of 

the EB Program), rather than have a net 

social welfare impact. 

UI Taxes. Except for the temporary 

provisions that are no longer in effect, 

Federal statutes specify that 50 percent 

of extended compensation is paid from 

the Extended Unemployment 

Compensation Account (EUCA) in the 

Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF), 

which is funded through the Federal 

Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), and 50 

percent is paid by the liable State from 

its account in the UTF. 

The Federal monies for extended 

compensation flow from EUCA, which 

is also used to fund additional Federal 

emergency benefit programs. 

Historically, the balance of this account 

has been sufficient to pay the level of 

extended compensation during a 

recession and would therefore be much 

greater than the estimated amounts that 

may result from the proposed change in 

the look-back mechanism.22

Nevertheless, even if EUCA, together 

with the other Federal accounts in the 

UTF is depleted, the account can obtain 

advances from the General Fund with 

no impact on the FUTA tax, which 

means there would be no expected 

increase in Federal taxes from the 

change in formulation of the TUR 

indicator. 

On the State side, every State has a 

tax structure that responds with higher 

taxes when the amount of reserves in its 

UTF account declines.23 Thus, a 

significant increase in paid extended 

compensation may result in a State UI 

tax increase on employers. However, the 

tax response takes place only with 

relatively large changes in the State trust 

fund account balance, and differs by 

State depending on the size of the 

account balance; small changes in a 

State trust fund account balance may 

actually have no impact in a State’s UI 

taxes. To gauge the magnitude of the tax 

impact from an increase in extended 

compensation paid, a generalized rule of 

State UI tax collections can be applied: 

For any specified increase in 

unemployment compensation, 100 

percent of the increase will be collected 

in UI taxes over a 10-year period.24

Using the estimated increase of 

extended compensation paid (due to the 

TUR indicator rounding computation) 

from the time-series simulation, $294 

million, an estimate was derived for the 

amount of potential State tax increases 

by assuming the increase in extended 

compensation was divided among the 

average number of States that 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
63872 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 

25 Derived by taking the average estimated yearly 

tax increase per State, $2.1 million, divided by the 

estimated amount of contributions per State per 

year, $1.4 billion. This is certainly a very rough 

estimate that depends on the size of the States 

having the optional TUR indicator in the 

simulation. However, because those States would 

be expected to continue having the indicator, it is 

considered a reasonable level. 26See Office of Management and Budget, Circular 

A–4: Regulatory Analysis, pp. 2–3, 10, 26–27 (Sept. 

17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 

omb/circulars_default. 27 In OMB Circular A–4 in reference to the size 

of stimulative impacts: ‘‘. . . that rules with annual 

costs that are less than one billion dollars are likely 

to have a minimal effect on economic growth.’’ 

28Similar in severity to the 1991 recession. 

29A value similar to the percentage of State 

months that triggered on to EB in the 1991 and 2001 

recessions. 

experienced an increase in extended EB 

compensation paid over a 10-year 

period. To arrive at an estimate for the 

expected increase in State 

unemployment compensation taxes due 

to a change in the rounding rule for the 

look-back feature of the TUR indicator, 

50 percent of the total extended 

compensation, $147 million, is assumed 

to be financed by seven States for an 

average of $21 million per State. The 

amount is assumed to be financed by 

increased State taxes over a 10-year 

period for an average of $2.1 million per 

year. This amount represents an 

estimated increase of 0.14 percent 25 in 

State unemployment compensation 

taxes for each State that turns ‘‘on’’ the 

EB Program under the proposed new 

rounding rules. 

TABLE 8—ESTIMATED INCREASE IN STATE TAXES COLLECTED UNDER NEW ROUNDING FORMULATION

[Based on the estimated extended compensation from the time-series data, 1993–2011] 

Period 

Est. amt. of 

added 

extended 

compensation 

to finance 1

(mil.) 

Amt. financed 

per state 2

(mil.) 

Avg. amt. 

financed per 

year 

(mil.) 

% Increase in 

taxes per 

state 3

1993–2011 data period .................................................................................... $147 $21 $2.1 0.14 

1Fifty percent of total estimated amount of increased extended compensation paid due to rounding from the Time-Series Data. 

2 Derived from 50 percent of the estimated increase in extended compensation payments under the Time Series data divided by the number of 

States that experienced an increase. 3Total extended compensation to be financed divided by the total unemployment compensation contributions over the period: http://

www.workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/hb394.asp 

In terms of specific distribution of 

these impacts, disaggregating the tax 

increases into subgroups of employers 

such as small businesses would mean 

working with monetary flows of very 

little consequence. Therefore, the 

Department has determined that no 

distributional analysis is necessary. 

Non-Quantified Impacts 

OMB Circular No. A–4 requires the 

identification of any non-quantifiable 

benefits and costs that cannot be 

reasonably measured.26 One primary 

non-quantifiable benefit of 

implementing regulations for the TUR 

indicator and the associated rounding 

rule, and which is a driving factor for its 

adoption, is that by codifying the TUR 

indicator the Department will explicitly 

clarify a methodology for computing the 

TUR look-back that regulations 

previously left unspecified. The 

proposed regulation would remove the 

potential for future misunderstanding in 

the computation of the optional TUR 

indicator, as compared to the current 

status quo where the TUR look-back 

computation method is not specified in 

Department regulations. 

Regarding the secondary impacts from 

increased temporary income during 

recessions and increased employer taxes 

during expansions, the Department has 

determined that the estimates of 

extended compensation and UI tax 

increases are too small to meaningfully 

model their impact on the macro 

economy. With a likely impact of 

increasing the number of instances the 

EB Program triggers ‘‘on’’ by two during 

an average recession and nine instances 

during a severe recession (as computed 

in detail in the scenarios below), these 

impact numbers are too small to model 

any stimulus impact during a recession 

or a dampening effect of the tax 

increases during expansions. Not only 

are the impacts on extended 

compensation and taxes small compared 

to the U.S. economy (e.g., far below the 

$1 billion limit for use of an economic 

multiplier effect on the level of 

employment or economic activity 27), 

but even compared to aggregate 

unemployment compensation payments 

and taxes the numbers are rather 

insignificant. 

Summary: Potential Future Stimulative 

and Distributional Impacts Scenarios 

By increasing the overall level of 

benefits paid by States during 

recessionary periods, the proposed 

change in TUR indicator computation 

methodology would aid in the countercyclical nature of the Unemployment 

Compensation program by increasing 

the economic stimulus during 

recessions and then tend to dampen the 

overall activity with higher taxes during 

expansions. The estimates for the 

increased probability of States triggering 

‘‘on’’ the EB Program, increased 

benefits, higher first payments, and 

potential changes to UI taxes, can 

provide estimates for the change in 

flows of the Unemployment 

Compensation program that this 

proposal may cause under various 

future recessionary scenarios. 

Scenario 1 (11 States with the 

optional TUR indicator; typical severity 

three-year recession and post-recession 

period).28 In a likely scenario, assuming 

a recession and post-recession high 

unemployment period lasting three 

years, with 11 States having the optional 

TUR indicator in place, it would mean 

396 possible State months (11 States * 

36 months) of high enough 

unemployment for the EB Program to 

trigger ‘‘on.’’ Using the results from the 

high unemployment periods in the 

Monte Carlo-type analysis, we could 

expect approximately 147 periods of the 

EB Program to be triggered ‘‘on’’ in 

States with the optional TUR indicator 

(37 percent 29 * 396 State months) using 

the original truncation methodology. 

With 11 States having the optional TUR 

indicator, the likelihood of turning ‘‘on’’ 

the EB Program under the rounding 

methodology would be 1.4 percent (11 

States * 0.13 percent per State 

likelihood), this would increase the 

number of EB Program periods by two 

instances (1.4 percent * 147 periods). 

Assuming a recession with $2 billion in 

total extended compensation paid and 

1.5 million first payments in the EB 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 63873 

30Similar in severity to the 2007 recession. 31For a state to trigger on extended compensation 

using the IUR, its insured unemployment rate (IUR) 

for the previous 13 weeks is at least 5 percent and 

is 120 percent of the average of the rates for the 

corresponding 13-week period in each of the two 

previous years. 

Program, then with two more instance 

of the EB Program triggering ‘‘on’’ we 

would expect an increase in extended 

compensation paid of $7 million (0.34 

percent * $2 billion) and an increase of 

9,000 in the number of first payments 

(1.5 million * 0.44 percent). The 

resulting tax increases spread over a 10- 

year period in one State would then be 

expected to be approximately $350,000 

per year (($7 million * 0.5 State cost)/ 

10 years). 

Scenario 2 (20 States with optional 

TUR indicator; more severe three-year 

recession and post-recession period).30

In a less likely scenario, but one with 

possibly the highest expected impact, 

assuming a recession and post-recession 

period lasting three years, with 20 States 

having the optional TUR indicator in 

place—720 State months (20 States * 36 

months). In a more severe recession we 

could expect 360 periods of the EB 

Program to be triggered ‘‘on’’ with the 

optional TUR indicator (720 * 50 

percent). With 20 States having the 

optional TUR indicator the likelihood of 

triggering ‘‘on’’ the EB Program under 

the new rounding rules would be 2.6 

percent (20 States * 0.13 percent) this 

would increase the number of periods 

the EB Program would be triggered ‘‘on’’ 

by nine instances (2.6 percent * 360 

periods). Assuming a recession with $5 

billion in total extended compensation 

paid and 3.0 million first payments for 

the program, with nine more instances 

of the EB Program triggering ‘‘on,’’ we 

would expect an increase in extended 

compensation of $77 million (0.17 

percent * 9 periods * $5 billion) and an 

increase of 60,000 in the number of first 

payments for the program (3 million * 

8 periods * 0.22 percent). The resulting 

tax increases spread over a 10-year 

period in one State would then be 

expected to be approximately $190,000 

per year ($77 million * 0.5 State cost)/ 

20 States)/10 years). 

Impact of the TUR Option 

The preceding impact analysis 

focused on changing the computational 

methodology of the TUR look-back 

provision. Since the Department is not 

considering the removal of the optional 

TUR indicator, the analysis does not 

measure the impact of the original 

adoption of the TUR indicator in 1992. 

However, it should be noted that a 

review of the most evident differences 

caused by the implementation of this 

option shows a rather small impact. 

From 1993 to 2006, for the 11 States 

that adopted the TUR indicator by 2006 

(Table 2), EB costs are totaled for each 

period when one of these States 

triggered on to the EB Program with the 

TUR option but would not have turned 

on extended compensation under the 

IUR option.31 During this 14-year 

period, there were 28 instances when a 

State triggered on to the EB Program 

using the TUR option and would not 

have triggered on using the IUR trigger. 

The total extended compensation costs 

of these instances were approximately 

$310 million and the number of First 

Payments was 330,000. 

TABLE 9—STATES TRIGGERING ON TO THE EB PROGRAM USING THE TUR OPTION

[Without qualifying with the IUR option] 

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 

Alaska Alaska Alaska Alaska Alaska Alaska Alaska 

Oregon Oregon Rhode Is. 

Rhode Is. Rhode Is. 

Washington 

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 

Alaska Alaska Alaska Alaska Alaska Alaska 

N. Carolina Michigan Michigan 

Oregon N. Carolina Oregon 

Oregon Washington 

Washington 

This is a relatively small number of 

States and amount spent, on average 

approximately $22 million per year, and 

in no year did the amount spent on 

extended compensation from States that 

triggered on using the TUR option ever 

exceed $100 million. Indeed, measuring 

the change in cyclical financial flows of 

the UI program does not seem necessary 

under these aggregates. 

Conclusion 

Placing the optional TUR indicator in 

regulations does not impose any 

additional change in burden, since no 

change in the operational procedure 

will occur. In addition, it incorporates 

in regulations the computational 

methodology previously communicated 

in UIPL No. 16–11 for the TUR’s lookback. 

Changing the look-back computation 

does have an impact, although it is 

estimated to be small. For each State 

that adopted the optional TUR 

indicator, it was found that the new 

rounding rule would likely add a 0.13 

percentage point increase in the 

likelihood of a single State triggering 

‘‘on’’ the EB Program during a recession. 

For each State that triggered ‘‘on’’ the 

EB Program, it would likely add a 0.17 

percent increase in the level of extended 

compensation paid, a 0.22 percent 

increase in people receiving extended 

compensation, and a per State increase 

in unemployment compensation taxes 

of 0.14 percent per year. These numbers 

indicate a negligible impact on the 

redistribution of the flows 

(unemployment compensation and 

taxes) in the Unemployment 

Compensation program. These impacts 

are so small that any stimulative or 

distributional effects would be 

considered of little consequence. 

Indeed, the probable economic impact 

encompasses the likely possibility 

(depending on the future level of the 

TUR) that there would be no measurable 

impact from a change in the derivation 

of the TUR indicator due to rounding 

the look-back proportion as opposed to 

truncating that value. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
63874 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 

Paperwork Reduction Act 

The purposes of the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), 44 U.S.C. 

3501 et seq., include minimizing the 

paperwork burden on affected entities. 

The PRA requires certain actions before 

an agency can adopt or revise a 

collection of information, including 

publishing a summary of the collection 

of information and a brief description of 

the need for and proposed use of the 

information. 

A Federal agency may not conduct or 

sponsor a collection of information 

unless it is approved by OMB under the 

PRA, and displays a currently valid 

OMB control number, and the public is 

not required to respond to a collection 

of information unless it displays a 

currently valid OMB control number. 

Also, notwithstanding any other 

provisions of law, no person shall be 

subject to penalty for failing to comply 

with a collection of information if the 

collection of information does not 

display a currently valid OMB control 

number (44 U.S.C. 3512). 

The Department has determined that 

this rule does not contain new 

information collection requiring it to 

submit a paperwork package to OMB. 

Executive Order 13132 

Section 6 of Executive Order 13132 

requires Federal agencies to consult 

with State entities when a regulation or 

policy may have a substantial direct 

effect on the States or the relationship 

between the National Government and 

the States, or the distribution of power 

and responsibilities among the various 

levels of government, within the 

meaning of the Executive Order. Section 

3(b) of the Executive Order further 

provides that Federal agencies must 

implement regulations that have a 

substantial direct effect only if statutory 

authority permits the regulation and it 

is of national significance. 

This proposed rule does not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States or 

the relationship between the National 

Government and the States, or the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of Government, within the 

meaning of the Executive Order 13132. 

Any action taken by a State as a result 

of the proposed rule would be at its own 

discretion as the rule imposes no 

requirements. 

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 

This regulatory action has been 

reviewed in accordance with the 

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 

(Reform Act). Under the Reform Act, a 

Federal agency must determine whether 

a regulation proposes a Federal mandate 

that would result in the increased 

expenditures by State, local, or tribal 

governments, in the aggregate, or by the 

private sector, of $100 million or more 

in any single year. The Department has 

determined this proposed rule does not 

include any Federal mandate that may 

result in increased expenditure by State, 

local, and Tribal governments in the 

aggregate of more than $100 million, or 

increased expenditures by the private 

sector of more than $100 million. 

Accordingly, it is unnecessary for the 

Department to prepare a budgetary 

impact statement. Further, as noted 

above in the conclusion of the economic 

impact analysis, the impact is positive 

for State UTF accounts. 

Effect on Family Life 

The Department certifies that this 

proposed rule has been assessed 

according to section 654 of the Treasury 

and General Government 

Appropriations Act, enacted as part of 

the Omnibus Consolidated and 

Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations Act of 1999 (Pub. L. 

105–277, 112 Stat. 2681), for its effect 

on family well-being. It will not 

adversely affect the well-being of the 

nation’s families. Therefore, the 

Department certifies that this proposed 

rule does not adversely impact family 

well-being. 

Regulatory Flexibility Act/SBREFA 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) 

at 5 U.S.C. 603(a) requires agencies to 

prepare and make available for public 

comment an initial regulatory flexibility 

analysis which will describe the impact 

of the proposed rule on small entities. 

Section 605 of the RFA allows an 

agency to certify a rule, in lieu of 

preparing an analysis, if the proposed 

rulemaking is not expected to have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

Furthermore, under the Small Business 

Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 

1996, 5 U.S.C. 801 (SBREFA), an agency 

is required to produce compliance 

guidance for small entities if the rule 

has a significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

The RFA defines small entities as 

small business concerns, small not-forprofit enterprises, or small 

governmental jurisdictions. The 

proposed rule does not regulate small 

entities. As a result, any indirect impact 

on small entities would be from a tax 

increase resulting from a State triggering 

‘‘on’’ because of the new computation 

method for the look-back. Therefore, the 

Department certifies that the proposed 

rule will not have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of these small entities. 

Plain Language 

The Department drafted this rule in 

plain language. 

List of Subjects in 20 CFR Part 615 

Grant programs—labor; Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements; 

Unemployment compensation. 

For the reasons discussed in the 

preamble, ETA proposes to amend 20 

CFR part 615 as follows: 

PART 615—EXTENDED BENEFITS IN 

THE FEDERAL-STATE 

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 

PROGRAM 

■ 1. The authority citation for 20 CFR 

part 615 is revised to read as follows: 

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805; 26 U.S.C. 1102; 

Secretary’s Order No. 6–10. 

■ 2. In part 615 remove the words ‘‘the 

Act’’ and add, in their place, the 

acronym ‘‘EUCA’’ in the following 

places: 

■ a. Section 615.1 introductory text (two 

places); 

■ b. Section 615.2 introductory text; 

■ c. Section 615.2(g); 

■ d. Section 615.2(i)(1); 

■ e. Section 615.2(i)(1); 

■ f. Section 615.2(i)(2); 

■ g. Section 615.2(i)(3); 

■ h. Section 615.2(j)(2); 

■ i. Section 615.2(n)(2); 

■ j. Section 615.2(o); 

■ k. Section 615.2(o)(1) (three places); 

■ l. Section 615.2(o)(4); 

■ m. Section 615.3 introductory text 

(four places); 

■ n. Section 615.4(a); 

■ o. Section 615.4(b); 

■ p. Section 615.7(d); 

■ q. Section 615.8(a); 

■ r. Section 615.8(c); 

■ s. Section 615.8(c)(2); 

■ t. Section 615.8(d); 

■ u. Section 615.8(d)(3) (two places); 

■ v. Section 615.8(d)(4); 

■ w. Section 615.8(e); 

■ x. Section 615.8(e)(8); 

■ y. Section 615.8(f); 

■ z. Section 615.8(f)(1)(ii); 

■ aa. Section 615.8(f)(4); 

■ bb. Section 615.8(g)(1); 

■ cc. Section 615.8(g)(5); 

■ dd. Section 615.9(d); 

■ ee. Section 615.12(e); 

■ ff. Section 615.14(a); 

■ gg. Section 615.14(a)(2); 

■ hh. Section 615.14(a)(3); 

■ ii. Section 615.14(a)(4); 

■ jj. Section 615.14(b); 

■ kk. Section 615.14(c)(1); 

■ ll. Section 615.14(c)(2) (two places); 

■ mm. Section 615.14(c)(3); 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 63875 

■ nn. Section 615.14(c)(4); 

■ oo. Section 615.14(c)(5); 

■ pp. Section 615.14(c)(6); 

■ qq. Section 615.14(c)(7)(i); 

■ rr. Section 615.14(c)(7)(ii); 

■ ss. Section 615.14(c)(7)(iii); 

■ tt. Section 615.14(d); 

■ uu. Section 615.14(d)(2) (two places); 

■ vv. Section 615.14(d)(3)(four places); 

■ ww. Section 615.14(d)(6); and 

■ xx. Section 615.15(a). 

■ 3. Revise § 615.1 to read as follows: 

§ 615.1 Purpose. 

This part implements the ‘‘FederalState Extended Unemployment 

Compensation Act of 1970’’ (EUCA). 

Under the Federal Unemployment Tax 

Act, 26 U.S.C. 3304(a)(11), an approved 

State law must provide for the payment 

of extended compensation to eligible 

individuals who have exhausted all 

rights to regular compensation during 

specified periods of unemployment, as 

prescribed in EUCA and this part. 

■ 4. Amend § 615.2 by: 

■ a. Removing the paragraph 

designations wherever they may occur 

and reorder the definitions 

alphabetically; and 

■ b. Adding alphabetical order the 

definitions for ‘‘EUCA,’’ ‘‘Extended 

benefit period,’’ ‘‘Extended Benefits 

Program or EB Program,’’ ‘‘Extended 

compensation account,’’ ‘‘Extended 

unemployment compensation,’’ ‘‘High 

unemployment extended 

compensation,’’ ‘‘High unemployment 

period,’’ ‘‘Insured Unemployment 

Rate,’’ ‘‘Regular extended 

compensation,’’ ‘‘Regular EB period,’’ 

‘‘Total Unemployment Rate,’’ ‘‘Trigger 

Value or average rate of total 

unemployment’’ as set forth below; 

■ c. Revising the definitions for 

‘‘Applicable Benefit Year,’’ 

‘‘Department,’’ ‘‘Eligibility Period,’’ 

‘‘Extended Compensation,’’ ‘‘Provisions 

of Applicable State Law,’’ ‘‘Sharable 

Compensation,’’ and ‘‘Week;’’ and 

■ d. Removing introductory paragraph 

(o) and redesignating them accordingly. 

The revisions and additions read as 

follows: 

§ 615.2 Definitions. 

* * * * * 

Applicable benefit year means, with 

respect to an individual, the current 

benefit year if, at the time an initial 

claim for extended compensation is 

filed, the individual has an unexpired 

benefit year only in the State in which 

such claim is filed, or, in any other case, 

the individual’s most recent benefit 

year. For this purpose, the most recent 

benefit year for an individual who has 

unexpired benefit years in more than 

one State when an initial claim for 

extended compensation is filed, is the 

benefit year with the latest ending date 

or, if such benefit years have the same 

ending date, the benefit year in which 

the latest continued claim for regular 

compensation was filed. The 

individual’s most recent benefit year 

which expires in an extended benefit 

period, when either extended 

compensation or high unemployment 

extended compensation is payable, is 

the applicable benefit year if the 

individual cannot establish a second 

benefit year or is precluded from 

receiving regular compensation in a 

second benefit year solely by reason of 

a State law provision which meets the 

requirement of section 3304(a)(7) of the 

Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 

U.S.C. 3304(a)(7)). 

Department means the United States 

Department of Labor, and shall include 

the Employment and Training 

Administration, the agency of the 

United States Department of Labor 

headed by the Assistant Secretary of 

Labor for Employment and Training to 

whom has been delegated the 

Secretary’s authority under the Act in 

Secretary’s Order No. 6–2010 (75 FR 

66268). 

Eligibility period means, for an 

individual, the period consisting of— 

(1) The weeks in the individual’s 

applicable benefit year which begin in 

an extended benefit period or high 

unemployment period, or for a single 

benefit year, the weeks in the benefit 

year which begin in more than one 

extended benefit period or high 

unemployment period, and 

(2) If the applicable benefit year ends 

within an extended benefit period or 

high unemployment period, any weeks 

thereafter which begin in such extended 

benefit period or high unemployment 

period, 

(3) An individual may not have more 

than one eligibility period for any one 

exhaustion of regular benefits, or carry 

over from one eligibility period to 

another any entitlement to extended 

compensation. 

EUCA means the Federal-State 

Extended Unemployment Compensation 

Act of 1970, title II of Public Law 91– 

373, 84 Stat. 695, 708 (codified in note 

to 26 U.S.C. 3304), as amended. 

Extended benefit period means the 

weeks during which extended 

compensation is payable in a State in 

accordance with § 615.11. 

Extended Benefits Program or EB 

Program means the entire program 

under which monetary payments are 

made to workers who have exhausted 

their regular compensation during 

periods of high unemployment. 

Extended compensation means the 

funds payable to an individual for 

weeks of unemployment which begin in 

a regular EB period or high 

unemployment period (HUP), under 

those provisions of a State law which 

satisfy the requirements of EUCA and 

this part with respect to the payment of 

extended unemployment compensation, 

and, when so payable, includes 

compensation payable under 5 U.S.C. 

chapter 85, but does not include regular 

compensation or additional 

compensation. 

Extended compensation account is 

the account established for each 

individual claimant for the payment of 

regular extended compensation or high 

unemployment extended compensation. 

Extended unemployment 

compensation means: 

(1) Regular extended compensation 

paid to an eligible individual under 

those provisions of a State law which 

are consistent with EUCA and this part, 

and that does not exceed the smallest of 

the following: 

(i) 50 percent of the total amount of 

regular compensation payable to the 

individual during the applicable benefit 

year; or 

(ii) 13 times the individual’s weekly 

amount of extended compensation 

payable for a week of total 

unemployment, as determined under 

§ 615.6(a); or 

(iii) 39 times the individual’s weekly 

benefit amount, referred to in paragraph 

(1)(ii) of this definition, reduced by the 

regular compensation paid (or deemed 

paid) to the individual during the 

applicable benefit year; or 

(2) High unemployment extended 

compensation paid to an eligible 

individual under an optional TUR 

indicator enacted under State law when 

the State is in a high unemployment 

period, in accordance with § 615.11(e) 

of this part, and that does not exceed the 

smallest of the following: 

(i) 80 percent of the total amount of 

regular compensation payable to the 

individual during the applicable benefit 

year; or 

(ii) 20 times the individual’s weekly 

amount of extended compensation 

payable for a week of total 

unemployment, as determined under 

§ 615.6(a); or 

(iii) 46 times the individual’s weekly 

benefit amount, referred to in paragraph 

(1)(ii) of this definition, reduced by the 

regular compensation paid (or deemed 

paid) to the individual during the 

applicable benefit year. 

(3) Regular extended compensation 

paid to an eligible individual for weeks 

of unemployment in the individual’s 

eligibility period, but only to the extent 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
63876 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 

that the sum of such compensation, plus 

the regular compensation paid (or 

deemed paid) to the individual for prior 

weeks of unemployment in the 

applicable benefit year, exceeds 26 

times the individual’s weekly benefit 

amount and does not exceed 39 times 

the individual’s weekly benefit amount 

(including allowances for dependents) 

for weeks of total unemployment 

payable to the individual under the 

State law in such benefit year: Provided, 

that such regular compensation is paid 

under provisions of a State law which 

is consistent with EUCA and this part. 

(4) Notwithstanding the preceding 

provisions of this paragraph, sharable 

compensation does not include any 

regular or extended compensation for 

which a State is not entitled to a 

payment under section 202(a)(6) or 204 

of EUCA or § 615.14 of this part. 

High unemployment extended 

compensation means the benefits 

payable to an individual for weeks of 

unemployment which begin in a high 

unemployment period, under those 

provisions of a State law which satisfy 

the requirements of EUCA and this part 

for the payment of high unemployment 

extended compensation. When so 

payable, high unemployment extended 

compensation includes compensation 

payable under 5 U.S.C. chapter 85, but 

does not include regular compensation 

or additional compensation. Regular 

extended unemployment compensation, 

along with high unemployment 

extended compensation, are part of the 

program referred to in this part as 

Extended Benefits. 

High unemployment period (or HUP) 

means a period where the Department 

determines that the Trigger Value in a 

State, which has enacted the alternative 

Total Unemployment Rate indicator in 

law, for the most recent three months 

for which data for all States is published 

equals or exceeds 8 percent and such 

Trigger Value equals or exceeds 110 

percent of such Trigger Value for either 

or both of the corresponding threemonth periods ending in the two 

preceding calendar years. 

Insured Unemployment Rate means 

the percentage derived by dividing the 

average weekly number of individuals 

filing claims for regular compensation 

in a State for weeks of unemployment 

in the most recent 13-consecutive-week 

period as determined by the State on the 

basis of State reports to the United 

States Secretary of Labor by the average 

monthly employment covered under 

State law for the first four of the most 

recent six completed calendar quarters 

before the end of such 13-week period. 

Provisions of the applicable State law, 

as used in section 202(a)(3)(D)(iii) of 

EUCA, means that State law provisions 

must not be inconsistent with sections 

202(a)(3)(C) and 202(a)(3)(E). Therefore, 

decisions based on State law provisions 

must not require an individual to take 

a job which requires traveling an 

unreasonable distance to work, or which 

involves an unreasonable risk to the 

individual’s health, safety or morals. 

Such State law provisions must also 

include labor standards and training 

provisions required under sections 

3304(a)(5) and 3304(a)(8) of the Internal 

Revenue Code of 1986 and section 

236(d) of the Trade Act of 1974. 

Regular extended compensation 

means the benefits payable to an 

individual for weeks of unemployment 

which begin in an extended benefit 

period, under those provisions of a State 

law which satisfy the requirements of 

EUCA and this part for the payment of 

extended unemployment compensation, 

and, when so payable, includes 

compensation payable under 5 U.S.C. 

chapter 85, but does not include regular 

compensation or additional 

compensation. Regular extended 

compensation, along with high 

unemployment extended compensation, 

are part of the program referred to in 

this part as Extended Benefits. 

Regular EB period means a period in 

which a state is ‘‘on’’ the EB Program 

because either the mandatory or 

optional IUR indicator satisfies the 

criteria to be ‘‘on’’ and the state is not 

in a 13-week mandatory ‘‘off’’ period; or 

the State is ‘‘on’’ the EB Program 

because the TUR indicator’s Trigger 

Value is at least 6.5 percent and it is at 

least 110 percent of the Trigger Value 

for the comparable three months in 

either of the prior two years. 

Sharable compensation means: 

(1) Extended compensation paid to an 

eligible individual under those 

provisions of a State law which are 

consistent with EUCA and this part, and 

that does not exceed the smallest of the 

following: 

(i) 50 percent of the total amount of 

regular compensation payable to the 

individual during the applicable benefit 

year; or 

(ii) 13 times the individual’s weekly 

amount of extended compensation 

payable for a week of total 

unemployment, as determined under 

§ 615.6(a); or 

(iii) 39 times the individual’s weekly 

benefit amount, referred to in paragraph 

(1)(ii) of this definition, reduced by the 

regular compensation paid (or deemed 

paid) to the individual during the 

applicable benefit year. 

(2) Extended compensation paid to an 

eligible individual under an optional 

TUR indicator enacted under State law 

when the State is in a high 

unemployment period, in accordance 

with § 615.12(f) of this part, and that 

does not exceed the smallest of the 

following: 

(i) 80 percent of the total amount of 

regular compensation payable to the 

individual during the applicable benefit 

year; or 

(ii) 20 times the individual’s weekly 

amount of extended compensation 

payable for a week of total 

unemployment, as determined under 

§ 615.6(a); or 

(iii) 46 times the individual’s weekly 

benefit amount, referred to in paragraph 

(1)(ii) of this definition, reduced by the 

regular compensation paid (or deemed 

paid) to the individual during the 

applicable benefit year. 

(3) Regular compensation paid to an 

eligible individual for weeks of 

unemployment in the individual’s 

eligibility period, but only to the extent 

that the sum of such compensation, plus 

the regular compensation paid (or 

deemed paid) to the individual for prior 

weeks of unemployment in the 

applicable benefit year, exceeds 26 

times and does not exceed 39 times the 

average weekly benefit amount 

(including allowances for dependents) 

for weeks of total unemployment 

payable to the individual under the 

State law in such benefit year: Provided, 

that such regular compensation is paid 

under provisions of a State law which 

are consistent with EUCA and this part. 

(4) Notwithstanding the preceding 

provisions of this paragraph, sharable 

compensation does not include any 

regular or extended compensation for 

which a State is not entitled to a 

payment under section 202(a)(6) or 204 

of EUCA or § 615.14 of this part. 

Total Unemployment Rate means the 

number of unemployed individuals in a 

State (seasonally adjusted) divided by 

the civilian labor force (seasonally 

adjusted) in the State for the same 

period. 

Trigger Value or average rate of total 

unemployment means the ratio 

computed using three months of the 

level of seasonally adjusted 

unemployment in a State in the 

numerator and three months of the level 

of the seasonally adjusted civilian labor 

force in the State in the denominator. 

This rate is used for triggering States 

‘‘on’’ and ‘‘off’’ the optional Total 

Unemployment Rate indicator is 

described in § 615.12(e). 

Week means: 

(1) For purposes of eligibility for and 

payment of extended compensation, a 

week as defined in the applicable State 

law. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 63877 

(2) For purposes of computation of 

extended compensation ‘‘on’’ and ‘‘off’’ 

and ‘‘no change’’ indicators and insured 

unemployment rates and the beginning 

and ending of an EB Period or a HUP, 

a calendar week. 

* * * * * 

■ 5. Amend section 615.3 by revising 

the third sentence in the paragraph to 

read as follows: 

§ 615.3 Effective period of the program. 

* * * Conformity with EUCA and 

this part in the payment of regular 

compensation, regular extended 

compensation, and high unemployment 

extended compensation (if State law so 

provides) to any individual is a 

continuing requirement, applicable to 

every week as a condition of a State’s 

entitlement to payment for any 

compensation as provided in EUCA and 

this part. 

■ 6. Amend § 615.7 by: 

■ a. Removing the term ‘‘Extended 

Benefits’’ wherever it appears and 

replacing it with the term ‘‘Extended 

compensation’’ throughout; 

■ b. Adding paragraph (b)(3); and 

■ c. Revising introductory paragraph 

(d). 

The additions and revisions read as 

follows: 

§ 615.7 Extended Benefits; maximum 

amount. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(3) If State law provides, in 

accordance with § 615.12(e), for a high 

unemployment period for weeks of 

unemployment beginning after March 6, 

1993, the provisions of paragraph (b)(1) 

of this section are applied by 

substituting: 

(i) 80 percent for 50 percent in 

(b)(1)(i), 

(ii) 20 for 13 in (b)(1)(ii), and 

(iii) 46 for 39 in (b)(1)(iii). 

Note to paragraph (b)(3). Provided, 

that if an individual’s extended 

compensation account is determined in 

accordance with the provisions of 

paragraphs (b)(3)(i) through (b)(3)(iii) 

(for a ‘‘high unemployment period’’ as 

defined in § 615.2) during the 

individual’s eligibility period, upon 

termination of the high unemployment 

period, such individual’s account must 

be reduced by the amount in the 

account that is more than the maximum 

amount of extended compensation or 

high extended compensation payable to 

the individual. Provided further, if the 

account balance is equal to or less than 

the maximum amount of extended 

compensation or high unemployment 

extended compensation payable, there 

will be no reduction in the account 

balance upon termination of a high 

unemployment period. In no case will 

the individual receive more regular 

extended compensation or high 

unemployment extended compensation 

than the amount determined in 

accordance with paragraphs (b)(1)(i) 

through (b)(1)(iii) of this section, nor 

more extended compensation or high 

unemployment extended compensation 

than as provided in paragraphs (b)(2)(i) 

through (b)(2)(iii) of this section. 

* * * 

(d) Reduction because of trade 

readjustment allowances. Section 233(c) 

of the Trade Act of 1974 (and section 

204(a)(2)(C) of EUCA), requiring a 

reduction of extended compensation 

because of the receipt of trade 

readjustment allowances, must be 

applied as follows: 

* * * * * 

■ 7. Amend § 615.8 by revising 

paragraph (e)(5)(iii), (f)(2)(i), (f)(2)(iii), 

(h)(3) and (h)(4) to read as follows: 

§ 615.8 Provisions of State law applicable 

to claims. 

* * * * * 

(e) * * * 

(5) * * * 

(iii) The work pays less than the 

higher of the minimum wage set in 

section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act of 1938, or any applicable 

State or local minimum wage, without 

regard to any exemption elsewhere in 

those laws, or 

* * * * * 

(f) * * * 

(2) * * * 

(i) The gross average weekly 

remuneration for the work for any week 

does not exceed the sum of the 

individual’s weekly benefit amount plus 

any supplemental unemployment 

compensation benefits (as defined in 

section 501(c)(17)(D) of the Internal 

Revenue Code of 1986) payable to the 

individual, 

(ii) * * * 

(iii) The work pays less than the 

higher of the minimum wage set in 

section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act of 1938, or any applicable 

State or local minimum wage, without 

regard to any exemption elsewhere in 

those laws, or 

* * * * * 

(h) * * * 

(3) What kind of jobs he/she must be 

actively engaged in seeking each week 

depending on the classification of his/ 

her job prospects, and what tangible 

evidence of such search must be 

furnished to the State agency with each 

claim for benefits. In addition, the State 

must inform the claimant that he/she is 

required to apply for and accept suitable 

work, and 

(4) The resulting disqualification if 

he/she fails to apply for work to which 

referred, or fails to accept work offered, 

or fails to actively engage in seeking 

work or to furnish tangible evidence of 

such search for each week for which 

extended compensation or sharable 

regular benefits is claimed, beginning 

with the week following the week in 

which such information shall be 

furnished in writing to the individual. 

■ 8. Revise § 615.11 to read as follows: 

§ 615.11 Extended Benefit Periods. 

(a) Beginning date. Except as provided 

in paragraph (d) of this section, an 

extended benefit period or high 

unemployment period begins in a State 

on the first day of the third calendar 

week after a week for which there is a 

State ‘‘on’’ indicator in that State under 

either § 615.12(a) or (b). 

(b) Ending date. Except as provided in 

paragraphs (c) and (e) of this section, an 

extended benefit period or high 

unemployment period in a State ends 

on the last day of the third week after 

the first week for which there is a State 

‘‘off’’ indicator in that State, unless 

another indicator is in ‘‘on’’ status. 

(c) Duration. When an extended 

benefit period and/or high 

unemployment period becomes effective 

in any State, or triggers ‘‘off,’’ the 

attained status must continue in effect 

for not less than 13 consecutive weeks. 

(d) Limitation. No extended benefit 

period or high unemployment period 

may begin in any State by reason of a 

State ‘‘on’’ indicator before the 14th 

week after the ending of a prior 

extended benefit period or high 

unemployment period in such State. 

Conversely, no extended benefit period 

or high unemployment period may end 

in any State by reason of a State ‘‘off’’ 

indicator before the 14th week after the 

beginning of an extended benefit period 

or high unemployment period in such 

State. In addition, no extended benefit 

period or high unemployment period 

may begin or end in any State before the 

most recent week for which data used 

to trigger the State ‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off’’ or ‘‘no 

change’’ indicator has been published. 

(e) Specific applications of the 13- 

week rule: 

(1) If a State concludes a 13-week 

mandatory ‘‘on’’ period by virtue of the 

IUR indicator which, at the end of the 

13-week period no longer satisfies the 

requirements for a State to be ‘‘on,’’ the 

extended benefit period continues if the 

TUR indicator is ‘‘on’’ during the 11th 

week of the 13-week mandatory ‘‘on’’ 

period. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
63878 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 

(2) If a State concludes a 13-week 

mandatory ‘‘on’’ period by virtue of the 

TUR indicator which, at the end of the 

13-week period no longer satisfies the 

requirements for a State to be ‘‘on,’’ the 

extended benefit period continues if the 

IUR indicator is ‘‘on’’ during the 11th 

week of the 13-week mandatory ‘‘on’’ 

period. 

(f) Determining if a State remains 

‘‘off’’ as a result of a total 

unemployment rate indicator after the 

13-week mandatory ‘‘off’’ period ends: 

(1) The State remains ‘‘off’’ if there is 

not an IUR ‘‘on’’ indicator the 11th week 

of the 13-week mandatory ‘‘off’’ period, 

and there is a TUR ‘‘off’’ indicator for 

the third week before the last week of 

the 13-week mandatory ‘‘off’’ period. 

■ 9. Amend § 615.12 by: 

■ a. Revising paragraph (d)(1) and (d)(2); 

■ b. Adding paragraph (d)(3); 

■ c. Revising and redesignating 

paragraph (e) as paragraph (f);and 

■ d. Adding new paragraph (e). 

The additions and revisions read as 

follows: 

§ 615.12 Determination of ‘‘on’’ and ‘‘off’’ 

indicators. 

* * * * * 

(d) * * * 

(1) Any determination by the head of 

a State agency of an ‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off’’ or ‘‘no 

change’’ IUR indicator may not be 

corrected more than three weeks after 

the close of the week to which it 

applies. If any figure used in the 

computation of a rate of insured 

unemployment is later found to be 

wrong, the correct figure must be used 

to redetermine the rate of insured 

unemployment and the 120 percent 

factor for that week and all later weeks, 

but no determination of previous ‘‘on’’ 

or ‘‘off’’ or ‘‘no change’’ indicator shall 

be affected unless the redetermination is 

made within the time the indicator may 

be corrected under the first sentence of 

this paragraph (d)(1). Any change is 

subject to our concurrence as provided 

in paragraph (e) of this section. 

(2) The initial release of the TUR by 

BLS is subject to revision. However, a 

State’s TUR indicator will be 

determined by the initial release of the 

TUR data and is not subject to revision 

even if the BLS TUR is revised. 

(3) The ‘‘on’’ period under a State’s 

optional IUR or TUR indicator may not 

begin before the later of the date of the 

State’s adoption of the optional insured 

unemployment rate or total 

unemployment rate indicator, or the 

effective date of that enactment. The 

‘‘off’’ period under a State’s optional 

insured unemployment rate or total 

unemployment rate indicator may not 

occur until after the effective date of the 

repeal of the optional insured 

unemployment rate or total 

unemployment rate indicator from State 

law. 

(e) Other optional indicators. 

(1) A State may, as an option, in 

addition to the State indicators in 

paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, 

provide by its law that there is a State 

‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off’’ indicator in the State for 

a week if we determine that— 

(i) The Trigger Value in such State 

computed using the most recent three 

months for which data for all States are 

published before the close of such week 

equals or exceeds 6.5 percent; and 

(ii) The Trigger Value computed using 

data from the three-month period 

referred to in paragraph (e)(1)(i) of this 

section equals or exceeds 110 percent of 

the Trigger Value for either (or both) of 

the corresponding three-month periods 

ending in the two preceding calendar 

years, (The Tax Relief, Unemployment 

Insurance Reauthorization, and Job 

Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111–312, 

allowed States to temporarily modify 

provisions in their EB laws to use the 

prior three years in applying the ‘‘lookback’’. This provision has been 

extended in the past and could be 

again.) This ‘‘look-back’’ is computed by 

dividing the Trigger Value by the same 

measure for the corresponding three 

months in each of the applicable prior 

years, and the resulting decimal fraction 

is rounded to the hundredths place, 

multiplied by 100 and reported as an 

integer and compared to the statutory 

threshold to help determine the State’s 

EB Program status; and 

(iii) There is a State ‘‘off’’ indicator for 

a week if either the requirements of 

paragraph (e)(1)(i) or (e)(1)(ii) of this 

section are not satisfied. 

(2) Where a State adopts the optional 

indicator under paragraph (e)(1) of this 

section, there is a State ‘‘on’’ indicator 

for a high unemployment period (as 

defined in § 615.2) under State law if— 

(i) The Trigger Value in the State 

computed using the most recent three 

months for which data for all State are 

published before the close of such week 

equals or exceeds 8.0 percent, and 

(ii) The Trigger Value in the State 

computed using data from the threemonth period referred to in paragraph 

(e)(2)(i) of this section equals or exceeds 

110 percent of the Trigger Value for 

either (or both) of the corresponding 

three-month periods ending in the two 

preceding calendar years. (The Tax 

Relief, Unemployment Insurance 

Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 

2010, Pub. L. 111–312, allowed States to 

temporarily modify provisions in their 

EB laws to use the prior three years in 

applying the ‘‘look-back.’’ This 

provision has been extended in the past 

and could be again.) This ‘‘look-back’’ is 

computed by dividing the Trigger Value 

by the same measure for the 

corresponding three months in each of 

the applicable prior years, and the 

resulting decimal fraction is rounded to 

the hundredths place, multiplied by 100 

and reported as an integer and 

compared to the statutory threshold to 

help determine the State’s EB Program 

status; and 

(iii) There is a State ‘‘off’’ indicator for 

high unemployment period for a week 

if either the requirements of paragraph 

(e)(2)(i) or (e)(2)(ii) of this section are 

not satisfied. 

(3) Method of computing the average 

rate of total unemployment. The average 

rate of total unemployment is computed 

by dividing the average of three months 

of the level of seasonally adjusted 

unemployment in the State by the 

average of three months of the level of 

seasonally adjusted unemployment and 

employment in the State. The resulting 

rate is multiplied by 100 to convert it to 

a percentage basis and then rounded to 

the tenths place (the first digit to the 

right of the decimal place). 

(4) Method of computing the State 

‘‘look-back.’’ The average rate of total 

unemployment, ending with a given 

month, is divided by the same measure 

for the corresponding three months in 

each of the applicable prior years. The 

resultant decimal fraction is then 

rounded to the hundredths place (the 

second digit to the right of the decimal 

place). The resulting number is then 

multiplied by 100 and reported as an 

integer (no decimal places) and 

compared to the statutory threshold to 

help determine the State’s EB Program 

status. 

(f) Notice to Secretary. Within 10 

calendar days after the end of any week 

for which the head of a State agency has 

determined that there is an ‘‘on,’’ or 

‘‘off,’’ or ‘‘no change’’ IUR indicator in 

the State, the head of the State agency 

must notify the Secretary of the 

determination. The notice must state 

clearly the State agency head’s 

determination of the specific week for 

which there is a State ‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off’’ or 

‘‘no change’’ indicator. The notice must 

include also the State agency head’s 

findings supporting the determination, 

with a certification that the findings are 

made in accordance with the 

requirements of § 615.15. However, the 

Secretary may provide additional 

instructions for the contents of the 

notice to assure the correctness and 

verification of notices given under this 

paragraph. The Secretary will accept 

determinations and findings made in 

accordance with the provisions of this 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 207 / Monday, October 27, 2014 / Proposed Rules 63879 

paragraph and of any instructions 

issued under this paragraph. A notice 

does not become final for purposes of 

EUCA and this part until the Secretary 

accepts the notice. 

■ 10. Amend § 615.13 by: 

■ a. Adding the term ‘‘or High 

Unemployment Periods’’ after the term 

‘‘Extended Benefit Periods’’ throughout 

so that it reads as ‘‘Announcement of 

the beginning and ending of Extended 

Benefit Periods or High Unemployment 

Period’’; 

■ b. Adding paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2), 

(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3); 

■ c. Revising paragraphs (c)(1) through 

(c)(4). 

The additions and revisions read as 

follows: 

§ 615.13 Announcement of the beginning 

and ending of Extended Benefit Periods. 

* * * * * 

(a) * * * 

(1) Extended benefit period. Upon 

receipt of the notice required by 

§ 615.12(f) which is acceptable to us, we 

publish in the Federal Register a notice 

of the State agency head’s determination 

that there is an ‘‘on’’ or an ‘‘off’’ 

indicator in the State, as the case may 

be, the name of the State and the 

beginning or ending of the extended 

benefit period, whichever is 

appropriate. If an ‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off’’ EB 

period is a result of our determination 

based on a State’s TUR Trigger Value, 

we publish that information in the 

Federal Register as well. 

(2) Notification. We also notify the 

heads of all other State agencies, and the 

Regional Administrators of the 

Employment and Training 

Administration of the State agency 

head’s determination of the State ‘‘on’’ 

or ‘‘off’’ indicator for an extended 

benefit period (based on the insured 

unemployment rate in the State) or our 

determination of an ‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off’’ 

indicator (based on the total 

unemployment rate in a State) for an 

extended benefit period or high 

unemployment period and of the 

indicator’s effect. 

(b) * * * 

(1) Whenever a State agency head 

determines that there is an ‘‘on’’ 

indicator in the State by reason of which 

an extended benefit period (based on 

the insured unemployment rate in the 

State) will begin in the State, or an ‘‘off’’ 

indicator by reason of which an 

extended benefit period in the State 

(based on the insured unemployment 

rate) will end, the head of the State 

agency must promptly announce the 

determination through appropriate news 

media in the State after the Department 

accepts notice from the agency head in 

accordance the 615.12(f). 

(2) Whenever the head of a State 

agency receives notification from us in 

accordance with § 615.12(f) that there is 

an ‘‘on’’ indicator by reason of which an 

extended benefit period or high 

unemployment period (based on the 

total unemployment rate in the State) 

will begin in the State, or an ‘‘off’’ 

indicator by reason of which a regular 

extended benefit period or high 

unemployment period (based on the 

total unemployment rate) will end, the 

head of the State agency must promptly 

announce the determination through the 

appropriate news media in the State. 

(3) Announcements made in 

accordance with paragraphs (b)(1) or 

(b)(2) of this section must include the 

beginning or ending date of the 

extended benefit period or high 

unemployment period, whichever is 

appropriate. In the case of a regular EB 

period or high unemployment period 

that is about to begin, the 

announcement must describe clearly the 

unemployed individuals who may be 

eligible for extended compensation or 

high extended compensation during the 

period, and in the case of a regular EB 

period or high unemployment period 

that is about to end, the announcement 

must also describe clearly the 

individuals whose entitlement to 

extended compensation or high 

extended compensation will be 

terminated. If a high unemployment 

period is ending, but an extended 

benefit period will remain ‘‘on,’’ the 

announcement must clearly state that 

fact and the effect on entitlement to 

extended compensation. 

(c) * * * 

(1) Whenever there has been a 

determination that a regular extended 

benefit period or high unemployment 

period will begin in a State, the State 

agency must provide prompt written 

notice of potential entitlement to 

Extended Benefits to each individual 

who has established a benefit year in the 

State that will not end before the 

beginning of the regular extended 

benefit period or high unemployment 

period, and who exhausted all rights 

under the State law to regular 

compensation before the beginning of 

the regular extended benefit period or 

high unemployment period. 

(2) The State agency must provide the 

notice promptly to each individual who 

begins to claim sharable regular benefits 

or who exhausts all rights under the 

State law to regular compensation 

during a regular extended benefit period 

or high unemployment period, 

including exhaustion by reason of the 

expiration of the individual’s benefit 

year. 

(3) The notices required by 

paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) of this 

section must describe the actions 

required of claimants for sharable 

regular compensation and extended 

compensation and those 

disqualifications which apply to the 

benefits which are different from those 

applicable to other claimants for regular 

compensation which is not sharable. 

(4) Whenever there is a determination 

that a regular extended benefit period or 

high unemployment period will end in 

a State, the State agency must provide 

prompt written notice to each 

individual who is currently filing claims 

for extended compensation of the 

forthcoming end of the regular extended 

benefit period or high unemployment 

period and its effect on the individual’s 

right to extended compensation. 

■ 11. Amend § 615.14 by revising 

paragraph (a)(4) to read as follows: 

§ 615.14 Payments to States. 

(a) * * * 

(4) As provided in section 204(a)(2)(C) 

of EUCA, for any week in which 

extended compensation is not payable 

because of the payment of trade 

readjustment allowances, as provided in 

section 233(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, 

and § 615.7(d). 

* * * * * 

■ 12. Amend § 615.15 by removing 

paragraphs (c) and (d) and revising 

paragraphs (a) and (b) to read as follows: 

§ 615.15 Records and reports. 

(a) General. State agencies must 

furnish to the Secretary such 

information and reports and make such 

studies as the Secretary decides are 

necessary or appropriate for carrying out 

the purposes of this part. 

(b) Recordkeeping. Each State agency 

must make and maintain records 

pertaining to the administration of the 

Extended Benefit Program as we require, 

and must make all such records 

available for inspection, examination 

and audit by such Federal officials or 

employees as we may designate or as 

may be required by law. 

Portia Wu, 

Assistant Secretary for Employment and 

Training. 

[FR Doc. 2014–24314 Filed 10–24–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4510–FW–P 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS