UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ TRAVIS CRACRAFT, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. UTAH VALLEY UNIVERSITY; JARED LESSER, d/b/a JL Home Design, Defendants - Appellees. No. 22-4034 (D.C. No. 2:19-CV -00397-TC-DBP) (D. Utah)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before PHILLIPS , MURPHY , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Pro se Appellant Travis Cracraft is back again, seeking review of the district court’s denial of another r ound of post-judgment motions. In those, he asks us to consider whether his procedural missteps permit the extraordin ary remedy of relief from the district court’s judgment. Exer cising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we conclude they do not and affirm. We need not dwell on the facts or pro cedural posture. A fo rmer student of Utah Valley University and former empl oyee of Jared Lesser’ s company, Cracraft asserts that the University a nd Lesser conspired to steal an algorithm he developed in

* This order and judgment is not bi nding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judica ta, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consiste nt with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### November 30, 2022 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 22-4034 Document: 010110775523 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 12 2003. Sixteen years later, Cr acraft sued the pair, alle ging $300 million in damages from this conspiracy and asserting clai ms under the Racket eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964(c). After Cracraft amended, the district cour t dismissed his amended comp laint as time-barred and inadequately pled; we affirmed. Cracraft v. Utah Valley Univ. , No. 21-4031, 2021 WL 5500604, at *1 (10th Cir. Nov. 24, 2021). We agreed with the district court that Cracraft’s injury accrued in 2012, causing his complaint to be three years too late under RICO’s four-year statute of limitations. Id. at *3-4. We also discarded Cracraft’s argument that Lesser and the University fraudulen tly concealed their conspiracy, reasoning that Cracraft did not make that argument below. Id. at *4. Even if he did, we concluded th at “Cracraft’s fraudulent con cealment theory is just a repackaged challenge to the district cour t’s inquiry-notice determination, which we have already rejected.” Id. We also affirmed the district court’s denial of Cracraft’s motion to reopen and post-judgment motion to amend. We recited the oft-quoted standard for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) that “such relief is extraordinar y and may only be granted in exceptional circumstances.” Id. at *5 (quoting Servants of the Paraclete v. Does , 204 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir. 2000)). And we specified that post-judgment motions are not places to “revisit issues already addressed or advan ce arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing.” Id. (citation omitted). Applyi ng that standard, we affirmed the district court’s ruling that Cr acraft’s motions were “based on facts that Appellate Case: 22-4034 Document: 010110775523 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 23 were available when he filed the original complaint” and fail ed to address the exceptional circumstances mandated by the Federal Rules. Id. at *5-6. Four months later, Cracraf t filed another pair of pos t-judgment motions with the district court. The firs t is an “Amended Motion for Re trial,” which supplanted an earlier-filed “Motion for Retria l due to Inadequate Repres entation.” The second is a derivative “Motion to Amend Motion for Re trial.” Both motions press that Rule 60(b)(6) warrants a “retrial” because the dist rict court “did not consider extenuating circumstances due to [his] proc edural missteps.” R. vol. II, at 34. In other words, the district court got it wrong because Cracraft didn’t know what he was doing. Broadly, Cracraft’s motions go on to dredge up ar guments about inquiry notice and fraudulent concealment. The district court summarily denied both motions. We review the denial of a Rule 60( b) motion for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Spencer , 950 F.3d 680, 701 (10t h Cir. 2020) (quoting Kile v. United States , 915 F.3d 682, 688 (10t h Cir. 2019)). “The denial of a 60(b)(6) motion will be reversed only if we find a complete absence of a reasonable basis and ar e certain that the decision is wrong.” Davis v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr. , 507 F.3d 1246, 1248 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Zurich N. Am. v. Matrix Serv., Inc. , 426 F.3d 1281, 1293 (10th Cir. 2005)). Here, we are certain the district court’s decision is right. Cracraft’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion identifies no grounds for re lief that qualify as extraordinary or exceptional. See Bud Brooks Trucking, Inc. v. Bill Hodges Trucking Co. , 909 F.2d 1437, 1440 (10th Ci r. 1990) (noting that “excepti onal circumstances” typically include “compelling circumstances beyond [the parties’] control”). Cracraft’s Appellate Case: 22-4034 Document: 010110775523 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 34 Opening Brief before us c onfirms as much, arguing that he “later discovered” precedent helpful to his argument. Cf. Collins v. City of Wichita , 254 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1958) (“A change in the law or in the judicial view of an established rule of law is not . . . an extraordinary circum stance which justifies such relief.” (citation omitted)). And to be sure, Cracraft’s motion does little mo re than unearth arguments about tolling that we have already rejected or that he could have raised earlier. 1 Nor are we persuaded that the district court interpreted Cracraft’s motions too harshly. True, as Cracraft points out, we lib erally construe pro se filings. But equally true is that “pro se status does not relieve [Cracraft] of the obligation to comply with procedural rules.” Murray v. City of Tahlequah , 312 F.3d 1196, 1199 n.3 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Ogden v. San Juan County , 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994)). Nor will we “‘assume the role of advocate’ and make [Cracraft’s] arguments for him.” Walters v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 703 F.3d 1167, 1173 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Yang v. Archuleta , 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10t h Cir. 2008)). On these precepts, we affirm the district court. Cracraft’s retrial motion is foreign to the Federal Rules but can be liberally construed as one for post-judgment relief under Rule 60(b)(6). So construed, Cracraft’s “procedural missteps ” are not reason enough to justify extraordinary relief under Rule 60(b)(6). And because Cracraft ’s Rule 60(b) motion is meritless, his

1 Cracraft contends that we never c onsidered his tolling arguments on the merits

. Our prior decision belies that reading. Ther e, we noted that Cracraft failed to properly preserve his tolling arguments. Cracraft , 2021 WL 5500604, at *4 & n.3. But we also noted that Cracraft’ s tolling theory lack ed merit because it “repackaged [his] challenge to the district court’s inquiry-no tice determination, which we have already rejected.” Id. at *4 (citing Dummar v. Lummis , 543 F.3d 614, 621 (10th Cir. 2008)). Appellate Case: 22-4034 Document: 010110775523 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 45 derivative (and unnecessary) motion to amend is moot. See Chihuahuan Grasslands All. v. Kempthorne , 545 F.3d 884, 891 (10th Cir. 200 8) (“[A] case or controversy no longer exists when it is impossible to gran t any effectual relief.” (citations omitted)). We discern no abuse of discretion with the district court’s conc lusions that echoed this reasoning. 2
We affirm. Entered for the Court

Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge

2 We are also troubled that Cracraft has used this appeal to reargue the merits of our prior decision. The place for that argument is a petition fo r panel rehearing, not recursive appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1) ( noting that litigants have fourteen days after entry of judgment to file petition for panel rehearing). Appellate Case: 22-4034 Document: 010110775523 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 5