J-S03022-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ALSHIEM THOMPSON

Appellant No. 1520 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 14, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007558-2007

 CP-51-CR-0011042-2007

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED APRIL 14, 2015

Appellant, Alshiem Thompson, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered after his probation and parole were revoked due to the filing of new 

charges against him. Additionally, Thompson’s court appointed counsel, 

Jennifer A. Santiago, Esq., has filed an application to withdraw as counsel 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). After careful 

review, we affirm Thompson’s judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s 

petition to withdraw.

On September 24, 2012, Thompson was arrested when he was found 

in a van with his legs over a mat that concealed a loaded handgun. At the 

time, Thompson was on parole from a conviction for possession of a 
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controlled substance, as well as being on probation for a conviction for 

possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (“PWID”). 

The Commonwealth moved to revoke both his probation and his 

parole, and a revocation hearing was held before the Honorable Glenn B. 

Bronson, who had not imposed either of the underlying sentences. At the 

end of the hearing, Judge Bronson found Thompson to be in violation of the 

terms of his probation and parole, and revoked both. After a sentencing 

hearing on November 14, 2013, Judge Bronson sentenced Thompson to a 

term of imprisonment of 1 1/2 to 5 years, followed by 3 years of probation 

on the probation violation, and sentenced Thompson to back time on the 

parole violation. Thompson filed a timely motion for reconsideration of 

sentence on Monday, November 25, 2013.1 Judge Bronson denied 

Thompson relief, and Thompson filed this appeal pro se.

2

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1

Prior to filing the motion for reconsideration, Thompson filed a notice of 

appeal to this Court. That appeal was withdrawn by Thompson shortly after 

he filed the motion for reconsideration. Thompson’s notice of appeal filed on 

April 10, 2014 was untimely. See Commonwealth v. Coleman, 721 A.2d 

798 (Pa. Super. 1998). However, at the close of sentencing, Judge Bronson 

requested Thompson’s then-counsel to file a motion for reconsideration to 

“protect his appellate rights” before withdrawing from the case. See N.T., 

11/14/13, at 89. We conclude that since the procedure followed by counsel 

followed the directions given by Judge Bronson, the untimely appeal in this 

case was the result of a breakdown in the court’s operation, and therefore 

decline to quash the appeal. See Commonwealth v. Coolbaugh, 770 A.2d 

788, 791 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

2 Thompson filed one notice of appeal covering both sentences. The filing of 

one notice of appeal from orders entered at different docket numbers “has 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(Footnote Continued) _______________________

long been discouraged.” 20 G. Ronald Darlington, et al., Pennsylvania 

Appellate Practice § 341:3.102 (2013-2014 ed.) (footnote omitted). This 

policy is set forth in the Note to Rule 341, which states that “[w]here, 

however, one or more orders resolve issues arising on more than one docket 

or relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of appeal must be 

filed.” Pa.R.A.P., 341 Note. 

Courts, however, have not automatically quashed such appeals. For 

instance, our Supreme Court considered this question in General Electric 

Credit Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 263 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1970), 

where the appellant filed a single appeal from two separate judgments 

entered against it. Upon considering these facts, our Supreme Court stated:

Taking one appeal from several judgments is not acceptable 

practice and is discouraged. It has been held that a single 

appeal is incapable of bringing on for review more than one final 

order, judgment or decree. When circumstances have 

permitted, however, we have refrained from quashing the whole 

appeal, but this Court has quashed such appeals where no 

meaningful choice could be made. 

Id. at 452-453 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 

Similarly, this Court, citing General Electric Credit Corp., declined to 

quash where counsel for appellants filed only one notice of appeal from 

separate orders denying each appellant’s motion to intervene. See 

Egenrieder v. Ohio Casualty Group, 581 A.2d 937, 940 n.3 (Pa. Super. 

1990). The panel noted that counsel should have filed a separate notice of 

appeal for each appellant and that the appeals would then have been subject 

to consolidation. See id. But see Commonwealth v. C.M.K., 932 A.2d 

111 (Pa. Super. 2007) (court quashing single notice of appeal by criminal 

co-defendants who were tried jointly but sentenced individually). 

 

Thus, the filing of one notice of appeal is “discouraged,” but both our 

Supreme Court and this Court have refrained from quashing an appeal 

where “circumstances have permitted.” Our examination of the 

circumstances of this appeal lead us to the conclusion that it is appropriate 

to review both the revocation of parole and the revocation of probation in 

this single appeal.
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As noted, Thompson’s appointed counsel has requested to withdraw 

and has submitted an Anders brief in support thereof contending that 

Appellant’s appeal is frivolous. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has 

articulated the procedure to be followed when court-appointed counsel seeks 

to withdraw from representing an appellant on direct appeal:

[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed 

counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a 

summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to 

the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel 

arguably believes supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s 

reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel 

should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case 

law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that 

the appeal is frivolous. 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).

We note that counsel has complied with the technical requirements of 

Anders as articulated in Santiago. Additionally, counsel confirms that she 

sent a copy of the Anders brief to Thompson as well as a letter explaining to 

Thompson that he has the right to proceed pro se or the right to retain new 

counsel. A copy of the letter is appended to counsel’s Anders brief, as 

required by this Court. See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 5990, 

594 (Pa. Super. 2010); Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748 (Pa. 

Super. 2005). 
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We will now proceed to examine the issues counsel has set forth in the 

Anders brief.3 Counsel identifies only two issues for our review. Thompson

contends that Judge Bronson did not have jurisdiction over his probation or 

parole, as Judge Bronson was not the judge who had imposed the original 

sentences. 

On appeal from a judgment of sentence following the revocation of 

probation

[o]ur review is limited to determining the validity of the 

probation revocation proceedings and the authority of the 

sentencing court to consider the same sentencing alternatives 

that it had at the time of the initial sentencing. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9771(b).

Commonwealth v. Fish, 752 A.2d 921, 923 (Pa. Super. 2000).

“Revocation of a probation sentence is a matter committed to the 

sound discretion of the trial court and that court's decision will not be 

disturbed on appeal in the absence of an error of law or an abuse of 

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 888 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (citation omitted). A court may revoke an order of probation upon 

proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation. See 

Commonwealth v. Infante, 888 A.2d 783, 791 (Pa. 2005). “A probation 

violation is established whenever it is shown that the conduct of the 

probationer indicates the probation has proven to have been an ineffective 

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3 Thompson has not filed a response to counsel’s petition to withdraw. 
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vehicle to accomplish rehabilitation and not sufficient to deter against future 

antisocial conduct.” Id., at 791 (citations omitted). Technical violations are 

sufficient to trigger revocation. See Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 

910 (Pa. Super. 2000).

Counsel certifies that she has found no authority to support 

Thompson’s argument that Judge Bronson did not have jurisdiction, and the 

Commonwealth agrees. Our own independent review has found no such 

authority. Furthermore, Thompson’s argument elevates a mere preference 

to a jurisdictional rule. Obviously, the court system prefers to allow a 

sentencing judge, who best knows the circumstances of the sentence 

imposed, the opportunity to deal with alleged violations of that sentence. 

However, that preference is administrative only, and does not constitute a 

right held by defendants. We therefore agree with counsel that this issue is 

wholly meritless.

Next, Thompson contends that the sentence imposed is excessive. 

This claim raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects of the sentence 

imposed. See Commonwealth v. Hornaman, 920 A.2d 1282, 1284 (Pa. 

Super. 2007).

“A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be 

considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such a 

claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (citation omitted). When challenging the discretionary aspects 
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of the sentence imposed, an appellant must present a substantial question 

as to the inappropriateness of the sentence. See Commonwealth v. 

Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa. Super. 2005). “Two requirements must be 

met before we will review this challenge on its merits.” McAfee, 849 A.2d 

at 274 (citation omitted). “First, an appellant must set forth in his brief a 

concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with 

respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Id. (citation omitted). 

“Second, the appellant must show that there is a substantial question 

that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.” 

Id. (citation omitted). That is, “the sentence violates either a specific 

provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a 

particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process.” Tirado, 

870 A.2d at 365 (citation omitted). We examine an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) 

statement to determine whether a substantial question exists.4 See id. 

“Our inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in 

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4 Rule 2119 provides the following, in pertinent part:

(f) Discretionary aspects of sentence. An appellant who 

challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence in a criminal matter 

shall set forth in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied 

upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects 

of a sentence. The statement shall immediately precede the argument 

on the merits with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence.

Pa.R.A.P., Rule 2119(f), 42 PA.CONS.STAT.ANN.
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contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary only to 

decide the appeal on the merits.” Id. (citation omitted).

In the present case, Thompson’s appellate brief does not contain the 

requisite Rule 2119(f) concise statement, and, as such, this issue could be

technically waived. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gambal, 561 A.2d 710, 

713 (Pa. 1989). Furthermore, the argument section of counsel’s Anders

brief does not separately list the arguments regarding each issue identified. 

However, rather than remand for an appropriate Anders brief, we will 

address Thompson’s issue on the merits in the interest of judicial efficiency.

Thompson argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court was 

excessive. It is well-settled that a generic claim that a sentence is excessive 

does not raise a substantial question for our review. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Christine, 78 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Additionally, we observe that Judge Bronson thoroughly identified the factors 

that led him to impose the sentences at issue: Thompson’s significant 

criminal history, the leniency the sentencing courts had initially shown and 

Thomspon had abused, and Thompson’s inability to recognize the 

seriousness of the charges he was facing. Pursuant to this reasoning, we 

conclude that the sentences imposed by Judge Bronson do not constitute an 

abuse of discretion, and therefore, we agree with counsel that this issue is 

wholly frivolous.
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After examining the issues contained in the Anders brief and 

undertaking our independent review of the record, we concur with counsel’s 

assessment that the appeal is wholly frivolous. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Permission to withdraw as counsel is 

granted. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/14/2015