2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

2-27-2013

Rohan Ramgeet Wilson v. Attorney General

United States

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-2271

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-2271

___________

ROHAN GEORGE RAMGEET WILSON,

Petitioner 

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

SECURITY; GARY MEAD, as Executive Associate Director, Enforcement and Removal

Operations; JOHN TSOUKARIS, as Acting Director, Enforcement and Removal

Operations, Newark, NJ Field Office,

Respondents

____________________________________

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A042-252-863)

Immigration Judge: Honorable Leo A. Finston 

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

February 26, 2013

Before: RENDELL, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 27, 2013)

___________

OPINION

___________
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PER CURIAM

Rohan Ramgeet Wilson, proceeding pro se, petitions for review of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals’ (BIA or Board) final order of removal. For the following reasons, 

we will deny the petition for review.

I.

Wilson, a native of Jamaica, was born on October 6, 1976. He became a lawful 

permanent resident upon his admission to the United States as an immigrant in August 

1989. In October 2011, the Government issued a Notice to Appear charging him with 

removal pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), based on his 1997 conviction for murder.

At a removal hearing in December 2011, Wilson claimed that he was not subject 

to removal because he had derived United States citizenship through his mother’s 

naturalization in May 1995. The Government contested the citizenship claim, explaining 

that, because Wilson had already turned eighteen at the time his mother naturalized, he 

did not derive citizenship from her under the applicable statute, former INA § 321(a)(4). 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(4) (repealed) (providing that a child born outside of the country 

who is residing in the United States can become a citizen when a parent naturalizes as 

long as “such naturalization takes place while such child is under the age of eighteen 

years”). The Immigration Judge (IJ) continued the proceedings in order to allow Wilson 

an opportunity to submit evidence in support of his citizenship claim.
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When the parties reconvened in January 2012, Wilson directed the IJ to three 

documents in his alien file (A-file) that, in his view, demonstrated his citizenship: a data 

sheet titled “Inmate Load Data,” one titled “Security/Designation,” and a document titled 

“Inmate Information Sheet,” all of which contained entries of “United States of America” 

or “United States” in the fields designated for citizenship. (AR000219-221.) The IJ

noted that the documents appeared to be records relating to Wilson’s incarceration for the 

murder conviction, and found that they did not demonstrate that he was an American 

citizen; rather, they demonstrated that, “[a]t best, the custodial authorities believed that 

[he was] a citizen of the United States when [he was] incarcerated.” (AR000183.) The IJ 

further found that, as a matter of law, Wilson did not derive citizenship through his 

mother’s naturalization because he was eighteen years old when his mother naturalized in 

May 1995. See 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(4). Accordingly, the IJ determined that Wilson was 

not an American citizen and was removable as charged.

Wilson appealed to the BIA, arguing that: (1) the IJ violated his due process rights 

by failing to meaningfully consider the documents in his A-file that – according to 

Wilson – proved his citizenship; (2) he was entitled to derivative citizenship under former 

INA § 321(a)(4) through his mother’s naturalization because he was seventeen, and thus 

“under the age of eighteen years,” at the time his mother applied for naturalization; and 

(3) the agency lacked the authority to adjudicate his citizenship claim. In a decision 

dated April 26, 2012, the BIA rejected Wilson’s arguments and dismissed the appeal. 

This petition for review followed.
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II.

We have jurisdiction over the petition for review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 

When, as here, “the BIA issues its own decision on the merits, rather than a summary 

affirmance, we review its decision, not that of the IJ.” Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 

483 (3d Cir. 2012). We review factual findings for substantial evidence, while legal 

determinations are reviewed de novo. Id.

Wilson first argues that the BIA erred in denying his claim that the IJ had violated

his due process rights by failing to meaningfully consider the three documents in his Afile that, in his view, prove his citizenship. Wilson further argues that the BIA “plainly 

ignored” his A-file when it considered his appeal. We see no error. First, the record 

reflects that the IJ carefully reviewed the three documents, and specifically stated on the 

record that they did not support Wilson’s citizenship claim. Insofar as Wilson disputes 

the IJ’s interpretation of these documents, we note that substantial evidence supports the 

IJ’s finding that they did not demonstrate that Wilson was an American citizen. Lastly, 

although Wilson complains that the BIA did not review the referenced documents on 

appeal, it is evident from the Board’s decision that it did. See Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 

241, 256 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The BIA is not required to write an exegesis on every 

contention. What is required is merely that it consider the issues raised, and announce its 

decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and 

thought and not merely reacted.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Next, Wilson claims that the agency erred in determining that he did not acquire 

derivative citizenship under former INA § 321 through the naturalization of his mother. 

Pursuant to INA § 321, a child born outside of the country who is residing in the United 

States can become a citizen when a parent naturalizes as long as “such naturalization 

takes place while such child is under the age of eighteen years.”1

Wilson also argues that, contrary to the agency’s contention, he was not required 

to provide a certificate of naturalization or a passport from the United States government 

in order to prove that he is a citizen. We agree with Wilson that an alien acquires 

 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(4) 

(repealed). Wilson recognizes that he did not meet the literal terms of the statute because 

he turned eighteen before his mother was naturalized in 1995. Nonetheless, he argues 

that he should be entitled to derivative citizenship because he was seventeen, and thus 

“under the age of eighteen years,” at the time she applied for naturalization. Former 

§ 321(a)(4) plainly requires that a child born outside of the United States to alien parents 

must be under eighteen years of age at the time his parent naturalizes in order to derive 

citizenship on that basis. See Chavarria-Calix v. Att’y Gen., 2013 WL 203393, at *3 (3d 

Cir. 2013) (not precedential). Therefore, this argument fails.

 1 Former § 321, 8 U.S.C. § 1432, was repealed by the Child Citizenship Act of 

2000 (“CCA”), Pub. L. No. 106-395, which took effect on February 27, 2001. The CCA 

liberalized the conditions for derivative citizenship of alien children of naturalized 

parents, but it is not retroactive. See, e.g., Drakes v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 189, 191 (2d Cir. 

2003). Thus, former § 321, which was in effect when Wilson was born, when he turned 

eighteen, and when his mother naturalized, controls his claim for derivative citizenship. 

See, e.g., Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 257 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005).
6

derivative citizenship by operation of law and not by adjudication. See In re FuentesMartinez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 893, 896 (BIA 1997). However, the agency did not base its 

determination in this case on the lack of a naturalization certification or passport. Rather, 

as discussed above, the agency determined that Wilson did not acquire derivative 

citizenship by operation of law because he did not meet the legal requirements of former 

§ 321(a).

Finally, Wilson argues that this Court lacks the authority to adjudicate his 

citizenship claim, and should remand the matter to the District Court for resolution in the 

first instance. Because this case does not present a genuine issue of material fact, we 

decline to do so. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A) (“If the petitioner claims to be a national 

of the United States and the court of appeals finds from the pleadings and affidavits that 

no genuine issue of material fact about the petitioner’s nationality is presented, the court 

shall decide the nationality claim.”)

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.