UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 

_________________________________________ 

 ) 

Bridget Green, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Civil No. 14-cv-00966 (APM) 

 ) 

District of Columbia, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

_________________________________________ ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiff Bridget Green, acting on behalf of her minor child, E.A., brought this action 

seeking an award of attorneys’ fees and costs arising from an administrative proceeding brought 

on E.A.’s behalf under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Plaintiff contends that she 

is entitled to $53,385.52 in fees and costs because she prevailed in the administrative proceedings. 

Defendant District of Columbia counters that Plaintiff is entitled to some but not all of the fees and 

costs requested because she did not prevail on all claims asserted. The District of Columbia also 

urges reduction of the award because (1) the proposed hourly rate for calculating fees is excessive 

and (2) some of the submitted fees and costs are unreasonable. Before the court are Plaintiff’s and 

Defendant’s respective Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. After considering the parties’ 

submissions and the relevant law, the court grants in part and denies in part both motions and 

awards attorneys’ fees and costs to Plaintiff in the amount of $32,934.71. 
2 

II. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff’s child, E.A., was a student in the District of 

Columbia’s public school system. On May 21, 2013, the District of Columbia Public Schools 

(“DCPS”) convened a meeting to develop an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) for E.A. 

See Hearing Officer Determination, ECF No. 9-5 at 7 [hereinafter HOD]. An IEP, as required by 

the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., is “a written 

statement for each child with a disability” that includes “the child’s present levels of academic 

achievement and functional performance” and sets forth the “services” and “accommodations” to 

be provided to the child, id. § 1404(14). In advance of E.A.’s IEP meeting, he was evaluated both 

by “independent professionals” who worked with him at his daycare facility and by “DCPS’s 

eligibility team members” whose only contact with E.A. was for diagnostic purposes. See HOD at 

4; see also id. 5-7. The resulting IEP (the “Initial IEP”) required DCPS to provide E.A. with five 

hours per week of “Specialized Instruction” in a general education setting and two hours per month 

of both “Occupational Therapy” and “Speech-Language Pathology” outside of a general education 

setting. Initial IEP, ECF No. 19-1 at 8. The Initial IEP concluded that E.A. had a “developmental 

delay” but “rejected the disability classification of autism spectrum disorder” advanced by Plaintiff, 

HOD at 7, and expressly declined to provide E.A. with a “dedicated aide,” Initial IEP at 8. 

Thereafter, E.A. was assigned to a general education classroom at a DCPS school. See HOD at 7. 

Dissatisfied with the Initial IEP, Plaintiff hired counsel and on September 12, 2013, filed an 

administrative due process complaint against DCPS alleging that the Initial IEP denied E.A. the 

“free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) to which he is entitled under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1400(d)(1)(A); see also Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 9-
3 

4 at 2 [hereinafter Pl’s Mot.]. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the Initial IEP (1) failed to 

“offer appropriate related services in the areas of occupational therapy [], speech/language and 

behavioral support and a 1-to-1-aide, and fail[ed] to offer appropriate specialized instruction and 

individualized classroom support/accommodations”; (2) improperly classified E.A. “as 

developmentally delayed instead of autistic”; (3) failed “to offer placement in a full-time program 

that provides full-time special education services in a small class setting with specially trained 

teachers”; and (4) failed “to take into account the conclusions, recommendations and other 

information in [E.A.]’s independent evaluations . . . .” HOD at 1; see also Def.’s Stmt. of 

Undisputed Material Facts, ECF No. 11-2 at ¶ 3 [hereinafter Def.’s Stmt. of Facts]; Def.’s CrossMot. for Summ. J. and Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 11-1 at 2 [hereinafter Def.’s 

Mot.]. Plaintiff requested six remedies that collectively, she alleged, would guarantee E.A. a FAPE. 

HOD at 2; see also Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 4. 

DCPS held E.A.’s due process hearing on November 5-6, 2013, during which Plaintiff and 

E.A. were represented by counsel. Def.’s Stmt. of Facts at ¶ 6; see also HOD at 2. The hearing 

officer issued her “determination” on November 17, 2013. Def.’s Stmt. of Facts at ¶ 7; see also 

generally HOD. In it, the hearing officer framed the issues before her as follows: 

1. Did DCPS develop an inappropriate IEP in May 2013? 

2. Did DCPS deny Student a FAPE by failing to offer placement in a full-time 

program that offers full-time special education services in a small class setting 

with specially trained teachers because the proposed DCPS school is 

inappropriate? 

3. Did DCPS deny Student a FAPE by failing to take into account 

recommendations and other information in Student’s independent evaluation? 

HOD at 3.1

 

 

1 Plaintiff “withdrew” what was initially her second claim, see Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 6—that E.A. was inappropriately 

classified “as developmentally delayed instead of autistic”—after the hearing officer advised her that it “should be 

merged with [her first claim—the appropriateness of the IEP],” HOD at 1. Defendant argues that, in evaluating 
4 

As to the first issue, the hearing officer determined “that DCPS denied [E.A.] a FAPE by 

failing to comply with the procedures set forth in IDEA regarding initial evaluations.” HOD at 8. 

These procedural deficiencies, the hearing officer found, prevented her from making a final 

judgment about the appropriateness of the Initial IEP. Id. (“[T]he hearing officer cannot confirm 

that the IEP is reasonably calculated to provide Student with educational benefits.”). The hearing 

officer similarly found that she could not make a final determination about the second issue—the 

appropriateness of E.A.’s school placement. Id. at 9 (“As the appropriateness of a student’s 

assigned location of services turns on whether the location can implement an appropriate IEP for 

a given student, the hearing officer concludes that the existing evidence is insufficient to allow a 

determination of the appropriateness of Student’s assigned location of services for SY 2013/14.”). 

With the aim of resolving the first two issues, the hearing officer ordered DCPS to administer 

additional evaluations to E.A. and to convene a meeting to revise the Initial IEP and alter E.A.’s 

school placement as appropriate. Id. at 10. As to the third issue, the hearing officer concluded 

that Plaintiff “failed to meet its burden of proof,” id. at 9, and denied and dismissed with prejudice 

Plaintiff’s claim that DCPS failed to adequately consider E.A.’s independent evaluations, id. at 10. 

DCPS conducted additional evaluations of E.A., as ordered by the hearing officer. See 

Parties’ Joint Resp. to Court’s Order of Feb. 11, 2015, ECF No. 18 at 1-2, 4 [hereinafter Parties’ 

Joint Resp.]. On January 16, 2014, and February 13, 2014, DCPS convened meetings for the 

purpose of revising, as appropriate, the Initial IEP. Id. These meetings produced a revised IEP, 

issued on February 16, 2014 (the “Revised IEP”), which differed in several ways from the 

 

Plaintiff’s success in the administrative proceeding, the court should treat Plaintiff as having advanced four claims 

instead of the three that the hearing officer identified. See, e.g., Def.’s Mot. at 1 (“Four issues were certified for 

hearing.”); id. at 13 (“Plaintiff was successful on only one out of the four issues certified for the hearing[.]”). However, 

for purposes of its analysis, the court will focus on the three claims as defined by the hearing officer and will not treat 

the fourth “withdrawn” claim as an unsuccessful claim, because it was “merged” with another claim upon suggestion 

of the hearing officer. 
5 

Initial IEP. See id. at 2-5. E.A.’s “Occupational Therapy” treatment increased from two to 

three hours per month; his “Speech-Language Pathology” treatment increased from two to four 

hours per month; and his “Behavioral Support Services” increased from zero to two hours per 

month. Id. at 2; Revised IEP, ECF No. 19-2 at 11. The Revised IEP did not, however, alter E.A.’s 

school placement, which remained “a large general education classroom with approximately 17-

18 students,” Parties’ Joint Resp. at 3; nor did it reclassify E.A. as autistic, id. at 3, 5. 

B. Procedural History 

On May 5, 2015, Plaintiff submitted to DCPS an application requesting payment of 

$53,385.52 in attorneys’ fees and costs arising from the representation of E.A. Compl., ECF No. 

1 ¶ 5. Plaintiff received no response to her application and, on June 6, 2014, filed a complaint with 

this court asking that it award her the full amount requested. Id. ¶ B. On July 30, 2014, Plaintiff 

moved for Summary Judgment, and on September 12, 2014, Defendant did the same. See 

generally Pl.’s Mot.; Def.’s Mot. Thereafter, at the request of the court, see Order, ECF No. 16, 

the parties jointly submitted supplemental information about DCPS’ implementation of the HOD 

and the contents of the Revised IEP, see Parties’ Joint Resp. Defendant also submitted redacted 

versions of both the Initial and the Revised IEP. See Notice of Filing of Redacted Docs., ECF No. 

19. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

A. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 

A court should grant a motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[A] material fact is ‘genuine’ . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” on an element of the claim. Anderson v. 
6 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Where parties file cross-motions for summary 

judgment, “neither party waives the right to a full trial on the merits by filing its own motion; each 

side concedes that no material facts are at issue only for the purposes of its own motion.” 

Sherwood v. Wash. Post, 871 F.2d 1144, 1147 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citation omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “[E]ach [party] must carry its own burden under the applicable legal 

standard.” Ehrman v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 2d 61, 67 (D.D.C. 2006) (citation omitted). If 

a party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to 

which it has the burden of proof,” the other party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 317-18 (1986). 

B. The IDEA 

The IDEA was enacted “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to 

them a [FAPE] that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their 

unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.” 

20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). A FAPE requires that each child with a disability receive “special 

education and related services that” are “provided at public expense” and “in conformity with the 

[child’s IEP].” Id. § 1401(9). The IDEA permits an individual to file a due process complaint 

and participate in an administrative hearing should she believe that a school district is denying a 

student a FAPE. Id. §§ 1415(b)-(c). 

A “court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to a 

prevailing party [in an administrative proceeding] who is the parent of a child with a disability.” 

Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). In analyzing a request for attorneys’ fees, a court must determine 

(1) “whether a party has prevailed and the extent to which it has prevailed,” and (2) “whether the 

attorneys’ fees being sought are reasonable.” A.S. v. District of Columbia, 842 F. Supp. 2d 40, 46 
7 

(D.D.C. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Jackson v. District of Columbia, 696 F. Supp. 2d 97, 

101 (D.D.C. 2010) (“A court’s determination of the appropriate attorney’s fees, in other words, is 

based on a two-step inquiry. First, the court must determine whether the party seeking attorney’s 

fees is the prevailing party. . . . Second, the court must determine whether the attorney’s fees 

sought are reasonable.”) (citing 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B)). Both inquiries—the degree to which 

Plaintiff prevailed and the determination of reasonableness—are at issue in this case. 

IV. ANALYSIS 

The court turns first to the parties’ dispute over whether the attorneys’ fees sought should 

be reduced based on the extent to which Plaintiff prevailed at the administrative hearing. It then 

considers their disagreement over the applicable hourly rate. Finally, the court addresses 

Defendant’s specific objections to certain time entries and claimed costs. 

A. Extent to Which Plaintiff Prevailed 

1. The “prevailing party” threshold 

A plaintiff must be a prevailing party to recover attorneys’ fees under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1415(i)(3)(B). “[P]laintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties’ for attorney’s fees purposes 

if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties 

sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. 

Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-89 (1st Cir. 1978). This “generous” standard does not guarantee a 

plaintiff full fees—it “brings the plaintiff only across the statutory threshold.” Id. 

Here, Defendant concedes that Plaintiff surpassed the prevailing party threshold. Def.’s 

Mot. at 1. (“Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff obtained some relief as a result of the 

hearing[.]”). Defendant argues, however, that Plaintiff is not entitled to the entirety of the 

requested fees because she “was denied the majority of the relief that she sought.” Id. Defendant 
8 

contends that Plaintiff prevailed on only one issue—the appropriateness of the IEP—and was 

“denied the most significant portions of relief that she requested including immediate funding and 

placement for the student at an appropriate program proposed by Parent, with transportation and 

all related services, as well as compensatory education consisting of social skills training and 

academic tutoring.” Id. at 12. Plaintiff counters that she “was the prevailing party and found to 

be entitled to specified special education services that DCPS had failed or refused to provide.” 

Pl.’s Mot. 2. Plaintiff further argues that she “was successful on the core issue in the case. Success 

was achieved because the additional testing was ordered and a new IEP reflecting this had to be 

developed.” Pl’s Reply to Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and Opp’n to Def.’s CrossMot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 12 at 5 [hereinafter Pl.’s Reply]. 

The court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff prevailed only in part but finds that 

Plaintiff’s success was nonetheless significant. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, the Supreme Court 

established a two-step inquiry to determine the attorneys’ fees to be awarded to a partially 

successful plaintiff, emphasizing that the district court has substantial discretion in awarding such 

fees. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 (“We reemphasize that the district court has discretion in 

determining the amount of a fee award.”);2 Goos v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 997 F.2d 1565, 1571 

(D.C. Cir. 1993) (“These equitable judgments are left to the discretion of the district court.”) (citing 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37); Nelson v. District of Columbia, 967 F. Supp. 2d 360, 362 (D.D.C. 

2013) (stating that “the first Hensley prong opens the door wide for discretion short of abuse”). 

 

2 Although Hensley involved fee-shifting under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Court explicitly noted that the “standards set 

forth in [its] opinion are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a 

‘prevailing party.’” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 n.7. Courts in this circuit have consistently applied the two-step Hensley

inquiry in IDEA cases. See, e.g., A.S., 842 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47; B.R. v. District of Columbia, 802 F. Supp. 2d 153, 

163-65 (D.D.C. 2011). 
9 

2. First Hensley inquiry 

The first inquiry under Hensley directs courts to consider whether “the plaintiff fail[ed] to 

prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 

434. If a court determines that an unsuccessful claim is not related to a successful claim, it “must 

confine fee awards to work done on the successful claims” by “weeding out work done on 

unrelated unsuccessful claims from any award.” George Hyman Const. Co. v. Brooks, 963 F.2d 

1532, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1992). If, however, “the plaintiff’s claims for relief . . . involve a common 

core of facts or [are] based on related legal theories” and “[m]uch of counsel’s time [is] devoted 

generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claimby-claim basis,” courts should move to the second Hensley inquiry without reducing the fees 

sought by a plaintiff. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Claims need not have a “complete factual overlap” 

in order to be related. Goos, 997 F.2d at 1570. 

In this case, the three issues addressed by the hearing officer shared a common core of facts 

and were premised on similar legal theories—the development and issuance of the Initial IEP and 

the inadequacy of the Initial IEP—and were therefore related. The first issue focused on the 

substance of the Initial IEP, asking whether it, as a whole, was appropriate. HOD at 8. The second 

issue concerned the propriety of E.A.’s school placement, which the hearing officer declared 

depended on the appropriateness of the Initial IEP. See id. at 9 (“[T]he appropriateness of a 

student’s assigned location of services turns on whether the location can implement an appropriate 

IEP for a given student[.]”). And the third issue, which focused on the process of developing the 

Initial IEP, i.e., whether DCPS sufficiently considered E.A.’s independent evaluations, also clearly 

shared that same common core of facts. It is thus difficult to segregate the hours expended by 
10 

Plaintiff’s counsel on the successful claims from the unsuccessful claims. The court will not 

reduce the attorney’s fees sought under the first Hensley inquiry. 

3. Second Hensley inquiry 

The second inquiry under Hensley requires a court to analyze the “degree of success 

obtained” by a plaintiff. 461 U.S. at 436. “Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his 

attorney should recover a full compensatory fee.” Id. at 435. Where “a plaintiff has achieved only 

partial or limited success . . . [t]he district court may attempt to identify specific hours that should 

be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success.” Id. at 436-

37. “There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations”; rather, the second 

inquiry under Hensley is an “equitable judgment” in which a “court necessarily has discretion.” 

Id. at 437. 

Here, the court finds that Plaintiff obtained a high degree of success for E.A., though not 

the “excellent results” that would warrant the full, undiminished award sought by Plaintiff. The 

administrative hearing addressed three related issues. Plaintiff sought a variety of different 

remedies. But at bottom, Plaintiff initiated the IDEA administrative hearing contending that DCPS 

had denied E.A. a FAPE and seeking to remedy that denial through additional testing and the 

revision of his IEP. The hearing officer determined that E.A. was, in fact, denied a FAPE and 

ordered DCPS to revise E.A.’s IEP as appropriate. DCPS revised the IEP by, among other 

adjustments, increasing the Occupational Therapy, Speech-Language Pathology, and Behavioral 

Support Services to be provided to E.A. These revisions demonstrate the inadequacy of the Initial 

IEP and Plaintiff’s success as to the core of its litigation effort—improving E.A.’s IEP. Because 

Plaintiff achieved important improvements in E.A.’s IEP, the court does not believe it would be 

fair to award her 50 percent or less of her counsel’s fees, as Defendant urges. 
11 

But Plaintiff fell short on two important fronts—a specialized school placement for E.A. 

and a diagnosis of autism, which presumably would have brought with it additional services. She 

also did not prevail on her claim that DCPS inadequately considered E.A.’s independent 

evaluations. A reduction of 35 percent, in the court’s view, fairly reflects Plaintiff’s overall success 

on E.A.’s behalf while recognizing the aspects of relief on which she did not prevail. 

B. Reasonable Hourly Rate 

The parties dispute the hourly rate on which to base the fee award. Plaintiff bears the 

burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the hourly rate sought. In re North, 59 F.3d 184, 

189 (D.C. Cir. 1995). She must support her proposed hourly rate with evidence “that the requested 

rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar lawyers of reasonably 

comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11 (1984). 

Such an hourly rate “is normally deemed to be reasonable, and is referred to—for convenience—

as the prevailing market rate.” Id.

Plaintiff argues that the prevailing hourly market rate in IDEA cases is $510 for attorneys 

with her counsel’s years of experience and $145 for experienced paralegals. Pl.’s Mot. at 5-6. 

Plaintiff derived these rates from the Laffey Matrix. See id. at 6-9; see Laffey Matrix (2003-2014), 

ECF No. 9-10. The Laffey Matrix is a fee schedule maintained by the Civil Division of the United 

States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, “which sets out compensable billing rates 

for attorneys in the District of Columbia and has been adopted by the judges of this District in 

many cases.” Bucher v. District of Columbia, 777 F. Supp. 2d 69, 74 (D.D.C. 2011) (citation 

omitted). Plaintiff asserts that, because of her counsel’s “extensive legal experience,” which 

consists of “over 30 years” of practicing law, Pl.’s Mot. at 7, and the “complex” nature of the 

hearing at issue, see id. at 2-5, the full Laffey rates are appropriate. Defendant counters that, 
12 

because E.A.’s administrative proceeding “was not novel or complex,” the court should reduce the 

Laffey rate by 25 percent. Def.’s Mot. at 11. 

Although some courts in this district have applied a diminished Laffey rate in IDEA cases, 

see, e.g., Rooths v. District of Columbia, 802 F. Supp. 2d 56, 63 (D.D.C. 2011); Agapito v. District 

of Columbia, 525 F. Supp. 2d 150, 152-55 (D.D.C. 2007), this court sees no reason to do so here. 

Plaintiff’s counsel has extensive experience practicing law in the District of Columbia and, in 

particular, litigating IDEA cases. See Decl. of Elizabeth T. Jester, Esq., ECF No. 9-2, ¶ 6 (“I have 

participated in hundreds of administrative due process hearings pursuant to IDEA and procured 

countless settlement agreements in IDEA cases in the District of Columbia.”). Her paralegal has 

worked with Plaintiff’s counsel for 19 years. Id. ¶ 14. And this case was not, as the District 

contends, uncomplicated. The administrative hearing at issue, which lasted for two days, involved 

testimony from nine witnesses—including five experts—and 22 exhibits—including various 

evaluations of E.A. Pl.’s Mot. at 3. The administrative hearing was preceded by a “lengthy 

prehearing conference.” Id. Additionally, counsel’s preparation for the hearing occurred over five 

months, and she expended additional time over three different months to prepare for the posthearing IEP meeting. See Invoice, ECF No. 9-6. Courts in this district “ha[ve] rejected the 

suggestion that IDEA administrative litigation is categorically less complex than other forms of 

litigation” and “reaffirm[ed] that IDEA cases are sufficiently complex to allow application of the 

Laffey Matrix.” Irving v. District of Columbia, 815 F. Supp. 2d 119, 129 (D.D.C. 2011); see 

also Jackson, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 102 (applying the Laffey Matrix and stating that “numerous judges 

in this district have applied Laffey rates in the context of fee awards arising out of IDEA 

administrative proceedings”) (citations omitted); Young v. District of Columbia, 893 F. Supp. 2d 

125, 130-31 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting that courts in this district have not had “a unified approach to 
13 

the proper rates for attorneys’ fees in IDEA cases” and “exercis[ing] . . . discretion to apply the 

rates that plaintiffs requested, which are equal to the Laffey Matrix rates”). The court applies the 

full Laffey rates here. 

C. Reduction of Specific Fees and Costs 

Defendant requests (1) a reduction of fees for specific tasks undertaken by Plaintiff’s 

counsel, namely, (a) travel to hearings and meetings in the District of Columbia and (b) drafting 

the due process complaint, and (2) a reduction of certain administrative costs. The court finds a 

50 percent reduction of fees for travel to be appropriate, but will not reduce the fees incurred for 

drafting the IDEA complaint or the administrative costs. 

1. Reduction of Fees 

a. Travel 

 Defendant asserts, and Plaintiff does not contest, that $5,433.46 of the fees and costs sought 

are attributable to travel by Plaintiff’s counsel. See Def.’s Mot. at 14; see also Invoice at 6, 8, 9. 

“In this circuit, travel time generally is compensated at no more than half the attorney’s appropriate 

hourly rate.” Blackman v. District of Columbia, 397 F. Supp. 2d 12, 15 (D.D.C. 2005) (citation 

omitted). Plaintiff concedes that a 50 percent rate reduction is proper for travel time. Pl.’s Reply 

at 7 (“[U]ndersigned counsel is willing to accept as reasonable in this case Defendant’s proposal 

that compensation or travel time be at 50 percent of her hourly rate.”). This court therefore will 

reduce the fees Plaintiff seeks for travel by 50 percent after applying the 35 percent reduction, 

which is applicable to all fees requested. 
14 

b. Due process complaint 

Defendant asserts that the 7.4 hours spent by Plaintiff’s counsel to draft and finalize the 

“Due Process Complaint Notice” was unreasonable.3

 Invoice at 5. Defendant argues that “[t]he 

amount billed to draft this Complaint was excessive and should be reduced accordingly; it is highly 

unlikely that it took nearly almost an entire business day to draft what is mostly a form complaint, 

and in any event, is only three pages in length.” Def.’s Mot. at 15. In support of its assertion, 

Defendant cites a single case in which a court reduced by 50 percent the fees requested for 10.5 

hours “to review both parties’ disclosures and prepare for the due process hearing.” Id. The court 

finds it reasonable that counsel would have spent a business day drafting and refining what would 

serve as the framework pleading for the administrative hearing. The court therefore declines to 

reduce the attorneys’ fees sought for drafting the complaint. 

2. Reduction of administrative costs 

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s counsel “billed an excessive amount for faxing and 

photocopying costs” and asks the court to limit reimbursement for such costs to $113.10. Id. The 

court finds that these costs, which Plaintiff’s counsel has repeatedly “averred . . . are accurate,” 

Pl.’s Reply at 11, are reasonable. The court will not further reduce Plaintiff’s reimbursement for 

such costs; it will, however, reduce such costs by 35 percent, in line with the reduction made to 

the award of attorneys’ fees.

 

3

 In its Reply brief, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s time entries of “2.7 hours reviewing records, 2 hours in ‘phone 

consults’ and 2.4 hours of ‘correspondence,’” are also attributable to Plaintiff’s drafting of the due process complaint. 

Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 14 at 5. “Taken together, that is 14.5 hours 

toward writing, again, what amounts to a three-page due process complaint. Accordingly, the entire 14.5 hours should 

be reduced by 50% because the number of hours billed are excessive and unreasonable.” Id. The court’s unchanged 

by Defendant’s amended argument. 
15 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff’s and 

Defendant’s respective Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff is awarded $32,934.71 

in attorneys’ fees and costs under the IDEA. A separate Order accompanies this memorandum 

opinion.