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HALL v. COUNTY OF LANCASTER 969

Cite as 287 Neb. 969

it deems just.24 Because there is no issue of fact and the City 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we determine the 

controversy accordingly.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the improvement unit mandating the 

paving of one block of Donna Street, which intersected Jean 

Drive, was plainly authorized by the second sentence of 

§ 18-2001. We reverse the judgment of the district court and 

remand the cause with direction to enter judgment in favor of 

the City.

Reversed and remanded with direction.

24 U.S. Bank Nat. Assn. v. Peterson, 284 Neb. 820, 823 N.W.2d 460 (2012).

Jeff Hall, appellee and cross-appellee, v. County

of Lancaster, appellant and cross-appellee, 

and Norris School District No. 160, 

appellee and cross-appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed April 18, 2014. No. S-13-724.

1. Tort Claims Act. Whether the allegations made by a plaintiff present a claim that 

is precluded by exemptions set forth in the State Tort Claims Act is a question 

of law.

2. Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act: Tort Claims Act. The Political 

Subdivisions Tort Claims Act includes a discretionary function exception similar 

to that contained in the State Tort Claims Act, and thus, cases construing the State 

Tort Claims Act exception are equally applicable to the discretionary function 

exception in the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act.

3. Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act: Appeal and Error. An appellate court 

has an obligation to reach its conclusion on whether a claim is precluded by 

exemptions set forth in the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act independent 

from the conclusion reached by the trial court.

4. Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act: Immunity: Waiver. The Political 

Subdivisions Tort Claims Act provides limited waivers of sovereign immunity 

which are subject to statutory exceptions.

5. Pretrial Procedure: Parties. A pretrial order is binding upon the parties.

6. Pretrial Procedure: Pleadings. The issues set out in a pretrial order supplant 

those raised in the pleadings.
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7. Immunity: Waiver. Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense that can 

be waived.

8. Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act: Appeal and Error. In actions brought 

under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, an appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly wrong.

9. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the trial court’s judgment, it must be considered in the light most 

favorable to the successful party; every controverted fact must be resolved in 

favor of such party, and it is entitled to the benefit of every inference that can be 

deduced from the evidence.

10. Negligence: Proof. In order to recover in a negligence action, a plaintiff must 

show a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of such duty, 

causation, and damages.

11. Trial: Negligence: Proximate Cause. Determination of causation is ordinarily a 

matter for the trier of fact.

12. Proximate Cause: Words and Phrases. A proximate cause is a cause that produces a result in a natural and continuous sequence and without which the result 

would not have occurred.

13. Negligence: Proximate Cause: Proof. To establish proximate cause, the plaintiff 

must meet three basic requirements: (1) Without the negligent action, the injury 

would not have occurred, commonly known as the “but for” rule; (2) the injury 

was a natural and probable result of the negligence; and (3) there was no efficient 

intervening cause.

14. Trial: Judgments: Evidence: Appeal and Error. Where neither party requests 

that the trial court make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, if there 

is a conflict in the evidence, the appellate court in reviewing the judgment rendered will presume that the controverted facts were decided in favor of the successful party, and the findings will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong.

15. Judgments. In the absence of a request by a party for specific findings, a trial 

court is not required to make detailed findings of fact and need only make its 

findings generally for the prevailing party.

16. Trial: Negligence: Damages: Appeal and Error. Because the purpose of comparative negligence is to allow triers of fact to compare relative negligence and 

to apportion damages on that basis, the determination of apportionment is solely 

a matter for the fact finder, and its action in this respect will not be disturbed on 

appeal if it is supported by credible evidence and bears a reasonable relationship 

to the respective elements of negligence proved at trial.

17. Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis 

that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Steven

D. Burns, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and 

remanded for further proceedings.

Joe Kelly, Lancaster County Attorney, and Richard C. 

Grabow for appellant.
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HALL v. COUNTY OF LANCASTER 971

Cite as 287 Neb. 969

Jeanelle R. Lust, of Knudsen, Berkheimer, Richardson & 

Endacott, L.L.P., for appellee Norris School District No. 160.

Terry R. Wittler, of Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson & 

Oldfather, L.L.P., and Vincent M. Powers, of Vincent M. 

Powers & Associates, for appellee Jeff Hall.

Heavican, C.J., Connolly, Stephan, McCormack, MillerLerman, and Cassel, JJ., and Bishop, Judge.

Cassel, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

A pickup truck and a schoolbus collided at a rural “blind 

intersection,” where a stop sign facing the truck was missing. 

The district court determined that both drivers were negligent. 

But the court also found that the county was liable, reasoning 

that it would have discovered the sign was missing if it had 

conducted regular sign inspections. Because there was no evidence to support that premise, the court was clearly wrong in 

determining that the county’s lack of a sign-inspection policy 

was a proximate cause of the accident. We reverse the judgment finding the county liable and remand the cause for a 

reallocation of liability between the driver of the pickup truck 

and the school district based upon the existing record.

II. BACKGROUND

1. Factual Background

On August 24, 2009, a pickup truck operated by Jeff Hall 

collided with a bus owned by Norris School District No. 160 

(Norris) and operated by Ronny Aden. The collision occurred 

at the intersection of South 25th Street and Gage Road in 

Lancaster County, Nebraska. South 25th Street and Gage Road 

are gravel country roads with a speed limit of 50 miles per 

hour. Neither vehicle was exceeding the speed limit. Hall was 

proceeding south on South 25th Street, while the bus was eastbound on Gage Road. The bus was on Hall’s right. A diagram 

from an exhibit in evidence illustrates the intersection and the 

direction of travel of each vehicle.
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The intersection had limited visibility and was “blind” for 

both drivers. Corn planted near the road obstructed Hall’s 

view to the right and Aden’s view to the left. The stop sign 

for southbound traffic on South 25th Street was missing at the 

time of the collision. There was no evidence that the County of 

Lancaster (County) had actual notice of the missing stop sign 

prior to the accident. Aden, who had driven the same bus route 

hundreds of times since 2007, had seen a vehicle at the intersection only once or twice a year. He did not believe there was 

a stop sign at the intersection, but, rather, believed it to be an 

“open intersection.” Hall had not previously traveled on South 

25th Street, and he assumed there would be a stop sign for east 

and west traffic, because he did not have one.

Hall testified that his rate of speed as he approached the 

intersection was between 45 and 50 miles per hour and that he 

slowed as he got closer to the intersection because he always 

slowed as he approached an intersection on a “county road.” 

He estimated his speed to be 40 miles per hour as he entered 

the intersection. Aden accelerated as he approached the intersection, but the bus did not increase in speed, because it was 

traveling up an incline. Aden told an investigating officer that 
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he was driving 47 to 48 miles per hour. Aden testified that a 

safe speed for the bus going into the blind intersection would 

have been 20 to 25 miles per hour.

Ted Sokol, Ph.D., an engineer performing accident reconstruction, concluded that there was not enough time for either 

driver to react once the vehicles became visible to one another. 

According to Sokol, Hall entered the intersection first, but the 

vehicles entered at approximately the same time. Sokol opined 

that Aden should have been more cautious as he approached 

or entered the intersection and that Aden could have avoided 

the accident by not assuming traffic on South 25th Street was 

going to stop and by approaching at a much lower speed so 

that he could have stopped before entering the intersection. 

According to Sokol, the bus’ maximum speed would have 

needed to be about 23 miles per hour in order for Aden to 

perceive and react in time to stop before getting to the west 

edge of South 25th Street. Sokol testified that Hall could have 

stopped without entering the intersection if Hall had slowed to 

18 miles per hour.

Benjamin Railsback, a mechanical engineer, concluded that 

the speed of the vehicles was not a contributing factor in the 

accident. He testified that due to the sight obstruction created 

by the corn, neither vehicle was visible to the other at a point 

in time where either driver had the opportunity to perceive 

and react in order to avoid the accident. He testified that the 

vehicles would have entered the intersection within a fraction 

of a second of one another. Railsback did not have any criticism of Aden’s driving, because Aden “acted reasonably and 

drove reasonably through the intersection.”

Hall suffered substantial injuries as a result of the accident. 

Aden and the children who were being transported in the bus 

also suffered personal injuries. Additionally, Norris incurred 

property damage.

2. Procedural Background

Hall sued the County and Norris, alleging that the collision was proximately caused by the negligence of the County 

and of Aden. Hall alleged that Aden was negligent in failing 

to yield the right-of-way, operating the schoolbus too fast for 
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the conditions, failing to keep proper control of the bus, and 

failing to keep a proper lookout. He alleged that the County 

was negligent in failing to have a traffic control device in 

place, failing to maintain the stop sign that had been in place, 

and “failing to take effective practices to ensure that a traffic 

control device would be in place.” Hall further alleged that the 

County failed to have in place any type of policy or practice 

to inspect or determine if a stop sign had been removed from 

an intersection.

The County’s responsive pleading alleged that it was immune 

from suit. The County alleged that Hall was negligent in several respects and that he was negligent in such a degree as to 

bar recovery or to proportionately diminish the amount sought 

as damages. The County further alleged that the negligence of 

Hall and Aden were efficient intervening causes.

Norris filed an answer, counterclaim, and cross-claim. 

Norris alleged that Hall was contributorily negligent in a 

degree equal to or greater than the total negligence alleged 

against Norris and the County. Norris claimed that Hall was 

negligent by failing to yield the right-of-way to Norris’ schoolbus, failing to have his vehicle under proper and reasonable 

control, operating his vehicle at a speed greater than was 

reasonable under the conditions, and failing to keep a proper 

lookout. Norris asserted a counterclaim against Hall, alleging 

that he proximately caused damage and injuries to Norris by 

virtue of his negligent acts and omissions. Norris’ cross-claim 

against the County alleged that the County was negligent for 

failing to discover through reasonable inspection that the stop 

sign was missing at the intersection and that such negligence 

was a proximate cause of injuries to Aden, injuries to the 

children on the bus, and property damage incurred by Norris. 

Norris sought judgment against both Hall and the County in 

the amount of $157,847.83.

In the County’s amended answer to Norris’ cross-claim, the 

County alleged that it was immune from suit. The County further alleged that it did not have actual or constructive notice of 

the malfunction, destruction, or removal of the stop sign. The 

joint pretrial conference order did not expressly identify immunity from suit as a legal issue presented by the case.
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3. District Court’s Decision

Following a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in Hall’s favor. The court stated that “regardless which 

driver had the right[-]of[-]way, both drivers were negligent 

for approaching the intersection at a rate of speed that was too 

fast for the circumstances.” The court found that Aden’s negligence was greater than that of Hall. As to Norris’ claims, the 

court found that Aden’s negligence was 50 percent and denied 

Norris’ claims for recovery.

The district court also found the County to be negligent. 

The court determined that the County would have discovered the stop sign was missing had it carried out a reasonable inspection and that the absence of a regular inspection, 

particularly during the high-risk time of year when crops are 

mature in late summer and early fall, was not reasonable. The 

court concluded that Aden’s and Hall’s conduct was foreseeable. Ultimately, the court found the County liable, stating that 

“[h]ad the stop sign been in placed [sic] it would have been 

clearly visible to Hall so that he could have stopped at the 

intersection and avoided the collision.”

The court explicitly determined that the negligence of Norris 

was 50 percent and that Hall’s percentage of negligence was 30 

percent. The court also stated that the combined negligence of 

Norris and the County was 70 percent. Thus, as the County and 

Hall acknowledge, the court implicitly allocated the County’s 

negligence as 20 percent. The court entered judgment against 

Norris and the County, jointly and severally, in the amount 

of $770,000. Additional findings of the district court will be 

included in the analysis.

The County timely appealed, and Norris filed a crossappeal. We moved the case to our docket under our statutory 

authority to regulate the caseloads of the appellate courts of 

this state.1

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The County assigns that the district court erred in failing to 

determine that the County maintained its sovereign immunity 

1 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2008).
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for discretionary policy decisions made in relation to sign 

inspections and related documentation.

The County and Norris each assign error regarding the district court’s ultimate determinations of negligence. The County 

contends that the court erred in determining that the County’s 

sign-inspection policies and documentation were so inadequate 

as to give the County constructive notice of a missing stop 

sign, in determining that the County’s failure to adopt an 

adequate sign policy was a proximate cause of Hall’s damages, and in failing to determine that the acts of Hall and Aden 

were efficient intervening causes for the claims of Norris and 

Hall against the County so that any negligence against the 

County could not be considered the proximate cause of Hall’s 

or Norris’ damages. Norris assigns that the court erred in not 

determining that Hall was more than 50 percent at fault as a 

result of the court’s failure to make findings on violations of 

the Nebraska Rules of the Road.2

Norris also assigns that the district court erred in failing to 

allocate Hall’s damages into economic and noneconomic damages and failing to allocate percentages of fault to Norris and 

the County on Hall’s claims.

IV. ANALYSIS

1. Sovereign Immunity

(a) Issue

The County argues that it maintained sovereign immunity 

for decisions made regarding the adoption and implementation 

of a sign-inspection policy. But Hall counters that the discretionary function exception was not an issue at trial.

(b) Standard of Review

[1-3] Whether the allegations made by a plaintiff present a 

claim that is precluded by exemptions set forth in the State Tort 

Claims Act is a question of law.3 The Political Subdivisions 

2 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 60-601 to 60-6,381 (Reissue 2010, Cum. Supp. 

2012 & Supp. 2013).

3 See Fickle v. State, 273 Neb. 990, 735 N.W.2d 754 (2007), modified on 

other grounds 274 Neb. 267, 759 N.W.2d 113.
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Tort Claims Act includes a discretionary function exception 

similar to that contained in the State Tort Claims Act, and 

thus, cases construing the State Tort Claims Act exception are 

equally applicable to the discretionary function exception in 

the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act.4 An appellate court 

has an obligation to reach its conclusion on whether a claim is 

precluded by exemptions set forth in the Political Subdivisions 

Tort Claims Act independent from the conclusion reached by 

the trial court.5

(c) Additional District 

Court Findings

The district court did not specifically reference Neb. Rev. 

Stat. § 13-910 (Reissue 2007) or make any findings regarding 

sovereign immunity or the discretionary function exception.

(d) Discussion

[4] The Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act provides 

limited waivers of sovereign immunity which are subject to 

statutory exceptions.6 If a statutory exception applies, the claim 

is barred by sovereign immunity.7 The County argues that the 

district court erred in implicitly determining that § 13-910(2) 

did not apply to Hall’s theory that the County had constructive notice of the missing stop sign by virtue of not adopting 

an adequate sign-inspection policy. The County relies on the 

statute stating that the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act 

shall not apply to “[a]ny claim based upon the exercise or 

performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of the political subdivision 

or an employee of the political subdivision, whether or not the 

discretion is abused.”8

4 See Shipley v. Department of Roads, 283 Neb. 832, 813 N.W.2d 455 

(2012).

5 See Fickle, supra note 3.

6 Shipley, supra note 4.

7 Id.

8 § 13-910(2).
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The County’s responsive pleadings claimed immunity. The 

County asserted that it was entitled to immunity because Hall’s 

and Norris’ claims were based on the exercise or performance 

of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function 

or duty on the part of a political subdivision or an employee 

of the political subdivision.9 The County further alleged that 

it was immune from suit, because the claim alleged by Norris 

arose out of the malfunction, destruction, or unauthorized 

removal of any traffic or road sign, signal, or warning device, 

and that the County did not have actual or constructive notice 

of such malfunction, destruction, or removal.10

Hall claims that the County waived the issue of immunity. 

He points out that the joint pretrial conference order listed only 

three legal issues for trial: Norris’ negligence, the County’s 

negligence, and Hall’s negligence. Indeed, the pretrial order 

did not identify sovereign immunity or the discretionary function exception as an issue for trial. The district court did not 

explicitly address immunity in its judgment. But the pretrial 

order framed the claim against the County as including the 

“fail[ure] to discover through reasonable inspection that the 

stop sign was missing at the intersection where the collision 

occurred.” This framed the issue in light of the provision of 

§ 13-910(9) regarding actual or constructive notice of a missing sign.

[5,6] The pretrial order is binding upon the parties.11 And 

the issues set out in a pretrial order supplant those raised in 

the pleadings.12 The joint pretrial conference order in this 

case did not identify immunity as an issue, and it specifically 

ordered that “trial of this case will be governed by the terms of 

this pretrial conference order and the terms hereof supersede 

all prior pleadings in this case.” This court has affirmed the 

limiting of the issues at trial to those specified in the pretrial 

9 See id.

10 See § 13-910(9).

11 Olson v. England, 206 Neb. 256, 292 N.W.2d 48 (1980).

12 Cotton v. Ostroski, 250 Neb. 911, 554 N.W.2d 130 (1996).
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order and limiting the admission of evidence to the issues thus 

established on numerous occasions.13

[7] Further, sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense 

that can be waived. The exceptions set forth in § 13-910 are 

affirmative sovereign immunity defenses to claims brought 

pursuant to the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act.14 We 

have interpreted exceptions to the State’s waiver of immunity under both the State Tort Claims Act and the Political 

Subdivisions Tort Claims Act as affirmative defenses that the 

State must plead and prove.15 In Reimers-Hild v. State,

16 the 

defendants did not raise sovereign immunity as an affirmative 

defense in their answer and the court’s pretrial order specified 

that the sole issue at trial was whether the plaintiff’s claim 

was timely filed. On appeal, the defendants argued that the 

action against the State was barred by sovereign immunity. 

We recognized that sovereign immunity implicated a jurisdictional issue that may be raised at any time by any party, 

but we declined to consider it because it was not raised in the 

trial court. We noted that the record was created by stipulation, that the parties apparently did not contemplate the sovereign immunity issue at that time, and that we did not know 

what arguments might have been made or evidence adduced 

had the State raised a sovereign immunity defense in the district court.

(e) Resolution

By failing to identify sovereign immunity as an issue for 

trial in the joint pretrial conference order, we conclude that 

the County waived its claim that it was entitled to immunity under the discretionary function exception contained in 

§ 13-910(2).

13 See Cockrell v. Garton, 244 Neb. 359, 507 N.W.2d 38 (1993) (collecting 

cases).

14 Doe v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 273 Neb. 79, 727 N.W.2d 447 (2007).

15 Doe v. Board of Regents, 280 Neb. 492, 788 N.W.2d 264 (2010).

16 Reimers-Hild v. State, 274 Neb. 438, 741 N.W.2d 155 (2007).
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2. Negligence of County

(a) Issue

The County argues that the district court erred in determining that it was liable because it did not have an adequate 

sign-inspection policy. Evidence established that the County 

did not have a written policy or a set schedule for conducting 

sign inspections. The court determined that the County’s signinspection procedures were so inadequate as to give the County 

constructive notice of the missing sign. The County argues that 

the court erred in determining that the County’s sign-inspection 

procedures were a proximate cause of Hall’s damages.

(b) Standard of Review

[8,9] In actions brought under the Political Subdivisions 

Tort Claims Act, an appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly wrong.17

When determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain 

the trial court’s judgment, it must be considered in the light 

most favorable to the successful party; every controverted 

fact must be resolved in favor of such party, and it is entitled 

to the benefit of every inference that can be deduced from 

the evidence.18

(c) Additional Evidence 

at Trial

The Lancaster County engineering department maintained 

over 800 miles of arterial roads in the county. Employees of 

the engineering department were trained to look for damaged 

or “down” signs while performing their work duties. As one 

employee testified, “[P]atrol operators . . . out running the 

roads . . . are [the County’s] first line of defense.” The sheriff’s 

office also notified the County of signs that were missing. If a 

stop sign was missing, the County tried to replace it as soon 

as possible.

Troy Foster, a laborer for the Lancaster County engineering department, mows ditches along the county roads. Foster 

17 Blaser v. County of Madison, 285 Neb. 290, 826 N.W.2d 554 (2013).

18 Ginapp v. City of Bellevue, 282 Neb. 1027, 809 N.W.2d 487 (2012).
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makes it to each “spot” in his area about twice a year, and he 

mows each area once a year. Foster testified that when he first 

began mowing, the district supervisor for the southeast area 

of Lancaster County told him to look for damaged or “down” 

signs while performing his job and to call the supervisor if such 

a sign was found. Foster testified that during times of inclement weather or when he was not otherwise mowing, his duty 

would be “to go around and look for signs that are down, leaning, any kind of repairs that need to be done.” He testified that 

signs are inspected “during our daily business or, you know, as 

we are going from place to place, we check signs then.” There 

was no pattern that he would follow, and he would not know if 

a fellow employee had gone to the same place. Foster did not 

make any record of where he had been to look for signs. Foster 

testified that he was not given a map or chart showing the location of signs within the county, but he also testified that at one 

time, employees were given maps showing “by the sections” 

where signs should be.

Employees of the Lancaster County engineering department 

testified regarding their most recent work at the intersection 

prior to the August 24, 2009, accident. Foster had last mowed 

near the intersection on June 24, and he testified that the stop 

sign was present at that time. Rick DeBoer, who performs 

general road maintenance for the County in the spring and 

summer months, graded South 25th Street to Gage Road and 

beyond on August 17. He testified that he automatically checks 

for signs while grading, that he would have done so on that 

day, and that he did not remember the stop sign being down. 

If it had been down, DeBoer would have immediately called it 

in or fixed it.

An employee with the Lancaster County engineering department maintains a computer database of all the signs owned by 

Lancaster County which includes when the signs have been 

replaced. The database also tracks why a sign is replaced, 

including, for example, routine maintenance, installation of 

a new sign, or the sign was stolen or vandalized. Each sign 

is replaced every 10 years. Every year, an employee runs a 

query through the database which results in a list of signs to be 

replaced that year.
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(d) Additional District 

Court Findings

The district court found the County to be negligent. The 

court stated that the County did not take reasonable steps to 

ensure that the stop sign was in place and that a collision at 

the intersection was foreseeable in the absence of a stop sign. 

The court observed that there was no policy in place for routine or more frequent inspections during the months that the 

intersection was rendered “blind” by mature corn. The court 

noted that no records of traffic control device inspections were 

kept by employees who routinely worked in the area, even 

though employees kept records of what areas were mowed 

and what roads were maintained, and that there was no record 

of the route taken or observations made during inclementweather inspections.

The district court found that the County would have discovered the stop sign was missing had it carried out a reasonable 

inspection and that the absence of a regular inspection, particularly during the high-risk time of year, was not reasonable. The 

court further found that “the inspections which were conducted 

were not designed to assure a reasonable inspection of the traffic control devices of the county. They were only conducted 

haphazardly, in inclement weather, without a map of where 

devices were located and without a search pattern that assured 

complete inspection.”

The district court considered the foreseeable nature of Aden’s 

and Hall’s conduct. The court stated that it was foreseeable that 

drivers on Gage Road and South 25th Street would not slow to 

the extremely slow speeds necessary to avoid a collision and 

that it was foreseeable that the risk of collision rises significantly at the time of the year the collision occurred. The court 

found the County liable, stating that Hall could have stopped at 

the intersection and avoided the collision if the stop sign had 

been in place.

(e) Discussion

The district court correctly recognized that the claim against 

the County based upon the missing stop sign was premised 
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upon the County’s failure to discover the absence of the sign 

“within a reasonable time after actual or constructive notice”19

to the County. The court also correctly recognized that there 

was no evidence of actual notice to the County. But the court 

reasoned that constructive notice could be found in the absence 

of a sign-inspection policy. We disagree.

[10] In order to recover in a negligence action, a plaintiff 

must show a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, 

a breach of such duty, causation, and damages.20 For purposes 

of this opinion, we will assume, without deciding, that the 

County breached a duty by failing to have a sign-inspection 

policy. Once the County elected to erect a stop sign, it was 

required to maintain it in conformance with the Manual on 

Uniform Traffic Control Devices (Manual).21 With regard to 

maintenance of traffic signs, the Manual provides in part:

To assure adequate maintenance, a schedule for 

inspecting (both day and night), cleaning, and replacing signs should be established. Employees of highway, 

law enforcement, and other public agencies whose duties 

require that they travel on the roadways should be encouraged to report any damaged, deteriorated, or obscured 

signs at the first opportunity.

The above provision is labeled as a “[g]uidance,” which the 

Manual defines as “a statement of recommended, but not mandatory, practice in typical situations, with deviations allowed if 

engineering judgment or engineering study indicates the deviation to be appropriate.” Notably, the Manual does not prescribe 

a frequency for the inspection of signs.

[11-13] Determination of causation is ordinarily a matter 

for the trier of fact.22 By finding the County liable, the district 

court determined that it was a proximate cause of the damages. A proximate cause is a cause that produces a result in a 

natural and continuous sequence and without which the result 

19 See § 13-910(9).

20 Blaser, supra note 17.

21 See § 60-6,121.

22 Brandon v. County of Richardson, 261 Neb. 636, 624 N.W.2d 604 (2001).
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would not have occurred.23 To establish proximate cause, the 

plaintiff must meet three basic requirements: (1) Without the 

negligent action, the injury would not have occurred, commonly known as the “but for” rule; (2) the injury was a natural 

and probable result of the negligence; and (3) there was no 

efficient intervening cause.24

In actions brought pursuant to the Political Subdivisions 

Tort Claims Act, this court has, on occasion, reversed the 

judgment of the district court with respect to causation despite 

the generally deferential standard of review. In Brandon v. 

County of Richardson,

25 the trial court found the victim to 

be contributorily negligent, but we reversed that finding and 

stated that the record failed to show that the victim’s conduct 

was a proximate cause. We reasoned, in part, that “[t]he record 

does not show that had [the victim] kept law enforcement 

accurately informed of her whereabouts or returned for the 

second interview . . . the result would have been different.”26

And in Koncaba v. Scotts Bluff County,

27 we reversed a trial 

court’s judgment in the plaintiff’s favor after determining that 

the record established, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff’s 

decedent was contributorily negligent and that such negligence 

was a proximate cause of the accident.

On this record, no reasonable fact finder could conclude 

that the County’s failure to have a sign-inspection policy was 

a proximate cause of the accident. Hall and Norris had the 

burden to show that if the County had established a proper 

procedure for inspecting its signs, it would have discovered the 

missing stop sign and replaced it before the accident occurred. 

But there is no evidence to establish how long the stop sign 

was missing or how frequently sign inspections should be conducted under the circumstances. Thus, Hall and Norris cannot 

establish that the sign was missing long enough that it would 

23 Stacy v. Great Lakes Agri Mktg., 276 Neb. 236, 753 N.W.2d 785 (2008).

24 Radiology Servs. v. Hall, 279 Neb. 553, 780 N.W.2d 17 (2010).

25 Brandon, supra note 22.

26 Id. at 667-68, 624 N.W.2d at 627.

27 Koncaba v. Scotts Bluff County, 237 Neb. 37, 464 N.W.2d 764 (1991).
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have been discovered pursuant to a sign-inspection procedure. 

And because the Manual does not mandate any frequency of 

inspection, liability in this case cannot be fairly attributed to 

the County’s lack of a formal policy for sign inspections. As a 

matter of law, the record fails to show that the County’s failure to have a sign-inspection policy was a proximate cause of 

the accident.

(f) Resolution

Because there was no evidence to establish that the County’s 

failure to have a sign-inspection policy was a proximate cause 

of the accident, we reverse the judgment of the district court 

finding the County liable and apportioning fault to it. We 

remand the cause to the district court to apportion the County’s 

share of negligence between Hall and Norris.28

3. Hall’s Negligence

(a) Issue

Norris argues that by failing to determine who had the rightof-way at the intersection, the court failed to give proper consideration as to whether Hall’s contributory negligence should 

bar his recovery as a matter of law.

(b) Standard of Review

In actions brought under the Political Subdivisions Tort 

Claims Act, an appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly wrong.29

[14] Where neither party requests that the trial court make 

specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, if there is a 

conflict in the evidence, the appellate court in reviewing the 

judgment rendered will presume that the controverted facts 

were decided in favor of the successful party, and the findings 

will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong.30

28 See Downey v. Western Comm. College Area, 282 Neb. 970, 808 N.W.2d 

839 (2012).

29 Blaser, supra note 17.

30 C. Goodrich, Inc. v. Thies, 14 Neb. App. 170, 705 N.W.2d 451 (2005).
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(c) Additional District 

Court Findings

The court found that “regardless which driver had the 

right[-]of[-]way, both drivers were negligent for approaching 

the intersection at a rate of speed that was too fast for the 

circumstances.” The court further found that Aden’s negligence was greater than that of Hall because Aden was familiar 

with the intersection, knew the intersection was completely 

blind, and believed traffic from the north was not required 

to stop, but entered the intersection at the maximum permissible speed.

(d) Discussion

Norris claims that the district court erred by failing to make 

a finding regarding whether Hall or Aden had the right-of-way. 

Norris argues that because the vehicles arrived at the intersection at approximately the same time, Aden had the right-ofway. Hall argues that the statutory right-of-way is only one 

factor to be used in evaluating a person’s conduct and that he 

complied with the applicable standard of care. He directs us to 

Hodgson v. Gladem,

31 where we stated:

The statutory right-of-way rule, if it is to be effective, 

must be accompanied by an observance by both parties 

of the rules applicable to the exercise of due care and in 

particular the duty to keep a lookout and make effective 

observations at a time when such observations can have 

an effect consonant with [the] underlying purpose of 

the rules.

[15] The district court was not required to make a specific 

factual finding regarding the statutory right-of-way. In the 

absence of a request by a party for specific findings, a trial 

court is not required to make detailed findings of fact and need 

only make its findings generally for the prevailing party.32

Neither Norris nor any other party requested specific findings 

by the district court. Accordingly, the court was not obligated 

31 Hodgson v. Gladem, 187 Neb. 736, 741, 193 N.W.2d 779, 782 (1972).

32 Lesser v. Eagle Hills Homeowners’ Assn., 20 Neb. App. 423, 824 N.W.2d 

77 (2012). See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1127 (Reissue 2008).
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to make a specific determination regarding which driver had 

the right-of-way.

(e) Resolution

Because no party requested specific findings of fact by 

the district court, we presume that any issue regarding the 

statutory right-of-way rule was decided in Hall’s favor. But 

because we remand for reallocation of the 20 percent of fault 

initially allocated to the County, we do not know whether the 

fault allocated to Norris will be equal to or greater than that 

allocated to Hall.

4. Allocation of Damages

and Fault

(a) Issue

Norris argues that the district court erred by failing to allocate damages into economic and noneconomic damages and 

by failing to allocate percentages of fault between Norris and 

the County.

(b) Standard of Review

[16] Because the purpose of comparative negligence is 

to allow triers of fact to compare relative negligence and to 

apportion damages on that basis, the determination of apportionment is solely a matter for the fact finder, and its action in 

this respect will not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported 

by credible evidence and bears a reasonable relationship to the 

respective elements of negligence proved at trial.33

(c) Additional District 

Court Findings

The district court awarded Hall $1,100,000 and identified 

Hall’s medical expenses as totaling $357,335.86. The court 

found the percentage of negligence of Norris and the County 

to be 70 percent and the percentage of negligence of Hall to be 

30 percent. After reducing the total damages by the 30 percent 

which represented Hall’s contributory negligence, the court 

entered judgment of $770,000 in Hall’s favor.

33 Connelly v. City of Omaha, 284 Neb. 131, 816 N.W.2d 742 (2012).
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(d) Discussion

Norris’ argument is based on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,185.10 

(Reissue 2008), which concerns the allocation of liability in 

actions involving more than one defendant. Norris asserts that 

the statute requires the district court to make specific rulings 

on economic and noneconomic damages and requires a separate judgment against each defendant for that defendant’s percentage of the noneconomic damages based on that defendant’s 

percentage of fault.

Our reversal of the judgment against the County undermines 

Norris’ argument. Because we have determined that the County 

is not liable for Hall’s injuries, the allocation between Norris 

and the County is no longer an issue.

But there is an issue of allocation remaining, which we 

cannot resolve in this appeal. The district court allocated 50 

percent of the negligence to Norris, 30 percent to Hall, and 

20 percent to the County. Because we have determined that 

the County was not liable for Hall’s damages, the 20 percent 

of negligence allocated to it must be reallocated. But because 

apportionment is solely a matter for the fact finder and will 

be upheld except in very limited circumstances, we cannot 

determine how the district court would have allocated the 20 

percent as between Hall and Norris.34 We must remand the 

cause in order for the district court to make this allocation in 

the first instance.

(e) Resolution

Because we have determined that the County is not liable for 

Hall’s damages, the matter of allocation of damages between 

the County and Norris is no longer an issue. But remand is 

necessary to apportion the County’s share of the negligence as 

between Hall and Norris. We remand the cause to the district 

court for a reallocation of liability between Hall and Norris 

based upon the existing record.

34 See Downey, supra note 28.
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5. Remaining Assignments

of Error

[17] Our resolution of this appeal makes it unnecessary to 

consider the other assignments of error. An appellate court is 

not obligated to engage in an analysis that is not necessary to 

adjudicate the case and controversy before it.35

V. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the County waived its claim that it was 

entitled to immunity under the discretionary function exception, because it failed to identify sovereign immunity as an 

issue for trial in the pretrial order. We reverse the judgment 

of the district court finding the County liable, because there 

is no evidence to establish that the County’s failure to have a 

sign-inspection policy was a proximate cause of the accident. 

Because the County is not liable, the matter of allocation of 

damages between it and Norris is no longer an issue. But as to 

the 20 percent of liability erroneously assessed to the County, 

we cannot determine how the finder of fact would have allocated such negligence between Hall and Norris. We remand 

the cause to the district court for a reallocation, between Hall 

and Norris based upon the existing record, of the 20 percent of 

liability initially allocated to the County.

 Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and

remanded for further proceedings.

Wright, J., not participating.

35 Kerford Limestone Co. v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., ante p. 653, ___ N.W.2d 

___ (2014).