In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 08-1625

MARK RUJAWITZ,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TIMOTHY MARTIN, former Secretary of the

Department of Transportation of the State of Illinois,

 Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:07-cv-00427-MJR-CJP—Michael J. Reagan, Judge.

ARGUED JANUARY 13, 2009—DECIDED APRIL 2, 2009

Before BAUER, POSNER and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Mark Rujawitz sued Timothy

Martin, Secretary of the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that his

substantive property right to employment had been

violated. The district court granted Martin’s motion to

dismiss holding that there was no property right present.

On appeal, Rujawitz argues that a favorable procedural
2 No. 08-1625

ruling converted his at-will status to tenure, establishing

such a right. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

For approximately thirteen years, Rujawitz worked for

IDOT as a Civil Engineer IV, an at-will position. This run,

however, came to a halt on October 27, 2004, when

Rujawitz was discharged for unlawful conduct, disruptive

conduct and failure to follow a supervisory directive.

The termination was prompted by Rujawitz’s failure to

abide by an injunction, which required him to remain at

least 100 feet from his ex-girlfriend, also an IDOT employee.

A disciplinary panel reviewed the discharge and found

that although not “totally without fault,” Rujawitz did not

violate the injunction because the contact with his exgirlfriend was incidental. The panel also found that

Rujawitz’s due process was violated because IDOT did

not provide sufficient documentation supporting the

charges. With these findings, the panel recommended

that termination was too severe and that a lesser level

of discipline was more appropriate.

Martin concurred with the panel’s recommendations

and ordered that: (1) Rujawitz be reinstated; (2) the discharge be changed to suspension without pay (including back-pay) for a certain period; and (3) Rujawitz

be transferred to a different office.

Rujawitz then brought this civil rights action, under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Martin, claiming that his sub-
No. 08-1625 3

stantive due process right to property was violated when

he was denied back-pay and constructively discharged

by the transfer. Rujawitz argued that IDOT’s decision to

utilize the disciplinary panel and Martin’s concurrence

with the panel’s recommendations endowed him with

substantive due process rights. Martin moved to dismiss

the action; the district court granted Martin’s motion,

holding that the panel’s recommendation and Martin’s

concurrence did not establish a property right in continued employment, since at most, it reinstated Rujawitz

as an at-will employee. The district court also held that

no protectable, contractual property interest existed

because IDOT’s policy manual expressly stated as much

and that there was no agreement giving Rujawitz a

tenured-employee status.

This timely appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Rujawitz argues that the district court erred

in concluding that he had no protected property interest

in his continued employment with IDOT and by granting

Martin’s motion to dismiss his due process claim. Specifically, Rujawitz argues that because IDOT employed the

disciplinary panel, which ultimately reversed Rujawitz’s

discharge, and Martin adopted the panel’s recommendation, a substantive property right was established. Our

review of a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss

is de novo. Andonissamy v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 547 F.3d

841, 847 (7th Cir. 2008). When ruling on a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), we accept all well-pleaded
4 No. 08-1625

allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences

in favor of Rujawitz. Id.

 In order to make his due process claim, Rujawitz

must first demonstrate that he had a constitutionally

protected property interest. Border v. City of Crystal Lake,

75 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996); Moss v. Martin, 473 F.3d

694, 700 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). We look to

Illinois law to determine whether he had a substantive

property interest in his employment with IDOT. Moss,

473 F.3d at 700. Under Illinois law, a person has a

property interest in his job where he has a legitimate

expectation of his continued employment based on a

legitimate claim of entitlement. Id. (citing Krecek v. Bd. of

Police Comm’rs of La Grange Park, 646 N.E.2d 1314, 1318

(Ill. App. Ct. 1995)). “To show a legitimate expectation

of continued employment, a plaintiff must show a

specific ordinance, state law, contract or understanding

limiting the ability of the a state or state entity to

discharge him.” Moss, 473 F.3d at 700 (quoting Krecek, 646

N.E.2d at 1318-19).

We begin by stating that there is neither an ordinance,

a state law, nor an express employment agreement that

would upgrade Rujawitz’s status from at-will to tenure.

IDOT’s policy manual expressly stated that it did not

constitute an employment contract. Rujawitz acknowledges this but argues that IDOT abandoned this disclaimer (converting his at-will status to tenure) when it

convened the disciplinary panel, and when the panel

issued a favorable recommendation that Martin agreed

with. These occurrences, Rujawitz argues, impliedly gave
No. 08-1625 5

rise to more than a unilateral expectation of continuing

employment.

We disagree; at most, Rujawitz relies on the disciplinary

panel as a procedural guarantee. Procedural guarantees,

whether relied on or not, do not establish a property

interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment’s

Due Process Clause. See Miyler v. Vill. of E. Galesburg,

512 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2008). We have previously

held that although the lack of grievance procedures

weighs strongly against a finding of for-cause employment, it does not mean that the existence of such procedures indicates for-cause employment. Border, 75 F.3d at

275. This is especially true in light of IDOT’s contractual

disclaimer. Id. We find meritless Rujawitz’s argument

that his case is different because the procedure was

actually followed. The district court properly held that

the entitlement must be directly to the job—namely

something that required Rujawitz to be fired only for

cause—and not to the disciplinary procedure. Id.;

Campell v. City of Champaign, 940 F.2d 1111, 1113 (7th Cir.

1991); Farmer v. Lane, 864 F.2d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 1988).

Rujawitz only points to the use of the procedure.

The presence of such disciplinary procedures does not

establish a property right in continued employment,

despite what Rujawitz may subjectively believe, neither

does the use of those procedures. The presumption in

Illinois is that employment is at-will, Moss, 473 F.3d at

700, and we have not found any case where a panel’s

review of an employee’s termination was found sufficient

to rebut that presumption. What Rujawitz argues might
6 No. 08-1625

well prompt IDOT to stop giving such procedures to atwill employees. It seems that he is trying to penalize the

state for providing him a process that ultimately got him

his job back. Use of a panel review, pursuant to IDOT’s

policy, and Martin’s concurrence, are not sufficient to

establish a substantive property right.

III. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal.

4-2-09