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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49399

In the Interest of: John Doe I, A Child 

Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age.

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STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 

HEALTH AND WELFARE,

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

JANE DOE (2022-02),

Respondent-Appellant.

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Filed: April 28, 2022

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Second Judicial 

District, State of Idaho, Nez Perce County. Hon. Victoria Olds, Magistrate.

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Joanna M. McFarland, Lewiston, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Floyd L. Swanton Jr., Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Floyd L. Swanton Jr., argued.

Paige M. Nolta, Lewiston, guardian ad litem.

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BRAILSFORD, Judge

Jane Doe (Mother) appeals from the magistrate court’s judgment terminating her parental 

rights to her minor child, J.D. Mother argues the court erred by concluding she neglected J.D. and 

that the termination of her parental rights is in J.D.’s best interests. She also challenges several 

orders the court entered during the underlying Child Protective Act (CPA) case before the court 

terminated her parental rights. We affirm the judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights but 

decline to consider Mother’s appellate challenges to the court’s orders entered in the underlying

CPA case.
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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In March 2014, Mother gave birth to J.D.1 At that time, Mother was in Lewiston;

unmarried; and in a relationship with a sex offender, who was not J.D.’s father.2 Shortly after 

J.D.’s birth, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare opened a voluntary case plan for Mother 

based on concerns about her mental health, inappropriate housing, and inability to care for J.D. 

That plan remained in place until about January 2015.

According to Mother’s testimony at the termination hearing, when J.D. was “around two 

or three years old,” he began having “tantrums” due to “frustration” and “anger,” and she had his 

mental health evaluated. Also during this timeframe, Mother married a man in December 2016

but divorced him within a “couple” of months. Then, in April 2017, Mother gave birth to twins, 

although the twins were not the children of the man Mother had married in December 2016 and 

subsequently divorced. 

Shortly after the twins’ birth in April 2017, the Department received a report in May 2017 

that Mother was locking J.D. in his room and that he had bruising on his legs. During an 

investigation of this report, Mother stated she was “overwhelmed” and “didn’t know what to do 

with [J.D.].” Following the investigation, the Department sought protective supervision of J.D.

and his younger twin siblings. Eventually, the State charged Mother with injury to child; Mother 

pled guilty to disturbing the peace; and the magistrate court granted the Department’s request for 

protective supervision of the children. The Department’s protective supervision concluded in 

approximately February 2018. During this time, Mother received services to improve her 

parenting skills.

In October 2018, Mother gave birth to a daughter, and in December 2018, she married the 

daughter’s father. A few months later, in April 2019, when J.D. was five years old, Mother took 

him to the emergency room “with a chief complaint of hyperactive behavior.” According to the 

 

1 Mother had given birth to two children before the birth of J.D. When Mother was nineteen 

years old, however, the children’s maternal grandmother obtained a guardianship over them, and 

at the time of the termination trial, Mother did not have custody of those two older children, who 

remained in their maternal grandmother’s custody in New Hampshire.

2 At J.D.’s birth, Mother was mistaken about the identity of his father, and Mother did not 

learn the father’s identity until later. The magistrate court terminated the parental rights of J.D.’s 

father, but that termination is not the subject of this case.
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emergency room physician, Mother reported that J.D. was locked in his room because “it was not 

time for him to come out” and “he had hit his head against a pane of glass in his bedroom, cracking 

the glass.” The emergency room nurse testified that Mother “was worried about [J.D.’s] behavior 

being out of control and was looking for a psych placement for [J.D.].” Both the physician and 

nurse testified to a lack of bonding between Mother and J.D. The physician discharged J.D. with 

instructions to follow up with family therapy intervention and with J.D.’s treating psychiatrist.

In May 2019, Mother drove J.D. to Boise, and he was admitted into an inpatient behavioral 

program. According to the child psychiatrist who admitted J.D. into the hospital, he was exhibiting 

behavioral issues of maladaptive aggression and suicidal thinking. Following this hospitalization, 

the Department filed a petition to obtain legal custody of J.D. and his three younger siblings under 

the CPA. After a shelter care hearing, the hospital discharged J.D. into the Department’s care.

The magistrate court held a two-day, contested adjudicatory hearing in August 2019 and

awarded the Department legal custody of J.D. The court, however, concluded that it did not have 

jurisdiction over his three younger siblings and dismissed the Department’s petition as to those 

children, and the case proceeded only as to J.D. In September 2019, the court approved a case 

plan. The case plan identified tasks for Mother to perform to improve her ability to meet J.D.’s 

mental health and his emotional and developmental needs. Those tasks included, for example, that 

Mother learn about attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, work with the Department to identify 

J.D.’s needs, learn how to meet those needs, attend visitation with J.D., and demonstrate her ability 

to provide appropriate parental care for him. 

During the case’s pendency, the Department placed J.D. in several different foster care 

arrangements. Initially, the Department placed J.D. in foster care with his step-grandparents. 

Later, it transferred J.D. to a different foster home. Then, in July 2020, it transferred him to a 

residential treatment facility for children in crisis. According to a child psychiatrist who began 

treating J.D. in February 2021, he had “very severe struggles” while at the facility and was 

hospitalized twice for “out-of-control aggressive behavior directed toward his peers, other kids at 

the [facility], and staff.” The psychiatrist testified that, while at the facility, “[J.D. was] very easily 

triggered by peers and noise and over activity. So there was a lot of uncontrollable tantruming and 

aggression in that environment because it’s a group care environment with a lot of children.” 

After J.D. had resided at the residential treatment facility for approximately one year, the 

Department transferred him to reside with a family in July 2021, approximately six weeks before 
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the termination hearing in August 2021. At the time of the termination hearing, the family was 

not a licensed foster care family but had applied for a license. As a result, a licensed foster care 

family “in the area” was “involved” in “oversee[ing] J.D.’s care.”

Also during the case’s pendency, the magistrate court held numerous review hearings and 

a permanency hearing in March 2021. During that hearing, the court amended the permanency 

goal from reunification to a primary goal of termination of parental rights and adoption and a 

concurrent goal of reunification. In April 2021, the Department petitioned to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights, and the court scheduled a termination hearing for August 2021. Approximately a 

week before that hearing, however, Mother left Idaho and drove to New Hampshire with her 

husband and other three younger children.3

The magistrate court held a termination hearing over the course of five days in August and 

September 2021. At the time of the hearing, Mother remained in New Hampshire and appeared at 

the hearing by video conference. Numerous witnesses testified including Mother, the guardian 

ad litem, three Department caseworkers, J.D.’s current foster mother, two child psychiatrists, a 

psychologist, two family therapists, and the emergency room doctor and the nurse who had treated 

J.D. Additionally, Mother called her husband, her mother-in-law, and a neighbor as witnesses.

Following the termination hearing, the magistrate court entered written findings of fact and 

conclusions of law terminating Mother’s parental rights. Among other things, the court concluded 

that Mother had neglected J.D. by failing to provide him with proper parental care and control and 

by failing to comply with her case plan. See Idaho Code § 16-1602(31)(a) (defining neglect to 

include failing to provide proper parental care and control); I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) (defining neglect 

to include failure to comply with case plan and the Department having custody of the child for 

fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months). Additionally, the court concluded that Mother is 

unable to discharge her parental responsibilities under I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d) and that termination 

of her parental rights is in J.D.’s best interests.

Mother timely appeals the magistrate court’s judgment terminating her parental rights.

 

3 The magistrate court made specific findings about Mother’s decision to travel to New 

Hampshire before the termination hearing. The court found that Mother did not inform the court, 

her attorney, the caseworker, or the guardian ad litem of her plan to travel to New Hampshire; 

Mother’s testimony on the subject was “not credible”; and “the family intended to move with no 

intention of Mother and the younger siblings returning to Idaho.” 
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II.

ANALYSIS

A. Orders Entered in Underlying CPA Case

Mother asserts numerous challenges on appeal, including challenging the magistrate 

court’s orders entered during the pendency of the CPA case. Those challenges include that the 

court erred by: (1) finding the Department had made reasonable efforts towards reunification,

(2) changing the permanency goal from reunification to termination of parental rights, and 

(3) denying Mother’s motion for an extended home visit and to vacate the termination hearing. As 

discussed below, because I.C. § 16-1625(1)(c) provided for appeal of these orders to the district 

court or to seek permissive appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, we decline to address Mother’s 

challenges to those orders.

1. Reasonable reunification efforts

Mother asserts the magistrate court “erred in finding [the Department] made reasonable 

efforts towards reunification from the review hearings.” Mother argues that “substantial, 

competent evidence does not support the court’s finding that the Department’s efforts were 

reasonable and that the Department failed to support “the reunification goals” and “to implement 

reasonable efforts that would ensure [J.D.’s] ongoing health and wellbeing.” In support, Mother 

cites evidence from numerous review hearings, which she contends supports that the Department’s 

efforts at reunification were not reasonable.

The Idaho Supreme Court, however, has definitively ruled that an “inquiry into the 

Department’s efforts at reunification is irrelevant to the termination of parental rights.” Idaho 

Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 164 Idaho 883, 888, 436 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2019); see also State, 

Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2019-31), 166 Idaho 357, 361, 458 P.3d 226, 230 (Ct. App. 

2020) (“It is well-settled that the Department’s efforts at reunification are not relevant to the 

magistrate court’s termination decision under I.C. § 16-2005.”). Mother acknowledges this ruling 

but argues she lacks “immediate appellate recourse for a court’s determination of the Department’s 

reasonable efforts [which] impacts her due process rights for termination of parental rights.”

We disagree. As this Court previously ruled in Doe (2019-31), 166 Idaho at 360-61, 458 

P.3d at 230-31, “[t]here is a statutory right to appeal at several points during the pendency of the 

child protection proceeding.” Idaho Code § 16-1625(1) sets forth this right and provides, in part,

that an aggrieved party may appeal “[a]n adjudicatory decree,” “[a]ny order subsequent to the 
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adjudicatory decree that vests legal custody of the child in the department,” or “[a]ny order 

subsequent to the adjudicatory decree that authorizes or mandates the department to cease 

reasonable efforts to make it possible to return the child to his home.” I.C. § 16-1625(1)(a)-(c).

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Based on this statutory scheme, this Court rejected the parent’s argument in Doe (2019-

31), 166 Idaho at 361, 458 P.3d at 231, that review under the scheme does not satisfy due process. 

Further, this Court concluded that an appellate review of the Department’s reasonable efforts 

following a termination is contrary to the statutory scheme and noted “important policy reasons” 

the legislature did not include reasonable efforts as a required finding after the Department files a 

termination petition. Id. Accordingly, we conclude Mother’s due process rights were not violated,

and we decline to address Mother’s argument that substantial and competent evidence does not 

support the district court’s findings during the pendency of the CPA case that the Department made 

reasonable efforts to reunify J.D. with Mother.

2. Change of permanency goal to termination

Mother also similarly asserts the magistrate court “erred in changing the permanency 

goal to termination of parental rights” during the pendency of the CPA case. In support, 

Mother cites to evidence admitted during the permanency hearing; contends the court 

acknowledged during the hearing a “need for additional visitation,” which Mother asserts

confirms she “was in compliance with her case plan tasks and reasonably able to reunify with 

the minor”; and argues “[n]othing regarding [Mother’s] progress prevented her from the return 

of her son to the household.” In response, the Department argues the court did not abuse its 

discretion in changing the permanency goal from reunification to termination. In support, the 

Department relies on Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 163 Idaho 565, 569, 416 P.3d 

937, 941 (2018), ruling that “the applicable standard of review of a magistrate court’s decision 

to accept, modify, or reject the Department’s proposed permanency plan” is the abuse of 

discretion standard. The guardian ad litem, however, argues Mother was required but failed 

to appeal the court’s order changing the permanency goal under I.C. § 16-1625(1).

We agree with the guardian ad litem that Mother was required to appeal the magistrate 

court’s order in the CPA case changing the primary permanency goal from reunification to 

 

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 The aggrieved party may appeal such orders to the district court or may seek a direct 

permissive appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. I.C. § 16-1625(1). 
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termination of parental rights under Idaho Code § 16-1625(1)(c). This statute provides that 

“an aggrieved party may appeal” “[a]ny order subsequent to the adjudicatory decree that 

authorizes or mandates the department to cease reasonable efforts to make it possible to return 

the child to his home” to the district court or to seek a direct permissive appeal of this order to 

the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The magistrate court’s order changing the permanency goal is 

such an order. 

Mother does not reply to the guardian ad litem’s assertion that she was required to 

appeal the magistrate court’s order changing the permanency goal under I.C. § 16-1625(1)(c). 

Specifically, she makes no argument and cites no authority that--despite her appellate rights 

under I.C. § 16-1625(1)--she may appeal the order after the magistrate court’s judgment 

terminating her parental rights. For the same reasons articulated in Doe (2019-31) that a parent 

may not challenge reasonableness of the Department’s reunification efforts post-termination, 

we conclude Mother may not appeal the magistrate court’s order changing the permanency 

goal in the CPA case post-termination. The legislature provided for statutory appellate review 

of the magistrate court’s order changing the permanency goal, and this Court will defer to that 

authority absent a constitutional violation. See Doe (2019-31), 166 Idaho at 361, 458 P.3d at 

230 (noting grant of statutory appellate review is within the legislature’s purview). 

We do not construe the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Doe, 163 Idaho 565, 416 

P.3d 937, on which the Department relies, to provide otherwise. Doe is a post-termination 

CPA case. Id. at 567, 416 P.3d at 939. After the termination of parental rights, “the 

Department filed a post-termination permanency plan that requested a change in the 

permanency goal from adoption by relative to adoption by non-relative.” Id. The magistrate 

court rejected this request, and the Department appealed. Id. On appeal, the Court noted the 

magistrate court entered the order on the permanency plan after entering a judgment 

terminating parental rights. Id. at 568, 416 P.3d at 940. As a result, the Court ruled that the 

Department’s appeal was valid under Idaho Appellate Rule 12.1(a)(2), which provides for an 

immediate appeal to the Court of an order entered after a final judgment in a CPA proceeding. 

Doe, 163 Idaho at 568, 416 P.3d at 940. The Court then ruled that “the applicable standard for 

review of a magistrate court’s decision to accept, modify or reject the Department’s proposed 

permanency plan” is for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 569, 416 P.3d at 941. The Court’s 
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decision, however, does not support the proposition that an aggrieved party may appeal a 

pretermination order on a proposed permanency plan contrary to the CPA’s statutory scheme 

under I.C. § 16-1625(1) for appellate review of such an order.

Moreover, even assuming that Mother’s appeal of the order changing the permanency 

plan from reunification to termination were valid and that we were to review such an order for 

an abuse of discretion, Mother’s argument otherwise fails. Mother fails to cite the four-prong 

test for determining whether a court abused its discretion or to explain how the court abused 

its discretion under that test. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 

194 (2018) (articulating four-prong test for analyzing abuse of discretion). That failure is also 

fatal to Mother’s challenge. See State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 870, 436 P.3d 683, 691 (2019) 

(requiring parties to argue abuse of discretion).

3. Denial of motion for extended home visit and continuance of termination 

hearing

Mother also challenges the magistrate court’s denial of her request--following the 

Department’s petition for termination of her parental rights--to review the case’s status, to make a 

finding the Department failed to make reasonable efforts at reunification, to change the primary 

permanency goal to reunification, to authorize an extended home visit with J.D., and to vacate the 

termination hearing. Essentially, Mother’s motion seeking this relief, including a finding that the 

Department failed to make reasonable efforts and to change the permanency goal to reunification, 

was a request for the court to reconsider its orders on such matters entered before the Department’s 

petition for termination of her parental rights. For the reasons discussed above, Mother’s requests 

to review the case’s status, to find the Department failed to make reasonable reunification efforts, 

to change the primary permanency goal, and to authorize an extended home visit5are subject to 

appeal under I.C. § 16-1625(1) and are irrelevant to the termination of parental rights. Cf. Doe, 

164 Idaho at 889, 436 P.3d at 1238 (“[I]nquiry into the Department’s efforts at reunification is 

irrelevant to the termination of parental rights.”); Doe (2019-31), 166 Idaho at 361, 458 P.3d at 

230 (“It is well-settled that the Department’s efforts at reunification are not relevant to the 

 

5 To the extent Mother’s appeal appropriately includes a review of the denial of her request 

to vacate the termination hearing, she fails to cite any authority or to make any argument on appeal 

challenging that denial. This Court generally does not address issues not supported by cogent 

argument and citation to legal authority, even in a case terminating parental rights. Idaho Dep’t 

of Health & Welfare v. Jane Doe (2018-24), 164 Idaho 143, 147, 426 P.3d 1243, 1247 (2018).
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magistrate court’s termination decision under I.C. § 16-2005.”). Because Mother did not seek a 

timely appeal under I.C. § 16-1625(1), we decline to address the merits of her challenges to the 

court’s orders entered before its judgment terminating her parental rights.

B. Termination of Parental Rights

1. Standard of review

In addition to challenging the magistrate court’s orders entered before the termination 

hearing, Mother also challenges the court’s judgment terminating her parental rights. The 

following principles apply to a review of the termination of parental rights. A parent has a 

fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her child. Troxel v. Granville, 

530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341, 343 (2002). This interest 

is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 

Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the Termination of Parent and Child 

Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family life should be strengthened and 

preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due process must be met when 

terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383, 386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 

(2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a parent-child relationship be proved 

by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental liberty interest is at stake, the United 

States Supreme Court has determined that a court may terminate a parent-child relationship only 

if that decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 

769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 

203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at 652. 

On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the 

decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243, 

245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences 

in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated. 

Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater 

quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and 

convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143 

Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood 

to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe 
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v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate court’s decision 

must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.

Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the 

parent-child relationship when it is in the child’s best interests and any one of the following five 

factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between 

the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities

for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or 

(e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. 

2. Neglect

Mother challenges the magistrate court’s conclusions that she neglected J.D under 

I.C. § 16-2005(b). The court concluded Mother neglected J.D. on two alternative grounds, 

including that J.D. “was without proper [parental] care and control necessary for his wellbeing” 

and that Mother failed to comply with her case plan.6 See I.C. § 16-1602(31)(a) (defining neglect

to include failing to provide proper parental care and control); I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) (defining 

neglect to include failure to comply with case plan and department having custody of child for 

fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months). Each of these alternative conclusions provides an 

independent basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights. See Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare 

v. Doe (2012-16), 154 Idaho 175, 181-82, 296 P.3d 381, 387-88 (2013) (noting statutory grounds 

for termination of parental rights are independent and if court finds one or more grounds for 

termination, it may grant termination).

 

6 The magistrate court also concluded Mother “is unable to discharge her parental 

responsibilities” under I.C. § 16-2005(d). Although Mother challenges this conclusion, we decline 

to address the merits of this argument because she fails to establish the magistrate court erred by 

concluding she neglected J.D. under I.C. § 16-2005(b). See Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. 

Doe (2012-16), 154 Idaho 175, 181-82, 296 P.3d 381, 387-88 (2013) (noting statutory grounds for 

termination of parental rights are independent and if court finds one or more grounds for 

termination, it may grant termination).
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a. Proper parental care and control

Mother challenges the magistrate court’s conclusion that “the child was without proper 

[parental] care and control necessary for his well-being.” See I.C. § 16-1602(31)(a) (defining 

neglect to include failing to provide proper parental care and control). In support of this 

conclusion, the court found Mother was unable or refused “to provide appropriate care, attention, 

and supervision” of J.D. For example, the court found Mother failed to recognize J.D.’s 

“developmental level or normal childhood exuberance and boundary-testing” and that his behavior 

was “the product of being locked in a room, physically disciplined with extreme means, and 

criticized for every mistake.” Further, the court found Mother wanted the Department, medical 

care providers and other caregivers “to ‘fix’” J.D., but she was unwilling or lacked the desire to 

commit to the time necessary to parent J.D. The court also rejected Mother’s inconsistent claims 

that “her poor demonstration of parenting skills [was] based on an inability to retain information 

regarding parenting” and that “she could appropriately parent [J.D.].” Finally, the court found 

“Mother did not complete programs she was perfectly capable of completing,” noting specifically 

that she failed to “progress to Phase Two of [parent-child interactive therapy (PCIT)] after a year 

of sessions” and “did not finish therapy” because she sabotaged the relationship with the therapist.

Mother argues the magistrate court’s description of her “actions and intent” do not 

“accurately reflect” the trial testimony. In support, Mother cites to numerous portions of the trial 

transcript which she contends shows “she followed medical advise [sic],” “complied with all 

medical recommendations,” “demonstrate[d] her PCIT skills,” and “completed a [trust-based 

relational intervention (TBRI)] training and was using the skills she learned in her visits.” 

Mother, however, does not identify any of the magistrate court’s findings--with one 

exception7--which she contends are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Rather, 

 

7 Mother challenges the magistrate court’s finding about the number of investigations the 

Department conducted related to Mother. Specifically, Mother claims that “the history of neglect 

is inaccurately reported by the [court] as the testimony was 16 calls for investigation (not 26).” 

Mother’s argument, however, misstates the court’s finding. The court found that “the family had 

26 CPA referrals to [the Department], 16 investigated, and ten information-only.” 

Substantial and competent evidence supports this finding, including the testimony of a 

Department social worker, who testified:

Q. Do you know how many times people have called the central hotline 

regarding [Mother]?

A. Twenty-six.
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Mother requests that this Court reweigh the evidence and substitute its view for that of the 

magistrate court’s view, which we decline to do. See Neustadt v. Colafranceschi, 167 Idaho 214,

228, 469 P.3d 1, 15 (2020) (“[A]ppellate courts in Idaho do not reweigh evidence.”); In re Doe

2009-19, 150 Idaho 201, 209, 245 P.3d 953, 961 (2010) (“It is not our role to reweigh the 

evidence.”).

b. Case plan compliance

Mother also challenges the magistrate court’s alternative conclusion that she neglected J.D. 

by failing to comply with the case plan. See I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) (defining neglect to include 

failure to comply with case plan and department having custody of child for fifteen of the most 

recent twenty-two months). Although the court concluded Mother completed some tasks, it 

concluded “Mother has been unable to comply with the two most important case plan tasks.” 

Nonetheless, the court’s decision indicates Mother failed to complete three tasks identified in the 

case plan. 

The magistrate court found Mother failed to complete Task 1.1.1.3. This task requires that 

Mother work with her therapist, J.D.’s therapist, and a parent coach “to build a healthy, parentchild relationship.” Regarding Task 1.1.1.3, the court found that “Mother was unwilling to make 

the sacrifice and devote the individual time to [J.D.] that he needed.” The court attributes this 

unwillingness to Mother’s “preferences for tending to [her] other children,” “her mental health 

struggles,” “her inability to apply what she learned over years of therapy and coaching,” and “her 

continuation of known abusive parenting techniques (locking in room, negative blaming and 

criticism, overreactions to normal if ebullient behavior, etc.).”

The magistrate court also found Mother failed to complete Task 1.1.1.5. This task requires 

Mother to work with the Department to identify J.D.’s medical and mental health care needs. 

Regarding Task 1.1.1.5, the court found that “Mother did not show an ability to manage [J.D.’s] 

 

Q. Do you know how many of those times they were just considered [an 

information and referral] and didn’t go anywhere?

A. I’m going to look in my document to refresh my memory. Sixteen of 

those were investigated.

. . . .

Q. Has [Mother] ever been substantiated?

A. She has.

Q. How many times?

A. She’s been substantiated three times for physical abuse.
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mental health care needs,” “refused to accept the diagnoses,” “was unwilling and unable to . . . 

follow the recommendations,” failed to devote even minimal time to addressing J.D.’s needs, and 

“failed to demonstrate competently the recommended parenting techniques.” 

Finally, the magistrate court found Mother failed to complete Task 1.1.1.6. This task 

requires Mother to demonstrate her ability to care appropriately for J.D., including demonstrating 

during scheduled visits the skills she learned in counseling. Regarding Task 1.1.1.6, the court 

found that, although Mother “did positive things during visits,” she “never progressed to 

unsupervised visits” and “struggled to fully engage and could not pick up on [J.D.’s] cues” and 

that “every therapist [who] provided parenting coaching, training and supervision agreed that 

Mother, despite years of support, lacked competency to parent [J.D.].” Based on these failures, 

the court concluded, among other things, that “Mother never fully applied herself to training and 

using learned skills during visits”; “Mother has not demonstrated [an] understanding how to be a 

safe or protective parent”; and she never “progress[ed] to warrant unsupervised visits.”

Again, Mother does not specifically challenge any of these findings. Instead, Mother 

argues that she complied with the case plan “to the extent [she] was allowed to participate” and 

that “barriers outside of [her] control . . . skew[ed] the accomplishments that were fundamentally 

most important.”8 Specifically, she identifies those barriers to include the coronavirus pandemic 

“restrictions,” J.D.’s “relocation to 4 different foster placements,” and changes in J.D.’s services 

and medications. Other than identifying these purported barriers to Mother’s compliance with her 

case plan, Mother fails to explain how these events created circumstances beyond her control that 

made it impossible for her to comply with her case plan. See Idaho Dep’t of Health and Welfare 

v. Doe (2016-14), 161 Idaho 596, 600, 389 P.3d 141, 145 (2016) (holding impossibility defense 

occurs where circumstances are beyond parent’s control); see also State, Dep’t of Health & 

 

8

In support of this argument, Mother cites In re Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J.

(In re N.J.), 8 P.3d 126 (Nev. 2000). She quotes that case as stating that “the parent cannot be 

judged unsuitable by reason of failure to comply with requirements and plans that are unclear and 

have not been communicated to the parent, or which are impossible for the parent to abide by.” 

The case, however, does not contain the quoted language or stand for that the quoted proposition. 

Rather, the quote is from Champagne v. Welfare Div. of Nevada State Dep’t of Hum. Res., 691 

P.2d 849, 857 (Nev. 1984), which In re N.J. overrules. In In re N.J., the Nevada Supreme Court 

addressed whether the biological parents who had not supported a child for seven years had 

abandoned that child under Nevada statutes providing for termination of parental rights. Id. at

135. Accordingly, In re N.J. provides no persuasive, applicable authority in this case. 
14

Welfare v. Doe (2020-47), 168 Idaho 496, 500, 483 P.3d 1039, 1043 (Ct. App. 2021) (“While the 

pandemic has undoubtedly changed the manner in which a parent must perform a case plan, Mother 

fails to articulate how the pandemic adversely impacted her ability to perform her case plan.”) 

Moreover, Mother’s argument that certain barriers precluded her complete performance of 

the case plan suggests she is relying on the impossibility defense. Idaho Dep’t of Health and 

Welfare v. Doe, 162 Idaho 236, 243, 395 P.3d 1269, 1276 (2017) (noting “impossibility may be 

asserted as a defense to a claim of neglect”). Mother, however, fails to address the magistrate 

court’s conclusion that impossibility is not a defense to her failure to comply with her case plan 

because she was “responsible for her failure to make meaningful progress” under the plan. 

Mother also asserts that she “was able to demonstrate” the “minimum” “knowledge and 

skills sufficient to return [J.D.] home and remain engaged in long-term services.” In support, she 

claims she should “be credited with what she did right,” is “able to describe a safety plan,” 

discussed and demonstrated “her skills during visitations,” and “has family support.” Contrary to 

this argument, however, Mother never progressed to unsupervised visits because of her failure to 

demonstrate adequate parental skills, as the magistrate court found. Moreover, Mother’s assertion 

that she should “be given credit for what she did right” simply requests that this Court reweigh the 

evidence, which again we decline to do. See Neustadt, 167 Idaho at 227, 469 P.3d at 14

(“[A]ppellate courts in Idaho do not reweigh evidence.”); In re Doe 2009-19, 150 Idaho at 209,

245 P.3d at 961 (“It is not our role to reweigh the evidence.”).

2. Best interests

Mother also challenges the magistrate court’s conclusion that termination of her parental 

rights is in J.D’s best interests. Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the 

trial court must next determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parentchild relationship. Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 

315 (1991). When determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court 

may consider the parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, 

the unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after 

the child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the 

parent’s efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. 

Doe (2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & 

Welfare v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best 
15

interests of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho 

Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012).

In this case, the magistrate court concluded the relevant factors favored termination of 

Mother’s parental rights.9 In support, the court stated that “Mother cannot provide for the child’s 

emotional, physical or developmental needs”; the child “needs a nurturing home with specially 

trained foster parents” because of his “obvious trauma history and maladaptive behaviors”; the 

child’s foster parents provide a safe, secure, and loving environment; and “the child has noticeably 

improved and flourished while [in foster] care.” 

Challenging the magistrate court’s best interests conclusion, Mother argues J.D.’s “agitate 

behaviors” are “directly related” to his foster care placement and his “lack of interaction with his 

family.” Further, Mother notes that J.D.’s “most successful” foster placement was with his 

grandparents and contends his best interests include his ability to have a relationship with his 

siblings. In support, Mother does not identify any finding or conclusion that substantial and 

competent evidence does not support but instead repeats evidence from trial. Mother’s challenge 

again simply requests that this Court reweigh the evidence and substitute its view of the facts for 

the magistrate court’s view, which we decline to do. See Neustadt, 167 Idaho at 227, 469 P.3d at

14 (“[A]ppellate courts in Idaho do not reweigh evidence.”); In re Doe 2009-19, 150 Idaho at 209,

245 P.3d at 961 (“It is not our role to reweigh the evidence.”).

III.

CONCLUSION

This Court declines to consider Mother’s challenges to the magistrate court’s orders in the 

underlying CPA case. Further, the Court holds that Mother failed to establish the magistrate court 

erred by concluding that she neglected J.D. and that the termination of her parental rights is in 

J.D.’s best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate court’s judgment terminating Mother’s 

parental rights.

Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR. 

 

9 The magistrate court also references “[t]he Department’s best interest factors” and 

generally cites a July 2017 standard articulating various “needs” for a child. A Department’s 

criteria for foster placement, however, is not relevant to a judicial termination of parental rights.