IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

August 10, 2021 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. STEPHEN C. WALLICK

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dickson County

No. 2016-CR-504 Suzanne Lockert-Mash, Judge

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No. M2020-01121-CCA-R3-CD

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A Dickson County jury convicted the defendant, Stephen C. Wallick, for the Class B felony 

of theft of property valued over $60,000 but less than $250,000. The trial court imposed a 

sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, suspended to 

supervised probation, and ordered the defendant pay $60,000 in restitution. The defendant 

filed this timely appeal, challenging the evidence supporting his conviction. Following our 

review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR.

and CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JJ., joined.

Jerred Creasy (at trial), Charlotte, Tennessee, and Michael J. Flanagan (on appeal), 

Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Stephen C. Wallick.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Sophia S. Lee, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Ray Crouch, District Attorney General; and Carey J. Thompson and 

Jennifer Stribling, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of 

Tennessee.

OPINION

Procedural and Factual History

The theft at issue stems from the contractual relationship between the defendant, 

Stephen C. Wallick, and the victim, Blankenship CPA Group, PLLC (“the Firm”). At trial, 

the State presented testimony from several of the Firm’s employees who detailed the 

09/08/2021
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relationship between the parties and their discovery of the defendant’s theft. A summary 

of their testimony follows.

In March 2012, the defendant was an accountant in Dickson County and maintained 

an established book of business. The defendant decided to sell his accounting practice and 

entered into negotiations with the Firm. The negotiations continued for several months 

and resulted in an asset purchase and employment agreement. As applicable to this appeal, 

the terms of the agreement established that the Firm was to pay the defendant $158,000 

over a period of three years for the defendant’s assets, or client list, and for his work 

production, or net billings, at an established rate. Though the agreement was never signed, 

the defendant agreed to the terms in an email to CJ Blankenship, the Firm’s managing 

partner, and the parties operated under the terms of the agreement for the next three years. 

During this period, the defendant received over $200,000 in compensation and $158,000 

for the purchase of his practice. 

Approximately one year into the agreement, however, “performance issues” arose 

between the defendant and the Firm. The issues culminated in the defendant’s resignation 

on November 30, 2015. In his resignation letter, the defendant asserted that he was not

contractually obligated to the Firm, stating: “I have never been provided a contract or 

signed anything that contractually binds me to continue. The terms negotiated have never 

been fulfilled and at this point I have significant doubts that they will ever be honored.” 

When the defendant resigned, the Firm had just over $60,000 in outstanding 

accounts receivable for work performed by the defendant. According to Mike Walters, the 

managing director of the Firm’s Dickson office, the Firm paid the defendant for the work 

he completed for these clients. The Firm, therefore, began contacting the clients in an 

effort to collect the outstanding balances and discovered the clients had “either already paid 

their bill or bartered away the bill” with the defendant.

This discovery led to an investigation conducted by John Ethridge, a criminal 

investigator for the District Attorney’s Office for the 23rd Judicial District. On March 9, 

2016, Mr. Ethridge executed a search warrant at the defendant’s office and seized 

“computers, external drives and an assortment of documentation.” The seized items were 

forensically examined by Regional Organized Crime Information Center (ROCIC), “a 

private organization that receives funds from the federal government to aid in crime 

protection and investigation.” The forensic examination revealed that the defendant 

downloaded client data files from the Firm’s server and made unauthorized copies of the 

information. In addition, the defendant extracted a “client list” from the Firm’s tax

software upon which he made notations “indicat[ing] what was potentially collected from 

those clients.” Mr. Ethridge also subpoenaed the defendant’s records from First Federal 
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Bank which showed numerous cancelled checks that had been deposited into the 

defendant’s account and that an escrow account existed, though the account was empty.

Mr. Walters reviewed the defendant’s subpoenaed bank records and determined 

“that there were payments that were for clients that [the Firm] had purchased and [the Firm] 

had billed, and they did not pay [the Firm], but they paid [the defendant].” Mr. Walters 

found cancelled checks “for a substantial portion” of the accounts receivable which had 

been deposited into the defendant’s bank accounts. He stated some of the checks “were 

actually made out to Blankenship CPA Group” and some were made out to the defendant. 

Mr. Walters compiled a spreadsheet which summarized the defendant’s bank records, 

pertinent invoices, accounts receivable ledgers, and cancelled checks. Mr. Walters also 

created a worksheet documenting the invoices issued by the Firm to the clients at issue, if 

the invoices had been paid, how the invoices had been paid, and who collected the 

payments. Mr. Walters’ spreadsheets and the defendant’s “client list” were entered into 

evidence. 

From the spreadsheet, Mr. Walters identified specific examples of clients who did 

not pay the Firm for their issued invoices, including: Underdawg Construction, U.S. 

Plumbing/Donna Story, Maynard Construction, Kingston, Inc., the Estate of Rosalee 

Lieberman, Martin Sir, Bodie Youngkin, and John Pruitt. Mr. Walters also identified the 

“client list” which “was where [the defendant] was keeping track of the payments that were 

made to him by his clients.” Though the defendant claimed he deposited the collected 

money into an escrow account, Mr. Walters stated the defendant did not actually do so as 

the account was actually overdrawn by $12.50. 

After reconciling the defendant’s “client list” with the Firm’s invoices and accounts 

receivable, Mr. Walters concluded the defendant collected $62,417.90 in accounts 

receivable that belonged to the Firm. According to Mr. Walters, the defendant collected 

payments totaling $12,885, and arranged for payments or bartered services for an 

additional $49,532.90. Jonathan Blankenship worked in collections for the Firm and 

provided an example of the defendant’s bartering, stating a client informed him that “they 

had exchanged [accounting services] work for brick work on [the defendant’s] house.” 

Trudi Hayes, an administrative assistant, prepared bills on behalf of the defendant and 

testified that he asked her to remove invoices from the books that had already been issued

to clients. Ms. Hayes explained, “There was one instance where there were two clients 

that [the defendant] had, that he told me he had bartered with them to do sewer line 

fieldwork at his house.” The defendant told Ms. Hayes “to give him the invoices and he 

would pay it, because he had told them he would swap out the work or barter it, whatever.” 

The defendant “eventually asked [Ms. Hayes] to write those balances off,” but she did not 

do so. According to Ms. Hayes, the defendant never paid the invoices.
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After resigning, the defendant made several complaints to his former colleagues 

regarding the Firm’s attempt to collect the accounts receivable. The defendant called 

Jonathan Blankenship numerous times “and told [Jonathan] to stop talking to these people, 

because they’re his clients.” In an email sent by the defendant to CJ Blankenship on 

December 17, 2015, the defendant stated he prepared for “14 months to get ahead of this 

situation. I understand you are attempting to collect the [accounts receivable]. There are 

a few still out there that I have not contacted but I have 58K in payments, promises, or 

terms.” In a text message sent on January 25, 2016, to Chris Griffin, a tax partner for the 

Firm, the defendant stated: “Chris, a call made by an unknown is prompting clients to call 

me. I have clients annoyed at Blankenship. I’ve collected almost $52,000; the majority 

are on post-dated.” Though the defendant believed the accounts receivable were his to 

collect, Mr. Griffin stated the accounts receivable belonged to the Firm. 

The State also presented testimony from three clients who paid the defendant 

directly for accounting services he performed prior to his resignation, including Timothy 

Rampaul, Laurel Joslin, and Donna Story. During Ms. Story’s testimony, confusion arose 

as to whether she bartered with the defendant because after the defendant resigned, Ms. 

Story told one of the Firm’s employees that she exchanged septic work for the defendant’s 

accounting services. During trial, however, Ms. Story testified that while she did perform 

over $2000 worth of septic work for the defendant and he performed accounting services 

for her, she paid the defendant directly for his services and did not “trade[] septic work.” 

The State then rested its case-in-chief, and the defendant moved for a judgment of 

acquittal. The trial court denied the motion after which the defendant presented testimony 

from Clayton Cooper, a certified fraud examiner and retired federal investigator for the 

Department of the Treasury. Mr. Cooper testified as an expert, stating he reviewed 

voluminous financial records and determined the Firm underpaid the defendant for the 

purchase of his assets and work production. In reaching his conclusions, Mr. Cooper used 

several alternative calculation methods based upon his understanding that the Firm did not 

make pro rata adjustments to its invoices. However, Mr. Cooper acknowledged that the 

Firm paid the defendant $158,000 for his assets over a three-year period. Mr. Cooper’s 

report was entered into evidence.

The defendant also testified, stating he has practiced as an accountant for twentyone years and in August 2012, entered into an asset purchase and employment agreement 

with the Firm. However, a formal agreement was never signed by either party, and as a 

result, in 2013, the defendant still did not know the terms of the agreement. The defendant 

believed he would be paid “40 percent of the cash collections for the purchase side” and 

“50 percent for cash collections on the salary side.” The defendant stated, “So, basically, 

I should have gotten 90 percent of the cash during the time they were buying my practice.” 
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The defendant grew frustrated because “the numbers never seemed right,” so he 

attempted to meet with CJ Blankenship “to finish my agreement and settle up.” According 

to the defendant, however, the agreement was never finalized, and because he was not 

satisfied with the arrangement, the defendant sought legal counsel in 2014. The defendant 

felt he had “made a huge mistake and [the Firm was] trying to steal my practice.” The 

defendant sought the advice of counsel about how to “get out of this mess” but continued 

working for the Firm until his resignation on November 30, 2015.

Upon resigning, the defendant believed the Firm owed him approximately 

$172,000. The defendant also asserted that he “never sold my clients, because we never 

finalized the contract.” Because the defendant did not believe he and the Firm finalized 

the agreement, the defendant testified, “I honestly believe that I’m either a co-owner at 

50-50, or I own 100 percent of my clients, based on what the Williamson County Court 

rules.”1 Furthermore, the defendant explained he was not a salaried employee but “was 

more like a contract employee,” and, according to the defendant, the Firm collected 

approximately $433,000 from his work product though he was only paid $363,255.60. The 

defendant stated, “[b]ased on my numbers, they made $75,000 for doing absolutely 

nothing.” 

The defendant admitted that after he resigned, he collected approximately $28,000 

in accounts receivable from his clients in November and December 2015. The defendant 

explained: “It was my intent to collect that to protect that money. And I believe that I’m 

owed much more than the amount that I was trying to protect.” Though the defendant 

disputed collecting over $60,000 in accounts receivable and provided explanations for 

some of the payments at issue, he admitted to generating “an accounts receivable report,” 

or the “client list,” which reflected the outstanding accounts receivable he had at the time. 

Based on the report, the defendant “had promises on 58-grand” and deposited checks 

totaling $28,031.20 as reflected on the “client list.” The defendant, however, stated not all 

of those deposits were related to outstanding accounts receivable and disputed some of the 

deposited checks as presented by the State, including checks issued by: Kim and Fayetta 

Wilcox, Martin and Anna Sir, Donald and Kelly Dillingham, Numatix, Inc., Dillingham 

Trucking, Inc., Kyle J. Gross, Lee E. Witherow, Sir & Smith, PLLC, White Bluff 

Imagination Station, Joann Jackowski, Side-by-Side/Charles and Jackie Franklin, and 

Perfect Pig, Inc.

During cross-examination, the defendant explained he has a work history in fraud 

and experience working with accounts receivable. The defendant stated during their threeyear relationship, the Firm paid him $158,000 for the purchase of his assets and paid him 

 

1 At the time of trial, a civil case between the parties was pending in Williamson County.
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a salary of $204,833. The defendant, however, maintained he did not have an agreement 

with the Firm according to advice he received from various attorneys. 

In regards to the spreadsheets produced by Mr. Walters, the defendant 

acknowledged that he “[c]ollected – had promises to collect, or had terms” for the invoices 

listed. However, the defendant denied collecting $60,000, stating he only collected about 

$28,000. The defendant again asserted that the Firm did not fully pay him for his assets, 

and as a result, the Firm did not own the accounts receivable upon which he collected. 

Instead, the defendant suggested the Firm paid him for “[m]aybe renting” his clients and 

that the Firm still owes him $172,000 “[b]ased on cash collections.” The defendant 

acknowledged that he had planned to resign and take his clients with him for about fourteen 

months prior to doing so.

Regarding the accounts receivable at issue in this case, the defendant stated, “I 

collected money, yes, to protect it, sir.” The defendant claimed he put the collected money 

into an escrow account at First Federal Bank which is now closed. The defendant testified 

that he is “owed significantly more on every option and scenario than what was in there.” 

The defendant admitted that he “took money” but stated, “[w]ho owns that money is still 

to be determined.”

After the defense rested, the jury returned a guilty verdict for theft of property 

valued over $60,000 but less than $250,000, a Class B felony. At the subsequent 

sentencing hearing, the trial court found the defendant to be a Range I, standard offender 

and imposed a sentence of 8 years suspended to supervised probation. The trial court 

ordered the defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $60,000 based upon the proof 

presented at trial and to complete 100 hours of public service. The trial court also 

prohibited the defendant from contacting “any principal, employee, staff member, or 

family member of a principal or employee of Blankenship CPA Group.” The defendant 

filed a motion for a new trial which was denied by the trial court, and this timely appeal 

followed.

Analysis

The defendant argues the evidence is insufficient to support his theft conviction 

because nothing in the record demonstrates the theft amounted to $60,000 or more.

2

 The 

State disagrees. When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question 

of the reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

 

2 While there was extensive testimony by the defendant concerning the purchase agreement or lack 

thereof, when asked if that was an issue on appeal during oral argument, the defendant informed this Court 

it was not. Rather, the only issue before this Court was the amount of the taking.
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to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see

also Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court 

or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier 

of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 

(Tenn. 1992); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). All 

questions involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the 

evidence, and all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact. See State v. Pappas, 754 

S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the 

trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts 

in favor of the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). 

Our Supreme Court has stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the 

jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their 

demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary 

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given 

to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human 

atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a 

written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 523 

(1963)). “A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which a defendant 

is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a convicted defendant 

has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.” State v. Tuggle, 639 

S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

Guilt may be found beyond a reasonable doubt where there is direct evidence, 

circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 

779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (citing State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 

1977); Farmer v. State, 343 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn. 1961)). The standard of review 

for sufficiency of the evidence “‘is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct 

or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) 

(quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)). The jury as the trier of fact 

must evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, determine the weight given to witnesses’ 

testimony, and reconcile all conflicts in the evidence. State v. Campbell, 245 S.W.3d 331, 

335 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978)). 

Moreover, the jury determines the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence and the 

inferences to be drawn from this evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are 

consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence are questions primarily for the 

jury. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379 (citing State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 
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2006)). This Court, when considering the sufficiency of the evidence, shall not reweigh 

the evidence or substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact. Id.

“A person commits theft of property if, with intent to deprive the owner of property, 

the person knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property without the owner’s 

effective consent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103(a). “Our supreme court has noted that 

although the statute defining theft does not contain ‘an element regarding the value of the 

property stolen,’ the property’s value should be included in the indictment, and its value 

‘must be determined in order to establish the grade of the theft offense.’” State v. Moats, 

No. E2019-02244-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 6392483, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 

2020), appeal denied (Mar. 17, 2021) (quoting State v. Jones, 589 S.W.3d 747, 756 (Tenn. 

2019) (internal citations omitted)). “Whenever a determination of value is necessary to 

assess the class of an offense in this code or the level of punishment, the determination of 

value shall be made by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 

39-11-115. Theft of property valued at $60,000 or more but less than $250,000 is a Class 

B felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-105(a)(5).

Here, the presentment alleged the defendant stole $60,765.453from the Firm. At 

trial, the State presented proof showing the defendant entered into an asset purchase and 

employment agreement with the Firm in 2012. The terms of the agreement provided, in 

part, that the Firm pay the defendant $158,000 for the purchase of his clients and 

compensate the defendant for his work production. For the next three years, the parties 

operated under these terms until the relationship between the defendant and the Firm

soured, resulting in the defendant’s resignation on November 30, 2015. When the 

defendant resigned, the Firm had approximately $60,000 in outstanding accounts 

receivable for work performed by the defendant. In an effort to collect the balances, the 

Firm discovered the defendant was collecting, “in payments, promises, or terms,” the 

outstanding accounts receivable by instructing clients to pay him directly, in cash or 

bartered services, for the accounting work he performed while employed by the Firm. 

A forensic examination of the defendant’s computers revealed that he downloaded 

the Firm’s client files without permission and created a “client list” documenting his theft. 

In a spreadsheet, which was entered into evidence, Mr. Walters reconciled the defendant’s 

 

3 The defendant takes issue with the presentment, noting it alleged two different amounts for the 

theft, “six thousand seven hundred sixty-five dollars and forty cents” and “$60,765.45,” and suggesting 

“that it is common knowledge that a bank would not cash a check where the amounts are different and 

would, in fact, give priority to the written word.” The defendant also asserts the presentment did not list 

the correct theft statute, and as a result, “allege[d] [he] violated a statute that does not even exist.” However,

it is clear from the record these were merely clerical errors. Both during trial and at sentencing, all of the 

parties operated under the correct theft statute and valued the amount of the theft at more than $60,000 but 

less than $250,000. 
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“client list” with the Firm’s invoices and accounts receivable and testified that the amount 

stolen by the defendant totaled $62,417.90. The defendant testified that he “[c]ollected –

had promises to collect, or had terms” for the client invoices listed on the spreadsheet. The 

defendant’s bank records showed numerous cancelled checks from clients totaling $12,885 

that were deposited into his personal bank accounts, and the defendant admitted to 

collecting approximately $28,000 from the clients. Mr. Rampual, Ms. Story, and Ms. 

Joslin testified that they paid the defendant directly for the accounting work he performed 

on their behalf. 

From these facts, a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of 

theft of property valued over $60,000 but less than $250,000 as the record makes clear the 

defendant intended to deprive the Firm of the outstanding accounts receivable and 

exercised control over the same. As noted, the defendant admitted to taking funds and 

compiling a “client list” documenting the monies or services he collected from the clients 

for the work he performed while employed by the Firm. The State provided testimony 

from numerous of the Firm’s employees who detailed the manner in which the defendant 

stole approximately $62,417.90. Though the defendant disputed the amount of the theft 

alleged by the State and testified that he believed the outstanding accounts receivable were 

his property, the jury, as the trier of fact, is entrusted with determining the value of the 

theft, the weight of the evidence, and evaluating the credibility of witnesses, and, based on 

the verdict, the jury reconciled the conflicting proof in favor of the State. Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 39-11-115; Campbell, 245 S.W.3d at 335; Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379. This Court will 

not reweigh the evidence. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379. Accordingly, the evidence was 

sufficient for a jury to convict the defendant of theft of property valued over $60,000 but 

less than $250,000. 

The defendant also suggests the trial court’s imposition of $60,000 in restitution 

demonstrates that the court “failed to find the amount of the theft was $60,765.45,” as 

alleged in the presentment. The State asserts the amount “was based on the [Firm’s] loss 

which comes from the jury’s verdict” and “the trial court’s decision to impose restitution 

less than the amount found by the jury does not militate or undermine the jury’s verdict,” 

and we agree. As explained above, the State identified over $60,000 in accounts receivable 

stolen by the defendant. At both trial and on appeal, the defendant admitted to taking the 

funds in an effort to protect himself and because he felt he was entitled to them. At the 

sentencing hearing, Mr. Griffin testified the Firm filed an insurance claim for the stolen 

funds and received an insurance payment of $55,000. Based upon this testimony, the trial 

court acknowledged a subrogation claim existed on behalf of the insurance company but 

ordered the defendant to pay restitution directly to the Firm. In determining the amount of 

restitution to be paid, the court stated it did not factor the insurance proceeds into its 

decision and instead, imposed $60,000 in restitution based upon the evidence presented at 
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trial, noting “the amount that was taken was $60,000.” Thus, we are not persuaded by the 

defendant’s argument, and he is not entitled to relief.

Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing authorities and reasoning, the judgment of the trial court 

is affirmed.

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J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE