J-A34029-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellee

v.

ARTHUR KENT HAMRICK,

Appellant

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 2087 MDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 14, 2013,

In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County, 

Criminal Division, at No. CP-01-CR-0000949-2012.

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED APRIL 17, 2015

Appellant, Arthur Kent Hamrick, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered November 14, 2013, following his conviction at a bench 

trial of driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”), general impairment 

and DUI, highest rate of alcohol. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts of the case as follows:

Appellant’s August 19, 2013 non-jury trial, which 

incorporated testimony from his March 25, 2013 suppression 

hearing, revealed the following facts. On May 31, 2012 at 

approximately 9:20 p.m., Officer Juanita Larmer of the 

Hamiltonban Township Police Department received a telephone 

call from Jesse Sanders on her work cell phone. Officer Larmer’s 

shift had ended at 9:00 p.m., but she remained in her patrol car 

and in full uniform. Mr. Sanders, a friend of Officer Larmer and 

a firefighter and EMS technician with the Fairfield Fire Company, 

had been picking up pizza at Ventura’s, a restaurant and bar in 

Fairfield, Adams County, Pennsylvania, with his friend Bradley 

Hartdagen. Mr. Sanders called Officer Larmer after Mr. 
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Hartdagen saw a gentleman leave Ventura’s looking confused 

and observed him attempting to enter a couple of different cars 

before he was able to locate his green Ford station wagon and 

drive away.

Mr. Sanders and Mr. Hartdagen began following the 

gentleman and observed his vehicle weaving and crossing the 

center line on several occasions. Mr. Sanders notified Officer 

Larmer of the gentleman’s behavior and provided her with a 

description of the vehicle and its license plate number. After 

receiving this information, Officer Larmer placed a phone call to 

Adams County Control, alerting them to the presence of a 

potentially intoxicated driver in Fairfield Borough and providing 

the identifying information she had received. County Control 

then notified Officer Dustin Miller of the Carroll Valley Borough 

Police that there was a possible intoxicated driver and gave him 

the license plate number of the vehicle and the address where it 

was registered.

Soon after getting off the phone with County Control, 

Officer Larmer made a phone call to Officer Miller, further 

describing the situation as related to her by Mr. Sanders. Officer 

Larmer and Officer Miller, in separate cars, proceeded to 

Appellant’s residence at 351 Fairfield Station Road and located 

the green Ford station wagon with the license plate number 

which Mr. Sanders had described to Officer Larmer. Once they 

arrived at the residence, Officer Miller knocked on Appellant’s 

back door. Appellant answered the door after a minute or two 

and remained “half in and half out of the threshold.” Upon the 

officers’ encouragement, Appellant stepped onto his porch to 

speak with Officer Miller. The officers noted that Appellant’s 

breath smelled strongly of alcohol and he exhibited signs of 

intoxication in that he was “not steady on his feet,” his speech 

was slurred, his eyes were bloodshot, his face was flushed red, 

and his movements were slow and lethargic.

During their conversation outside of Appellant’s house, 

Appellant admitted that he had been driving approximately 10-

15 minutes before the officers arrived and that he was returning 

home from Ventura’s Restaurant. Appellant stated that he drank 

one beer there. Officer Miller then asked Appellant whether he 

would be willing to come to Officer Miller’s car to speak further 
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with him. At that point, Appellant became irate and attempted 

to go back into his house—Officer Miller prevented Appellant 

from retreating by grabbing his wrists. The officers then walked 

Appellant to Officer Miller’s car, performed a pat down search of 

Appellant for weapons, and removed a knife from Appellant’s 

pocket. Eventually, the officers were able to have Appellant 

perform field sobriety tests. The tests revealed indications that 

Appellant was intoxicated. Appellant then stated that he had 

consumed two beers at Ventura’s. Officer Miller placed Appellant 

under arrest for DUI and transported him to Gettysburg Hospital 

for a blood test. Appellant’s blood sample was sent to NMS labs 

where Appellant’s blood alcohol content was determined to be 

.184 percent.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/6/14, at 1–3.

Appellant filed a suppression motion on December 17, 2012. The trial 

court held a hearing on March 25, 2013, and denied the motion on April 17, 

2013. Following a bench trial on June 3, 2013, the trial court found 

Appellant guilty of DUI, general impairment and DUI, highest rate of alcohol. 

The trial court determined that Appellant’s convictions merged for purposes 

of sentencing and held that his convictions were second offenses for 

sentencing purposes. The trial court sentenced Appellant on November 14, 

2013, commensurate with the “Commonwealth’s recommendation and the 

defense’s agreement with that recommendation,” Trial Court Opinion, 

1/6/14, at 3, to thirty-six months in the County Intermediate Punishment 

Program (“IPP”) with forty-five days in Phase I (re-entry), forty-five days in 

Phase II (house arrest), and the remainder in Phases III through V 

(restorative sanctions). Id.
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Appellant filed a notice of appeal on November 21, 2013. Both the 

trial court and Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

A. Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to 

substantiate a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the 

charges, Did the police have sufficient justification to order the 

defendant out of his house, and forcibly escort him to their 

patrol cars, Did the police subject the defendant to custodial 

interrogations without the benefit of Miranda warnings.

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (verbatim) (full capitalization omitted).

While Appellant presents this claim as a single issue in his Statement 

of Questions Involved, he breaks it down in the argument section of his brief 

into headings labeled A, B, and C. Appellant’s Brief at 8. Heading “A” 

purports to assail the sufficiency of the evidence; however, Appellant fails to 

assert any argument in his brief, thus, this issue has been abandoned. 

Therefore, any claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is waived. 

Bolick v. Commonwealth, 69 A.3d 1267, 1269 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding 

that failure to present an argument in support of issue results in waiver) 

(citing Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) and Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 282 

(Pa. 2011)). See also Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1003–

1004 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“In order to develop a claim challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence properly, an appellant must specifically discuss 

the elements of the crime and identify those which he alleges the 

Commonwealth failed to prove” and failure to do so results in waiver.).
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Heading “C” purports to raise an issue regarding Miranda1 warnings. 

Appellant fails to include a section identified as heading “C” in his brief. In 

his argument under heading “B,” Appellant includes three conclusory 

sentences referencing Miranda, one of which is repeated twice. Appellant’s 

Brief at 9 and 12. In Commonwealth v. Harris, 979 A.2d 387 (Pa. Super. 

2009), we stated as follows:

When an allegation is unsupported [by] any citation to the 

record, such that this Court is prevented from assessing this 

issue and determining whether error exists, the allegation is 

waived for purposes of appeal. . . . Commonwealth v. 

Einhorn, 911 A.2d 960, 970 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“An appellate 

brief must provide citations to the record and to any relevant 

supporting authority. This Court will not become the counsel for 

an appellant, ‘and will not, therefore, consider issues ... which 

are not fully developed in the brief.’”). See also 

Commonwealth v. Tielsch, 934 A.2d 81, 93 (Pa. Super. 

2007); Commonwealth v. Judd, 897 A.2d 1224, 1233 (Pa. 

Super. 2006).

Id. at 393 (some internal citations omitted). Thus, this issue is also waived. 

The only issue preserved for review is the claim identified in Appellant’s brief 

as issue “B.”2

 

1

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2

 It is important to keep in mind that we are not now evaluating the 

sufficiency of the evidence, as we have held that issue waived. Thus, we are 

not evaluating whether the Commonwealth had to prove that Appellant was 

in actual physical control of his vehicle during the time when he was 

rendered incapable of safely doing so due to the consumption of alcohol. 

Accord Commonwealth v. Segida, 985 A.2d 871, 879 n.6 (Pa. 2009) 

(Commonwealth need not prove accused did not drink alcohol after accident 

because DUI statute does not contain this element).
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Appellant’s three-page argument under heading “B” consists of two 

pages of references to case law setting forth standards regarding probable 

cause and the existence of exigent circumstances under which police may 

arrest without a warrant when a defendant is in his home. The extent of 

Appellant’s argument is as follows:

In the present case, Officer Miller received a dispatch of a 

possible intoxicated driver and a registration plate number. 

There was no information as to the source of the information or 

the alleged observations that were made.

When reviewing the audio/video recording from the patrol 

unit, and the audio recording of the County Dispatch Center, it 

was clear that no other information was conveyed to Officer 

Miller at the time of the arrest. It should be noted that [O]fficer 

Lamer [sic] testified that she made a cellphone call to Officer 

Miller informing him of a possible DUI and where it was heading, 

but that phone call is not on the audio/visual recording of Miller’s 

car which occurs the time of the initial call to Officer Miller until 

the time of arrest. Also, there is no mention of the alleged 

phone call in any police report or prior testimony.

Therefore, when Officer Miller ordered [Appellant] to come 

out of the house he simply had the equivalent of an anonymous 

uncooberated [sic] tip. He then removed [Appellant] from his 

house and conducted a pat-down search. During the incident, 

[Appellant] started bleeding. He was clearly under arrest (i.e. “if 

you don’t take the tests we’re going to the hospital”).

Once he was removed from the house, and subjected to 

physical restraint by two uniformed officers, [Appellant] was 

clearly in custody.

Appellant’s Brief at 10–11. Appellant does not cite case law supporting his 

position, other than heretofore described references to standards, and he 
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fails to include any citations to the record in this case. He baldly asserts that 

all evidence “must be suppressed.”

We consider this argument mindful of the following standard of review:

In addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a 

suppression motion we are limited to determining whether the 

factual findings are supported by the record and whether the 

legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Since the 

Commonwealth prevailed in the suppression court, we may 

consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of 

the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when 

read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record 

supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by 

those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn 

therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1104–1105 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Cauley, 10 A.3d 321, 325 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

This Court recently explained the three types of interactions between 

citizens and police, as follows:

Interactions with police are classified as mere encounters, 

investigative detentions, or formal arrests. Commonwealth v. 

Ellis, 379 Pa.Super. 337, 549 A.2d 1323, 1331 (1988).

Police may engage in a mere encounter absent any 

suspicion of criminal activity, and the citizen is not 

required to stop or to respond. If the police action 

becomes too intrusive, a mere encounter may 

escalate into an investigatory stop or a seizure. If 

the interaction rises to the level of an investigative 

detention, the police must possess reasonable 

suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, and the 

citizen is subjected to a stop and a period of 

detention. Probable cause must support a custodial 

interrogation or an arrest.
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Commonwealth v. Boswell, 554 Pa. 275, 721 A.2d 336, 341 

(1998) (citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93 A.3d 478, 485 (Pa. Super. 2014).

Whether the instant matter began as a mere encounter or an 

investigative detention, the record is clear that police had reasonable 

suspicion throughout the encounter. While it is true that Appellant was in 

his home when the police officer came to his back door, the United States 

Supreme Court has stated, when discussing police approach to a front door, 

that “a police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and 

knock, precisely because that is ‘no more than any private citizen might do.’ 

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1862, 179 L.Ed.2d 

865 (2011).” Florida v. Jardines, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 

(2013). Herein, when police prevented Appellant from retreating into his 

own house, the encounter clearly must be characterized as an investigative 

detention. N.T. (Suppression), 3/25/13, at 25; Commonwealth v. Smith, 

904 A.2d 30, 35 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“An investigative detention occurs when 

a police officer temporarily detains an individual by means of physical force 

or a show of authority for investigative purposes.”).

“An investigatory detention triggers the constitutional protection of the 

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8 of 

the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the prerequisites for such a detention as 

set forth in Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23–26 (1968)].” Cauley, 10 A.3d 
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at 325–326 (footnote and citations omitted). The Cauley Court further 

stated:

An investigative detention is lawful if supported by 

reasonable suspicion. [Commonwealth v.] Sands, 887 A.2d 

[261] at 269 [(Pa. Super. 2005)] (quoting [Commonwealth v.] 

Hill, 874 A.2d [1214,] 1217 [(Pa. Super. 2005]). “To meet the 

standard of reasonable suspicion, the officer must point to 

specific and articulable facts which, together with the rational 

inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant the intrusion.” Smith, 

904 A.2d at 35 (quotation omitted). In addition, “we must look 

to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the 

officer had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.” 

Id. at 35–36 (quoting Barber, 889 A.2d at 593). An 

investigative detention may last “as is necessary to confirm or 

dispel such suspicion.” Commonwealth v. LaMonte, 859 A.2d 

495, 500 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 58, 757 A.2d 884, 889 (2000)). Because 

the level of intrusion may change during the course of the 

encounter, the record must be carefully scrutinized for any 

evidence of such changes. Commonwealth v. Blair, 860 A.2d 

567, 572 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citing Strickler, 563 Pa. at 58–60, 

72–73, 757 A.2d at 889–91, 897–98).

Cauley, 10 A.3d at 326.

The trial court, in its April 17, 2013 opinion denying Appellant’s motion 

to suppress, concluded that all three types of interactions were present in 

this case. The court opined that Officer Miller’s act of knocking on 

Appellant’s door was “nothing more than a mere encounter.” Trial Court 

Opinion (Suppression), 4/17/13, at 5 (citing Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 

979 A.2d 879, 884–885 (Pa. Super. 2009)). Alternatively, the court stated 

that even if the initial interaction is considered an investigatory detention, 

information provided by informants—here, Jesse Sanders—may provide 
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police with reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. The 

suppression court stated:

Instantly, Officer Larmer received a tip from a named 

informant that a possible DUI was in progress. The informant 

[Jesse Sanders] was well known to Officer Larmer. The 

information presented was specific and reliable as the informant 

made personal observations of [Appellant’s] condition then 

followed [Appellant] as he drove. The information provided by 

Mr. Sanders gave Officers reasonable suspicion that [Appellant] 

was driving under the influence.

This suspicion was heightened and corroborated during the 

encounter on [Appellant’s] porch when Officer Miller learned 

from [Appellant] that he had recently driven and when he 

noticed signs of alcohol intoxication including a strong smell of 

alcohol coming from [Appellant’s] breath, bloodshot eyes, slow 

lethargic movements, unsteadiness and a flushed face.

After Officers had all of that information [Appellant] asked 

the Officers to leave his property and attempted to go back into 

his house. At that time he was detained by the Officers with 

minimal compulsion. Clearly, by then the Officers possessed 

reasonable suspicion that [Appellant] was driving under the 

influence. Without doubt there was then an investigatory 

detention. Based on the totality of the circumstances Officers 

possessed reasonable suspicion that [Appellant] was driving 

under the influence of alcohol sufficient to subject him to field 

sobriety testing.

Trial Court Opinion (Suppression), 4/17/13, at 5–6. We agree with the trial 

court’s alternative conclusion.

As the trial court noted, “Even if this initial interaction is considered an 

investigatory detention, information provided by informants may provide 

Police with reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. 

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 954 A.2d 648, 651 (Pa. Super. 2008).” Trial 
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Court Opinion (Suppression), 4/17/13, at 11. Although the instant scenario 

was not a traffic stop, because we have concluded that the subsequent 

encounter between police and Appellant was an investigative detention, the 

requirement of reasonable suspicion herein is akin to that required to 

conduct an investigatory stop, and we draw guidance from case law 

expounding on that concept. This Court recently emphasized:

To have reasonable suspicion, police officers need not personally 

observe the illegal or suspicious conduct, but may rely upon the 

information of third parties, including “tips” from citizens. 

Naturally, if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more 

information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of 

suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable. 

This Court has examined the requirements surrounding 

reasonable suspicion for automobile stops emanating from 

information provided by a tipster and has explained:

Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is 

dependent upon both the content of information 

possessed by police and its degree of reliability. 

Both factors—quantity and quality—are considered in 

the “totality of the circumstances—the whole 

picture,” that must be taken into account when 

evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion. 

Thus, if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, 

more information will be required to establish the 

requisite quantum of suspicion than would be 

required if the tip were reliable.

When the underlying source of the officer’s 

information is an anonymous call, the tip should be 

treated with particular suspicion. However, a tip 

from an informer known to the police may carry 

enough indicia or reliability for the police to conduct 

an investigatory stop, even though the same tip from 

an anonymous informant would likely not have done 

so.
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Indeed, identified citizens who report their observations of 

criminal activity to police are assumed to be trustworthy, in the 

absence of special circumstances, since a known informant 

places himself at risk of prosecution for filing a false claim if the 

tip is untrue, whereas an unknown informant faces no such risk. 

When an identified third party provides information to the police, 

we must examine the specificity and reliability of the information 

provided. The information supplied by the informant must be 

specific enough to support reasonable suspicion that criminal 

activity is occurring. To determine whether the information 

provided is sufficient, we assess the information under the 

totality of the circumstances. The informer’s reliability, veracity, 

and basis of knowledge are all relevant factors in this analysis.

Commonwealth v. Washington, 63 A.3d 797, 803 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Barber, 889 A.2d 587, 593–594 (Pa. Super. 

2005) (quotations, quotation marks, and citations omitted)).

Upon review and in consideration of the circumstances of this case, we 

conclude the trial court did not err in determining that the officers had 

reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant and submit him to field-sobriety 

tests. Officer Larmer, a thirteen-year veteran in the Hamiltonban Township 

Police Department, received the equivalent of a reliable tip on her work 

cellular telephone indicating that Appellant appeared “confused and possibly 

intoxicated” and had “crossed over the center line several times.” N.T. 

(Suppression), 3/25/13, at 5. The detailed information provided by Mr. 

Sanders, who was known to Officer Larmer as reliable, provided Officer 

Larmer with reasonable suspicion that Appellant was driving under the 

influence. Id. at 5–6. Officer Larmer testified that she contacted Adams 
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County Control and alerted them to the presence of a potentially intoxicated 

driver in Fairfield Borough and further, provided the identifying information 

she had received from Mr. Sanders. Id. at 6. County Control then notified 

Officer Dustin Miller of the Carroll Valley Borough Police Department that 

there was a possible intoxicated driver and gave him the license plate 

number of the vehicle and the address where it was registered. Id. at 19. 

Officer Larmer and Officer Miller spoke on the telephone at that point. Id. at 

7, 20. Officer Larmer and Officer Miller each proceeded to Appellant’s 

residence, arriving within “a few minutes,” id. at 8, and located the green 

Ford station wagon with the license plate number that Mr. Sanders had 

described to Officer Larmer. Id. at 21.

Officer Miller knocked on Appellant’s back door. N.T. (Suppression), 

3/25/13, at 21. When Appellant opened the door, Officer Miller noticed a 

“strong” odor of alcohol emanating from Appellant and asked him to step 

onto the porch. Id. at 22. Appellant exhibited signs of intoxication 

including being “unsteady,” with “slurred” speech, his eyes “were bloodshot 

red,” his face “was flushed red,” and his movements were “slow” and 

“lethargic.” Id. at 22–23. During the conversation outside of Appellant’s 

house, Appellant admitted that he had been driving approximately ten to 

fifteen minutes before the officers arrived and that he was returning home 
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from Ventura’s Restaurant. Id. at 24. Thus, prior to the sobriety tests, 

Officer Miller noticed indicia of intoxication.

Officer Miller’s police vehicle was equipped with an in-car camera 

system, it was recording the events described, and copies of the recording 

were admitted without objection. N.T. (Suppression), 3/25/13, at 27–28. 

Appellant exhibited indicia of intoxication when performing the field sobriety 

tests. Id. at 26. Officer Miller testified that Appellant admitted to drinking 

beer at Ventura’s Restaurant and did not indicate he had anything to drink 

after returning to his home. Id.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the officers possessed 

requisite reasonable suspicion and were able to point to articulable and 

specific facts that gave rise to the probability that Appellant had been driving 

under the influence. Cauley, 10 A.3d at 327. The officers reasonably drew 

the inference that Appellant “having driven to the scene and immediately 

exhibited signs of intoxication, drove to the scene while intoxicated.” Id. As 

a result of the field sobriety tests, police had probable cause to arrest 

Appellant. Appellant has offered no substantial argument to the contrary in 

his brief. Appellant’s Brief at 11. As such, we further conclude the trial 

court properly denied Appellant’s suppression motion.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/17/2015