J. S52010/16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

CLIFFORD W. BROWN, : No. 2435 EDA 2015

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the PCRA Order, July 13, 2015,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0708081-1996

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 25, 2016

Clifford W. Brown appeals, pro se, from the order of July 13, 2015, 

dismissing his third PCRA1 petition without a hearing. We affirm.

In a prior memorandum filed July 8, 2013, affirming the dismissal of 

appellant’s second PCRA petition, this court set forth the factual and 

procedural history of this case as follows:

We have previously explained the underlying 

facts of this case:

In the early hours of August 5, 1995, 

[Appellant] was playing “craps” outside 

[of] J’s Bigshot Bar with Robert 

Richardson (“Richardson”) and the 

victim, Vaughn Gaillard (“Gaillard”). 

[Appellant] and Gaillard argued 

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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throughout the game, with [Appellant] 

insisting that Gaillard bet at least 

$100.00. Gaillard responded that 

[Appellant could not] tell him how to bet.

Gaillard won the game, collected his 

winnings, and walked towards his car. 

[Commonwealth witness Dana 

Lucas[Footnote 1] testified at trial that, 

as Gaillard was walking away, Appellant] 

. . . stated to Richardson, “[y]ou’re going 

to let him walk away? You ain’t going to 

handle your business? You know how we 

do. You either put down or lay down.”

[Footnote 1] Dana Lucas is also 

known as “Carolyn Eddles.” 

See, e.g., Appellant’s First 

PCRA Petition, 1/8/03, at ¶ 17.

Richardson kicked off his shoes, walked 

into the street, and shot Gaillard three 

times in the side and back. 

[Commonwealth witness Henry Jones 

testified that, after Richardson shot 

Gaillard, Appellant yelled] “[s]hoot him 

again! Get his money!” Richardson and 

[Appellant] then fled. Gaillard was taken 

to the hospital and shortly thereafter was 

pronounced dead from th[e] gunshot 

wounds.

[Appellant] was arrested [and charged 

with several crimes related to the 

murder. Following Appellant’s jury trial, 

Appellant was] found guilty of first 

degree murder, possessing instruments 

of crime, and criminal 

conspiracy.[Footnote 2]

[Footnote 2] 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 2502(a), 907, and 903, 

respectively.
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[On July 1, 1997, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant] to a term of life 

imprisonment for the [first-degree 

murder conviction and concurrent terms 

of imprisonment for the remaining 

convictions].

Commonwealth v. Brown, 754 A.2d 14 (Pa.Super. 

2000) (unpublished memorandum) at 1-2.

Appellant filed a direct appeal to this Court and 

raised a number of claims, including claims of trial 

court error and a claim that his trial counsel provided 

him with ineffective assistance. Id. at 3. With 

respect to Appellant’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim, Appellant claimed that counsel was 

ineffective for failing to present the testimony of 

eyewitness William Hanible. According to Appellant, 

Mr. Hanible’s testimony would have established that 

“[Appellant] never said anything to Richardson to 

incite Richardson to shoot Gaillard, and that 

[Appellant] appeared shocked and amazed when 

Richardson shot Gaillard.” Id. at 9.

On February 8, 2000, this Court affirmed 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence, but remanded the 

case so that the trial court could conduct a limited 

evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 9-10; see, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Pearson, 685 A.2d 551, 558-

559 (Pa.Super. 1996) (in the time prior to 

Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 

2002), where an appellant’s judgment of sentence 

was proper on direct appeal, but where the conjoined 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim had arguable 

merit, this Court was required to “affirm the 

judgment of sentence and remand solely for an 

evidentiary hearing on [the] ineffectiveness claim;” 

if, following remand, this Court affirmed the denial of 

the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 

appellant could then file a petition for allowance of 

appeal with our Supreme Court, contesting both the 

denial of his ineffective assistance claim and the 

affirmance of his judgment of sentence).
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Following remand, the trial court rejected 

Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

We affirmed the trial court’s order on June 12, 2001 

and, on January 11, 2002, our Supreme Court 

denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 779 A.2d 1214 

(Pa.Super. 2001) (unpublished memorandum) at 

1-7, appeal denied, 793 A.2d 904 (Pa. 2002).

Appellant filed his first PCRA petition on 

January 8, 2003. The PCRA court dismissed this 

petition on June 10, 2003, we affirmed the PCRA 

court’s order on May 24, 2004, and our Supreme 

Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of 

appeal on October 26, 2004. Commonwealth v. 

Brown, 855 A.2d 128 (Pa.Super. 2004) 

(unpublished memorandum) at 1-10, appeal 

denied, 862 A.2d 1253 (Pa. 2004).[2]

Appellant filed the current PCRA petition – his 

second – on October 10, 2009. Within this pro se

PCRA petition, Appellant acknowledged that he filed 

his petition outside of the PCRA’s one-year time-bar. 

Appellant’s Second PCRA Petition, 10/10/09, at 7. 

Appellant, however, claimed that a man named 

Tyrone Williams had recently come forward with 

“exculpatory evidence” regarding Appellant’s case. 

Id. Appellant thus claimed that his PCRA petition 

 

2

[W]ithin Appellant’s first PCRA petition (which was 

filed in 2003), Appellant included and relied upon an 

affidavit from an individual named Shareef Cato. In 

his 2003 affidavit, Mr. Cato averred that, 

immediately before the shooting, Dana Lucas was 

watching the outside dice game, but was insulted by 

Appellant. Mr. Cato averred that, following the 

insult, Ms. Lucas “turned away and went inside the 

bar” – and that, after Ms. Lucas was inside of the 

bar, the shooting occurred. Affidavit of Shareef 

Cato, 12/12/02, at 1-2.

Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 3150 EDA 2012, unpublished memorandum 

at 13 (Pa.Super. filed July 8, 2013).
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was timely under the “after-discovered facts” 

exception to the PCRA’s one-year 

time-bar.[Footnote 3] Id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(ii). Moreover, attached to Appellant’s 

PCRA petition was a sworn affidavit from 

Mr. Williams[.]

[Footnote 3] Obviously, in order to 

satisfy the “after-discovered facts” 

exception to the PCRA’s one-year 

time-bar, the petitioner need not plead 

or prove that the evidence was 

“exculpatory” or that the evidence 

“would have changed the outcome of the 

trial.” Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 

A.2d 1264, 1270-1272 (Pa. 2007) 

(holding that the PCRA’s after-discovered 

facts exception “merely requires that the 

‘facts’ upon which such a claim is 

predicated must not have been known to 

appellant, nor could they have been 

ascertained by due diligence”) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). Our 

reference to the alleged “exculpatory” 

nature of Appellant’s evidence simply 

reflects our effort to summarize 

Appellant’s claim.

Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 3150 EDA 2012, unpublished memorandum 

at 1-5 (Pa.Super. filed July 8, 2013) (brackets in original).

According to Appellant’s memorandum in support of 

his second PCRA petition, [Williams’] affidavit 

demonstrates: “[1) that Appellant] was not the one 

engaged in an argument with the decease[d] over a 

bet . . . [; 2) that Appellant] did not promote, order, 

or instruct the shooter to [shoot] the deceased . . . 

[; and, 3) that] the Commonwealth’s key witness 

(Dana Lucas) did not actually eyewitness the 

shooting, and was inside the bar when the incident 

took place and when the shots were fired.” 

Appellant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of 

Second PCRA Petition, 10/10/12, at 15-16.
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Id. at 6 (brackets in original). 

Appellant’s second petition was dismissed on October 15, 2012; and 

this court affirmed on July 8, 2013, holding, inter alia, that Williams was 

merely a newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known 

facts, and that such evidence does not satisfy the PCRA’s after-discovered 

facts exception to the jurisdictional one-year time-bar. Id. at 13, citing 

Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720, 722 (Pa. 2008). We 

observed that, “Initially, since Appellant was present at the time of the 

shooting, Appellant was aware of the alleged ‘fact’ that Appellant ‘was not 

the one engaged in an argument with the decease[d] over a bet’ and that 

Appellant ‘did not promote, order, or instruct the shooter to [shoot] the 

deceased.’” Id. at 12. Furthermore, appellant brought similar claims on 

direct appeal and in his first PCRA petition. Id. at 12-14. Appellant simply 

reiterated facts that were previously supplied by Hanible and Cato. Id.

Our supreme court denied appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal 

from this court’s decision affirming the order dismissing his second PCRA 

petition. Commonwealth v. Brown, 82 A.3d 1058 (Pa.Super. 2013), 

appeal denied, 85 A.3d 481 (Pa. 2014), cert. denied, U.S. , 135 

S.Ct. 226 (2014). The instant petition was filed on October 3, 2014. Again, 

appellant claimed that the after-discovered facts exception applied, this time 

relying on an August 14, 2014 affidavit from Andre Lewis (“Lewis”). 
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Therein, Lewis alleged that at the hospital after the shooting,3 he told Lucas 

to implicate appellant:

I pulled [Lucas] to the side and told her, you can’t 

just tell them what happened. You have to get 

[appellant] locked up with [Richardson]. If you are 

going to tell on [Richardson] you have to put 

[appellant] in it and get [appellant] off the streets 

because if you don’t something is going to happen to 

you. [Lucas] asked me how do [sic] she put 

[appellant] in it, I told her to tell them that after 

[Richardson] shot [the victim] [appellant] told 

[Richardson] to shoot him again and take his money.

Affidavit, Andre Lewis, 8/14/14 at 2 (appellant’s brief, Exhibit 1). On 

July 13, 2015, the PCRA court dismissed appellant’s petition as untimely 

and/or previously litigated. This timely appeal followed. Appellant was not 

ordered to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); however, the PCRA court filed a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on October 5, 2015. 

Appellant has raised the following issues for this court’s review:

1. Given that [appellant] proved the 

after-discovered facts exception, did the PCRA 

court abuse its discretion when it decided that 

[appellant]’s petition is untimely?

2. Given that the PCRA court did not review the 

newly-discovered evidence on its merits, did 

the court abuse its discretion?

3. Did the PCRA court abuse its discretion when it 

denied [appellant]’s request for permission to 

amend his PCRA petition?

 

3

Lewis was a friend of the victim, Gaillard, and drove him to the hospital. 

(Appellant’s brief at 15.)
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Appellant’s brief at 4.

“Our standard of review in reviewing an order either granting or 

denying post-conviction relief is limited to examining whether the court’s 

determination is supported by evidence of record and whether it is free of 

legal error.” Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 698 n.3 (Pa. 

1998) (citation omitted).

In 1995, the legislature amended the PCRA to 

require that PCRA petitions must be filed within a 

certain period of time. These amendments require 

that any PCRA petition, “including a second or 

subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of 

the date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(1). A judgment becomes final “at the 

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary 

review in the Supreme Court of the United States 

and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the 

expiration of time for seeking the review.” 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). These timeliness 

requirements are jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. 

Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214, 222 (1999). ‘[A] 

court has no authority to extend filing periods except 

as the statute permits.’ Id. (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Howard, 788 A.2d 351, 353 (Pa. 2002).

This court affirmed appellant’s judgment of sentence on June 12, 

2001, and our supreme court denied allocatur on January 11, 2002. 

Therefore, appellant’s judgment became final on or about April 11, 2002, 

after the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the United 

States Supreme Court expired. See U.S.Sup.Ct. Rule 13, 28 U.S.C.A. 

Appellant had until April 11, 2003, one year later, to file a timely PCRA 
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petition. Since this petition was filed 111⁄2 years after the date on which 

appellant’s judgment became final, then it was obviously filed beyond the 

one-year time limitation.

[T]he 1995 amendments afford three narrow 

exceptions to the one-year time limitation for 

seeking PCRA relief. One of the exceptions provides 

that a party is excused from the general one-year 

filing requirement of the PCRA if “the facts upon 

which the claim is predicated were unknown to the 

petitioner and could not have been ascertained by 

the exercise of due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(ii). This exception has come to be 

known as the after-discovered evidence exception. 

See Commonwealth v. Yarris, 557 Pa. 12, 731 

A.2d 581, 592 (1999) (characterizing 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(ii) as “the after-discovered evidence 

exception to the timeliness requirement”); 

Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547, 722 

A.2d 638, 643 (1998) (stating that “the exceptions 

to [PCRA] filing period encompass government 

misconduct, after-discovered evidence, and 

constitutional changes”). Furthermore, as a 

secondary proviso, the amendments mandate that 

when a petitioner alleges entitlement to an exception 

to the one-year time limitation, the petition will only 

be addressed on substantive grounds if it is “filed 

within 60 days of the date the claim could have been 

presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Thus, a 

petitioner relying on the after-discovered evidence 

exception is further required to file his or her PCRA 

petition within 60 days of the discovery of the new 

evidence proffered in support of relief.

Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000).

The timeliness exception set forth in 

Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a petitioner to 

demonstrate he did not know the facts upon which 

he based his petition and could not have learned 

those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. 

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382, 395, 930 
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A.2d 1264, 1271 (2007). Due diligence demands 

that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect 

his own interests. Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 

A.2d 1164, 1168 (Pa.Super. 2001). A petitioner 

must explain why he could not have obtained the 

new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence. 

Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323, 

330-31, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (2001); Commonwealth 

v. Yarris, 557 Pa. 12, 29, 731 A.2d 581, 590 

(1999). This rule is strictly enforced. See 

[Commonwealth v. Vega, 754 A.2d 714, 718 

(Pa.Super. 2000)].

Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Pa.Super. 2010), 

appeal denied, 20 A.3d 1210 (Pa. 2011).

We emphasize that it is the petitioner who bears the 

burden to allege and prove that one of the timeliness 

exceptions applies. [Commonwealth v. 

Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263 (Pa. 2008)]. In 

addition, a petition invoking any of the timeliness 

exceptions must be filed within 60 days of the date 

the claim first could have been presented. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). A petitioner fails to satisfy 

the 60-day requirement of Section 9545(b) if he or 

she fails to explain why, with the exercise of due 

diligence, the claim could not have been filed earlier. 

Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323, 781 

A.2d 94, 98 (2001).

Marshall, 947 A.2d at 719-720.

First, we observe that Lewis’ affidavit was dated August 14, 2014, and 

appellant filed his petition on October 3, 2014, within 60 days. However, 

appellant does not allege when he first became aware of the information in 

Lewis’ affidavit, i.e., that Lewis told Lucas to tell police that appellant urged 

Richardson to shoot the victim and take his money. Appellant claims that 

his wife sent him Lewis’ affidavit on September 2, 2014. (Appellant’s brief 
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at 10; appellant’s reply brief at 4.) However, appellant failed to plead when 

he first became aware of the facts alleged in Lewis’ affidavit, as required by 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). The operative date is not the date of Lewis’ 

affidavit, nor when appellant received the affidavit in the mail. See 

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 905 A.2d 507, 510-511 (Pa.Super. 2006), 

appeal denied, 917 A.2d 845 (Pa. 2007) (“While Holmes’ petition was 

admittedly filed within sixty days of the date of the Fauntleroy affidavit, 

there is absolutely no indication that Mr. Fauntleroy drafted the affidavit on 

the same day that he first approached Appellant and revealed to him the 

new information. Thus, Holmes failed to demonstrate the predicate 

requirement that the instant claim was raised within sixty days of the date it 

first could be presented, and, therefore, he did not sustain his burden of 

pleading and proving that the after-discovered evidence exception permits 

him to circumvent the statutory time-bar.”).

Furthermore, appellant has failed to demonstrate why this evidence 

could not have been obtained earlier, with the exercise of due diligence. 

According to appellant, Lewis was a friend of the victim and drove the victim 

to the hospital after the shooting. (Appellant’s brief at 15.) The alleged 

conversation between Lewis and Lucas took place in the emergency room of 

Germantown Hospital. (Id.; Lewis affidavit, 8/14/14 at 1.) Initially, Lewis 

also gave a statement to police inculpating appellant. (Appellant’s brief at 

15.) Lewis did not testify at trial. (Id.) However, appellant does not allege 
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that he was unaware of Lewis’ existence or could not have uncovered this 

evidence prior to trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence. 

Even if appellant could demonstrate that he met the 60-day 

requirement and that the evidence was not discoverable earlier, with due 

diligence, he would still not be entitled to relief. As described thoroughly 

above, this is at least the fourth witness that appellant has found to say 

essentially the same thing, i.e., that appellant did not order Richardson to 

shoot the victim. See Marshall, 947 A.2d at 720 (“The focus of the 

exception is ‘on [the] newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or 

newly willing source for previously known facts.’”), quoting Commonwealth 

v. Johnson, 863 A.2d 423, 427 (Pa. 2004) (emphasis in Johnson) 

(footnote omitted). This court observed on appeal from dismissal of 

appellant’s second PCRA petition,

Unquestionably, Appellant has long been aware of all 

three of the alleged “facts” that are contained in 

Mr. Williams’ affidavit. Initially, since Appellant was 

present at the time of the shooting, Appellant was 

aware of the alleged “fact” that Appellant “was not 

the one engaged in an argument with the decease[d] 

over a bet” and that Appellant “did not promote, 

order, or instruct the shooter to [shoot] the 

deceased.” Appellant’s Memorandum of Law in 

Support of Second PCRA Petition, 10/10/12, at 

15-16. Therefore, with respect to these two aspects 

of Mr. Williams’ affidavit, Appellant’s after-discovered 

facts claim immediately fails.
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Brown, No. 3150 EDA 2012 at 12. Appellant keeps finding new witnesses 

to submit affidavits containing the same averments of fact. This is not new 

evidence.

Finally, we address appellant’s argument that he should have been 

granted leave to amend his PCRA petition, after receiving Rule 9074 notice,

to include his investigator’s interview of Lewis. (Appellant’s brief at 20.) 

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 905 provides, “(A) The judge may 

grant leave to amend or withdraw a petition for post-conviction collateral 

relief at any time. Amendment shall be freely allowed to achieve substantial 

justice.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A). The transcript of the investigator’s interview 

with Lewis does not add anything material to Lewis’ affidavit. (Appellant’s 

brief at 11-12.) Lewis does not actually exonerate appellant. At the end of 

the interview, Lewis states that, “[The victim] was winning but then he 

crapped out and tried to leave without paying the fade. [The victim] went to 

the passenger side of his car and that’s when [Richardson] shot him.” (Id.

at 12.) Lewis does not allege that Lucas’ statement to police was false, only 

that he urged her to “put [appellant] in it.” Lewis’ allegations did not 

constitute after-discovered evidence for PCRA purposes, and the PCRA court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant leave to amend his petition 

to include the transcript provided by appellant’s investigator. Certainly, 

appellant was not prejudiced by the PCRA court’s denial of leave to amend.

 

4

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.
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Lastly, we address appellant’s “Application for Post-Submission 

Communication,” filed June 16, 2016. Appellant avers that on June 6, 2016, 

during the pendency of this appeal, he received an affidavit from Lucas. 

According to appellant, Lucas confirms what was said by Lewis and also 

contradicts her own trial testimony. (Id. at 2.) At trial, Lucas testified that 

she heard appellant tell Richardson to shoot the victim, not that she was 

instructed to say so by Lewis. (Id.) Appellant seeks a remand to amend his 

PCRA petition to include Lucas’ affidavit. (Id.) Appellant also notes that he 

has dispatched an investigator to interview Lucas and seeks permission to 

include any additional exculpatory evidence provided by Lucas. 

(“Memorandum of Law in Support of Application for Relief,” 6/16/16 at 

2 n.1.)

On July 15, 2016, appellant filed a “Supplemental Application for 

Post-Submission Communications,” alleging that his investigator interviewed 

Lucas on June 29, 2016. Appellant attaches a notarized, handwritten 

question-and-answer sheet in which Lucas exonerates appellant. 

(“Supplemental Application for Relief,” 7/15/16, Exhibit 1.)

We decline appellant’s invitation to remand to amend the instant PCRA 

petition, his third, to include yet another claim of after-discovered evidence 
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based on Lucas’ affidavit. Appellant will have to raise any such claim in a 

serial PCRA petition.5

Order affirmed. Appellant’s application and supplemental application 

for post-submission communication are denied.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/25/2016

 

5 The PCRA court observed that in his October 10, 2009 PCRA petition, 

appellant claimed to have after-discovered evidence that Lucas fabricated 

her trial testimony and that she did not actually witness the shooting. 

(PCRA court opinion, 10/5/15 at 4.)