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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

April 21, 2015 

v No. 319838 

Berrien Circuit Court 

BRIAN WAYNE MILLS, LC No. 2012-005295-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: METER, P.J., and SAWYER and BOONSTRA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of four counts of second-degree criminal 

sexual conduct (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (sexual contact with a person under the age of 

13). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 42 months to 15 years’ imprisonment. He appeals 

by right. We affirm. 

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 The victim, SD, was the best friend of defendant’s daughter and spent a lot of time at 

defendant’s home in the summer of 2012. On one occasion that summer, when SD was between 

11 and 12 years old, she stayed overnight at defendant’s home. SD testified that she watched 

television with defendant and his family that evening; later, defendant’s family went to bed, 

leaving SD alone with defendant in the television room. 

 In her initial testimony at trial, SD stated that defendant began to rub her foot. Defendant 

told her that she was pretty and that if he were in her grade, he would date her. He then moved 

his hand up her leg to her calf, and then to her mid-thigh. Feeling uncomfortable, SD got up 

from the couch and went into the bathroom. However, when she returned, defendant told her to 

sit back down. She complied, and defendant pulled her legs toward him. He again moved his 

hand up her leg, to the top of her thigh, and rubbed it. He then moved his hand inside her shorts 

and rubbed the top of her “pubic area,” over her underwear. Defendant further moved his hand, 

while still inside her shorts, around to her buttocks, again over her underwear. Defendant then 

told SD to “come here,” and he moved her onto his lap. He placed his hand underneath her shirt 

and rubbed her bare stomach. He then reached his hand further up SD’s shirt, under the 

underwire of her bra, and rubbed the bottom of her breasts. SD demonstrated to the jury where 

on her body defendant had touched her. While sitting on defendant’s lap, SD felt defendant’s 

erect penis. The encounter ended when SD convinced defendant to play video games with her. 
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 As discussed further below, SD was recalled for further testimony on the second day of 

trial. In that testimony, she clarified that she had meant “vagina” when in her earlier testimony 

she referenced “pubic area,” and that defendant had touched both her inner thigh and outer thigh 

during the encounter. 

 After the events, SD did not immediately report the incident to anyone, but she eventually 

disclosed the sexual touching several months later to her teachers, who reported the incident to 

police. Defendant was charged with four counts of CSC-II, related to the touching of four 

separate body parts. Defendant was convicted on all four counts as described above. This 

appeal followed. 

II. RECALL OF COMPLAINING WITNESS 

 Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to recall SD 

on the second day of trial, because she had not been sequestered following her initial testimony. 

We disagree. We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision regarding the 

sequestration of witnesses. People v Roberts, 292 Mich App 492, 502-503; 808 NW2d 290 

(2011). Likewise, we review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision whether to recall a 

witness. See People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, 643; 683 NW2d 597 (2004). An abuse of 

discretion occurs when the trial court “selects an outcome outside the range of reasonable and 

principled outcomes.” People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 689; 780 NW2d 321 (2009). 

 The record reflects that the trial court entered a sequestration order at the outset of the 

trial proceedings. However, following SD’s initial testimony, she was allowed to remain in the 

courtroom. At the end of the first day of trial, the trial court expressed concern with its 

preliminary instruction to the jury regarding Count IV of the information. Specifically, that 

instruction had indicated that defendant had allegedly touched SD’s vagina, whereas SD’s 

testimony was that defendant had touched her “pubic area.” The trial court proposed changing 

the wording of the final instructions. The prosecution supported the amendment and also 

proposed recalling SD to the witness stand so that she could explain what she had meant when 

she said “pubic area.” Defendant objected on the basis that SD had been allowed to remain in 

the courtroom following her testimony and thus had heard other witnesses’ testimony and the 

parties’ arguments regarding her initial testimony. In making this argument, defendant also 

noted a separate problem with SD’s initial testimony: although the trial court’s preliminary 

instruction regarding Count I alleged that defendant had touched SD’s inner thigh, SD never 

testified specifically that defendant had touched her inner thigh, and, according to defendant, she 

did not touch her inner thigh when she was demonstrating to the jury. The trial court overruled 

defendant’s objection and allowed SD to be recalled. SD subsequently testified that she had 

meant “vagina” when she said “pubic area” and that defendant had touched both her inner thigh 

and outer thigh during the encounter. 

 “The purposes of sequestering a witness are to prevent him from coloring his testimony 

to conform with the testimony of another, and to aid in detecting testimony that is less than 

candid.” People v Meconi, 277 Mich App 651, 654; 746 NW2d 881 (2008). MCL 780.761 

specifically addresses a trial court’s authority to sequester a victim who will be called as a 

witness. That statute provides: 
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The victim has the right to be present throughout the entire trial of the defendant, 

unless the victim is going to be called as a witness. If the victim is going to be 

called as a witness, the court may, for good cause shown, order the victim to be 

sequestered until the victim first testifies. The victim shall not be sequestered 

after he or she first testifies. 

 At the outset, given the plain language of MCL 780.761, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in allowing SD to remain in the courtroom after she first testified. Moreover, we 

conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecution to recall SD to the witness 

stand. SD’s initial testimony was detailed; she described the progression of defendant’s hand 

from the bottom of her leg, all the way up to the top of her thigh, then to her “pubic area” and 

around to her buttocks, and then eventually up her shirt to her breasts. The primary purpose for 

allowing SD to be recalled was simply for her to clarify what she meant when she said “pubic 

area.” SD did so, while also clarifying that when defendant touched her thigh, he touched both 

her inner thigh and outer thigh. Thus, SD’s initial testimony is consistent with the testimony she 

offered upon being recalled; there is no evidence that SD on recall conformed her testimony to 

another witness’s testimony.1

 Meconi, 277 Mich App at 654. Moreover, the jury was able to 

fully assess whether SD’s testimony was consistent because it saw her initial demonstrations as 

to where defendant had touched her. Further, defendant was allowed to explore on crossexamination the fact that SD had remained in the courtroom following her initial testimony and 

that she had heard other testimony and the parties’ arguments before being recalled. Under these 

circumstances, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing SD to be 

recalled. See Williams, 470 Mich at 643. 

III. TESTIMONY OF FORENSIC INTERVIEWER 

 Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing Brooke Rospierski, a forensic 

interview specialist who interviewed SD in connection with the investigation, to testify in a dual 

capacity as both an expert witness and a fact witness, absent a specific instruction from the trial 

court informing the jury of Rospierski’s dual role. Defendant did not request such an instruction 

at trial, and in fact approved the instructions as given. Defendant’s express approval of the trial 

court’s jury instructions waived any claim of error. People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488, 503-505 

n 28; 803 NW2d 200 (2011). Nevertheless, were we to consider the issue for plain error 

affecting defendant’s substantial rights, we would conclude that reversal is not warranted. Id. at 

505. In United States v Lopez-Medina, 461 F 3d 724, 743 (CA 6, 2006), the principal case relied 

upon by defendant, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that, where a 

witness testifies in two capacities, an instruction on the witness’ dual roles is appropriate. 

However, the court recognized that even absent an explicit instruction regarding the witness’ 

dual role, an instruction on how to weigh expert opinion testimony will generally suffice. Id. In 

that case, the court found that the trial court had plainly erred in permitting the dual-role 

 

1

 In fact, two of the three witnesses SD observed before being recalled did not even testify 

regarding the circumstances of the encounter, and the third witness (a police detective) testified 

solely to what defendant’s version of events was and his subsequent investigation. 
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testimony because “no instruction on expert witness testimony was given, let alone an instruction 

on the agents’ dual role as a fact and expert witness.” Id. 

 In this case, unlike Lopez-Medina, the jury was properly instructed regarding the 

differences between lay and expert testimony, as well as how to evaluate both lay and expert 

testimony. Moreover, the trial court specifically instructed the jury that it was free to reject 

Rospierski’s expert testimony. Taken as a whole, these instructions reduced any risk that the 

jury would conflate Rospierski’s dual role or that it would give undue weight to her expert 

testimony, and the instructions therefore adequately protected defendant’s rights. People v 

Martin, 271 Mich App 280, 337-338; 721 NW2d 815 (2006). 

IV. AMENDMENT OF INFORMATION/JURY INSTRUCTIONS 

 Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in amending Count IV of 

the information. We disagree. At the outset, we disagree with defendant’s characterization that 

the trial court amended the information. The information alleged four counts of CSC-II; each 

count only generally alleged that defendant engaged in sexual contact with SD, without 

specifying what part of SD’s body was touched. It was the trial court’s preliminary instructions 

that specifically indicated for Count IV that defendant allegedly had touched SD’s vagina. As 

noted above, the trial court expressed concern with the preliminary instructions following SD’s 

initial testimony, and ultimately amended the final instructions to reference, in Count IV, an 

alleged touching of SD’s “groin and/or vagina.” By doing so, the trial court did not broaden the 

scope of the information or otherwise alter the elements of the offense. Thus, the trial court’s 

change in instructions did not amount to an amendment of the information. Nevertheless, even 

assuming an amendment occurred, reversal is not warranted. 

 “Both MCL 767.76 and MCR 6.112(H) authorize a trial court to amend an information 

before, during or after trial.” People v McGee, 258 Mich App 683, 686; 672 NW2d 191 (2003). 

The only legal obstacle to doing so is “whether the amendment would cause undue prejudice to 

the defendant because of ‘unfair surprise, inadequate notice, or insufficient opportunity to 

defend.’ ” Id. at 690, quoting People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 462; 579 NW2d 868 (1998). 

Here, as noted above, the information generally alleged four counts of “sexual contact”2

; the 

specificity in the charges, as reflected in the preliminary instructions, was based on SD’s 

preliminary examination testimony, wherein she alleged, in relevant part, that defendant had 

touched her vagina. Defendant was therefore sufficiently on notice of the allegations by the time 

of trial. Defendant’s theory of defense was that he never touched SD in any inappropriate areas 

or for a sexual purpose, and that SD was fabricating the allegations. Thus, changing the final 

instructions regarding Count IV to reference defendant’s alleged touching of SD’s “groin and/or 

 

2

 “ ‘Sexual contact’ includes the intentional touching of the victim’s ... intimate parts or the 

intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s ... intimate 

parts . . . .” MCL 750.520a(q). “ ‘Intimate parts’ includes the primary genital area, groin, inner 

thigh, buttock, or breast of a human being.” MCL 750.520c(f). Defendant does not contend that 

the conduct alleged in the information or referenced in the preliminary or final jury instructions 

fell outside of these definitions. 
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vagina” instead of merely her “vagina” did not result in unfair surprise, nor did it force defendant 

to alter his theory of defense. See McGee, 258 Mich App at 692-693. Further, the final 

instructions “adequately protected the defendant’s rights by fairly presenting to the jury the 

issues to be tried.” Martin, 271 Mich App at 337-338. 

V. DENIAL OF DIRECTED VERDICT 

 Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed 

verdict as to Count I of the information, which was the Count based on defendant’s alleged 

touching of SD’s inner thigh. “When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion for a 

directed verdict, this Court reviews the record de novo to determine whether the evidence, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could persuade a rational trier of fact that 

the essential elements of the crime charged were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v 

Parker, 288 Mich App 500, 504; 795 NW2d 596 (2010). 

 To support a conviction for CSC-II based on this alleged touching, the prosecution was 

required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant intentionally touched SD’s inner 

thigh, that the touching could reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal 

or gratification or done for a sexual purpose, and that SD was under the age of 13. 

MCL 750.520c(1)(a); MCL 750.520a(f), (q). Defendant does not dispute that SD was under the 

age of 13 at the time of the encounter. Likewise, defendant does not dispute, and the evidence 

supports, that the touching could reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual 

arousal or gratification, given SD’s testimony that defendant told her she was pretty, that he said 

that he would date her if he were her age, and that he had an erection while she was on his lap. 

 Defendant’s sole contention, in arguing that a directed verdict was appropriate, is that 

there was insufficient evidence that he had touched SD’s inner thigh. We disagree. First and 

foremost, defendant concedes that, upon being recalled, SD specifically clarified that defendant 

had touched her inner thigh. Defendant’s argument thus rests on his position, which we have 

already rejected, that the trial court should not have allowed SD to be recalled. In light of our 

conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing SD to be recalled, this 

testimony was properly considered by the trial court. See People v Schultz, 246 Mich App 695, 

702; 635 NW2d 491 (2001) (In ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the trial court is required 

to “consider in the light most favorable to the prosecutor the evidence presented by the 

prosecutor up to the time the motion [was] made.”). Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to 

support this conviction. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Patrick M. Meter 

/s/ David H. Sawyer 

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra