This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 RAYMOND V. SANCHEZ, 2 Worker-Appellee, 3 v. No. 35,155 4 INTEL CORPORATION, 5 Employer-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATION 7 David L. Skinner, Workers’ Compensation Judge 8 Dunn Law Offices 9 Ralph O. Dunn III 10 Rio Rancho, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Maestas & Suggett, P.C. 13 Paul Maestas 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 for Appellant 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 SUTIN, Judge. 182 {1} Employer has appealed from an award of attorney fees. We previously issued 1 a notice of proposed summary disposition in which we proposed to uphold the 2 workers’ compensation judge’s (WCJ) determination. Employer has filed a 3 memorandum in opposition. After due consideration, we remain unpersuaded. We 4 therefore affirm. 5
{2} The issue on appeal concerns the app lication of the statutory fee-shifting 6 provision. [DS 6; MIO 1-10] SeeNMSA 1978, § 52-1-54(F)(4) (2013) (providing that 7 the worker may serve upon the employer an o ffer, and if the worker’s offer was less 8 than the amount ultimately awarded by the compensation order, the employer shall 9 pay 100% of the attorney fees to be paid the worker’s attorney). 10
{3} We do not understand there tobe any dispute as to the operative facts and 11 principles of law, as previously set forth in the notice of proposed summary 12 disposition. We will avoi d unnecessary reiteration here and focus instead on the 13 content of the memorandum in opposition. 14
{4} Employer contends that Worker’s offer of judgment should be regarded as 15 higher than the amount he ultimately rec overed, based on the absence of express 16 language allowing for credits and/or offsets. [MIO 2-5] We disagree. As we 17 previously observed, Worker’s offer exp licitly called for due application of NMSA 18 1978, Section 52-1-25.1 (2005). [CN 3; MIO 2] By its plain language, Section 52-1- 193 25.1 entails offsetting and crediting. As such , the statutory reference was sufficient to 1 apprise Employer of its entitlement to the same. 2
{5} Alternatively, Employer suggests that Worker’s offer should be regarded as 3 ambiguous, such that it does not supply an appropriate basis for application of the fee4 shifting provision. [MIO 5-9] See Leonard v. Payday Prof’l , 2007-NMCA-128, ¶ 26, 5 142 N.M. 605, 168 P.3d 177 (observing that, where critical issues are unresolved, the 6 offer does not supply an appropriate basis for fee shifting). Once again, we disagree. 7 As previously stated, insofar as Section 52-1-25.1 clearly and specifically addresses 8 crediting and offsetting and insofar as Worker’s offer unequivocally called for 9 application of Section 52-1-25.1 without any stated limitation, Worker’s offer 10 unambiguously allowed for crediting and offsetting. See generally Abeyta v. Bumper 11 to Bumper Auto Salvage , 2005-NMCA-087, ¶ 10, 137 N.M. 800, 115 P.3d 816 12 (observing that, in Abeyta ’s context, an offer is unambiguous if it is “clear as to [the 13 w]orker’s meaning and intent”). We perceive no need for greater specificity by 14 reference to individual statutory sub-sections or otherwise. 15
{6} Finally, we understand Employer to contend that the portion of the fee order 16 that refers to Section 52-1-25.1 creates some ambiguity relative to offsetting and 17 crediting as previously allowed under the compensation order. [MIO 7-8] However, 18 it seems apparent that the WC J’s reference to Section 52-1-25.1 in the fee order was 194 intended to clarify the basis for Employer’s entitlement to offsetting and crediting as 1 previously implied in the compensation order, which further clarified the basis for the 2 attorney fee award. [RP 220-21] We therefore remain unpersuaded. 3
{7} Accordingly, for the reasons stated in our notice of proposed summary 4 disposition and in this Opinion, we affirm. 5
{8} IT IS SO ORDERED. 6

__________________________________ 7 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 8

WE CONCUR: 9

_______________________________ 10 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 11

_______________________________ 12 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 13