13-3592-cv

Victory v. Pataki et al.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York on the

17th day of April, two thousand fifteen.

Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER,

BARRINGTON D. PARKER,

Circuit Judges.

*

_____________________________________________________

ALBERT LOPEZ VICTORY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 13-3592-cv

GEORGE PATAKI, Former Governor of the State of New York in his official capacity, BRION

D. TRAVIS, Ex-Chair, Board of Parole, New York State Division of Parole, THOMAS P.

GRANT, Special Assistant to the Chair of the Board of Parole, MIKE HAYDEN, Acting

Director of the Division of Parole, RONALD P. WHITE, Director of Upstate Field Operations

for the Division of Parole, TERRANCE X. TRACY, Chief Counsel to the Chair of the Board of

Parole, KENNETH E. GRABER, Commissioner of the Board of Parole, GEORGE CHARD,

Senior Parole Officer, Utica Parole Office, DOUGLAS C. SMITH, Ex-Supervising Parole

Officer, Utica Parole Office, PERRITANO, “JOHN,” First Name Unknown, Parole Officer,

Utica Parole Office, KEVIN MCCARTHY, Head of the Special Services Bureau for the

Division of Parole, Central New York Area, THOMAS MURFITT, Syracuse Police Officer,

GILHOOLEY, “JOHN,” first name unknown, Syracuse Police Officer, TIMOTHY FOODY,

Ex-Police Chief, Syracuse Police Department, John Does, 1, 2, 3, etc., Jane Does 1, 2, 3, etc.,

(whose identities are unknown but who are believed to be either employees of the Division of

*

 The Honorable Richard C. Wesley of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit was originally assigned as a member of the panel, but recused himself prior to

oral argument and did not participate in the appeal. The appeal is being determined by the

remaining members of the panel, who are in agreement. See 2d Cir. R. § 0.14(b); Murray v.

National Broad. Co., 35 F.3d 45, 46 (2d Cir. 1994).
Parole, the Governor’s Office, and/or the Syracuse Police Department); all such individual

defendants being sued both in their individual and official capacity, THE CITY OF

SYRACUSE, New York, DENNIS DUVAL, Chief of Police of the Syracuse Police Department,

GEORGE ALEXANDER, Chair, Board of Parole, in his official capacity, GOVERNOR DAVID

PATERSON, RORY D. GILHOOLEY, Syracuse Police Officer, JOHN FALGE, Ex-Police

Chief, Syracuse Police Department, GARY MIGUEL, Police Chief, Syracuse Police

Department, ELIOT SPITZER, Governor of the State of New York in his official capacity,

Defendants-Appellees.

**

__________________________________________

Appearing for Appellant: Myron Beldock, Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP, New York,

N.Y. for Albert Lopez Victory.

Appearing for Appellees: Andrew B. Ayers, Assistant Solicitor General, Office of the

Attorney General (Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the

State of New York; Barbarda D. Underwood, Solicitor General;

Nancy A. Speigel, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, on the brief),

Albany, N.Y. for New York State Appellees.

Shannon T. O’Connor, Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City 

of Syracuse, (Robert P. Stamey, Corporation Counsel for the City

of Syracuse, on the brief), Syracuse, N.Y. for City of Syracuse

Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Skretny,

C.J.).

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be and it hereby is REVERSED in part,

AFFIRMED in part, and REMANDED for a trial on the due process claims. 

Plaintiff-Appellant Albert Lopez Victory, a former inmate of the New York Department

of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), appeals from the August 27, 2013

order of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Skretny, C.J.)

granting summary judgment for defendants and dismissing in its entirety his complaint. See

Victory v. Pataki, No. 02-CV-0031, 2013 WL 4539296 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2013). On appeal,

Victory challenges the dismissal of those claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

various New York State officials and employees (“State Defendants”) as well as the City of

Syracuse and several of its police officers (collectively “Syracuse Defendants”) for violating and

conspiring to violate Victory’s due process, equal protection, and Fourth Amendment rights in

connection with the rescission and revocation of his parole. Because we conclude that genuine

** The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the caption as above.

2
issues of material fact preclude summary judgment for certain State Defendants on Victory’s due

process claims arising out of the rescission of his grant of parole release, we reverse in part and

remand to permit Victory to proceed at trial on this claim.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Summa v. Hofstra

Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2013). In assessing the record to determine whether there is a

genuine dispute as to any material fact, we resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible

inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight

Line Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying

facts and procedural history, which we recount only to the extent necessary to explain our

decision.

I. Background

In 1970, Victory entered DOCCS custody to serve a sentence of twenty-five years to life

upon his conviction of felony murder, stemming from his involvement in the shooting death of a

police officer. See People v. Bornholdt, 350 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1973) (upholding conviction);

Victory v. Bombard, 570 F.2d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1978) (reversing grant of writ of habeas corpus). In

1978, Victory absconded from Green Haven Correctional Facility and remained at large for three

years before being apprehended. The defendants do not dispute that Victory behaved as a model

prisoner throughout the 21 years following his return to DOCCS custody in 1981.

It is undisputed that throughout the period Victory was eligible for parole release, former

Governor George Pataki espoused strong beliefs that parole should not be granted to violent

felons and publicly supported legislative reforms that would abolish parole for this category of

offender. In 1997, Victory’s initial parole application was denied, but a two-member panel was

unable to reach a consensus with respect to his next two applications.

On January 11, 1999, Victory was considered for parole release for the fourth time by a

two-member panel consisting of Commissioners Kenneth Graber and Lawrence Scott. During

the hearing, Commissioner Graber assured Victory that the panel had reviewed all the documents

in his file, even if it failed to mention every consideration. The information before the panel

contained numerous prominent references to Victory’s 1978 escape. However, unlike the two

prior panels, the January 11, 1999 panel never explicitly mentioned Victory’s escape.1

 Graber

and Scott granted Victory’s application for parole and assigned him an open release date of

March 11, 1999. Pursuant to the direction of non-party Katherine Lapp, who then served as

Pataki’s Director of Criminal Justice, Victory was not informed of the panel’s determination

until January 19, 1999, when he simultaneously received a Notice of Temporary Suspension of

Parole Release.

1

 The January 11, 1999 parole panel did discuss, without further inquiry, certain facts

related to his escape, such as his disciplinary record and the fact that Victory married his current

wife “twenty-one years ago, [in] 1978” and had “one daughter who is now eighteen.” App’x at

941, 943.

3
The core dispute concerns the events precipitating the March hearing to rescind Victory’s

grant of parole release. Victory proffered admissible evidence supporting the following

allegations. On January 12, 1999—the day after the panel granted Victory parole—Thomas P.

Grant, the Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Board of Parole, received a media inquiry

requesting the outcome of Victory’s hearing. Grant then called Terrance X. Tracy, Chief Counsel

to the Chairman of the Board of Parole, to inform him that Victory had been granted release.

Grant also called Director Lapp at the Governor’s office and conveyed the panel’s determination

along with the nature of Victory’s offense and his history as an escapee. Five minutes later, Lapp

called Grant back to request that he immediately send the file that had been before the January

11, 1999 panel to her in Albany. On January 13, 1999, it is undisputed that Lapp met with Tracy

and Grant to discuss whether proper procedures were followed during the hearing, and they

addressed the issue of Victory’s escape. Grant testified that Lapp instructed him not to serve

Victory with the panel’s decision until she had an opportunity to review the file, and this

instruction was implemented by Michael Hayden, the Deputy Chief of Operations of the

Department of Parole. That same day, Lapp also contacted Assistant District Attorney James

Kindler and Judge John F. Keenan, the former Assistant District Attorney who had prosecuted

Victory, requesting information to supplement the record militating against his release. Kindler

testified that he understood the panel “would need new information.” On January 14, Kindler

sent a letter in opposition to Victory’s release, which emphasized the escape. On March 8, 1999,

Judge Keenan wrote a letter to Pataki that was provided to the Parole Board, discussing at length

Victory’s escape and urging the Governor to prevent his release.

On March 9, 1999, a rescission hearing was held before a three-member panel, which

included Commissioner Graber. The only evidence offered on the issue of whether Victory’s

escape was unknown to the January 11, 1999 panel was Graber’s own unsworn statements to this

effect. Based on “new materials” highlighting Victory’s escape, the rescission panel

unanimously voted to rescind Victory’s release. On November 8, 1999, the Board of Parole

Appeals Unit reversed the rescission determination, concluding that “[t]he conduct of

Commissioner Graber acting as unsworn witness, prosecutor and judge at the rescission hearing

so tainted the proceeding that the rescission hearing must be deemed constitutionally insufficient

in violation of Mr. Victory’s right to due process.” App’x at 1215. It therefore remanded for a

new rescission hearing to be convened immediately before a panel of three commissioners who

lacked any prior involvement in Victory’s case. 

Ultimately, the rehearing never transpired. On December 15, 1999, the Wyoming County

Supreme Court (Dadd, J.) (“Dadd Order”) granted Victory’s state habeas petition and ordered

his immediate parole release. Victory was released on December 28, 1999. The Fourth

Department subsequently reversed the Dadd Order as premature and reinstituted the Board of

Parole’s direction to conduct a new rescission hearing. People ex rel. Victory v. Herbert, 716

N.Y.S.2d 254 (4th Dep’t 2000), lv. denied, 723 N.Y.S.2d 132 (2001). A second hearing was

rendered unnecessary, however, by Victory’s reincarceration for violating the conditions of his

parole during his intervening release. See People ex rel. Victory v. Travis, 734 N.Y.S.2d 749,

751 (4th Dep’t 2001).

On April 7, 2000, Syracuse police officers arrested Victory for his admitted consumption

of alcohol and his violation of a parole condition imposed by Syracuse Parole Officer Kevin

McCarthy, that he not enter any establishment serving alcohol. Later that year, a final hearing

4
revoked Victory’s parole and recommended a 28-month delinquent time assessment. The Board

of Parole affirmed the parole commissioner’s decision to instead impose a time assessment of 60

months. Victory challenged his parole revocation, alleging that his restrictive conditions of

release, intensive surveillance, and excessive time assessment constituted selective enforcement.

The Clinton County Supreme Court (Feldstein, J.) upheld the revocation decision, but

determined that the 60-month delinquent time assessment was excessive. Because Victory had

already served the majority of this term, the court ordered that Victory be immediately

considered for re-release to parole supervision. On October 18, 2005, Victory was re-released. 

II. Parole Rescission Claims

“It is firmly established that a constitutional right exists not to be deprived of liberty on

the basis of false evidence fabricated by a government officer.” Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342,

355 (2d Cir. 2000). Although a state prisoner has no liberty interest in “the mere possibility of

release,” Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2001), parole grantees have a

protectable liberty interest entitling them to due process during a hearing to rescind a prior grant

of parole, see Green v. McCall, 822 F.2d 284, 289–90 (2d Cir. 1987); Drayton v. McCall, 584

F.2d 1208, 1214 (2d Cir. 1978). Due process protections extend to the present context, in which

“parole release may be temporarily suspended or rescinded based upon significant information

which existed where such information was not known by respondent.” Raheem v. N.Y.S. Bd. of

Parole, 888 N.Y.S.2d 631, 633 (3d Dep’t 2009) (internal alterations and quotation marks

omitted); see also 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.5(b)(2)(i); Ortiz v. N.Y.S. Bd. of Parole, 668 N.Y.S.2d

823, 825 (4th Dep’t 1998). The minimal guarantees of procedural due process require that the

decision be issued by “a neutral and detached hearing body such as a traditional parole board”

and supported by at least “some evidence,” Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir.

2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Victory alleges that the State Defendants violated and conspired to violate his right to

due process by fabricating a false basis for rescinding his parole and by depriving him of an

unbiased panel at his rescission hearing. The district court acknowledged that the rescission

hearing was “problematic on a due process level” and that “there arguably exist issues of fact

with regard to whether Graber knew of the escape, and therefore whether the information that his

rescission hearing was based upon was ‘new’ for purposes of 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.5(b)(2) (i).”

Victory, 2013 WL 4539296, at *17. Nonetheless, it held that Victory could not sustain a claim

based upon his parole rescission because Graber was protected by absolute immunity and

Victory could not establish the personal involvement of any of the other named defendants since

these individuals did not “directly participate” in the rescission hearing. Id.

We affirm the district court insofar as it concluded that Graber was entitled to absolute

immunity for any actions taken while performing the quasi-judicial function of deciding whether

to grant, deny, or rescind Victory’s parole. See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 759 (2d Cir.

1999) (“[W]e hold that Graber was entitled to absolute immunity because he was acting in a

quasi-judicial capacity when he revoked Montero’s parole.”). However, Graber’s absolute

immunity does not protect other alleged wrongdoers who violated Victory’s due process rights

while not performing a judicial function. See Zahrey, 221 F.3d at 353; Scotto v. Almenas, 143

F.3d 105, 110–13 (2d Cir. 1998) (no absolute immunity for parole officers who fabricated parole

violation while acting in investigatory capacity); Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123,

5
130 (2d Cir. 1997) (no absolute immunity for police officer who conspired to fabricate and

forward to prosecutors a known false confession); see also Coggins v. Buonora, 776 F.3d 108,

113 (2d Cir. 2015) (police officer who perjured himself before grand jury not entitled to absolute

immunity for lying to the district attorney and knowingly falsifying and omitting material facts

from police reports).

We agree with Victory that the district court erred in concluding that no rational jury

could find that any of the other defendants conspired to violate his right to due process. Despite

the State Defendants’ admission to multiple conversations regarding Victory’s parole, the district

court found that Victory could not establish the agreement necessary to sustain a conspiracy

claim due to lack of direct evidence “that these individuals agreed to anything other than

reviewing Plaintiff’s parole file.” Victory, 2013 WL 4539296, at *20. It is axiomatic, however,

that “conspiracies are by their very nature secretive operations that can hardly ever be proven by

direct evidence.” Rounseville v. Zahl, 13 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 1994); see also United States v.

Downing, 297 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is a rare case where all aspects of a conspiracy

can be laid bare in court with the precision of a surgeon’s scalpel.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Therefore, in assessing the evidence supporting Victory’s allegations, the district court

was not permitted to rely on the fact that no State witness admitted to any impropriety.

The district court did not draw all reasonable inferences in Victory’s favor when it

concluded that “Graber’s failure to note the escape in the parole file when it was readily

available was nothing more than a mistake” and that no nexus existed “between Lapp, Kindler,

Keenan, Grant, Travis, and Tracy discussing Plaintiff’s parole file and Graber depriving Plaintiff

of an impartial hearing.” Victory, 2013 WL 4539296, at *20. Crucially, at no point did the

district court address the phone records corroborating Victory’s contention that the conversations

allegedly identifying Victory’s escape as a basis for rescission preceded Graber’s own purported

realization that he had overlooked the escape. Whereas the State Defendants asserted that Graber

first became aware of Victory’s escape on January 13, 1999, during a phone conversation

between Graber, Tracy, and Grant, Victory pointed to phone records indicating that this call

could not have occurred until January 14, 1999, the day after admissible evidence suggests that

Lapp was already soliciting letters emphasizing the escape. As the district court at one point

acknowledged, Victory raised a genuine dispute as to whether Graber lied about his awareness of

the escape to the rescission panel. Considering these facts in conjunction with the State

Defendants’ inconsistent testimony regarding the chain of events preceding the rescission

hearing, a reasonable juror could conclude that there was an agreement among those defendants

who prematurely set in motion rescission procedures with this allegedly false pretext in mind.

See Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 129. These “inference[s] of impropriety” distinguish Victory’s

conspiracy allegations from those that we have dismissed on the basis that they are supported

only by “unsubstantiated speculation” with no evidence “to suggest anything untoward took

place.” Scotto, 143 F.3d at 115. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of Victory’s due process

claims against Tracy, Grant, and Travis. 

We also reverse the grant of summary judgment for lack of personal involvement with

respect to Michael Hayden and Ronald White, both directors of the Division of Parole.

“[P]ersonal involvement is a question of fact,” Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 484 (2d Cir.

2006), which may preclude summary judgment, see, e.g., Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 129. Here, it is

undisputed that Hayden and White arranged for Victory’s file to be sent to Lapp in Albany, and

6
that, prior to deciding to convene a rescission hearing, they had conversations with Grant and

Tracy about the panel’s failure to mention Victory’s escape. Despite the district court’s assertion

to the contrary, Victory, 2013 WL 4539296, at *5, Hayden also testified that he participated in

the decision to initiate a rescission hearing. White was subsequently involved in arranging the

procedural aspects of the rescission hearing. It is undisputed that White received the names of

the three commissioners assigned to the panel in advance of the rescission hearing, although it is

unclear precisely how Graber came to be assigned to this panel. Given this backdrop, the district

court decided disputed issues of material fact when it concluded that none of the State

Defendants either assigned Graber to the rescission panel or knew that Graber would be assigned

to the rescission panel. Victory, 2013 WL 4539296, at *20. Rather, a triable issue remains as to

whether White and Hayden personally participated in orchestrating a rescission hearing where

they knew Graber would provide a false pretext for rescission, while simultaneously serving as

judge and unsworn witness.2

The district court also dismissed former Governor Pataki for lack of personal

involvement. While the opinion below failed to draw all inferences in Victory’s favor in this

respect, we nonetheless agree with its ultimate determination that Victory failed to come forth

with evidence that would permit a jury to reasonably find that Pataki was personally involved in

depriving Victory of due process. As an initial matter, the undisputed involvement of two highranking members of Pataki’s staff in the events preceding the rescission hearing is insufficient to

establish Pataki’s liability “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the

unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”).

Moreover, while Victory suggests that these staff members were acting pursuant to Pataki’s

instruction or request, he relies on mere speculation in asserting that Pataki was even aware of

Victory’s case at that time. Even if a jury were to discredit the testimony of Pataki’s staff and

conclude that Pataki became aware of Victory’s grant of parole on January 12, 1999, the jury

would still be left to rely only “on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature” of

Pataki’s involvement in his staff’s subsequent alleged misconduct, for which it is undisputed

Pataki was not present. Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986); see also

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986).

Victory has similarly failed to show that Pataki fostered a policy or custom that deprived

him of due process during his rescission hearing. Undeniably, there is evidence in the record to

suggest that Pataki promoted a blanket policy opposing parole for violent offenders, but this does

not support the inference that he “created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional

practices occurred.” Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Scott v.

Fischer, 616 F.3d 100, 110 (2d Cir. 2010). Victory does not allege that Pataki generally

encouraged his staff to intervene in parole decisions or ratified the rescission procedures

employed by the Board of Parole. In fact, Victory repeatedly argued that his treatment was

anomalous and that Lapp’s involvement in the process was unprecedented. Accordingly, we

affirm the district court’s dismissal of Pataki for lack of personal involvement.

2

 We do not opine on whether absolute immunity would bar claims against the individual

who assigned Graber to the panel, as the State Defendants have not asserted that defense on

behalf of White or Hayden. See Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66–67 (2d Cir. 1997). 

7
III. Parole Supervision and Revocation Claims

We affirm the grant of summary judgment in all other respects. The district court

properly dismissed Victory’s equal protection claims in light of his failure to come forth with

any evidence suggesting that his admittedly stringent treatment during his parole supervision or

revocation was motivated by impermissible considerations. This Court has previously explained

that an unofficial policy to deny parole to all violent offenders would not violate the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because such disparate treatment is rationally

related to the legitimate state interest in protecting the public. See Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d

110, 117 (2d Cir. 2012). Victory asserts that he was treated more severely than other violent

offenders, but concedes that this difference stemmed from his status as a “cop killer.” That

parole restrictions may vary according to the nature of an offender’s crime requires no citation.

Likewise, Victory’s challenge to his parole supervision fails under a “class-of-one” theory

because Victory has presented no evidence that he was subject to a higher level of supervision

than other similarly situated parolees. See Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d

55, 59-60 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Class-of-one plaintiffs must show an extremely high degree of

similarity between themselves and the persons to whom they compare themselves.” (alterations

and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

The district court dismissed Victory’s Fourth Amendment challenge on the basis that he

failed to proffer any admissible evidence that the defendants actually placed a global positioning

system device (“GPS”) on his vehicle. Upon de novo review, we find no error in the district

court’s holding in this respect. Even assuming that Victory had raised a genuine dispute as to the

GPS’s placement, the defendants personally involved would be entitled to qualified immunity

because, in 2000, when the alleged conduct occurred, it was not “clearly established” that the

warrantless placement of a GPS device on the vehicle of a parolee subject to electronic

monitoring would violate the Fourth Amendment. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002);

see also United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251, 261–62 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding police officers’

warrantless placement of GPS on defendant’s vehicle fell within the good-faith exception to

exclusionary rule because such conduct was “objectively reasonable” under United States v.

Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)). 

Victory asserts no other colorable challenge to his supervision during his parole release.

Although he repeatedly asserts that the Department of Parole violated New York regulations or

its own policies, such conduct is not actionable under Section 1983. See Wray v. City of New

York, 490 F.3d 189, 193–95 (2d Cir. 2007). Similarly, while Victory alleges a conspiracy

between McCarthy and the Syracuse Defendants, he does not identify a federal or constitutional

right that these individuals conspired to violate. See Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110,

119 (2d Cir. 1995). Furthermore, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars Victory’s

conspiracy claims arising out of the zealous supervision performed by his parole officers. See

Herrmann v. Moore, 576 F.2d 453, 459 (2d Cir. 1978). Finally, the district court properly

dismissed Victory’s challenges to the proceedings resulting in his parole revocation as barred by

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). 

In sum, we reverse the grant of summary judgment with respect to Board of Parole

officials Tracy, Grant, and Travis, and Division of Parole officials Hayden and White, because

8
triable issues remain as to whether these individuals were personally involved in depriving

Victory of due process. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of all of Victory’s remaining

claims.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM IN PART, REVERSE IN PART, and REMAND

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

9