Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 13 / Wednesday, January 21, 2015 / Notices 2997 

1This included governments that received 

government-to-government assistance and or 

assistance to be provided through implementing 

partners. Additional governments may receive 

assistance through regional or global programs, but 

the governments identified in the report represent 

the vast majority of foreign assistance recipients. 

Request for Comments 

To identify ways we may enhance our 

periodic onsite review process and 

improve the representative payee 

program, we are asking for your 

comments on the following questions. 

(1) Besides those representative 

payees that the Act requires us to 

review, what representative payees 

should we include in our site review 

process? What criteria should we use to 

select representative payees for review? 

(2) What data sources should we 

consider when we select which 

representative payees to review, and 

which of these data sources should we 

use to detect improper use of 

beneficiary payments? 

(3) What tools or processes should we 

use to hold our representative payees 

accountable for their responsibilities? 

(4) How can we reduce the likelihood 

of mismanagement or misuse of a 

beneficiary’s payments? 

(5) Currently, when we do a site 

review we focus on how a 

representative payee manages a 

beneficiary’s funds. Should our reviews 

focus on any other issues? 

(6) What ideas do you have to 

improve the representative payee 

program overall? 

Please see the information under 

ADDRESSES earlier in this document for 

methods to give us your comments. We 

will not respond to your comments, but 

we will consider them as we review our 

policies and instructions to determine if 

we should revise or update them. 

Dated: January 13, 2015. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security. 

[FR Doc. 2015–00931 Filed 1–20–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4191–02–P 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

[Public Notice 9006] 

2014 Fiscal Transparency Report 

AGENCY: Department of State. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: The Department of State 

hereby presents the findings from the 

FY 2014 fiscal transparency review 

process in its Fiscal Transparency 

Report. This report describes the 

minimum requirements of fiscal 

transparency developed by the 

Department of State in consultation 

with other relevant federal agencies, 

identifies governments that are potential 

beneficiaries of FY 2014 foreign 

assistance funds, assesses those that did 

not meet the minimum fiscal 

transparency requirements, and 

indicates whether those governments 

made significant progress towards 

meeting the requirements. 

Fiscal Transparency 

Fiscal transparency is a critical 

element of effective public financial 

management, helps in building market 

confidence, and sets the stage for 

economic sustainability. Transparency 

also provides a window into 

government budgets for citizens of any 

country, helping them to hold their 

leadership accountable. The Department 

of State’s fiscal transparency review 

process assesses whether governments 

meet minimum requirements of fiscal 

transparency. The review includes an 

assessment of the transparency of 

processes for administering government 

contracts and licenses for natural 

resource extraction. 

Annual reviews of the fiscal 

transparency of governments that 

receive U.S. assistance help ensure U.S. 

taxpayer money is used appropriately 

and to sustain a dialogue with 

governments to improve their fiscal 

performance, leading to greater 

macroeconomic stability and better 

development outcomes. 

Section 7031(b) of the Department of 

State, Foreign Operations, and Related 

Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 

(Div. K, Pub. L. 113–76) (‘‘the Act’’) 

requires the Secretary to develop, for 

each government receiving assistance 

appropriated by the Act, minimum 

requirements of fiscal transparency, in 

consultation with heads of other 

relevant federal agencies, and to make a 

determination of ‘‘significant’’ or ‘‘no 

significant progress’’ in meeting the 

minimum requirements of fiscal 

transparency for each government that 

did not meet the minimum 

requirements. Through authority 

delegated from the Secretary, the 

Deputy Secretary of State for 

Management and Resources made those 

determinations for FY 2014. 

This report describes the minimum 

requirements of fiscal transparency 

developed by the Department, identifies 

whether governments met the 

requirements, and indicates whether 

those governments that did not meet the 

minimum requirements made 

significant progress toward meeting 

them. The report includes a description 

as to how those governments fell short 

of the minimum requirements, outlines 

any significant progress being made 

toward meeting the minimum 

requirements, and provides specific 

recommendations of short and longterm steps such governments should 

take to improve fiscal transparency. The 

report also outlines the process followed 

by the Department in completing the 

assessments and describes how funds 

appropriated by the FY 2014 and earlier 

appropriations acts are being used to 

support fiscal transparency. 

Fiscal Transparency Review Process 

and Criteria 

The Department reviewed its 

minimum requirements of fiscal 

transparency in consultation with other 

relevant federal agencies, and updated 

and strengthened its review criteria. In 

determining which governments were 

subject to fiscal transparency 

assessments and inclusion in the report, 

the Department identified those 

governments it anticipated would 

receive bilateral allocations of assistance 

appropriated by the Act based upon a 

review of the Congressional Budget 

Justification for FY 2014, and in 

consultation with the Department’s 

Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance 

Resources, as well as the Department’s 

regional and functional bureaus.1

The Department then assessed the 

fiscal transparency of the 140 

governments identified as potential 

recipients of bilateral allocations of 

assistance from FY 2014 foreign 

assistance funds, determined whether 

the minimum requirements were met, 

and identified any measures those 

governments had implemented to make 

significant progress towards meeting the 

requirements. 

In conducting the FY 2014 review, the 

Department assessed the fiscal 

transparency of governments as of 

January 17, 2014, the date the Act, 

which mandated this review, became 

law. In reaching a determination, the 

Department considered information 

from U.S. embassies and consulates, 

other U.S. government agencies, 

international organizations such as the 

IMF and multilateral development 

banks, and civil society organizations. 

U.S. diplomatic missions consulted 

with foreign government officials, 

NGOs, international organizations, and 

civil society to obtain information for 

these assessments. 

Minimum Requirements of Fiscal 

Transparency 

Subsection 7031(b)(2) of the Act 

provides that the minimum 

requirements of fiscal transparency 

developed by the Department are 


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requirements ‘‘consistent with those in 

subsection [7031](a)(1)’’ and the public 

disclosure of: 

• National budget documentation (to 

include receipts and expenditures by 

ministry), and 

• government contracts and licenses 

for natural resource extraction (to 

include bidding and concession 

allocation practices). 

The FY 2014 fiscal transparency 

review process evaluated whether 

governments receiving U.S. foreign 

assistance publicly disclosed budget 

documents including receipts and 

expenditures by ministry. The review 

process also evaluated whether the 

government has an independent 

supreme audit institution or similar 

institution that carries out a yearly 

verification of financial statements to 

ensure they meet internationally 

accepted accounting principles. The 

review further assessed the existence 

and public disclosure of criteria and 

procedures for awarding government 

contracts and licenses for natural 

resource extraction, including bidding 

and concession allocation practices. The 

Department applied the following 

criteria in assessing whether 

governments met the minimum 

requirements of fiscal transparency. 

Budget information should be: 

• Substantially Complete: Budget 

documents should provide a 

substantially full picture of a 

government’s revenue streams, 

including natural resource revenues, 

and planned expenditures. Budget 

documents should include allocations 

to and earnings from significant stateowned enterprises. A published budget 

that does not include significant cash or 

non-cash resources, including foreign 

aid or the balances of special accounts 

or off-budget accounts, would not be 

considered substantially complete. 

Budget documents should also include 

expenditures to support royal families 

or offices where such expenditures 

represent a significant budgetary outlay. 

The review process recognizes that 

military and/or intelligence budgets are 

often not publicly available for national 

security reasons. 

• Reliable: Budget documents and 

related data are considered reliable if 

they are accurate and disseminated on 

time. Actual receipts and expenditures 

should be reasonably correlated to the 

budget plan, and significant departures 

from planned receipts and expenditures 

should be explained in supplementary 

budget documents and publicly 

disclosed in a timely manner. Financial 

statements should meet internationally 

accepted accounting principles. The 

executed budget should be audited on a 

regular and timely basis by an 

independent supreme audit institution, 

and the results of such audits should be 

made public. 

• Publicly Available: Budget 

documents should be broadly available 

online, at government offices or 

libraries, on request from the ministry, 

or for purchase at a nominal fee at a 

government office. Publicly available 

budgets should include receipts and 

expenditures broken down by ministry. 

Information on government debt 

obligations should be publicly available. 

Natural resource extraction 

contracting and licensing procedures 

should be: 

• Transparent: The criteria and 

procedures for the contracting and 

licensing of natural resource 

exploitation should be publicly 

available and codified in law or 

regulation. Procedures used to award 

contracts and licenses in practice 

should be consistent with the country’s 

legal requirements. The basic 

parameters of concessions and contracts 

should be made publicly available after 

the decision. Such information should 

include the geographic area covered by 

the contract or license, the resource 

being developed, the duration of the 

contract, and the company to which the 

contract or license is awarded. 

The Department recognizes the 

specific circumstances and practices of 

fiscal transparency differ among 

governments. The review process takes 

a tailored approach in evaluating 

governments while ensuring minimum 

fiscal transparency requirements are met 

in order to enable meaningful 

participation of the public in the 

budgeting process. 

Fiscal Transparency Innovation Fund 

Section 7031(b)(4) of the Act 

recommended that not less than $10 

million appropriated under title III of 

the Act be made available for programs 

and activities to improve budget 

transparency and to support civil 

society organizations that promote fiscal 

transparency. With this 

recommendation in mind, the 

Department and USAID have created the 

Fiscal Transparency Innovation Fund 

(FTIF). FTIF supports programs and 

activities that assist countries improve 

their public financial management and 

fiscal transparency standards, and NGOs 

that promote budget transparency. The 

Bureau of Economic and Business 

Affairs and USAID’s Bureau for 

Economic Growth, Education, and the 

Environment (E3) solicit and award 

funds in accordance with established 

guidelines. FY 2014 funding to be used 

for FTIF was notified in November, but 

has not been obligated or expended. 

The Department utilized $5 million in 

FY 2013 authorized funds to support 11 

projects in the following countries: 

Chad, Democratic Republic of the 

Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Haiti, Malawi, 

Nicaragua, Niger, and Somalia, as well 

as one regional project in North Africa 

and one global project to benchmark 

public procurement systems. The 

projects furthered efforts by government 

and civil society to improve the state of 

fiscal transparency and public financial 

management practices, and improve 

public awareness and involvement in 

the expenditure of public resources. 

Examples of projects included $542,000 

to the Department of Treasury’s Office 

of Technical Assistance to support 

improved budgetary practices in Gabon 

and $200,000 to the Institute of Strategic 

Studies and Public Policy in Nicaragua 

to support civil society participation in 

the budget process. 

The Department intends to use FY 

2014 FTIF funds to support projects to 

enhance: (1) Governments’ capacity to 

develop and execute comprehensive, 

reliable, and transparent budgets; (2) 

citizens’ visibility into state expenditure 

and revenue programs; and (3) citizens’ 

ability to advocate for specific issues 

related to government budgets and 

budget processes. 

Conclusions of Review Process 

The Department concluded that, of 

the 140 governments that were potential 

beneficiaries of foreign assistance and 

were evaluated pursuant to the Act, 50 

did not meet the minimum 

requirements of fiscal transparency. Of 

these, eleven governments made 

significant progress toward meeting the 

minimum requirements of fiscal 

transparency. 

The Department assessed the 

following governments as meeting the 

minimum requirements of fiscal 

transparency for FY 2014: Albania, 

Angola, Armenia, Argentina, The 

Bahamas, Belize, Benin, Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 

Cabo Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa 

Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech 

Republic, Djibouti, Ecuador, El 

Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Ghana, 

Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, 

Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, 

Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kosovo, 

Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, 

Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali, 

Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, 

Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, 

Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, 

Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, 

Pakistan, Palestinian Authority, 

Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 


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Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 

Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, 

Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 

Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South 

Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, TimorLeste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and 

Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, 

Uruguay, Vietnam, and Zambia. 

The following table lists those 

governments that were found not to 

meet the minimum requirements of 

fiscal transparency and identifies 

whether the governments made 

significant progress toward meeting 

those requirements: 

Governments assessed pursuant to the act as not meeting minimum requirements of fiscal 

transparency for FY 2014 

Significant 

progress 

No significant 

progress 

Afghanistan .................................................................................................................................................. X 

Algeria .......................................................................................................................................................... X 

Azerbaijan .................................................................................................................................................... X 

Bahrain ......................................................................................................................................................... X 

Bangladesh .................................................................................................................................................. X 

Burkina Faso ................................................................................................................................................ X 

Burma .......................................................................................................................................................... X 

Burundi ......................................................................................................................................................... X 

Cambodia ..................................................................................................................................................... X 

Cameroon .................................................................................................................................................... X 

Central African Republic .............................................................................................................................. X 

Chad ............................................................................................................................................................ X 

China ............................................................................................................................................................ X 

Comoros ...................................................................................................................................................... X 

Congo, Democratic Republic of the ............................................................................................................ X 

Congo, Republic of the ................................................................................................................................ X 

Dominican Republic ..................................................................................................................................... X 

Egypt ............................................................................................................................................................ X 

Ethiopia ........................................................................................................................................................ X 

Fiji ................................................................................................................................................................ X 

Gabon .......................................................................................................................................................... X 

Gambia, The ................................................................................................................................................ X 

Guinea ......................................................................................................................................................... X 

Guinea-Bissau ............................................................................................................................................. X 

Haiti .............................................................................................................................................................. X 

Kazakhstan .................................................................................................................................................. X 

Laos ............................................................................................................................................................. X 

Lebanon ....................................................................................................................................................... X 

Libya ............................................................................................................................................................ X 

Madagascar ................................................................................................................................................. X 

Malawi .......................................................................................................................................................... X 

Maldives ....................................................................................................................................................... X 

Nicaragua ..................................................................................................................................................... X 

Niger ............................................................................................................................................................ X 

Nigeria .......................................................................................................................................................... X 

Oman ........................................................................................................................................................... X 

Sao Tome and Principe ............................................................................................................................... X 

Saudi Arabia ................................................................................................................................................ X 

Somalia ........................................................................................................................................................ X 

South Sudan ................................................................................................................................................ X 

Sudan ........................................................................................................................................................... X 

Suriname ...................................................................................................................................................... X 

Swaziland ..................................................................................................................................................... X 

Tajikistan ...................................................................................................................................................... X 

Tanzania ...................................................................................................................................................... X 

Turkmenistan ............................................................................................................................................... X 

Ukraine ......................................................................................................................................................... X 

Uzbekistan ................................................................................................................................................... X 

Yemen .......................................................................................................................................................... X 

Zimbabwe .................................................................................................................................................... X 

Government by Government 

Assessments 

This section describes areas where 

such governments fell short of the 

Department’s minimum requirements of 

fiscal transparency, and includes 

specific recommendations of short and 

long-term steps such governments 

should take to improve fiscal 

transparency. For those countries found 

to have made significant progress 

toward meeting the minimum 

requirements, the section also includes 

a brief description of such progress. 

Note that correcting previously 

identified deficiencies was a necessary 

but not sufficient condition for meeting 

the minimum requirements of fiscal 

transparency. 

Afghanistan: Despite significant 

improvements in recent years, revenue 

data is still considered unreliable. 

Financial allocations to, and earnings 

from, significant state-owned 

enterprises need to be clearly accounted 

for in public documents. While laws 

governing the award of contracts and 

licenses for natural resource extraction 

are publicly available, improvement is 

needed in how well they are followed. 

Afghanistan’s fiscal transparency would 

be enhanced if the supreme audit 

institution were to audit the budget, 

including all line ministries. 

Algeria: Algeria’s published budget 

does not include information on 


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receipts, expenditures, and balances of 

special treasury accounts, a persistent 

weakness for fiscal transparency in 

Algeria. Algeria’s fiscal transparency 

would be enhanced by disclosing such 

financial flows as part of the published 

budget. In addition, budget reliability 

would be improved with an annual 

verification of revenues and 

expenditures by an independent 

supreme audit institution that can 

certify such financial statements meet 

internationally accepted accounting 

principles. 

Azerbaijan: While Azerbaijan has 

taken steps to ensure revenues from 

resource extraction are generally 

transparent, the government’s criteria 

for awarding licenses for natural 

resources extraction are not made 

public. Outside the area of natural 

resource extraction, there is little 

publicly available information about the 

financial relationships between 

significant state-owned enterprises and 

the government. Azerbaijan’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

making public the criteria for awarding 

licenses for natural resource extraction, 

and publishing information on the 

relationships between state-owned 

enterprises and the government. 

Bahrain: Bahrain does not disclose 

the expenditures of the royal family in 

its publicly available budget. Bahrain’s 

fiscal transparency would be enhanced 

by publicly disclosing royal family 

expenditures in its budget. 

Bangladesh: While the independence 

of Bangladesh’s supreme audit 

institution is enshrined in the 

constitution, the supreme audit 

institution has not produced and made 

publicly available timely and 

comprehensive year-end evaluations of 

the government’s accounts. This 

deficiency diminishes the reliability of 

the budget and accountability to the 

public. Bangladesh’s fiscal transparency 

would be enhanced by working to 

ensure the supreme audit institution 

annually audits the central government 

budget and makes its findings publicly 

available. 

Burkina Faso: While budget 

documents are available to the public 

and summaries are published online, 

financial allocations to significant stateowned enterprises are not reflected in 

budget documents. Burkina Faso’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

using the opportunity provided by the 

formation of a new government to make 

further progress and improve budget 

documents to more fully include 

allocations to and earnings from stateowned enterprises. 

Burma: Burma does not yet have 

comprehensive and institutionalized 

procedures for budget execution, 

monitoring, and reporting, which has 

caused official fiscal data to be 

incomplete. Also, the supreme audit 

institution did not publish annual 

audits to verify revenues and 

expenditures. Nonetheless, Burma has 

made significant progress in improving 

fiscal transparency in recent years. This 

progress includes increasingly robust 

participation by parliament in the 

budget drafting process and several 

high-profile tenders that have been 

lauded for their fairness and 

transparency. These tenders follow the 

issuance by the president’s office of a 

directive in April 2013 providing 

government ministries with 

standardized guidelines on conducting 

and awarding public tenders. Burma’s 

fiscal transparency would be enhanced 

by putting in place clear and 

comprehensive procedures for budget 

management, monitoring and reporting, 

and conducting and making public 

annual audits of budget execution. 

Burundi: While expenditures are 

broken down by ministry and are 

included in the publicly available 

budget, budget documents do not 

provide reliable information about 

revenues. Basic data regarding contracts 

for natural resource extraction is legally 

available to any interested party, 

however, the Ministry of Mines and 

Energy does not consistently honor 

requests for information, and it is not 

clear whether Burundi follows its law 

and regulations for natural resource 

contracts. Burundi’s fiscal transparency 

would be enhanced by providing a full 

and reliable accounting of all of its 

revenues and expenditures in its 

budgetary documents, making public 

basic data regarding contracts for 

natural resource extraction, and 

improving transparency regarding 

procedures in granting licenses for 

natural resource extraction. 

Cambodia: While Cambodia publishes 

a reasonably detailed budget, 

shortcomings in fiscal transparency 

constrain public participation in the 

budget process. Furthermore, the 

supreme audit institution has failed to 

publish timely annual audit reports. 

Cambodia has made significant progress 

in fiscal transparency during the past 

few years, in part by making the budget 

more comprehensive and accessible. 

The Ministry of Economy and Finance 

produced a Budget in Brief and made it 

available online. Cambodia’s fiscal 

transparency would be further enhanced 

by continuing to ensure all government 

revenues are reflected in the budget and 

conducting and making public timely 

annual audits of the government’s 

budget execution. 

Cameroon: Cameroon’s budget does 

not provide data on all significant 

government expenditures, most notably 

state subsidies and allocations to 

significant state-owned enterprises. In 

addition, the country’s supreme audit 

institution is not sufficiently 

independent. Cameroon made 

significant progress in 2013 on budget 

execution by establishing budget 

execution follow-up committees at 

national, regional, divisional, and local 

council levels, with participation by 

civil society groups. Cameroon’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced if the 

central government budget provided 

transparency regarding all major 

government expenditures and the head 

of the supreme audit institution were 

not subject to executive authority or 

influence. 

Central African Republic: Following 

the seizure of power by the Seleka rebel 

alliance on March 24, 2013, and 

continuing through the review period, 

the government was unable to carry out 

normal functions because of the security 

situation and political crisis. When 

made possible by circumstances, the 

Central African Republic’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

drafting a budget and following normal 

budgeting procedures. 

Chad: While budget information is 

publicly available, the high degree of 

extra-budgetary spending indicates the 

budget is not substantially complete. 

Chad made significant progress in 

developing transparency regulations 

and governance standards, moving 

forward on conducting a post-execution 

review of the budget, and strengthening 

public financial management by 

working on limiting extra-budgetary 

expenditures. The government also 

created a Web site publishing budget 

and public financial information. Chad’s 

fiscal transparency would be enhanced 

by improving its budgetary process and 

reducing extra-budgetary spending by 

implementing the 2014 Organic Finance 

Law reforms and ensuring ministrylevel budget staff are appointed and 

trained to increase public financial 

management capacity across the 

government. 

China: While China publishes annual 

budget documents, the government does 

not disclose all financial allocations to 

and earnings from numerous significant 

state-owned enterprises. Also, although 

the supreme audit institution audits all 

national government entities, including 

ministries and state-owned enterprises, 

it cannot be considered an independent 

agency, as it directly reports to China’s 

State Council and is one of 25 ministries 

and commissions under the State 

Council’s direct supervision. China’s 


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fiscal transparency would be enhanced 

by explicitly detailing financial 

allocations to and earnings from stateowned enterprises and taking steps to 

increase the independence of the 

supreme audit institution. 

Comoros: Comoros’ budget includes 

relevant revenues and expenditures, 

including allocations to and earnings 

from significant state-owned enterprises 

and natural resource extraction; 

however, budgets are not always 

followed, and may be changed with 

little to no legislative oversight. Budget 

documents are not readily available to 

the public. Technical assistance on 

budget execution from the IMF is 

ongoing, and Comoros has made 

significant progress in improving budget 

execution. Comoros’ fiscal transparency 

would be enhanced by improving 

budget execution and oversight and 

making provisions for budget 

documents to be publicly available. 

Congo, Democratic Republic of the 

(DRC): Despite a public and open 

process for preparation, dissemination, 

and parliamentary debate of the budget, 

receipts and expenditures, broken down 

by ministry, are not substantially 

complete and reliable. The budget does 

not accurately reflect revenues from 

extractive industries. The criteria for 

awarding extractive contracts have not 

been codified. The country’s supreme 

audit institution is not sufficiently 

independent, is insufficiently funded 

and trained, and does not conduct 

yearly comprehensive audits of 

spending. Significant progress has been 

made to improve the process by which 

salaries are paid to increase 

transparency and effectiveness in this 

area of budget execution. The DRC made 

significant progress in natural resource 

transparency with the publishing of 

information on existing natural resource 

contracts. The DRC’s fiscal transparency 

would be enhanced by increasing the 

capacity and independence of the 

supreme audit institution, increasing 

transparency regarding the process and 

outcomes for awarding natural resource 

concessions, contracts, and licenses, 

and providing complete and reliable 

accounting of receipts and expenditures. 

Congo, Republic of the: The Republic 

of the Congo’s budget includes 

significant gaps, relating both to 

petroleum revenues and to government 

expenditures. Debt obligations are not 

fully disclosed, and audits are not 

conducted in a timely manner. The 

Republic of the Congo’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

improving the completeness and 

reliability of its budget reporting, 

including disclosing sovereign debt 

obligations, and conducting audits in a 

timely manner. 

Dominican Republic: The Dominican 

Republic’s budget lacks detail for large 

portions of spending by the Office of the 

Presidency, which accounts for nine 

percent of central government 

expenditure. Autonomous and 

decentralized institutions, and even 

some ministries, do not fully report 

revenue and expenditures during budget 

implementation, but only at the end of 

the accounting year. The Dominican 

Republic’s fiscal transparency would be 

enhanced by taking additional steps to 

improve the completeness and 

timeliness of its budget, particularly for 

the Office of the Presidency. 

Egypt: Egypt’s published budget does 

not disclose income and expenditures 

information for significant state-owned 

enterprises or presidential expenses. 

The process for awarding natural 

resource revenue contracts and the basic 

terms of natural resource concessions 

are also not publicly disclosed. Egypt’s 

fiscal transparency would be enhanced 

by implementing reporting of stateowned enterprise finances and making 

public the process for awarding natural 

resource contracts and licenses and the 

basic terms of those contracts, such as 

to whom licenses have been awarded, 

covering which resources, and for what 

length of time. 

Ethiopia: While Ethiopia’s budget 

documents are publicly available, they 

are not yet substantially complete due to 

the lack of information on the fiscal 

impact of significant state-owned 

enterprises. Additionally, the 

government’s general processes for 

awarding natural resource concessions, 

contracts, and licenses are opaque. 

Ethiopia made significant progress in 

improving state-owned enterprise 

financial reporting during the review 

period by increasing in practice the 

oversight role played by the legislature 

in state-owned enterprise management 

and standardizing its contract award 

process. Ethiopia’s fiscal transparency 

would be enhanced by including 

allocations to and earnings from stateowned enterprises in its budget and 

financial statements in both 

consolidated and stand-alone forms, 

providing disclosures of natural 

resource information in its budget, and 

providing more information to the 

public about the process and outcomes 

for awarding governmental contracts, 

licenses, and natural resource 

concessions. 

Fiji: During the review period, Fiji’s 

publicly available budget documents 

did not provide a substantially full 

picture of the country’s revenues and 

expenditures because of the lack of 

explanatory narratives. In addition, 

Fiji’s failure to release the Auditor 

General’s Report since 2008 

undermined the public’s ability to 

effectively monitor the budgetary 

process and negatively impacted the 

budget’s reliability. Fiji’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

making public annual audit reports, 

along with comprehensive budgetary 

documents, including budget narratives. 

Gabon: Gabon’s budget reliability is 

lacking. The supreme audit institution 

has been unable to complete verification 

of annual revenues and expenditures on 

a timely basis because of a lack of 

information from the government. The 

public does not have sufficient 

information about the budget. As of the 

close of the review period, Gabon has 

yet to make a complete 2014 budget 

publicly available. In addition, Gabon 

lacks transparency and reliability in 

government contracting and project 

financing. Gabon’s fiscal transparency 

would be enhanced by ensuring timely 

publication of the supreme audit 

institution’s yearly verification of the 

annual financial statement. 

Gambia, The: The Gambia does not 

include earnings from and allocations to 

significant state-owned enterprises in 

the general budget documents, although 

this information is available to the 

National Assembly after the fact. 

Additionally, the requirements for 

awarding natural resource exploration 

rights are not publicly available, and 

information on contracts or awards, 

including the identity of the party 

holding the rights, is not made available 

to the public. The Gambia’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

increasing transparency on how natural 

resources contracts are reviewed and 

what has been awarded, as well as 

increasing transparency regarding 

revenues from and allocations to stateowned enterprises. 

Guinea: Guinea does not make the 

budget accessible to the general public. 

The government also lacks a supreme 

audit institution. Guinea has not made 

the criteria for natural resource 

licensing tenders public and the budget 

does not provide information on 

revenues from significant state-owned 

enterprises, including those from 

natural resources. However, the 

government has made significant 

progress in making natural resource 

revenues transparent by making basic 

information on all current mining 

concessions public. Guinea’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

creating an independent supreme audit 

institution, making the budget publicly 

accessible, making public the criteria for 

natural resource licensing tenders, and 


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3002 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 13 / Wednesday, January 21, 2015 / Notices 

providing a comprehensive and reliable 

accounting of all revenues. 

Guinea-Bissau: Guinea-Bissau’s 

budget process was not reliable during 

the review period, as a large amount of 

unbudgeted expenditure occurred, and 

fiscal controls were insufficient. The 

new government of Guinea-Bissau’s 

fiscal transparency would be enhanced 

by using this window of opportunity to 

implement comprehensive public 

financial management reforms. 

Haiti: Although Haiti’s budget is 

publicly available, the country’s process 

for granting natural resource contracts 

lacks transparency and information on 

natural resources contracts is not 

published. Haiti’s budget process does 

not consistently follow the country’s 

established timetable and does not 

include earnings from significant stateowned enterprises. Haiti’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

improving the transparency of its 

system governing natural resource 

contracts, more closely following its 

budget timetable, and improving 

reporting for state-owned enterprises. 

Kazakhstan: While the budget is 

publicly available, information on 

allocations to and revenues from 

significant state-owned enterprises is 

not included. Estimated to produce 

approximately 40 percent of GDP, stateowned enterprises are believed to 

account for a sizeable portion of the 

government’s allocations and revenues. 

Kazakhstan’s fiscal transparency would 

be enhanced by including allocations to 

and revenue from state-owned 

enterprises in its budget. 

Laos: While Laos’ budget is publicly 

available, some key budget documents 

were not published in a timely fashion. 

One quarter of government spending 

occurred outside of the National 

Assembly’s authorized budget. Limited 

budgetary information was publicly 

available on state-owned enterprise 

finances and the process used to award 

natural resource contracts is generally 

not transparent or accessible by the 

public. The government made 

significant progress in strengthening the 

role of the supreme audit institution. 

Laos’ fiscal transparency would be 

enhanced by publishing key budget 

documents in a timely manner, ensuring 

government spending is subject to 

parliamentary oversight, capturing 

allocations to and earnings from stateowned enterprises in the budget, and 

improving transparency and legal 

frameworks regarding the process for 

awarding natural resource concessions. 

Lebanon: Lebanon does not disclose 

financing or assistance in-kind received 

from foreign sources in its budget. 

Lebanon’s budget also does not include 

transfers to or earnings from significant 

state-owned enterprises. Lebanon’s 

budget data remain unreliable and its 

budgets are not subject to annual 

comprehensive audits. Lebanon’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

reporting all foreign financing and 

assistance and including detailed 

information for state-owned enterprises, 

public institutions, and all ministries in 

its budget. Lebanon’s fiscal transparency 

would further be enhanced by 

establishing annual audits of its budget 

execution by an independent supreme 

audit institution. 

Libya: Libya’s national budget does 

not include expenditures managed by 

the Ministry of Planning, and there is no 

verification by an independent supreme 

audit institution that annual receipts 

and expenditures meet internationally 

accepted accounting principles. Libya’s 

fiscal transparency would be enhanced 

by including all expenditures in the 

annual budget approved by Libya’s 

parliament and ensuring financial 

statements are verified by an 

independent supreme audit institution. 

Madagascar: The former government 

of Madagascar did not follow 

procedures outlined under domestic law 

for making awards of extractive industry 

contracts, nor did the former 

government publish results in a 

consistent manner. Additionally, budget 

documents under the former 

government did not match actual 

spending, and follow-up reporting of 

actual receipts and expenditures was 

inconsistent and inadequate. 

Madagascar’s supreme audit institution 

has not published a report since 2006. 

Madagascar’s fiscal transparency would 

be enhanced by improving its 

extractives contracting procedures and 

providing information on outcomes to 

the public. Madagascar’s fiscal 

transparency would be further enhanced 

by improving budgeting processes. 

Malawi: While Malawi’s budget 

documents are substantially complete, 

the supreme audit institution lacks full 

independence and a clear reporting 

structure. Revenue from state-owned 

enterprises and natural resources is 

included in the budget. However, the 

government’s procedures for awarding 

contracts and licenses for natural 

resource extraction are not regularly 

publicly available, and, once awarded, 

the basic information of such contracts 

and licenses is not routinely made 

available to the public. As Malawi 

develops its emerging extractive 

industry sector, it needs to improve 

transparency with regard to contracts 

and licenses. Malawi’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

addressing potential inconsistencies 

between its Constitution and the 

relevant statutory law regarding the 

supreme audit institution’s reporting 

structure. 

Maldives: While Maldives’ budget is 

publicly available and provides a 

substantially complete picture of the 

country’s revenue and expenditures, the 

figures are not always reliable. The 

independent supreme audit institution 

does not conduct and make public yearend audits of the central government 

budget. Maldives’ fiscal transparency 

would be enhanced by continuing to 

improve its public financial 

management. Maldives’ fiscal 

transparency would be further enhanced 

if the supreme audit institution were to 

conduct and make publicly available 

year-end audits of the central 

government budget. 

Nicaragua: Nicaragua’s budget does 

not provide information on substantial 

financial support provided to the 

government by Venezuela. The 

reporting on allocations to and earnings 

from significant state-owned enterprises 

also lacks detail. Nicaragua’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

fully reporting off-budget support 

provided to the government and 

improving reporting on allocations to 

and earnings from state-owned 

enterprises. 

Niger: Niger’s central budget is not 

substantially complete because it does 

not reflect earnings of significant stateowned enterprises or revenues and debt 

associated with oil production. The 

government made significant progress in 

2013 with the first release of oil revenue 

numbers and the first audit of the oil 

industry. Niger’s fiscal transparency 

would be enhanced by ensuring the 

budget includes all revenue and 

expenditures, including natural 

resources. 

Nigeria: While Nigeria’s budgetary 

process meets and in many ways 

exceeds many elements of the 

Department’s minimum requirements in 

budgetary areas, Nigeria does not meet 

the Department’s overall minimum 

requirements due to concerns in the 

natural resources sector. While the 

criteria for awarding natural resource 

extraction concessions is made public, 

actual practices are opaque and do not 

appear to always conform to the criteria. 

Significant off-budget spending on fuel 

subsidies is also of concern. 

Additionally, while the Finance 

Ministry publishes aggregate revenues, 

lack of transparency in the revenues and 

expenditures of Nigeria’s flagship oil 

and gas sector state-owned enterprise, 

the Nigerian National Petroleum 

Corporation (NNPC), impedes Nigeria’s 

overall fiscal transparency. Nigeria’s 


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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 13 / Wednesday, January 21, 2015 / Notices 3003 

fiscal transparency would be enhanced 

by conducting a full audit, to 

international standards, of NNPC. The 

Petroleum Industry Bill, once 

implemented, could partially address 

the transparency concerns in the oil and 

gas sector. Nigeria’s fiscal transparency 

would be further enhanced by moving 

off-budget spending on budget. 

Oman: Oman does not disclose the 

expenditures of the royal family in its 

publicly available budget. Oman’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

publicly disclosing royal family 

expenditures in its budget. 

Sao Tome and Principe: While Sao 

Tome and Principe’s budget can be 

considered substantially complete, its 

budget documents do not currently 

comply with internationally accepted 

accounting principles. Sao Tome and 

Principe publishes periodic reports 

throughout the year evaluating the 

budget execution, though it does not 

publish an end-of-year report. While 

Sao Tome and Principe was not 

assessed in previous reports, the 

government has made significant 

progress on fiscal transparency, 

including passing legislation in recent 

years requiring all payments to 

government agencies over five dollars to 

be made directly at the Central Bank 

and all salary payments to civil servants 

be paid directly to employees’ bank 

accounts. Sao Tome and Principe’s 

fiscal transparency would be enhanced 

by adopting internationally accepted 

accounting principles for public 

financial documents and producing and 

making public an annual report on 

overall budget execution. 

Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia does not 

publish a detailed annual budget that 

discloses revenues and expenditures 

broken down by ministry. While Saudi 

Arabia discloses the contribution of 

natural resource revenues to the budget 

in an annual IMF report, it does not 

publish such data in its publicly 

available budget, nor does it disclose the 

expenditures of the royal family in the 

publicly available budget. Saudi 

Arabia’s fiscal transparency would be 

enhanced by publishing such a budget. 

Saudi Arabia’s fiscal transparency 

would be further enhanced if the 

supreme audit institution were to 

publish an annual verification that 

revenues and expenditures were carried 

out in accordance with internationally 

accepted accounting principles. 

Somalia: Partly due to a severe lack of 

institutional capacity and funds, 

Somalia does not have an effective 

public financial management system. 

Ministries do not follow budget 

procedures. Somalia does not have an 

effective, functioning, independent 

supreme audit institution. The 

government does not make basic 

information about the results of 

concessions or natural resource 

contracts available. Somalia’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

implementing comprehensive public 

financial management reforms. 

South Sudan: South Sudan’s budget 

execution is unreliable, with some 

ministries overspending while others 

spend less than allocated. Fiscal 

activities are not subject to effective 

internal oversight and safeguards, and 

the supreme audit institution has not 

published a report on the budget in 

several years. Additionally, while the 

2012 Petroleum Act requires the 

government to make information on 

tenders, licensing, and petroleum 

agreements publicly available, it is not 

clear those requirements have been 

carried out in practice. South Sudan’s 

fiscal transparency would be enhanced 

by implementing comprehensive public 

financial management reforms and 

making available information on 

tenders, licensing, and petroleum 

agreements. 

Sudan: Publicly available budget 

documents do not provide a full picture 

of Sudan’s revenues and expenditures, 

including natural resource revenues. 

There are no procedures in place 

allowing for parliamentary review of the 

allocations to and earnings from 

significant state-owned enterprises, 

particularly those operated by the 

security services. Sudan’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

providing a full accounting of the 

allocations to and earnings from stateowned enterprises and allowing for 

legislative oversight of expenditures of 

the security services. 

Suriname: Suriname does not fully 

report on the financial performance of 

some significant state-owned enterprise 

and related government transfers. The 

executive branch often fails to provide 

Suriname’s supreme audit institution 

with sufficient information to conduct 

thorough oversight. The government 

does not disclose information about 

how it awards natural resource contracts 

and licenses, nor does it disclose basic 

information on awards granted. 

Suriname’s fiscal transparency would be 

enhanced by improving the 

transparency and reporting of natural 

resource contracts, providing more 

robust reporting for state-owned 

enterprises, and strengthening its 

auditing function. 

Swaziland: Swaziland’s budget lacks 

transparency with regard to allocations 

to and earnings from significant stateowned enterprises and with regard to 

natural resource revenues. Additionally, 

Swaziland does not have a functioning, 

independent supreme audit institution, 

and there are concerns about off-budget 

spending. Swaziland’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

ensuring that all revenues and 

expenditures are reflected in the budget, 

including natural resource revenues and 

allocations to, or earnings from, stateowned enterprises. 

Tajikistan: Tajikistan’s budget is not 

substantially complete, and revenues 

and expenditures are not broken down 

by ministry. Tajikistan’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

publishing a detailed budget, carrying 

out audits of yearly expenditures by an 

independent supreme audit institution, 

and engaging the public in the budget 

process. 

Tanzania: Tanzania has used pension 

funds to support off-budget projects 

through loans that have at times not 

been included in the country’s debt 

obligations. In addition, Tanzania’s 

procedures for awarding contracts and 

licenses for natural resource extraction 

are not clear. Tanzania’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

clearly publicizing and following 

procedures for awarding contracts and 

licenses for natural resource extraction 

and by including all governmental 

expenditures and debt obligations in the 

budget. 

Turkmenistan: The budget is not 

substantially complete, nor does it 

provide a breakdown of revenue and 

expenditures by individual ministry. No 

information on allocations from the 

budget to significant state-owned 

enterprises is disclosed. Turkmenistan’s 

fiscal transparency would be enhanced 

by making this information publicly 

available. Turkmenistan’s fiscal 

transparency would be further enhanced 

by disclosing proceeds from the sale of 

oil and natural gas, which constitute the 

majority of the government’s revenues, 

and making public the process for 

awarding government contracts and 

licenses for natural resources. 

Ukraine: While Ukraine’s national 

budget and budget execution reports are 

readily available to the public, the 

former government of Ukraine did not 

include quasi-fiscal activities in the 

energy sector in the state budget. The 

audit agency was not permitted to 

review government revenues or the 

financials of significant state-owned 

enterprises. Criteria for natural resource 

tenders, aside from production sharing 

agreements for oil and gas, were not 

made public. Ukraine’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

including quasi-fiscal energy sector 

activities in the budget, allowing the 

audit agency to review revenues of the 


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3004 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 13 / Wednesday, January 21, 2015 / Notices 

government and the financials of stateowned enterprises, and making public 

the criteria for all natural resource 

tenders. 

Uzbekistan: The budget process is not 

transparent, as budget discussions in the 

legislative branch are not open to the 

public. Only a general overview of the 

budget is publicly available; a 

breakdown of revenues and 

expenditures by ministry is not 

disclosed. Information on revenue from 

the extraction and sale of natural 

resources is not available to the public. 

While criteria for awarding natural 

resource contracts are publicly 

available, the process of awarding 

contracts in practice is not transparent. 

Uzbekistan’s fiscal transparency would 

be enhanced by making the budget 

publicly available. Uzbekistan’s fiscal 

transparency would be further enhanced 

by providing information on revenue 

from the extraction and sale of natural 

resources and ensuring the process of 

awarding contracts is transparent. 

Yemen: Yemen’s annual budget lacks 

sufficient information regarding 

allocations to and revenue from 

significant state-owned enterprises. The 

supreme audit institution does not 

publish its annual verifications that 

statements of revenues and 

expenditures meet internationally 

accepted accounting principles. 

Yemen’s fiscal transparency would be 

enhanced by providing sufficient detail 

in the section of the budget devoted to 

state-owned enterprises. Yemen’s fiscal 

transparency would be further enhanced 

if the supreme audit institution were to 

make such audits public each year. 

Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe’s budget lacks 

transparency with regard to financial 

flows to and from significant stateowned enterprises and with regard to 

natural resource revenues, including 

mining contracts. Zimbabwe’s fiscal 

transparency would be enhanced by 

improving transparency in its budget 

management, including greater 

transparency on the country’s debts, and 

including a substantially complete 

picture of natural resource revenues in 

the budget. Zimbabwe’s fiscal 

transparency would be further enhanced 

by making public the criteria and 

process for awarding natural resource 

contracts and licenses and the basic 

terms of those contracts, such as to 

whom licenses have been awarded, 

which resources are covered, and the 

length of the contract or license. 

Dated: December 31, 2014. 

Heather Higginbottom, 

Deputy Secretary of State for Management 

and Resources, Department of State. 

[FR Doc. 2015–00792 Filed 1–20–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4710–07–P 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

[Public Notice 9009] 

Culturally Significant Objects Imported 

for Exhibition Determinations: 

‘‘Staging the Ukrainian Avant-Garde of 

the 1910s and 1920s’’ Exhibition 

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the 

following determinations: Pursuant to 

the authority vested in me by the Act of 

October 19, 1965 (79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 

2459), Executive Order 12047 of March 

27, 1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and 

Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 Stat. 

2681, et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et 

seq.), Delegation of Authority No. 234 of 

October 1, 1999, Delegation of Authority 

No. 236–3 of August 28, 2000 (and, as 

appropriate, Delegation of Authority No. 

257 of April 15, 2003), I hereby 

determine that the objects to be 

included in the exhibition ‘‘Staging the 

Ukrainian Avant-Garde of the 1910s and 

1920s,’’ imported from abroad for 

temporary exhibition within the United 

States, are of cultural significance. The 

objects are imported pursuant to a loan 

agreement with the foreign owner or 

custodian. I also determine that the 

exhibition or display of the exhibit 

objects at The Ukrainian Museum, New 

York, NY, from on or about February 7, 

2015, until on or about September 13, 

2015, and at possible additional 

exhibitions or venues yet to be 

determined, is in the national interest. 

I have ordered that Public Notice of 

these Determinations be published in 

the Federal Register. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

further information, including lists of 

the exhibit objects, contact Julie 

Simpson, Attorney-Adviser, Office of 

the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of 

State (telephone: 202–632–6467). The 

mailing address is U.S. Department of 

State, SA–5, L/PD, Fifth Floor (Suite 

5H03), Washington, DC 20522–0505. 

Dated: January 14, 2015. 

Kelly Keiderling, 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau 

of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 

Department of State. 

[FR Doc. 2015–00899 Filed 1–20–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4710–05–P 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

[Public Notice 9008] 

In the Matter of the Designation of 

‘Abdallah al-Ashqar Also Known as 

Abdallah al-Ashqar; Also Known as 

Abdullah al-Ashqar; Also Known as 

‘Abdallah al-‘Ashqar; Also Known as 

Abdullah Jihad al-Ashqar; Also Known 

as ‘Abdallah Jihad Musa al-Ashqar; 

Also Known as Abdullah Jihad al 

Ashqar; Also Known as Abu al 

Muhtasib al Maqdisi; Also Known as 

Muhandes al-Tawhid; Also Known as 

Muhandis al-Tawhid; Also Known as 

Abu al Muhtasib; Also Known as Abual-Muhtasib al-Maqdisi; Also Known as 

Abu-Hajir; Also Known as Abdallah 

Ashkar as a Specially Designated 

Global Terrorist Pursuant to Section 

1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as 

Amended 

Acting under the authority of and in 

accordance with section 1(b) of 

Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 

2001, as amended by Executive Order 

13268 of July 2, 2002, and Executive 

Order 13284 of January 23, 2003, I 

hereby determine that the individual 

known as ‘Abdallah al-Ashqar, also 

known as Abdallah al-Ashqar, also 

known as Abdullah al-Ashqar, also 

known as ‘Abdallah al-‘Ashqar, also 

known as Abdullah Jihad al-Ashqar, 

also known as ‘Abdallah Jihad Musa alAshqar, also known as Abdullah Jihad 

al Ashqar, also known as Abu al 

Muhtasib al Maqdisi, also known as 

Muhandes al-Tawhid, also known as 

Muhandis al-Tawhid, also known as 

Abu al Muhtasib, also known as Abu-alMuhtasib al-Maqdisi, also known as 

Abu-Hajir, also known as Abdallah 

Ashkar, committed, or poses a 

significant risk of committing, acts of 

terrorism that threaten the security of 

U.S. nationals or the national security, 

foreign policy, or economy of the United 

States. 

Consistent with the determination in 

section 10 of Executive Order 13224 that 

‘‘prior notice to persons determined to 

be subject to the Order who might have 

a constitutional presence in the United 

States would render ineffectual the 

blocking and other measures authorized 

in the Order because of the ability to 

transfer funds instantaneously,’’ I 

determine that no prior notice needs to 

be provided to any person subject to this 

determination who might have a 

constitutional presence in the United 

States, because to do so would render 

ineffectual the measures authorized in 

the Order. 

This notice shall be published in the 

Federal Register. 


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