### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 11 -CV

St e ve n J. St e e le , A ppe lla nt

v . Raquel J. Steele , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF CALDWELL COUNTY , 207TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 06- D-07 0 , HO NORAB LE TODD A. B LOM ERTH , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N

I n this case, we must evaluate w hether the notice of appea l was ti mely based on the

a pp lic a tio n o f T e xas R

ule of Civ il Pr oc e dure 30 6a (4 ), whi ch g ov e rn s si tuatio ns in w hic h a pa rt y has no n o t i ce o f a j u dg ment. The judg ment in this di vorce case was sig ned Oc tober 12, 2006. A motion for new tria l was due N ovember 13, 2006, but was not filed until De cembe r 11, 2006. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 329b(a). Without a tim ely motion for new tria l to ex tend the appe llate timetable, the notice of ap p ea l wa s d ue Nove mber 13, 2006, but wa s not filed until J anuar y 10, 2007, past the deadline. See Tex. R. App. P . 26.1.

Counsel was notified by

letter a nd g iven the opportu n i t y t o show ca use why the appea l should not be dismi ssed for want of jurisdiction based on the l ate notice of appeal. See id. R. 42.3(a). Counsel r esponded that he rec eived late notice of the judg ment so the motion for new trial was timely based on the date of notice. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 306a(4). Af ter a hear ing, the trialI t is undisput ed that appe llant was not repr esente d by counsel at the time of the divorce

. 1 2 court found that appellant wa s not entitled to invoke an extended time period to file hi s motion for new tria l beca

use he ha d actua l notice of the judg ment on October 12, 2006. After

revie wing counsel’s r esponse to our le tter, the c lerk’s r ecor d, and the r eporte r’s re cord f rom the hear ing on the

m o t i o n fo r n ew t ri al , we agr ee wi t h t h e t ri al co u rt ’s fi n d i n g.

I f w ith in t we nty da y s af te r the jud g me nt or oth e r a pp e a la ble or de r i s si g ne d, a

pa rt y or his attorney does not rec eive notice or ac tual knowledg e of tha t event, then with re spect to that 1 party , all the per iods for filing motions fo r newtrial and other such docume nts beg ins on the date tha t n o ti c e o r a c tu a l kn o w le d g e o f th e s ig n in g o c c u r r e d e xc e p t th a t s u c h ti me p e r io d s cannot beg in more than ninety

day s after

the orig inal judgme nt or other a ppeala ble ord er w as sig ned. Te x. R. C iv. P. 3 06 a (4 ). To e sta bli shthe a

pp lic a tio n o f t

his ru le , t he par

ty a dv e rs e ly

a ff e c te d is require d to prove in the trial c ourt, on sworn motion and not i ce , t h e d at e o n which the pa rty or h i s at t o rn ey

fi rs tei t h er

re ce i v edn o t i ce o f t h e j u d gm en to r a cq u i re d ac tu al kn o wl ed ge o f t h e s i gn i n g. Id . R. 306a(5).

An a p p el late cour

t can r eview the sufficie ncy of the e vidence to support the trial court’s f indings c oncer

ning the date that a

party rec eived actual noti ce of a judg ment. Texaco, I nc. v. Phan , 1 37 S.W. 3d

76 3, 76 6 n .1 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D is t. ] 200 4, no pe t.) ; Hot Shot Me sse ng e r S e rv., I nc . v . S tat e , 7 9 8 S. W. 2 d

4 1 3 , 4 1 4 ( T e x. A p p . —

A u s ti n 1 9 9 0 , w r it

d e n ie d )

. We revie w finding s of fa ct enter ed in a be nch trial for leg al and fac tual sufficie ncy of the evidenc e by the same standa

rds used t o revie w jury

finding s. Catali na v. Blasdel , 881 S.W .2d 295, 297 (T e x. 19 94 ); Ludwi

g v. Enc ore Me d. , 191 S.W .3d 285, 294 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied).Th is expl a natio n mig ht be a r on his a bil ity to se c ur e a bil l of re vie w ba se d on b e ingfr a ud ule ntl y 2 preve nted from a

ppear ing. H oweve r, appe llee re sponded t o t he motion for new trial and testified at the hea ring on the motion. She did not deny having intercour se with him on t h e d ay h e was se rv e d, bu t state d that sh e ne ve r tol d a pp e lla nt sh e wa s dis mis sin g the div or c e a nd su bs e qu e ntl y

tol d him to m ov e ou t. 3 I n a le g a l- su ff

ic ie nc y c ha lle ng e , w e vie w the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t f

avo rabl e to t

he ve rd ic t,

cre diting fa

vora b le evidenc e if a

rea sonable fa ct finder

could, and disre g ardingcontra ry evidenc e unless a re asonable fac t finder c ould not. See City of K el l erv. W

ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2005). When review ing the fac tual sufficie ncy of the evidenc e, we examine all the evidenc e and set a side the finding only if it is so ag ainst the gre at weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e as to be manife stly

unjust. H

o t Shot , 7 9 8 S

. W

. 2 d

at 4 1 5 (c i t i n g In re Kin g’ s E sta te , 244 S.W .2d 660 (Tex. 1951)).

Th e jud g me nt at iss ue in thi s ca se wa s a div or c e de c re e e nte re d a s a de fa ult jud g me nt. Appellant acknow ledg es being serve d with the suit, but contends that appellee tricked him by having sexual int erc ourse with him on that day and telling him that she intended to d i s m iss the divorce. Th is e xpla

natio n f or wh y he did no t fi le a n a ns we r do e s no t be a r on e sta bli sh ing a 30 6a

no tic e date for r ece ipt of notice of the judg ment, howeve r. 2

Appellant also a

rg ues that it is undisput ed that he did not re ceiv e a copy of the judgme nt unti l No v ember 7, 2006. Howeve r, Rule 306a r efe rs to rec eipt of notice or actua l kn ow le dg e o f

t h e s i g n i n g o f

t h e j u d g m e n t , n o tr e c e i p to f i t s c o n t e n t s . A c c o r d i n g t o a p p e l l a n t,

a pp e lle e tol d h im that th e div or c e wa s fi na l on Oc tob e r 12 , 20 06 , a nd that a c op y of the de c re e wo uld be ma ile d to him . App e lla nt s a y s h e wen t to the c ourt ho us e , b ut w a s n ot g ive n a c op y be c a us e itThis information comes fr om appellant’s a ffidavit in support of his Rule 306a motion. 3 4 would be mailed. He waited until November 7, 2006, befor e re turning to the courthouse a nd ob ta ini nga

c op y of the jud g me nt. Appellant asse rts that no one tol d him that an order had actua lly been sig ned on the October 12 date. He a rgu es that a divorc e ca n be fina l on a ce rtain date without a judgme nt being signe d. See Dunn v. Dunn , 439 S.W .2d 830, 832-33 (T ex . 1 9 6 9 ) (or al re ndition may be fina l judgme nt). Appellant’s pr oposition can be c orre ct, but if the cler k at the cour

thouse and a

ppellee told him a copy

would be mailed, that strong ly implies the ex istence of

a document, not just an oral pronounce ment. Appellant did not explain why he wa ited so long to follow up on his non-rec eipt of a c opy of that docume nt or why h e d el ay ed h i ri ng an attorne y until after r ece iving a

copy . On October 12, his wife informe d him that the divorce w as final, that she had custody of the c hildren, and that his visitation was limi ted, the provisions to which appellant now objects. Appellant re fer s 3 to “saving up” to hire a

n attorney , but his initial appointment with an attorne y occur red only a we ek afte r he r ece ived t he copy of t he judgment. Had he secur ed counse l within a week a fter his wife ’s Oc tob e r 1 2 a

nn ounc e me nt, he wo uld

have ha d ti me to f

ile a mot ion fo r n e w tri a l. A n a n a l o g o u s s i tu a t i o n i s p e r h a p s i l l u m i n a t i n g c o n c e r

n i n g a d u t y t o i n v e s t i g a t e . In P r ince v . Prince , appellant moved f or a ne w trial, which w as denie d. 912 S.W .2d 367, 368 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1995, no writ). In Prince , the husband found a divorce petition

“ sit tin gon

the c ounte r t op ” ; si g ne d a wa ive r o f s e rv ic e of

pr oc e ss a nd no tic e of he a ri ng s; bu t sa id that he did no t kn ow un til a we e k pr ior to the date of the fi na l ju dg me nt t hat hi s w if

e wa s g oin g to file for a divorc e. Id

. a t 36 9. He c la ims that hi s w if e de fr a ud e d h im b y

re su min g “ mari ta l r e la tio ns ”5

and say ing nothing about the divorce for e leven months afte r the wa iver. Id

. The c ourt noted that in spite of appellant’s knowledg e of the filing of the divorce and his wife’ s notification befor e the final hea ring , appellant f

ailed to file a

n answe r, see k any leg al help or advic e, or make any inquiry about the import of the “pape rs” he rec eived. Id

. a t 370. Th e c ourt he ld t hat a pp e lla nt’ s f a ilure to appea r wa s the result of c onscious indiffer ence and denie d the motion for new tr ial. Id . at 371. Appellant in this case did mor e to pr otect himself than the a ppellant in Prince in that he ma de a n att e mpt to obt a in a co py of the jud g me nt. Ho we ve r, he did no t f oll owup on

that f ir st attempt or sec ure le g al counse l promptly to learn the import of the delay in securinga copy . For

e xamp le , h e say s th a t th e c le rk tol d h im tha t he co uld fi le a mot ion fo r n e w t ri a l, b ut d id n ot t e ll h im that th e re we re de a dli ne s to fi le it. An a tto rn e y c ou ld h a ve pr op e rl y

a dv ise d h im. Viewing th e e v id e n c e in

th e li g h t m o s t f

a v o r a b le to th e v e r d ic t, w e c o n c lu d e tha t appellant’ s knowledg e that the divorc e wa s final, that there was some de cision on custody and vis itatio n, a nd

that so me kin d o f d oc ume nt e xiste d is le g a lly and fa c tua lly

su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to support the finding that appellant ha d actua l knowledg e of the judgme nt on October 12, 2006, for p u rposes of Rule 306a. See City of Keller , 1 6 8 S. W. 3 d a t 8 0 7

. T h e f in d in g is n o t s o a g a in s t the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e as to be m an i fe s t l y u njust. See H ot Shot , 798 S.W .2d at 415. We have c oncluded t h at appellant was not entitled to an extended timetable under Rule 306a. Ac cording ly , his notice of appe al was late. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1. We dismiss the appea l for wa

nt of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P . 42.3(a)

.6 W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pury ear and He nson Dismissed for Want of J urisdiction Filed: May

4, 2007