SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

214 

OP 15-01306 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, NEMOYER, CURRAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF BOHDAN S. CHOMYN, PETITIONER, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

M. WILLIAM BOLLER, AN ACTING SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 

IN HIS CAPACITY AS LICENSING OFFICER FOR PISTOL 

PERMITS IN ERIE COUNTY, CHRISTOPHER L. JACOBS, AS 

ERIE COUNTY CLERK, AND WILLMER FOWLER, JR., IN HIS 

CAPACITY AS PISTOL PERMIT SUPERVISOR, ERIE COUNTY 

CLERK’S OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

 

JAMES OSTROWSKI, BUFFALO, FOR PETITIONER. 

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (FRANK BRADY OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT M. WILLIAM BOLLER, AN ACTING SUPREME COURT

JUSTICE IN HIS CAPACITY AS LICENSING OFFICER FOR PISTOL PERMITS IN

ERIE COUNTY.

MICHAEL A. SIRAGUSA, COUNTY ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (JEREMY C. TOTH OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENTS CHRISTOPHER L. JACOBS, AS ERIE COUNTY CLERK,

AND WILLMER FOWLER, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PISTOL PERMIT SUPERVISOR,

ERIE COUNTY CLERK’S OFFICE. 

 

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in the

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial

Department pursuant to CPLR 506 [b] [1]) to review a determination of

respondents. The determination revoked petitioner’s pistol permit.

It is hereby ORDERED that the determination is unanimously

confirmed without costs and the petition is dismissed. 

Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding

seeking, inter alia, to annul the determination revoking his pistol

permit. We reject the contention of petitioner that he was denied his

right to due process. “ ‘It is well settled that a formal hearing is

not required prior to the revocation of a pistol permit [where, as

here,] the licensee is given notice of the charges and has an adequate

opportunity to submit proof in response’ ” (Matter of Cuda v Dwyer,

107 AD3d 1409, 1409; see Matter of Strom v Erie County Pistol Permit

Dept., 6 AD3d 1110, 1111).

Contrary to petitioner’s further contention, we conclude that the

determination is neither arbitrary and capricious nor an abuse of

discretion. “It is well established that ‘[a licensing officer] is
-2- 214 

OP 15-01306 

vested with broad discretion in determining whether to revoke a pistol

permit and may do so for any good cause,’ including ‘a finding that

the petitioner lack[s] the essential temperament or character which

should be present in one entrusted with a dangerous instrument . . . ,

or that he or she does not possess the maturity, prudence,

carefulness, good character, temperament, demeanor and judgment

necessary to have a pistol permit’ ” (Matter of Peters v Randall, 111

AD3d 1391, 1392). Here, petitioner was involuntarily committed to a

mental health facility after threatening police officers when they

responded to an activated security alarm at his residence, his medical

records indicate that he suffered from paranoia and delusions and

exhibited poor insight and judgment, and petitioner made incoherent

statements and demonstrated aggressive behavior before the Hearing

Officer (see Matter of Mazzone v Czajka, 8 AD3d 788, 788; Matter of

Pelose v County Ct. of Westchester County, 53 AD2d 645, 645, appeal

dismissed 41 NY2d 1008).

Finally, petitioner’s contention that the revocation of his

pistol permit violates his rights under the Second and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution is without merit (see

Cuda, 107 AD3d at 1410; Matter of Kelly v Klein, 96 AD3d 846, 847-848;

see also Kachalsky v County of Westchester, 701 F3d 81, 93-101, cert

denied ___ US ___, 133 S Ct 1806).

Entered: March 25, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court