PD-0263-15

IN THE TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

_________________________________________________

DETRA PHILLIPS WEBSTER

APPELLANT

vs.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

APPELLEE

_________________________________________________

FROM THE FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS

CAUSE NO. 05-12-00854-CR

APPEAL FROM THE 204TH DISTRICT COURT

OF DALLAS COUNTY, CAUSE NO. F10-60721-Q

_________________________________________________

APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR

DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

_________________________________________________

BRUCE ANTON

State Bar No. 01274700

ba@sualaw.com

BRETT ORDIWAY

State Bar No. 24079086

bordiway@sualaw.com

SORRELS, UDASHEN & ANTON

2311 Cedar Springs, Suite 250

Dallas, Texas 75201

214-468-8100 (office)

214-468-8104 (fax)

Counsel for Appellant

PD-0263-15

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 4/8/2015 4:00:35 PM

Accepted 4/15/2015 12:41:26 PM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK
2

Ground for Review

Whether the court of appeals ignored the facts 

and law to arrive at its desired conclusions that 

an extraneous offense was properly admitted and 

not harmful
3

Table of Contents

Ground for Review...................................................................................... 2

Index of Authorities.................................................................................... 4

Identity of Parties and Counsel................................................................. 5

Statement Regarding Oral Argument....................................................... 6

Statement of the Case and Procedural History ........................................ 7

Argument.................................................................................................... 9

The court of appeals ignored the facts and law to arrive at its desired 

conclusions that an extraneous offense was properly admitted and not 

harmful.................................................................................................... 9

I. The court of appeals’s holding ....................................................... 9

II. The court ignored the facts in holding that the alleged 

extraneous offense was properly admitted ...................................... 10

III. The court of appeals ignored the law in holding that Webster 

was not harmed, regardless.............................................................. 13

Prayer........................................................................................................ 14

Certificate of Service ................................................................................ 16

Certificate of Compliance......................................................................... 16

Appendix ................................................................................................... 17
4

Index of Authorities

Cases

Delay v. State, --- S.W.3d ---, No. PD-1465-13, 2014 WL 4843911 (Tex. 

Crim. App. Oct. 1, 2014) (Meyers, J., dissenting) ......................... 12, 14

Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 88 (1963)............................................ 13

Garza v. State, No. 06-14-00054-CR, 2014 WL 5490947, *3 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana Oct. 30, 2014) ..................................................................... 13

Harrell v. State, 884 S.W.2d 154, 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)................. 9

Lopez v. State, 288 S.W.3d 148, 178 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009, 

pet. ref’d)................................................................................................ 13

Webster v. State, No. 05-12-00854-CR, 2014 WL 6873136 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Dec. 8, 2014) .............................................................. 8, 10, 11, 13

Statutes

TEX. PEN. CODE § 22.02(b).......................................................................... 8
5

Identity of Parties and Counsel

For Appellant Detra Phillips Webster:

LISA A. FOX

Trial counsel of record

LAW OFFICE OF LISA A. FOX

6565 North MacArthur Boulevard, Suite 225

Irving, Texas 75039

BRUCE ANTON

BRETT E. ORDIWAY

Appellate counsel of record

SORRELS, UDASHEN & ANTON

2311 Cedar Springs, Suite 250

Dallas, Texas 75201

ba@sualaw.com

bordiway@sualaw.com

For Appellee the State of Texas:

SOINKNE M. LEWIS

FARHEEN S. JAN

Trial counsel of record

DALLAS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

133 North Riverfront Boulevard

Dallas, Texas 75207

MARISA ELMORE

Appellate counsel of record

DALLAS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

Trial court:

THE HONORABLE LENA LEVARIO

204TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
6

Statement Regarding Oral Argument

Oral argument is waived.
7

Statement of the Case and Procedural History

Webster’s brother Otis 1 re-routed their disabled sister Katrina’s 

social security checks to his address. (RR7: 35-36). Otis claimed that 

when Webster learned of this, she stabbed him. (RR7: 38, 99). Webster 

claimed, however, that Otis became enraged when Katrina would not 

accompany him to the bank, and, blaming it on Webster’s influence, he 

attacked Webster with an iron. (RR8: 171-179, 195). Webster maintained that she only stabbed Otis in self-defense. (RR8: 187-188).

Though only Otis’s wife supported his version of events, while 

Katrina and Webster’s children vouched for Webster’s, Webster was indicted on October 14, 2010, for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of a family member. (RR7: 152-153; 209-211, 249-251, 286-287; RR8: 

24, 32, 35, 59); (CR: 13); see TEX. PEN. CODE § 22.02(b). Webster initially 

pleaded guilty to the charge, but, when she explained to the trial court 

that Otis had attacked her first, the court refused to accept her plea and 

set the case for a jury trial. (RR2: 9; RR3: 28). The jury ultimately found 

Webster guilty and sentenced her to 10 years’ imprisonment. (CR: 85). 

 

1 Because all relevant persons are related to Webster, they will be referred to by 

their given names. 
8

On appeal to the Fifth Court of Appeals, Webster argued that the 

trial court abused its discretion by admitting extraneous offense evidence, and that the admission of such evidence was harmful. Webster v. 

State, No. 05-12-00854-CR, 2014 WL 6873136 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 

8, 2014). The court overruled her contention and affirmed her conviction 

in an opinion released December 8, 2014. Id. Webster then filed a motion for rehearing, which the court denied on February 9, 2015. 
9

Argument

The court of appeals ignored the facts and law to 

arrive at its desired conclusions that an extraneous offense was properly admitted and not harmful

! ! !

I. The court of appeals’s holding

In Webster’s opening brief on appeal, she urged the court that the 

trial court abused its discretion in admitting extraneous offense evidence—specifically, that she had previously stolen from Katrina’s bank 

account—because it had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(Ap. Br. at 9) (citing RR7: 16-17, 35-36; Harrell v. State, 884 S.W.2d 

154, 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“in deciding whether to admit extraneous offense evidence in the guilt/innocence phase of trial, the trial court 

must, under rule [of evidence] 104(b), make an initial determination at 

the proffer of the evidence, that a jury could reasonably find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the extraneous offense.”)). The only evidence that Webster did came from the highly motivated Otis, while Katrina herself testified she gave Webster permission to withdraw money from her bank account, and moreover that, if 

anyone had stolen from her, it was Otis’s wife. (Ap. Br. at 9) (citing 
10

RR8: 39, 73-74). Webster further contended the erroneous admission 

was harmful for exactly those reasons for which the evidence was admitted: it turned a “he said, she said” case into one in which Webster 

had a clear motive for assaulting Otis. (Ap. Br. at 13-14). Because this 

error plainly affected Webster’s substantial rights, she respectfully requested the court to reverse and remand this case for a new trial. (Ap. 

Br. at 14).

The court of appeals disagreed, determining that, despite Katrina’s testimony, a jury “could have” found the theft proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that, regardless, she was not harmed, because the 

jury “could have” found Webster guilty without the evidence. Webster v. 

State, No. 05-12-00854-CR, 2014 WL 6873136, *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

Dec. 8, 2014). In so doing, the court both ignored the facts and the law.

II. The court ignored the facts in holding that the alleged extraneous offense was properly admitted

In determining that, despite Katrina’s testimony, a jury “could 

have” found the theft proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the court of 

appeals reasoned that a jury “could have... concluded Katrina was unaware of [Webster] taking money from her on numerous other conclusions” because “her account was short on funds to take care of her own 
11

needs after she loaned Detra her debit card.” Id. Alternatively, the court 

reasoned that jury could have “simply concluded Katrina lied.” Id. If so,

the court figured, the remaining evidence indeed supported the inference that Webster stole from Katrina. Id.

This is an entirely unreasonable view of the record. There is nothing in the record that indicates Katrina was oblivious, or lied. As to the 

former, that Webster “drained” Katrina’s bank account when she gave 

Webster her debit card to get her car fixed is not evidence of theft—it’s 

evidence the repairs were costly, or that Katrina’s bank account had a 

low balance to begin with. (RR8: 55-56). And more importantly—and as 

maintained by Webster in her brief on appeal—Katrina explicitly insisted Webster had not stolen from her:

Defense counsel: Okay. Now, there’s been some allegations that [Webster] had been taking 

your money. Had she been taking your 

money?

Katrina: No.

Defense counsel: Did you give her permission to have 

any money needed?

Katrina: Yeah.

Defense counsel: Okay. And did you let her have money 

for car repairs and things like that?
12

Katrina: Yeah.

Defense counsel: And so if someone said she was stealing your money, is that true or not 

true?

Katrina: Not true.

(RR8: 39). This exonerating testimony followed Katrina accusing Otis 

and his wife of stealing from her. (RR8: 38-39). As to the latter, the 

court, unsurprisingly, pointed to nothing at all.

Judge Meyers recently lamented that “[y]ou can always tell when 

an opinion is written with the outcome decided before any legal analysis 

is done because it reads like a medical report written by a doctor who 

has never conducted a physical examination of the patient.” Delay v. 

State, --- S.W.3d ---, No. PD-1465-13, 2014 WL 4843911 (Tex. Crim. 

App. Oct. 1, 2014) (Meyers, J., dissenting). And just like in that case, 

“this is precisely how the... opinion in this case comes across.” Id. The 

opinion simply “ignored the facts in order to arrive at a desired outcome.” Id. Accordingly, Webster respectfully requests this Court to 

grant this petition so that it may reverse the decision of the court of appeals and hold that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the alleged extraneous offense.
13

III. The court of appeals ignored the law in holding that Webster was not harmed, regardless

Because the court of appeals also held that, regardless, the admission of the evidence was not harmful, however, this Court must examine that conclusion, too. 

It is equally strained. As to the harm imparted by the trial court’s 

error, the court of appeals held that Webster was not harmed by the 

admission of the extraneous offense because: “While we agree with 

[Webster] that the State relied on the theft as a motive for [Webster] to 

attack Otis, the record shows that even without that evidence, the jury 

could have discounted [Webster’s] self-defense claim.” Webster, 2014 

WL 6873136 at *6 (emphasis added). 

In evaluating harm, though, the reviewing court is not to be “concerned with whether there was sufficient evidence on which [Webster] 

could have been convicted, but rather, whether there is a reasonable 

possibility the impermissible testimony might have contributed to the 

conviction.” Garza v. State, No. 06-14-00054-CR, 2014 WL 5490947, *3 

(Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 30, 2014) (citing Lopez v. State, 288 S.W.3d 

148, 178 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009, pet. ref’d)); see also Fahy v. 

Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 88 (1963)). Just as the court “ignored the facts 
14

in order to arrive at a desired outcome” in its discussion of the merits of 

the issue, then, it also “changed the law” in its evaluation of whether 

Webster was harmed by the error. See Delay, --- S.W.3d ---, 2014 WL 

4843911 (Meyers, J., dissenting). Because the court of appeals should, of 

course, do neither, Webster further respectfully requests this Court to

grant this petition for discretionary review so that it may reverse and 

remand this case to the court of appeals to conduct the proper harm 

analysis.

Prayer

Webster respectfully requests this Court to grant this petition so 

that it may: (1) reverse the decision of the court of appeals and hold that 

the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the alleged extraneous offense; and (2) remand this case to the court of appeals to conduct the 

proper harm analysis.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Bruce Anton

BRUCE ANTON

Bar Card No. 01274700

ba@sualaw.com
15

/s/ Brett Ordiway

BRETT ORDIWAY

Bar Card No. 24079086

bordiway@sualaw.com

SORRELS, UDASHEN & ANTON

2311 Cedar Springs Road Suite 250

Dallas, Texas 75201

(214)-468-8100 (office)

(214)-468-8104 (fax)

Attorneys for Appellant
16

Certificate of Service

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 

the foregoing Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review was electronically served to the Dallas County District Attorney’s Office and the 

State Prosecuting Attorney on April 8, 2015.

/s/ Bruce Anton

BRUCE ANTON

Certificate of Compliance

Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(3), undersigned counsel certifies 

that this brief complies with:

1. the type-volume limitation of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(2)(D) because 

this petition contains 1,122 words, excluding the parts of the brief 

exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1).

2. the typeface requirements of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(e) and the type 

style requirements of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(e) because this brief has 

been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft 

Word 2011 in 14-point Century Schoolbook.

/s/ Bruce Anton

BRUCE ANTON
17

Appendix
Affirmed and Opinion Filed December 8, 2014 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-12-00854-CR 

DETRA PHILLIPS WEBSTER, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. F10-60721-Q 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Bridges, Lang, and Evans 

Opinion by Justice Bridges 

A jury convicted appellant Detra Phillips Webster of aggravated assault with a deadly 

weapon of a family member and sentenced her to ten years’ imprisonment. On appeal, she 

argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting extraneous offense evidence, and the 

admission of such evidence was harmful. We affirm. 

Background 

On September 16, 2012 Detra was at home, where she lived with her two sons, De’Jaun 

and Deveion,1

 and her disabled sister, Katrina. Earlier in the day, Otis, the complainant and 

Detra’s older brother, picked up De’Jaun and took him to a court appearance. When they 

 1

 Deveion was sixteen at the time of trial and De’Jaun was fourteen. 
 –2– 

returned later in the afternoon, De’Jaun and Otis went inside the home so Otis could pick up his 

mother’s bills for Charlot, his wife, to pay. 

The events that happened next were disputed at trial by Otis, Detra and other family 

members that testified. Otis and Charlot testified to the following events. 

On this particular day, Otis had Katrina’s social security check with him. In the past, the 

check was direct deposited into Katrina’s bank account, but because Otis suspected Detra was 

withdrawing and spending the money to support her drug habit, he changed the checking 

delivery method so that Katrina’s check was mailed to him. Otis claimed Katrina knew he 

changed the address so that he would receive the check. 

Otis asked Katrina if she wanted to go with him to cash her check. Detra told Katrina 

Otis planned to take her back to a nursing home if she went with him.2 Katrina then refused to 

leave with Otis. He showed Katrina the check, and upon seeing the check, Detra picked up a 

knife from the table and starting coming towards Otis. He yelled to 

Charlot to come inside. According to both Otis and Charlot, when Charlot got to the door, Detra 

came at her with a knife. Charlot testified Detra said, “I’m gonna kill that bitch anyway.” 

Charlot then ran back to the car and called the police. 

After Charlot ran out, Detra ran towards Otis with the knife in one hand and an iron in the 

other hand. Otis grabbed the iron and that is when Detra stabbed him multiple times in the chest 

area and near the permanent shunt in his left arm used for dialysis. His injuries, which included 

a collapsed lung, resulted in a two-week hospital stay. 

Otis admitted they were “cussing” at each other before the stabbing, and he told Detra 

“that crack is killing you.” Otis also admitted he swung the iron and hit Detra in the head; 

 2

 Katrina had suffered several strokes and heart attacks and was unable to care for herself. She was unable to walk on her own, but she 

could speak. Otis’s wife testified she was unable to make decisions on her own. She was described as “very slow, as far as mentally.” 
 –3– 

however, he claimed that was the first time on that day he showed any aggression towards her. 

He adamantly denied being the first aggressor. He testified Detra threatened to “kill” his 

“handicap ass.” De’Jaun and Deveion eventually pulled Otis from the couch where he had fallen 

and took him outside where they waited for officers and paramedics to arrive. 

The responding officer took Deveion’s statement shortly after the incident. Deveion said 

Otis and Detra were fighting over Detra stealing all of Katrina’s money because “that’s what my 

uncle came into the house saying.” Detra became violent, and she grabbed the iron and knife 

and started swinging. In his statement to police, Deveion did not say Detra picked up the knife 

only after Otis threatened her. In fact, he never told officers Otis allegedly threatened her or 

acted as the first aggressor. 

Officers arrested Detra because after interviewing multiple witnesses, no one ever said 

she acted in self-defense. Rather, the consensus seemed to be that Detra became angry about 

money and attacked. 

At trial, however, Deveion told a different story. He testified Otis was the aggressor, and 

Detra tried to back away and leave the situation but Otis continued to follow and yell at her. 

When she felt threatened, she grabbed the knife and stabbed it into the table. Otis eventually 

backed her into a corner towards the couch, she grabbed the knife again, and she fell back 

swinging the knife. The knife went into Otis as she fell. 

Deveion admitted family members had gotten together to discuss their testimony in the 

case. He also admitted Detra told him his testimony was very important because it was “going to 

win this case.” 

Katrina testified that when Otis first walked into the house, he immediately started 

“fussing” about cashing her check. At the time, Katrina said she was unaware Otis had rerouted 

her check. 
 –4– 

When Otis asked if Katrina wanted to go with him, she said no because she thought 

Charlot had already cashed the check. Katrina denied that Detra said anything about Otis taking 

her back to a nursing home if she left with him. Rather, she said Otis told her she could “stay 

here in this mess,” referring to Detra’s drug habit. Katrina testified Otis became angry when she 

would not leave with him, and he started following Detra around fussing at her. While she could 

not remember exactly what he said, Katrina was certain he made threats towards Detra. She said 

that was when Detra grabbed the knife off the table. Otis continued towards Detra, and “she 

stuck him.” She also claimed Otis hit Detra with the iron before the stabbing occurred. 

Katrina said the allegations about Detra taking money were not true, but rather she had 

given Detra permission to take any money she needed. However, she also recalled giving Detra 

her debit card because Detra needed to fix her car and shortly thereafter, her money was drained 

from her account. Katrina thought Detra had taken all the money. Katrina later clarified she had 

no problem helping her sister, and any money Detra took, she took with Katrina’s approval. 

Detra testified in her own defense and claimed Otis came into the house in a rage and was 

cursing and name calling. She claimed neither she nor Katrina knew Otis had rerouted the social 

security check until that day when he showed it to them. Detra said Otis kept walking towards 

her as she continued to walk away. He was saying things like, “you taking Trina’s money out 

the bank, and, bitch this and crack head this and you doing this and you’re doing that, . . . .” 

Detra claimed Otis called Charlot to come “whoop [her] ass.” Detra picked up the knife on the 

table and told him “don’t try this.” She stuck the knife in the table so he would know she was 

serious. Detra denied threatening Charlot when she came into the house. 

Because Otis kept following her, she pulled the knife out of the table. Detra claimed he 

kept walking closer and closer. She testified he hit her and she fell against a wall, knocking 

pictures off. However, the State admitted pictures taken on the day of the incident, which 
 –5– 

showed a wall of pictures intact with no sign of shattered glass in the area. When she fell back 

into the couch, Detra said she started swinging the knife (because she was falling and Otis was 

choking her) and she stabbed him. Despite her allegations that Otis choked her and she fell 

against a wall, officers did not see any visible injuries on her. Detra testified no one from the 

Dallas Police Department ever interviewed her, and the trial was the first opportunity to tell her 

side of the entire story. 

When questioned about Katrina’s bank account, Detra admitted to posing as her sister on 

one occasion. She also admitted a bank employee questioned her when she tried to withdraw 

money because the employee did not recognize her as Katrina. However, she denied stealing 

money from Katrina, and argued Katrina gave her the wallet to get money when needed. She 

admitted to taking money from Katrina’s account more times than she could remember. 

She denied using Katrina’s money to support her crack habit. However, she admitted to 

using crack a few days before the incident. 

Tausha Johnson, the manager of First Convenience Bank, testified as a rebuttal witness 

for the State. She testified that Otis and Charlot came into the bank in September of 2010 

disputing some fraudulent transactions on Katrina’s bank account. They said Detra was taking 

money from the account, and Tausha told them to file a police report. Tausha also explained 

Katrina’s account had a note stating to be cautious because someone was “doing unauthorized 

items on the account.” Otis and Charlot reviewed bank security footage and confirmed Detra 

was the person making repeated withdrawals on Katrina’s account. 

Tausha testified about the time Detra posed as Katrina and was detained. When 

questioned about her identity, Detra claimed she looked different with a ponytail, and she had 

lost weight from being in the hospital. Tausha said she called the police, but Detra left before the 

police arrived. Tausha testified to knowing of two fraudulent transactions on Katrina’s account. 
 –6– 

Upon further questioning from defense counsel, Tausha admitted she did not know if Katrina had 

given Detra permission to withdraw money, but she explained Detra could not legally withdraw 

money because her name was not on the account and it did not matter if she had permission. 

Tausha reiterated it was against the law for a person to represent herself as someone with an 

account when they are not that person. 

The jury rejected Detra’s self-defense claim and found her guilty of aggravated assault 

with a deadly weapon. The trial court found she used or exhibited a deadly weapon, a knife, 

during the commission of the offense, and that the offense involved family violence. She 

received a ten-year sentence. This appeal followed. 

Standard of Review and Applicable Extraneous Offense Law 

We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude extraneous offense evidence for an 

abuse of discretion. Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We will 

affirm a trial court’s ruling that an extraneous offense has relevance apart from proving 

conformity with the defendant’s character if the ruling is within the zone of reasonable 

disagreement. Id. Likewise, we give deference to a trial court’s determination that the probative 

value of the evidence is not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. 

A defendant may not be tried for a collateral crime or for being a criminal generally, and 

rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of extraneous offenses to prove a defendant’s character or to 

show that the defendant acted in conformity with the character. TEX. R. EVId. 404(b). But 

extraneous offenses may be “admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Id. 

In deciding whether to admit evidence of an extraneous offense, the trial court must 

determine the “the jury could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

committed the extraneous offense.” George v. State, 890 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) 
 –7– 

(en banc); see also Thompson v. State, 4 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, 

pet. ref’d). Then, as the sole judge of witness credibility, it is up to the jury to decide conflicts in 

evidence and determine if the State proved an extraneous offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Thomspon, 4 S.W.3d at 886; see also Collins v. State, No. 01-12-00238-CR, 2014 WL 1318882, 

at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 31, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication). 

Here, the State offered the extraneous offense of theft to establish Detra’s motive for 

stabbing Otis because she became enraged when she learned he had rerouted Katrina’s social 

security check. To prove theft under Texas Penal Code section 31.03(a), the State must prove a 

defendant “unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property.” TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a) (West Supp. 2014). Appropriation of property is unlawful if it is 

without the owner’s effective consent. Id. § 31.03(b). Elements of theft may be proved by direct 

or circumstantial evidence. Christensen v. State, 240 S.W.3d 25, 32 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g). 

Discussion 

In her sole issue, Detra does not argue the evidence was inadmissible to prove motive or 

perhaps same transaction contextual evidence, but rather “assumes for the sake of argument” the 

extraneous offense evidence was admissible. Detra’s complaint focuses on the State’s alleged 

failure to prove she committed a theft beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, she was harmed 

by admission of the evidence. 

Detra specifically focuses on the State’s failure to prove the offense beyond a reasonable 

doubt because Katrina testified Detra had permission to use any money she needed. And while 

the State characterizes Detra as “draining” Katrina’s checking account, Detra responds this is not 
 –8– 

evidence of theft, but rather evidence that Detra’s needs were costly or Katrina’s account was 

low to begin with. 

Detra further challenges the State’s reliance on her own admission and the testimony 

from the bank manager that Detra repeatedly withdrew funds from Katrina’s account, and even 

did so dressed in disguise on one occasion. While she acknowledges it may be against the law to 

pretend to be someone and withdraw money from an account, she argues, “In light of Katrina’s 

insistence that she gave [Detra] permission to withdraw money from her account, that she misled 

the bank while doing so in no way provides evidence beyond a reasonable doubt” that she was 

stealing from Katrina. As she repeatedly argues, Katrina gave her consent to use money she 

needed. Thus, Detra contends the only evidence that Detra stole from Katrina came from the 

“highly motivated Otis, and Katrina specifically refuted the accusation.” 

Detra encourages the Court to reject the State’s invitation to rely on the conflicting 

evidence the jury “could” have resolved in its favor because “it was the trial judge, not the jury, 

who erroneously admitted the evidence.” However, in cases where an appellant has challenged 

whether the State proved an extraneous offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the reviewing court 

has deferred to the jury as the sole judge of witness credibility and its role in resolving 

conflicting evidence. Thomspon, 4 S.W.3d at 886; see also Collins v. State, No. 01-12-00238-

CR, 2014 WL 1318882, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 31, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. 

op., not designated for publication). For example, in Fanniel v. State, the defendant was tried for 

aggravated robbery, and the prosecution admitted extraneous offense evidence of a prior 

burglary to demonstrate a common scheme or plan as to the current offense. Fanniel v. State, 

No. 01-00-00732-CR, 2002 WL 467158, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 28, 2002, 

pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication). On appeal, the defendant argued, among other 

things, that the prosecution did not prove the extraneous offense because he offered two alibi 
 –9– 

witnesses who accounted for his whereabouts on the night of the alleged extraneous offense 

burglary. Id. at *3. The reviewing court concluded that the jury, after considering all the 

evidence and resolving any conflicts, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant committed the extraneous offense despite alibi witnesses. Id. 

Similarly, in Collins v. State, the court concluded that simply because one eyewitness 

could not positively identify the defendant as the robber in an extraneous offense, the witness’s 

lack of positive identification did not refute another witness’s positive identification of him for 

purposes of proving the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Collins, 2014 WL 1318882, at *11. 

It was up to the jury to decide whose testimony to believe, despite any discrepancies. Id. 

Here, after reviewing the evidence presented, we agree with the State the jury was free to 

weigh the conflicting testimony and could have found it proved the theft beyond a reasonable 

doubt. While the record is clear Katrina testified Detra had permission to use her money, we do 

not believe this alone supports Detra’s claim that the State failed to prove the theft beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

For example, the record shows Detra repeatedly withdrew money from Katrina’s account, 

and even dressed up as Katrina on one occasion in which she was detained by the bank manager, 

but left before the police arrived. The jury could infer a guilty conscious based on this action. 

And while Katrina testified she gave Detra permission to use money when she needed help, 

Katrina testified that her account was short on funds to take care of her own needs after she 

loaned Detra her debit card. From this, the jury could have concluded Katrina was unaware of 

Detra taking money from her on numerous other occasions. This is further supported by the fact 

that the jury heard testimony and witnessed for themselves that Katrina had physical and 

potential mental disabilities. The jury could have also simply concluded Katrina lied about 

giving Detra permission to take her money. 
 –10– 

Moreover, Otis, whose name was also on the account, reported unauthorized transactions 

to the bank and later identified Detra in video footage. The bank made a note on the account to 

be “cautious, someone is doing unauthorized items on this account.” The jury could conclude 

this circumstantial evidence further supported the State’s claim that Detra unlawfully 

appropriated property. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

admitting the extraneous offense evidence. 

However, even if we assumed the trial court abused its discretion, we would conclude 

Detra has failed to establish harm. Detra contends the admission of the extraneous offense 

turned a “he said, she said” case into one in which Detra had a clear motive to attack Otis, 

thereby tipping the scales in favor of the State for the jury to believe Otis’s “uncorroborated tale” 

and discount her self-defense claim. We do not agree. 

The erroneous admission of an extraneous offense is nonconstitutional error. Johnson v. 

State, 84 S.W.3d 726, 729 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d). Texas Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) states that any error, other than constitutional error, that does not 

affect substantial rights must be disregarded. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). In other words, we 

disregard the erroneous admission of evidence if it did not adversely affect the jury’s verdict, or 

had but a slight effect on the jury’s verdict. Johnson, 84 S.W.3d at 729. 

While we agree with Detra that the State relied on the theft as a motive for Detra to attack 

Otis, the record shows that even without that evidence, the jury could have discounted Detra’s 

self-defense claim. 

Otis suffered from renal failure and required dialysis three times a week. He testified he 

had received dialysis for the past five years and, “that’s just about all I do. Go and go to bed.” 

The jury could assess his physical limitations and conclude that while he certainly argued, 

“cussed,” and called Detra names, he was not the first aggressor. 
 –11– 

The jury could easily dismiss Detra’s claims that Otis choked her and pushed her into a 

wall causing pictures to crash to the ground. The State introduced testimony from a responding 

officer that Detra had no injuries on the day of the incident indicating she had been choked, and a 

picture admitted into evidence showed a wall with pictures in place. Thus, the evidence 

undermined Detra’s credibility and the likelihood that the jury would believe her version of the 

events. 

While Detra attempts to distance from Deveion’s incriminating statement given on the 

day of the incident and rely only on his trial testimony in which he accused Otis of first attacking 

Detra, the jury was free to disbelieve his testimony. The jury could determine Deveion was not 

credible because he admitted that he, along with other family members, met and discussed how 

he would testify. Deveion also admitted talking to Detra and Detra telling him that his testimony 

was important because it was going to win the case for her. Thus, with Otis’s testimony that 

Detra was the first aggressor and Deveion’s written statement in which he said Detra “didn’t 

listen and picked up a knife” and “. . . my mother picked the iron and knife and began to swing,” 

the jury heard more than Otis’s “uncorroborated tale.” Rather, they heard Deveion’s account of 

the events on the day in question and the glaring omission that Otis was supposedly the first 

aggressor.3 

 3

 Deveion’s full written statement reads as follows: 

The fight started with a arrgerrment [sic] between my mother and uncle. They arrgerment [sic] was 

because of my aunt. My uncle told my mom that she was steeling all my aunt [sic] money out of the 

bank and was mad because my aunt didn’t want to go to his house. So he said you can stay here with 

this mess. My mom then got mad and said what do you mean this mess. Leave the situation was 

what I told my mother. She didn’t listen and picked up a nife [sic]. The arrgerment [sic] got even 

more heated and they got to [sic] close then my uncle said if she stabed [sic] him they would call 5,0. 

He then called his wife she came to the door talking bout [sic] what she was gona [sic] do to my 

mom. She opened the door saw the nife [sic] and ran to the car and called the police. The fight 

began my mother picked the iron and nife [sic] and began to swing. She stabed [sic] my uncle 3 

times and cut him. My Uncle grabbed the iron and me and my brother toke [sic] him outside and 

that’s when the police arrived. 
 –12– 

Accordingly, we conclude Detra has failed to show the admission of the extraneous 

offense “tipped the scales” in favor of the State and adversely affected the jury’s verdict resulting 

in harm. Her sole issue is overruled. 

Conclusion 

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47 

120854F.U05 

 

/David L. Bridges/ 

DAVID L. BRIDGES 

JUSTICE 
 –13– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

DETRA PHILLIPS WEBSTER, Appellant 

No. 05-12-00854-CR V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. F10-60721-Q. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges. 

Justices Lang and Evans participating. 

 Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered December 8, 2014.