_______________________________ 

Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

Chief Justice: Justices: 

Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver Opinion Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED NOVEMBER 8, 2005 

COUNTY ROAD ASSOCIATION OF 

MICHIGAN and CHIPPEWA COUNTY 

ROAD COMMISSION, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees 

and 

MICHIGAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION,

ANN ARBOR TRANSPORTATION 

AUTHORITY, CAPITAL AREA

TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, and

SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR 

REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION, 

Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v No. 125665 

GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, DIRECTOR OF

THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,

DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND 

BUDGET, STATE BUDGET DIRECTOR,

STATE TREASURER, DEPARTMENT OF

TREASURY, SECRETARY OF STATE, and

STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

PER CURIAM. 
This case involves the authority of the Governor, 

exercised in Executive Order No. 2001-9, to reduce the 

Legislature’s allocation of general sales taxes to the 

Comprehensive Transportation Fund (CTF) by $12,750,000 for 

the fiscal year ending September 30, 2002, and to transfer 

those revenues to the state’s general fund. Appellants 

claim that the general sales tax revenues allocated to the 

CTF are “constitutionally dedicated” funds within the 

meaning of Const 1963, art 9, § 9, and therefore immune to 

the Governor’s power to balance the budget, Const 1963, art 

5, § 20. 

The Court of Appeals concluded that art 9, § 9, which 

it found to be ambiguous, does not dedicate any portion of 

the general sales tax revenues for comprehensive 

transportation purposes. 260 Mich App 299; 677 NW2d 340 

(2004). We agree with the Court of Appeals that the 

revenues at issue are not constitutionally dedicated and 

that the Governor had the authority to reduce the 

Legislature’s allocation of general sales tax revenues to 

the CTF in EO 2001-9. We disagree, however, that art 9, § 

9 is ambiguous. In affirming the Court of Appeals, we rely 

on the plain meaning of the constitutional provision. 

2
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 

To alleviate a budget shortfall for the fiscal year 

ending September 30, 2002, the Governor implemented EO 

2001-9. The order transferred $12,750,000 in general sales 

tax revenues from the CTF to the general fund. 

Plaintiffs sought and obtained a preliminary 

injunction from the Ingham Circuit Court to enjoin the 

transfer. Plaintiffs maintained that the general sales tax 

revenues allocated to the CTF were “constitutionally 

dedicated” within the meaning of Const 1963, art 9, § 9 and 

immune to the Governor’s power to reduce the expenditure 

and balance the budget under Const 1963, art 5, § 20. 

In a published decision, the Court of Appeals 

reversed. 260 Mich App 299; 677 NW2d 340 (2004). The 

Court of Appeals found the language of the constitutional 

provision ambiguous, and examined the historical 

development of art 9, § 9 in determining whether the 

allocation to the CTF was “constitutionally dedicated.” We 

granted oral argument on the application. 471 Mich 887 

(2004). 

II. Standard of Review 

Constitutional issues are reviewed de novo. Wayne Co 

v Hathcock, 471 Mich 445, 455; 684 NW2d 765 (2004). 

3
 
Our first inquiry, when interpreting constitutional 

provisions, “is to determine the text’s original meaning to 

the ratifiers, the people, at the time of ratification.” 

Id. at 468. This is accomplished by “applying each term’s 

plain meaning at the time of ratification.” Id. at 468-

469. See also Silver Creek Drain Dist v Extrusions Div, 

Inc, 468 Mich 367, 375; 663 NW2d 436 (2003). 

III. Analysis 

The Governor’s authority to reduce state expenditures 

is found in art 5, § 20, which states: 

No appropriation shall be a mandate to 

spend. The governor, with the approval of the

appropriating committees of the house and senate,

shall reduce expenditures authorized by

appropriations whenever it appears that actual

revenues for a fiscal period will fall below the

revenue estimates on which appropriations for 

that period were based. Reductions in 

expenditures shall be made in accordance with

procedures prescribed by law. The governor may

not reduce expenditures of the legislative and

judicial branches or from funds constitutionally 

dedicated for specific purposes. [Emphasis

added.] 

The disputed issue in this case is whether the general 

sales tax revenues that the Legislature allocated to the 

CTF are “constitutionally dedicated for specific purposes,” 

and therefore immune from the Governor’s authority to 

reduce expenditures. The answer to this question is found 

in art 9, § 9, which states, in relevant part: 

4
 
 

 

All specific taxes, except general sales and

use taxes and regulatory fees, imposed directly

or indirectly on fuels sold or used to propel

motor vehicles upon highways and to propel

aircraft and on registered motor vehicles and

aircraft shall, after the payment of necessary

collection expenses, be used exclusively for 

transportation purposes as set forth in this 

section. 

* * * 

Amount used for transportation purposes.

The balance, if any, of the specific taxes, 

except general sales and use taxes and regulatory

fees, imposed directly or indirectly on fuels

sold or used to propel motor vehicles upon

highways and on registered motor vehicles, after

the payment of necessary collection expenses;

. . . and not more than 25 percent of the general 

sales taxes, imposed directly or indirectly on

fuel sold to propel motor vehicles upon highways,

on the sale of motor vehicles, and on the sale of

the parts and accessories of motor vehicles . . .

shall be used exclusively for the transportation

purposes of comprehensive transportation purposes

as defined by law. [Emphasis added.] [1] 

While construing the wording of art 9, § 9 might 

require effort, the provision’s meaning is clear. The 

provision limits the amount of general sales taxes that the 

Legislature can allocate to comprehensive transportation to 

1

 The manner in which any funds allocated under this

provision to “comprehensive transportation purposes” will

be distributed is set forth in the General Sales Tax Act,

MCL 205.51 et seq. For fiscal year 2001-2002, MCL 

205.75(4) apportioned only 27.9 percent of the 25 percent

of revenues to the CTF. The balance of the general sales

tax revenues described in art 9, § 9 was directed to the 

state general fund. 

5
 
 

“not more than 25 percent of the general sales taxes . . . 

.” In doing so, it places a ceiling on the amount of 

general sales tax revenues that can be used “exclusively 

for . . . comprehensive transportation purposes . . . ,” 

but does not dedicate any specific amount of general sales 

taxes to be used for comprehensive transportation purposes. 

The only conclusion that can be drawn from art 9, § 9 is 

that the general sales tax revenues described in that 

provision are not constitutionally dedicated funds. 

When construing art 9, § 9, the Court of Appeals 

mistakenly found that the constitutional provision was 

subject to alternative interpretations, and then 

unnecessarily considered its history and purpose and the 

circumstances under which it was written and later amended. 

See 260 Mich App 307-311. As described above, the Court 

should have looked no further than the plain language of 

art 9, § 9 to determine that the general sales tax revenues 

allocated by the Legislature to the CTF were not 

constitutionally dedicated funds. Our obligation is to 

give the words of our Constitution a reasonable 

interpretation consistent with the plain meaning understood 

by the ratifiers. Hathcock, 471 Mich at 468-469. Text 

that may require reasonable effort to parse is not for that 

reason ambiguous. 

6
 
 

IV 

In sum, we conclude that art 9, § 9 is unambiguous, 

and we agree with the Court of Appeals that, with respect 

to the reduction of the general sales tax revenues 

allocated to the CTF by EO 2001-9, the executive order was 

a lawful exercise of the Governor’s constitutional 

authority under art 5, § 20. 

We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals resolution of 

this issue in favor of the defendants. In all other 

respects, leave to appeal is denied because we are not 

persuaded that the remaining questions should be reviewed 

by this Court. This case is remanded to the trial court 

for entry of a judgment in favor of defendants on the 

merits. 

Clifford W. Taylor

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman 

CAVANAGH, J. 

I concur in the result only. 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

7
 
_______________________________ 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

COUNTY ROAD ASSOCIATION OF 

MICHIGAN and CHIPPEWA COUNTY 

ROAD COMMISSION, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees 

and 

MICHIGAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION,

ANN ARBOR TRANSPORTATION 

AUTHORITY, CAPITAL AREA

TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, and

SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR 

REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION, 

Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

No. 125665 

GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, DIRECTOR OF

THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,

DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND 

BUDGET, STATE BUDGET DIRECTOR,

STATE TREASURER, DEPARTMENT OF

TREASURY, SECRETARY OF STATE, and

STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

WEAVER, J. (concurring). I concur in the result of the 

opinion per curiam because I agree that the revenues at 

issue are not constitutionally dedicated and that the 

Governor had the authority to reduce the Legislature’s 
allocation of general sales tax revenues to the 

Comprehensive Transportation Fund. As noted by the 

majority opinion, Const 1963, art 9, § 9 places a ceiling 

on the amount of general sales tax revenues that can be 

used for comprehensive transportation purposes, but it does 

not dedicate any specific amount of general sales tax 

revenues to be used for comprehensive transportation 

purposes. I also agree with the majority that art 9, § 9 

is not ambiguous. 

I write separately because I cannot join some of the 

principles of constitutional interpretation, as they are 

articulated and applied in the opinion per curiam, 

including the standard of review section of the opinion, 

which relies on cases in which I concurred in part and 

dissented in part. See Wayne Co v Hathcock, 471 Mich 445, 

485; 684 NW2d 765 (2004) (Weaver, J. concurring in part and 

dissenting in part), and Silver Creek Drain Dist 

Extrusions Div, Inc, 468 Mich 367, 382; 663 NW2d 436 (2003) 

(Weaver, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). In 

each of these cases, I disagreed with the method by which 

the majority attempted to carry out our mandate that we 

2
 

v 
 

 

interpret a constitutional provision according to the 

“common understanding” that the people would give it. 1 

Further, although I agree that the Court of Appeals 

was wrong to conclude that art 9, § 9 is ambiguous, I would 

not be unduly critical of the Court of Appeals for 

considering the history and purpose of the amendment. Ante 

at 6. A court may “also consider the circumstances 

surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision and 

the purpose sought to be accomplished by it” when the 

common understanding of the provision is questioned. Wayne 

Co, supra at 487 (citing Traverse City School Dist, supra 

1

 As described by Justice Cooley, the rule of “common

understanding” means: 

“A constitution is made for the people and

by the people. The interpretation that should be

given it is that which reasonable minds, the

great mass of the people themselves, would give 

it. ‘For as the Constitution does not derive its 

force from the convention which framed, but from

the people who ratified it, the intent to be 

arrived at is that of the people, and it is not 

to be supposed that they have looked for any dark 

or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but 

rather that they have accepted them in the sense 

most obvious to the common understanding, and 

ratified the instrument in the belief that that 

was the sense designed to be conveyed.’”

[Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General,

384 Mich 390, 405; 185 NW2d 9 (1971), quoting

Cooley’s Const Lim 81 (emphasis in Traverse City 

School Dist).] 

3
 
at 405). Moreover, when interpreting a constitution, “the 

technical rules of statutory construction do not apply.” 

Traverse City School Dist, supra at 405. 

For these reasons, I concur in the result of the 

opinion per curiam. 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

4
 
_______________________________ 

 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

COUNTY ROAD ASSOICATION OF MICHIGAN 

and CHIPPEWA COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

and 

MICHIGAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION,

ANN ARBOR TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,

CAPITAL AREA TRANSPORTATION 

AUTHORITY, and SUBURBAN MOBILITY

AUTHORITY FOR REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION, 

 Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

No. 125665 

GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, DIRECTOR OF

THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSORTATION, DIRECTOR

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND 

BUDGET, DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND

BUDGET, STATE BUDGET DIRECTOR, STATE

TREASURER, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,

SECRETARY OF STATE, and STATE OF

MICHIGAN, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

KELLY, J. (concurring in the result only). 

I concur with the majority that general sales tax 

revenues are not constitutionally dedicated funds for the 

reasons stated in the Court of Appeals opinion. The 

Governor has the authority to reduce the Legislature’s 
 

 

allocation of general sales tax revenues to the 

Comprehensive Transportation Fund. 

I write separately because, unlike the majority on 

this Court, I agree with the Court of Appeals that Const 

1963, art 9, § 9 is ambiguous. It is ambiguous because it 

reasonably has “several possible meanings or 

interpretations.”1 

The Court of Appeals panel accurately explains the 

nature of the ambiguity: 

[The section] unequivocally exempts all 

general sales taxes from the restrictions imposed

on specific taxes but then simultaneously

subjects up to twenty-five percent of general

sales taxes to the very same restrictions.” [260

Mich App 299, 306; 677 NW2d 340 (2004) (emphasis

in original).] 

When interpreting an ambiguous constitutional 

provision, it is proper for a court to consider its history 

and purpose. The Court of Appeals did not err when it 

looked outside the text to the section’s history and 

purpose to determine which of the text’s several possible 

meanings was intended. The majority’s criticism of this 

approach is misplaced. 

For these reasons, I concur only in the result of the 

majority opinion. 

 Marilyn Kelly 

1

 This is the first definition of “ambiguous” found in

the Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001). 

2