J-S76032-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant

v. STEVEN WAYNE DILLOW, Appellee No. 1106 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered June 23, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0001162-2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., PANELLA AND OLSON, JJ

. MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JANUARY 22, 2015 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (“Commonwealth”) a ppeals from a June 23, 2014 order that dismissed, pursuant to 1 8 Pa.C.S.A. § 110 (the compulsory joinder statute), driving under the infl uence and related charges filed against Steven Wayne Dillow (“Appellee”). We affirm. The undisputed factual and procedural history in t his case is as follows. On March 13, 2013 at 1:25 a.m., Pennsylvania State Troopers Andrew Prizzi, Robert Broadwater, Marc Ziegler, and Joel Guthrie w ere dispatched to a residence on Mayflower Drive in South Union Townshi p. Troopers Prizzi and Broadwater traveled to the scene in the same patrol vehicle while Troopers Ziegler and Guthrie traveled in a separate vehicle. The troopers were dispatched in response to a report that a male, who arrived at the scene in a silver Ford Focus, was banging on the door and atte mpting to gain access toJ-S76032-14

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the Mayflower Drive residence. All of the troopers arrived at the scene simultaneously. Upon arrival, Trooper Prizzi observed Appellee sit ting in the driver’s seat of the silver Ford Focus. The vehicle was par ked on the side of Mayflower Drive with its right tires on the curb an d the rest of the vehicle in the road. The engine of the vehicle was running. Trooper Prizzi parked his patrol car in front of Appellee’s vehicle and the o ther patrol car parked behind it. As Trooper Prizzi approached Appellee, he observed that Appellee’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy and that a strong odor of alcohol emanated from Appellee’s person. After confirming Appellee’s identity and the status of his driver’s license, Trooper Prizzi asked Appellee to exit the vehicle and the trooper performed certain field sob riety tests upon Appellee. 1 Based upon Appellee’s performance, Trooper Prizzi c oncluded that Appellee was impaired and placed him under arrest for drivin g under the influence. 2 While Trooper Prizzi interacted with Appellee, Tro oper Broadwater interviewed the residents of the house on Mayflower Drive. Based upon his investigation, Trooper Broadwater came to believe t hat Appellee, while in an

____________________________________________ 1 Trooper Prizzi performed the horizontal gaze nysta gmus (“HGN”) test and administered a portable breath test. Trooper Prizz i did not perform the one leg stand and the walk and turn test because Appell ee advised that he had pre-existing ankle injuries that prevented him from performing those tests.

2 Subsequent testing revealed that Appellee had a bl ood alcohol content of .154%.J-S76032-14

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intoxicated state, created a disturbance within the community when he banged on the door of the Mayflower Drive residence and honked the horn of his Ford Focus. Trooper Broadwater issued two summary offense citat ions dated March 13, 2013 that charged Appellee with public drunkenn ess 3 and disorderly conduct. 4 The citation charging Appellee with public drunke nness alleged that, “[Appellee] did appear in a public place mani festly under the influence of alcohol to a degree that [Appellee] may have end angered himself or other persons or property or annoy persons in the vicinit y; to wit: [Appellee] was intoxicated while he was banging on the front of [t he residence on] Mayflower causing annoyance to sleeping [residents] .” Non-Traffic Citation (Public Drunkenness), 3/13/13. The citation chargi ng Appellee with disorderly conduct alleged that, “[Appellee], with the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly cr eating a risk thereof did make unreasonable noise; to wit: [Appellee] did ba ng on the front of [the residence on] Mayflower causing the [residents] ala rm and annoyance. [Appellee] also [continually honked] his car horn c ausing alarm to the resident at [another house on] Mayflower.” Non-Tra ffic Citation (Disorderly

____________________________________________ 3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505.

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(2).J-S76032-14

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Conduct), 3/13/13. Appellee pled guilty to both su mmary charges on March 20, 2014. On March 26, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a crimina l complaint charging Appellee with driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”) - general impairment, 5 DUI - high rate, 6 careless driving, 7 and restraint systems. 8 Thereafter, Appellee filed an omnibus pre-trial m otion alleging that the charges set forth in the criminal complain t were subject to compulsory joinder under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110 and, th erefore, barred by the prior summary offense prosecutions. The trial cour t convened a hearing on Appellee’s motion on September 24, 2013 and, by ord er dated June 23, 2014, dismissed the charges against Appellee. This timely Commonwealth appeal followed. In its brief, the Commonwealth raises the following claim for our review: Whether the [trial court] erred in granting [Appell ee’s] pre[-]trial motion to dismiss when the charges [alleged within the criminal complaint] were not within the jurisdiction of a si ngle court and [Appellee] was not placed in double jeopardy accord ing to Commonwealth v. Bellezza , 603 A.2d 1031 (Pa. Super. 1992)[?]

____________________________________________ 5 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).

6 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(b).

7 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3714(a).

8 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4581(a)(2)(ii).J-S76032-14

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Commonwealth’s Brief at 4. 9 The Commonwealth advances two arguments in support of its contention that the trial court erred in dismissing DUI and related charges against Appellee. First, the Commonwealth asserts that the DUI charges investigated by Trooper Prizzi did not arise from t he same criminal episode as the summary offenses investigated by Trooper Bro adwater within the meaning of section 110. In support of this positio n, the Commonwealth argues that the DUI charges arose from observations made by Trooper Prizzi upon his arrival at the scene while the summary off enses were based upon Appellee’s conduct that occurred before the trooper s arrived. Second, the Commonwealth maintains that the summary offenses an d the DUI charges did not occur within the same judicial district sin ce the former fell within the jurisdiction of the district magistrate and the lat ter fell within the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas. The Commonwealth cit es Bellezza as support for both of its contentions. These claims fail. Section 110, known as the compulsory joinder rule, bars a subsequent prosecution if each prong of the followi ng test is met: the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or conviction; the current prosecution was based on the same criminal conduct or arose from the same criminal episode; the prosecuto r in the subsequent trial was aware of the charges before th e first trial;

____________________________________________ 9 The Commonwealth preserved the claim it raises on appeal by including it within a timely filed concise statement of errors c omplained of on appeal.J-S76032-14

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and all charges [are] within the same judicial dist rict as the former prosecution. Commonwealth v. Reid , 77 A.3d 579, 582 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted). In this appeal, the Commonwealth challenges the tr ial court’s determinations that Appellee met the second and fou rth prongs of the test for compulsory joinder. 10 These elements relate to the logical relationship prong and the requirement that all charges emerge f rom the same judicial district. We address these issues in turn. When considering the logical relationship prong, o ur Supreme Court has instructed that we must “look at the ‘temporal’ and ‘logical’ relationship between the charges to determine whether they arose from a ‘single criminal episode.’” Id . In assessing the logical relationship between cha rges, the Supreme Court explained: In ascertaining whether a number of statutory offen ses are logically related to one another, the court should initially inquire as to whether there is a substantial duplication of factual, and/or legal issues presented by the offenses. If there i s duplication, then the offenses are logically related and must be prosecuted at one trial. The mere fact that the additional statu tory offenses involve additional issues of law or fact is not suf ficient to create a separate criminal episode since the logical relat ionship test does not require an absolute identity of factual ba ckgrounds.

____________________________________________ 10 We need not discuss parts one and three of the com pulsory joinder test. Appellee’s guilty plea constitutes a conviction for purposes of section 110. Commonwealth v. Hockenberry , 701 A.2d 1334, 1336 (Pa. 1997). Moreover, there is no dispute that the prosecutor w as aware of the DUI charges before the initial proceedings, as all the crimes were known to the prosecuting authority at the same time.J-S76032-14

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Id . (citation and internal quotations omitted). Moreo ver, [when considering] the temporal and logical relatio nship between the criminal acts, [courts must be] guided by the policy considerations that [section] 110 was designed to s erve: to protect a person accused of crimes from governme ntal harassment of being forced to undergo successive tr ials for offenses stemming from the same criminal episode; a nd as a matter of judicial administration and economy, to a ssure finality without unduly burdening the judicial process by re petitious litigation. Id . at 583 (citation omitted). Under the circumstances presented in this appeal, w e find instructive the Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Anthony , 717 A.2d 1015 (Pa. 1998). In Anthony , the defendant committed a series of burglaries with juvenile cohorts. After an investi gation, the defendant was initially charged with corruption of minors and rel ated charges. The charges alleged, among other things, that the defendant ent iced and encouraged the juveniles to commit thefts and residential burglari es. The defendant pled guilty and was sentenced. Thereafter, the Pennsylv ania State Police filed theft and burglary charges against the defendant. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges on grounds of double jeopardy a nd compulsory joinder, arguing that the second prosecution arose from the same criminal episode that culminated in his prior conviction. Both the trial court and this Court denied relief.J-S76032-14

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Upon further review, our Supreme Court reversed, co ncluding that the defendant's subsequent prosecution arose from the s ame criminal episode as the initial prosecution because all of the criminal acts were temporally and logically related. The Supreme Court held that the prosecutions were temporally related since they essentially covered t he same period of time. The Court also found substantial duplication of iss ues of fact and law because much of the evidence from the first proceed ing would be introduced in the second trial. With regard to the duplicatio n of legal issues, the Court noted: As for the legal issues, [the defendant]'s first co nviction for corrupting the morals of the minors was grounded on his encouraging and enticing the minors to commit burgl aries and thefts. The second Information also charges burgla ry and theft[;] the variation in the form of the criminal charges cannot disguise the commonality of the legal issues within the two informations. Id . at 1019. After careful review, we are persuaded in this cas e that a temporal and logical relationship exists between the first and s econd prosecutions. Thus, the trial court correctly determined that the curre nt prosecution arose from the same criminal episode as the original prosecuti on. The present criminal complaint charges Appellee with DUI and other offen ses arising from events that occurred on March 13, 2013 at or around 1:25 a .m. Appellee argued that those criminal charges arose from the same cri minal episode as the summary offenses to which he pled guilty. Like the DUI charges, theJ-S76032-14

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summary offenses with which Appellee was charged st emmed from events that occurred on Mayflower Drive on March 13, 2013 at approximately 1:25 a.m. Hence, the present DUI charges share a direct temporal relationship with the conduct upon which Appellee’s summary char ges rested. The Commonwealth argues that the crimes alleged in the criminal complaint are not logically related to Appellee’s s ummary convictions since they do not involve the same conduct. In developin g this argument, the Commonwealth stresses that Appellee’s summary convi ctions arose from the drunken disturbance he created before the troopers arrived on scene, as investigated by Trooper Broadwater. By contrast, t he Commonwealth notes, the DUI charges (and other crimes) alleged in the c riminal complaint stem from observations made by Trooper Prizzi upon his a rrival at the Mayflower Drive address. The Commonwealth, however, overlook s the fact that “[a] logical relationship is not conditioned upon the du plication of identical criminal acts.” Id . Instead, “a logical relationship [may exist] wher e the sequence of criminal acts reveals a substantial dup lication of issues of law and fact.” Id . A substantial duplication of issues exists in the present case. While it is conceivable under the facts of this case that th e Commonwealth could prove the crimes alleged in the criminal complaint without introducing the testimony of Trooper Broadwater or the witnesses he interviewed, we do not believe that the involvement of two law enforcement officers is sufficient toJ-S76032-14

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preclude compulsory joinder given the substantial o verlap of legal issues. Appellee’s guilty plea to public drunkenness establ ished that he was manifestly under the influence of alcohol at or aro und 1:25 a.m. on March 13, 2013. Moreover, Appellee’s guilty plea to diso rderly conduct established, among other things, that he honked his car horn and , by inference, was in physical control of his vehicle. The criminal comp laint alleged that Appellee committed DUI, which required the Commonwealth to p rove that Appellee was intoxicated and that he was in control of his v ehicle. Given the commonality of the legal issues between the first a nd second prosecutions, we find that the present charges arose from the sam e criminal episode as the first set of charges since the criminal acts we re temporally and logically related. 11 The Commonwealth next argues that, although all of Appellee’s offenses occurred within Fayette County, the summar y offenses and the DUI charges did not occur within the same judicial dist rict since the former fell within the jurisdiction of the district magistrate and the latter fell within the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas. The Com monwealth relies on Bellezza to support its position. The Commonwealth’s relia nce upon

____________________________________________ 11 Since there were common elements shared between Ap pellee’s summary offenses and the present DUI charges, Bellezza does not bar application of the compulsory joinder doctrine in this case. See Bellezza , 603 A.2d at 1039 (holding that where there were no common eleme nts between summary offense of disorderly conduct and subsequen t DUI charge, double jeopardy did not bar later prosecution).J-S76032-14

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Bellezza is misplaced, however, since that case interpreted a prior version of section 110 which required that all offenses be within the jurisdiction of a single court. That language was amended in 2002 to require that the crimes occur within the same judicial district. Our Supre me Court interpreted the amended language in Commonwealth v. Fithian , 961 A.2d 66, 75 (Pa. 2008) stating, “[b]ased upon the plain words of the se statutory provisions, we have no problem in concluding the General Assemb ly intended that, for purposes of the compulsory joinder statute, the phr ase ‘judicial district’ means the geographical area established by the Gene ral Assembly in which a court of common pleas is located.” Since section 110 no longer includes the language upon which the Commonwealth relies, it is clear that the Commonwealth’s contention in this appeal merits no relief. Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 1/22/2015