This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A16-0615 State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs. Christopher Gary Zurek, Appellant. Filed December 5, 2016 Affirmed Stauber, Judge Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-14-22592 Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Jeffrey A. Carson, Rogers City Attorney, David K. Ross, Assi stant City Atto rney, Carson, Clelland & Schreder, Brooklyn Ce nter, Minnesota (for respondent) Paul P. Sarratori, Mesenbourg & Sarratori Law Offices, P.A ., Coon Rapids, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Worke, Presid ing Judge; Stauber, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N STAUBER , Judge On appeal from his conviction of gross- misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI), appellant argues that the district c ourt erred by concluding that (1) his initial2 contact with the arresting officer did not c onstitute a seizure and (2) even if it was a seizure, it was supported by th e requisite reasonable articulable suspicion. We affirm. FACTS In August 2014, appellant Christopher Zurek was charged with two counts of third-degree DUI. Appellant subsequently move d to dismiss the charges, arguing that the results of his breath test should be suppresse d because the officer’s stop of appellant was not supported by the requisite reasonable artic ulable suspicion. Appellant also claimed that Minnesota’s implied-consent advisory is unconstitutional. At the omnibus hearing, evidence and te stimony was presented establishing that on August 2, 2014, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Officer Jeffrey Ma dson was on routine patrol in Rogers. According to Officer Madson, he observed a silverpickup truck travel from southbound Main Street to westbound 147th Avenue and then turn left on to a dirt inlet or driveway that leads to private pr operty on which several vacant buildings are located. Before he made the tu rn, the driver of the pickup stopp ed to talk to the driver of a limousine which was parked on the edge of 147th Avenue n ear the driveway entrance. The pickup then turned into the driveway that “goes into a field” and proceeded to “drive[] around in [the] grassy field” near the “old aba ndoned buildings.” Officer Madson testified that he drove to the area and asked the limousine driver if he needed assistance. The driver stated that he was “h aving electrical problems with his vehicle but would be out of the area momentar ily.” Officer Madson then asked the driver if he knew the driver of the pickup. The limous ine driver stated that he did not, but that he noticed the “driver’s speech was slurred a little bit” and that he smelled like alcohol.3 After speaking with the limousine driv er, Officer Madson drove around the limousine and parked his squad car on the dirt driveway “as the pickup truck was coming up over the hill towards [him]. ” According to Officer Mads on, the dirt driveway was “wide enough for more than one car,” and he was not parked in such a manner that “would block the egress or [appe llant’s] ability to get out of [the] area.” Officer Madson then got out of his car and wa lked towards the pickup truc k. Although the squad car lights were not turned on, the driver of the pickup stopped and Officer Madson identified the driver as appellant. In speaking with him, Officer Madson observed that appellant demonstrated several indicia of intoxicatio n and appellant was arrested for DUI. The district court denied appellant’s mo tion to dismiss, concluding that Officer Madson’s initial contact with appellant did no t constitute a seizure. But the court also concluded that even if it was a seizure, it was supported by the requisite articulable suspicion based on (1) the officer’s observati on of appellant “drivi ng off-road on private property near abandoned and va ndalized buildings” and (2) the limousine driver’s belief that appellant was intoxicated because he was slurring his speech and smelled of alcohol. Finally, the district court rejected appellant ’s challenges to Minnesota’s implied-consent law. Following a trial on stipulated facts, th e district court found appellant guilty of the charged offenses. This appeal followed. D E C I S I O N “When reviewing pretrial orders on mo tions to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred by suppressing —or not suppressing—the evidence.” State v. Harris ,4 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). We review th e district court’s findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard, but its legal determinations are reviewed de novo. State v. Bourke , 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006). Appellant argues that the district court erroneously conclude d that (1) Officer Madson’s initial contact with appellant did not constitute a seizure and (2) even if it was a seizure, it was supported by the requis ite reasonable articulable suspicion. 1 But we need not reach the issue of whether appellant’s in itial contact with the officer constituted a seizure because we conclude, as did the distri ct court, that even if Officer Madson’s initial contact with appellant constituted a seizure, the seizure was supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal behavior. The United States and Minnesota Constitutio ns prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. U.S. Const. amend IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. When a person is seized, courts must suppress evid ence gathered from the seizure only if the seizure was unreasonable. Harris , 590 N.W.2d at 99. “The brief seizure of a person for investigatory purposes is not unreasonable if an officer has a particular and objective basis for suspecting the particular person [seized] of criminal activity.” Id. (alteration in original) (quotations omitted). Whether the police have reas onable suspicion to conduct an investigative seizure depend s on the totality of the circ umstances and a showing that

1 Appellant also challenged th e district court’s rejection of his various constitutional challenges to Minnesota’s implied-consent law. But appellant waived these challenges at oral argument in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota , 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), which was released after appellant filed his appellate brief in this matter.5 the stop was not “the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” In re Welfare of
M.D.R. , 693 N.W.2d 444, 44 8 (Minn. App. 2005) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. June 28, 2005). Appellant argues that there are “no facts” in the record demonstrating that the stop and seizure by Officer Madson was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion. We disagree. The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high; it demands less than the standard for probable cause or a preponderan ce of the evidence, but requires more than a hunch. State v. Diede , 795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011 ). The factual basis necessary to support an investigatory stop “need not arise from the personal observations of the police officer but may be derived from in formation acquired from another person.” Magnuson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 703 N.W.2d 557, 560 (Minn. App. 2005). An informant’s tip may be adequate to support an investigative stop if the tip has sufficient indicia of reliability. In re Welfare of G.M. , 560 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. 1997). When examining the sufficiency of an informant’s tip to provide reasonable, articulable suspicion for a stop, the reviewing court examin es two factors: (1) identification of the informant and (2) facts supporting the informant’s basis of knowledge. State v. Cook , 610 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). Neither factor is dispositive, and the overall determin ation of reasonable susp icion is based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. Appellant argues that the information received from the limousine driver is insufficient to establish the re quisite reasonable suspicion be cause Officer Madson “never obtained identifying information of the limo driver.” To support his claim, appellant6 cites Olson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 371 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn. 1985), in which the supreme court held that when a st op is based on a tip alone, an “ anonymous caller must provide at least some specific and articulab le facts to support the bare allegation of criminal activity.” (Emphasis added.) But Minnesota courts distinguish between anonymous and identifiable informants. Rose v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 637 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2002). When an informant provides sufficient information to locate him and hold him account able for giving false information, an officer is justified in pr esuming that the informant is truthful in identifying himself. Id. “An informant who provides sufficient identifying information is not anonymous, even if the info rmant does not provide a name.” Id. Anonymous tips that are “provided to police face to face are suffici ently reliable to justify an investigative stop, because the tipster puts himself in a pos ition where his identity might be traced, and he might be held accountable for providing any false information.” State v. Balenger , 667 N.W.2d 133, 138 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 2003). Here, there is nothing in the record in dicating that Officer Madson obtained the name of the limousine driver. But Officer Ma dson spoke with the driver face-to-face, and identified the vehicle he was driving as a Hummer limousine. By speaking with the limousine driver in person, and recognizing his occupation, Officer Madson identified sufficient information so that the informant’s “identity might be traced, and he might be held accountable for providi ng false information.” Id. Where the informant is identifiable, and th e record supports an inference that the informant’s tip was based on personal observa tion, courts have upheld investigatory stops7 based on general tips of drunk driving. See, e.g., City of Minnetonka v. Shepherd , 420 N.W.2d 887, 891 (Minn. 1988) (stating that a gas station atte ndant’s tip that a driver was intoxicated was sufficient to justify investigatory stop); Magnuson , 703 N.W.2d at 560- 61 (stating that identified citizen’s tip that a driver was drunk was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion because it was based on the informant’s personal observation); State v. Pealer , 488 N.W.2d 3, 5 (Minn. App. 1992) (concluding that police had reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop based on known, confidential informant’ s tip that a driver was intoxicated). The record here reflects thatthe limousine driver stated that appellant smelled of alcohol and slurred his speech. The driver’s statements were based on his personal interaction with appellant, and Officer Mads on witnessed the driver conversing with appellant. Thus, Officer Madson had reason to believe the lim ousine driver’s statements. See Playle v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 439 N.W.2d 747, 749 (Minn. App. 1989) (stating the police had reason to believe the inform ant based on his personal observations). Moreover, in addition to the driver’s statements, Officer Madson witnessed appellant driving around in a grassy field on private property near some old abandoned buildings. Appellant’s driving conduct was suspicious and was sufficient to justify the stop. Therefore, based on the totality of the ci rcumstances presented here, which include appellant’s suspicious drivin g conduct and the limousine dr iver’s statements, Officer Madson’s seizure of appellant was justif ied by the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion. Affirmed.8