alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### V. J. DRABEK, Appellant, v. COMET DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 49348.

Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 1.

Oct. 19, 1976.

Released for Publication by Order of Court of Appeals Nov. 13, 1976.

Stephen Jones, Enid, for appellant.

Don Porter, Oklahoma City, for appellee.

ROMANG, Judge:

V. J. Drabek (plaintiff) appeals from an order of the District Court vacating a default judgment in his favor against Comet Development Company (defendant). We affirm the action of the District Court.

The default judgment was entered on a petition alleging breach of certain express and implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose. It was entered on December 31, 1975 (the same day the motion for a default judgment was filed). Based on the defendant’s Motion to Vacate the Default Judgment it was set aside by order of the District Court on January 14, 1976.

Plaintiff argues that the District Court abused its discretion in setting aside the default judgment. Vacation of a default judgment rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. *Burroughs v. Bob Martin Corp.,*536 P.2d 339 (Okl.1975). The vacating of a default judgment requires a balancing of the judicial need to compel the defendant’s appearance and adherence to orderly processes against the laws preference for litigation on the merits. The Supreme Court, as recently as June of 1975, set out

> “. . . those matters and reasons that justified or sustained the granting of an application to vacate a default judgment, as follows: in proceedings of this character each case must depend on the facts of the particular case; default judgments are never viewed with favor; litigated questions should be tried on their merits; it is the policy of the law to afford every party to an action a fair opportunity to present his side of a cause; an application to vacate a judgment, under 12 O.S.1971, § 1031, is addressed to the sound legal discretion of the trial court, and an order vacating said judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that the trial court has abused that discretion; such discretion should always be exercised so as to promote the ends of justice, and a much stronger showing of abuse of discretion must be made where a judgment has been set aside than where it has been refused.” *Burroughs,*supra, pp. 342-343.

No special equity is alleged in this appeal and the predicate for the allegations *596of abuse of discretion is that the trial court should have held the defendant to the answer date. We agree that the trial courts have responsibilities to protect the judicial process from abuse by reluctant defendants. But that responsibility depends on a totality of the circumstances uniquely in the competence of the trial court. Sanctions short of a default judgment have been used to protect the judicial process and the plaintiff.1

We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court and affirm the order.

AFFIRMED.

REYNOLDS, P. J., and BOX, J., concur.

1

. It is noted that in *Burroughs,*supra, the trial court set aside the default judgment and ordered the defendants to pay the court costs including a $1000 attorneys fee to be assessed as costs.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

March 15, 2019

No. 04-18-00733-CR

Martinz BALLEZA,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017CR12645

Honorable Frank J. Castro, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellant’s brief was due February 27, 2019, but was not filed. This court notified 

appellant’s counsel of the deficiency on March 4, 2019. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(b)(2). 

Appellant has not filed the brief or a motion requesting an extension of time. 

Accordingly, we ORDER appellant to file his brief in this court on or before April 15, 

2019. If the brief is not filed on or before the date ordered, we will abate this appeal and remand 

the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether appellant or his counsel has 

abandoned the appeal. 

We further order the clerk of this court to serve this order on counsel by first class 

United States mail and by certified mail, return receipt requested, with delivery restricted to 

addressee only, or give other personal notice of this order with proof of delivery. 

_________________________________

Beth Watkins, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 15th day of March, 2019.
___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 97-2895

___________

Darwin E. Conley, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Walter Richter; Billy Hinch; Steve * Western District of Missouri.

Long; Michael Groose; David Dormire; * [UNPUBLISHED]

Lawrence Dixon; Robert Malone; *

Harriett Swinger; David Dobson; *

George Grellner; D. Spencer, *

Lieutenant; D. Edwards; Holtmeyer, *

Lieutenant, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: March 18, 1998

Filed: March 23, 1998

___________

Before BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit

Judges.

___________
The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District Judge for the Western 1

District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable William

A. Knox, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

-2-

PER CURIAM.

Missouri inmate Darwin Conley appeals the district court’s grant of summary 1

judgment in favor of defendant prison officials in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Having

carefully reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that no error of law

or fact appears and that an opinion would lack precedential value. We deny Conley’s

motion for appointment of counsel.

The judgment is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A20A1827. RANDALL HARRIS v. THE STATE.

Randall Harris was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and child

molestation, and we affirmed his conviction on direct appeal in an unpublished

decision. See Case No. A13A1224 (Nov. 22, 2013). In 2015, Harris filed an

“extraordinary” motion for an out-of-time appeal, which the trial court denied on

September 16, 2016. Harris filed a notice of appeal on November 7, 2016. We lack

jurisdiction. 

Pretermitting whether the denial of Harris’s motion for an out-of-time appeal

issubject to a direct appeal, see Brown v. State, 296 Ga. App. 224, 224 (674 SE2d 91)

(2009) (“[s]ince an out-of-time appeal is not available to one whose conviction has

been affirmed on direct appeal, the denial of a motion for out-of-time appeal . . . is not

subject to direct appeal” and any such appeal must be dismissed), this appeal is

untimely. A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of an

appealable judgment. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). The proper and timely filing of a notice of

appeal is an absolute requirement to confer appellate jurisdiction on this Court. 

Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872, 872 (1) (452 SE2d 756) (1995). Harris’s notice of

May 14, 2020
appeal was untimely filed 52 days after entry of the order sought to be appealed. 

Consequently, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

05/14/2020
#### State v. Grindling

23472

07/31/2001

Affirmed
**EXHIBIT32.2**

BRIGGS &STRATTON CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES

2007 Annual Reporton Form 10-K

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection withthe Annual Report of Briggs & Stratton Corporation (the “Company”) on Form10-K for the fiscal year ended July 1, 2007, as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, James E. Brenn, ChiefFinancial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, asadopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best ofmy knowledge:

(1)                                  TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)                                  Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| /s/ James E. Brenn      |   |
|-------------------------|--------|
| James E. Brenn          |
| Chief Financial Officer |
| August 30, 2007         |

 

This certificationaccompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A signed originalof this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to theCompany and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities andExchange Commission or its staff upon request.

----
December 30, 1998

21605

#### Beshore v. Jim

Affirmed
EX-10.2



 Exhibit 10.2 

FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 TO THE

 A. H. BELO 

SAVINGS PLAN 
 A. H.
Belo Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), pursuant to its authority to amend the A. H. Belo Savings Plan contained in Article 15 of the Plan, hereby adopts this Fourth Amendment to the A. H. Belo Savings Plan
as amended and restated January 1, 2015 (the “Plan”) effective as provided herein. 
 1.    The
Preamble to the Plan is hereby amended to read as follows: 
 A.H. Belo Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the
“Company”), originally adopted the A.H. Belo Savings Plan (the “Plan”) effective as of February 5, 2008. The Plan is a profit sharing plan with a cash or deferred arrangement intended to qualify under Code section 401(a) and
to meet the requirements of Code section 401(k), including, for certain plan years, the alternative methods of meeting the nondiscrimination requirements set forth in Code section 401(k)(13) and Code section 401(m)(12). 

Effective as of February 5, 2008, the account balances of each Participant under the Belo Savings Plan were transferred to
the Plan in anticipation of the distribution on February 8, 2008, by Belo Corp. to its shareholders of all of the issued and outstanding common stock of A. H. Belo Corporation. 

The Plan has been amended on several occasions following its original effective date. The Plan is hereby amended and restated
in its entirety effective January 1, 2015, primarily to incorporate all such previously adopted amendments. 
 Effective
as of June 29, 2018, A. H. Belo was reincorporated in the State of Texas pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger between A. H. Belo and A. H. Belo Texas, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of A. H. Belo and a Texas corporation, whereby A. H.
Belo was merged with and into A. H. Belo Texas, Inc., and the name of A. H. Belo Texas, Inc. was change to A. H. Belo Corporation, a Texas corporation, (the “Effective Date”). 

Words and phrases with initial capital letters used throughout the Plan are defined in Article 1. 







 2.    Section 1.13 of the Plan (“Company”) is hereby
amended to read as follows: 
 1.13    Company means A. H. Belo Corporation, a Texas corporation effective
as of the date A.H. Belo Corporation, a Delaware corporation, was merged into A. H. Belo Texas, Inc., a Texas corporation, and the surviving entity’s name was changed to A. H. Belo Corporation, a Texas corporation. With respect to periods prior
to the Effective Date, references to the term “Company” mean A. H. Belo Corporation, a Delaware corporation. 

3.    No other provision of the Plan is amended by this Fourth Amendment to the Plan. 

Executed at Dallas, Texas effective June 29, 2018. 

 

			
	A. H. BELO CORPORATION
		
	By:	 	/s/ Julie Hoagland
	Name:	 	Julie Hoagland
	Title:	 	Chief People Officer



  
 2
Exhibit 31.2

     CERTIFICATIONS OF CFO PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

I, Mark F. Spiro, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of Calprop Corporation;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure control and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual
report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

August 24, 2004

/s/ Mark F. Spiro
----------------------------------------
Mark F. Spiro
Vice President/Secretary/Treasurer
(Chief Financial and Accounting Officer)
**Exhibit 32.2**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350 (as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), I, theundersigned Chief Financial Officer of infoUSA Inc. (the “Company”), hereby certify that to thebest of my knowledge, (i) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly periodended September 30, 2005 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.        Date: November 9, 2005 /s/ *Raj Das*   Raj Das,   Chief Financial Officer
EXHIBIT
32










Certification


Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


(Subsections
(a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States
Code)






Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of
section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of the
undersigned officers of Chattem, Inc., a Tennessee corporation (the “Company”),
does hereby certify, to such officer’s knowledge, that:




The
Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended November 30, 2008 (the “Form
10-K”) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the
Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.








Dated:     January 29,
2009




/s/ Zan
Guerry


Zan
Guerry


Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer










Dated:     January 29,
2009




/s/ Robert B.
Long


Robert B.
Long


Vice
President and Chief Financial Officer










The
foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63
of title 18, United States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Form
10-K, or as a separate disclosure document.




A SIGNED
ORIGINAL OF THIS WRITTEN STATEMENT REQUIRED BY SECTION 906 HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO
CHATTEM, INC.  AND WILL BE RETAINED BY CHATTEM, INC. AND FURNISHED TO
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OR ITS STAFF UPON REQUEST.
Exhibit
99.6



CEO AND CFO SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION



February 1, 2016







Securities and Exchange Commission



450 Fifth Street, N.W



Washington, D.C. 20549





Ladies and Gentlemen:



The certification set
forth below is being submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission for the purpose of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule
15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of
Title 18 of the United States Code.



Claude Mongeau, President
and Chief Executive Officer, and Luc Jobin, Executive Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer, of Canadian National Railway
Company, each certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:



| | 1. | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act;
and
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of Canadian National Railway Company.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

















|/s/
    Claude Mongeau                |  | /s/
    Luc Jobin            | 
|------------------------------------- |  | ---------------------------- | 
|Claude Mongeau                        |  | Luc Jobin                    | 
|President and Chief Executive Officer |  | Executive Vice-President and | 
|                                      |  | Chief Financial Officer      |
#### In the Matter of Judith Valek, Appellant, v Craig Simonds, Respondent.

—Weiss, J.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Broome County (Esworthy, J.), entered January 2, 1990, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, for an upward modification of child support.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether Family Court should have applied the Child Support Standards Act (L 1989, ch 567) (hereinafter the Act) in its determination of the petition for upward modification of a Family Court order which required respondent to pay $55 weekly for child support. Petitioner alleges that there has been a substantial change in circumstances of the parties. Following an evidentiary hearing, a Hearing Examiner decided that the petition should be denied and Family Court thereafter denied the written objections filed by petitioner. This appeal followed.

At the time the subject order was made, Family Court Act § 413 former (1) *(l)*provided that application of the Act to applications for modification of child support pending after September 15, 1989, the effective date of the Act, was discretionary. The Act, however, was thereafter amended (L 1990, ch 818, §§ 8, 11) and now mandates that courts apply the guidelines set forth in the Act to applications for modification *793pending on July 25, 1990, the amendment’s effective date (L 1990, ch 818, § 23). This court has held that the Act must be applied to pending appeals from orders modifying child support *(see, Matter of Weber v Weber,*172 AD2d 901; *Matter of Squires v Squires,*171 AD2d 990, 991, n 1). Because the order in this appeal has not reached final judgment, the Act must be applied *(see, supra; see also,*McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 58).

To establish entitlement to modification of child support, the burden is on petitioner to show by clear and convincing proof a substantial change in circumstances *(see, Matter of Vitek v Vitek,*170 AD2d 908). We find that petitioner’s loss of employment, resulting in a reduction of income from $22,000 a year to unemployment benefits of $184 a week, constitutes a substantial change in circumstances warranting upward modification *(see, Quinn v Quinn,*145 AD2d 754, 757; *Matter of Flanter v Flanter,*123 AD2d 626, 627). Accordingly, this matter must be remitted to Family Court for application of the Act and determination of an appropriate award of child support thereunder.

Casey, J. P., Mikoll, Levine and Crew III, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs, petitioner’s objections sustained and matter remitted to the Family Court of Broome County for further proceedings not inconsistent with this court’s decision.
NOSB Final Recommendation on Mushroom Practice Standards

205.208 Mushroom practice standard

(a) The producer must maintain a production environment that prevents contact between 

organically produced mushrooms and prohibited substances throughout the entire growing cycle, 

harvesting and post harvesting process. The producer must not use lumber treated with arsenate 

or other prohibited materials for new installations or replacement purposes in contact with the 

growth substrate.

(b) The producer must use organically produced spawn, Except, that nonorganically produced 

spawn that that have not been treated with a prohibited substance and have not been raised on 

GMO substrate may be used when organically produced spawn are not commercially available.

(c) Agricultural materials including grain and straw that are used in production substrate must be 

organically produced. Sawdust, logs or other materials derived from wood used as a growth 

substrate must originate from trees that have been grown in areas free of prohibited materials for 

at least three years, and must not have been treated with a prohibited substance after tree 

harvest. Producers may include nonsynthetic, nonagricultural materials in substrate used to 

produce mushrooms.

(d) Manure and any nonorganic agricultural material used as a growth substrate must be 

composted. Compost used as a growth substrate must be produced in accordance with compost 

guidelines presented in 205.203 (c) (2)

(e) Sanitizers and disinfectants not on the National List for such purpose may not be applied to 

crops or growing substrates
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED FE BRUARY 14, 2020

NO. 03

- 19

- 00537

- CV

Frederick

- Omoyuma Silver, Appellant

v.

State of Texas; Texas Department of Transportation; Officer R. Perez, Jr.; Officer C. Ortiz; Officer E. G. San Miguel; Officers John Doe 1

- 5; Alanis Wrecker Service Inc.; Alejandro L. Alanis; Ur VMS Vehicle Storage Facility; and

Mission Wrecker Service, S.A., Inc., Appellee s

APPEAL FROM THE 126TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY BEFORE JUSTICES GOODWIN, BA KER, AND KELLY AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE GOODWIN

This is an appeal from the interlocutory order signed b y the tr i a l court on July 22, 2019

. Having

reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, the C ourt holds that there was no reversible error

in the trial court’s interlocutory order

. Therefore, the C ourt affirms the trial court’s interlocutory

order

. N o costs of appeal shall be assessed in this Court or in the court below

.