[Cite as In re J.A.T., 2023-Ohio-1854.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

TRUMBULL COUNTY

IN THE MATTER OF:

J.A.T., DELINQUENT CHILD

CASE NO. 2022-T-0108

Criminal Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas, 

Juvenile Division

Trial Court No. 2020 JD 00157

O P I N I O N

Decided: June 5, 2023

Judgment: Affirmed

Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Ryan J. Sanders, Assistant 

Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH 

44481 (For Appellee, State of Ohio).

Gregory S. Robey, Robey & Robey, 14402 Granger Road, Cleveland, OH 44137 (For 

Appellant, J.A.T.).

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.

{¶1} Appellant, J.A.T., delinquent child, appeals the judgment of the Trumbull 

County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, adopting the magistrate’s decision 

and classifying him as a tier II sexually oriented offender.

{¶2} J.A.T. asserts one assignment of error, contending the juvenile court erred 

and abused its discretion by classifying him as such without properly considering the 

required factors in R.C. 2152.83(D). 
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{¶3} After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, we find J.A.T. has not 

established plain error regarding the juvenile court’s classification. Thus, we affirm the 

judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division.

Substantive and Procedural History

{¶4} In May 2020, a complaint was filed in the Trumbull County Court of Common 

Pleas, Juvenile Division, alleging J.A.T. is a delinquent child for committing the offenses 

of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and gross sexual imposition in violation of 

R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) and (C)(2). Both offenses would constitute felonies if committed by 

an adult. The charges stemmed from allegations that J.A.T., who was 15, engaged in 

sexual conduct/contact with his four-year-old sister. 

{¶5} In August 2020, J.A.T. appeared with counsel, waived his rights, and 

entered a plea of “true” to the rape offense in exchange for dismissal of the gross sexual 

imposition offense. The juvenile court sentenced J.A.T. to serve a minimum of 12 months 

at the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“DYS”), with his commitment not to exceed 

his attainment of age 21. The juvenile court ordered J.A.T. to complete an adolescent 

sex offender program at the facility and informed J.A.T. that a sexually oriented offender 

classification hearing would be held prior to his release. 

{¶6} On November 2, 2022, the magistrate held the classification hearing. The 

state, J.A.T., and his counsel appeared, along with J.A.T.’s father, parole officer, and 

therapist. The magistrate explained registration was discretionary because J.A.T. was 

15 at the time of the offense. 

{¶7} The state requested that the juvenile court classify J.A.T. as a tier III 

sexually oriented offender, i.e., the most severe classification, due to his and the victim’s 
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ages at the time of the offense and because J.A.T. had been denied eligibility for parole 

on four prior occasions because of his failure to complete the adolescent sex offender 

program. 

{¶8} J.A.T.’s counsel requested that the juvenile court not classify J.A.T. as a 

sexually oriented offender because he completed the sex offender program. J.A.T.’s 

therapist informed the magistrate that J.A.T. completed the program on October 3, 2022, 

i.e., approximately one month prior to the classification hearing.

{¶9} The magistrate determined registration was necessary based on the level 

of J.A.T.’s offense and the age of the victim. The magistrate also made the following 

findings: there was only one victim, not multiple victims; there was no use of drugs or 

alcohol to impair the victim; J.A.T. had no prior record of delinquency; and there was no 

evidence demonstrating a pattern of abuse or extreme cruelty or any threats of cruelty. 

However, the magistrate also found that due to the victim’s age, the physical or mental 

injuries suffered were exacerbated. The magistrate also considered the fact J.A.T. took 

over two years to complete the sex offender program. Therefore, the magistrate 

determined J.A.T. should be classified as a tier II sexually oriented offender. 

{¶10} The hearing transcript depicts several instances where J.A.T.’s father 

interrupted the proceedings, making comments such as, “Are you kidding me?” and 

“That’s so stupid.” When the magistrate referenced J.A.T.’s delay in completing the sex 

offender program, J.A.T.’s father interjected, “Because he has a learning disability.”

{¶11} Following the hearing, the magistrate filed a decision recommending J.A.T. 

be classified as a tier II sexually oriented offender. J.A.T. did not file objections pursuant 

to Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b). On November 10, 2022, the juvenile court filed a judgment entry 
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adopting the magistrate’s decision and ordering J.A.T. to register as a tier II sexually 

oriented offender. 

{¶12} J.A.T., through counsel, filed a notice of appeal.1 J.A.T. subsequently filed 

a motion to supplement the record, attaching a one-page “Sexualized Behavior Program 

Assessment” from Cadence Care Network dated June 3, 2020 (“the CCN letter”), and a 

four-page “report” completed by Robert Rowland dated September 9, 2020. This court 

remanded the matter to the juvenile court to determine whether the referenced documents 

should be part of the record. The juvenile court filed a judgment entry stating that the 

CCN letter is a part of, and should be supplemented to, the record. However, the juvenile 

court also found that the four-page report was a screening tool used by the juvenile 

probation department and is therefore not properly in the record.

{¶13} J.A.T. asserts the following sole assignment of error:

{¶14} “The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it classified appellant 

as a tier II sexually oriented offender without properly considering the required factors set 

forth in R.C. 2152.83(D).”

Standard of Review

{¶15} As stated, J.A.T. did not file objections to the magistrate’s decision. Juv.R. 

40(D)(3)(b)(iv) provides, “Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error 

on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not 

specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Juv.R. 

40(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by 

1. Different counsel also filed a notice of appeal on J.A.T.’s behalf, which this court sua sponte dismissed 

as duplicative. See In re J.A.T., 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2022-T-0118. 
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Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b).” See In re J.D., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2021-L-126, 2022-Ohio-2334, ¶ 

9, appeal not accepted, 168 Ohio St.3d 1447, 2022-Ohio-3909, 197 N.E.3d 585.

{¶16} “[T]he plain-error standard that [applies] in criminal proceedings [applies] 

when errors that are not preserved arise in juvenile-delinquency proceedings.” State v. 

Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-7565, 103 N.E.3d 784, ¶ 49. To demonstrate 

plain error, an appellant must show (1) there was an error, (2) the error was “plain,” i.e., 

obvious, and (3) the error affected the appellant’s “substantial rights.” State v. Barnes, 

94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). To show an error affected an appellant’s 

substantial rights, he or she must show “a reasonable probability that the error resulted 

in prejudice—the same deferential standard for reviewing ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 

38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 22. Therefore, the appellant must show “the probability of a different 

result is ‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome’ of the proceeding.” United 

States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004), 

quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 

(1984).

Legal Requirements

{¶17} For a juvenile, the process for classifying an adjudicated sex offender has 

two steps. In re T.M., 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2016-G-0067, 2017-Ohio-156, ¶ 13. First, 

the court must decide whether the juvenile should be designated as a juvenile offender 

registrant under R.C. Chapter 2950. Id. That decision can either be mandatory or 

discretionary. Id.; see R.C. 2152.83(A) and (B). If the juvenile is deemed to be a juvenile 
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offender registrant, the second step involves the designation as tier I, II, or III. T.M. at ¶ 

13. 

{¶18} In this case, J.A.T. was 15 at the time of the offense; he did not have a 

previous adjudication for a sexually oriented offense; and he had not been labeled as a 

serious youthful offender. Consequently, the determination to designate him as a juvenile 

offender registrant and the tier level were discretionary. See R.C. 2152.82, 

2152.83(B)(1), and 2152.86; T.M. at ¶ 14.

{¶19} Prior to making its “juvenile offender registrant” decision, the juvenile court 

must conduct a hearing. See R.C. 2152.83(B)(2); T.M. at ¶ 15. The juvenile court is 

required to consider all relevant factors, including (1) the nature of the offense; (2) whether 

the juvenile has shown genuine remorse or compunction; (3) the public interest and 

safety; (4) the factors in R.C. 2950.11(K); (5) the relevant factors in R.C. 2929.12(B) and 

(C); and (6) the results of any treatment and follow-up professional assessment. See

R.C. 2152.83(D); T.M. at ¶ 15.

{¶20} The factors in R.C. 2950.11(K) are (1) the juvenile’s age; (2) the juvenile’s 

prior delinquency record; (3) the victim’s age; (4) whether the offense involved multiple 

victims; (5) whether drugs or alcohol were used to impair the victim; (6) prior sentence 

completions; (7) any mental illness or mental disability of the juvenile; (8) the nature of 

the sexual conduct and whether the conduct was a demonstrated pattern of abuse; (9) 

whether the juvenile displayed or threatened cruelty during the offense; and (10) any 

additional behavioral characteristics. See T.M. at ¶ 16.

{¶21} The factors in R.C. 2929.12(B) are indicative of more serious conduct and 

include: (1) the physical or mental injury suffered by the victim which was exacerbated 
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due to the victim’s physical or mental condition or age; (2) the victim suffered serious 

physical, psychological, or economic harm; (3-5) the juvenile held a position in the public 

or community; (6) the juvenile’s relationship with the victim facilitated the offense; (7) the 

juvenile committed the offense for hire or as a part of an organized criminal activity; (8) 

the juvenile was motivated by prejudice based on race, ethnic background, gender, 

sexual orientation, or religion; and (9) the offense involved particular sections of the 

Revised Code dealing with family or household members. See T.M. at ¶ 17.

{¶22} The factors in R.C. 2929.12(C) are indicative of less serious conduct and 

include: (1) the victim induced or facilitated the offense; (2) the juvenile acted under 

strong provocation; (3) the offender did not cause or expect to cause physical harm to 

any person or property; and (4) there are substantial grounds to mitigate the juvenile’s 

conduct, although the grounds are not enough to constitute a defense. See T.M. at ¶ 18.

Analysis

{¶23} J.A.T. contends the juvenile court improperly considered his delay in 

completing the sex offender program as a negative factor. According to J.A.T., the delay 

was “attributed” to his “diagnosed learning disability.” 

{¶24} R.C. 2152.52(D)(6) requires the juvenile court to consider “[t]he results of 

any treatment provided to the child.” While this provision does not expressly reference 

the existence of delay in completing treatment, the juvenile court is required to consider 

“all relevant factors, including, but not limited to,” those listed in R.C. 2152.83(D)(1) 

through (6). 

{¶25} In addition, J.A.T. presented no evidence at the hearing indicating he was 

diagnosed with a learning disability, much less that it caused the delay in his completion 
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of the program. This allegation came from J.A.T.’s father, which he interjected while the 

magistrate was speaking. Although the CCN letter does state J.A.T. has a “historical 

diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder,” it does not reference a learning disability. 

Therefore, we discern no error from the juvenile court’s consideration of J.A.T.’s delay in 

completing treatment as a relevant factor.

{¶26} J.A.T. next contends several positive factors outweighed any negative 

factors. Two alleged factors, i.e., that J.A.T. lives in Pennsylvania with his grandfather 

while the victim lives in Trumbull County and that J.A.T. has been diagnosed with ADHD, 

do not appear anywhere in the record. “[F]actual assertions appearing in a party’s brief, 

but not in any papers submitted for consideration to the trial court below, do not constitute 

part of the official record on appeal, and an appellate court may not consider these 

assertions when deciding the merits of the case.” Akro-Plastics v. Drake Indus., 115 Ohio 

App.3d 221, 225, 685 N.E.2d 246 (11th Dist.1996). 

{¶27} Two other alleged factors, i.e., that J.A.T. “felt remorse for the victim” and 

that he has a “low risk level,” are purportedly contained in the CCN letter. However, they 

are not actually referenced in that document; they come from the probation department 

report the juvenile court expressly determined was not part of its record. “A reviewing 

court cannot add matter to the record before it, which was not a part of the trial court’s 

proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter.” State v. Ishmail, 

54 Ohio St.2d 402, 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶28} Further, J.A.T.’s argument is based on his apparent disagreement with the 

weight the juvenile court assigned to the statutory factors. The statute only requires the 

juvenile court to consider all relevant factors. See R.C. 2152.83(D). The juvenile court 
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is in the best position to assess and weigh the evidence before it. In re T.M., 12th Dist. 

Fayette No. CA2015-07-017, 2016-Ohio-162, ¶ 27. Therefore, it was within the juvenile 

court’s discretion to determine what weight to afford the different factors. See In re D.J., 

12th Dist. Warren No. CA2020-05-029, 2021-Ohio-278, ¶ 18.

{¶29} In sum, J.A.T. has not established plain error. J.A.T.’s sole assignment of 

error is without merit.

{¶30} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of 

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.,

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,

concur.