Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email 

corrections@akcourts.us. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

ARTHUR J. KINNAN, 

Appellant,

v. 

SITKA COUNSELING, MICHAEL 

McGUIRE, & ERIC SKOUSEN,

Appellees. 

) 

) Supreme Court No. S-15437 

Superior Court No. 1SI-12-00216 CI 

O P I N I O N 

No. 6998 – April 17, 2015 

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) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, First 

Judicial District, Sitka, David V. George, Judge. 

Appearances: Arthur J. Kinnan, pro se, Sitka, Appellant. 

Brian E. Hanson, Brian E. Hanson, LLC, Sitka, for 

Appellees. 

Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen, and 

Bolger, Justices. 

BOLGER, Justice. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Arthur J. Kinnan lived in a three-bedroom residence as part of a substance 

abuse treatment program operated by Sitka Counseling. Funding for that program ended, 

and Sitka Counseling informed Kinnan that he would be required to vacate the residence. 

Kinnan filed suit against Sitka Counseling and two of its staff members, alleging several 

torts based on the defendants’ conduct when removing him from the premises, violations 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

of Alaska’s Landlord Tenant Act, and deprivation of constitutional rights under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. After a bench trial, the superior court ruled in favor of Sitka 

Counseling on all claims. 

Kinnan argues that the superior court wrongfully denied a continuance to 

allow him to seek counsel, wrongfully excluded the testimony of a late-disclosed witness 

and two affidavits, and improperly facilitated questioning regarding Kinnan’s mental 

disability. We conclude that any error resulting from the exclusion of Kinnan’s witness 

was harmless and we see no abuse of discretion in the superior court’s denial of Kinnan’s 

continuance, its exclusion of the affidavits as hearsay, or its consideration of Kinnan’s 

mental disability. And we also reject Kinnan’s argument that the superior court’s 

adverse rulings created an appearance of judicial bias. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

Sitka Counseling operated a substance abuse treatment program in a threebedroom residence. Arthur J. Kinnan lived in the residence as part of this program, but 

Sitka Counseling terminated the program in September 2011, after program funding 

ended. On August 31, 2012, Sitka Counseling provided Kinnan written notice that he 

had ten days to vacate the residence. Kinnan vacated the residence on September 14, 

after visits to the residence from Michael McGuire, Sitka Counseling’s executive 

director, and Eric Skousen, another staff member. 

Kinnan then filed suit against Sitka Counseling, McGuire, and Skousen 

(collectively Sitka Counseling), alleging that McGuire and Skousen committed assault 

and battery in attempting to remove him from the residence. In particular Kinnan alleged 

that on September 10, 2012, McGuire entered the residence uninvited and stated “in an 

angry voice” while standing “very close” to Kinnan that because he had resigned from 

Sitka Counseling, “he was not bound by the ususal constraints of his professional 

relationship with . . . Kinnan and . . . intended to engage in physical combat.” Kinnan 

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further alleged that on September 14, Skousen “barged into” the residence and “took 

hold of the front of [Kinnan’s] shirt, lifted [Kinnan] off the ground, shook [Kinnan] and 

told [Kinnan] that if [Kinnan] didn’t leave the house immediately he would throw him 

to the floor, handcuff [Kinnan] and drag [Kinnan] out into the street and hurt him.” 

In addition to the assault and battery claims, Kinnan alleged negligent 

hiring and supervision; trespass to real estate; trespass to personal property; violations 

1 of the Landlord Tenant Act ; intentional infliction of emotional distress; violation of

constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and conspiracy to violate constitutional 

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

According to Sitka Counseling, Kinnan subsequently returned to the 

residence. Sitka Counseling allowed him to remain there but filed a forcible entry and 

detainer (FED) counterclaim,2

 seeking to regain possession of the residence. 

A scheduling conference was held on February 5, 2013. Both Kinnan and 

his attorney, James McGowan, were present. The superior court then entered a pretrial 

order setting the trial for the week of October 28, 2013, and establishing various pretrial 

deadlines, including due dates for Alaska Civil Rule 26 disclosures and witness lists. 

A hearing on the FED action was held on February 22, 2013. At the outset 

of the hearing, McGowan informed the superior court that Kinnan wished to “fire” him, 

and the court allowed McGowan to withdraw as counsel. Kinnan proceeded without 

counsel from this point forward. Following the FED hearing, the court ruled that 

Kinnan’s occupancy of the residence was not covered by the Landlord Tenant Act and 

ordered Kinnan to peacefully vacate the residence by February 28, 2013. 

1 AS 34.03.010-.380. 

2 See AS 09.45.070(a) (“When a forcible entry is made upon a premises, or 

when an entry is made in a peaceable manner and the possession is held by force, the 

person entitled to the premises may maintain an action to recover the possession.”). 

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As for Kinnan’s suit, Sitka Counseling never received any initial 

disclosures from Kinnan nor any responses to its discovery requests in the months that 

followed.3

 Nor does it appear that Kinnan took any action or submitted any filings in his 

case until October 10, 2013, when he filed a witness list that was eight days late and 

included only his witnesses’ names and addresses. On October 15 Kinnan filed a request 

for a continuance, citing his difficulty in retaining another attorney. He requested that 

the trial date be postponed until November 18, 2013. 

A pretrial conference was held on October 17, 2013. The judge denied 

Kinnan’s request for continuance and explained that the trial would be held as scheduled 

on October 28, 2013. The court also partially granted Sitka Counseling’s request to 

exclude the witnesses on Kinnan’s untimely witness list. The judge explained that 

Kinnan would be allowed to call himself, the other parties, and impeachment witnesses. 

A bench trial on Kinnan’s complaint was held on October 28, 2013. The 

superior court granted a directed verdict in Sitka Counseling’s favor on Kinnan’s 

Landlord Tenant Act claim, his trespass to personal property claim, and his § 1983 

claims. At the conclusion of the trial, the court ruled that Kinnan failed to carry his 

burden of proof on his remaining claims: assault, battery, trespass to real property, 

negligent supervision and hiring, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The 

court then dismissed Kinnan’s complaint with prejudice. Kinnan appeals pro se, based 

on 1) the denial of his requested continuance, 2) the exclusion of his eyewitness, 3) the 

exclusion of two affidavits as hearsay, 4) inquiries into the nature of his mental disability, 

and 5) the judge’s alleged appearance of bias. 

Under the pretrial order, initial Civil Rule 26 disclosures were due March 

15, 2013, and discovery was to be closed by September 27, 2013. 

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3 
 

 

 

 

 

 

III.	 STANDARD OF REVIEW 

“We will not disturb a trial court’s refusal to grant a continuance unless an 

abuse of discretion is demonstrated. An abuse of discretion exists when a party has been 

deprived of a substantial right or seriously prejudiced by the [trial] court’s ruling.”4 “We 

consider the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case to determine 

whether the denial was so unreasonable or so prejudicial as to amount to an abuse of 

discretion.”5 “[D]ecisions about the admissibility of evidence” are reviewed for abuse 

of discretion. 6 “We review de novo the question of whether a judge appears biased, 

which is assessed under an objective standard.”7 

IV.	 DISCUSSION 

A.	 The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying 

Kinnan’s Request For Continuance. 

“A continuance for the purpose of finding and obtaining counsel requires 

a showing of diligence.” 8 “There is no general right to counsel in civil cases under the 

4	 Greenway v. Heathcott, 294 P.3d 1056, 1062 (Alaska 2013) (quoting Azimi 

v. Johns, 254 P.3d 1054, 1059 (Alaska 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

5 Id. (quoting Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 208 P.3d 168, 183 (Alaska 

2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

6	 Shooshanian v. Dire, 237 P.3d 618, 622 (Alaska 2010). 

7 Sagers v. Sackinger, 318 P.3d 860, 863 (Alaska 2014); see also Phillips v. 

State, 271 P.3d 457, 459 (Alaska App. 2012) (“On the separate issue of whether, given 

the circumstances, reasonable people would question the judge’s ability to be fair, the 

proper standard of review is de novo — because reasonable appearance of bias is 

assessed under an objective standard.” (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

8 Greenway, 294 P.3d at 1067. 

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United States or Alaska Constitutions. Further, many litigants successfully represent 

themselves in civil litigation.”9 

Kinnan filed his motion for continuance on October 15, 2013, less than two 

weeks before his case was set for trial. In this motion Kinnan claimed his original 

attorney had charged him $5,000 for each telephonic appearance, “effectively wiping out 

[his] savings.” Kinnan contended that his “first choice” attorney was unavailable and 

that “there are fewer and fewer lawyers of experience and integrity,” but did not 

otherwise detail any of his efforts to retain new counsel. 

At the pretrial conference, Kinnan was unable to further articulate a 

justification for his requested continuance. The judge noted that Kinnan had 

“presumably” been seeking counsel since his original attorney had withdrawn and had 

not shown how his efforts would be successful given more time. Accordingly, the judge 

denied Kinnan’s request for continuance. At trial Kinnan sought reconsideration of that 

decision, but the judge reiterated the reasoning behind his original ruling and concluded 

there was no rationale for reconsideration. 

On appeal Kinnan claims he “lives on meager funds,” his prior attorney 

exhausted his savings, and “[t]o retain an experienced, interested, available law firm, 

willing to work on a contingency basis without retainer is a time consuming endeavor.” 

But even assuming these claims are true, difficulties in retaining counsel cannot alone 

justify a continuance, absent a “showing of diligence.”10 Although Kinnan claimed at 

trial that he had obtained the name of a law firm to which he could try to “sell [his] case,” 

he offered no other evidence of his efforts to retain counsel. 

9 Azimi, 254 P.3d at 1061. 

10 Greenway, 294 P.3d at 1067. 

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Kinnan also cites his “severe mental disability” and appears to argue that 

this favored granting a continuance. But even considering the “particular facts and 

circumstances” of Kinnan’s situation, denying a continuance where Kinnan’s attorney 

had withdrawn nearly eight months prior was not “unreasonable” or “prejudicial.”11 The 

superior court therefore did not abuse it discretion in denying Kinnan’s requested 

continuance.12 

B.	 Any Error Resulting From The Exclusion Of Daniel Klannot, Jr.’s 

Testimony Was Harmless. 

Kinnan appears to argue that he should have been allowed to call Daniel 

Klannot, Jr. as an “eye witness” at trial, despite his failure to include Klannot on a timely 

submitted witness list. We conclude that although the judge should have considered 

alternative sanctions for Kinnan’s noncompliance with the pretrial order, any error 

resulting from the exclusion of Klannot’s testimony was harmless.13 

Under the pretrial order entered in February 2013, the parties were required 

to submit preliminary witness lists in May and final witness lists by October 2. Neither 

Kinnan nor Sitka Counseling timely submitted a preliminary list. Sitka Counseling 

11	 See id. at 1062 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

12 Kinnan also appears to argue that it was unfair not to grant him a 

continuance because Sitka Counseling received a routine extension of time to file its 

appellee’s brief. But different standards apply to a continuance as opposed to a routine 

extension of time under Alaska Appellate Rule 503.5. Compare Wagner v. Wagner, 299 

P.3d 170, 175 (Alaska 2013) (“[A] motion for continuance should be denied absent a 

weighty reason to the contrary.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), with 

Alaska R. App. P. 503.5(b), (c) (requiring “a showing of diligence and substantial need” 

only for a non-routine motion). 

13 See Hill v. Giani, 296 P.3d 14, 22 n.23 (Alaska 2013) (“We must disregard 

harmless errors that have no substantial effect on the rights of the parties or on the 

outcome of the case.”). 

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timely submitted a final witness list, noting that because no preliminary witness list had 

been submitted, Sitka Counseling would rely on the defendants’ testimony alone. On 

October 10, 2013, Kinnan filed his first witness list, which included Klannot’s name and 

address. 

At the pretrial conference, Sitka Counseling sought to exclude all witnesses 

besides the parties. The judge asked Kinnan if he could offer any excuse for his failure 

to timely submit a witness list. In response Kinnan stated only that his prior attorney had 

been “ineffective” and that he was merely a lay person. The judge then ruled that Kinnan 

would be allowed to call only himself, the defendants, and impeachment witnesses. 

“If a party or party’s attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial 

order, . . . the judge, upon motion or the judge’s own initiative, may make such orders 

with regard thereto as are just, and among others any of the orders provided in Rule 

37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D).”14 As this court has noted, the exclusion of a witness “falls 

squarely within this language.” 15 “The trial court has broad discretion to choose an 

appropriate sanction,”16 but in fashioning such a sanction, the court must consider: 

(A) the nature of the violation, including the willfulness of 

the conduct and the materiality of the information that the 

party failed to disclose; 

(B) the prejudice to the opposing party; 

(C) the relationship between the information the party failed 

to disclose and the proposed sanction; 

14 Alaska R. Civ. P. 16(f). 

15 Sykes v. Melba Creek Mining, Inc., 952 P.2d 1164, 1169 (Alaska 1998); see 

also Alaska R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B) (providing for “[a]n order . . . prohibiting [the 

disobedient] party from introducing designated matters in evidence”). 

16 Cartee v. Cartee, 239 P.3d 707, 720 (Alaska 2010) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

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(D) whether a lesser sanction would adequately protect the 

opposing party and deter other discovery violations; and 

(E) other factors deemed appropriate by the court or required 

[ ] by law. 17

Kinnan indisputably violated the pretrial order by failing to disclose 

Klannot as a witness until October 10, 2013 — more than four months after preliminary 

witness lists were due. But in fashioning an appropriate remedy, the superior court was 

required to consider the above factors. 18 And in light of Kinnan’s pro se status and his 

alleged mental disability, consideration of a “lesser sanction” would have been 

particularly appropriate under the circumstances of this case.19 Accordingly, the superior 

court should have considered alternative options, such as ordering a deposition to clarify 

the content of Klannot’s testimony prior to trial.20 

But “[w]hen the trial court has erroneously excluded evidence, a party must 

show that the error was harmful or prejudicial before we will reverse the trial court.”21 

“The test for determining whether an error was harmless is whether on the whole record 

17 Alaska R. Civ. P. 37(b)(3); see also Cartee, 239 P.3d at 721 (quoting 

Alaska R. Civ. P. 37(b)(3)); Sowinski v. Walker, 198 P.3d 1134, 1158 (Alaska 2008) (“In 

fashioning . . . remedies [for discovery order violations], Rule 37 commands courts to 

consider the nature and severity of the violation, the prejudice to the opposing party, and 

any other factors it deems appropriate.”). 

18 Cartee, 239 P.3d at 721 (quoting Alaska R. Civ. P. 37(b)(3)). 

19 Alaska R. Civ. P. 37(b)(3)(D). 

20 Cf. Lewis v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 550, 557 (Alaska 1990) (upholding the 

exclusion of testimony as a sanction for an untimely filed witness list where the trial court 

first provided an opportunity to depose the witness); Bertram v. Harris, 423 P.2d 909, 

915-17 (Alaska 1967) (same). 

21 Barton v. N. Slope Borough Sch. Dist., 268 P.3d 346, 353 (Alaska 2012). 

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the error would have had a substantial influence on the [trier of fact].” 22 Here it is 

somewhat difficult to discern the likely content of Klannot’s testimony, as Kinnan did 

not describe the subject of Klannot’s testimony in his late-filed witness list or at the 

pretrial conference, and merely characterizes Klannot as an “eye witness” in his briefing 

to this court. At trial Kinnan claimed that Klannot would “affirm that [they] were 

threatened,” though he did not specify by whom or on what occasion. 

McGuire’s testimony, however, suggests Klannot was initially present for 

the incident on September 10, 2012, which formed part of the basis for Kinnan’s assault 

claim. Specifically McGuire testified that Klannot was sitting on the couch with Kinnan 

when McGuire arrived at the residence to verify that Kinnan had vacated the premises. 

But according to McGuire, Klannot “got up and left because he knew that [McGuire and 

another individual] were there to ask [Kinnan] to leave.” Kinnan did not refute this 

testimony, and it is therefore unclear how much of the September 10 incident Klannot 

actually witnessed. Nor is there is anything in the record to suggest Klannot was present 

for Kinnan’s interaction with Skousen on September 14, 2012, which formed the basis 

for Kinnan’s battery claim. 

Moreover, Kinnan offered no information as to how Klannot’s testimony 

would have differed from McGuire’s own recounting of events. In particular McGuire 

admitted to making a variant of the comment that Kinnan described as threatening. 

According to Kinnan’s testimony at trial, McGuire told Kinnan “that he was quitting his 

job [with Sitka Counseling] but if he ever saw [Kinnan] on the street, it would be mano 

a mano.” According to McGuire, he said to Kinnan, “You know . . . , there was a time 

when we could settle this man to man.” But McGuire also testified that he was 69 years 

Id. (quoting Noffke v. Perez, 178 P.3d 1141, 1147 (Alaska 2008)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

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22 
 

 

 

 

old, not “in fighting shape,” and recovering from a heart bypass. In the absence of any 

explanation on appeal of how Klannot’s testimony would have differed from this 

account, we cannot conclude that Klannot’s testimony would have had a “substantial 

influence” on the court’s decision.23 

C.	 The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Excluding 

Affidavits From Myron Fribush And Michael Boyd As Hearsay. 

At trial Kinnan sought to introduce two affidavits into evidence, both of 

which the superior court excluded as inadmissible hearsay. The first affidavit was from 

Dr. Myron A. Fribush, who claimed to be Kinnan’s primary physician. In relevant part, 

Dr. Fribush attested that forcing Kinnan to vacate the residence had “rendered [Kinnan] 

homeless and deprived [Kinnan] of services under the Community Support Program.” 

Dr. Fribush also observed that “Kinnan has a well established mental health history.” 

The second affidavit was from Michael J. Boyd, “past director” of Sitka 

Counseling. Boyd claimed that Sitka Counseling obtained the residence through a grant 

from the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority requiring that the property “be used 

solely for supportive housing for the chronically mentally [ill]” and not for “general 

agency purposes.” 

Based on Sitka Counseling’s objections, the superior court excluded both 

affidavits as inadmissible hearsay. As Sitka Counseling correctly argues, affidavits are 

“quintessentially hearsay and suspect evidence.”24 Neither witness was available for 

23 See Barton, 268 P.3d at 353 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

24 See Greenway v. Heathcott, 294 P.3d 1056, 1064-65 (Alaska 2013) 

(upholding a superior court’s exclusion of affidavits as hearsay “even absent an 

objection” by the opposing party). 

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cross-examination.25 Kinnan presents no legal theory as to why the affidavits would 

have fallen under an exception to the hearsay rule, arguing only that the judge’s 

characterization of the affidavits as hearsay was “false.” Accordingly, it was not an 

abuse of discretion to exclude the Fribush and Boyd affidavits as hearsay. 

D.	 It Was Not Plain Error To Allow And Facilitate Cross-Examination 

Regarding Kinnan’s Mental Disability. 

Kinnan appears to argue that the superior court should have prohibited 

Sitka Counseling’s attorney from cross-examining him about the details of his mental 

disability. Kinnan similarly takes issue with questions the judge asked during crossexamination. 

In his complaint Kinnan stated that he had “been diagnosed with a mental 

disability.” At trial Kinnan also described himself as “100 percent mentally disabled 

[due to a] . . . traumatic [brain] injury.” During cross-examination Sitka Counseling’s 

attorney, Brian Hanson, asked Kinnan to state his specific diagnosis, but after sharing 

information about who made the diagnosis, Kinnan responded, “It’s 100 percent 

disability. Other than that, it’s none of your businesses.” At Hanson’s request the judge 

intervened and asked Kinnan to explain his diagnosis, which Kinnan did without 

objection. 

Hanson then resumed questioning, asking Kinnan whether his mental 

disability created delusions or impaired his memory, which Kinnan denied. Hanson 

asked what effect the mental disability had, and Kinnan responded that he “refuse[d] to 

answer.” The judge again intervened, inquiring about the potential impacts of Kinnan’s 

mental disability, without objection. 

25 Dr. Fribush appeared later in the trial, but only as an impeachment witness. 

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“We review a superior court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.”26 

But “[w]e will not consider issues on appeal that were not raised below absent plain 

error, which exists ‘where an obvious mistake has been made which creates a high 

likelihood that injustice has resulted.’ ”27 Aside from his initial refusal to answer 

Hanson’s questions, Kinnan raised no objection to the inquiries regarding his mental 

disability, nor did Kinnan argue that the effects of his mental disability were irrelevant. 

Accordingly, we review this issue only for plain error, and none is apparent from this 

record. 

Notably, Kinnan himself referenced his mental disability both in his 

complaint and again at trial. In particular Kinnan raised the issue of his mental disability 

in seeking a continuance, contending that he does not “think as fast as other people.” 

Given Kinnan’s own invocation of the issue, there is not a “a high likelihood that 

injustice . . . resulted”28 when the superior court required Kinnan to clarify his diagnosis 

and answer questions regarding the effects of his disability. 

Nor was the probative value of testimony regarding Kinnan’s mental 

disability “outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”29 As the superior court noted, 

inquiries into Kinnan’s mental disability were aimed at assessing his “ability to perceive, 

recall, recollect, and relate.” Both McGuire and Skousen contradicted Kinnan’s 

testimony regarding his claims of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional 

26 Janes v. Alaska Railbelt Marine, LLC, 309 P.3d 867, 875 (Alaska 2013). 

27 David S. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 

270 P.3d 767, 774 (Alaska 2012) (quoting D.J. v. P.C., 36 P.3d 663, 667-68 (Alaska 

2001)). 

28 See id. 

29 See Alaska R. Evid. 403. 

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distress. Accordingly, evidence regarding Kinnan’s memory and perception was highly 

probative, and it was not plain error to allow and even facilitate cross-examination on the 

topic of Kinnan’s mental disability. 

E. 	 Neither The Superior Court Judge’s Rulings Nor His Conduct Created 

An Appearance Of Bias. 

As we noted in Greenway v. Heathcott, “[a] judge must recuse himself or 

herself if there is bias. If the appearance of bias is involved, we have held that the judge 

should give weight to preserving the appearance of impartiality.”30 But we have also 

held “that even incorrect rulings against a party do not show bias in and of themselves.”31 

Kinnan appears to argue that the superior court judge’s rulings created an 

appearance of impropriety or bias. In particular he asserts that the judge’s bias was 

“exposed” through the denial of Kinnan’s request for a continuance and the exclusion 

of the Fribush and Boyd affidavits as inadmissible hearsay. We rejected a similar 

argument in Greenway, holding that neither the denial of a continuance nor the exclusion 

of affidavits as hearsay demonstrated an appearance of bias. 32 As we have previously 

reminded pro se litigants, “judicial bias should not be inferred merely from adverse 

rulings.”33 And as in Greenway, nothing in the judge’s demeanor or tone in denying the 

30 294 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Alaska 2013) (footnote omitted). 

31 Id. 

32 Id. at 1064-68. 

33 Khalsa v. Chose, 261 P.3d 367, 376 (Alaska 2011) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

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continuance or excluding the affidavits “objectively permit[s] a conclusion that the court 

was biased, or appeared to be biased.”34 

Kinnan similarly contends that the judge viewed the defendants as “above 

reproach” and appears to argue that the judge exhibited bias by crediting the defendants’ 

testimony regarding Kinnan’s assault and battery claim.35 But the judge’s determinations 

regarding witness credibility similarly fail to support a claim of bias.36 

Kinnan also argues that the denial of his requested continuance forced him 

to appear pro se and that the judge’s attempts to explain the trial process were 

insufficient. But Kinnan had no right to counsel,37 and the record shows that the judge 

met his obligation to “inform a pro se litigant of the proper procedure for the action he 

34 294 P.3d at 1064. 

35 In this portion of his opening brief, Kinnan also makes a number of 

allegations that could be interpreted as an argument that the superior court erred in 

making certain factual findings. But Kinnan does not expressly make this argument, and 

his factual allegations are without citation to the record. Accordingly, Kinnan waived 

any argument regarding the superior court’s factual findings through inadequate briefing. 

See A.H. v. W.P., 896 P.2d 240, 243 (Alaska 1995) (noting in the context of a pro se 

appellant that “superficial briefing and the lack of citations to any authority constitutes 

abandonment of the point on appeal”). 

36 See Khalsa, 261 P.3d at 376; see also Wasserman v. Bartholomew, 38 P.3d 

1162, 1170-71 (Alaska 2002) (“Mere evidence that a judge has exercised his judicial 

discretion in a particular way is not sufficient to require disqualification.” (alteration, 

citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

37 See Azimi v. Johns, 254 P.3d 1054, 1061 & n.19 (Alaska 2011) (“There is 

no general right to counsel in civil cases” . . . , and “[t]he provision of publicly-funded 

counsel in some child custody, parental termination, and involuntary commitment cases 

is a notable exception to this rule.”). 

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or she is obviously attempting to accomplish.”38 For instance, the judge provided an 

overview of the relevant trial procedures and explained the basis for his evidentiary 

rulings. The judge also assisted Kinnan with the presentation of his case by inquiring 

about each cause of action listed in Kinnan’s complaint, and prompting Kinnan to offer 

any testimony he had on each claim. 

Kinnan also argues that the judge’s conduct at trial created an appearance 

of bias. In particular Kinnan contends that the judge “openly mocked plaintiff’s 

ignorance and inability.” But this claim is without citation to the record, and is 

contradicted by both the judge’s respectful tone and his attempts to explain the relevant 

procedures. 

Similarly Kinnan argues that the judge assumed the role of Sitka 

Counseling’s attorney by questioning Kinnan about his mental disability. But the 

superior court “may examine any witness” under Alaska Evidence Rule 614(b), and there 

was nothing in the judge’s tone or demeanor during this exchange that exhibited bias 

against Kinnan. Kinnan further argues that the judge had a duty to intervene when 

Kinnan was “badgered, belittled, and deliberately confused” by Sitka Counseling’s 

attorney, but a review of the record reveals no conduct that would have necessitated the 

judge’s intervention.39 

Finally Kinnan argues that the judge “confessed to pre-judgment” by noting 

that “he already made a ruling on . . . the ownership of the [residence].” But there is no 

38 See Wagner v. Wagner, 299 P.3d 170, 174 (Alaska 2013) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

39 Under the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, “[a] judge shall be patient, 

dignified, and courteous to litigants” and “shall take reasonable steps to maintain and 

ensure similar conduct from lawyers . . . .” Alaska Code of Jud. Conduct 3(B)(4). 

-16- 6998
 
evidence that the superior court “pre-judge[d]” this issue. 40 To the contrary, in 

responding to one of Sitka Counseling’s evidentiary objections earlier in the trial, the 

judge expressly noted that evidence regarding the ownership of the residence could be 

relevant to Kinnan’s claims. For the reasons above, neither the judge’s rulings nor his 

conduct created an appearance of impropriety or bias. 

V. CONCLUSION 

We therefore AFFIRM the superior court’s judgment. 

In the comments Kinnan cites, the judge merely noted that he had 

previously issued an order upholding Sitka Counseling’s “possession of the property.” 

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40