In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 21, 2021 

S20G1214. STAR RESIDENTIAL, LLC et al. v. HERNANDEZ.

 MELTON, Chief Justice.

This case arises from an incident in which Manuel Hernandez 

was shot and seriously injured by unknown assailants as he 

approached the doorway to his apartment. Hernandez filed suit 

against the owner of the apartment complex, Terraces at 

Brookhaven, and the operator of the complex, Star Residential, LLC 

(collectively “Star Residential”), asserting, among other things, a 

nuisance claim under the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and 

Prevention Act, OCGA § 16-15-1 et seq. (the “Gang Act”). Hernandez 

claimed that he was entitled to treble damages (i.e., three times the 

actual damages he sustained in the shooting) and punitive damages

under OCGA § 16-15-7 (c) because his injuries occurred as a result 

of a criminal street gang creating a public nuisance on Star 
2

Residential’s property.1 See OCGA § 16-15-7 (a) (“Any real property 

which is erected, established, maintained, owned, leased, or used by 

any criminal street gang for the purpose of conducting criminal gang 

activity shall constitute a public nuisance and may be abated as 

provided by Title 41, relating to nuisances.”) and (c) (“Any person 

who is injured by reason of criminal gang activity shall have a cause 

of action for three times the actual damages sustained and, where 

appropriate, punitive damages[.]”). Star Residential moved to 

dismiss Hernandez’s nuisance claim but the trial court denied the 

motion.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the 

motion to dismiss, holding, in relevant part, that whether to hold a 

property owner liable under OCGA § 16-15-7 (c) of the Gang Act for 

maintaining a public nuisance is always a question for the factfinder

to decide, and not for the court. See Star Residential, LLC v. 

Hernandez, 354 Ga. App. 629, 633-634 (1) (841 SE2d 392) (2020)

 

1 There is no claim in this case that Star Residential was directly 

affiliated or involved with a street gang. Nor is there any allegation that Star 

Residential was involved in the shooting or engaged in criminal gang activity.
3

(“OCGA § 16-15-7 provides for a cause of action for treble damages 

to persons injured by reason of criminal gang activity if the 

factfinder determines that the action is consistent with the . . .

codified legislative intent [of the Gang Act]. . . . Thus, whether the 

present action is consistent with the intent set forth in OCGA § 16-

15-2 is not a threshold issue for courts to resolve[.]”). We granted 

Star Residential’s petition for a writ of certiorari to determine 

whether the Court of Appeals properly construed the civil liability 

provision of OCGA § 16-15-7 (c). For the reasons that follow, we 

conclude that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the statute is 

incorrect. Accordingly, we reverse.

1. In order to determine the proper meaning of § 16-15-7 (c) of 

the Gang Act, we examine the Act’s plain language, presuming 

that the General Assembly meant what it said and said 

what it meant. To that end, we must afford the statutory 

text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the 

statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we 

must read the statutory text in its most natural and 

reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English 

language would . . . [and] if the statutory text is clear and 

unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain 
4

meaning, and our search for statutory meaning is at an 

end.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 

172-173 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013). Additionally, “in construing 

language in any one part of a statute, a court should consider the 

entire scheme of the statute and attempt to gather the legislative 

intent from the statute as a whole.” (Citation and punctuation 

omitted.) Lyman v. Cellchem Int’l, Inc., 300 Ga. 475, 477 (796 SE2d 

255) (2017).

With these principles in mind, our analysis begins with a 

consideration of the relevant language contained in OCGA § 16-15-

7 of the Gang Act, which states:

(a) Any real property which is erected, established, 

maintained, owned, leased, or used by any criminal street 

gang for the purpose of conducting criminal gang activity 

shall constitute a public nuisance and may be abated as 

provided by Title 41, relating to nuisances.

(b) An action to abate a nuisance pursuant to this Code 

section may be brought by the district attorney, solicitorgeneral, prosecuting attorney of a municipal court or city, 

or county attorney in any superior, state, or municipal 

court.
5

(c) Any person who is injured by reason of criminal gang 

activity shall have a cause of action for three times the 

actual damages sustained and, where appropriate, 

punitive damages; provided, however, that no cause of 

action shall arise under this subsection as a result of an 

otherwise legitimate commercial transaction between 

parties to a contract or agreement for the sale of lawful 

goods or property or the sale of securities regulated by 

Chapter 5 of Title 10 or by the federal Securities and 

Exchange Commission. Such person shall also recover 

attorney’s fees in the trial and appellate court and costs 

of investigation and litigation reasonably incurred. All 

averments of a cause of action under this subsection shall 

be stated with particularity. No judgment shall be 

awarded unless the finder of fact determines that the 

action is consistent with the intent of the General 

Assembly as set forth in Code Section 16-15-2.

(d) The state, any political subdivision thereof, or any 

person aggrieved by a criminal street gang or criminal 

gang activity may bring an action to enjoin violations of 

this chapter in the same manner as provided in Code 

Section 16-14-6 [Civil Remedies under the Georgia 

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act].

Read as a whole, OCGA § 16-15-7 provides different causes of 

action for different remedies with different plaintiffs and 

defendants. The first such cause of action is for nuisance, which is 

covered under subsections (a) and (b). In this regard, OCGA § 16-15-

7 (a) states:
6

Any real property which is erected, established, 

maintained, owned, leased, or used by any criminal street 

gang for the purpose of conducting criminal gang activity 

shall constitute a public nuisance and may be abated as 

provided by Title 41, relating to nuisances.

(Emphasis supplied).

Subsection (a) says nothing about civil damages. It does not 

create an ability for any party to pursue an action for damages 

arising from a public nuisance created by criminal gang activity. To 

the contrary, the subsection speaks only in terms of abatement of a 

public nuisance.2 See, e.g., Superior Farm Mgmt. v. Montgomery, 

270 Ga. 615, 615 (513 SE2d 215) (1999) (action in abatement 

involves temporary and permanent injunctive relief to halt activity 

that is causing nuisance). The Gang Act then goes on in subsection 

(b) to identify the plaintiffs who may pursue an action for 

abatement:

 

2 Hernandez points to OCGA § 41-1-3, which allows an individual to 

pursue a cause of action for nuisance damages “if a public nuisance in which 

the public does not participate causes special damage to [that] individual.” 

However, his reliance on OCGA § 41-1-3 is misplaced, as the general provisions 

on nuisance contained in Chapter 1 of Title 41 have nothing to do with the 

abatement procedures contained in Chapter 2 of Title 41.
7

An action to abate a nuisance pursuant to this Code 

section may be brought by the district attorney, solicitorgeneral, prosecuting attorney of a municipal court or city, 

or county attorney in any superior, state, or municipal 

court.

(Emphasis supplied).

As in subsection (a), there is no mention in subsection (b) of the 

availability of civil damages. And, with respect to the remedy that 

is available under subsection (a) – abatement – private individuals 

are not listed as proper parties under subsection (b) to pursue such 

a remedy under the Gang Act.3 The specific entities listed as proper 

parties to pursue abatement are “the district attorney, solicitorgeneral, prosecuting attorney of a municipal court or city, or county 

 

3 Under Chapter 2 of Title 41, “[p]rivate citizens may not generally 

interfere to have a public nuisance abated. A complaint must be filed by the 

district attorney, solicitor-general, city attorney, or county attorney on behalf 

of the public. However, a public nuisance may be abated upon filing of a 

complaint by any private citizen specially injured.” OCGA § 41-2-2. While 

OCGA § 16-15-7 (b) lists many of the same entities referenced in OCGA § 41-

2-2 as proper plaintiffs to pursue an action for abatement under the Gang Act, 

OCGA § 16-15-7 (b) also contains some significant differences from OCGA § 41-

2-2. Specifically, OCGA § 16-15-7 (b) adds the “prosecuting attorney of a 

municipal court or city” to the list of potential plaintiffs who may file a 

complaint to abate a nuisance under the Gang Act, but deletes from that list 

the “city attorney” referenced in OCGA § 41-2-2. Furthermore, unlike OCGA § 

41-2-2, OCGA § 16-15-7 (b) does not contain any reference to specially injured 

individuals being allowed to pursue an action for abatement. 
8

attorney.” This demonstrates that the General Assembly intended 

that private individuals would not be able to pursue an action for 

abatement under the Gang Act. See Turner v. Ga. River Network, 

297 Ga. 306, 308 (773 SE2d 706) (2015) (Some “longstanding tenets 

of statutory construction [are] expressio unius est exclusio alterius

(expression of one thing implies exclusion of another) and expressum 

facit cessare tacitum (if some things are expressly mentioned, the 

inference is stronger that those not mentioned were intended to be 

excluded.”)) (citation omitted; emphasis in original). Thus, under the 

plain terms of subsections (a) and (b), Hernandez cannot pursue any 

form of damages or abatement in connection with a public nuisance 

created by criminal gang activity. 

Separate from the nuisance abatement action created by 

subsections (a) and (b) for certain public officials, the next cause of 

action created by OCGA § 16-15-7 is defined in subsection (c). That 

subsection provides that “[a]ny person who is injured by reason of 

criminal gang activity shall have a cause of action for three times 

the actual damages sustained and, where appropriate, punitive 
9

damages.” (Emphasis supplied). In other words, a cause of action 

under subsection (c) must result from criminal gang activity, which 

is defined as

the commission, attempted commission, conspiracy to 

commit, or the solicitation, coercion, or intimidation of 

another person to commit any of the following offenses on 

or after July 1, 2006:

(A) Any offense defined as racketeering activity by Code 

Section 16-14-3;

(B) Any offense defined in Article 7 of Chapter 5 of this 

title, relating to stalking;

(C) Any offense defined in Code Section 16-6-1 as rape, 16-

6-2 as aggravated sodomy, 16-6-3 as statutory rape, or 16-

6-22.2 as aggravated sexual battery;

(D) Any offense defined in Article 3 of Chapter 10 of this 

title, relating to escape and other offenses related to 

confinement;

(E) Any offense defined in Article 4 of Chapter 11 of this 

title, relating to dangerous instrumentalities and 

practices;

(F) Any offense defined in Code Section 42-5-15, 42-5-16, 

42-5-17, 42-5-18, or 42-5-19, relating to the security of 

state or county correctional facilities;

(G) Any offense defined in Code Section 49-4A-11, relating 

to aiding or encouraging a child to escape from custody;

(H) Any offense of criminal trespass or criminal damage 

to property resulting from any act of gang related 

painting on, tagging, marking on, writing on, or creating 

any form of graffiti on the property of another;

(I) Any criminal offense committed in violation of the laws 

of the United States or its territories, dominions, or 

possessions, any of the several states, or any foreign 
10

nation which, if committed in this state, would be 

considered criminal gang activity under this Code section; 

and

(J) Any criminal offense in the State of Georgia, any other 

state, or the United States that involves violence, 

possession of a weapon, or use of a weapon, whether 

designated as a felony or not, and regardless of the 

maximum sentence that could be imposed or actually was 

imposed.

(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 16-15-3 (1).

Consistent with the manner in which we have interpreted the 

language “by reason of” in similar statutory contexts, the plain 

language of subsection (c) indicates that an injured person may 

pursue a cause of action for treble and, where appropriate, punitive 

damages against the actors who proximately caused the plaintiff’s 

injuries by reason of their criminal gang activity. Cf. Vernon v. 

Assurance Forensic Accounting, LLC, 333 Ga. App. 377, 391-93 (4) 

(2015) (plaintiff injured “by reason of” criminal racketeering 

activities must show that the defendant who engaged in the illegal 

racketeering activities proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries). 

In this case, however, there is no allegation that Star Residential 

itself committed, attempted to commit, conspired to commit, or 
11

solicited, coerced, or intimidated another person to commit any of 

the criminal gang activity that injured Hernandez. Accordingly, 

Hernandez cannot maintain a cause of action against Star 

Residential under subsection (c) as a matter of law.

In reaching its erroneous conclusion that Hernandez could 

maintain a nuisance cause of action under subsection (c), the Court 

of Appeals improperly grafted the terms of subsections (a) and (b) 

onto subsection (c) even though, as explained above, these 

subsections describe entirely separate causes of action. Subsections 

(a) and (b) describe the nature of a public nuisance created by 

criminal gang activity and provide procedures for specific public 

officials to abate that nuisance, whereas subsection (c) provides a 

private cause of action for damages against the members and 

associates of criminal street gangs who proximately cause a 

plaintiff’s injury through criminal gang activity.4 There is no cause 

 

4 The fact that subsection (c) provides a separate remedy from the 

abatement remedy referenced in subsections (a) and (b) is underscored by the 

final section of OCGA § 16-15-7. Subsection (d) establishes yet another cause 

of action for a different set of plaintiffs with the remedy of injunction, providing 

that
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of action for abatement available to Hernandez under subsections 

(a) and (b), nor does any viable cause of action against Star 

Residential exist under the separate provisions of subsection (c) 

under the facts alleged in this case.

Thus, with regard to the nuisance claim alleged by Hernandez, 

because the Gang Act does not establish a cause of action for 

damages under subsection (c) arising from a public nuisance created 

by gang activity as defined under subsections (a) and (b), the Court 

 

[t]he state, any political subdivision thereof, or any person 

aggrieved by a criminal street gang or criminal gang activity may 

bring an action to enjoin violations of this chapter in the same 

manner as provided in Code Section 16-14-6 [civil remedies for 

violations of Georgia’s RICO Act].

Subsection (d) allows individuals aggrieved by a criminal gang or criminal 

gang activity (as well as governmental entities) to enjoin violations of the Gang 

Act in the same manner that individuals can enjoin violations of the RICO Act. 

This includes obtaining an order from a superior court that would require a 

defendant to divest himself of any interest in a criminal enterprise, impose 

restrictions on the defendant’s future investments, order the dissolution of an 

enterprise, order the revocation of an enterprise’s license to operate in the 

state, or order the forfeiture of a company’s charter. See OCGA § 16-14-6 (a). 

The authority for individuals to enjoin certain activities provided in subsection 

(d) has nothing to do with the abatement of a nuisance by public officials 

provided in subsections (a) and (b), nor does it have anything to do with 

damages as provided in subsection (c). The terms of subsection (d) cannot be 

rationally grafted onto the terms of subsections (a) to (c). The plain language 

of OCGA § 16-15-7 makes clear that the statute provides for several separate 

remedies in its separate subsections.
13

of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise. We cannot read beyond 

the plain language of the Gang Act to create a private civil cause of 

action for nuisance damages under subsection (c) where none exists. 

See, e.g., You v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 293 Ga. 67, 75 (4) (743 

SE2d 428) (2013) (“As members of this State’s judicial branch, it is 

our duty to interpret the laws as they are written.”); State v. Fielden, 

280 Ga. 444, 448 (629 SE2d 252) (2006) (“[U]nder our system of 

separation of powers this Court does not have the authority to 

rewrite statutes.”).

2. The Court of Appeals also erred in its interpretation of the 

following language of OCGA § 16-15-7 (c):

No judgment shall be awarded unless the finder of fact 

determines that the action is consistent with the intent of 

the General Assembly as set forth in Code Section 16-15-

2.

(Emphasis supplied).

The Court of Appeals reasoned that this language indicated 

that “it is for the factfinder to determine whether [a cause of] action 

is consistent with the legislative intent expressed in OCGA § 16-15-
14

2.” (Emphasis in original.) Star Residential, supra, 354 Ga. App. at 

634 (1). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals determined that whether 

Hernadez’s cause of action was “consistent with the intent set forth 

in OCGA § 16-15-2 [was] not a threshold issue for courts to resolve,” 

and that the court had to “give effect to that policy choice” of the 

General Assembly. Id. This reasoning is incorrect.

As an initial matter, “[o]ur well established rules of statutory 

interpretation require courts to ascertain the legislature’s intent in 

enacting the law in question.” (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Inagawa v. Fayette County, 291 Ga. 715, 717 (1) (732 SE2d 421)

(2012). And, there is nothing in the language of subsection (c) to 

indicate that the General Assembly intended for a jury to usurp the 

judiciary’s role of determining the meaning of the statute at issue. 

The plain language of subsection (c) states that no judgment shall 

be awarded under the subsection unless the cause of action 

presented to the factfinder is consistent with the legislative intent 

of the statute. This means only that, once a legally appropriate cause 

of action is submitted to the factfinder for decision, that factfinder 
15

must be instructed on the legislative intent codified in OCGA § 16-

15-2 in order to determine if the circumstances of the case warrant 

the imposition of liability under OCGA § 16-15-7 (c).5 The statute 

simply does not say that a factfinder must determine the meaning

of subsection (c) in the first instance, which is a role reserved for the 

courts.6

Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

 

5 In this regard, OCGA § 16-15-2 acts as a limit on the scope of conduct

for which defendants may be held liable for damages under OCGA § 16-15-7 

(c). For example, pursuant to OCGA § 16-15-2 (a):

It is not the intent of this chapter to interfere with the exercise of 

the constitutionally protected rights of freedom of expression and 

association. The General Assembly recognizes the constitutional 

right of every citizen to harbor and express beliefs on any lawful 

subject whatsoever, to associate lawfully with others who share 

similar beliefs, to petition lawfully constituted authority for a 

redress of perceived grievances, and to participate in the electoral 

process.

6 No other business. . . .