J-S15013-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ADAM QUENTIN MICHAEL

Appellant No. 1254 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 25, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-SA-0000151-2014

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED APRIL 15, 2015

Adam Quentin Michael appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, following his 

conviction for driving under suspension.1 Upon careful review, we reverse.

On September 23, 2013, Patrolman Todd E. Wise of the Northern York 

County Regional Police Department initiated a traffic stop after he observed 

Michael make an illegal U-turn. While issuing a citation for the one-way 

violation, Officer Wise learned that Michael’s license was suspended. 

Accordingly, Officer Wise also cited Michael for driving under a suspended 

license.

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1 75 P.S. § 1543(a).
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On February 4, 2014, Michael pled guilty before the Magisterial District 

Court to both offenses. Thereafter, Michael filed a summary appeal on the 

driving under a suspended license charge.

On June 25, 2014, the court held a hearing de novo. Officer Wise 

testified on behalf of the Commonwealth that Michael’s driving privileges had 

initially been suspended because he failed to renew his inspection. The 

Commonwealth introduced into evidence a copy of the citation issued to 

Michael following the vehicle stop and a certified copy of Michael’s driving 

record. Michael also testified on his own behalf, claiming that he never 

received notice that his license was suspended. Following the testimony, the 

court convicted Michael of driving under a suspended license.

On June 30, 2013, Michael filed a motion for reconsideration of verdict 

with the trial court. When the trial court did not respond, Michael filed a 

notice of appeal on July 22, 2013. On August 3, 2014, the trial court issued 

an order to schedule argument, but later concluded that it lacked jurisdiction 

over Michael’s case and filed its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on October 16, 

2014. In its opinion, the trial court conceded that the evidence was 

insufficient. Relying on Commonwealth v. Crockford, 660 A.2d 1326 (Pa. 

Super. 1995), the court held, “upon further review of the evidence 

presented, along with relevant case law, the trial court has determined that 

despite the evidence of mailing of the Notice presented by the 

Commonwealth, there is insufficient additional evidence of knowledge to 
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establish notice of the suspension beyond a reasonable doubt.” Trial Court 

Opinion, 10/16/14, at 3. 

On appeal, Michael presents a single issue for our review: whether the 

Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence that he had notice his license 

was suspended. When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the 

evidence, our standard of review is as follows:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

[finder] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses 

and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, 

part or none of the evidence.

Further, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the court must give 

the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be 

drawn from the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Harden, 103 A.3d 107 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations 

omitted).
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The offense of driving while operating privileges are suspended or 

revoked is defined as follows:

A person who drives a motor vehicle on a highway or trafficway 

of this Commonwealth at a time when the person’s operating 

privilege is suspended or revoked as a condition of acceptance of 

Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition for a violation of section 

3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled 

substance) or the former section 3731, because of a violation of 

section 1547(b)(1) (relating to suspension for refusal) or 3802 

or former section 3731 or is suspended under section 1581 

(relating to Driver’s License Compact) for an offense 

substantially similar to a violation of section 3802 or former 

section 3731 shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a summary 

offense and shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $500 and to 

undergo imprisonment for a period of not less than 60 days nor 

more than 90 days.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1).

Regarding notice of license suspension, our Supreme Court held in 

Commonwealth v. Kane, 333 A.2d 925, 927 (Pa. 1975), that it is 

necessary for the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant had actual 

notice of a suspension in order to sustain a conviction of driving while under 

suspension. Since the rule in Kane was announced, this Court has found 

numerous factors2that, in conjunction with evidence that a notice was 

____________________________________________

2 Such factors include, but are not limited to: evidence that the defendant 

was verbally or in writing apprised of the license suspension during the trial 

or a plea, statements by the accused indicating knowledge that he or she 

was driving during the period in which his or her license had been 

suspended, evidence that PennDOT sent by mail the notice of the suspension 

to appellant’s current address, evidence that PennDOT’s notice of suspension 

was not returned as undeliverable, attempts by the accused to avoid 

detection or a citation, and any other conduct demonstrating circumstantially 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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mailed, satisfy the element of actual notice. See Crockford, 660 A.2d at 

1330-31 (“[t]he Commonwealth is required to establish actual notice which 

may take the form of a collection of facts and circumstances that allow the 

fact finder to infer that a defendant has knowledge of suspension.”)

Instantly, the Commonwealth presented only one piece of evidence 

regarding notice – Michael’s Certified Driving History, which indicates that 

notice of the suspension was mailed on June 19, 2013. The address listed 

on the Certified Driving History matches the address Michael provided Officer 

Wise during the traffic stop. Accordingly, the Commonwealth established 

that notice of the suspension was mailed to Michael’s current address. 

However, this is insufficient to establish actual notice of suspension. See 

Kane, 333 A.2d at 927 (evidence offered to prove actual notice insufficient 

where only evidence of actual notice was notice of suspension mailed to 

defendant). Because the Commonwealth was unable to prove Michael had 

actual notice of the suspension, we determine that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion when it concluded the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain a conviction for driving while license suspended. Harden, supra.

Judgment of sentence reversed.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

or directly appellant's knowledge of the suspension or awareness of guilt. 

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dietz, 621 A.2d 160, 162 (Pa. Super. 1993).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/15/2015