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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

September 5, 2019 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE V. REUBEN EUGENE MITCHELL

Appeal by Permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals 

Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 102034 Steven W. Sword, Judge

No. E2017-01739-SC-R11-CD

The defendant, Reuben Eugene Mitchell, was convicted of one count of arson and one 

count of presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim. The Court of Criminal Appeals 

affirmed the defendant’s arson conviction but reversed his conviction for presenting a 

false or fraudulent insurance claim. We granted the State’s application to appeal to 

address whether the proof at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for 

presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim. Our review leads us to conclude that the 

evidence was sufficient. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of 

Criminal Appeals and reinstate the defendant’s conviction for presenting a false or 

fraudulent insurance claim. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission;

Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed in Part,

Reversed in Part; Judgments of the Trial Court Affirmed

ROGER A. PAGE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS, C.J., 

and CORNELIA A. CLARK, SHARON G. LEE, and HOLLY KIRBY,JJ., joined. 

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor 

General; Katherine C. Redding, Assistant Attorney General; Randall E. Nichols, District 

Attorney General; and William C. Bright and Andrea Kline, Assistant District Attorneys

General, for the appellant, the State of Tennessee.

Joshua D. Hedrick, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Reuben Eugene Mitchell.

12/20/2019
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OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After a fire caused extensive damage to his house, the defendant was charged with 

one count of arson1and one count of presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim.2 

At the ensuing jury trial, the following evidence was adduced.

On November 30, 2011, the defendant applied to Allstate Property and Casualty 

Insurance Company (“Allstate”) for a homeowner’s insurance policy. On December 1, 

2011, Allstate issued the homeowner’s policy, number 9 63 861797, naming the 

defendant as the insured and the defendant’s residence as the insured dwelling (“the 

Policy”). A copy of the Policy, which covered the house, “other structures,” personal 

property, and “additional living expense,” was admitted into evidence. As to the 

dwelling, the Policy covered “sudden and accidental direct physical loss.” It also 

provided liability protection. 

In the portion titled “Section I Conditions,” beginning on page 16, the Policy 

contains multiple provisions directing what the insured “Must Do After A Loss.” One of

the requirements is to “immediately give” Allstate or its agent “notice.” Also required, 

“within 60 days after the loss,” is a “signed, sworn proof of the loss” including “the 

actual cash value and amount of loss for each item damaged, destroyed or stolen.” 

Nowhere in the criteria for “What You Must Do After A Loss” is the insured required to 

“file” a “claim” for a loss resulting from fire damage.

On the evening of December 5, 2011, just a few days after the Policy was issued, a 

fire caused extensive damage to the living room area of the defendant’s residence. The 

defendant was not at home, and neighbors called the fire department. Although the fire 

had been extinguished, the defendant called the fire department after he arrived home the 

morning after the fire. The defendant, who testified at trial, also called Allstate and told 

Allstate that there had been a house fire. He acknowledged that he called Allstate “to 

report the loss” and that his call was to “start the process to file a claim.” However, the 

defendant also testified that he did not fill out any claim forms for Allstate, and he denied 

telling anyone at Allstate that he wanted to be paid for a property loss or that he wanted 

 

1 The indictment charged that the defendant “did knowingly damage, by fire a structure . . . 

without the consent of all persons having a possessory and proprietary interest in said structure[.]” See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-301(a)(1) (2010) (defining arson as “knowingly damag[ing] any structure by 

means of a fire or explosion . . . [w]ithout the consent of all persons who have a possessory, proprietary or 

security interest therein”). 

2 The indictment charged that the defendant “did unlawfully and intentionally present and cause 

to be presented to Allstate Insurance Company, a false and fraudulent claim for the payment of a loss 

upon a contract of insurance coverage for property located at” the address of his residence. See Tenn.

Code Ann. § 39-14-133 (2010). 
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Allstate to make repairs. He stated that he did not fill out a list of property that he lost 

and wanted replaced but added that an Allstate representative did so.

 

After reporting the fire, the defendant met with two Allstate representatives, Mr. 

David Gray and Ms. Heather Stover. According to Mr. Gray, a “large loss adjuster,” the 

defendant told Mr. Gray that “he had been home, and he had had a fire going in the 

fireplace and had to leave the home and shortly after he left, the fire took place in the 

home.”

On December 9, 2011, Ms. Stover, a “large loss contents adjuster,” presented the 

defendant with a document titled “Advance Payment Agreement” and a check for $1,000. 

The Advance Payment Agreement, signed by the defendant on December 9, 2011, was 

admitted into evidence. This document references “Claim No.: 0228336426” and “Policy 

No.: 000963861797.” It also lists the defendant as the “Policyholder(s),” the defendant’s 

residence as the “Address of Insured Property,” and “[f]ire” as the “Type of Damage.” 

The Advance Payment Agreement further provides as follows:

In consideration of the advance payment described below, the 

policyholder(s) (“you”) and Allstate (“we”) agree as follows:

Before any benefit can be paid under this policy, you have an 

obligation to fully comply with all policy requirements in submitting the 

claim. We have an obligation to investigate and determine if the policy is 

valid, if the claim is valid and the extent of coverage that may be applicable 

to the loss, if any. We will continue to investigate the claim. If there are 

requirements in the policy which you have not yet completed, you need to 

comply with those requirements.

In the meantime, in good faith and to prevent any undue hardship 

which this loss may cause you, we advance $1,000.00 on the loss under the 

following terms and conditions:

1) that this advance shall not be considered payment under any 

portion of the policy;

2) that if either the policy or the claim is not valid and payment is 

not required by us, you will repay the advance; and

3) we, in making this advance, reserve and do not waive any right or 

requirement under the policy described above, whether procedural or 

substantive. 
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By signing this agreement, you accept the advance payment fully 

understanding that we reserve all rights and requirements under the policy 

described above, including the right to receive from you proper notice and 

proof of loss, and the right to ask you to take an examination under oath. If 

the claim is honored, we may apply the advance against any benefit due 

under the policy, and if it is determined that any part of the policy or the 

claim is not valid, and no payment is due, you will repay the advance to us 

in full.

The parties hereby acknowledge and agree to the terms set forth 

above.

(Emphases added). The defendant acknowledged taking the $1,000 payment and signing 

the Advance Payment Agreement. 

When questioned about the Advance Payment Agreement, Ms. Stover explained: 

“When we have a customer who has had a fire claim with extensive damage, we offer an 

advance payment just for them to start getting some of the things they need right away, 

and it’s taken off of their total settlement if and when we pay the claim.” She added that 

“any time we do have a fire claim that’s extensive damage such as this one, we do offer 

an advance payment just for people to get started replacing some of their personal 

property.” Asked about the process following an advance payment, Ms. Stover further

explained: 

Well, normally, we . . . prepare estimates. We have to do an investigation; 

our cause and origin begins the investigation. And if everything comes 

back okay with the investigation, then we proceed with paying the claim,

but in this situation, it went to our special investigations unit and when it 

does that, . . . it’s removed from the adjuster’s handling and into the special 

investigations unit where they do a more extensive investigation.

According to Ms. Stover, at the time she delivered the check to the defendant, 

“everything had been done to start the processing of the claim.” She reiterated that any 

advance payment would be deducted from the total proceeds payable on a valid claim. If 

no valid claim were eventually processed, the advance payment would have to be repaid 

by the recipient. On cross-examination, Ms. Stover asserted that the advance payment 

was “issued in good faith that we will pay the claim.” She also acknowledged that she 

did not receive a claim form or a signed, sworn proof of loss document from the 

defendant. 

Allstate hired EFI Global, a nationwide company that conducted investigations 

into the causes and origins of fires, to investigate the cause and origin of the fire. Gary 

M. Young, an investigator with EFI Global, reported to the scene and spoke with the 
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defendant. The defendant acknowledged speaking with Mr. Young over the phone and 

stated that Mr. Young told him that Allstate “wanted to investigate [the fire] first before 

they file a claim.” 

Mr. Young subsequently prepared a written report about the cause of the fire, 

dated December 30, 2011 (“the Report”). A copy of the Report was admitted into 

evidence, and in it, Mr. Young opined that “this fire was intentionally precipitated, by 

introducing accelerant underneath and behind the loveseat in the living room, and then 

igniting the accelerant with a manually and intentionally introduced ignition source.” 

The Report also noted: “I questioned [the defendant] as to whether or not he has any 

opinion as to the cause for this fire loss. He revealed that it is his opinion that this fire 

was apparently caused by some problem with the wood burning fireplace.” 

E. Metts Hardy of EFI Global, the Vice President of fire investigations for EFI 

Global, reviewed and signed the Report. Because Mr. Young was deceased by the time 

of trial, Mr. Hardy testified about EFI’s investigation. The trial court recognized Mr. 

Hardy as “an expert in the area of origin and cause relating to fires.” Mr. Hardy opined at 

trial that the fire had been intentionally set and had not originated in the fireplace. Based 

on this information, Allstate did not pay the defendant any further money under the 

Policy. Rather, this prosecution commenced on December 28, 2011, less than a month 

after the fire. Allstate cancelled the Policy on February 14, 2012. 

The defendant offered a different explanation of the fire. He explained that, due to 

his failure to pay his bills, both water and electricity to the house had been cut off weeks 

before the fire. On the evening of December 5, he arrived home during the early evening 

and began a fire in the fireplace. He started the fire with a small starter log, some 

kindling wood, and starter gel. He stated that there were no large pieces of wood in the 

fireplace when he began the fire.

After starting the fire, the defendant claimed that he received a phone call 

informing him that his sister was critically ill. He “went into panic mode” and, to 

extinguish the fire, he “grabbed some wet logs” and threw the wet logs into the fireplace. 

He explained that the logs had been out in the rain all week and he thought that they 

would put out the fire he started. He stated that, after he threw the wet logs into the 

fireplace, it “looked like” the fire was extinguished. He then left the house.

The defendant claimed that he drove to his sister’s house, where she was being 

prepared for transport in an ambulance. He followed the ambulance to the hospital and 

did not leave until the next morning. He did not realize that his house had caught fire 

until his return home on December 6, 2011. As to the presence of an accelerant, the 

defendant explained that he had recently refinished the living room floor and used 

polyurethane, a flammable substance.
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After considering the evidence, the jury rejected the defendant’s explanation of the 

fire and convicted him of arson. The jury also convicted the defendant of presenting a 

false or fraudulent insurance claim in the amount of $10,000 or more but less than 

$60,000. After a subsequent hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, 

standard offender to four years of incarceration on each conviction, to be served 

concurrently and suspended to supervised probation. 

The defendant appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the 

defendant’s conviction of arson. State v. Mitchell, No. E2017-01739-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 

WL 6439502, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2018). However, a majority of the Court 

of Criminal Appeals panel concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the 

false or fraudulent insurance claim conviction and, therefore, reversed that conviction and 

dismissed the charge. Id. We granted the State’s ensuing application for permission to 

appeal to address whether the proof at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s 

conviction for presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard for appellate review of a claim challenging the sufficiency of the 

State’s evidence is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (citing 

Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972)); see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); State v. 

Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tenn. 2011). To obtain relief on a claim of insufficient 

evidence, the defendant must demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 319. This standard of review is identical whether the conviction is predicated on 

direct or circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both. State v. Dorantes, 331 

S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (citing State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 

2009)); State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1977) (quoting Farmer v. State, 343 

S.W.2d 895, 896 (Tenn. 1961)). 

On appellate review, “‘we afford the prosecution the strongest legitimate view of 

the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn 

therefrom.’” Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729 (quoting State v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 857 

(Tenn. 2010)); see also State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). In a jury 

trial, questions involving the credibility of witnesses and the weight and value to be given 

the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence, are resolved by the jury 

as trier of fact. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Pruett, 788 

S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990) (citations omitted). This Court presumes that the jury has 

afforded the State all reasonable inferences from the evidence and resolved all conflicts 

in the testimony in favor of the State; as such, we will not substitute our own inferences 

drawn from the evidence for those drawn by the jury, nor will we re-weigh or re-evaluate 
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the evidence. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 379; State v. Lewter, 313 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Tenn. 

2010); Liakas v. State, 286 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tenn. 1956). Because a jury conviction 

removes the presumption of innocence that the defendant enjoyed at trial and replaces it 

with one of guilt at the appellate level, the burden of proof shifts from the State to the 

convicted defendant, who must demonstrate to this Court that the evidence is insufficient 

to support the jury’s findings. Davis, 354 S.W.3d at 729 (quoting State v. Sisk, 343 

S.W.3d 60, 65 (Tenn. 2011)).

III. ANALYSIS

In conducting our sufficiency review, we must evaluate the proof in light of the 

elements of the crime. See State v. Gentry, 538 S.W.3d 413, 420 (Tenn. 2017) 

(recognizing that the first step of a sufficiency review is to “‘examine the relevant 

statute(s) in order to determine the elements’ of the offense that must be proven by the 

prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt” (quoting State v. Stephens, 521 S.W.3d 718, 

723-24 (Tenn. 2017)). Accordingly, our review of the evidence in this case depends 

upon our construction of the false or fraudulent insurance claims statute, Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 39-14-133, which provides:

Any person who intentionally presents or causes to be presented a 

false or fraudulent claim, or any proof in support of such claim, for the 

payment of a loss, or other benefits, upon any contract of insurance 

coverage, or automobile comprehensive or collision insurance, or certificate 

of such insurance or prepares, makes or subscribes to a false or fraudulent 

account, certificate, affidavit or proof of loss, or other documents or 

writing, with intent that the same may be presented or used in support of 

such claim, is punished as in the case of theft.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-133 (2010).

When engaging in statutory interpretation, “well-defined precepts apply.” State v. 

McNack, 356 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tenn. 2011). “The most basic principle of statutory 

construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly 

restricting or expanding a statute’s coverage beyond its intended scope.” Owens v. State, 

908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995) (citing State v. Sliger, 846 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tenn. 

1993)); see also Carter v. Bell, 279 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn. 2009) (citing State v. 

Sherman, 266 S.W.3d 395, 401 (Tenn. 2008)). In construing statutes, Tennessee law 

provides that courts are to avoid a construction that leads to absurd results. Tennessean v. 

Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 485 S.W.3d 857, 872 (Tenn. 2016). “Furthermore, the 

‘common law is not displaced by a legislative enactment, except to the extent required by 

the statute itself.’” Wlodarz v. State, 361 S.W.3d 490, 496 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting 

Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Tenn. 2002)), abrogated on 

other grounds by Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2016). “When statutory 
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language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply its plain meaning in its normal and 

accepted use, without a forced interpretation that would extend the meaning of the 

language . . . .” Carter, 279 S.W.3d at 564 (citations omitted).

The false insurance claim statute criminalizes two courses of conduct. The 

elements of the first prohibited course of conduct are as follows: (1) intentionally; (2) 

presenting or causing to be presented; (3) a false or fraudulent; (4) claim or any proof in 

support of such claim; (5) for the payment of a loss or other benefit; (6) upon any 

contract of insurance coverage. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-133. The elements of the 

second prohibited course of conduct are as follows: (1) preparing, making, or 

subscribing to; (2) a false or fraudulent; (3) account, certificate, affidavit or proof of loss, 

or other documents or writing; (4) with intent; (5) that the same may be presented or used 

in support of; (6) a claim for the payment of a loss or other benefit; (7) upon any contract 

of insurance coverage. See id. The defendant was charged with engaging in the first 

prohibited course of conduct. 

The majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals panel held that the proof was 

insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of this offense because “[t]he defendant

legally, and under the policy, did not initiate a claim because he did not file the necessary 

and required documentation pursuant to the policy, including a proof of loss, in the 

requisite time period.” Mitchell, 2018 WL 6439502, at *12. The intermediate appellate 

court relied on the Policy’s technical requirements attendant upon filing a claim and 

concluded that “the defendant in this case did not meet the conditions precedent to filing 

a claim.” Id. The majority reasoned, 

While the defendant made Allstate aware that there had been a fire, he did 

not file any documentation to support his filing of a claim for the initiation 

of a claim. Further, he did not comply with the requirements for filing a

claim because he did not file a proof of loss. For the same reasons that 

Allstate could have denied the defendant coverage for not adequately filing 

a claim, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support that he 

fraudulently filed an insurance claim against Allstate.

Mitchell, 2018 WL 6439502, at *12 (emphasis added). The majority dismissed the 

significance of the Advance Payment Agreement that the defendant signed and the 

$1,000 advance payment that Allstate made to the defendant thereunder on the basis that, 

“[b]y the plain language of the agreement[,] the $1,000 is an advance, and not part of the 

coverage pursuant to the policy.” Id. 

Judge John Everett Williams dissented from the majority’s holding that the 

evidence was not sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for presenting a false or 

fraudulent insurance claim, reasoning as follows:
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The majority reasons that the defendant did not initiate a claim 

because he did not submit the documentation required to file a claim under 

the insurance policy, including a proof of loss, in the requisite time period. 

In my opinion, the language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-

133, which criminalizes insurance fraud, is broad and does not limit a 

conviction for the offense to those instances in which a defendant has 

adhered to the provisions and niceties of the insurance policy. Under the 

majority’s analysis, an insurance company may determine what constitutes 

a criminal offense for filing a false insurance claim through its provisions in 

its insurance policies. Had the legislature intended for insurance companies 

to have such authority, the legislature would have stated so in the statute.

Mitchell, 2018 WL 6439502, at *13 (Williams, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 

part). We agree with Judge Williams’ reasoning.

Initially, we note that, as defined in our criminal code: “‘Fraud’ means as used in 

normal parlance and includes, but is not limited to, deceit, trickery, misrepresentation and 

subterfuge, and shall be broadly construed to accomplish the purposes of” the criminal 

code. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(13) (2010). 

The false or fraudulent insurance claims statute does not define the word “claim.” 

However, when a statute does not define one of its terms, we may turn to other sources 

for guidance, including Black’s Law Dictionary. See, e.g., State v. Edmondson, 231 

S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tenn. 2007) (“When the Legislature does not provide a specific 

definition for a statutory term, this Court may look to other sources, including Black’s 

Law Dictionary, for guidance.”); see also, e.g., State v. Fitz, 19 S.W.3d 213, 216 (Tenn. 

2000) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for guidance in construing the word “violence” 

as used in the robbery statutes). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “claim,” as apposite in 

this context, as “[t]he assertion of an existing right; any right to payment or to an 

equitable remedy, even if contingent or provisional.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 

2019), available at Westlaw BLACKS. In addition, Black’s offers a subordinate 

definition of “insurance claim”: “A policyholder’s formal report to an insurance company 

about a loss with a request for a payment based on the insurance policy’s terms.” Id.

Significantly, the statute does not use the term “insurance claim.” Rather, it uses 

the much broader term, “claim.” Moreover, as Judge Williams recognized, the statute is 

drafted very broadly. The statute’s clear and unambiguous intent is to criminalize a

person’s intentional efforts to obtain monies under an insurance contract through the 

presentation of false or fraudulent information to the insurer. The statute does not require 

any precise methodology that a person must follow in his efforts to convince an insurance 

company, through the provision of false or fraudulent information, to pay him money

under an insurance policy. The statute certainly does not criminalize some 
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methodologies and not others based on the technical requirements of different insurance 

policies. 

In this case, the Policy required the defendant to submit a written proof of loss 

within sixty days of the loss. Well within that time frame, however, Allstate concluded 

that the fire was not a covered loss. Therefore, any proof of loss subsequently submitted 

by the defendant would have been pointless. More importantly, within a few days of the 

fire, the defendant made sufficient verbal representations to Allstate to cause Allstate to 

assign a claim number to the alleged loss and to make an advance payment of $1,000 to 

the defendant, pending further investigation. The defendant accepted this payment and 

signed the Advance Payment Agreement, which refers repeatedly to “the claim.” The 

defendant’s words and actions represented to Allstate that the fire was a covered loss 

under the Policy, that is, a “sudden and accidental direct physical loss” to the defendant’s 

house and its contents. (Emphasis added). Thus, it can certainly be inferred that the 

defendant was claiming that the fire was accidental based on his conduct in this case.

The defendant’s signature on the Advance Payment Agreement also indicated that 

he understood that the advance payment was provisional pending further investigation of 

his claim prior to an eventual payment under the Policy. The Court of Criminal Appeals’ 

majority opinion emphasized that, because the $1,000 delivered to the defendant pursuant 

to this Agreement “shall not be considered payment under any portion of the policy,” the 

$1,000 was not payment of a claim under the Policy. This interpretation elevates form 

over substance. The common-sense construction of the Advance Payment Agreement is 

that it enabled Allstate to alleviate an insured’s immediate financial concerns resulting 

from an alleged covered loss while also allowing it to investigate the alleged loss and 

determine whether a covered loss had been established. If Allstate then determined that 

the alleged loss was not covered by the policy, Allstate was not obligated to pay any 

benefits under the policy. Indeed, in that event, the recipient of the advance payment was

obligated to repay it to Allstate. The Court of Criminal Appeals erred in interpreting the 

advance payment, and the defendant’s acceptance thereof, as independent, separate, and 

distinct from the underlying Policy and the defendant’s apparent intent to recover under 

the Policy. 

We conclude that the defendant’s conduct satisfied the statute’s elements of 

intentionally presenting a false or fraudulent claim because, in making his verbal 

representations to Allstate representatives, signing the Advance Payment Agreement, and 

accepting the $1,000 advance payment, the defendant was clearly and unambiguously 

asserting a right to payment under his homeowner’s policy, even if that right was 

contingent or provisional insofar as Allstate had the contractual right to require further 

documentation, such as a written proof of loss, for final payment. The defendant’s words 

and conduct were fraudulent because they involved, at a minimum, “subterfuge” and led 

Allstate to consider, at least provisionally, that the fire was a covered loss. Because the 

Policy entitled the defendant to recover losses resulting from accidental direct physical 
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losses, and because the jury determined that the fire was not accidental but, rather, was 

set deliberately by the defendant, the jury was entitled to conclude that the defendant had 

violated the statute prohibiting the presentation of a false or fraudulent insurance claim.

In short, the evidence in this case presented the jury with a textbook example of 

presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim. The defendant intentionally informed 

Allstate that there had been a fire at his house. His description of the fire to Allstate and 

ELI clearly implied that the fire had been accidental. He subsequently accepted a 

payment and signed a document referring to his claim in conjunction with Allstate 

investigating his report. The defendant’s words and conduct clearly implied to Allstate 

that he considered the fire to be a covered loss under the Policy, i.e., accidental; however, 

the jury determined that he set the fire knowingly. Thus, the defendant’s words and 

conduct entitled the jury to conclude that the defendant intentionally presented a false or 

fraudulent claim for the payment of a loss or other benefit upon the Policy. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the proof was sufficient to support the jury’s 

conclusion that the defendant violated the false or fraudulent insurance claims statute. 

The Court of Criminal Appeals committed reversible error in concluding otherwise.

IV. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the proof was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of 

presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim. Therefore, we reverse the decision of 

the Court of Criminal Appeals on this point and reinstate the defendant’s conviction of 

presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim in the amount of $10,000 or more but less 

than $60,000. 

_______________________________

JUSTICE ROGER A. PAGE