United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 08-3808

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Martin Damkam, *

*

Petitioner, *

* Petition for Review of an Order

v. * of the Board of Immigration

* Appeals.

Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney *

General of the United States, *

*

Respondent. * 

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Submitted: September 22, 2009

Filed: January 15, 2010

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Before BYE, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Martin Damkam petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Damkam contends that

the BIA erred in affirming the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility finding. We

deny the petition.
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I.

Damkam, a native and citizen of Cameroon, entered the United States in

October 2003 on a visitor’s visa. He was authorized to remain until April 24, 2004,

but stayed beyond that date. In May 2004, Damkam applied for asylum, withholding

of removal, and protection under the CAT, claiming that if he were returned to

Cameroon, he would be persecuted on account of his political opinion. The

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) reviewed Damkam’s application and, on

October 18, 2004, commenced removal proceedings against him pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(1)(B). DHS referred his application to an immigration judge (“IJ”).

In an affidavit accompanying his application, Damkam specified that his

membership in the Social Democratic Front (“SDF”), an opposition party in

Cameroon, had led to torture and threats against him and his family. Damkam said

that he was arrested and tortured in 1992 and again in 2002. He also alleged that he

received two threatening calls between July 2002 and April 2003, and that his house

was searched twice by the police in May 2003. Damkam claimed that on June 12,

2003, he was summoned to a “special police station,” where the police interrogated

him for four hours and accused him of sabotaging the ruling political party. Damkam

said that these experiences caused him to go into hiding and flee to the United States.

Damkam conceded removability before an IJ in November 2004, and renewed

his request for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT.

Damkam originally filed his claim in Baltimore, but on January 11, 2006, he filed a

motion for a change of venue to St. Louis. The motion, which was granted the day it

was filed, was accompanied by a letter from Pascal Damkam stating that he and

petitioner were brothers, and that petitioner had relocated to Missouri to live with him.

On August 21, 2006, Damkam appeared before an IJ in St. Louis for a hearing

on the merits of his claims. Damkam testified that he had joined the SDF in 1992 to
1

French for “the swing,” this device is described in a report submitted by DHS

as one in which torture “victims were hung up-side-down with their hands tied

together and beaten.” Immigration and Nationality Directorate, U.K. Home Office,

Report of Fact-Finding Mission to Cameroon 6.9 (2004).

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bring political change to Cameroon. He stated that he was not a leader in the party,

but a “militant” who helped to organize meetings. Damkam testified in detail about

two instances of alleged persecution that he also referenced in his written application.

The first incident occurred on November 12, 1992, when Damkam was

allegedly protesting the results of a “stolen” presidential election with other SDF

members in Doula, Cameroon. Damkam claimed that the police used tear gas to

disperse the protesters, and that he had been arrested. Damkam said that he was

detained in a cell at the central police station for nearly two weeks and was beaten day

and night before his release.

Damkam testified that he continued his active involvement in the SDF despite

this initial arrest. He stated that he had no other incidents with the police until a

second arrest on May 20, 2002, while he was protesting to demand that the

government accept a list of SDF candidates for upcoming municipal and legislative

elections. According to Damkam, the police again used tear gas on the protestors and

detained him at a police station. He claimed that for six days, the police starved,

tortured, and interrogated him at the urging of Ms. Françoise Foning, a leader in

Cameroon’s ruling political party and Damkam’s employer at the time.

Damkam testified that he began working as Foning’s driver in February 1999,

but that she did not know about his SDF membership. He alleged that he was

supposed to be driving Foning at the time of his arrest, and when she became aware

that his absence was the result of his involvement with the opposition, she demanded

that the police torture him. Damkam said that on the sixth day of alleged

mistreatment, he fell from a torture device used by the police called “la balançoire”1
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and broke his arm. According to his testimony, a family member visiting the jail

bribed the police to allow Damkam to receive treatment at a hospital, where he

remained for eighteen days. He was allegedly released from the hospital upon signing

an agreement to cease all activities with the SDF.

On cross-examination, Damkam stated that he obtained a visitor’s visa to come

to the United States on July 31, 2003, but did not leave Cameroon until October 23,

2003. He testified that he delayed his departure so that his family could ensure his

safe travel to the airport. He also said that all his immediate family members,

including his parents and five brothers, reside in Cameroon and are active in the SDF,

but have not been harmed by the police. Similarly, Damkam testified that his wife and

children had not been harmed since his departure. He reported, however, that in 2005

his home had been searched by police looking for documents that they suspected he

stole from Foning. He also said that his wife had been summoned to a police station

in December 2005 and January 2006 to provide information on his whereabouts.

On examination by the IJ, Damkam revealed that the person with whom he

lived in Missouri was not his brother, as stated in his motion for a change of venue,

but a cousin whom he regarded as a brother. Damkam said that although this cousin

was aware of his involvement in the SDF, Damkam had not asked the cousin to testify

because he did not think it would matter. Damkam also said that he knew his

supporting witness, Alexander Taku, only from afar in Cameroon, because of Taku’s

position as the third-highest ranking member of the SDF, but reported that he had

interacted with Taku in the United States beginning in May 2004.

Taku, the SDF National Secretary for Political Education and Training, also

testified at the hearing. He said that he had been asked by SDF party leadership to

testify on Damkam’s behalf. Taku reported that he did not know Damkam in

Cameroon, but had learned about him through investigations by his party and

information he had gathered while in the United States. Taku stated that it was “an
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open secret” that Damkam had served as an informant for the SDF while working as

a driver for Foning. Taku opined that given Damkam’s betrayal of Foning, a powerful

political leader with an alleged history of atrocities, Damkam’s life would be in

danger if he returned to his home country. Taku also testified that in June 2002, a

“convocation,” or summons, was issued for Damkam to report to the police station in

Cameroon for arrest, and that this summons remained in effect. Finally, Taku stated

that he had last seen Damkam before the hearing on August 4, 2006, at an SDF

meeting in Washington, DC, when Damkam confirmed with Taku that he would

testify on his behalf.

On March 21, 2007, the IJ denied Damkam’s application for asylum on

credibility grounds, concluding that Damkam’s “testimony not only lacked detail, but

also was inconsistent with his own application for relief, with his supporting

documents, and the testimony of his witness.” The IJ set forth a series of

inconsistencies and omissions that undermined Damkam’s credibility, including

Damkam’s failure to mention his alleged role as an SDF informant in his testimony.

The IJ also concluded that even if Damkam had provided credible testimony,

he would not have established eligibility for asylum. The IJ cited the long gap in time

between Damkam’s arrests, the three-month delay between the issuance of his visa

and his departure from Cameroon, the lack of persecution suffered by his family

members who are actively involved in the SDF, and the recent electoral success of six

SDF mayoral candidates in Damkam’s home province as reasons why Damkam did

not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Cameroon. The IJ thought it

questionable that Damkam had not submitted corroborating testimony from the cousin

who allegedly was aware of Damkam’s arrests and detentions in Cameroon, and

suspicious that Damkam did not submit his SDF identification card in time for

forensics examination that could have corroborated Damkam’s testimony. While

recognizing that corroboration is not required to establish persecution, the IJ found

that the lack of corroboration, “in combination with [Damkam’s] weak and vague
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overall claim,” undermined Damkam’s claim for asylum. The IJ then held that given

the lack of credible evidence for asylum, Damkam necessarily failed to meet the

higher standard required for withholding of removal. Finally, the IJ denied Damkam

protection under the CAT, because the evidence failed to show a likelihood of torture

if Damkam were returned to Cameroon.

The BIA adopted and affirmed the decision of the IJ, with some additional

reasoning. The BIA observed that the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was

“sufficiently supported by the record,” and determined that Damkam, who did not

specifically contest any of the inconsistencies enumerated by the IJ, failed to show

that the finding was clearly erroneous. The Board also affirmed the IJ’s finding that

Damkam had failed to provide corroborative evidence concerning his experiences in

Cameroon, noting that “the weaker the alien’s testimony, the greater the need for

corroborative evidence.” See In re Y-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 1136, 1139 (BIA 1998). The

BIA also agreed with the IJ that Damkam had not shown a sufficient likelihood of

torture if returned to his home country.

II.

Damkam challenges the BIA’s decision concerning his request for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT. “When the BIA adopts and affirms

the IJ’s decision, but also adds reasoning of its own, we will review both decisions

together.” Chen v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 797, 800 (8th Cir. 2007). We review the BIA’s

decision for substantial evidence on the record as a whole, Menendez-Donis v.

Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2004), and will not disturb its findings of fact

“unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 & n.1, 483-84

(1992).
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The Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien who is unwilling to return

to his home country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion. Singh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 553, 556 (8th Cir. 2007); see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1); id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). “To establish a well-founded fear of future

persecution, the alien must show that he subjectively fears persecution, and that there

is credible, direct, and specific evidence that a reasonable person in the alien’s

position would fear persecution if returned to the alien’s country.” Mamana v.

Gonzales, 436 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 2006). 

To qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must demonstrate a “clear

probability” that “his or her life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed

country of removal on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a

particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b); see also 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3). An alien seeking relief under the CAT must demonstrate that “it is more

likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of

removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).

Damkam challenges the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, arguing that the

findings are not supported by “specific, cogent reasons for disbelief.” [Appellant’s

Br. at 9]. The law requires that the IJ’s reasons must be “specific enough that a

reviewing court can appreciate the reasoning behind the decision,” but there is no

additional requirement of specificity. Singh, 495 F.3d at 557. A credibility

determination is a finding of fact, and the statute provides that we must uphold it

“unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Mamana, 436 F.3d at 968. There is no greater
2

The Real ID Act of 2005 includes a provision governing credibility

determinations, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), but this provision applies only to

applications made after May 11, 2005. Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101(h)(2), 119 Stat.

231, 305. Because Damkam made his application before this date, the new statute

does not apply. 

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requirement of cogency beyond the § 1252(b)(4)(B) standard. Singh, 495 F.3d at

558.2

 

We conclude that the IJ and BIA offered a sufficient explanation for the finding

that Damkam was not credible, and that the record does not compel a contrary finding.

The IJ cited several inconsistencies and omissions in the record, implausible

testimony, and an absence of corroboration that reasonably justified a finding that

Damkam’s claims were not credible. 

First, while Taku, Damkam’s supporting witness, testified at length about the

grave danger that Damkam would face from retribution that Foning, an allegedly

“vicious” politician, would seek against her former employee, Damkam failed even

to mention in his testimony and his written application that he allegedly served as an

SDF informant while working as Foning’s driver. The IJ observed that Damkam’s

informant status “would have served to be the strongest ground for a well-founded

fear of prosecution,” but that Damkam did not even raise the issue. This central

omission reasonably led the IJ to conclude that Damkam was not actually an SDF

informant and called into question the remainder of Damkam’s testimony. See Esaka

v. Ashcroft, 397 F.3d 1105, 1110 (8th Cir. 2005); Kondakova v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d

792, 796 (8th Cir. 2004). 

Damkam contends that he did discuss his work as an informant when he

testified before the IJ that Cameroonian police officers had searched his house in 2005

for documents they believed he had stolen while working as Foning’s driver. But this

hearing testimony, at most, was an ambiguous, indirect reference to the most essential
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element of Damkam’s asylum claim. The testimony is not sufficient to show that any

reasonable adjudicator must have construed it as Damkam suggests, and believed that

he actively worked as an SDF informant while in Foning’s employ. That Damkam

made no mention of his alleged SDF informant status in his written application,

moreover, lends further support to the adverse credibility finding of the IJ and the

BIA. See Mohamed v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 835, 836-37 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding an

IJ’s credibility finding where “crucial portions of [the alien’s] claim appeared for the

first time at the asylum hearing”). 

A second discrepancy between the statements of Damkam and Taku concerned

the summons allegedly issued for Damkam to report to the police station. Taku

testified that after Damkam’s release from the hospital following his second arrest,

Damkam was summoned to return to the police station in June 2002. Taku explained

that because Damkam did not appear in response to this summons, he would be

arrested upon returning to Cameroon. Although this risk of arrest bears directly on

Damkam’s fear of persecution, Damkam failed to mention the summons in his

testimony or his application. 

Damkam argues that Taku performed an independent investigation of the facts,

and that “[t]here is nothing in the record to support a finding that Mr. Damkam was

aware of being summoned to the police station.” But Taku’s own testimony

contradicts Damkam’s argument, for Taku explained that “the police invited [i.e.,

summoned] him and then he [i.e., Damkam] said he escaped.” It was reasonable to

conclude that Damkam would not say that he “escaped” from police if he was unaware

of the summons. The IJ’s conclusion that Damkam must have known of the June

2002 summons is further supported by Taku’s testimony that several summonses were

delivered to Damkam’s home and to the SDF party office months before Damkam’s

departure to the United States in October 2003. That Damkam was interrogated by

police and released in June 2003, together with Damkam’s failure to mention fear

arising from the 2002 summons, bolsters the IJ’s conclusion that there was no well-
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founded fear of a future arrest based on a summons that pre-dated the most recent

police encounter.

The IJ and the BIA also reasonably relied on conflicting accounts of the

interaction of Taku and Damkam before the hearing. The IJ noted that Damkam had

testified that he only knew Taku in Cameroon from afar “as a militant,” and he

mentioned only his first meeting with Taku in the United States at a celebration at the

Cameroonian Embassy in 2004. Taku, by contrast, testified about more frequent

contact between the two men, including an SDF meeting on August 4, 2006, at which

Damkam confirmed that Taku would testify on his behalf. Damkam’s failure to

mention this important meeting when questioned about his previous interaction with

Taku supports the inference that some evidence may have been exaggerated or

manufactured to support the claim for asylum.

In addition to discrepancies, the BIA permissibly cited aspects of Damkam’s

testimony that it deemed implausible. See Mamana, 436 F.3d at 968. Damkam

claimed in his written application that shortly after Foning caused him to be tortured

by police in May 2002, he contacted Foning to obtain back wages. The IJ justifiably

could not “fathom how [Damkam] could have a well-founded fear of persecution

when he voluntary contacted his persecutor.” The IJ also cited suspicious testimony

about Damkam’s relationship with a relative in Missouri. In his change of venue

request, Damkam stated that the man was his brother, but upon questioning at the

hearing, Damkam conceded that the man was actually his cousin. Even accounting

for potential cultural differences in the use of the term “brother,” we cannot declare

unreasonable the IJ’s conclusion that the inaccurate characterization of this

relationship in official proceedings “sheds doubt on [Damkam’s] sincerity.”

Given the weakness of Damkam’s claim, it was reasonable for the BIA to cite

the absence of corroborating testimony as a factor in its decision. Damkam testified

that he kept his SDF membership card with him “very securely,” but curiously could
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not produce it in time for forensic testing before his hearing. And Damkam failed to

produce the “brother” or “cousin” with whom he resided in Missouri to corroborate

alleged encounters with police in Cameroon.

Because the record does not compel a finding that Damkam presented credible

testimony, we uphold the determination of the BIA on that point. Without credible

testimony to demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future

persecution, Damkam’s asylum claim must fail. Singh, 495 F.3d at 559. The denial

of Damkam’s asylum claim dictates the same outcome on his claims for withholding

of removal and relief under the CAT, which are based on the same underlying factual

allegations. See Alemu v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 572, 576 (8th Cir. 2005).

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is denied. 

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