### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 631 -CV

Sam ue l C am pos , A ppe lla nt

v. Texas P ropert y & Casualty Insu rance G uaranty Association f or Re liance National Insu rance C om pany, an Im paired Carrie r , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 53RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-04- 0021 33 , HO NORAB LE GUS J. STRAUSS JR., JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N Ap pe lla nt S a mue l Campo s w a s in jur e d o n th e job . T he Te xas Wor ke rs ’ Compensation Commission de termined that Campos’s impairment rating was prope rly assig ned by the desig nat ed d o ctor and that Campos was not entitled to reimburseme nt of trave l expenses for visits t o his treating doctor. Campos soug ht judicial reviewof the Commission’s determination by bring ing suit agai n s t appellee Texas Property and Casualty

I nsuranc e Gua

ranty Association (“TPC I GA ”) in Wi nkler County district court. The Winkler County district court transf

err ed the action to Travis County

district c ourt, which subseque ntly g rante d TPCI GA’s motion for summary judgme nt on all claims. We conclude that, in accor dance with section 410.252(b) of the Texas L abor Cod e , th e pr op e r v e nu e fo r C a mpo s’ s su it i s in Wink ler County . We re ve rs e the Tr a vis County district court’s judg ment and rema nd, with instructions to t ransf er the case to the 109th District Court i nW i n k l e r

C o u n t y.We a pp ly th e Tex as P rope rt

y and Ca su a lty I ns ur anc e Gu ara

nty Ac t in e ff e c t in 1 Oct o b er 2001, when the w orker s’ compensation carr ier be came an impaire d insurer. See Lat te r v . A utr

y , 8 5 3 S

. W

. 2 d

8 3 6 , 8 3 6 n . 1 (T ex . Ap p . — Au s t i n1 9 9 3 , n o wr i t ) ( ci t i n g Du ris h v. Channelvie w Bank , 809 S.W .2d 273, 275-77 (Te x App.—Austin 1991, writ denied) ). Howeve r, we will c ite to the curr ent sections of the Guar anty Act beca use the provisions that we cite ha ve not been amende d since October 2001 in a manner that would aff ect our ana ly sis. Se e ge ne ra lly Act of Aug . 25, 1991, 72d L eg ., 2d C.S., ch. 12, § 1.20, 1991 Tex. Gen. L aws 252, 264-73, amende d byAct of May 30, 1993, 73d L eg., R.S., ch. 685, §§ 9.01-.23, 1993 Te x . Gen. L aws 2559, 2632-38 (codifie d 2005) (cur

rent ve rsion at Tex. I ns. Code Ann. ch. 462 ( West 2008)). An insurer

is impaired if i t i s d esig nated a s such by the commissioner of insura nce a nd 2 i s e i t h e r p l a c e d i nr e c e i v e r s h i p o r l i qu i d a t i o n u n d e r a c o u rto r d e r

b a s e d o na f i n d i n g o f i n s o l v e n c y, or pla c e d in

c on se rv ato rsh ip a ft e r t

he c omm iss ion e r d e te rm ine s th a t th e ins ur e r i s in so lve nt. Tex. I ns. Code Ann. § 462.004(5) ( West 2008). A “c overe d claim,” in g ener al, is an unpaid c laim arising out of a policy that was issued 3 or assumed by

an impaire d insurer a

nd that is covere d by

the Guar anty

Act, and is within the cover ag e and a

pplicable limits of the policy

. Id. § 462.201 (West 2008). 2 Fac tua l an d P

ro c e dural B ac kg

ro und T h is c a s e inv o lv e s th e T e xa s Pr o p e rty an d Ca s u a lt y I n s u r an c e G u ar an ty

Act (the “ Guar anty

Act”)

. Samuel Campos was inj ured in an acc ident at work on N ovember 13, 1999. 1 Relia n c e N a ti o n a l I

n s u r an c e Co mp an y

w a s th e w o r

k e r s ’ c o mp e n s a ti o nc ar

r ie r f o r Ca mp o s ’s employ er. I n October 2001, Reliance was de signated an impaire d insurer, trig g eringthe statutory 2 ob lig a tio n o f T PCI GAto p ay Re lia nc e ’s c ov e re d c la ims

. 3 Two disputes arose betwee n Campos and TP CI GA. After Campos’s tre ating doctor assig ned a 30% impairment rating , TPCI GA dis puted t he methodology used by the treating doc tor and re quested that a

desig nated doc tor be a ssigne d. The de signated doctor as s i gn ed a 6% impai rm en t rating . Campos disputes the 6% impairment rating. In addition, Campos sought

re imb ur se me nt f

or tr a ve l e xpe ns e s in c ur

re d d ur ing20 02 to vis it his tr e a tin g do c tor , wh os e of fi c e in Odessa wa s approximately 45 miles from Campos’s reside nce in Ke rmit. TPC I GA re fusedThe Te x as Workers’ Compensation Comm ission was abolished ef fec tive 4 Se pte mbe r 1 , 2 00 5, a nd

its fu nc tio ns we re a ssume d b y

the div isi on of wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n w ith in the Texas Depa

rtment of Insuranc e. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 402.001 ( West 2006). 3 Campo s’ s r e qu e st f

or re imb ur se me nt, c on te nd ingtha t me dic a l tr e a tme nt w a s r e a so na bly a va ila ble within 20 mil es of Campos’s r esidenc e. A c ontested ca se hea ring was held on J une 12, 2003, bef ore th e T e xa s Wo r

k e r s ’ Co mpensation Commis sion, Hear ings D ivision. T h e h earing office r dete rmined 4 that the desig nated doc tor’s impairment rating of 6% wa s corr ect a

nd that Campos was not entitled to th e r e im

b u r s e me n t o f tr a v e l e xp e n s e s . Ca mp o s s o u g h t r e v ie w b y an a p p e a ls panel of the Commi ssion, which aff

irmed the he aringoffice r’s de terminations on November 14, 2003. Campos filed suit in W inkler County district court on De ce m b er 22, 2003, seeking ju d ic ia l r e v ie w o f th e Co mm is s io n ’ s d e c is io n o n th e tw o d is p u te d is s u e s . T PC I G A filed a motion to transfer

venue to Tr avis County , which the Winkler County district court g rante d on J une 28, 2004. In the Travis County district court, TPCI GA fi l ed a n o evidenc e motion for summary judgme nt on C am p o s ’s entire c ause of action, which the district court g rante d on September 20, 2006.

V e nue On appe al, Campos contends that ve n u e w a s p r o p e r

in Wi nk le r Co u nty and, ther efor e, the Wink le r C ounty

dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr e d i n trans fe rr ingve nu e to T ra vis Cou nty . T PCI GA , in response , contends that ve nue wa s proper in Travis County

and the tra

nsfer of v en u e s h o uld be aff irmed. Campos r elies on the venue provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, and TPCI GA

re lie s o n th e ve nu e pr ov isi on of the Te xas P ro pe rt

y and Ca su a lty I ns ur anc e Gu ara

nty Ac t.4 We a g re e wi th TPCI GA that the ve nu e pr ov isi on of the Gu ara

nty Ac t, i f v ie we d in iso la tio n, wo uld a

pp ly to the pr e se nt laws uit . T he Gu ara nty Ac t st a te s, “ Ve nu e in a

su it b y or a g a ins t the commissioner or a ssociation relating to a n action or ruling of the commissioner or assoc iation under this cha

pter is in Travis County .” Te x . I ns. Code Ann. § 462.017(b) ( West 2008). Campos submits that the plain lang uag e of the Guar anty Act’s venue pr ovision does not app l y h er e b ecause he challeng es a r uling of the Commiss ion, not an “ac tion or ruling” of the

c omm iss ion e r o f i ns ur anc e or TPC I GA

. Th is a sse rt ion

ov e rl oo ks the re a lity

that, a bs e nt a n a dv e rs e “ac tion or ruling ” by TPCI GA, Campos would not have initiated the Commissi on’s administrative pr oc e e din g s in the fi rs t pla c e . Th e Gu ara nty Ac t’ s v e nu e pr ov isi on

a pp lie s to a

su it that re lat es to TPCI GA’s a ction or ruling . I t is not limit ed to a direct appea l of such an action or ruling. Under the Guar anty Act, TPCI GA wa s o b l i gat ed to “investig ate a nd adjust, compromise, settle, and pa y

cover ed cla ims to t he extent of the assoc i at i o n ’s obliga tion and deny all other c laims .” Id. § 462.301(a) (West 2008) (empha sis added). The W orker s’ Compensation Act’s a dminist rative p ro ce ed i ng s take plac e in orde r to settle disputes betwee n the par ties. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 410.021 (West 2006) (purpose of bene fit review confe renc e i s t o resolve disputed issues by ag ree ment of t he parties), § 410.025(b) ( West 2006) (contested c ase he aringschedule d if disputed issues not resolved at benef it review c onfer ence ). Ther efor e, Campos’s suit relate s to an ac tion or

ru lin g of TPC I GAun de r t

he Gu ara nty Ac t. Howeve r, we also ag ree with Campos that the Workers’ Compensation Ac t’s venue provision for judicial re view of a n appea ls panel dec ision, if view ed in isolation, would apply to the pr e se nt l aws uit . T he Wor ke rs ’ C omp e ns a tio n A c t st a te s:5

Th e pa rt y br ing ingsu it t o a

pp e a l th e de c isi on

mus t fi le a

pe tit ion wi th t he a pp ro pr ia te court in: (1) the county

wher e the e mploy ee resided at the time of the injury or death, if the employ ee i s d ec ea s ed; or (2) in the case of an oc cupational disea se, in the county wher e the e mploy ee r esided on the date disability beg an or any county ag ree d to b y the pa rt ie s.

Id. § 410.252(b) ( West 2006).

TPCI GA submits that section 410.252(b) doe s not apply here beca use TP CI GA is not an “insura nce c arr ier.” TPCI GA points out that it i s not, in ge nera l, considere d to “stand in the plac e of an impaire d insurer,” Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 462.102 (West 2008), and c hapter 410 of the labor cod e g o v e r

n s th e p r o c e e d in g s

— a d mi n is tr a ti v e an d ju d ic ia l— th a t “ d e te r

mi n e th e li a

b il it y of an insurance carrier fo r co mpe ns a tio n for an in jur y or de a th” un de r t

he Wor ke rs ’ C omp e ns a tio n A c t, Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 410.002 ( West 2006) (empha sis added)

. Howeve r, we need not de termine wh e the r T PCI GAis or is not an “in sura nc e c arr ie r” so a s to subj e c t T PCI GAto c ha pte r 4 10 , b e c a

us e the Guar anty Act independe ntly subjects TPCI GA to c hapter 410. The Guar anty Act re quires that TPC I GApa

y “ the fu ll a

mou nt” of a c la im a ri sin g ou t of

an impai red in su re r’ s w or ke rs ’ compensation insurance policy , but only if the claim is a c overe d claim. See Tex. I ns. Code Ann. § 4 62 .2 13 (b ) ( Wes t 20 08 ). Th e a dmi nis tr a tiv e re vie w p ro c e dure s o f c ha pter 4 10 of

the Wor ke rs ’ Compensation Act—bene fit review confe renc e, conte sted ca se hea ring , and appe als pane l—are mandatory

for a work er s ’ compensation claimant to challeng e a de nial of bene fits in court. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 410.251 ( West 2006). There fore , these a dminist rative r eview pr ocedur es ar e

nece ssary , in case of a dispute, to dete rmine whe ther a claim i s a covere d claim. I ndeed, T PCI GA admits that it i s subject to th es e ad m i nistrative re view proc edure s. TPCI GA does not e x plain, howeve r, why

its obligation under the Guar anty Act to pay a covere d claim would subject TPCI GA6

to the Workers’ Compensation Ac t’s administrative r ev i ew p rovi sions in order to deter mine the claimant’s entitlement to, a nd the amount of, benef

its, but not the judicial revie w provisions, which h a v e t h e s a m e p u r

p o s e . W e f

i n d t h a tt h e G u ar a

n t y A c t , b y r e qu i r i n g T P C IG A t o p ay o n l y cove red claims, subjects TPCI GA to the entire ty of cha pter 410. We have pote ntially

conflicting statutes g overningvenue in this ca se. Unde r the Guar anty

Act’s ve nue provision, mandator y venue f or Campos’s suit is in Travis County

. See Tex. I ns. C ode Ann. § 462.017( b). Unde r the Worker s’ Compensation Act’s ve nue provision, on the oth e r hand , man dator

y ve nu e is in Winkl e r County , th e c ounty of Ca mpo s’ s r e sid e nc e a t th e tim e of his injury

. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 410.252( b).

I n order to resolve whic h statute controls, we first look to the applicable pr ovisions of the Gua

ranty Act’s c onflict-of- law sec tion: (a) E x ce p t as provided by Subsection (b), if this cha pter c onflicts with another statut e re la tin g to t

he a sso c ia tio n, thi s c ha

pte r c on tr ols

. (b) This sec tion does not apply to a conf lict betwee n this chapter a nd: (1) Subtitle A, Title 5, L abor Code . . . .

Tex. In s . Co d e A n n . § 4 6 2

. 0 1 0 ( We s t 2 0 0 8 )

. T h e Wo r k e r s ’ Co mp e n s a ti o nA c t i s c o d if ie d at titl e 5 , s u b t i t l e A of

the labor c ode. Section 462.010 of the Guar anty Act expressly

excepts the Workers’ Compensation Act from the g ener al rule that the Guara nty Act contr ols in the event of a conflict with anothe r statute. The ref ore, we cannot conclude that the Guar anty Act preva ils in every conflict with the Worker s’ Compensation Act. Se e City of L aP or te v . B ar

fie ld , 898 S.W .2d 288, 292We note that this Court has made t h i s o bservation in an unpublished opinion. See 5 Texas Prop. & Ca s . Ins. Guar. Ass’n v . Texas W orkers’ Compe nsation Comm’n , No. 0 3-00-00467- CV, 2001 Tex. App. L EXI S 1246, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 28, 2001, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ( “F urther, if a co n fl ict exis ts betwee n the Guar anty Act and the Texas Workers’ Compensation Ac t, the Workers’ Compensation Ac t controls.”). 7 (Tex. 1995) (cour

ts should avoid st at u t o ry construction that re nders a ny part of the statutory lang uag e mea

ningle ss). Howeve r, the Gua

ranty Act’s c onflict-of- law sec tion also does not state that the Wor ke rs ’ Com

pe ns atio n Ac t pr e va ils in e ve ry c on fl ic t wi th the Gu ara nty Ac t. I n lig ht of

thi s, TPCI GA conte nds that we must apply rules of statutory

construction to deter

mine which venue provision c ontrols. For purposes of our revie w, we need not de termine whether section 46 2 .010 sh ou ld b e c on str

ue d s uc h th a t th e Wor

ke rs’ Com

pe ns a tio n A c t do e s p re va il i n a ll c on fl ic ts w ith the Gu ara

nty Ac t, beca

use we conclude that even unde r rules of statutory construction, the 5 Workers’ Compensation Act’s venue provision preva ils over the Guar anty Act’s venue provision. I n the ca se of a

n irrec oncilable c onflict betwe en a g ener al statutory provision and a specific statutory provision, the specific provision controls over the g ener al pr o v i sion. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 3 11 .0 26 (We st 2 00 5) . Se c tio n 41 0. 25 2 of the Wor ke rs ’ Com

pe ns a tio n Ac t is a

pp lic a ble on ly to worke rs’ compensation claim disputes. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 410.251. I f the Gua ranty Act h ad a s p ec i fi c venue pr ovision for disputes over c overe d claims, we mig ht be fa ced w ith a more problem at ic question. Howe ver, se ction 462.017 of the Gua ranty Act applies to anysuit by or ag ainst the commissioner or TPCI GA, re lating to anyaction or r uling of t h e co m m issioner or TPC I GAma de un de r the Gu ara nty Ac t. T e x. I ns . Co de Ann. § 4 62 .0 17 ; see also id. § 462.101(a) (3)Acc ording to TPCI GA, the Worker s’ Compensation Act’s ve nue provision is the g ener al 6 provision beca

use it applies to all worke rs’ co m p ensation claimants, where as the Gua ranty Act’s ve nu e pr ov isi on

a pp lie s to su c h c la ima

nts on ly wh e n th e re is a

n im pa ir ed insur e r, in w hic h c a se TPC I GAis r e sp on sib le fo r t he im pai red ins ur e r’ s p oli c y ob lig a tio ns . H ow e ve r, in f oll ow ingthi s argument, we c annot imag ine a c ircumstance i n wh i ch a Workers’ Compensation Act provision would preva il in the event of a conflict with the Gua

ranty Act. This would ef

fec tively write the Workers’ Compensation A ct exception out of the Gua ranty Act’s c onflict-of- law sec tion. W e re ject an in te rp re ta tio n th a t r e nd e rs statut or y langua g e me anin g le ss.

8 (West 2008) (TPCI GA may “sue or be sued” ). In our view, the speci fi c v en u e p ro vision of the Wor ke rs ’ C omp e ns a tio n A c t c on tr ols ov e r t he g e ne ra l ve nu e pr ov isi on of the Gu ara

nty Ac t. 6 TPCI GA conte nds that such a conclusion would be contrary to Du ris h v . Ne wbe rry , 800 S.W .2d 610 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1990, writ dism’d by ag r.), in which the court of appe als held that the venue provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act did not control over the

mand a tor y ve nu e pr ov isi on

of an in sura

nc e c od e c ha

pte r t hat g ov e rn e d in sura

nce co mpa

nie s in

rec eiver ship. Howeve r, none of the cour t’s three rea sons for its holding in Du ris h is applicable he re. First, the cour

t in Du ris h deter

mined that the phra se “sha ll have exclusive venue ” in the insuranc e code’ s venue pr ovision “could not b e cl ear er” in expressing the le g islative intent for that venue provision to be controlling

. 800 S.W .2d at 611. The Guaranty Act does not contain such la ng uag e. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 462.017(b). Sec ond, in Du ris h , the i nsuranc e code cha pter at issue stated, without ex ception, that “[ i ] n the eve nt of conflict be tween the provisions of this Article and the provisions of any

exis ting law , the provisions of this Ar ticle shall preva il.” Act of Ma y 16, 1955, 54th L eg ., R.S., ch. 267, § 1, art. 21.28, sec . 16, 1955 Tex. Gen. L aws 737, 747, repeale d byAct of May 30, 2005, 79th L eg ., R.S., ch. 995, § 9, 2005 Tex. Gen. L aws 3307, 3362. The Guar anty Act’s conflict-of

-law pr ovision contains a spec ific exception for the Workers’ Compensation Ac t. SeeTPC I GAargue s th a t Du ris h v . Ne wbe rry ref lects the Gua

ranty Act’s policy

conce rn that 7 T P C I GA ’s resources not be de pleted by being require d to liti g ate suits in the county of ea ch c la ima nt’ s r e sid e nc e . T he Gu ara nty Ac t in c lud e s amo ngits purp os e s to “ a vo id f ina nc ia l lo ss t o claimants or policy

holders bec ause o f an ins urer ’s impairment.” Te x . I ns. Code Ann. § 462.002 (We st 2 00 8) . I t ma

y be the c a se that r e qu ir ingTPC I GAto li tig a te ou tsi de Tr a vis County c ou ld reduc e the f

und s h el d b y T P CI GA that would other wise be a vailable to cla imants. Howeve r, requiringvenue to be in the claimant’s c ounty of re sidence could ca

use d epletion of TPC I GA’s re so ur c e s to the same e xten t tha t re qu ir ing ve nu e to b e in T ra vis Cou nty c ou ld c a us e fi na nc ia l lo ss to claiman ts

. M o r e o v e r , c o n tr ar y to T PC I G A ’ s a ll e g e d

p o li c y a g a in s t t r a v e l e xp e n s e s , T PC I GA admits that the benef

it review c onfer ence s and conte sted ca se hea ring s i n which TPCI GA participates are g ener ally held, i n acc ordanc e with the W orker s’ C ompensation Act, withi n 75 miles of the claimant’s residenc e at the time of the injury

. See Te x. L a b. Cod e Ann. § 4 10 .0 05 (a ) ( Wes t 2006). 9 Tex. I ns. Code Ann. § 462.010(b)( 1). Third, the c ourt in Du ris h noted that, in connec tion with the insurer’ s rec eiver ship, the Travis County district c ourt had issued a pe rmane nt injunction enjoining any further claims ag ainst the insurer e x cept in the pr ocee dings before it, and the c laimant had not challeng ed the injunction. Se e Du ris h , 800 S.W .2d at 612. There is no injunction i n the ca se bef ore

us . T he re fo re , w e are of

the op ini on

that Du ris h does not alter our analy sis here. 7 TPCI GA also a

rg ues that Campos waive d any objection t o t he trial c ourt’s venue deter mination by

not seeking mandamus re l ief. Unde r sec tion 15.0642 of the civil prac tice and

reme dies code , “[a] party may apply for a writ of mandamus with an appellate court to enf orce the mandatory

venue pr ovisions of this chapter.” Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.0642 (West 2002). Chapter 15 of the c ivil practice and re medies code includes a ma ndatory venue provision for “[a]n action g overne d by any other statute pr escr ibing mandatory venue.” Id. § 15.016 (West 2002). L abor c ode sec tion 410.252 prescr ibes mandatory venue. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 410.252(b). Thus, a

party may apply for a writ of mandamus to enforc e sec tion 410.252(b).Courts have c oncluded that manda mus is not an ex clusive re m ed y wh en face d with the 8 same question in a differ ent context, including the wrong ful denial of discover y , see Pope v. Stephe nson , 787 S.W .2d 953, 954 (Tex. 1990) (“T he dec ision not t o pursue the e x traordina ry reme dy of mandamus does not prejudice or wa ive a pa rty ’s rig ht to complain on appeal

. ”), a nd mandatory venue for a suit aff ectingthe par ent-c hild relationship, see I n re S.G.S. , No 2-05-211- CV, 2006 Tex. App. L E XIS 5730, at *3-4 (T ex. App.—Fort Worth J une 29, 2006, pet. de nied) (m e m. op .) (T e xas Sup re me Court ’s ho ldi ng that mand a mus re lie f w a s ava ila ble be c a us e a pp e llate revie w was ina dequate , did not make re medy by appea l—however

inadequate—unava ilable). 10 Acc ording to TPCI GA, when the leg islature has ma de mandamus relief a vailable, a pa rt y sh ou ld n ot b e a llo we d to awa it the ou tc ome of a tr ia l, a nd the n in the e ve nt o f a

n unf a vo ra ble judgme nt, base a

n appea l on “an alleg ed error that could easily have been a ddresse d prior to trial.” This would amount to a rule that whe re ma ndamus relief

is poten t i al ly

available , it becomes the

e xclu siv e me ans of

se e kin g a pp e llate re vie w. TPC I GA ha s not dir e c te d u s to any a uth or ity fo r i ts position that mandamus is the only avenue to e nforc e a mandatory venue provision suc h as those at iss ue he re . Se c tio n 1 5. 06 42 , b y its pla in ter ms, do e s n ot i mpo se su c h a lim itatio n: “ A p a rt

y may apply for a writ of manda

mus . . . . ” Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.0642 (e mph a sis a dd e d)

. Mand a mus and or din ary a pp e a l are dif

fe re nt a pp e llate re me die s w itha

va ri e ty of differ ent re qu ir e me nts and su bs tanti a lly

dif fe re nt f or ms o f a va ila ble re lie f. Th e y

c an a pp ly to differ ent situations and are not mutually exclusive. W e plac e particula r empha sis on In re Mi

sso ur i Pacific Railroad Co. , 998 S.W .2d 212 (Tex. 1999), in which the Texas Supre me Court concluded that a par

ty seekingmandamus re view under section 15. 0 6 4 2 d i d not need to esta blish the inadequa cy

of appe llate re view. Central to the supreme court’s conclusion was its recog nition that venue de cisions are corr ecta ble by appea l ( and, there fore , to r equire a showing of inade quate r emedy by appea l would make sec tion 15.0642 a “usele ss act”)

. See 99 8 S .W .2 d at 21 6. We d e c lin e to hold that ma

ndamus was Campos’s exclusive r emedy to e nforc e the Workers’ Compensation Act’s venue pr ovision. 8Ac cordingly , we do not re ach Campos’s additional point on appeal that the 9 Tr a vis Cou

nty dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in g ra nti ng TPC I GA ’s no e vid e nc e mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. 11 Conclu sion We conclude that, in acc ordanc e with section 410.252(b) of the Te x as L abor Code,

m an d a t o r y v e n u e f o rC a mp o s ’ s s u i ti s i nW i n k l e r C o u n t y. The Winkler County district court’s 9 transfe r of ve nue to Travis County was re versible e rror . See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & R em. Code Ann. § 1 5.06 4(b ) (We st 2 00 2) . We re ve rs e and va c a te the su mma

ry jud g me nt a

nd re mand , w ith ins tr uc tio ns that th e Tr a vis County dis tr ic t c ou rt tr ans fe r t

he c a se to t

he 10 9th Di str ic t Co ur

t in W i n k l e r C o u n t y.

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Waldrop a nd Henson Reverse d and Remande d Filed: August 28, 2008