[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-11370

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-03466-WSD

ROBERT CUSICK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

YELLOWBOOK, INC., 

a Delaware corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee,

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(April 20, 2015)

Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Robert Cusick appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

in favor of his employer, Yellowbook, on his association discrimination claim filed 

pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 

12112(b)(4).

1

 On appeal, Cusick argues that the district court erred in finding that 

no material disputed facts existed with regard to his prima facie case of association 

discrimination and his evidence that Yellowbook’s reason for demoting him—his 

deficient leadership skills—was a pretext for unlawful discrimination based on the 

known disability of his daughter. 

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and drawing all 

reasonable inferences in their favor. Castleberry v. Goldome Credit Corp., 408 

F.3d 773, 785 (11th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant 

shows that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that he is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To overcome a motion for 

summary judgment, the non-moving party must present more than a “mere 

scintilla” of evidence supporting his position, because “there must be enough of a 

 1

 Cusick also raised claims for association discrimination under the ADA based upon his 

termination and for retaliation. However, he did not address these claims in his response to 

Yellowbook’s motion for summary judgment, and the district court properly deemed them 

abandoned. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) 

(holding that “grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are 

deemed abandoned”). Moreover, Cusick has waived review of these claims on appeal by failing 

to address them in his brief. See Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 

1318-19 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating that a party abandons an issue “by failing to list or otherwise 

state it as an issue on appeal”). 

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showing that a jury could reasonably find for that party.” Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n 

of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006). 

The ADA protects a “qualified individual” from discrimination on the basis 

of disability in the “terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12112(a). The ADA defines the term “discriminate” to include “excluding or 

otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the 

known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to 

have a relationship or association.” Id. § 12112(b)(4). We may evaluate disability 

discrimination and association discrimination claims brought under the ADA using 

the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973), under which the plaintiff must first establish a 

prima facie case of disability discrimination. See Cleveland v. Home Shopping 

Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2004). 

To establish a prima facie case of association discrimination under the ADA, 

the plaintiff may show: “(1) that [he] was subjected to an adverse employment 

action; (2) that [he] was qualified for the job at that time; (3) that [his] employer 

knew at that time that [he] had a relative with a disability; and (4) that the adverse 

employment action occurred under circumstances which raised a reasonable 

inference that the disability of the relative was a determining factor in the 

employer’s decision.” Wascura v. City of S. Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th 

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Cir. 2001) (quotations and brackets omitted). If a plaintiff establishes a prima 

facie case of discrimination and the defendant articulates a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, the burden then 

shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason is a pretext for unlawful disability discrimination. Id. at 1242-43. 

Pretext means that the reason given by the employer was not the real reason 

for the adverse employment decision. Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 

F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997). An employee can show that the employer’s 

articulated reason was false by pointing to “weaknesses, implausibilities, 

inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” in the proffered explanation. Id. 

at 1538 (quotation omitted). However, a reason is not a pretext for discrimination 

unless the plaintiff shows both that the reason was false and that discrimination 

was the real reason. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S. Ct. 

2742, 2752 (1993). The inquiry into pretext is concerned with the employer’s 

beliefs, not the employee’s perceptions of his performance. Holifield v. Reno, 115 

F.3d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1997). Furthermore, we do not “sit as a superpersonnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.” Alphin v. 

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 940 F.2d 1497, 1501 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted). 

Assuming, arguendo, that Cusick was qualified for a relevant management

position with Yellowbook (in light of the fact the position he previously held was 

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eliminated in the company’s restructuring), he failed to establish a prima facie case 

because he did not demonstrate that his daughter’s medical condition, or the health 

care costs of her condition, was a determinative factor in Yellowbook’s decision to 

demote him. See Wascura, 257 F.3d at 1242. There was no testimony suggesting 

that either Michels or Terrizzi—Cusick’s supervisors who made the decision to 

demote him—bore any discriminatory animus against either Cusick or his 

daughter. Nor was there any evidence that Michels or Terrizzi knew the costs of 

Cusick’s daughter’s medical treatment or whether such costs were increasing 

Yellowbook’s insurance premiums. 

Moreover, even if Cusick had established a prima facie case, he failed to 

show that his employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for demoting him—

his deficient leadership skills—was a pretext for disability discrimination, because

he merely disagrees with the decisionmakers’ perceptions of his leadership 

shortcomings. See Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1565; Alphin, 940 F.2d at 1501. In fact, 

reflecting upon his termination and performance, Cusick expressly acknowledged 

that “[t]he disappointments clearly outweigh the accomplishments.” Given the 

absence of evidence that either Michels or Terrizzi harbored any discriminatory 

animus or even knew whether Cusick’s daughter was imposing increased costs on 

Yellowbook, and in the context of the substantial restructuring Yellowbook was 

undertaking at the time, we cannot conclude that Cusick has created genuine issues 

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of fact with respect to whether Cusick’s daughter’s medical condition was a 

determinative factor in Yellowbook’s employment decisions.

Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm 

the grant of summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.

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