IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 301A19

Filed 17 July 2020

IN THE MATTER OF: M.A., B.A., A.A.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 7 May 

2019 by Judge Denise S. Hartsfield in District Court, Forsyth County. This matter 

was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 19 June 2020 but was 

determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 

the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Theresa A. Boucher, Assistant County Attorney, for petitioner-appellee Forsyth 

County Department of Social Services.

Michelle FormyDuval Lynch, GAL Appellate Counsel, for appellee Guardian ad 

Litem.

Mary McCullers Reece for respondent-appellant father.

Richard Croutharmel for respondent-appellant mother.

ERVIN, Justice. 

Respondent-father Earl A. and respondent-mother Peggy A. appeal from an 

order entered by the trial court terminating their parental rights in their minor

children M.A., B.A., and A.A.1 After careful consideration of the parents’ challenges 

 

1 M.A., B.A., and A.A. will, respectively, be referred to throughout the remainder of 

this opinion as “Maria,” “Brenda,” and “Andrew,” which are pseudonyms used to protect the 

juveniles’ identities and for ease of reading.
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to the trial court’s termination order, we conclude that the order in question should 

be affirmed.

I. Factual Background

On 2 August 2017, the Forsyth County Department of Social Services filed 

petitions alleging that Maria, Brenda, and Andrew were neglected juveniles and 

obtained the entry of orders placing the children in nonsecure custody.2 In these 

petitions, DSS alleged that substance abuse and domestic violence in the presence of 

the children had caused it to offer in-home services to the family and to subsequently 

seek to have the children removed from the family home. In addition, the petitions 

alleged that DSS had had extensive prior dealings with the children’s family, 

including their placement in DSS custody from 19 April 2011 through 6 November 

2012, and the fact that they had been the subject of a prior adjudication of neglect.3

The petitions came on for hearing before the trial court on 21 March 2018. On 

30 May 2018, the trial court entered an order determining that the children were 

 

2 In addition, DSS obtained nonsecure custody of respondent-mother’s oldest son, A.J., 

who will be referred to throughout the remainder of this opinion as “Adam.” Respondentfather is not Adam’s father. In view of the fact that any issues concerning DSS’ involvement 

with Adam are not before the Court in connection with this appeal, we will refrain from 

discussing those issues in the remainder of this opinion.

3 The children were adjudicated to be neglected juveniles due to domestic violence and 

substance abuse by means of an order entered by the trial court on 4 August 2011. However, 

the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s adjudication order and remanded that case to 

the District Court, Forsyth County, for further proceedings. In re M.A., No. COA11-1238, 

2012 WL 1316378 (N.C. Ct. App. April 17, 2012) (unpublished). On remand, the trial court 

entered an order on 25 July 2012 finding the children to be neglected juveniles on the basis 

of domestic violence and substance abuse.
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neglected juveniles “in that they received improper care and supervision from [the 

parents] and [ ] were allowed to live in an environment injurious to their wellbeing.” 

The trial court’s order detailed ongoing instances of domestic violence and substance 

abuse that had occurred in the presence of the children despite the fact that the 

parents had entered into a family services agreement with DSS that prohibited such 

conduct. As a precondition for allowing them to reunify with the children, the trial 

court ordered the parents to obtain substance abuse and domestic violence 

assessments and follow all resulting treatment recommendations; “[s]ubmit to 

random drug testing”; “[e]ngage in supervised visits with [the] children and 

demonstrate consistency and safe parenting skills during visits”; “[e]stablish and 

maintain stable, safe, adequate housing to meet [the] children’s basic needs”; and 

notify DSS “of any change in residency, telephone number, or employment.” In 

addition, respondent-father was ordered to “[p]rovide [DSS] with names of all 

physicians . . . prescribing him controlled substances” and to “[s]ign releases to all 

doctors providing treatment for him[.]”

After a permanency planning hearing held on 11 June 2018, the trial court 

entered an order on 11 July 2018 that established the primary permanent plan for 

all three children as adoption, with a secondary permanent plan of guardianship. In 

addition, the trial court ordered the cessation of efforts to reunify the parents with 
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the children and instructed DSS to file petitions seeking to have the parents’ parental 

rights in the children terminated.4

On 14 August 2018, DSS filed a petition seeking to have the parents’ parental 

rights in the children terminated based upon neglect and willful failure to make 

reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that led to the children’s 

removal from the family home. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(2) (2019). The 

termination petition came on for hearing before the trial court on 4 February 2019. 

On 7 May 2019, the trial court entered an order terminating both parents’ parental 

rights in the children on the basis of both grounds for termination alleged in the 

termination petition. In addition, the trial court concluded that termination of the 

parents’ parental rights would be in the children’s best interests. The parents noted 

an appeal to this Court from the trial court’s termination order.5 In seeking relief 

from the trial court’s termination order before this Court, respondent-father argues 

that the trial court erred by finding that grounds existed to support the termination 

of his parental rights in the children while respondent-mother argues that the trial 

court erred by determining that termination of her parental rights would be in the 

children’s best interests.

 

4 The parents filed notices preserving their right to seek appellate review of the 11 

July 2018 order by the Court of Appeals pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1001(a)(5).

5 Although the parents noted appeals to this Court from the 11 July 2018 order, they 

have not contended in their briefs that the challenged order is legally erroneous, thereby 

abandoning any challenge that they might have otherwise been entitled to make to the 

lawfulness of that order. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6).
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II. Legal Analysis

A. Standard of Review

According to well-established North Carolina law, termination of parental 

rights proceedings involve the use of a two-stage process. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 

(2019). “At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by 

‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ the existence of one or more grounds for 

termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the General Statutes.” In re A.U.D., 373 

N.C. 3, 5–6, 832 S.E.2d 698, 700 (2019) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f)). “If [the trial 

court] determines that one or more grounds listed in section 7B-1111 are present, the 

court proceeds to the dispositional stage, at which the court must consider whether it 

is in the best interests of the juvenile[s] to terminate parental rights.” In re D.L.W., 

368 N.C. 835, 842, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016) (citing In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 

485 S.E.2d 612, 614–15 (1997); N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110).

B. Respondent-Father’s Appeal

As an initial matter, we will address respondent-father’s contention that the 

trial court erred by determining that his parental rights in the children were subject 

to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2). “This Court reviews a 

trial court’s adjudication decision pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 in order to 

determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing 

evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law, with the trial court’s 

conclusions of law being subject to de novo review on appeal.” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 
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71, 74, 833 S.E.2d 768, 771 (2019) (cleaned up) (citations omitted). “Findings of fact 

not challenged by respondent are deemed supported by competent evidence and are 

binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54, 58 (2019) (citing 

Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991)). “Moreover, we 

review only those findings necessary to support the trial court’s determination that 

grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights.” Id. at 407, 831 S.E.2d at 

58–59 (citing In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404, 293 S.E.2d 127, 133 (1982)). “[A] finding 

of only one ground is necessary to support a termination of parental rights.” In re 

A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 194, 835 S.E.2d 417, 421 (2019).

According to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), a trial judge may terminate a parent’s 

parental rights in a child in the event that it finds that the parent has neglected his 

or her child in such a way that the child has become a neglected juvenile as that term 

is defined in N.C.G.S. § 7B-101. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2019). A neglected juvenile 

is “[a]ny juvenile less than 18 years of age . . . whose parent . . . does not provide 

proper care, supervision, or discipline” or “who lives in an environment injurious to 

the juvenile’s welfare.” Id. § 7B-101(15).

[I]n deciding whether a child is neglected for purposes of 

terminating parental rights, the dispositive question is the 

fitness of the parent to care for the child at the time of the 

termination proceeding. In the event that a child has not 

been in the custody of the parent for a significant period of 

time prior to the termination hearing, requiring the 

petitioner in such circumstances to show that the child is 

currently neglected by the parent would make termination 

of parental rights impossible. In such circumstances, the 
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trial court may find that a parent’s parental rights in a 

child are subject to termination on the grounds of neglect 

in the event that the petitioner makes a showing of past 

neglect and a likelihood of future neglect by the parent.

In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 80, 833 S.E.2d at 775 (cleaned up) (citations omitted). “When 

determining whether future neglect is likely, the trial court must consider evidence 

of changed circumstances occurring between the period of past neglect and the time 

of the termination hearing.” In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88, 95, 839 S.E.2d 792, 797 (2020) 

(citing In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984)). “A parent’s 

failure to make progress in completing a case plan is indicative of a likelihood of 

future neglect.” In re M.J.S.M., 257 N.C. App. 633, 637, 810 S.E.2d 370, 373 (2018)

(citation omitted).

In light of the testimony, prior orders, and a report prepared by the guardian 

ad litem that was introduced into evidence at the termination hearing, the trial court 

found that “[respondents], the parents of [Maria], [Brenda] and [Andrew,] have 

neglected their children” and that “[t]here is a strong probability of repeated neglect 

of [Maria], [Brenda] and [Andrew] should they be returned to the care[,] custody[,] 

and control of [respondents].” In support of these ultimate findings, the trial court 

made numerous evidentiary findings concerning the progress that respondent-father 

had made toward satisfying the requirements of his case plan in the course of 

concluding that the progress that he made toward the achievement of that goal had 

not been reasonable.
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Although respondent-father acknowledges the existence of the trial court’s 

earlier determination that the children were neglected juveniles, he challenges its 

finding that there was a substantial probability that the children would be neglected 

in the event that they were returned to his care. Among other things, respondentfather argues that the challenged trial court finding was erroneous because he had 

“made reasonable progress in addressing substance use, domestic violence, and 

maintenance of a stable home and income.” In support of this contention, respondentfather asserts that several of the trial court’s factual findings lack sufficient 

evidentiary support to the extent that they indicate that he had failed to make 

reasonable progress toward satisfying the requirements of his case plan. A careful 

review of the record persuades us that the trial court’s findings concerning 

respondent-father’s failure to adequately address the issue of domestic violence have 

ample evidentiary support and are, standing alone, sufficient to support a 

determination that there was a likelihood of future neglect in the event that the 

children were returned to respondent-father’s care.

Respondent-father acknowledges that the trial court identified domestic 

violence as the central problem that resulted in the children’s removal from the family 

home in the 30 May 2018 adjudication order. In that order, the trial court detailed 

the incidents of domestic violence that had occurred in the family home during March 

and July 2017, resulted in the intervention of law enforcement officers, and caused 

the removal of the children from the parent’s care before noting that the children had 
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previously been in DSS custody and that “the issues for [ ] removal [in this instance 

were] similar to the prior removal reasons.” According to the trial court, “[t]here was 

ongoing constant domestic violence in the home between [the parents,]” “[t]here were 

numerous 911 calls due to domestic violence[,]” “[respondent-mother] ha[d] made 

numerous attempts to leave the home with the juveniles[,]” “[respondent-mother] 

admitted to . . . ongoing issues of domestic violence with [respondent-father,]” and 

“this is clearly a case where domestic violence between [respondents] has made this 

environment injurious to their children.” In order to remedy the problems resulting 

from the ongoing domestic violence between the parents and in an effort to achieve 

reunification, the trial court had ordered respondent-father to “[p]articipate in a 

domestic violence assessment at Family Services or with the COOL Program and 

follow all recommendation[s].”

In its termination order, the trial court found that:

26. [Respondent-father] attended 4 domestic violence 

classes: an intake session on April 7, 2018, and classes on 

May 5, 2018, May 12, 2018, May 17, 2018, and May 26, 

2018. He was discharged unsuccessfully on August 15, 

2018. 

27. [Respondent-father] has failed to demonstrate the 

concepts taught in domestic violence classes. The 

[guardian ad litem] for the children learned of an incident 

at the [respondent-father’s] home involving a disturbance 

for which law enforcement was called in November 2018. 

. . . .
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34. . . . [Respondent-father] has failed to fully engage in 

domestic violence treatment. 

Although respondent-father does not contend that Finding of Fact Nos. 26 and 27 

lack sufficient evidentiary support, he does assert that these findings fail to support 

the trial court’s determination that he had failed to make reasonable progress in 

addressing his domestic violence problems in light of the surrounding circumstances.

A careful review of the record evidence satisfies us that Finding of Fact Nos. 

26, 27, and 34 are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. At the 

termination hearing, the social worker testified that respondent-father had not 

complied with the trial court’s order to complete domestic violence classes. In spite 

of the fact that respondent-father enrolled in domestic violence classes provided by 

the COOL Program on 7 April 2018 and attended four classes on 5, 12, 17, and 26 

May 2018, there was no evidence that he had had any further involvement in or had 

completed that or any other domestic violence program as of the date of a review 

hearing held on 5 December 2018. In addition, the social worker testified that the 

staff of the COOL Program had indicated that respondent-father had not attended 

any classes since 26 May 2018 and that respondent-father had not demonstrated the 

ability to utilize the concepts that he had been taught in the domestic violence classes 

that he had attended. Furthermore, the guardian ad litem testified that he had 

received a report that there had been 911 calls relating to disturbances at respondentfather’s home approximately every other month during 2018. Although the report 
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did not provide any details relating to these calls, the guardian ad litem asserted that 

the number of calls made during 2018 was similar to the number of calls relating to 

respondent-father’s residence shown in an earlier report and “ma[d]e the point that 

the house, or the home ha[d] the same pattern of behavior [as] the last time [he] ran 

the 911 report[.]” In our opinion, this evidence provides ample support for Finding of 

Fact Nos. 26, 27, and 34 and demonstrates that respondent-father failed to fully 

engage in domestic violence treatment.

In seeking to persuade us to reach a different result with respect to this issue, 

respondent-father argues that the record evidence shows that he was attentive and 

engaged during the four domestic violence classes that he did attend. According to 

respondent-father, his limited attendance constituted reasonable progress under the 

circumstances, with it not being “surpris[ing] that [he] stopped attending [the 

domestic violence classes]” given that the trial court had ended the stipend for his 

expenses that was being drawn from the children’s accounts, reduced his visitation 

with the children, and eliminated reunification as the permanent plan. In addition, 

respondent-father points to the social worker’s testimony that, prior to the 

termination hearing, respondent-father “thought the rights had already been 

terminated with prior court proceedings.” Finally, respondent-father contends that, 

“[i]n the context of the case, even though [he] did not complete the COOL [P]rogram, 

he was reasonably addressing the issues relating to domestic violence.” We do not 

find these arguments persuasive.
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In light of the lengthy history of domestic violence between the parents dating 

back to the initial DSS involvement with the family in 2011, the trial court did not 

err by determining that respondent-father’s limited attendance at and his failure to 

complete the COOL Program constituted a failure to fully engage in domestic violence 

treatment and a lack of reasonable progress toward addressing the issue of domestic 

violence. Although the 11 July 2018 order did end respondent-father’s ability to 

obtain access to a $25 monthly stipend from the children’s accounts, reduce 

respondent-father’s visitation with the children, and eliminate reunification as the 

permanent plan for the children, that order did not terminate respondent-father’s 

parental rights in the children. On the contrary, the 11 July 2018 order contained 

provisions requiring respondent-father to address the concerns that had resulted in 

the children’s removal from the family home, including a requirement that he 

complete domestic violence classes. In addition, the 11 July 2018 order authorized 

monthly visits with the children, which respondent-father continued to attend 

through November 2018. Simply put, respondent-father’s mistaken belief that his 

parental rights in the children had been terminated was unreasonable and does not 

either justify his failure to address the issue of domestic violence or render the 

minimal progress that he did make toward addressing the issue of domestic violence 

reasonable. See In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 385, 831 S.E.2d 305, 314 (2019) 

(explaining that the trial court has the authority to decide whether a parent’s limited 

progress toward compliance with the provisions of his or her case plan was 
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reasonable). In the event that respondent-father is contending that he was unable to 

continue participating in domestic violence classes because he could not afford them 

in the absence of the monthly stipend, any such argument is refuted by the fact that 

financial assistance was available through the COOL Program and the fact that 

respondent-father had never “at any given point stopped by the office with . . . 

concerns about the financial barriers.”

Similarly, respondent-father argues that the trial court had erred by finding 

that he had failed to make reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that 

had led to the children’s removal from the family home given that, even though he 

and respondent-mother continued to live together, the record contained no evidence 

that there had been ongoing conflict between them. Although the record does not 

contain any definitive indication that there had been recent instances of domestic 

violence between the two parents, it did contain evidence tending to show that law 

enforcement officers had been summoned to address disturbances at respondentfather’s home at a level that was similar to the rate at which such calls had been 

made during earlier stages of this proceeding. Moreover, given the long history of 

domestic violence between the parents, which resulted in determinations that the 

children were neglected juveniles in both 2011 and 2018, the absence of evidence that 

there had been any recent incidents of domestic violence between the parents does 

not suffice to establish that respondent-father had adequately addressed the issue of 

domestic violence given his failure to make reasonable efforts to complete required 
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domestic violence education.6 As a result, we conclude that the record does not 

support respondent-father’s assertion that there was no longer any reason for concern 

that he would be involved in incidents of domestic violence with respondent-mother.

Aside from his argument that he had made reasonable progress toward 

addressing the conditions that had led to the children’s removal from the family 

home, respondent-father contends that there has been a substantial change in 

circumstances because he is no longer required to interact with Adam. More 

specifically, respondent-father asserts that “several of the incidents preceding the 

neglect adjudication arose from conflicts between [himself] and [Adam]” and that a 

psychologist who had evaluated him had concluded that, while he was capable of 

parenting his own children, Adam’s behaviors exceeded respondent-father’s 

parenting capabilities. In view of the fact that Adam’s permanent plan did not involve 

a return to respondent-father’s home, respondent-father argues that the principal 

obstacle to his ability to parent the children would no longer be present there. This 

aspect of respondent-father’s challenge to the trial court’s order reflects little more 

than his failure to comprehend the underlying domestic violence problem confronting 

the family and rests upon a failure to accept responsibility for the domestic violence 

that plagued the family home.

 

6 As an additional matter, the trial court noted that respondent-mother’s oldest son, 

Adam, was involved in a physical altercation with respondent-father on 29 July 2017 that 

stemmed from Adam’s intervention into a physical altercation between the parents for the 

purpose of protecting respondent-mother.
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The trial court’s order reflects a clear understanding of the lengthy history of 

domestic violence in the family home and respondent-father’s failure to make 

reasonable progress toward addressing the principal obstacle toward reunification 

that had been identified in the trial court’s initial adjudication and disposition order. 

For that reason, we hold that the trial court’s findings support its determination that 

“[t]here is a strong probability of repeated neglect of [Maria], [Brenda,] and [Andrew] 

should they be returned to the care[,] custody and control of . . . [respondent-father]”7

and that respondent-father’s parental rights in the children were subject to 

termination on the grounds of neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). In 

addition, given that the existence of a single ground for termination suffices to 

support the termination of a parent’s parental rights in a child, see In re A.R.A., 373 

N.C. at 194, 835 S.E.2d at 421, and that respondent-father has not challenged the 

lawfulness of the trial court’s best interests determination, we affirm the trial court’s 

termination order with respect to respondent-father.

C. Respondent-Mother’s Appeal

 

7 As a result of our determination that the trial court’s findings of fact concerning 

respondent-father’s failure to adequately address the issue of domestic violence suffice to 

support its determination that his parental rights in the children were subject to termination 

on the basis of neglect, we need not address respondent-father’s challenge to the trial court’s 

findings relating to the issues of substance abuse, the suitability of respondent-father’s home, 

and the nature and extent of respondent-father’s contacts with DSS. See In re T.N.H., 372 

N.C. at 407, 831 S.E.2d at 58–59 (stating that “we review only those findings necessary to 

support the trial court’s determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s 

parental rights”).
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Next, we will address respondent-mother’s contention that the trial court erred 

by finding that the termination of her parental rights would be in the best interests 

of the children. The trial court’s best interests determination is governed by N.C.G.S. 

§ 7B-1110, which provides that:

[t]he court may consider any evidence, including hearsay 

evidence as defined in [N.C.G.S. §] 8C-1, Rule 801, that the 

court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to 

determine the best interests of the juvenile. In each case, 

the court shall consider the following criteria and make 

written findings regarding the following that are relevant:

(1) The age of the juvenile.

(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.

(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will 

aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for 

the juvenile. 

(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.

(5) The quality of the relationship between the 

juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, 

custodian, or other permanent placement.

(6) Any relevant consideration.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). “The trial court’s assessment of a juvenile’s best 

interests at the dispositional stage is reviewed solely for abuse of discretion.” In re 

A.U.D., 373 N.C. at 6, 832 S.E.2d at 700; see also In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. at 99–100, 

839 S.E.2d. at 800 (reaffirming the use of an abuse of discretion standard of review 

for the purpose of reviewing a trial court’s best interests determination pursuant to 
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N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)). An “[a]buse of discretion results where the court’s ruling is 

manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the 

result of a reasoned decision.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. at 6–7, 832 S.E.2d at 700–01

(quoting In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107, 772 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2015)). “The trial 

court’s dispositional findings of fact are reviewed under a ‘competent evidence’ 

standard.” In re K.N.K, 374 N.C. 50, 57, 839 S.E.2d 735, 740 (2020) (citation omitted).

In its termination order, the trial court made detailed findings of fact that 

addressed each of the relevant statutory criteria. More specifically, the trial court

found that Andrew was thirteen years old, that Brenda was twelve years old, and 

that Maria was nine years old at the time of the termination hearing and that each 

of the children had spent approximately thirty-eight months of their lives in DSS 

custody. In addition, the trial court found that, while no prospective adoptive families 

had been identified for the children, an adoption recruiter had become involved, so 

that the likelihood that each child would be adopted was very high. Furthermore, 

the trial court found that termination of the parents’ parental rights in the children 

was necessary to effectuate the permanent plan of adoption; that the children had 

strong bonds with their parents and with the caregivers in the group home in which 

they had been placed; that the children were doing well in school and therapy and 

had no special needs; that the adoption recruiter was working to locate a family who 

would be willing to adopt all three children; that the children understood that the 

situation with their parents was not getting better; and that the children were not 
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resistant to the plan of adoption. Finally, the trial court found that the adoption 

recruiter believed that there were no barriers to the children’s adoption and that the 

guardian ad litem recommended that the parents’ parental rights in the children be 

terminated given that the children had been in foster care for a lengthy period of time 

and needed a safe, permanent home.

Although respondent-mother acknowledges that “[t]he trial court made 

findings concerning the enumerated factors of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a),” she 

questions the sufficiency of the evidentiary support for certain of the trial court’s 

findings and faults the trial court for failing to make findings concerning the extent 

to which the children would consent to being adopted. As an initial matter, 

respondent-mother disputes the validity of the trial court’s determination in Finding 

of Fact Nos. 37, 43, and 49 that the likelihood that the children would be adopted was 

“very high.” According to respondent-mother, the fact that the children “were placed 

in a group home with no identified adoptive placements[;]” that “[t]he adoption 

recruiter testified that it could be up to two years before an adoptive family is 

found[;]” that the children had strong bonds with respondents and wanted to be 

returned to their care; and that, since Brenda and Andrew were more than twelve 

years old, they must consent to be adopted fatally undermined the trial court’s 

findings relating to the adoptability issue.

The trial court’s finding that there was a high likelihood that the children 

would be adopted has adequate record support. A social worker with responsibility 
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for handling this matter testified that she believed that all three children had “a great 

likelihood of adoption[.]” In addition, the social worker’s testimony tended to show 

that the children had adjusted well to their current placement, that they had formed 

bonded relationships with their caregivers and other children who lived in the group 

home in which the children resided, that the children had no special needs and were 

not on medication, and that the children were generally doing well in school and 

succeeding in therapy. In addition to describing the circumstances in which the 

children currently found themselves, the guardian ad litem testified that he had no 

concerns about the children’s ability to bond with an adoptive family and that 

termination of the parents’ parental rights in the children would be in the children’s 

best interests given their need for safety and permanence. In light of this testimony, 

we have no hesitation in concluding that the trial court’s findings with respect to the 

issue of adoptability have ample record support.

In addition, we conclude that respondent-mother’s argument that the 

likelihood that the children would be adopted was not high and her assertion that the 

trial court’s statement in Finding of Fact No. 56 that there were “no barriers to 

adoption” was devoid of sufficient evidentiary support lack persuasive force. 

Although respondent-mother is correct in stating that no adoptive placement had 

been identified for the children, the absence of such a placement does not preclude 

the termination of a parent’s parental rights in his or her children. See In re A.R.A., 

373 N.C. at 200, 835 S.E.2d at 424 (finding no error in the trial court’s best interests 
IN RE M.A., B.A., A.A.

Opinion of the Court

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determination despite the absence of an identified adoptive placement for the 

juvenile) (citing In re D.H., 232 N.C. App. 217, 223, 753 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2014)). The 

adoption recruiter assigned to work with the children testified that she first met with 

the children on 3 December 2018, that she was in the initial phase of attempting to 

find an adoptive placement for them, and that the second stage in that process, which 

included participation in adoption-related events, would begin in several months. In 

spite of the fact that the adoption recruiter did state that the longest that it had taken 

to complete an adoption in the cases in which she had been involved was “probably 

18 months, two years[,]” her testimony to that effect did not constitute an estimate of 

the amount of time that it would take to find an adoptive placement for the children 

in this case. Instead, the adoption recruiter testified that “[e]ach situation really is 

different,” with the trial court having clarified that the adoption recruiter’s testimony 

was “based on the kids that she has worked with in the past.” Simply put, the record 

does not support respondent-mother’s assertion that the adoption recruiter testified 

that “it could be up to two years before an adoptive family is found” for the children.

Moreover, contrary to the assumption upon which this particular aspect of 

respondent-mother’s argument rests, the possibility that the adoption process would 

be a lengthy one does not preclude a finding that there is a high likelihood that the 

children will be adopted. On the contrary, the adoption recruiter testified that there 

were no barriers to the children’s adoption and that the termination of the parents’ 

parental rights in the children would be in their best interests by making them 
IN RE M.A., B.A., A.A.

Opinion of the Court

-21-

eligible for listing with adoption services agencies and making additional avenues for 

identifying an adoptive family available to them. As a result, the testimony provided 

by the adoption recruiter supports the trial court’s findings that there were no 

barriers to the children’s adoption and that there was a high likelihood that the 

children would be adopted.

In addition, respondent-mother argues that the likelihood that the children 

would be adopted was not high given that the children had strong bonds with the 

parents, that the children wanted to return to their parents’ care, and that Brenda 

and Andrew would be required to consent to any adoption because they were over 

twelve years old, see N.C.G.S. § 48-3-601(1) (2019), with this aspect of respondentmother’s argument being directed against Finding of Fact Nos. 47, 53, and 55. A 

careful review of the record evidence, however, satisfies us that the relevant findings 

of fact have sufficient support given that the record contains evidence tending to show 

that, while the children hoped that they could return to their parents’ care and while 

they would like for this outcome to come to pass, the intensity of their hopes that such 

an outcome would ever happen had diminished given the passage of time and missed 

parental visits. In addition, the record contains evidence tending to show that the 

children were aware that the adoption recruiter was looking for an adoptive family 

and that Andrew and Brenda had expressed preferences concerning the composition 

of any adoptive family that might become available, a fact that suggests that these 

two children had begun to accept the idea that they would be adopted. Although the 
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-22-

guardian ad litem testified that Maria did not want to be adopted and simply wished 

to return to the parents’ care, the record also contains evidence tending to show that 

even she understood that the problems that the parents had been experiencing had 

not been resolved. According to the adoption recruiter, even though the children 

wanted to return to the family home, they acknowledged that conditions there had 

not improved. As a result, we hold that the trial court’s findings that the children 

understood that the parents had not addressed the issues that had resulted in their 

removal from the family home and that Andrew and Brenda did not resist the idea of 

adoption had adequate evidentiary support.8

In spite of the fact that the existence of a close bond between the children and 

the parents, the children’s preference for returning to the parental home, and the 

necessity for certain of the children to consent to an adoption are clearly relevant to 

a trial court’s best interests determination, we are not satisfied that these facts 

preclude a finding that the children are likely to be adopted. Instead of ignoring these 

issues, the trial court addressed them in Finding of Fact Nos. 39, 45, and 51 and 

considered them in the course of making its ultimate best interests determination. 

Similarly, while the trial court is entitled to consider the children’s wishes in 

 

8 The guardian ad litem’s testimony at the termination hearing does not support the

trial court’s finding that Maria was not resistant to adoption. However, a finding that Maria 

opposed being adopted did not preclude a determination that termination of the parents’ 

parental rights in the children would not be in their best interests, rendering the trial court’s 

error in this respect harmless in light of the other surrounding facts and circumstances.
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Opinion of the Court

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determining whether termination of their parents’ parental rights would be 

appropriate, their preferences are not controlling given that the children’s best 

interests constitute “the ‘polar star’ of the North Carolina Juvenile Code.” In re 

T.H.T., 362 N.C. 446, 450, 665 S.E.2d 54, 57 (2008); see also Clark v. Clark, 294 N.C. 

554, 577, 243 S.E.2d 129, 142 (1978) (stating that “[t]he expressed wish of a child . . . 

is . . . never controlling upon the court, since the court must yield in all cases to what 

it considers to be for the child’s best interests, regardless of the child’s personal 

preference”). As a result, given that the trial court’s findings of fact have adequate 

evidentiary support and given that the trial court considered all of the relevant 

factors before determining that termination of the parents’ parental rights would be 

in the children’s best interests, the trial court did not commit any prejudicial error of 

law in the course of making its best interests determination.

Furthermore, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by failing to 

make findings of fact concerning the extent to which Brenda and Andrew would 

consent to be adopted. To be sure, N.C.G.S. § 48-3-601 provides that a juvenile over 

the age of twelve must consent to an adoption. N.C.G.S. § 48-3-601(1) (2019). On the 

other hand, N.C.G.S. §48-3-601 governs adoption, rather than termination of 

parental rights, proceedings. In addition, N.C.G.S. § 48-3-603(b) provides that a trial 

judge may dispense with the requirement that a child who is twelve years of age or 

older consent to an adoption “upon a finding that it is not in the best interest of the 

minor to require the consent.” Id. § 48-3-603(b)(2). For that reason, any refusal on 
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Opinion of the Court

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the part of Brenda and Andrew to consent to a proposed adoption would not preclude 

their adoption in the event that the trial judge made the necessary findings. As a 

result, given that a refusal on the part of one or more of the children to consent would 

not necessarily preclude their adoption, we hold that the trial court was not required 

to make findings and conclusions concerning the extent, if any, to which Brenda and 

Andrew were likely to consent to any adoption that might eventually be proposed.

Similarly, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred in making 

Finding of Fact Nos. 40, 46, and 52, in which it found that the children had strong 

relationships and had bonded with the persons responsible for their care in the group 

home in which they lived. Instead of arguing that these findings lack sufficient 

evidentiary support, respondent-mother contends that the challenged findings are 

irrelevant because N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(5) requires consideration of the “quality of 

the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, 

custodian, or other permanent placement,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(5) (2019), rather 

than the quality of the relationship between the children and the persons caring for 

them in their current non-adoptive placement. To be sure, the trial court could not 

make a finding concerning the quality of the children’s relationship with any 

prospective adoptive parent because no such persons had been identified. On the 

other hand, the trial court’s findings concerning the ability of the children to bond 

with their current caregivers did tend to support a conclusion that the children were 

adoptable given their ability to develop a bond with other human beings. Thus, the 
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-25-

trial court did not err by making findings of fact concerning the bond between the 

children and their current caretakers.

Finally, respondent-mother challenges Finding of Fact No. 57, in which the 

trial court found that “[p]overty is not the cause for [respondents’] neglect of their 

children.” In response, respondent-mother argues that “poverty was most certainly 

an issue that impacted [her] ability to reunify with the juveniles.” Although 

respondent-mother is correct in noting that her parental rights are not subject to 

termination in the event that her inability to care for her children rested solely upon 

poverty-related considerations, see N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2019) (providing that 

“[n]o parental rights . . . shall be terminated for the sole reason that the parents are 

unable to care for the juvenile on account of their poverty”), the challenged trial court 

finding appears to relate to the trial court’s decision that grounds for the termination 

of respondent-mother’s parental rights existed, a determination that respondentmother has not challenged on appeal, rather than to the trial court’s best interests 

determination. However, to the extent that the trial court intended for Finding of 

Fact No. 57 to relate to the dispositional, as well as the adjudicatory, stage of the 

present proceeding, we conclude that Finding of Fact No. 57 is supported by the 

unchallenged findings that respondent-mother failed to comply with substance abuse 

treatment; failed to demonstrate sustained sobriety; failed to obtain domestic violence 

counseling and demonstrate the ability to use the concepts that she had learned 

during that process; continued to reside with respondent-father; and failed to 
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Opinion of the Court

-26-

consistently keep FCDSS aware of changes in her employment, residence, and contact 

information and conclude that the trial court’s decision that it would be in the 

children’s best interests for respondent-mother’s parental rights to be terminated did 

not rest solely upon respondent-mother’s poverty.

Thus, with a single exception, we conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact 

had ample evidentiary support. Moreover, in spite of the existence of record evidence 

tending to show that the children were strongly bonded to the parents and wanted to 

return to their care, the termination order establishes that the trial court performed 

a reasoned best-interests analysis and did not abuse its discretion by determining 

that the termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights in the children would be 

in their best interests. For that reason, given that respondent-mother has not 

challenged the trial court’s determination that grounds for the termination of her 

parental rights in the children existed, we hold that the trial court did not err by 

terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights in the children. As a result, the 

trial court’s termination order is affirmed with respect to both parents.

AFFIRMED.