J-S76032-14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant 

v. 

STEVEN WAYNE DILLOW, 

 Appellee No. 1106 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order Entered June 23, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0001162-2013 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., PANELLA AND OLSON, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JANUARY 22, 2015 

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (“Commonwealth”) appeals from 

a June 23, 2014 order that dismissed, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110 (the 

compulsory joinder statute), driving under the influence and related charges 

filed against Steven Wayne Dillow (“Appellee”). We affirm. 

 The undisputed factual and procedural history in this case is as follows. 

On March 13, 2013 at 1:25 a.m., Pennsylvania State Troopers Andrew Prizzi, 

Robert Broadwater, Marc Ziegler, and Joel Guthrie were dispatched to a 

residence on Mayflower Drive in South Union Township. Troopers Prizzi and 

Broadwater traveled to the scene in the same patrol vehicle while Troopers 

Ziegler and Guthrie traveled in a separate vehicle. The troopers were 

dispatched in response to a report that a male, who arrived at the scene in a 

silver Ford Focus, was banging on the door and attempting to gain access to 
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the Mayflower Drive residence. All of the troopers arrived at the scene 

simultaneously. 

 Upon arrival, Trooper Prizzi observed Appellee sitting in the driver’s 

seat of the silver Ford Focus. The vehicle was parked on the side of 

Mayflower Drive with its right tires on the curb and the rest of the vehicle in 

the road. The engine of the vehicle was running. Trooper Prizzi parked his 

patrol car in front of Appellee’s vehicle and the other patrol car parked 

behind it. As Trooper Prizzi approached Appellee, he observed that 

Appellee’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy and that a strong odor of alcohol 

emanated from Appellee’s person. After confirming Appellee’s identity and 

the status of his driver’s license, Trooper Prizzi asked Appellee to exit the 

vehicle and the trooper performed certain field sobriety tests upon Appellee.1 

Based upon Appellee’s performance, Trooper Prizzi concluded that Appellee 

was impaired and placed him under arrest for driving under the influence.2

 While Trooper Prizzi interacted with Appellee, Trooper Broadwater 

interviewed the residents of the house on Mayflower Drive. Based upon his 

investigation, Trooper Broadwater came to believe that Appellee, while in an 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Trooper Prizzi performed the horizontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”) test and 

administered a portable breath test. Trooper Prizzi did not perform the one 

leg stand and the walk and turn test because Appellee advised that he had 

pre-existing ankle injuries that prevented him from performing those tests. 

2

 Subsequent testing revealed that Appellee had a blood alcohol content of 

.154%. 
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intoxicated state, created a disturbance within the community when he 

banged on the door of the Mayflower Drive residence and honked the horn of 

his Ford Focus. 

Trooper Broadwater issued two summary offense citations dated March 

13, 2013 that charged Appellee with public drunkenness3 and disorderly 

conduct.4 The citation charging Appellee with public drunkenness alleged 

that, “[Appellee] did appear in a public place manifestly under the influence 

of alcohol to a degree that [Appellee] may have endangered himself or other 

persons or property or annoy persons in the vicinity; to wit: [Appellee] was 

intoxicated while he was banging on the front of [the residence on] 

Mayflower causing annoyance to sleeping [residents].” Non-Traffic Citation 

(Public Drunkenness), 3/13/13. The citation charging Appellee with 

disorderly conduct alleged that, “[Appellee], with the intent to cause public 

inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof did 

make unreasonable noise; to wit: [Appellee] did bang on the front of [the 

residence on] Mayflower causing the [residents] alarm and annoyance. 

[Appellee] also [continually honked] his car horn causing alarm to the 

resident at [another house on] Mayflower.” Non-Traffic Citation (Disorderly 

____________________________________________ 

3

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. 

4

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(2). 
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Conduct), 3/13/13. Appellee pled guilty to both summary charges on March 

20, 2014. 

On March 26, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint 

charging Appellee with driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”) - 

general impairment,5 DUI - high rate,6 careless driving,7 and restraint 

systems.8 Thereafter, Appellee filed an omnibus pre-trial motion alleging 

that the charges set forth in the criminal complaint were subject to 

compulsory joinder under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110 and, therefore, barred by the 

prior summary offense prosecutions. The trial court convened a hearing on 

Appellee’s motion on September 24, 2013 and, by order dated June 23, 

2014, dismissed the charges against Appellee. This timely Commonwealth 

appeal followed. 

In its brief, the Commonwealth raises the following claim for our 

review: 

Whether the [trial court] erred in granting [Appellee’s] pre[-]trial 

motion to dismiss when the charges [alleged within the criminal 

complaint] were not within the jurisdiction of a single court and 

[Appellee] was not placed in double jeopardy according to 

Commonwealth v. Bellezza, 603 A.2d 1031 (Pa. Super. 

1992)[?] 

____________________________________________ 

5

 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1). 

6

 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(b). 

7

 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3714(a). 

8

 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4581(a)(2)(ii). 
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Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.9

The Commonwealth advances two arguments in support of its 

contention that the trial court erred in dismissing DUI and related charges 

against Appellee. First, the Commonwealth asserts that the DUI charges 

investigated by Trooper Prizzi did not arise from the same criminal episode 

as the summary offenses investigated by Trooper Broadwater within the 

meaning of section 110. In support of this position, the Commonwealth 

argues that the DUI charges arose from observations made by Trooper Prizzi 

upon his arrival at the scene while the summary offenses were based upon 

Appellee’s conduct that occurred before the troopers arrived. Second, the 

Commonwealth maintains that the summary offenses and the DUI charges 

did not occur within the same judicial district since the former fell within the 

jurisdiction of the district magistrate and the latter fell within the jurisdiction 

of the court of common pleas. The Commonwealth cites Bellezza as 

support for both of its contentions. These claims fail. 

Section 110, known as the compulsory joinder rule, bars a 

subsequent prosecution if each prong of the following test is 

met: 

the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or conviction; the 

current prosecution was based on the same criminal conduct or 

arose from the same criminal episode; the prosecutor in the 

subsequent trial was aware of the charges before the first trial; 

____________________________________________ 

9

 The Commonwealth preserved the claim it raises on appeal by including it 

within a timely filed concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. 
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and all charges [are] within the same judicial district as the 

former prosecution. 

Commonwealth v. Reid, 77 A.3d 579, 582 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted). 

 In this appeal, the Commonwealth challenges the trial court’s 

determinations that Appellee met the second and fourth prongs of the test 

for compulsory joinder.10 These elements relate to the logical relationship

prong and the requirement that all charges emerge from the same judicial 

district. We address these issues in turn. 

 When considering the logical relationship prong, our Supreme Court 

has instructed that we must “look at the ‘temporal’ and ‘logical’ relationship 

between the charges to determine whether they arose from a ‘single criminal 

episode.’” Id. In assessing the logical relationship between charges, the 

Supreme Court explained: 

In ascertaining whether a number of statutory offenses are 

logically related to one another, the court should initially inquire 

as to whether there is a substantial duplication of factual, and/or 

legal issues presented by the offenses. If there is duplication, 

then the offenses are logically related and must be prosecuted at 

one trial. The mere fact that the additional statutory offenses 

involve additional issues of law or fact is not sufficient to create 

a separate criminal episode since the logical relationship test 

does not require an absolute identity of factual backgrounds. 

____________________________________________ 

10 We need not discuss parts one and three of the compulsory joinder test. 

Appellee’s guilty plea constitutes a conviction for purposes of section 110. 

Commonwealth v. Hockenberry, 701 A.2d 1334, 1336 (Pa. 1997). 

Moreover, there is no dispute that the prosecutor was aware of the DUI 

charges before the initial proceedings, as all the crimes were known to the 

prosecuting authority at the same time. 
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Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). Moreover, 

[when considering] the temporal and logical relationship 

between the criminal acts, [courts must be] guided by the policy 

considerations that [section] 110 was designed to serve: 

to protect a person accused of crimes from governmental 

harassment of being forced to undergo successive trials for 

offenses stemming from the same criminal episode; and as a 

matter of judicial administration and economy, to assure finality 

without unduly burdening the judicial process by repetitious 

litigation. 

Id. at 583 (citation omitted). 

Under the circumstances presented in this appeal, we find instructive 

the Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Anthony, 717 A.2d 

1015 (Pa. 1998). In Anthony, the defendant committed a series of 

burglaries with juvenile cohorts. After an investigation, the defendant was 

initially charged with corruption of minors and related charges. The charges 

alleged, among other things, that the defendant enticed and encouraged the 

juveniles to commit thefts and residential burglaries. The defendant pled 

guilty and was sentenced. Thereafter, the Pennsylvania State Police filed 

theft and burglary charges against the defendant. The defendant moved to 

dismiss the charges on grounds of double jeopardy and compulsory joinder, 

arguing that the second prosecution arose from the same criminal episode 

that culminated in his prior conviction. Both the trial court and this Court 

denied relief. 
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Upon further review, our Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the 

defendant's subsequent prosecution arose from the same criminal episode as 

the initial prosecution because all of the criminal acts were temporally and 

logically related. The Supreme Court held that the prosecutions were 

temporally related since they essentially covered the same period of time. 

The Court also found substantial duplication of issues of fact and law 

because much of the evidence from the first proceeding would be introduced 

in the second trial. With regard to the duplication of legal issues, the Court 

noted: 

As for the legal issues, [the defendant]'s first conviction for 

corrupting the morals of the minors was grounded on his 

encouraging and enticing the minors to commit burglaries and 

thefts. The second Information also charges burglary and 

theft[;] the variation in the form of the criminal charges cannot 

disguise the commonality of the legal issues within the two 

informations. 

Id. at 1019. 

 After careful review, we are persuaded in this case that a temporal and 

logical relationship exists between the first and second prosecutions. Thus, 

the trial court correctly determined that the current prosecution arose from 

the same criminal episode as the original prosecution. The present criminal 

complaint charges Appellee with DUI and other offenses arising from events 

that occurred on March 13, 2013 at or around 1:25 a.m. Appellee argued 

that those criminal charges arose from the same criminal episode as the 

summary offenses to which he pled guilty. Like the DUI charges, the 
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summary offenses with which Appellee was charged stemmed from events 

that occurred on Mayflower Drive on March 13, 2013 at approximately 1:25 

a.m. Hence, the present DUI charges share a direct temporal relationship 

with the conduct upon which Appellee’s summary charges rested. 

 The Commonwealth argues that the crimes alleged in the criminal 

complaint are not logically related to Appellee’s summary convictions since 

they do not involve the same conduct. In developing this argument, the 

Commonwealth stresses that Appellee’s summary convictions arose from the 

drunken disturbance he created before the troopers arrived on scene, as 

investigated by Trooper Broadwater. By contrast, the Commonwealth notes, 

the DUI charges (and other crimes) alleged in the criminal complaint stem 

from observations made by Trooper Prizzi upon his arrival at the Mayflower 

Drive address. The Commonwealth, however, overlooks the fact that “[a] 

logical relationship is not conditioned upon the duplication of identical 

criminal acts.” Id. Instead, “a logical relationship [may exist] where the 

sequence of criminal acts reveals a substantial duplication of issues of law 

and fact.” Id.

 A substantial duplication of issues exists in the present case. While it 

is conceivable under the facts of this case that the Commonwealth could 

prove the crimes alleged in the criminal complaint without introducing the 

testimony of Trooper Broadwater or the witnesses he interviewed, we do not 

believe that the involvement of two law enforcement officers is sufficient to 
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preclude compulsory joinder given the substantial overlap of legal issues. 

Appellee’s guilty plea to public drunkenness established that he was 

manifestly under the influence of alcohol at or around 1:25 a.m. on March 

13, 2013. Moreover, Appellee’s guilty plea to disorderly conduct established, 

among other things, that he honked his car horn and, by inference, was in 

physical control of his vehicle. The criminal complaint alleged that Appellee 

committed DUI, which required the Commonwealth to prove that Appellee 

was intoxicated and that he was in control of his vehicle. Given the 

commonality of the legal issues between the first and second prosecutions, 

we find that the present charges arose from the same criminal episode as 

the first set of charges since the criminal acts were temporally and logically 

related.11

 The Commonwealth next argues that, although all of Appellee’s 

offenses occurred within Fayette County, the summary offenses and the DUI 

charges did not occur within the same judicial district since the former fell 

within the jurisdiction of the district magistrate and the latter fell within the 

jurisdiction of the court of common pleas. The Commonwealth relies on 

Bellezza to support its position. The Commonwealth’s reliance upon 

____________________________________________ 

11 Since there were common elements shared between Appellee’s summary 

offenses and the present DUI charges, Bellezza does not bar application of 

the compulsory joinder doctrine in this case. See Bellezza, 603 A.2d at 

1039 (holding that where there were no common elements between 

summary offense of disorderly conduct and subsequent DUI charge, double 

jeopardy did not bar later prosecution). 
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Bellezza is misplaced, however, since that case interpreted a prior version 

of section 110 which required that all offenses be within the jurisdiction of a 

single court. That language was amended in 2002 to require that the crimes 

occur within the same judicial district. Our Supreme Court interpreted the 

amended language in Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66, 75 (Pa. 

2008) stating, “[b]ased upon the plain words of these statutory provisions, 

we have no problem in concluding the General Assembly intended that, for 

purposes of the compulsory joinder statute, the phrase ‘judicial district’ 

means the geographical area established by the General Assembly in which 

a court of common pleas is located.” Since section 110 no longer includes 

the language upon which the Commonwealth relies, it is clear that the 

Commonwealth’s contention in this appeal merits no relief. 

 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 1/22/2015