96-661

 No. 96-661

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

 1997

MONTANA METAL BUILDINGS, INC.,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

DAVID A. SHAPIRO, Individually and d/b/a

BRIDGER AVIATION SERVICES,

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Gallatin,

 The Honorable Larry W. Moran, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Robert Cameron, Gregory O. Morgan; Morgan, Cameron & Weaver

 Bozeman, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Steven R. Milch; Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, 

 Billings, Montana

 Terry B. Cosgrove, Michael E. Frank; Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole

 & Dietrich, Helena Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: April 3, 1997

 Decided: July 15, 1997

Filed:

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 __________________________________________

 Clerk 

Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 David A. Shapiro (Shapiro) appeals from the order and decree entered by the

Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, which granted the cross-motion 

for

summary judgment filed by Montana Metal Buildings, Inc. (MMB) and foreclosed its

construction lien. We reverse.

 The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in granting MMB's crossmotion for summary judgment.

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 On April 14, 1994, MMB submitted a bid proposal to Shapiro, doing business as

Bridger Aviation Services, for the construction of a 60' x 80' metal building on 

premises

leased by Shapiro at the Three Forks Airport. Shapiro accepted the bid proposal and

MMB began construction. Thereafter, MMB served a Notice of Claim and Construction

Lien (Lien) on Shapiro on July 31, 1995. It specified that MMB claimed a lien 

against

Shapiro's property in the amount of $26,889.43, as the balance due for materials and

labor used in the construction of the metal building. 

 MMB subsequently sued Shapiro in District Court, seeking judgment in the amount

of $26,889.43, plus interest on that amount from July 31, 1995, and an order of

foreclosure on the Lien. In his answer to the complaint, Shapiro denied that MMB was

entitled to the relief requested and affirmatively alleged that he did not owe MMB 

any

additional payments.

 Shapiro subsequently moved for summary judgment, asserting that the Lien was

fatally flawed and, therefore, unenforceable as a matter of law. The bases for his 

motion

were that the Lien insufficiently described the property to which it purported to 

attach and

that statutory notice requirements had not been met. He filed affidavits in support 

of his

motion. MMB opposed Shapiro's motion, contending that the Lien sufficiently 

described

the property and that the notice provisions did not apply. MMB also filed a crossmotion

for summary judgment, relying on its brief in opposition to Shapiro's motion and the

affidavit of its president and requesting entry of judgment in its favor against 

Shapiro for

the amounts prayed for in its complaint.

 At the hearing on the summary judgment motions, the attorneys for both parties

presented their arguments for and against the validity of MMB's Lien. Neither party

presented testimony, although MMB entered a photograph of the Bridger Aviation

Services building it had constructed for Shapiro into evidence.

 The District Court subsequently entered a written order denying Shapiro's motion

and granting MMB's motion. The court determined that no issues of material fact 

existed

in the case and decreed that the amounts listed in MMB's complaint were due and 

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owing,

that they were a first and prior lien on the property and that MMB's Lien be 

foreclosed. 

The District Court certified its order as a final judgment for purposes of appeal 

pursuant

to Rule 54(b), M.R.Civ.P., and Shapiro appeals that portion of the order which 

granted

MMB's cross-motion for summary judgment and ordered foreclosure of the Lien. 

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

 Our standard in reviewing a district court's summary judgment ruling is de 

novo; 

we use the same Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., criteria as the district court. Clark v. Eagle

Systems, Inc. (Mont. 1996), 927 P.2d 995, 997, 53 St.Rep. 1150, 1151 (citations

omitted). Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., provides, in pertinent part, that 

 [t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

 with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

 material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

 of law. 

Summary judgment is an extreme remedy which should never be substituted for a trial

if a material factual controversy exists. Clark, 927 P.2d at 997 (citations 

omitted).

 The party seeking summary judgment must establish, in light of the pleadings and

other evidence before the court, the absence of any genuine issue of material fact 

which

would allow the nonmoving party to recover and entitlement to judgment as a matter of

law. Clark, 927 P.2d at 997-8 (citations omitted). If, but only if, the party 

seeking

summary judgment meets this burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with

substantial and material evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Clark, 

927

P.2d at 998 (citation omitted). "[A]ll reasonable inferences that might be drawn 

from the

offered evidence should be drawn in favor of the party who opposed summary 

judgment." 

Clark, 927 P.2d at 998 (citations omitted).

 DISCUSSION

 Did the District Court err in granting MMB's cross-motion for summary

judgment?

 Shapiro argues that MMB did not establish the absence of genuine issues of

material fact regarding entitlement to the relief prayed for in its complaint. 

Specifically,

he contends that MMB presented no testimony or other evidence establishing that he 

owed 

the amount set forth in MMB's Lien and prayed for in the complaint, or any other

amount. Because his answer to the complaint put the amount MMB sought to recover

at issue, Shapiro asserts that genuine issues of material fact remain for trial which

preclude summary judgment for MMB. Thus, we first address whether MMB met its

initial burden as the party moving for summary judgment.

 MMB's complaint alleged, in pertinent part, that it had an interest in certain

property by virtue of the Lien attached to, and incorporated by reference in, the

complaint. It also alleged that Shapiro owed it $26,889.43, plus interest, as 

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reflected on

invoices billed to Shapiro for the labor and materials used in the construction of 

the metal

building. Copies of the invoices also were attached to, and incorporated by 

reference in,

MMB's complaint. As a result of Shapiro's failure to pay, the allegations continued,

MMB filed the Lien. The effect of attaching and incorporating the Lien and the 

invoices

is to make those attachments a part of the complaint for all purposes. Rule 10(c),

M.R.Civ.P.; see Gallatin Trust and Savings Bank v. Darrah (1968), 152 Mont. 256, 262,

448 P.2d 734, 737. 

 In his answer to the complaint, Shapiro denied that the described property was

subject to MMB's Lien, denied that MMB had an interest in the property and denied 

that

he owed the amount indicated in the invoices. Shapiro affirmatively asserted that he

owed no further payments to MMB. The denials and affirmative allegation in Shapiro's

answer effectively controverted the factual allegations in MMB's complaint on which 

its

prayer for relief was based, thus putting those allegations in issue. See Rule 8(b),

M.R.Civ.P.; Brown v. Ehlert (1992), 255 Mont. 140, 146, 841 P.2d 510, 514.

 Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., authorizes summary judgment "if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." It is clear from MMB's

complaint and Shapiro's answer in this case that MMB was not entitled to summary

judgment based on the pleadings because the allegations on which MMB's prayer for

relief was based were put at issue by Shapiro's answer. In other words, the denials 

of

MMB's material allegations in Shapiro's answer created genuine issues of material 

fact

and put MMB to its proof. The question then becomes whether MMB came forward with

evidence--via discovery, affidavits or otherwise--to overcome Shapiro's denials and

establish the absence of genuine issues of material fact. See Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.

P. We

conclude that it did not. 

 MMB submitted the affidavit of its president, Donald Jones. Jones' affidavit 

was

directed at Shapiro's argument that the Lien was materially defective in that it

insufficiently described the property to which it purported to attach; in that 

regard, Jones

stated only that MMB provided materials and labor for the construction of the Bridger

Aviation Services metal building and identified the building by location and 

description. 

Although MMB's Lien is mentioned in the affidavit, no statements are made therein 

that

Shapiro owed any amount of money to MMB. In addition to the affidavit, MMB

admitted a photograph of the Bridger Aviation Services building it had constructed 

for

Shapiro into evidence at the hearing on the summary judgment motions. Like Jones'

affidavit, the photograph was advanced solely to counter Shapiro's argument about the

sufficiency of the property description.

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 The only other items of record which relate to MMB's motion for summary

judgment are its brief filed in the District Court and its counsel's arguments at the

hearing. The brief and arguments also related solely to whether MMB's Lien was, as

Shapiro contended, materially defective; they did not touch on MMB's entitlement to

judgment in the amounts prayed for in the complaint. In any event, however, proof is

required to establish the absence of genuine issues of material fact; a party may 

not rely

on the arguments of counsel. City of Bozeman v. AIU Ins. Co. (1993), 262 Mont. 370,

378, 865 P.2d 268, 273.

 MMB contends that it presented the District Court with an appropriate 

evidentiary

basis to establish the absence of genuine issues of material fact in the form of the 

Lien

and the invoices attached to its complaint. These documents were not attached to 

MMB's

briefs submitted on the summary judgment motions, were not otherwise filed by MMB

and were not admitted into evidence at the hearing on the motions. While MMB's

argument in this regard is not altogether clear, it is clear that the Lien and the 

invoices

became part of the complaint, as discussed above, and were not separately filed or

submitted by MMB. To that extent, they were not evidence of the matters contained

therein, but merely allegations of the complaint. See Gallatin Trust and Savings 

Bank,

448 P.2d at 737. Moreover, as discussed above, the denials of those allegations in

Shapiro's answer put the allegations at issue and required additional proof by MMB of

the absence of genuine issues of material fact. MMB advanced no such additional 

proof.

 MMB also argues that, since Shapiro did not object to the documents attached to

its complaint and which it purports to have used as the basis for its cross-motion, 

he

"waived any right to object to the evidentiary basis in support of MMB's cross-motion

for summary judgment." We observe that this argument presupposes the existence in the

record of an evidentiary basis for MMB's motion separate and apart from the complaint

and attachments thereto. As previously noted, no such evidentiary basis exists in 

the

record. As a result, we need not address the cases on which MMB relies for its 

waiver

theory.

 As the party moving for summary judgment, MMB had the initial burden of

producing evidence to establish the absence of any genuine issue of material fact 

with

regard to its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on its complaint. See HKM

Assoc. v. Northwest Pipe Fittings, Inc. (1995), 272 Mont. 187, 193, 900 P.2d 302, 

305. 

It could not rely on the allegations in its complaint, where those allegations had 

been

denied, or the arguments of its counsel. See AIU Ins. Co., 865 P.2d at 273. The 

record

reflects that MMB did not satisfy its burden. 

 The District Court determined that, as a result of the cross-motions for summary

judgment, no issues of material fact existed. However, the fact that both parties 

have

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moved for summary judgment does not establish, in and of itself, the absence of 

genuine

issues of material fact. Duensing v. Traveler's Companies (1993), 257 Mont. 376, 

385,

849 P.2d 203, 209. Cross-motions for summary judgment may support a conclusion that

no genuine issues of material fact exist when the parties are moving for summary

judgment on precisely the same legal issue or theory. In this case, for example, had

MMB moved for partial summary judgment on the sole issue of the legal validity of its

Lien, its cross-motion may have sufficiently mirrored Shapiro's motion so as to 

support

the District Court's determination that the mere existence of the cross-motions 

established

the absence of material factual issues.Here, however, MMB's motion for summary

judgment went beyond asserting entitlement to judgment on the issue of the legal 

validity

of its Lien. It requested judgment for the dollar amounts and other relief prayed 

for in

the complaint and, thus, brought into issue whether Shapiro was actually indebted to

MMB for those amounts. As a result, MMB bore the burden of establishing the absence

of genuine issues of material fact regarding the amounts owed by Shapiro and, as

discussed above, it did not satisfy that burden. The District Court's 

misapprehension that

cross-motions for summary judgment necessarily preclude the existence of genuine 

issues

of material fact led it into error in this case.

 We hold that the District Court erred in granting MMB's cross-motion for

summary judgment and in ordering that MMB's Lien be foreclosed.

 Reversed.

 /S/ KARLA M. GRAY

We concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

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