NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JEREMY V. PINSON,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.
UNKNOWN PARTY, John Doe #1, Special Investigative Agent; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 16

- 16744

D.C. No. 4:13

- cv

- 02059

- DCB

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 26, 2017 **

Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Federal prisoner Jeremy V. Pinson appeals pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment and dismissal order in her action under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and the
Privacy Act, alleging deliber ate indifference to her safety. We have jurisdiction

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

OCT 4 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 16

- 16744

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g)
, Barren v. Harrington , 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)
, and summary
judgment, Nunez v. Duncan , 591 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9 th Cir. 2010). We reverse and

remand.
The district court granted summary judgment on Pinson’ s deliberate
indifference claim, concluding that defendants were not deliberately indifferent to
Pinson’s safety because they identif ied Pinson as an informant to inmates in a
facility where Pinson was not housed, and that her identification as an informant

was not the cause of the subsequent attack on Pinson. However, Pinson presented

evidence that s he suffered an attack that was motivated by defendants’

identification of her as an informant

. Viewing the evidence in the l ight most

favorable to Pinson, Pinson raised a triable dispute as to whether defendants were
deliberately indifferent to her safety when they identified her a s an informant , and

whether this identification was the cause of the attacks and threats she suffered.

See Valandingham v. Bojorquez , 866 F.2d 1135, 113 8 (9th Cir. 1989) ( labelling

prisoner a “snitch” may violate the prisoner’ s right to be protected from violence
while in custody); see also Lemire v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab. , 726 F.3d 1062,
1074 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that plaintiffs alleging deliberate indifference in §

1983 actions “must ... demonstrate that the defendants’ actions were both an actual
and proximate cause of their injuries”). We reverse the judgment on this claim,3 16

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and remand for further proceedings.

The district court properly determined that defendant Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”), as a federal agency
, is not a proper defendant in a Bivens action.

However, the district court did not address Pinson’s claim that the BOP violated
the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, by improperly disclosing her records without her

consent. See Schowengert v. General Dynamics Corp. , 823 F.2d 1328, 1340 (9th

Cir. 1987) (the agency is the only proper defendant in a civil action under the
Privacy Act); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1). W e remand for the district court to consider
Pinson’s Privacy Act claim against the BOP in the first instance.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009).

REVERSED and REMANDED.