NO. 06-14-00234-CR 

NO. 06-14-00235-CR 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT TEXARKANA 

 

MELVIN WAYNE RICHARDSON, 

 Appellant 

v. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

 Appellee 

 

On appeal from the 195TH Judicial District Court 

of Dallas County, Texas 

Cause No. F06-62371-N & F06-68662-N 

 

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW 

 

Counsel of Record: 

Lynn Richardson Nanette Hendrickson 

Chief Public Defender Assistant Public Defender 

Dallas County, Texas State Bar No. 24081423 

 Frank Crowley Courts Building 

 133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB-2 

Katherine A. Drew Dallas, Texas 75207-4399 

Chief, Appellate Division (214) 653-3582 (phone)

Dallas County Public Defender’s Office (214) 653-3539 (fax) 

 Nanette.Hendrickson@ 

dallascounty.org 

Attorneys for Appellant

ACCEPTED

06-14-00234-CR

SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS

TEXARKANA, TEXAS

4/20/2015 3:02:54 PM

DEBBIE AUTREY

CLERK

 FILED IN 6th COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 4/21/2015 9:40:00 AM DEBBIE AUTREY Clerk
ii

LIST OF PARTIES 

APPELLANT

Melvin Wayne Richardson 

APPELLANT’S ATTORNEYS 

AT TRIAL: 

Mr. George Ashford 

325 N. St. Paul St. 

Dallas, TX 75201 

ON APPEAL: 

Nanette Hendrickson 

Assistant Public Defender 

Dallas County Public Defender’s Office 

State Bar Number: 24081423 

Frank Crowley Courts Building 

133 N. Industrial Blvd., LB 2 

Dallas, Texas 75207-4399 

STATE’S ATTORNEYS 

AT TRIAL: 

Danielle Uher 

Assistant District Attorney 

Andrew Anagnostis 

Assistant District Attorney 

ON APPEAL: 

Susan Hawk 

(or her designated representative) 

Dallas County District Attorney’s Office 

Frank Crowley Courts Building 

133 N. Industrial Blvd., LB-19 

Dallas, Texas 75207-4399 
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

LIST OF PARTIES ................................................................................................... ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................... v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................. 1

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL ............................................................................... 2

SPECIAL STATEMENT TO THE COURT ............................................................ 3

Objection to Hearsay ....................................................................................... 5

Performance of Trial Counsel .......................................................................... 8

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................... 10

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ...................................................................... 10
iv

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases

Asberry v. State, 

813 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) .......................................... 1 

Bigley v. State, 

865 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ................................................................. 1 

Cevalles v. State, 

513 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) ............................................................... 4 

Davenport v. State, 

858 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no pet.) ................................................ 4 

Dinnery v. State, 

592 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ............................................................... 4 

Harmelin v. Michigan, 

501 U.S. 957 (1991) ............................................................................................... 9 

Harris v. State, 

656 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) ............................................................... 9 

Hernandez v. State, 

726 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ................................................................. 8 

Jeffery v. State, 

903 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) .............................................. 3 

Motilla v. State, 

78 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ................................................................. 6 

Potier v. State, 

68 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) .............................................................6, 7

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ........................................................ 8 

Studer v. State, 

799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) ............................................................... 3 

Taylor v. State, 

268 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ............................................................... 6 

United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 

970 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1992) ................................................................................... 7 

Statutes

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.14(b) .......................................................................... 3 
v

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.15 .............................................................................. 4 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13 ...................................................................... 4 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13(b)........................................................................ 4 

TEX. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 481.112 ...........................................................1, 3 

Rules

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 .................................................................................................... 5 

Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b) .............................................................................................. 1 

TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) ...........................................................................................6, 7 

TEX. R. EVID. 801(d) .................................................................................................. 5 

TEX. R. EVID. 802 ....................................................................................................... 6 

TEX. R. EVID. 802(1-24) ............................................................................................. 6 

TEX. R. EVID. 802(4) .................................................................................................. 6 

Constitutional Provisions

TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 .............................................................................................. 9 

TEX. CONST. art. V, §12 ............................................................................................. 3 

U.S. CONST. art. VIII .................................................................................................. 9 
1

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS: 

The undersigned attorney submits this brief in support of the motion to 

withdraw. This is an appeal from two convictions for the offenses of unlawful 

possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance in the 195th Judicial District 

Court of Dallas County, Texas, the Honorable Don Metcalf, sitting for The 

Honorable Fred Tinsley, Judge presiding. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

Appellant was charged in each case by indictment with unlawful possession 

of controlled substance with intent to deliver: cocaine between 4g and 200g in 

violation of TEX. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 481.112. (CR1: 7; CR2: 91). 

Appellant pursued a “slow plea” in which he entered pleas of guilty before the trial 

court but elected that a jury assess his punishment. (RR2: 4-12). After hearing 

evidence, the jury assessed punishment at 25 years’ imprisonment and a $420 fine 

in trial case number F06-62371 and 40 years’ imprisonment and a $740 fine in 

F06-686622. (CR1: 14, 29; CR2: 10, 26). On May 5, 2010, the trial court 

 

1 CR1 refers to the District Court Clerks record in trial case number F06-62371-N; CR2 refers to 

the District Court Clerks record in F06-68662-H. 

2

 Appellant notes that the fine amounts on the judgment in each case are incorrect. The judgment 

in F06-68662-N says the fine is $420 when it should read $740. (CR2: 10; RR4: 24). The 

judgment in F06-62371 states the fine is $740 and should read $420. (CR1: 14; RR4: 24). This 

Court has the authority to correct the judgment of the court below to make the record speak the 

truth when it has the necessary data and information to do so. Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. 

State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). Appellant requests this Court to reform the judgment to 

speak the truth as reflected in the record. 
2

pronounced sentence and entered judgment. (CR1: 14, 29; CR2: 10, 26; RR4:24). 

After filing an application for an 11.07 writ of habeas corpus with the Texas Court 

of Criminal Appeals, that Court issued an opinion on November 19, 2014 granting 

Appellant an appeal out of time. (CR1: 30-33; CR2: 36-37). Appellant 

subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal. (CR1: 36; CR2: 38). 

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

In compliance with the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 

87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1966) and Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137, 138 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1969), the undersigned appointed attorney states that she has 

diligently reviewed the entire record in this cause and the law applicable thereto 

and, in her opinion, this appeal is without merit and wholly frivolous in that the 

record reflects no reversible error. It is also the opinion of the undersigned 

appointed attorney on appeal that there are no grounds of error upon which an 

appeal can be predicated. 

The undersigned appointed attorney on appeal has served a copy of this brief 

on Appellant. At that time, the undersigned attorney informed Appellant by letter 

that, in her professional opinion, the appeal was without merit. The undersigned 

attorney also explained that Appellant has the right to review the record and to file 

a pro se brief if he so desires. The undersigned attorney has provided a copy of the 

record to Appellant. Appellant has also been informed by the undersigned attorney 
3

that he may request an extension of time from this Honorable Court for the filing 

of a pro se brief if he so desires. 

The undersigned attorney has also filed a Motion to Withdraw as mandated 

by this Court’s opinion in Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

1995, no pet.). 

 SPECIAL STATEMENT TO THE COURT

The record in this case clearly reflects that Appellant entered pleas of guilty 

to the indictments. (RR2: 4-12). The indictments contained all of the elements of 

the offense as proscribed by TEX. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 481.112. These 

indictments conferred jurisdiction upon the trial court. TEX. CONST. art. V, §12; 

Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). No complaint, either 

in the form of an objection or a motion, was made to these indictments; hence, 

nothing is presented for appellate review. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.14(b). 

The undersigned attorney has searched the record for any pretrial motions 

which might support a point of error. Appellant filed no motions upon which a 

point of error could be predicated. As such, there is nothing presented for appellate 

review. 

Prior to accepting Appellant’s plea, the court inquired as to the voluntariness 

of the plea and Appellant’s understanding of the consequences of his plea. (RR2: 

7-11). Appellant entered his plea freely and voluntarily. (RR: 7–8). After a 
4

complete review of the record, the undersigned attorney is satisfied that Appellant 

was competent to enter his plea and that this plea was made both freely and 

voluntarily. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13(b). 

Appellant was orally admonished by the trial court; those admonishments 

were in substantial compliance with Article 26.13. (RR2: 7–11). The undersigned 

attorney is satisfied that, in the case at bar, these admonishments were sufficient to 

substantially comply with Art. 26.13. 

The State introduced evidence sufficient to substantiate Appellant’s plea of 

guilty to the charged offenses and true to the enhancement paragraph. TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. art. 1.15. Appellant signed judicial confessions and stipulations of 

evidence in each case which were introduced as State’s Exhibits 1 & 2. (State’s 

Exhibits 1 & 2). The judicial confessions, standing alone, are sufficient evidence to 

support Appellant’s convictions. Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1979); Cevalles v. State, 513 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); 

Davenport v. State, 858 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no pet.). 

Furthermore, Appellant entered stipulations to his prior conviction alleged in the 

indictments which were admitted as State’s Exhibit 11. (State’s Exhibit 11). 

The undersigned attorney has reviewed the voir dire proceedings. There 

were no objections during the voir dire. (RR2: 12-87). Neither the State nor 

Appellant objected as to the jury seated. (RR2: 87-88). Thus, there is nothing 
5

presented for appellate review regarding the makeup of the jury. TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1. The undersigned attorney has reviewed the record to determine if any 

objections were made on Appellant’s behalf which would support an issue on 

appeal. The following objection was made during the punishment phase of 

Appellant’s trial: 

Objection to Hearsay 

Deputy Beggs testified regarding an assault Appellant made on her while in 

the holdover at the courthouse on a separate case. (RR3: 91-103). Beggs testified to 

her injuries and pictures of those injuries were admitted as State’s Exhibits 43 & 

45. (RR3: 97). Beggs testified about severe headaches she suffered as a result of 

the assault. (RR3: 98). In response to the question, “...have you learned new things 

about your injuries or what is gonna be the progression of your injuries or the 

lasting effects?” (RR3: 98). The officer responded, “At that time, they were 

treating severe headaches. They thought they might get better. They said 

somewhere between six and 12 months, the headaches will ease up and go away.” 

(RR3: 98). Appellant objected to “hearsay as to medical testimony.” (RR3: 99). 

The trial court overruled Appellant’s objection. 

Hearsay is a “statement, other than one made by the declarant while 

testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted.” TEX. R. EVID. 801(d). Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls under 
6

certain exceptions to the hearsay rule pursuant to Rule 802. TEX. R. EVID. 802(1-

24). Statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis are an exception under 

Rule 802, subsection 4. TEX. R. EVID. 802(4). However, the rule applies to 

statements made by a patient to a medical professional or other person in the 

interest of treatment or diagnosis of a medical condition. Taylor v. State, 268 

S.W.3d 571, 577-578 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In the case at bar, the patient is 

testifying to statements made to her by, presumably, the medical professionals she 

spoke with regarding her injuries. (RR3: 98-99). Therefore, Rule 802 would not 

allow admission of this statement. Furthermore, the statements do not appear to be 

admissible under any other exception under Rule 802. TEX. R. EVID. 802. Thus, it 

is possible the trial court erred by overruling Appellant’s objection. However, if 

any error existed, it was harmless. 

The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the admission of evidence does 

not affect the substantial rights of the accused if, after looking at the record as a 

whole, it did not influence the jury or had only a “slight affect.” Motilla v. State, 78 

S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Furthermore, the Court of Criminal 

Appeals determined the erroneous admission of hearsay statements amounts to 

non-constitutional error. Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 663-664 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2002); TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). “Not every hearsay error amounts to a 

constitutional violation. At a minimum, a defendant must demonstrate that the 
7

excluded evidence was important to his defense.” Potier, 68 S.W.3d at 663 

(quoting United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 588(9th Cir. 1992)). 

Therefore, the error will be ruled harmless unless it affects Appellant’s substantial 

rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). 

The admission of Begg’s hearsay statements was harmless. The statements 

testified to by Beggs were made during punishment after Appellant had already 

entered a guilty plea in front of the jury to unlawful possession with intent to 

deliver cocaine on two separate occasions. Appellant also pled true to the 

enhancement paragraph in the indictments making the range of punishment a 

minimum of fifteen years and a maximum of 99 years, or life. Appellant received 

concurrent sentences of 40 years’ incarceration in one case and 25 years’ 

incarceration in the other. (CR1: 29, CR2: 26). The evidence showed Appellant 

was stopped in his vehicle on two separate occasions with cocaine and 

paraphernalia used to prepare drugs for sale such as baggies and a razor blade. 

(RR3: 19, 22, 29). In trial case number F06-68662-N, Appellant was sentenced to 

40 year’s incarceration when Appellant’s teenage daughter was with him when he 

was arrested with cocaine in his vehicle. (RR3: 42, 125, 131; CR2: 26). In trial 

case number F06-62371, Appellant was sentenced to 25 year’s incarceration when 

cocaine and a razor blade were on a plate on the passenger seat in addition to more 

cocaine under the driver’s seat. (RR3: 22; CR1: 29). 
8

The jury knew that prior to the case at bar, Appellant had already been tried 

by a jury and convicted of the assault testified to by Deputy Beggs. (RR3: 98, 101-

102; State’s Exhibit 9). Furthermore, Appellant stipulated to the prior conviction 

for assault on a public servant during the jury trial on punishment. (State’s Exhibit 

11). Beggs had already testified to the assault Appellant inflicted on her as well as 

other injuries, such as bruises. (RR3: 93-98). Further, the State showed the jury 

pictures of Beggs’ injuries following the assault. (RR3: 97; State’s Exhibits 43 and 

45). Moreover, Appellant stipulated to evidence of four other prior felony 

convictions during Appellant’s jury trial on punishment. (State’s Exhibit 11). In 

light of the evidence regarding the charged offenses and the extraneous offense 

evidence admitted during the punishment trial, the admission of these statements 

regarding when Beggs’ headaches would end did not affect the jury’s decision 

regarding punishment or violate his substantial rights. 

Performance of Trial Counsel 

The undersigned attorney has reviewed the performance of trial counsel. The 

record reflects that Appellant received reasonably effective assistance of trial 

counsel, based on the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 

104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984) and Hernandez v. State, 726 

S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). 
9

The undersigned attorney has reviewed the jury charge regarding 

punishment. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the jury was improperly 

charged. (CR: 56-62). Regardless, there was no objection to the charge. (RR4: 

169). 

The punishment assessed is within the range established by the Legislature, 

and, as such, does not violate the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and 

unusual punishment under either U.S. CONST. art. VIII or TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; 

Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Nor does the 

undersigned attorney discern anything in the record to suggest that the punishment 

assessed is grossly disproportionate to the crime. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 

U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991). Additionally, no objection was 

made to the punishment assessed at trial. 

In the undersigned attorney’s professional opinion, Appellant received a fair 

trial free from reversible error. 

CONCLUSION

After full review of the record, the undersigned attorney is of the opinion 

that the appeal in this cause is frivolous and without merit. 

 
10

 Respectfully submitted, 

 Lynn Richardson 

 Chief Public Defender 

 

 /s/ Nanette Hendrickson 

 Nanette Hendrickson 

 Assistant Public Defender 

 State Bar No. 24081423 

 Frank Crowley Courts Building 

 133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB-2 

 Dallas, TX. 75207-4399 

 (214) 653-3550 (telephone) 

 (214) 653-3539 (fax) 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing brief was served on the 

Dallas County Criminal District Attorney’s Office (Appellate Division), 133 N. 

Riverfront Blvd., LB-19, 10th Floor, Dallas, Texas, 75207, by hand delivery and 

electronic service to Lori Ordiway at DCDAAppeals@dallascounty.org on the 20th

day of April, 2015. 

 /s/ Nanette Hendrickson

 Nanette Hendrickson 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

 I certify that the foregoing brief contains 2,617 words. 

 /s/ Nanette Hendrickson

 Nanette Hendrickson