J-A10043-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JEREMY LYNN COONS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1121 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 29, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-01-CR-0000525-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: JULY 19, 2022

Appellant, Jeremy Lynn Coons, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Adams County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench trial 

convictions for two counts of driving under the influence of a controlled 

substance (“DUI”).

1

 We affirm. 

The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts and procedural history 

of this appeal as follows: 

The stipulated facts establish that on May 6, 2020, at 

approximately 9:08 a.m., Appellant was driving a vehicle on 

State Route 116. State Route 116 is a public roadway in 

Hamilton Township, Adams County. Trooper Matthew 

Geiman of the Pennsylvania State Police was employed and

on patrol at the time as a patrol trooper. As of the date of 

this incident, Trooper Geiman had been employed with the 

PSP for approximately six years, received standard field 

sobriety testing training while at the academy, and had 

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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(i), (iii). 
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arrested approximately 200 people for DUI—many of which 

involved marijuana. 

Trooper Geiman was traveling eastbound on State Route 

116 when he observed Appellant’s vehicle travelling 

westbound on State Route 116. Trooper Geiman noticed an 

alleged illegal window tint on Appellant’s vehicle. As 

Appellant turned his vehicle into a public parking lot in 

Fairfield Borough, Adams County, Trooper Geiman 

effectuated a traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle on the basis 

of the alleged illegal window tint. Trooper Geiman’s 

interaction with Appellant during the traffic stop was visually 

and audibly recorded by dashcam video and was admitted 

into evidence for the bench trial. After interacting with 

Appellant, Trooper Geiman placed him under arrest and 

transported him to Gettysburg Hospital for blood testing. 

Appellant initially refused the blood draw, but after Trooper 

Geiman obtained a search warrant to collect the same, 

Appellant agreed to the blood draw pursuant to the search 

warrant. 

At approximately 11:25 a.m., two vials of blood were drawn 

from Appellant’s arm at the hospital and were then sealed 

and sent to NMS Laboratory for testing. The resulting blood 

tests showed the presence of active marijuana compounds 

(Delta-9 THC) and metabolites of those compounds (Delta9 Carboxy THC) in Appellant’s blood system. Marijuana is a 

Schedule I controlled substance pursuant to the Controlled 

Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 9/3/21, at 1-3). 

On December 3, 2020, Appellant filed a suppression motion. Appellant 

proceeded to a suppression hearing on February 8, 2021. At that time,

Appellant argued that Trooper Geiman lacked reasonable suspicion to detain 

Appellant or conduct field sobriety tests. (See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 

2/8/21, at 4). The court denied the suppression motion on February 23, 2021. 

The court subsequently conducted a stipulated bench trial and found Appellant 
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guilty of two counts of DUI. On June 29, 2021, the court sentenced Appellant 

to an aggregate 84 months of probation with restrictive DUI conditions. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on July 22, 2021. On August 2, 

2021, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant filed his Rule 1925(b) 

statement on August 24, 2021. 

Appellant now raises three issues on appeal:

Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s 

suppression motion because there was no “reasonable” 

suspicion of DUI to force Appellant out of his vehicle to 

perform field sobriety tests, or the subsequent probable 

cause to take his blood, absent the alleged odor of 

marijuana and whereby the officer did not specify whether 

the alleged odor was of burnt or fresh marijuana. 

Whether the trial court erred in denying suppression after 

Appellant was directed to get out of his vehicle for an

investigative detention, during which law enforcement 

admittedly engaged in an illegal warrantless search of his 

vehicle. 

Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s 

suppression motion because there was not sufficient 

probable cause to demand Appellant submit to a blood test. 

(Appellant’s Brief at 14). 

Appellant’s issues are related, and we address them together. Appellant 

argues that Trooper Geiman conducted a traffic stop due to the tinted windows 

on Appellant’s vehicle. Appellant maintains that the subsequent traffic stop 

should have been limited to an investigation of this vehicle code violation, 

absent reasonable suspicion of some other criminal activity. Regarding the 
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existence of reasonable suspicion for other criminal activity, Appellant notes 

that there is no evidence that he drove erratically or exhibited slurred speech 

at the time of the stop. Although the trooper smelled marijuana, Appellant 

emphasizes that “the odor of marijuana, without more, is insufficient to 

establish reasonable suspicions of criminal activity to justify a detention for

field sobriety testing, nor can it be used to establish probable cause....” (Id.

at 27). Appellant further alleges that Trooper Geiman’s observations that 

Appellant’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy are unsupported by the record. 

Appellant concludes that the record did not support the suppression court’s 

legal conclusions, and this court must vacate his judgment of sentence on this 

basis.

2

 We disagree. 

The following principles govern our review of an order denying a motion 

to suppress: 

An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a 

challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the suppression court’s factual 

findings are supported by the record and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because 

the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, 

we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth 

and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

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2 To the extent Appellant also alleges that the trooper conducted an illegal, 

warrantless search of the vehicle, the court noted that “the stipulated facts 

presented at trial did not include any evidence obtained from the search of 

Appellant’s vehicle.” (Trial Court Opinion at 4). Our review of the record 

confirms the court’s reasoning, and we proceed to address the remaining 

claims regarding the legality of the vehicle stop, investigative detention, and 

blood draw. 
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whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by 

[those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal 

conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on allegations 

of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are 

not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to 

determine if the suppression court properly applied the law 

to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below 

are subject to plenary review. 

Commonwealth v. Ford, 175 A.3d 985, 989 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal 

denied, 647 Pa. 522, 190 A.3d 580 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. P. 

Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa.Super. 2015)). 

Our analysis of the quantum of cause required for a traffic stop begins 

with the Motor Vehicle Code, which provides: 

§ 6308. Investigation by police officers

* * *

(b) Authority of police officer.—Whenever a police 

officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking 

vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a 

violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may 

stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of 

checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of financial 

responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine 

number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other 

information as the officer may reasonably believe to be 

necessary to enforce the provisions of this title. 

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) (emphasis added). 

“[D]espite subsection 6308(b)’s reasonable suspicion standard, some 

offenses, by their very nature, require a police officer to possess probable 

cause before he or she may conduct a traffic stop.” Commonwealth v. 
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Ibrahim, 127 A.3d 819, 823 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal denied, 635 Pa. 771, 

138 A.3d 3 (2016). “For a stop based on the observed violation of the Vehicle 

Code or otherwise non-investigable offense, an officer must have probable 

cause to make a constitutional vehicle stop.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 

A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2017). See also Commonwealth v. Feczko, 

10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 611 Pa. 650, 25 A.3d 

327 (2011) (stating mere reasonable suspicion will not justify vehicle stop 

when driver’s detention cannot serve investigatory purpose relevant to 

suspected violation). 

Further, we note that an “investigative detention” is interchangeably 

labeled as a “stop and frisk” or a “Terry[3] stop.” Commonwealth v. Brame, 

239 A.3d 1119, 1127 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 251 A.3d 

771 (2021). 

An investigative detention ... constitutes a seizure of a 

person and thus activates the protections of Article 1, 

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. To institute an 

investigative detention, an officer must have at least a 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 

Reasonable suspicion requires a finding that based on the 

available facts, a person of reasonable caution would believe 

the intrusion was appropriate. 

* * *

Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able to 

articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with 

reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led 

him reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that 

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3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
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criminal activity was afoot and that the person he stopped 

was involved in that activity. 

Commonwealth v. B. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa.Super. 2005) (internal 

citations omitted). 

Reasonable suspicion of DUI can arise where an officer observes “classic 

signs” of intoxication, such as the odor of intoxicants, slurred speech, and 

glassy eyes. Commonwealth v. Cauley, 10 A.3d 321, 327 (Pa.Super.

2010). When an officer possesses good reason to believe that a driver is

intoxicated, he is justified in asking the driver to perform sobriety tests. See 

Commonwealth v. Ragan, 652 A.2d 925, 929 (Pa.Super. 1995), appeal 

denied, 541 Pa. 650, 664 A.2d 540 (1995). 

Additionally, “[t]he administration of a blood test, performed by an 

agent of, or at the direction of the government, constitutes a search under 

both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.” Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 188 A.3d 486, 489 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal denied, 649 Pa. 179, 

195 A.3d 852 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Evans, 153 A.3d 323, 328 

(Pa.Super. 2016)). The Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a search 

warrant for a blood draw, provided that they can do so without significantly 

undermining the efficacy of the search. See Commonwealth v. Trahey, 658 

Pa. 340, 355, 228 A.3d 520, 529 (2020). “It is hornbook law that search 

warrants may only issue upon probable cause....” Commonwealth v. Leed, 

646 Pa. 602, 615, 186 A.3d 405, 413 (2018). 

Probable cause is established when police have “knowledge of sufficient 
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facts and circumstances, gained through trustworthy information, to warrant 

a prudent man in the belief that a crime has been committed.” 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 834 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Pa.Super. 2003)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Aiello, 675 A.2d 1278, 1280 (Pa.Super. 1996)). 

“[T]he smell of marijuana indisputably can still signal the possibility of criminal 

activity,” and it “may be a factor, but not a stand-alone one, in evaluating the 

totality of the circumstances for purposes of determining whether police had 

probable cause....” Commonwealth v. Barr, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 266 A.3d 25, 

41 (2021). 

Instantly, Trooper Geiman testified that he observed Appellant’s vehicle 

travelling westbound on Route 116. (See N.T. Suppression Hearing at 10). 

Trooper Geiman noted that the “front window” of Appellant’s vehicle was

“tinted to a degree which prevented me from seeing in the vehicle.” (Id.) 

Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, the trooper testified regarding this specific 

observation of a vehicle code violation that caused him to execute a traffic 

stop of Appellant’s vehicle. Thus, the record supported the suppression court’s 

conclusion that the trooper possessed the requisite probable cause to initiate 

the traffic stop. See Harris, supra. See also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1)

(stating vehicle cannot have window tint that obstructs view into vehicle

through windshield, side wing or side window). 

Trooper Geiman testified that as he approached Appellant’s vehicle, he 

noticed a strong “odor of burnt marijuana” coming from Appellant’s vehicle. 
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(See N.T. Suppression Hearing at 11). The trooper spoke with Appellant and 

observed that Appellant’s eyes were glassy and bloodshot, with dilated pupils. 

(Id. at 12). Based upon the trooper’s training and experience, he believed 

Appellant might have been intoxicated. (Id.) Additionally, Appellant 

appeared “extremely nervous,” and he “was fidgeting around a lot when he 

was searching for his documents.” (Id. at 13). 

The smell of burnt marijuana, combined with Appellant’s glassy, 

bloodshot eyes, nervousness, and fidgeting, allowed Trooper Geiman to 

develop reasonable suspicion that Appellant was operating his vehicle while 

intoxicated. See Cauley, supra. In light of this reasonable suspicion, 

Trooper Geiman properly asked Appellant to exit the vehicle and perform field 

sobriety tests. See Ragan, supra. Appellant subsequently failed the field 

sobriety tests. (See Affidavit of Probable Cause, dated 6/15/20, at 1). 

Appellant’s inability to pass the sobriety tests, combined with the trooper’s 

previous observations regarding the odor of marijuana and other indicia of 

intoxication, yielded the probable cause necessary to support the warrant 

authorizing the blood draw. See Robinson, supra; Johnson, supra. 

Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the suppression court’s 

factual findings are supported by the record, and its legal conclusions are 

correct. See Ford, supra. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief on 

any of his claims. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 07/19/2022