Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1409-CR-611 | April 20, 2015 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Barbara J. Simmons

Oldenburg, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Brian Reitz

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Amber Mobley,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 20, 2015

Court of Appeals Cause No.

49A02-1409-CR-611

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

Cause No. 49F08-1405-CM-28061

The Honorable Amy Jones, Judge

The Honorable Cheryl MamanRivera, Pro Tem

Barnes, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1409-CR-611 | April 20, 2015 Page 2 of 5

Case Summary

[1] Amber Mobley appeals her conviction and sentence for Class B misdemeanor 

criminal mischief. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Mobley raises two issues, which we restate as:

I. whether there is sufficient evidence to support 

her conviction; and

II. whether the trial court properly ordered her to 

pay restitution. 

Facts

[3] In May 2014, Mobley and her children were staying with Lindsi Heaton at 

Heaton’s home in Marion County. Heaton and Mobley got into an argument, 

and Heaton asked Mobley and her family to leave. During the argument, the 

windshield of Heaton’s car was smashed. When Officer Jose Navarro of the 

Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department arrived on the scene, Mobley 

admitted that she broke the windshield.

[4] Mobley was charged with Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief. Following 

a bench trial, Mobley was convicted of Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief. 

The trial court sentenced her to 180 days with 176 executed and credit for time 

served for the remaining days. The trial court also sentenced Mobley to nonreporting probation until she paid restitution in the amount of $192.15. Mobley 

now appeals.
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Analysis

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[5] Mobley argues that there is insufficient evidence that she broke the windshield. 

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither 

reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses. Bailey v. State, 979 

N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012). We view the evidence—even if conflicting—and 

all reasonable inferences drawn from it in a light most favorable to the 

conviction and affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value 

supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of fact 

could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 

[6] Mobley contends that her seven-year-old daughter used a brick to break the 

windshield and that she took the blame for her daughter’s actions. However, 

Heaton testified that the children had already left the premises when the 

windshield was broken and that she saw Mobley do it. This is consistent with 

Officer Navarro’s testimony that he did not see any children when he arrived 

and that he “did not see anything laying around the car area.” Tr. p. 26. 

Moreover, Mobley told Officer Navarro that she “smashed the windshield; it is 

what it is and I can’t change it now[.]” Id. at 15. Mobley’s attempt to shift the 

blame to her daughter is a request to reweigh the evidence and witness 

credibility. We must deny this request. There is sufficient evidence to support 

the conviction.
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II. Restitution

[7] Mobley argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s 

restitution order. “A restitution order must be supported by sufficient evidence 

of actual loss sustained by the victim or victims of a crime.” Rich v. State, 890 

N.E.2d 44, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. The amount of actual loss is a 

factual matter that can be determined only upon the presentation of evidence, 

and a trial court’s order of restitution is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. 

We will affirm the trial court’s order if it is supported by sufficient evidence. Id. 

[8] Mobley contends there was no evidence of Heaton’s actual loss other than her 

unsupported estimate. Mobley relies on J.H. v. State, 950 N.E.2d 731, 734 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2011), in which we reversed a restitution order based solely on a piece 

of paper with a dollar amount on it given to the prosecutor by the victim. We 

concluded:

Neither of the purported estimates was placed into evidence and 

neither is available for our review, so we cannot determine whether the 

dollar amounts were listed on papers containing any information, such 

as a letterhead, which would show the court that the paper came from 

a legitimate business. Furthermore, neither “estimate” showed the 

cost of labor and materials. 

J.H., 950 N.E.2d at 734. 

[9] Here, however, Heaton testified at the sentencing hearing that she had gotten a 

couple of estimates to get her windshield fixed and that they were “$200.00 give 

or take maybe depending on where I went and if they had to come out to me or 

if I had to go to them.” Tr. p. 31. Moreover, two written estimates were 
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admitted into evidence in support of the restitution request. Both included 

business names, addresses, and phone numbers. Both included the parts 

needed and the adhesive to be used. One was for $192.15 and the other was for 

$202.63, and the trial court specifically chose the lower of the two estimates. 

We must conclude that this case is distinguishable from J.H. and that there is 

sufficient evidence from which the trial court could determine Heaton’s actual 

loss. 

Conclusion

[10] There is sufficient evidence to support Mobley’s conviction for Class B 

misdemeanor criminal mischief, and there was evidence of Heaton’s actual loss 

so as to support the restitution order. We affirm.

[11] Affirmed. 

Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.