### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Se pte m be r 11, 200 7 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. PIERRE JAC KSON

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty Nos. 01-12067-68, 01- 12070-71 John P. Colt on, Jr., Judge

No. W2006-02127-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled May 12, 2008

I n 2003 the def

endant, Pierr e Jackson, was c onvicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of ag g ravated vehicula

r homicide, two c ounts o f l eaving the sce ne of a

n acc ident, and one c ount of driving on a revoke d license, third of fense , rec eiving an ef

fec tive sentenc e of f

ifty -two y ear s, five months, and twenty -nine da y s. On appe al, he a

rg ues that the State’s pr oof as to pri o r DUI convictions was de ficient, the i ndictments and jury instructions were defic ient, and the tria l court

er re d i n sentenc ing. F ollowing our revie w, we a ffirm the de fenda nt’s convictions but remand f or
rese ntencingas to the c o n v i ct i ons for a g g ravated vehicula r homicide upon findingthat the trial

c ourt ’s a pp lic a tio n o f o ne se nte nc ing e nh anc e me nt fa c tor vio la te d the Sixth Ame ndme nt. We a lso dir e c t th e e ntr

y of jud g me nts re fl e c tin g the c on vic tio ns fo r l e a vin g the sc e ne of an a c c ide nt.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f the Cr im ina l C our t A ffirm e d &

Rem anded f

or Re sentencing & Entry of Jud gm ents

A L AN E. G L EN N , J

. , d el i v er ed the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

Robert B rooks (on appeal), Charles Gil christ and Ty rone Pay lor (at tria l), Memphis, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Pierre Jackson.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Ra c he l E. Wil lis , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and D en n i s J ohnson and Stephanie Johnson, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

F AC TS-2-

Tak e n i n t h e l i g h t m o s t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e S t a t e , t h e e v i d e n c e s h o w e d t h a t t h e de fe nd a nt, operating a

motor vehicle w hile under the influenc e of a n intox icant, struck a

nd killed a couple on a motorcycle.

At t ri al , Caroly

n Young testified that she wa s driving be hind a motorcy cle on Summer Avenue in Memphis on the ni g ht of J uly 25, 2001. As she ente red the junction of Summer Avenue and Interstate 240, she g lance d over a nd noticed that the two mo t o rc y cl e riders w ere ly ing on the road. She did not see a collision but saw a ve ry dark vehicle cross in front of her and approa ch the

on-ra mp to the interstate. She neve r saw the driver of the vehicle

. Christopher Coly er w as trav el i n g westbound on Summer Avenue when he came upon a tr a ff ic a c c ide nt a

t th e I nte rs ta te 24 0 ju

nc tio n. He did no t wi tne ss t he a c c ide nt b ut, a ft e r s top pin g his vehicle a nd g oing over to the motorcy cle, saw a man ly ing on top of the motorcy cle a

nd a woman lyingon top of the man. B y sta

nd e rs tol d h im that a

va n h a d s top pe d o n th e ent ranc e ra mp t o I nterstate 240. H e pursue d the driver of the van and saw him in a par king lot, waving his a

rms and stumbli ng back and forth. Coly er testified that he obser ved that the de fenda

nt, who was drivingthe van, smelled of a lcohol and that his speec h was slurre d

. The de fenda nt told C oly er that the motorcy cle r an into him, he had drunk a beer , and he did not have a d ri v er’ s license. In Coly er’ s opinion, the defe ndant was not in a suitable c ondition to drive a vehicle

.
Offic er Marlon Wright of the Memphis Police Depa rtment testified that he w as ca lled to the

sc e ne of the a c c ide nt. He detai ned the de fe nd ant a nd re tur ne d h im t o th e sc e ne of

the a c c ide nt, observingthat he smelled of a lcohol, h ad b l oodshot ey es and slurr ed spee ch, and c laimed to be unsure of what had ha

ppened. H e plac ed the de fenda nt in the back of his c ar f

or appr ox imately

ten minutes. W hen he r emoved the defe ndant, the bac k of the c ar ha d a ver y strong odor of a lcohol. On

cross-e x amination, Offic er Wrig ht acknowle dg ed that he did not witness the ac cident and that the defe ndant was c ooperative with him.

Offic ers J ohn Simps on and J eff Fa rr of the Memphis Police D epar tment testified that they

arr ived at the sc ene a fter O ffice r Wright. B oth observed that t he def endant wa s disoriented, had b lo o d s h o t an d w a te r

y e y e s , an d e mi tt e d a s tr o n g o d o r o f a lc o h o l. I t to o k th e d e f e n d ant seve ral minutes to retrieve his identification from his pocke ts after reque sted to do so by

Offic er Simpson. They transporte d the def

endant to the Reg ional Medica l Center to g ive a blood sample.
Serg eant William C . Porter of the Memphis Police Depa rtment Special Tr aff

ic I nvestig ation Unit inter viewed the defe ndant at the sc ene. A fter be ing a dvised of his Miranda rig hts, the defe ndant tol d Se rg e ant P or

te r t hat he wa s o n his way to pic k up his da ug hte r f ro m w or k. Th e de fe nd ant s a id he had a g ree n arr ow as he approa ched the intersec tion, and, when the arrow chang ed to y ellow, he sped up to make the turn and his c ar was struck. He said he did not see the other ve hicle involved in the acc ident. Serg eant Porter testifi ed t h at t h e defenda nt smelled of alcohol, his ey es we re bloodshot an d water

y , and he ha d a “sle epy appea ranc e about him.” Ser g eant Porter then administered field sobriety tests. The defe ndant rec ited the alphabe t c orre ctly , but did notSe e T en n

. Code An n

. § 39- 13- 21 8( c) ( “ I f t h e def en dan t i s c on v i ct ed of

v eh i cu l ar h omi ci de u n der § 39- 13- 1
2 1 3( a) ( 2) , t h e j u r y s h al l t h en s epa r at el y c on s i der w h et h er t h e def en dan t h as t h e r equ i s i t e n u mber a n d t y pes of pr i or
o f f enses or l evel o f b l o o d al co ho l co ncent rat i o n necessar y t o co nst i t ut e t he o f f ense o f aggravat ed vehi cul ar hom i ci d e. ”).

-3- satisfac torily

complete the one -legstand or hee l-to-toe tests. Consequently , Serg eant Porter formed the opinion that the defe ndant was too impaire d to safely operate a motor ve hicle.

Mark Dunla

p, a for ensic scie ntist with the Tenne ssee Bur eau of Investig ation, testified that he ana ly zed the bl ood sample t aken from t he defenda nt on the ni g ht of t he accident and found that the blood alcohol conc entration of the sample wa s 0.12%.
Diane Joy

ner, the safe t y

examiner supervisor f

or the Memphis off

ice of the Tenne ssee Depa rtment of Safe ty , testified that on J uly 25, 2001, the defe ndant’s rec ord showed that his driver’s license w as suspende d, revoke d, or ca ncele d.

Dr . O .C. Smit

h, the S helb y

County Me dic a l E xami ne r, pe rf or me d th e a

uto ps ie s o n b oth victims, determining that eac h died of multiple injuries inflicted ac cidentally , which wa s consistent with their being involved in an automobile collision.
The jury convicted the def

en d an t of two counts of ve hicular homicide , felony and misdemeanor le aving the sce ne of a n acc ident, and driving while license revoke d. A hea ring was then conduc ted at which the State prese nted proof on the char g es of a g g ravated vehicula r homicide and driving on a ca

ncele d, suspended, or

revoke d license a s a repe at offe nse. Severa l modes of 1 proof wer e utiliz ed. Wit hout obje ction from the defe ndant, the State tender ed a c ertified c opy of the de fe nd ant’ s T e nn e sse e De pa rtmen t of S afe ty

dr ive r’ s h ist or

y a s a n e xhibi t to the pr oc e e din g s. Christina L ane, a

keepe r of the rec ords for the Shelby County Criminal Court C lerk’s of fice , testified that the def

endant wa s convicted of driving under the influence o n September 30, 1993 a nd November

16, 1990. She said that the re cord of the 1993 conviction did no t i n d i cate whether the defe ndant was r epre sented by coun s el , b u t t he re cord of the 1990 conviction showe d that the defe ndant was repr esente d by the public def

ender ’s offic e. Willi am Fr eema n, keepe r of the r ecor ds for the g ener al sessions criminal cour t, testified that the def

endant pled guilty

to driving unde r the influence on November 14, 1980, and to driving while license canc elled, suspende d, or re voked on J anuar y 24, 2001, and on Apr il 6, 2001. On cross-e x amination, Fr eema n said that his rec ord of the DUI conviction did not show whether the def endant wa s repr esente d by counsel.
The judg ments in this m atter w ere enter ed on J une 2, 2003. On J uly 18, 2003, the def endant filed an untimely

motion for new tria l, which was d en i ed o n S ep tember 4, 2003. O n Aug ust 13, 2 0 0 4 , t h e d e f

e n d an t f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f

o r p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f a l l e g i n g t h a t h i s c o u n s e l’ s f a ilu re to
move timely

for a new tria l constituted ineffe ctive assistanc e. The trial court g rante d post-conviction

re lie f, va c a te d the de fe nd ant’ s c on vic tio ns , imm e diate ly re ins ta te d th e m, a nd re mand e d th e c a se to the orig inal trial court to allow the defe ndant t hirty additional day s to file a moti on for ne w trial. The de fe nd ant t

he n ti me ly

mov e d f or a ne w tri a l.-4- AN AL YSI S

On app eal , th e de fe nd ant p re se nts fi ve iss ue s f or our r e vie w. He argue s th a t ( 1) his convictions for a g g ravated vehicula r homicide must be vac ated be c a u s e th e e v id e n c e w a s in s u f f ic ie nt
a s a ma tte r of law t o e sta

bli sh that he ha d th e tw o p ri or

DU Ic on vic tio ns a lle g e d in the ind ic tme nt; (2) the indictment c harg ing him with drivi ng while l icense canc elled, suspended, or revoked fa iled to state an off

ense and g ive proper not ice of the charg es aga inst him; (3) the tr ial court’s instruc tions to th e j u ry re sulted in a construc tive amendment of the indictments for a g g ravated vehicula r ho mic ide and

dr ivi ngwh ile lic e ns e c anc e lle d, su sp e nd e d, or re vo ke d; ( 4) the tr ia l cou rt ’s fa ilure to
c ha rg e to t he jur y an e sse nti a l e le me nt o f t

he of fe ns e of le a vin g the sc e ne of an ac c ide nt a mou nts to plain err or; and (5) the trial cour t’s use of e nhance ment fac tors and imposition of consecutive

se nte nc ingwa s im

pr op e r. We w ill re vie w the se c la ims

.

I. Evi de nc e of P r iorDU I C onv ic ti ons

Th e de fe nd ant a

rgue s th a t hi s 19 80 and

19 93 DU Ic on vic tio ns sh ou ld n ot h a ve be e n u se d to convict him of ag g ravated vehicular homicide be cause the State did not affir matively show that he

was re prese nted by

counsel or w aived his rig ht to counsel in those case s.

Vehicula r homicide is, i n t e r a lia , “the r eckle ss killi ng of anothe r by the oper ation of an automobile, airplane , motorboat or other motor vehicle, as the proxi mate result of:

. . . (2 ) [ t ] he driver’ s intox ication, as set f orth in [Tennessee Code Annotated] § 55-10-401.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-213( a)( 2) (2006)

. T en n essee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-218( a) c odifies ag g ravated vehicular homicide as “ vehicular

homicide, as de fined i n § 39-13-213( a)( 2), whe re: (1) [t ]he defe ndant has two (2) or more pr ior convictions for: ( A) [d] rivingunder the influence of an int oxic ant; (B ) [v ]eh ic ula r a ssaul t; o r ( C) [a]n y

c omb inatio n o f s uc h o ff e ns e s[.]” I f a

pe rs on is convicted of

vehicular homicide under

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-213(a )(2) , the jury

mus t de te rm ine whe th er the d e fe nd ant h a s th e re qu isi te nu mbe r o f a nd ty pe s o f p ri or

of fe ns e s to constitute the offe nse of ag g ravated vehicular hom icide. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-218(c ) (2006)

.
B e fo re re vie wi ngthe a

uth or iti e s c ite d by the de fe nd ant and the State , we fi rs t ob se rv e that,
a t tr ia l, d e fe ns e c ouns e l did no t ob je c t to the te sti mony of e ith e r of the wi tne sse s c a lle d b y

the State to prove the defenda

nt’s prior DUI convictions, nor t o a Tennessee Depa rtment of Safe ty

printout setting out the de fenda

nt’s fairly extensive recor d of convic tions, including the DUI s which ar e the subject of this issue.

I n h is a rgume nt, the de fe nd ant r e lie s u po n St a te v. O’ B ri e n, 66 6 S. W.2 d 4 84 (T e nn . Cr im. App. 1984), whe re the defe ndant had been c onvicted of f ourth offe nse DUI . Although stipulating that he had thr ee pr ior DUI convictions, O’B rien c halleng ed their use to enhance h i s punishment be c a us e the State did

no t pr ov e that he wa s r e pr e se nte d b y c ouns e l or

wa ive d th e ri g ht t o c ouns e l in those prior c ases. O’ Br ien, 666 S.W.2d at 485. This court agre ed and r ever sed the de fenda nt’s

c on vic tio n, ho ldi ngthat B a lda sar v

. I ll inois , 4 46 U. S. 2 22 (1 98 0) , r e qu ir e d th a t th e Sta te aff irmatively

establish that a criminal defe ndant was repr esente d by counsel in a prior misdemeanorT he U ni t ed St at es Supr eme Co ur t ha s s ubs equen t l y l i mi t ed t he s cope of B al das ar t o convi ct i ons wh er e a ct ual 2
inc a rc e ra tio n w a s im p o se d . N ic h o ls v. U n ited S ta te s., 5 1 1 U .S . 7 3 8 , 7 4 8 -4 9 (1 9 9 4 ).

-5- c on vic tio n b e fo re su c h c on vic tio n c ou ld be us e d fo r e nh anc e me nt purp os e s. I d. Th e de fe nd a nt i n 2 the pre sent appea l argues t hat his situation is square ly on point with O’Br ien and that his convic tions fo r ag g ra vate d ve hic ula

r hom ic ide sim ila

rl y mus t be re ve rs e d. We n ote that in O’ B ri e n, un lik e in the pre sent ca se, the de fenda nt f i l ed a pretria l motion s eekingto block the State’s use of the prior DUI convictions. I n the pre sent ca se, as we have s aid, neither pretria l nor during the trial did the de fe nd ant o bje c t to the e vid e nc e of the pr ior DU Ic on vic tio ns

. The State, c iting State v. Killebre w, 760 S .W.2d 228 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988), re sponds that the def endant ha s waived this assig nment of er ror by fa iling to object c ontemporane ously to the introduction of the testimony and e x h i b i t s related to the prior c onvictions. I n the alter native, the State argues that the e vidence is sufficient to support the convic tions for aggr avated vehicular homicide. The St at e ar g ues that Hickma n v. State, 153 S.W .3d 16 (Tenn. 2004) , distinguishes Ba ldasar on the g rounds t hat, i n the l atter case, the rec ord af firmatively

showed that the de fenda

nt

was no t repr esente d by counsel. I n Hickman, our supreme court held, in the co n t ex t o f a habea s corpus pr ocee ding, that a judgment i s not rende red void by its silence a s to whether the defe ndant

wa s r e pr e se nte d b y

c ouns e l or wa ive d the ri g ht to c ouns e l. 15 3 S.W. 3d a t 25 . T he de fe nd ant a sse rt s that Hickman’ s scope should be limit ed to habe as cor pus proce eding s, where the burde n of proof lies with the petitioner by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e, not the State beyond a re asonable doubt.

I n its orde r denying the defe ndant’s timely motion for a new trial, the trial cour t found that the jud g me nts we re fa c ia lly va lid and , th us , c ou ld b e us e d f

or e nh anc e me nt p ur

po se s:

The Te nnessee Supreme Court stated in State v. McCli n t o ck , 732 S.W .2d 268, 271-72 (Te nn. 1987), that “unle ss inva l i d o n i ts face , a prior judg ment of conviction in a cour

t with personal and s u b j ec t matter jurisdiction cannot be collater ally

attacke d in a subsequent proce eding in w hich the cha lleng ed convic tion is use d to e nh anc e punis hme nt. ” Re g ula ri ty of c ri min a l pr oc e e din g s in c ourt is presumed w hen it appea rs on the fa ce of

the pr o ce eding s that the court ha d jurisdiction over the subjec t matter and the parties. See McClintock 732 S.W.2d at 27 0. Suc h is the c a se be fo re us . We c on c lud e that th e pr ior c on vic tio ns fo r D UI

in [1980 and 1993] are valid on their fa ce a nd wer e prope rl y used to enha nce the defe ndant’s senten ce. Any attack upon the fac ially valid judgme nts should be

rese rved f or a post-c onviction proce eding , not this case.
We ag ree with the State that, althoug h the def endant r aised this issue in his motion for new trial, he wa ived plenar

y appellate revie w by

failing to contempora

neously object at the se ntencing hear ing. T enn. R . App. P. 36(a) ( “Nothing in this rule shall be construe d as re quiring relief be g ra n t e d t o a p art y r e s p o n s i b l e f

o r ane r r o r o r w h o f a i l e d t o t a k e w h a t e v e r

a c t i o nw a s r e a s o n a bly available to preve nt or nullify the har mful eff ect of an er ro r. ”); see also State v. Thompson, 36Si gn i f i can t l y , t he s t at ut e does not r equi r e t hat t he j udgm ent be i n t r odu ce d t o e s t abl i s h t h e v al i di t y of a pr i or 3

c o n v ic tio n

. -6- S.W. 3d 10 2, 10 8 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ) ( “ Th is c ourt is e xtre me ly

he sit ant t o p ut a

tr ia l c ourt

in

err or whe re its alleg ed shortcominghas not bee n the subject of a contempora

neous objec tion.”).

We b a se our c on c lus ion

a dd iti on a lly

up on an a na ly sis of the ho ldi ng in Sta te v. Al be rt Ev a ns , No

. W 20 05 -00 161- CCA -R 3- CD , 2 00 6 WL 13 81 58 5 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. Ma y 17 , 2 00 6) , p e rm . to appea l denied (Te nn. Oct. 16, 2006), w h er ei n the def endant wa s convicted of first deg ree preme ditated murder

and sentenc ed to life in pr ison without parole on the basis of the jury ’s finding

o f th r e e a g gr a v a ti n g circ umstances, includingthat the def endant wa s previously

convicted of

a fe lony whose statutory

elements involved the use of violence to the person. I d. at *14. He a rg ued on appe al that no competent e vidence supported the a pplication of the violent fe lony ag g ravator bec ause the State e rr on e ou sly

int ro du c e d a ne g oti a te d ple a a g re e me nt fo rm , ra the r tha n a c op y of the jud g me nt, to p ro ve the pr ior

c on vic tio n. Th is c ourt

he ld t hat th e de fe nd ant w a ived th e is su e fo r a pp e llate revie w by

faili n g t o co n temporane ously object to the introduction of the doc ument or deny the

e xiste nc e of

the pr ior c on vic tio n. I d. a t *1 5. We c on c lud e that, s imi larl y , th e de fe nd ant i n th is c a se waived ple nary

revie w of this assign m en t o f err or by not objecting contempora neously to the introduct io n o f h is dr iv in g r e c o r d o r th e te s ti mo n y o f th e r e c o r d k e e p e r s , an d n o t d e n y in g the exis tence of his three prior DUI convictions. He h as n o t s ufficie ntly prese rved this issue for appellate revie w, so it is unnecessar y for us to re ach the merits of his argument.

We rec og nize that this court may disreg ard w aiver

and cons i d er err or whe never nece ssary to do substantial just ice. Te nn. R. Crim. P

. 5 2 (b ); S t at e v . Smit h, 24 S.W .3d 274 (Tenn. 2000) (adopting five-f

actor test for plain e rror

revie w first set out in State v

. Ad kisson, 899 S.W .2d 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)). I n order for us to f ind pla in e rror , Adkisson require s that “(a ) the re cord

mus t c le arl y

e sta bli shwh a t oc c ur

re d in the tr ia l c ourt ; ( b) a

c le ar a nd un e qu ivo c a l ru le of

law mus t have be en bre ache d; (c) a

substantial rig ht of the accused must have been adverse ly aff ecte d; (d) the

acc used did not waive the issue for tactica l r easons; and ( e) c onsideration of the err or is ‘nec essar y to do substantial just ice.’ ” Smith, 24 S .W.3d at 282 (quoting Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 6 4 1 -42).

“ [T ]h e p r e s e n c e o f a ll f

iv e f a c to r s mu s t b e e s ta

b li s h e d b y th e r e c o r d

b e f o r e th is Co u rt w il l r e c o g n iz e the e xiste nc e of pla in er

ro r, and c omp le te c on sid e ra tio n of a ll the fa c tor s is no t ne c e ssa ry wh e n it is

c le ar f ro m th e re c or d th a t a t le a st o ne of the fa c tor s c ann ot b e e sta bli sh e d. I n a dd iti on , th e “ ‘p la in

err or’ must [have bee n] of such a g reat ma g nitude that it pr obably chang ed the outcome of the trial.’ ” I d. at 283 (quoting Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d at 642). We find this issue inappropriate for pla in error revie w bec ause it is not evident that a c lear and unequivoc al rule of law has bee n brea ched, or that consideration of the err or is nece ssary to do substantial justi ce. T ennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 39-13-218 is si l en t as t o t he ty pe or a mount of proof ne cessa

ry to establish the prior convic tions require d by

section 39-13- 218(a) (1). Fur thermore , the proof of

g uilt int roduce d at trial wa s ample. 3 This claim is without m erit.-7-

II. Ind ictm ent for Driving Whil e License Suspend ed, Revoked, or Cance lled

The de fenda

nt alleg es that the indictment cha rg ing him with dr iving while his lice nse wa s
canc elled, suspend ed, or revoked f ailed to state a

n offe nse or g ive prope r notice of the cha rg es
a g a ins t hi m. H e arg

ue s th a t th e ind ic tme nt a lle g e s th re e se pa ra te of fe ns e s in the same c ount a

nd is fata lly de fi c ie nt f

or fa ili ngto i nf

or m hi m of the e sse nti a l e le me nts of

the c ha rg e d o ff e ns e

. Th e Sta te counter s that the indictment was valid bec ause it cha rg ed the de fenda

nt with differe nt means of committing only

one off ense.

Th e c ha lle ng e d in dic tme nt r e a ds :

THE GRAND J URORS of the State of Tenne ssee, duly selec ted, empane led,

sworn and char g ed to inquire for the body of the c ounty

of Shelby , Tenne ssee, upon the ir oath, pr e se nt t

hat:

PI ERRE J ACKSON

on July 25 , 2 00 1 in

She lby Coun ty , T e nn e sse e , a

nd be fo re the fi nd ingof

thi s ind ic tme nt, did

un lawf ull y and kn ow ing ly

dr ive a mot or ve hic le up on

a pu bli c highw ay in Shelby County , Tenne ssee, at a time when the said PI ERRE J ACKSON’s privileg e to do so was ca

ncelled, suspe nded or r evoked, in violation of T.C.A. 55-50- 504, ag ainst the pea ce a

nd dignity

of the State of T ennesse e. An indictment or pre sentment must inform the acc used of “ the n ature and ca use of the

acc usation.” U.S. Const. Amend. VI ; Tenn. Const. Art. I , § 9. I n addition, T en n essee Code Anno ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 13 -2 02 re qu ir e s tha t an ind ic tme nt “ state the fa c ts c on sti tut ingthe of fe ns e in ordinary and conc ise lang uag e, without prolix ity or repetition, in a manner so as to ena ble a pe rson of c omm on un de rs tan di ng to knowwh a t is int e nd e d a nd wi th t hat de g re e of

c e rt a int y wh ic h w ill enable the cour

t, on conviction, to pronounce the prope r judg ment.”

An indictment that achie ves its “over riding purp o s e o f n otice to the ac cused w ill be

c on sid e re d s uf

fi c ie nt t o s a tis fy

bo th c on sti tut ion a l and

statut or y re qu ir e me nts .” State v. Ha mmo nd s, 30 S.W. 3d

29 4, 30 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) . O ur su pr e me c ourt

ha s h e ld t

hat an in dic tme nt is su ffi cie nt to satisfy notice re quirements if it “c ontains alleg ations tha t (1 ) enable the a ccuse d to know the

acc usat i o n t o whi ch answ er is re quired; (2) furnish the trial c ourt an a dequate basis for e ntry of a proper judgme nt; and (3) pr otect the a ccuse d from a subse quent prosec ution for the same offe nse.” I d. at 299 (c iting State v. Hill, 954 S.W .2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997) ).

The trial c ourt found that the indictment wa s sufficient to s h o w t he cha rg es ag ainst the de fe nd ant:

This court fe els that the indictment w a s sufficie nt to show the Defe ndant what he wa s b e ingc ha

rg e d w ithin o rd e r f

or him to a de qu a te ly

pr e pa re fo r t ria l and it-8-

s h o u l d h av e b ee nu n d er s t o o d

wh at s t at u t e t h e D ef

en d an t wa s ch ar ged wi t h b re ak i n g. I t is g e ne ra lly

su ff ic ie nt i f t he ind ic tme nt s ta te s th e of fe ns e in t he wo rd s o f t

he statut e
or in wo rd s e qu iva le nt to the statut e

. State v. Gr if fi s, 96 4 S.W. 2d 57 7 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ). Th e tr

ue te st of an indi c tme nt is not wh e the r it c ou ld b e mor e de fi nit e and ce rtain, but wh et h er i t contains the e lements of the of fense to be cha

rg ed and

su ff ic ie ntl y a pp ri [s]e s th e de fe nd ant o f w hat he or sh e mus t be pr e pa

re d to me et. State v. Over

ton, 193 Tenn. 171, 245 S.W.2d 188 (1951); St ate v. Sowder , 826 S.W. 2d 92 4 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ); Sta te v. Smith, 61 2 S. W.2 d 4 93 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 1 9 8 0 )

. F u rt h e r

m o r e , i f t h e D e f

e n d an t d i d n o t h a v e e n o u g h i n f o r m a t i o nto prepa re a defe nse, he c ould have f iled a Motion for a

Bill of Particula

rs. I t is the opinion of this court that the indictment of [the defenda nt] was more than suffic ient to apprise him of the c harg es beingbroug ht ag ainst him.

The de fenda

nt argues that h e m ay not be cha rg ed with driving while license canc elled,

su s p en d ed , or re voked in a one -count indictment bec ause this cour t held in State v. Goodson, 77 S.W. 3d 24 0, 24 4 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ), that T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno ta te d se c tio n 5 5- 50 -5 04 se ts out three se parate and distinct off enses. The defe ndant in Goodson was indicted a nd convicted f

or driving on a re voked license . Howeve r, the proof at trial showed th at the def endant’ s license ha d been suspe nded, not re voked, which thi s co u rt found to be a constructive a

mendment of the indictment, reve rsing the def endant’ s conviction. I d. at 244-45.

Howeve r, Goodson wa s indicted and c onvicted of driving on a re voked license , but the proof was only that his license wa s suspended. B y contra st, the defe ndant in the present case was indicted and convict ed of driving on a ca ncelled, suspe nded, or r evoked lice nse, and the State’s proof demonstrated that his li cense was re voked. I t is im materia l that the defe ndant’s indictment cha rg ed him with all three mea

ns of violating T ennesse e Code Annotat ed section 55-50- 504; “[w] hen the of fe ns e [ch arg e d in the ind ic tme nt] may be c omm itt e d by dif fe re nt fo rm s, by dif

fe re nt m e ans or

wi th differ ent intents, such forms, mea ns or intents may

be alleg ed in the same count in the alter native.” Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 13 -2 06 (a ). Go od so n it se lf state d that it wo uld

have be e n p ro pe r f

or the Sta te to char g e the de fenda

nt with all three mea

ns of violating se ction 55-50-504 within a single count and prove a ny one of the three means. See Goodson, 77 S.W .3d at 244 n.2.

Th e ind ic tme nt i n th is c a se satis fi e s a ll o f t he Ha mmo nd s r e qu ir e men ts . I t is su ff ic ie ntl y detailed to inform the de fenda nt of the statute h e wa s accused of violating , allow the entr y of a proper judgme nt, a

nd protec t the defe ndant from double jeopa rdy . We uphold the determination of the trial cour

t on this i ssue.

III . J ur y I nst r uc ti ons

The de fenda

nt next alleg es that the trial court’s jury instructions constructively amende d the indictments for ag g ravated vehicula r homicide a

nd driving while license c ance lled, suspended, or revoke d. I n his view, the trial court im permissibly broade ned the indictment by instructing the jury on all three means of c ommitt ing a g g ravated vehicular homicide, when the indictment a nd proof atT he t ri al co urt i nad vert ent l y om i t t ed t he wo rd “aggravat ed ” f rom t hi s i nst ruct i o n. T he wri t t en i nst ruct i o ns 4 gi ven t o t he j ur y cont ai ned t he word “ agg r ava t ed. ”
-9- trial alleg ed only

one mea ns of committing the of

fense

. He also alleg es t hat t he cour t’s instructions on the cha rg e of driving while l icense canc elled, suspended, or re voked construc tively amende d the indictment. As we unde rstand, the de fenda nt argues that this constructively amende d indictment

re su lte d in

a jur y ve rd ic t th a t w a s n ot u

na nim ou s.

Th e c ha lle ng e d ju

ry ins tr uc tio ns re a d, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s: [Agg ravated Vehic ular Homicide ]

The lawprovides for

incre ased punishment for aggr avate d vehicular homicide. Any

person who c ommits the offe nse of [ag g ravated] vehicular homicide 4 is gu i l t y of a c rime. F or y ou to find the defe ndant g uilty of [ag g ravated] vehicular homicide, the State must have pr oven beyond a rea sonable doubt the e x istence of the following essential ele ments: One, that the de fenda nt h as t wo or more prior convictions for dr iving under t he influence of an intox icant, vehic ular a ssault, or any combination of such of

fense s; or that the def

endant ha s one or more prior convic tions for the pr e s e n t o f

f e n s e o f v e h ic u la

r h o mi c id e ; o r th a t th e r e w a s a t th e ti me o f the offe nse 20 hundre dths of 1 perc ent – o f 2 p er cent – 20 hundredths of 1 per cent or more of weig ht of bl ood alcohol in the defendant’s blood; and that the defe ndant has one prior c onviction for driving under the influence of an intoxi cant or vehicular assault.

. . . . [Driving While L icense Cance lled, Suspended, or Revoke d]

The indictment cha

rg es that at the time the alleg ed off ense w as committed, that sa id d e fe nd ant h a s b e e n c on vic te d o f t wo pr ior of fe ns e s of dr ivi ngwh ile lic e ns e suspended or revoke d. The law provides for incre ased penalties f o r s u b sequent offe nses. I f y ou find from the proof that the ...State has shown unde r the lawthat the defe ndant is g uilty

of driving wh i l e l i cense ca ncele d, suspended, or

revoke d, y ou must write in your verdic t w hether defe ndant is a first, sec ond, third, fourth, fifth, or six th offende r. Your ve rd i ct should – should y ou so find the def endant guilty

of driving while l icense canc eled, suspended, or re voked should be, We, the jury , find the def endant guilty of driving whil e li cense canc eled, suspended, or revoked f or a blank time, inserting the number of the offe nse.

De fe nd ants have a

“ c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht to a c or re c t and c omp le te c ha

rg e of the law. ” State v. Tee l, 793 S

. W.2d 236, 249 (Tenn. 1990). Ac cording ly , trial courts have the duty to give “a complete c harg e of the law applicable to the facts of t he ca se.” State v. D avenpor t, 973 S.W .2d 283,-10-

287 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (citing State v. Har bison, 704 S.W .2d 314, 319 (Tenn. 1986)). When revie wing challenged j u ry instructions, we must look at “the cha rg e as a whole in deter

mining whether prejudicia l error

has bee n committed.” I n re Estate of Elam, 738 S.W .2d 169, 174 (Tenn. 1987); see a lso St ate v. Phipps, 883 S.W .2d 138, 142 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)

.
After an indictment has be en re turned, its char g e may not be broa dened or

chang ed except by action of the g rand jury , as explained in Goodson, 77 S.W .3d at 244:

Stirone require s that courts dis tinguish between constructive ame ndments of the indictment, which ar e re versible pe r se , and var iance s between i n dictment and pr oo f, wh ic h a

re e va luate d und e r t

he h arm le ss e rr or

do c tr ine . T he a c c e pte d te st i s that a construc tive amendment of the indictment occur s when the jury is permitted to convict the def

endant upon a

fac tual basis that eff

ectively modifies an esse ntial element of

the offe nse cha

rg ed. . . . I n such ca ses, re versa l is automatic, beca use the defe ndant may

have be en convic ted on a gr ound not char g ed in the indictment. . . . I f, on the oth e r h and , th e va

ri a tio n b e tw e e n p ro of

and ind ic tme nt d oe s n ot e ff

e c tiv e ly modif y a n e sse nti a l e le me nt o f t he of fe ns e c ha rg e d, “ the tr ia l c ourt ’s re fu sa l to restric t the jury char g e to the words of the indictment is merely another of the fla ws in trial that mar its perf

ection but do not prejudice the def endant.”

I d. (quoting United States v. Adams, 778 F .2d 1117, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985)).

The trial c ourt found t h e d efe ndant’s alleg ation without merit that the jury rea ched a “patc hwork ve rdict” ba sed on diffe rent off enses. Implicit in this holding is a finding that the jury instructions did not constructively amend the indictments.

Neither of these instruc tions constructively amende d its re spective indictment. The jury was not permitted to convict t h e d ef en d an t on a fa ctual basis that modifies an e ssential element of the offe nse cha

rg ed. The only

proof introduc ed at tria l on the char g e of a g g ravated vehicula r homicide related to the def

endant’ s prior DUI

convictions. The verdic t c onformed to the indictment, a nd the ba lanc e of

the ins tr uc tio n w a s me re surp lus a g e . St a te v. Way ne E. Mit c he ll, No . 0 1C0 1- 92 09 -C R00 29 5, 19 93 WL65 84 4, a t *3 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. Ma r. 11 , 19 93 ), pe rm

. to a

pp e a l de nie d ( Te nn . July 6, 1993). The instruction on driving while license canc elled, suspended, or re voked did not broade n
or c ha ng e the fa c tua l ba se s a lle g e d in the ind ic tme nt. Th e de fe nd ant i s n ot e nti tle d to re lie f o n th is issue.

IV . P lai n Er r or – F ail ur e to Cha r ge Ess e nt ial Ele m e nt

The de fenda

nt asks that we rec og nize a s plain err or the trial c ourt’s omission from the jury instructions of an esse ntial element of the offe nse of lea ving the scene of an a ccide nt. The trial cour t did not i n s tr

u c t o nth e r e qu ir e me n t t

h a t t h e a c c u s e d

kn o w o r s h o u ld r e a s o n a b ly h a v e kn o w nth at death resulted from the accident. The S tate responds that the defendant has waived the issue by not providing an ade quate a

ppellate r ecor d and that this issue is not susceptible to plain error revie w.-11-

Th e tr ia l c ourt

de te rm ine d th a t th e e rr or , if any , w a s h arm le ss:
[I ]t is a se ttl e d te ne t of

law that th e g e ne ra l or g anizatio n o f j ur y in str uc tio ns is a matter within the trial court’s discretion. See United States v. Dunn, 805 F .2d 1275 (6th Cir. 1986). The trial judge ’s i nstructions will be rea d contextually as a w hole, and the f act that some por

tio n s co n sidered a lone may be er roneous will not be

c on sid e re d prej ud icial e rr or on a pp e a l, w he n th e ins tr

uc tio n r e a d a s a

wh ole is

corr ect. . . . Eve n if that [omi tted] phrase wa s somehow essential to understanding the statute as a

who l e wh i ch it does not appe ar to be , the fa ilure to instruct on an essential ele ment of an of

fense may be deeme d harmless e rror if the omitted element is support ed by

uncontrove rted e vidence . State v. Ducke r, 27 S.W.3d 889 (Tenn. 20 00 ); State v. Ga

rr iso n, 40 S.W. 3d

42 6 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) (h arm le ss e rr or ana ly sis is available even wh en t h e trial judge omits from the jury instructions an essential

e le me n t o f

th e o f f e n s e

. ) [. ]

The de fenda

nt has not demonstrated that plain err or analy sis is appropr iate. As the trial cour t observe d, the fa ilure to instruct on an e ssential element of an off ense ma y constitute harmless er

ror. We conclude, a s did the trial court, that, unde r the fa cts of this case , any err or in the instruction was harmless. Ac cording ly , “substantial justice” does not r equire that we conduct a plain err or re view of this matter. Duc ker, 27 S.W.3d at 899.

V. Se nt e nc ing
Finally , the def

endant a rg ues that the trial cour

t committed error

by sentenc ing him to a total of 52 y ear s, five months, and 29 day s, and imposing c onsecutive se ntencing . He c halleng es the trial court’s a pplication of two enha

nceme nt fac tors and its finding that consec utive sentenc ing w as
war rante d beca

use t he defenda

nt is a dange rous offender

. The S tate contends that the def endant ha s waived his c laim as t o t h e enhance ment fac tors and that the r ecor d supports the impositi on of

consec utive sentenc es. The jury found the de fenda

nt guilty of two counts o f aggr avate d vehicular homicide, one count of fe lony

leavingthe sce ne of an a ccide nt, one count of misdemea nor leaving the scene of an

acc ident, and one c ount of driving while license suspended or revoke d, third offe nse. The trial c ourt senten ce d t h e d ef en d an tt o t we n t y -f

i v e y ea rs fo r e ac h co u n to f a ggra v at edv eh i cu l ar h o m i cide; ele ven months and twenty -nine day s for driving while license canc elled, suspended, or revoke d; eig hteen months for felony

leavingthe sce ne of a

n acc ident; and six months fo r misdemeanor leavingthe

scene of an a ccide nt. Findingthat the defendant was a dange rous offender , the t rial cour t ordere d

e a c h s e nte nc e , e xce pt t

hat f or mis de me ano r le a vin g the sc e ne of an ac c ide nt, to r un c on se c uti ve ly to a ll o the rs , r e su lti ng in an e ff e c tiv e se nte nc e of fi ft

y -t wo y e ars , fi ve mon ths , a

nd tw e nty -n ine da

y s.

When an ac cused challeng es the leng th, r ang e, or manner of service of a sentenc e, it is t he d u t y o f this court to conduct a de novo r e v ie w o n th e r e c o r d w it h a p r e s u mp ti o n that “the deter minations made by

the cour t from which the a

ppeal is take n are corr ect.” Tenn. Code Ann. §-12-

40-35-401( d) (2006) . This presumption is “conditioned upon the af firmative showingin the rec ord that the trial co u rt consider ed the se ntencingprinciples and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 1 6 6 , 1 6 9 (Tenn. 1991) . The pre sumption does not apply to the leg al conclusions rea ched by the trial court in se ntencingthe ac cused or to the deter

minations made by

the trial court whic h are p re d i cate d upon uncontrove rted fa cts. State v. Butler , 900 S.W .2d 305, 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Smit h, 891 S.W .2d 922, 929 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Bone stel, 871 S.W .2d 163, 166 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), overr uled on other g rounds by State v. Hooper , 29 S.W .3d 1, 9 (Tenn. 2000) . Howeve r, this court is require d to give g reat we i g ht to the tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n o f c on tr ov e rt e d f a c ts a s th e tr ia l c ourt ' s d e te rm inatio n o f t he se fa cts i s p re d i ca t edu

p o nth e w i t n es s es ’ d em ea n o r a n d ap p ea ra n ce wh en t es t i fy i n g.

I n conductinga de novo revie w of a sentenc e, this c ourt must c onsider ( a) an y evidenc e
rec eived at the trial and/or se ntencinghear ing, ( b) the pre senten ce report, (c) the principles of sentenc ing, ( d) the a

rg uments of counse l relative to sentencing alternatives, (e) the nature and char acte ristics of the off

ense, ( f) a ny mitigating or enhanc ement fac tors, (g ) any statements made by the ac cused in his own behalf, and (h) the acc used’s potential or la ck of pote ntial for re habilitation or treatment. Tenn. C o d e Ann. §§ 40-35-103, - 210 (2006); State v. Ta y lor, 63 S.W .3d 400, 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). Enhanc ement fac tors may be considere d only if they are “appr opriate f or the offe nse,” a

nd “not themselves e ssential elements of the offe nse.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114 (2006).
The pa

rty challeng ing the sentenc e im posed by the trial cour

t has the burde n of establishing that the sentenc e is err oneous. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sente ncing Commi ssion Cm ts.; Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 1 6 9

. I f o u r re view re flec ts that the trial court, followingthe statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, im posed a lawful sentence, after having g iven due consideration and proper weig ht to the fac tors and princ iples set out under the sentencing law and ma de finding s of fa ct that

are adequa

tely supported by

the re cord, the n we may

not modify the sentenc e even if we w ould have pref err ed a dif

fer ent re sult. S tate v. F letcher , 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

. A. Blakely Error

Th e tr ia l c ourt

fo un d a pp lic a ble tw o e nh anc e me nt f

a c tor s a nd no mit ig a tin g fa c tor s:

Th e Court

ha s e xami ne d th e e nh anc e me nt fa c tor s p re se nte d b y the Sta te , thre e in

numbe r a nd the Court fi nd s two . Enh anc e me nt n umb e r o ne a s w e numbe r t ho se in

our e nh anc e me nt f

ile s h e re . T he Cou

rt loo ks at this a s a

man w ho ha s f

or tw e nty y ear s had var ious and sundry traff ic offe nses including three DUI ’s prior to this and if y ou want t o count it, this was the fourth time he wa s driving w hile intox icated. . . . The Court a lso note s and will a cce pt e nhance ment number e ight. The defe ndant in t his ma tte r, it ap pe ars he wa s re pe a te dly re le a se d, g ive n c ha nc e s b y on e Court

to appea r out to the workhouse and fa iled to appea r.-13-

The de fenda

nt argues that the trial court’s finding of these two enhanc ement fa ctors violates Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct . 2531 (2004), whic h require s that any fac t other than that of a pr ior conviction u s ed to enhance a defe ndant’s sente nce be proven to a jury bey ond a

rea sonable doubt. The State responds that the defe ndant has waived revie w of this issue by failing to raise it at the se ntencinghear ing or in his motion for new trial. We note that the de fenda nt was sentenc ed on May

30, 2003, befor e Blakely was decided. He filed a timely motion for new tria l on September 23, 2005, a ft er the re lease of State v. Gomez, 163 S.W .3d 632, 661 (Tenn. 2005) , vacated, re manded by

Gomez v. Tennesse e, __U.S.__, 127 S. Ct. 1209 (2007), in which the Tenne ssee Supre me Court held that Tenne ssee’ s 1989 Sentencing Reform Ac t did not run af oul of the Six th Amendment and B lakely . There fore, the def endant c ould not reasona bly have be en
e xpe c te d to ra ise his B lake ly c la im at an e arl ie r s ta g e of the pr oc e e din g s, and

we wi ll r e vie w h is

c la im o n it s me ri ts.

The defe ndant is c orre ct that the trial court misapplied e nhance ment fac tor (8) be cause it was not proven to a jury

bey ond a re asonable doubt. See State v. Gomez, 239 S.W .3d 733, 740 (Tenn. 2007) (Te nnessee ’s pre -2005 Sentencing Reform Ac t violates the Six th Amendment to the extent that it permits sentence enhanc ement base d on j u d i ci ally deter mined fac ts other than the f act of a prior convic tion). Howeve r, t he trial c ourt’s application of fac tor (1) is supported by the re cord a

nd does not implicate the Six th A mendment rig ht to a jury trial bec ause it wa s based on the de fenda nt’s pr ior c ri min a l c on vic tio ns . I t a pp e ars that th e tr ia l c ourt int e nd e d that g re a t w e ig ht b e g ive n to enhanc ement fa ctor (1) , which could be the basis for imposing the sentenc es which it did. Howe ver, in view of the substantial sen t en ce s rec eived by the def endant a nd the fa ct that one e nhance ment fac tor could not be a

pplied, we r emand f

or re sentenc ing.

B. C ons e c ut ive Se nt e nc ing

The trial c ourt found that the de fenda nt’s sentenc es should be serve d consec utively based on the “da ng erous of

fende r” c riterion:

The Court f

inds that the defe ndant is a dang erous of fende r whose be havior indicates no reg ard f

or others in he sitation about committ ing, he doesn’t he sitate about committing a c rime in which the risk for human life is high. The Court further finds that it’s nece ssary to protec t the publ ic from someone of this nature , as I ’ve a lrea dy state d.

. . . A nd , th e Court so fi nd s and fu rt he r f ind s th a t th e fa c ts o f t

his c a se
re a so na bly re la te to t he se ve ri ty

of the of fe ns e s. Th e Court

wi ll a pp ro ve the ve rd ic ts of the jury

. As a g ener al rule, c onsecutive sentence s are imposed at the discre tion of the trial cour t upon its consideration of one or more of the following statutory

criter ia:
(1) The de fenda

nt is a profe ssional criminal who has kno wi n g ly devoted suc h defe ndant’s life to c riminal acts as a major sourc e of livelihood;T he d efen d an t arg ue s t ha t we sho uld no t p resu m e that t he t rial co urt’ s fin d in g t h a t “t h e fac t s o f t his case 5

re a so n a b ly re la te to the se v e rity o f t h e o ff e n se s” ind ic a te s tha t t h e c o u rt fo u n d tha t co n se c u tive s e n te n c e s re a so n a b ly

r el at e t o t he s eve r i t y of t he cas e. W e di s agr ee and bel i eve t hat a f ai r cont ext ual r eadi ng of t he cour t ’ s f i ndi ng s i ndi cat es t hat i t f o und t hat t he severi t y of t he o f f enses warrant ed co nsecut i ve sent enci ng.

-14- (2) The de fenda

nt is an offe nder w hose re cord of criminal ac tivity

is ex tensive;
( 3 ) T h e d e f

e n d an t i s a d an g e r o u s m e n t a l l y a b n o r m a l p e r s o n a s d e c l a r e d b y a
c omp e te nt p sy c hiatr ist

who co nc lud e s a s a

re su lt o f a

n inve sti g a tio n p ri or

to sentenc ing that the defendant’s criminal conduct has been char acte rized by a patter n of re pe tit ive or

c omp uls ive be havio r w ithhe e dle ss i nd if fe re nc e to c on se qu e nc e s; (4) The de fenda

nt is a dan ger o u s offe nder w hose beha vior indicates little or no

re g ard fo r h uma n li fe , a nd no he sit a tio n a

bo ut c omm itt inga

c ri me in w hic h th e ri sk to human life is high;
(5) The d efendant is convicted of two (2) or

more statutory

offe nses involving sexual abuse of a mi nor wit h consideration of the a g g ravating c ircumstance s arising from the r elationship betwee n the def endant a nd victim or victims, the time span of defe ndant’s u n d et ec t ed sexual activity , the nature and scope of the sexual acts a nd the e xten t of

the re sid ua l, p hy sic a l and

me nta l da

ma g e to t he vic timor

vic tim s; (6) The de fenda

nt is sentenced f

or an of fense committed while on probation; or
(7 ) Th e de fe nd ant i s se nte nc e d f or c ri min a l c on te mpt

.
Te nn . Code Ann. § 40- 35 -1 15 (b ) (2 00 6)

. Th e se c ri te ri a are state d in

the a lte rn a tiv e ; th e re fo re , o nly

one nee d exis t to support the a ppropriate ness of consec utive sentenc ing. Her e, the trial court a pplied criter ion (4): “The defe ndant is a dang erous of fende r whose be havior indicates littl e or no r eg ard for human life , and no hesitation about committing a c rime in which the r isk to human life is high.” I d. § 40-35-115( b)(4) (2006). Criterion four has been spe cifica lly discussed by

our supre me cour

t in State v. Wi lkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995), whe re the court he ld:
[T] he imposition of consecutive se ntence s o n an o ffe nder f ound to be a da

ng erous
o ff en d er re qu i re s , i nad d i t i o nt o t h e ap p l i ca t i o no f ge n er al p ri n ci p l es o f s en t en ci n g, the finding that an extended sente nce is ne cessa ry to protect the public ag ainst further

c ri m i n a l c o n d

u c tb y t h e d e f e n d an tan d

t h a tt h e c o n s e c u t i v e s e n t e n c e s mus t
rea sonably

relate to the seve rity

of the off enses c ommitt ed.

I d. at 939.

We conclude that the trial court made t h e re q u i s i te Wilkerson findings, a nd the re cord supports the impositi on of conse cutive sente nces. We note that the re cord on a ppeal doe s not 5-15-

include judg ments for the two c onvictions for l ea v i n g t h e s cene of a n acc ident. Acc ording ly , we dir e c t th a t ju dg me nts be e nte re d f or the se tw o c on vic tio ns

.
CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the for eg oing a uth o r it ie s a

n d r e a s o n in g , th e d e f

e ndant’s convic tions are a ffirme d, and the matter

is remande d for r esente ncing as to the def endant’ s convi ct i o n s for a g g ravated vehicular homicide and f

or entry o f j u d gm ents as to the convic tions for leavingthe sce ne of a n
a c c ide nt.

___________________________________ AL AN E. GL ENN, JUDGE