131 Nev., Advance Opinion 11 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

KAREN BROWN, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

EDDIE WORLD, INC.; AND 

STAGECOACH HOTEL AND CASINO, 

INC., 

Respondents. 

No. 63896 

FILED 

APR 1 6 2015 

TRACIE K. LINDEMAN 

MtQUR 

CHIEF DEPIITY CLERK 

CL 

Appeal from a district court order granting a motion to dismiss 

in a wrongful termination action. Fifth Judicial District Court, Nye 

County; Kimberly A. Wanker, Judge. 

Affirmed. 

Law Office of Daniel Marks and Daniel Marks and Adam Levine, Las 

Vegas, 

for Appellant. 

Stephens Gourley & Bywater and David A. Stephens, Las Vegas, 

for Respondents. 

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC. 

OPINION 

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.: 

In this appeal, we must determine whether the district court 

properly refused to recognize a new cause of action under the common law 

doctrine of tortious discharge in violation of public policy. Specifically, we 

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must decide whether a plaintiff can state a claim for third-party 

retaliatory discharge, when that discharge tends to discourage reporting 

violations of Nevada's gaming laws. While enforcing gaming laws is a 

fundamental public policy in Nevada, we decline to recognize a common 

law cause of action for third-party retaliatory discharge. Accordingly, we 

affirm 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Appellant Karen Brown was employed by respondent Eddie 

World, Inc., as assistant manager of a nut and candy store. The store was 

located on property owned by respondent Stagecoach Hotel and Casino, 

Inc., and both respondent corporations (collectively, Stagecoach) were 

under common ownership and management. Stagecoach knew that Brown 

was engaged to Donald Allen. Brown does not allege that Stagecoach ever 

employed Allen. Allen filed a complaint with the Nevada Gaming Control 

Board (NGCB) regarding some of Stagecoach's slot machines. Shortly 

after the NGCB informed Stagecoach that Allen filed the complaint, 

Stagecoach began assigning Brown's job responsibilities to other 

employees. Within weeks, Stagecoach terminated Brown's employment. 

Brown filed a complaint in district court alleging that 

Stagecoach terminated her employment in retaliation for Allen's 

complaint to the NGCB and that discharging her was therefore tortious 

and in violation of public policy. Stagecoach moved to dismiss Brown's 

complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to NRCP 12(10(5). The 

district court granted Stagecoach's motion because Nevada has not 

recognized a cause of action for third-party retaliatory discharge. Brown 

now appeals 

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DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Brown asks this court to recognize, for the first 

time, a common law cause of action for third-party retaliatory discharge. 

For the reasons discussed herein, we decline to do so. 

This court reviews de novo an order granting a motion to 

dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." 

NRCP 12(b)(5); Buzz Stew. LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 227- 

28, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008). In doing so, we assume that all facts alleged 

in the complaint are true, and we review all legal conclusions de novo. 

Buzz Stew, 124 Nev. at 228, 181 P.3d at 672. 

An at-will employee may generally "be properly discharged 

without cause at the will of the employer." K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 

Nev. 39, 42 n.1, 732 P.2d 1364, 1366 n.1 (1987), abrogated on other 

grounds by Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990). 

Nevertheless, "Fain employer commits a tortious discharge by terminating 

an employee for reasons which violate public policy." DAngelo v. Gardner, 

107 Nev. 704, 712, 819 P.2d 206, 212 (1991). Specifically, tortious 

discharge "arises out of the employer-employee relationship," and we have 

stated in dicta that tortious discharge occurs "when an employer dismisses 

an employee in retaliation for the employee's, . . acts which are consistent 

with. . . sound public policy and the common good." Id. at 718, 819 P.2d 

at 216 (emphasis added). "[T]ortious discharge actions are severely 

limited to those rare and exceptional cases where the employer's conduct 

violates strong and compelling public policy." Sands Regent v. 

Valgardson, 105 Nev. 436, 440, 777 P.2d 898, 900 (1989). 

We have previously stated that Inio public policy is more 

basic than the enforcement of our gaming laws." Wiltsie v. Baby Grand 

Corp., 105 Nev. 291, 293, 774 P.2d 432, 433 (1989); see also NRS 

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463.0129(1) (stating that the gaming industry is essential to Nevada's 

economy and welfare, and its success depends on "strict regulation"). 

Thus, it cannot be disputed that enforcing Nevada's gaming laws is a 

sufficiently "strong and compelling public policy" to support a claim for 

tortious discharge. Sands Regent, 105 Nev. at 440, 777 P.2d at 900; see 

also Wiltsie, 105 Nev. at 293, 774 P.2d at 433. 

Despite this fundamental public policy, we have yet to 

determine whether a discharged employee may state a common law claim 

for third-party retaliatory discharge. Accordingly, we "examine how other 

jurisdictions have addressed the issue." Moon v. McDonald, Carano & 

Wilson LLP, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 56, 306 P.3d 406, 409 (2013). 

Other courts have recognized causes of action for third-party 

retaliatory discharges arising under federal statutes, but those decisions 

depended upon broad language in the statutes themselves. See, e.g., 

Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 174-75 (2011) (Title VII); 

Kastor v. Cash Express of Tenn., LLC, F. Supp. 3d „ No. 3:14- 

CV-432-JGH, 2015 WL 128051, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 8, 2015) (Family and 

Medical Leave Act); Dembin v. LVI Servs., Inc., 822 F. Sapp. 2d 436, 438- 

39 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act). In contrast 

to the broad statutes involved in the aforementioned cases, common law 

"tortious discharge actions are severely limited." Sands Regent, 105 Nev. 

at 440, 777 P.2d at 900. Thus, the fact that some courts have recognized 

statutory third-party retaliatory discharge claims does not persuade us to 

recognize such claims at common law.' 

1Brown also asks this court to overrule Pope v. Motel 6, wherein we 

concluded that antiretaliation provisions in Nevada's discrimination 

statutes do not create a statutory cause of action for third-party 

continued on next page... 

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We have only found one court that has squarely considered 

whether to recognize a common law cause of action for third-party 

retaliatory discharge. 2 See Bammert v. Don's Super Valu, Inc., 646 

N.W.2d 365, 367 (Wis. 2002). In Bammert, the plaintiffs husband, a 

police officer, assisted in the arrest of the plaintiffs employer's wife for 

driving under the influence of alcohol, and the plaintiff was discharged 

shortly thereafter. Id. Despite the compelling public policies "favoring the 

stability of marriage" and "requiring the diligent pursuit and punishment 

of drunk drivers," the court refused to recognize a common law cause of 

action for third-party retaliatory discharge. Id. at 370-72. Such a cause of 

action, the court explained, would "have no logical stopping point." Id. at 

372. Therefore, the doctrine of tortious discharge in violation of public 

policy would "remain narrow in scope." Id. We find this rationale 

persuasive. 

...continued 

retaliatory discharge. 121 Nev. 307, 313-14, 114 P.3d 277, 281-82 (2005). 

Brown relies upon Thompson, wherein the U.S. Supreme Court construed 

a federal antiretaliation statute in Title VII. 562 U.S. at 174-75. Because 

Brown alleges that her termination amounted to a common law tortious 

discharge and does not allege that her termination violated a statute or 

related to discrimination, we could recognize Brown's common law claim 

without disturbing our holding in Pope. We therefore decline to overrule 

Pope. See Miller v. Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 597, 188 P.3d 1112, 1124 (2008) 

(stating that this court will not overrule precedent "absent compelling 

reasons for so doing"). 

2Courts in Idaho and Louisiana have expressly declined to address 

this issue. Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 75 P.3d 733, 739 n.3 

(Idaho 2003); Portie v. Devall Towing & Boat Serv., Inc., 634 So. 2d 1324, 

1327 (La. Ct. App.), rev'd in part on other grounds by 637 So. 2d 1061 (La. 

1994). 

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Tortious discharge requires an "employer-employee 

relationship." DAngelo, 107 Nev. at 718, 819 P.2d at 216. We have also 

stated, albeit in dicta, that tortious discharge occurs "when an employer 

dismisses an employee in retaliation for the employee's. . . acts." Id. 

(emphasis added). The cases recognizing statutory third-party retaliatory 

discharge claims have similarly involved retaliation for acts of other 

employees. See Thompson, 562 U.S. at 174-75; Kastor, F. Supp. 3d at 

, 2015 WL 128051 at *1, *3; Dembin, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 437-39. This 

limitation is consistent with the rule that "tortious discharge actions are 

severely limited," Sands Regent, 105 Nev. at 440, 777 P.2d at 900, and we 

therefore adopt this limitation here. Here, Brown has not alleged that 

Stagecoach ever employed Allen. Thus, this most basic requirement of an 

employment relationship involving Allen, the person whose acts led to the 

challenged retaliation, is not satisfied. 

Moreover, as in Bammert, if we were to recognize Brown's 

claim, the theory of third-party retaliatory discharge would "have no 

logical stopping point." Bammert, 646 N.W.2d at 372. Allen was neither a 

Stagecoach employee nor under any obligation to report perceived 

violations of Nevada's gaming regulations to the NGCB. 3Because 

"tortious discharge actions are severely limited," Sands Regent, 105 Nev. 

at 440, 777 P.2d at 900, we cannot countenance recognition of Brown's 

common law claim for third-party retaliatory discharge. 

3The dissent in Bammert proposed recognizing a "narrow" cause of 

action for third-party retaliatory discharges that arise from "police officers 

acting lawfully in their capacity." 646 N.W.2d at 373 (Bablitch, J., 

dissenting). We neither consider nor decide whether to recognize such an 

exception to the rule announced herein. 

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CONCLUSION 

Although enforcing gaming laws is indisputably a compelling 

public policy in Nevada, we decline to recognize a common law cause of 

action for third-party retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy. 

Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to 

state a claim pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5), and we affirm. 

CCU- J. 

We concur: 

, CA. 

Hardesty 

tp-c C9 14:3 

Douglas 

, J. 

Gibbons 

firrykdA 

Pickering 

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