NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

DOUGLAS D. YOKOIS,

Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al. 

Respondents/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 17-0120

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2016-008175

The Honorable Lori Horn Bustamante, Judge

The Honorable Teresa A. Sanders, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Douglas D. Yokois, Florence

Petitioner/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Jonathan H. Schwartz, Michael E. Gottfried

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee Arizona Department of Corrections

FILED 10-16-2018
YOKOIS v. ADC, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Douglas D. Yokois, a prisoner in the Arizona Department of 

Corrections (“ADC”) appeals a superior court order denying special action 

relief from a finding by ADC that he violated prison regulations and 

imposing discipline for the infraction. Yokois contends the superior court 

abused its discretion by (1) disregarding ADC’s purported violations of his 

right to due process at the disciplinary hearing; (2) holding him, a pro se

litigant, to the same standards as ADC’s attorneys in litigating the matter; 

and (3) ignoring ADC’s alleged interference with his rightful access to the 

court. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶2 On February 22, 2016, an ADC Correctional Officer (“CO”) 

ordered Yokois to pack up his belongings for a move to another cell. 

Because Yokois did not pack quickly enough, some COs ushered him to his 

new cell while other COs remained behind to finish packing his things.

Once at the new cell, Yokois remained outside while the COs brought in his 

belongings and dumped them onto the bed.

¶3 While unpacking Yokois’ things, one of the COs discovered a 

weapon among Yokois’ belongings—a 4” long and 1” wide piece of plastic 

sharpened to a point and attached to a small metal handle. Prison 

authorities initiated disciplinary proceedings. Three days later, CO Lopez 

delivered to Yokois an “Inmate Disciplinary Report” that stated he was 

charged with possession of a weapon. Yokois signed the document, 

acknowledging that he was served notice of the charge and that he received 

a copy of the report.

 

1 We view the facts contained in the record before the ADC hearing 

officer and testimony of ADC officers in the light most favorable to 

upholding the superior court’s ruling. See Hornbeck v. Lusk, 217 Ariz. 581, 

582, ¶ 2 (App. 2008).
YOKOIS v. ADC, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 At the hearing on the charged infraction, Yokois read from a 

prepared statement, but refused to provide the Disciplinary Hearing 

Officer, Captain Schitter, a copy of the statement after he asked for it. The

evidence consisted of Yokois’ statement; three witness statements; reports 

by the COs involved in moving Yokois between cells and discovering the 

weapon; and reports generated as part of the disciplinary hearing process. 

The three witness statements entered in evidence on Yokois’ behalf were 

obtained by way of written answers to questionnaires submitted by Yokois 

to the witnesses via ADC staff. Reviewing this evidence, Captain Schitter 

found it “more probably true than not” that Yokois was guilty of possessing 

a dangerous weapon. At the conclusion of the hearing, Captain Schitter 

stated in writing (and later repeated in an affidavit) that he based his 

decision “on the Disciplinary Report, the Information Reports, the 

Investigative Reports and copies of physical evidence.” Yokois signed the 

form, received a copy, and was assessed 360 days of lost earned-release 

credit (“ERC”), along with additional punishment not relevant to this case.

¶5 After two unsuccessful administrative appeals, Yokois 

petitioned the superior court for special action relief. The superior court 

accepted jurisdiction but, finding that Yokois was not denied due process

throughout his administrative hearing and appeals, denied relief. Yokois 

timely appealed to this court, then filed a motion in the superior court to 

vacate and set aside the special action judgment. We granted Yokois’ 

subsequent motion to suspend his appeal until the superior court ruled on 

his motion to vacate and set aside. The superior court denied Yokois’ 

motion.

¶6 In his appeal, Yokois claims the superior court’s denial of his 

special action violates his due process rights. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes sections 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-

2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 When the superior court accepts jurisdiction over a nonstatutory special action and rules on the merits, as the court did here, we 

review for abuse of discretion. Bazzanella v. Tucson City Court, 195 Ariz. 372, 

374, ¶ 3 (App. 1999) (citation omitted). A court abuses its discretion where 

the record fails to provide substantial support for its decision or the court 

commits an error of law in reaching the decision. Grant v. Ariz. Pub. Serv.

Co., 133 Ariz. 434, 456 (1982); see also Torres v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 135 

Ariz. 35, 40 (App. 1982) (discretion abused if “manifestly unreasonable, or 

exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons”).
YOKOIS v. ADC, et al.

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I. Due Process During Yokois’ ADC Disciplinary Hearing

¶8 After a state has granted ERC to an inmate, it may not rescind 

or withdraw the ERC without certain due process. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 

418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). Imprisonment does not strip an inmate of his rights 

under the Due Process Clause; however, an inmate’s rights are “subject to 

restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which [prisoners] have 

been lawfully committed.” Id. at 556. More specifically, “[p]rison 

disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full 

panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Id.

¶9 Before a prisoner may be stripped of ERC as a disciplinary 

measure,

2 due process requires he receive: “(1) advance written notice of 

the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with 

institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present 

documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the 

factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary 

action.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985)

(citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67). This is known as the three-factor Wolff test.

¶10 Due process further requires that “some evidence” must 

support a finding of guilt in such a hearing. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. This 

standard is met “if there was some evidence from which the conclusion of 

the administrative tribunal could be deduced.” Id. (internal quotation and

citation omitted). In ascertaining whether this standard was met, the court 

does not decide afresh the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, or 

reexamine the full record—“the relevant question is whether there is any 

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the 

disciplinary board.” Id. at 455-56 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

¶11 Regarding the first Wolff factor, the record reflects that prison 

authorities gave Yokois a copy of his Inmate Disciplinary Report eighteen 

days before his hearing—well ahead of the constitutionally required 

twenty-four hours. Yokois argues he was not allowed to keep a copy of the 

form. CO Lopez gave a sworn statement to the contrary. In any event, the 

purpose of providing an inmate with a copy of the charges is “to inform 

him of the charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a 

 

2 Yokois argues his disciplinary five-month assignment to Special 

Management Unit II also implicated the due process protections articulated 

in Wolff. 418 U.S. at 557. We agree. However, as discussed in the context 

of his deprivation of ERC claim, we conclude he was afforded those due 

process protections.
YOKOIS v. ADC, et al.

Decision of the Court

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defense.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564. The summary of the charge on the form 

Yokois signed was stated in just three sentences, only the first of which 

would be relevant to Yokois in preparing his defense. Yokois does not 

allege that any inability to retain a copy of the Inmate Disciplinary Report 

prejudiced him in any way. Yokois had eighteen days after being informed 

of the charge to prepare for the hearing, and within that time, he obtained 

three witness statements with responses to his written questions and 

drafted a five-page statement that he presented at his hearing. He does not 

allege that ADC failed to provide him notice of the charge against him, nor 

does he argue what he might have done differently in the preparation of his 

defense had the form not been taken from him. Accordingly, even if he was 

not allowed to keep a copy of the form, he has shown no prejudice. See 

Powell v. Coughlin, 953 F.2d 744, 750 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is entirely 

inappropriate to overturn the outcome of a prison disciplinary proceeding 

because of a procedural error without making the normal appellate 

assessment as to whether the error was harmless or prejudicial.”).

¶12 Next, Yokois was not denied due process during the hearing

itself. Captain Schitter considered his three witness statements at his 

hearing, even though Yokois submitted them late. Similarly, Captain

Schitter considered Yokois’ own five-page statement even though Yokois 

refused to provide a copy for the hearing record. Yokois complains on 

appeal that he was unfairly deprived of the opportunity to call witnesses to 

testify in person on his behalf. ADC argues he waived any argument about 

live witnesses because he did not ask for any live witnesses to be called. 

Yokois argues in response that any request would have been futile, given 

ADC’s blanket policy against allowing inmates to call live witnesses at 

disciplinary hearings. In McCann v. Coughlin, the Second Circuit held that 

due process may be improperly denied when an inmate fails to request live 

witnesses “on the basis of the overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence 

that prisoners at [the prison] had never been allowed to call witnesses.” 698 

F.2d 112, 123 (2d Cir. 1983).

¶13 We find McCann persuasive. Regardless, while Yokois argues 

that ADC maintains such a blanket policy, the record is devoid of evidence 

that ADC adheres to a policy against permitting live witness testimony in 

every case. In fact, the record suggests that the issue of live witness 

testimony was given particularized consideration, as due process requires.

In her sworn statement, CO Lopez indicated Yokois presented security 

concerns, noting that “Yokois was in maximum custody at the time of [the] 

investigation,” which meant “that he must be restrained at all the limited 

times when he would be removed from his cell.” Even if concerns 

regarding his proximity or physical access to other inmate witnesses was 
YOKOIS v. ADC, et al.

Decision of the Court

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not provided contemporaneously with his hearing, “prison officials may 

choose to explain their decision at the hearing, or they may choose to 

explain it later.” Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 497 (1985) (internal quotations 

omitted). So long as the reasons provided relate logically to prison safety

considerations and institutional goals, the due process concerns outlined in 

Wolff are satisfied. See Ponte, 471 U.S. at 497. We hold that reasonable 

justification was provided by ADC that relates logically to prison safety, 

and that Yokois’ due process rights were not violated by the requirement 

that his witnesses provide hearing testimony in written form.

¶14 Wolff‘s final prong requires the prison to give an inmate who 

is adjudicated guilty a written decision stating the evidence and reasoning 

on which the decision is based. At the conclusion of his hearing, Yokois 

received a copy of Captain Schitter’s written ruling against him. Captain 

Schitter stated in affidavit, and the written ruling reflects, that in finding 

Yokois committed the infraction, he “relied on the Disciplinary Report, the 

Information Reports, the Investigative Reports and copies of physical 

evidence.” This procedure satisfied Wolff’s third prong. In addition, we 

have reviewed this evidence, and find it sufficient to meet the requirement 

in Hill that “some evidence” support the conclusion that Yokois committed 

the infraction. See 472 U.S. at 455.

¶15 Because Yokois’ hearing satisfied due process, the superior 

court did not abuse its discretion when it denied special action relief.

II. The Standard to Which Pro Se Litigants Are Held

¶16 Yokois next argues the superior court improperly held him to 

the same standard as ADC attorneys in matters of court procedure and 

briefing requirements. Because “[w]e hold unrepresented litigants in 

Arizona to the same standards as attorneys,” Yokois’ argument must fail. 

Flynn v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, 83, ¶ 24 (2017).

III. Yokois’ Access to the Courts

¶17 The record does not support Yokois’ claims that ADC and/or 

the superior court committed fraud, forgery, perjury, and intentional delay 

as a means of interfering with his access to the courts. Although he claims 

opposing counsel and ADC attempted to thwart his efforts to pursue 

administrative and judicial review of the disciplinary proceedings, the 

record shows he received notice of the charge against him, obtained witness 

statements, was able to prepare filings with citations to legal authority, 

effected service upon pertinent parties, and argued on his own behalf.
YOKOIS v. ADC, et al.

Decision of the Court

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¶18 Moreover, despite any difficulties he may have encountered 

in the process, Yokois does not allege, let alone demonstrate, that he 

suffered any prejudice because of the conduct of opposing counsel or ADC. 

Since we “will uphold a denial of special action relief if our review reveals 

any valid reason for so doing,” Carrington v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 199 Ariz. 

303, 305, ¶ 6 (App. 2000), and because our thorough review of the record

reveals no error of law, Files v. Bernal, 200 Ariz. 64, 65, ¶ 2 (App. 2001), we 

conclude Yokois was not denied access to the courts.

3

CONCLUSION

¶19 We affirm the superior court’s order declining relief on 

Yokois’ special action petition.

 

3 To the extent Yokois appeals the superior court’s denial of his 

Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Judgment, because he advances the same 

arguments for overturning the court’s ruling on that motion as he did for 

overturning the court’s judgment, we similarly affirm the order denying the 

motion.