RESPONDENT PRO SE

R. Mark Keaton

ATTORNEYS FOR THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT 

DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION

G. Michael Witte, Executive Secretary

David B. Hughes, Staff Attorney

Allison Southgate Avery, Staff Attorney

Indianapolis, Indiana

______________________________________________________________________________

In the

Indiana Supreme Court

_________________________________

No. 02S00-1302-DI-95

IN THE MATTER OF:

R. MARK KEATON,

Respondent.

_________________________________

Attorney Discipline Action

Hearing Officer Susan B. Eisenhauer

_________________________________

April 21, 2015

Per Curiam.

We find that Respondent, R. Mark Keaton, committed attorney misconduct by, among 

other things, engaging in an extreme and pervasive pattern of conduct involving harassment and 

dishonesty. For this misconduct, we conclude that Respondent should be disbarred. 

This matter is before the Court on the report of the hearing officer appointed by this 

Court to hear evidence on the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission's "Verified 

Complaint for Disciplinary Action," and on the post-hearing briefing by the parties. 

Respondent's 1998 admission to this state's bar subjects him to this Court's disciplinary 

jurisdiction. See IND. CONST. art. 7, § 4. 
Procedural Background and Facts

The Commission filed a three-count "Verified Complaint for Disciplinary Action" against 

Respondent on February 4, 2013. The hearing officer filed her report on September 12, 2014, 

which we now adopt and summarize.

Conduct involving “JD” (Count 1). In 2005, Respondent – who at the time was 41 years 

old, married, and lived in Fort Wayne – began an intimate relationship with JD, who at the time 

was a sophomore at Indiana University and the roommate of Respondent’s daughter. 

Respondent and JD maintained a tempestuous long-distance relationship until March 2008, when 

JD permanently ended the relationship. 

During the ensuing four months, Respondent left numerous voicemails for JD, 90 of 

which were recorded and preserved by JD. And from March 2008 through April 2010, at least 

7,199 emails were exchanged between Respondent and JD, the vast majority sent by Respondent. 

Both Respondent’s oral and written communications to JD were threatening, abusive, and highly 

manipulative in nature.1

One form of leverage over JD exploited by Respondent was financial. Respondent had 

borrowed about $8,000 from JD during their relationship, and JD needed this money repaid for 

her educational expenses. For several months after their break-up Respondent endeavored to 

1 One illustrative example among the many similar voicemails left by Respondent and preserved by JD is 

the following:

(Shouting) Call me the f*** back! I don’t know who the f*** you think you are. But I’ll 

tell you what, you better f***ing call me f***ing back now! You f*** with me one more 

time and this time you’ll really f***ing pay for it! And you need to think about it! Now 

you f***ing quit f***ing with me! I f***ing deal with your f***ing illness so f***ing 

long, don’t f*** with me another f***ing day! Not another f***ing day! You return my 

call right now!

We agree with the hearing officer’s assessment that “[t]he true angry, hostile and threatening content and 

tone present in the voicemails can only be fully understood” by listening to them. (HO’s Report at ¶ 20). 

Quite simply, they are profoundly disturbing.

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condition repayment on JD’s agreement to communicate and meet with him. Respondent 

eventually repaid the money in September 2008, apparently believing that JD would respond the 

way he had hoped. When she did not, Respondent quickly sent a series of threatening emails

within mere moments of one another, writing among other things that “This is a very dangerous 

situation. You have no idea. Telephone me immediately”; “You do not have class at noon. If 

you f*** with me this time, it will be the last time. Do you understand?”; and “Okay. Because 

you have chosen to ignore me, the worst will now happen. The worst. You have until 12:30 to 

telephone me.” 

On other occasions, Respondent threatened suicide unless JD would yield to his demands. 

For example, he wrote JD in one email that “I’m leaving the house for the roof. You must call 

and stop me or I’m gone. These emails will persist and everyone will find them and know you 

didn’t call.” In another email, Respondent wrote “I will kill myself tonight if I get one more 

instance of cruelty or indifference from you. I will do it. I have had enough. This is sick. So, I 

am asking you to drop the cruelty and indifference and engage in a rational caring exchange with 

me. Are you going to or not?” 

Even more perniciously, Respondent threatened to publicly disseminate explicit 

photographs of JD taken during their relationship, and to contact JD’s family, friends, 

acquaintances, and other third parties regarding Respondent’s accusations that JD was a “whore” 

or a “slut” and that she suffered from mental illness and psychosis.2

 For example, in one 

voicemail message Respondent told JD, “What a f***ing whore. You’ve got exactly two 

f***ing minutes to email me or call me. Or these 10 f***ing emails are f***ing going. (laugh) 

I’m not f***ing kidding you. . . . You’re f***ing scum. But I’ll tell you right now I’m gonna hit 

the f***ing g****** send button. And and and you don’t even know which 10 people it’s to. 

And there’re f***ing 6 pictures in each f***ing email.” In another voicemail, Respondent 

demanded to JD, “Return my call. If I don’t hear from you by midnight, you will regret you ever 

2 Because Respondent’s accusation that JD suffers from mental illness factors into the arguments 

presented in his review briefs, we note that Respondent is not trained in psychology and lacks the 

credentials to make such a diagnosis, and that aside from Respondent’s own assertions the record in this 

case otherwise is devoid of evidence that JD has been diagnosed with or treated for any mental or 

emotional conditions. 

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f***ing met me. Every day of your life will be a f***ing living hell. I will ruin your life. . . . I 

will f***ing wreak nothing but hatred on you every day of your life for the rest of your life if my 

phone does not ring by midnight. . . . You will be embarrassed every f***ing time you turn 

around. . . . I have every f***ing email of every person who was accepted at IU in the incoming 

class, it’s posted on the f***ing site. I have tracked down their f***ing emails. I will destroy 

your m*********ing life, you f***er.”

Unfortunately, Respondent repeatedly carried out these latter categories of threats, both 

through emails to others and through postings on various adult-oriented websites. Respondent 

frequently taunted JD afterwards. In one such instance, in April 2008, Respondent wrote to JD, 

“Just so you know, they’ve been up on one site since March 1, when you started this s***. 151 

pictures to date; 209,748 hits! . . . The site permits people to mark their favorites and everyone 

loves you.” Respondent added, “[You s]hould have realized that I was the best thing that ever 

happened to you. . . . Now, I’m through with you except for the joy I will take in revenge.” In 

another, Respondent offered to take down some of the pictures he had posted if JD would call 

him immediately and admit to her alleged mental illness, but warned she only had a few minutes 

to do so because “I will be in court all day and out after that. I can get back to my computer at 

any time, but I have no intention to do so unless I hear from you . . . under my terms.” 

Additionally, Respondent has maintained and published for several years a blog about JD 

that identifies her by name and includes disparaging diatribes about her and explicit photographs 

of her. Respondent does not identify himself or include any pictures of himself in this blog. 

Even to this day, Respondent has refused to part with the blog and has refused to destroy or 

permanently delete the explicit photos of JD in his possession.

Despite the distance between Fort Wayne and Bloomington, Respondent’s unwanted 

post-breakup contact with JD was not limited to telephone and electronic communications. At 

least twice during the spring and summer of 2008, Respondent showed up unannounced at JD’s 

residence, and on one of these occasions JD discovered Respondent peeping into her bedroom 

window. In the fall of 2008, after JD had started law school, Respondent confronted JD in the 

school’s law library and demanded she have coffee with him, refusing her pleas that he leave, 

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and Respondent later prevented JD from getting into her car by standing between her and her car 

door.

In early December 2008, Respondent wrote JD that “I’m heading down [to 

Bloomington]. Obviously, I have taken a step. My actions will take a second and will not be 

avoided. This ends tonight or tomorrow morning at the very latest, the first time you walk back 

into the law school. So are you going to call or not?” Respondent added, “I will tell you that I 

am prepared to die there.” Frightened for herself and for others, JD changed her phone number 

and advised Respondent she would be seeking help from the police and from the law school.

A few days after JD changed her phone number, a private investigator retained by 

Respondent attempted to obtain JD’s new phone number from JD’s landlord.

JD alternately sought to block, or else not respond to, Respondent’s emails. However, 

Respondent utilized at least seventeen different email addresses and at least one fake social 

media profile to communicate with JD, which hindered JD’s ability to block the 

communications. Further, JD felt some need to keep apprised of Respondent’s threats, given that 

Respondent frequently was following through on those threats. From time to time, JD would 

reply to Respondent’s emails with short and straightforward statements imploring him, to no 

avail, to leave her alone. As the hearing officer aptly described, Respondent’s emails regularly 

“put [JD] in a box” and left her in an impossible “Catch 22.” (HO’s Report ¶¶ 64-65, 119). 

In June 2009, Leonard Fromm, the associate dean for students and alumni affairs at 

Indiana University Maurer School of Law, contacted Respondent at JD’s request and asked that 

Respondent cease contact with JD. Respondent told Dean Fromm that Respondent was violating 

no law or ethical rule and was “blameless in this matter,” that JD was “happily engaged in” the 

email communications, and that JD “has a lengthy history of mental health issues,” physical 

abuse, self-mutilation, and substance abuse.

Thereafter, JD sought help from the Indiana University Police Department. In August 

2009, a detective phoned Respondent and advised Respondent to stop contacting JD. 

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Respondent’s response to the detective was similar to his response to Dean Fromm, and later that 

night Respondent sent a series of threatening emails to JD warning her against seeking a 

protective order. Nevertheless, there ensued a brief period in which Respondent refrained from 

contacting JD.

However, Respondent resumed his frequent emails in November 2009 and “continued his 

pattern of alternating pleas, threats and vitriol.” (HO’s Report ¶ 87). In April 2010, JD received 

an ex parte protective order against Respondent, and in May 2010 Respondent was arrested and 

criminally charged in Monroe County with felony stalking. This criminal case, which would 

prove to be the first of several legal proceedings spawned by Respondent’s conduct toward JD, 

eventually was dismissed without prejudice by the State in April 2011 based on personal privacy 

concerns raised by JD.

Respondent continued to attempt to contact JD in 2011, both by phone and by email. JD 

did not reply.

In February 2012, the Commission notified Respondent that it was investigating his 

conduct involving JD. Ten days later, Respondent, pro se, filed a civil complaint in state court 

against JD alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process. And in May 2012, Respondent, 

pro se, filed a second complaint in federal court against JD and others alleging unlawful arrest 

(the “Federal Case”).3

Conduct involving the Commission’s investigation (Count 2). During the course of the 

Commission’s investigation into the matter involving JD, on September 18, 2012, Respondent 

sent a written response to the Commission stating the following:

3 In addition, during some of the period of time in which Respondent was harassing JD, he was on 

criminal probation in Allen County as the result of a conviction for operating while intoxicated; and in a 

third lawsuit initiated pro se by Respondent, he sued his probation officer in the wake of revocation 

proceedings that were initiated and later dismissed as a result of the Monroe County criminal case. The 

state court lawsuits against JD and Respondent’s probation officer, and the Federal Case against JD and 

others, all have resulted in awards of summary judgment for the defendants. 

6

 
Throughout all the prosecutions, [Respondent] has tried not to disparage [JD] nor has 

he even suggested that [JD] has been less than truthful with the various law 

enforcement and attorneys with whom she has communicated. As far as 

[Respondent] can remember, he’s never suggested that [JD] has lied to anyone. Put 

simply, [Respondent] doesn’t know whether she has or hasn’t, because she has never 

testified in any proceeding relating to these matters nor has she ever been required to 

provide any kind of factual support under oath for the facts that others keep asserting.

Respondent had counsel at this stage of the disciplinary proceedings but testified that he 

personally drafted this language. (Tr. at 599).

However, several months earlier, Respondent had filed an amended complaint in the 

Federal Case accusing JD and others of providing false information, testimony, and evidence in 

connection with the Monroe County criminal case. (Pet. Ex. 31).

Conduct involving “DS” (Count 3). Respondent represented DS in two matters 

stemming from DS being laid off from his employment. In one of those cases, DS initially was 

awarded unemployment compensation benefits but later was ordered to pay the benefits back to 

the State due to income earned but not reported to the State during the benefit period. 

Respondent agreed to file an appeal for DS in the Court of Appeals if DS paid the filing fee 

($250), estimated transcript cost ($283), and Respondent’s flat fee ($750) up front. DS did so, 

and Respondent emailed DS confirmation of his engagement in the appeal and a copy of the 

notice of appeal that Respondent indicated would be filed that day.

However, Respondent never obtained a copy of the transcript, nor did he file an appellate 

brief for DS. Respondent neither consulted with nor informed DS regarding these actions. The 

Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal due to the failure to file an appellant’s brief. Respondent 

did not inform DS of the appeal’s dismissal. DS later was surprised to receive an approximate 

$8,000 claim for reimbursement from the Department of Workforce Development, because he 

thought his appeal was still pending. DS initially was unable to reach Respondent by phone or 

by email.

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The next month, Respondent and DS finally spoke and reached a tentative agreement for 

Respondent to pay DS $4,000. However, the settlement discussions later broke down when DS 

sought more money. To date, DS has received no reimbursement from Respondent, including 

for the up-front fees paid by DS to Respondent.

Discussion

The Commission alleged, and the hearing officer concluded following an evidentiary 

hearing, that Respondent violated the following Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct:

1.4(a)(2): Failing to reasonably consult with a client about the means by which 

the client’s objectives are to be accomplished. (Count 3)

1.4(a)(3): Failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a 

matter. (Count 3)

1.4(b): Failing to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit a 

client to make informed decisions. (Count 3)

8.4(b): Committing criminal acts (stalking, harassment, and intimidation) that 

reflect adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a 

lawyer. (Count 1)

8.4(c): Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation. (Count 2)

After carefully reviewing the hearing officer's thorough report and the parties' 

submissions,4 the Court concludes that the hearing officer's assessment of the evidence, findings 

of fact, and conclusions of law are well supported.

Count 1. For the most part, Respondent does not specifically challenge any of the 

underlying facts. However, he argues that his contact with JD during this time period was 

mutual, consensual, and not unwelcomed by JD. According to Respondent, JD suffers from a 

form of mental illness whereby her protestations that she did not want Respondent to contact her, 

or alternatively her silence, were actually indicative of her desire to submit to Respondent’s 

4 Respondent’s reply brief was tendered belatedly, accompanied by a motion requesting permission for 

belated filing. By separate order issued today, we grant that motion.

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conduct and her voluntary participation in the events recounted above. On these points, the 

hearing officer found that “Respondent’s testimony is simply not credible” in light of “the 

overwhelming documentary and other evidence.” (HO’s Report ¶ 122). We agree and decline 

Respondent’s invitation to reweigh the evidence in favor of his self-serving testimony.

Respondent also contends that his actions do not amount to stalking or harassment 

because there is no evidence showing that (1) JD actually experienced emotional distress due to 

Respondent’s conduct, (2) a reasonable person in JD’s position would be distressed by 

Respondent’s conduct, and (3) Respondent possessed the requisite intent. Again though, the 

hearing officer found to the contrary, the evidence amply supports her findings, and accordingly 

we decline to disturb them. 

Finally, Respondent’s contention that he did not intimidate JD is similarly unavailing. 

His argument that he did not act with the intent to induce JD to do anything against her will 

invites a reweighing of evidence, which we decline. Nor do we find Respondent’s attempted 

invocation of truth as a defense to be persuasive here. Respondent’s statements to others about 

JD’s character and alleged mental illness, substance abuse, and physical abuse find no 

evidentiary support beyond Respondent’s self-serving testimony, which was discredited by the 

hearing officer. Further, statements that when viewed in context amount to “true threats” to 

someone’s safety – such as the thinly-veiled threats of violence contained in Respondent’s 

December 2008 email to JD, by which time Respondent had left dozens of profane and abusive 

voicemails, sent many more similar emails, twice appeared unannounced at JD’s residence, 

peeped into her bedroom window, confronted her in the law library, and blocked her entry into 

her car, among many other things – enjoy no protection. 

We concur with the hearing officer's conclusion that Respondent violated Professional 

Conduct Rule 8.4(b) by committing criminal acts (stalking, harassment, and intimidation) that 

reflect adversely on Respondent’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. 

Count 2. Respondent does not dispute the underlying facts, but he contends the 

statements he made to the Commission, that “he’s never suggested that [JD] has lied to anyone” 

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or “suggested that [JD] has been less than truthful with the various law enforcement and 

attorneys with whom she has communicated,” are not inconsistent with his pleadings in the 

Federal Case. As Respondent sees things, the assertions regarding JD in the amended complaint 

Respondent filed in the Federal Case were made in the context of Section 1983 claims alleging 

“conspiratorial and not testimonial acts” by JD.

We agree with the hearing officer’s assessment that “Respondent’s explanations are 

tortured and not credible.” (HO’s Report ¶ 153). Several paragraphs of Respondent’s amended 

complaint alleged that JD personally provided false evidence or testimony. For example, one 

paragraph alleged that “[JD] additionally furthered the conspiracy by personally withholding 

exculpatory evidence, the provision of false evidence, and the provision of perjured testimony in 

furtherance of the defendants’ conspiracy.” Another paragraph directly accused JD and two 

other individuals of having “submitted false pretrial testimony under oath in connection with the 

false charges.” And during proceedings before the hearing officer, Respondent testified in 

reference to the amended complaint, “[JD] did provide false information to the prosecutor’s 

office and to the State of Indiana, that’s what I am saying there.” (Tr. at 615-16).

In sum, Respondent’s statements to the Commission cannot be reconciled with 

Respondent’s allegations regarding JD in the Federal Case. We therefore concur with the 

hearing officer's conclusion that Respondent violated Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(c) by 

engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 

Count 3. With respect to his representation of DS, Respondent expressly admits the 

charged violations of Professional Conduct Rules 1.4(a)(2) and 1.4(b), and he advances no 

separate argument with respect to the hearing officer’s findings and conclusions that he also 

violated Professional Conduct Rule 1.4(a)(3). We concur with the hearing officer's findings and 

conclusion that Respondent violated all three of these Rules. 

Sanction. Our analysis of appropriate discipline entails consideration of the nature of the 

misconduct, the duties violated by the respondent, any resulting or potential harm, the 

respondent's state of mind, our duty to preserve the integrity of the profession, the risk to the 

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public should we allow the respondent to continue in practice, and matters in mitigation and 

aggravation. See Matter of Usher, 987 N.E.2d 1080, 1089-90 (Ind. 2013). 

We have long emphasized that a license to practice law is a privilege, and that privilege is 

conditioned upon the faithful performance of the responsibilities imposed upon the attorney by 

the society that grants the privilege. See Baker v. Keisker, 236 Ind. 617, 620, 142 N.E.2d 432, 

434 (1957). First and foremost among these responsibilities is that an attorney be of good moral 

character and fitness, including the attorney’s conformity to the standards imposed by the law, 

the oath of attorneys, and our professional conduct rules. Id. Respondent’s outrageous behavior 

falls woefully short of these standards and reflects a fundamental betrayal of the trust that has 

been placed in him. 

Put simply, Respondent engaged in – and continues to engage in – a scorched earth 

campaign of revenge in the wake of being dumped by JD seven years ago, in March 2008. The 

scores of voicemails and thousands of emails sent by Respondent to JD are abusive, threatening,

and extremely manipulative. Respondent exploited financial leverage and threats of violence 

and self-harm in attempting to coerce JD into communicating or meeting with him, and 

Respondent repeatedly carried through on his threats to disseminate intimate photos of JD and 

various unsupported accusations regarding her character to JD’s family, friends, academic and 

professional acquaintances, and the general public. Respondent showed up unannounced at JD’s 

residence, peeping into her bedroom window. Respondent also confronted JD in her law school 

library and later impeded her ability to get into her car and leave. After his conduct involving JD 

gave rise to criminal proceedings and a disciplinary investigation, Respondent filed three 

separate pro se lawsuits against JD and others, and later made duplicitous statements to the 

Commission in reference to those related proceedings. 

Most disturbingly, despite the entreaties of JD and several others, Respondent simply has 

refused to take “no” for an answer. When asked at the disciplinary hearing what else JD might 

have told Respondent that would have convinced him to leave her alone, Respondent pointedly 

answered, “You know what, [c]ounsel, I don’t know if there is anything she could have ever said 

or done that would convince me[.]” (Tr. at 510). And to this day Respondent refuses to part 

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with the blog or with the explicit photos he continues to hold as leverage against JD; Respondent 

instead has told JD “[y]ou will simply have the mistakes you made plastered all over for all to 

see for the rest of your life.” 

In short, Respondent’s repugnant pattern of behavior and utter lack of remorse with 

respect to the events involving JD, his deceitful responses and lack of candor toward the 

Commission, his neglect involving DS’s appeal, his inability or unwillingness to appreciate the 

wrongfulness of his misconduct, and his propensity throughout to shift blame to others and see 

himself as the victim, all lead us unhesitatingly to conclude that disbarment is warranted and that 

Respondent’s privilege to practice law should permanently be revoked. 

Conclusion

The Court concludes that Respondent violated the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct 

by committing criminal acts against JD that reflect adversely on Respondent’s honesty, 

trustworthiness, and fitness as a lawyer; by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 

deceit, or misrepresentation; and by the various shortcomings in his representation of DS. 

Respondent already is under an order of suspension for failure to fulfill his continuing 

legal education requirements. For Respondent's professional misconduct, the Court disbars

Respondent from the practice of law in this state effective immediately. Respondent shall fulfill 

all the duties of a disbarred attorney under Admission and Discipline Rule 23(26). 

The costs of this proceeding are assessed against Respondent. The hearing officer 

appointed in this case is discharged.

All Justices concur.

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