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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

MATTHEW SHELSON,

Plaintiff, UNPUBLISHED May 19, 2015

v No. 318762 Sanilac Circuit Court SECURA INSURANCE COMPANY, LC No. 12-034648-NF

Defendant-Appellant, and

GREAT WEST CASUALTY COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: B ECKERING , P.J., and J ANSEN and B OONSTRA , JJ.

B OONSTRA , J. ( concurring ).

I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately because I would go farther than does the majority in addressing the i ssues and in interpreting the l anguage of the pertinent statute. While affirming the trial court, the majority ostensibly limits its holding to the trial court’s determination that plaintiff was not the owner of the vehicle. It specifically declines to consider whether plaintiff was self-employed, an employee of Sam Forrest & Sons (Forrest), or an independent contractor, or any ot her issue regarding the applic ability of MCL 500.3114(3).

But it is clear, in my view, that plaintiff was an independent contractor, and not an employee of Forrest. 1 First, Secura Insurance Compa ny (Secura), plaintiff’s insurer , conceded as much in its initial brief on appe al (describing plaintiff as “a self-employed independent contractor doing business as a sole proprietor”), just as it ha d conceded the point in the trial court. Second, while Secura later sought to backtrack from tha t position in its reply brief on appeal, it did so by analogy to h ere-inapplicable language foun d in the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.01 et seq . Third, the case on which Secura relies in attempting to make that analogy has since been reversed by our Supreme Court. See Auto-Owners Insurance

1 If plaintiff were an employee of Forrest while an occupant of the Forrest-owned vehicle, then Great Lakes, as Forrest’s ins urer, would be the responsible ins urer under MCL 500.3114(3).-2- Co v All Star Lawn Specialists Plus, Inc , 497 Mich 13; 857 NW2d 520 (2014). Therefore, since Forrest was not plaintiff’s empl oyer, Forrest’s insurer is not obligated under MCL 500.3114(3).

As set forth in its initial brief on appeal, Secura’s primary position is that plaintiff was both an “employee” and an “employer”; that is, he was a self-employed independent con tractor and employed himself in that capacity. By that reasoning, acco rding to Secura, plaintiff is an “employee” under MCL 500.3114(3) such that he is entitled to “r eceive personal protection insurance benefits . . . from the insurer of the furnished vehi cle.” Id . According to Secura, that insurer is Great Lakes, because it insured the vehicle furnishe d by Forrest.

MCL 500.3114(3) states:

An employee, his or her spouse, or a relative of either domici led in the same household, who suffers accidental bodily injury while an o ccupant of a motor vehicle owned or registe red by the employer, shall receiv e personal protection insurance benefits to which the employee is entitled from the insurer of the furnished vehicle.

The language of the statute must be read as a whole, and we mu st where possible give effect to all of its parts. Chico-Polo v Dep’t of Corrections , 299 Mich App 193, 198; 829 NW2d 314 (2013). As applied to this case, the statute in essence pr ovides that “an employee . . . who suffers . . . injury while an occupant of a motor vehicle owned . . . by the employer, shall receive . . . benefits . . . from the insurer of the furnished vehicle.” Id . In other words, when an employer furnishes a vehicle for the employee’s use, and the em ployee is injured while an occupant of the vehicle, the ins urer of the vehicle furnished b y the employer must provide benefits.

Secura’s reading, by contrast, would divorce the term “employe r” from the term “furnished vehicle.” And it woul d render meaningless the term “employee.” That is, under Secura’s interpretation, an employee of himself (as a self-empl oyed independent contractor) may recover benefits not from his own insurer (as either employee or employer), but ins tead from the insurer of a third party who happened to furnish the vehicle. But, in my view, reading the statute as a whole, it is implicit in the statutory language that the p arty “furnishing” the vehicle and the “employer” are one and the same. Here, the “employer” did not “furnish the vehicle.” Moreover, Secura’s reading of t he statute would render nugatory its requirement that the person be an “employee,” because the same outcome would obtain even if the person were an “independent contractor.” See Robinson v City of Lansing , 486 Mich 1, 21; 782 NW2d 171 (2010). I would therefore reject Secura’s strained interpretat ion of the statutory language. 2

In any event, Secura’s argument still fails because, as the ma jority properly holds, plaintiff was not an “owner” of the vehicle under MCL 500.3101( 2)(h). I therefore concur in the

2 Secura’s reliance of Celina Mut Ins Co v Lake States Ins Co , 452 Mich 84, 89; 549 NW2d 834 (1996), is misplaced. In that case, unlike here, it was the se lf-employed business owner (not a third party) who had fur nished the vehicle.-3- majority opinion, and offer these additional reasons for affirm ing the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of pl aintiff and against Secura.

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra