# FIL ED
DEC 7 2020 SUSAN M . SPRAUL, CLERK U. S. BKCY

. APP. PANEL O F T HE NI NT H CI RCUI T 

### ORD ERED PU BLISHED U NIT E D ST A T E S BA NK RU PT CYA PPE L L A T E PA N E L

OF T HE NINT H CIRCU IT In re: A RTEM KO SHKA LDA,

Deb to r. A RTEM KO SHKA LDA,

A p pellant, v. E. LY N N SC HO EN MA N N, C hapter 7 Trustee; SEIKO E PSO N C O R PO RA TIO N ; EPSO N A MERIC A, IN C

. ,

A p pellees. BA P N o . N C -20-1050-SGB BA P N o . N C -20-1051-SGB (R elated A ppeals) Bk. N o . 18-30016 A dv. N o . 18-03020 OPINION

A ppeal fro m the U nited States Bankruptcy C o urt fo r the N o rthern Distric t o f C alifo rnia Hannah L. Blum enstiel, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

A P PEA RA N C E S: A ppellant A rtemK o shkalda argued prose; Henry S. David o f The David Firmargued fo r appellees Seiko Epso n C o r po ratio n and Epso n A m eric a, Inc .; Jac k Praetzellis o f Fo x R o thschild LLP argued fo r appellee E. Lynn Scho enm ann, C hapter 7 Trustee Befo r e: SPRA K ER

, GA N, and BRA N D, Bankruptcy Judges. SPRA K ER

, Bankruptcy Judge:INT ROD U CT I ON

C hapter 7 1 deb to r A rtem K o shkalda appeals the b a nkruptcy c o urt’s
o rders determ ining that he is a vexatio us litigant and im p o sing pre-filing restric t io ns against himin his m ain b ankruptc y and in an adversary pro c eeding c hallenging his disc harge. Tho u gh we find no erro rin the b ankruptcy c o urt’s findings that K o shkalda was a vexatiou s litigant, we
m ust vac ate the pre-filing o rder in the m ain c ase to address a few defec ts. A dditio nally, we must reverse the vexatio us litigant o r der entered in the adversary pro c eeding. By the tim e the b ankruptc y c o urt entered this vexatio us litigant o rder, it already had dispo sed o f the adversary pro c eeding b y entering sum m ary judgm ent against K o shkalda. There was insuffic ient po stjudgm entevidenc e o f an o ngo ing need fo rpre-filing restric t io ns to c o ntro l his future filings in the adversary pro c eeding. A c c o rdingly, we R EVER SE the adversary pre-filing o rder, VA C A TE the
c ase pre-filing o rder, and R EMA N D, so the b ankruptc y c o urt c an m ake the
nec essary changes to the c ase pre-filing o rder. FA CT S A . Pre-bankruptcy litig ation. Prio r to his b ankruptcy filing, appellee Seiko Epso n C o rpo ratio n and

1 Unless specifi ed other wi se, all chapterand secti on r efer ences ar e to the Bankr uptcy Code, 11 U.S

. C. §§ 101-1532, all “Rule” r efer ences ar e to the Feder a l Rules of Bankr uptcy Pr ocedur e, and all “Ci v i l Rule” r efer ences ar e to the Feder al Rules of Ci v i l Pr ocedur e. 2Epso n A m eric a, Inc . (jo intly, “Epso n”) sued K o shkalda and his affiliates in

the U nited States Distric t C o urt fo r the Distric t o f N evada fo r tradem ark infringem ent, tradem ark c o unterfeiting, unfair c o m petitio n, and false advertising (“Infringem ent A c tio n”). The distric t c o urt eventually entered a series o f injunc tio ns and o rders pro hib iting K o shkalda and the o ther defendants fro mengaging in wro ngful c o nduc tand restric ting their ab ility to use o r transfer assets. A s a result o f K o shkalda’s no nc o m plianc e with these o rders and severe and repeated disc o very ab uses, the distric t c o urt ultim ately struc k his answer and entered a default judgm ent fo r $12
m illio n in favo r o f Epso n o n January 16, 2018. B. K os hkalda’sc hapter 11 c as e filingand c onv ers ion to c hapter 7. O n January 5, 2018, after the district c o urt entered default against K o s hkalda b ut b efo re entry o f the default judgm ent, K o shkalda filed a
vo luntary chapter 11 petitio n. K o shkalda was represented b y c o unsel at the
c o m m enc em ent o f his b ankruptcy. W ithin days o f the b ankruptc y filing, Epso n m o ved to dism iss the
c ase, asserting that it had b een filed in b ad faith in furtheranc e o f K o s hkalda’s effo rts to thwart the distric t c o u rt litigatio n. The b a nkruptc y
c o u rt dec lined to dism iss the c ase b ut instead o rdered it c o nverted to
chapter 7. A ppellee E. Lynn Sc ho enm ann was appo inted to serve as
chapter 7 trustee. Scho enm ann then em plo yed Fo x R o thschild, LLP as
c o u nsel fo r the chapter 7 estate. In the dec laratio n sub m itted in suppo rt o f
3Fo x R o thschild’s em plo ym ent, the law firmdisc lo sed that Epso n was a

c urrent c lient in unrelated m atters. The applic atio n to em plo y Fo x R o thschild and the dec laratio n in suppo rt were m ailed to K o shkalda and his c o unsel. The c o urt appro ved the estate’s em plo ym ent o f Fo xR o thschild
as c o unsel fo r the estate witho ut objec tio n. In June 2018, Epson ob tained an o rder annulling the auto m aticstay. This o rder retro ac tively validated the distric t c o urt’s entry o f the $12
m illio n default judgm ent and alsoperm itted K o shkalda to pro c eed with his appeal fro mthat judgm ent. The N inth C irc uit affirm ed that judgm ent in Dec emb er 2019. During the c o urse o f the c ase, Scho enm ann liquidated o ver $5 m illio n in estate assets, o ften o ver K o shkalda’s objec tio ns. A fter the c o sts o f sale, the payo ff o f secured c laim s, and the paym ent o f adm inistrative expenses, it is unc lear to what extent, if any, there will b e funds left o ver fo r a distrib utio n to K o s hkalda’s unsecured c redito rs. Much o f the adm inistrative expenses inc urred c an b e attrib u ted to K o shkalda’s litigatio n c o nduc t. C. T he E ps on A dv ers a ry Proc eeding . In May 2018, Epson c o m m enc ed an adversary pro c eeding o bjec ting to K o shkalda’s discharge under § 727 and seeking toexc ept the judgm ent deb t fro mdischarge under § 523 (“Epson A dversary Pro c eeding”). The b ankruptcy c o urt later stayed so m e o f the § 523 c laim s pending reso lutio n 4o f Epso n’s § 727(a) claim s and its c laim s under § 523 b ased o n fraud. 2

In Septemb er 2019, the b ankruptc y c o urt granted Epso n sum m ary judgm ent o n its c laim s under §§ 727(a)(2)(A ), (a)(3), and (a)(7). The b ankruptcy c o urt then dism issed as m o o tthe rest o f the c laim s and entered final judgm ent in Epso n’s favo r. Fo r o ur purpo ses, the m o st salient feature o f the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding was no t the judgm ent itself. R ather, it was the am o unt o f
m o tio n prac tic e and disc o very disputes it generated. A s the b ankruptc y
c o u rt later ob served in its o r der determ ining K o shkalda to b e a vexatio us litigant (“Vexatio us Litigant Ruling”): The c o urt entered o rders c o nc erning twelve disc o very disputes initiated thro ugh the c o urt’s info r m al disc o very pro c edures, every single o ne o f which aro se fro meither Mr. K o shkalda’s unreaso nab le dem ands o r his ob stinate, b aseless refusal to c o o perate with Seiko Epso n’s legitim ate disc o very requests. A t o ne po int, the c o urt fo und Mr. K o shkalda in c o ntem pt and im po sed issue and m o netary sanc tio ns against himfo rab usive disc o very prac tic es. In additio n to the do zen disc o very disputes attrib u tab le to Mr. K o shkalda’s b elligerenc e, he also filed eighteen m o tio ns in the A VP, all o f which the c o urt denied. A ll b u t two o f these m o tio ns were entirely lac king in m erit. The c o urt ruled o n m any o f themwitho u t o ral argum ent, and a few witho ut even requiring an o ppo sitio n.

2 S choenmann also commenced a deni a lof di schar ge adv er sar y pr oceeding agai nst Koshkalda. (Adv . No. 18-03059.) Thi s adv er sar y pr oceeding also was stayed pending the outcome of the Epson Adv er sar y Pr oceeding. 5D . T he withdrawal of K os hkalda’sc ouns el and the res ultingm atters

filed by K os halda. O n Septemb er 26, 2018, the b ankruptc y c o urt granted the m o tio n to withdraw filed b y K o shkalda’s c o unsel. Unrestrained b y c o unsel, K o s hkalda m o u nted c o ntinuo us and repetitive challenges to Scho enm ann’s adm inistratio n o f the estate. K o shkalda filed a series o f m o tio ns to c o m pel her to ab ando n estate pro perty b a c k to him, even tho ugh so m e o f the pro perty was sub

jec t to o ngo ing sale o r settlem ent effo rts. In additio n, K o shkalda b egan a c o nc erted effo rt to rem o ve Scho enm ann and her c o unsel fo r their failure to litigate against Epso n and its c laim . A s part o f these effo rts, K o shkalda objec ted to the c o ntinued
em plo ym ent and c o m pensatio n o f b o th the trustee and her c o unsel. On a
numb er o f o c c asio ns, his argum ents in these objec tio ns o verlapped with po sitio ns he to o k in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding as part o f his m o tio ns and disc o very prac tic e. K o s hkalda’s ac tio ns in the m a in c ase and the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding largely to o k plac e b etween O c tob er 2018 and January 2020. E . Sc hoenm a nn’s m otion for a pre-filing order and E ps on’s Joinder. O n Dec emb er 26, 2019, Ko shkalda filed his m o tio n to vac ate the
c o u rt’s o rder retaining Fo x R o thschild, seeking to set aside the law firm ’s
em plo ym ent b y the estate. K o shkalda filed this m o tio n ro ughly a week after the c o u rt denied his prio r m o tio n to disqualify Fo x R o thschild as the

6trustee’s c o u nsel. To gether with her o ppo sitio n to the m o tio n to vac ate,

Scho enm ann requested that the c o urt enter “a pre-filing o rder . . . requiring that he ob tain c o urt-perm issio n b efo r e b eing perm itted to file any further papers in this b ankruptcy c a se.” Tosuppo rt her request, Scho enm ann listed eleven separate m o tio ns K o shkalda filed in the b ankruptc y c ase. She urged that each o f these m o tio ns dem o nstrated his vexatio us c o nduc t, as well as tho se he filed in the Epso n A d versary Pro c eeding. She further po inted o ut that b o th the b ankruptcy c o urt and the distric t c o u rt already had im po sed o ther fo r m s o f sanc tio ns against K o shkalda b ut that these lesser sanc tio ns had no t pro ven suc c essful in curb ing K o shkalda’s vexatio us c o nduc t. The next day, the b ankruptc y c o urt entered an o rder denying the m o tio n to vac ate and set the vexatio us litigant m o tio n fo r hearing in Feb ruary 2020. Afew days after entry o f the c o urt’s scheduling o r der, Epso n jo ined Scho enm ann’s vexatio us litigant m o tio n. But the “jo inder” ac tually so ught additio nal relief o ver and ab o ve the trustee’s m o tio n. Epso n so ught to extend the pre-filing o rder to adversary pro c eedings filed in K o shkalda’s b ankruptcy c ase – inc luding the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding. In suppo rt
o f its jo inder, Epso n m aintained that K o shkalda’s frivo lo us filings and ab usive litigatio n tac tic s o c c urred no t o nly in the b ankruptc y c ase b ut also in the distric t c o u r t Infringem ent A c tio n and in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding. Epso n pro c eeded to discuss num ero us spec ificexam ples o f
7K o s hkalda’s vexatio us c o nduc t in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding.

K o s hkalda o ppo sed b o th Scho enm ann’s m o tio n and Epso n’s “jo inder
m o tio n.” The b ankruptcy c o urt vac ated the hearing and to o k the m a tter under sub m issio n. O n Feb ruary 18, 2020, the b ankruptc y c o urt entered its Vexatio us Litigant Ru ling, in whic h it granted Scho enm ann and Epso n the relief they requested. In its dec isio n, the b ankruptc y c o u rt detailed the histo ry o f K o shkalda’s ac tio ns and exam ined ro ughly 44 o f K o shkalda’s filings in the b ankruptcy c ase and the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding. In alm o s t every instanc e, the b a nkruptc y c o urt fo und that each spec ificpaper was frivo lo u s, filed with the intent to harass, o r b o th. The c o urt then explained that the im petus fo r its ruling was no t the sheer vo lum e o f papers K o shkalda filed, b ut “[r]ather, it is the lac k o f m erit, falsity, and duplic ative nature o f the disputes instigated b y Mr. K o shkalda that fo rc es the c o urt to its c o nc lusio n.” The c o urt went o n to elab o rate: Each and every tim e, Mr. K o shkalda raised argum ents the c o urt rejec ted, so m etim es several tim es o ver. He m ade fac tual allegatio ns that were half-true o r c o m pletely untrue. He lied to the c o urt repeatedly in o rder to evade Seiko Epso n’s effo rts to trac e allegedly fraudulent transfers in which Mr. K o shkalda had invo lved his parents. In this judge’s seven years on the b enc h, no single litigant has so aked up and wasted m o re reso urc es than Mr. K o shkalda. The c o urt further fo u nd that, as a result o f K o shkalda’s “frivo lo us
8and harassing litigatio n,” estate funds that o therwise c o uld have b een used

to pay the estate’s c redito rs wo uld nec essarily b e used to c o m pensate Scho enm ann’s c o unsel. The c o urt therefo re determ ined that entry o f a prefiling o r der in the b ankruptcy c ase (“C ase Pre-filing O rder”) wo uld serve the b est interests o f the estate and its c redito rs. The c o urt ob served that K o s hkalda’s “strategy sinc e the withdrawal o f his c o unsel has b een to im po se as great a b urden as po ssib le o n the c o urt, o n [Ms.] Scho enm ann, and o n Seiko Epso n.” The c o urt, therefo re, additio nally c o nc luded that it was appro priate to enter a pre-filing o rder in the Epso n A d versary Pro c eeding as well (“A d versary Pre-filing O rder”). The b ankruptcy c o urt entered b o th pre-filing o rders o n Feb ruary 18, 2020. K o shkalda tim ely appealed b o th o r ders. JU RISD ICT ION The b ankruptcy c o urt had jurisdic tio n pursuant to28 U .S.C . §§ 1334 and 157(b )(2)(A ) and (J). W e have jurisdic tio n under 28 U .S.C . § 158, sub jec t to the finality issue discussed im m ediately b elo w. In no n-b ankruptcy federal c ivil litigatio n, pre-filing o rders entered against parties are no t final and appealab le until a judgm ent is entered
c o nc luding the ligatio n. S ee Mo lsk iv. Evergreen D y na sty Co r

p. , 500 F.3d 1047, 1055-56 (9th C ir. 2007). This is a c o nc ern fo rthe C ase Pre-filing O rder b ec ause the b ankruptcy c ase rem ains o pen. In c o ntrast, the A dversary Pre-filing O rder is final b ec ause the b ankruptc y c o u rt already entered final
9judgm ent in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding.

W e express no o pinio n as to whether princ iples o f “pragm atic ” o r “flexib le” finality applic ab le in b ankruptc y c ases render the C ase Pre-filing O rder final. S ee genera lly Jue v. Liu (In re Liu) , 611 B.R
. 864, 870-79 (9th C ir. BA P 2020) (exam ining the finality o f o rders denying m o tio ns to dism iss b ankruptcy c ases). Tothe extent the appeal fro mthe C ase Pre-filing O rder is interlo c u to ry, we grant leave to appeal under Rule 8004(d). Bec ause the A dversary Pre-filing o rder is final and im m ediately appealab le as o f right, and b ec ause the two appeals present fac tually-interrelated issues, delaying the appeal fro mthe C ase Pre-filing O rder wo uld do no thing b ut waste the
reso urc es o f the c o urts and the parties. Under these c ircum stanc es, we grant leave to appeal. S e e Ga llo way v. Fo rd (In re Ga llo way) , BA P N o . A Z -13-1085–PaKiTa, 2014 WL 4212621, at *4 n.9 (9th Cir. BA P A u g. 27, 2014) (granting leave to appeal under sim ilar c irc um stanc es). ISSU E Did the b ankruptcy c o urt ab use its disc r etio n when it entered the prefiling o r ders? ST A ND A RD OF RE V I E W W e review pre-filing o rders entered against vexatio us litigants fo r an ab use o f disc retio n. R i nggo ld-Lo ckha rt v. C ty. o f L.A. , 761 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th C ir. 2014); Mo lsk i, 500 F.3d at 1056. The b ankruptc y c o urt ab uses its disc retio n if it applies an inc o rrec t legal rule o r its fac tual findings are
10illo gic al, im p lausib le, o r witho ut suppo rt in the rec o rd. United S ta tes v.

Hinkso n , 585 F.3d 1247, 1262–63 & n.21 (9th C ir. 2009) (en b a nc ). D ISCU SSION Bankruptcy c o urts have inherent autho rity to sanc tio n “b ad faith” o r “willful” litigatio n m isc o nduc t. Dyer v. Lindbla de (In re Dyer) , 322 F.3d 1178, 1196 (9th C ir. 2003) (c iting Ca ldwell v. U nified C apita l Co rp. (In re R a inbo w Maga z i ne, Inc.) , 77 F.3d 278, 284 (9th Cir. 1996)). This inc ludes the po wer to
sanc tio n vexatio u s litigatio n o c c urring in that c o urt. In re R a i nbo w Maga z ine, Inc. , 77 F.3d at 284. 3 Befo re a c o urt c an im po se pre-filing restric tio ns against a vexatio us litigant, it m ust: (1) give litigants no tic e and an o ppo rtunity to o p po se the o rder b efo re it is entered; (2) c o m pile an adequate rec o r d fo rappellate

3 Ther e i s at least one addi ti onal sour ce of author i ty pr esumably enabling bankr uptcy cour ts to r estr i ct the i mpr oper li ti gati on tacti cs of v exati ous li ti gants. Under the All Wr i ts Act, 28 U.S .C. § 1651(a), “[t]he S upr eme Cour t and all cour ts establi shed by Act of Congr ess may i ssue all wr i ts necessary or appr opr i ate i n ai d of thei r r especti v e j ur i sdi cti ons and agr eeable to the usages and pr inci ples of law.” Thi s statute per m i ts feder al cour ts to enj oin abusiv e li ti gati on acti v i ty. Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1061 (ci ti ng De Long v. Hennessey , 912 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Ci r . 1990)). Though the Ninth Ci r cui t has not speci fi cally held whetherbankr u ptcy cour ts fall wi thin the scope of the All Wr i ts Act, we hav e pr ev i ously r eached thi s conclusi on. See, e.g. , Sui v. Marshack (In re Sui) , BAP No. CC-13-1572-TaS pD, 2014 WL 5840246, at *6 (9th Ci r . BAP Nov

. 10, 2014); Richardson v. Melcher (In re Melcher) , BAP No. NC–13–1168-DJKi . 2014 WL 1410235, at *9 (9th Ci r. BAP Apr

. 11, 2014); see also Lakusta v. Evans (In re Lakusta) , Case No. C 06-6105- PJH, 2007 WL 2255230, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2007), a ff'd, 328 F. App’x 385 (9th Ci r . 2009) (“Bankr uptcy cour ts hav e the power to r egulate v exati ous li ti gati on pur suant to 11 U.S .C. § 105(a) and 28 U.S .C. § 1651(a).”). 11review, inc luding a listing o f all the c ases and m o tio ns that led

the distric tc o urt to c o nc lude that a vexatio us litigant o rder was needed; (3) m ake sub stantive findings o f frivo lo u sness o r harassm ent; and (4) tailo rthe o rder narro wly so as “toc lo s ely fit the spec ific vic e enc o untered. R inggo ld-Lo ckha rt, 761 F.3d at 1062 (citatio ns, b rac kets, and internal quo tatio n m arks o m itted). The first two fac to rs are pro c edural and the latter two are sub stantive. Id. (c iting Mo lsk i, 500 F.3d at 1058). The first sub stantive fac to r assists the c o urt in defining who qualifies as a vexatio us litigant and the sec o nd sub stantive fac to r assists the c o u rt in tailo ring an appro priate rem edy. R inggo l d-Lo ckha rt, 761 F.3d at 1062. 4 A . K os hkalda had adequate notic e and opportunity to oppos e the entry of the pre-filing

orders . K o shkalda c laim s that he was denied adequate no tic e and a
reaso nab le o ppo rtunity to o p po se Scho enm ann’s vexatio u s litigant m o tio n. A s he puts it, the b ankruptcy c o urt spec ific ally c o nsidered as evidenc e o f his vexatio us litigatio n no less than 44 o f his filings, b ut Scho enm a nn’s
m o tio n spec ific ally addressed less than 11 o f these filings. Thus, K o shkalda
c o nc ludes that he had no way o f kno wing that his o p po sitio n needed to address the 33 additional papers the b a nkruptc y c o u rt relied o n b u t

4 Ringgold-Lockhar t fur ther indi cated that Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc. , 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Ci r . 1986), pr ov i des a “helpful fr amewor k” for ev aluating the two substanti v e factor s. Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1062 (quoti ng Molski, 500 F.3d at 1058 (9th Ci r . 2007)). Though the bankr uptcy cour t her e di d not speci fi cally r efer ence Safir, all of Safir’s under lyi ng consi der a ti ons ar e subsumed within the Vexati ous Li ti gant Ruli ng. 12Scho enm ann did no t address.

K o shkalda fram es his argum ent as a denial o f due pro c ess. But the
no tic e aspec t o f the due pro c ess requirem ent is a relatively m inim al standard. S trickla nd v. U.S . Tr. (In re W o jcik ) , 560 B.R . 763, 768 (9th C ir. BA P 2016). It m erely requires “no tic e reaso nab ly c alculated, under all the
c irc u m stanc es, to apprise interested parties o f the pendenc y o f the ac tio n and affo rd theman o ppo rtunity to present their obj ec tio ns.” Id. (quo ting M ulla ne v. Cent. H

a no ver Ba nk

&Tr. Co . , 339 U
. S. 306, 314 (1950)). Ko shkalda
c o m p letely igno r es the filings spec ific ally addressed in Epson’s jo inder, as well as the do c um ents inter-related to tho se spec ific ally addressed b y Scho enm ann and Epso n. When these additio nal filings are ac c o unted fo r, it turns o ut that the vast m a jo rity o f the do c um ents the b ankruptc y c o urt fo c used o n were well within the fo c us o f the vexatio us litigant m o tio n and the jo inder. Mo re im po rtantly, Scho enm ann stated that the b asis fo r her m o tio n was “K o shkalda’s filings in his b ankruptc y c a se and the adversary pro c eedings.” She reiterated her relianc e o n a ll o f K o shkalda’s filings elsewhere in her m o tio n. Scho enm ann additio nally m ade it c lear that, “K o shkalda’s filings are no t lim ited to the Bankruptc y C a se and the Trustee’s A dversary Pro c eeding, b ut alsoc o nsist o f num ero us filings in the Seiko Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding.” Scho enm ann’s m o tio n and Espo n’s jo inder plac ed K o shkalda o n no tic e that all o f his b ankruptc y c a se filings
13and adversary pro c eeding filings were at issue. A nd it was c learly pro per

fo r the b ankruptcy c o urt to c o nsider all o f K o hskalda’s filings. S ee R inggo ld-Lo ckha rt, 761 F.3d at 1063-64 (alleged vexatious litigant’s entire litigatio n histo ry c an help info rmthe c o urt’s assessment o f the litigant’s
c o nduc t as ab usive); Mo lsk i, 500 F.3d at 1058 (same). K o s hkalda had suffic ient no tic e that all o f his filings in the b ankruptc y c ase and the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding were in play when he filed his o ppo sitio n. K o shkalda alternately argues that he was denied due pro c ess b ec ause the b ankruptcy c o urt set a 10-page lim it o n his legal b rief in suppo rt o f his
o ppo sitio n. This argum ent is witho u t m erit. K o shkalda devo ted just under fo ur pages in his o ppo sitio n to spec ific a lly and direc tly challenging Scho enm ann’s vexatio us litigant m o tio n. The rem ainder o f his o ppo sitio n is devo ted to o ther m atters. 5 Mo reo ver, he has failed sho w that the page lim it prevented him fro m presenting any evidenc e o r argum ents. There is sim ply no indic atio n that he was prejudic ed b y the alleged lac k o f no tic e and o ppo rtunity to respo nd. S ee R o s so n v. F itzgera l d (In re R o sso n) , 545 F.3d 764, 776–77 (9th C ir. 2008). A c c o rdingly, we rejec tK o shkalda’s due pro c ess argum ents. The
rec o r d estab lishes that he was pro vided adequate no tic e and a reaso nab le

5 Fur ther m or e, the bankr uptcy cour t speci fi ed that i ts page li mi tati on di d not apply to declar ati ons and exhibi ts fi l ed in suppor t of the opposi ti on. In fact, Koshkalda fi led a declar a ti on wi th exhibi ts totali ng mor e than 275 pages. 14o ppo rtunity to o ppo se the entry o f the pre-filing o rders, and he did so

.

B. T he bankruptcy c ourt c om piled an adequate rec ord for review. K o shkalda next argues that the b a nkruptc y c o urt did no t c o m pile an adequate rec o rd fo r review. He c o ntends that, even tho ugh the c o urt spec ific ally c ited and discussed 44 o f his filings as suppo rting its findings
o f frivo lo usness and harassment, this did no t c o nstitute an adequate rec o rd b ec ause K o shkalda was no t pro vided with any o ppo rtunity to respo nd to
m o st o f them

. This argum ent do es no thing m o re than restate K o s hkalda’s due pro c ess argum ent in slightly different term s and do es no t address the adequacy o f the rec o rd. “A n adequate rec o rd fo r review sho uld inc lude a listing o f all the
c ases and m o t io ns that led the distric t c o urt to c o nc lude that a vexatio us litigant o rder was needed.” R inggo ld-Lo ckha rt, 761 F.3d at 1063 (citing D e Lo ng, 912 F.2d at 1147). The b ankruptc y c o urt c learly detailed the filings it relied o n in m akings its dec isio n. Its Vexatio us Litigant Ruling c o m plied with the nec essary pro c edural requirem ents as set fo rth in R inggo ld-Lo cka rt and o ther N inth C irc uit prec edent. C. T he bankruptcy c ourt’s finding s of friv olous nes s and haras s m ent were not c learly erroneous . K o shkalda’s princ ipal argum ent o n appeal challenges the b ankruptcy
c o u rt’s fac tual findings that his filings were frivo lo us and m a d e fo r the purpo se o f harassm ent. A gain we turn to R i nggo ld-Lo ckha rt, which instruc ts

15that b efo re entering a pre-filing o rder,“it is incumb ent o n the c o urt to m ake

‘sub stantive findings as to the frivo lo us o r harassing nature o f the litigant’s
ac tio ns.’” Id . at 1064 (quo ting D e Lo ng, 912 F.2d at 1148). A s fo r an evaluatio n o f frivo lo usness fo r purpo s es o f vexatio u sness, the N inth C irc uit has em phasized that “[f]rivo lo us litigatio n is no t lim ited to c ases in which a legal c laimis entirely witho ut m erit.” Mo lsk i, 500 F.3d at 1060. Frivo lo us filings inc lude tho se that have “so m e m easure o f a legitim ate c laimto m ake false assertio ns.” Id

. at 1060-61. Impo rtantly, a frivo lo u s filing alo ne is no t eno ugh. N either is m ere litigio u sness. R inggo ldLo ckha rt, 761 F.3d at 1064. Rather, the frivo lo us filings must b e “ino rdinate” in numb er. Id . C o urts must, therefo re, “lo o k at ‘b o th the numb er and
c o ntent o f the filings as indic ia’ o f the frivo lo usness o f the litigant’s c laim s.” Id . (quo ting D e Lo ng, 912 F.2d at 1148). The N inth C irc uit has explained that a pattern o f harassm ent c an b e “an alternative to frivo lo u s ness” and c an suppo rt a vexatio us litigant finding. Id . at 1064. R inggo ld-Lo ckha rtc autio ned, ho wever, that “c o urts
m ust b e c areful no t to c o nc lude that particular types o f ac tio ns filed repetitio usly are harassing, and must instead . . . discern whether the filing
o f several sim ilar types o f ac tio ns c o nstitutes an intent to harass the defendant o r the c o urt.” Id . (quo ting D e Lo ng, 912 F.2d at 1148 n.3) (internal b rac kets and quo tatio n m arks o m itted). The b ankruptcy c o urt entered detailed findings that K o shkalda m ade
16num ero us frivo lo us filings in a pattern o f harassm ent thro ugho ut the

Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding and in the m ain c ase. K o shkalda c o ntends that these findings are erro neo us b ec ause he is right and the b ankruptc y
c o u rt was wro ng. But K o shkalda has taken little o r no c o nc rete steps to po int to m eaningful erro r in the m erits determ inatio ns o f his underlying filings. N o r are we aware o f any. A s a result, and b ec ause the b a nkruptcy
c o u rt articulated the c o rrec t legal standards fo r finding vexatio us c o nduc t, we fo c us o ur review o n the c o urt’s findings o f frivo lo usness and harassm ent largely to determ ine whether these findings are illo gic al, im plausib le, o r unsuppo rted b y the rec o rd. The b ankruptcy c o urt exam ined each o f the 44 filings it identified and
c o nc luded that they were frivo lo us and filed toharass Scho enm ann, Epso n,
o r the c o urt. K o s hkalda argues that the c o u rt c o uld no t c o nsider his ac tio ns in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding, and that he was m erely preserving his
challenges to Scho enm ann and Fo x R o thschild while he awaited his
o ppo rtunity to appeal the b a nkruptc y c o u rt’s dec isio ns no t to rem o ve them fro mhis c ase. 6 W e address the c o urt’s findings and K o shkalda’s argum ents against themwithin the c o ntext o f the analysis articulated in R inggo ld.

6 At the ti me the i ssuance of thi s Panel's deci si on, the bankr uptcy cour t’s or der s denyin g r emov a l of S choenmann and Fox Rothschi ld wer e not yet fi nal and appealable. 171. K os hkalda’sac tions in the E p s on A dv ers ary Proc eeding .

W e b egin with K o shkalda’s ac tio ns in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding as they are the first signific ant b atch o f ac tivity identified b y the
c o u rt when c o nsidered chro no lo gic ally. The c o u rt entered its first o rder
reso lving an info rm al disc o very dispute o n Feb r uary 14, 2019, and entered its last o rder reso lving an info rm al disc o very dispute o n June 12, 2019. The
c o u rt entered ten o ther o r ders reso lving info rm a l disc o very disputes b etween tho se dates. Tho u gh b o th Epso n and K o shkalda lib erally invo ked the c o urt’s info rm al disc o very dispute reso lutio n pro c ess, the b ankruptc y c o urt fo und that “all o f these disputes aro se b ec ause Mr. K o shkalda m ade unreaso nab le dem a nds in pro p o unding his o wn disc o very o r ob stinately refused to
c o o perate in go o d faith with Seiko Epso n’s legitim ate effo r ts to c o nduc t disc o very.” In m arching thro ugh the twelve disc o very disputes, the c o urt fo und m o st o f themto b e ob strepero us and b a seless effo rts b y K o shkalda to evade Epso n’s legitim ate disc o very. The c o urt b egan its analysis no ting that, tho ugh K o shkalda was pro c eeding pro se b y this po int, he knew that serio us c o nsequenc es c o uld result fro m ab usive disc o very tac tic s given the
c ase ending disc o very sanc t io ns im po sed against himin Epso n’s distric t
c o u rt Infringem ent A c tio n. The b ankruptc y c o urt ob served that Epso n did
no t particularly distinguish itself in handling these disputes, b ut the c o urt
c o nc luded that “[w]hile Seiko Epso n’s c o nduc t was frustrating, it was clear
18that Mr. K o shkalda was c o ntinuing to engage in ab usive, harassing

disc o very tac tic s, which suppo rts entry o f a pre-filing o rder.” Given that the b ankruptcy c o urt presided o ver the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding and these disc o very disputes, it was uniquely situated toassess Ko shkalda’s
ac tio ns and intent. Its determ inatio n o f frivo lo u sness and harassment with respec t to the info rm al disc o very disputes was no t c learly erro neo us. Sim ilarly, the b ankruptc y c o urt identified fifteen m o t io ns K o shkalda filed in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding that suppo rted the pre-filing
o rders. O f these, the c o urt fo und that “[a]ll b ut two o f these m o tio ns were entirely lac king in m erit.” K o shkalda filed seven o f these m o tio ns during a two -week perio d b etween A ugust 20 and Septem b er 3, 2019. The tim ing o f these m o tio ns, the relief so ught, and the c o ntent o f the filings all reflec ted K o s hkalda’s stro ng desire to derail the reso lutio n o f Epso n’s m o tio n fo r partial sum m a ry judgm ent. Indeed, in the pro c ess o f evaluating o ne o f these m o tio ns, the b ankruptcy c o urt stated: “The c o urt b elieved then and b elieves no w that this m o t io n, and tho se upo n which it was b ased, were filed fo r no purpo se o ther than to delay this ac tio n, which m eans they were frivo lo u s and they justify issuanc e o f a pre-filing o rder.” The rec o rd suppo rts this finding. K o shkalda argues that his actio ns in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding
c anno t b e c o nsidered as part o f the vexatio us litigant assessm ent b ec ause Epso n failed to litigate whether they were frivo lo us o r harassing in the
19Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding. He c o ntends that issue and c laimprec lusio n

b arred b o th Epso n and Scho enm ann fro musing any o f his c o nduc t in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding to estab lish that he is a vexatio us litigant. Issue prec lusio n do es no t apply b ec ause the vexatio us litigant issue was
no t nec essary to reso lve Epso n’s discharge c laim s . S ee S k ilsta f, Inc. v. C V

S Ca rem a rk Co rp. , 669 F.3d 1005, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2012) (ho lding that issue prec lusio n applied where the first distric t c o urt “nec essarily had to adjudic ate” the sam e objec tio ns the sam e litigant raised in the sec o nd distric t c o urt). A nd c laimprec lusio n do es no t apply b ec ause the vexatio us litigatio n “c laim s” did no t exist as o f the filing o f the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding. S ee MediaR ights Techs., Inc. v. Micro so ft Co rp. , 922 F.3d 1014, 1024 (9th C ir. 2019) (ho lding that c laimprec lusio n did no t b ar c laim s that
aro se after first lawsuit was c o m m enc ed). A dditio nally, Scho enm ann was
no t a party to the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding. Therefo re, she was no t b o und b y it. S ee Taylo r v. S turgell, 553 U .S. 880, 892–96 (2008) (reco gnizing general rule pro hib iting applic atio n o f c laimand issue prec lusio n against a perso n who was no t a party in the previo us lawsuit). K o hskalda further argues that there are no c ases in which a defenda nt has b een determ ined to b e a vexatio us litigant. The ab senc e o f such c ases
m akes sense. Im plic it within the c o nc ept o f vexatio u s litigatio n is vo litio nal
ac tivity, and o ne do es no tvo litio nally undertake to b e a serial defendant. Mo reo ver, c o u rts m o re c o m m o nly c o ntro l defendants’ ab usive litigatio n 20c o nduc t b y using o ther sanc t io ns, inc luding m o netary and c ase term inating

sanc tio ns – as the distric t c o urt em plo yed against K o shkalda in the Infringem ent A c tio n and as the b ankruptc y c o urt im po sed in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding. In any event, b y fo c using o n his ro le as the defendant, K o shkalda igno res the true signific anc e o f the b ankruptc y c o urt’s assessment o f his litigatio n c o nduc t. The c o urt relied o n his ac tio ns to develo p a b r o a d pic ture o f his intent to file frivo lo us m atters fo r the purpo s e o f harassing Scho enm ann, Epso n, and the c o urt. A s no ted ab o ve, the c o u rt m arched thro ugh 27 distinc t exam ples o f K o shkalda’s litigatio n c o nduc t in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding , all o f which, it c o nc luded, evidenc ed his unwarranted and illegitim ate effo rts to frustrate Epso n’s discharge c laim s. Tellingly, K o shkalda o ffers no defense o f these ac tio ns b ut rather m erely states that they c anno t b e c o nsidered. W e find no erro r with the b ankruptcy
c o u rt’s use o f K o shkalda’s c o nduc t in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding to estab lish an o verall pattern o f frivo lo us and harassing filings. 2. K os hkalda’sc onduc t in the m ain bankruptcy c as e. A fter the c o u rt entered its judgm ent against himin the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding, K o shkalda shifted his attentio n to the m ain c ase. The b ankruptcy c o urt ob served that “[e]leven o f [K o shkalda’s m o tio ns] were filed during a frantic fo ur-m o nth perio d b etween Septemb er 23, 2019 and January 2, 2020, after the c o urt denied Mr. K o shkalda’s discharge.” The
21filings in the m ain c ase identified b y the c o urt as suppo r ting the pre-filing

o rders reflec ted repeating patterns o f c o nduc t . The b ankruptc y c o urt no t ed that K o shkalda had filed num ero us m o t io ns to c o m pel Scho enm a nn to ab ando n estate pro perty even when she was ac tively adm inistering the asset o r had a sale pending. The c o urt listed twoo f K o shkalda’s ab ando nm ent m o t io ns as the first instanc es o f c o nduc t dem o nstrating his spec ificintent to harass the estate with frivo lo us filings. A t b est, the repetitive nature o f the frivo lo us ab ando nm ent m o tio ns reflec ted K o s hkalda’s into leranc e fo r, and im p atienc e with, Scho enm a nn’s effo rts to adm inister the estate’s assets. A t wo rst, the m o t io ns were part o f a
c alculated and cynic al sc o rched earth strategy that K o s hkalda im plem ented with the intent to prevent his c redito rs – espec ially Epso n – fro mever
rec o vering any signific ant am o unt fro mthe liquidatio n and distrib utio n o f the estate’s assets. The b ankruptcy c o urt fo und the latter. That finding was suppo rted b y the rec o rd and, henc e, was no t c learly erro neo us. A fter his c o unsel withdrew, K o shkalda b egan to attac k Scho enm ann and her pro fessio nals direc t ly b y b elatedly c hallenging their em p lo ym ent and c o m pensatio n. O ne o f his first pro se challenges, filed late in 2018,
so ught to rem o ve Scho enm ann as trustee seven m o nths into the c ase. K o s hkalda b ased his request on Scho enm ann’s prio rac tio ns invo lving Epso n – ac tio ns to which K o shkalda did no t o riginally o bjec t
. Tho u gh the c o u r t identified the m o tio n to rem o ve Scho enm ann as an 22exam ple o f K o shkalda’s litigo usness, it did no t identify it as a frivo lo us o r

harassing filing. R ather, it was the sub sequent repetitive c hallenges that the
c o u rt fo und frivo lo us and harassing. These c hallenges inc luded: (1) a
m o tio n to disqualify Fo xR o thschild as Scho enm ann’s c o unsel filed ro ughly a year after its em p lo ym ent, to which K o shkalda did no t o riginally o bjec t despite no tic e; (2) objec tio ns tothe pro fessio nals’ interimfee applic a tio ns; (3) a m o tio n fo rautho rity to sue b o th Scho enm ann and Fo x R o thschild in state c o urt, filed despite the denial o f K o shkalda’s prio rchallenges; (4) a
m o tio n to vac ate as vo id the o rder autho rizing Fo x R o thschild’s
em plo ym ent; and (5) vario us related rec o nsideratio n m o tio ns. A t the sam e tim e, K o shkalda c o ntinued his attem pts to im pede Scho enm ann’s effo rts to adm inister the estate b y o ppo sing Scho enm ann’s
c o m p ro m ise and sale m o tio ns. K o shkalda alsoc o ntinued to file additio nal ab ando nm ent m o t io ns – particularly tho s e related to K o shkalda’s asserted
c laim s against Epson allegedly arising fro mEpso n’s prepetitio n seizure o f K o s hkalda’s assets and its pro s ecutio n o f the distric t c o urt Infringem ent A c t io n. A dditio nally, K o s hkalda c o nsistently so ught rec o nsideratio n o f adverse rulings as a m atter o f c o urse despite the b ankruptc y c o urt’s repeated explanatio n o f the lim ited gro unds availab le to justify am endm ent
o r m o dific atio n o f c o urt o rders. A s the c o urt sim ilarly explained in its review o f filings in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding, the m o tio ns fo r 23rec o nsideratio n dem o nstrated “Mr. K o shkalda’s hab itual m isuse o f

m o tio ns fo r rec o nsideratio n, which c a n o nly b e granted o n very narro w gro unds. R ather than m aking any effo rt whatso ever to estab lish gro unds fo r rec o nsideratio n, he uses themto rehash the sam e argum ents he
o riginally m ade o r to raise additio nal argum ents fo rthe first tim e.” The
c o u rt fo und this to b e stro ng evidenc e o f K o shkalda’s use o f frivo lo us filings to harass the trustee, Epson, and the c o urt. In suppo r t o f its Vexatio us Litigant Ru ling, the b ankruptc y c o urt also relied o n six o ppo sitio ns K o shkalda filed in the m ain b ankruptc y c a se. The
c o u rt’s relianc e o n o ppo sitio ns to suppo rt its Vexatio us Litigant Ruling gives us pause and mu s t b e c arefully exam ined. In R inggo l d-Lo ckha rt, the N inth C irc uit raised sim ilar c o nc erns when the distric t c o urt partially b ased its determ inatio n o f vexatio usness o n the litigant’s respo nse to a tentative
o rder. A s R inggo ld-Lo ckha rtexplained:

Mo st tro ub ling, the distric t c o urt’s list inc ludes the Ringgo lds’ respo nse to its tentative o rder finding themvexatio us. A s explained, the Ringgo lds had a due pro c ess right to b e heard o n this m atter. The distric t c o urt faults the Ringgo lds fo r “reiterating o ld fac ts and argum ents” in their respo nse to the c o urt o rder. A s the Ringgo lds had toargue that their filings were no t frivo lo us, such repetitio n was inevitab le. What’s m o re, the distric t c o urt invited their respo nse, so it is particularly inappro priate to ho ld it against them

. R inggo ld-Lo ckha rt, 761 F.2d at 1065.
24K o shkalda sim ilarly had a right to b e heard in o ppo sitio n to

Scho enm ann’s m o tio ns. 7While it is inappro p riate to penalize K o shkalda fo r exerc ising this right, what he said in these o ppo sitio ns and ho w he said it pro vided m eaningful c o ntext fo r the c o urt’s frivo lo usness and harassm ent findings. O f the six o ppo sitio ns, three o f themwere objec tio ns to the fee applic atio ns filed b y Scho enm ann and her pro fessio nals. K o s hkalda did no tchallenge the b illings, b ut rather c o ntinued to reargue his disagreem ent with Scho enm a nn’s dec isio n no t to challenge Epso n’s $12
m illio n c laimo r to ac tively pursue his asserted c laim s against Epso n. By the tim e K o shkalda m ade these obj ec tio ns, the b a nkruptc y c o urt already had c o nsidered and rejec ted as m eritless K o s hkalda’s underlying po sitio ns
a numb er o f tim es in a numb er o f different m atters.

7Not all chapter 7 debtor s hav e standing to challenge a tr ustee’s admini str ati on of the bankr uptcy estate. A debtor ’s standin g to obj ect to matter s such as claims obj ecti ons, allowance of fees, sales of pr oper ty, and settlements gener ally depends upon hav ing a pecuni ar y i nter est inthe estate. Wher e the bankr u ptcy estate cannot pay all cr edi tor s in full and no sur p lus wi ll be r etur ned to the chapter 7 debtor , that debtor cannot gener ally demonstr ate i nj ur y i n fact to obj ect to the tr ustee’s admin i s tr ati on of the estate and lacks standing. An-Tze Cheng v. K&S Diversified Invs., Inc. (In re Cheng) , 308 B.R. 448, 454 (9th Ci r. BAP 2004), aff’d, 160 F. App’x 644 (9th Ci r . 2005). But wher e the estate has a sur plus to r etur n to the debtor , or wher e a debtor ’s di schar ge i s deni ed, that debtor has a pecuni ar y i nter est inthe admin i str a ti on of the estate and has standing to challenge the tr ustee’s acti ons. Wellman v. Ziino (In re Wellman) , 378 B.R. 416 (table), 2007 WL 4105275, at 1* n.5 (9th Ci r . BAP Nov . 9, 2007)(unpubli shed) (citi ng Heath v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. (In re Heath), 331 B.R. 424, 429 (9th Ci r . BAP 2005)). Her e, Koshkalda had a pecuni ar y i nter est in the admini s tr ati on of the estate as a r esult of the deni a lof hi s di schar ge, and had standing to obj ect to the tr ustee’s admini s tr ati on of the estate. 25The o ther three o ppo sitio ns c o nc erned pro po sed settlem ents o f the

estate’s c laim s. Like the c o m pensatio n-related objec tio ns, each o f these three o ppo s itio ns were fo unded o n po sitio ns that lac ked m erit and which the c o urt already had rejec ted in prio rm atters. Thus, even tho ugh the
o ppo sitio ns o rdinarily sho u ld no tb e c o nsidered as direc t evidenc e o f vexatio us c o nduc t, here they pro vide additio nal c o ntext fo rthe assessm ent
o f K o shkalda’s o ther filings and fo r the b ankruptc y c o urt’s findings that they were frivo lo us and harassing. The b ankruptc y c o urt’s discussio n o f K o s hkalda’s o ppo sitio ns do es no t c o nstitute reversib le erro r. In sum m ary, K o s hkalda’s filings run the gamu t – fro mrepeated
challenges to Scho enm ann’s adm inistratio n o f the estate and c o ntinuo us disc o very disputes in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding – to a never-ending b attle against em plo ym ent and c o m pensatio n o f Scho enm ann and Fo x R o thschild. Underlying the vast m ajo r ity o f K o shkalda’s filings was his
o ngo ing dispute with Epso n. The b a nkruptcy c o urt c o gently desc rib ed the interrelatio nship b etween his c hallenges against Scho enm ann and Fo x R o thschild, his effo rts to thwart estate adm inistratio n, his anim us fo r Epso n, and his disdain fo r any c o urt ruling that m ight have resulted in Epso n ac tually realizing a rec o very o n so m e part o f its $12 m illio n judgm ent. This is seen in b o th the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding and the
m ain b ankruptcy c ase. W e find no erro r – c lear o r o therwise – in the b ankruptcy c o urt’s frivo lo usness and harassment findings.
263. T he num ber of K os hkalda’s friv olous and haras s ingfiling s within his bankruptcy was inordinate. K o shkalda c o ntends that any pre-filing o rder against himis inappro priate b ec ause he o nly c o m m enc ed his b ankruptc y and was a defendant in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding. He argues that his invo lvem ent in these pro c eedings c a nno t suppo rt a vexatio us litigant finding b ec ause it lac ks the required num ero sity. 8 In suppo rt o f his argum ent, he c ites to R inggo ld-Lo ckha rt, where the N inth C irc uit reviewed a pre-filing o r der issued b y the distric t c o urt b ased prim arily o n the plaintiffs’ m o tio ns prac tic e in two federal lawsuits. Id. at 1064-65. The N inth C irc uit ac kno wledged that the two federal lawsuits c o m m enc ed b y the plaintiffs were “far fewer than what o ther c o urts have fo und ino rdinate.” Id. at 1064-65 (citatio ns and internal quo tatio n m arks o m itted). Im po rtantly, the N inth C irc uit in R inggo ld-Lo ckh a rt dec lined to set a
m inim umnumb er o f ac tio ns a litigant must c o m m enc e b efo re he o r she c an b e fo u nd to b e a vexatio us litigant. It rem arked, ho wever, that “[s]uch a situatio n wo uld at least b e extrem ely unusual, in light o f the alternative

8 The Ninth Ci r cu i t’s r equi r ement that a li ti gant’s v exati ous clai ms must be inor din ate ar i ses wi thin i ts di scussi on of fr i v olous fi lings. In re Ringgold, 761 F.3d at 1064; Molski, 500 F.3d at 1059. Whi le not phr ased in the same ter ms, any consi der ati on of har assment in suppor t of a pr e-fi ling or der also r equi r es ev i dence of a patter n. Ringgold-Lockhart, 7 61 F.3d at 1064 (quoti ng De Long, 912 F.2d at 1148). Accor dingly, our di scussi on concer ning the numer osi ty of fr i v olous fi lings appli es equally to the establi shment of a patter n of har a ssment. 27rem edies availab le to distric t judges toc o ntro l a litigant’s b ehavio r in

individual c ases.” Id. at 1065. R inggo ld-Lo ckha rtem phasized that “[i]n light
o f the serio usness o f restric ting litigants’ ac c ess to the c o urts, pre-filing
o rders sho uld b e a rem edy o f last reso rt.” Id. a t 1062. A s a result, it
c o nsidered the question o f whether o ther rem edies wo u ld b e suffic ient under the c irc um stanc es to b e “particularly im po rtant.” Id. This led the N inth C irc uit to c o nc lude in R inggo ld-Lo ckha rtthat the distric t c o urt erred b y failing to c o nsider o ther rem edies to curb the ab use, inc luding sanc tio ns under C ivil Rule 11. Id . at 1065. In the m atter b efo re us, the b ankruptc y c o u rt attem pted to address K o s hkalda’s ac tio ns thro ugh a series o f inc reasingly severe sanc tio ns. Initially, the c o urt addressed Ko shkalda’s disc o very ab u ses thro ugh an info rm al disc o very dispute reso lutio n pro c ess. Unfo rtunately, K o hskalda’s ab usive c o nduc t in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding c o ntinued with frivo lo u s and harassing m o tio ns seeking to prevent disc o very and fo restall Epso n’s sum m ary judgm ent m o t io n. The c o u rt ultim ately im po sed
m o netary and issue term inating sanc tio ns o n K o shkalda, finding that he repeatedly lied to the c o urt and b aselessly refused topro vide required
c o ntac t info rm atio n fo rhis parents sothat they c o uld b e depo sed in regard to num ero us challenged transfers invo lving them, K o shkalda and his affiliated b usiness entities. A fter K o shkalda shifted his attentio n to the m a in b ankruptc y c ase, 28the b ankruptcy c o urt sim ilarly attem pted to dissuade himfro mfiling

frivo lo u s and harassing m atters. The c o urt denied a prio r request to im po se
m o netary sanc t io ns against K o hskalda under 28 U .S.C . § 1927 fo r vexatio usly and in b ad faith multiplying the pro c eedings in the b ankruptcy
c ase. In its dec isio n, the b ankruptc y c o urt explained that, at that tim e, it wanted to give leeway to K o shkalda as a pro se litigant and that it was no t prepared to c o nc lude at that tim e that he was m o tivated b y an im pro per, b ad-faith purpo se – like harassm ent. Y et, the rec o rd dem o nstrates that K o shkalda c o ntinued to press his
c o m p laints against Scho enm ann’s adm inistratio n o f the estate and Epso n’s
c laimdespite prio r rulings. While the c o urt repeatedly desc rib ed the
ac tio ns undertaken in the identified filings as b aseless, it typic ally m ade these determ inatio ns o nly after it had previo u sly c o nsidered and rejec ted the sam e argum ents in prio r rulings. This appears tob e why the c o urt did
no t inc lude the o r iginal m o tio n to rem o ve Scho enm ann in its listing o f frivo lo u s and harassing m atters. R ather, the c o urt relied o n sub sequent filings that c o ntinued to relitigate the sam e underlying issues. In a sim ilar vein, the b ankruptcy c o urt identified as vexatio us so m e b ut no tall o f K o shkalda’s m o tio ns seeking to c o m pel Scho enm a nn to ab ando n estate pro perty. In fac t, the c o urt’s identific atio n o f K o shkalda’s frivo lo u s ab a ndo nm ent m o tio ns b egins with K o shkalda’s seventh ab ando nm ent m o t io n. The b ankruptc y c o urt did no t rely o n the prio r six
29ab ando nm ent m o t io ns (o r two sub sequently granted m o tio ns). A fter six

prio r o rders explaining the standards fo rab ando nm ent, there is no legitim ate do ub t that K o s hkalda – even as a pro se litigant – was well
aware o f what must b e sho wn. Y et, as the b ankruptc y c o urt po inted o ut, K o s hkalda c o ntinued to seek ab ando nm ent o f assets that Scho enm a nn
ac tively was adm inistering. This is illustrative o f the vast m ajo rity o f
m atters the b a nkruptc y c o urt relied o n to suppo rt its Vexatio us Litigant Ruling. Mo re im po rtantly, this histo ry am ply dem o nstrates that the c o urt
c o nsidered and applie d less severe sanc tio ns in an attem pt to c o ntro l K o s hkalda’s c o nduc tb efo re it entered the pre-filing o r ders. A t b o t t o m, the lesser sanc tio ns im po sed suppo rt the c o nc lusio n that such sanc t io ns did
no t, and wo uld no t, wo rk with K o shkalda. The b ankruptcy c o urt im po sed the C ase Pre-filing O rder as a
m easure o f last reso rt, and it did so am idst c o nc erns that K o shkalda’s filings were exhausting the b ankruptc y estate. Bo th Scho enm ann and the
c o u rt expressed c o nc erns that K o shkalda’s ac tio ns were turning a so lvent estate into o ne that was adm inistratively inso lvent witho ut suffic ient funds to pay the c o s ts o f adm inistering the c hapter 7 c ase, much less to m ake a distrib utio n to unsecured c redito r s. The Sec o nd C irc uit c o nsiders whether o r no t a litigant has c aused needless expense o r po sed an unnec essary b urden when evaluating whether the c hallenged filings are frivo lo us and harassing. S a fir , 792 F.2d at
3024. While the N inth C irc uit did no t spec ific ally inc o rpo rate this

c o nsideratio n into its articulatio n o f the vexatio us litigant fac to rs, it has
m o re generally rec o gnized that the S a fir fac to rs pro vide a “helpful fram ewo rk” fo r c o nsidering whether filings are frivo lo u s and whether a pre-filing o r der is narro wly tailo red. Mo lsk i, 500 F3d at 1058. A n exam inatio n o f unnec essary b urden is particularly relevant in b ankruptcy c ases b ec ause vexatio us litigatio n m ay waste the estate’s lim ited reso urc es and deprive c r edito rs o f any distrib utio n. S ee, e.g. , Ta ngwa ll v. Co m p to n (In re Berta n) , BA PN o . A K–17–1139–LBF, 2018 W L 1704306 at *6 (9th Cir. BA P A pril 6, 2018) (affirm ing pre-filing o rder where b ankruptcy c o urt fo und that the litigant had “c a used needless expense to
o ther parties” and the trustee and c o u rt were c o nc erned that the c o ntinued
ac tio ns wo uld needlessly “b urden the b ankruptc y estate’s resou rc es and the c o urt”); Melcher v. R icha rdso n (In re Melcher) , BA P N o . N C –14–1573–TaDJu, 2015 W L 8161915 at *4 (9th Cir. BA P Dec . 7, 2015) (affirm ing pre-filing o rder where “[t]here is no questio n that a o nc e so lvent estate is no w inso lvent due to the Deb t o r’s pro trac ted effo rts to stall the sale o f Sto newall and o ther real pro perties”); In re S ui, 2014 WL 5840246 at *8 (vac ating pre-filing o r der as inc o nsistent with N inth C irc uit autho rity, b ut quo ting with appro val the b ankruptc y c o urt’s c o nc ern that repetitive filings had to sto p o r “there’s no t go ing to b e any m o ney left fo r anyo ne”). In suppo r t o f his argum ent that he did no t file an ino rdinate numb er 31o f frivo lo us and harassing m atters, K o s hkalda direc ts o ur attentio n to c ases

invo lving traditio nal litigatio n in whic h the vexatio us litigant filed m ultiple lawsuits. But his argument igno res the reality o f b ankruptc y c ases. A s the Suprem e C o urt has rec o gnized“[a] b a nkruptc y c ase invo lves an ‘aggregatio n o f individual c o ntro versies,’ m any o f which wo uld exist as stand-alo ne lawsuits b ut fo r the b ankrupt status o f the deb to r.” Bulla rd v. Blue Hi lls Ba nk

, 575 U .S. 496, 135 S. C t. 1686, 1692 (2015) (quoting 1 C o llier
o n Bankruptcy ¶ 5.08[1][b ], p. 5-42 (16th ed. 2014)). Tho u gh K o shkalda o nly c o m m enc ed a single b ankruptc y c ase, he initiated num ero u s disputes within the b a nkruptc y c ase and in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding b y pressing his unreaso nab le and b aseless po sitio ns. This c aused the b ankruptcy estate to expend tim e and inc ur atto rney fees to address frivo lo us m atters in the m ain b ankruptc y c ase. A t the tim e the b ankruptcy c o urt im po sed its C ase Pre-filing O rder, it had exhausted less drasticm easures tono effec t, and K o s hkalda’s pattern o f filing frivo lo us and harassing m atters was depleting the b ankruptc y estate to the detrim ent
o f his c redito rs. K o shkalda fails tostate what effec tive sanc tio ns the b ankruptc y c o urt
c o u ld have im po sed sho rt o f entering the C ase Pre-filing O rder. In general
c ivil litigatio n, the c o urt retains the ab ility to im po se c ase ending sanc tio ns against the o ffending party - as the distric t c o u rt did in the Infringem ent A c t io n. S ee genera l ly S ui v. Ma rsha ck , 691 F. A pp’x 374 (9th C ir. 2017)
32(rec o gnizing distric t c o urt’s inherent equitab le po wer to im po se c ase

term inating sanc tio ns (c iting TeleV ideo S ys. Inc. v. H

eidentha l, 826 F.2d 915, 916 (9th C ir. 1987))). Bankruptcy c ases, ho wever, generally affo rd no sim ilar o ppo r tunity. The c lo sest analo g to term inating sanc t io ns in a
chapter 7 b ankruptcy is dism issal fo r c ause, inc luding a deb to r’s refusal to
c o o perate with the trustee. S ee§ 707(a). But in so m e asset c ases, dism issal
o f the c hapter 7 c ase is exac tly what the deb to r wants. In this c ase, fo r instanc e, dism issal wo uld have rewarded K o shkalda fo r his lac k o f
c o o peratio n b y returning to himassets Scho enm a nn was in the pro c ess o f liquidating fo r the b enefit o f the estate. Denial o f the deb t o r ’s discharge o ften is identified as ano ther po tential rem edy fo rdeb to r m isc o nduc t. S ee La w v. S iegel, 571 U .S. 415, 427 (2014). But even if we assum e that K o hskalda’s litigatio n c o nduc t c o u ld suppo rt denial o f his discharge, he already had b een denied his discharge
o n o ther gro unds. La w also identified the c o urt’s sanc tio ning autho rity under Rule 9011, § 105(a), and the c o urt’s inherent po wers as additional
rem edies availab le to the b ankruptcy c o urt to disc o u rage deb to r
m isb ehavio r. Id. In light o f the denial o f his discharge, ho w ever, K o shkalda already was saddled with a nondischargeab le $12 m illio n judgm ent deb t despite b eing in b ankruptcy fo r years. Under such c irc um s tanc es, the im po sitio n o f m o netary sanc tio ns o n to p o f a large no ndischargeab le deb t typic ally is likely to have little o r no effec tin regulating a deb t o r’s litigatio n 33c o nduc t. Even then, the estate wo uld b e left to c o llec t fro ma litigio us

deb to r w ith m o re than $12 m illio n in no ndischargeab le deb ts. A s instruc ted b y R inggo ld-Lo ckha rt, the b ankruptc y c o urt pro perly
c o nsidered whether K o shkalda’s frivo lo us and harassing filings were ino rdinate in numb er to suppo rt the pre-filing o rders. It exam ined the relevant c ircum stanc es as appeared in this c ase, inc luding: (1) K o hskalda’s litigatio n histo ry; (2) his patterns o f frivo lo us and harassing filings; (3) the ineffec tiveness o f alternative rem edies to c o ntro l his b ehavio r; and (4) the need to avo id further depletio n o f the b ankruptc y estate. W e ac kno wledge that the o nly ac t io n K o shkalda filed was his b a nkruptc y. Y et, the ab senc e o f
m ultiple lawsuits do es no t m ean that the b ankruptc y c o urt must stand b y im po tently while the estate’s assets are exhausted tolitigate K o shkalda’s repetitive, frivo lo us, and harassing filings after o ther less severe m easures have pro ven inadequate. The b ankruptc y c o urt pro p erly to o k this into
ac c o u nt when finding that K o shkalda’s filings were ino rdinate and im po sing the pre-filing o rders as a m a tter o f last reso rt. 9 D . Nec es s ity and narrow tailoring of pre-filing

res tric tions . Tho u gh we agree that K o s hkalda qualified as a vexatio us litigant, R inggo ld-Lo ckha rt also requires that the pre-filing restric tio ns “must b e

9 Because we ar e r ev er sing the Adv er s ar y Pr e-fi ling Or der on other gr ounds, we expr ess no opini on whether the number of fr i v olous and har assing fi lin gs was inor din ate for pur poses of the Adv er sar y Pr e-fi ling Or der

. 34narro wly tailo red to the vexatio us litigant’s wro ngful b ehavio r.” Id. at 1066

(quo ting Mo lsk i, 500 F.3d at 1061). Therefo re, we c o nsider whether the b ankruptcy c o urt’s pre-filing o rders were nec essary to prevent c o ntinuing vexatio us c o nduc t and whether the spec ificrestric tio ns were narro w ly tailo red. The C ase Pre-filing O rder required K o shkalda to sub m it fo r pre-filing review any pro po sed m o tio ns o r o ther papers he desired tofile that c o uld im pac t – o r o ppo se argum ents m ade b y – Scho enm ann, Epso n, their
c o u nsel, o r the estate’s pro fessio nals. This o rder further dic t a ted that, as part o f its pre-filing review, the c o u rt wo uld determ ine whether the pro po sed m o tio ns o r o ther papers had m erit “such that they sho u ld b e b riefed and heard.” The o rder exc luded fro mthe restric tio ns any no tic e o f appeal filed fro mthe C ase Pre-filing O rder o r fro mthe Vexatio us Litigant Ruling. But it did no texc lude no tic es o f appeal that he m ight desire to file fro many o ther c o urt rulings the c o urt m ight render. A s fo r the A dversary Pre-filing O rder, it c o ntained sim ilar pro visio ns, b ut applied to pro po sed
m o tio ns and papers im pac t ing Epso n, its em plo yees, its agents, its affiliates, and its c o unsel. In R inggo ld-Lo ckha rtthe pre-filing o rder at issue was o verb ro ad in two respec ts. First, the pre-filing o rder im perm issib ly pro vided fo r an
assessm ent o f the m erits o f the pro po sed new ac t io n. A s R inggo ld-Lo ckha rt explained, the pre-filing sc reening pro c ess is ill-suited pro c edurally fo r a 35m erits determ inatio n. Id

.

Sec o nd, the subj ec t pre-filing o r der was o verb ro ad b ec ause it restric t ed the vexatio us litigants’ ab ility to file a nyac tio n pertaining to adm inistratio n o f state c o urts o r prob ate c o urts. R inggo ld-Lo ckh a rtreaso ned that this restric tio n easily c o u ld extend to fac tual sc enario s having no thing to do with the dispute at the heart o f the vexatio us litigatio n: So m etim es a ranc o ro us dispute leaves a person with a b itter taste that do es no t fade, no m atter ho wm any reso urc es are expended and no m atter ho w m any years pass. Fro mo ur review o f the c ase law discussing vexatio us litigants, it is no t unc o m m o n fo r distric t c o urts to enjo in litigants fro m relitigating a pa rticula rc ase, such as when a litigant refuses to ac c ept the finality o f an adverse judgm ent. But in such c ases, c o u r ts generally tailo r the sc o pe o f a litigatio n restric tio n so as to restrain litigants fro mreo pening litigatio n b ased o n the fac t s and issues decided in previo us lawsuits. The underlying litigatio n here attem pts to reo pen a c ase that has reached final judgm ent. Anarro wly tailo red injunc tio n wo uld address only filings in that o r related ac tio ns. Id. at 1067 (c itatio ns, internal b rac kets, and quo tatio n m arks o m itted). K o shkalda asserts that a pre-filing o rder was no t nec essary in either the b ankruptcy c ase o rin the Espo n A dversary Pro c eeding. A s the b ankruptcy c ase rem ains o pen, K o shkalda’s pattern o f frivo lo us and harassing filings warrants the C ase Pre-filing o rder. W e agree, ho wever, with K o s hkalda that there was no need fo r a pre-filing o rder in the
c o m p leted Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding. A s K o shkalda has po inted o ut, b y 36the tim e the c o urt issued its A dversary Pre-filing O r der, a final judgm ent

already had b een entered, he had c o m m enc ed his appeal fro mthat judgm ent, and he already had c eased filing papers in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding. 1 0 W e are aware that K o shkalda filed three po st-judgm ent m o tio ns in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding: (1) a m o tio n fo r rec o nsideratio n o f the
c o u rt’s sum m ary judgm ent ruling; (2) a m o tio n fo r rec o nsideratio n o f the
c o u rt’s o rder denying his m o tio n to strike c ertain b a nk rec o rds pro duc ed b y Epso n after Epso n ob tained themfro mBank o f A m eric a ; and (3) a
m o tio n to c o m pel additio nal respo nses to his do c um ent pro duc t io n requests. The b ankruptcy c o urt did no t list the sum m ary judgm ent
rec o nsideratio n m o tio n as an exam ple o f K o shkalda’s vexatio us litigatio n
c o nduc t. N o r did it m ake any findings that this filing was frivo lo us o r intended to harass. But the c o urt did m ake frivo lo us and harassm ent findings as to the o ther two po st-judgm ent m o tio ns. K o shkalda filed the two frivo lo u s po st-judgm ent disc o very m o tio ns in O c tob er 2019. A fter that, he did no t file anything else in the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding b efo r e entry o f the pre-filing o r ders several m o nths later. A dm ittedly, these two m o tio ns were no less frivo lo us o r harassing

1 0 In contr a st, for the same r easons we upheld, abov e, the bankr uptcy cour t’s fr i volousness, har assment, and numer osi ty fi ndings, we fur ther hold that the Case Pr efi ling Or der was necessary. 37than the c o urt’s o ther exam ples fro mthe Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding.

Even so, under the c irc um stanc es, these two m o tio ns were insuffic ient to estab lish a c o ntinuing and o ngo ing need fo r the A dversary Pre-filing O rder. A dditio nally, K o s hkalda argues that b o th pre-filing o rders were
o verb ro ad. W e also agree with this po int. The pre-filing o rders did no t expressly lim it their restric tio ns o n filing to K o shkalda’s b ankruptc y c ase and to the Epso n A dversary Pro c eeding. Sinc e the c o urt m ade no findings regarding frivo lo us o r harassing filings o utside o f these two m atters, there
was no dem o nstrated need fo r b ro a der restric tio ns. Indeed, neither Scho enm ann no r Epso n ever requested that the b ankruptc y c o urt im po se b ro ader restric t io ns. In additio n, the C ase Pre-filing O rder also po tentially infringed o n K o shkalda’s right toappeal fro mfuture o r ders entered in the b ankruptcy c ase. Finally, b o th pre-filing o rders c o ntravened R inggo ld-Lo ckha rt ’s pro hib itio n against pre-filing pro c edures that c o ntem plate m erits
sc reening. A s discussed ab o ve, R inggo ld-Lo ckha r theld that m erits reviews sho uld no t b e part o f any narro w ly-tailo red pre-filing pro c edures im po sed. R inggo ld-Lo ckha rt, 761 F.3d at 1066; s ee a lso In re S ui, 2014 WL 5840246, at *8. CONCL U SION Fo r the reaso ns set fo rth ab o ve, we VA C A TE A N D R EMA N D with respec t to the C ase Pre-filing O rder. O n rem and, the b ankruptc y c o urt will
38need to am end the C ase Pre-filing O rder to rem o ve any pro visio n fo r a

m erits review as part o f the pre-filing review pro c ess. It alsosho uld lim it the sc o pe o f this o rder to c o ver o nly papers filed in K o shkalda’s b ankruptcy c ase and to exc lude no tic es o f appeal. A s fo r the A dversary Pre-filing O rder, we R EVER SE. 1 1

1 1 In her r esponsi ve br i ef inNC-20-1051, S choenmann has asked thi s Panel to enter a pr e-fi ling or der . S he clai ms that Koshkalda has fi led numer ous, fr i v olous har a ssing appeals and that a BAP pr e-fi ling or der i s necessary to pr ev ent addi ti onal li ti gati on mi sconduct. We di sagr ee and her eby DENY that r equest. Most of hi s appeals hav e been di smi ssed as inter locutor y. Bankr uptcy finali ty i s a compli cated i s sue and continues to be an unsettled ar ea of law. See generally Bullard, 575 U.S . 496, 135 S . Ct. at 1692–94 (explaining why an or der denying confi r mati on of a chapter 13 plan i s inter locutor y); see also In re Liu , 611 B.R. at 872-73 (r ei ter ati n g the Ni nth Ci r cui t’s adv i ce that “li ti gants inbankr uptcy who ar e unsur e about the fi nali ty of an or der [should] file a noti ce of appeal to pr eser v e thei r r i ghts whether the matter was final or inter locutor y”). Fur ther mor e, the bur den on appellees ar i sing fr om inter locutor y appeals, especi a lly when we deny leav e to appeal and di smi ss them as inter locutor y, i s mini mal. 39