alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
DENY; and Opinion Filed April 15, 2015.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-15-00436-CV

IN RE CHARLES HENSLEY MITCHELL, Relator

On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-11-14792

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Francis, Myers, and Schenck

Opinion by Justice Schenck

In this petition for writ of mandamus relator contends the trial court violated a ministerial 

duty by failing to invalidate a durable power of attorney, which he contends was not signed 

before a notary. Relator raised a similar argument on direct appeal. See Mitchell v. Houston, 

No. 05-13-00618-CV, 2015 WL 544117, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 10, 2015). We affirmed 

the trial court’s judgment concluding relator had not preserved the issue for review. 

A writ of mandamus is not a substitute for an appeal. In re Bernson, 254 S.W.3d 594, 

596 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, no pet.). Mandamus is an appropriate remedy only where 

appeal does not provide an adequate means for asserting the relator’s claims. In re Prudential 

Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). This is not such a situation.
–2–

We deny the petition.

150436F.P05

/David J. Schenck/

DAVID J. SCHENCK

JUSTICE
11 TH C OURT OF A PPEALS E ASTLAND , T EXAS J UDGMENT

Estate of Marvin L. Smith, Jr., * From the 244th District Court d/b/a Idlewood Terrace Apartments, of Ector County, Trial Court No. C

- 134,054

.

Vs. No. 11

- 13

- 00337

- CV * November 12, 2015

Ector County Appraisal District, * Opinion by Bailey, J. (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., Willson, J. , and Bailey, J. )

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is no error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court ’ s opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed. The costs incurred by reason of this appeal are taxed against the Estate of Marvin L. Smith, Jr., d/b/a Idlewood Terrace Apartments.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2183

MIGUEL ANGEL LOPEZ-FERRUFINO,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals.

Submitted: March 26, 2015 Decided: April 20, 2015

Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Petition dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Randall L. Johnson, JOHNSON & ASSOCIATES, Arlington, Virginia, 

for Petitioner. Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, Mary Jane Candaux, Assistant Director, Robbin K. Blaya, 

Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Miguel Lopez-Ferrufino, a native and citizen of Honduras, 

petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal from the immigration 

judge’s denial of his requests for withholding of removal and 

protection under the Convention Against Torture. For the 

reasons discussed below, we dismiss the petition for review.

Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2012), we lack 

jurisdiction, except as provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) 

(2012), to review the final order of removal of an alien who is 

removable for having been convicted of certain enumerated 

crimes, including a controlled substance offense under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012). Under § 1252(a)(2)(C), we retain 

jurisdiction “to review factual determinations that trigger the 

jurisdiction-stripping provision, such as whether [LopezFerrufino] [i]s an alien and whether []he has been convicted of 

a [controlled substance offense].” Ramtulla v. Ashcroft, 301 

F.3d 202, 203 (4th Cir. 2002). Once we confirm these two 

factual determinations, then, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), 

(D), we can only consider “constitutional claims or questions of 

law.” § 1252(a)(2)(D); see Turkson v. Holder, 667 F.3d 523, 527 

(4th Cir. 2012).

Because Lopez-Ferrufino conceded before the immigration 

judge that he is a native and citizen of Honduras and that he is 
3

removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), as an alien 

who, at any time after admission, was convicted of a controlled 

substance violation, other than a single offense involving 

possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, 

we find that § 1252(a)(2)(C) divests us of jurisdiction over the 

petition for review.*

 We therefore dismiss the petition for 

review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

PETITION DISMISSED

 * Lopez-Ferrufino does not raise any colorable questions of 

law or constitutional issues that would fall within the 

exception set forth in § 1252(a)(2)(D).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> UT
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
balance sheet, statement of income, statement of retained earnings and
statement of cash flows contained in Form 10-K of Cambridge Electric Light
Company for the fiscal year ended December 31, 1996 and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000016573
<NAME> CAMBRIDGE ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                            <C>
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>              DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                   DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-TYPE>                         YEAR
<BOOK-VALUE>                      PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>          100,378
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>          9,408
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>              20,326
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>            45,039
<OTHER-ASSETS>                           0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                     175,151
<COMMON>                             8,665
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>           27,953
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                  9,233
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>      45,851
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                    0
<PREFERRED>                              0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                21,763
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                  23,790
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>           0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>          100
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>              0
<LEASES-CURRENT>                         0
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>      83,647
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>      175,151
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>          119,105
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                 2,683
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>         110,215
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>         112,898
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>              6,207
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                   2,242
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>       8,449
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>             3,329
<NET-INCOME>                         5,120
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>              0
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>        5,120
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>             3,448
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>            2,238
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>               9,914
<EPS-PRIMARY>                            0
<EPS-DILUTED>                            0



</TABLE>
#### Billy McKINNEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.

No. 2758.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Nov. 4, 1977.

*734Walter L. Carpeneti, Asst. Public Defender, Juneau, and Brian Shortell, Public Defender, Anchorage, for appellant.

Larry Weeks, Dist. Atty. and Avrum M. Gross, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.

Before BOOCHEVER, Chief Justice, RA-BINOWITZ, CONNOR and BURKE, Justices, and DIMOND, Justice Pro Tern.

OPINION ON REHEARING

BOOCHEVER, Chief Justice.

The petition for rehearing is granted, and the case is remanded for resentencing.

The state in its memorandum concedes that:

> Mr. McKinney may have been “prejudiced” by his failure to obtain a continuance before sentencing in the sense that there was possible favorable testimony that could have been offered had he obtained a continuance.1

Counsel for defendant indicated that he would have objected to proceeding with sentencing since he had had no time to prepare, having received the pre-sentence report only that day. He stated that he agreed to go forward only because of Mr. McKinney’s desire to complete the matter. We believe that there was sufficient showing of prejudice flowing from the superior court’s failure to grant a continuance sua sponte of the sentencing proceedings, and we remand for the sole purpose of resen-tencing.

We do not find that McKinney’s due process rights were violated by the superior court’s failure to grant such a continuance sua sponte, and order the limited remand under this court’s general supervisory authority over Alaska’s trial courts in criminal matters.

PETITION GRANTED.

1

. Admittedly, the state further argues that attached affidavits may weaken the claim by making some of the testimony offered by defendant ambiguous.

BURKE, Justice,

dissenting.

I dissent. My view is that this case was correctly decided by our opinion in *McKinney v. State,*566 P.2d 653 (Alaska 1977).

The state’s “concession” of prejudice, as it is characterized by the majority, is taken entirely out of context. Read in its entirety, the state’s memorandum stands as a strong statement against the necessity of resentencing. I find the state’s argument persuasive, and would deny the petition for rehearing.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                  SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                        398,952
<SECURITIES>                  247,948                  <F1>
<RECEIVABLES>                 0
<ALLOWANCES>                  0
<INVENTORY>                   0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              0
<PP&E>                        13,215,542               <F2>
<DEPRECIATION>                0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                13,973,674
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         1,913,128
<BONDS>                       651,038                  <F3>
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>         0
<PREFERRED>                   0
<COMMON>                      11,409,508               <F4>
<OTHER-SE>                    0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  0
<SALES>                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              850,906                  <F5>
<CGS>                         0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 412,245                  <F6>
<OTHER-EXPENSES>              20,631                   <F7>
<LOSS-PROVISION>              0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>            0
<INCOME-PRETAX>               0
<INCOME-TAX>                  0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           0
<DISCONTINUED>                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>               0
<CHANGES>                     0
<NET-INCOME>                  418,030
<EPS-BASIC>                 0
<EPS-DILUTED>                 0




<FN>
<F1>   "SECURITIES" REPRESENTS INVESTMENT IN JOINT VENTURE
<F2>   "PP&E" REPRESENTS REAL ESTATE HELD FOR SALE
<F3>   "BONDS" REPRESENTS MINORITY INTEREST IN JOINT VENTURE
<F4>   "COMMON" REPRESENTS NET ASSETS IN LIQUIDATION
<F5>   "TOTAL REVENUES" REPRESENTS RENTAL, INTEREST, AND OTHER
          INCOME
<F6>   "TOTAL COSTS" REPRESENTS TOTAL EXPENSES
<F7>   "OTHER EXPENSES" REPRESENTS MINORITY AND EQUITY INTEREST
          IN JOINT VENTURES' NET INCOME
</FN>


</TABLE>
No. 07-14-00003-CR

Jack Alonso Rock

 Appellant

v.

The State of Texas

 Appellee

§

§

§

§

From the 181st District Court

 of Potter County

April 21, 2015

Opinion by Justice Campbell

J U D G M E N T

Pursuant to the opinion of the Court dated April 21, 2015, it is ordered, adjudged

and decreed that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed.

Inasmuch as this is an appeal in forma pauperis, no costs beyond those that

have been paid are adjudged.

It is further ordered that this decision be certified below for observance.

o O o

FILE COPY
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-15-00009-CV

Byron C. Wilder and Barbara A. Wilder, Appellants

v.

CitiCorp Trust Bank, F.S.B.; CitiBank, N.A.; and CitiMortgage, Inc., Appellees

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 353RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-GN-12-001696, HONORABLE DARLENE BYRNE, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellants’ brief was due on March 11, 2015. On March 25, 2015, this Court

notified appellants that their brief was overdue and that a failure to respond by April 6, 2015, would

result in the dismissal of this appeal for want of prosecution. To date, appellant has not filed a brief

or a motion for extension of time. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of prosecution. See

Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a), 42.3(b).

__________________________________________

Cindy Olson Bourland, Justice

Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton, and Bourland

Dismissed for Want of Prosecution

Filed: April 21, 2015
Agricultural Marketing Service, Specialty Crops Program, Specialty Crops Inspection Division

This PATCH represents official guidance. This PATCH is scheduled to be incorporated into the 

document listed above. After incorporation into the document listed above this PATCH will 

become obsolete. USDA is an equal opportunity provider, employer, and lender.

PATCH # 43 Specks on Tomatoes (February 5, 2019)

SCI Division Inspection Series

Page 1 of 1

PATCH # 43

DOCUMENT: Tomatoes Shipping Point and Market Inspection Instructions, December 2005

REMARKS: Numerous White, Yellowish White to Gold Specks on Tomatoes. This 

physiological factor is not a defect. It may be described using general terms and reported in the 

“Other” or in the “Remarks” sections as not affecting grade, reported at applicant’s request. 

Research is ongoing and official USDA visual aids will be issued in the near future.
RUSF1 USDA is an equal opportunity provider and employer. 

Exhibit A RUSF Paste Primary Container Markings
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the quarterly report of Sun Network Group, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the six months ending June 30, 2002, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, T. Joseph Coleman, Chief Executive Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my
knowledge and belief:

         (1)      the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and result of
                  operations of the Company.




/s/T. Joseph Coleman
T. Joseph Coleman
Chief Executive Officer and Acting Chief Financial Officer
October 10, 2003

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
EXHIBIT 11.1

           SUNRISE INTERANATIONAL LEASING CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES

                         PER SHARE EARNINGS COMPUTATIONS
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                       Six Months Ended
                                                      September 30, 1998
                                                   1998                1997
                                              ---------------    ----------

<S>                                                <C>                <C>      
Basic Earnings Per Share:

   Weighted average number of
     common shares outstanding                      7,812,000          7,586,000
                                              ===============    ===============

       Net income                             $     1,502,000    $     1,835,000
                                              ===============    ===============
       Net income per common and
         common equivalent share              $          0.19    $          0.24
                                              ===============    ===============

Fully Dilutive Earnings Per Share:

   Weighted average number of                       7,812,000          7,586,000
   Common stock equivalents
     from assumed exercise of
     options and warrants                              27,000                --
                                              ---------------    ---------------
       Total shares                                 7,839,000          7,586,000
                                              ===============    ===============

       Net income                             $     1,502,000    $     1,835,000
                                              ===============    ===============

       Net income per common
         and common equivalent share          $         0.19     $          0.24
                                              ==============     ===============
</TABLE>

Net income per common and common equivalent share is computed using the weighted
average number of shares outstanding during each period.
#### FLEMING v. UNITED STATES.

No. 7846.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Nov. 14, 1939.

For former opinion, see 106 F.2d 452.

J. S. Edmondson, of Memphis, Tenn. (Dixon, Williams & Edmondson, of Memphis, Tenn., on the brief), for appellant.

Thomas E. Walsh, of Washington, D. C. (William McClanahan and C. P. J. Mooney, both of Memphis, Tenn., and Julius C. Martin, and Wilbur C. Pickett, both of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for the United States.

Before HICKS, SIMONS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge.

The appellant calls our attention to an obvious error in our former opinion, 6 Cir., 106 F.2d 452. We based our decision on the fact that the veteran’s policy of insurance lapsed June 21, 1919, for non-payment of premiums.

The facts are that the veteran had issued to him two war risk insurance policies for $5,000 each, one of which lapsed for non-payment of premiums in June. 1919. Premiums were paid on the remain-, ing policy, to and including April 1925, at which time $1,000 of it was converted into an ordinary life policy, No. K-481,273, and (he payment of premiums on the balance thereafter, discontinued.

The inferences to be drawn from appellant’s testimony, considering it as a whole, have a reasonable tendency to show that the insured was totally and permanently disabled in .April 1925, within the meaning of war risk insurance policies as defined by a regulation promulgated by the Director of the Bureau of War Risk Insurance under section 13 of the War Risk Insurance Act 1917, 40 Stat. 398, as amended, 40 Stat. 555, and section 5 of the World-War Veterans’ Act, 43 Stat. 608, 38 U.S.C.A. § 426.

That part of the opinion which sustained the judgment of the lower court in dismissing appellant’s petition on each of the-insurance policies on the veteran’s life is-modified as to $4,000 of the insurance in, force in April 1925, and as to that the judgment of the lower court is reversed for new trial in conformity with this modified opinion. Drew v. United States, 6 Cir., 104 F.2d 939.
Exhibit 32.1



SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION



The undersigned officers of AutoImmune Inc. (the Company) hereby certify that, as of the date of this statement, the Companys quarterly
report on Form 10-Q for the three months ended March 31, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Act) and that, to the best of their
knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition of the Company as of March 31, 2004 and the results of operations of the Company for the three months ended March 31, 2004.



The purpose of this certification is solely to comply with
Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code, as amended by Section 906 of the Sabarnes-Oxley Act of 2002. This statement is not filed for the purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or otherwise
subject to the liabilities of that Act or any other federal or state law or regulation.



|                   |  |                                         
|------------------ |  | ----------------------------------------
|Date: May 12, 2004 |  | /s/ Robert C. Bishop                    
|                   |  | Name: Robert C. Bishop                  
|                   |  | Title: Chief Executive Officer          
|                   | 
|                   |  | /s/ Heather A. Ellerkamp                
|                   |  | Name: Heather A. Ellerkamp              
|                   |  | Title: Director of Finance and Treasurer
EXHIBIT 21


                  CV REIT, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES


                   Subsidiaries of the Company






                                State of            Date of
     Name                     Incorporation       Incorporation


D.X. Properties, Inc.            Florida          November 27, 1989

CV Warehouse 75, Inc.            Florida          June 6, 1990

CV Warehouse 76, Inc.            Florida          June 6, 1990

CV Warehouse 78, Inc.            Florida          June 6, 1990

GRX Corp.                        Florida          November 16, 1990

Recreation Mortgages, Inc.       Delaware         December 23, 1991

W.X. Properties, Inc.            Florida          January 10, 1992

CX Properties, Inc.              California       January 15, 1992

LRX Properties, Inc.             Florida          March 19, 1993

Boca Mortgage Funding, Inc.      Florida          March 19, 1993