This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2019 UT 70

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PAUL TIMOTHY and JANICE TIMOTHY,

Petitioners,

v.

PIA, ANDERSON, DORIUS, REYNARD & MOSS, LLC,

and BRENNAN MOSS,

Respondents.

No. 20180228

Heard December 12, 2018

Filed December 16, 2019

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Third District, Salt Lake

The Honorable Todd M. Shaughnessy

No. 120905780

Attorneys:

Nelson Abbott, Provo, for petitioners

J. Ryan Mitchell, John P. Mertens, William O. Kimball, 

Salt Lake City, for respondents

JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE,

JUSTICE HIMONAS, and JUSTICE PEARCE joined.

JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 We granted certiorari in this case to address whether a 

law firm that deposited funds from a client into its trust account is 

a “transferee” under the former Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
TIMOTHY v. PIA ANDERSON DORIUS REYNARD & MOSS

Opinion of the Court

2

(UFTA).1 However, while this case was before the court of 

appeals, Petitioners allowed the judgment that formed the basis of 

their fraudulent-transfer claim to expire. Respondents filed a 

suggestion of mootness with this court. They argue that 

Petitioners have no remedy under the UFTA because they are no 

longer creditors, so even if Petitioners were to prevail on the 

transferee issue, it would not affect their rights.

¶2 We agree and dismiss the petition as moot. We further 

vacate the judgment of the court of appeals because Petitioners’

fraudulent-transfer claim became moot before that court’s opinion 

was issued. The judgment of the district court stands.

BACKGROUND2

¶3 Paul and Janice Timothy prevailed in a lawsuit against 

Thomas and Teri Keetch for, among other things, fraud and 

breach of contract. The Timothys obtained a judgment against the 

Keetches on May 6, 2009.3 But they were never able to collect it.

¶4 The record indicates that the Keetches took measures to 

avoid paying this debt, including depositing their money into an 

 

1 The UFTA was set out in Utah Code sections 25-6-1 to -14. It

was subsequently amended, renumbered, and renamed as the 

Uniform Voidable Transactions Act. This amendment was not 

effective until after the facts in this case took place. Accordingly, 

we cite to and apply the 2013 version of the UFTA unless 

otherwise noted. Additionally, we refer to such claims as

fraudulent-transfer claims rather than voidable-transaction 

claims.

2 When reviewing a district court’s grant of summary 

judgment, we view “the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”

Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation omitted).

Summary judgment is proper “if the moving party shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” UTAH R. CIV. P.

56(a).

3 Although the district court ruled in the Timothys’ favor on 

January 13, 2009, the final judgment of $76,451.17 plus attorney 

fees was not signed and filed until May 6, 2009. The latter date is 

when the statute of limitations on the judgment began to run.
Cite as: 2019 UT 70

Opinion of the Court

3

account held in a minor son’s name.4 Despite this, the Keetches 

testified at a supplemental hearing in March 2011 that they had no 

assets. And Brennan Moss, an attorney with the law firm of Pia, 

Anderson, Dorius, Reynard & Moss (PADRM), wrote letters 

stating that the Keetches did not have significant assets.

¶5 Although the Keetches claimed to have no assets, less 

than a week after the supplemental hearing, PADRM deposited 

into its trust account (IOLTA)5 a check for $50,000 drawn from the

minor’s bank account. The check had been written over a month 

earlier, and its memo line read: “Terry Keetch.” With 

representation from Moss, the Keetches later used $20,000 from 

those funds to make a down payment on a house.

¶6 The Timothys tried to access the proceeds in the IOLTA 

by obtaining a writ of garnishment against PADRM that required 

the firm to hold all funds owned by the Keetches.6 But PADRM

twice refused to accept service of the writ. And by the time it did 

accept service, the Keetches had moved all of their money out of

the IOLTA.

¶7 Finally, in August 2012, the Timothys sued both Moss 

and PADRM, alleging various theories of fraudulent transfer 

under the UFTA, civil conspiracy, and wrongful conduct.

¶8 Respondents filed a motion for partial summary 

judgment in the district court, arguing that they were not 

“transferees” under the UFTA and were thus immune from 

liability on the fraudulent-transfer claims. The district court 

agreed and granted Respondents’ motion, holding:

 

4 The district court found that the Keetches had access to the 

minor’s account and that much of the money deposited into that 

account was theirs.

5 In Utah, all lawyers or law firms must maintain an “Interest 

on Lawyers’ Trust Account” or “IOLTA,” which is “an interest or 

dividend-bearing trust account for client funds.” UTAH CODE JUD.

ADMIN. R. 14-1001(a).

6 After interest, and minus the $2,682.47 the Keetches had paid 

toward the judgment, the amount due under the judgment was 

$170,786.44 in July 2011, when the Timothys served PADRM with 

the writ of garnishment.
TIMOTHY v. PIA ANDERSON DORIUS REYNARD & MOSS

Opinion of the Court

4

Because the relevant provisions of the Utah Uniform 

Fraudulent Transfer Act were modeled on federal 

Bankruptcy law, the court is persuaded that 

“transferee” as used in the Act is most logically 

defined in the manner it has been defined in the 

Bankruptcy context. That is, a “transferee” must 

exercise dominion or control over the transferred 

asset. Here, [defendants] did not—and could not—

exercise dominion and control over funds held in 

the firm’s trust account. . . . Accordingly, 

[defendants were] not “transferee[s]” within the 

meaning of the Act and the [Timothys’] fraudulent 

conveyance claims fail as a matter of law. Those 

claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice.

The Timothys timely appealed that ruling.

¶9 On August 24, 2017, while the case was pending before 

the court of appeals, the Timothys filed in the district court an 

application to renew their judgment against the Keetches. In its 

ruling, the district court noted that judgments are valid for a 

period of eight years pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-5-202(1), 

and that “[a] judgment creditor may renew a judgment by filing a 

motion under Rule 7 [of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] in the 

original action before the statute of limitations on the original 

judgment expires.”7 The district court concluded that because 

more than eight years had passed since the original judgment was 

entered on May 6, 2009, the statute of limitations barred the

Timothys from renewing their judgment. Accordingly, the district 

court denied the Timothys’ renewal request.

 

7 To clarify, there are two different eight-year periods at play 

in relation to a judgment. First, section 78B-5-202(1) defines the 

duration of the judgment itself. Creditors can renew their 

judgments by filing a motion to renew before the original 

judgment expires. See UTAH CODE § 78B-6-1802; UTAH R. CIV. P.

58C. Second, section 78B-2-311 establishes the statute of 

limitations to commence a separate action on a judgment. At issue 

here is the expiration of the judgment itself under section 

78B-5-202(1) and the Timothys’ failure to renew their judgment 

under section 78B-6-1802. We are not presented with an argument 

about the statute of limitations to commence an action on the 

judgment under section 78B-2-311.
Cite as: 2019 UT 70

Opinion of the Court

5

¶10 However, neither party informed the court of appeals 

that the judgment had expired. And the court of appeals issued its

ruling on February 23, 2018, affirming the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment on the basis that PADRM “had no legal right 

to put the funds to its own use” and therefore “lacked the 

requisite dominion” to be considered a transferee under the 

UFTA. See Timothy v. Pia, Anderson, Dorius, Reynard & Moss LLC, 

2018 UT App 31, ¶ 27, 424 P.3d 937 (citation omitted).

¶11 The Timothys then petitioned for certiorari. We granted 

the petition on the issue of whether the court of appeals erred 

when it used the dominion-and-control test to determine whether 

PADRM was a “transferee” under the UFTA. Respondents then 

filed a suggestion of mootness, arguing that we should not reach 

the merits of the petition because the Timothys’ 

fraudulent-transfer claims became moot when their judgment 

expired. We exercise jurisdiction under Utah Code section 

78A-3-102(5).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 “On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 

appeals, not the trial court.” Fla. Asset Fin. Corp. v. Utah Labor 

Comm’n, 2006 UT 58, ¶ 8, 147 P.3d 1189 (citation omitted). And 

where “the decision of the court of appeals rests on questions of 

statutory interpretation, we review it for correctness, affording no 

deference to the court of appeals’ legal conclusions.” Id.

ANALYSIS

¶13 The merits of this case call for us to review the court of 

appeals’ interpretation of the UFTA sections 25-6-5(1)(a)–(b) and 

25-6-6(1). However, we must first address the mootness argument 

raised by Respondents. The question we face is whether a 

fraudulent-transfer claim based on a judgment becomes moot 

when the underlying judgment expires. We conclude that the 

Timothys’ fraudulent-transfer claim is moot and do not reach the 

merits of the issue presented. Further, because their claim became 

moot before judgment was entered in the court of appeals, we 

vacate that ruling.

I. MOOTNESS

¶14 The Timothys’ judgment against the Keetches was 

entered on May 6, 2009, and it expired as a matter of law eight 

years later on May 7, 2017. See UTAH CODE § 78B-5-202(1). When

they attempted to renew the judgment on August 24, 2017, the

district court denied their renewal motion as untimely. The 
TIMOTHY v. PIA ANDERSON DORIUS REYNARD & MOSS

Opinion of the Court

6

Timothys concede this voided their judgment, and they do not 

raise any argument that the underlying debt is somehow still 

collectible. Respondents argue this renders the Timothys’ 

fraudulent-transfer claim against them moot because the

Timothys are no longer creditors with a claim and therefore have 

no remedy under the UFTA. We agree with Respondents.8

¶15 “Mootness . . . presents one of the several bases that may 

prevent a court from reaching the merits of a case.” State v. Legg, 

2018 UT 12, ¶ 13, 417 P.3d 592. “An issue on appeal is considered 

moot when ‘the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of 

the litigants.’” State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840, 841 (Utah 1994) (citation 

omitted). Unlike standing, which must be determined by the facts 

that existed at the time the suit was filed, “[a]n appeal is moot if 

during the pendency of the appeal circumstances change so that 

the controversy is eliminated.” Salt Lake Cty. v. Holliday Water Co., 

2010 UT 45, ¶ 15, 234 P.3d 1105. And we typically will not decide 

an issue that becomes moot while on appeal. State v. Black, 2015 

UT 54, ¶ 10, 355 P.3d 981.

¶16 Although the Timothys concede that their judgment 

against the Keetches is void, they argue that their fraudulent-

 

8 Other courts that have addressed this issue have reached a 

similar conclusion. See, e.g., RRR, Inc. v. Toggas, 98 F. Supp. 3d 12, 

22 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[O]nce a judgment has been extinguished as a 

matter of law, any fraudulent transfer action based upon that 

judgment is also extinguished.”); cf. Or. Recovery, LLC v. Lake 

Forest Equities, Inc., 211 P.3d 937, 942 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (“[W]hen 

the judgments on which the UFTA claim is based expired, 

plaintiffs were no longer creditors of defendants and their 

[fraudulent-transfer] claims became moot.”); Carr v. Guerard, 616 

S.E.2d 429, 429–31 (S.C. 2005) (concluding that once plaintiff lost 

his status as a judgment creditor, he lost standing to bring his 

fraudulent-transfer action). But the Mississippi Supreme Court 

has made the important distinction that the expiration of the 

judgment, by itself, is not enough to invalidate a UFTA claim if 

the underlying debt is somehow still viable. See Parker v. 

Livingston, 817 So. 2d 554, 562 (Miss. 2002) (“Assuming arguendo 

that the Florida judgments had expired, the underlying debt 

remained. Therefore it was still within the chancellor’s power to 

entertain the fraudulent conveyance action, as all of the elements 

. . . are present.”).
Cite as: 2019 UT 70

Opinion of the Court

7

transfer claim against Respondents is not moot for a number of 

reasons. First, they assert that under Porenta v. Porenta, the UFTA 

requires a debtor-creditor relationship only at the time the action 

is filed—not throughout the entirety of the case—as evidenced by 

“the fact that the act uses present tense when defining the term 

‘claim.’” (Citing 2017 UT 78, ¶ 12, 416 P.3d 487.) But the Timothys 

misread the holding of Porenta.

¶17 In Porenta, after a married couple filed for divorce, the 

husband transferred his interest in the couple’s marital home to 

his mother to prevent that property from being distributed as part 

of the marital estate. Id. ¶¶ 1–3. While the divorce case was 

pending, the husband died, causing the divorce court to dismiss 

the case for lack of jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 5. Soon after, however, the 

wife sued the husband’s mother under the UFTA. Id. ¶ 6. 

Following trial, the district court ruled that the husband’s transfer 

of the marital home to his mother was fraudulent under the 

UFTA. Id. ¶ 8.

¶18 On appeal, the mother argued that a debtor-creditor 

relationship must exist at the time a UFTA claim is filed, and that 

any such relationship had been extinguished in that case because 

the husband died before the wife had filed her claim. Id. ¶¶ 1, 9. 

Relying on the use of present-tense language in the statute, see id.

¶ 12, we agreed with the mother that the UFTA does indeed 

“require[] an ongoing debtor-creditor relationship when a claim 

under the [UFTA] is filed.” Id. ¶ 1. But we ultimately determined 

that the wife’s claim survived the husband’s death because she 

had maintained a debtor-creditor relationship with his estate at 

the time of filing. Id. ¶¶ 36, 55. Specifically, the wife’s claim for the 

entire marital estate, “including the right to preserve the joint 

tenancy,” extended to the husband’s estate upon his death. Id.

¶ 36. So while Porenta does state that a debtor-creditor 

relationship must exist at the time of filing a UFTA claim, it does 

not follow that it is immaterial whether the debt is invalidated or 

satisfied during the pendency of the case.

¶19 Second, the Timothys point out that mootness is not 

concerned with whether all elements of a claim persist throughout 

the litigation, but instead, whether a court’s decision can affect the 

rights of the parties. As the Timothys ask for money damages 

against Respondents, they argue that granting this remedy will 

certainly affect their rights.

¶20 The Timothys are generally correct that a claim does not 

become moot merely because the facts that satisfy the elements of 
TIMOTHY v. PIA ANDERSON DORIUS REYNARD & MOSS

Opinion of the Court

8

the claim change during the litigation.9 So long as the requested 

judicial relief can affect the rights of the litigants, a change in the 

facts supporting each element of the claim does not necessarily 

equate to mootness. See Sims, 881 P.2d at 841; see also Holliday 

Water Co., 2010 UT 45, ¶ 15.

¶21 The Timothys give the example of a statutory rape 

prosecution, which does not become moot if the victim turns 

eighteen while the case is pending. And while that is certainly 

true, it is not analogous to the situation presented.

¶22 Here, we must interpret the requirements of the UFTA 

and the remedies the statute provides to determine whether the

Timothys’ claim is moot. When interpreting a statute, our primary 

objective is “to ascertain the intent of the legislature.” Bagley v. 

Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 10, 387 P.3d 1000 (citation omitted). “[T]he 

best evidence of the legislature’s intent is the plain language of the 

statute itself.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, “we look first to the 

plain language of the statute,” id. (citation omitted), while reading 

“the statute as a whole,” State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, ¶ 11, 217 P.3d 

265.

¶23 A plaintiff in a UFTA action seeks to collect a debt from 

a transferee rather than the original debtor. Accordingly, under 

the plain language of the statute, a plaintiff must be a creditor 

with a claim against the debtor to obtain any remedy against the 

transferee. See UTAH CODE § 25-6-5, -6, -8. The UFTA broadly 

defines “[c]reditor” as “a person who has a claim,” id. § 25-6-2(4), 

with “[c]laim” meaning “a right to payment,” id. § 25-6-2(3).

¶24 In defining what constitutes a fraudulent transfer, the 

UFTA makes clear that a transfer by an insolvent debtor is 

fraudulent only as to a creditor of that debtor. See id. § 25-6-5, -6 

(enumerating when “[a] transfer made or obligation incurred by a 

debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor” (emphasis added)).

 

9 See, e.g., State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ¶¶ 12–18, 214 P.3d 104 

(holding that despite a change in circumstances, the case was not 

moot because a legal controversy still existed between the parties);

State ex rel. Bluestone Coal Corp. v. Mazzone, 697 S.E.2d 740, 748 

(W. Va. 2010) (holding that “a case may survive mootness upon a 

change of circumstances,” so long as parties have a cognizable 

legal interest in the outcome of the litigation).
Cite as: 2019 UT 70

Opinion of the Court

9

¶25 Further, section 25-6-8, which establishes the remedies 

available under the UFTA, speaks of remedies available only to 

creditors. Section 25-6-8(1) states: “In an action for relief against a 

transfer or obligation under this chapter, a creditor . . . may obtain” 

various remedies. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, section 25-6-8(2) 

states: “If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the 

debtor, the creditor . . . may levy execution on the asset transferred 

or its proceeds.” (Emphases added.) 

¶26 Once the district court denied the Timothys’ motion to 

renew judgment, the Timothys concede they no longer had a 

viable judgment or a right to payment from the Keetches.10

Because they are not creditors with a claim, the Timothys can no 

longer obtain a remedy under the UFTA. Their 

fraudulent-transfer claim against Respondents is therefore moot.11

¶27 The premise of the Timothys’ argument to the contrary 

is that after an alleged fraudulent transfer, the transferee assumes 

independent liability for damages to the plaintiff even if the 

judgment expires. For this, the Timothys point to subsection

25-6-9(2), which states that a “creditor may recover judgment for 

the value of the asset transferred . . . against any subsequent 

transferee.”

¶28 But this language does not make a transferee liable for 

money damages even where an underlying debt has become void. 

The same section clarifies that “to the extent a transfer is voidable 

 

10 We note that the UFTA does not require that a claim be 

reduced to a judgment. A “[c]laim” is “a right to payment, 

whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, 

unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 

undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.” UTAH CODE

§ 25-6-2(3). So theoretically, if a plaintiff could somehow show 

that even though the judgment had expired, the plaintiff still had 

a viable right to payment, the UFTA action would not be moot.

11 It is important to clarify, however, that the expiration of a 

judgment does not automatically lead to the dismissal of a related 

fraudulent-conveyance claim. Like a statute of limitations, the 

expiration of the judgment is an affirmative defense that can be 

waived. This could create a complex issue in a UFTA case. 

However, because the Timothys have not raised this issue here, 

we do not address it.
TIMOTHY v. PIA ANDERSON DORIUS REYNARD & MOSS

Opinion of the Court

10

in an action by a creditor under Subsection 25-6-8(1)(a), the creditor 

may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred . . . or 

the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim, whichever is 

less.” Id. § 25-6-9(2) (emphases added). So a plaintiff under the 

UFTA must be a creditor, and recovery is generally capped at the 

amount of the plaintiff’s underlying claim. If a plaintiff has no 

underlying right to repayment from the debtor, the plaintiff has

no cause of action against an alleged transferee of the insolvent 

debtor’s assets.

¶29 We also note that the Timothys’ UFTA claim became 

moot before the court of appeals issued its opinion on February 

23, 2018. The Timothys concede their judgment became invalid 

when it expired. By operation of Utah Code section 78B-5-202, the 

Timothys’ judgment expired on May 7, 2017—eight years after the 

date of the judgment’s entry. And they failed to timely renew it. 

We agree with the district court’s determination that it “was 

deprived of jurisdiction to renew the Judgment due to the passage 

of time and the expiration of the Statute of Limitations.”

¶30 However, Respondents, who prevailed in the court of 

appeals, ask us to dismiss the petition but not vacate the court of 

appeals’ opinion. But when a case becomes moot before final 

adjudication, the proper result is vacatur and dismissal of the 

judgment. See Teamsters Local 222 v. Utah Transit Auth., 2018 UT 

33, ¶ 22, 424 P.3d 892.

¶31 To be clear, this was not the court of appeals’ error, but a 

failure of Respondents to file a suggestion of mootness with the 

court of appeals after the judgment had expired. However, the 

result is the same: we must vacate the court of appeals’ opinion 

because the case became moot before the opinion issued.

II. THE MOOTNESS EXCEPTION

¶32 Finally, the Timothys argue that even if their case is

moot, we should reach the merits of the petition because an 

exception to mootness applies here. We have recognized an 

exception to the mootness doctrine when the case: (1) “affect[s]

the public interest,” (2) “[is] likely to recur,” and (3) “because of 

the brief time that any one litigant is affected, [is] likely to evade

review.” State v. Steed, 2015 UT 76, ¶ 7, 357 P.3d 547. These 

elements form a conjunctive test, so one arguing for this exception 

to the mootness doctrine must establish the existence of each 

element.
Cite as: 2019 UT 70

Opinion of the Court

11

¶33 The Timothys argue that the transferee issue affects the 

public interest and that it may recur. Assuming this is correct, 

however, the Timothys have not shown that the transferee issue is 

one of inherently short duration that is likely to evade review. 

“The types of issues likely to evade review are those that are 

inherently short in duration so that by the time the issue is 

appealed, a court is no longer in a position to provide a remedy.” 

Guardian ad Litem v. State ex rel. C.D., 2010 UT 66, ¶ 14, 245 P.3d 

724; see also Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, ¶ 27, 16 P.3d 1233 

(holding that violation of the election code is likely to evade 

review because the election would always be over before the 

violation could be litigated).

¶34 But the issue of how “transferee” should be defined 

under the UFTA is not one of inherently short duration. There 

was ample time for the district court to rule on this issue. And if 

the Timothys had timely renewed their judgment against the 

Keetches, we could have reached the merits of this question and 

the court of appeals’ opinion would not need to be vacated.

¶35 Accordingly, we conclude that the exception to the 

mootness doctrine does not apply in this case.

CONCLUSION

¶36 The Timothys’ UFTA claim against Respondents is moot. 

Because the court of appeals issued its decision after the claim 

became moot, we must vacate that opinion. The judgment of the 

district court remains in place.