Anne Arundel County, Maryland v. Harwood Civic Association, No. 39, September 

Term, 2014 

Zoning—Comprehensive Zoning—Legislative Action—Litigation—Standing 

Plaintiffs wishing to challenge in Maryland courts the legislative action adopting a 

comprehensive zoning ordinance are required to demonstrate taxpayer standing—a 

standing doctrine required for challenges to legislation. The doctrine of property owner 

standing (i.e., a proximity-driven standing doctrine) is not the appropriate basis upon 

which a judicial challenge to a comprehensive zoning legislative action may be 

maintained. 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 

Case No.: 02-C-11-164569

Argued: 13 January 2015 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 

MARYLAND 

No. 39 

September Term, 2014 

 

ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, 

MARYLAND, et al. 

v. 

HARWOOD CIVIC ASSOCIATION, 

INC., et al. 

 

 

 Barbera, C.J., 

 Harrell,

Battaglia, 

 Greene,

 Adkins,

 McDonald,

 Watts, 

 JJ.

 

Opinion by Harrell, J.

Battaglia, Adkins, and McDonald, JJ., 

dissent. 

 

 

Filed: April 21, 2015 
In Anne Arundel County, Maryland v. Steve Bell, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.3d ___ 

(2015) (No. 29, September Term, 2014), filed immediately prior to the opinion in the 

present case, we concluded that the doctrine of property owner standing is not the 

appropriate test for a judicial challenge to a comprehensive zoning action. See id., Slip 

Op. at 1. Rather, plaintiffs wishing to challenge in Maryland courts the legislative 

process and final action adopting a comprehensive zoning are required to demonstrate 

taxpayer standing—the standing doctrine applicable to judicial challenges to legislative 

actions. Id. Accordingly, Bell answers the first two questions presented to us in this 

appeal.

1

 With that as a given, we proceed here to determine whether the Protestants in 

this matter alleged sufficiently a basis for their standing to challenge the adoption by the 

 

1

 We issued a writ of certiorari in the present matter to consider the following questions, 

along with three others:

1. Whether the prima facie presumption of aggrievement for 

nearby property owners established by Bryniarski v. 

Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 230 

A.2d 289 (1967) should be extended to cases in which a 

private citizen challenges the validity of legislatively enacted 

comprehensive zoning? 

2. Whether the considerations established as relevant to 

special aggrievement in Ray v. Mayor & City Council of 

Baltimore, 430 Md. 74, 59 A.3d 545 (2013) apply equally to 

cases in which a private citizen challenges the validity of 

legislatively enacted comprehensive zoning? 

These questions are nearly identical to those posed in Anne Arundel County, Maryland v. 

Steve Bell, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2015) (No. 29, September Term, 2014), differing

in phraseology only. Id., Slip Op. at 6. 
2

County Council for Anne Arundel County in 2011 of a comprehensive zoning ordinance 

for a large, different portion of Anne Arundel County than was involved in Bell. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Anne Arundel County (the “County”), a charter county, adopted in 2009 a 

comprehensive land use master plan, called a “General Development Plan” (“GDP”), for 

the entire County. During the run-up to that action, between 2007 and 2009, the County 

engaged in the process of preparing the GDP. The County’s Office of Planning and 

Zoning (the “OPZ”) prepared a draft of the GDP and submitted it to the County Council 

(the “Council”) in July 2009. After hearings on the draft (including several 

amendments), the Council approved the final GDP by Bill 64-09. 

Thereafter, beginning in late 2009, the County initiated a county-wide, systematic, 

and comprehensive review of zoning with a mind to implementing, as appropriate, the 

recommendations of the GDP through a series of comprehensive zoning bills. The 

County is comprised of seven Councilmanic Districts, which the OPZ combined into 

three groups for the purpose of its zoning review and the comprehensive zoning 

initiatives. One of these groups consisted of properties located in Councilmanic Districts 

VI and VII, which are together referred to colloquially as “South County.” 

Property owners desiring rezoning were given an opportunity to submit 

applications to the County. After posting online the received property owner 

applications, the OPZ evaluated the applications in light of the recommendations of the 

GDP, made a recommendation as to each application, and incorporated its various other 
3

recommendations in a draft of what became Bill 44-11.2 The County Planning Advisory 

Board reviewed the OPZ’s recommendations and, after holding public hearings and 

receiving testimony and written statements from the public, made its recommendations to 

the County Executive. 

In August 2011, the Council adopted Bill 44-11, with 40 amendments to the draft 

bill submitted by the OPZ. The County Executive signed Bill 44-11, but vetoed 16 of the 

amendments.3 The Council voted successfully to override ten of those vetoes.4 Bill 44-

11 became “final” and effective on 21 October 2011. 

On 6 October 2011, several non-profit community associations and individual 

property owners (collectively, the “Protestants” or, later in this opinion, “Respondents”) 

filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County a Complaint for Declaratory 

Judgment and Equitable Relief, in which they sought specifically a declaration that 

certain provisions of Bill 44-11 were void because assertedly they granted illegal spot 

zoning and were inconsistent with the recommendations of the GDP. In the Complaint, 

the individual property owners each alleged that they owned property and resided “near” 

 

2

 All of the properties relevant to this appeal are located in Councilmanic Districts VI and 

VII. 

3

 Specifically, the County Executive vetoed Amendments 9, 18, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 

34, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44, 45, and 46. 

4

 Specifically, the Council voted to override the vetoes to Amendments 9, 22, 25, 26, 27, 

30, 34, 37, 43, and 46. 
4

or “adjacent to” one of the properties rezoned by Bill 44-115 and that “the value of [their] 

property and [] enjoyment thereof will be substantially reduced as a result of this 

rezoning.” Owners of some of the properties rezoned by Bill 44-11 (collectively, the 

“Defendants”) filed motions to intervene, all of which were granted. 

The County and several Defendants filed motions to dismiss the Complaint, 

arguing that the Protestants (1) failed to exhaust required administrative remedies; 

(2) failed to state a claim for a declaratory judgment; and (3) did not have standing. 

Protestants filed a memorandum in opposition, but, before the Circuit Court ruled on the 

motions to dismiss, the Protestants filed on 27 January 2012 an Amended Complaint in 

which they added additional plaintiffs and defendants. The other allegations of the 

Protestants, however, remained the same. Most of the Defendants and the County 

responded with another wave of motions to dismiss, reiterating their previous arguments. 

One of the intervening Defendants (Alva Reta Trahan, hereinafter “Ms. Trahan”), in her 

motion to dismiss, argued, inter alia, that the Protestants “do not allege facts sufficient to 

establish taxpayer standing, and should dismiss [most of the counts of the complaint] 

because [Protestants] do not allege facts sufficient to establish common law standing.”6

 

Ms. Trahan argued that, as the Protestants had not alleged that Bill 44-11 would result in 

an increase in their taxes (and in fact alleged that Bill 44-11 would result in decreased 

 

5 See infra note 8. 

6

 Based on the cases she relied on in support of her argument as to “common law 

standing,” it appears that Ms. Trahan was referring in this assertion to property owner 

standing.
5

property values), they could not satisfy the requirements of taxpayer standing. The rest 

of Ms. Trahan’s arguments echoed those of the other Defendants. 

Protestants submitted a memorandum in opposition to Ms. Trahan’s motion to 

dismiss (hereinafter “May 2013 Memorandum”), in which they argued, among other 

things, that their allegations satisfied the requirements of Bryniarski v. Montgomery 

County Board of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 230 A.2d 289 (1967). Furthermore, in a 

footnote, Protestants noted that they “do not claim to have standing as taxpayers or that 

any of the plaintiff organizations have standing except as derivatively through their 

members.” (emphasis added). 

Following a hearing, the Circuit Court issued an Opinion and Order on 27 March 

2012, dismissing the Protestants’ Amended Complaint, but granting leave to amend 

within 30 days. The trial judge noted, in a section entitled “Disputed Legal Issues”: 

“Defendants claim that Plaintiffs lack both taxpayer and common-law standing. The 

Plaintiffs argue[] in response that their Complaint alleges harm to several individual 

plaintiffs sufficient to give them standing to bring this action. . . .” In a later footnote, the 

trial judge recognized that Protestants conceded in the May 2013 Memorandum that they 

did not claim to have taxpayer standing, and proceeded to consider whether they satisfied 

property owner standing. Relying on Bryniarski for the proposition that a plaintiff 

seeking a declaratory judgment that a zoning ordinance is unlawful must allege special 

harm with “definite” allegations and “competent evidence,” see Bryniarski, 247 Md. at 

144, 230 A.2d at 294, the Circuit Court concluded that all Protestants lacked standing. 

The Circuit Court reasoned that “[t]he mere fact that several [Protestants] own property 
6

adjacent to property rezoned by Bill 44-11 does not by itself meet the burden of proving 

special damage by competent evidence required in cases seeking a declaratory 

judgment.” The court’s reasoning continued that the Protestants’ allegations of reduced 

property values and enjoyment of the properties were “indistinguishable from those 

found insufficient in [Ray v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 203 Md. App. 15, 36 

A.3d 521 (2012), aff’d on other grounds, 430 Md. 74, 59 A.3d 545 (2013)].” Finally, the 

Circuit Court concluded that Protestants failed to state a claim for spot zoning.7

On 26 April 2012, the Protestants filed a Second Amended Complaint, adding 

additional plaintiffs and defendants yet again and seeking a declaration that seven of the 

 

7 Spot zoning is 

the arbitrary and unreasonable devotion of a small area within 

a zoning district to a use which is inconsistent with the use to 

which the rest of the district is redistricted . . . . It is . . . 

universally held that a “spot zoning” ordinance, which singles 

out a parcel of land within the limits of a use district and 

marks it off into a separate district for the benefit of the 

owner, thereby permitting a use of that parcel inconsistent 

with the use permitted in the rest of the district, is invalid if it 

is not in accordance with the comprehensive zoning plan and 

is merely for private gain. 

Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. 514, 546, 814 A.2d 

469, 488 (2002) (emphasis removed) (quoting Cassel v. Mayor and City Council of 

Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 355, 73 A.2d 486, 488–89 (1950)). Spot zoning is not invalid 

per se, but rather its validity “depends on the facts of each individual case.” Id. (quoting 

Tennison v. Shomette, 38 Md. App. 1, 8, 379 A.2d 187, 192 (1977)). 
7

amendments to Bill 44-11 and the rezoning of one additional property8 were void because 

they were inconsistent with the recommendations of the GDP, constituted illegal spot 

 

8

 Protestants challenged Amendments 9, 22, 26, 34, 37, 43, and 46. Each of these 

Amendments were vetoed by the County Executive, but the vetoes were overridden 

ultimately by the County Council. 

Protestants challenged also the rezoning of the property located at 1625 Old 

Generals Highway, Crownsville, Maryland (the “Wedding Chapel Property”). In his 

Veto Statement, the County Executive wrote that he would have exercised a line item 

veto of this rezoning, but declined to because it would have left this property without a 

classification, which was “neither desirable nor legal.” 

The following list contains each challenged rezoning its corresponding 

challenger(s):

1. Amendment 9 (rezoning 11.5 acres at 1308 Defense 

Highway) was challenged by Ronald Haritan. 

2. Amendment 22 (rezoning properties on the northeast 

and northwest corners of the intersection of Riva Road and 

West Central Avenue) was challenged by Elizabeth Caney 

and David Gray. 

3. Amendment 26 (rezoning properties at 1027, 1081, 

1085, 1125, 1131, and 1133 Mt. Zion-Marlboro Road) was 

challenged by Shirley Harrison. 

4. Amendment 34 (rezoning various properties on Cox 

Road and Polly Place) was challenged by Richard M. 

Paukstitus and Elizabeth Novotny and Curtis and Karen 

Pendleton. 

5. Amendment 37 (rezoning 1300 Defense Highway) was 

challenged by Ronald Haritan. 

6. Amendment 43 (rezoning 1541 Defense Highway) was 

challenged by Duane and Rosie Delaney. 

7. Amendment 46 (rezoning 2972 Solomons Island 

Road) was challenged from Greg Traintifillides and August 

and Betty Kruelle. 

8. The rezoning of 1625 Old Generals Highway was 

challenged by Roman and Kimberly Ferrer, Robert E. 

Lamothe, Dwayne Harman, Jan Orazem, Judith Anderson 

Harris, and Brian Johnson and Erica Zippel.

 (Continued...)
8

zoning, and exceeded the County’s zoning authority. The Protestants reiterated generally 

the proximity of their properties to the rezoned properties, and alleged further various 

discrete injuries, including reduced property values, reduced enjoyment of the properties, 

increased traffic, increased noise and light pollution, fear of damage to trees and 

mailboxes on their properties as a result of increased traffic, damage to the rural nature of 

the properties, increased run-off from storm water, and the pressure to permit additional 

and more intense commercial uses in the future. One Protestant, Shirley Harrison 

(“Ms. Harrison”), who owns and resides on a property “adjacent to” a property rezoned in 

Bill 44-11, reiterated her allegations that enjoyment of her property would be reduced 

substantially and that the rezoning would cause an increase in traffic. She alleged further 

in the Second Amended Complaint that she “also fears that her property taxes will 

increase due to the R5 zoning on the adjacent rezoned property.”9

 

In response to the Second Amended Complaint, some of the Defendants, including 

the County, filed new motions to dismiss, asserting that the Protestants lacked standing 

still, failed to state a judiciable controversy ripe for adjudication, failed to join all 

necessary parties, and failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. 

The Protestants, in their opposition to the motion to dismiss the second amended 

complaint filed by the County, reiterated, among other things, their argument that their 

 

(...continued)

The Protestants challenged previously Amendments 25, 27, and 30 to Bill 44-11, but no 

longer challenged those Amendments in their Second Amended Complaint. 

9

 This appears to be the first and only horseshoe in the record thrown by any Protestant in 

the direction of taxpayer standing. 
9

“allegations of special aggrievement are sufficient” to establish their standing. The 

Protestants analyzed in this portion of their opposition Bryniarski and Ray, as well as 120 

W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 407 Md. 253, 964 A.2d 

662 (2009) [hereinafter “Superblock I”]. In their discussion of Superblock I, the 

Protestants appear to have conflated our jurisprudence regarding property owner standing 

with that directed to taxpayer standing, when referring to the allegedly ultra vires action 

of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. Furthermore, ignoring apparently certain of 

the limited revisions made in the allegations of their Second Amended Complaint, the 

Protestants suggested, in a footnote, that “[a]ll of the individual Plaintiffs allege that they 

anticipate a reduction in the value of their property and their enjoyment of it.”

One of the Defendants (Boone’s Estates, Inc., hereinafter “Boone’s Estates”), 

focused pointedly in its motion to dismiss on the allegations of Ms. Harrison. Boone’s 

Estates argued that Ms. Harrison’s allegations failed to satisfy the “special damage” 

requirements of Bryniarski and that she failed to allege that she would be “specially 

affected . . . in a way different from that suffered by the public generally.” (emphasis 

removed). Specifically, Boone’s Estates contended that Ms. Harrison’s new allegations 

of an increase in traffic and an increase in property taxes did not constitute special harm 

because both harms would be regional in scope. Finally, Boone’s Estates maintained

that, “if it is argued that [Ms. Harrison] should have standing to challenge Amendment 26 

as a taxpayer, the argument must fail because [she] has not alleged that she will suffer 

pecuniary losses from the change in zoning.” 
10 

The Protestants filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss filed by Boone’s 

Estates as well. In this opposition the Protestants noted that Ms. Harrison’s revised 

allegations were sufficient to give her property owner standing, relying on Cassel v. 

Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 353, 73 A.2d 486, 488 (1950) 

(concluding, with minimal analysis, that property owners residing less than 100 feet from 

property rezoned by a piecemeal rezoning ordinance had standing to attack the validity of 

the amending ordinance), and Habliston v. City of Salisbury, 258 Md. 350, 355, 265 A.2d 

885, 887 (1970) (granting property owner standing in a challenge to a piecemeal 

rezoning). The Protestants did not address in any way Boone’s Estates arguments 

regarding taxpayer standing, nor did they disavow explicitly their earlier disavowal of 

taxpayer standing. 

Boone’s Estates replied to Protestants’ opposition and, after addressing what it 

called Ms. Harrison’s argument “that Bryniarski does not require a plaintiff in zoning 

cases at equity to make definite allegations of special damage,” Boone’s Estates turned to 

what it called Ms. Harrison’s “alternat[e]” argument that she had alleged sufficiently 

nonetheless “special damage.” Boone’s Estates argued that the potential increase in 

property taxes was neither “definite” nor “special,” as the same effects would be felt by 

all owners of property located in the area of parcels rezoned. 

Finally, the Protestants also opposed a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant 1625 

Limited. In this opposition, the Protestants maintained again that they enjoyed standing 
11 

as “adjoining property owners,” relying indiscriminately on cases discussing both 

property owner standing and taxpayer standing.10

Following a hearing, the Circuit Court issued on 11 October 2012 an Opinion and 

Order dismissing the Second Amended Complaint. The trial judge noted again, in a 

section entitled “Disputed Legal Issues,” that “Defendants claim that Plaintiffs lack both 

taxpayer and common-law standing. The Plaintiffs argue[] in response that their 

Complaint alleges harm to several individual plaintiffs sufficient to give them standing to 

bring this action.” After discussing Superblock I and Long Green Valley Association v. 

Bellevale Farms, Inc., 205 Md. App. 636, 46 A.3d 473, aff’d on other grounds, 432 Md. 

292, 68 A.3d 843 (2013), the trial judge concluded rightly that these two cases were 

distinguishable from the matter at hand by virtue of the fact that the protestants in those 

cases were challenging a land disposition agreement and an agricultural easement, 

respectively, not a comprehensive zoning ordinance. 

The trial judge grouped the plaintiffs by virtue of their respective allegations and 

addressed each group in turn to evaluate whether they enjoyed standing. Regarding 

Ms. Harrison, the trial judge noted, in a footnote, that “an increase in property value by 

 

10 Specifically, refuting 1625 Limited’s argument that the Protestants’ allegations were 

too “speculative,” the Protestants asserted: “[i]t is the potential for harm, not the 

existence of actual harm, that gives a plaintiff the right to sue.” In support thereof, the 

Plaintiffs directed the court’s attention to 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor and City 

Council of Baltimore, 407 Md. 253, 964 A.2d 662 (2009) [Superblock I] (discussing both 

property owner and taxpayer standing), Habliston v. City of Salisbury, 258 Md. 350, 265 

A.2d 885 (1970) (discussing property owner standing), Crozier v. County Comr’s of 

Prince George’s County, 202 Md. 501, 97 A.2d 296 (1953) (discussing property owner 

standing), and Citizens Planning & Housing Ass’n v. County Executive of Baltimore 

County, 273 Md. 333, 344, 329 A.2d 681, 687 (1974) (discussing taxpayer standing). 
12 

definition is not ‘harm’ and that a tax increase for more valuable property does not 

constitute a viable zoning complaint.” The Circuit Court went on to conclude that 

Ms. Harrison’s allegations were too generalized to satisfy the requirement of “special 

harm.” The trial judge concluded that all, save two, of the Protestants lacked standing to 

challenge Bill 44-11. As to the two, he concluded that Richard M. Paukstitus and 

Elizabeth Novotny (hereinafter the “Wildlife Complainants”) enjoyed property owner 

standing because of their allegation that the rezoning of a nearby parcel “will result in a 

loss of or a deterioration of the wildlife habitat and will destroy or drive off the currently 

abundant wildlife there.” This assertion was deemed sufficient to “satisf[y] the standard 

of special harm distinct from the general public as required in Habliston and Bryniarski.” 

Regarding whether the Protestants (including Ms. Harrison and the Wildlife 

Complainants) failed to state a claim, the Circuit Court, relying on the Preamble to 

Chapter 181 of the Acts of 2009 (House Bill 297),11 concluded that the rezoning actions 

 

11 Chapter 181 of the Acts of 2009 revised portions of then-Article 66B of the Maryland 

Code in direct response to our opinion in Trail v. Terrapin Run, LLC, 403 Md. 523, 943 

A.2d 1192 (2008), where we interpreted the meaning of the word “conform” as it 

appeared in Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl. Vol.), Article 66B, § 1.00(k). Chapter 181 

was designed expressly to abrogate our holding in Terrapin Run. The Circuit Court in 

the present case referred to this portion of the Preamble to Chapter 181:

While the holding of the Terrapin Run decision could be 

narrow and confined to the granting of special exceptions, the 

General Assembly is concerned that a broader interpretation 

of the decision could undermine the importance of making 

land use decisions that are consistent with the comprehensive 

plan; 

* * * 

 (Continued...)
13 

that Protestants challenged were “not ‘rare’ in the context of the huge number of 

properties contained in southern Anne Arundel County and otherwise impacted by the 

comprehensive rezoning process.” The trial judge rejected further Protestants’ argument, 

citing Cassel, 195 Md. at 354, 73 A.2d at 488, that “[t]he test of invalidity of a zoning 

ordinance [in a piece rezoning context] is whether it is arbitrary, unreasonable and 

discriminatory, and has no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or 

general welfare.” Relying on County Council of Prince George’s County v. Offen, 334 

Md. 499, 639 A.2d 1070 (1994) (challenging a comprehensive zoning action), the Circuit 

Court determined the appropriate standard to apply was whether Protestants alleged the 

County was acting “within its legal boundaries.” The court concluded that it “must find 

that the County Council acted ‘within its legal boundaries’ [because] it is required by 

statute to enact a GDP and comprehensive zoning.” Accordingly, the Circuit Court 

concluded that all Protestants failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted and 

dismissed the Second Amended Complaint. 

 

(...continued)

The people of Maryland are best served if land use decisions 

are consistent with locally adopted comprehensive plans;

* * * 

[And i]t is the intent of the General Assembly, as evidenced 

in Article 66B, §§ 1.03(e) and 4.09, that comprehensive plans 

should be followed as closely as possible while not being 

elevated to the status of an ordinance and that deviations from 

the plan should be rare[.] 

Chapter 181 of the Acts of 2009, at 981. 
14 

The Protestants appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, where they argued again 

that they enjoyed property owner standing by virtue of their proximity to various rezoned 

parcels. The Protestants noted first, without apparent exception, that “[i]n each case, the 

Second Amended Complaint also alleges that [the Protestants] believe that the challenged 

rezoning will substantially reduce the value of their property and their enjoyment of 

it . . . .” Although noting Ms. Harrison’s allegations of increased property taxes later in 

their brief, at no point did the Protestants discuss or advance anything that could be 

construed as an argument or authorities justifying taxpayer standing. The County, in its 

responsive brief, reiterated its arguments that the Protestants failed to satisfy Bryniarski’s 

standing requirements, and similarly did not discuss taxpayer standing further. 

The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, relying on its opinion in 

Bell v. Anne Arundel County, Md., 215 Md. App. 161, 79 A.3d 976 (2013)12, concluded 

that the doctrine of property owner standing applies to declaratory judgment actions 

challenging comprehensive zoning legislation. Applying those standards to the present 

case, the intermediate appellate court concluded that “the circuit court erred in 

concluding that [Protestants] lacked standing with respect to their challenges of 

Amendments 9, 22, 26, 37, and 46 and the portion of Bill 44-11 rezoning 1625 Generals 

Highway.” As for Amendment 43, the appellate court concluded that two of the 

Protestants lived close enough to the rezoned property to be almost prima facie

aggrieved. See Ray v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 430 Md. 74, 91, 59 A.3d 545, 

 

12 As noted at the outset, in Bell, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.3d ___, filed today, we reversed the 

holding of the Court of Special Appeals in Bell. 
15 

555 (2013). The panel of the court did not determine whether the Protestants alleged 

sufficiently “plus factors” supporting special damage, and instead remanded the case to 

permit the Protestants to amend their Complaint in light of the court’s discussion of “plus 

factors” in Bell. The panel did not discuss taxpayer standing, save for a vague and brief 

comment discussing the holding in Superblock I.

13

The intermediate appellate court concluded also that the trial judge erred when he 

applied the “legal boundaries test” because he should have reviewed the spot zoning 

allegations for “arbitrary, unreasonable, and discriminatory action.” After observing that 

one purpose of Chapter 674 of the Acts of 201314 was to “clarify[] a certain requirement 

 

13 Specifically, the intermediate appellate court stated, “[The proximity principles 

articulated in Ray v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 430 Md. 74, 59 A.3d 545 

(2013)] apply to judicial review of a board of zoning appeals decision, [Bryniarski v. 

Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 230 A.2d 289 (1967)]; a challenge 

to a municipality’s ‘allegedly illegal avoidance of urban renewal and procurement 

ordinances,’ [Superblock I, 407 Md. at 272, 964 A.2d at 673]; and a challenge ‘as an 

illegal or ultra vires action the approval of a proposed use of land subject to a [Maryland 

Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation] easement,’ [Long Green Valley Association 

v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 205 Md. App. 636, 688, 46 A.3d 473, 504, aff’d on other 

grounds, 432 Md. 292, 68 A.3d 843 (2013)].” None of these cases involved a challenge 

to a comprehensive zoning action. 

14 Chapter 674 of the Acts of 2013 was conceived as a “clean-up amendment” following 

the recodification project that resulted in 2012 in adoption of the Land Use Article. 

During the process of the code revision project (designed to “revise, restate, and recodify 

the laws of the State relating to zoning, planning, subdivision, and other land use 

mechanisms, . . . and generally relating to the laws of the State concerning land use,” 

Chapter 426 of the Acts of 2012, at 2198–99), the Land Use Code Revision Committee 

(“the Committee”) took pains to note carefully any and all substantive revisions brought 

about during the revision project, of which there were few. In the process of drafting the 

Land Use Article in 2012, the Committee identified a number of “significant issues” it 

confronted in the code revision process and deemed to be outside the purview of the 

Committee’s scope of work. Revisor’s Note, Maryland Code (2012), Land Use Article, 

 (Continued...)
16 

of consistency with the plan for certain zoning laws and other local law,” the court also 

concluded that “[b]ecause the circuit court did not have the opportunity to consider this 

legislative change and because [it was] already remanding the case, [the court would] 

remand on the plan consistency question, too.” Accordingly, the Court of Special 

Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court and remanded the case for further 

proceedings. 

The County and several Defendants (collectively, the “Petitioners”) petitioned us 

for a writ of certiorari, which we granted on 18 June 2014, to consider the following 

questions: 

1. Whether the prima facie presumption of aggrievement for 

nearby property owners established by Bryniarski v. 

Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 230 

A.2d 289 (1967) should be extended to cases in which a 

private citizen challenges the validity of legislatively enacted 

comprehensive zoning? 

2. Whether the considerations established as relevant to 

special aggrievement in Ray v. Mayor & City Council of 

Baltimore, 430 Md. 74, 59 A.3d 545 (2013) apply equally to 

cases in which a private citizen challenges the validity of 

legislatively enacted comprehensive zoning? 

3. Whether Maryland law required Bill 44-11 to be consistent 

with the County GDP?[15] 

 

(...continued)

§ 1-417. A number of the issues identified by the Committee were taken up and 

addressed the following year, during the 2013 Session of the Maryland General 

Assembly, by House Bill 1257, which was codified as Chapter 674 of the Acts of 2013. 

15 The writ identified five Questions. We consolidate Questions 3–5 into the question 

framed above because it represents the “essence” of each of those Questions. Questions 

3–5 were originally expressed as follows: 

 (Continued...)
17 

Anne Arundel County v. Harwood Civic Association, 438 Md. 739, 93 A.3d 288 (2014). 

 Of all the Petitioners, the County and Boone’s Estates filed discrete and separate 

briefs.16

 The County advanced initially several arguments for why the Protestants did not 

enjoy property owner standing. The County proceeded then to discuss the Protestants’ 

“alternative” argument that they were specially harmed “in a way different and distinct 

from the public at large.” Boone’s Estates’ arguments echoed largely those of the 

County, with one notable exception17: Boone’s Estates reiterated the arguments made to 

the Circuit Court regarding Ms. Harrison’s allegations. It also referenced in a footnote 

 

(...continued)

3. Whether Land Use Article § 1-417 (enacted in 2012) 

required that comprehensive zoning enacted by Anne Arundel 

County in 2011 to be consistent with the Anne Arundel 

County General Development Plan? 

4. Whether the title to Chapter 674, Laws of Maryland 2013 

retroactively required comprehensive zoning enacted by Anne 

Arundel County in 2011 to be consistent with the Anne 

Arundel County General Development Plan?

5. Whether Md. Code Ann., Art. 66B, § 1.04(f) required 

comprehensive zoning enacted by Anne Arundel County in 

2011 to be consistent with the Anne Arundel County General 

Development Plan? 

16 The remaining Petitioners—Alva A. Trahan, Julie A. Hill, Michael D. Hill, Robert A. 

Rawlings, Millie J. Rawlings, Barbara Messenger, Elizabeth Rommel, and John 

Rommel—adopted by reference the briefs filed by the County and Boone’s Estates. 

Because both briefs advance similar arguments, we refer to the arguments of both the 

County and Boone’s Estates collectively as those of the Petitioners. 

17 Boone’s Estates appears also to have conceded that the Wildlife Complainants alleged 

sufficiently special damages, such as demonstrating sufficiently property owner standing, 

to challenge Amendment 34 of Bill 44-11. 
18 

the Protestants’ (pre-Second Amended Complaint) May 2013 Memorandum (wherein the 

Protestants disclaimed taxpayer standing), concluding with the following statement: 

“Boone’s Estates here notes that [Ms. Harrison’s] allegations are insufficient to give rise 

to taxpayer standing.”18

 The Protestants, in their responsive brief, argued that they enjoyed property owner 

standing, but did not argue that they enjoyed taxpayer standing, although they did refer 

tangentially to the latter doctrine several times in general discourse. Ironically, the 

Protestants discussed the public policy underpinnings of taxpayer standing and the 

necessity for standing doctrines that enable citizens to protect themselves from 

“legislative overreach” and the “ultra vires act of a legislature.” The Protestants 

concluded their discussion of the policies behind taxpayer standing with a quotation from 

the taxpayer standing section of Superblock I, see Superblock I, 407 Md. at 266, 964 A.2d 

at 669, which they contextualized by saying: “The passage relates to the difficulties of 

pleading special aggrievement in a taxpayer standing case, but the difficulties faced by 

nearby landowners in a zoning case are no different.” Later, they suggested that their 

Second Amended Complaint “alleges specific reasons why the value of their property and 

their enjoyment of [it] will suffer from the ultra vires act of the County Council.” 

 So ends our excruciatingly exact recital of the procedural history of this case, 

which we set out at length as prelude to determining whether Respondents preserved their 

 

18 Boone’s Estates reiterated this observation and argument in a footnote in its reply to 

the Respondents’ brief. 
19 

ability to assert that they satisfied the requirements of taxpayer standing to maintain their 

suit.

II. TAXPAYER STANDING:

HOW THE RESPONDENTS’ SUIT FARES HERE

As we discussed in Bell, in order to establish eligibility to maintain a suit under the 

taxpayer standing doctrine, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that the complainant is a taxpayer; 

and (2) that the suit is brought, either expressly or implicitly, on behalf of all other 

taxpayers.” State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 547, 92 

A.3d 400, 457 (2014). “Once a complainant establishes eligibility to bring a suit, he, she, 

or it must allege . . . both a governmental action that is illegal or ultra vires and that the 

action may affect injuriously the taxpayer’s property (meaning that it reasonably may 

result in a pecuniary loss to the taxpayer or an increase in taxes).” Bell, Slip Op. at 38; 

see State Center, 438 Md. at 540, 92 A.3d at 453 (quoting Kendall v. Howard County, 

431 Md. 590, 605, 66 A.3d 684, 693 (2013) (quoting Superblock I, 407 Md. at 267, 964 

A.2d at 669–70))). Finally, “there must be a ‘nexus’ between the showing of potential 

pecuniary damage and the challenged act . . . which is true not only for the complainant, 

but also all similarly situated taxpayers.” Id., Slip Op. at 39. 

 Respondents here did not satisfy the requirements of the taxpayer standing 

doctrine on this record, or waived any arguments they may have had to that effect. As 

noted above, Ms. Harrison—the only Respondent to make any arguable effort at 
20 

demonstrating taxpayer standing19—alleged the following in the Second Amended 

Complaint: 

Plaintiff Shirley Harrison owns and resides at 1037 Marlboro 

Road, Lothian, Maryland, adjacent to the property rezoned by 

Amendment 26 to Bill 44-11, as described below. She 

believes that her enjoyment of her property will be 

substantially reduced by the new intense residential 

development that would be made possible by this rezoning. 

She believes that development activity enabled by the 

rezoning would cause an increase in traffic, both during and 

after construction, causing driving to and from her residence 

to become more difficult. She also fears that her property 

taxes will increase due to the R5 zoning on the adjacent 

rezoned property.

Unlike the complainants in Bell, see Slip Op. at 46–48, Ms. Harrison alleged that her 

taxes would be increased, satisfying the requirement that she allege pecuniary loss. We 

shall assume for purposes of our analysis that she is, in fact, a taxpayer by virtue of her 

ownership of real property located at 1037 Marlboro Road, Lothian, Maryland.20 We 

shall assume further that Ms. Harrison’s allegations of “impermissible” spot zoning 

 

19 “Where one party has standing, we do not inquire typically as to whether another party 

on the same side also has standing.” Bell, Slip Op. at 45; see State Center, LLC v. 

Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 550, 92 A.3d 400, 458 (quoting Board of 

Supervisors of Elections v. Smallwood, 327 Md. 220, 233 n.7, 608 A.2d 1222, 1228 n.7 

(1992) (quoting Board of License Commissioners v. Haberlin, 320 Md. 399, 404, 578 

A.2d 215, 217 (1990))). 

20 In State Center, 438 Md. at 550–52, 92 A.3d at 458–60, we considered whether the 

plaintiffs in that case were taxpayers. There, the plaintiffs were comprised of limited 

partnerships, limited liability corporations, and eight general Maryland corporations. 

State Center, 438 Md. at 550–51, 92 A.3d at 459. We “presumed” that the general 

Maryland corporations were taxpayers, although they did not allege specifically in their 

amended complaints that they paid taxes. Id. n.59, 92 A.3d at 459 n.59. 
21 

satisfy the requirement of alleging a governmental action that is illegal or ultra vires,

21 in 

light of the “lenien[cy]” with which that requirement has been applied in the past. See

State Center, 438 Md. at 555–56, 92 A.3d at 462 (“This requirement has been applied 

leniently and seems rather easy to meet . . . .”). The added allegations in the Second 

Amended Complaint, however, even buttressed by our assumptions, do not bestow 

taxpayer standing on Ms. Harrison, as such an argument has been waived.22 As noted 

above, after disclaiming standing as taxpayers in their May 2013 Memorandum, 

Respondents alleged nonetheless additional facts that, generally construed, could be a 

nod presumably in the direction of taxpayer standing. At no point before the Court of 

Special Appeals or before us, however, did any Respondent assert that he, she, or it 

enjoyed taxpayer standing or satisfied the requirements thereof. See Maryland Rules 8-

131(b) and 8-504(a)(6). “[A]rguments not presented in a brief or not presented with 

particularity will not be considered on appeal.” Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 552, 

735 A.2d 1061, 1074 (1999) (refusing to consider an argument when one statement to 

that effect was “lumped in” with another argument); see Comptroller of Treas. v. Aerial 

 

21 Respondents alleged that Amendment 26 (the amendment challenged specifically by 

Ms. Harrison) was “inconsistent with the GDP and is therefore in violation of Maryland 

Code Article 66B,” that, in adopting Amendment 26, the County “acted arbitrarily and 

capriciously, in violation of Maryland law,” that Amendment 26 “constitute[s] 

impermissible spot zoning,” and that the zoning changes effected by Amendment 26 

“[were] not guided by the GDP, and [are] therefore in violation of § 18-2-102 of the 

Anne Arundel County Code.”

22 Because Respondents waived the taxpayer standing argument, we need not consider 

whether Ms. Harrison alleged sufficiently that Respondents’ suit was brought on behalf 

of all other taxpayers situated similarly, or if she alleged sufficiently a nexus between the 

challenged illegal or ultra vires act and pecuniary loss suffered by her. 
22 

Prods., Inc., 210 Md. 627, 644–45, 124 A.2d 805, 814 (1956); see also Mathis v. 

Hargrove, 166 Md. App. 286, 318, 888 A.2d 377, 396 (2005); Pool v. State, 207 Md. 

App. 614, 633, 53 A.3d 479, 491 (2012). As the analysis in Bell demonstrates, it can

come as no surprise to Respondents that the longstanding requirements of taxpayer 

standing apply to judicial challenges to comprehensive zoning actions. Their failure to 

grapple with that requirement dooms them in this case. 

III.CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court to dismiss Respondents’ Second Amended 

Complaint was correct. Complainants must satisfy the requirements of taxpayer standing 

to challenge comprehensive zoning legislation. Bell, Slip Op. at 48. Because 

Respondents waived any argument they may have had that they enjoyed taxpayer 

standing, they cannot sustain their suit, which must be dismissed. 

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 

SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; 

CASE REMANDED TO THAT 

COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO 

AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 

CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE 

ARUNDEL COUNTY; COSTS IN 

THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF 

SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID 

BY THE RESPONDENTS. 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 

Case No.: 02-C-11-164569 

Argued: January 13, 2015 

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND 

 

No. 39

September Term, 2014 

 

ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND, et al. 

v. 

HARWOOD CIVIC ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. 

 

Barbera, C.J. 

Harrell

Battaglia 

Greene

Adkins

McDonald

Watts, 

JJ.

 

Dissenting Opinion by Adkins, J., which 

Battaglia and McDonald, JJ., join. 

 

Filed: April 21, 2015 
 I respectfully dissent for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Anne Arundel 

County, Maryland v. Bell, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2015) (No. 29, September Term, 

2014, filed April 21, 2015). 

 Judge Battaglia and Judge McDonald authorize me to state that they join in the 

views expressed in this opinion.