* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

REVISED MARCH 26, 2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-10472

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

DEARL DUANE ADAMS,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:08-CR-12-1

Before GARZA, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Dearl Duane Adams appeals his guilty plea conviction and sentence for

conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. § 846. He argues

several points of error, none of which were raised in the district court.

Accordingly, his arguments are subject to review for plain error only. United

States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58–59 (2002).

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 16, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 09-10472

2

Adams argues that the district court erred by accepting his guilty plea

because his plea agreement was void for lack of consideration. He also argues

that his plea was obtained in violation of his due process rights and Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 11 because the district court and magistrate judge failed

to assure that it was knowingly and voluntarily entered. Citing his plea

agreement’s alleged lack of consideration, Adams complains that he did not

understand the scope of the Government’s promises and that the magistrate

judge failed to advise him that he obtained no benefits under the plea bargain.

This court has never expressly held that consideration is required to

support a valid plea bargain. United States v. Smallwood, 920 F.2d 1231, 1239

(5th Cir. 1991). Moreover, Adams’s arguments discount the Government’s

promise in the plea agreement to advise the sentencing court of the extent of

Adams’s cooperation. As that promise bound the Government to do something

it was not otherwise required to do, Adams has not shown that his bargain

lacked consideration. His arguments do not establish error, plain or otherwise.

Adams next contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and

voluntarily entered because the magistrate judge advised him during the

rearraignment hearing thatthe degree of his cooperation during his presentence

interview would affect the severity of his sentence. However, Adams has not

established that the statement, made after he entered his plea, had any bearing

on his decision to plead guilty. Cf. United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 568

(1992) (holding that statements made at sentencing, after the defendant entered

his plea, could not have influenced the defendant’s decision to plead guilty).

Finally, Adams contends that the magistrate judge’s same statement

constituted structural error because it prevented him from exercising his

Fifth-Amendment right against self-incrimination. Adams has not established

that the statement, referencing the fact that Adams’s offense level could be

reduced pursuant to § 3E1.1(a) for acceptance of responsibility, conveyed to him
No. 09-10472

3

that he was compelled to give up that right. See United States v. Kleinebreil, 966

F.2d 945, 953–54 (5th Cir. 1992).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.