* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-20839

Summary Calendar

SHEENA MORGAN, and Minor

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

STATE OF TEXAS; CITY OF PLANO; CITY OF MCKINNEY; COUNTY OF

COLLIN; COURT 199; COURT 211; COLLIN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,

and Public and Private Elementary Schools; COUNTY OF DENTON; CITY

OF DENTON; CITY OF FRISCO; COUNTY OF DALLAS; CITY OF DALLAS;

CITY OF ADDISON; CITY OF ARLINGTON; COUNTY OF TARRANT;

COUNTY OF WITCHITA FALLS; CITY OF WITCHITA FALLS; COUNTY

OF BELTON; CITY OF KILLEEN; CITY OF HOUSTON; COUNTY OF

TRAVIS; CITY OF AUSTIN; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION;

SACRAMENTO COUNTY; PLACER COUNTY; STATE OF CALIFORNIA;

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; UNITED STATES JUSTICE

DEPARTMENT; DOES I THROUGH XXX

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas, Houston

USDC No. 4:06-CV-2068

Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 23, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-20839

2

This appeal arises from the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of

Sheena Morgan’s (“Morgan”) civil rights action against numerous state, federal,

and private defendants. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment

of the district court against Morgan. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Morgan, proceeding pro se, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against

numerous governmental and private entities on May 24, 2006, bringing twentyfour causes of action including constitutional violations, medical malpractice,

custody disputes, negligence, and more. Many of her causes of action concern

the government’s alleged activity or inactivity with respect to Morgan’s custody

of an unnamed minor, allegations of abuse impacting the custody arrangement,

and Morgan’s own arrest and imprisonment. Morgan purportedly filed suit on

behalf of herself and the unnamed minor. 

Review of Morgan’s complaint reveals that her causes of action are based

on events that allegedly occurred between 2000 and 2003. As a result, the

district court sua sponte ordered Morgan to show cause why her claims should

not be dismissed as time-barred. The district court also ordered Morgan to

provide the date of birth of the unnamed minor and to identify what claims she

was bringing on behalf of the minor and the factual bases for any such claims.

In response, Morgan asserted that she was unaware ofthe statute of limitations.

She further asserted that she did not want to reveal any circumstances

regarding the minor in order to protect the minor’s privacy. The district court

expressed sympathy, but dismissed the action with prejudice on July 21, 2006.

Morgan appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
No. 06-20839

1

In Paragraphs 93 and 105 of her complaint, Morgan does assert that she was denied

legal representation from 2000 to the present; however, she does not identify any legal

proceedings that occurred after 2003 in which she could have been denied legal representation.

While we are to construe pro se pleadings liberally, conclusory allegations or legal conclusions

masquerading as factual conclusions are not sufficient to prevent dismissal. See Taylor v.

Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002). Therefore, as there are no factual

allegations to support her claims regarding the denial of legal representation after 2003, those

claims do not provide a basis for maintaining this suit.

2 We note that the district court purported to dismiss the claims of the unnamed minor

with prejudice. However, because Morgan was proceeding pro se, she had no authority to bring

claims on behalf of the minor. See Johnson v. Lufkin Daily News, 48 F. App’x 917, 917 (5th

Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (per curiam) (holding that father could not proceed pro se on behalf

of his wife and her child); see also Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d 123, 124-25

(2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (raising the issue sua sponte and holding that father could not

appear pro se on behalf of his child). Therefore, the district court’s judgment should not be

considered binding with respect to the minor.

3

II. DISCUSSION

Morgan has brought all of her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With

respect to § 1983 claims, the applicable statute of limitations is that which the

state would apply in an analogous action in its courts. Bourdais v. New Orleans

City, 485 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 2007). In Texas, the applicable limitations

period for Morgan’s causes of action is either one or two years, depending on the

specific claim. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.002(a), 16.003(a)

(Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006); see also Stanley v. Foster, 464 F.3d 565, 568 (5th

Cir. 2006). In this case, all of Morgan’s claims concern events that occurred

between 2000 and 2003, which is more than two years before she filed suit.1

Morgan has made no arguments to the contrary on appeal. Accordingly,

Morgan’s § 1983 claims are time-barred, and the district court correctly

dismissed them.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court

against Morgan.2

AFFIRMED.