Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Aljohani, 2021 IL App (1st) 190692

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

ABDULLAH ALJOHANI, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. First District, Fourth Division 

No. 1-19-0692

Rehearing denied

Filed

January 25, 2021

January 28, 2021

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 15-CR-6105; the 

Hon. Timothy Joseph Joyce, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Stephen F. Hall, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, 

Iris G. Ferosie, and Shawn M. Concannon, Assistant State’s 

Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the 

court, with opinion.

Justices Lampkin and Reyes concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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OPINION

¶ 1 After a bench trial in Cook County circuit court, defendant Abdullah Aljohani, age 27, was 

convicted of the first degree murder of his roommate, Talal Aljohani, who was found stabbed 

to death in their apartment on March 15, 2015. Although they shared the same last name, the 

victim and defendant were not related. Defendant was sentenced to 23 years with the Illinois 

Department of Corrections (IDOC). 

¶ 2 On this direct appeal, defendant claims (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion 

to suppress evidence, on the ground that the police officers’ warrantless entry into the 

apartment immediately after the murder was not justified by the community caretaking 

exception, (2) that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of defendant’s flight as 

circumstantial evidence of his guilt, and (3) that the State’s evidence was insufficient either to 

prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt or to justify denying defendant’s motion for 

a directed finding. 

¶ 3 For the following reasons, we do not find these claims persuasive and affirm.

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 In brief, the State’s evidence at trial established that defendant’s downstairs neighbor heard 

sounds of wrestling and screaming coming from the apartment above. When the neighbor 

knocked on defendant’s apartment door, defendant answered and stated that there had been an 

argument but everything was okay. Shortly thereafter, officers found the victim stabbed to 

death inside the apartment, with a broken and bloody knife nearby. The parties stipulated that 

a forensic chemist would testify that DNA from blood on the knife blade matched the victim 

and DNA found on the knife handle matched defendant’s DNA.

¶ 6 I. Pretrial Proceedings

¶ 7 At the suppression hearing on defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress, defendant bore the 

burden of proof, and he argued that the officers’ “entry” into his apartment was illegal without 

a warrant and anything “recovered pursuant to the illegal entry” should be suppressed. 

¶ 8 The defense called Officer Banito Lugo of the Chicago Police Department as its sole 

witness. Lugo testified that, on March 15, 2015, at 4:15 a.m., he and his partner, Officer 

Anthony Richards, responded to a call concerning a battery in progress at defendant’s 

apartment building. Khalid Ali, a neighbor and the person who had called the police, met them 

outside the building. Ali told the officers that he understood Arabic and that he had heard a 

loud verbal argument between two men in Arabic in the apartment above, which was followed 

by the sound of two people wrestling. Ali then heard a person asking “are you ok, get up,” and 

he heard the wrestling stop. Ali further informed the officers that he went upstairs, where he 

spoke with defendant, and that defendant stated that the victim, whom defendant described as 

his brother, was in the bathroom. 

¶ 9 Lugo testified that, after Ali let them into the building, they went upstairs and knocked on 

defendant’s apartment door and talked to defendant. Defendant stated in English that 

everything was okay. The officers asked if they could speak with his “brother,” and defendant 

replied that he was sleeping. The officers went back downstairs, where Ali was “adamant” that 

someone was seriously injured, so the officers went back upstairs and knocked again on 
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defendant’s door. This second time, the officers knocked for five minutes and received no 

response. Then they exited the building and returned to their squad vehicle, where they 

punched in a code to indicate that they had completed their assignment and everything was 

okay. Despite punching in the code, the officers did not depart. Instead, they drove around the 

building and into the alley behind the building because, as Officer Lugo explained, 

“[s]omething didn’t feel right.” After parking, they observed that the back gate was open. The 

officers then proceeded into the yard and found that the garage door was open and the side 

entrance to the back of the building was also open. The officers entered the side entrance and 

went back up to the second-floor apartment, where they observed that the back door to the 

apartment was “wide open.” 

¶ 10 Lugo testified that they knocked on the back door and announced their “office” but received 

no response. The officers entered the apartment, walking first into a hallway where they did 

not observe anything unusual. The officers then decided to look through the apartment room 

by room, until they arrived at the southeast bedroom, where they observed the victim lying on 

a mattress. Observing no wounds at first, the officers again announced their “office” and 

received no response. After determining that the victim was unresponsive and not breathing, 

they called for an ambulance. Defendant was no longer present in the apartment. The officers 

were not asked any questions about any further search after the discovery of the body. 

¶ 11 Prior to closing argument on the suppression motion, the trial court asked defense counsel 

what exactly defendant was seeking to suppress. Counsel responded that there was a 

subsequent search of the apartment and it was the items recovered during this subsequent 

search that defendant was seeking to suppress. The court then asked: “So the defense is seeking 

to suppress anything the State wants to put into evidence that was recovered from this 

apartment up on the second floor?” When both parties agreed, the court explained that it wanted 

to ensure that “we’re on the same page with respect to what the defense is trying to do.” When 

both parties said yes, the court stated: “I’ll consider that a stipulation.” 

¶ 12 In closing, the State argued that “this falls squarely within the emergency aid doctrine.” 

The State also argued forfeiture by wrongdoing and inevitable discovery. With respect to 

forfeiture, the State argued that defendant cannot be allowed to silence the only other person 

who would have been able to consent to the police’s entry to help him. The defense argued that 

“there was nothing unusual” about defendant’s behavior when he answered the door and the 

officers did not ask him at that time for consent to enter the apartment because they had no

concerns. When the officers drove to the back of the building, they had no information about 

how long the gate or the door had been open. 

¶ 13 After listening to the testimony and the arguments of counsel, the trial court found, “first[,] 

I believe Officer Lugo.” The court observed that, when the police went back up to the secondfloor apartment a second time and knocked for a solid five minutes at “4:15 in the morning,” 

the fact that no one answered “clearly gave them pause,” and “that’s why” they went 

downstairs and drove to the back of the building. At the back of the building, they observed “a 

garage door open, the back gate open, this side door to the apartment building open,” and the 

back door to the apartment open. The trial court found it “reasonable” that “they wanted to 

make sure that no one is in any distress.” The trial court found that the officers “were not 

investigating a crime, they had no reason to believe a particular crime had taken place. They 

wanted to make sure that everyone was okay.” This desire was further supported by the fact 
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that the police knew that there had just been “some kind of physical altercation *** where 

somebody was heard to say are you okay, get up.” 

¶ 14 In conclusion, the trial court found that “the circumstances herein taking place without any 

warrant by the police falls squarely within the community caretaking function,” and the motion 

to suppress was denied.

¶ 15 II. Trial

¶ 16 The bench trial proceeded immediately after the conclusion of the pretrial suppression 

hearing, and the parties stipulated that, if called to testify, Officer Lugo would provide the 

same testimony that he had provided during the pretrial suppression hearing. The trial court 

accepted the stipulation, “[s]ubject to an appreciation of whatever he testified to in the motion 

was admissible in the motion and might not be admissible at trial, [and] would be so considered 

by the Court.” 

¶ 17 The State’s first witness at trial was Abduilhadi Aljohani, who testified that he was a police 

officer in Medina, Saudi Arabia. After identifying a photo of the victim as his brother, the 

witness testified that the victim grew up in Saudi Arabia and came to Chicago in December 

2014 to attend college. In Chicago, the victim lived with defendant. Although the victim and 

defendant share the same last name, they were not related. The witness testified that he last 

spoke to the victim on the telephone the day before the victim died. 

¶ 18 The State’s next witness was Khalid Ali, the neighbor who had originally contacted the 

police. Ali, 46 years old, testified that he was born in Somalia and can understand Arabic. 

Since 2004, he has been a taxicab driver in Chicago. Ali lives with his wife and five children 

on the first floor of the same building where defendant and the victim lived on the second floor. 

Defendant and the victim moved into the building in December 2014, and Ali met them in 

January 2015. When they spoke together, they spoke mainly in Arabic. 

¶ 19 Ali testified that in the early morning hours of March 15, 2015, his wife woke him up. 

After he woke up, he heard, first, the sounds of wrestling, and then he heard yelling and 

screaming, all coming from the upstairs apartment. Ali then heard defendant calling the 

victim’s first name, “Talal, Talal,” and next he heard “ah, ah,” which sounded to him like 

“panic.” Ali also heard defendant stating “come, come” which he understood to mean “stand 

up or wake up.” Ali went upstairs and knocked on defendant’s door, and defendant answered. 

When Ali asked “what happened,” defendant replied that there was a small argument, but then 

defendant gave a two-thumbs up sign and stated “everything is okay.” 

¶ 20 Ali testified that, after defendant shut the door, Ali returned to his own apartment. 

However, after a few minutes, Ali went upstairs and knocked on defendant’s back door. When 

defendant opened the back door, defendant stated again that “everything is okay.” Ali asked 

where the victim was, and defendant replied that the victim was in the bathroom. However, 

through the open back door, Ali could observe the inside of the bathroom and could observe 

that the victim was not in it. The bathroom is directly in front of the back door. Ali testified 

that he had been in defendant’s apartment before and there is only one bathroom. Ali asked 

defendant again where the victim was, and this time defendant replied that the victim was on 

the telephone talking with his family.

¶ 21 Ali testified that he asked defendant if he could observe the victim, and defendant repeated 

that the victim was on the telephone talking with his family. Ali asked again, and then 
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defendant appeared “a little bit mad” and stated “do whatever” and closed the door. After 

returning to his own apartment, Ali called 911 to “mak[e] sure that Talal is okay.” When the 

officers arrived, Ali met them outside, told them what he had heard, and let them into the 

building. 

¶ 22 On cross-examination, Ali testified that, when his wife woke him up, she told him that she 

had heard defendant and the victim singing earlier that morning, at 1 or 2 a.m. Twenty or thirty 

minutes before she woke him up, she heard something being thrown and someone expressing 

pain and saying “awe.” After Ali heard the wrestling, he called the owner of the building and 

told him the “upstairs guys are fighting.” 

¶ 23 Ali testified that he had had a good relationship with defendant, and he knew that both 

defendant and the victim were attending school. Ali had never heard defendant and the victim 

argue before and had never observed the victim drinking alcohol. Ali did not know whether 

defendant and the victim had invited anyone to their apartment that evening. The noise that Ali 

heard sounded to him like two people wrestling, but it could have been more people. Ali added 

that, after he heard defendant saying “Talal, Talal,” he heard “somebody dragging like a leg or 

something” on the floor and somebody walking. Ali testified that the shower had a glazedglass door and he could tell if someone was taking a shower. However, he admitted that he 

could not observe the bathroom sink from the back door. 

¶ 24 David Ryan testified that he recently retired from the Chicago Police Department but that 

he had been the forensic investigator who examined defendant’s apartment after the homicide. 

Ryan arrived on the scene at 5:50 a.m. on March 15, 2015, where he observed the victim lying 

on one of two mattresses in the southeast bedroom. Ryan observed a wound on the victim’s 

hip, a large wound in the victim’s midsection, and the victim’s bloody shirt. When Ryan moved 

a suitcase on the floor of the southeast bedroom, he found a steak knife with a 31⁄2-inch handle 

and a 4-inch blade with blood on the blade. In the same bedroom, Ryan found a second steak 

knife that was broken in two, with the 4-inch blade broken off the handle. Ryan obtained 

fingernail scrapings from the victim at the scene. Ryan also observed blood on the lower part 

of the south wall in the southeast bedroom near the light switch, on the west wall, and on the 

exterior side of the bedroom door. 

¶ 25 Dr. Kristin Escobar, an assistant medical examiner and pathologist, testified that she 

performed the autopsy on the victim. During the autopsy, she observed injuries to his face, 

neck, chest, abdomen, and legs. The lower right side of his face and his chest each had a cluster 

of abrasions, and incised wounds were present on his chest, hip, and legs. The pathologist 

explained that an incised wound was “a superficial cut” caused by a sharp-edged weapon. 

There was also a stab wound on the upper right side of the abdomen, which was eight 

centimeters deep. During the internal examination, she observed that the stab wound resulted 

in a “sharp force injury to his liver as well as the inferior vena cava and the aorta.” The 

pathologist found, within a reasonable degree of medical and scientific certainty, that the 

victim died from the stab wound to his abdomen. She testified that the other wounds that she 

described were “fresh” from “around the time” of the victim’s death. She explained that she 

was able to determine this because there was hemorrhaging around the wounds, which 

indicates that the victim was still “alive around the time that these injuries were inflicted.” At 

the conclusion of her direct examination, she testified that she had found, within a reasonable 

degree of medical and scientific certainty, “that the manner of death was a homicide, meaning 

that he was killed by another person.” On cross-examination, she testified that a knife fight 
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between two people was “a possibility.” She also agreed with defense counsel’s statement that 

she had “no way of determining whether or not the victim in this case was in the process of 

attempting to attack somebody else.” In response to a question by the court, she opined that, 

with this type of injury, a person would live only a couple of minutes. 

¶ 26 Officer Anthony Acevez, the arresting officer, testified that on March 17, 2015, in the early 

afternoon, he observed defendant on the street with another man in an area with retail stores. 

Acevez was in plain clothes but was also wearing a police vest with “police” on the back and 

a gun holster. Acevez was with two other officers who were also in plain clothes. When Acevez 

first observed defendant on the street, Acevez was sitting in an unmarked vehicle and made 

eye contact with defendant. Acevez was 10 to 15 feet away from defendant, and the weather 

was clear. When they made eye contact, defendant immediately began to run, and Acevez 

chased him on foot. Defendant’s companion ran with defendant, and the two men ran for about 

three-quarters of a block, until Acevez tripped the other man, who then fell into defendant. 

Both defendant and the other man landed on the ground. Acevez then placed defendant in 

custody. When defendant was running, Acevez observed that defendant “had run out of his 

shoes.” When Acevez arrested defendant, defendant was in his socks, and his shoes were still 

on the street at the location where they had first made eye contact. The arrest happened at 

1 p.m., two days after the homicide and four blocks from where the homicide occurred. 

¶ 27 After Acevez testified, the parties stipulated (1) that certain police officers, if called to 

testify, would testify that they took photos of defendant and his clothing when he was arrested 

and (2) that blood stains from defendant’s underwear and from a knife blade, as well as swabs 

from a knife handle, from defendant and from the victim, were inventoried and sent for testing. 

Margaret Ness, a forensic chemist, if called to testify, would testify that she analyzed the 

material in this case and found (1) that the blood stain from defendant’s underwear was a 

mixture of at least two people and contained a DNA profile “which matches the DNA profile” 

of the victim, (2) that the blood stain from the knife blade “matches the DNA profile of [the 

victim] and does not match the DNA of the defendant,” and (3) that the swab obtained from 

the knife handle contained a mixture of at least two people and contained a DNA profile that 

“matches the DNA profile of the defendant and does not match the DNA profile of [the 

victim].” The parties further stipulated that defendant’s T-shirt was properly packaged and 

inventoried but was not submitted for testing. After the stipulations, the State rested.

¶ 28 After the State rested, defense counsel moved for a direct finding. Since this is an issue on 

appeal, we provide the defense’s entire motion and argument below: 

“Judge, at the conclusion of the State’s case we’d respectfully ask your Honor to 

consider a motion for a directed finding. Your Honor has heard the testimony at this 

point. We wouldn’t wish to argue that further.” 

The trial court denied the motion. 

¶ 29 As part of the defense case, the parties stipulated (1) that, if the assistant medical examiner 

were recalled, she would testify that she extracted blood from the victim which was submitted 

to the toxicology unit of her office for drug and alcohol analysis, (2) that if Peter Koin of the 

toxicology unit were called to testify, he would testify that the victim had a blood alcohol level 

of 0.106, which is more than “the legal limit” in the State of Illinois, (3) that, if Megan Ness, 

the forensic chemist, were called to testify, she would testify that the victim’s fingernail 

scrapings contained a mixture of DNA profiles that were either not suitable for comparison or 

from which defendant could be excluded, and (4) that Ness would further testify that she was 
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not called upon to analyze other exhibits other than those already described in the parties’ 

stipulations. The defense then rested. 

¶ 30 After listening to closing arguments, the trial court first made credibility findings, stating 

that it believed Officers Lugo, Acevez, and Ryan; Dr. Alvarenga, the assistant medical 

examiner; and Ali, the neighbor. After reviewing the evidence and arguments in detail, the 

court found defendant guilty of first degree murder. The transcript of the sentencing hearing is 

not in the appellate record; however, defendant does not raise any issues on this appeal 

regarding his sentence or the sentencing hearing. The mittimus reflects that, on January 25, 

2019, the court sentenced defendant to 23 years with IDOC. Defendant’s posttrial motion for 

a new trial was denied on March 1, 2019, and his motion to reconsider sentence was denied on 

March 18, 2019. Thus, his notice of appeal was timely filed on March 18, 2019, and this appeal 

followed.

¶ 31 ANALYSIS

¶ 32 I. Pretrial Motion to Suppress

¶ 33 On appeal, defendant claims first that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to 

suppress.

¶ 34 A. Standard of Review

¶ 35 “The defendant bears the burden of proof at a hearing on a motion to suppress.” People v. 

Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d 298, 306 (2003); 725 ILCS 5/114-12(b) (West 2018) (“the burden of 

proving that the search and seizure were unlawful shall be on the defendant”). “A defendant 

must make a prima facie case that the evidence was obtained by an illegal search or seizure.” 

Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d at 306-07. “If a defendant makes a prima facie case, the State has the burden 

of going forward with evidence to counter the defendant’s prima facie case.” Gipson, 203 Ill. 

2d at 307. “However, the ultimate burden of proof remains with the defendant.” Gipson, 203 

Ill. 2d at 307. 

¶ 36 “In reviewing a ruling on a suppression motion, we apply the familiar two-part standard of 

review announced by the United States Supreme Court in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 

690, 699 (1996).” People v. Lindsey, 2020 IL 124289, ¶ 14. “Under that standard, we give 

deference to the factual findings of the trial court, and we will reject those findings only if they 

are against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Lindsey, 2020 IL 124289, ¶ 14. “We remain 

free, however, to decide the legal effect of those facts, and we review de novo the trial court’s 

ultimate ruling on the motion.” Lindsey, 2020 IL 124289, ¶ 14. 

¶ 37 De novo consideration means that a reviewing court performs the same analysis that a trial 

judge would perform. People v. Begay, 2018 IL App (1st) 150446, ¶ 34. By contrast, a 

judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence “ ‘only when an opposite conclusion 

is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence.’ ” 

People v. Daniel, 2013 IL App (1st) 111876, ¶ 21 (quoting Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 

215 (1995)). The deferential standard accorded a trial court’s factual findings is “ ‘grounded 

in the reality that the circuit court is in a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility 

of the witnesses, observe the witnesses’ demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their testimony.’ ” 

Daniel, 2013 IL App (1st) 111876, ¶ 21 (quoting People v. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d 261, 268 (2005)). 
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¶ 38 “When reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we may consider 

evidence both from the trial and the suppression hearing.” People v. Eubanks, 2019 IL 123525, 

¶ 61. In addition, we may affirm the trial court’s ruling on a suppression motion “on any basis 

appearing in the record, whether or not the trial court relied on that basis or its reasoning was 

correct.” Daniel, 2013 IL App (1st) 111876, ¶ 37.

¶ 39 B. Fourth Amendment

¶ 40 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides the people with the right 

“to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 

seizures.” U.S. Const., amend. IV. Similarly, the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides “the 

right to be secure” against unreasonable searches and seizures. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. In 

addition, through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. 

XIV), the federal protection of the fourth amendment extends to searches and seizures 

conducted by the states. People v. Hill, 2020 IL 124595, ¶ 19. 

¶ 41 “Generally, a search is per se unreasonable if conducted without a warrant supported by 

probable cause and approved by a judge or magistrate.” Hill, 2020 IL 124595, ¶ 20. However, 

there are a few “clearly recognized” exceptions to the warrant requirement. Hill, 2020 IL 

124595, ¶ 20.

¶ 42 C. Community Caretaking Doctrine

¶ 43 The trial court found the officers’ warrantless search of the apartment permissible under 

the community caretaking exception, which is a well-established exception to the warrant 

requirement. See People v. McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d 260, 268-69 (2010). The phrase 

“community caretaking refers to a capacity in which the police act when they are performing 

some task unrelated to the investigation crime, such as *** calls about missing persons or sick 

neighbors.” McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d at 269. 

¶ 44 The community caretaking exception applies when the following two conditions are 

satisfied. “First, law enforcement officers must be performing some function other than the 

investigation of a crime.” McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d at 272. “In making this determination, a 

court views the officer’s actions objectively.” McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d at 272. “Second, the 

search or seizure must be reasonable because it was undertaken to protect the safety of the 

general public.” McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d at 272. “ ‘Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in 

objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.’ ” McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d at 

272 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)). “The court must balance a citizen’s 

interest in going about his or her business free from police interference against the public’s 

interest in having police officers perform services in addition to strictly law enforcement.” 

McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d at 272.

¶ 45 D. Emergency Aid Exception

¶ 46 At the pretrial hearing, the State argued that the officer’s actions fell “squarely within the 

emergency aid exception.” In its brief on appeal, the State argues that the emergency aid 

exception is an “example” of the community caretaking doctrine. 

¶ 47 Since a reviewing court may affirm a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress on any 

basis found in the record (People v. Bahena, 2020 IL App (1st) 180197, ¶ 25), it does not 
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matter whether the emergency aid exception is a subset of the community caretaking doctrine 

or that the trial court did not rely on this exception. 

¶ 48 The emergency aid exception allows police to enter and search a home without a warrant 

in emergency situations. People v. Lomax, 2012 IL App (1st) 103016, ¶ 29. The exception 

involves a two-part test. Lomax, 2012 IL App (1st) 103016, ¶ 29. “First, the police must have 

‘reasonable grounds’ to believe there is an emergency at hand; and second, the police must 

have some reasonable basis, ‘approximating probable cause,’ associating the emergency with 

the area to be searched or entered.” Lomax, 2012 IL App (1st) 103016, ¶ 29 (quoting People 

v. Ferral, 397 Ill. App. 3d 697, 705 (2009)). 

¶ 49 “The reasonableness of the officers’ beliefs as to the existence of an emergency is 

determined by the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of entry.” 

Lomax, 2012 IL App (1st) 103016, ¶ 29. “[E]mergency situations include instances when 

someone may be injured or threatened with injury.” Lomax, 2012 IL App (1st) 103016, ¶ 29.

¶ 50 1. Belief That an Emergency Exists

¶ 51 In the case at bar, the officers had reasonable grounds to believe an emergency existed. 

First, the police received a 911 call concerning a battery in progress at defendant’s apartment 

building. “ ‘A 911 call is one of the most common—and universally recognized—means 

through which the police and other emergency personnel learn that there is someone in a 

dangerous situation who urgently needs help.’ ” Lomax, 2012 IL App (1st) 103016, ¶ 31 

(quoting United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2000)). Second, this was not 

an anonymous caller but a call from a neighbor, who was waiting outside to speak to the police 

officers, thereby giving them the opportunity to assess his credibility. See Lomax, 2012 IL App 

(1st) 103016, ¶ 58 (“Generally, anonymous tips to the police lack sufficient reliability.”). 

Third, the neighbor had no apparent motive or bias against defendant. Fourth, Officer Lugo 

testified that the neighbor informed the officers that he had heard a loud verbal argument 

between two men in Arabic in the apartment upstairs, followed by what sounded like two 

people wrestling and then one person asking if the apparently injured person was “ok” and 

begging the injured person to please “get up.” Fifth, finding the neighbor’s narrative credible, 

the police knocked on defendant’s door in the middle of the night, not once but twice. Sixth, 

when the officers appeared to be leaving, the neighbor was still adamant that someone was 

seriously injured. Seventh, defendant failed to answer his door the second time the police 

knocked, although it was shortly after their first knock. Officer Lugo testified that, instead of 

leaving, they drove to the back of the building because “[s]omething didn’t feel right.” Cf. 

Lomax, 2012 IL App (1st) 103016, ¶ 38 (“an unanswered return call is sufficient to create the 

reasonable belief that an emergency situation exists”). Lastly, after the officers observed that 

all the gates and doors leading to defendant’s apartment were wide open, it was reasonable for 

them to infer from this fact, coupled with the fact that defendant failed to answer his door a 

second time, that the person who was injured in the apartment had now been left completely 

alone. It would have been a dereliction of duty for the officers to have left all alone a person 

who was, reportedly, injured to the point where he could not stand up and where at least two 

people were worried if he was “ok”—those two people being defendant and the neighbor. 

Thus, we find that the facts establish that the police officers had reasonable grounds to believe 

that an emergency existed. “[R]easonableness ‘must be judged from the perspective of a 

reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,’ ” and the 
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calculus of reasonableness must allow for the fact that police officers are often forced to make 

decisions in response to circumstances that are uncertain and rapidly evolving. Ryburn v. Huff, 

565 U.S. 469, 477 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)); 

Lomax, 2012 IL App (1st) 103016, ¶ 40. 

¶ 52 Defendant argues that the passage of time in this case argues against finding an emergency, 

and he cites in support this court’s opinion in Lomax. In Lomax, this court wrote: “Waiting 10 

minutes undermines the purpose of the emergency aid exception because in that time, the 

emergency could pass.” Lomax, 2012 IL App (1st) 103016, ¶ 35. However, in Lomax, we also 

wrote that “each case is decided by the totality of its own unique facts.” Lomax, 2012 IL App 

(1st) 103016, ¶ 37. In Lomax, we found it reasonable for the police to act quickly in response 

to a report of shots being fired, where it was obviously important to act before more shots could 

be fired. Lomax, 2012 IL App (1st) 103016, ¶ 36. By contrast, in the case at bar, the disturbance 

involved not a firearm, which can injure many in a short space of time, but a physical fight that 

was apparently over. In the case at bar, the police acted prudently, waiting to enter until they 

had reasonable grounds to believe that the injured person had been abandoned and left alone. 

¶ 53 Defendant argues that the following testimony establishes that the officers did not believe 

there was an emergency. Officer Lugo testified that, after knocking on defendant’s door the 

first time and speaking with defendant, he was satisfied that he “had done [his] job” and he 

told the neighbor that he was satisfied that everything was okay. However, the neighbor was 

still concerned, and it was the neighbor’s concern that caused the officers to reconsider and 

return and knock a second time. The second time, the officers knocked for a period of time and 

received no response. Again, they told the neighbor that they were satisfied that nothing was 

wrong, and they exited the building, returned to their police vehicle, and punched in a code 

indicating their assignment was complete. Defendant argues to this court, as he did to the trial 

court, that this testimony establishes that the police did not believe there was an emergency. 

¶ 54 In response to this argument, the trial court found: “The fact that the police tell Ali that 

they were satisfied is not fact—is not, I should say proof that, in fact, they did think everything 

is okay because clearly they didn’t.” The trial court found that “[t]he fact that nobody answers 

the door is something that I don’t doubt gave them pause, clearly gave them pause, that’s why 

they *** got in their car and went around to the back.” The trial court’s factual finding here is 

well supported by the evidence. The fact that the officers did not depart shows that they had 

begun to suspect that something was wrong, and in fact, Officer Lugo testified to just that. He 

testified: “Something didn’t feel right.” The lack of a response, after five minutes of knocking 

when the door had been promptly answered just minutes before, combined with the wide-open 

gates and doors, gave the officers reasonable grounds to believe an injured person had just 

been abandoned. 

¶ 55 Defendant argues that the police had no idea how long the gates and doors had been left 

open. However, defendant’s back apartment door was also “wide open,” and the officers had 

already observed defendant carefully closing the front door after they had finished speaking to 

him. Thus, we do not find this particular point persuasive as to defendant’s theory.

¶ 56 2. Emergency Associated With the Area

¶ 57 Second, the police must have some reasonable basis, “ ‘approximating probable cause,’ 

associating the emergency with the area to be searched or entered.” Lomax, 2012 IL App (1st) 

103016, ¶ 29 (quoting Ferral, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 705). In the section above, we found 
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reasonable grounds to believe an emergency existed. In this section, we discuss whether that 

emergency was sufficiently associated with defendant’s apartment to justify entering and 

searching it. 

¶ 58 In the case at bar, practically every piece of information that the police officers had 

associated this emergency with the area to be searched or entered. The events described by the 

neighbor all occurred in defendant’s apartment—the sound of wrestling and the statements 

asking the apparently injured person if he was “ok.” The gates and the doors that were open all 

led, progressively, to defendant’s apartment. The police had every reason to believe that the 

injured person was still inside defendant’s apartment, since defendant, as overheard by the 

neighbor, had manifested a concern about whether the injured person had even the capacity to 

stand. Thus, we find that the facts establish that the police had a reasonable basis, 

approximating probable cause, to associate this emergency with the area to be searched or 

entered. There was no question here about whether the police had entered the correct 

apartment. See Lomax, 2012 IL App (1st) 103016, ¶ 54.

¶ 59 In sum, we find that the police officers’ warrantless entry into defendant’s apartment fits 

squarely within the emergency aid exception. 

¶ 60 On appeal, defendant argues that, even if an exception existed that justified the officers’ 

initial entry and search for a victim, the trial court erred by not finding that the police officers’ 

subsequent search exceeded the scope of the emergency aid exception and community 

caretaking doctrine. Defendant now argues that, after the discovery of the victim’s body, the 

police should have immediately stopped and obtained a warrant before searching further. 

¶ 61 However, at the pretrial hearing, the officer was not asked a single question concerning 

any subsequent search after the discovery of the body, and the defense made no arguments to 

the trial court that the scope of any such search exceeded any applicable exception. As a result, 

the trial court made no finding on this issue. As noted above, the defendant bears the burden 

of proof at a hearing on a motion to suppress, both the initial burden of going forward and 

establishing a prima facie case and the ultimate burden of proving the grounds for the motion. 

Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d at 306-07. Only if a defendant first establishes a prima facie case does the 

State have the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut the prima facie case established 

by defendant. Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d at 307. Where the defense did not introduce any evidence at 

the pretrial hearing regarding the officers’ actions after the discovery of the victim’s body and 

where the defense argued to the trial court about the illegal “entry” but made no arguments 

regarding the permissible scope of any applicable exceptions, this cannot now be a basis for 

finding that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s pretrial suppression motion.

¶ 62 II. Defendant’s Flight

¶ 63 Defendant argues that the trial court erred during trial by allowing the admission of certain 

evidence as evidence of flight. Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court erred by 

allowing evidence (1) that defendant fled from police when he left his apartment after the 

police knocked on his door on the day of the murder and (2) that he fled from police on the 

day of his arrest. 

¶ 64 Flight is generally considered some evidence of a guilty mind. People v. McNeal, 2019 IL 

App (1st) 180015, ¶ 83; People v. Ross, 2019 IL App (1st) 162341, ¶ 32 (“Defendant’s flight 

from police also demonstrates consciousness of guilt.”). In particular, “ ‘[h]eadlong flight’ ” is 

one factor, when taken together with others, that may support a finding of criminal activity. 
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In re D.L., 2018 IL App (1st) 171764, ¶ 30 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 

(2000)). It is well established that flight, when considered with all the other evidence, is a 

circumstance that a factfinder may consider as tending to prove guilt. E.g., People v. Trzeciak, 

2014 IL App (1st) 100259-B, ¶ 64.

¶ 65 We review the admission of flight evidence, as we do the admission of other evidence 

generally, only for an abuse of discretion. Trzeciak, 2014 IL App (1st) 100259-B, ¶ 64. An 

abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable 

or where no reasonable person would take the position adopted by the trial court. McNeal, 

2019 IL App (1st) 180015, ¶ 28. 

¶ 66 In his brief to this court, defendant concedes, as he must, that “[(1)] there was evidence 

offered that [defendant] left the apartment after he answered the door for the police the first 

time on March 15, 2015, and [(2)] there was evidence that he ran from plain-clothes police on 

March 17, 2015.” However, defendant argues that “there was never any evidence that 

[defendant] was wanted for the killing of [the victim] or that he knew he was wanted.” 

Therefore, defendant argues that the State failed to impute consciousness of guilt from these 

actions. In addition, defendant argues that he could have had a general “fear of the police or of 

a foreign justice system.” 

¶ 67 Whether an inference of guilt may be drawn from evidence of flight depends on the 

suspect’s knowledge (1) that an offense has been committed and (2) that he or she may be 

suspected. Trzeciak, 2014 IL App (1st) 100259-B, ¶ 64; People v. Wilcox, 407 Ill. App. 3d 151, 

169 (2010). While evidence that a defendant is aware that he may be a suspect is essential, 

actual knowledge of a possible arrest is not. Trzeciak, 2014 IL App (1st) 100259-B, ¶ 64; 

Wilcox, 407 Ill. App. 3d at 170 (“ ‘actual knowledge of his possible arrest is not necessary’ ” 

(quoting People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 350 (1995))). 

¶ 68 First, with respect to the day of the murder itself, both these factors are satisfied. It is 

reasonable to infer that when the police knocked on defendant’s door, the victim was already 

dead. The medical examiner testified that the victim died from the stab wound and died within 

a couple of minutes. It is reasonable to infer that the moment when the neighbor heard 

screaming was also the moment when the victim was stabbed. The neighbor testified that he 

heard the sounds of wrestling, which were followed by yelling and screaming, and then he 

heard defendant calling the victim’s name and pleading for the victim to stand up. The neighbor 

testified that, when he knocked on defendant’s door a second time, defendant stated that the 

victim was in the bathroom, when the neighbor could observe that he was not. When the 

neighbor asked to observe the victim, defendant became mad and told him to “do whatever” 

and closed the door. In the case at bar, where the victim was stabbed in the abdomen by a knife 

and died within a couple of minutes, where the evidence establishes that defendant was in the 

apartment when the stabbing occurred, and where the neighbor testified to defendant’s agitated 

and untruthful response to an inquiry about the victim’s well-being, the State has established 

sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could reasonably infer defendant’s knowledge 

that an offense had been committed. 

¶ 69 The evidence at trial also established that, on the day of the murder, defendant had reason 

to believe he was a suspect. The police had knocked on his door—twice—in the middle of the 

night. After defendant spoke with them and told them that everything was okay, the police still 

returned. While the police may not have known at that moment that a crime had been 

committed, defendant did. When the police walked away the first time, defendant may have 
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thought that they had believed him. However, when they knocked a second time, for a solid 

five minutes, he had to have known that they had begun to have their doubts—which they did. 

¶ 70 As a result of their doubts, they did not leave the scene but drove to the back of the building, 

where they found the doors and gate leading to defendant’s apartment wide open. The fact that 

the garage and back doors—even the apartment door—were open—was indicative of a 

headlong flight. Thus, the evidence establishes a reasonable inference that defendant was 

aware, at the moment that he fled the apartment on the day of the murder, that he would be a 

suspect for this crime. 

¶ 71 Defendant argues that the evidence did not establish how long the gates and doors had been 

left open and, thus, this fact was not necessarily indicative of flight. However, defendant’s 

back apartment door was wide open, and the neighbor had testified that defendant had closed 

this door after telling the neighbor to “do whatever.” In addition, defendant had been present 

in the apartment minutes before and now was indisputably gone. Thus, it was reasonable to 

infer that the open gates and doors, including the apartment door, were evidence of a headlong 

flight.

¶ 72 The second instance of flight occurred immediately after defendant made eye contact with

Officer Acevez in a retail shopping area, two days after the homicide and four blocks from 

where it occurred. Although the officer was in plain clothes and in an unmarked police vehicle, 

he was also in a police vest. After making eye contact, defendant did not stop running until 

Officer Acevez tripped defendant’s companion, who then fell into defendant, knocking them 

both down. It was reasonable to infer from these actions that defendant was engaged in 

headlong flight from the police. 

¶ 73 We already established above that the two factors for admission were satisfied. However, 

defendant argues that, instead of showing a guilty mind about the murder, defendant could 

have had a general fear of the police or fears about a foreign justice system. First, there is 

nothing in the record to suggest that defendant was in the United States illegally, as he was 

here as a student. In contrast, all the evidence indicates that he knew that there was a dead body 

in his apartment and the police knocked on his door for five minutes, even after he tried to 

assure them that the victim was okay. Thus, it was reasonable to infer that his headlong flight 

from the police was in response to the stabbing death of the victim.

¶ 74 For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

admitting evidence of defendant’s flight from the police on the day of the murder and again 

two days later.

¶ 75 III. Insufficient Evidence

¶ 76 Defendant argues that the State’s evidence was insufficient either to prove him guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt or to withstand the defense’s motion for a directed finding at the 

close of the State’s case-in-chief.

¶ 77 Section 115-4(k) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-4(k) (West 

2018)) governs motions for a directed finding. It provides, in relevant part, with respect to 

bench trials:

“When, at the close of the State’s evidence or at the close of all the evidence, the 

evidence is insufficient to support a finding or verdict of guilty the court may and on 
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motion of the defendant shall make a finding ***, enter a judgment of acquittal and 

discharge the defendant.” 725 ILCS 5/115-4(k) (West 2018).

¶ 78 When deciding a motion for a directed finding, the trial court determines only whether a 

reasonable mind could fairly conclude the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, 

while considering the evidence most strongly in the State’s favor. People v. Cazacu, 373 Ill. 

App. 3d 465, 473 (2007). “ ‘In moving for a directed verdict [or finding], the defendant admits 

the truth of the facts stated in the State’s evidence for purposes of the motion.’ ” Cazacu, 373 

Ill. App. 3d at 473 (quoting People v. Kelley, 338 Ill. App. 3d 273, 277 (2003)). This same 

standard applies whether the trial is a bench or a jury trial. Cazacu, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 473. 

Since a motion for a directed finding of not guilty presents a question of law, we review the 

trial court’s ruling de novo. Cazacu, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 473. As we noted above, de novo

consideration means that a reviewing court performs the same analysis that a trial judge would 

perform. Begay, 2018 IL App (1st) 150446, ¶ 34. 

¶ 79 When an appellate court is asked to consider the sufficiency of the evidence after a trial, 

our function is not to retry the defendant. People v. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2011). Instead, 

we determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d at 8. In this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences 

from the record in favor of the State. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d at 8. A reviewing court will not 

reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so improbable, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive that 

it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d at 8. Also, a 

conviction may generally be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 

2d at 9. 

¶ 80 In his brief to this court, defendant does not make any separate arguments with respect to 

his motion for a directed finding. Instead he argues that we should find that the trial court erred 

in denying his motion “[f]or the reasons stated” in the prior section of his brief that argued that 

“the [S]tate failed to offer proof beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] was guilty of first 

degree murder.” Similarly, before the trial court, defendant did not argue the motion. Thus, we 

consider together, as he did, the arguments concerning his motion and the sufficiency of the 

State’s evidence.

¶ 81 A. Corpus Delicti

¶ 82 Defendant argues, first, that the State’s evidence was insufficient because it failed to prove 

that the victim’s death was caused by the criminal agency of another person. 

¶ 83 “Proof of an offense requires proof of two concepts: first, that a crime occurred, or the 

corpus delicti, and second, that it was committed by the person charged.” People v. Ehlert, 211 

Ill. 2d 192, 202 (2004). “In a prosecution for murder, the corpus delicti consists of the fact of 

death and the fact that death was produced by a criminal agency.” Ehlert, 211 Ill. 2d at 202-

03. 

¶ 84 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove that the victim’s death was produced by a 

criminal agency. However, the pathologist testified that she opined, within a reasonable degree 

of medical and scientific certainty, that the victim died from a stabbing and “that the manner 

of death was a homicide, meaning that he was killed by another person.” This testimony was 

sufficient to establish the corpus delicti for purposes of either a motion for a directed finding 

or a claim on appeal of insufficient evidence. See People v. King, 2020 IL 123926, ¶ 53 (where 
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the pathologist testified that the victim died of strangulation, “this testimony alone,” if believed 

by the factfinder, is “sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable 

doubt that [the victim’s] death was produced by criminal agency”). 

¶ 85 In his brief to this court, defendant argues that the State’s evidence failed to “dispel the 

notion that [the victim] was in the process of attacking someone else or that he received wounds 

during a knife fight.” In support of this argument, he relies solely on the pathologist’s 

testimony. The pathologist who performed the autopsy testified that she observed injuries to 

the victim’s face, neck, chest, abdomen, and legs. The lower right side of his face and his chest 

each had a cluster of abrasions, and incised wounds were present on his chest, hip, and legs. 

The pathologist testified that these nonfatal wounds were “fresh” from “around the time” of 

the victim’s death. She explained that she was able to determine this because there was 

hemorrhaging around the wounds, which indicates that the victim was still “alive around the 

time that these injuries were inflicted.” In addition, she did not observe any defensive wounds 

on his hands or forearms. On cross-examination, she testified that a knife fight between two 

people was “a possibility” and that she had “no way of determining whether or not the victim 

in this case was in the process of attempting to attack somebody else.” 

¶ 86 However, there is no evidence in the record that a third person was present in the apartment 

and no evidence or argument made at either trial or on this appeal that defendant was acting in 

self-defense or in mutual combat. The pathologist testified that the time span between the fatal 

stabbing and the resulting death was only two minutes. The neighbor testified that he heard 

wrestling and then screaming, which, it is reasonable to infer, occurred at the moment of death. 

This is particularly reasonable to infer, in light of the fact that the neighbor then heard 

defendant repeating the victim’s name and pleading for the victim to stand. When the neighbor 

knocked on defendant’s door, defendant admitted that there had been an argument. The DNA 

evidence established that the victim’s blood was present on defendant’s underwear when he 

was arrested, that blood on a knife blade was from the victim, and that DNA on the knife’s 

handle was from defendant. If a third person was the culprit, then it would be reasonable to 

expect an outcry from defendant upon discovery of the offense or the victim’s lifeless body. 

Not only was there no outcry, defendant reassured the police that everything was okay, 

although the evidence indicates that the victim was already dead when they inquired. In light 

of all this evidence, where no argument was made at trial or on appeal of either self-defense or 

mutual combat, and where no evidence existed of a third person being involved, we do not find 

this argument persuasive.

¶ 87 B. DNA Evidence

¶ 88 Defendant argues next that other items in the apartment could have been tested for DNA 

evidence, that additional testing would have more conclusively established the presence or

absence of a possible third person, and that defendant’s DNA on items in his own apartment 

does not prove his guilt.

¶ 89 In the case at bar, the blood stain on defendant’s underwear contained the DNA of the 

victim. The trial court found this evidence “compelling, if not damning,” and so do we. In 

addition, the victim’s blood was found on the knife blade, while defendant’s DNA was on the 

handle. Where the victim’s blood was found on both defendant and the blade of the apparent 

murder weapon and where defendant’s DNA was found on the weapon’s handle, we cannot 

find that the trial court, as factfinder, was irrational for not inferring that the DNA of a third 
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person would have been found in other locations. A trier of fact is not required to “search out 

all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable 

doubt.” People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 70. 

¶ 90 Defendant argues that he could have been wearing the victim’s underwear and there was 

no proof that the underwear he wore was his own. However, it is reasonable for a factfinder to 

infer that the underwear that one is wearing is one’s own underwear. “[T]he trier of fact is not 

required to disregard inferences that flow normally from the evidence before it ***.” Jackson, 

2020 IL 124112, ¶ 70.

¶ 91 C. Circumstantial Evidence

¶ 92 Lastly, defendant argues that the State’s evidence was circumstantial and, thus, created a 

reasonable doubt of guilt. Defendant argues that there was no confession, no eyewitness, and 

no evidence of a motive or intent.

¶ 93 First, “[i]t has long been recognized” by our supreme court “that motive is not an essential 

element of the crime of murder, and the State has no obligation to prove motive in order to 

sustain a conviction of murder.” People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 56 (1990). 

¶ 94 Second, while there was no “eye” witness, there was an “ear” witness. The neighbor 

appears to have heard the wrestling before the stabbing, the screaming resulting from the 

stabbing, and defendant’s subsequent pleading for the victim to stand during the two minutes 

that the pathologist testified it took for the victim to die. 

¶ 95 Third, although we do not have an outright confession by defendant, his own words and 

actions are incriminating. If the victim’s death was the result of an accident or the acts of a 

third person, one would have expected an immediate outcry by defendant to the police and 

neighbor who knocked on his door. However, what defendant did was just the opposite. Instead 

of seeking their aid, he sought to assure them that everything was okay and closed the door on 

their possible assistance.

¶ 96 Fourth, intent may be inferred from the type of injury and the force needed to inflict it. See 

People v. Richardson, 401 Ill. App. 3d 45, 51-52 (2010) (photos of the deceased’s injuries 

were properly admitted to prove intent). In addition, the pathologist testified that she found, to 

a reasonable degree of medical and scientific certainty, that the victim’s death was a homicide. 

See King, 2020 IL 123926, ¶ 53. As already discussed above, flight was evidence of 

consciousness of guilt, as was defendant’s attempted cover-up. 

¶ 97 Finally, our supreme court has repeatedly found that circumstantial evidence is sufficient 

to sustain a murder conviction, so long as, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt. King, 2020 IL 123926, ¶ 52; Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶¶ 64, 75. 

¶ 98 In the section above discussing the flight evidence, we already detailed the evidence 

establishing defendant’s presence at the scene, his knowledge of the offense, and his flight 

from the police officers. Nonetheless, we are aware that “[t]he mere presence of a defendant 

at the scene of the crime is *** insufficient to make a defendant accountable [for it], even if it 

is coupled with defendant’s flight from the scene or defendant’s knowledge that a crime has 

been committed.” People v. Johnson, 2014 IL App (1st) 122459-B, ¶ 132. 

¶ 99 However, in addition to presence, knowledge, and flight, there was (1) the DNA evidence, 

which, as the trial court found, was “damning”; (2) the neighbor’s testimony about the 
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wrestling, the screaming, defendant’s immediate pleading with the victim to rise, and 

defendant’s subsequent admission of an argument; (3) the attempted cover-up by defendant, 

where he repeatedly asserted to both police and to a neighbor that everything was okay, 

although the evidence indicates that the victim was already dead by that time; and (4) a second 

flight, which showed that the first flight was no coincidence. 

¶ 100 In sum, we find that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient for a factfinder to find 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed 

finding. “[I]t is not necessary that the trier of fact find each fact in the chain of circumstances 

beyond a reasonable doubt,” so long as the trier of fact finds that the evidence, taken together, 

supports a finding of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, 

¶ 70. Taken together, the evidence in this case satisfied this standard.

¶ 101 CONCLUSION

¶ 102 For the foregoing reasons, we do not find defendant’s claims persuasive, and we affirm his 

conviction and sentence.

¶ 103 Affirmed.