1 

Filed 11/14/19

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

GUO ZHANG CHEN, ) No. BV 033055

)

Plaintiff and Respondent, ) Pasadena Trial Court

)

 v. ) No. 19PDUD00385

)

JANE LIN, )

)

Defendant and Appellant. ) OPINION

 )

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, William D. 

Dodson, Commissioner. Judgment reversed.

Steven W. Kerekes for Plaintiff and Respondent Guo Zhang Chen.

Jane Lin, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. 

* * *
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INTRODUCTION

Can a tenant in an eviction action be deprived of the right to jury for failing to comply 

with a court order requiring preparation of proposed jury instructions and other trial documents 

and not “meeting and conferring” with the landlord’s lawyer? We hold the answer is no.

Code of Civil Procedure section 631, subdivision (f), sets forth the exclusive grounds for 

a jury waiver, and failure to prepare for trial is not listed. Showing up for trial unprepared may 

subject a party to monetary sanctions, but it does not constitute a waiver of the right to jury, and 

a court has no power under these circumstances to refuse to conduct a jury trial.

The tenant here, defendant and appellant Jane Lin, was sued to evict her from her home 

by the landlord, plaintiff and respondent Guo Zhang Chen. In her capacity as a self-represented 

litigant, defendant filed a demand for jury trial, but appeared on the trial date without 

complying with a Los Angeles County Superior Court Civil Division unlawful detainer 

standing order. The court found “defendant had waived jury by not preparing for a jury trial,” 

and following a court trial, judgment was entered against her and possession of the premises 

was awarded to plaintiff. Because the court exceeded its authority in denying defendant’s right 

to be tried by a jury, we reverse the judgment.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed the action on February 8, 2019,1alleging he owned the property in 

question, he served defendant with a 30-day notice to quit, and defendant remained in 

possession without complying with the notice. On February 15, defendant filed an answer. She 

entered a general denial of the complaint’s allegations and asserted affirmative defenses, 

including retaliatory eviction and breach of the warranty of habitability.

Also on February 15, defendant filed a demand for a jury trial, stating therein, “Please 

take notice that defendant Jane Lin hereby demands a jury trial in this action.” On February 20, 

plaintiff filed a request to set the case for trial and, on the same date, the case was calendared 

for a non-jury trial to start on March 12. 

1All further references to dates are to the year 2019 unless otherwise specified. 
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In a March 12 minute order, the court noted, “Along with the answer, defendant 

demanded a trial by jury. By March 12, defendant had not complied with any portion of the 

court’s general order regarding jury trials. She had not, for example, prepared proposed jury 

instructions and other documents. Similarly, she had not met with plaintiff’s counsel before 

trial to comply with the general order.” The court stated defendant asked to continue the case 

“so that she could prepare documents for a jury trial and subpoena government officials. 

Defendant did not give a credible legal reason why she had not been [able] to prepare for trial 

before March 12.” The court further noted, “Before the trial actually began . . . defendant again 

demanded a jury. The court again asked what preparation [defendant] had done for a jury trial, 

and, again, [defendant] conceded that she had done nothing, and again asked for a continuance 

of the trial, which was again denied. The court made a finding that defendant had waived jury 

by not preparing for a jury trial.”

In the ensuing court trial on March 12, after considering documentary exhibits, the 

testimony provided by plaintiff and his witness, and defendant’s testimony, the court took the 

matter under submission. The court issued a written order entering judgment in plaintiff’s 

favor. The court awarded plaintiff possession of the property and forfeited the parties’ rental 

agreement. Defendant filed an ex parte application to move to vacate the judgment, listing as 

one of the grounds that “defendant has demanded for [sic] a jury trial,” and the court denied the 

motion. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.

DISCUSSION

Noncompliant Brief

Defendant represented herself on appeal, and the contents of her appellate brief did not 

comply with the California Rules of Court. Specifically, the brief did not cite to the appellate 

record or to any authority and failed to list its arguments under separate headings. (See Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.883(a)(1).) The brief consisted almost exclusively of a notation of dates 

pertaining to the events in the case followed by assertions that errors occurred. One of the 

errors was that “defendant demanded for [sic] jury trial. Court denied without any reasons 

[sic].” (Other purported errors included, “defendant received the notice to move out from 
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landlord. It was retaliated against defendant [sic]” and “plaintiff has breached the warranty to 

provide habitable premises.”)

Despite not complying with the appellate court rules, defendant’s assertion that she 

was denied her right to a jury trial is explicit. Opposing counsel’s briefing of the argument in 

his respondent’s brief signifies defendant’s demand was sufficiently identifiable to be 

understood as an issue on appeal. We exercise our discretion and disregard defendant’s 

noncompliance with the court rules pertaining to the contents of briefs. (See Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.883(d)(2)(C); Keep Our Mountains Quiet v. County of Santa Clara (2015) 236 

Cal.App.4th 714, 728.) 

Denial of Right to Jury

The court’s determination that defendant showed up for trial unprepared—failing to 

produce proposed jury instructions and other documents and not having met and conferred with 

her opponent’s counsel—is undisputed. Whether this amounted to a lawful ground to deprive 

defendant of the right to jury trial is a legal issue, and “[w]e review legal questions de novo. 

[Citation.]” (Florio v. Lau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 637, 641; see also Apartment Assn. of 

Los Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 24 Cal.4th 830, 836 [issues pertaining to 

constitutional and statutory construction are reviewed de novo on appeal].)

Article I, section 16 of the California Constitution gives parties in a civil dispute the 

right to trial by jury, providing, in relevant part, “Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be 

secured to all . . . .” The fundamental right to a jury trial in civil cases is specifically 

guaranteed in unlawful detainer actions by Code of Civil Procedure section 1171. (See 

Munoz v. Silva (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th Supp. 11, 14.) In such cases, the statute states, in 

relevant part, “Whenever an issue of fact is presented by the pleadings, it must be tried by a 

jury, unless such jury be waived as in other cases. . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1171.) The right to 

a jury of one’s peers is “‘a basic and fundamental part of our system of jurisprudence. . . . As 

such, it should be zealously guarded by the courts. . . . In case of doubt therefore, the issue 

should be resolved in favor of preserving a litigant’s right to trial by jury.’ [Citations.]” 
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(Cohill v. Nationwide Auto Service (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 696, 699; see Byram v. Superior 

Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 648, 654.) 

In a civil case, any waiver of the right to jury must occur “by the consent of the parties 

expressed as prescribed by statute.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) ““‘California constitutional 

history reflects an unwavering commitment to the principle that the right to a civil jury trial 

may be waived only as the Legislature prescribes . . . .”’ [Citation.]” (Garcia v. Cruz (2013) 

221 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 5.) 

Code of Civil Procedure section 631, subdivision (f), states, “A party waives trial by jury 

in any of the following ways: [¶] (1) By failing to appear at the trial. [¶] (2) By written consent 

filed with the clerk or judge. [¶] (3) By oral consent, in open court, entered in the minutes. 

[¶] (4) By failing to announce that a jury is required, at the time the cause is first set for trial, if 

it is set upon notice or stipulation, or within five days after notice of setting if it is set without 

notice or stipulation. [¶] (5) By failing to deposit with the clerk, or judge, advance jury fees 

provided in subdivision (b). [¶] (6) By failing to deposit with the clerk or judge, at the 

beginning of the second and each succeeding day’s session, [jury fees].”

The statute is the exclusive authority governing civil jury waivers. (See De Castro v. 

Rowe (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 547, 552 [“It has been repeatedly held that trial by jury may be 

waived only in the manner designated by . . . section 631”]; see also Grafton Partners v. 

Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 944, 952 [“[N]onstatutory authority for waiver of the right to 

jury trial is not permitted by our Constitution”]; cf. Cooks v. Superior Court (1990) 224 

Cal.App.3d 723, 727 [holding a court improperly struck a jury request based on a defendant’s 

failure to prepare proposed jury instructions, and noting, “[plaintiff] also argues that the failure 

to submit jury instructions within the specified time effected a waiver of the right to jury trial. 

Waiver of this constitutional right may be accomplished by any of the means specified in Code 

of Civil Procedure section 631. Those methods are exclusive”].)

“Under the general settled canons of statutory construction, we ascertain the 

Legislature’s intent by starting with the words of the statute and giving the words their usual 

and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] The plain language of the statute controls the court’s 
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interpretation unless the words are ambiguous. So long as the plain language of the statute is 

unambiguous, the court need not, and should not, ‘go beyond that pure expression of legislative 

intent. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Under such circumstances, our inquiry ends and we presume 

that the Legislature meant what it said and that the plain meaning of the statute governs. 

[Citation.]” (Munoz v. Silva, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th Supp. 11 at p. 15.) 

The words of the statute are crystal clear on the present issue. Nothing in section 631 of 

the Code of Civil Procedure alludes to a party’s failure to prepare for trial as a proper basis for 

finding a waiver of the right to a jury trial. 

Plaintiff argues the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request for a 

jury trial given defendant’s failure to comply with the court’s “General Order of the 

Los Angeles Superior Court.” Plaintiff maintains, “Specifically, by the date of trial, 

[defendant] had not prepared proposed jury instructions. Nor had she met with plaintiff’s 

counsel before trial to comply with the General Order.” 

We have taken judicial notice of the Los Angeles County Superior Court Civil 

Division’s March 5, 2018, Third Amended Standing Order pertaining to unlawful detainer 

trials, applicable at the time the case was tried.2 The Standing Order emphasizes parties must 

comply with numerous requirements when appearing for trial, including printing out proposed 

jury instructions and verdict forms, giving the court an exhibit list, and requiring the litigants to 

“meet and confer.” The Standing Order states, “Failure to comply with any provision of this 

Standing Order without substantial justification may result in monetary sanctions.” (See Code 

Civ. Proc., § 575.2 [authorizing imposition of sanctions for failure to comply with trial court 

rules when the rules specify sanctions may be imposed]; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 177.5 [“A 

judicial officer shall have the power to impose reasonable money sanctions . . . for any 

violation of a lawful court order by a person, done without good cause or substantial 

2The trial court’s and plaintiff’s reliance on the court’s “general order” appears to be a reference 

to a February 19, 2016, general court order, which was superseded by the Standing Order. 
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justification”].) Notably, the Standing Order does not provide failing to prepare for trial per its 

requirements can result in a jury waiver.3 

But, more to the point, even if the Standing Order had provided that failing to comply 

with its provisions could result in a jury waiver, it would be unenforceable. “The fundamental 

flaw here is that the court imposed a remedy for the violation of its order that was not 

authorized by law.” (Garcia v. Cruz, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. Supp. 6.) The Legislature 

“has prescribed the conditions under which a jury may be waived, and . . . the local courts have 

no power to adopt or enforce rules at variance with those of the state.” (Turlock Golf & 

Country Club v. Superior Court of Stanislaus County (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 693, 700.) “[O]ur 

Constitution forbids the creation of judicial rules of waiver.” (Grafton Partners v. Superior 

Court, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 953.) Pursuant to the authority conferred by the Constitution, 

“the Legislature, alone, ha[s] the power to determine the circumstances under which a jury 

could be waived.” (Ibid.)

The evidence presented at trial is irrelevant to whether defendant was prejudiced by the 

court’s error. Stripping a party of the right to trial by jury is reversible error per se. (See 

People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 313 [“where a case improperly is tried to the court 

rather than to a jury, there is no opportunity meaningfully to assess the outcome that would 

have ensued in the absence of the error”]; Munoz v. Silva, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. Supp. 

15 [“deprivation [of the right to a jury] constitutes a miscarriage of justice and reversible error 

per se without the need to demonstrate actual prejudice”]; accord, Guttman v. Chiazor (2017) 

15 Cal.App.5th Supp. 57, 64-65.) We set aside the judgment so that, unless jury is waived 

pursuant to statute, defendant is afforded her right to a jury trial.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. Defendant is to recover costs on appeal.

3Although it did not apply to the present case, the February 19, 2016, general order similarly 

only stated that failure to comply with its provisions may result in monetary sanctions. 
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_________________________

Ricciardulli, J. 

We concur:

_________________________ _________________________

Kumar, Acting P. J. Richardson, J.