NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TODD ALBRIGHT, an individual,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. ALLIANT SPECIALTY INSURANCE SERVICES, INC., a California Corporation doing business in Washington; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 18

- 35770
D.C. No. 3:17

- cv - 05062

- RBL

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding Submitted August 28, 2019 ** Seattle, Washington Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
In 201 6 , Alliant Insurance Services, Inc. and its subsidiary , Allian t Specialty Insurance Services, Inc. , ( together, “Alliant”) w ere negotiating contract s , called “co

broker agreement s ,” with Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. (“ AJG ”) , under which two

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

AUG 30 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

brokerages that AJG had recently acquired would sell and service Alliant’s insura nce products

. An Alliant employee circulated a draft co

- broker agreement containing a

term that excluded one of AJG ’s brokers, Todd Albright, from performing any work under the agreement. Albright sued Allian t, claiming the term defamed him in
several st ates, tort i ously interfered with his business expectancy, and negligently injured him . The district court granted summary judgment in Alliant’s favor and
denied Albright’s motion for partial summary judgment on choice of law . It also
denied Albright’s mo tion for reconsideration. Albright appeals these rulings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
The district court did not err by applying Washington law to Albright’s defamation claims and denying Albright’s motion for partial summary judgment on
choice of law. The re is no outcome

- determinative difference between the law of Washington and the laws of California, Illinois, and Oklahoma as they relate to the resolution of Albright’s defamation claims. All four states recognize a conditional “common interest” privilege for otherwise

- defamatory communications that is lost when the declarant is motivated by malice or otherwise abuses the privilege. See
Moe v. Wise , 989 P.2d 1148, 115 4

– 58 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999); see also Taus v. Loftus , 151 P.3d 1185, 1209

– 10 (Cal. 2007); Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing and Amin., Inc. , 619 N.E.2d 129, 134

– 36 (Ill. 1993); Trice v. Burress , 137 P.3d 1253,
1260 n.15 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006) ; Thornton v. Holden vill Gen. Hosp. , 36 P.3d 456,3

461 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001) . Given the absence of a “real” conflict between the relevant laws, the district court properly applied Washington law and denied Albright’s motion for partial summary judgment. See Seizer v. Sessio ns , 940 P.2d 261, 264 (Wash. 1997).
Nor was there error in granting summary judgment in Alliant’s favor on Albright’s defamation claims . The allegedly defamatory co

- broker agreements were communicated in furtherance of a “legitimate business relationshi p” between Alliant
and AJG , and thus were covered by the common interest privilege. See Corbin v.
Madison , 529 P.2d 1145, 1151 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). Albright’s evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Robert Shearer , the a uthor of
the co

- broker agreement, was motivated by malice when he drafted and published the relevant language.
There was also no error in granting summary judgment in Alliant’s favor on Albright’s tortious interference claims

. Albright presented insuffi cient evidence that
Alliant “interfered for an improper purpose or used improper means ” to exclude him from a business expectancy. Leingang v. Pierce Cnty. Med. Bureau, Inc. , 930 P.2d 288, 300 (Wash. 1997).
There was no abuse of discretion in denying Alb right’s motion for reconsideration. Albright fails to show clear error in the district court’s underlying ruling on the motion s for summary judgment, and the newly discovered evidence he4

presented to the district court did not create an issue of material fact as to the
existence of malice

. Carroll v. Nakatani , 342 F.3d 934, 940, 945 (9th Cir. 2003).
AFFIRMED.