Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 16, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00197-CV

AUBREY R. JEFFERSON, Appellant

V.

UNITY NATIONAL BANK, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1004469

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal of an order in which, eighteen months after granting final 

summary judgment in this cause, the trial court purported to grant an “amended” final 

summary judgment. Because the trial court’s plenary power in this cause expired long 

before it signed the amended judgment, we declare the amended order void and we 

dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
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I. BACKGROUND

Appellee Unity National Bank filed a suit on a note against appellant Aubrey R. 

Jefferson. The suit was assigned cause number 1004469, and on May 31, 2012, the trial 

court rendered a final summary judgment against Jefferson for the principal due and 

owing on the note, together with interest, attorney’s fees, and costs of court. The parties 

did not appeal that order.

On December 10, 2013, the trial court rendered an “amended” summary judgment 

against Jefferson in the same cause number. The amended judgment is almost identical 

to the original judgment, except that the awards of prejudgment interest and attorney’s 

fees are quadrupled. Jefferson has appealed this judgment.

In the time between these two events, Jefferson filed a separate bill-of-review

proceeding, which was assigned cause number 1019981. In that action, the trial court 

signed an order in which it purported to reopen this proceeding, cause number 100469. 

The proceeding before us, however, is not an appeal of any order rendered in the bill-ofreview action; it is an appeal only of the amended judgment rendered in the original 

cause. Unity contends that the amended judgment is void because it was rendered after 

the trial court lost plenary power in this action. Thus, the only issues before us are 

(a) whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the “amended” summary judgment 

being appealed, and if so, (b) whether the trial court reversibly erred in failing to sustain 

Jefferson’s objections to the summary-judgment evidence or in granting the summary 

judgment. 

II. ANALYSIS

Where, as here, a party contends that a judgment is void, our first inquiry must be 

to determine whether the challenged judgment is void or merely voidable. See PNS 

Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 272 n.8 (Tex. 2012). Here, the challenged 
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judgment was rendered in cause number 1004469, a case in which the trial court had 

long since rendered final judgment. A trial court may change its final judgment while it 

retains plenary power. See Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip., Inc., 10 S.W.3d 

308, 310 (Tex. 2000). Thus, to determine whether the second judgment is void or 

merely voidable, we must determine whether the trial court still had plenary power 

when it rendered a second judgment in the same cause number.

Absent a timely post-judgment motion extending the trial court’s plenary power, 

the trial court retains jurisdiction over a case for thirty days after the final judgment is 

signed. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d). If an appropriate post-judgment motion is filed 

within that time, then the trial court’s plenary power is extended for thirty days after the 

motion is overruled by a signed order or by operation of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 

329b(e). If the trial court fails to sign an order ruling on the motion within seventy-five 

days after the judgment was signed, then the motion is overruled by operation of law. 

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(c). Thus, if an appropriate post-judgment motion was filed but 

was not granted, then the trial court’s jurisdiction could extend for as much as 105 days 

after the final judgment was signed. 

It is undisputed that in cause number 1044669, the trial court signed its “first” 

final judgment on May 31, 2012, and no party timely filed a post-judgment motion. The 

trial court accordingly lost plenary power over this cause on June 30, 2012.

After the trial court’s plenary power expires, it cannot substantively modify the 

judgment except by a bill of review. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(f).1 A bill of review, 

however, is an independent proceeding. Tice v. City of Pasadena, 767 S.W.2d 700, 702 

(Tex. 1989) (citing Schwartz v. Jefferson, 520 S.W.2d 881, 889 (Tex. 1975) (orig. 

 

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Even after its plenary power has expired, the trial court may sign a judgment nunc pro tunc to 

correct a clerical error, and it may declare a judgment void if it was signed after the trial court’s 

plenary power expired. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(f). 
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proceeding)); see Amanda v. Montgomery, 877 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding) (holding that trial court’s refusal to order severance 

of bill of review from underlying case was an abuse of discretion warranting mandamus 

relief). And although the record before us shows that Jefferson did file a separate billof-review action, this is not an appeal from that proceeding; it is an appeal from the 

amended judgment rendered in the original suit. As Unity points out in its response 

brief, the trial court’s plenary power in the original suit expired long before it rendered 

an amended judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b. 

A judgment in which the trial court attempts to substantively alter a final 

judgment after its plenary power has expired is void. See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. A.P.I.

Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 168 & n.21 (Tex. 2013) (holding that a second 

judgment was void because it substantively altered the first judgment 351 days after the 

first judgment was rendered). An appellate court has no jurisdiction to review the 

merits of a void judgment. See Waite v. Waite, 150 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). Because the trial court rendered the amended 

judgment in this cause after its plenary power expired, it is void, and we cannot review 

the remaining issues. See id. 

We therefore declare the amended judgment of December 10, 2013 void, and 

dismiss the appeal. See State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. 1995) 

(per curiam). In doing so, we note an important difference in the facts of this case and 

those of a case that Unity describes as “nearly identical” to it. In State v. 1985 

Chevrolet Pick-Up Truck, VIN: 1GCEK14H1FS165672, the owners of two vehicles 

filed bills of review to challenge the final judgment in a forfeiture action. See 763 

S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1988) (“1985 Chevrolet I”), rev’d sub nom.

State v. 1985 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, VIN: 1GCEK14HLFS165672, 778 S.W.2d 463 

(Tex. 1989) (per curiam) (sub. op.) (“1985 Chevrolet II”). After the bills of review were 
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erroneously “redocketed” into the original cause, the trial court purported to grant them 

and rendered an “amended judgment.” Id. As a result of the redocketing, all of the 

orders in connection with the bill of review were rendered in the underlying cause after 

the trial court had lost plenary power. See 1985 Chevy II, 778 S.W.2d at 465. On 

review, the Texas Supreme Court (a) vacated all of the orders rendered after the trial 

court’s plenary power expired, (b) reinstated the original judgment, and (c) remanded 

the case for the trial court to reconsider the bills of review. See id. This case differs 

from the 1985 Chevrolet case in that here, the bill-of-review proceeding was not simply 

redocketed into the original suit; it retained its separate existence, and the orders 

rendered in that proceeding are not properly before us for review. We accordingly 

dispose only of the case before us, and we express no opinion about the propriety or 

effect of the trial court’s orders in the separate bill-of-review proceeding. 

III. CONCLUSION

Because the trial court lacked plenary power to render the amended judgment in 

cause number 1004469, we declare the amended judgment void. We dismiss this appeal 

without reaching Jefferson’s remaining issues.

/s/ Tracy Christopher

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Donovan, and Wise.