Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1409-CR-453| April 21, 2015 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jill M. Acklin

McGrath, LLC

Carmel, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Brian Reitz

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Mary Stephens,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

April 21, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

29A04-1409-CR-453

Appeal from the Hamilton Superior 

Court

The Honorable J. Richard Campbell, 

Judge

Cause No. 29D04-1310-FD-8683

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A04-1409-CR-453| April 21, 2015 Page 2 of 6

Statement of the Case

[1] Mary Stephens appeals her conviction for theft, as a Class D felony, following a 

bench trial. Stephens raises one issue on appeal, namely, whether the State 

presented sufficient evidence to support her conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 19, 2013, Stephens was working as a member of a probation work 

crew clearing brush and trees from a Hamilton County park. Probation Officers 

C.J. Miller and Breanne Lewis were supervising the work crew. At the end of 

the day, Officer Lewis and a probationer took the final load of cleared brush to 

an off-site “burn pile,” and Officer Miller waited with the other nine 

probationers in the work group, including Stephens, who sat in and around a 

fifteen-passenger community corrections van.

[3] After a probationer informed him that Stephens had taken items from Officer 

Lewis’ purse, Officer Miller approached the van and saw Stephens putting 

things into the purse, which Officer Lewis had left beneath the front seat of the 

van. Stephens attempted to zip the purse shut and shove it under the seat in 

front of her and, when confronted, told Officer Miller that the purse had fallen 

down and that some items had fallen out of it.

[4] When Officer Lewis returned, Officer Miller described what had happened and 

suggested that they search Stephens. Officer Lewis looked around Stephens in 

the van to see if she had anything of hers, and Officer Lewis asked Stephens to 
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take off a sweatshirt that she was wearing. Officer Lewis then took Stephens to 

a women’s restroom at the park to search Stephens. Stephens brought the 

sweatshirt with her. In the restroom, Stephens dropped the sweatshirt on the 

floor. When Stephens bent to pick it up, Officer Lewis noticed a clutch 

belonging to Officer Lewis on the ground beneath the sweatshirt. Officer Lewis 

then searched Stephens and found a bottle of prescription medication, which 

also belonged to Officer Lewis and had been in the clutch. 

[5] Stephens apologized and asked the officers not to call police, but they called

Cicero Police Department Officer Kyle Comer to the scene. When Officer 

Comer asked Stephens why she had Officer Lewis’ prescription bottle, Stephens 

said that she had noticed that it had fallen out of Officer Lewis’ purse and she 

had attempted to put the bottle back in the purse. Stephens explained that she 

panicked when confronted by Officer Miller and hid the bottle instead of 

returning it to the purse.

[6] The State initially charged Stephens with possession of a controlled substance 

and theft, both as Class D felonies. However, the State dropped the possession 

charge and amended the theft charge to read: “On or about October 19, 2013, 

Mary Kathryn Stephens did knowingly exert unauthorized control over the 

property of Breanne Lewis, to-wit, [a] purse, with the intent to deprive said 

person of any part of the use or value of the property.” Appellant’s App. at 27.

[7] Following a bench trial, the trial court found Stephens guilty as charged and 

sentenced her to 730 days, with ninety days executed in the Hamilton County 
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Jail, 275 days executed on home monitoring, and 365 days suspended. This 

appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Stephens contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support her 

conviction. Our supreme court has held that when there is substantial evidence 

of probative value to support a conviction, it will not be set aside. Jones v. State,

783 N.E.2d 1132, 1139 (Ind. 2003). When reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a conviction, we must consider only the probative evidence 

and reasonable inferences supporting the conviction. See Dallaly v. State, 916 

N.E.2d 945, 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). We do not assess witness credibility or 

reweigh the evidence. Id. We consider conflicting evidence most favorably to 

the trial court’s ruling. Id. We affirm the conviction unless “no reasonable fact 

finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)). It is not 

necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of 

innocence. Id. Rather, the evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably 

be drawn from it to support the conviction. Id.

[9] To prove theft, as a Class D felony, the State was required to show that 

Stephens knowingly exerted unauthorized control over Probation Officer 

Lewis’ purse with the intent to deprive Officer Lewis of any part of the use or

value thereof. Stephens’ sole contention on appeal is that the State’s 

presentation of evidence misled the trial court regarding whether she was 
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charged with having stolen a purse or a clutch, or smaller purse, contained 

within a larger purse.1 In particular, Stephens maintains that the State charged 

her with theft of a purse, not items kept in the purse. And, she asserts, because 

there was no evidence that she stole a purse, her conviction cannot stand.

[10] In support of her contention, Stephens directs us to the following colloquy 

during cross-examination of Officer Comer:

Defense Counsel: Do you know, [sic] personal knowledge, whether 

anything was stolen out of the clutch?

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney: Objection. Relevance. The charging 

information and the charge here is that she took the purse[,] not items 

from inside the purse. It specifically says the purse.

Defense Counsel: I think it says property, Judge, on the amended 

information.

Deputy Prosecutor: It says, to wit, purse[,] not items inside.

The Court: So the State is just charging theft of the purse?

Deputy Prosecutor: That’s right.

The Court: Sustain the objection.

Tr. at 30.

[11] But Officer Comer then explained that one of the items Stephens had stolen 

from inside the bigger purse was a clutch. And Officer Comer described a 

 

1

 We note that Stephens makes no contention that her conviction cannot stand because of a fatal variance 

between the charging information and the proof at trial. See, e.g., Mitchem v. State, 685 N.E.2d 671 (Ind. 

1997).
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clutch as “a smaller purse or wallet that you would put inside your purse.” Id.

at 33.

[12] A clutch is a purse. The evidence shows that Stephens stole Officer Lewis’

clutch. The State charged Stephens with theft of a purse. At Stephens’ bench 

trial the trial court, as trier of fact, found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 

and we are confident that the court was not confused.

[13] Thus, the State presented evidence that Stephens stole a purse from Officer 

Lewis, and the evidence clearly supports the conviction. Stephens’ contentions 

on appeal amount to a request that we reweigh evidence previously evaluated 

by the trial court, which we will not do. The State presented sufficient evidence 

to support Stephens’ theft conviction. 

Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.