J-S16032-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

J.J.B. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

B.A.B.

APPEAL OF: B.A.B.

No. 1501 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered August 5, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County

Civil Division at No(s): 2006-20469

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED APRIL 21, 2015

B.A.B. (“Mother”) appeals pro se from the order entered August 5, 

2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County, which awarded her 

former husband, J.J.B. (“Father”), sole legal custody of their three minor 

sons: Z.R.B., born in February of 2000; C.J.B., born in May of 2002; and 

C.M.B., born in September of 2003 (collectively, “the Children”), while 

Mother retains primary physical custody.1 We affirm.

This appeal arises from a prior disposition by this Court, wherein we 

affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s May 15, 2013 custody 

____________________________________________

1 Mother and Father separated in May of 2006. A divorce decree was 

entered on May 18, 2012.
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order. See J.J.B. v. B.A.B., 100 A.3d 306 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished 

memorandum). In that order, the court awarded Mother primary physical 

custody of the Children, awarded Father partial physical custody, and

awarded both parents shared legal custody. However, the order included a 

tiebreaking procedure with respect to legal custody, providing that “[i]f and 

only if the parties cannot reach an agreement after consultation regarding 

an important issue, FATHER shall be granted the ability to render a final and 

binding decision.” Order, 5/15/13, at 1-2. In this Court’s prior disposition, 

we concluded that the tiebreaking procedure violated Hill v. Hill, 619 A.2d 

1086 (Pa. Super. 1993), and struck the provision from the court’s order.2 

____________________________________________

2 The Court reasoned as follows:

In Hill, the trial court granted the parties “shared legal custody 

with the provision that in the event of conflict, the mother’s 

decision shall prevail.” [619 A.2d] at 1087. Father asserted on 

appeal that the trial court’s order “effectively granted mother 

sole legal custody.” Id. at 1088. This [C]ourt agreed, stating as 

follows: 

The language in the order giving rise to appellant's 

objection is “In the event of disagreement, Mother's 

preference shall prevail.” We conclude the court's 

order is a hybrid, not recognized by statute or 

decisional law, and effectively deprives father of 

shared legal custody. . . .

[T]he judge sought dual objectives in his order, to 

grant the parties shared legal custody and at the 

same time to forestall the parties from returning to 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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J.J.B. v. B.A.B., 100 A.3d 306 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished 

memorandum at 12-14). We then remanded the case, instructing the court 

“to consider whether, absent its imposition of the improper tie-breaking 

provision, Father should have sole legal custody since the trial court was 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

court in the event of a disagreement. In so doing, 

however, the court gave the father authority in name 

only and deprived him of a legal remedy because he 

was already awarded “shared legal custody.” There 

is no provision in the law for the order the court 

issued.

This Court is neither unaware of nor unconcerned 

with the fact that granting shared custody involves 

an inherent risk that couples may reappear on the 

courthouse steps for further resolution of their 

conflicts. . . . While theoretically this may be, we 

trust this will happen only rarely. . . . 

It is abundantly clear . . . that the concept of shared 

legal custody does not contain the principle of giving 

one parent final authority in the event of a dispute.

Id. at 1088-1089 (citations omitted).

Based on Hill, we agree with Mother that the trial court 

erred by describing its award as shared legal custody, but 

designating Father as the tie-breaker in an failure of the parties 

to agree with regard to issues encompassed by legal custody. In 

so doing, the trial court effectively awarded Father sole legal 

custody.

J.J.B. v. B.A.B., 100 A.3d 306 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished 

memorandum at 12-13).
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essentially granting that status to him in its May 15, 2013 order.” Id. at 14. 

This Court affirmed the trial court’s order with respect to physical custody.

Thereafter, on June 9, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on the issue 

of legal custody. During the hearing, the court heard the testimony of the 

Children’s therapist, Ms. C. Katherine DeStefano; Mother’s physician, Dr. 

Timothy Riley; Father; Mother; and the Children’s Guardian Ad Litem, Mr. 

Wiley Parker (“the GAL”). On August 5, 2014, the court entered its order 

awarding Father sole legal custody of the Children. Mother timely filed a 

notice of appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal, on September 3, 2014. On September 25, 2014, the court issued an 

opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Mother now raises the following issues for our review.

I. The trial court erred when granting Father full legal custody of 

the Children.

II. The trial court erred when it declared the review hearing 

nothing more than regarding the issue of legal custody and no 

other evidence shall be presented.

III. The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it acted 

in a prejudice and bias [sic] manner toward [Mother].

Mother’s brief at 1-4.3

____________________________________________

3 We note that Mother’s pro se brief does not contain a statement of 

questions involved, as required by our Rules of Appellate Procedure. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(4), 2116(a). 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Our standard of review is well-established:

In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type 

and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept 

findings of the trial court that are supported by competent 

evidence of record, as our role does not include making 

independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to 

issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to 

the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses 

first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial court’s 

deductions or inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, 

the test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable 

as shown by the evidence of record. We may reject the 

conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an error of law, 

or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the 

trial court.

C.R.F., III v. S.E.F., 45 A.3d 441, 443 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting A.D. v. 

M.A.B., 989 A.2d 32, 35–36 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

[A]ppellate briefs and reproduced records must materially 

conform to the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal 

if the appellant fails to conform to the requirements set forth in 

the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Although this 

Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se

litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the 

appellant. To the contrary, any person choosing to represent 

himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, 

assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his 

undoing.

In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1211-12 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 

20 A.3d 489 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted). While Mother’s error permits us 

to dismiss her appeal, we decline to do so, and we review the merits of 

Mother’s arguments to the extent they are properly preserved and 

developed in her brief. See Green v. Green, 69 A.3d 282, 285 n.2 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (quoting White v. Owens–Corning Fiberglas, Corp., 668 

A.2d 136, 141 (Pa. Super. 1995), appeal denied, 683 A.2d 885 (Pa. 1996)) 

(“‘[I]f the failure to comply with the rules of appellate procedure does not 

impede review of the issues or prejudice the parties, we will address the 

merits of the appeal.’”).
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We have stated: 

[t]he discretion that a trial court employs in custody matters 

should be accorded the utmost respect, given the special nature 

of the proceeding and the lasting impact the result will have on 

the lives of the parties concerned. Indeed, the knowledge 

gained by a trial court in observing witnesses in a custody 

proceeding cannot adequately be imparted to an appellate court 

by a printed record. 

Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 540 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting 

Jackson v. Beck, 858 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2004)).

“The primary concern in any custody case is the best interests of the 

child. The best-interests standard, decided on a case-by-case basis, 

considers all factors that legitimately have an effect upon the child's 

physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well[-]being.” J.M.R. v. J.M., 1 

A.3d 902, 911 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citing Saintz v. Rinker, 902 A.2d 509, 

512 (Pa. Super. 2006)).

Relevant to this custody case is Section 5328(a) of the Child Custody 

Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5321-5340, which provides as follows:

(a) Factors.--In ordering any form of custody, the court shall 

determine the best interest of the child by considering all 

relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors 

which affect the safety of the child, including the following:

(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and 

permit frequent and continuing contact between the 

child and another party. 

(2) The present and past abuse committed by a 

party or member of the party’s household, whether 

there is a continued risk of harm to the child or an 

abused party and which party can better provide 
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adequate physical safeguards and supervision of the 

child. 

(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)

(relating to consideration of child abuse and 

involvement with protective services). 

(3) The parental duties performed by each party on 

behalf of the child. 

(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s 

education, family life and community life. 

(5) The availability of extended family. 

(6) The child’s sibling relationships. 

(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based 

on the child’s maturity and judgment. 

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against 

the other parent, except in cases of domestic 

violence where reasonable safety measures are 

necessary to protect the child from harm. 

(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, 

stable, consistent and nurturing relationship with the 

child adequate for the child’s emotional needs. 

(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily 

physical, emotional, developmental, educational and 

special needs of the child. 

(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties. 

(12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or 

ability to make appropriate child-care arrangements. 

(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the 

willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate 

with one another. A party’s effort to protect a child 

from abuse by another party is not evidence of 

unwillingness or inability to cooperate with that 

party. 
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(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party 

or member of a party’s household. 

(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or 

member of a party’s household. 

(16) Any other relevant factor. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).

In her first issue, Mother contends that the trial court erred by 

awarding Father sole legal custody. The crux of Mother’s argument is that 

Father is abusive toward the Children, and that the court should have 

awarded her shared or sole legal custody in light of 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 

5328(a)(2), 5323(e), and 5329(a). Mother’s brief at 1-2. Mother also 

argues that the court erred by failing to credit the testimony of Ms. 

DeStefano and the GAL, who testified that they were concerned about what 

Father would do if he were granted sole legal custody. Id. at 2-3.

We first address Mother’s contention concerning Father’s alleged acts 

of child abuse. As quoted supra, Section 5328(a) provides that courts 

considering an award of custody should give “weighted consideration to 

those factors which affect the safety of the child . . . .” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

5328(a). Section 5328(a)(2) provides that courts should consider “[t]he 

present and past abuse committed by a party or member of the party’s 

household, whether there is a continued risk of harm to the child or an 

abused party and which party can better provide adequate physical 
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safeguards and supervision of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(2). 

Sections 5323(e), and 5329(a) provide as follows.

(e) Safety conditions.--After considering the factors under 

section 5328(a)(2), if the court finds that there is an ongoing 

risk of harm to the child or an abused party and awards any 

form of custody to a party who committed the abuse or who has 

a household member who committed the abuse, the court shall 

include in the custody order safety conditions designed to 

protect the child or the abused party.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(e).

(a) Offenses.--Where a party seeks any form of custody, the 

court shall consider whether that party or member of that party's 

household has been convicted of or has pleaded guilty or no 

contest to any of the offenses in this section or an offense in 

another jurisdiction substantially equivalent to any of the 

offenses in this section. The court shall consider such conduct 

and determine that the party does not pose a threat of harm to 

the child before making any order of custody to that parent 

when considering the following offenses:[4]

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5329(a).

In the trial court’s May 15, 2013 opinion, it discussed at length, and 

rejected, Mother’s allegation that Father has engaged in child abuse. See

Trial Court Opinion, 5/15/2013, at 12-21. In our prior disposition, this Court 

reviewed the trial court’s reasoning and concluded that it did not abuse its 

discretion. J.J.B. v. B.A.B., 100 A.3d 306 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished 

memorandum at 18-19).

____________________________________________

4 Section 5329(a) goes on to provide a list of relevant offenses which we 

need not reproduce here.
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During the June 9, 2014 legal custody hearing, additional testimony 

was presented concerning alleged child abuse by Father. Specifically, the 

GAL, and the Children’s therapist, Ms. C. Katherine DeStefano, testified 

concerning two incidents of violence that were reported by the Children. In 

the first incident, Father “grabbed [C.M.B.] and threw him into a chair.” 

N.T., 6/9/14, at 14, 31, 209. While the details of this incident are unclear, 

the GAL testified that Father became aggressive with C.M.B. because he 

tried to “pull away” from Father. Id. at 209. In the second incident, Father 

“grabbed [C.J.B.], pulled him, ending up pulling him into like a sign post.”5 

Id. at 17, 206. Reportedly, this incident occurred because C.J.B. was acting 

out, or “misbehaving in some fashion.” Id. at 17, 206. Ms. DeStefano 

described Father’s actions as “accidental.” Id. at 17. Ms. DeStefano also 

reported that Father engages in aggressive behavior toward the Children by 

doing things like pushing or pulling them, that Father yells at the Children 

and threatens to hit them when they become “rambunctious,” and that 

C.M.B. reportedly overheard Father talking to himself and saying that he 

“should just kill” Mother. Id. at 13, 16, 18-20, 25, 29-30, 32, 53-54. The 

____________________________________________

5 Ms. DeStefano, the GAL, and Father testified that Father was investigated 

for child abuse twice since the previous September. N.T., 6/9/14, at 29, 54-

55, 133-34, 205-06. However, the investigating agency determined that the 

allegations of abuse were unfounded. Id. at 54-55, 133-34. Father’s 

counsel indicated that one of these investigations resulted from the incident 

involving a sign post. Id. at 54. It is not clear what allegations led to the 

second investigation. 
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GAL testified that Father “blows up” and yells at the Children over minor 

issues. Id. at 205, 219-220.

In its opinion accompanying the subject order, the court reaffirmed its 

view that Father has not committed child abuse. The court found as follows:

In the past year, FATHER has twice been investigated for 

child abuse. He was twice cleared of abusing or neglecting his 

children. For her part, MOTHER stated that she had nothing to 

do with any report of child abuse. Given the nature of the 

language we used in our May 15, 2013 Opinion, we would have 

found it unlikely that MOTHER would directly report FATHER for 

anything other than very clear abuse. However, MOTHER’S 

modus operandi has always been to employ manipulation of 

others and we cannot discount the possibility that MOTHER 

somehow indirectly caused abuse allegations to be proffered. 

Regardless of how the abuse allegations were proffered, 

FATHER was cleared by investigating agency of abusive conduct. 

Moreover, we are aware that [the GAL] developed a relationship 

with the parties’ sons to the point where they would affirmatively 

initiate telephone calls with [the GAL]. Had FATHER actually 

physically abused the [C]hildren we believe that [the GAL] would 

have brought that to our attention. He did not. 

With the above being said, it is clear that the [C]hildren 

still have a degree of fear for their father. [The GAL] stated: 

“There is still a level of fear [on the part of the [C]hildren] for 

their dad, and that is a terrible place for them to be.” Moreover, 

[the GAL] testified that FATHER has continued to act at times in 

a “counterproductive manner.” [The GAL] stated that 

“sometimes [F]ather’s response was way out of proportion to the 

incident at hand.”

Based upon everything we stated in our May 15, 2013 

Opinion and upon what we have heard most recently, we stand 

by the conclusion we rendered in our May 15, 2013 Opinion with 

respect to abuse. There, we stated:

We refuse to classify FATHER as a child abuser. 

FATHER is not a perfect parent. Without question, 
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FATHER has a temper that can and has adversely 

affected the [C]hildren. However, we categorically 

reject MOTHER’s efforts to characterize FATHER as 

an out of control parent who abuses his children.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/14, at 12-13.

Thus, the court considered Father’s allegedly abusive conduct when 

awarding him sole legal custody, as required by Section 5328(a)(2). Based 

on the evidence presented, it was reasonable for the court to conclude that 

Father’s isolated acts of aggression do not qualify him as a child abuser. 

Given the court’s conclusion that Father does not abuse the Children, the 

court was not required to give “weighted consideration” to this factor 

pursuant to Section 5328(a), nor was it required to include safety conditions 

in its custody order pursuant to Section 5323(e). With respect to Section 

5329(a), it is clear that the court has thoroughly considered the extensive 

history of this case, including prior protection from abuse proceedings and 

criminal charges against Father.6 We discern no abuse of discretion.

We next turn to Mother’s claim that the court erred by failing to credit 

the testimony of the GAL and Ms. DeStefano. During the June 9, 2014 

hearing, Ms. DeStefano testified that Father “has shown” that he will 

exercise an “unhealthy” level of control if given sole legal custody. N.T., 

____________________________________________

6 During her discussion of Section 5329(a), Mother avers that the trial court 

is “aware [F]ather was found guilty of violating [a] PFA” order in 2008, and 

that Father pled guilty to assaulting Z.R.B. in 2012. Mother’s brief at 1. The 

record reveals that Father pled guilty to simple assault and disorderly 

conduct in 2012. N.T., 3/14/13, at 129-30. Neither of these offenses 

requires consideration under Section 5329(a). 
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6/9/14, at 79. Ms. DeStefano reported that Father did not give C.J.B. his 

prescribed Prozac during at least two of Father’s custodial periods, that 

Father has repeatedly demanded that C.J.B. be taken off Prozac, and that 

Father has refused to give Z.R.B. his allergy medication. Id. at 69-76. Ms. 

DeStefano also testified that Father has threatened to prevent the Children 

from participating in extracurricular activities, that Father has instructed 

Mother not to schedule the Children’s medical appointments during his 

custodial time, and that Father has tried to prevent the Children from 

continuing to have appointments with her. Id. at 70, 76-79. Similarly, the 

GAL stated that he did not want Father to receive sole legal custody. Id. at 

225. The GAL expressed concern that Father would terminate the Children’s 

relationship with Ms. DeStefano, and that Father would stop or prevent 

C.J.B. from taking recommended medications, including Prozac. N.T., 

6/9/14, at 210-11, 213, 225.

In its opinion accompanying the subject order, the trial court 

addressed specifically the concerns presented by Ms. DeStefano and the GAL 

relative to the possibility that Father would abuse his power if granted sole 

legal custody.

With respect to FATHER’s ability to be an accommodating 

parent, we heard a great deal. However, most of what we heard 

involved fears of what FATHER might do if he were awarded sole 

legal custody. Katherine DeStefano testified: “It is not so much 

that I disagree with what [F]ather has already decided; it is what 

I fear he will do if given complete power.” This is a theme that 

was mirrored by other witnesses as well. Despite these fears, 

we discerned only a handful of instances when FATHER actually 
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asserted the authority we gave him on May 15, 2013. In point 

of fact, FATHER has continued to allow [C.J.B.] to take Prozac 

despite the fact that he disagrees with the decision. FATHER 

continues to support the [C]hildren in their pursuit of a multitude 

of activities in the Wrightsville area even though it requires him 

to drive great distances to participate in those activities. 

MOTHER testified that she did not perceive her parenting role to 

have changed greatly since May of 2013, and FATHER certainly 

could have asserted his authority to dramatically change 

MOTHER’s role with the [C]hildren. In short, we do not believe 

that FATHER abused the parenting authority we gave him by way 

of our May 15, 2013 Court Order. 

To be sure, we understand that FATHER may have been 

restrained somewhat in exercising his parenting authority by 

virtue of MOTHER’s appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. 

Nevertheless, we cannot and will not ignore the fact that the 

Court Order affording FATHER with “tiebreaking” authority was in 

effect for over a year. During that period of time, we cannot say 

that FATHER abused his authority or exercised it in a way 

contrary to the interests of his children. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/14, at 11-12.

Again, we conclude that Mother is not entitled to relief. The record 

supports the trial court’s conclusion that Father had tiebreaking authority 

with respect to legal custody for over a year at the time of the June 9, 2014 

hearing, and that he did little, if anything, to abuse his authority. In 

addition, the subject order alleviates two of the primary concerns presented 

by Ms. DeStefano and the GAL, as it provides that Father may not take 

C.J.B. off of Prozac without further order of court, and retains Ms. DeStefano 

as the Children’s counselor. Order, 8/5/14, at 5-7. We acknowledge that 

the trial court has reached an unusual decision in this matter, by awarding 

primary physical custody of the Children to Mother, and awarding sole legal 
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custody of the Children to Father. However, the court has thoroughly 

explained and justified its decision, and we discern no abuse of discretion.

In her second issue, Mother argues that the trial court erred by 

limiting the June 9, 2014 hearing to evidence concerning legal custody only. 

Mother’s brief at 4. No relief is due, as Mother has waived this claim by 

failing to support it with citation to relevant authority. In re W.H., 25 A.3d 

330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 24 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2011) 

(quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa. Super. 2010)) (“‘[W]here an 

appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to

relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful 

fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”’). 

Furthermore, in our prior decision, we affirmed the trial court on all 

claims raised by Mother on appeal and remanded solely for the trial court “to 

consider whether, absent its imposition of the improper tie-breaking 

provision, Father should have sole legal custody since the trial court was 

essentially granting that status to him in its May 15, 2013 order.” J.J.B. v. 

B.A.B., 100 A.3d 306 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum at 14). 

Based on this instruction, the trial court could simply have ordered that 

Father be awarded sole legal custody without conducting an additional 
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hearing at all. The fact that the court held a hearing with respect to legal 

custody cannot be the basis for a finding of error. No relief is due.7

In her third issue, Mother contends that the trial court violated the 

Code of Judicial Conduct by acting in a prejudiced and biased manner toward 

her. Mother’s brief at 4-9. In support of this argument, Mother provides a 

list of complaints based primarily on the court’s credibility determinations 

and findings of fact, and on the court’s insistence on closely monitoring 

Mother’s health and her recovery from drug addiction. Id. In its September 

25, 2014 opinion, the trial court stated that it could not address this claim, 

because it was not presented with sufficient specificity in Mother’s concise 

statement of errors on appeal. Trial Court Opinion, 9/25/14, at 8. In her 

concise statement, Mother presented this claim as follows: “The [t]rial 

[c]ourt erred and abused it’s [sic] discretion when it acted in prejudice and 

bias [sic] manner toward [Mother].” Concise Statement of Matters 

Complained on Appeal, 9/3/14, at 1. 

____________________________________________

7 As part of this claim, Mother also argues that the court “violated it’s [sic] 

own directions by acutally [sic] changing other areas of the court order 

without allowing for evidence or testimony that would have affected those 

changes.” Mother’s brief at 4. However, Mother does not direct us to any 

“other areas” of the order that she contends the court changed improperly. 

Additionally, as before, Mother fails to support this contention with citation 

to relevant authority. Thus, it is waived. See W.H., 25 A.3d at 339 n.3.
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We agree with the trial court, and conclude that Mother has waived 

this issue by failing to adequately present it in her concise statement. As 

this Court has explained,

it is well-established that “[an a]ppellant's concise statement 

must properly specify the error to be addressed on appeal.” 

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. Super. 

2011), appeal denied, 613 Pa. 642, 32 A.3d 1275 (2011) 

(citation omitted). “[T]he Rule 1925(b) statement must be 

specific enough for the trial court to identify and address the 

issue an appellant wishes to raise on appeal.” Id. (brackets, 

internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Further, this 

Court may find waiver where a concise statement is too vague. 

Id. “When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is 

appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review.” 

Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686 (Pa. Super. 

2001) (citation omitted). “A Concise Statement which is too 

vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is 

the functional equivalent of no Concise Statement at all.” Id. at 

686–87.

In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 350 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Moreover, even if we were to reach the merits of this claim, we would 

conclude that Mother is not entitled to relief. As explained supra, the trial 

court has drafted a series of thorough opinions detailing its credibility 

determinations and findings of fact, including its August 5, 2014 opinion, 

which accompanied the subject order, and its September 25, 2014 opinion 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). The court’s decision to award Father sole 

legal custody is supported by competent evidence of record, and nothing 
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about the court’s reasoning suggests that its actions are based on bias or 

prejudice.8

Accordingly, because we conclude that none of Mother’s claims entitles 

her to relief, we affirm the order of the trial court.

Order affirmed.

Judge Panella joins in this memorandum decision.

Judge Olson concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/21/2015

____________________________________________

8

In connection with this claim, Mother attempts to raise a number of other 

issues. For example, Mother challenges the portion of the court’s order 

providing Father with the authority to hire a family counselor, and requiring 

that Mother “cooperate with the counseling to be provided by that 

individual.” Mother’s brief at 8; Order, 8/5/14, at 5. Mother also challenges 

the portion of the court’s order requiring that Mother’s addictions counselor 

must report to the Children’s guardian ad litem “anything that is of concern 

to him regarding MOTHER’s addiction and medication intake.” Mother’s brief 

at 8; Order, 8/5/14, at 5-6. Again, these claims are not supported by 

citation to relevant authority, other than Mother’s vague assertion that the 

trial court violated “HIPPA and laws protecting psych. records.” Mother’s 

brief at 8. Thus, we conclude that they are waived. See W.H., 25 A.3d at 

339 n.3.