p. 1 

# PICK-UPDATE : 3/8/200 7
BO X 

# 1 0 O F 

# 1 0 Ste p 2 : FO R ASR C INTERNA L US E ONL Y (PARTA o

f B )



# EP ADOCKE T ID : 102RQ-R N
1 ) INDE X 3 ) 102RQ-RN-1- 2 5 ) 102RQ-RN-1- 4 7 ) 102RQ-RN-1- 6 9 ) 102RQ-RN-3- 1 11 ) 102RQ-RN-3- 3 13 ) 102RQ-RN-2-1- 2 15 ) 102RQ-RN-2-1- 4 17) 102RQ-RN-2-2- 1 19 ) 102RQ-RN-2-3- 1 21 ) 102RQ-RN-2-4- 2 23 ) 102RQ-RN-2-4- 4 25 ) 102RQ-RN-2-4- 6 27 ) lQ2r^_-_

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. 29£OQ2RQ-RN-2-4-10j > 31 ) 102RQ-RN-4- 2 33 ) 102RQ-RN-4- 4 35 ) 102RQ-RN-4- 6 37 ) 102RQ-RN-4- 8 39 ) 102RQ-RN-5- 1 Ste p 3 : FO R ASR C INTERNA L US E ONL Y CD : OA : / 

# 2 ) 102RQ-RN-1- 1 4 ) 102RQ-RN-1- 3 6 ) 102RQ-RN-1- 5 8 ) 102RQ-RN-1- 7 10 ) 102RQ-RN-3- 2 12 ) 102RQ-RN-2-1- 1 14) 102RQ-RN-2-1- 3 16 ) 102RQ-RN-2-1- 5 18 ) 102RQ-RN-2-2- 2 20 ) 102RQ-RN-2-4- 1 22 ) 102RQ-RN-2-4- 3 24 ) 102RQ-RN-2-4- 5 26 ) 102RQ-RN-2-4- 7 28 ) 102RQ-RN-2-4- 9 30 ) 102RQ-RN-4- 1 32 ) 102RQ-RN-4- 3 34 ) 102RQ-RN-4- 5 36 ) 102RQ-RN-4- 7 38 ) 102RQ-RN-4- 9 40 ) 102RQ-RN-5- 2

Ste p 1 : FO R ASR

C INTERNA L US E ONL Y Are ther e mor

e document

s fo r thi s Docke

t i n anothe r box

? Til l out Continuatio n Sheet an d g o t o Ste p 2 Interna l SFUN D Bo

x Numbe r 3 5 O F 28 3 Initials/Date : LDS / 3-8-200 7 

## /^EsyN OP. 2

I 

## NUREG-114 0


# A Regulator

y Analysi s o n Emergenc

y Preparednes s fo r Fue l Cycl e an d Othe r Radioactiv

e Materia l Licensees Draf t Repor t fo r Commen t

Manuscrip

t Completed : May 198

5 Date Published : Jun e 198 5 .; , S
. A
. McGuir

e 

### Divisio n o f Ris k

Analysi s an d Operation s Offic e o f Nuclea r Regulator y Researc h U.S.IMuclea r Regulator y Commissio n Washington , D.C
. 2055 5

. % 

### .~y

/P. 3

EXECUTIV E SUMMAR

Y

Th e questio nthi s Regulator y Analysi s sough t t o answe r is : Shoul dthe . . NR C impos e additiona l emergenc y preparedness requirement s o ncertai nfue l cycl e
an dothe r radioactiv e materia l licensee s fo r dealin g wit haccident s tha t might , hav e offsit e release s o f radioactiv e material ? T o answe r th e question , w e analyze dpotentia l accident s fo r 1 5 type s o f fue l cycl e andothe r radioactiv e materia l licensees . -'..;•'

_ Th e mos t potentiall y hazardou s accident , b y a larg e margin,-wa s determine d t o b e th e sudde nruptur e o f a heated-multi-to ncylinde r o f UF 6 . Acut e fatalitie s
ma y b e possibl e i nth e -immediat e vicinit y o f the

_releas e point . Acut e permanen t - injurie s ma y

b e possibl e fo r man y hundred s o f meters , an dclinicall y

observabl e transien t injur y

o f unknow

nlong ter

m consequence s ma y

b e possibl e fo r distance s
u pt o a few

miles . Thes e effect s woul db e cause db y th e chemica l toxicit y o f th e UF 6 an

dth e product s resultin g fro m it s reactio nwit hmoisture . Accompanyin g * radiatio ndose s woul dno t b e o f significance . Th e mos t potentiall y hazardou s acciden t du e t o radiatio nexposur e was " determine d t o b e a larg e fir e a t certai nfacilitie s handlin g larg e quantitie s
o f alpha-emittin g radionuclides : (i.e. , Po-210 , Pu-238 , Pu-239 , Am-241 , Cm-242 , Cm-244 ) o r radioiodines (1-12 5 an d1-131) . However , acut e fatalitie s o r injurie s t o peopl e offsit e du e t o accidentfa 1 release s o f thes e material s d o
no t see m plausible . A

fe w othe r radionuclide s ar e o f lesse r importanc e (H-3 , P-32 , Sr-90 , an

dCs-137> . I f plutoniu m wer e t o b e handle da t fue l cycl e facilities , a fire~i nsuc ha facilit y ma y a-ls o b e o f significance . Th e onl y

othe r significan t acciden t wa s identifie da s a long-term pulsatin g criticalit y a t fue l cycl e facilitie s handlin g high^enriche d uraniu m
o r plutoniu

m i naqueou s solutions . Asid e fro

m fire s o r accident s tha t lea dt o fires , UF 6 releases , o r cri ticalit y

accidents , no othe r significan t accident s wer e identified . Explosion s
wer e no t see nt o yiel da s larg e a releas e unles s the y wer e followe d b

y a fire . Tan k rupture s wer e no t identifie da s havin g a potentia l fo r significan t releases . Earthquake s als o wer e no t identifie da s leadin g t o significan t release s unles sthe

y wer e followe

d b y a fire . Tornado s might caus e larg e release , but woul d dispers e th

e materia l so widel y tha t significan t dose s woul d not result . Th e criterio

nfo r decidin

g whethe r a

nacciden t wa s significant i s whethe r
a releas e coul d caus e a perso noutsid

e th e plant o

nth e plum e centerline t o receiv e withi n8 hour s a

neffectiv

e dos e equivalen t o f mor e tha n1 rem, " a . thyroi d dos e o f more-tha n5 rems , o

r a nintak e o f solubl e uraniu m exceedin

g 2 mg . One re

m whol e bod

y o r 5 rem s thyroi d are at th e lowe r en d o f th e rang e
o f dos e fo

r whichth

e EP A say s protectiv

e action s shoul d b

e considered . A roug hscreenin

g identifie

d 6 4 licensee s authorize d to posses s quantitie s o f radioactiv

e matertals.fo r whic ha nacciden t releas e coul d caus e dose s exceedin g 1 re m effectiv

e dos e equivalent , 5 rem s thyroid , o

r intak e o f 2 m

g o f solubl e uranium . However , som e o f thes e licensee s d o no t actuall y

posses s al l o f the material s authorize d b y th e license . Thes e licensee s are likely t o amen

d thei r license s t o lower thei r possessio nlimit s rathe r tha nsubmi t a plan. . Othe r licensee s coul d demonstrat e tha t a significan t releas e i s not possible . In actuality , only

about 3 0 plan s woul d b e submitted . Fo

r mos t o f thes e licensees , however , th

e degre e o f hazar

d i s smal H Fo

r mos t suc

hlicensee s maximu

m dose s fo r eve nthe mos t severe postulate d accident s are only a fe w reus . The area s withi nwhichpeopl e shoul d tak e protectiv

e action s are smal l - fo r mos t licensee s muc

hless-tha

na square mile . A t mos t site s thes e area s woul d contai n fe w people . An

d th e probabilit

y o f a majo r releas e i s smal l - les s tha n10- 4 /yr . Th e probability

o f a major releas e simultaneou s withhighly advers e meteorolog y i s les s tha

n10- 5 /yr . Thu s th e probability

o f eve na singl e person' s receivin g
a dos e i

nexces s o f 1-re

m at.mos t o f ;these facilitie s ha s about th e sam e probability

a s a cor e mel t acciden t wit hcontainmen t failur e a t a nuclea r powe r plant . . A furthe r feature of-major ace-rderit s a t suc

hlicense

d facilitie s i s tha t airborne release s are likel y to occu

r rapidl y

wit hTittl e warning . Rupture s
o f UF 6 cylinder s an d fire s woul d giv

e littl e or n

o warning . Release s coul d star t befor e a fire i s detecte d or shortl y

thereafter . Plum

e trave l tim

e t o nearb y peopl e i s likely

t o b e n o mor e tha

na fe w minutes . Release s woul d ina majority

o f case s en

d withi nhal f a

nhou r to a nhou r whe nth e fire departmen t controlled th

e fire . I

nmos t instances , action s take nhal f a

nhou r afte r acciden t detectio

nwoul d b

e fairly

ineffective . Action s take n1 5 minute s afte r acciden t detectio ncoul d o

nth e average b

e expecte

d t o b e roughl y

50 % effective . Thu s protectiv e action s woul d hav e t o b e take nquickly . Thi s require s predetermine d action s to b

e take nb y peopl e i

nth e vicinity

o f th e i iP. 5

sit e to notify

nearb y residents . Ther e i s no t likely t o b e enoug htim e fo r dos e projection s or complicate d decisionmakin

g durin g th e accident , no

r fo r participatio

no f personne l not i nth e immediat e vicinity o f th e site . A nappropriat e pla

nwoul d (1 ) identif y Occident s fo

r whichprotectiv

e action s shoul d b

e take nb y peopl e offsite . (2 ) lis t th e licensee' s respon sibilitie s fo

r eac htype.o f accident , includin g notificatio

no f loca l authoritie s (fire an d polic e generally) , an d (3 ) giv

e sampl e message s for loca l authoritie s includin g protectiv

e actio nrecommendations . Thi s approach
mor e closel y

follow s th e approac

huse d fo r researc

hreactor s tha

nfo r powe r reactors ^ Th

e lo w potentia l offsit e dose s (acut e fatalitie s an d injurie s no t possibl e except fo

r UF 6 releases) , th e smal l area s wher e action s woul d b e warranted , th

e smal l number o f peopl e involved , an d th e fac t tha t th

e loca l polic e an

d fire department s woul d b e doin g essentiall y

th e sam e thing s the

y normally

do , are al l factor s tha t ten d to make a simpl e pla nadequate .



### mP. 6

CONTENT S

EXECUTIV

E SUMMAR

Y. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT S . . . 1 . PROPOSE

D ACTIO N 1. 1 Descriptio

no f th e Propose

d Actio n 1.2 : Nee

d fo r th e Propose

d Actio n. . . TECHNICA

L BASI S FO

RTHj E PROPOSE

D RULE 2. 1 Methodolog

y ...... . y

. . 2.1. 1 Th

e Acciden t Histor

y Approach.... . 2.1: 2 Acciden t Sourc e Term s ........ . 2.1. 3 Calculation s o f Dose s ... . 2.1. 4 Protectiv

e Actio nGuide s ...... . 2.1. 5 A

Discussio

no f th e Conservatis

m i nth e Calculation s . . . ' . 2. 2 Fue l Cycl e Facilitie s 2.2. 1 Uraniu

m Minin g 2.2. 2 Uraniu

m Millin g ...... . 2.2. 3 UF 6 Conversio nPlant s . . . . 2.2. 4 Enrichment Plant s . 2.2. 5 Fue l Fabricatio n- Uraniu

m . 2.2: 6 Fue l Fabricatio n-Plutoniu

m 2.2.- 7 Spent Fue l Storag e 2.2,8-Ne w

Fue l Storag

e 2.2. 9 Reprocessin

g of-Spent Fue l . 2.2.1 0 Researc

hwit hNuclear Fuel s . 2. 3 Byproduc t Materia l Facilitie s 2.3. 1 A

Generi c Overvie

w ...... . 2.3. 2 Radiopharmaceutica l Manufacturin g 2.3. 3 Radiopharmacie s an d Hospital s . . 2.3. 4 Seale

d Sourc e Manufacturin g . . . 2.3. 5 Universit

y Researc

hLaboratorie s 2.3. 6 Wast e Warehousin g an d Buria l . . 2.3. 7 Deplete

d Uraniu

m Product s ... . 2. 4 Summar

y o f Facilitie s t o b e Covere

d 2. 5 A Protectiv

e Actio nStrateg

y . . . . Pagj s i . ix
1
1 3 .

4 6 7 1 2 

## 1 4 

## '.

- 1 7 _-. - 1 7 1 7 2 5 3 7 3 9 5 0 5 6 5 9 5 9 6 4
6 6
6 7 8 1 8 3 8 4 8 9 9 0 9 3
9 6 9 8P. 7

CONTENT S (Continued )

"2.5. 1 Th

e Initia l Respons e I 2.5. 2 Th

e Relocatio

nPhas e ......... . 2.5. 3 Th

e Assessmen t Phas e . .. . . .... . 2.5. 4 Th

e Foo d Pathwa

y . . ... . . . . . ... . . . . . 3 . VALUE/IMPAC T . . . ,, . . ..v . . . . 3. 1 Alternatives . .- . . . .. . ^
.......... . A..
. . 3. 2 -Valu

e o f th e Propos e Actio

n. .- . • .. . • • ... . . . . .

. ," ' 3. 3 Cost.. . . r ,; . . . .

_. . .. . ..... . . . . . . " . . . . 3-r 4 Value/Impac t o f Alternative s 4 . STATUTOR

YCONSIDERATION S ..-, . 4.1 " NR C Regulator

y Authorit

y . . . . 4. 2 Agreemen t State s . . 4. 3 Environmenta l Impac t Appraisa l .............. . 5 . CONCLUSION S Page 9 8 10 4
10 5 10 7
10 7
10 7 10 7 10 9 11 0
11 1
11 1 11 1 11 1
11 2
FIGUR E
1 . Atmospheri c dispersio ncalculate

d b y CRAC 2 fo r F stability , 1 meter/secon

d win d : spee d . . . . ."•...-

• ..... . .... "

v TABLE S
1 . Fire s inUraniu m Mill s ... . 2 . Uraniu

m Mil l Tailing s Releases , 1959-198 4 3 . Acciden t Sourc e Term s an d Dose s Fro

m Uraniu m Mil l Accident s . . 4 . Accident s Involvin g UF ^ Release s . 5 . Criticaiity

Accident s InFue l Cycl e Facilitie s -...'....
. 6 . Fire s an

d Explosion s Involvin g Uraniu

m an d Thoriu

m 7 . Othe r Accidenta l Release s fro m Uraniu m Fue l Fabricatio

nPlant s 8 . Amount s o f Radioactive-Material s Release d t o Roo

m Ai r Du e t o a Critica l it

y Acciden t ...... . . . . . . . . , 9 . Offsit e Dose s Calculate d fo r Fue l Fabricatio

nPlant s 10 . Calculate

d Release s an

d Dose s fro

m Spent Fue l Storag e Accident s 11 . Fire s an

d Explosion s Involvin g Releas e o f Byproduc t Material s . 12 . Accidenta l Release s o f Byproduc t Materia l Excep t Fire s an d Explosion s ..... . 13 . Quantitie s o f Radioactiv e Material s Requirin g Evaluatio

no f th e Nee d fo r Offsit e Emergenc

y Preparednes s 14 . Radiopharmaceutica l Manufacturing : Maximu m Possessio

nLimits , Releas e Fractions , an d Dose s Du

e t o a Majo r Facility Fir e . . . 15 . Radiopharmacy : Maximu m Possessio

nLimits , Releas e Fractions , an d Dose s Du

e t o a Major Facilit y Fir e 

### 1 1

1 9 2 0 2 2 2 7 4 0 4 2 4 3
4 5 4 7 6 0 6 8
6 9
7 5 8 2
8 5

V iCONTENT S (Continued )

TABLE S (Continued ) Page

16 . Seale

d Sourc e Manufacturing : Maximu m Possessio

nLimits , Releas e Fractions , an d Dose s Du

e t o a Majo r Facility

Fire . . . . 8 7 17 . Universit

y Researc

hLaboratories : Maximu m Possessio

nLimit s . Releas e Fractions , an d Dose s Du

e to a Majo r Fire ........ . 9 0 18 . Wast e Warehousin g Airborn

e Release s an

d Dose s Du

e t o a Majo r Facilit y Fire .. . . . , . . 9 1 19 . Beaufor t Win

d Scal e (Simplified ) . _9 9 20 . Pasquill' s Relatio no f Turbulenc e Type s to Weathe r Condition s . . 10 0 21 . Dos e fo

r Different,Meteorologia l Condition s Relativ e 

### to F, 1 m/s
........... . . ....... . 10 0 22 . Downwin

d Distance s to Whic h.Protectiv

e Action s Shoul d Be Considere

d fo r a nAcciden t Involvin g Fiv e Time s th

e Quantity o f Materia l i

nTabl e 1 3 .:.:.. . 10 1 23 . Downwin

d Distance s to Whic hProtectiv

e Action s Shoul d Be Considere

d for.a nAcciden t Involvin g 5 0 Time s th

e Quantity o f Materia l inTabl e 1 3 .: . . . 10 3 24 . Compariso

no f Cost s an

d Benefit s o f Specia l Emergenc y Preparednes s 11 0

v i 1P. 9

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT S

W e woul dlik e t o than k th e followin g peopl e fo r helpin g u s prepar e thi s Regulator y

Analysis . Davi d Bennett , Eugen e Runkle j Danie l Alpert , Kennet hAdams , and Davi d Aldric ho f Sandi a Nationa l Laborator y fo r performin g dos e calculation s
an d meterologica l modeling . Pete r Owczarski , Su e Sutter , Jof uMishima , an dMar k Halverso no f Battelle Pacifi c Northwes t .Laboratory fo r performin g releas e fractio nexperiments , analyzin g releas e fractio nexperiments , reviewin g th e literatur e o nreleas e fractions , developin g acciden t scenarios , andanalyzin g accidents . Mosh e Simon-To v

andRei dWilliam s o f Martin-Mariett a Energ y Systems , Oa k Ridge , fo r performin g analyse s o f UF 6 releases . Rober t Jus t fo r discussion s
o nth e healt heffect s o f UF 6 . Andrea s Jense no f th e JohnHopkin s Universit y Applie dPhysic s Laborator y fo r descriptions_o f th e U.S . Departmen t o f transportatio nacciden t modeling: : methods . - .'_".'•• - Josep hLogsde no f th e U.S . Environmenta l Protectio n.Agency " fo r discussion s
o nth e us e o f th e EPA' s protectiv e actio nguides . Pau l Morro w

o f th e -Universit y

o f Rocheste r andMcDonal dE dWren no f th e Universit y

o f Uta hfo r discussio no nth e chemica l toxicit y o f uranium . Duan e Hal l o f 3 M

fo r hostin g a tou r o f th e 3 M seale dsourc e manufacturin g plan t i nNe w

Brighton , Minn , andfo r discussio non-jth e releas e fraction s o f polonium-210 . . - ' . . " Edwar dJanzo w

o f Monsant o Researc hCorporatio nfo r hostin g a tou r o f th e Monsant o Dayton, Ohio , seale dsource " manufacturing.plan t andfo r informatio n
onth e particl e siz e o f americiu m oxid e powder . Melit a Rodec k o f th e Federa l Emergenc y Managemen t Agenc y

fo r helpfu l comments . A l Arcun i andSandy

Mulle no f Internationa l Energy Associate s Limite d fo r helpfu l comments .

i xO nth e NRC' s Offic e o f Nuclear Materia l Safet y an d Safeguard s staff : Frit z Storz , Lee Rouse , an d Joh nRobert s for assistanc e i npreparin

g th e sectio no nspent fue l storage ; Denni s Sollenberge r an d Georg e Gnugnol i for assistanc e inpreparin g th e sectio

no nuraniu

m milling ; Fre

d Fisher , E

d Shum , an d R . Gerr

y Page fo

r suggestion s throughou t th e analysis ; Josep hWan g for assistanc e i

npreparin

g section s i

nbyproduc t materia l licensees ; Ro nCardarell i fo r hel p i

ncollectin

g informatio

ni nemergenc

y plan s submitted t o NRC . O nth e NRC' s Offic e o f Nuclear Regulator y Researc

hstaff : Steve

nBernstei n
an d Do nSolberg fo

r assistanc e o

nacciden t scenario s an d releas e fractions , a s wel l a s contrac t assistance ; Rober t Kornasiewic z an d Let a Brow

nfo r comment s
an d assistanc e o

nmeterologica l modeling ; Jame s Marti nan d Leonar

d Soffe r for comment s an

d assistanc e wit hregar d t o existin

g NR C policy , o

nemergenc

y prepar edness , especially*a s i t relate s t o nuclear powe r plants ; Jame s Norberg , Phili p Ting , Rober t Bernero , Jame s Malaro , an d Kar l Golle r fo

r man y helpfu l comment s an

d valuabl e support . O nth e NRG' s Offic e o f Nuclear Reactor Regulatio nstaff : Irwi nSpickle r for man y valuabl e comments^an d discussion s o

nmeterologica l modeling . O nth e NRC' s Offic e o f Analysi s and Evaluatio no f Operationa l Dat a staff : KathleenBlac k an

d Eugen e Trage r fo

r hel p incollectin g informatio

no nacciden t histories .P.1 1

A REGULATOR YANALYSI S



### O N

EMERGENC YPREPAREDNES S FORFUE L CYCL E AND OTHE RRADIOACTIVE MATERIA L LICENSEE S

1 . . PROPOSE D ACTIO N

_•
_ -

1. 1 Descriptio no f th e Propose dActio n. -

Thi s regulator y

analysi s evaluate s th e nee dfo r a propose drul e t o requir e additiona l emergenc y preparednes s fo r certai nfue l cycl e = an d other.radioactiv e materia l licensees . Th e purpos e o f th e rul e woul db e to~require , fo r certai n licensee s wh o ar e authorize dt o posses s radioactiv e material s i nlarg e quantity , "emergency

procedure s fo r offsit e release s o f radioactive"materials . = Thes e woul dinclude :

(1 ) A brie f descriptio no f th e licensee' s facilit y andth e are a near , th e site . -
(2 J _A nidentificatio no f eac htyp e o f acciden t fo r which"protectiv e -action s fo r th e publi c ma y b e needed . -

_
(3 ) A nanalysi s o f th e potentia l dose s to.th e publi c fro m eac htyp e o f accident , includin g dose s fro m naturall y

occurrin g andaccelerato r produce dradioactiv e materia l i nadditio nt o al l license dmaterial .
(4 ) Identificatio no f the mean s o f detectin g eac htyp e o f acciden t i na timel y manner .(5 ) A brie f descriptio

no f th e mean s an

d equipment fo

r mitigatin

g th e consequence s o f eac htyp e o f accident , includin g thos e provide

d t o protec t worker s onsite .

" - - - . - *
. - - - (6 ) A brie f descriptio

no f th e method s an

d equipment to asses s release s o f radioactiv

e materials . .
(7 ) A brie f descriptio

nofth e responsibilitie s o f license e personne l shoul d a

nacciden t occur , includin g identificatio

no f personne l responsible , fo

r notifyin

g offsit e authoritie s an d notifyin

g th e NRC .
(8 ) A brie f descriptio

no f th e mean s o f promptl y notifyin

g offsit e authoritie s an

d o f requestin

g offsit e assistanc e resources .
(9 ) A brie f descriptio

no f th e method s fo

r assurin

g tha t recommende

d protectiv

e action s an

d distance s are unambiguousl y communicate

d t o

_ - respons e organizations .
(10 ) A brie T descriptio

no f an y specia l instruction s th e license e woul d giv e "t o fire , police , medica l an d othe r emergenc

y personnel .
(11 ) A brie f descriptio

no f th e mean s o f restorin g th e facilit

y t o a saf e conditio

nafte r a

naccident . {1-2 ) Provision s fo

r conductin

g onsit e drill s a t interval s no t t o exceed tw o years . : -

. Th e questio

ni s no t whethe r licensee s shoul d hav e an y emergenc

y preparedness , tha t questio

nwa s addresse

d lon g ago . Th

e NR C ha s lon

g require

d licensee s t o b e prepare

d to cop

e wit hemergencies . Th e questio

ni s whethe r ther e shoul d b e additiona l requirements . Fo r example , should NR C requir e forma l writtenstat e
an d loca l governmen t plan s fo r copin g offsit e wit hseriou s radiatio naccidents ? Suc hplan s might includ e provision s fo

r earl y evacuatio

nb y th e publi c o

r notifyin

g the m t o take shelter indoors . Th e questio

ni s als o no t whethe r Stat e an d loca l government s shoul d hav e emergenc

y preparednes s capabilitie s fo r dealin

g wit hradiatio

naccidents .P
. 1 3

Polic e departments , fir e departments , an dothe r agencie s tha t ar e routinel y prepare dt o cop e wit hemergencies already exist . Thi s rulemakin g i s intende d t o assur e that , wher e needed , ther e exis t emergenc y procedure s fo r mitigatin g
an dcopin g wit hoffsit e releases . W e mus t als o distinguis hbetwee nemergenc y respons e andforma l emergenc y procedures . I f a

nacciden t happens , th e license e an dStat e an

dloca l govern ment s ca nbe expecte dt o respondt o th e bes t o f thei r abilitie s whethe r o r no t ther e ar e an

y forma l writte nemergenc y procedure s fo r offsit e releases . Th e questio ni s whethe r th e respons e woul db e adequat e i f ther e wer e no Writte n emergenc y

procedure s fo r copin g wit hth e emergency . Thi s regulator y

analysi s consider s plausibl e accident s fo r variou s type s
o f fuelcycl e an dothe r radioactiv e materia l licensees . Th e analysi s the n determine s for.whic htype s o f facilitie s th e respons e t o anacciden t woul d involv e s o many

people , suc hlarg e areas , an drequir e suc hpromp t action s tha t th e respons e woul dno t be adequat e unles s ther e wer e availabl e additiona l specia l resource s beyon dthos e already existing .

1. 2 Nee dfo r th e Propose dActio n

Th e NR C ha s always.require d tha t it s licensee s tak e step s t o reduc e th e likelihoo do f seriou s accident s t o a minima l level , bu t ye t b e prepared " t o cop e wit haccident s shoul dthe y occur . However , durin g th e Commission' s delibera tion s o nrulemakin g concernin g nuclea r powe r plan t emergenc y preparednes s followin g th e acciden t a t Thre e Mil e Island , th e Commissio ndirecte dth e staf f t o evaluat e th e jiee d t o strengthe nth e emergenc y preparednes s requirement s fo r fuel : eyele-an d othe r radioactiv e materia l licensees . I nlat e 1980 , th e staf f reevaluate dpreviousl y submitte demergenc y plan s fo r fue l fabricatio nplant s an dfoundsom

e weaknesse s i nth e plan s a s written . . Fo r example , som

e plan s di dno t describ e (1 ) timel y alerting-o f potentiall y affecte dpubli c t o a hazard , (2 ) recommendation s fo r specifi c action s th e publi c shoul dtak e t o protec t itself , suc ha s shelterin g o r evacuation , and (3 ) arrangement s fo r promp t notificatio no f NR C an dstat e and loca l governmen t agencies . I nFebruary , 1981 , th e NR C issue dorder s t o 6 2 licensee s t o eithe r submi t comprehensiv e radiologica l emergenc y plan s o r lowe r thei r possessio nlimit s fo r radioactiv e material . Abou t hal f o f th e licensee s submitte dplans , and '" » P.1 4



### hal f lowere dthei r possessio nlimit s o r surrendere dthei r license . Then , a n Advanc e Notic e o f Propose dRulemakin g onth e subjec t o f offsit e emergenc y pre parednes s wa s publishe dinth e Federa l Registe r o nJun e |3 , 198 1 (4 6 F

R29712) .
2 . TECHNICA L BASIS , FO RTH E PROPOSE D RUL E y
2. 1 Methodolog y
Thi s regulator y

analysi s identifie s th e classe s o f fue l cycl e an dothe r radioactiv e materia l licensee s tha t coul dhav e accident s tha t migh t resul t i n radiatio ndose s t o th e publi c exceedin g protectiv e actio nguide s establishe d b y th e EPA . (Chemica l toxicit y i s als o considere dfo r th e specia l cas e o f uraniu m hexafluorid e an

dsolubl e uraniu

m releases. ) Th e plausibilit y o f exceedin g th e EPA' s protectiv e "actio nguide s wa s considered.from two point s o f view : (1 ) th e acciden t history o f fue l cycl e andbyproduc t materia l licensees , and(2 ) theoretica l calculation s o f th e release s an doffsit e dose s o f accident s considere dto = 

### b e possible . - " '

_- : 

### •'•• =
2.1. 1 Th e Accident . Hi story Approac h. ' -
Th e historyo f accident s involvin g radioactiv e byproduc t materia l (Par t 3 0 licensees) , sourc e materia l (Par t 4 0 licensees) , specia l nuclea r materia l (Par t 7 0 licensees) , an dspen t fue l storag e (Par t 7 2 licensees ) wa s surveyed . In.summary , w e found , n o evidenc e tha t an

y accidenta l releas e o f radioactiv e materia l fro

m facilitie s o f these"type s ha s eve r cause da neffectiv e dos e equivalen t t o an

y individua l offsit e exceedin g eve n1% o f th e EPA' s 1-re

m protectiv e actidr

v guide . - - Th e valu e o f th e historica l review i s tha t i t identifie s type s o f accident s tha t hav e occurre dan

ddraw s ou r attentio ntowar daccident s simila r t o thos e tha t hav e occurred . I naddition , accident s tha t hav e happene dcanno t hav e violate dth e physica l laws o f nature . Thi s statemen t canno t b e mad e abou t theoretica l calculations . Theoretica l calculation s ca nus e simplifyin g assump tion s tha t ar e internall y inconsisten t o r inconsisten t wit hth e law s o f nature . Mor e informatio nonth e nature, causes , an dfrequenc y

o f accident s i s availabl e fo r fue l cycl e an dothe r radioactiv e materia l licensee s tha ni s availabl e fo r nuclea r powe r plant s becaus e ther e ar e s o many mor e fue l cycl ean

d othe r radioactiv

e materia l licensee s tha nnuclear powe r plants . Currentl y th e NR C regulate s about 9,00 0 non-reactor licensees . I naddition , Agreemen t State s regulat e roughly another 12,00 0 non-reactor licensees . A larg e numbe r
o f thes e licensee s hav e operate

d fo r man y years , an

d th e combine

d experienc e
o f thes e licensee s approache s hal f a millio nlicensee-years . B y contrast , ther e are only

about 7 0 nuclear powe r plant s operatin g wit habou t 1,00 0 plant year s o f combine

d operatin

g experience . Thu s mor e experienc e exist s fo r fue l cycl e an

d othe r radioactiv

e materia l licensee s tha nexist s fo

r nuclear powe r plants . Operatin

g experienc e ma

y b e mor e relevant fo

r thes e licensee s tha nfor nuclear powe r plant s becaus e o f th e nature o f th

e accident drivin

g force . I

n nuclear powe r plant s th e drivin

g forc e i s th

e enormou s amount o f hea t i nth e reactor . Th

e availabl e energ

y i s so larg

e tha t som

e uniqu e occurrence s ar e conceivable , suc

ha s molte

ncores , large-scal e metal-wate r reactions , an d rupturin

g th e containment b

y overpressurization . Becaus e thes e event s hav e
never happene

d the y can . only

be^studie

d theoretically . Th e dominan t drivin

g force s fo

r accident s at_non-reactor licensee s are commo nindustria l accidents — fires , chemica l explosions , leaks , an d the like . A

grea t dea l o f industria l acciden t experienc e ca nb e draw nupo ni nanalyzin

g these.potentia l accidents . Muc hinformatio

no nth e acciden t histor

y o f fuel cycl e an

d othe r radio activ e materia l licensee s i s available . NR C regulation s requir e th e reportin

g
o f al l significant events . Al l licensee s mus t notif y NR C o f (1 ) th

e overexposur e
o f an y individua l to radiatio n[1 0 CF

R§20.40 3 an

d §20.405] , (2 ) th

e airborne releas e o f larg

e quantitie s o f radioactiv e materia l [1 0 CF

R§20.40 3 an

d §20.405] , (3 ) th

e los s o f on

e da y or more r o f th

e operatio

no f an y facility [1 0 CF R§20.403] , (4) . damage to property inexces s o f $200 0 [1 0 CF R§20.403] , (5 ) th e los s o

r thef t o f license

d materia l [1 0 CF

R§20.402] , (6 ) excessiv e radiatio

nlevel s or contaminatio no npackage s receive

d [1 0 CF

R§20.205] , an

d (7 ) majo r defect s i nequipment or noncomplianc e withregulation s tha t hav e majo r safet

y significanc e [1 0 CF R§21.21] . I

naddition , ther e are othe r reportin

g requirement s i

nNR C regulation s tha t apply to specifi c classe s o f licensees . Th

e report s tha t licensee s hav e file d provid

e extensiv

e informatio

n fo r evaluatin

g th e histor

y o f accident s i

nthi s par t o f th

e nuclear industry . Sinc e Januar

y 1975 , th

e NR C ha s carefull y

an d systematicall y

published report s describin

g accident s o f significance , "Repor t to Congres s o nAbnorma lP.1 6



### Occurrences, " NUREG-0090 . Accident s i nth e fue l cycl e an da t byproduc t mate ria l facilitie s ar e include dfo r NR C licensee s andAgreemen t Stat e licensees . Al l thes e report s fo r th e perio dfro m January , 1975 , t o September , 1983 , wer e reviewe dfo r thi s Regulator y Analysis . Also , a comprehensiv e fil e o f ove r 5,00 0 event s fro m th e perio do f 195 0 throug h197 8 wa s compile da t Argonn e Nationa l Laboratory . Th e fil e include s primaril y

event s fro

m NR C licensee s (formerl y AE C licensees ) andgovernment owne dlaboratorie s ru

nb y DO E (formerl y

ERD A andAEC) , andsom

e report s o n accident s fro

m Agreemen t Stat e licensee s andfacilitie s i nforeig ncountries . Th e fil e inciude s event s fro m nuclea r powe r plants , th e nuclea r fue l cycle , andothe r radioactiv e materia l usage. . - A brie f summary

o f 163 4 event s i nth e commercia l nuclea r fue l cycl e wa s publishe di n1981.? " Th e Argonn e fil e als o include s som

e event s fro

m 1979 , bu t i s no t complet e fo r tha t year . I naddition , othe r source s wer e searche dfo r thi s analysis , suc ha s NRC' s annua l report s onradiatio nexposures , NRC' s preliminar y notificatio no f unusua l even t reports , th e memor y o f NR C staf f members , an daccount s publishe d i nth e ope nliterature . : 

### . = 

### - Usin g al l thes e source s o f informatio nthi s analysi s shoul dinclud e mos t significan t accident s fo r th e year s fron t 195 0 throug h1983 . Althoug hsome event s ma y

have bee nomitted , i t i s beTieve dtha t al l relevan t event s i nth e Unite dState s tha t cause da significan t releas e o f radioactiv e materia l outsid e a restricte dare a have bee nincluded .
2.1. 2 Acciden t Sourc e Term s • - - . -

Many plausibl e acciden t scenario s wer e considere dfo r variou s type s o f facilities . Th e NR C consider s inSafet y Evaluation . Report s a numbe r o f possibl e accident s andthei r effect s onpubli c healt handsafet y befpr e issuin g license s ._ fo r fue l cycl e facilities . Th e NR C require s applicant s t o evaluat e possibl e accidents . Additionally , th e NR C perform s it s ow nanalyse s o f severa l sever e accident s t o determin e whethe r ther e i s adequat e protectio no f publi c healt h andsafety . Th e NRC' s analyse s ar e the nissue dwhe nth e licens e i s issued . Thi s regulator y

analysi s make s us e o f thos e NR C staf f analyse s i ndevelopin g acciden t sourc e terms .
*Debora hJ . Bodea ue t al. , Dat a Bas e fo r Radiatio nEvent s i nth e Commercia l Nuclea r Fue l Cycle , 1950-1978 , NR C Repor t NUREG/CR-2429 , 1981 .Th e significan t accident s wer e determine dt o b e UF 6 releases , fires , and

criticalit y

accidents . Asid e fro m th e specia l case s o f UF 6 release s andcri ticalities , th e releas e fraction s fo r fire s wer e considere dt o b e large r tha n th e releas e fraction s fo r other type s o f accidents . Thus , releas e fraction s fo r fires , a s describe di nSection2.3.1.2 , ar e use dt o determin e th e nee dfo r emergenc y

preparedness . _ .

2.l. 3 Calculation s o f Dose s

Dose s fro

m airborne.release s wer e calculate db y assumin g releas e fraction s fo r radioactiv e materials , assumin g a atmospheri c dispersio nmodel , andcalcu lating dose s fro

m thre e pathways-inhalation , cloud-shine , andground-shin e fro m particulate s deposite donth e ground . I ngeneral , th e highes t dose s com e fro m inhalation . Tw o kind s o f dose s wer e calculated : effectiv e dos e equivalen t an dchild' s thyroi ddose. * Th e effectiv e dos e equivalen t i s th e su m o f th e 50-yea r dos e equivalen t commitmen t t o eac hbody orja nmultiplie db y a weightin g facto r fo r
eac horga na s give ni nICR P Publicatio n2 6 and , fo r th e skin , ICR P Publica tion . 28.* * Fo r th e inhalatio npathway , dos e conversio nfactor s fro m ICR P Publicatio n30** * wer e used . Thyroi ddos e i s th e dos e equivalen t delivere dt o the thyroi db

y inhale dradioiodines . Th e child' s thyroi ddos e i s calculate d b y multiplyin g th e valu e calculate dfo r a nadul t b

y two . Fo r th e tw

o externa l dos e pathway s dos e conversio nfactor s fro m Kocher*** *
wer e used . A

n8-hou r groun dexposur e tim e an da 0. 7 shieldin g facto r (30 %

*Davi dE . Bennet t e t al. , Preliminar y Screenin g o f Fue l Cycl e andByproduc t Materia l License s fo r Emergenc y Planning, " NUREG/CR-3657 , March , 1985 .

. **Statemen t fro

m th e 197 8 Stockhol m Meetin g o f th e ICRP , Publicatio n28 , Internationa l Commissio nonRadiologica l Protection , Pergamo nPress , Oxford , 1978 . ***Limit s fo r Intake s o f Radionuclide s b y Workers , Publicatio n30 , Internationa l Commissio no nRadiologica l Protection , Pergamo nPress , Oxford , 197 9 and1980 . ****D . C . Kocher , "Dose-Rat e Conversio nFactor s fo r Externa l Exposur e t o Photo n an dElectro nRadiatio nfro m Radionuclide s Occurrin g i nRoutin e Release s fro m Nuclea r Fue l Cycl e Facilities, " NR C Repor t NUREG/CR-1918 , 1981 . Als o D.C . Kocher , "Dose-Rat e Conversio nFactor s fo r Externa l Exposur e t o Photon s and Electrons , "Healt hPhysics , 45 , 665 , 1983 . f'Reacto r Safet y

Study, " NR C Repor t WASH-1400 , Appendi xVI , pag e 11-23 , 1975 .reduction ) fo r a not perfectl y

fla t surfac e wer e use d to calculat e th

e externa l exposur e fro

m radionuclide s deposite d o nth e ground . Th

e basi s fo

r th e 8-hou r exposur e t o groun

d shin e i s tha t eve

ni f ther e i s n

o pre-existin

g offsit e emergenc

y preparednes s i t shoul d b e possibl e t o locat e area s wit hhig hdos e rate s du

e to groun

d shin e (greater tha

n10 0 mR/hr ) an

d mov e peopl e out withi n

.8 hours . Th

e contaminate

d area s fro

m whichpeopl e woul d nee d t o relocat e woul d b e smal l an

d generall y

nea r th e site . Th e atmospheri c dispersio nmode l i s a standar d Gaussia

nplum e model . Dose s
wer e calculate

d fo r tw o set s o f meteorologica l conditions : stability clas s F wit h1 m/ s win

d spee d an d stability

clas s D wit h4.-

5 m/ s win

d speed . Th

e F , 1 m/s " assumption s are thos e traditionall y use d b y NR C i nhazar d evaluation s an

d represen t ver

y advers e weathe r conditions . Th e D , 4. 5 m/ s assumption s ar e thos e traditionall y use d b y DOT i ncalculatin

g evacuatio

ndistance s for accident s involvin

g toxi c chemicals t an d represent mor e typica l weather . DOT consider s evacuatio

ndistance s base

d o nD , 4. 5 m/ s adequat e to protec t publi c healthan d safet y a s demonstrate

d b y experienc e wit htoxi c chemica l releases . The NRC' s propose d rul e associate

d wit hthi s analysi s base s th e nee d fo r emergenc

y preparednes s o

nth e traditiona l NR

C assumption s i f F , 1 m/s . Th e dose s calcu

y late d usin g th e DOT assumption s o f D , 4. 5 m/ s are include d fo r perspectiv

e t o - sho w dose s tha t woul d b e expecte

d under mor e typica l o r realisti c conditions . Th e intercept fractio nfo r inhalatio

no f 10- 6 i s considere d t o b e abou t th e maximu

m valu e likely

to b e inhale

d i na naccident. * Usin

g F , 1 m/ s meteor olog y an d th e assumption s describe d below , 10- 6 correspond s t o a distanc e o f 10 0 meter s fo

r th e entir e duratio

no f th e accident . Limitin g th e intaket d 10- 6 i neffec t mean s tha t a perso no nth e plum e centerlin

e i ndens e smok

e close r tha

n 10 0 meter s fro

m th e releas e poin t wil l mov e out o f th

e smok e befor e th

e releas e ends . Thus , th

e distanc e at whichdose s wer e calculate d Wa s take

nt o b e 10 0 m

- fro m th e releas e point i

nou r mathematica l model . Thi s distanc e result s i na n•>-
_ intercep t fractio

no f 0.8 9 x10- 6 fo r radioactiv

e material s tha t deposi t o nth e

t"Hazardou s Materials-Emergenc y Respons e Guidebooks, " Material s Transportation. Bureau , U.S . Department o f Transportation , DOT Publicatio nD0T-P5800.2 , 1980 . *"Upgraded Emergenc y Preparednes s fo

r Certai nFue l Cycl e an d Materia l Licensees, " 4 6 Federa l Register 29712 , 1981 ; "Criteri a fo r Selectio

no f Fue l Cycl e an d Majo r Material s Licensee s Needin g Radiologica l Contingenc y Plans, " NUREG-0767 , 1981 ; an

d Alle nBrodsky , "Resuspensio nFactor s an

d Probabilitie s o f Intake o f Materia l i

nProces s (o

r I s 10- 6 a Magi c Number i nHealthPhysics?) " HealthPhysics , 39 , 992 , 1980 .



### 8\ 

### } around . I nothe r word s a perso no nth e plum e centerlin e i s assume dt o inhal e

a t mos t abou t on e one-milliont ho f th e materia l release dregardles s o f th e «eteorolpgy . Dosjas wer e calculate dfo r a perso nstandin g i nanope nfiel di nth e down winddirectio nonth e plume centerlin e breathin g a t a rat e o f 2.6 6 xIO- 4 m 3 /s . Atmospheri c stabilit y clas s F andwin dspee do f 1 m/ s wer e assumed . Dose s t o peopl e i nbuilding s woul db e smalle r tha nth e dose s give ni nthi s analysi s becaus e building s provid e shieldin g andsome respiratory protection . Dose s t o peopl e standin g outsid e i nurba nandsuburba narea s o r woode darea s woul db e les s tha nthos e give nher e becaus e obstacle s t o win dflow woul dcaus e th e plum e t o broaden . Dose s wer e calculate dusin g a slightl y modifie dversio no f th e CRAC 2 compute r code.* . Th e CRAC 2 cod e ha s bee nuse dextensivel y b y th e NR C fo r calcu lation s o f dose s tha t coul dresul t fro m nuclea r powe r plan t accidents . Th e key inpu t parameter s fo r th e CRAC 2 calculation s ar e buildin g size , releas e duration , releas e height , dos e conversio nfactor s fo r eac hradio nuclide , radioactiv e halflif e o f eac h.radionuclide , and-depositio nvelocit y fo r particulates .

- - Buildin g siz e determine s th e buildin g wak e facto r o r th e initia l plum e dimension . I nmos t case s th e buildin g siz e wa s assume dt o b e 2 5 m wid e b y •10-W'high . Fo r buoyan t release s n o buildin g wak e facto r wa s used . A t clos e indistance s th e buildin g wak e effec t fro m a 25 0 m 2 buildin g significantl y reduce s th e concentration s o f airborn e material s fro m a release . A t distance s
o f 1000m , th e buildin g wak e facto r i s relativel y unimportant . Th e releas e duratio ndetermine s th e amount-o f plum e meander . Plum e meande r
wa s no t include d a t 10 0 m becaus e th e plum e i s considere dt o b e stil l i nth e buildin g wake'.-'-- ' Releas e heigh t determine s plume heigh t andthu s affect s groun dleve l . concentrations . Greate r releas e height s caus e lowe r groun dleve l ai r concen trations . I nthi s regulator y analysis , th e releas e heigh t wa s assume d t o b e groundleve l o r a t 2 0 meters . Th e 20-mete r releas e heigh t wa s use dt o accoun t fo r buoyan t plumes .

*L.T . Ritchi e e t al. , "CRAC 2 Mode l Description, " NR C Repor t NUREG/CR-2522 , 1983 .P.2 0



### Th e CRAC 2 cod e account s fo r th e radioactiv e deca y o f material s i ntransit . I nmos t case s thi s correctio ni s negligible . However , Kr-8 9 wit ha 3-minut e half-lif e dominate s th e externa l dos e fro m a criticalit y

accident , s o tha t i n thi s cas e th e deca y

correctio ni s significant . Th e CRAC2cod e doe s no t calculat e radioactiv e deca y whil e a materia l i s hel du p i na buildin g befor e release . A separat e correctio nfacto r Wa s deve lope dt o accoun t fo r radioactiv e deca y befor e releas e t o th e atmosphere . Thi s facto r wa s use dt o reduc e th e quantitie s o f short-live dradionuclide s fo r cri tica l it y accidents . I ncalculatin g externa l dos e du e t o clouds , th e CRAC 2 cod e perform s th e calculatio nfo r a finite-siz e cloudrathe r tha na ninfinite-siz e .cloud . Th e , differenc e betwee nth e tw o canb e substantia l a t distance s a s clos e a s 10 0 m fo r stabl e atmospheri c conditions . Fo r example , failur e t o correc t fo r thi s facto r a t 10 0 m fro m a poin t releas e (i.e. , no buildin g wake ) durin g clas s F stabilit y woul dcaus e externa l dose s t o b e overestimate db y a facto r o f almos t 40 . How ever , th e finit e cloudcorrectio nfacto r i s muc hsmalle r whe nbuildin g wak e factor s ar e used . " -'..- ' Jh e result s o f th e atmospheri c dispersio ncalculation s fo r inhalatiorvar e show ni nFigur e 1 fo r bot hF , 1 m/ s an dD , 4. 5 m/ s assumptions . Figur e 1, - givin g x/ Q i ns/m 3 

### , ca nbe usedt o calculat e inhalatio ndos e D i nrem s du e t o a release dquantit y

Q i nuC i b

y using th e equation :

D = DC F xB xx/ Q xQ where : DC F = dos e conversio nfactor , rems/uC i inhaled , a s give ni n

Tabl e 1 3 and_•"." . B = ' breathin g rate" , whic hi s 2.6 6 x10- 4 

### m 3 

### /s . Th e dose s du e t o ground-shin e an dcloud-shin e shoul db e adde dt o th e inhalatio ndos e t o obtai na person' s tota l dose . A s a practica l matter , howeve r ground-shin e an

dcloud-shin e dose s wil l b e considerabl y smalle r tha nth e inhala tio ndos e excep t fo r a fe w radionuclide s (xenon , krypton , Na-24 , Mn-56 , Tc-99m , andRu-105) .

1 0P.2 1



## i

60 0 80 0 Distance , Meter s 

### Figur e 1 . Atmospheri c dispersio nversu s distance . 140 0



### 1 1P.2 2

2.1. 4 Protectiv

e Actio nGuide s

Protectiv

e actio nguide s are expresse d i nterm s o f projecte

d dose s t o individual s i

nth e populatio

nwhic hwarran t takin

g protectiv

e action . Th

e EP A ha s publishe

d draf t guide s fo

r takin g protectiv

e actio ni norde r to avoidexpo sur e to radiatio

na s th e resul t o f a

nacciden t at a nuclear powe r plant. * The . .EP A recommend s tha t protectiv e action s shoul d b

e considered b

y responsibl e Official s i f projecte d whol e bod

y dose s are i

nth e range o f 1 to . 5 rems . The loWer dos e o f 1 re

m i s a leve l which"shoul d b e use d i f ther e are n

o majo r loca l constraint s i nprovidin

g protectio

na t tha t level , especiall y t o sensi tiv e populations " (childre nan d pregnant women) . Th e EP A believe s tha t "i nn o
cas e shoul d th

e highe r valu

e ( 5 rems ) b

e exceede

d i hdeterminin

g th e nee d for protectiv

e action. " Pu

t another way , protectiv e action s ma

y b e considere

d optiona l at 1 rem , t o b e take ni f readily

feasible , but are highly recommende

d
at 5 rem

s i f at al l feasible . Not e tha t th e 1-re m an d 5-re m dose s are projecte d dose s tha t might occu r after th

e protectiv

e actio ndecision . Dose s receive d prior t o th

e decisionmakin

g an d durin g th e protectiv

e actio nimplementatio

n tim e are nbt^considere d i nth e decisionmaking . Onl y dos e saving s a s a resul t
o f takin

g a protectiv

e actio nare t o b

e use d i n"determinin

g whethe r suc

hprotec tiv e actio ni s warrented . Fo r radioactiv

e material s tha t delive r dos e to th e bod y nonuniforml y

afte r the y are inhaled , th

e resultin

g effectiv

e dos e equivalen t i s compare d t o th

e EPA' s protectiv

e actio nguides . Th

e effectiv

e dos e equivalent , a s define d i n th e previou s section , i s th e su m o f th e externa l gamm

a dos e equivalent , th e dos e equivalen t delivere d to eachbod

y orga nmultiplie

d b y a weightin

g facto r fo r th e orga nfro m ICR P Publicatio

n26,

_an d th e externa l bet a dos e equivalen t delivere

d t o th e ski nmultiplie

d b y th e weightin

g facto r fro

m ICR P Publicatio

n28 . Th e factor s use

d to conver t intak

e o f radionuclide s t o a neffectiv

e dos e equiva len t are.take

nfro m ICR P Publicatio

n30 . Th e Commission' s polic y o nth e us e o f th

e EPA' s protectiv

e actio nguide s t o establis hplannin g zone s fo

r nuclear powe r plant s i s state d i nNUREG-0654.* *

*EPA-520/l-75-001 , "Manua l o f Protectiv e Actio nGuide s an

d Protectiv

e Action s fo r Nuclear Incidents, " Draf t Revisio no f June , 1980 . **NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l , Revisio n1 , "Criteri a for Preparatio nan d Evaluatio

n o f Radiologica l Emergenc y Respons e Plans an

d Preparednes s i

nSuppor t o f Nuclear Power Plants, " joint NRC/FEM A Report , 1980 , page 12 .



### 1 2P.2 3

"Th e siz e (abou t 1 0 mile s radius ) o f th e plume exposur e emergenc y plannin g zon e wa s base dprimaril y o nth e followin g considerations :

a . projecte ddose s fro m th e traditiona l desig nbasi s accident s woul d no t excee dprotectiv e actio nguid e level s outsid e th e zone ; 

### b .

c .

•er. - projecte ddose s fro m mos t cor e mel t sequence s woul dno t excee d protectiv e actio nguid e level s outsid e th e zone ; fo r th e wors t cor e mel t sequences , immediat e lif e threatenin g dose s woul dgenerall y

no t occu r outsid e th e zone ; detaile dplannin g withi n1 0 mile s woul dprovid e a substantia l bas e fo r expansio no f respons e effort s i nth e even t tha t thi s prove d necessary. " _[• •

( Fo r nuclea r powe r plant s th e traditio ndesig nbasi s acciden t assumes th e

containmen t doe s no t fail . I nothe r words , on e majo r barrie r t o a radioactiv e releas e remains. . Failur e o f al l engineere dsafeguard s i s evaluate dwit hrespec t t o lif e threatenin g dose s rathe r tha nprotectiv e actio nguide s i nth e 1 t o 5 re m range . I naddition , emergenc y preparednes s doe s no t guarante e ther e wil l b e n o los s o f lif e fo r th e wors t cas e imaginable .

A late r repor t elaborate s o nth e Commission"'-policy.-' • NURE6--0771 * states: .

"Fo r th e smal l releases , th e lowe r range s o f th e protectiv e actio n guide s (PAG ) woul dbe use da s th e appropriat e measur e t o bas e plan ning . Fo r somewha t large r releases , th e criteria.shif t t o th e uppe r range s o f th e PA

Gan dlevel s o f exposure s whic hWoul dstil l b e les s tha nmedicall y

detectable . Fo r intermediat e leve l releasesearl y injurie s woul db e useda s th e measur e t o bas e th e EP Z distanc e judg men t on . Finally , fo r th e mos t sever e accidents , earl y fatalitie s become th e immediat e concer nan dtherefor e th e measur e t o bas e th e criteri a upon... "

*NUREG-0771 , "Regulator y Impac t o f Nuclea r Reacto r Acciden t Sourc e Term Assumptions, " fo r comment , June , 1981 , pag e 35 .



### 13Fo r applicatio nt o fue l cycl e andbyproduc t materia l licensees , th e lowe r

endo f th e rang e ( 1 rem ) o f th e EPA' s protectiv e actionguide s i s use di ncon junctio nwit hcalculation s o f release s andoffsit e radiatio ndose s du e t o sever e accidents , suc ha s a majo r facilit y fire , t o establis hth e nee dfo r a plan , thu s th e lowe r rang e o f th e protectiv e actio nguide s i s use dt o determin e th e
nee dfo r offsit e emergenc y preparedness . . Th e actua l assumption s tha t wer e use dfo r eac hfacilit y typ e ar e discusse d i nseparat e section s i nth e remainde r o f thi s report . Th e reason s fo r selectin g th e assumption s ar e als o discussed .

2.1. 5 . A

Discussio no f th e Conservatis m i nth e Calculation s

Th e Commission' s polic y i s that , "Emergenc y plannin g shoul dbe . base do n realisti c assumption s regardin g sever e accidents." * The.dose s calculate di nthi s Regulator y Analysi s hav e bee nconservativel y calculated . Dose s t o peopl e nea r a plan t experiencin g a sever e acciden t ar e likel y t o b e fa r belo w

th e dose s i nthi s analysis , probabl y b y anorde r o f "mag - ~ nitud e o r more , excep t in-ver y unusua l circumstances . Th e acciden t histor y o f - suc hfacilitie s i nth e U.S . i s tha t ther e i s n o know ncas e o f a membe r o f th e publi c receivin g eve na s muc ha s 1 % o f th e dose s calculate di nthi s analysi s
a s th e resul t o f anaccidenta l airborn e releas e fro m an y nonreacto r facility.* * A numbe r o f factor s whic hcaus e thi s analysi s t o be conservativ e ar e discusse d below .

*"U.S . Nuclea r Regulator y Commissio nPolic y

an dPlannin g Guidance. - 1985, " U.S. " Nuclea r Regulator y Commission , NUREG-0885 , Issu e 4 , 1985 , pag e 6 . /'"' - **Fo r a 196 2 releas e o f high-enriche dUF 6 fro m th e NF S "plant , Erwin , Tennessee , a plum e centerlin e dos e equa l t o 4 % o f th e 1-re m effectiv e dos e equivalen t guid e wa s calculate dusin g conservativ e assumption s (no deposition , ope n fiel ddiffusio nparameters , n o win ddirectio nshift , etc. ) However , th e repor t stated , "No specifi c informatio nregardin g th e presenc e o f individual s durin g th e release s wa s available. " Becaus e ho on e i s know nt o hav e stoo d o no r nea r th e plum e centerline , w e ca nsay ther e ar e n o know

nexposure s exceedin g 1%

o f 1-rem . Th e dos e calculation s ar e containe di nanunpublishe d report , "Dos e Assessmen t o f Airborn e Release s fro m NFS-Erwi nFue l Facilit y - 1972-1981, " U.S . Nuclea r Regulator y Commission , Regio nII , Atlanta , Georgia , May , 1983 .



### 142.1.5. 1 Conservativ e Factor s

1 . Entir e possessio nlimi t assume dt o b e involved . I ncalculatin g th e quantitie s o f radioactiv e materia l fo r whic ha nemergenc y pla nwoul db e needed , thi s analysi s generall y assume dtha t th e licensee' s entir e o r nearl y entire... . possessio nlimi t woul db e involved . I nactuality , mos t licensee s a t an y particular , tim

e posses s muc hles s materia l tha nthe y ar e legall y

authorize d t o possess . I nmany case s th e possesse dmateria l wil l b e locate da t differen t location s an

dwil l no t al l b e subjec t t o releas e durin g a particula r accident . Fo r example , th e Nationa l Institute s o f Healt hi s authorized.t o us e andstor e license dmateria l i nmor e tha n1,00 0 differen t laboratories . - 2 . Worst-cas e releas e fractions . Th e releas e fraction s du e t o fire s (th e accident s wit hhighes t potentia l release ) wer e determine dfro m experiment s designe dt o maximiz e releases . I nsuc hexperiments a finel y powdere dmateria l i s typicall y

place donto po f a larg e amoun t o f combustibl e material . Havin g th e entir e license d inventor y unenclose do nto po f a larg e quantit y o f combusti bl e materia l woul db e mos t unusual . Radioactiv e material s ar e usuall y withi n shielde d"pigs " an

dkep t i nmeta l safe s o r wel l shielde dho t cell s o r glov e "

_.' . boxes . Amount s o f combustibl e material s presen t ar e generall y kep t low. . 3 . No credi t fo r engineere dsafeguard s o r respons e efforts . N o credi t . . i s .generall y

give nfo r desig no r operatin g feature s tha t coul d reduc e releases . No credi t i s give nfo r sprinkle r system s designe dt o sto pfires . Generally , n o credi t i s give nfo r filte r system s durin g a fire . No credi t rs-give nfor . fir e fightin g effort s t o sto pth e fir e befor e i t reache s radioactiv e materials ^ Littl e o r no credi t i s give nfo r holdin g u pth e releas e o f th e materia l b y means , o f depositiono r plateout . Fo r UF 6 release s outdoors , no credi t i s give nfo r knockin g th e uraniu m ou t o f th e ai r usin g fir e hoses . 4 . - Th e expose dindividua l make s n o response . I nth e cas e o f fire s and UF 6 releases , th e dos e i s calculate dfo r a perso nwh o stand s directl y o nth e plume centerlin e fo r 3 0 minutes . Suc ha perso nwoul db e standin g i ndens e smok e p r irritatin g aci dfumes . Realistically , peopl e ca nb e expecte dt o mov e fro m suc hposition s t o avoi dsmok e inhalation . Peopl e clos e i nwoul donl y hav e t o
mov e abou t 2 0 meter s t o ge t completel y ou t o f th e plume . 5 . No plume-ris e fo r smoke . Eve nwher e th e assume dacciden t i s a larg e fir e no credi t i s give nfo r plum e ris e du e t o buoyanc y i ncalculatin g th e quantitie s o f radioactiv e materia l fo r whic ha nemergenc y pla nwoul db e needed . Th e smok e i s assume dt o b e release da t andremai na t groun dlevel . 1 5P.2 6

6 . Conservativ

e dosimetry . Th

e materia l i s assume d t o hav

e th e solubil it y whichwoul d resul t i nth e highes t dos e per curi e inhaled . Particulate s ar e generall y

assume d t o hav

e a siz e o f 1 micro nmakin g the m highl y respirabl e an

d transportable . 7 . Advers e meteorology . Quantitie s o f radioactiv e materia l fo

r which
a nemergenc

y pla nwoul d b

e neede d wer e calculate

d fo r atmospheri c stability clas s F wit ha 1 m/ s windspeed . Thes e condition s resul t i nminima l dilutio

n
an d hig hplum e centerlin

e doses , bu

t als o ver

y narro w plumes . I t i s probabl e tha t th e actua l weathe r woul d caus e lower doses . Fo r example , dose s durin g a moderatel y

sunn y da y withaverage wind s woul d b e a.factor o f 5 0 time s smalle r tha nth e dose s calculate

d fo r th e analysis . 8 . Open-fiel d sit e assumed . A rura l open-fiel d sit e i s assumed . Greate r atmospheri c dispersio nahd-thu s lower dose s woul d occu r a t a nurba nor suburba

n site . Buildings , trees , or other obstacle s i nth e plum e pat hwoul d broadenth e plume . Hea t source s woul d increas e th e plum e height . 9 . N o win d shifts . Dose s are calculate d only o nth e plum e centerline . I t i s assume

d tha t n

o win d directio

nshift s occu

r durin g th e accident . I

naddi tion ^ correctionfactor s fo r plum e meande r are conservative;"th e factor s wer e selecte d to envelop

e th e experimenta l data . Normall y greate r plum

e meande r woul d b e expected . - . . " • 10 . 8-hou

r criticality . Th

e sourc e ter

m assume s a pulsatin g criticality . wit ha tota l o f 4 8 burst s occurrin g over 8 hour s (see Sectio n2.2.5.2) . Thi s i s a highl y

conservativ

e sourc e term . 11 . Ther e ma

y b e n o on e standin

g o nth e plum e centerline . The dose s ar e calculate d fo

r singl e point , an

d the y fal l of f rapidly

a s on e move s awa

y fro m th e point . Eve

nwit hn o protectiv e actions , th

e highes t dos e anyone woul d -receiv e i s likely , t o b

e wel l belo

w th e assume

d dose .

2.1.5. 2 Nonconservativ e Factor s

O nth e othe r han

d ther e are certai nassumption s i nth e dos e calculation s tha t ma y b e nonconservativ

e i ncertai ninstances . Thes e factor s are discussed below : 1 . Adul t doses . Dose s are calculate d fo r adult s rathe r tha nchildren (excep t fo

r radioiodin

e dose s whichare calculate d for children) . Thi s i s becaus e dos e conversio nfactor s fo

r childre

nusin g moder ndosimete r model s ar e generall y

not available . Fo r som e inhale

d radionuclide s a chil d standin g i n 1 6

# si v

K Anlufn e ma yperhap s receiv e a dos e 2 o r 3 time s highe r tha n an adul t standin g

a t th e sam e location

. 2 Breathing rates
. Th e breathin g rat e used i n th e dos e calculation s £9 6 6 x IO- 4 m 3 /s ) represent s a n averag e breathing rate
. Breathing rate s fo r ^ov e averag e activit ywoul d b e higher

. 3 Site-specifi c factor s no t considered

. Th e tabl e o f quantitie s o f _'•• • ••tcrla l fo r whic h emergenc yplanning shoul d b e considere d wa s base d o n assump tion s (fo r exampl e building wake ) tha t woul d usuall yb e conservative , bu t may not b e conservativ e fo r al l instances

. Fo r example , th e buildin g wak e facto r fo r * particula r building coul d b e les s tha n assume d although i t woul d generall y b « larger
. Thi s shoul d be a mino r factor
. An yincrease s i n dos e du e t o suc h factor s woul d no t b e significan t i n siz e b ycompariso n wit h th e size s o f th e conservatism s discusse d above
.
2.2 Fue l Cycl e Facilitie s
-.2.2.1 Uraniu

mMining "

Uraniu mmining i s no t considere d i n this-repor t becaus e th e NR C ha s n o regulator

yjurisdictio n ove r uraniu mmining

. Uraniu

mmining i s regulate d Instea d b yth e Min e Safet yan d Healt h Administration , th e Environmenta l Protec

tion Agency , an

d th e individua l states
.

2.2. 2 Uraniu

mMilling

Uraniu mmill s extrac t uraniu mfro mor e tha t typicall yaverage s abou t 1 par t par 100 0 uranium

. Th e mill s produc e concentrate d uraniu mcompounds , whic h ar e shippe d ou t i n 55
. gallo n drums , an d wast e "tailings, " whic h contai n radium-22 6 An d thorium-23 Q no t remove d fro mth e or e b

yth e mil l processes . I n lat e 198 4 there wer e abou t 1 0 full-scal e uraniu mmill s operating i n th e U.S
. I n addition , ther e ar e smalle r facilitie s tha t perfor msome o f th e processe s foun d i n milling , toughly hal f th e mill s ar e license d b yth e NRC
. Th e other s ar e license d b y Agreement States
. I n addition , thi s sectio n consider s "in-situ " solutio n uraniu mmining , i n whic h a solutio n tha t ha s leache d uraniu mfro mth e ground i s pumpe d u p and uraniu m extracte d fro

mth e solution

.



### 1 7P.2 8

2.2.2. 1 Acciden t Histor y
i majo r fire s a

i
o r -taiVing s li. i Uraniu mmill s have experience d majo r fire s an d accidenta l release s fro m tailing s pond s du e t o da mfailures-or-taiVing s .line-breaks. • Uranium-mill s have a potentia l fo r Targ e fire s becaus e larg e quantitie s
o f kerosen e ar e use d a s a solven t t o extrac t uraniu mi n on e mil l process . Th e kerosen e contain s dissolve d uraniu man d i s containe d in larg e ope n tanks
. Tw o larg e fire s i n solven t extractio n circuit s hav e occurred
. Tabl e 1 list s fire s know n t o hav e occurred
. I t i s notabl e tha t th e fire s tha t hav e occurre d hav e
cause d littl e releas e o f radioactiv e materia l eve n thoug h two o f th e fire s
wer e ver

yintense

. r Asid e fro

mfires , th e othe r notabl e typ e o f acciden t at.uraniu mmill s ha s bee n tailing s pon d releas.es
. Ther e have bee n a t leas t 1 6 instance s wher e uraniu mmil l tailing s solid s an d liquid s wer e release d fro mtailing s impound

ments
. Tabl e 2 describe s thes e releases
. I n no instance s wer e ther e radiatio n dos e rate s tha t woul d caus e dose s t o th e publi c i n th e rang e o f th e EPA' s protectiv e actio n guides

. In nojcas e wa s drinking wate r contaminate d above , : " NRC limit s (Appendi x B o f 1 0 CF R Par t 20).-"-'
. . ~ - . _

2.2.2. 2 AccidentrSourc e Term s

Potentia l releases.o f radioactive.material s an d potentia l dose s tha t coul d resul t fro

maccident s a t uraniu mmill s ar e show

n in Tabl e 3
. Th e larges t potentia l release s wer e determine d t o occu r a s af.resul t of : (1 ) fires , (2 ) undetecte d failure s o f ai r cleaning -systems , _(3 ) tailing pon d releases , an d (4 ) tornadoes
. Some reporte d calculations , o f th e quantitie s release d an d projecte d offsit e dose s ar e show n i n Tabl e 3
. ". " Thes e calculation s show tha t th e larges t offsit e radiatio n dose s woul d b e du e t o a fir e in th e solven t extractio n circui t o r a n undetecte d failur e o f th e "ai r cleaning syste mservicin

g th e yellowcak e drying area . However , th e undetecte d failur e of'th e ai r cleaning systemservicing the yellowcak e dryin g
are a doe s no t provid e a basi s fo r action s t o protec t th e public

. A s lon g a s th e failur e remain s undetecte d n o emergenc yplan can b e activate d an d no protec

tiv e action s can be taken
. As soo n a s th e failur e i s detected , th e releas e
ca n be stoppe d b

yturning of f th e ventilatio n blowers
. Airborn e concentration s



### 1 8Tabl e 1 . Fire s i nUraniu

m Mill s P.2 9 •B E

Dat e Mil l Fire Descriptio

n Offsit e releas e 3-19-5 9 Vanadiu

m Corp. , o f America , Durango , C

O 6-25-6 5 America

nMetal , Gran d Junction , C O 2-6 8 Wester

nNuclear , Jeffer y City.iW

Y

11-10-6 8 Petrotomic s Co. ,

Shirle y Basin , W

Y

12-25-6 8

_

Atla s Corp. , Moab , U T

10-23-8 0 Mineral s Exploration ,

- Sweetwater , W

Y

1-2-8 1 Atla s Corp. ,

Moab , U T Fire i nyellowcake drye r

Fire i nore drye r fo

r 3- 5 min . $260 0 damage Worker s starte

d a fire to tha

w a froze

n ore dryer . Fire ignite d propane fro

m a leakin

g tank . Solvent extractio

n circuit . $300,00 0 damage Solvent extraction . : circuit . Caus e unknown . $1,000,00 0 damage - Majo r fire burned , i nmil l befor e i t starte d operatio

n

Fire i nyellowcake scrubbe r stack fo

r 1 5 mi n Non e detecte

d

Non e detecte

d

Non e detecte

d

Non e detecte

d

Non e detecte

d

None . Radioactive , materia l wa s not ye t bein

g . processed . Non e detecte

d



### 1 9P.3 0

Tabl e 2 . Uraniu

m Mil l Tailing s Releases , 1959-198 4

Dat e Mil l Typ e o f Inciden t Releas e 8-19-5 9 Unio

nCarbide Gree nRiver , U

T Tailing s da

m washed ~ 15,00 0 T sand s los t t o ou t river i nflashfloods ; n

o increas e i

ndissolvin

g R a wa s note

d i nriver . 8-22-6 0 Kerr-McGe e

Shiprock , N

M

12-6-6 1 Unio

nCarbid

e Maybell, : C

O -

6-11-6 2

8-17^6 2 Mine s Develop ment , Inc . Edgemont , SD : Atlas-Zinc Mineral s Mexica nHat , U

T Raffinat e pon

d dik e failur e

Tailing s dik

e failure

Tailing s dik

e failure

Slurr y pipelin

e rupture

6-16-6 3 Uta

hConstructio

nPrecautionar

y

- - Riverton ^ WY

_releas e 240,00 0 gal o f raffinat e release s int o rive r

~ 5 0 x10- 8 uCi/m

l Ra-226 ; river sample s collected severa l days afte r releas e showe d n o increas e i

n Ra-22 6 background .

~ 50 0 T solid s release d fro m tailing s area ; 20 0 T reache d unrestricte

d area ; n o liqui d reache

d an y stream . 20 0 T solid s washed into " cree k an d som e carrie

d 2 5 m i int o reservoir . Est . 28 0 T solid s + 24 0 T liquid s release

d fro m broke ntailing s discharg e lin e int o dra

w 1. 5 m i fro m river . Materia l release

d b y 2 f t drainage cut mad

e t o preven t crestin g du e t o heav

y rains ; materia l release

d belo w 1 0 CF RPar t 2 0 values . 11-17-66 . VC

A Shiprock , N

M Raffinat e line "

failur e

2-6-6 7 Atla s Corp .

Moab , U T Lin

e failure Est . 16,00 0 gal s o f liqui d los t becaus e o f break in raffinat e line ; materia l sprea d over 1/ 4 acre ; break occurre d 1 m i fro m rive r withsom

e smal l amoun t reachin g river . 440,00 0 gal lost ; averag e Ra-22 6 concentratio nwa s wa s 5. 5 x10- 8 mCi/ml .



### 2 0MZ

Tabl e 2 . (continued )

Clima xUraniu

m Gran dJunction , C O Typ e o f Inciden t Releas e Tailing s dik e failur e - Dik e failur e release d 1-1 0 acre-f t o f wast e liqui d int o Colorad o River ; n o indicatio ntha t R a cone , i nrive r exceede d1 0 CF R Par t 2 0 limits . 11-23-6 8 Atla s Corp .

Moab , U T Slurr y pipelin e ruptur e 35,00 0 ga l o f tailing s slurr y lost ; flowe d1/ 2 mil e t o Colorad o River ; mos t solid s settled.ou t i ndrywash . 2-16-7 1 Petrotomic s

Shirley . Basin , W Y J-23-7 1 Wester nNuclea r

Jeffre y City , W Y

2-5-7 7 Unite dNuclear Homestak e Partner s Grants , N

M

4-7 7 Wester nNuclear ,

Inc . Jeffre y City , W

Y Secondar y

_tai1 i ng s dik e failur e
Tailing s lin e an d dik e failur e

Slurr y pipelin e ruptur e

Failur e o f tailing s pondembankmen t 2,00 0 ga l o f liqui dlos t t o unrestricte darea ; spil l froz e i nplace . Brea k i nslurr y

lin e casue d a dik e failur e allowin g san d tail s t o flow

int o natura l basi nadjacen t t o tailing s sit e o nlicensee' s property . 50,00 0 ton s o f solid s an d slime s andsomewher e betwee n 2 millio nand8 millio nga l o f liquid . Al l materia l wa s confine dt o company property .

~ 2 millio nga l o f liqui d tailing s and5 5 yd 3 o f solid s wer e released . N o materia l was . release dt o unrestricte dareas . 9-26-7 7 - Unite dNuclea r 9-27-7 7 Churc hRock , N M Releas e fro

m tailing s slurr y lin e Approximatel y 1 to no f solid s and90 0 ga l o f liqui d entere dth e watercourse. " 7-16-7 9 Unite dNuclea r

Churc hRock , N

M Tailing s dik e failur e 100,000,00 0 gallon s o f tail ing s solutio nand1,10 0 ton s o f tailing s solids . Mos t o f th e solid s wer e deposite d nea r th e impoundment , bu t muc hsolutio nreache da river .
•eference : Regulator y Guid e 3.11.1 , "Operationa l Inspectio nandSurveillanc e o f Embankmen t Retentio nSystem s fo r Uraniu m Mil l Tailings. "

.-•?$«• • 

### 2 1Tabl e 3 . Acciden t Sourc e Term s andDose s Fro m Uraniu m Mil l Accident s

Tornad o Tailin g PondReleas e Fir e 'i nSolven t Extractio nCircuit , Referenc e Releas e Dos e Releas e Dos e Releas e Dos e Failur e o f th e Ai r Cleanin g System

Servin g th e Yellowcak e Dryin g Are a Releas e Dos e GEI S

SandRoc k DE S

Thi s Repor t 11,40 0 k

g Utota l < 2.2 " x10- 7 re m 140 0 ton s soli dSmall . Cleanu p< 1 3 kg U < 11,40 0 k

g U respirabl e 455 0 kg Utota l < 455 0 k g U. respirabl e t o lung s a t 500 m

< 1. 1 x10- 7 re

m a t 400,0 m (max . dose ) , , ' 14,000,00 0 gal: ,

liquid s Same a s GEI S assumed 1 < 0.6 5 k g ttiqrlum

*

< 1. 1 k g U < 1.3 6 rem *

t o bon e a t 50 0 m 1 1 kg Insolubl e 8 6 mrem

Uoxide s t o lung lOve r 8 hour s

re m

1. 3 k g U IO- 7

t o bon e a t 800 0 m (neares t residence ) 0.0 1 t o 0. 1 re m ED E 1 2 kg insolubl e Uoxide s ove r 8 hour s a t 200 0 m

10- 2 re m t o lung a t 800 0 m (neares t residence )

Reference s •' '. : y ,; ;V V '

'••',' • ' " • • • ' ' ' > •<••• . GEIS : "Fina l Generi c Environmenta l Impac t Statemen t o nUraniu m Milling, " NUREG-0706 , Volume 1 , pp 7- 1 t o 7-20 , September , 1980 . SandRoc k DES : "Draf t Environmenta l Statemen t Relate dt o th e Operatio no f SandRock s Mil l Project, " NUREG-0889' , page s 5- 1 t o 5-12 , March , 1982'..', . -,,.• ' , ' •''''•.,-"','•" • " ,- '

.'••.' - ' ' . • ' .'••' ' i • . , *Th e dos e valu e fro

m GEI S i s i nerror . Th e solven t extractio nwa s assume dt o contai n5 % a s muc hThV23 0 a s uraniu m b y weight . Th e valu e shoul d hav e bee nb%

by ^ activity . Thi s erro r cause s th e dos e t o b e overestimated'by a facto r o f abou t 50,00 0 times.£&y
\«ty** > . -tix/ p materia l promptl ydrop t o ver ylo w levels
. Externa l exposur e -0 / raflioaci. i v

c "Haibl e becaus e uraniu mi s a ver

ywea k gamm

a emitter

. Tbrnadoe s coul d releas e a large r amoun t o f radioactiv e material

. However , iWa d th e materia l s o greatl ytha t resulting dose s ar e ver ysmall, * a s i n Tabl e 3
. Becaus e th e dose s tha t woul d b e cause d b ytornadoe s ar e s o Her-tha n dose s fro mothe r accidents, , release s an d dose s du e t o torna



### tMw n 

### mch 

### s» a dee * »re no t discusse d furthe r in thi s analyses
. Tailing s pon

d failure s als o releas e a larg e quantit yo f material

. However , •it * dos e rate s ar e les s tha n 0. 1 mR/h r an d radioactiv e materia l concentration s
s o lo w tha t promp t emergenc yactio n i s no t neede d t o preven t anyone' s dos e fro a exceedin

g the EPA' s protectiv e actio n guides

. Thu s w e conclud e tha t a fir e i n the solven t extractio n circui t is:th e acciden t o f greates t significanc e fo r emergenc ypreparedness
. W e assume th e releas e fro

mth e buildin g i s 1. 3 k g o f uranium

. Th e 1. 3 k g releas e i s base d p a 0
. 1 % ofth e materia l i n proces s becoming airborn e an d escapin g fro

mth e building

. Experiment s o n release s o f uraniu mi n a kerosen e fir e showe d averag e release s o f 0.025 % whe n th e residu e i s no t heate d wit h a propan e torc h afte r dryness-occurs.* * Du e t o licensing polic yrequiring.automati c fir e detectio n
an d supression systems** * (suc h a s automatic , sprinklers. , foam , o r halo n systems ) significan t heatin

g beyon d drynes s woul d no t be expected
. Othe r experiment s ihowe d similarl ylow releases. ! Th e uraniu mwoul d b e i n insolubl e for m (solubilityclas s Y ) becaus e a larg e kerosen e fir e woul d produc e temperature s exceedin

g 400°C , th e temperatur e a t whic h th e uraniu mshoul d for

minsolubl e oxides.*** * Th e uraniu mma ybe clas s Y i f the fir e completel yoxidize s the

*NUREG-0706 , Volum e 1 , "Fina l Generi c Environmenta l Impac t Statement.o n ~ ~ Uraniu mMilling, " September , 1980 , p . 7-4
. **Jof u Mishim

a an d Lyl e Schendiman , "Interi mReport : Th e Fractiona l Airborn e Releas e o f Dissolve d Radioactiv e Material s During th e Combustio n o f 3 0 Percen t Norma l Tributy l Phosphat e in a Kerosene-Typ e Diluent, " BNWL-B-274 , Pacifi c Northwes t Laboratory , 1973
. •**Regulator

yGuid e 8.31 , "Informatio n Relevan t t o Ensuring tha t Occupationa l Radiation Exposure s a t Uraniu mMill s Wil l B e a s Lo w a s I s Reasonabl y Achievable, " Sectio n C.3.4
. tO
. WhitneyTharin , Jr. , "Burnin g o f Radioactiv e Proces s Solvent, " Savannah Rive r Laborator

yRepor t DP-942 , Aiken , Sout h Carolina , 1965
. ****R
. C
. Merritt , Th e Extractiv e Metallurg yo f Uranium , Colorad o Schoo l o f Mine s Researc h Institute , pp . 252-4 , 1971
.

'&-' • 

### 2 3I
. solubl e clas s D uraniu m inth e solven t extractio ntank s an

d convert s i t t o insolubl e uranium . Thi s sourc e ter

m oj f 1. 3 k g o f uraniu

m i s als o considere

d t o b e suitabl e fo r "in-situ " solutio nwining . Som

e "insitu " minin

g processe s us e solven t extractio

nprocesse s similar t o thos e i nuraniu

m mills . Mor e sever e accident s tha ndescribe

d abov e wer e no t identifie d fo r "in-situ " mining .

2.2.2. 3 Calculation s o f Dose s

A 1. 3 k g releas e o f natura l uranium , du e t a a fire a t a

nuraniu

m mil l coul d resul t i

na potentia l dos e o f 0. 1 re m effectiv

e dos e equivalen t durin g advers e weathe r (F , 1 m/s ) o r 0.0 1 re m durin g typica l weathe r (D , 4. 5 m/s) . Assumption s
wer e tha t th

e buildin

g siz e wa s 1 0 m

hig hb y 2 5 m wide , th

e releas e heigh t wa s groun d level , an

d th e releas e duratio

nwa s 3 0 minutes . Th e factor s "fo

r deter minin g effectiv

e dos e equivalen t fro m ICR P Publicatio

n3 0 for a particl e siz e
o f 1 micro

nAMA D an d clas s Ysolubility are : 1.3 1 x10 8 rem/C i for U-234 , 1.2 1
x10 8 rem/C i fo

r U-235 , an

d 1.1 7 x10 8 rem/C i for_Q-238 . I f 1 curi e o f Uraniu m i s compose

d o f U-234 , U-235 , an d U-23 8 inthei r naturall y occurring-proportions , th e dos e conversio

nfactor i s 1.2 4 x10 8 rem/Ci . - . - . - Th e calculate

d dos e fro

m thi s acciden t i s smal l (0. 1 rem . or less).becaus e
o f th e ver y lo w specifi c activity

o f th e uraniu

m an d th e lo w volatilit y

o f th e uraniu m compounds , whichcause s a lo w releas e fraction . Lo w releas e fraction s are th e reaso nwh y n o offsit e groun

d contamination
wa s ever detecte

d du e t o th e fire s liste

d i nTabl e 1. . - . 7 -

2.2.2. 4 Implication s fo r Emergenc

y Preparednes s

O nth e basi s o f th

e ver y lo w dose s calculated , th e staf f conclude s tha t ther e i s n

o nee d for offsit e emergenc y protectiv

e action s o

nth e par t o f th

e publi c at uraniu

m mill s o

r fo r "in-situ " mining . Th e staf f conclude s tha t n o credibl e accident woul d justify emergency protectiv

e action s becaus e radiatio ndose s to th

e publi c offsit e fro m a nacci dent woul d b

e belo w th e EPA' s protectiv

e actio nguides . Also , th e quantity

o f uraniu m inhale d i s belo

w th e quantity

wher e chemica l toxicity effect s ar e



### 2 4Fi-li

«r f * Thus , neithe r radiatio ndose s no r chemica l toxicit y fro m license d x i * -i c a concer nwit hrespec t t o th e nee dfo r promp t protectiv e actions . I nth e even t o f suc ha fire , th e license e woul db e require db y existin g

_ _-filiation s t o tak e certai nactions . Amon g these , th e license e woul db e _Milred b y

§26.201(b ) t o conduc t survey s (offsit e i f appropriate ) t o determin e
Mt ^_ r t j, e NRC' s limit s onradioactivit y i neffluent s t o unrestricte darea s 12 0 10 6 wer e exceeded . A majo r fir e woul dals o requir e immediat e notifica tiono f NR C b

y telephon e an

dtelegrap h(§20.403) . I f appropriate , th e NR C etm\d elec t t o immediatel y senda ninspecto r t o th e sit e t o mak e an y necessar y radiatio nmeasurement s o r evaluat e th e situation . Wit hrespec t t o tailin g da m failures , rapi demergenc y respons e i s no t - ~M«de dto-avoi ddose s exceedin g protectio nactio nguide s becaus e dos e rate s
a t • spil l sit e ar e ver y low . A

nappropriat e respons e is ' t o monito r drinkin g wate r especially'fo r radium-226 , t o b e sur e tha t drinkin g wate r standards-ar e

M t . Gamm

a ra y monitorin g o f th e groun di s als o appropriat e t o determin e wher e the tailing s hav e bee ndeposited . However , groun dcontaminatio npresent s littl e tjBMdiat e hazar dt o th e publi c becaus e th e gamma dos e rate s ar e low . Gamm a dose rete s incontact.wit htailing s shoul db e les s thaf i 0. 1 mR/hr . Sinc e th e EPA' s protectiv e actio nguide s woul dno t b e exceeded , a rapi demergenc y respons e i s

= ho t needed . A

clean-u po f th e spille dtailing s woul db e expected , bu t thi s coul db e don e effectivel y withou t preexistin g emergenc y preparedness .

2.2. 3 UF RConversio nPlant s

.Conversio nplant s conver t yellowcak e shippe dfro m uraniu m mill s int o iiu « hexafluorid e (UF 6 ) . Heate dliqui dUF 6 i s pu t int o 10-to no r 14-ton ~ "

- . Qflinders , Th e cylinder s ar e coole dfo r severa l day s unti l th e UF 6 solidifies . eventually , th e fille dcylinder s ar e shippe dt o enrichmen t plant s t o enric h th e uraniu

m i nU-235 . Ther e ar e two NRC-license dconversio nplants : Kerr-McGe e I nOklahoma an

dAllie dChemica l i nIllinois . Th e uraniu

m i s handle di nman y differen t chemica l form s i nUF 6 conversio n plants , bu t th e UF 6 itsel f i s th e onl y chemica l for

m o f uraniu

m tha t i s readil y dlspersible . Fo r example , th e dispersibilit y o f yellowcak e i s essentiall y th e

•R . A . Jus t an

dV . S . Emler , "Generi c Repor t o f Healt hEffect s fo r th e U.S . 6eseou s Diffusio nPlants, " DO E Repor t K/ D 5050 , Sectio nVIII , Par t 1 , Peg e 6 , 1984 .

• % & 

### 25sam e a s tha t o f yellowcake a t uraniu m mills . Accident s involvin g yellowcak e
wer e previousl y

discusse d an

d foun d no t t o requir e offsite emergenc y preparedness . j Th e releas e o f UF 6 i nsignifican t quantit y i s possible becaus e UF 6 i s volatile abov e roo m temperature . Th e UF 6 release d wil l reac t wit hwate r in " th e ai r a s follows:' " -

UF 6 ; + 2H 2 0 = U0 2 F 2 + 4H F + 52. 2 kcal/mole *

Th e U0 2 F 2 form s a particulate , very solubl e i nth e lungs , whic hwil l -b e carrie d
awa y b y win d an

d wil l settl e ont o th e ground . Th e HF i s " a corrosiv e aci d Vapo r tha t ca nseverel y har m th e lung s i f sufficientl y concentrated . Th e releas e o f 1 k g o f UF 6 combinin g wit h0.1 . k g o f wate r result s i nreleas e o f 0.8 8 k g o f U0 2 F 2 (whic hcontain s 0.6 8 k g o f uranium ) an

d 0.2 3 k

g o f HF .

2.2.3. 1 Acci-den

t Histor y

Tabl e 4 list s significan t release s o f UF 6 tha t hav e occurre d fro m al l type s
o f facilities , no t ius t conversio nplants . Ther e hav e bee nmany release s of-U_F 6 . The release s have cause d a t leas t tw o promp t fatalitie s an d severa l injuries . .'.'. Th e significan t UF 6 release s hav e consistentl y bee nwit hUF 6 heate d abov e it s \ meltin g poin t (65°C) . Th e release s hav e generall y bee nfairl y

rapid—lastin g fro m a fe w minute s t o a nhour . The plumes , wher e the y ar e highl y

concentrated , .. . hav e bee nvisibl e an d immediatel y

irritatin g t o th e lungs . Th e escap e o f UF 6 ca nbe-diminishe d greatl y i f the lea k ca nb e spraye d wit hwater . Inhalation~o f uraniu m du e t o a UF 6 releas e ca nb e verifie d b y measurement s
o f uraniu

m concentration s inurinetake nwithi n4 8 hour s o f th e exposure . Th e uraniu m fro m UF g ha s a biologica l half-lif e fo r expulsio nvi a th e urin e o f 4 to " 6 hours.* * Worker s expose d tohig hconcentration s hav e suffere d edema o f th e lungs , presumabl y fro m exposur e t o HF , an d kidne y

damag e due t o heav y meta l

*Minto nKelly , Oa k Ridg e Nationa l Laboratory , Sept . 1983 . **M.W . Babcock an d R . C . Heatherton , "Bioassa y Aspect s o f a UF 6 Fume Release, " Proceeding s o f th e 12t hAnnua l Bio-Assa y an d Analytica l Chemistr y Meeting , AE C Repor t C0NF-661018 , 1966 , p p 147-159 .



### 2 6Tabl e 4 . Accident s Involvin g UF 6 Release s
Typ e o f facilit y Quantit y o f UF 6 release d Caus e an d consequenc e



# i

J949

- AE

C facilit y Experimenta l

laborator y



### , ;, 

### $$§ y

J94 9 AE

C facilit y No t

identifie d

5-10-6 0 Babcock' &

Wilcox , Apollo , P

A Fue l

fabricatio n

11-17-6 0 _HJ'nio

hCarbide , Uranium . -

- Oa k Ridge , T N

enrichmen t
5-25-6 2 iluclea r Fue l

Services ,



### - Erwih , T N

yJ - 20 - 6 4

f-14-6 6 Nuclea r Fue l

Services , Erwin , T N Nationa l Lead , Fernald , O H . Fue l

fabricatio n meta l

Fue l fabricatio n meta l

- Fee d- - - materia l - production .

$-29-6 7


### 7-19-6 8 Kerr-McGee ,

Gore , O K Kerr-McGe e Crescent , O

K UF 6 conversio n Fue l fabricatio n

:':@v : Ver y larg e amoun t accom panie dwit h live stea

m

Believe d t o be 1 3 k g

No t reporte d

No t reporte d
1 5 k g HE Ui n 5 min . 6 k

g recovere di n plan t
1 k g i n2 hrs . Hal f recovere d onsit e 230 0 k g i n 1 hr . Muc h absorbe db

y wate r spra y

4 5 k g i n 15-2 0 mi n 4 5 k g o f 1.6 % enriche dU i n15-2 0 mi n Ruptur e o r explosio n

o f larg e tank . Two worker s killed . Thre e othe r worker s seriousl y injured , 1 3 other s les s seriousl y

injured . Sudde nlea k in a ho t cylinder . On e worke r receive dinjur y

t o respirator y

tract , eyes , and kidneys . Lea k i nhea t exchange r allowe dU0 2 F 2 t o escap e t o rive r water . 6 0 x MP C a t discharg e point . Ruptur e o f 10-to n cylinder. "
A noverheate d15-k g cylinde r rupture dand release dit s content s i nth e building . Overpressur e burs t tub e

Operato r accidentall y remove dvalv e o na ho t 10-to ncylinder , deve lope dlun g edema , hospitalize d 6 days . No observe dinjur y

t o kidney . Gaske t leake ddu e t o overheating . Valv e accidentall y

lef t ope ndurin g heating .



### 2 7Tabl e 4 . (continued )

Dat e
11-12-6 8

5-2-7 3

4-20-7 4 Facilit y

Allie d Chemical, . I L Goodyea r Atomi c Oa k Ridge , T N
Numec , Apollo , PA Typ e o f

facilit y

UF 6 conversio n
UF processin g

Mixe doxid e fue l fabricatio n Quantit y o f UF 6 release d
43kg - y

10 0 k g i n 2 0 mi n (inside )
6 kg , slightl y enriche d Caus e

Valv e failur e

Worke r brok e valv e o n. 10-to ncylinder .

' • '

12-2-7 6 Exxo nNuclear , Fue l

Richland , W

A fabricatio n Sma l 1 Worke r disconnecte d lin e bu t ha dforgotte n t o clos e valve . 3-7-7 8

12-3-7 8

8-7-7 9

5-20-8 0

9-15-8 1

10-12-8 1

2-25-8 2

12-8 3 Portsmout h

Gaseou s Diffusio n Plant , O H 

### G E

NFS , Erwi n T N - 

### G E

G E

NFS , Erwin , T N
Exxo n

Edlo w Inter national , Eas t St . Louis , I L Enrichmen t

plan t

Fue l - fabricatio n
Fue l fabricatio n
Fue l fabricatio n
Fue l r . - fabricatio n Fuel , fabricatio n
Fue l fabricatio n Warehous e 950 0 k g i n1/ 2 t o 1 hou r

no t know

n

< 3 k g

< 1 kg

<<7 4 k g

0.0 5 t o 0. 1 - kg , HE U
« 2 5 k g

Non e Ruptur e o f droppe dho t

14-to nUF 6 cylinder .

Bloc k valv e opene d

Accidenta l ventin g o f cylinde r t o stack . Pip e flang e failur e

Gaske t lea k

Releas e vi a mai n scrubbe r stack . Gaske t lea k

Fir e i nwarehouse . . _ _



### 2 8P.3 9

•sonin g fro m uranium

. A t leas t tw o worker s wer e killed

. Person s injure d o r kille d i n thi s manne rhav e al l bee n worker s i n a roo m workin g clos e t o a UF 6 cyliner . Two o f th e case s involvin g th e mos t seriou s exposure s wer e reporte db y Howland. * Thes e involve dtw o fatalities , fou r seriou s injuries , and sligh t injur y t o 1 3 othe r people . On e o f th e fatalitie s showe db y autops y

roughl y 100 0 m g of . uranium:i nth e lungs . Howlan dconclude dtha t th e mos t seriou s injurie s (observe donth e skin , eye , mucou s membran e o f th e uppe r respirator y tract , esophagus , larynx , an d bronchi ) wer e al l cause db y th e actiono f th e fluorid e io

no nth e expose dtissues . Uraniu m produce dtransien t urinary-trac t changes . Th e conclusio nis"tha t H F and uraniu m bot hhav e adverse , effects , bu t tha t the H F effect s ar e th e mor e severe . - Inth e Nationa l Lead-Fernal d accident , on e worke r suffere d lung edema , presumabl y

fro m exposur e t o HF.* * - N o injur y t o hi s kidney s wa s observed . H e excrete di nurin e ove r 1 m g o f uraniu

m i nth e firs t two " day s afte r th e acci dent , suggestin g a tota l intak e o f roughl y 2 t o 3 m

g o f uranium . Th e larges t releas e o f UF 6 wa s th e 197 8 acciden t a t th e Portsmouth , -Ohi o gaseou s diffusio nplant . I nthi s acciden t a heatedythin-walle d cylinde r con- . taining 1 4 (short ) ton s o f natura l UF 6 wa s droppe d8 t o 1 0 inche s and rupture d belo w th e liqui dlevel.** * Within-on e hour , abou t 950 0 k g o f UF 6 escaped . Thi s i s equa l t o abou t 640 0 k g o f uranium . Th e releas e wa s outdoors . Th e ai r temperatur e wa s 32°F , th e win dspeed.Wa s 2 meters/sec , an d a mixtur e o f snow
an dfreezin g rai nwa s falling . Sno w covere dth e grbund . Abou t 55 0 k g o f uraniu m wer e recovere do nth e groun dafterwards . Agglomeratio ni s likel y t o have increase dth e settling . Abou t 4800 T k g o f uraniu

m (75 % ofth e release )
wer e estimate dt o hav e become airborn e and-dissipat_ed in " th e air , muc hthereb y leaving the-site . Th e sit e boundar y i nth e downwin ddirectio nwa s a t a distanc e o f 2. 2 km . . """." "

*Jo e W . Howland , "Studie s OnHuma nExposure s t o Uraniu m Compounds, " i n Pharmacolog y

and Toxicolog y

o f Uraniu

m Compounds,-edite d b y Car l Voegtli n an dHarol dHodge , McGraw-Hill , Ne w York , 1949 , p 993 . **Babcoc k and Heatherton , op . cit . ***"Investigatio no f Occurrenc e Involvin g Releas e o f Uraniu m Hexafluorid e fro

m a Fourteen-To nCylinde r a t th e Portsmout hGaseou s Diffusio nPlan t o nMarc h7 , 1978, " DO E Repor t ORO-757 , June , 1978 .



### 29P.4 0

Wate r sample s fro

m a drainag e ditc hlocate dnea r th e releas e ha da pea k uraniu m concentratio no f 45 0 mg/l , 1 0 time s th e NRC' s radiologica l limi t fo r wate r t o be release dt o unrestricte dareas. * Th e reporte denvironmenta l effect s wer e minimal . Worker s wh o drov e through"th e plume showe d n o detectabl e uraniu m i nsample s o f thei r urine . Significan t groun dandwate r contaminatio nwer e confine dt o distance s o f a few hundre dyard s fro

m th e releas e point . Airborn e concentration s a t th e sit e boundar y

(2. 2 knv ) wer e calculate dt o b e no t highenoug ht o be harmfu l fo r brie f exposures . Anothe r larg e releas e o f U.F 6 occurre dinFranc e in . 1977. t A s th e resul t
o f a handlin g erro r a valv e rupture dona containe r heate dto r 90-95°C - Th e UF 6 immediatel y

starte dt o spil l ou t ont o th e ground . Th e liqui dflo w laste d. : 1 0 t o 1 5 minute s unti l th e leve l o f liqui di nth e containe r ha dfalle nbelow v th e valv e opening . The nUF 6 continue descapin g a s a ga s unti l th e valv e wa s plugge d wit ha woode npe g 3 0 minute s afte r th e rupture . O f th e 880 0 kg o f liqui dUF e i nth e container , 710 0 k g escaped . --' • Wate r "an

dCarbo ndioxid e wer e use dt o preven t th e escape dUF 6 "fro m becomin g airborne . However , 33 0 k g o f uraniu

m an d160 0 k

g o f H F wer e no t recovered . -Thus 7 % o f th e uraniu m an d98 % o f th e H F tha t escape dth e containe r apparentl y becam e airborne . "Weathe r condition s favore drapi ddilution . I t wa s a war m
and sunny

afternoo nwit ha windspee do f 9 m/s . Th e Frenc hworkplac e limi t fo r H F o f 2. 4 mg/m 3 wa s exceede du pt o a distanc e o f 120 0 meters . Groundcontaminatio nb y uraniu m o f u pt o 1 0 mg/m 2

wa s observe du

pt o 60 0 meters . Th e are a onwhic hvirtuall y "al l the^soli d uraniu m compound s settle ddi dno t excee d100 0 m 2
. -N o injurie s wer e observed . Urin e sample s wer e take nfro m 44 9 people. . -Tw o worker s excrete dmor e tha n0. 5 mgdurin g th e firs t day , but_n o physio logica l symptom s wer e observed . N o symptom s o f th e H F exposur e wer e observed .

*th e NR C limi t fo r wate r i nunrestrice darea s i n1 0 CF RPar t 20 , Appendi xB i s 3 x10- 5 microcuries/ml . Usin g th e specifi c activit y o f natura l uraniu m o f 6.7 7 x10- 7 microcuries/microgram , th e effluen t wate r standar di s equiva len t t o 4 4 milligrams/liter . tA.J . Docouret , "A

nExperienc e o f Accidenta l Releas e o f UF 6 , " Comurte xPlant , Pierrelatte , France .



### 3 0P.4 1

U ^ S

gf« " 

### additio n t o gaseou s UF 6 

### releases , conversio n plant s hav e release d

t o rivers

. O n Dec
. 1 , 197 8 th e Kerr-McGe e conversio n plan t accident

al " •lease d 75 0 ,k

g o f natura l uranium

i n th e for mo f urany l nitrat e int o a rlvt r fo r Th e liqui d release d ha d a uraniumconcentratio n o f "1. 4 times.th e MP C

.. . whic h woul d the n b e dilute d b yth e rive r water
. w/ti 1

- ' »


### 2.2.-3. 2 Acciden t Sourc e Term s
Th e NR C staff , Sutte r a t Pacifi c Northwes t Laboratory , an d M
. Simon-Toy * n* k Ridg e Nationa l Laborator yhave-recently_analyze d potentia l accident s a t
* mnversio n plant s t o estimat e potentia l release s o f JUF 6 

### . - Uf « c 

### The larges t releas e postulate d b yth e NR C staf f i s containe d i n a n Environ

t a 1 Impac t Appraisa l fo r th e Allie d Chemica l conversio n plant.* * Th e NR C •af f assume d tha t th e larges t releas e o f UF 6 

### woul d b e cause d b yth e ruptur e o f heate d 14-to n cylinder

. Th e staf f assume d tha t 950 0 kg o f UF 6 

### . woul d escape, . -n d tha t th e materia l woul d hydrolyze
. A s a result , 480 0 kg o f natura l uraniu m woul d b e release d wit h th e chemica l for m U0 2 

### F2, a highl ysolubl e compound.
. Sutter** * considere d a numbe r o f possibl e accidents

. Thes e include :
1
. Th e ruptur e o f tw o 14-to n UF 6 

### cylinder s outdoor s i n conjunctio n wit h
a fir e fe d b

y10 0 gallon s o f gasolin e du e t o a truc k cras h 2. Alea k o f UF 6 

### fro ma pip e 3
. Atornad o strik e 4
. Fire s _-_--"-
. -. . y 5 / Chemica l explosion s - :
"-
. 6. ~ Natura l ga s explosion s -"•" '

Th e acciden t determine d b ySutte r t o caus e th e mos t significan t releas e - 1 s th e ruptur e o f tw o 14-to h UF 6 

### Cylinder s alon g wit h a gasolin e fire

. Th e initiatio n i s assume d t o b e a truc k acciden t i n whic h thevtruc k hit s th e

*M
. Simon-To ve t al. , "Scenario s an d Analytica l Method s fo r UF 6 

### Release s a t NRC-License d Fue l Cycl e Facilities, " NUREG/CR-3139 , 1984
. ""Environmenta l Impac t Appraisa l fo r Renewa l o f Sourc e Materia l License , No
. SUB-526 , Allie d Chemica l Compan yUF R

### Conversio n Plant , Offic e o f Nuclea r Materia l Safet yand Safeguards , NUREG-1071 , May , 1984 , pag e 4-28
. ***S.L
. Sutter , e t al. , op . cit

.

3 1mmm ^ am ^ mmm _

cylinders , rupture s it s ga s tank , an d catche s o nfire . A tota l releas e o f
u p t o 380 0 k

g o f UF 6 wa s calculated . Th e amoun t o f materia l tha t coul d b e release di s limite db y th e amoun t o f hea t availabl e t o vaporiz e th e soli dUF 6 . Hea t require dt o rais e th e temperatur e o f th e cylinde r an d UF 6 i s neglected . I f th e UF 6 cylinde r i s not.ruptured , the hea t i s sufficien t t o rais e th e temperatur e o f the.UF 6 .fro m 2 0 t o 100°F . Th e pressur e produce dwoul dno t b e enoug ht o ruptur e th e cylinder . Simon-Tov' s wor k wa s directe dtowar ddeterminin g acciden t scenarios , and analysi s method s fo r UF 6 releases . Hi s wor k i s th e mos t recen t and mos t comprehensive . Twenty-fiv e releas e scenario s ar e describe di nhi s repor t (Chapte r 5> . Th e scenari o mos t appropriat e fo r thi s analysi s i s th e ruptur e
o f a heate dliquid^fille d cylinde r outdoors . A t a temperatur e o f 100°C , 57 % o f th e liqui dUF 6 coul db e vaporized . A t 120°C , 65 % coul db e vaporize d (Figur e 11 , page-58) . Th e mos t importan t paramete r fo r determinin g th e releas e i s th e temperatur e o f th e cylinder . Thusvth e larges t releas e i s fro m a cylinde r just-filled . Analyse s o f plausibil e fir e scenario s involvin g coole dcylinders ^ show that"th e UF 6 canno t b e heate dsufficientl y t o caus e a s larg e a releas e as . fro m a ho t cylinder . "

_- Fo r th e purpose-o f thi s regulator y analysis , th e releas e t o b e evaluate d fo r UF & conversio nplant s wil l b e on e simila r t o th e on e tha t occurre da t th e Portsmout hgaseou s diffusio nplant . Tha t acciden t involve dth e ruptur e o f a ho t 14-to nUF 6 cylinde r outdoor s wit ha releas e o f 950 0 k g o f UF 6 (equivalen t t o 640 0 k

g o f natura l uranium) . I t i s assume dtha t 480 0 k g o f natura l uraniu m become s airborn e and th e remainde r settle s onth e groun ddu e t o agglomeratio n
.an d impaction" - _Th

e releas e wa s calculate db y W . Rei dWilliam s a s likel y t o
occu r i nabou t 1 5 minutes . Ther e woul db e n o advance.warning . Becaus e th e : "releas e i s assume dt o b e outdoors , n o automati c detectio no r alarm system woul d detec t th e release . Rather , plan t personne l ar e assume dt o detec t th e releas e ari

dthe ntak e emergenc y measures . Th e plume woul db e readily.detectabl e t o the ; huma nsense s becaus e o f th e H F and it s resultin g irritation . Therefor e n o monitorin g instrument s ar e neede d t o detec t highconcentrations .



### 3 22.2.3. 3 Calculation s o f Dose s

Th e releas e o f UF 6 present s a chemica l rathe r thaniradiologica l hazard . Exposure s letha l du e t o uraniu m chemica l toxicit y

o r HF^burn s o nlun g tissu e woul dno t resul t i nradiatio ndose s exceedin g 1 re m effectiv e dos e equivalent . Therefore , radiation , dose s ar e no t calculated . Th e releas e assumed-is.th e escap e o f 950 0 k

g o f UF 6 i n1 5 minute s du e t o th e ruptur e outdoor s o f a heate d 14-to ncylinder . Th e mas s o f uraniu m i n950 0 k

g o f UF 6 i s 640 0 kg . Som e o f the uraniu

m wil l b e remove dfro m th e ai r initiall y

b y agglomeratio nan dimpac tion . W e "assum

e 480 0 k

g o f uraniu

m become s airborne . Th e correspondin g mas s
o f HF i s 1620.kg . " Intake s ar e calculate dfo r atmospheri c stabilit y clas s F wit ha win dspee d
o f 1 m/ s a s wel l a s stabilit y Clas s D wit hwin dspee do f 4. 5 m/s . Th e plum e i s assume d initiall y

t o hav e a centerlin e nea r groun dlevel . Th e hea t fro m th e chemica l reactio no f UF 6 combinin g wit hth e moistur e i nth e ai r wil l caus e th e plum e t o become buoyant . Calculation s b y W . Rei dWilliam s indicat e th e plum e woul d lif t of f withi n2 0 t o 3 0 meter s anda plum e centerlin e heigh t o f abou t 2 0 meter s woul db e obtaine dwithi n20 0 t o 30 0 meters . However , w e d o nc» t consi de r Williams ' mode l t o b e sufficientl y develope da t thi s tim e (May , 1985 ) t o us e i nthi s Regulator y Analysi s exclusively . Therefore , w e presen t a rang e o f intakes , assumin g th e plume i s neutrall y buoyan t fo r on e en do f th e rang e an d assumin g a 20-mete r plum e centerlin e heigh t (bu t no t buildin g wake ) fo r th e othe r en

do f th e range . Th e equatio nfo r uraniu m intak e lis :



### I = Q xB x' =

wher e Q = th e release dquantit y (480 0 kg) , B = th e breathin g rat e (2.66. x10- 4 m 3 /s) , and x/ Q = th e atmospheri c dispersio nvalu e fro m Figur e 1 .



### 33P.44

.

NR C FOR M U S
NRC M 110}
. U l NUCHA * REGULATOR Y COMMISSIO N BIBLIOGRAPHI C OAT A SHEE T

SI C INSTRUCTION S O N TM t REVERS E Rt'OR TNUMBE R tA„.t*rOt>, HOC tat) Vo' No. .1 tn ri 

### NUREG-114

0 Draf t

1 TlTL C AN O SU8TITL I i LEAV E BLAN K A Regulator y

Analysi s o nEmergenc y Preparednes s fo r Fue l Cycl e an d Othe r Radioactiv e Materia l Licensee s Draf t Repor t fo r Commen t 4 DAT E REPOR TCOMPLETC O

9 AUTHORIS I MONT H I YEA R 

### Ma y' 198 5 Stephe n A

. McGuire 6 OAT E REPOR TISSUE D

- MONT H I YEA R 

### Jun e ' 198 5

7 PERFORMIN G ORGANIZATIO N NAM E AN D MAILIN G ADDRES S ttnclt/dt Z*> Ctxitl Divisio no f Ris k Analysi s an d Operation s Offic e o f Nuclea r Regulator y Researc h U . S . Nuclea r Regulator y Commissio n Washington . D.C . 2055 5 8 PROJECT/TASK/WOR KUNI TNUMBE R

9 FI N O R GRAN TNUMBE R

1 0 SPONSORIN G ORGANIZATIO N NAM E AN D MAILIN G AOORES S llnditOf im Cotti i i r TYP E O F REPOR T 

### Draf t Same . t > PERIO D COVERE O llnclvt.f (ttntl

1 2 SUPPLEMENTAR Y NOTE S

T3
. ABSTRAC T1200 wotxti ar Itul Potentia l accident s fo r 1 5 type s o f fue l cycl e an d othe r radioactive materia l licensee s wer e analyzed . Th e mos t potentiall y hazardou s accident , b y a larg e margin , wa s determine d t o be th e sudde nruptur e o f a heatedmultl-to ncylinde r o f UF g . Acut e fatalitie s offsit e probabl y no t credible . Acut e permanen t Injurie s ma y b e possibl e fo r man y hundred s o f 

### ar e meters , an

d clinicall y

observabl e transien t effect s o f unknow nlon g ter m consequence s ma y

b e possibl e fo r distance s up t o a fe w miles . Thes e effect s woul db e cause db y th e chemica l toxicit y o f th e UF, . Radiatio ndose s woul dno t b e significant . Th e mos t potentiall y

hazardou s acciden t du e t o radiatio nexposur e wa s determine dt o b e a larg e fir e a t certai nfacilitie s handlin g larg e quantitie s o f alpha-emittin g radionuclide s (I.e. , Po-210 , Pu-238 , Pu-239 , Am-241 , Cm-242 , Cm-244 ) o r rad1o1od1ne s (1-12 5 and 1-131) . However , acut e fatalitie s o r Injurie s t o peopl e offsit e du e t o accidenta l release s o f thes e material s d o no t see m plausible . Th e onl y othe r significan t acciden t wa s Identifie da s a long-ter m pulsatin g cr1t1cal1t y a t fue l cycl e facilitie s handling h1gh-enr1che< t uraniu m o r plutoniu m . _. . - _--.-•'..- , - ' - ^ AnImportan t featur e o f the mos t seriou s accident s 1 s tha t release s ar e Ukel y to

_ star t withou t prio r waring . Th e release s woul dusuall y en d withi nabou t hal f a nhour . Thu s protectiv e action s woul dhave t o b e take nquickl y t o b e effective . Ther e 1 s no t Ukel y t o b e enoug htim

e fo r dos e projections , complicate ddecisionmakin g during th e accident , o r th e partlcpatlo no f personne l .no t 1 nth e Immediat e vicinit y o f th e site . Th e appropriat e respons e b

y th e facilit y

1 s t o Immediatel y

notif y loca l fire , police , an d othe r emergenc y personne l and giv e the m a brie f predetermine dmessag e recommending protectiv e actions . Einergenc y personne l ar e generall y wel l qualifie dt o respon deffectivel y

t o smal l accident s o f thes e types , 1 4 DOCUMEN TANALVSI S - •KEYWORDS/DESCRIPTOR S

b IDENTlflERS/OPENCNOE D TERM S XXX. AVAILABILIT Y STATEMEN T 

### Unlimite d

I B SECURIT Y CLASSIFICATIO N 

### On'cT'ssifie d

ITtitl rtfiorll Unclassifie d

1 ? NUMBE R O F PAGE SP.45
.

Uraniu m intak e du e t o th e airborn e releas e o f 480 0 k g o f uraniu

m



### Distanc e (meters ) 10 0 20 0 30 0 50 0 70 0 1,00 0 1,50 0 ,2,00 0 5,00 0 10,00 0 15,00 0 20,00 0 

### F v

1 m/ s buoyan t 0 6 4 6 11 0 11 0 9 2 6 2 4 4 1 1 3 1 0. 6 Uraniu

mintak e (mg )
F , 1 m/ s D , 4. 5 m/ s ground buoyan t 400 0 6 200 0 5 3 110 0 5 9 53 0 4 0 31 0 2 8 17 0 1 7 8 0 1 0 4 5 6 6 1. 6 0. 8 0. 5 0. 2 : 

### 0. 3 0.04

- 0. 2 D , 4. 5 m/ s groun d 54 0 21 0 12 0 5 4 3 2 1 8 10

- 6 1. 5 0. 5 0. 3 0. 2

Th e exposur e t o concentration s o f H F ca nb e calculate dsimilarly , sure s du e t o th e ai=rborn e releas. e o f 162 0 kg- o f HF ar e show nbelow . Expo HF exposure , du e t o th e airborn e release , o f 162 0 k g o f H F

- 

### Distanc e (meters )

- 10 0 20 0 30 0 50 0 ,70 0 1,00 0 1,50 0 2,00 0 5,00 0 10,00 0 15,00 0 20,00 0 " - . - -


### F , 1 m/ s buoyan t

_ 0 _9

_ -68

_ 16 0 16 0 14 0 9 2 6 5 1 6 5 1. 8 0. 9 H F exposur e (mg/m 3 

### )

F , 1 m/ s D , 4. 5 m/ s groun d buoyan t 590 0 9 2900

- 7 7 170 0 8 6 77 0 5 9 45 0 4 1

- 25 0 2 5 12 0 1 4 6 7 9

. : 9 2. 3 1. 2 0. 8 0. 2 0. 4 0.0 6 0. 3 - 

### D , 4. 5 m/ s groun d 79 0 31 0 17 0 7 9 4 7 2 7 15 ' 9 2. 2 0.: 7 0. 4 0. 2



### 3 4Intak e 24 3 4 5 8. 6 4. 5 ( m 9 ) 2.2.3. 4 Implication s fo r Emergenc y Preparednes s

O f al l th e accident s considere dinthi s Regulator y Analysis , th e ruptur e
o f a heate d14-to ncylinde r o f UF 6 i s clearl y andb y fa r th e mos t hazardou s t o peopl e offsite , Th e corrosiv e effect s o f exposur e t o HF an dheav y meta l poison in g du e t o uptak e o f uraniu m ar e discusse dseparatel y below . Heav y meta l poisoning : W e conside r th e bes t estimate s o f th e healt h .effect s o f uraniu

m intak e t o b e thos e intw o DO E reports * base donth e wor k o f
a pane l o f expert s o nuraniu m toxicity . Th e effect s ar e summarize dbelow :

Healt hEffec t , 50 % Lethalit y Permanen t damag e Rena l injur y

(transient ) No effec t

I t i s no t likel y

fro m th e calculate dresult s tha t letha l intake s ar e actuall y

plausible^fo r outdoo r release s o f UF 6 . I norde r t o calculat e letha l intake s i t i s necessar y t o assume littl e o r no-buoyahcy , whic hi s believe dt o b e incorrect , andlittl e b r no effor t o nth e par t o f th e expose dindividua l t o escap e th e plume , whic hma y no t be a reasonabl e assumption . W e conclud e tha t letha l intake s o f uraniu m b y peopl e offsit e ar e no t reall y plausibl e unde r realisti c conditions . Permanen t kidne y

damage , onth e othe r hand , doe s appea r possible . Fro m th e intake s calculate dabov e permanen t kidney damag e coul doccu r a s fa r a s 200 0 m (1. 2 miles ) unde r ver y advers e weathe r (F , 1 m/s ) an dno attemp t t o escap e th e plume , Unde r mor e typica l condition s (D , 4. 5 m/s , som e .buoyancy , and-attempte d | escape ) permanen t kidne y damag e woul dno t be expecte doffsite . S Transien t kidne y injur y appear s t o be quit e plausible . Unde r highl y advers e { condition s (F , 1 m/s ) i t migh t b e possibl e a s fa r a s fiv e mile s away . . Unde r

- : mor e typica l condition s (D , 4. 5 m/ s an dsom e escap e attempt ) transien t injur y migh t occu r a s fa r a s 1 mil e away .

*R . A . Jus t andV . S . Emler , "Generi c Repor t onHealt hEffect s fo r th e U.S . Gaseou s Diffusio nPlants, " DO E Repor t K/ D 5050 , Sectio nVIII , Par t 1 , 1984 .



### 3 5P.4 7

I t i s Commissio npolic y fo r nuclea r powe r plan t accident s t o pla nt o avoi d acut e fatalitie s an d seriou s injurie s fo r th e wors t cas e accident s an d protec tiv e actio nguid e dose s fo r mor e probabl e accidents . Wit hthi s i nmind , th e recommende dprotectiv e actio nfo r ruptur e o f a 14-to ncylinde r woul d b e evacua tio nt o a distanc e o f 1 mile , i f possible . Thi s woul davoi dacut e fatalitie s
and seriou s injurie s for.worst-cas e accident s and transien t kidne y injur y unde r
mor e typica l conditions . HF : Estimate s o f th e healt heffect s ar e fro m a recen t DO E report. * Th e effect s describe dher e ar e base do nconcentratio na s applie d t o a 1 5 minut e exposure : "--."'•'•-- • - -

Healt heffec t HF concentratio n(mg/m 3 )
Letha l (1 5 min ) Unbearabl e fo r 1 mi n Irritatio n(1 5 min ) Detectabl e b

y smel l bu t n o healt heffect s 350 0 

### 10 0 13 2. 5

Fro m th e calculate dH F exposure s give nabove , letha l exposure s offsit e
ar e no t plausible . y - _ -. • . . Unfortunately , level s fo r permanen t injury are.no t knowrv . A s a consequenc e
w e ar e substitutin g th e concentratio no f 10 0 mg/m 3 a s th e leve l considere dt o b e "unbearable " fo r mor e tha na minute . Suc hlevel s ma y occu r ou t t o abou t 150 0 meter s unde r advers e conditions . Generally , the y woul d no t b e expecte d t o occu r offsite s unde r typica l conditions (D y 4. 5 m/s) . i f on e discount s some wha t th e groun dleve l releas e values . _. '""*-" ' '- Irritatio nappear s possibl e ou t t o a t leas t 500 0 meter s ( 3 miles ) unde r advers e meteorolog y and roughl y

150 0 m ( 1 mile ) unde r typical-conditions . Thu s th e consequences , o f HF exposur e ar e simila r i nseverit y t o thos e fro

m uraniu m intake . Consequentl y tb e one-mil e evacuatio nsuggeste d fo r th e ruptur e
o f a 14-to ncylinde r o f UF 6 i s appropriat e fo r protectio nagains t bot huraniu m
and UF 6 . ; -

*R . A . Jus t an

d V . S . Emler , "Generi c Repor t onHealt hEffect s fo r th e U.S . Gaseou s Diffusio nPlants, " DO E Repor t K/ D 5050 , Sectio nVIII , Par t 1 , 1984 .



### 3 6

### $ A'

\ Th e U.S . Departmen t o f Transportatio nha s als o establishe d evacuatio nguide s H F releases. * Fo r smal l leak s (drum , smal l container , smal l lea k fro m a

. » tn e DO T recommend s isolatio ni nal l direction s t o a distanc e o f 24 0 fee t 7 S meters) . . Fo r a larg e spil l fro m a tan k (i.e . railroa d tan k car ) th e DO T end s isolatio ni nal l direction s t o a distanc e o f 49 0 fee t (15 0 meters )
•n d thenevacuatio ni na downwin d directio nt o a distanc e o f 1. 8 mil e and a <dtho f 1- 2 mile . Th e DO T distances , however , ar e base d o na large r quantit y .
f HF . Thus , the one-mil e distanc e suggeste d her e i s consisten t wit hDO T recom mendations . DO T evacuatio ndistance s ar e base d onatmospheri c stabilit y Clas s D
an d win d spee d o f 4. 5 m/s . DO T state s that-evacuatio ndistance s base d onthos e assumption s hav e prove nt o b e adequat e unde r actua l acciden t situations . -



### c e 2.2. 4 Enrichmen t Plant s "

At presen t ther e ar e no NRC-license d enrichmen t plants , no r ar e ther e an y immediat e prospect s fo r one . Basically , however , enrichmen t plant s receiv e UP 6 fro m conversio nplant s and shi p UF 6 ,Eenriche di nU-235 , t o fue l fabrica- " tio nplants . Thu s the-type s o f potentia l accident s ar e simila r t o thos e at " conversio nplant s an d fue l fabricatio nplants .

2:2.4. 1 Acciden t Histor y

j

. - Severa l larg e release s o f UF 6 hav e occurre d a t enrichmen t plants , a s

show ninTabl e 4 . Thes e hav e bee nth e resul t o f th e ruptures o f heate d larg e 10-tono r 14-to ncylinders . Th e larges t releas e wa s th e 197 8 cylinde r ruptur e
a t the Portsmouth , Ohi o gaseou s diffusio nplant , whic hrelease d 950 0 k g o f "_ . UF 6 . . -

*"Hazardou s Materials-Emergenc y Respons e Guidebook ' Transportatio nrepor t D0T-P5800.2 , 1980 , op . cit . U.S . Departmen t o f



### 3 72.2.4. 2 Acciden t Sourc e Term s

Sourd e term s fo r tw o type s o f accident s are considered : UF 6 release s an d criticality

accidents. - Th e UF 6 releas e fo

r natura l uraniu

m i s considere

d t o b e th e sam e a s fo r v th e UF 6 releas e previousl y discusse

d fo r UF 6 conversio

nplant s i

nSectio

n2.2.3.2 . Th e UF 6 release s fo

r enriche

d uraniu

m are considere

d t o b e th e sam e a s thos e fo r fue l fabricatio nplant s tha t wil l b e discusse

d i nSectio

n2.2.5:2 . Th e criticalit

y accident s i s assume d to b e th e sam e at th e criticality .acciden

t fo r th e fabricatio

nplant s tha t wil l b e discusse

d i nSectio

n2.2.5.2 .

2.2.4. 3 Calculation s o f Dose s

Dose s du

e t o a UF 6 releas e fro m th e rupture o f a 14-to ncylinde r o f natura l uraniu

m are th e sam e a s thos e give

ni nSectio

n2.2.3. 3 fo

r UF 6 conver sion-plants . Dose s du e to_UF 6 release s o f lo w an d high:enriche

d uraniu

m are th e sam e a s thos e tha t wil l b e give ni nSectio

n2.2.5. 3 fo

r fue l fabricatio

n plants . . _'•-•'.:.'•-•_ ' Dose s du

e to a criticalit

y are th e sam e a s thos e givenfor a criticality
a t a fue l fabricatio nplant i

nSectio

n2.2.5.3 .

2.2.4. 4 Implications fo r Emergenc

y Preparednes s

-Offsit e emergenc

y preparednes s a t uraniu m enrichmen t plant s shoul d b e " - base d d hchemica l toxicit

y fro m a larg e UF 6 release . Thus , uraniu m enrichmen t plant s shoul d b

e considere

d a potentia l chemica l hazard , not a radiatio nhazard . Basically , uraniu

m enrichment plant s shoul d hav e th e sam e leve l o f offsit e emergenc

y preparednes s a s UF 6 conversio nplants . Currently , enrichmen t plants , i f licensed , woul d b e covere

d under Par t 5 0 o f NR C regulations . Th

e emergenc

y preparednes s requirement s i nPar t 50 , whic

hwer e develope

d fo r nuclear powe r "plants , are clearly excessiv

e fo r enrichment plants . However , becaus e NR C doe s
not currentl y

licens e an

y enrichment plants , th e discrepanc

y i s academic .



### 3 8p r c PIIP I Fabricatio n - Uraniu m

c 1 fabricatio nplants(generall y receiv e UF 6 enriche d i n th e uranium-23 5
conver t i t generall y "int o highl y

refractor y

uraniu

m oxides , for

m th e oxide s int o pellets , an d load th e pellet s int o metal-cla d fue l elements . Momen t t o nuclea r powe r plants . I n mos t case s th e uranium-23 5 i s enriche d tha n5% , bu t a t severa l plant s th e enrichmen t exceed s 93% . However , 

### It y on e licensed plan t (Nuclea r Fue l Services , Erwin , Tennessee ) currentl y P'^P^-mlts'th e volatile.UF 6 in highl y enriche d form . {• f vi . ~ Acciden t Histor y :



### - A'y"-- A^yMirz
•**i..?

. Amon

g the...accident s tha t have occurre d in processin g uraniu m ar e criti - ;^iHtt1U y

accidents , fires , an d release s o f UFg .

. - -:«i i - $j n c e the firs t successfu l self-sustainin g nuclea r chain-reactio nthere bee nn o les s than3 7 occasion s whe nth e powe r .level o f fissil e system s

^ y : 1jsi| i unexpectedly-becaus e o f unplanne d o r unexpecte d change s in^system reac- - "v.$~t.lvity . O f these-3 7 cases , si xcases , cause d eigh t deaths , tw o o f whic hoccurre d

: '-'-.rfa"4.n

e early" , rushe d pac e nea r th e en d o f Worl d Wa r II . y-:3 > •' " O f thes e 3 7 criticalities , eigh t occurre d i n fue l cycl e facilitie s ( 7 i n ^^^tfct'U.S . an

d one abroad ) an

d ar e thu s relevan t t o thi s analysis . The remainin g •J t occurre d i

nnuclea r reactor s o r critica l assembl y experiments . Th e seve n rtUvant.LL . S . fue l cycl e facilit y criticalitie s ar e liste d i n Table 5 . One t yyifcftttfrred-ina license d facilit y (Wood Rive r Junction , R.I. , 1964) . -Ther e ar e severa l lesson s abou t criticalitie s tha t ca n b e learne d fro m y.y studying thes e accidents . Accidenta l criticalitie s ca n occu r an d occasionall y Whe nthe

y "occur the . dose s t o worker s ca n be very large , sometime s fatal , vjv^.—
— sometime s requirin g hospitalization . Radioactiv e solution s ca n b e ejecte d
ca ncontaminat e worker s an d the plan t area . N o offsit e contaminatio no r latio ndose s have bee nreported .



### 3 9Tabl e 5 . Criticalit y Accident s I nFue l Cycl e Facilitie s

Dat e Locatio n Proces s Caus e Tota l Fission s Duratio nPersonne l Exposure s Contaminatio n Ih-plan t Contaminatio n

Ou t o f Buildin g Jun e 16 , Y-1 2 Process 195 8 in

g Plant , Oa k Ridge , T N

Dec . 30 , P uProcess 195 8 1n

g Plant , Lo s Alamos , N

M Oct . 16 , 195 9

o Jan . 25 , 196 1

Apri l 7 , 196 2 Jul y 24 , 196 4

Oct . 17 , 197 8 Idah o Chemica l

Processin g Plant , Idah o Reacto r Tes t Sit e

Idaho Chemica l Processin g Plant , Idah o Reacto r Tes t Sit e Hanfor dWorks , Richland , W

A Scra pRecover y Plant , Woo d Rive r Junction , R I Chemica l Processin g Plant , NRTS , I D Recover y o f highl y enriche duraniu

m b y chemica l methods . i Recover y o f plutoniu m fro m scrap . Transfe r o f highl y enriche duraniu

m solution . 1. 5 x10 1 7 1 se c

Was hwate r adde dt o 1. 3 x, 10 1 8 1 8 mi n U 0 2 (N0 3 ) 2 solutio n 1n55-gal . drum . Liqui dphase s o f plutoniu m separate d out' . Solutio ntransferre d t o unsaf e geometr y (500 0 ga l tank ) 4 x10 1 9 1 5 t o 2 0 m1 n

Transfe r o f highl y

Solutio ntransferre d6 xIO 1 7 1 se c enriche duraniu

m solution .

Plutoniu m processin g ' Recover y o f highl y enriche duraniu

m <

Solven t extractio n colum n t o unsaf e geometr y

Plutoniu m solutio n incorrectl y

siphone d Solutio nhand-poure d Int o unsaf e geometr y 8 xIO 1 7 37. 5 h r
1. 3 x10 1 7

3 x10 1 8 2 shor t

pulse s 1. 5 hr s apar t 1 5 mi n 8 people . Dose s o f 461 , Smal l loca l Non e

418, , 413 , 341 , 298 , 87 , contaminatio nreporte d 2 9 rads . No fatalities . 3 people. ' Dose s o f 12,000 , 134 , 5 3 rads . • On e fatality . 1 9 people . No direc t gamm a o r neutro ndos e becaus e tan k wa s shielded , bu t bet a dose s fro

m release d radi o activit y

o f 5 0 rem , 3 2 rads , an

d smalle r amount s fo r 1 7 othe r people . None . Shielde d operatio n Non e reporte d
Ye s airborn e bet a activit y

i •

Non e reporte d Non e

reporte d
No t reporte d

Non e reporte d

3 people . Dose s o f 110 , 43 , 1 9 rads . 3 people . Dose s o f 10,000 , 100 , 6 0 rads . On e fatality .
Les s tha n.1 3 rem . (I nshielde dcell ) Non e reporte d 20 % o f solutio n splashe d ou t o f tan k A1 r monitor s detecte d considerabl e activit y T , Non e

reporte d Non e reporte d

Filter s remove d mos t particle s

References : William

R . Stratton , " A

Revie w o f Criticalit y

Accidents, " AE C Repor t LA-3611 , Octobe r 17 , 1978," ' DOE'Repor t ACI-362 , November , 1978 . > j < 1 h r 196 7 and."Recover

y o f ICP P fro

m Criticalit y

Even t o f

mm•rf** ' A numbe r o f fire s an dexplosion s involvin g uraniu m o r thorium , whic hwoul d similarly , hav e bee nreported . Uraniu m meta l i s pyrophoric . Uranium •^y - i heate do r inpowdere dfor m o r heate da s a soli dwil l spontaneousl y ignit e ff & nose dt o air . Reporte dfire s andexplosion s involvin g uraniu m o r thorium
* Include di nTabl e 6 below . Wha t i s noteworthy i s tha t thes e fire s hav e ha d

^ ««tt1 e consequenc e wit hregar dto . eithe r personne l exposur e o r groun dcohtamina -

' Ktttx Reporte doffsit e contaminatio nlevel s wer e generall y belo w th e level s

t th e NRC allow s onequipmen t t o b e release dfo r unrestricte duse. * B y comparison , th e acciden t recor dfo r plutonium , whic hha s a muc hhighe r t-t-tr activity , i s muc hdifferent . Plutoniu m accident s hav e bee ncharac gpec < ii*- , t*rize d b y extensiv e radioactiv e contaminatio nandpersonne l exposures . Ye t avt nth e mos t seriou s o f thes e accidents , th e Rock y Flat s fire , cause donl y smal l fractio no f th e plutoniu m involve dt o b e released . O f hundred s of kllograms o f plutoniu m involve di nth e fire , onl y 0.00 3 g wa s release dthroug h A damage dexhaus t system.* * Thu s th e overal l releas e fractio nfo r plutonium ^g f abou t 10- 8 , base donth e estimate dreleas e quantit y compare dt o th e y -aantit y

involve di nth e fire.* * = - Tabl e 7 list s othe r accident s involvin g uraniu m fue l fabrication , bu t
no t including UF 6 releases , fires , o r exposion s whic hwer e liste dpreviously . Thes e accident s i nTabl e 7 al l involve dventilatio nsystems . Non e o f th e accident s liste di nTabl e 7 cause dan y offsit e dose s approachin g th e 1 re m lowe r limi t o f th e protectiv e actio nguides . •Surfac e contaminatio nlevel s fo r uraniu m allowabl e onequipmen t t o b e release dfo r unrestricte dus e ar e average : 500 0 dp m alpha/lOO^cm* , maximum : 15,00 0 dp

m alpha/10 0 cm 2 , andremovable : 100 0 dp m jilpha/10 0 cm2
. - Thes e
" value s ar e foundi nRegulator y Guid e 1.86 , "Terminatio no f Operatin g License s fo r Nuclea r Reactors, " and"Guideline s fo r Decontaminatio no f Facilitie s an d Equipmen t Prio r t o Releas e fo r Unrestricte dUs e o r Terminatio no f License s for Byproduct , Source , o r Specia l Nuclea r Material, " USNRC , July , 1982 . **H . K . Elder , "Technology , Safet y an dCost s o f Decommissionin g Referenc e Nuclea r Fue l Cycl e andNon-fue l Cycl e Facilitie s Followin g Postulate d Accidents, " NUREG/CR-3293 , pag e 3.3 , 1985 .



### 4 1Tabl e 6 . Fire s an d Explosion s Involvin g Uraniu

m an d Thoriu

m

Dat e Facilit

y Releas e Descriptio n 6-27-4 9

6-12-5 3 Los Alamo s

Laboratory , N

M

10-29-5 2 Truc k i

nKansa s City , M O

12-9-5 2 AEC facilit y Non

e reporte

d

Considerabl e

U.S . Non e

Onsit e contamina tio nu p to 15,00 0 dpm/10 0 cm2
. 8-20-5 6

9-21-5 6

6-23-5 8

9-26-6 0

9-20-63 .

6-29-6 7

9^2-7 2

3-12-8 1 AEC contractor

Truc k i nDetroit , M I

AE C contractor Attleboro , M

A

M&C Nuclear Attleboro , M

A Controls , Inc . Attleboro , M

A

Kerr-McGe e Crescent , O

K Unite d Nuclear Fue l fabricatio

n facilit y
Nuclear Metal s Concord , M

A 100,00 0 dpm /

10 0 cm2 onsite . 50 0 dpm/10 0 cm 2 offsite . Non e

N o materia l los s
Enriche d U n o exposures . Non e detecte d

Minor
Uraniu m a t 1 5 time s MP C

Minor inplant contaminatio

n Fire broke ou t i na dru m containin

g uraniu

m meta l turnings. i Truc k carryin

g uraniu

m meta l burned . Uraniu m ignite d and . muc

hwa s lost . Moltenuraniu

m meta l wa s bein g cas t i

na vacuum . Spil l rupture

d vacuum . Uranium-the

nburned . Explosio

no f powdere

d uraniu m an d CC1 4 " i

n glovebox . Thoriu m explosio

n

Dru m containin

g thoriu

m • - meta l starte

d t o burn . N o contamination . N o exposures , y

"'-..• . Fire i nslightly

. .yenriche d uraniu

m scra p inperchloroethylene . ••-.. - Magnesiu

m explosio

ni n vacuu m inductio

nfurnace . Fire i nfilte r bo x. exhaustin

g enriche

d uranium . N

o contaminatio

n o nor offsite . - - - ''".. . Explosio

ni nio nexchang e column . - '"•-'-' ' Flas hfire caused b y organi c contaminant s i n ductworks . Considerabl e . damage . Fire i nscrap-packagin

g . buildin g fro m spontaneou s combustio

no f 1 0 lb

s o f uraniu m turnings . N

o overexposures .Tabl e 7 . Othe r Accidenta l Release s fro m Uraniu m Fue l Fabricatio nPlant s (UF 6 releases , fires , andexplosion s excluded )

Dat e Facilit y Releas e Acciden t descriptio n .4-2-7 1

2-28-7 3

8-24-7 3

9-6-7 4

1-24-7 5

1-7 9 Babcoc k an dWilco x

ResearchFaci1it y Lynchburg , V

A

Genera l Electric , Wilmington , NC 1 0 Microcuri e i n plan t

Below MP C

Babcoc k and-W-i'lco

x.Decontaminatio n Apollo , P

A " require do nand

offsite . Releas e •_-'••' • wa s 6. 3 microcuries . 12-8-7 3 Babcoc k andWilco xOffsit e releas e o f

Apollo , P

A

Westirighous e Columbia , S C natura l uran i ur n 4 time s MPC . Offsit e decontam i nat i o n required . UO ,

Babcoc k andWilco xEnriche duraniu m Apollo , PA
Genera l Electric , 6 2 K g o f lo w Wilmington , NC enriche dU0 2 powde r stolen . Contaminatio noutsid e a ho t cel l du e t o a plu g be i n g i hstal1e d w i thou t a sealin g bellows . HEP A filte r failed .
Enriche duraniu

m release d whe ncorrode dscrubbe r spra y nozzl e di dno t provid e enoug hscrubbing. " Inadequat e ventilatio n o f caieine r allowe d uraniu m t o escap e throug hcanopy

exhaust .

Lea k i na roughin g filte r allowe d U0 2 powe r t o b e discharge ddirectl y t o th e air . Malfunctio no f scrubber / ventilatio nsystem . Two can s o f powde r stole n anduse dinextortio n attempt . Thie f arrested , convicte dandimprisoned . Powder recovered .



### 43

### 2.2.5. 2 Theoretica l Calculation s o f Release s

Criticalit y

accidents , UF 6 

### releases , fires , explosions , andtornadoe s hav e bee nconsidere dinvariou s analyse s o f accident s ina fue l fabricatio n plant . Th e mos t seriou s accident s appea r t o b e criticalitie s an dUF 6 

### releases . Thus , w e conside r thos e accident s here . Criticalit y

Accident : th e NRC staf f ha s develope da se t o f assumption s o nth e releas e o f radioactiv e fissio nproduct s fro m a criticalit y

acciden t occurrin g i na solution . Th e assumption s ar e published.i nRegulator y Guid e 3.34 , "Assumption s Use dfo r Evaluatin g th e Potentia l Radiologica l Consequence s o f Accidenta l Nuclear-Criticalit y i na Uraniu

m Fue l Fabricatio nPlant, " Jul y 1979 . '" Regulator y

Guid e 3.3 4 assume s a criticalit y excursio noccur s i na vente d vesse l o f unfavorabl e geometr y containin g a solutio no f 40 0 g/ 1 o f uraniu m enriche di nU-235 . Th e excursio nproduce s aninitia l burs t o f 10 1 8 

### fission s i n0- 5 secondfollowe dsuccessivel y a t 1 0 minut e interval s b y 4 7 burst s o f -1. 9 x10 17



### _fission s "eac hfo r a tota l o f 10 1 9 

### fission s i n8 hours . Th e excursio n i s assume dt o be-term i hate db y evaporatio no f 10 0 liter s o f th e solution . Th e amounts , o f radioactiv e material s assume dt o b e release dfro m .th e solutio n vesse l t o th e roo

m ai r ar e give ni nTabl e 8 . Regulator y

Guid e 3.3 4 allow s credi t fo r remova l o f fissio nproduct s b y filter s i nth e ventilatio nsystem . I norde r t o escap e t o th e environmen t th e ^ roo m ai r mus t pas s throug ha filte r syste m b y mean s o f th e buildin g ventilatio n system . Eve ni f door s ar e opene dth e ventilatio nsyste m shoul dexhaus t th e fissio nproduct s throug h_th e filters . I nthi s analysi s th e filter s ar e assume d t o remov e 75 % o f th e iodin e bu t non e of-th e iner t gases . Thi s analysi s assume d th e ventilation-system operate s a t 5 ai r change s pe r hour . Th e NR C staf f ha s recentl y analyze dth e potentia l consequence s assumin g a . criticalit y

acciden t fo r Exxo nNuclea r i nRichland , Washington,*"Combustio n Engineerin g i nHematite , Missouri,* * an dNuclea r Fue l Service s i nErwin , *"Environmenta l Impac t Appraisal , Exxo nNuclea r Company , Nuclea r Fue l Fabricatio nPlant , Richland , Washington, " Docke t 70-1257 , NR C Offic e o f Nuclea r Materia l Safet y andSafeguards , August , 1981 . **"Environmenta l Assessment , Combustio nEngineering , Inc. , Nuclea r Fue l Fabricatio nPlant , Hematite , Missouri, " Docke t 70-36 , NR C Offic e o f Nuclea r Materia l Safet y andSafeguards , November , 1982 .

4 4P.5 6



### Tabl e 8 . Amount s o f Radioactiv e Material s Release d

t o Roo m Ai r Du e t o a Criticalit y Acciden t (IO 1 8 

### fission s initiall y an d1. 9 xIO 1 7 

### fission s ever y

1 0 minute s fo r 8 hours )

.. .
Radionuclid e
Kr-83 m Kr-85 m Kr-8 7 Kr-8 8 Kr-8 9
Xe-13 3
. " ' " Xe-135 m" Xe-13 5 Xe-13 7 Xe-13' 8
1-13 1 1-13 2 1-13 3 1-13 4 I-135

_ - -

_; Half-lif e i n hour s r 

### 1. 8 4. 5 1.2 7 v 2. 8 0.0 5
125
.

- = 0.2 6 •

_ 

### 9, 1 0.0 6 0^2 4
192 , 

### 2. 3 21
.

. 0._8 8 6.6 " Radioactivit y

•0-0.-5-.h r 

### 2 2 2 1 

### 14 0 9 1 590 0 " 

### 4 31 0

: 5 0 690 0 180 0 

### 0. 3 3 8 

### 5. 5

- 16 0 

### 1 7 i n Curie s

0.5- 8 h r 

### 14 0 .13 0 

### 85 0

. 56 0 36,00 0 

### 2 3 190 0 

### 31 0 42,00 0 11,00 0
1: 9 

### 24 0 3 5 

### 98 0 10 0 

### Source: . Regulator y

Guid e 3.34 , Tabl e 1 , July , 1979 . """..- • Th e value s fo r radioiodine s i nTable.lo f : th e guid e wer e reduce db y a facto r o f 4 t o ••••- accoun t fo r retentio ni nth e solutio nwater .
Tennessee. * Ineac h_cas e th e radionuclid e release s fro m Regulator y

Guid e 3.3 4 wer e used . - y_ Low-enriche dUF fi 

### r " Th e Exxon , arid-CombustionEngineerin g analyses* * als o considere drelease s o f UF 6 

### , a s di da recen t analysi s fo r th e Genera l Electri c fue l fabricatio nplan t i nWilmington , Nort hCarolina. t Th e worst-cas e acciden t i nth e Exxo nan

dCombustio nEngineerin g analyse s wa s assume dt o involv e th e -releas e o f UF 6 

### a s migh t occu r fro m valv e o r lin e failur e o f a heate dcylinde r bein g unloaded . Assumin g tha t a ful l cylinde r o f UF 6 

### (250 0 kg ) a t elevate d
^"propose dNew

Emergenc y

Preparednes s Licens e Condition s a t NFS-Erwin, " NR C Commissio nPape r SECY-82-311 , Jul y 23 , 1982 . **0p . cit . t"Environmenta l Impac t Appraisal , Genera l Electri c Company , Wilmingto n Manufacturin g Department, " Offic e o f Nuclea r Materia l Safet y andSafeguards, " NUREG-1078 , June , 1984 , pag e 69 .
4 5temperatur e starte dt o lea k an dtha t no additiona l hea t wa s supplie d afte r cylinde r failure , th e NR C staf f estimate dtha t abou t 2 2 percen t o f th e materia l woul db e release dbefor e th e UF 6 woul db e coo l enoug ht o solidif y andhav e a vapo r pressur e lo

w enoujg hs o tha t th e releas e woul dstop . Th e NR C staf f esti mate dtha t suc ha releas e woul dlas t fo r 1 5 minutes, , and ,54 0 k g o f UF 6 woul d b e released . Thi s ha s a uraniu m conten t o f 36 0 kg . Th e staf f assume dthe . uraniu m release dwoul dreac t wit hwate r i nth e ai r andfor m highl y solubl e U0 2 F 2 o f a respirabl e particl e size . High-enriche dUF B : I nevaluatin g th e nee dfo r offsit e emergenc y prepared nes s a t Nuclea r Fue l Services , Erwin , Tennessee , th e NR C staf f conclude dthat , th e UF 6 acciden t t o b e considered-wa s releas e fro m a 15-k g cylinde r containin g hig henriche duranium. * Thi s i s larges t cylinde r use da t th e sit e fo r highl y enriche dUF 6 . A

nacciden t i n196 2 breache don e cylinder . O f th e 15-k g contents , 6 kg wa s recovered'bu t 9 k g wa s no t recovered.an d presumabl y muc ho f th e materia l escape dfro m th e plant .

2.2.5. 3 Calculation s o f Dose s '

_.
Potentia l radiatio ndose s du e t o criticalit y accident s andUF 6 release s previousl y

calculate db

y th e NR C staf f fo r Combustio nEngineering , Exxon , and Nuclea r Fue l Service s ar e summarize di nTabl e 9 . Criticalit y

accident : T o calculat e th e dos e du e t o a criticalit y accident , th e Exxo nanalysi s assume da win dspee do f 1 m/sec , atmospheri c stabilit y clas s F , anda buildin g wak e facto r o f 1. 0 beyond50 0 meter s (i.e . n o buildin g wak e assumed) . Th e buildin g ventilatio nrat e is.assume d t o be 3 0 ai r changes/hr . Th e whol e body

dose s wer e calculate d t o B e 0.00 4 re m a t 360 0 m

(th e neares t residence ) and0.00 9 re m a t 200 0 m

(th e neares t industria l site) . Th e dose s t o th e thyroi dwer e calculate dt o be 1. 7 re m a t 360 0 m

an d4. 5 re

m a t 200 0 m . I f on e assume donl y 25 % o f th e iodine s woul dpas s throug hth e filte r system, . th e thyroi ddose s woul db e 0. 4 re m a t 360 0 m

and1. 1 re

m a t 200 0 m . Th e NR C analysi s fo r th e Combustio nEngineerin g plan t mad e simila r assump tions . Th e whol e bod y dos e a t th e neares t residenc e (80 0 m ) woul d b e 0.2 7 rem . Th e thyroi ddos e a t 80 0 m woul db e 1. 7 rem . I f th e filter s reduce dth e iodin e concentration s b

y 75% , th e thyroi ddos e woul db e 0. 4 rem .
*"Propose d Ne w

Emergenc y

Preparednes s Licens e Condition s a t NFS-Erwin, " NR C Commissio nPape r SECY-82-311 , Jul y 23 , 1982 .
4 6Tabl e 9 . Offsit e Dose s Calculate dfo r Fue l Fabricatio nPlant s

Analysi s Key

Assumption s Criticalit y UF 6 -lo w enrich . Effectiv e D E Thyroi dD E Effectiv e D E Bon e D E UF 6 -hig henrich . Effectiv e D E NUREG-114 0

Combustio n Engineerin g

Exxo n

NFS , Erwi n Buildin g size : 25 0 m 2

Wind : F , 1 m/se c Releas e height : groun d

Buildin g size : 0 Wind : F , 1 m/se c Releas e height : stac k Buildin g size : 0 Wind : F , lm/se c Releas e height : groun d Buildin g size : 0 , , Wind : G , 0. 5 m/se c Releas e height : same leve l a s residenc e 0. 5 t o 2. 6 rem s a t 10 0 m

0.2 7 re m a t 80 0 m

0.00 9 re

m a t 200 0 m ' 1. 1 t o

8. 2 rem s a t 10 0 m .(child' s thyroid ) 1. 7 rem s a t 80 0 m

4. 5 rem s a! t 200 0 m

5 rem s a t 100 0 m 0.0 5 re m a t 800 , m

0.1 1 re m a t 200 0 m 0.8 2 re m a t 80 0 m

1 . 7 reiji s a t 200 0 m 0. 2 t o

1. 5 re m a t 10 0 m

- 1 re m a t 100 0 mThi s analysi s calculate d a neffectiv

e dos e equivalen t du e t o th e airborne releas e fro

m a criticalit

y a s 0. 5 t o 2. 6 re

m a t 10 0 m . Th

e dos e fro

m promp t gamma s an

d neutron s fro

m excursion s after th e firs t on

e shoul d b

e adde d to tha t dose , but thos e dose s hav e not ye t bee

ncalculated . [ W e calculate

d th e thyroi d dos e to a chil d du e to th e radioiodin

e releas. e fro m a criticality

accident , to b

e 1. 1 to 8. 2 rem

s at 10 0 m . Low-enriche

d UF B : Fo

r th e UF 6 release , th

e Exxo nplan t analysi s assumed
a groun d leve l releas e an

d calculate

d a dos e to th

e bon e o f 1. 7 re

m at 200 0 m . Th e whol e bod

y dos e wa s calculate d t o b e 0.1 1 rem . I

nth e analysi s th

e NR C staf f publishe

d for th

e Combustio

nEngineerin

g plant , th

e releas e wa s assumed t o b e throug

ha stack . Th

e bon e dos e wa s calculate d to b e 0.8 2 re

m at 80 0 m . Th e whol e bod

y dos e wa s calculate d t o b e 0.0 5 rem. " For purpose s o f thi s Regulator y Analysi s uraniu

m intake s an

d H F concentra tion s hav

e bee ncalculated . Radiatio ndose s wer e not calculate d sinc e the

y are
o f lesser concern . The releas e wa s assume d t o b e 54 0 k g o f UF

6 i a t groun

d level . Th e uraniu m conten t -i

s 364 " kg . Atmospheri c dispersio nvalue s fro

m Figur e 1 wer e used . Uraniu m intake s are show

nbelo w fo r groun d leve l releases . Buoyan t release s
ar e no t calculate

d becaus e ther e ma

y not b e enoug hmateria l t o creat e buoyancy .
Uraniu m intake s du

e t o a groun

d leve l releas e o f 54 0 k g o f UF 6

Distanc e (meters ) 

### 10 0 20 0 30 0 40 0 50 0 100 0 150 0 200 0 500 0 Uraniu

m
F , 1 m/ s 

### 32 0 15 0 9 0 4 2 2 4 1 4 6 4 0. 5 intak

e (mg )

- D ^ 4. 5 m/ s 

### 4 3 16 9 3 2. 2 1. 4 0. 8 0. 5 0. 1

High-enriched UF R : For th e Nuclear Fue l Service s Plant , th e NR C staf f previousl y

calculate

d th e effectiv

e dos e equivalen t a t 100 0 m du e t o th e releas e o f 1 5 k

g o f UF 6 , high-enriched , t o b e 1 rem . For a 9 k g releas e o f hig henriche

d uranium , w

e calculate

d a neffectiv

e dos e equivalen t o f 0. 2 t o

4 81. 5 rem s a t 10 0 m , a uraniu m intak e o f 0. 3 to 2. 6 mg , an d exposur e t

o H F a t a concentratio

no f 1. 0 to 7. 8 mg/m 3
. A buildin

g siz e o f 1 0 m

x2 5 m , neutra l buoyanc y fo r th e plume , groun

d leve l release , 5-minut e releas e deration , 1.5 % U-23 4 with , solubility Clas s D fo

r uraniu

m an d F , 1 m/ s an

d D , 4. 5 m/ s meteorology "
wer e th e assumptions . ..."' .

2.2.5. 4 Implication s fo r Emergenc

y Preparednes s

Th e implication s o f criticality accident s an

d UF 6 release s are discussed separatel y

below . - -. - _'_". . Criticality

accident : Usingwha t are believed t o b e reasonabl e assump - .. . tions , at 10 0 m

effectiv

e dos e equivalent s o f 0. 5 t o 2. 6 rem s fo r F , 1 m/ s _and

D , 4. 5 m/s-meteorologie s wer e calculate d compare

d to . a 1 t o 5 re

m protectiv

e actio nguide . A

child' s thyroi d dos e o f 1. 1 t o 8. 2 rem s wa s calculate

d compare

d to a 5 t o 2 5 re

m protectiv

e actio nguide . Th

e calculated dose s excee d th e lowe r
en d o f th e rang e wher e protectiv

e action s shoul d b

e considered out t o abou t 20 0 t o 250 " m . "_ - " y~ . Low-enriche

d UF fi release : For th

e releas e o f 54 0 k

g o f lowTenriched . UF 6 , letha l intake s (24 2 mg ) offsit e d o not see

m plausible . -Intake s sufficien t t o caus e permanen t kidne y injur y (4 5 mg ) ar

e calculate

d for advers e meteorolog y wit hnot buoyanc

y to about 50 0 meters , althoug hconsideratio

no f buoyanc

y migh t easil y eliminat e calculate d permanen t injur

y under an

y conditions . Transien t kidne y injur y might occu

r to 10 0 meter s under wors e cas e meteorolog y an d to perhap s about 30 0 meter s under mor e typica l meteorology . Ther e would.be-n o observabl e effect s a t 40 0 meter s fo r typica l meteorology * Therefore , i nkeep-

_ in g wit hth

e Commission' s polic y o nnuclear powe r plan t emergenc y preparedness , avoidin g fatalitie s an

d seriou s healtheffect s for wors t cas e an d protectiv

e actio nguide dose s for mor e probabl e events , a respons e distanc e o f roughl y 40 0 meter s i s recommended . High-enriche

d UF B : Fo

r th e releas e o f 9 k

g o f high-enriched UF 6 durin g F , 1 m/ s meteorology , th e dos e at 10 0 m

i s 1. 5 rem

s effectiv

e dos e equivalen t
an d th e uraniu

m intak e i s 5 mg . Fo

r D , 4. 5 m/ s meteorolog y th e dos e a t 10 0 m i s 0. 2 re

m an d th e uraniu

m intak e i s 0. 7 mg . Buoyanc y i s no t considere

d i n eithe r cas e sinc e th e quantity

o f materia l i s so small . Protectio naction s t o reduc e dos e ma

y be appropriat e durin g F , 1 m/ s meteorolog y t o a distanc e
o f 15 0 m .



### 4 9

### T P.6 1

2.2. 6 Fue l Fabricatio n- Plutoniu m

There i s currentl y n o plutoniu

m fue l fabricatio nbein g don e i nth e U.S. , bu t accident s fo r facilitie s fabricatin g plutoniu m fue l hav e bee nanalyze d i n NUREG-0002 , "Fina l Generi c Environmenta l Statemen t o nth e Us e o f Recycl e Plutoniu

m i nMixe d Oxid e Fue l i nLigh t Wate r Coole d Reactors, " 1976 , usually , called : "GESMO. " Becaus e o f th e qualit y ari d thoroughnes s o f tha t report , w e wil l directl y

quot e relevan t section s fo r thi s analysis *

2.2.6. 1 Accident-History *

" A summary , o f operationa l accident s i nU.S . Governmen t facilities , fro m 194 3 t o 1970 , i s give ni nWASH-1192 . Fo r som e facilitie s an

d operation s havin g
a general"resemblanc e t o the variou s mixe d oxid e fue l cycl e step s (i nth e area s
o f fuel-reprocessing , fue l fabrication , an d scra p recovery ) ther e hav e been: a numbe r o f accidents . Thos e whic hinvolve d th e possibilit y o f environmenta l -releas e include , tbe following : -• • =

Fiv e solutio ncriticalit y event s (1958— 2 events ; on e eac hi n1959 , 1961 , y and-1-962 ) inreprocessin g o r recover y operation s involvin g highl y enriche d uranium

o r plutonium . Al l wer e o f smal l consequenc e i nterm s o f propert y damage o r release s o f radioactivit y t o th e environment , bu t on e fatalit y
an d severa l hig hradiatio nexposure s occurre d amon g operatin g personnel .

Chemical - explosio ninevaporato r (.1953) , relate d t o fue l reprocessing .
Explosio nan

d fir e inplutoniu m purificatio nfacilit y (1963) .

Metalli c fue l fir e (reactiv e metal ) i nproces s dissolve r (1960) , relate d t o fue l reprocessing . ;

Spontaneou s fir e inradioactivel y contaminated , combustibl e wast e (1951) .

*Fro m GESMO , page s 11-4 5 t o 11-48 . Th e reference s give ninGESM O ar e no t include d her e t o save space . Th e reade r wantin g the reference s shoul d refe r t o th e origina l GESMO .


### 5 0P.6 2

Tw o fire s at th

e Rock y Flat s plutoniu

m fabricatio

nan d recover

y facility , (1957 ) an

d (1969) . Th

e 196 9 fire cause

d $4 5 millio

ni nproperty

damage . Bot hfire s ar

e attributabl e to spontaneou s ignitio no f plutoniu

m meta l whic hi s no t involve

d i nth e mixe d oxid e fuel cycle .

Fire aroun

d a nanio nexchange column , fue l reprocessin g plant . (1964) .

"Som e o f thes e accident s occurre d durin g th e early year s o f operation s Wit hne w facilitie s an

d newly develope

d technologies . Al l wer e investigate d
an d correctiv

e action s wer e take n(e.g. , desig

nchanges ) t o make th e event s unlikel y o f recurrence. - Suc hcorrectiv

e action s hav

e bee ncarrie

d forward , wher e applicable , into desig npractice s fo

r ne w facilities , bothgovernmen t
an d commercial . Durin g th e pas t decade , criticalit y accident s hav

e disappeared fro m th e acciden t scene , an d fir e o r explosio

ninvolvin

g reactiv

e metal s ha s becom e th e predominan t major acciden t i ngovernmen t facilities .

"O na comparabl e basis , acciden t experienc e i ncommercia l facilitie s to dat e include : ' ~

A solutio

ncriticalit

y acciden t i

nrecover

y operation s involvin g highl y enriche d uranium , fata l t o operator (1964) .
A A serie s o f dissolver "fires " (reactiv e metal) , fue l reprocessin g plan t (1967-1968) .
Fina l HEP

A filter ban

k failure (inadequat e mechanica l support) , fue l reprocessin

g plant (1968) .

Fire i nplutoniu

m contaminate

d wastes , fue l fabricatio nfacility

{1973) . Ther e wa s n

o detectabl e releas e o f plutoniu m t o th e environment .
Explosio

ni nplutoniu

m glovebox , fue l fabricatio nfacilit

y (1972) . 5. 6 uC i o f alph

a activit

y wa s release

d vi a th

e stack . Abou t



### 5 1

### "Th e measure dan destimate dquantitie s o f long-live dalph a activit y release dfro

m th e Rocky

Flat s plan t durin g it s firs t 2 0 year s o f operatio nar e summarize di nTabl e 11-12... .
"Th e specifi c an

dextensiv e modification s mad e t o al l plutoniu m handling facilitie s a t Rocky

Flat s subsequen t t o th e 195 7 fir e (especiall y th e substitu tio no f "flam

e resistan t filter s fo r thos e formerl y used , an

dth e additio no f fir e protectio ni nth e filte r bank s andplenums ) wer e clearl y responsibl e fo r th e vastl y

improve dcontainmen t o f alph a activit y durin g th e 196 9 fire . Th e new plutoniu

m recover y

facilit y

no w unde r constructio na t Rocky Flat s (as . a replacemen t fo r olde r facilities ) i s bein g buil t unde r criteri a tha t shoul d provid e eve ngreate r assuranc e tha t th e facilit y wil l b e abl e t o confin e plu toniu m release s t o exceedingl y smal l values , eve nunde r sever e abnorma l circum stances — includin g natura l events" , suc ha s tornados. "

z . "Tabl e 11-1 2

" LONG-LIVE D ALPHA

ACTIVIT YRELEASE D FRO M ROCKY.FLAT S
Dat e C i rcumstance s Quant i t y 1958-196 8

195 7

196 9

1953-197 0 Leakag e of . P ucontaminate dmachin e oi l

store da t the . Rocky

Flat s sit e Fir e i nBldg . 77 1 resultin g i nmajo r damag e t o fi' i te r system Fir e in.Bldg . 776 .

Norma l effluen t release s (cumulative ) 5. 3 C i t o soi l a t dru m storag e are a 6 0 uCi , airborne , mostl y durin g fir e 0. 2 uCi , airborne , ove r 6-day

perio d durin g andafte r fir e
< 4 1 uCi , airborn e 9 1 uCi , liqui d effluent s

5 2P.6 4

2.2.6. 2 Acciden t Sourc e Term *

" A wid e spectru

m o f credibl e accident s fo r thes e plant s ha s bee nanalyze d

an d thei r potentia l consequence s estimated .

"Som e incidents , suc ha s puncture s o r tear s o f glove s o r othe r glovebo x malfunctions , ar e expecte d t o occu r a s par t o f the norma l operation . Othe r
mor e seriou s accidents—suc ha s glovebo xwindo w breakage—wil l occu r fa r les s often , althoug hth e offsit e consequence s fro m suc haccident s ar e judge d t o b e insignificant , the y ar e include d inth e estimat e o f airborn e effluent s result in g fro m norma l operations . Uppe r limi t accident s tha t ma y occu r includ e a . criticalit y

incident , a

nexplosion , o r a fire... .

Criticalit y

"Ther e hav e bee nn o criticalit y

accident s t o dat e i nproces s operation s wher e undermoderatio ni s a primar y metho d o f control , an d fe w in-aqueou s o r moderate d systems . The numbe r o f fission s has-bee nestimate d t o b e IO 1 8 i na n accidenta l criticality . I ncalculatin g th e effects , i t i s assume d tha t al l o f th e nobl e gase s krypto nan d xeno nan

d 25 % o f th e iodin e forme d b y th e fission s woul d escape . I naddition , i t i s assume d tha t 50 0 gram s o f P u woul d becom e air born e i na glovebo xb y the accidenta l criticalit y excursion . The ventilatio n filter s ar e assume d t o remai nintac t becaus e a criticalit y i s no t anexplosiv e process . The decontaminatio nfacto r o f thre e HEP A filter s i nserie s ha s bee n
assume d t o b e 2 xIO 7 , lowe r b y a facto r o f 5 0 tha ntb e decontaminatio nfacto r
assume d fo r norma l operatin g conditions . [P u releas e = 0.2 9 uC i alpha ] Calcu lation s show-tha t th e maximu m offsit e individua l dos e commitmen t result s fro m absorptio no f fissio nproduc t iodin e i nthe thyroi d an d amount s t o 36 0 mrem . Thi s i s comparabl e t o the dos e t o the closes t theoretica l residen t fro m a cri ticalit y

acciden t at. a U0 2 fabricatio nplant . Th e slightl y differen t fissio n produc t yiel d an

d th e presenc e o f smal l amount s o f plutoniu m particulat e d o no t significantl y

alte r th e effect s o f a Pu0 2 criticalit y acciden t relativ e t o thos e o f a U0 2 criticalit y accident .

'Fro m GESMO , page s I

V D-3 7 t o I

V D-39 .



### 5 3• H

Fire

"Unlik

e a criticality

excursio

nor a nexplosion , a fire usuall y i s no t
a ninstantaneou s event an d very(ofte

nstart s fro

m a smal l flam

e source . Th

e design , construction , an d operationo f fue l fabricatio nplant s consider s in detail , th

e possibility

o f a fir

e an d equipment an

d procedure s fo

r fire preven tion . Regulator

y Guide 3.16.-present s method s acceptabl e t o th e NR C for a fir e protectio

nprogra

m tha t shoul d prevent , detect , extinguish , limit , o r contro l fire s an

d explosion s an

d thei r hazard s an

d damagin

g effects . Licensee s mus t operat e witbi nthes e or acceptabl e equivalent constraints . Unde r thes e condi tions , th

e probabilit y

o f a fire o f th

e magnitude considere d i nthi s statemen t i s considere

d highl y

unlikely . I

ngeneral , operator s have-tim e to reac t t o an

d extinguis hsmal l fires . The.proces s materials , oxide s o f uraniu m an d plutonium , ar e not themselve s flammable . Th e fina l filter s ar

e protecte

d agains t fir e b

y wate r spra

y system s installe

d i nth e duc t some , distanc e upstrea m o f th e fina l • filters . Mis t deflector s o r collector s are installe d betwee

nth e wate r spra

y syste m an d th e filter s to remov

e larg e drop s o f water . Th e wate r fro

m th e sprays collect s i

nth e botto m o f th e ductsan d flow

s to a fire-wate r collectio ntank . Thi s tan

k i s eithe r a

" safe-geometr

y tan k or a fixed-poison-controlle d tan k t o preclud e th e possibility

o f a criticalit

y acciden t as a resul t o f a fire .

"Th e fina l HEP

A filter s ar

e locate

d som e distanc e fro

m th e gloveboxes . Thi s separatio

ndistanc e an

d th e wate r spra

y syste m shoul d b

e sufficien t t o protec t th

e filter s agains t th e effect s o f an " explosio no r fire , bu

t th e fir e
o r explosio

ni s assume

d to destro

y th e loca l filter s on " th e gloveboxes . Plutoniu

m an d uraniu

m oxide s reac

hth e fina l filters" . Base d o na nassume

d
roo m volum e o f 1,00 0 m 3 an

d a nai r loadingo f 10 0 mg/m 3 fo r plutoniu

m oxide particulate , 10 0 gram s o f plutoniu

m woul d reac

hth e filters. . Eac

ho f th e filter s i s expecte

d t o remove.99.9 % of th e particulat e reachin g it , so tha t
a tota l o f 0. 1 m

g o f P u passe s throug

hth e filters . [5 3 uC i alpha ]



### 5 4Explosio n

"A nexplosio

nmight occu

r i na mixe

d oxid e fuel fabricatio

nplant at loca tion s wher e a

nexplosiv

e mixtur e o f vapor s i nai r $oul d b

e present . Ther e i s a potentia l fo

r th e existenc e o f combustibl e gase s at th e sinterin

g furnanc e an

d i nth e clea nscra p reductio

noperation . I

naddition , flammabl e solvent s are
use d i nth e dirt y scra p recycl e operatio

nan d ma y b e use d fo r cleanin

g fue l rod s
.an d during'cleanu

p an d maintenanc e operations . Thes e operation s are essentiall y th e only one s tha t hav

e a potentia l fo

r supportin

g a nexplosion.... .

"Th e consequence s o f anexplosio nare similar to thos e o f a fire . Th e
amount o f plutoniu

m reachin

g o r passin

g throug

hth e filter s i s estimate d t o b e th e sam e a s tha t estimate

d fo r th e fire [5 3 uC i alpha ] an d woul d hav

e th e sam

e relativel y

minor offsit e consequences. " [En d o f quote ]

2.2.6. 3 Calculations ] o f Dose s

Fo r th e accidenta l release s above , GESM O assume

d th e neares t residen t wa s
a t 50 0 m . GESM

O use d a chi/ Q o f 1. 3 x10- 4 fo r Pasquil ! Stability Categor

y D , win d spee d 3 m/s , an

d 1 0 mete r releas e height . GESM O assume

d th e plutoniu

m t o b e soluble . Th e followin

g dos e commitment s wer e calculate d for GESMO :
Typ e o f acciden t Dos e commitment (rem ) Criticality

0.3 6 (thyroid ) _. . - Fire 0.0 2 (bpne)

_ Explosio

n0.0 2 (bone )

Usin g th e standar

d assumption s i

nthi s Regulator

y Analysis , dose s woul d b e slightly

higher tha

nthos e i

nGESMO .

2.2.6. 4 Implication s fo r Emergenc

y Preparednes s 1

Th e GESM O analysi s conclude d tha t th

e desig no f plutoniu

m fue l fabricatio

n plant s i s adequat e to prevent release s tha t woul d caus e dose s exceedin g protec tiv e actio nguides . Thu s specia l emergenc y preparednes s woul d not b e neede d offsite .



### 5 5I naddition , GESM

O (pag e 11-10 ) conclude

d ther e wa s littl e threa t fro m th e ingestio

npathway .

" A stud y o f indigenou s an

d experimenta l animal s kep t fo r long l period s i

n
area s heavily

contaminate

d withplutoniu

m indicate s tha t direc t uptake o f plu toniu m wa s small . Plutoniu m uptak e b y plant s fro

m soi l an

d growthmedia , ha s bee ninvestigate

d i nth e field an

d i nth e laborator

y unde r a variety

o f condi tions . Th

e concentratio

no f plutoniu

m i nplant s o

na dr y weigh t basi s wa s neve r
mor e tha

non e thousandtho f tha t i nth e growthmedium , an d only abou t on

e te n thousandtho f tha t i nth e soil . Th

e fractio

no f availabl e plutoniu m absorbe

d fro m th e gastrointestina l trac t of-animal s grazin g o ncontaminate

d vegetatio

n i s les s tha

non e te nthousandthth

e tota l intak

e o f th e elemen t and : measurement s
o f plutoniu

m transfe r fro

m th e bloo d strea m t o mil k sugges t a furthe r reductio n inplutoniu

m concentratio

nb y anothe r factor o f a t leas t 10 . Consumptio no f anima l product s b

y ma nwil l introduc e anothe r reductio nfactor o f a t leas t 10- 4 i nth e plutoniu

m concentratio

nenterin

g th e systemi c circulation , excep t i nth e
ver y youn g infant wher e th

e factor ma

y approac h0.01 . = I t appears , therefore , tha t th e possibility

o f transfe r o f plutoniu m fro m soi l t o ma

nb y wa y o f th e foo d chai ni s negligible. " ~ . -

2.2. 7 Spent Fue l Storage *

Spent nuclear powe r plant fue l ma y b e store d i npool s o f water , in . dr y storage casks , i

ndrywells , or dr

y vaul t storage. . Eac ho f thes e method s i s discussed i

nthi s section . ' - - • , v . - -

*Sourc e term

s i nthi s sectio

nwer e develope

d wit hth

e assistanc e o f Frit z Sturz , Advanced Fue l an

d Spent Fue l Licensin g Branch , Offic e o f Nuclea r Material s Safet y an d Safeguards , NRC .



### 56P.6 8

2.2.7. 1 Acciden t Histor y

Ther e hav e bee nno accident s associate dwit hspen t fue l storag e tha t hav e had . any significanc e fo r offsit e radiatio nexposure . Radioactiv e materia l ha s escape dt o storag e poo l wate r whe ncask s containin g damage dfue l element s wer e opened . However , thes e event s hav e n o significanc e fo r offsit e emergenc y preparedness .

2.2.7. 2 Acciden t Sourc e Term

Poo l storage : Poo l storag e fo r spen t fue l storag e i npools , possibl e accident s andtheir effect s ar e discusse d ina generi c environmenta l impac t .. . statement , NUREG-0575. * -

Th e accident s considere dare :

1 . Th e rupturin g of-fue l pin s du e t o th f dro po f a"fuel.assembl y

_ " - .2 . A

tornad o drive nutilit y pol e strike s th e poo l at-th e worst-possibl e anglean druptures- a 4 5 foo t ro w o f assemblie s -3 . Fire s an

dexplosion s 4 . A criticality . acciden t 5 . Hig hradioactivit y inth e poo l water 6 . Ruptur e o f a wast e tan k o r pipin g -7 — - 7 . Lowerin g o f th e wate r leve l i nth e poo l ^ ; 8 . Los s o f th e abilit y t o coo l th e poo l wate r - _- . -

O f thes e accidents , th e generi c environmenta l impac t statemen t fo r poo l storag e estimate dtha t th e mos t seriou s o f thes e accident s i s th e ruptur e o f
a larg e numbe r o f fue l assemblies - b y a tornado-drive nmissile . Th e statemen t calculate dth e releas e o f radioactivit y t o be 19,00 0 curie s o f krypton-8 5 and 0.0000 6 curie s o f iodine-129 . (Actually , 1-12 9 i s o f onl y academi c interest . Du e t o saturation , th e 5-re m thyroi ddos e useda s th e protectiv e actio nguid e
canno t b e reached. )

*NUREG-0575 , Generi c Environmenta l Impac t Statemen t onHandlin g an dStorag e o f Spen t Ligh t Wate r Powe r Reacto r Fuel , p p4-1 7 t o 4-22 , Volum e 1 , Augus t 1979 .



### 5 7A mor e recen t NR C repor t onpoo l storag e evaluate dacciden t consequence s fo r th e Genera l Electri c fue l storag e facilit y i nMorris , Illinois. * Th e mos t seriou s acciden t wa s considere dt o b e th e dro po f a fue l storag e baske t i nth e wate r o f th e storag e pool . Th e maximu m dro pwoul dbe abou t 7 m . Whil e experienc e wit hsimila r drop s indicate s tha t onl y mino r damag e t o a fue l assembl y

woul dresult , th e calculation s assume dtha t al l th e fue l rod s i nfou r PW Rfue l bundle s woul druptur e andtha t al l th e plenu m gase s woul db e release d t o th e poo l water . Th e releas e wa s calculate dt o be abou t 600 0 C i o f Kr-8 5
and 0.0000 8 C i o f 1-129 . Severa l othe r type s o f accident s wer e als o analyze dfor . th e GE-Morris . facility . & los s o f basi nwate r wa s considere dt o b e no t .credible. , anearth quak e wa s estimate dt o caus e minima l offsit e radiologica l consequences , a tornado-drive nmissil e wa s estimate dt o caus e th e sam e releas e a s th e fuel - _-. , baske t drop , an

da criticalit y

wa s estimate dt o caus e minima l offsit e doses. -

Dr y cas k storage : Th e acciden t assume dfo r thi s analysi s i s th e remova l
o f th e li do f a dry cas k i nwhich " al l th e fue l rod s hav e bee ndamaged . Th e gaseous-activit y

i nth e ga pbetwee nth e fue l andcladdin g i s assume dt o b e r released. . Fro

m NUREG-0575* * 10 % o f th e krypton-8 5 and1 % o f th e iodine-12 9 '-• - activitie s ar e assume dt o b e i nth e gap . Th e cas k i s assume dt o hol d2 4 PWR-•-~ . spen t fue l assemblies . Th e fue l i s assume dt o be les s tha n5 % b y weigh t uranium-235 . " Th e fue l burnu pfo r thi s analysi s i s assume dt o b e 33,00 0 megawatt-day s pe r metric tono f uranium . . Th e fue l i s assume dt o hav e bee nremove dfro m th e reacto r cor e b

year s earlier . Usin g thes e assumption s th e activit y release d fro m a cas k woul db e 8,00 0 curie s o f kryptori-8 5 and0.00 4 curie s o f iodine-129 . Drywel l an

ddry vaul t storage- - Whil e th e numbe r o f fue l rod s ma y b e large r than-assume d fo r dry cas k storag e above , i t i s reasonabl e t o assum e tha t
a singl e acciden t woul dno t damag e a large r numbe r o f fue l rod s tha nassume d abov e fo r dry

cas k storage . Therefore , th e dry cas k storag e sourc e term i s als o "appropriat e fo r drywel l an ddry.vaul t storage .

*NUREG-0709 , "Safet y Evaluatio nRepor t relate dt o th e Renewa l o f Material s Licens e SNM-126 5 fo r th e Receipt , Storage , andTransfe r o f Spen t Fue l Pursuan t t o 1 0 CF RPar t 72 - Morri s Operatio n- Genera l Electri c Compan y - Docke t Nos . 70-130 8 an d72-1, " July , 1981 , Chapte r 7 . **NUREG-0575 , op . cit. , Volum e I , p . 4-18 .



### 5 8P.7 0

2.2.7. 3 Calculation s o f Dose s

Dos e estimate s previousl y publishe db

y th e NR C staf f fo r th e poo l release s describe d abov e ar e give ni nTabl e 10 . Doses-.for'the dry

cas k storag e acciden t describe dabov e calculate di nthi s analysi s ar e als o show ni nTabl e 10 . Th e effectiv e dbs e equivalen t fo r F , 1 m/ s meteorolog y

woul db e 0.00 3 re

m an dth e child' s thyroi ddos e woul db e 0.0 4 rem . Fo r D , 4. 5 m/ s meteorology , th e child' s thyroi ddos e woul d b e 0.00 5 rem .

2.2.7. 4 Implication s fo r Emergenc y Preparednes s

Th e doses-show

ni. nTabl e 1 0 ar e belo w th e EPA' s protectiv e actio nguide s fo r takin g protectiv e actio nafte r a naccident . Therefor e offsit e emergenc y preparednes s is-'no t necessar y

fo r spen t fue l storag e either , i ndr y cask s o r i n pools .

2.2. 8 New

Fue l Storag e

Ne w fue l will"a t time s b e store dprio r t o bein g loade dint o a nuclea r powe r plant".core. - Sto.re d new fue l doe s no t requir e an y offsit e emergenc y preparednes s becaus e o f its . minima l hazard . B y compariso nwit hspen t fue l storag e jus t discussed , no fissio nproduct s ar e present . Thu s n o volatil e radioactiv e material s ar e present , an dno drivin g force , suc ha s deca y heat , i s presen t t o caus e th e uraniu m fue l t o escap e it s claddin g andbecom e airborne .

2.2. 9 Reprocessin g o f Spen t Fue l

Spen t fue l reprocessin g i s th e mechanica l andchemica l processin g o f spen t nuclea r fue l t o extrac t "enricheduraniu m andplutonium . fro

m th e fue l element s
s o tb e y ca nb e use di nnew fue l elements . Radioactiv e fissio nproduct s ar e
remove dfro

m th e spen t fue l andprocesse dint o high-leve l radioactiv e waste . Currently , no reprocessiri g plant s ar e license db y NR C t o operat e i nth e U.S. , no r ar e ther e an y nea r ter

m prospect s fo r licensin g any reprocessin g plants . However , th e Nuclea r Fue l Service s reprocessin g plan t i nWes t Valley , Ne w York , operate da s a commercia l plan t unde r NR C licens e fo r man y years , and



### 59Tabl e 10 . Calculate d Release s an

d Dose s fro

m Spen t Fue l Storage Accident s

O Referenc e Storage i

npools : Generi c Environmenta l Impac t Statement , NUREG-057 5 Storage i

npools : GE-Morri s SER , NUREG-070 9
Dr y cask , drywell , o r dr y vaul t storage : NUREG-114 0 Acciden t Tornad o drive n missil e followe

d b y cal m

Dro p o f a fue l storag e baske t

Remova l o f cas k li d wit hal l fuel element s rupture

d

i Kr-8 5

Releas e 19,00 0 C

i

6*00 0 C i

8,00 0 C i

• . Ski n

Dos e
I'M I 0.0 6 re m at 27 5 m

.No t calculate

d



### No t calculate

d

, - Effectiv e Dos e Equivalen t
No t calculate

d

.

• ' 0.01 6 re

m at 15 0 m

0.00 3 re

m at 10 0 m

, 1-12 9 Releas e

0.0000 6 C

i

0.0000 8 C

i

0.00 4 C i

• 

### Thyroi d 1

Dos e 1 0.0 3 re m • a t 27 5 m

•

0.000 4 re

m 1 a t 15 0 m I

0.00 5 t o 8 0.0 4 re m I withi nI 10 0 m • (child ) •

I 'reprocessin g plant s hav e bee noperatin g i nth e U.S . weapon s program fo r ove r 4 0 years . I naddition , reprocessin g plant s ar e operatin g i nsevera l foreig n countries . 

# I 2.2.9. 1 Acciden t Histor y -

. Th e Nuclea r Fue l Services , reprocessin g plan t wa s plague db y many smal l release s int o groun dwater , surfac e water , andai r a s wel l a s unusuall y hig h occupationa l radiatio nexposures . However , th e plan t neve r hadanacciden t o f significanc e fo r offsit e emergenc y preparedness . Severa l criticality-accidents;-a s liste di nTabl e 5 , hav e occurre d i n spen t fue l reprocessin g o r i nprocesse s simila r t o thos e tha t woul db e use d i nspen t fue l reprocessin g plants . No othe r accident s o f significanc e offsit e are:know nt o hav e happene d i nspen t fue l reprocessing .

2.2.9. 2 Acciden t Sourc e TermsJ * =

Acciden t sourc e telrm s fo r a reprocessin g plan t wer e analyze di nGESMO , . and ar e quote dbelow .
"Uppe r leve l accident s tha t ma y occu r a t separation s facilities o r Pu0 2 conversio nfacilitie s include :

Criticalit y

y - " - • . Hig hleve l radioactiv e wast e concentrato r o r calcine r explosio n Plutoniu

m produc t concentrato r explosion s

Criticalit y

Acciden t -_'

•

" A criticalit y

acciden t i s unlikel y i na separations facilit y o r Pu0 2 conversio nfacility , becaus e equipmen t andproces s limitation s ar e designe dt o preven t suc hincidents . Saf e spacin g i s assure di nstorag e basin s b y physicall y spacin g th e fue l element s i nstorag e rack s i na saf e array . Proces s system s
and control s ar e designe dt o preven t a nunsaf e condition . Nevertheless , a

*From GESMO , page s I

V E-3 9 t o I

V E-42 .
6 1criticalit y acciden t o f IO 1 9 fission s i s assumed . Thi s yiel di s approximatel y
anorde r o f magnitud e greate r tha nth e yiel dtha t ha s bee nexperience dfo r P u system s i npas t accidents . I t i s furthe r assume dtha t al l nobl e gase s an d50 %
o f th e halogen s (o r halides ) ar e discharge dfromlth e plan t stack . Th e dos e commitment s woul db e essentiall y th e sam

e fo r U0 2 fue l o r MOXfuel .

Wast e Concentrato r Explosio nAcciden t

"Durin g operatio no f th e separatio nfacilit y solven t extractio nprocess , solven t degradatio nproduct s ar e generate dandma y b e carrie doye r int o th e wast e streams . Unde r extreme condition s i nearl y pilo t plan t operations" , thes e nitrate ddegradatio nproduct s (re doil ) hav e cause dconcentrato r explo sions . However , re doi l explosion s ca nb e prevente db y installin g equipmen t t o eliminat e th e accumulatio no f organi c material s i nth e waste , andb y con trollin g th e proces s temperatur e i nth e concentrator .

"Concentrator s ar e installe di nhighl y shielde dcells , havin g a volum e o f "abou t 100,00. 0 c uf t (3,00 0 m 3 ) . I nth e unlikel y even t o f a naccident , th e -- ' explosio ni s estimate dt o dispers e abou t 15 0 gallon s (60 0 liters ) o f hig h leve l radioactive.wast e solutio nint o th e cel l i nth e for m o f a finel y

divicte d mist . A

substantia l portio no f th e mis t woul drai nou t o r plat e ou t o nth e cel l surfaces . Droplet s remainin g i nth e ai r (1 0 mg/m 3 ) woul d b e carrie d throug hth e ventilatio nduct s t o th e highefficienc y filters . Moistur e sepa rator s upstream

o f th e filter s woul dknoc k ou t mos t o f th e mist . "Th e j)lan t ventjlatio nfilter s ar e locate dsom e distanc e fro

m th e separa tion-plan t proces s cells . Mos t o f th e explosiv e energ y woul db e expende di n destructio no f th e concentrator . Pressure s develope db y th e explosio nwoul d b e dampene db

y expansio nint o th e cel l an dwoul db e furthe r attenuate di nth e ductwork . Thefina l filter s ar e no t expected.to.b e affected . "I t ha s bee nestimate dtha t plateou t o f th e droplet s ohth e cel l wall s
and floor s andremova l b y th e filtratio nsystem wil l resul t i na reductio ni n th e fractio no f materia l release dt o 3. 6 x10- 8
. Materia l leavin g th e fina l filte r ha s bee nestimate dt o b e 30. 5 m g o f hig hleve l radioactiv e wast e solutio n i nth e for

m o f anaerosol .



### 6 2"Tabl e IV E-1 6 identifie s thos e nuclide s tha t woul dcontribut e significantl y t o th e offsit e dose , and summarize s th e offsit e bon e dos e commitmen t tha t migh t resul t fro

m thi s hypothetica l accident . Th e maximu m offsit e dos e commitmen t t o
a nindividua l i s estimate dt o b e abou t 2. 6 mre m (bone ) fo r U0 2 fuep , and abou t 6. 9 mrem

(bone ) for . MOXfuels .

"Tabl e IV E-1 6 WASTE CONCENTRATIO N EXPLOSIO N

EFFECT S

Nuclid e

i

_

* 

### P u
241 A m 242 

## Cn T

244 C m
9 0 S r ioe R u__.. - 144 C e " - Othe r F.;P / Hal f Lif e

458 y 162 d " : 

### 18 y 29 y 

### : i y - . . - 284d v

' • - Radioactiv i



### i n

- U0 2 Fue l
0.02 - 0.007 " 0.7 6 0.0 5 2.8 0 2000 . - 

### 27 .
: l-5 ? 

### Ac

e m C

- t y Release

d iden t 

### iM0 XFue l
0.1 5 0.0 5 12. 3 3.2 5 1.6 2 3400 . 23 . ; 

### 1. 5 Acciden t Bon e

Dos e Contributio n mrem U0 2 Fue l MO XFue l
0.0 1 0.0 2 0.0 4 0.0 7 1.9 2 0.0 2 0.04 " 0.4 8 0.0 6

0.1 7 0.6 0 4.38 1.1 4 0.0 4 "TJ.0 3 0.4 8 Tota l 2. 6 6. 9

"Tabl e IV

E-17..show

s th e radionuclid e release s and th e bon e dos e commit men t t o th e maximall y expose doffsit e individual... .

. v -•-- - . Tabl e IV

E-1 7 "PLUTONIUM

PRODUCT-EVAPORATO REXPLOSIO N EFFECT S

_ _ Plutoniu

m Isotop e 

### 23 8 23 9 24 0 24 1 - .

- ' - . - -

-

Hal f Lif e 

### 86 y

- " 2. 4 xI0 4 y

- 6,540 y 

### 13 y Radioactivit y Release d

inAcciden t 

### mC i

- U0 2 Fue l MO XFue l
1.0 2 0.0 8 0.1 1 2.9 4 2:i l ;

0.0 4 0.1 3 4.0 1 Tota l En d o f Acciden t

Dos e Cont r mrem Bone ibutio n

U0 2 Fue l MO XFue l
5.9 4 0,5 1 0.7 6 3.9 8 11. 2 Quot e 12.2 7

0.2 8 0.8 8 5.4 2 18. 9



### 6 3• ^



### Plutoniu m Concentrato r Explosio nAcciden t

"Th e postulate dexplosio no f a plutoniu m concentrato r i nth e reprocessin g plan t i s typica l o f uppe r leve l accident s b y whic hplutoniu

m coul db e release d[ t o a cel l o r glovebo xarea . Typically , th e plutoniu m processin g equipmen t tend s t o be smaller , andinstalle dinsmalle r room s (cell s o r gloveboxes ) tha nth e wast e concentrato r previousl y discussed . Th e releas e rat e i s derive db y assumin g tha t th e roo

m (cel l o r glovebox ) atmospher e contain s th e sam e mas s o f aeroso l (1 0 mg/m 3 

### ) a s th e atmospher e o f th e wast e concentrato r cell . Fo r a 1,00 0 m 3 

### plutoniu m concentrato r cel l volume , th e postulate dacciden t woul dreleas e abou t 2. 2 m

g o f plutonium .
2.2.9. 3 Calculation s o f Dose s
Th e dose s below

fo r thes e accident s ar e take ndirectl y fro m GESMO , pag e I V E-40 . i -

"Maximu m Offsit e Individua l Dos e Commitmen t (rem ) Acciden t PW RMOXFue l Criticalit y

0.05 6 (thyroid ) Wast e Concentrato r .Explosio n0.006 9 (bone ) PuEvaporato r Explosio n0.01 9 (bone ) Fir e 0.013 5 (bone ) En do f Quot e
2.2.9. 4 Implications-fo r Emergenc y Preparednes s
Accordin g t o th e GESMO analysi s accident s a t reprocessin g plant s woul d no t caus e dose s i nexces s o f protectiv e actio nguides. Thi s is . primaril y du e t o lac k of.stron g drivin g force s an dextensiv e containmen t systems . Thus . specia l emergenc y

preparednes s i s no t neede doffsite .
2.2.1 0 Researc hwit hNuclea r Fuel s
Thes e facilitie s perfor m researc handdevelopmen t relate dt o nuclea r powe r plan t fue l manufacturin g an dtesting . The y

us e specia l nuclea r material s

6 4i nform s rangin g fro m powder s t o solutions , althoug hlarge r quantitie s ar e usuall y

i nth e for

m o f fue l pellets . Th e wor k take s place i nlaboratorie s an d glov e bo xtrains . Processe s suc ha s blending , crushing , milling , sintering , grinding , and solven t extractio nma y tak e place .

2.2.10. 1 Acciden t Histor y .

A numbe r o f th e accident s previousl y discusse d fo r othe r part s o f th e fue l cycl e ar e relevan t t o researc hwit hnuclea r fuels . Fo r example , i f the facilit y

haridle s larg e quantitie s o f enriche d uranium , criticalitie s a s liste d inTabl e 5 coul d occur , yI naddition , fire s an d othe r type s o f accident s suc h
a s thos e liste d i nTable s 6 an d 7 coul d occur . Sinc e thes e type s o f accident s hav e bee ndiscusse d previously , the y wil l no t b e discusse d furthe r here .

2.2.10. 2 Accident.Sourc e Term s

Sutter * ba s analyze d nuclear , fue l researc hfacilitie s an d concluded - tha t " th e potential-accident s arercriticality.accidents , spills.an d leaks , tornados , earthquakes , .fire s outsid e th e facility , fire s insid e th e facility , explosions , an d fue l handlin g accidents.- 7 -~ - " = - I f larg e quantitie s o f materia l are handle d " a criticalit y

acciden t ma y

b e
a possibility . I f thi s i s th e case , th e release s an d offsite dose s woul d b e th e same a s thos e discusse d i nSectio n2:2.5.2 . fo r criticalitie s a t fue l fabricatio nplants . "-."-"

_ The othe r possibl e accidents_of " significanc e woul d b e a majo r fir e in-th e facilit y

suc ha s a fir e i na glovebo xtrain. - I f trie-fire doe s no t brea k th e glove.bo xfilter s an d th e fina l HEPA

filters , th e releas e t o th e environmen t woul d b e negligible . However , i f bot hsets.o f filter s ar e breache d a consider abl e releas e i s plausible . Assumin g 1 3 glov e boxe s ar e inth e train , 2 k g o f materia l i s presen t i neach , an d 0.1 % become s airborne du e t o th e fire, : a releas e o f 0.02 6 k g woul d be calculated . Thi s woul d be uraniu m o r plutonium , whicheve r wa s beiri g processed , althoug ha t thi s tim e n o licensee s ar e handlin g
suc hquantitie s o f plutonium .

*Sutter , Op . cit .



### 6 5P.7 7

2.2.10. 3 Calculation s o f Dose s

Dose s du e t o a criticalit y woul db e th e sam

e a s discusse dpreviously . A fir e involvin g lo

w enriche duraniu

m (solubilit y

clas s Y ) woul dresul t i nan effectiv e dos e equivalen t withi n10 0 m o f 0.00 7 re

m fo r F , 1 m/ s meteorolog y
and0.00 1 re

m fo r mor e typica l D , 4. 5 m/ s meteorology . Inhale dquantitie s ar e wel l below

level s wher e chemica l toxicit y i s observed 7 Th e dos e calculation s assume dtha t th e buildin g siz e wa s 2 5 m x1 0 m , th e releas e wa s a t groun d level , andth e releas e duratio nwa s 3 0 minutes . I f plutonium-23 9 wer e th e fuel , rathe r tha nuranium , th e effectiv e dos e equivalen t fro

m th e fir e woul db e abou t 6 7 rem s fp r typica l D , 4. 5 m/ s meteor olog y and50 0 rem s fo r conservativ e F , 1 m/ s meteorology . Th e dos e calculation s fo r Uraniu

m an dplutoniu

m conside r aninsolubl e clas s Ycompound . However , th e plutoniu

m dbs e was'calculate d assumin g tha t plutoniu m facilit y

woul dhav e th e same containmen t capabilit y a s uraniu

m facilitie s woul db e expecte dt o have . Sinc e superio r containmen t i s provide dfo r plutonium , th e offsit e dose s presente dher e ar e probabl y large r tha t coul dactually-b e b y quit e a larg e margin . Fo r .example , w e assume 0.1 % releas e fo r th e involve dplutonium . B y compariso nth e actua l releas e fo r th e Rock y Flat s fir e discusse d previousl y wa s 10- 8 ," a hundred-thousan d time s lower 2.2.10. 4 Implication s fo r Emergenc y Preparednes s
Criticality , a s discusse dpreviously , ma y require,som e emergenc y prepared ness . Othe r accident s a t facilitie s handlin g uraniu m woul d no t see

m t o requir e emergenc y

preparedness . Plutoniu m processing , "on~th e othe r handcoul d caus e larg e dose s offsit e iff-no t contained . W e therefor e conclud e tha t fo r plutoniu m researchanddevelopmen t activitie s th e nee dfo r offsit e emergenc y preparednes s shoul db e evaluate dona cas e b y cas e basis .

2. 3 Byproduc t Materia l Facilitie s

Ther e ar e si xtype s o f byproduc t materia l licensee s tha t handl e larg e enoug hquantitie s o f radioactiv e materia l no t i nseale dfor m s o tha t nee d fo r offsit e emergenc y preparednes s shoul db e considered . Thes e are : radio pharmaceutica l manufacturing , radiopharmacies , seale dsourc e manufacturing ,



### 66P.7 8

universit y

researc hlaboratories , wast e warehousing , an dfabricatio no f deplete duraniu

m products .

2.3. i ( A

Generi c Overvie w

W e wil l conside r eac ho f thes e type s o f facilitie s separatel y rathe r tha n
a s a singl e group . Th e reaso ni s tha t w e Wis ht o determin e whethe r acciden t scenario s andreleas e fraction s develope dfo r eac htyp e ca nb e generalize d int o a singl e se t o f acciden t scenario s an dreleas e fractions . Bu t first , w e wil l conside r certai ncommo no r generi c characteristic s o f byproduc t materia l licensees . ' ' j . -.-_..." • - ."

2.3.1. 1 Acciden t Histor y y

Th e accident s involvin g releas e o f byproduc t materia l fro m al l type s o f facilitie s handlin g byproduc t materia l ar e liste dbelow i nTable s 1 1 and12 . Th e reaso nfo r combinin g al l type s o f facilities = i nthes e table s .is-tha t th e experienc e o f on e typ e o f facilit y ma y b e relevan t t o othe r type s o f facilities . Fo r example , a fir e or-explosion-i na gloveboxo r ho t cel l "is anaccident-tha t coul dhappe na t almos t an y typ e o f majo r byproduct-handlin g facility . Th e rele van t accident s liste di nTable s 1 1 an d1 2 wil l b e discusse di nlate r sections . Overall , accident s involvin g byproduc t materia l hav e ledt o smal l offsit e doses . Release s hav e alway s bee nbelow th e EPA' s protectiv e actio nguid e lowe r limi t o f 1 rem . Thus , n o emergenc y

protectiv e action s hav e ever-bee nnecessar y t o protec t peopl e offsit e fro m airborn e release s o f radioactivity,.- -

2.3.1. 2 Releas e Fraction s fo r Acciden t Sourc e Terms * •-.. -

Th e releas e fraction s "selecte dar e give nbelow alon g wit hth e reason s fo r selectin g them . Nobl e gase s (1.0) : K r an dX e wer e assigne da releas e fractio no f 1 becaus e the y ar e alway s gase s a t roo m temperature , the y

do no t plat e out , the y ar e no t retaine db

y filters , an

dthe y do no t reac t chemicall y t o for m les s volatil e compounds .
*Thi s sectio nprepare dwit hth e assistanc e o f Mar k Halverson , Pacifi c North wes t Laboratory , wh o compile dth e reference s upo nwhic hth e releas e fraction s ar e based . 6 7Tabl e 11 . Fire s an dExplosion s Involvin g Releas e o f Byproduc t Material s

Dat e Facilit y Releas e Descriptio n 4-23-5 0

2-21-5 5

10-8-5 9

11-10^6 0

12-29-6 0

.4^5-6 1

9-25-6 4

4-20-6 9

8-30-7 6 Lawrenc e Radiatio nMi

tab , S,F . , C

A - •
AE C Contractor

Moun dLaboratory , Miamisburg , O H 

### (Fue l R&D )

Laborator y

a t Univ . o f Calif . , Berkeley , C

A

Universit y

o f Alabama
_ (Laboratory )
U.S . (locatio n unspecified )
AE C contracto r Babcoc k and Wi-1 co x

Hanfor dSit e - Plutoniu

m Plan t 

### no r

Mi no r

Pp-21 0 contaminatio n i nlaboratory . 3 9 C i release d onsit e
Non e

Some

1 mCi . Mino r contaminatio n 2. 5 g o f americiu

m Co-6 0 contaminatio n o f incinerato r o f 1 0 mR/h r 30 0 C i Am-24 1 Worke r seriousl y contaminated . Negligibl e releas e t o environment . Multistor y researc hbuild in g destroye db

y fire . Spontaneou s ignitio nfir e brok e ou t i nnitri c aci d saturate drag s andpape r i na contaminate dwast e storag e are a o f a chemica l proces s laboratory . Explosio ni ndrybo x disperse s Po-210 . Labtec h combine daceton e was hwit h nitri c aci dsolution .

A noverheate doi l bot h starte da fir e i na process in g cav e handlin g curium . No exposure s andn o contami natio noutsid e cave . Fir e cause dlos s o f some radioactiv e materials .
Radiochemistr y

buildin g fire . Shippin g containe r explosion . A ba g o f Co-6 0 contaminate d pape r wa s put : ir i rionradio^ activ e tras hari

dburne di n incinerator . Explosio no f anion. ' - exchang e colum

ncontainin g 10 0 g (30 0 Ci ) o f Am-241 . 1 t o 5 C i deposite do na worker' s ski nandclothing . 5 mC i remaine d onbody afte r initia l washing . Inhalatio nuptak e b y lun g estimate da t 0.0 5 mCi .



### 6 8Tabl e 12 . Accidenta l Release s o f Byproduc t Materia l Except Fire s an d Explosion s

Dat e Facilit

y Releas e

H-3 , mino r [

1-13 1 leake

d fro m cask . Dos e o f 5 R/h

r o nsurfac e Sr-9 0 Descriptio n 7-25-5 8

8-24-6 2

1-23-6 4

1-15-6 7 Lo s Alamo s

Scientific.Lab. , Lo s Alamos , N

M Phillip s Petroleu

m Co. , Idah

o Reactor Tes t Site , Idah

o Falls , ID Hanfor d Laboratory

-, • Richland , W

A

Babcoc k an

d Wilcox , Apollo , P

A Ir-19 2 onsit e

4-4-6 7

9-27-6 8

5-5_-6 9 .. .

8-6^7 0

9-17-7 3

5-2-7 4 "Savanna

hRiver Laboratory , Aiken , S C

U.S . (locatio

n not reported )

-U.-5. . Nava l Ammuni tio nFacilit

y
Lawrenc e Radiatio

n Laboratory , Berkeley , C

A

Rock y Flats , Golden , C

O

Savanna hRiver Laboratory , Ailen , S C H- 3 release d throug hstack . Mino r

Lo w leve l wast e contaminatio

n

Minor quantity o f Kr-8 5
H- 3 acci dentall y discharge

d throug h 100-f t stack
H- 3 release

d to wate r

H-3 , 5 0 g H- 3 ga s escaped .

Leak y shippin

g cas k contaminated truck an

d cask .

Whil e worker s wer e replacin g a nagitato r o

na wast e storage . . "tank" , convectio

ncurrent s - carrie d contaminated vapo r fro m th e ope nto p o f th e tan k t o th e environment . Technician s cut int o a nIr-19 2 pelle t i

nhot cell . Ventilation tio nimbalanc e allowe

d Ir-19 2 t o escap e t a workin

g area . A nelectri c welde r malfunctioned causin g th e failur e o f a.sea l tub e whichrelease

d H- 3 t o - stack . """•- - . . • ~ . A cas k o f canne

d wast e wa s dumpe d int o a

nundergroun

d caisson . Radioactiv e dus t escape d contaminatin

g th e cask , it s truck , an

d workers. . Release d t o atmospher e

Automati c safet

y device s failed .

Wate r no t know

nt o be contaminate d wit hH- 3 release

d t o plant wast e stream . Failur e o f a pipe fittin g allowe d H- 3 to b

e discharged throug hstack .



### 6 9P.8 1

Tabl e 12 . (continued )

Dat e Facilit y Releas e Descriptio n
"Norma l operatin g losses, " Some foodprepare driearby containe d. H- 3 i nconcentration s abov e EP A drinkin g wate r standar d o f 0.0 2 uCi/ £ ( 4 mrem/y r fo r 2 liter/da y

consumption) . (Thi s wa s no t anaccidenta l release , bu t i s include dbecaus e o f th e larg e quantit y

o f materia l released. ) Airborn e Am-24 1 whil e renovatin g contaminate dgloveboxes . Release ddurin g openin g o f 2 capsule s containin g 3 0 C i o f S-35 . Ir-19 2 surfac e contam i nat i o n foundi nlab . Escap e pat hfro m ho t cell s riot discovered . A stuc k wel l loggin g sourc e wa s cu t b

y a dril l bi t durin g recover y

operations . Becaus e th e lea k wen t unrecognized , som e Am-24 1 activit y

wa s tracke dint o home s and businesses . A 2 0 C i Am-24 1 seale dsourc e wa s accidentall y

cu t ope no na cu t open"o na lath e durin g machining . Si xemployee s wer e exposed . 2 C i Cs-13 7 seale dsourc e cu t ope nonlathe . Some CsC l powde r spille dout . Sho pcontaminated : 1 5 home s contaminate db y Cs-13 7 from , worker s shoe s an dclothing . 197 8 - calenda r yea r

9-1-80 -

7-24-8 1

11-19-8 1 12-12-8 1

8-27-8 2

2-8-8 3

9-13-8 3 America nAtomic s

-Corp , Phoenix , . A Z 287,000 C i o f H- 3

New . Englan dNuclear , Am-24 1 insid e N . Bil l erica , M

A

_ plan t
Ne w Englan dNuclear 7 3. 2 C i o f S-3 5 N . Billerica , M

A -
Tech/Ops , Burlington , M

A

Conso l idatio n"Coa

l Company , Library , '-P-A ' -"-•--. "

Gul f Nuclear , -Inc . Webster , T Xy - -

She!wel 1 Serv i ces , Inc. , Hebron , O H Ir-19 2 surfac e

U pt o 0. 5 C i o f Am-24 1 i n drillin g mud

Am-24 1 insid e plan t

Cs-13 7 o n ;worker s shoe s an dclothin g



### 7 0P.8 2



### Volatil e an

dcombustibl e compound s (0.5) : A releas e fractio no f 0. 5 wa s assigne dt o compound s o f hydrogen , carbon , phosphorous , sulfur , andiodine . Compound s o f thes e element s woul db e expecte dt o b e les s tha n100 % du e t o thes e factors : (1 ) some o f th e compound s o f th e element s ma y for m som e novolatil e compound s (ash ) i na fire , (2)-som e o f th e compound s o f the.element s wil l plat e bu t an

ddeposi t oninterna l surfaces , (3 ) som e o f compound s o f th e element s wil l be subjec t t o retentio nb y filters , (4 ) no t al l container s -" ' possesse db

y a license e woul dbe likel y t o b e breache dinanaccident , (5 ) a t any particula r time th e actua l inventor y ma y b e below

the license dpossessio n limit , and(6 ) some particle s forme dma y no t b e respirable . Consideratio no f sit e specifi c factor s coul dcaus e Considerabl e reduction s i nth e releas e fraction s fo r specifi c facilities . •;...--• '
7 

### Wit hrespec t t o 1-131 , experimenta l release s fro m a fir e wit hth e 1-13 1 i na flammabl e solven t wer e 65%. . I f th e containe r wa s subsequentl y heate d afterword s wit ha propan e torc hth e releas e reache d83%. * Othe r factor s a s mentione dabov e woul dreduc e th e quantit y tha t woul dactually escap e th e building

. '

. Semi-volatil e compound s (0.01) : Thes e includ e compound s o f th e element s selenium , mercury , cesium , polonium , bromine , tellurium , an druthenium . Release s o f Cs-13 7 a t 1000° C hav e beer r measure da t 1%/hr, * 1.5%/hr,* * and 4.2%/hr. t Additiona l remova l b y -filte r retentio nandcondensatio nwa s measure da t 3 5 t o 93 % removal , an danadditiona l 30 % remova l b y depositio n wa s measured.t t Base do nth e assumptio no f a 30-minut e fire , a nassume d releas e fractio no f 0,0 1 i s believe dt o b e reasonabl e fo r cesiu m an dselenium compounds . ^ "

_ - Unknownform : (bu t not " generall y volatil e "o

r combustible ) <0.01) : Fo r us e i nscreenin g analyse s inwhic hthe chemica l for m o f a radioactiv e materia l i s no t known , a releas e fractio no f 0.0 1 i s assumed . Thi s valu e doe s no t appl y !



### *A . E. . Albrethsen.an dL . C . Scheridiman , "Volatilizatio no f Fissio nProduct s fro m High-Leve l Wastes, " BNWL338 , Pacifi c Northwes t Laboratory , 1967 . **W . J . Gray , "Volatilit y o f a Zin c Borosilicat e Glas s Containin g Simulate d High-Leve l Radioactiv e Waste, " BNWL-2111 , Pacifi c Northwes t Laboratory , 1969 . tD . Walmsle y

e t al , "Volatilit y

Studie s o f Glasse s fo r th e Finga l Process , AERE-R-5779 , England, 1969 . ttR . K . Hilliard , "Fissio nProduc t Releas e fro m Uranium

Heate dinAir, " HW-60689 , Hanfor dAtomi c Product s Operation , 1959 .

7 1t

o Kr , Xe , H , C , P , or S , whic hwer e assigne

d differen t value s above . I t doe s
not appl y

to U , Pu , Am , o

r Cm , whic

hare assigne

d a releas e fractio no f 0.00 1
o nth e basi s o f thei r genera l for m a s nonvolatil e powder s a s explaine d below . I t als o doe s not appl y to Co , Ta , an

d Ir , whichare assigne d a releas e fractio n
o f 0.001 , a s explaine d below. - Th e 0.0 1 releas e facto r for uriknow

nfor m shoul d b

e use d only fo r screening . Fo r specifi c facilities , th e actua l chemica l :for m o f th e radioactiv

e materia l coul d b e use d to determin

e a nappropriat e (generall y lower ) releas e fraction . Nonvolatil e powder s (0.001) : Releas e fraction s fo r nonvolatil e compound s
ar e give

na s th e fractio

no f materia l release d whichi s o f respirabl e size . Mos t experiment s report-tota l releas e fraction . T o conver t thes e to respirabl e releas e fraction , th e releas e o f particle s large r tha n1 0 micron s wa s excluded fro m th e respirabl e releas e fraction . Mos t reporte d experiment s provide enoug hinformatio

nt o allo

w thisdetermination , bu t som e d o not . Fo

r experi ment s providin

g n o informatio

no nparticl e size , i t i s necessar y to estimat e respirabl e releas e fraction s fro m tota l releas e fraction s b y assumin

g tha t th

e respirabl e proportio nwil l b

e similar t o tha t reporte d i nsimilar experiments . A releas e fractio

no f 0.00 1 wa s assigne d t o nonvolatil e compound s i n
_ powde r form . Th

e mechanis

m is.not volatilization . Rather i t i s entrainmen t
o f th e particle s i

n.a nairstream. . Eve

nfinel y

groun d powder s wil l generall y contai nles s tha

na fe w percent of.th

e powde r ir

i respirabl e size . Th e frac tio no f particle s o f respirabl e siz e i s kept smal l b y th e difficult

y i npro ducin g al l smal l particle s an d subsequentl y

b y agglomeratio

nan d weathering , processe s whichcaus e micron-size d particle s to . stick t o surfaces , to large r particles , an

d to themselves . Particle s larger"tha nrespirabl e siz e (>1 0 micron s aerodynami c media ndiameter ) quickl y settl e ou

t o f th e air , an

d i f inhale d seldo m ar e deposite

d i nth e lungs . '-•

_- Th e releas e fractio

no f 0.00 1 i s suggeste d b y a numbe

r o f experiment s generall y

designe

d t o maximiz e th

e release. * Tbe experiment s usually foun d

*J . Mishima , L . Scbwendiman , an d Radasch , ''Plutoniu m Releas e Studie s III . Releas e fro

m Heate d Plutoniu

m Bearin g Powers, " BNWL-786 , Pacifi c Northwes t Laboratory , Richland , WA , 1968 . J . Mishim

a an d L . Schwendiman , "Fractiona l Airborne Releas e o f Uraniu m (Representin

g Plutonium ) Durin

g th e Burnin

g o f Contaminate

d Wastes, " BNWL-1730 , Pacifi c Northwes t Laboratory , Richland , WA , 1973 . S . Sutter , Johnson , an d J . Mishima , "Aerosol s Generate d b y Free Fal l Spill s o f Powder s an

d Solution s i

nStati c Air, " NUREG/CR-3093 , 1981 .



### 7 2W41U B

release s o f respirabl e siz e particle s o f abou t 0.00 1 o r less . I

na fe w specia l
case s designe

d to produc e maximu m releases , value s abov e 0.00 1 wer e found . Thes e condition s wer e fo r highly

groun d powder s o

ncertai nflammabl e surface s suc ha s rubbe r or plexiglass , fo r hig hvelocit

y ai r flow , o

r fo r highl y

pres surize d release s i

nwhic hal l th

e materia l i s violentl y throw ninto the . air , whichi s the

nsample

d before significant settlin g ca noccur . Suc

hcondition s
are not corisidere

d representativ

e o f realisti c acciden t conditions . Uraniu m meta l an

d plutoniu

m meta l (0.001) : Thes e material s are pyrophoric . Th e releas e fractio

no f 0.00 1 i s representativ e o f experimenta l measurement s describe

d i nSectio

n2.3.7.2 . Nonvolatil e solid s (0.0001) : Fo r nonvolatil e compound s i nsoli d for

m rathe r tha

npowde r form , a releas e fractio no f 0.000 1 wa s assume d t o reflec t - th e lowe r amoun t o f materia l tha t woul d b e o f respirabl e size . Thi s value coul d b e applie

d t o cobalt , iridium , an d tanalu

m in.soli d for

m o na cas e b

y cas e basis . : Nonvolatil e element s i nflammabl e liquid s (0.005) . A releas e fractio

nO f 0.00 5 wa s assigne

d t o nonvolatil e compound s i nflammabl e liquids . Experiment s wit hstrontiu m i na flammabl e solvent yielded a releas e fractio no f 0.00 2 fro

m a fire. * . - . . Release s o f uraniu

m i nflammabl e solvent average d 0.00025 , releases : o f cesiu m average

d 0.0024 , release s o f ceriu m average

d 0.0065 , an

d release s o f zirconiu

m als o average

d 0.0065.* * Whe

nth e containe r i

nthos e experiment s
wer e subsequentl y

heate d witha propan

e torc huraniu

m release s wer e 0.003 , cesiu m release s average

d 0.006 , ceriu

m release s average

d 0.0074 , an

d zirconiu

m average d 0.004.* *

_ _~ Fo r U0 2 "powde r i

ngasoline , releas e fraction s wer e 0.0012.whe nairflo

w
wa s 1. 8 m/s. t O f this , 66 % wa s les s tha n1 0 micro

nAEDf t fo

r a respirabl e releas e fractio

no f 0.0008 . Whe

nairflo

w increase

d to 8. 9 m/s , th

e releas e fractio nincrease

d t o 0.013, t bu

t only 7%t t wa s smalle r tha n1 0 microns , thu s

*S . L . Sutte r et al , "Fractiona l Airborn e Releas e o f Strontiu m Durin g th e Combustio

no f 30 % Norma l Tributyl Phosphage i na Kerosin

e Type Diluent, " BNWL-B-358 , Pacifi c Northwes t Laboratory , 1974 . **J . Mishim

a an d L . C . Schwendiman , BNWL-B-274 , 1973 , op.cit . tJ . Mishim

a an d L . C . Schwendiman , BNWL-1730 . ttJ . Mishim

a an d L . C . Schwendiman , BNWL-1732 .



### 7 3th e respirabl e releas e fractio nwa s 0.0009 , abou t th e same a s wit hth e lowe r

airflow . I nothe r experiment s onburnin g o f kerosene-base dsolven t release s o f Ru-10 6 w e li

e belo w 0.1 % an

d release s o f uraniu m an d plutoniu

m wer e muc h lower. * - -_'""•"' ' Nonvolatil e compound s i nnonflammabl e liquid s (0.001) : Nonvolatil e compound s i nnonflammabl e liquid s ar e assigne da releas e fractio nof . 0.001 . Severa l studie s hav e measure drelease s i nthes e circumstances . I ngeneral , releas e o f thes e compound s ca nb e expecte dt o b e smal l unti l th e liqui di s dried . Afte r dryin g releas e fraction s generall y remai nsmal l becaus e th e materia l normall y

cake s dnth e substrat e o r bind s int o particle s to o larg e t o b e respirable .

"2.3.1. 3 Quantitie s Requirin g Consideratio no f Emergenc y Preparednes s

Tabl e 1 3 list s th e quantitie s requirin g consideratio no f emergenc y preparednes s base do nth e quantitie s neede dt o delive r a 1-re m effectiv e dos e equivalen t offsite . Th e quantitie s Q . i nTabl e 1 3 wer e calculate dusin g the followin g equation :



## Q > X 1 RF i ( H I i * H GC i + H CSi >
wher e Q . = th e quantit y o f materia l i , curie s

" RF . = releas e fractio no f materia l i . (Releas e fraction s air e fo r a - sever e facilit y

fire , whic hha s bee nidentified..a s "th e acciden t wit hth e larges t plausibl e releas e fractions. )

H T - = th e effectiv e dos e equiv.aleri t fro m materia l i fo r th e inhalatio n pathway- , rems/curi e released . _.-..'... '

*D . Whitne y

Tharin , Jr. , "Burnin g o f Radioactiv e Proces s Solvent , Savanna h Rive r Laborator y

Repor t DP-942 , Aiken , Sout hCarolina , 1965 .



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- ^ n re -' • v > fi I D v j r oTabl e 13 . (continued )

Radioactiv

e materia l Dos e conver sio nfacto r (rems/uC i inhaled ) Solubility

clas s Releas e

fractio n Quantity (weight ) Quantity .[ ' (curie)

_ Irradiate

d material-solid , noncombustibl e Mixed radioactiv

e waste , bet a gamm

a except 1-12 5 an

d 1-13 1 Package d waste , bet a gamma * An y othe r alph

a emitter Contaminated equipment , alpha T Package d waste , alph a 0.00 1

0.0 1
0.00 1 0.00 1
0.000 1
0.000 1 10,000 ;

1,000 . 10,00 0 2
2 0
2 0 *Type B package s assume d to hav

e n o releas e an

d n o nee d fo r emergenc

y preparedness .

'GC i - th

e effectiv

e dos e equivalen t fro m materia l i fo

r th e groun d

_contaminatio

npathway , rems/curi e released .

'CS i th

e effectiv

e dos e equivalen t fro m materia l i for th

e cloudshine . pathway , rems/curi e released .

Fo r al l material s o f greates t interes t fo r fuel cycl e an

d othe r radio activ e materia l licensees , th e dos e fro

m th e inhalatio

npathwa

y H, . wil l dominat e th

e dose . . , .;_. - •_._.- ' H T . wa s calculate

d b y assuming- a maximu

m plausibl e intercep t fractio nfor non-depositin

g (non-particulate ) material s o f 10- 6
. Thus ,

H^ . = 10- 6 xDC

F

wher e DC

F = dos e conversio

nfactor , rems/curi e inhaled . Thi s intercep t frac tio nwa s foun

d to b e th e intercept fractio ntha t woul d b

e calculated a Gaussian plum e dispersio

nmodel , a distanc e o f 10 0 meter s o nth e plum e centerline , atmospheri c stabilit y clas s F , 1 m/ s win d speed , releas e duratio no f 3 0 minutes , buildin g siz e o f 1 0 m

b y 2 5 m , n

o othe r obstruction s t o sprea d th e plume , an

d
n o plum e ris e du

e t o buoyancy .



### 7 8P.9 0

Accordin g t o thi s mode l intercep t fraction s woul d excee d IO- 6 a t distance s close r tha n10 0 meter s fro m th e releas e point . Suc hlarge r intercep t fraction s
ar e no t use d becaus e they ar e no t considere d physicall y realistic . Large r intercep t fraction s requir e th e assumptio ntha t th e smok e fro m a fir e wil l no t ris e ove r th e head s o f peopl e close r tha n10 0 meter s an d tha t th e people woul d Stand i.

ndens e smok e fo r th e ful l duratio no f th e release . Thes e assumption s
ar e riot considere d realistic . Next , a depositio nmode l wa s adde d t o the meteorologica l mode l describe d above . A

depositio nvelocit y o f 1 cm/se c wa s assumed. . Thi s reduce s th e intercep t fractio nat-10 0 meter s t o 0. 9 x10- 6 , bu t add s a dos e contributio n fro m groun d shine.- - Exposur e t o groun d shin e fo r 8 hour s wa s assumed . Tabl e 1 3 include s al l radionuclide s -listed - on2 0 o r mor e o f NRC' s approxi matel y 9,00 0 licenses . A quantit y

fo r 1-12 9 i s no t include d becaus e satura tio nwoul d preven t th e thyroi d fro m absorbin g enoug h1-12 9 t o reac hth e 5-re m protectiv e actio nguid e dose . Table 1 3 als o include s al l beta-gamma emitter s liste d on_mor e tha non e bu t les s tha n2 0 license s i f th e quantit y tha t migh t delive r aheffectiv e dose="equivalent-e_xce_edin g 1 re m i s les s tha n10,00 0 curies . Tabl e 1 3 als o include s all-alph a emitters-liste d o nmore tha non e bu t les s tha n 2 0 license s i f th e quantit y tha t migh t delive r aneffectiv e dos e equivalen t exceedin g 1 re

m i s les s tha n2 curies. . The quantitie s i nTable.1 3 ar e differen t fro m quantitie s previousl y pub lishe d i nNUR£G-0767 , "Criteri a fo r Selectio no f Fue l Cycl e an d Majo r Material s Licensee s Needin g Radiologica J Contingenc y Plans, " an

d Federa l Registe r Notice s wit horder s (4 6 F R12566 ) and-a nAdvance-Notic e o f Rulemakin g (4 6 F R29712) . Th e mai nreason s are : (-1 ) dosimetri c models " fro m ICR P Publication s 2 6 and 3 0 hav e bee nuse d instea d o f th e olde r model s fro m ICR P Publicatio n2 an d (2 ) release fraction s hav e change d a s a.resul t o f furthe r study . Meteorologica l model s ar e slightl y different , bu t thi s ha s a smal l effec t i nmost'cases . Th e intercep t fractio nfo r inhalatio no f a materia l tha t doe s no t deposi t o nth e groun d i s 10- 6 i nbot hcases . Fo r particulates , whic hdo deposi t onth e ground , th e dos e pe r curi e release d can-b e a s much , a s 11 % lowe r for-radionuclide s wit h negligible externa l dos e t o abou t 5 time s highe r fo r radionuclide s whos e majo r dose pathwa y

i s groundshin e fro m materia l deposite d onth e ground. * The value s i nTabl e 1 3 includ e consideratio no f groundshine .

*See Table 5. 5 o f NUREG/CR-365 7 fo r contribution s o f eac hpathway .



### 7 9P.9 1

Quantitie s are als o give nfo r certai nfrequentl y occurrin

g mixture s o f radionuclides . Mixe d fissio

nproduct s ar

e assigne

d th e generall y

applicabl e releas e frac tio no f 0.0 1 an

d a quantit

y o f 100 0 curies . Thi s valu e i s typica l fo

r fissio

n products , assume s tha t short-live d iodine s wil l not b e present , an

d assume s tha t n o singl e nuclid

e wiI T account fo

r mor e tha

nperhap s 5 t

o 10 % o f th

e activity . I

nparticular , Sr-9 0 i s likely to b e th e dominant contributor t o dos e an d i s assume

d t o b e n o more tha

n5 to 10 % o f th

e activity . Mixe d corrosio

nproduct s ar

e assume

d to b e boun d t o surface s an

d thu s assigne d th e smalle r releas e fractio no f 0.001 . Cobalt-6 0 i s likely t o b e th e dominan t nuclide . Th e quantit

y assigne

d i s 10,00 0 curies . Contaminate

d equipment , beta-gamm a i s likewis e assume d to hav

e a lowe r releas e fractio

no f 0.00 1 due"t o bondin g to surfaces . Th

e activity

assigne

d i s 10,00 0 Curies . Sr-9 0 i s assume d to b e les s tha

n10 % o f th

e activity . Irradiate

d materia l i s assigne d th e sam e value s a s mixe

d fissio

nproduct s becaus e th

e form s an d nuclide s ar

e likely

t o b e similar . However , soli d noncom bustibl e irradiate

d materia l i s assigne d a lower releas e fractio no f 0.00 1 an

d
a nactivity

_o f 10,00 0 curies . - . y Mixe d radioactiv

e waste , beta-gamma , except 1-13 1 an d 1-12 5 i s assigned
a a activity

o f 100 0 curies . Iodine-13 1 an d iodine-12 5 ar

e assume

d no t t o dominat e th

e hazar d du e to thei r shor t half-lives . I f significant quantitie s
o f iodin

e woul d b

e i nth e waste , thei r quantitie s shoul d b e calculate

d separately . Package d waste , beta-gamm

a i s assume

d t o hav

e one-tenth.th

e releas e fractio no f unpackage

d materia l du

e to a nassume

d protectio

nprovide

d b y th e packaging . Th

e quantit

y assigne

d i s 10,00 0 curies. " - - " - - _ Contaminate

d equipment , alph

a i s assume

d t o hav

e one-tenthth

e releas e fractio no f alph

a emitter s i

ngenera l du

e to bondin

g onto surfaces . A nactivity i s 2 0 curie s i s assigned . Package d waste , alph

a i s assigne

d a nactivity

o f 2 0 curie s becaus e th e package s are assume d to provid

e som e protectio

nagains t release . Type B package

d wast e i s assume

d t o b e a seale

d sourc e an

d assume

d t o hav

e
n o significan t release .



### 8 0Tabl e 17 . Universit y Researc hLaboratories : Maximu m Possessio n Limit s Releas e Fractions , an d Dose s Du e t o a Majo r Fir e P.9 2

Radioactiv e materia l Maximu m license dReleas e possessio nlimi t (Ci ) fractio n Effectiv e dos e equivalent , rem s


### H- 3 C-1 4 P-3 2 S-3 5 Ni-6 3 Sr-9 0 Mo-99/Tc-99 m 1-12 5 1-13 1 Xe-13 3 Po-21 0 Am-24 1 Cm-24 4 Cf-25 2 300 0 

### 1 0 

### 5 5 1 0. 5 1 0 

### 8 1 1 0 1 0 

### 0. 5 

### 1 0. 1 0. 5

0. 5 0. 5 0. 5 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 

### 0. 5 0. 5 I
. 

### OAn. 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0,00 2 t o 0. 2

" • 0 t o 0.0 1 0 t o 0.0 4 0 t o 0.0 1 

### 0 0 t o 0.00 5 

### 0 0.0 6 t o 5. 5 0.0 1 t o 1
. ( 0

_. • • 0.00 9 t o 0. 9 0.00 3 t o 0. 3 0.00 3 t o 0. 3 0 t o 0,0 1 (child' s thyroid) . -

2.3.5. 3 Calculation s o f Dose s

A rang e o f calculate deffectiv e dos e equivalent s i s show ni n Tabl e 17 . Th e larges t potentia l dose s ar e fro m 1-125, ; Po-210 , and Am-241 . Th e rang e
_ reflect s th e likelihoo dtha t releas e fraction s wilVi e considerabl y belo w
_ ' thos e show

ni n th e tabl e an

d a rang e o f possibl e meteorology .

2.3.5. 4 Implication s fo r Emergenc y Preparednes s

Offsit e emergenc y

preparednes s doe s no t appea r necessar y fo r universit y
researc hlaboratorie s becaus e potentia l effectiv e dos e equivalent s ar e low .

2.3. 6 Wast e Warehousin g an d Buria l

I hwast e warehousing , radioactiv e materia l i n containers (drums ) i s store d fo r a perio do f generall y no t mor e tha nsi xmonths . Drum s ma y b e opene di n th e wast e warehousin g operation . The y ar e store dand the ntransporte dt o a license d wast e buria l ground .



### 9 0P.9 3

2.3.6. 1 Acciden t Histor y

Accident s involvin

g wast e warehousin

g an d buria l hav

e bee nminor , suc

ha s very smal l releases , leakin g containers , an

d container s havin

g surfac e contami natio nabov e regulator

y limits , Ther e hav e bee nn o offsit e airborn

e release s
o f significance . _

2.3.6. 2 Acciden t Sourc e Term s
Warehousing . Sinc e mos t radioactiv e wast e i s i

nmeta l drums , th

e potentia l fo r accidenta l release s i s low . A nevent o f significant magnitude t o breachthe drum s woul d b

e require

d t o mak

e materia l airborne . Accident s considere

d are tornadoes , earthquakes , fires , an d explosions . A majo r facility

fire i s see

na s yieldin

g th e larges t releases . Th e activitie s o f radioactiv e material s becomin g airborn

e wer e estimate

d b y Sutter . Thes e activitie s ar e liste d i nTabl e 18 . -

Tabl e 18- . Wast e Warehousin g Airborn

e Release s an

d Dose s Du

e t o a Major Facility

Fire
Radioactiv

e Quantity

Releas e Effectiv e dos e materia l presen t (Ci ) fractio nequivalent , re

m
0.00 4 t o 0. 4 0.00 2 t o 0. 2 0.0 1 t o 1 . . - _'.- 0.00 2 t o 0. 2 0 4 t o 400 . (child' s thyroid ) 0. 4 t o 40 . (child' s thyroid ) 

### H- 3 C-1 4 P-3 2 S-3 5 Cr-5 1 1-12 5 1-13 1 620 0



### 16 0 16 0 - 

### 12 0 6 0 28 0 2 0 0. 5

0. 5 0. 5 0. 5 0.0 1 

### 0. 5 0. 5

9 1Burial . Accident s durin g wast e buria l were analyze d i na draf t environ menta l impac t statement. * A major trenc

hfir e o f tw o hour s duratio

nwa s deter mine d to b e th e acciden t wit hth

e larges t potentia l airborn e release . Droppe

d
an d rupture

d container s wer e determine d t o caus e smaller releases . Th e reade r i s referre

d to th e reference

d environmenta l statement fo r th e detail s o f th

e
assume d releases . -

2.3.6. 3 Calculation s o f Dose s
Warehousing . A

rangeo f effectiv

e dos e equivalent s outsid e th e buildin

g du e t o a majo r warehous e fire ar e als o show

ni nTabl e 18 . Th

e rang e represent s th e uncertainty

i ndose s tha t might resul t fro m a severe accident . Burial . Dose s calculate d fo r a major trenc

hfire are give

ninNUREG-078 2
a s 0.00 6 rem"whole.bod y an d 0.0 3 re

m to th e lungs . Whil e thes e dose s wer e no t calculate

d b y exactl y

th e sam e calculatio,nal technique s a s other s inthi s report , the

y are so lo

w tha t ther e seem

s t o b e n o nee d t o recalculat e them .

2.3.6. 4 -Implications fo r Emergenc

y Preparednes s ? - .
Since " potentia l acciden t dose s fo r wast e buria l are fa r belo w th e EPA' s protectiv

e actionguides , buria l doe s not.see m t o require specia l offsit e emergenc

y preparedness . Fo r warehousing , th

e radioiodine s 1-12 5 an d 1-13 1 ma

y mak e som e specia l emergenc

y preparednes s appropriate .

*0ffic e of.Nuclear Materia l Safet y an d Safeguards , Draf t Environmenta l Impac t Statemen t o

n1 0 CF RPar t 6 1 "Licensin g Requirement s fo

r Lan d Disposa l o f Radioactiv

e Waste, " NR

C Repor t NUREG-0782 , Volum e 2 , Sectio

n6.2.2 , 1981 .



### 9 22.3. 7 Deplete dUraniu m Products *

Deplete duraniu

m i s use dt o mak e a numbe r o f products : radiatio nshield s fo r radioisotope s an dx-ra y machines , aircraf t counterweights , armor-pierci'ng bullets , an dartiller y shells . Amon g th e processin g operation s performe dare : reductio no f "gree nsalt " (uraniu m tetrafluoride ) t o metal ; meltin g andcastin g
o f th e metal ; welding ; extrusion , cuttin g an detching ; andmachining. " Sinc e uraniu m meta l turning s andpowder s wil l burn , fire s ar e a potentia l acciden t o f
concern .

2.3.7. 1 Acciden t Histor y '.-_•-. -

Tabl e 6 liste dfire s and ; explosion s involvin g uraniu m andi s relevan t t o fabricatio no f deplete duraniu m products . Th e release s andoffsit e contamina tio ntha t resulte dwer e negligibl e i nal l cases .

2.3.7.2 . Acciden t Sourc e Term s . :

Thre e potentia l scenario s durin g thre e operation s sugges t themselves-a s potentiall y

resultin g i nth e larges t airborn e release s o f uranium . First , a larg e quantit y

o f molte nuraniu

m i s handle ddurin g th e meltin g andcastin g operation . Second , moderat e quantitie s o f divide duraniu m scrap , whic hca nb e
mor e readil y

ignite dtha nbul k pieces , ca nb e store doutdoor s unde r wate r i n containers . Finally , larg e quantitie s o f uraniu m i nth e for

m o f deplete d uraniu m munition s ar e store db y th e military . U pt o abou t 70 0 k

g o f molte nuranium-coul db e poure ddurin g a castin g operation . I f anoperationa l o r equipmen t failur e resulte di nth e releas e o f

_ • th e molte nuraniu

m an dih e los s o f th e iner t ga s cover , th e uraniu m woul d oxidiz e rapidl y

anda fractio nwoul db e mad e airborne . Carte r andStewar t (1970 ) experimentall y measure dth e airborn e releas e fro m molte nuraniu

m and

*Thi s sectio nprepare dwit hth e assistanc e o f Dr . JofuMishima , Pacifi c Northwes t Laboratories .



### 9 3

# "W

( • • measure dairborn e releas e rate s rangin g fro m 0.005 % t o 0.3 % dependin g upo nth e condition s - ignitio nan dburning , melting , o r partia l disruptio no f liqui d int o droplets. * Th e potentia l airborn e releas e fro m thi s scenari o rang e fro m 0.0 4 k g t o 2 kg-o f uranium . Castip g operation s occu r inenclose dfacilitie s
andsom e o f th e airborn e materia l wil l be los t du e t o natura l processe s suc h. a s gravitationa l settlin g o r depositio no nsurface s durin g it s transpor t t o th e release , poin t fro m th e facility . Many suc hfacilitie s ar e equippe dwit h particl e remova l device s suc ha s filter s whic hfurthe r reduce , th e emission . Scra pmeta l suc ha s turning s ca nb e store dunde r water inmeta l cans . . Prezbindowsk i (1983 ) analyse dsuc haheven t postulate dt o occu r outdoors.* * -19 0 k g o f uraniu

m turning s i na 3 0 gallo nmeta l dru m wer e assume dt o ignite
andoxidiz e t o completion . Th e airborn e releas e wa s estimate dt o b e 0.1 % resultin g i n0.19 0 k g bein g release dt o th e environment . Th e potentiall y

mos t serious - acciden t woul dinvolv e a fir e i na munition s storag e bunke r (igloo ) holdin g a larg e quantit y o f variou s type s o f munition s (deplete duranium , hig hexplosive , etc.) . I t i s postulate dtha t 12,00 0 round s
o f a - 10 5 m

m deplete duraniu

m cartridg e coul dLb e present . Eac hcartridg e woul d hol d3. 3 k

g o f uraniu

m resultin g inVtota l o f 40,00 0 k g o f uranium . Other type' s o f combustible s suc ha s woode ncrate s andpallets , paper base dpackin g materials , etc . wouldals o b e present; . I f th e materia l presen t wer e ignited , th e fir e woul dinitiall y sprea dslowl y

unti l sufficien t flammabl e vapor s coul d b e generate dandflashove r occurs . Onc e flashove r occurs , th e entire content s
o f th e enclosur e ar e involved . Th e fir e soo nbecome s oxyge nlimite ddu e t o th e limite daccessibilit y o f air . Eventually , th e cartridge s themselve s woul d b e ignite dand , i f containmen t i s lost" ; -th e fir e woul dbur nmor e vigorousl y du e t o th e greate r availabilit y o f oxygen . _ Igloo s ar e designe dt o vent : i na perferre d directio nwhic hdoe s no t involv e adjacen t structures . Th e flammable-vapor s release dmay wel l bur n outsid e th e facilit y du e t o th e hig hvapor generatio nrat e reducin g radian t hea t transfe r t o th e material s inside .

*R . F . Carte r an dK . Stewart , "Onth e Oxid e Fum e Forme db

y th e Combustio n o f Plutoniu

m andUranium, " Inhale dParticle s III , Unwi nBrother s Limited , Th e Gresham

Press , England , 1970 . **6 . L . Prezbindowski , "Uraniu m Oxid e Facilit y

Safet y Analysi s Report, " UNI-M-157-DR , Unite dNuclea r Industries , Richland , Washington , 1983 .



### 9 4_ _ ^ Pj 7

Ther e ar e two type s o f cartridge s case s use dfo r deplete duraniu m munition s meta l andcombustible . Th e deplete duraniu m portio no f meta l case dcartridge s
wer e ejecte dfro

m andunaffecte db

y th e fir e i na large-scale , outdoor s test. * Deplete duraniu

m fro m combustible-case dmunition s i|nsimila r test s wer e no t ejecte dfro

m th e fir e an

dwer e almos t completel y oxidize d(83%:and.85.2%).* * Collection.and analysi s o f th e residua l materia l di dno t indicat e a los s o f uraniu m an dai r sample s take ndurin g par t o f th e burnin g an dal l o f th e recover y perio d di dno t show an y significan t airborn e release.** * Experimenta l studie s measure dth e rat e o f oxidatio nan dairborn e releas e durin g oxidatio na t elevate dtemperature s (40 0 C t o 120 0 C ) o f th e deplete d uraniu m portio no f large-calibe r munition s i nai r an da 50 % air-50 % carbo n dioxid e mixture . Th e maximu m airborn e fractiona l releas e rat e measure d durin g th e outdoo r tes t usin g combustibl e material s a s th e hea t sourc e wa s 2. 2 x 10- 6 /mi nb

y weight . Th e materia l wa s primaril y U 3 0 8 . Abou t 50 % o f th e materia l had a b y weigh t aerodynami c equivalen t diamete r o f 1 0 micron s o r less . Th e thre e deplete duraniu m specimen s oxidize da naverag e o f 44 % durin g th e thre e hou r test . Tli

e velocityo f ai r passin g aroun dth e sample s wa s 2.2 3 m/ s ( 5 mph) . Simila r bu t lowe r rate s wer e measure di nlaborator y studie s a t variou s tempera ture s andatmospheres . Fo r th e wors t cas e acciden t involvin g deplete duraniu m i t i s postulate d tha t 40,00 0 k

g o f deplete duraniu m ar e involve di naniglo o fir e andtha t i t i s completel y

oxidized . I t i s als o assume dtha t th e materia l i s combustible case d althoug hth e iglo o limi t i s fo r metal-cased . Base dupo nth e experimenta l studie s reporte db

y Elde r an

dTinkle,*** * th e materia l woul dbe completel y

*R . L . Gilchrist , G . B . Barker , andJ . Mi sh i ma,_ " Radiological-an d Toxicologica l Assessmen t o f anExterna l Hea t (Burn ) Tes t o f th e 10 5 m m Cartridge , APFSDS-T , XM-774, " PNL-2670 , Pacifi c Northwes t Laboratory , Richland , Washington , 1978 . **C . 0 . Hooke r e t al , "Hazard s Classificatio nTes t o f th e Cartridge , 12 0 mm , APFSDS-T , XM-829, " PNL-4459 , Pacifi c Northwes t Laboratory , Richland , Washington , 1983 ; ***J . C . Elde r andM . C . Tinkle , "Oxidatio no f Deplete dUraniu m Penetrator s andAeroso l Dispersio na t Hig hTemperatures, " LA-8610-MS , Lo s Alamo s Scientifi c Laboratory , Lo s Alamos , NM , 1980 . ****J . C . Elde r andM . C . Tinkle , "Oxidatio no f Deplete dUraniu m Penetrator s andAeroso l Dispersio na t HighTemperatures, " LA-8610-MS , Lo s Alamo s Scientifi c Laboratory , Lo s Alamos , NM , 1980 .



### 9 5P.9 8

oxidize d i n40 0 min . A

t th e rat e o f 2. 2 x10- 6 /min , 3 5 k g woul d b

e mad e air borne o f whic hhal f ar e respirabl e particles . Th e tota l airborn

e releas e o f respirabl e deplete

d uraniu

m thu s woul d b

e 1 8 kg .

2.3.7. 3 Calculation s o f Dose s

Th e effectiv

e dos e equivalen t fo r a n1 8 k g releas e o f deplete d uraniu

m wa s calculated t o b

e i nth e range fro

m 0.00 1 t o 0.0 6 rem . Heav y meta l poisonin

g o f th e kidneys i s not a factor becaus e th e uraniu

m woul d not b

e i nsolubl e form .

2.3.7. 4 Imp!ication s fo r Emergenc

y Preparednes s

N o specia l offsit e emergenc y preparednes s i s necessar y for deplete

d uraniu m product s becaus e dose s are belo w protectiv

e actio nguides .

2. 4 Summar

y o f Facilitie s t o b e Covere

d

Fue l Cycle : Th

e acciden t wit hth

e greates t potentia l hazar d appear s t o b e releas e o f a larg e quantity_o f UF 6 . Th e releas e of-ajlarge'quantity o f UF 6 present s a chemica l toxicity hazard . Th

e greates t potentia l hazar d i s a t UF

g conversio

nplant s wher e hot 14-to ncylinder s are handle d outside . NR

C license s tw o suc hplants . Th

e rupture o f a ho t cylinde r i s quit e plausibl e an d coul d lea d t o multi-to

nrelease s o f UF 6 . Th e releas e woul d begi ninstantly . In
suc ha cas e evacuatio

nt o severa l kilometer s downwin d woul d b

e appropriat e for
ver y cal m weathe r conditions . Th e plum e i s easilydetectable-b y sigh t an d b y smel l a t level s wel l belo w level s likely

t o caus e injury . Thu s peopl e downwin d woul d b e abl e t o see th

e plum e comin g an d woul d beabl e to judg e fo r themselve s whenthe

y hav e reache

d a narea o f safety . A protectio

nactio nstrateg

y i s discussed i

nmore detai l i

nSectio

n2.5 . I na nactua l acciden t th e releas e coul d b

e greatly

diminishe

d b y sprayin

g th e releas e poin t wit hwate r or carbo ndioxide . Thi s i s probabl y th e mos t effectiv

e actio ntha t ca

nb e take nt o mitigat e offsit e consequences . Th e releas e o f low-enriche d UF 6 coul d als o occu r fro m smalle r 10-to

n cylinder s an

d coul d occu

r insid e a building , whichwoul d preven t escap e o f



### 9 6muc

huranium . Fo

r th e 9 suc hfacilitie s license d b y NR C th e appropriat e respons e woul d b

e similar t

o tha t abov

e but woul d b

e limite

d t o distance s o f perhap s about hal f a s great . I Th e releas e o f high-enriche d UF 6 fro

m hot cylinder s ma

y not requir e offsit e respons e du

e to th e smal l cylinde r siz e used . Th e releas e o f UF 6 fro m col d cylinder s doe s not require a respons e becaus e th e quantitie s release d woul d b

e quit e small . Withregar d t o th e heatin

g o f col d cylinder s i

na fir e an d subsequent release , a respons e similar t o tha t fo r ho t cylinder s ma

y b e appropriate , but additiona l warnin g tim e woul d generall y b e available . Fo r a criticality

accident , th

e lower en

d o f th e protectiv

e actio nguide range coul d b

e exceede

d fo r a perso

nstandin

g outsid

e o nth e plum e centerline outvt o a distance'o f about 25 0 meter s fro m th e releas e point assumin g advers e weathe r conditions . Th e calculate

d dose s are base

d o nth e assumptio

no f a pulsatin

g criticality

lastin g 8 hour s an

d th e perso nstandin

g outside o

nth e plum e centerlin

e fo r th e entire 8 hours . Thre e additiona l licensee s might b e i nthi s category . "

_ . " - _ An-appropriat e emergenc y respons e t o a criticality acciden t durin

g advers e meteorolog

y woul d b

e immediat e shelterin g an d closin

g windows u

p to a distanc e
o f 25 0 meter s downwind . Thi s respons e shoul d b e accomplishe

d withi nabou t 3 b r 4 minute s afte r th e criticalit

y occurs . Th

e initia l puls e i s likely t o b e th e larges t one . Plum

e trave l tim

e t o 25 0 meter s woul d b e abou t 4 minute s for lo w win d speed s an

d 1 minut e fo

r average win

d speeds . Ther e woul d b e som e added

. de]a y du e t o holdu

p i nth e liqui d solutio

nan d th e buildin

g atmosphere . Afte r th e immediat e shelterin g response , evacuatio ncoul d b

e considere

d a s a nalter nativ e to further sheltering . Preparednes s fo

r suc ha respons e i s recommende d fo r th e are a withi n20 0 t o 25 0 meter s fro

m high-enriche

d uraniu

m ari d plutoniu

m processing . Plutoniu

m facilitie s (non

e currentl y

operating ) ma

y als o nee

d specia l off sit e emergenc

y preparednes s du

e to airborn

e release s o f plutonium . However , th e GESM O analysi s discusse d i nSectio

n2.2. 6 woul d indicat e tha t extensiv e preparednes s ma

y not b e appropriate . Byproduc t materia l an d plutoniu

m licensees : A

tota l o f abou t 4 8 Par t 3 0
or Par t 7 0 licensee s wer e identifie d wh o wer e authorize

d to posses s on

e or
mor e radionuclide s inunseale d for m inexces s o f th

e quantitie s inTabl e 1 3 o f thi s analysi s (i.e. , effectiv e dos e equivalen t coul d excee d 1 re m offsit e or



### 9 7

### B B p. 1

thyroi ddos e coul dexcee d5 rems) . However , some o f th e licensee s hav e littl e
o r n o nee dt o posses s a s muc ha s the y ar e authorize dt o andsom e ca nd o a n evaluatio nt o sho

w release s woul db e smalle r tha nassumed . W e estimat e tha t
mos t o f th e licensee s wil l elec t t o lowe r thei r authorize dpossessio nlimits , o r perform

a nevaluatio nrathe r tha nsubmi t a plan . Thus , th e tota l numbe r of affecte dlicensee s i s likel y t o b e abou t 1 0 exceedin g th e limi t fo r plutoniu m
an d 7 exceedin g th e limi t fo r othe r materials , specificall y Am-241 , Po-210 , 1-125 , 1-131 , H-3 , P-32 , Sr-90 , Cm-242 , andCm-244 . I nal l case s a fir e woul dbe th e acciden t o f concern ; Th e appropriat e emergenc y

respons e woul db e t o evacuat e peopl e fro m th e immediat e vicinit y (a t leas t 10 0 meters ) s o a s no t t o interfer e wit hfirefightin g andt o shelte r o r - evacuat e everywher e els e wher e smok e ca nb e smelled . Thes e action s shoul db e take nwithi na few

minutes .

2. 5 A Protectiv e Actio nStrategy

- Th e mos t importan t characteristi c o f th e accident s discusse di s tha t ther e i s likel y

t o b e littl e o r no warnin g tim e befor e release s start. " Th e mos t importan t accidents , UF 6 release s andfires , ar e likel y t o b e controlle dwithi n roughl y hal f anhou r i na majorit y o f cases . Thu s release s ar e ofte nlikel y t o sto p o r be.greatl y reduce dwithi na hal f hour .

2.5. 1 Th e Initia l Respons e
Quic k decision s andpromp t action s ar e necessary . Th e goa l shoul d b e t o mak e decision s o nprotectiv e action s andstar t implementin g thos e decision s withi n5 o r 1 0 minute s o f discoverin g th e accident . Th e hear t o f aneffectiv e protectiv e actio nstrateg y i s predetermine d protectiv e actio ndecisions . Th e decision s shoul db e made , agree dupon , an d writte ndow

nprio r t o anacciden t becaus e accident s o f concer nar e likel y t o happe nso . quickl y

tha t decision s onprotectiv e action s mus t b e immediat e t o b e effective . Thus , th e licensee' s initia l notificatio no f polic e andfir e official s shoul dinclud e a recommendatio no nwha t protectiv e action s ar e appropriat e an dth e distance s t o whic hth e protectiv e action s ar e appropriate .



### 9 8

### Respons e distance s ca nb e calculate di nadvanc e base donhow muc hmateria l i s subjec t t o releas e relativ e t o th e value s i nTabl e 1 3 an donsimpl e meteoro logica l observables . Th e value s inTabl e 1 3 ar e base do na meteorolog y

o f stability.clas s F andwin dspee do f 1 m/s . Stabilit y classe s A . throug hE and highe r win dspeeds ; woul deac hcaus e dose s t o b e reduced . Th e protectiv e actio n strategy develope dher e account s fo r tha t reduction . Th e win dspeed s a t th e tim e o f a nacciden t ca nb e roughl y estimate dfro

m simpl e observations . Th e correlation , calle dth e Beaufor t win dscale , i s show n i nTabl e 19 .
.' . Tabl e 19 . Beaufor t Win dScal e (Simplified )
Mea nWin dSpee da t

_- ' 1 0 meter s heigh t Descriptio no f win d 0. 9 m/ s Ligh t ai r - directio no f win dshownb y smok e drift , bu t no t b y win dvanes . 2. 4 m/ s Ligh t breez e - windfel t onface ; leave s rustle ; ordinar y

. • • - _van e move db y wind . 4. 4 m/ s - _=. " . Gentl e breez e - leave s andsmal l twig s i nconstan t \

. - -.-'•'' J motion ; win dextend s ligh t flag . . 6. 7 m/ s Moderat e breez e - raise s dus t andloos e paper ; smal l

. . _' branche s ar e moved. - 9. 3 m/ s - Fres hfreeze - smal l tree s i nlea f begi nt o sway ; creste d wavelet s for

m oninlandwaters .

I naddition , atmospheri c stabilit y classe s ca nb e adequatel y determine d fro m simpl e observations : whethe r i t i s da y o r night , th e strengt ho f th e sun , clou dcover , andwin dspeed-; " Th e relationship , develope db y Pasquill , i s show ni nTabl e 20 .

I t i s now

possibl e t o relat e dose s compare dt o th e dos e fo r F , 1 m/ s meteorology . Thi s i s don e i nTabl e 21 . Th e compariso ni s base don10 0 meters . Th e tabl e i s slightl y

conservativ e fo r greate r distances. ;

- Th e nex t ste pi s t o develo prespons e distance s fo r differen t weathe r condi tions . First , conside r a license e fo r whic hth e quantit y subjec t t o releas e i s 5 time s th e amoun t i nTabl e 13 . Thi s represent s a typica l license e t o whic hth e propose drul e woul dapply . Th e maximu m potentia l effectiv e dos e equivalen t off sit e fo r F , 1 m/ s weathe r i s thu s 5 rems . Protectiv e action s shoul db e considere d

9 9Tabl e 20 . Pasquill' s Relatio no f Turbulenc e Type s t o Weathe r Condition s
A—Extremel y unstabl e condition s B—Moderatel y unstabl e condition s C—Slightl y unstabl e condition s D—Neutra l conditions * E —Slightl y stabl e condition s F—Moderatel y stabl e condition s

Surfac e win d speed , m/se c
< 2 2 4 6 > 6 Stron g

A A- B B 

### c C Daytim e insolatio n

Moderat e A- B B B- C C- D D Sligh t.

B C 

### c D D T

h o r Nighttim e i n overcas t 2 % cloudi
ness t

E D D D condition s

s V , cloudi
nes s
F E D D . •Applicabl e t o heav y overcast , da y o rnight . - ' ' tTh e degre e o

f cloudines s i s define d a s thatfractio n o f th e sk y abov e th e loca l apparen t horizo n that.i s covere d b y clouds .

Tabl e 21 . Plum

e Centerlin

e Dos e fo

r Differen t Meteorologia l Condition s £ Relativ

e t o F , 1 m/ s " - •

Surfac e win d speed , m/se c

< 2 2 4 6 > 6 Day t

Stron g 0.0 3 0.0 2 0.0 1 0.0 2 0.0 1 - im e insolat i Moderat e 0.0 4 0.0 3 0.0 2 0.0 3 0.0 3 o n •

Sligh t 0.0 5 0.0 5 0.0 3 0.0 4

, 0.0 3 Nighttim e

Thi n overcas t o r> V 8 cloudines s 1.0 0 0.2 1 >• 0.0 6

_0:0 4 0.0 3 condition s

< 3 / 8 cloudines s 1.0 0 0.5 0 0.1 1 0.0 4 0.0 3 Da

yo rNigh t Heavyovercas t 0.2 3 0.1 2 0.0 6 0.0 4 0.0 3

wher e th

e dos e unde r actua l meterologica l condition s coul d excee d 1 rem . Down win d distance s to whichaction s shoul d b e considere

d are show

ni nTabl e 2 2 below . Not e tha t th e tabl e an

d it s terminolog

y ha s bee

nsimplie

d fo r us e b y night watchmen , firemen , an d policemen . Figur e 1 (pag e 11 ) ha s bee

nuse d t o estimat e distances . Distance s are rounde d of f t o th

e neares t 10 0 meters . Not e tha t th

e onl y tim e tha t action s woul d b e considere

d fo r mor e tha

nth e immediat e vicinity

o f th e plan t (i.e. , beyon d 10 0 meters ) occur a t nigh t durin g light breezes . We woul d therefor e recommen d th e followin

g protectiv

e actions . I ngeneral , th

e fire an

d polic e department s shoul d evacuat e t o a radiu s o f ver y



### 10 0Tabl e 22 . Downwin d Distance s to Whic hProtectiv e Action s Shoul d Be Considered for a

nAcciden t Involvin g Fiv e Time s th

e Quantit y o f Materia l i

nTabl e 1 3

-

Wind
Very light breez e - direc tio no f win

d show nb y smoke , dr i ft . Ligh t breez e - wind fel t o

n face , leave s rustle . Gentl e breez e - leave s an

d twin s inconstan t aotion ; win

d extend s light flag . O r an

y stronge r wind . 

### Da y (except heav y overcast )
0 meter s

0 meter s



### 0 Nigh t

Th i novercas t or 50+ % Les s than40 % clou d cove r clou

d cove r 40 0 40 0 meter s meter s

10 0 20 0 meter s meter s

0 0 - Da y or Nigh t
Heav y overcas t 10 0 meter s

0 meter s



### 0

roughl y 10 0 meters . Thi s would.b e a nappropriat e actio nfor an

y larg e fire t o preven t onlooker s fro m interferrin

g withfirefightin

g efforts . At nigh t protectiv e action s t o 20 0 meter s or 40 0 meter s downwin d woul d b

e recommended fo

r light winds . Evacuatio no r shelterin

g ar e bothappropriat e responses . Th

e loca l authoritie s shoul d selec t on e or th e othe r base

d o nthei r practicalitie s at th e time . Shelterin

g has . a

nadvantage i

ntha t mos t peopl e woul d alread

y b e indoor s a t night . Fo r shelterin

g t o b e effective , door s an d window s shoul d b

e close d an d furnace s an

d ai r conditioner s shoul d b e shu t off . Uponterminatio

no f th e release , door s an d window s shoul d the nb e opene d t o allo w an y radioactiv

e material s tha t hav e gotte ni nt o blo

w out . Evacuatio

n
o f th e are a i s als o a

nacceptabl e alternative , bu t i f i t canno t b e don e withi n
a fe w minute s i t ma

y no t b e a s effectiv

e a s sheltering . Downwin d distance s calculate d i nthi s manne r shoul d b e take na s approxi mat e guidelines , not a s rigi d criteria . I na nactua l situatio

nfireme

nan d policemenshoul d notic e wher e smok e i s blowin

g an d tak e reasonabl e step s t o



### 10 1preven t anyone stayin g i ndens e smok

e fo r a nextende

d time . I

naddition , sinc e th e uppe r ranq

e o f th e protectiv

e actio nguide s i s neve r exceeded , th e protec tiv e action s r[ecomende d abov e shoul d b

e considere

d optional , no t mandatory . No w conside r a license e fo r whic hth e quantit

y o f materia l subjec t t o releas e i s 5 0 time s th e quantit

y i nTabl e 13 . Thi s siz e releas e probabl y represent s a practica l uppe r boun d fo r a nacciden t a t an

y currentl y

license

d facility . Th

e followin

g tabl e o f downwin

d distance s ca

nb e calculated . Not e tha t inth

e daytim

e a rather modes t respons e i s appropriate , excep t fo r heavy , overcas t days wit hligh t breezes . A

t nigh t wit hver

y ligh t breezes , protectiv

e action s shoul d b e considere

d t o 150 0 meter s downwind . Th e tabl e als o show

s distance s downwin d t o whic hdose s might excee d th e upper en

d o f th e protectiv

e actio nguid e ranges .



### 10 2P. 6

Tabl e 23 . Downwin

d Distance s to Whic hProtectiv

e Action s Shoul d b

e Considere

d fo r a nAcciden t Involvin g 5 0 Time s th

e Quantity o f Materia l inTabl e 1 3 Night

Win d Stron g Su n
100 m 

### Da y Moderat e Su n
200 m Slight

Su n
200 m Thi n. . overcas t or 50+ % clou d cove r

- 1500 m (600m) * Less ,

tha n40 % clou d cove r
1500 m (600m ) Pa

y o r Nigh t
Heav y overcas t

700m (200m ) Ver y ligh t .breez e - direc tio no f smok

e show nb y smok e drift . Ligh t breez e win d fel t o

n face ^ leave s rustle . 100 m 100 m 200

m 600

m (200m ) 1000

m (400m ) 400 m

(100m )

Gentl e breez e - leave s an

d twig s i nconstan t motion , win

d extend s ligh

t flag . Moderat e breez e • raise s dus t an

d loos e paper , smal l branche s are moved . 100 m 100

m 300

m 400m

(100m ) 300m

100 m 100 m 200

m 200

m 200

m 200

m

Moderately , strong breez e - smal l tree s i

n lea f begi nto sway . 100 m 100

m 100

m 100

m 100m

*Distance s i

nparenthesi s are distance s to whichth e 5-re m upper en

d o f th e protectiv

e actio nguid e rang e .coul d b e exceeded .



### 10 3P. 7

I - . W

e hav e not define

d a nemergenc

y plannin

g zon e fo r eithe r th

e plum e expo sure pathwa

y or th e ingestio

npathwa

y a s i s done for nuclear powe r plan t emergenc

y planning . Instea

d w e hav e calculate

d respons e distances . The concep t o f th

e plannin

g zon e ha s n o practica l applicatio nfo r th e smalle r accident s tha t migh t occu r fo r thes e type s o f facilities . Ingeneral , th e respons e woul d b

e unde r th

e directio

no f th e loca l fire an

d polic e depart ment s jus t a s similar industria l accident s ar e handled . I t i s onl y necessar

y to identify

th e organization s tha t wil l b e notifie

d an d wil l respon

d rathe r tha na geographica l are a fo r whichplannin

g woul d take place .

2.5. 2 The Relocatio nPhas e

Afte r th

e initia l evacuatio no r sheltering , th

e nex t ste p i s to relocat e peopl e out o f "ho t spots " cause d b y depositio

no f gamm

a ra y emitters . Th e initia l respons e describe d abov e include

d th e assumptio

no f exposur e t o groun d shin e fo r 8 hour s indeterminin g th e distance s t o whic ha perso nmight.receiv

e
a dos e o f 1 re

m effectiv

e dos e equivalent . Th e relocatio

nphas e i s concerned wit hdose s received ; fro m groun d shin e fo r longer.period s o f time . Surveys should-begi nnea r th e releas e poin t and;work outwar d so tha t th

e highes t dos e level s ar e likely t o b e foun d earliest , ther e are only a limite

d number o f radioactiv e material s withth e potentia l t o cas e dose s exceedin g 1 re m withi n2 4 hour s outside the initia l respons e area . Thes e are : Na-22 , Na-24 , K-42 , V-48 , Mn-56 , Cu-64 , Tc-99m , Ru-105 , Sb-126 , an d W-187 . However , non e o f thes e material s i s currentl y possesse

d b y an y license e i

nquantitie s suc

htha t groun d shine coul d exqee d 1 re m withi n2 4 hours . A s a practica l matter , groun d shin e woul d no t b

e expected to excee d 4 0 mR/h r fro m an y acciden t a t a license d facility , excep t possibl y quit e near th e releas e poin t wher e fallout o f ver y large , heav

y particle s ma

y occur . "Hotspots " thu s shoul d b e foun d withi n8 hour s insid e th e initia l respons e
are a an d withi n2 4 hour s outside . Thes e time s ar e believe d t o b e practica l
an d als o adequat e t o allo w takin g protectiv

e action s i

na timel y

manner . Sinc e ther e ar e n

o officia l guideline s o ndos e rate s a t whichpeopl e shoul d b

e relocate

d pendin

g decontamination , w e sugges t here a valu e o f abou t 2 mR/h r t o b e roughl y

consisten t wit hNRC' s concep t o f restricte d area s an

d unrestricted areas . Unde r norma l circumstance s licensee s mus t kee p dose s t o peopl e i

nunrestricted area s t o les s tha n2 mre m i nan y on e hour . Lower or



### 10 4highe r value s coul db e use di nspecifi c circumstances . Lowe r value s ma y b e appropriat e fo r mor e sensitiv e member s o f th e population , suc ha s residence s
o f preschoo l ag e childre no r pregnan t women . Highe r value s coul db e use di f occupanc y

factor s woul db e lo w o r ther e wer e othe r restraints t o relocation . Fo r example , highway s o r parkin g lot s coul db e use da t highe r dos e level s base d o nlo

w occupanc y

factors . Critica l industria l processe s coul db e maintaine da t highe r dos e level s base doneconomi c needs , an dth e home s o f peopl e no t wishin g t o relocat e coul db e use dbase donth e concep t o f informe d consent .

2.5. 3 Th e Assessmen t Phas e

Soo nafte r th e releas e ha s ended , usuall y withi nha] f anhou r t o a nhour , th e assessmen t phas e o f th e emergenc y respons e shoul dbegin . Th e publi c wil l b e concerne dabou t whethe r th e dange r i s over , whethe r the y wer e exposed , whethe r the y

ar e contaminate dwit hradioactivity , whethe r thei r home s ar e contaminated , wit hradioactivity, " andwha t shoul dthe y do . Th e new s medi a wil l
wan t t o kno

w wha t happened . Bot hth e license e an dth e NR C mus t b e prepare dt o respondt o suc hconcern s promptl y o r suffe r damage dreputations , ill-will , and possibl y

lawsuits . A s discusse dabove , fiel dmeasurements t o locat e groun dcontaminatio nwil l b e underway . Th e questio no f whethe r peopl e wer e expose dca nonl y b e answere dwit h abundan t fiel dmeasurements . Generally , direc t measurement s o f radioactiv e materia l concentration s i nth e plume wil l no t b e possibl e becaus e o f a lac k o f time t o prepar e an

da lac k o f ability_t o locat e and-follo w th e plume . Never theless , plan t personne l shoul dattemp t suc hmeasurement s wit havailabl e instru mentatio nt o th e exten t possibl e becaus e i f the y ar e fortunat e enoug ht o ge t data , th e dat a wil l b e valuable . Th e answer s o f whethe r o r t o wha t degre e peopl e wer e expose dar e likel y t o b e bes t answere db

y measurement s o f groundcontaminatio nari dbioassa y

measure ments . Groun dcontaminatio nmeasurement s wil l allow a direc t determinatio no f whethe r ther e wa s a release . The y wil l als o allow

a quic k roug horder-of magnitud e estimate s o f th e time-integrate d exposur e t o peopl e i nth e areas . Th e time-integrate dexposur e i s equa l t o concentratio nxi nuCi/cm 3 time s tim e t i n seconds :



### 10 5P. 9



### * G C XXt = j
-

v 

### d wher e G C i s th e groundcontaminatio ni nuCi/cm 2 

### andth e depositio nvelocit y V . ma y b e take nt o b e 1 cm/s . Thi s valu e fo r th e depositio nvelocit y shoul d| normall y provid e conservativ e estimate s o f concentration s anddose , especiall y fo r distance s withi na fe w hundre dmeter s o f th e releas e point . th e effectiv e dos e equivalen t H i nrem s t o a nindividua l durin g plum e passag e is :

H = DC F xB xxxt xIO- 6



### wher e H = effectiv e dos e equivalen t fro m inhalation , rem s DC F = dos e conversio nfacto r fro m Tabl e 13 , rems/curi e inhale d B = breathin g rate , 26 6 cm 3 

### / s Xxt = concentratio ntime s time , uCi's/cm 3 

### 10- 6 = a 

### facto r t o conver t uC i t o curies .
A t thi s poin t tlpse ca nb e writte ndirectl y in-term s o f th e measure dgroun d contaminatio nGC . Th e dos e conversio nfacto r DC F fo r th e specifi c radionuclid e i s give ni nTabl e 13 : --"-.'. - - . _ ' ' .- ' -

H = 2.6 6 x10- 4 

### xDCF ; 

### xG C
Thi s equatio nprovide s a fas t metho dt o roughl y approximat e a person' s interna l dos e directl y fro m measurements , o f ground.contamination . Th e quantit y

o f materia l release dxa nb e roughl y approximate dfro

m groun d contaminatio nmeasurement s as . well , th e equatio nca nb e derive db y simila r means . Admittedly , thi s approac hwil l b e subjec t t o Ver y larg e uncertainties . However , ther e i s no t likel y t o b e an

y bette r means , t o estimat e th e siz e o f th e releas e fo r a t leas t severa l days . I nadditio nt o th e dos e estimate s describe dabove , bioassa y measurement s ma y b e desirabl e whethe r a releas e occurre do r no t becaus e ther e ma y b e no wa y t o prov e tha t ther e wa s no release . Nasa l swipe s andski ncontamination s ar e

10 6P.1 0

th e easies t t

o obtai nan

d hel p answer th

e questio

no f whethe r a particula r perso nwa s exposed . Urin e sample s ca

nprovid

e more sensitiv

e an d quantitativ

e estimate s o f dose . Feca l samplin g an d i nviv o countin

g ca nsupplement th

e abov e methods .

2.5. 4 th

e Foo d Pathwa

y

Fro m experienc e w

e kno w tha t th

e contaminate

d area wil l b

e primaril y

near th e plant an

d wil l rapidly

dro p of f withdistance , th e jo bo f a monitorin

g tea m woul d b

e to g o whereve r necessary . W e ca ndefin e th e monitorin

g capability needed . W

e canno t define?i nadvanc e a nactua l area tha t coul d beaffected .

3 . VALUE/IMPAC f

3. 1 Alternative s

* Thre e alternative s hav e bee nidentified : (1 ) adoptin g aregulatio n containin

g th e propose

d "requirements , (2 ) imposin g th e requirement s b

y licens e conditio

nrather tha

nb y regulation , an

d (3 ) impose

d n o ne w requirement s wit h regar d t o emergenc

y planning . Th

e firs t tw

o alternative s woul d hav e essentiall y th e sam e valu e an d costs . Thos e value s an d cost s are discusse d below . Th

e thir d alternative , n

o ne w requirements , woul d hav e essentiall y

n o valu e or costs .

3. 2 Value o f th

e Propose

d Actio n

Valu e ca nb e expresse

d i nterm s o f ris k reduction . Conside r a releas e i nwhic hth e effectiv

e dos e equivalen t at a distanc e
o f 10 0 meter s i s 5 rems , assumin g Clas s F atmospher e stability an d a win d spee d
o f 1 meter/sec . Th e area ove r whichth e 1 re m protectiv

e actio nguid e woul d b

e exceede d woul d b

e 0.00 6 square miles . I f thi s area containe d peopl e at th

e average populatio

ndensit

y o f th e continenta l Unite d State s (7 2 people/squar e mile ) i t woul d contai no nth e average about hal f a person .



### 10 7However , th e facilitie s under consideratio nar e usually

locate d i nbuilt-u

p areas . A

surve y o f potentiall y

affecte

d licensee s show

s tha t typica l popula tio ndensitie s are about 3,00 0 people/squar e mile. * Thu s perhap s abou t 2 0 peopl e woul d typicall y

b e i nth e area . Generall y

about 80 % o f peopl e are i nth e build ing s s o about 4 peopl e woul d b e outdoor s an

d 1 6 woul d b

e indoors . " Th e average dos e to a perso noutdoor s i

nth e area wa s calculate d t o b e abou t 3 rems . (Thi s valu e wa s calculate

d fo r a nope nfield ; dose s i

nurba n
area s woul d b

e less , but w

e ignore tha t factor. ) I naddition , dose s t o peopl e i nbuilding s woul d b e hal f thi s dos e becaus e o f protectio nprovide

d b y th e building . • , "."•'•• - . th e tota l collectiv e dos e fo

r th e urba narea thus migh t b e 4 0 person-rems . Protectiv

e action s tha t woul d b e availabl e to thes e peopl e are primaril y evacuatio

nan d sheltering . Evacuatio nwoul d be . th

e more effectiv

e i f i t coul d b e don e promptl y

befor e th

e plum e arrived . Shelterin g woul d ofte

nb e mor e practica l becaus e i t ca nb e don e faster an

d mos t peopl e ar

e alread

y inside . Ver y roughly

th e dos e savings , du

e t o protectiv

e action s for thi s advers e meteorolog

y coul d b

e pu t a t 2 0 person-rem , abou t hal f th e potentia l dose . . Assumin g tha t th

e chanc e o f deathdu e t o cance r du

e to dose s o f severa l rem s i s i nth e range betwee

nzero t o 10- 4 cance r deaths/rem . the expected.numbe r
o f live s save

d du e to th e protectiv

e action s woul d b

e les s tha

n0.00 2 fo

r advers e meteorolog

y an d roughly

0.0000 2 live s average d over al l meteorology . . Our estimat e o f th

e frequenc

y o f a majo r releas e i s les s than10- 4 /year\ . insuranc e statistic s availabl e fro m insuranc e companie s dealin g i ncommercia l -structures.indicat e fire losse s i nunsprinklere

d commercia l an

d industria l facilitie s t o b

e 0.006/year . Sprinkler failure rate s are estimate d t o "b e 0.03 8 shoul d a fir

e occur.* * Th

e fire los s rat e fo r a sprinklere

d facility shoul d thu s b

e roughly

2 xl0- 4 /year . I t i s no w assume d tha t additiona l sit e y specifi c factor s wil l reduc e th e probability , o f a releas e to roughl y 10- 4 /year .

*J . P . McBride , "Economi c Consequence s o f Accidenta l Release s fro m Fue l Fabricatio

nan d Radioisotop

e Processin

g Plants, " NUREG/CR-0222 , 1979 , Appendi xA . **Nationa l Fire Protectio nAssociation , Fire Protectio nHandbook , 14thedition , Tabl e 14-19 , pag

e 14-5 .



### 10 8Example s o f suc hfactor s woul dbe : materia l kep t i nfireproo f storag e thu s

preventin g significan t release , filte r system doe s no t fai l thu s preventin g release , o r fireme nextinguis hfir e befor e radioactiv e materia l i s heate dho t epqug hfo r a significan t release , an d many more . Thu s protectiv e action s coul db e expecte dt o save 0.0000000 2 live s pe r yea r pe r facility . I f a lif e i s give na valu e o f ten-millio ndollars , th e valu e o f protectiv e action s a t a typica l sit e i na nurba nare a i s $0.2 0 pe r facilit y pe r yea r o r less . Now

conside r a releas e i nwhic hth e effectiv e dos e equivalen t a t a distanc e
o f 100 0 meter s i s 5 rems assumin g Clas s F atmospheri c stabilit y an d win dspee d. o f . 1 meter/sec . A t thi s leve l earl y injurie s hav e stillbee navoided . Th e
are a ove r whic hth e ~1 re m protectiv e actio nguid e woul db e exceede dwoul db e 0.1 5 squar e miles . Fo r a typica l buil t u p sit e thi s are a woul dcontai nabou t 45 0 people. y Th e averag e dbs e t o a perso noutdoor s i nth e are a wa s calculate dt o b e abou t 3 rem s an

d t o a perso nindoor s wa s calculate dt o b e 1. 5 rems . Th e tota l collectiv e dos e assumin g some peopl e ar e indoor s a s previousl y discusse dmigh t b e 80 0 person-rem . Th e dos e saving s du e t o protectiv e action s coul db e abou t hal f o f thi s o r 40 0 person-rem . Live s save d du e t o thes e protectiv e action s Coul d b e a p t o 6.0 4 lif e fo r advers e meteorolog y and 0.0 4 lif e fo r averag e meteorology . Wit hth e frequenc y

o f a majo r releas e a t 10- 4 /year , protectiv e action s migh t perhap s sav e u p t o 0.00000 4 lif e pe r yea r pe r facility .

_I f a life " i s give na valu e o f ten-millio ndollars , th e valu e o f protectiv e action s i na-densel y populate durba nare a i s $ 4 o r les s pe r facilit y pe r year .

3.3 . Cos t - •_"--•-.""•• "

Fo r th e smalle r clas s o f accidents , thos e exceedin g 1 re m offsit e bu t no t 5 rem s a t 100 0 meters , th e license e i s considere dt o hav e a 50-pag e pla ntellin g whath e woul dd o i nth e even t o f emergencies suc ha s fires . Cos t dat a wer e obtaine dfro m tw o radiopharmaceutica l manufacturers . Bot h licensee s calculate dth e cos t o f th e onsit e contingenc y plan s require db

y order . Th e manufacture r wit ha smal l program and limite dfacilitie s estimate dth e initia l set-u pcos t $84,000 . Annua l operatin g cost s wer e estimate dt o b e



### 10 9P
. 1 3

$18,000 . Labo r accounte dfo r 1/ 2 t o 2/ 3 o f th e cos t ineac hcategory . Labo r
wa s give na valu e o f $30/hou r wit hn o overhea dcharged . Th e mai nequipmen t cost s wer e fo r radios , extr a monitorin g equipmen t fo r emergenc y use , andextr a respirators . Th e larges t annua l expens e i s fo r training . Othe r operatin g expense s ar e fo r audits[ , drills , an dequipmen t replacemen t an dmaintenance . T o plac e al l expense s o nanannual - basi s th e initia l set-u pcos t wa s divide d b

y iO , assumin g a ten-yea r usefu l lif e o f a plan . Thu s annua l cost s
ar e estimate dt o be $26,000/year/facilit y fo r thi s radiopharmaceutica l manufac ture r wit ha smal l program . A secon dradiopharmaceutica l manufacture r wit hon e o f th e larges t program s tha t woul d b e covere db y th e regulatio nreporte dtha t th e cos t o f establishin g thei r on-sit e radiological.contingenc y pla nwa s mor e tha n$550,000 . N o annual " operatin g cost s wer e given . Assumin g a 10-yea r pla nlif e an doperatin g cost s o f $18,000/yea r (th e estimat e o f th e othe r manufacturer ) th e tota l annua l cos t i s $73,000/year / facilit y

fo r larg e facilities . Cost s t o NR C t o review an dinspec t plan s hav e bee nestimate dt o b e $4,000/year/facility .

3. 4 Value/Impac t o f Alternative s

Th e cost s o f emergenc y preparednes s ar e expecte dt o excee dth e benefit s i n term s o f protectin g publi c healt han d safet y

a s show

nbelow .

Tabl e 24 . Compariso no f Cost s an dBenefit s o f Specia l Emergenc y

Preparednes s
Siz e o f License e . V Cos t Benefi t Smal l - Possessing" 5 time s quantit y i nTabl e 1 3 $30,000/y r $0.20/y r Larg e - Possessin g 5 0 time s quantit y i nTabl e 1 3 $77,000/y r $4/y r



### 110P.1 4

4. 0 STATUTOR

YCONSIDERATION S

4. 1 NR C Regulator

y Authorit

y

Th e Atomi c Energ

y Act , give s NR

C authority

t o adop t regulation s fo r protec tin g publi c healt

han d safety . Thi s propose d rul e woul d b

e justifie

d unde r tha t authority .

4. 2 Agreemen t Stat e

The " questio

ni s whethe r NRC' s Agreemen t State s woul d adop t offsit e emer genc y preparednes s requirement s similar to NRC's . Th e NRC' s Offic e o f Stat e Program s intend s t

o mak e thi s requiremen t a matte r requirin

g compatability . Thus , NR C woul d require tha t Agreemen t State s adop t requirement s similar to NRC's .

4. 3 Environmenta l Impac t Appraisa l

Th e NRC' s regulation s [1 0 CF R§ 51.5(b) ] require tha t substantiv e an d significan t amendment s (jfro m the-standpoin t o f environmenta l impact)-o f regula tion s requir e a

nenvironmenta l impac t statement . T o make th

e .findin

g tha t amendment s are no t substantiv

e an d significan t fro m th e standpoint o f environmenta l impact , NR C regulation s [1 0 CF R§ 51.5(c)(1) ] requir e th

e preparatio

no f a negativ

e declaratio

nan d a nenvironmenta l impac t appraisal . Th e environmenta l impac t appraisa l roust includ e [1 0 CF

R§ 51.7(b)] T

(1 ) A descriptio

no f th e propose

d "action .
(2 ) A summar y descriptio

no f th e probabl e impact s o f th e proposed actio

n
o nth e environment .
(3 ) Th e basi s fo

r th e conclusio

ntha t n

o environmenta l impac t statemen t
nee d b e prepared .



### Il lTh e propose

d actio ni s a rul e t o requir e emergenc y procedure s fo

r off sit e releases . A

descriptio

no f th e propose

d requirement s i s containe d i n Sectio n1.1 , "Descriptio

no f th e Propose

d Action. " A summar y descriptio

no f th e probabl e impact s o f th e propose

d actio no n th e environmen t i s containe d i nSectio

n3.2 , "Valu

e o f th e Propose

d Action. " Th e basi s for th

e conclusio

ntha t n

o environmenta l impac t statemen t nee d b e prepare

d i s tha t th

e benefit s to publi c safet y are neither substantiv e 'no r significan t a s describe d i nSectio

n3.2 , "Valu

e o f th e Propose

d Action, "
an d summarize

d i nTabl e 24 .

5 . CONCLUSION S

Th e conclusio

no f thi s Regulator y Analysi s i s tha t accident s at fue l cycl e
an d othe r radioactiv

e materia l licensee s pos e a ver y smal l ris k to th

e public . Seriou s accident s are infrequent an d woul d generall y

involv e relativel y

smal l radiationdose s to fe w peopl e locate

d i nsmal l areas . Thi s i s not to_sa

y tha t radiatio

ndose s large-enoug ht o excee

d guide s for takin g protectiv

e action s canno t occur . I t may . b e possibl e t o hav

e a nacciden t
a t som e license

d facilitie s whic

hwoul d caus e offsit e dose s exceedin g protectiv

e actio nguides . However , offsit e radiatio ndose s larg

e enoug hto caus e acut e fatality

or eve nearly injur y fro m a nairborn

e releas e are no

t considered plausible . For a license e possessin g 5 time s th

e amoun t o f materia l i nTabl e 13 , we conclude tha t protectiv e action s ina

nurba narea-might save.u p t o 0.0000000 2 live s pe r yea r per facility . Perhap s abou t 2 0 t o 3 0 licensee s hav e a possibil it y o f suc ha naccident o

r worse . For thes e iTacilitie s w e recommen

d ther e shoul d b

e notificatio

no f local authorities . However , n o specia l facilities , equipment , o

r othe r resource s fo r respondin

g are considere

d necessary . For a license e wit h5 0 time s a s muchreleasabl e materia l a s inTabl e 13 , we conclude tha t protectiv e action s i

na buil t u

p are a might sav

e u p t o 0.000000 4 live s pe r yea r per facility . Ther e ma y b e 2 or 3 licensee s witha capability o f
a nacciden t thi s severe . Th e cos t o f thi s preparednes s ma y no t b e justifie

d i nterm s o f protectin

g publi c healthan

d safety . Rather w e woul d justify

i t i nterm s o f th e intangibl e benefi t o f bein

g abl e t o reassure th e publi c tha t i f a

nacciden t happen s loca l authoritie s wil l b

e notifie

d so the

y make take appropriat e actions .



### 11 2PJ 6 

# x M



# __ m 

# _____mmmxWxmmm,

Althoug hemergenc

y preparednes s fo

r fue l cycl e an

d othe r radioactiv e materia l licensee s canno t b e show nt o b e cos t effective , th e NR C feel s tha t
suc hpreparednes s represent s a pruden t ste p whichshoul d b

e take ni nlin e wit h th e NRC' s philosoph

y o f defense-in-depth , t o minimiz e th e advers e effect s whichcoul d resul t fro m a severe acciden t a t on e o f it s facilities .



### 11 3