IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-50418

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

ANTHONY NAVARRO SPENCER, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:13-CR-2506-1

Before JOLLY, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

After masterminding several criminal schemes involving identity theft, 

forgery, and financial fraud,1 defendant Anthony Navarro Spencer fled the 

United States, using his brother’s U.S. passport—which he stole—to enter 

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

1 Spencer’s extensive criminal history includes convictions for forgery; money 

laundering; identity theft; making false financial statements (multiple times); writing checks 

with insufficient funds (multiple times); obtaining money/property by false pretenses; grand 

theft (multiple times); theft; petty theft; theft from an elder or dependent adult; inflicting 

corporal injury on his spouse; and carrying a concealed weapon.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 16, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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Mexico and evade apprehension for some of his previously uncharged criminal 

conduct.2 After the dust settled, Spencer attempted to reenter the United 

States using the same stolen passport, but was thwarted at the border because 

his brother had reported the passport as lost or stolen. Caught, Spencer pled 

guilty to improper use of another person’s passport, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

1544.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court noted that Spencer’s lengthy 

criminal history “reflects a continuous pattern of criminal conduct that covers 

more than thirty years” and is “unrelenting.” After applying the § 3553 factors, 

the district court sentenced Spencer to an above-guidelines sentence: thirty 

months in prison and three years of supervised release. The district court then 

orally pronounced several special conditions of Spencer’s supervised release, 

including prohibitions against self-employment and jobs involving the need to 

handle financial matters or sensitive information.3 The district court also 

pronounced this restriction on Spencer’s ability to travel:

As a condition of your supervised release, you are going to be 

prohibited from traveling or residing in Mexico and Canada at any 

time during the term of supervised release. For that matter, you 

are not going to be allowed to travel anywhere in the world without 

the specific permission of your probation officer. 

Subsequently, the district court entered a written judgment that includes this 

special condition related to travel: “The defendant shall not be allowed to 

travel during the term of supervision.” Notably, the special travel condition in 

2 When he absconded, Spencer was under parole supervision; he was still under parole 

supervision when he committed the crime underlying this appeal.

3 The jobs prohibited while on supervised release were real estate agent, sales 

representative, real estate broker, loan officer, financial consultant, financial advisor, bank 

teller, accountant, property manager, auditor, treasurer, or any other job involving monetary 

transactions.

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the written judgment omits the phrase from the oral pronouncement that 

allows travel with the permission of Spencer’s probation officer.

Spencer appeals the imposition of these supervised-released conditions. 

I. Employment-Based Conditions

Spencer argues that the district court plainly erred in imposing 

occupational restrictions as special conditions of his supervised release because 

the restrictions are not reasonably related to his offense conduct and are not

imposed to the minimum extent necessary.4

There are several statutes and sentencing guidelines that affect our 

analysis, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3563, 3583; U.S.S.G. §§ 5D1.3, 5F1.5, but the 

nub of the case is that there needs to be “a reasonably direct relationship” 

between the occupational conditions and “the conduct relevant to the offense 

of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a)(1); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1) (using the 

phrase “reasonably related”); id. § 3553(a)(1), (2). The imposition of the 

conditions also needed to be “reasonably necessary to protect the public 

because there is reason to believe that, absent such restriction, [Spencer] will 

continue to engage in unlawful conduct similar to that for which [he] was 

convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a)(2); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). 

After stealing a passport, Spencer represented himself as the person 

described on the passport and presented that passport to federal officials in an 

attempt to avoid revealing his true identity. The district court’s decision to 

restrict Spencer’s access to self-employment and financial services jobs that 

involve sensitive information—such as personal identification documents and 

private financial records—is related directly to Spencer’s offense conduct. 

4 Spencer did not object to the employment-based supervised-release conditions. 

Accordingly, we review his claim for plain error. See United States v. Weatherton, 567 F.3d 

149, 152 (5th Cir. 2009). 

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Moreover, the imposed conditions are reasonably necessary to protect the 

public by denying Spencer access to sensitive documents and information while 

on supervised release. Given the reasonably direct relationship between the 

conduct underlying Spencer’s crime and the employment-based restrictions, 

we conclude that the district court did not plainly err in imposing the special

conditions for the term of Spencer’s supervised release.5

II. Travel Conditions

The written judgment prevents all travel while on supervised release. 

The oral pronouncement prevents all such travel “without the prior permission 

of [Spencer’s] parole officer.” The parties agree that there is a discrepancy 

between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment regarding whether 

Spencer can travel with permission or cannot travel at all.6 However, the

parties disagree as to whether the permission-versus-no-permission

discrepancy is a “conflict” or an “ambiguity.” Compare United States v. 

Martinez, 250 F.3d 941, 942 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that the oral 

pronouncement controls when a conflict exists between an oral pronouncement 

and the written judgment), with United States v. Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d 934, 

935 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that the intent of the sentencing court controls 

when the discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and written judgment

amounts to an ambiguity). 

5 To the extent that the supervised-release conditions are not the type of “occupational 

restrictions” captured by § 5F1.5(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines, the conditions are subject 

to lesser standard of scrutiny and would necessarily withstand challenge on appeal. Accord 

United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 171 n.18 (5th Cir. 2001).

6 Because a defendant has no opportunity to object to conditions of supervised release 

that are included for the first time in the written judgment, we review the imposition of such

conditions for an abuse of discretion rather than plain error. United States v. Mudd, 685 

F.3d 473, 480 (5th Cir. 2012).

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In this case, however, this ambiguity-versus-conflict distinction is an 

academic matter without palpable, practical implications for Spencer’s 

sentence. If the discrepancy amounts to a “conflict,” the written judgment need 

only be corrected so that it is consistent with the oral pronouncement. See

Martinez, 250 F.3d at 942. In such case, the written judgment would be 

modified to state that Spencer is banned from travel “without the specific 

permission of [his] probation officer.” And, if the discrepancy is an “ambiguity,” 

the written judgment need only be modified to capture the district court’s 

intent regarding the travel restriction. Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d at 935. Here, 

the best evidence of the district court’s intent is its own statement at 

sentencing that Spencer is banned from travel “without the specific permission 

of [his] probation officer.” All roads lead to the same conclusion: Spencer 

cannot travel without the permission of his probation officer. 

The next question is whether the Court should remand for entry of a 

modified/clarified judgment or amend/clarify the judgment here. This Court 

has the option to chart either course. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (providing that 

federal appellate courts “may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any 

judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and 

may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, 

decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just 

under the circumstances”). We choose the latter course and modify the special 

travel condition in the written judgment, such that it now reads: “The 

defendant shall not be allowed to travel during the term of supervision without 

the specific permission of his probation officer.” 

III. Conclusion

We AFFIRM the employment-based conditions. We AFFIRM the travelbased restrictions AS MODIFIED to reflect that Spencer may travel during the 

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term of his supervised release if he obtains the specific permission of his 

probation officer.

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