UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4666

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

DARIUS STEPHEN MCNAIRY,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4686

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

BRIAN EUGENE HARGRAVE,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, 

District Judge. (1:14-cr-00008-CCE-2; 1:14-cr-00008-CCE-1)

Submitted: April 16, 2015 Decided: April 20, 2015

Before AGEE and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Terry F. Rose, Smithfield, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley 

Rand, United States Attorney, Lisa B. Boggs, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Darius McNairy and Brian Hargrave appeal the district 

court’s criminal judgments entered pursuant to their guilty 

pleas to charges of violating the Hobbs Act and using a firearm 

during a crime of violence, and sentencing them to 140 and 147 

months’ imprisonment, respectively. On appeal, Appellants 

challenge only their Hobbs Act convictions. We affirm.

The Hobbs Act makes it a crime to commit robbery or 

extortion to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce or the movement 

of any commodity in commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012). The 

Hobbs Act “requires proof of two elements: (1) the underlying 

robbery or extortion crime, and (2) an effect on interstate 

commerce.” United States v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350, 353 (4th 

Cir. 2003). Proof that a business acquired supplies or goods 

from out-of-state sources will normally satisfy the commerce 

element. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 

(1960); see also United States v. Curcio, 759 F.2d 237, 241 (2d 

Cir. 1985). Commerce is also affected if the robbery depletes 

the assets of the business. Williams, 342 F.3d at 354-55.

Appellants contend that the district court lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction over this case because the commerce element 

was not proven. To the contrary, the commerce element 

“implicates the power of Congress to regulate the conduct at 

issue, not the jurisdiction of the court to hear a particular 
4

case.” Cf. United States v. Carr, 271 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 

2001) (construing the commerce element in the federal arson 

statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000)*). Therefore, Appellants 

“merely contest[] the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

that element of the offense.” Id.

In the context of guilty pleas, Rule 11(f) of the Federal 

Rules of Criminal Procedure explains that “the court should not 

enter a judgment upon such [] plea[s] without making such 

inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for 

the plea[s].” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f). Because Appellants did 

not object to the factual basis for their pleas before the 

district court, our review is for plain error. United States v. 

Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 2009). Under this 

standard, Appellants must show that an error (1) occurred, 

(2) was plain, and (3) affected their substantial rights. Id.

at 342-43 (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 

(1993)). Even then, we will only exercise our discretion to 

correct the error if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 

507 U.S. at 732 (citations, alterations, and internal quotation 

marks omitted).

 * The current version is available at 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) 

(2012).
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We find no error in the district court’s acceptance of the 

factual basis for Appellants’ guilty pleas, plain or otherwise. 

Appellants stole cash from a North Carolina beauty salon, which 

purchased supplies from another business in Virginia. 

Appellants’ counterarguments are unconvincing. That 

Appellants “only” stole $200 is irrelevant. See United 

States v. Capozzi, 347 F.3d 327, 337 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting 

that Government need only show “de minimis” effect on interstate 

commerce). The factual basis need not have specified that the 

beauty salon was a “commercial entity.” See Williams, 342 F.3d 

at 352 (holding that the robbery of a drug dealer satisfied the 

commerce element). Finally, despite Appellants’ protests to the 

contrary, the factual basis specified that the stolen cash 

belonged to the beauty salon, not to the owner in her individual 

capacity. We thus hold that the factual basis was adequate to 

satisfy the commerce element.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgments. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED