alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                                      Exhibit 23

               CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

   We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-8 No.'s 33-09117, 33-24517, 33-44397, 33-58108, 33-73584, 33-86968,
333-19015, 333-35025, 333-68753, 333-69993, 333-33538 and 333-33832) pertaining
to the 1992 Stock Option Plan, 1992 Restricted Stock Plan, Employee Stock
Purchase Plan, 1986 Stock Option Plan, the Adaptive Broadband Tax-deferred
Savings and Deferred Profit Sharing Plan, the Non-Qualified Stock Option
Agreement between California Microwave, Inc. and Frederick Lawrence dated
effective as of July 16, 1997, and the Supplemental Executive Deferred
Compensation Plan of our report dated July 21, 2000, with respect to the
consolidated financial statements of Adaptive Broadband Corporation included in
the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended June 30, 2000.

   Our audits also included the financial statement schedule of Adaptive
Broadband Corporation listed in Item 14(a)(ii). This schedule is the
responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an
opinion based on our audits. In our opinion, the financial statement schedule
referred to above, when considered in relation to the basic financial
statements taken as a whole, presents fairly in all material respects the
information set forth therein.

                                          /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

Palo Alto, California
August 28, 2000
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Lamont Griswold, Appellant.

—Judgment unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed, in accordance with the following Memorandum: The jury convicted defendant of attempted murder in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 125.25 [1]); assault in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.10 [1]); assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05 [2]); and three counts of burglary in the first degree (Penal Law § 140.30 [2] [two counts], [3] [one count]). The evidence demonstrated that defendant unlawfully entered the dwelling of Eugenia Golding, his former wife, and, while there, he stabbed Ms. Golding and cut Mary Ellen Van Velson with a knife.

Under count four of the indictment, defendant was convicted of a violation of subdivision (2) of Penal Law § 140.30 for having entered the dwelling with intent to commit crimes therein and having caused physical injury to Ms. Golding. The fifth count, of which defendant was also convicted, was identical to the fourth, except that it charged defendant with having caused physical injury to Ms. Van Velson. Where, as here, there is but one unlawful entry and the indictment charges two counts of burglary in the first degree under the same subdivision of the statute, defendant may be convicted of only one count of burglary *(see, People v Perrin,*56 AD2d 957; *see also, People v Davis,*165 AD2d 610). Although the issue is unpreserved, the People concede that one count of burglary should be dismissed. Thus, we reverse the conviction under the fifth count of the indictment and we dismiss that count *(see, People v Perrin, supra).*

The same rationale does not apply, however, to defendant’s conviction of burglary in the first degree under the sixth count of the indictment because that count charged defendant with a violation of subdivision (3) of Penal Law § 140.30 for having used a dangerous instrument while in the victim’s dwelling *(see, People v Davis, supra).*

*1039We further conclude that defendant’s sentence was neither harsh nor excessive. The remaining contentions raised by defendant have not been preserved for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]) and we decline to reach them in the interest of justice. (Appeal from Judgment of Monroe County Court, Connell, J.—Attempted Murder, 2nd Degree.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Boomer, Balio and Lowery, JJ.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATIONS

I, Brian E. Dearing, certify that:



|1. |  | I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of ARI Network
Services, Inc.;                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
|-- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|  
|2. |  | Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
this quarterly report; and
|  
|3. |  | Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash
flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
quarterly report.                       

Date: March 16, 2004

|       |  |                            
|------ |  | ---------------------------
|By:    |  | /s/ Brian E. Dearing       
|       |  |                            
|By:    |  | Brian E. Dearing           
|Title: |  | Chairman, President and CEO

This certification accompanies this Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by
the Company for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
<PAGE>
Exhibit 10.48

                    Schedule to Form of Management Agreement
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
<S>                          <C>                                    <C>     <C>                              <C>
Project                      Management Firm                         Beds   County/State                     Location
Centerville, Ohio            Balanced Care at Centerville, Inc.      198    Montgomery County, Ohio          1046 North Jefferson
                                                                                                             Street, Medina, Ohio
                                                                                                             44256

Medina, Ohio                 Balanced Care at Medina, Inc.           137    Medina, Ohio                     8630 Washington
                                                                                                             Church Road,Miamisburg,
                                                                                                             Ohio 45342

Shippensburg, Pennsylvania   Balanced Care at Shippensburg, Inc.     120    Cumberland County, Pennsylvania  120 Walnut Bottom Road,
                                                                                                             Shippensburg, PA  17257
                             Senior Care Operators of Shippensburg,
                             LLC
</TABLE>
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 17

- 4849

_____________________________
R ICHARD J. H ANCHETT , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County

. Michael A. Flowers , Judge

. September 6, 2018

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
M AKAR , O STERHAUS , and J AY , JJ., concur.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Richard J. Hanchett, pro se
, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
**Exhibit 99.6**

 

**CONSENT OF IAN R. MCDONALD**

 

I hereby consent to the use of and reference to my name, and the information derived from my Report on Reserves Data dated February 16, 2011, contained in the sections entitled “Reserves, Production and Related Information” and “Interests of Experts” in the Annual Information Form of Nexen Inc. (the “Corporation”) dated February 16, 2011, which is included in the Corporation’s Annual Report on Form 40-F for the year ended December 31, 2010 (the “Form 40-F”), as described or incorporated by reference in: (i) the Form 40-F; (ii) the Corporation’s Registration Statements on Form S-8 (File Nos. 333-119276, 333-118019 and 333-13574, (iii) the Corporation’s Registration Statements on Form F-3 (File Nos. 333-142670, 333-142652 and 333-84786, and (iv) the Corporation’s Registration Statement on Form F-10 (File No. 333-159551), filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, as applicable.

 
| By:    | /s/   IAN R. MCDONALD                   |   |
|--------|-----------------------------------------|--------|
|   |                                    |   |
| Name:  | Ian   R. McDonald                       |
| Title: | Internal   Qualified Reserves Evaluator |
|        |                                         |        |  |

 

Calgary, Canada

February 24, 2011

 

1

----
EXHIBIT 10.1
                                  ------------


                               GEORGE STEWART, CPA
                     2301 SOUTH JACKSON STREET, SUITE 101-G
                            SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98144
                        (206) 328-8554 FAX (206) 328-0383




To Whom It May Concern:

The  firm  of  George  Stewart,  Certified  Public  Accountant  consents  to the
Financial Statements of Coronation Acquisition,  Corp., as of March 31, 2002 and
March 31, 2001,  in any filings that are necessary now or in the future with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.



Very truly yours,

/s/George Stewart, CPA
--------------------------
George Stewart, CPA

April 24, 2002









                                 Page 51 of 52
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS FOUND ON
PAGES 4 THROUGH 10 OF THE COMPANY'S FORM 10-QSB FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED JULY
30, 2000, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCES TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-30-2000
<CASH>                                         121,961
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  147,025
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (35,698)
<INVENTORY>                                  1,740,259
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,577,688
<PP&E>                                       4,099,259
<DEPRECIATION>                             (1,991,869)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,138,538
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,053,130
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         2,867
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,645,694
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,138,538
<SALES>                                      2,570,866
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,570,866
<CGS>                                          788,327
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,121,849
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 (784)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              12,062
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (388,526)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (388,526)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (388,526)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.24)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.24)


</TABLE>
the hearing. 1Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

setting the matter for a three-hour evidentiary hearing. 

Appellant also argues that the district court abused its 

discretion when it modified the parties' custody arrangement without 

granting appellant's request for the court to interview the children 

regarding their custodial preferences. Custody matters are within the 

sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal 

absent an abuse of discretion. Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 

922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996). When modifying custody, the district court was 

required to consider evidence of the children's custodial preferences, but it 

was not required to interview the children. NRS 125.480(4)(a). In the 

proceedings below, the parties did not offer evidence of the children's 

custodial preferences, but did present evidence of conflict between the 

parents, appellant's alcohol abuse, domestic abuse in appellant's home, 

and other factors relevant to the best interests of the children. See NRS 

125.480(4). In light of this evidence, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion when it determined that it was not necessary to interview the 

'The transcript of the hearing as it appears in the record on appeal 

is abridged and there is no support for appellant's assertion that he 

advised the district court that the time allotted was insufficient. 

Appellant has the burden of providing this court with an adequate 

appellate record and when "appellant fails to include necessary 

documentation in the record, we necessarily presume that the missing 

portion supports the district court's decision." Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. 

Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 1947A 
children and granted respondent primary physical custody of the parties' 

children based on the children's best interests. 

For the reasons discussed above, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 2 

J. 

Gibbons 

Pickering 

J. 

cc: Hon. Charles J. Hoskin, District Judge, Family Court Division 

Christopher Richardson 

Flangas Dalacas Law Group, Inc. 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

2Appellant's appeal statement also challenges the portion of the 

district court's March 11, 2014, order granting respondent's countermotion 

for attorney fees. Because that order did not set forth an amount of 

attorney fees, any challenge to the attorney fees award is premature and 

not properly before this court in the context of this appeal. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 3 

(0) I947A )40:414
FILED

July 16, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE 

 MAY 1998 SESSION

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

)

Appellee, ) No. 03C01-9707-CC-00238

 )

) Blount County

v. ) 

) Honorable D. Kelly Thomas, Jr., Judge 

)

EUGENE McCARTER, ) (Probation revocation)

) 

Appellant. )

For the Appellant: For the Appellee:

Mack Garner John Knox Walkup 

District Public Defender Attorney General of Tennessee

419 High Street and

Maryville, TN 37804 Michael J. Fahey, II

Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee 

 425 Fifth Avenue North

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

Michael L. Flynn

District Attorney General

and

Edward P. Bailey, Jr.

Assistant District Attorney General

Blount County Courthouse

363 High Street

Maryville, TN 37804

OPINION FILED:____________________

AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 20

Joseph M. Tipton

Judge
2

O P I N I O N

The defendant, Eugene McCarter, appeals as of right from the Blount

County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation. He argues that the trial court erred

by revoking his probation. We disagree.

The defendant was convicted on December 5, 1994, upon the entry of a

guilty plea to the offense of selling more than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds

of marijuana, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I,

standard offender to two years to be suspended after serving six months in the county

jail. On June 9, 1995, a probation violation warrant was issued, and the defendant’s

probation was revoked on July 25, 1995, following a probation revocation hearing. The

defendant was released again on December 12, 1995. Another probation violation

warrant was issued on June 21, 1996.

At the revocation hearing, Stan Miller, the defendant’s probation officer,

testified that the defendant admitted to him that he used alcohol while on probation. He

said that the defendant voluntarily went for detoxification treatment but that the

defendant left after a few days. He stated that on June 6, the defendant was arrested

for public intoxication. He stated that the defendant failed to report to him after June 5,

failed to maintain suitable employment, and failed to complete community service. At

the hearing, the defendant admitted that he drank beer while on probation and that he

failed to report to his probation officer. The trial court revoked the defendant’s

probation and ordered the defendant to serve his sentence. 

After full consideration of the record, the briefs, and the law governing the

issues presented, we are of the opinion that the evidence justifies the revocation and

that no error of law exists that would require a reversal. Therefore, we determine that
3

the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim.

App.

 

Joseph M. Tipton, Judge 

CONCUR:

 

Joe G. Riley, Judge 

 

Curwood Witt, Judge
FW: presentation

MOORE Beth 

t

o

:

Jordan Page 02/16/2010 01:07 PM

Cc: "FULTS Janet E", "MASTERSON Kevin"

From: "MOORE Beth" <MOORE.Beth@deq.state.or.us>

To: Jordan Page/DC/USEPA/US@EPA

Cc: "FULTS Janet E" <Janet.E.Fults@state.or.us>, "MASTERSON Kevin" 

<MASTERSON.Kevin@deq.state.or.us>

Jordon.  More Pesticide data.  Let me know if you have questions.

Beth Moore

General Permits Coordinator

DEQ WQ-Surface Water Management

Phone: (503) 229-6402

Fax: (503) 229-6037

From: MASTERSON Kevin 

Sent: Friday, February 12, 2010 11:14 AM

To: MOORE Beth

Cc: KISHIDA Koto

Subject: presentation

Beth,

As per our discussion, see Diuron detections toward the end of the presentation.   There were 46 detects

(most of any of the 100+ we looked for), and one of the local chemical distributors told me it was being

used as an aquatic herbicide in the “distributaries” that course through the orchard areas where we

were monitoring.

Kevin
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED

January 19, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk REVISED JANUARY 24, 2006

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-50114 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaint iffAppellee,

versus

ALONZO SUAREZ-OLAYO,

DefendantAppellant.

-------------------------------------------------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:04-CR-76

-------------------------------------------------------------

Before BARKSDALE, STEWART and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Alonzo Suarez-Olayo (“Suarez”) pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute at least

500 grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(ii). Suarez was

sentenced to 60 months of imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release. Suarez timely

appealed his conviction, challenging only the district court’s denial of his suppression motion.-2-

Suarez argues that Agent Tucker Cowles of the Drug Enforcement Agency did not have

art iculable reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle Suarez was driving. Agent Cowles received a

no n-specific tip that there was drug activity at a certain motel in the Austin, Texas, area. Agent

Cowles went to the motel and observed Suarez enter the motel parking lot. The motel’s room doors

opened directly onto the parking lot, a feature that, in Agent Cowles’s experience, drug dealers find

advantageous. Suarez made a cellular telephone call while in the parking lot, he left the parking lot,

and he returned with two companions. Suarez and the two other men parked and entered one of the

motel rooms. Suarez was empty-handed upon entering the hotel room. Several minutes later, Suarez

exited the motel room carrying a plastic grocery bag that he concealed behind the seat of his truck.

Suarez then left the parking lot. In addition to these facts, Agent Cowles stated that a check of the

license plate on Suarez’s vehicle returned no response from the state’s computer database.

“Reasonable suspicion must be supported by particular and articulable facts, which , taken

together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant an intrusion.” G oodson v. City

of Corpus Christi

, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotati o n marks and citations

omitted). The facts stated by Agent Cowles, and credited by the district court, are specific and were

articulated in clear terms. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the

district court did not err in concluding that all of the specific facts considered together supported the

stop. See id.; United States v. Foy , 28 F.3d 464, 474 (5th Cir. 1994).

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 10.04

                                                                  March 28, 2002
Burke Ferrari
Hybrid Networks, Inc.
6409 Guadalupe Mines Road
San Jose, CA  95120

Dear Burke,

This Letter  Agreement will confirm that in connection with and in consideration
of your continued  employment with Hybrid Networks,  Inc.  ("Hybrid") Hybrid and
you agree as follows:

1. At Hybrid's  request you will remain  employed by Hybrid for up to sixty (60)
days  following  the date  hereof,  or, until such time that Hybrid is no longer
able to pay you your regular base salary (the "Retention  Period") provided that
Hybrid continues to pay your current base salary at its regular periodic payroll
dates;

2. You will receive a Severance Payment of $6,041.50, (the "Severance Payment"),
which is equal to two weeks of your regular base salary;

3. You will receive a Retention  Bonus of $12,083.00,  (the  "Retention  Bonus")
which is equal to four  weeks of your  regular  salary,  payable  upon  Hybrid's
receipt  of a  signed  copy of a  release  and a  signed  copy  of  this  Letter
Agreement.  The  Retention  Bonus will be  returned by you to the Company if you
voluntarily  terminate your employment with the Company before the expiration of
the Retention Period; and

Please acknowledge your acceptance of this Letter Agreement by signing below and
returning this letter to me as soon as possible.

If you  have  any  questions  concerning  this  offer,  please  call me at (408)
323-6291.

Sincerely,


Michael D. Greenbaum
President and CEO


I have reviewed the above Letter Agreement and understand and agree to the terms
under which I will continue to be employed with Hybrid Networks, Inc.


------------------------            --------------------------------
Date                                [name]