### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 4 -00 518 -CV

Rosem arie Satte rfield, as Representative of the Estate of

Je r r old Br ale y, De c e as e d , A ppe lla nt

v. Crown Cork & Seal Com pany, I nc., Ind ividu ally and as Su cce ssor to

Mundet Cork Corporat ion , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN40314 5 , HO NORAB LE P ETER M. LOW RY , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

D I S S E N T I N GO P I N I O N
A f te r ca ref ul consideration of the rec ord and e x tensive ana ly sis of the g overningleg al authority —including that which is proffe red a s support for c onclusions in the majority opinion—I believe that Satterfield has not met he r hea vy burden of demonstrating that chapte r 149, as a pplied to her c ase, violate s article I section 16 of the T exas Const itution, and Irespe ctfully dissent. The presumption of constitutionality that is aff orded to chapter 149 c annot be ove rcome without showing that th e statut e a

br og a te d a

ve ste d r ig ht, tha

t it de pr ive d Satte rf

ie ld o f a ll r e me dy

fo r her c la ims , and that i t was an im pr op e r e xer c ise of le g isl a tiv e po lic e po we r. Th e ma jor ity op ini on is fundame ntally

flawe d beca

use (1) it d oes not discer n that Satterfield’ s succe ssor-liability theory ag ainst Crown was ne ither a c ause of action nor a

vested rig ht, (2) it favor s Pennsy lvania law overIn re Abe stos Li tigation , 59 Pa. D. & C.4th 62, 65 (Pa. Ct. C m. Pl. 2002), rev’d on other 1 grounds , Ie ro

po li v . A C& S Co rp ., 842 A.2d 919 (Pa. 2004). Crown was a

New Y ork-ba sed compa ny when it merg ed with M u n d et , b u t i t has bee n 2 incorpora ted in Pennsy lvania since 1989. Br aley chose to f

ile suit in Travis County , even though he had lived in Wy oming f or over 3 twenty y ear s and al le g e d

th a t he was e x posed to asbestos-c ontaining pr oducts in five states, including the state of

his re sid e nc e . H e wa s n e ve r a n Aus tin or Tr a vis County

re sid e nt. Ve nu e in thi s c a se 2 Texas law on the availability of Satterf ield’s re medy , and (3) it does not recognize the leg islature’s rig ht to reasona

bly exercise its police powe r af te r bala ncingthe competingconsidera tions on it s own. Add it io n a lly , beca

use Satterf

ield did not demonstrate that cha pter 149 is a spe cial law that vi olate s ar ti cle I I Ise c tio n 5 6 o f t he Te xas C on sti tut ion

and be c a us e Cr ow n c on c lus ive ly established its aff

irmative def

ense limiting its post-mer g e r succ essor liability , Iwould aff irm the trial
c ourt ’s jud g me nt. Iwr ite se pa rate ly fo r f ull dis c us sio n o f t

he iss ue s p re se nte d in

thi s a pp e a l.
Overview A major de velopment in the prolifer ation of asbe stos lit iga tion, the “long est-running mass tort liti g ation in the United States,” has bee n the incre ased involveme nt of d ef en dants who 1
wer e not major manuf

actur ers or

distributors of asbestos. In re J oint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Li tig. , 237 F. Supp. 2d 297, 300 (E.D.N.Y
. 2002). Def endants in asbestos litigation ar e no long er c onfined to a cor e g roup of c ompanies who proc essed a sbestos or used it extensively
. Id . at 305. I nstead, the pursuit of solvent defe ndants has led to the i nvolvement of over 6,000 companies, in virtually ever y ty pe of A merica

n industry , whose c onnection to asbe stos is attenuated. Id
. That trend is e vident in this c as e, in which Bra ley sued numerous c orporations includi n g Crown in T e xas, se e kin g dama g e s f or inj ur ie s th a t he a ttr ibute d to his e xpos ur e to 2 3was ba sed on the princ ipal office of one de fenda nt who had already provided a settlement. Given these fa cts, Crown cor

rec tly noted that the re lationship between B rale y ’s suit a nd the state of Te x as was “ tenuous.” B ra le y smo ke d a

pa c k o f c ig are tte s d a ily

sin c e the a g e of

fo ur te e n. Ag a ins t hi s p hy sic ians ’ 4 ad v i ce , h e c o n t i nu edt o s m o k e, ev en af t er h i s ca n ce r d i agn o s i s an d

h i s l aw s u i t ’s fi l i n g. 3 a sb e st os -con ta ini ngpr od uc ts. Although Crown itself never manufa cture d, sold, or distributed 4

a sb e sto s- c on ta ini ngpr od

uc ts, it w a s th e su c c e ssor by mer g e r t o a c or po ra tio n th a t di d: M un de t. B e c a us e of its me rg e r w ithMund e t, C ro wn ha s b e e n n a me d in mor e tha n 2 0, 00 0 s uc c e sso r- lia

bil ity
c a s e s in T e xa s alone. S

ee, e.g. , Robinson v. Crown Cork &Seal Co. , 251 S.W .3d 520, 538 n.12 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2006, pet. g rante d). The rec ord ref lects that throug h May

2003, Crown had a lrea dy

paid asbe stos-relate d claims totaling more than $413 million.
1966 Crown -Mundet m erger The succ essor-liability

theory Satterfield a sserts ag ainst Crown is based on it s merg er with Mu n d et m ore tha

n four de cade s ag o. Mundet had a thermal-insulation division that manufa cture d, sold, and installed asbestos produc ts befor e 1 963. Mundet also had a “closure ” div ision, which was not involved with asbestos at a ll. The closure division, l ike Crown, manufa cture d and sol d metal bot tle caps lined with cork, known in the industry as “c rowns.” Crown
so ug ht t o a c qu ir e Mund e t’ s clo sure div isi on . Af te r be inginf

or me d th a t th e c los ur e div isi on wo uld not be sold separ ately , Crown purc hased a majority of Mundet stock for approximately $7 milli on
on November

13, 1963. Mundet had c ease d manufa cturinginsulation products during the summer befor e Crown’ s stock purcha se.The majority assumes that Crown a cquire d all of Mundet’s pr e-me rg er liabilities. Nowher e 5 in t he c e rt if ic a te of me rg e r d oe s Cr ow n a ssume any lia bil iti e s o f M un de t. Crown’s re sponse to Br aley ’s motion for par tial summary

judgme nt clarifie d that when a 6 Wy oming resident files a lawsuit ag ainst a Pennsy lvania corpor ation in a Texas court, Te x as choic eof-law rules apply . Moreove r, C ro wn n o t ed that the tort li ability in this case wa s based on the alleg ed torts of Mundet—Crown w as not a “bad actor ” but a n innocent succ essor c orporation. The parties disputed whe ther the punitive damag es issue should be g overne d b y P en nsy lvania or New Y ork law
. Ho we v er, be cause statutes from either state provided that Crown would have s u cc ee d edt o M u n d et ’s co mp en s at o ry l i ab i l i t y , t h e l ac k

o f c o n t es tt o s u ch l i ab i l i t y i s u n s u rp ri s i n g. 4 I mmediately

afte r the stock purcha se and at Crown’s re quest, Mundet beg an looking fo r a purc ha se r fo r the ins ulatio n div isi on . Mund e t so ld the ins ulatio n div isi on wi thi n nin e ty da y s,
on F e br ua ry 8, 19 64 , to a

manu fa c tur e r a

nd se lle r o f a sb est os -c on ta ini ngins ulatio n p ro du c ts, B a ldw in- Eh re t- Hi ll, I nc . ( “ B -E -H ” ). As pa rt of the purc ha se a g re e me nt, B -E -H a c qu ir e d th e bo ok s,
re c or d s , e mp l o y e e s , e qu i p m e n t , f i n i s h e d g o o d s , tr a d e m ar

k s , l i c e n s e s , r aw m a t e r i a l , an d p os tpurcha se liabilities of Mundet’s insulation divisi on. I n 19 6 6 , t wo y ear s after B- E-H pur chase d Mundet’s insulation divisi on, Crown and Munde t merg ed. 5

Ba sed on this merg er, B rale y filed a motion for pa

rtial summary

judgme nt asserting that “Crown Cork [wa]s responsible for the pr oducts and c onduct of Mundet Cork, whic h it acquire d throug h merg er.” T h e trial court g rante d the motion, impos ing liability on Crown for da

mag es 6
cause d by

asbestos-c ontai n i n g p roducts that were ma nufac tured, sold, or distributed bef ore F e br ua ry 8, 19 64 , b y

Mund e t.
Enactm ent of chapter 149 Re c og nizi ng tha t su c c e sso r cor

po rat io ns cou ldbe b ankrup tedby li abi lit y fo r a sb e sto srelated injuries that they

did not cause a

nd rec og nizi ng the r i sks to Tex as jobs and pensions, theTexas courts use the R estateme nt’s “most signific ant relationship” test to decide c hoice- 7 of-law issues, applying the law of the state wit h the most significa nt relationship to the particula r issue to be re solved. Torringt on Co. v. Stutzman , 4 6 S.W.3 d 8 29 , 8 48 (T e x. 20 01 ); Hughes W ood Prods., Inc. v . W

agner , 18 S.W .3d 202, 204 (Tex. 2000) ; Re statement (Second) of Conflict of L aws §§ 6, 145 (1971). 5 leg islature ena cted the liability limit ation in chapter

149 of the c ivil practice and re medies code on J une 2, 2003. SeeTe x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. C od e Ann. §§ 14 9. 00 1- .0 06 ; see also H.J
. o f Tex ., 78th L eg ., R.S. 6042-43 (2003). The statute was made applicable to domestic corpor ations that were org anized under Te x as law, a nd to fore ign corporations—li ke Mundet a nd Crown—org anized under the law of another jurisdiction. SeeTex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 149.001(2); .002. Under the statute, a suc cessor

corp o ra tion that had paid claims equiva lent to the statutory limit would rema in liable only for c erta in ty

pes of c laims or if the succ essor c ontinued the business of manufa cturing , selling, or distributing asbe sto s -c o n taining pr oducts afte r the mer g er. Id . § 14 9. 00 2( b) (p ro vid ingthat li a bil ity lim itatio ns in s e c tio n 1 49 .0 03 do n ot a pp ly to c e rt a in c la ims , including those for wor

kers’ compensation, premises liability , and pendingsettlement contra cts for asbestos cla ims; or to successors who c ontinue business of mining a sbestos, or manufact u ri n g, selling, or distributing asbe stos-containing products after merg er or consolidation). Her e, the r ecor d ref lects that by

mid-2003, Crown had a lrea dy pai d cu m u lative asbe stos-relate d liabiliti es over $4 13 mil lio n—

mor e tha n s ix time s th e statut or

y lim it. The leg islature also c odified a ch oice- of-law provision in chapter

149 that made Te xas l aw a

pp lic a ble to e ve ry

su c c e ssor -l ia

bil ity su it f ile d in the state , e ve n if

the iss ue of

po stmerg er liability

would have othe rwise be en g overne d b y another state’s lawunder c hoice- of-law
ru le s su c h a s th e c omm on law “ mos t si g nif

ic ant r e latio ns hip ” te st. Id . § 149.006. 7I t is undisputed that the leg islature intended chapte r 149 to apply to pending case s. That 8 c le ar l e g isl a tiv e int e nt w ou ld b e a de c isi ve fa c tor in up ho ldi ngthe c on sti tut ion a lity of the statut e if it were scrutinized only

under analog ous fede ral law. The Supreme Court held that the judiciary ’s fi rs t ta skwh e n c o n s i d e r i n g a c a s e t h a t c h a l l e n g e s a s t a tu t e e n a c t e d a f t e r t h e e v e n t s i n s u i t i s to de te rm ine wh e the r C on g re ss h a s e xpre ssl y pr e sc ri be d th e statut e ’s pr op e r r e a c h: I f Cong ress ha s done so [ex pressly presc ribed the statute’s proper rea ch], of course , the re is n o n e e d to resort to j ud ic ia l de fa ult ru le s. Whe n, ho we ve r, the statut e c on tai ns no su ch ex pres s co mm and , t he co urt mu st det erm in e wh eth er t he n ew s ta tut e would have r etroa ctive ef fec t
. . . . I f the statute would ope rate retroa ctively , our traditional presumption teac hes that it doe s not g overn absent clear c o n gressional intent favoringsuch a r esult.” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods ., 51 1 U. S. 24 4, 28 0 (1 994) ; se e als o Fernandez- Vargas v. Gonzales , 5 4 8 U. S
. 3 0 , 3 7 (2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. St. Louis, San Francisco &Tex. Ry . Co. , 2 70 U. S. 1, 3 (1926)) (holding that “a statute shall not be g iven re troac tive ef fe ct unless such construc tion is require d by

expli cit lang uag e or by

nece ssary

implicatio n ”); Tex . Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.022 (West 2005) (“Astatute i s p re s u med to be prospe ctive in its operation unless expressly made re tr oa c tiv e .” ); cf. Johns-M anville Sales Corp. v. R. J. R eagan Co. , 577 S.W .2d 3 4 1 (T ex . C iv. Ap p. —Wa c o 1 97 9, wr it r e f’ d n .r .e .) (i nv a lid a tin g statut e that la c ke d a ny pr ovis io n makingit expressly retroa ctive). 6 Ad dit ion a lly , th e le g isl a tur e e xpre ssl y prov ide d th a t c ha

pte r 1 49 wo uld

be c ome “ef fec tive immediately ” in all case s commence d on or af ter June 11, 2003. See Act of J une 2, 2003, 78 th L e g ., R.S. , c h 2 04 , § 17 .0 2, 20 03 Te x. Ge n. L aws 89 5; se e als o Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 149.001 (re fer encinghistorical note that desig nates June 11, 2003, as statute’s e ffe ctive date ). Ca se s p e nd inga s o f Jun e 11 , 20 03 , h ave c ha pte r 1 49 a pp lie d to the m. Id . (mandating a pplication 8 of c ha pte r 1 49 to a ll c a se s “ in wh ic h the tr ia l, or any ne w tr ia l or re tr ia l f oll ow ingmot ion , a

pp e a l, or otherw ise, beg ins on or afte r that ef fec tive date.” ). B eca

use this suit ag ainst Crown was pe nding
on June 11 , 2 00 3, and

se t f or tr ia l on No ve mbe r 3 , 2 00 3, c ha

pte r 1 49 a pp lie d to it.The majority ’s discussion of vested r igh t s in this as-applied cha lleng e leaves sig nificant 9 questions unanswer ed with re g ard to Crown: What wer e B rale y ’s ac cru ed ca u s es of action or commo n -law c laims ag ainst Crown? What duty was owe d to Bra ley

by a cor poration that neve r manu fa c tur e d, so ld, or dis tr ibute d asb e sto s- c on ta ini ng pr od uc ts? What the or

y of re c ov e ry pe rm its Br aley to seek damag es fr om Crown? What “validly vested rig hts” did Br aley have a g ainst Crown that wer e af

fec ted by chapte r 149? The majo r it

y d is c e r n s n o d is p u te b e tw e e nth e p arti e s th a t “ th e c a u s e s o f a c ti o nB r a le y 10 asser ted ag ainst Crown Cork ac crue d prior to the S tatute’s enactment.” Review of the record a nd bri ef i n g s h o w ot herw ise, as Crown ha s consistently maintained that it was sued a s Mundet’s succe ssor and that the c auses of action al l ege d in this case ac crue d ag ainst the alleg ed tortfe asor, Mund e t. 7 No ve st e d r igh t i n suc c e sso r -l iab ili tyr e m e dy

Successor liability issues a r e f a c t- in te n s iv e
— g iv e n

th e “ my r ia d f actua l circumstanc es
and le g a l c on te xts in

wh ic h it c an a

ri se ,” the Sup re me Court

ha s n ote d th a t “ an e mph a sis on the fa c ts of each case as it arises is especially appropr iate.” Howard Johnson Co., Inc. v . Detroit Local Joint Exe c. Bd. , 417 U.S. 249, 256 (1974). The majority veer s from any analy sis of the fac ts that inform the ve ste d- ri g hts iss ue and in doi ng so , co nf us e s a the or

y of su c c e sso r- lia

bil ity a g a ins t Cr ow n w ith
a c a us e of a c tio n a g a ins t Mund e t. I t states that “the que stion presented is whe ther a n acc rued a

nd 9 pending common law cause of action is a vested rig ht a nd thus pr otected by

the Texas Constit ution.” But what follows that statement is an ana ly sis of vested rights in a vac uum. Nowher e does the ma jor ity op ini on ide nti fy wh a t “ c a

us e of a c tio n” or

wh ich “com mo n- law c la ims ” a g a ins t Crown have supposedly

vested. The re w ere none. As the summar y -judg ment evidenc e in this recor d de mon str a te s, Cr ow n it se lf ne ve r m anu fa c tur e d, so ld, or dis tr ibute d a sb e sto s- c on ta ini ngpr od uc ts, and B rale y

was not injured b y any

act or omission on t he par

t of Crown. Cf. Barker v . Eck man , 10 213 S.W .3d 306, 311 (Tex. 2006) (“This Court has consist ently held that a c ause of action ac crue s when a party has bee n injured by

actions or omissions of another .”).8 The succ essor-liability

theory does not cre ate a

cau s e of ac tion. In reFa irc hil d A i r c r a ft Co rp . , 184 B.R. 910, 920, 921 n.11(B ankr. W.D. Tex. 1995), vacate d on other grounds , 22 0 B .R. 90 9 ( B ank

r. W.D . T e x. 19 98 ); see National Architectural Prods. Co. v. A tlas-Telecom Se rv s. , No. 3:06-CV-0751-G ECF, 2007 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 51182, at *34 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (noting that is su e of wh e the r sa le -o f- a sse ts ag re e me nt sub je c te d c or po ra te de fe nd ant t o s uc c e sso r l ia bil ity was not one soundingin tort). The theor y mere ly allows for t h e t ra n s fer

of liability

from the prede cessor

to the succe ssor. In reFa irc hil d A irc ra ft Co rp ., 18 4 B .R. a t 92 0, 92 1 n .1 1; see Griggs v. Capitol Mach. W

orks, Inc

. , 690 S.W .2d 287, 289 (Tex. App.— Au s t i n 1985, writ ref ’d n.r.e .) (noting that liability

soug ht to be imposed ag ainst succe ssor corpor a ti o n was vica rious beca use it was not based on a

ny act or omission by

succe ssor but on its im puted liability for act or omissi on of dissolved prede cessor

corpor ation); see also R.C.M. Ex ecutive Gallery Corp. v. Rols Capital Co. , 901 F. Supp. 630, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (cha rac terizing succ essor li ability as “f undamentally

a for m of sec ondary , vicar ious liabili ty imposed upon an innoce nt party”). Successor liability supplies the claimant with a r emedy

whe n a predec essor c orporation cease s to ex ist—e.g ., beca use of a dissoluti on or merg er—a

nd cannot be sued. Se e W hite v . Co ne -B lan c ha rd

Cor p ., 217 F. Supp. 2d 767, 774 n.1 (E.D. Te x . 2002). Her e, it a llows Crown to be considere d a “tortfe asor” by virtue of its me rg e r w ithMund e t.

Thus, the succ essor-liability t h eo ry is the proce dural re medy that makes re cover

y possible for the torts Satterfield has attributed t o Mundet, from whom she w ould otherwise have no
rec overy at all. The precise question prese nted t o this Court is whether Satterfield ha d a veste d rig ht to that succe ssor-liability reme dy ag ainst Crown under the Texas Constit ution. After c onsidering9

the par ameter s of a “ vested rig ht” that re ceive constitutional protection and apply ing the m to the fa c ts o f t his re c or d, Iam pe rs ua de d th a t sh e did no t.
V este d righ ts a re

c e rta in a nd i

mm e dia te ly

e nf or c e ab le I n her f irst issue, Satterfield contends that chapte r 149 retroa ctively impaired a vested
r i g h t
. V e s t e d

r i g h t s ar e p r o p e rt y r i g h t s , w h i c ht h e c o n s t i tu t i o np r o t e c t s l i k e an y o t h e r p r o p e rt y. Subaru, Inc. v . David Mc David Nissan, Inc. , 8 4 S
. W
. 3 d 2 1 2 , 2 1 9 (T ex . 2 0 0 2 ) ( c i t i n g Middleton v. Texas Powe r & Light Co. , 185 S.W . 5 5 6 , 5 6 0 (Tex. 1916)). Ar ticle I , section 16 of the Texas Consti tution, which prohibits the enactment of retroa ctive laws, pr otects vested r ights by excluding them from the rea ch of subsequently enac ted l egi s l ation. SeeTex. Cons t. art. I , § 16. S t a tu t e s t h a td o n o ta f

f e c ta c l a i m an t ’ s v e s t e d

r i g h t s , h o w e v e r , ar e n o ts h i e l d e d b y art i c l e I, section 16. State v. Projec t Principle, Inc ., 724 S.W .2d 387, 390 (Tex. 1987) (stating that laws ar e deeme d retrospe ctive and c onstitut ionally prohibited if their re trospective ope ration destroy s or impairs vested rig hts); De Cordova v. C ity of Galveston , 4 T e x. 47 0, 47 9- 80 (T e x. 18 49 ) ( same ); see als o Cor pu s Chr ist i Pe op le ’s Ba

pti st Chu rc h v . Nue c es Cou nty Ap prais al Di st ., 904 S.W .2d 621, 626 (Tex. 1995) (concluding that provision in tax code a llowing e x emption to be established af ter ta x es w e re a sse sse d w a s n ot r e tr oa c tiv e law b e c a us e ta xingun it h a d n o v e ste d r ig ht t o taxes u nti l d e te r mi n a ti o n o f e xe mp ti o n )
. T h u s , in th e a b s e n c e o f a c o n s ti tuti o n a l p r o h ib it io n , th e leg islature may chang e statutory

or common law, but in so doing , it may not deprive a

person of a prope rty

rig ht acquir ed under

exis ting law
. Ae tna In s. Co. v . R ic ha rd e lle , 528 S.W .2d 28 0 , 284 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref’d n.r .e.).I n attempt to char acte rize Satterfield’ s succe ssor-liability theory ag ainst Crown as a ve sted 11 rig ht, the majority

relies he avily o n a line of c ases c oncluding that, afte r the e x piration of time require d by

a statute of limitations, the l eg islature cannot abrog ate a defe ndant’s veste d rig ht to a ssert a limitations defense. See, e .g. , Bake r Hughes, Inc . v. Kec o R. &D., Inc

. , 12 S.W .3d 1, 4 (T e x. 19 99 ); Mellinger v. Houston , 3 S.W
. 249, 253 (Tex. 1887); De Cordova v . City of Galveston , 4 (Tex. 470, 479-80 (Te x . 1849). Those a re not the f

acts of this ca se.
10 Wheth er a particula

r rig ht is vested is a difficult question, Groce rs Supply Co.

v . S ha rp , 978 S.W .2d 638, 643 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied), but a key char acte ristic of
a v e s te d le g a l r ig h t is it s imme d iate le g a l e n f o r c e a b ility
. See Melli nger v. Houston , 3 S.W . 249, 253 (Tex. 1887); s ee a l

s o Corpus Chris ti People’s Baptist Church , 904 S.W .2d at 626. The Texas Supreme Court explained that “a r ight, in a le g al sense, e x ists, when in conseque nce of g iven fa c ts t he law d e c lare s th a t on e pe rs on is entitled to enforce a g a ins t ano ther a c la im o r t o resist the

e nfo rc e me nt o f a c la im u r g e d b y an o th e r . ” Mellinger , 3 S.W . at 253 (e mphasis added) ; se e als o Co r p u s Ch r is ti P e o

p le ’ s B a p tist Church , 9 04 S.W .2d at 626 (noting that taxes that were due on
re c e ipt and be c ame de lin qu e nt ne xt y e ar if un pa id, re pr e se nte d lia

bil ity “ fo r whic h th e ta xingun it may enfor ce c ollection”). The court fur ther de fined “ rig hts” as “w ell-founde d claims,” mea ning those claims that ar e “r ecog nized or secur ed by law.” Mellinger , 3 S.W. at 25 3. De mon str a tin g its definition of vested rig hts, the court in Mellinger struck a statute that was e nacte d afte r a tax pay er’ s suit was filed, barr ing the taxpay er’ s defe nse of limit ations to a city ’s tax collection suit. See3 S. W. at 249-251. Deter

minative considera

tions for the Mellinger court we re the lack of any sug g estion that th e le g isl a tur e int e nd e d to mak e the law ap pli c a ble to pe nd ing c a se s and

the ta xpay e rs ’ r ig ht t o rely on the def

ense of limit ations, which vested on the expiration of the limit ations period and preve nted the city ’s tax claim from beingenfor ced. Se e id . at 251-53. 11Mo re ov e r , t h e h o l d i n g s i n t h o s e c a s e s w o u l d c o n t r a d i c t t h e m a j o r i t y ’ s s u g g e s t i o n t ha t a c la ima nt h a s a ve ste d r ig ht t o a

statut or y re me dy imm e diate ly

up on fi lin g su it. Th is i s b e c a us e mere ly filing suit would not decide the l eg al enforce ability or entit lement t o the relief s oug ht by the claimant. For ex ample, if a suit were f

iled afte r the e x piration of a limitations period, the def endant would have a

n immediate, leg ally

rec og nized right unde r Texas law to dismissal o f t h e suit on limit ations g rounds, and that rig ht c ould not be defe ated by the claimant’ s assertion of a competing “v es t edi n t er es t ” b as eds o l el y o nt h e s u i t ’s fi l i n g.

11 Echoingthese c onsiderations of leg al enf orce ability , Texas courts have held that vested rig hts are those that imply an immediate ri g ht or an e ntitlement—those that are not ba sed upon mere expectation or conting ency . Se e City of D all as v . Tram me ll , 101 S. W
. 2 d 1009, 1014 (Tex. 1937); W

alls v. Firs t State Bank of Miami , 900 S.W .2d 117, 121 (Tex. A pp.—Amarillo 1995, writ denied) ; Houston Indep. Sc h. Dist. v. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. , 7 9 8 S. W. 2 d 5 8 0 , 589 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 90 , w ri t de nie d) ; see also Attorney G eneral of Tex. v . Redding , 60 S.W .3d 8 9 1 , 8 9 3 (Tex. 2001) (noting that defe ndant’s rig ht to rely on statute of limitations
ve sts wh e n lim itatio ns perio d ex pi res) ; Bake r Hughes, Inc . v. Kec o R. &D., Inc

. , 12 S.W .3d 1, 4 (Tex. 1999) (same ).

Choic e -o f- law rule s a re alt e ra ble Th e ma jor ity su g g e sts that c ha

pte r 1 49 dis ru

pte d Satte rf

ie ld’ s se ttl e d e xpe c tatio ns in thi s c a se . I t did n ot. Sa tte rf ie ld l a c ke d a

ny imm e diate e nti tle me nt o r l e g a lly e nf or c e a ble ri g ht t o impose succe ssor lia b i l ity on Crown. Her

succe ssor-liability

reme dy depende d entirely

on the
a pp lic a tio n o f N e w Y or

k la w thr ou g h c ho ic e -o f- law ru le s and tho se ru le s may be a lte re d b y statut e in the same manne r as ot h er T exas law. See O wens Corning v. Carter , 997 S.W .2d 560, 574 ( T e x. 1 9 9 7 ) ( r e c o g n i z i n g t h a tc o u rt s m ay m a k e r e a s o n e d

a d j u s t m e n t s i nl e g a l sy ste m) ; se e als oThese de finitions remain uncha ng ed fr om the 2003 version in ef fec t when B rale y

soug ht 12 partial summary

judgme nt to establish Crown’s liability as Mundet’s suc cessor . 12 Restatement (Sec ond) of Conflict of L aws § 5 (choic e-of -law r ules are as open to re examination as any other common-law rules), 5 William V. Dorsane o I I I , Texas Litigat ion Guide § 62.01 [1] (2007) (same)
. T ex as l aw d i d n o ti m p o s e s u cc es s o r l i ab i l i t y b as edo nt h e m er ger

o f t wo fo re i gn corpor ations—those incorp o ra t ed outside Texas—until chapter 149 w as ena cted. See Te x. B us . Corp. Act Ann. a

rt. 1.02 (14) ( defining “for eig n corpor ation” as “a corpor ation for profit org anized under la ws other than the laws of this State”), ( 18) (West Supp. 2006) (def ining “mer g er” as division of dom estic corporation into two or more ne w domestic cor porations, or into surviving corpor ation and at lea st one new dome stic corpor ation, o r co m b i nation of one or more domestic c orporations with other entities). Mundet a nd Crown wer e conside red “ fore ign c orporat i o ns,” bec ause the y
wer e incor

porate d in a s t at e o t h er than Texas. Se e id . art. 1.02(11) (West Supp. 2006) (defining “domestic c orporation” to exclude “fore ign c orporation”), (14)
. Whe n this su it w a s f ile d a g a ins t 12 Crown, Tex as courts had to apply the l aw of the state with the “ most significa nt relationship” to the merg er to de termine whic h state’s lawshould appl y an d wh ether that state’s law w ould provide for the imposition of succe ssor liability
. See Torrington Co. v. Stutzman , 4 6 S. W. 3 d 8 2 9 , 8 48-49 (Tex. 2001) (ela

boratingon “most s i gn i fica nt relationship” test set for th in sections 6 and 145 of Restatement (Sec ond) of Conflict of L aws for deter mining choic e-of

-law issues)
. Mundet and Crown w ere incorpor ated in Ne w York when they merg ed, and the i r c e rt i f

i c a t e o f m e r g e r w a s f

i l e d i n N e w Y o r

k p u r s u an t t o N e w Y o r

k l aw . U s i ng the mos t-Satterfield argued that the t rial court’s choice of l aw was irrele vant because the succe ssor- 13 lia bil ity law wa s the same in Te xas a s in Ne w Yo rk
. She no te d that art ic le 5. 06 of t he Bu si ne ss Corporation Act states that the surviving company “inher its the liabiliti es of its pre dece ssors” af ter merg er. See Te x. B us . Co rp . A c t A nn . a rt . 5 .0 6 ( Wes t 20 03 ). He r r eli ance on art ic le 5. 06 is misplaced. That article a pplies only

to a merg er involving at least one domestic corpor ation org anized under Te x as laws , an d n ei t h er Crown nor Mundet we re dome stic corpor ations. Se e id
. ar t. 1
. 0 2 ( 1 1 ) ( d e f

in in g “ d o me s ti c c o r

p o r a ti o n ” to e xc lu d e “ f

o r e ignc o r

p o r a ti o n ” ) , ( 1 4 ) ( d e f

in ing “for eig n corpor ation” as “ a co rp o ration for profit org anized under la ws other than the laws of this S tate”) , (18) ( defining“mer g er” as division of domestic corpor ation i n t o t wo o r more new domestic c orporations, or into surviving cor poration and at least one new domestic corpor ation, or combination of one or more dome stic corpor ations with other entities) (W est Supp. 2006). Ar tic le 5. 06 do e s not ap ply to a m e rg e r b e tw e e n tw o f or e ig n c or po ra tio ns , li ke Cr ow n a

nd Mund e t, that did not incorporate in Texas. Se e id . art. 1.02(14) , (18). The majority

states that Crown did not d i s p u t e that it was liable for Mundet’s tortious 14 conduct unde r Texas law a nd that Crown’s mot ion for summary judgme nt “conc eded” its successor lia bil ity in t he a bs e nc e of c ha pte r 1 49 . H ow ever , th e re c or d r e fl e c ts t hat Cr ow n d id d isp ute its succe ssor liability

under Te x as law a s it ex isted befor e the enac tment of chapter 149. Crown opene d its discussion of the successor -liability issue in its m otion for summary judgme nt with a

ref ere nce to the g ener al rule of article 5.06. I t e x plained the exception to that g ener al rule in its re ply , which e xpre ssl y c on te nd s th a t art ic le 5. 06 is i na pp lic a ble to the me rg e r of

the se tw o f

or e ig n c or po ratio ns , t h a tS a t t e r f

i e l d ’ s o n l y t h e o r

y o f r e c o v e r y f r o mC r o w ni s b a s e d

o nt h e d o c t r i n e o f s u c c e s s o r l i a b i l i t y, 13 signific ant-re lationship test, the tria l c ourt deter mined that New York law should apply to the issue of succe ssor liability
. I t a lso de termined that New York law provided for the imposit ion of succe ssor liability ag ainst Crown. SeeN.Y. Bu s . Corp. L aw Ann. § 906( b)(3) (McKinne y 2003) (“ [t ]he 13 surviving . . . c orporation shall assume and be liable for a ll the liabilit ies . . . of the co n s t i t uent
e nti tie s. No lia

bil ity
. . . , c la im or de mand fo r any c a us e e xistin g a g a ins t any

su c h c on sti tue nt e nti ty . . . shall be re lease d or impaired by such merg er” ). Acc ording ly , the cour t gr anted B rale y ’s motion f o r p art i a l s u m m ar

y j u d g m e n to nt h e i s s u e o f l i a b i l i t y. Ho we ve r, the e na c tme nt o f c ha pte r 1 49 ’s c ho ic e -o f- law p ro vis ion , r e qu ir ingc ourt s to apply Texas law to the issue of succ essor a sbestos-re lated liabili t ies, superse ded the c ommon law’ s mo st- sig nif

ic ant- re latio ns hip te st a

nd re nd e re d N e w Y or

k law ina pp lic a ble to t his su it. See

14and that, until the enac tment of chapte r 149, succe ssor liability involving the mer g er or consolidation of solely fore ign c orporations was not rec og nized by Texas law. Se e id . art. 1.02(14) , (18). The majority

states that Crown’s summary judgme nt “did not raise the arguments that the 15 Statute does not impair vested rig hts beca use it merely

chang es the c hoice of law provision or that Satterfield ha s no vested rig ht in a reme dy or statutory choice of law provision.” Howeve r, in direc t re sp on se to S a tte rf

ie ld’ s a sse rt ion

of a ve ste d r ig ht, Cr ow n d id m a ke thi s a rgume nt t o th e tr ia l c ourt : Plaintiff’s cause of ac tion ac cr ued ag ainst Mundet Cork Corporation, the a lleg ed tortfea sor. L iability , if any , for the tor ts of Mundet, a for eig n corpor ation, could transf er to Crown, a for eig n corp o ra tion, only by application of the doctrine of succe ssor lia bil ity —a c re a tur e of

ind ivi du a l st a te statut e . Wit ho ut t he app li cat ion

of thi s 14 Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem
. C o d e Ann. § 149.006; see also Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dacc ach , 217 S.W .3d 430, 443 (Tex. 2007) (stating that when deciding which jurisdiction’s la w applies, “[t] he first question is whether the particula r substantive law is subjec t to a clear ch o i ce o f l aw de te rm inatio n b y

the L e g isl a tur e of

the fo rum st a te ” ); A me r i ca n Ho me A s s u r a n ce C o . v. S a f w a y Steel Prods. Co. , 7 43 S.W. 2d

69 3, 69 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 1987 , w ri t de nie d) (r e a so nin g that mo stsignific an t- r e lati o n s h ip an a ly s is is u n n e c e s s ar y if lo c a l s tatuto r

y p r o v is io nc o n tr o ls d is p o s it io nof choice -of- law question).

After the ena ctment of chapter 149, Satter field had no r ight to the c ontinued
a pp lic a tio n of Ne w Yo rk ’s su c c e sso r- lia bil ity law thr ou g h c ho ic e -o f- law r ule s. A “ ri g ht” is a

c la im that one is e n ti tl e d

to e n f o r c e a g a in s t a

n o th e r an d a “ v e s te d r igh t” r e qu ir e s mo r e th ana mere expectancy based upon an anticipated continuance of an exis ting law
. See M ellinger , 3 S.W . at 253; Tra mm e ll , 1 01 S.W. 2d

a t 10 14 . Satte rf

ie ld m ay have anti c ipate d th a t N e w Y or k’ s s u c c e s s or -l ia

bil ity law would apply to her suit, but the application of New York law depende d on the use of c hoice- oflaw rule s and t he lack of a Texas statute g overning succe ssor liability for f oreig n corpor ations after their merg er. See Dacc ach , 217 S.W .3d at 443. 15statutorily cre ated r emedy , plaintiffs would have no hope of re cover y ag ainst succe ssor corpor ation for the a lleg ed torts of dissolved pre dece ssors. Prior to th e ad o ption of HB 4, Texas substantive law did not g overn suc cessor liability involving the mer g er or consolidation of solel y

fore ign c orporations. . . . I n Texas courts, there fore , the succe ssor liability of fore ign corpor ations that merg ed with other f oreig n corpor ations w a s t h e nd e t e r

m i n e d b y c h o i c e - o f

- l aw p r i n c i p l e s . . . . H B 4 c h an g e s t h i s u n c e rt a i n t y. I t is, first, a codified c hoice of law provision dictating the us e of Te x as substantive law in T exas c ourts to de termine the a sbestos-re lated succ essor liability of some for eig n and domestic corpor ations. . .
. Rather than de prive Plaintiff of a vested rig ht, theref

ore, HB 4 cre ated a T ex as s u bstantive reme dy wher e no Te x as substantive re medy pr e vio us ly

e xiste d.
. . . Pl a int if

f c ou ld n ot h a ve ha d a

le g iti mate ex pectatio n th a t a pa rt ic ula r f or e ig n state ’s law wo uld be a pp lie d thr ou g h c ho ic e of law pr inc ipl e s un til a final judg ment [was] rende red in thi s case . . . . HB 4 is a codified c hoice- of-law p r o v i s i o nth a ta l s o c r e a t e s a T e x a s s t a tu t o r

y r e m e dy w h e r e n o n e e x i s t e d b e f

o r e . It c ann ot t he re fo re be he ld t o f

ru str a te le g iti mate e xpe c tations or im pair ve ste d r ig hts
. [C it a ti o n s o mi tt e d ]. The majority

sug g ests that issues raised by this a rgument cannot be conside red be cause they wer e in Crown’s re ply . Howeve r, Ru l e 1 6 6 a(c ) supports a diff ere nt conclusion. SeeTe x. R. C iv. P. 16 6a (c ); see also Alder v . Laurel , 82 S.W .3d 372, 375-76 (Te x . App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (“ [A] trial court c onsideringa motion f or summary

judgme nt is restricted to the issues ra ised in the motion, re s p o n s e, an d

s u b s eq u en tre p l i es . ”) (c i t i n g Stiles v. Re solution T

rust Co. , 8 6 7 S. W. 2 d

2 4 , 2 6 ( T e x. 19 93 )) ; Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth. , 58 9 S.W. 2d 67 1, 67 4- 77 (T e x. 19 79 ); Blakey v. Texas De p’ t of He alt h , N o. 03 -0 2- 00 68 2- CV , 20 04 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 12 47 , at * 1 8- 19 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 2 0 0 4 , n o p e t
. ) ( n o t i n g t h a tt h i s C o u rtw a s u n c o n v i n c e d t h a ts u m m ar

y j u d g m e n tr

u l e a l w ays pr oh ibi te d mo va

nt f ro m su pp le me nti ngits g ro un ds by wa y of re ply if the no nmo va

nt i s n ot o the rw ise unfairly prejudice d by

supplementation). Rule 166a( c) pr ovides that Th e jud g me nt s ou g ht s ha ll b e re nd e re d f or thw ithif (i ) t he de po sit ion

tr anscri pts , interrog atory

answe rs, and other

discovery

resp o nses re fer ence d or set for th in the motion or response , and (ii) the pleading s, admissions, a ffidavits, stipulatio n s o f t he parties, an d authenticated or c ertified public r ecor ds, if any , on file at the time of the he ari ng , or fi le d the re a ft e r an d be fo re jud g me nt wit h pe rm iss ion of

the c ourt , s ho w that, except as to the amount of da mag es, there is no g enuine issue as t o any materia l fac t and the moving pa

rty is entitled to judgme nt a s a matter of law on the issues expressly set out in the motion or

in a n a ns we r o r a ny

oth e r re sp on se . I ssues not expressly prese nted t o t h e t r i a l c o u rtb y writt en motion, answer or other response shall not be consider ed on a pp e a l a s g ro un ds fo r r e ve rs a l.

15Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(c) ( emphasis adde d). Be cause the issues addre ssing c hapter 149’s lack of impairment of a

vested rig ht based on a

mere chang e to a c hoice of law provision and Satterfield’ s lack of a

vested rig ht in a reme dy or statutory

choice of law pr o v i sion were expressly prese nted t o the t rial court by written response, t he is sues may be conside red he re. Additionally , Satterfield wa s not prejudiced by the supplementa t i o n. She filed a re joi nd e r b ri e f t

he da y a ft e r C ro wn

fi le d it s r e ply , a

nd the tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r s pe cif ies that it con s id e r e d “ th e M o ti o n , Pl a inti f f ’ s O b je c ti o n s to Cr o w n Co r

k & Se a l Co mp an y , I nc.’s Summary J udg ment evidenc e and Response to Motion for Summary J udg ment, Def

endant’ s Reply , and Plaintiff’s Rejoinder.”

16

Satterfield’ s relianc e on existi ng choice -of- law rule s for the a pplication of Ne w York la w r e s e mb le s th a t o f th e A la b ama c la im an ts in Ow en s Corning , w ho re lie d o n a Te xas s tatut e permitting the m t o f

il e th e ir a s b e s to s - e xp o s u r e c la im s in T e xa s . 9 9 7 S. W. 2 d

a t 5 6 5
. U n d e r

that
s t a tu t e , i f t h e c l a i m an t s ’ s u i t s w e r e t i m e l y u n d e r T e xa s ’ s s t a tu t e o f

l i m i t a t i o n s , t h e s u i t s c ou ld proce ed in Texas, reg ardle ss of whether limit ations had expired in the state wher e the wrong ful ac t actua lly occur red. Id
. After Texas c ourts beca me crow ded with a sbestos-exposure claims having l i t t l e o r n o co n n ec t i o nt o t h e s t at e, t h e l egi s l at u re en ac t ed a b o rr o wi n g s t at u t e, p ro v i d i n g t h at fo re i gn claims could be broug ht in Tex as only if those claims could a lso be broug ht in the state wher e the wrong ful ac t occur

red ( thus “borrow ing” the state’s statute of limitations for application in Texas). Id . at 56 5- 66
. Th e statut e wa s g ive n imme diate e ff e c t, wit ho ut al low ing a ff

e c te d part ie s a

re a so na ble g rac e period for filing t heir claims afte r its enac tment. Id . at 57 2. Th e Te xas S up re me Court up he ld the constitutionality

of the borr owing statute, whi c h it c h a r a c te rized as “e ssentially

a codif ied choice

of-law rule.” Id
. at 573. I t noted t hat any conce rns about expectations the litiga nts might have had17

conce rning the continued application of Texas’s statute of limitations pl ay ed only a “minimal role” in the case
. Id
. L ike the borr owing statute in Owens Corning , chapte r 149 conta ins a c o d if ie d choice

of-law provisi o n t h at create s a Texas-statutory reme dy wher e none e x isted befor e—Te x as had no law g overningsucce ssor liability for f oreig n corpor ations after

their merg er. Where the common law is r evised by statute, the statute controls. W ingfoot Enters. v. Alvarado , 111 S.W .3d 134, 146 (T e x. 20 03 ); Pittman v. Time Sec

. , 301 S.W .2d 521, 523 (Tex. Civ. App.—S an Antonio 1957, no writ). “T he Te x as Constitut ion has not undertaken to pre serve inviolate the rules of the common law, ” and be c a us e no on e ha s any

ve ste d o r p ro pe rt

y int e re st i n c omm on -l aw r ule s, no on e is de pr ive d o f a

c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht whe n th e c omm on law is c ha ng e d thr ou g h le g isl a tiv e e na c tme nt. Middleton , 1 85 S.W. a t 56 0- 61 ; Sm ith v . S mi th , 126 S.W .3d 660, 66 3 (T ex . App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2004, no writ); se e als o Colum brar ia L td. v . P im ie nta , 110 F. Supp. 2d 542, 548 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (“N o person ha s a vested rig ht in any g ener al rule of law or policy

of leg islation entitl ing him to ins ist that it rema in unchang ed for his benefit.”)
. Satterfield did not have a ve sted rig ht to a
su c c e sso r- lia

bil ity re me dy that w a s d e pe nd e nt o n c ho ic e -o f- law r ule s.
Fina l jud gment s a re le ga lly e nf or c e ab le The ma jo r it y ma k e s th e b r o a d

a s sertion that “Satter field’s c ause of action wa s acc rued and pending, or vested, prior to the eff ective date of the Statute.” But it offe rs no authority for the p r o p o s it io nth a t t

h e me r e f il in g o f s u it o na c la im e d in ju r y c o n s ti tute s a

v e s te d r igh t t o a s tatutory
re me d y p r o v i d e d b y c h o i c e - o f

- l a w r u l e s. Sa tte rf

ie ld’ s le g a l argume nt i n th is s umm ary -j ud g me nt c a se
wo uld be str on g e r i f s he ha d ob ta ine d a fi na l ju dg me nt b e fo re the e na c tme nt o f c ha pte r 1 49 . With18

a fi na l jud g me nt, sh e c ou ld h ave c la ime d a le g a lly e nf or c e a ble e nti tle me nt t o h e r s uc c e sso r- lia bil ity
reme dy
. See M

ellinger , 3 S.W . at 253 (de fining “rig ht” as c laim t h at i s “re cog nized or secur ed by law.”) . I n that situation, the trigg eringevent that wo u ld vest the rig ht to impos e Ne w York’ s
succe ssor-liability

law on Crown would be the entry of a f inal judgme nt, not the filing of a suit. See Di c k so n v . Na v arro County LeveeImprove ment Dist. No. 3 , 139 S.W .2d 257, 25 9 (T ex . 1 940); Durham Transp. Co. v. Be ettner , 201 S.W. 3d 85 9, 87 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —Wa c o 2 00 6, pe t. d e nie d) ; W all s , 900 S.W .2d at 122; Trahan v. Trahan , 894 S.W .2d 113, 119 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, writ denied); Hous ton Chronicle Publ’g Co. , 7 98 S.W. 2d a t 58 9; se e als o P im ie nta , 110 F. Supp. 2d at 548; Thompson v. Miller , N o. 03 -9 8- 00 62 7- CV , 1 99 9 T e x. Ap p. L EX I S 55 38 , at *4 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 19 99 , n o p e t.) (n ot d e sig nate d f or pu bli c a tio n) (h old ingthat any ri g ht c la ima

nt m ig ht h a ve ha d to
rec eive c erta in information prior to statute’s amendment was not vested beca use his lawsuit had not been r esolved).

Wit hout a final judg ment, Satterfield did not have a veste d rig ht, and her st atutory
succe ssor-liability

reme dy was not beyond the re ac h of subseque ntly enac ted leg islation. See Mellinger , 3 S.W . at 253; T r a m m e ll , 1 0 1 S
. W
. 2 d at 1014; W all s , 900 S.W .2d at 121; Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. , 798 S.W .2d at 589. Since 1849, the Tex as S upreme Court rec og nized that leg islative acts ar e not within the prohibition ag ainst retrospe ctive laws unle ss they impair rig hts that
are vested, De Cordova , 4 Te x. a t 47 9, and in s up po rt

of tha t pr op os iti on , th e c ourt

c on sid e re d a

c a se that invalidated a statute “purpor ting to g rant a

new tria l in a civil cause afte r a f inal judgme nt.” Id
. a t4 7 7
. T o d ay t h e m a

j o r i t y r e j e c t s t h e s i g n i f

i c an c e o f a f i n a l j u d g m e n ti nt h e v e s t e d

- r i g h t s i n qu i r y, but its signific ance was previously rec og nized by

the opinion’s author. See American H onda Motor19

Co. v. Miller , 47 S.W. 3d 61 4, 62 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 01 , p e t. d e nie d) (n oti nga pp ro va l of

thi s Court’s conclusion that cla imant “did not have a v es t ed rig ht to protest beca use House B ill 1595 [rescinding the r ig h t t o p r o te s t] to o k e f f e c t p r io r to th e ti me th e B o ar d

r e n d e r e d a f in a l d e c is io n”) (c i t i n g Robbins Che vrolet Co. v. Motor Ve hicle Bd. , 989 S.W .3d 865, 870 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. denied)
. The re asoning followed by the author in Miller

applies her e—Satterf

ield did not have a veste d rig ht to enforc e the suc cessor -liability reme dy beca use chapter 149 took eff

ect before the tr ia l c ourt e nte re d a fi na l ju dg me nt. The Te x as Supreme Co u rt ’s opi nion in Dickson illust rate s the conc ept that a f inal judgme nt is nece ssary

to claim a veste d rig ht to a statutory reme dy that subsequently

collapses by leg islative action. See 139 S.W .2d at 259. I n that case , E.K. Atwood held l evee bonds issued by two improvement districts. Id
. at 258. Bondholde rs l ike Atwood had a statutory reme dy allowing them to s ue land ow ne rs to e nf

or c e de lin qu e nt t a xes o n th e bo nd s if the dis tr ic ts f a ile d to do so wi thi n s ixty day s afte r the taxes beca

me delinquent. Id
. Atwood, ac ting on be half of the Nava rro County

L evee I mpro v em en t Di s trict No. 3, sued thre e landowne rs in district court to rec over the taxes that they failed to pa

y for 1933 a

nd 1934. Id
. On J une 25, 1937, Atwood obtained a de fault judg ment in favor of the district for

the delinquent taxes. Id
. Whil e the c ase w as on appe al, the leg islature re peale d the statute authori z i ng the bondholders’ reme dy
. Id
. at 259. The court of appe als subsequently aff irmed the district cour

t’s defa ult judgment. Id . But the supr eme c ourt set i t aside, concluding that the leg islature’s r epea l of the bondholder- enfor ceme nt statute had “wholly collapsed” the “spe cial re medial privileg e ” that had been a ffor ded to Atwood as a bond purcha ser. Id
. The court reje cted the notion that Atwood had20

been “ robbed of

some rig ht” and noted a lthough the district ha d obtained a judgme nt in its favor , the court ha d never

enter ed a f

inal judgme nt. Id. at 260. Another c ase highlighting the sig nificanc e of s ecur ing f inal adjudication whe n purs uin g a

statut or y re me dy is Richardelle. See528 S.W .2d at 285-86. I n Ri c ha rd e lle , application of a ne wl y e na c te d p are nta l- lia

bil ity statut e de pr ive d a

n in sure r o f t

he a bil ity to e nf or c e a fa vo ra ble jury verdic t. Id . at 28 2. Th e ve rd ic t wa s a g a ins t the Ric ha rd e lle s, pa

re nts of an e le ve n- y e ar- old

c hil d who set fire to a re sidence
. Id
. Aetna, which i nsured the residenc e, sued the parents to rec over f unds paid t o the homeowne rs on their fir e-da mag e cla im. Id
. Al tho ug h the ri g ht t o attr ibute lia bil ity to pare nts for the torts of their minor children was not r ecognized at common law, id . at 28 5; see als o In re D.M

., 191 S.W .3d 381, 388 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied), a st atute in eff ect on the date of the fire in 1972 allowed prope rty owner s to seek compe nsation from par ents whose c hildren
wer e at lea st ten y ear s old when they damag ed or destroy ed proper ty maliciously . 528 S.W .2d 283. Th a t pa re nta l- lia bil ity statut e wa s r e pe a le d o n Jan ua ry 1, 19 74 , w iththe a ddit io n of a ne w t itl e to the family

cod e, t h e day

befor e Ae tna filed suit. Id . T he ne w l aw s til l a llo we d p are nts to b e he ld lia b le f o r an y p r o p e rty d ama g e c a u s e d b y th e w il lf

u l an d ma li c io u s c o n d

u c t o f th e ir c h il dr e n , but i t ra i s ed the minimum ag e of the child to twelve. Id
. B e c a u s e th e Ri c h ar d e ll e s ’ s o n w a s eleve n y e ars old wh e n h e se t f

ir e to t he ho us e , th is s tatut e a ff

or de d th e Ric ha

rd e lle s a ne w s tatut or

y de fe ns e to A e tna ’s su it.

Aetn a ar g u e d th a t th e s u it s h o u ld b e g o v e r n e d b y th e la

w in e f f e c t when the Ric ha rd e lle s’ so n set

the fi re and

that th e ne w l a

w d e str oy e d it s v e ste d r ig ht t o p ro c e e d a g a ins t th e p ar e n ts o f

te n - an d e le v e n - y e ar - o ld

c h il dr e nw h o c o mm itte d w il lf u l a n d ma li c io u s torts. Id
.21

RejectingAetna’ s assertion of a vested rig ht, the court stated that no person has a veste d rig ht to a particula r reme dy acc orded by law, either at common law or by statute. Id
. at 2 8 4 (c i t i n g Middleton , 185 S.W . 556). I t noted t hat t he st atute g iving Ae tna the rig ht to sue the Richarde lles was re peale d befor e proc eeding s commence d to enforce such rig ht, and bef ore the repe al Aetna

had not bee n g rante d final relief on the enfor ceme nt of its demand. Id . at 28 5- 86 ; see W all s , 900 S.W .2d at 122. The c oncept that r ight s v es t u p on final adjudication is also il lustrated in a r ece nt decision fro m a Fl orida c ourt that consider ed a r etroa ctivity challeng e to the state’ s Asbestos and Silica Compensation Fa irness Ac t. Se e Da im le rCh ry sle r Co rp . v . H

ur st , 949 So. 2d 279, 281 (F la. Dist. Ct. App. 2007, pet. denied)
. Due to a f lood of asbestos litigation, the Florida le g islature passed a law barring smokers from filing or maintaining civil suits that attributed t heir lungcanc er to asbestos exposure unless they provided a

diag nosis from a qualifie d phy sician conc luding t hat exposure to asbestos wa s a substantial contributing fac tor to their ca ncer . Id . at 283-84. The leg islature spec ified t hat t he Act was to be a pplied to all pending asbestos-r elated c ases in which tr ial had not c ommenced as of the e ffe ctive date
. Id
. at 284-85. The c laimant in Hu rst was the w ife of the dec edent, who ha d quit smoki ng about thirteen y ear s befor e his lung canc er dia g nosis. Id . at 282. She a rgue d that the a dd iti on of the “ su bs tanti a l c on tr ibutin g fa c tor ” re qu ir e me nt t o h e r p e nd ingsu it ag ainst DaimlerChry sler was unconstitutional be cause it de prived her of a veste d rig ht. Id . at 285. The trial c ourt ag ree d and denie d DaimlerChry sler’s motion to dismi ss Hurst’s claim. Id . at 282.

Reversingthat ruling , the appe llate cour t stated that when H urst fi l ed suit she was purs uin g a

c omm on law t or t the or y and ha d, a t most, a me re e xpe c tatio n th a t th e c omm on law w ou ld not be alter ed by

leg islation. Id . at 28 6- 87. T he c ourt he ld t hat H ur st d id n ot h a ve a

ve ste d r ig ht,22

and it distinguished her

expectancy

from ca ses in which cla imants had obtained a judgme nt before the effec tive date of a st atute or had a rig ht to recove r a de finite sum of money that was due when the new le g islation passed. Id . at 28 7; se e Flows e rv e Co rp . v. Bo nil la , 9 52 So. 2d 12 39 (F la . Ct
. App. 2007) (r elying on Hu rst to quash trial court’s order that held Asbestos and Silica Compensation Fa irness Ac t unconstituti onal).

Her e, it is undisputed that final j udg ment had not been entere d befor e the e nactment of chapte r 149. Simil ar to the c laimants in Dickson and Hu rst , Satterfield ha d only an expectation that her statutory

reme dy would rema in unchang ed. L ike t h e ins urer in Ri c ha rd

e lle , Satte rf

ie ld
so ug ht r e c ov e ry

fr om a no n- tor tf e a so r, re lyingon

a vic ari ou s- lia

bility the or y that w a s unava ila

ble
a t c omm on

law a nd to whic h s he ha d n o v e ste d r ig ht. Fur thermore , t h e p artial summ ary judgme nt entere d by

the district court did not transfor m Satterfield’s e x pectation of a succ essor-liability reme dy under N ew York law into a veste d ri gh t
. That judg ment was not final whe n chapte r 149 bec ame e ffe ctive four day s later. The d i s t ri ct co u rt would have been a ble to rec onsider its ruling on the partial summary judgme nt and
reve rse it. Se e El

de r Co ns t., In c . v . Ci ty

of C oll e y v ill e , 839 S.W. 2d 91 , 92 ( Te x. 19 92 ). Sa tte rf ie ld cannot maintain her vested-r ight argument based on a trial-c ourt ruling that was interloc utory
. See Middleton , 185 S.W
. at 561 (c oncluding that law may be cha ng ed by leg islature so long as it does
no t de str oy

or pr e ve nt a de qu ate enfo rc e me nt o f v e ste d r ig hts ); Dickson , 139 S.W .2d at 259-60 (setting aside de fault judg ment that was not final and was not imm une to subsequent leg islative action).Th e so le Te xas d e c isi on c oncern ingthe c on sti tut ion a lity of c ha pte r 1 49 , o n f

a c ts 16 rema rkably simil ar to this ca se, is not considere d by the majority

opinion. Se e Ro bin so n v . Cr own Cork & Seal Co. , 251 S.W .3d 520, 523 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2006, pet. g rante d). 23 Satterfield ha s not demonstrated that c hapter 149 violates the constitutional prohibition ag ainst retroa ctive laws be cause she has not shown that s h e h ad a v ested rig ht to a
succe ssor-liability

reme dy throug h choice -of- law ru l es . See D e Cordova , 4 Tex. at 479-80 (re cog nizi ng t h at consti tutional prohibiti on ag ainst retroa ctive laws is not violated without d es t ruction or impairme nt of vested r ight) ; s e e a ls o Co r p u s Ch r is ti

P e o p le ’ s B a p ti s t C h u rch , 90 4 S. W.2 d at 62 6 ( same ); Project Principle, I nc ., 724 S.W .2d at 390 (same ). Abrogation of remedy Th e ma jor ity op ini on fu rt he r m isd ir e c ts the c on sti tut ion a l in qu ir y by re lyingo n

a c a se interpre ting the Pennsy

lvania Constituti on, whic h has no prohibition ag ainst retroa ctive laws. In that
case , a closely split cour

t inva lidated a succe ssor-liability statute under the open courts provision of the Pennsylvania Constituti on beca use t he statute e liminated the claimants’ r emedy
. Se e Ie ro po li v. AC& S Corp. , 842 A.2d 919, 932 (Penn. 2004). At lea st three sig nificant proble ms arise with the majority ’s re liance on that case : (1) Satterf ield never raised a n open-c ourts challeng e to cha pter 149 in response to Crown’ s summ ary -judg ment motion; (2) the invalidated Pennsylvania statute wa s broade r (af

fording an aff

irmative defe nse to a larg er, less-innoce nt se t of corpor ate suc cessor s) than the on e a t is su e he re ; and

(3 ) o ve r f our p a g e s are de vo te d to d isc us sio n o f n on bin din g Pe nn sylva

nia aut ho ri ty but th e F if

th C ir c uit ’s a

pp lic a tio n o f T e xas l aw t o a statut e c ha lle ng e d o n o pe n c ourt s g rounds as ba

rring the claimant’s reme dy is r educe d to a footnote. See J ones v. Pullman Kellogg 1624

Cor p ., 78 5 F .2 d 1 27 0 ( 5th

Cir . 1 98 6) . I f t

he ma jori ty is i nc lin e d to c on sid e r a n o pe n c ourt s provision, it should be the provision in the Texas Constitution. Additionally , it is m y opinion that the Fif th Circuit’s interpre tation of t he law has gre ater persua sive value in this Tex as ca se than that of a c ourt in Pennsy lvania, construing a broader statute and a diff ere nt constituti on in the context of
an o pe n c ourt s c ha lle ng e that is no t be fo re thi s Co ur t. Th e Te xas S up re me Court ha s long he ld that law s af fe c tin g a c la ima

nt’ s r e me dy

in pending case s—providing a new statutory defe nse for instance—a re constitutional if the claimant’s
reme dy is not taken awa

y entirely
. S

e e Ci ty o f Ty le r v . Likes , 9 6 2 S
. W .2d 489, 502 (Tex. 1997) (c i t i n g De Cordova , 4 Te x. a t 48 0) ; see also Burlington N. & Santa F e R.R. Co. v. Skinner Tank Co. , 419 F.3d 355, 359- 60 (5th Cir. 2005). Quoting the supreme court in Likes , Satterfield a cknowledg es that a st atu te do e s n ot v iol a te the c on sti tut ion a l pr oh ibi tio n a g a ins t r e tr oa c tiv ity if it a ff or ds a
rea sonable time or f

air opportunity

to preser ve a c laimant’s rig hts under the f orm er l aw, or

if the
am en d m ent does not bar all reme dy . 962 S.W .2d at 502. Additionally , the supreme court ha s conclude d that a g rac e per iod is unnecessa ry when , as h er e, its inclusion would defeat the very purpose of

the statute. Owens Corning , 997 S.W .2d at 573. Thus, even if Satterfield somehowhad a veste d rig ht to impos e succ essor liability ag ainst Crown, cha

pter 149 will pass constit u t i o nal muster, eve n without a g rac e per iod, if it does not completely deprive her o f re m ed i es for the tor t
c la ims in h e r s uit
.

Arg uing tha t her c laims were “complete ly ex t i n gu i s h ed , ” S at t er fi eld compar es cha pter 149’s ef fec t on her suit to that of the leg islation challeng ed by the claimants in Likes. 962 S.W .2d at 489

. Howeve r, the leg islation at issue in Likes re c la ssi fi e d the c ity ’s sto rm se we r o pe ratio n a s aI n Likes , “entire ly taken a way” equat ed not t o a ca p on the amount of a

defe ndant’s 17 statutory liability or t he pursuit of money

in addition to any

other de fenda

nt’s paid settlement, but an absolute abrog ation of re medy for the injurie s alleg ed, yielding the claimant a total r ecove ry of zero dollars. That wa s not the case here
. 25 g over nme nta l f u n c ti o n f o r wh ic h the city

could not be sued—e ven thoug h opera tion and maintenanc e of the sew ers ha d been c lassified as proprietar y functions for which a city could have been sue d at common law. Id . at 502. As a r esult of the statutory rec lassification, cities we re immune fr om ever y suit alleg ing ne g lige nt maintenance of it s s t o rm sewe rs, and a claimant’s r ecove ry

of any amount f r o m a mu n ic ip a l d e f

e n d an t f o r s u c h c la im s w a s f

o r e v e r b ar

r e d. See id . By

contra st, chapter

149 does not g rant immunity

from suit to e very

asbestos-manuf

actur er’ s succe ssor, and it does not bar Satterfield’ s cause of ac tion. Com pa reid ., with Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 149.003

. 17 I n contra st to the challenge d statute in Likes , c ha pte r 1 49 do e s n ot c a

us e c omp le te de pr ivatio n o f a

le g a l r e me dy
. Ap ply

ing Te xas l aw, the F if

th C ir c uit ha s r e c og nize d th a t a

statut e does not leave a cla imant “without any ‘viable’ defe ndants or ‘effe ctively den[y ] a cause of a ction’” wh e n s he has cla ims re ma ini nga g a ins t ot he r d e fe nd ants . Jones , 7 8 5 F. 2 d at 1 2 7 3 (c i t i n g Nelson

v . M e tal lic -B ra de n B ldg. Co ., 695 S.W .2d 213, 215 (Tex. App.—Hou s ton [ 1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref ’d
n. r. e .) ; se e als o Gom e

z v. Pa sa de na He alt

h Ca reMg

mt
. , 246 S.W .3d 306, 314 (Tex. App.—Houston [ 1 4 t h Di s t
. ] 2008, no pet.) (conc luding that thre e-year survival statute for

minor’s hea lth-car e lia bil ity c la im d id no t e ff

e c tiv e ly a br og a te c la ima

nt’ s r ig ht t o r e dr e ss a g a ins t me dic a l c e nte r a nd its g e ne ra l pa rt ne r b e c a us e c la ima

nt h a d a lte rn a tiv e re me dy

of su it a g a ins t phy sic ians ); W ilson v. AC& S, Inc ., 864 N.E.2d 682, 695 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (holding that new statute, which re quired proof that asbestos exposure wa s substantial contributing f actor to claimant’s medica l condition, could beJones ill us tr a te s th e fa c tua l ba sis fo r a Te xas c ourt’s re

je c tio n o f t

he argume nt t

hat a 18 claimant wa s left without a ny viable defe ndants or eff ectively denied a cause of action. For over a ce n tu r y , th e T e xa s Su

p r e me Co u rt h a s r e c o g n iz e d th a t la w s a f f e c ti n g a r e me dy

are not unconstitutionally

retroa ctive unless the r emedy is entirely

taken a way . See D e Cordova , 4 Tex. at 48 0; see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Skinner Tank Co. , 419 F.3d 355, 359-60 (5th Cir. 26 a pp lie d to pe nd ingc a se s and did no t a br og a te c la ima

nt’ s v e ste d r ig ht b e c a

us e sh e wa s st ill a

ble to purs ue he r c a

us e of a c tio n a nd re c ov e r f or inj ur y c a us e d b y he r h us ba nd ’s e xpos ur e to a sb e sto s; statute mere ly

aff ecte d methods and proc edure by which that ac tion was rec og nized, protected a nd enfor ced, not the c ause of action itself), appeal dism’d , 864 N.E.2d 645 (Ohio 2007)
. I n Jones , the widow of a Gulf Oil ref

inery worke r broug ht a wrong ful death and surviv orship suit ag ainst Pull man Kellog g and appe aled the tr ial court’s dismissal of her case on summary judgme nt. Id . at 1271. She alle ged that from the mid-1960s until 1975 her husband worke d around a

fluid cata ly

tic cra ckingunit that was desig ned by Pullm an Ke llogg , and that he
was c ontinually

exposed to poly

nuclea r ar omatic hy droca

rbons which ultimately ca u sed his lung disease. Id
. Pul lma

n K e llo g g re sp on de d th a t th e te n- y e ar s tatut e of re po se fo r s uit s a g a ins t arc hit e c ts
an d e n g in e e r s b ar

r e d J ones’s suit. Id . Jon e s a sse rt e d th a t th e statut e vio late d th e op e n c ourt s clause of the Te x as Constitut ion beca use her suit was ba

rre d befor e her

husband’s injury

manifested itself. Id . at 1272.

Affir ming the c onstitut ionality of the statute, the Fifth Circuit concluded that J ones still had a leg al remedy beca use she was able to pursue her claims ag ainst other de fenda nts. See id. ; see also Gome

z , 2 46 S.W. 3d

a t 31 4; W ilson , 864 N.E.2d at 695. The court noted that J ones had sue d her husba nd’s em p l o y er as we ll as thirteen manuf actur ers a nd suppliers of asbe stos-containing pr od uc ts a nd that sh e ha d e nte re d into s e ttl e me nt a g re e me nts wi th s e ve ra l of the m. Id
.

182005); City of T yler v . Likes , 96 2 S.W. 2d 48 9, 50 2 ( Te x. 19 97 ). Th e ma jor ity state s th a t Jones “ did no t c on sid e r whe the r s uc h a law wo uld vio late the Te xas C on sti tut ion ’s e xpre ss p ro hib iti on a g a ins t re tr oa c tiv e laws in a

rt ic le I , sec tio n 16. ” Ho we ve r, that is no t a re le va nt c on c e rn . Re tr oa c tiv ity is a non-issue if the claimant is not completely deprive d of a r emedy
. Jones of fe rs a ssi sta

nc e in understandingwhat fa cts do not constitute complete abr og ation of a c laimant’s re medy and for that rea son, it is entirely

instructive her e.
27 Satterfield’ s leg al position is s imilar to Jones’s beca use chapte r 149 does not preve nt Satterfield from pursuing her reme dies or rec overing all of her damag es, jointly and seve rally , from
nume ro us oth e r d e fe nd ants (n or do e s it a ff e c t any se ttl e me nt t

hat sh e ha s a lr e a dy

re c e ive d in

thi s
case ). Ac cording ly , chapte r 149 does not violate t he constit utional prohibition aga inst retroac tive laws in article I , section 16.

F ur the rm or e , th e re is no vi ol a tio n o f a rt ic le I , s e c tio n 1 6 b e c a

us e c ha pte r 1 49 is a
reme dial statute that could be applied to pe nding c ases. See Exxon Corp. v. Breche en , 526 S.W .2d 519, 525 (Tex. 1975) (holding that statute which be came eff ective a fter c laimant’s death but prior to the trial of wr ong ful death case was remedial, constitutional; and g overne d pendinglitigation pr oc e e din g s th a t w e re pe nd ingwh e n s tatut e wa s e na c te d) ; De Cordova , 4 Tex. at 477 (re cog nizi ng that laws mere ly

regulate the r emedy

are not within constit utional prohibition aga inst retrospec tive laws); Villers v. Republic Fin. Se rvs., Inc ., 60 2 S. W.2 d 56 6, 57 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 19 80 , w ri t ref ’d n.r.e .) (noting that g ener ally , statutes conce rning reme dies are to be applied to a ctions tried af ter the ir pa ssa g e e ve n tho ug h a c tio n aro se be fo re ha nd ); Se rge an t E

nte rs. , I nc . v . S tra y ho rn , 112 S.W .3d 24 1, 25 0 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 03 , no pe t.) (r e c og nizi ngtha t r e me dia l st a tut e s ma

y be a pp lie d to pe nd ing c a se s bec a

us e the y us ua lly do no t af fe c t ve ste d r ig ht) ; see 16A C.J .S. Constit utional L aw § 2 67 (1 98 6) (“ A s tatut e wh ic h r e late s me re ly to m a tte rs of r eme dy

may be ma de a

pp lic a ble28

to pending proce eding s at any time before the final judg ment of the c ourt bec omes eff ective.” ). A
reme dial statute is one that introduces a new r egulation for the a dvance ment of the public we lfare or conduc ive to the public g ood, aff ords a r emedy , improves and f acilitates ex isting re medies, or
corr ects de fec ts, mistakes, and omi ssions in the l aws of the S tate. Lukes v. Em ployee s Ret. Sys. of Tex
. , 5 9 S
. W
. 3 d

8 3 8 , 8 4 2 (T ex . Ap p . —

Au s t i n 2 0 0 1 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Sim s v . A d o p ti o n A ll ia nce , 922 S.W .2d 213, 217 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied))
.

Chapter 149 is a r emedial statute be cause it corre cted a n omission i n Texas law
conce rning the post-merg er suc cessor liability of for eig n corpor ations. Chapter 149 a lso addresse d the lon g -t a ile d, un

pr e dic ta ble a sb e sto s- re late d lia

bil iti e s that may

ba nk ru pt s uc c e sso r c or

po ratio ns :
A cor poration is curr ently

liable up to its total value f or all injuries it cause s. I f that corpor ation merg es with a much la rg er c orporation, h oweve r, the succ essor corpor ation is liable for the injuries c aused by its predec essor (e ven thoug h not cause d in any way by the succe ssor) up to the succe ssor’s much highe r value. I n the ca se of long- tailed and unknown a sbestos-re lated liabil i t i es, a much larg er suc cessor can e a sil y be ba nk ru pte d b y the a sb e sto s- re late d li a

bil iti e s it inn oc e ntl y

re c e ive d f

ro m a much smaller pr edec essor with which it mer g ed many deca des ag o. To eliminate that unfairne ss––and ev en to save succ essor c orporations from bankruptcy ––some have proposed a

new r ule limiti ng liability

espec ially

for a sbestos-re lated succ essor liabiliti es ac quired solely

throug h a mer g er. . . . [Under this rule], any asbestos-r elated liabiliti es ac quired solely

throug h a mer g er w ould be trac ed bac k throug h one or more me rg e rs to t

he or ig ina l tr ans fe ro r wh o did so me thi ngre late d to a sb e sto s th a t a c tua lly resulted in har

m. The total of transferr ed li abilities that the succe ssor corpor ation had to pay would be limited t o the value ( adjusted upwa rd for time and inflation) of the tot a l g ro ss a sse ts o f t

he or ig ina l tr ans fe ro r t

hat c a us e d th os e same lia

bil iti e s.
H.J . of Tex., 78th L eg ., R.S. 6042-43.29 Be cause chapte r 149 is a

reme dial statute that could be a pplied to pending case s and beca use the statute did not bar Satterfield from pursuing her c laims ag ainst multi ple other defe ndants, it is constit utional under a rticle I section 16. Police power The ne x t fundamenta l flaw in the majority opinion is that it does not recog nize the leg islature’s r ight to re asonably exercise its police powe r af ter ba l an ci n g t he compe ting considerations on it s own. Dismissing cha pter 149 a s being enac ted under the mere “guise” of police power , the majority

posits that the ne eds of the public are distinct from the financ ial protec tion of a par ticular private-busines s s egment. But the conne ction betwee n the solvency of a pa rticular business seg ment and potential publi c har m is evident to Satterfield, who doe s not dispute the signific ance of the asbestos-litigation crisis to non-tortfeasor succe ssor corpor ations or the potential eff ects of the ir bankruptc ies on Texas jobs a nd state reve nue. The Supreme Court has also made the
connec tion between suppo rt of a business se ctor a nd preve ntion of public harm, holding that pr ote c tio n o f t

he pe op le ’s vit a l in terest s is not li mit e d to he a lth , mo ra ls a nd sa fe ty , b ut e xten ds to economic ne eds as we ll. Veix v . Sixth W ard Bldg. & Loan Ass’n , 310 U.S. 32, 38-39 (1940) (uph o l d i n g state statutes desig ned to protec t solvency of building a

nd loan associations as
c on sti tut ion a l e xer c ise of state ’s po lic e po we r) ; s e e a l s o B r a n d v . K o rth , 9 9 S
. W
. 2d 285, 287 (Tex. 1936) (re cog nizi ng that exercise of leg islative police powe r extends to safeguardingsolvency of ba nk s) . Co ntr ary

to t he ma jor ity ’s de c lara

tio n th a t th e le g isl a tur e ’s e na c tme nt o f c ha pte r 1 49 is
ou tsi de the sc op e of

the po lic e po we r, the Sup re me Cou rt ha s d e te rm ine d that le g isl a tio n a imi ngto benef it s tate re sidents and their e conomic intere sts—by incre asing state industries, deve loping30

its r es o u rc es , and adding to its wea lth and prosper ity —is embrac ed by

the police powe r. Barbier

v . Co nn oll

y , 1 13 U. S. 2 7, 31 (1 88 5) ; se e als o J e fc o, In c . v . Le wis , 520 S.W .2d 915, 922 (Tex. Civ. Ap p . — Au s t i n1 9 7 5 , wr i tre f’ d

n . r. e) (c i t i n g City o

f Co l em an v. Rhone , 222 S.W .2d 646, 648 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1949, writ ref ’d)) . Chapter 149 se rves t h e p u b lic g oals rec og nized by the Supreme Court. It seeks to minimiz e fina ncial per il to non-tortfeasor succe ssor corpor ations and reduc e risks to jobs and pensions, which promotes the state’s prosper ity and addre sses proper subject matter for the exercise of

leg islative police powe r. “A larg e dis cre tion is necessar ily vested in the L eg islature to deter mine not only

what the inter es t s of the public re quire, but what measure s are nece ssary for the pr otection of such interests.” State v. Richards , 301 S
. W
. 2d 597, 602 (Tex. 1957); Grothues v. City of Helotes , 928 S.W .2d 725, 729 (Tex. App.—Sa n An tonio 1996, no writ) (“A s the aff airs of the people a

nd g overnme nt chang e and pr og ress, so the police power chang es and pr og resse s to meet the nee ds.”) (q u o t i n g City

of B re c k e nr idge v . Coza rt , 478 S.W .2d 162, 165 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1972, writ ref ’d n.r.e .)). Ac cording ly , whether a leg islative act will serve a public use or purpose is, in the first instance, a question for the deter mination of the leg islature, and that determination or de cision cannot be revie wed a

nd the contra

ry deter mined by the judiciary

except in instances whe re the leg islative determination of the question is palpably and manife stly arbitra ry and incor rec t. Rhone , 222 S.W .2d at 649 (quoting Ne al v. Bo og-S c ott , 247 S.W . 689, 691 (Tex. Civ. App.—Bea umont 19 23 , n o w ri t) ); see also Je fco , 5 2 0 S
. W
. 2 d

at 9 2 2 (c i t i n g Rhone , this Court stated that wisdom of exercise of

police powe r is larg ely

for leg islative rathe r than judicial deter mination, courts will notThe e x pansion of succ essor-liability asbestos litigation affe cts Texas r esidents. Crown’s 19 former secr etar y and g ener al counse l, Richard Krzyzanowski, testified that Crown’s subsidiaries or aff iliates produce bever ag e ca ns at fac iliti es in Conroe, Sug arla nd, and Abilene
. T h o s e thre e fa c ili tie s e mpl oy

a lmo st 1 ,0 00 Te xan s and c on tr ibute $5 mil lio n in pr op e rt y and fr anc his e ta xes t o the state. Krzyzanowski further noted t h at C ro wn’s cor porate family

includes appr ox imately

as many Te xas r e tir e e s a s e mpl oy e e s. 31 d is tu r b e xe r c is e o f p o li c e p o w e r u n le s s it w a s u n n e c e s s ar y an d u n r e a s o n a

b le , an d if d if

fer ence of opinion ex ists as to it s nece ssity and re asonable ness, cour ts will not invalidate it). B e c a u s e o p e r a t i o no f

t h e p o l i c e p o w e r

o f t e nr e s u l t s i nt h e a

b r i d g m e n to f

p r i va te rig hts, Spann v. Dallas , 2 35 S.W. 51 3, 51 5 ( Te x. 19 21 ), ind ivi du a l ha rd sh ip i s b a lanc e d a g a ins t the statute’s public a dvantag es in de termining whether a statute is a va lid ex erc ise of police pow er, St at e v . Ci ty

of A us tin , 3 31 S.W. 2d

73 7, 74 3 ( Te x. 19 60 ); T e x a s S ta t e T e a c h e r s A s s ’ n v . Stat e , 711 S.W .2d 421, 424 (Tex. App.—Austin 1986, writ ref’ d n.r.e.)
.

Her e, the leg islature enac ted a limit ation on the asbestos-r elated liabil i t y o f n o ntortfea sor succ essor c orporations to contain the financ ial peril threatening non-tortfe asor suc cessor corpor ations and to reduc e the r esulting r i s k s t o T ex ans’ jobs and pe nsions when the f inancial 19 stability of those cor

porations is jeopardiz ed b y succe ssor-liability

litigation. The state ment of le g isl a tiv e int e nt expr e sse s the po lic y be hin d the law an d th e ha rm tha t it wa s in te nd e d to a dd

re ss: Corporations ac tually

in the asbestos busi ness and their successors throug h merg er have be en fina

ncially drai n ed b y d ecades of litig ation. As a re sult, nearly 70 such corp o ra tions have soug ht protection throug h bankruptc y . The c ost in jobs and pension bene fits, to cite just two ex amples, has be en substantial. This leg islation s e e k s t o h e l p k e e p r e m a i n i n g h ar d

- p r e s s e d s u c c e s s o r s o u to f

b an kr u p t c y.
H.J . of Tex., 78th L eg ., R.S. 6044.32 To attain these obje ctives and afte r balanc ing the competinginterests, the leg islature expressly decide d to apply

chapte r 149 to pendingcase s. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem
. C o d e A nn. § 149.001 (mandating a

pplication of cha

pter 149 to all case s “in which the trial, or any new trial or
re tr ia l f oll ow ingmotio n, a

pp e a l, o r o the rw ise , b e g ins on or a ft e r t hat e ff e c tiv e date .” ); Lebohm

v . Ci ty o f G a lveston , 2 7 5 S.W .2d 951, 955 (Tex. 1955) (op. on re h’g ) (statingthat police powe r inc lud e s le g isl a tiv e a

uth or ity to w ith dr aw r e me die s f

or c a us e s of ac tio n whe n that w ith dr awl “ is a
re a so na ble e xer c ise of

the po lic e po we r i n th e in ter e st o f t he g e ne ra l w e lf

are .” ); see also Quick

v . Ci ty of A us tin , 7 S.W .3d 109, 136 (Tex. 1999) (Ha nkinson, J., dissenting ) (noting that “[w]hether t o ap p l y a s t at u t e r et ro ac t i v el y

i s , fo r v ery

go o d re as o n s , a l egi s l a t i v e p o l i cy ch o i ce ”)
. T h ro u gh May 20 0 3 , Cr o w nh a d a lr e a dy p a id s u c c e s s o r

a s b e s to s - r e late d

c la im s to ta li n g mo r e th an $413 milli on. I f it had bee n require d to continue pay ing suc h claims, Crown would have been thr e a te ne d w ithba

nk ru ptc y —th e pr e c ise c on se qu e nc e that th e le g isl a tur e so ug ht to pr e ve nt f or a ll sim ila rl y sit uate d c or po ratio ns . Satterfield c oncede s that the l eg islature may enac t laws that aff

ect pe nding matters—if the le g islation addresses w ater conser vation, protec tion of the environme nt or children,
or the regulation of profe ssions, z oning, or handguns—beca

use valid exercise of police pow er in the public interest is a recog nized exception to the unconstitutionality of laws with potential re troac tive eff ect. See I

n re A.V. , 1 1 3 S
. W
. 3 d

3 5 5 , 3 6 1 (T ex . 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Ba rsh op v . M e din a Co un ty Un de rg ro un d W ate r D ist ., 925 S.W .2d 618, 633-34 (Tex . 1996)); see also Kil patrick v. State Bd. of Re gis tra tio n fo r P ro

f’ l E ng ’r s , 610 S.W .2d 867, 871 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1980, writ ref’ dTh e qu e sti on of “ wh e the r t

he le g isl a tur e re a so na

bly e xer c ise d its poli c e po we r to e na c t a 20 retroa ctive law” has been a nswere d at least twice by

the author of

the majority

opinion, who stated that, “[w]hi le article 1, section 16 of the T exas Const itution ex pressly forbids re troac tive leg islation, it has been c onsistently

construed not to invalidate a ll retroac tive leg islation.” Institute of Cogni tive Dev ., Inc. v . Texas De

p ’t o f Mental He alth & Mental Retardation , No. 03-98-00376- CV, 1999 Tex. App. L EXI S 4780, at *13 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.). The author fur ther noted that “valid exercise of

the police powe r by

the leg islature to safe g uard the public safe ty and we lfare can pr evail over

a findingthat a law is unc onstitut ionally ret ro ac t i v e. ” Id. at *22 (c iting Barshop v . M e din a Co un ty U

nd e rg ro un d W ate r D ist ., 92 5 S. W.2 d 6 18 , 6 37 -3 8 ( Te x. 19 96 ); Te x as Sta te Te ac he rs A ss’n v . S

tate , 711 S.W .2d 421, 424 (Tex. App.—Austin 1986, writ ref’ d n.r.e.) ). The majority ’s discussion of leg islative police power conta ins conflicting asser tions. On the on e ha nd , it state s th a t “ the Te xas L e g isl a tur e ha s no powe r, po lic e or oth e rw ise ” to e na c t a retroa ctive law. O n the other ha nd, just four pag es later , it recog nizes that in B arshop and other case s, the l eg islature’s e nactment of laws that applied to pe nding c auses of action “ma

y have involved a valid exerc ise of police pow er.” 33 n.r.e) (“The constitutional rule s ag ainst impairing contra cts and retroa ctive laws are not a bsolute and must y ield to a state’s r ight to saf eguard the public safe ty

and we lfare .”). 20 H o w e v e r , s h e a l s o ar g u e s t h a tt h e p r o h i b i t i o na g a i n s tr e t r o a c t i v e l aw s i n art i c l e I, section 16 of the T exas Const itu t i on’s B ill of Rights is streng thened by article I , section 29 of the constitution, which states that ever y thing in the B ill of Rights “is excepted out of the g ener al power s of g overnme nt, and shall fore ver r emain inviolate, and all laws contra ry there to . . . shall be void.” See Tex. Cons t. art. I , § 29.

Satterfield f

ails to ex plain the evident inconsistency betwee n (1) her rec og nition of the consti tutionality of applying c erta in police-powe r-e nacte d laws (involving water conser vation; pr ote c tio n o f t

he en vi ronm e nt a

nd c hil dr e n; a

nd re g ulatio n o f p ro fe ssi on s, zon ing , a nd ha nd g un s) to pending claims, and (2) her a ssertion that article I , section 29 prohibits all retroa ctive laws. SeeThe utility of ar ticle I , section 29 of the T exas Const itution has been questioned: 21 Presum ab l y s ection 29 wa s desig ned as a closing flourish to emphasize the importance of the B ill of Rights. Unfortunately , it is not clear just what it means and one is left wi t h t h e suspicion that despite the a ppare ntly strong lang uag e it means nothing at all. Section 29 has bee n cited in re latively fewcase s and in them the decision ty

pically turned on another section of the Bill of Rights c ited with section 29
. . . . Se c tio n 2 9 s e e ms t o b e a me anin g le ss p ro vis ion

of the B ill of

Rig hts
. I t is not even the a id to rigid c onstruction which it might appe ar to be
. . . . Article I today is r e dund ant, c on fu sin g , p art ia lly ob so le te and

in p la c e s h ig hly

te c hn ic a l. I

n it s prese nt form its justi fication is hi story not logic. 1 Geor g e D. Br aden, et al., The Constit ution of the State of T exas: An Annotated and Comparative An aly sis 85-86 (1977)
. T h e T e xa s S u

p r e m e C o u rt h a s o b s e r

v e d t h a t m e an i n g o f t h e T e xa s C o n s t i tu t i o n mu st 22 be soug ht with the understandingthat it “was ratified to function as an org anic document to g overn society and instituti ons as they

evolve throug h time.” Da v e np or t v . G ar c ia , 834 S.W .2d 4, 19 (T e x. 19 92 ). I f t

he ma jor ity ’s int e rp re tatio n o f a rt ic le I , s e c tio n 2 9 is le g a lly so un d, th en all contempora

ry T exas statutes that place a ny limit whatsoeve r on the fr eedoms of spe ech, pr ess, or re lig ion ; th e ri g ht o f d

ue pr oc e ss; or

any oth e r p ro vis ion

in t he bil l of ri g hts , a re un c on sti tut ion a l. Th e ma jor ity a sse rt s that le g isl a tiv e int e nt and an a sse ssm e nt of a statut e ’s re a so na ble ne ss 23 are impossibl e without something a kin to Congre ssional findings. But a s the Texas Supreme Court ha s st a te d, the “ sure st guid e to le g isl a tiv e int e nt” is in t he wo rd s th a t th e le g isl a tur e c ho os e s to us e in a statute. Leland v. Brandal , 200 8 T ex . L E XI S 574, at *5 (Tex. J une 13, 2008) ( quoting Fitzgerald v. Advanc ed Spine Fix ation Sys., Inc
. , 9 9 6 S
. W
. 2 d 8 6 4 , 8 6 6 ( T e x . 1 9 9 9 ) )
. In t e r e s t i n g l y, in the para g raph immediate ly following this a ssertion, the majority conclude s that chapte r 149 is not a re asonable exercise of

leg islative police powe r.

34 id . art. I , §§ 16, 29. Be cause Satterfield c oncede s that, at least in some instance s, the leg islature 21 may enac t laws under its police pow er that apply to pending claims wi thout running a foul of the Te xas C on sti tut ion , th e re is n o n e e d to a tte mpt to r e c on c ile the inc on sis te nc y in h e r a rgume nt. 22 Courts are r eluctant to disturb leg islative action on subj ect matter that lies within the p o l i c e p o w e r

an d w i l l n o td o s o u n l e s s i tc l e ar l y a p p e ar s t h a tt h e r e g u l a t i o ni s u n n e c e s s ar y,
unrea sonable, and unjustified by the fa cts. Be lla irev . La mk in , 317 S.W .2d 43, 45-46 (Tex . 1958) 2335

(c i t i n g Rhone , 222 S.W. 2d a t 64 9) ; Jefc o, Inc. , 52 0 S.W. 2d a t 92 2; Martin v. W holesome D airy Inc ., 43 7 S.W.2 d 586 , 5 91 -9 2 ( Te x. Civ . App .— Au sti n 1 96 9, wr it r e f’ d n .r .e .) . A s th e Te xas S up re me Court has stated, “

If there is room for a fair diff erenc e of opinion as to the nece ssity and

re as on ab le ne

ss o f a le gis lat iv e e na c tm e nt on a subj e c t wh ic h li es wi thi n th e po lic e po we r, thec ou rts will no t ho ld i t v oid .” Be lla ire , 31 7 S.W. 2d a t 45 -4 6 ( e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) ; Jefc o , 520 S.W .2d at 92 2; Ma rti n , 437 S.W .2d at 592.

S a t t e r f i e l d h a s n o t m a d e i tc l e ar l y a p p ar e n tt h a tc h a

p t e r 1 4 9 i s u n n e c e s s ar

y,
unrea sonable, a

nd unjustified by

the fa cts. Se e Be lla ire , 3 17 S.W. 2d a t 45 -4 6. To inv a li date chapte r 149, Satterf

ield would have this Court reje ct the stateme nt of le g is la ti v e in tent acc ompanying the s t at u t e’ s en actment. However , beca use there is room for a f

air diff ere nce of opinion as to the
nece ssity and re asonable ness of c hapter 149 on subjects that lie within the police powe r (i.e., pr omo tio n o f t

he pu bli c in ter est in j ob s a

nd pe ns ion s, inc re a sin g state ind us tr ie s, de ve lop ingits
resour ces, and addingto its wealth and prospe rity), this Court will not hold it void. Se e id .; se e als o Barshop , 925 S.W .2d at 634 (holding that Edwar ds Aquifer Act’s c ap on landown ers’ water wi thd ra wl wa s n e c e ssa

ry to s a fe g ua

rd pu bli c wel fare and that c on sid e ratio n o f p re e xistin g us e rs ’ water consumption before eff

ective date of Ac t did not render A ct unconstitutional). Chapter 149 ha

ndles competingeconomic inter ests: ha ving a reme dy

available for
c la ima nts by sh if tin g tor t li a bil ity to s uc c e sso r c or

po ra tio ns ve rsus mi nim izin g fi na nc ia l r isk to
su c c e sso r co rp or a tio ns and the job s and pe ns ion s pro vid e d by tho se c or po ratio ns . Ba lanc ingthe se
c o mp e t i n g i n t e r e s t s i s a

qu i n t e s s e n t i a l f

u n c t i o no f

t h e l e g i s l a tu r e , n o tt h e j u d i c i ar y. See City of Rock wall v. Hughes , 246 S.W .3d 621, 626 n.38 (Tex. 2008) (Willett, J ., dissenting)
.This ge nera l prohibition does not preclude the leg islature fr om passing spe cial laws for 24 prese rvation of Te x as fish and g ame a nd fenc e laws “ as may

be nee ded to meet th e wa n t s of the people.” Tex. Cons t. art. I I I , § 56(b)( 1), (2)
. 36

Havingconclude d that Satterfield f ailed to demonst ra t e the unconstitutionality of applying c hapter

149 to this case, conside ration is g iven to her nex t constituti onal cha lleng e: whether chapte r 149 constitutes a spec ial law.
Constitutional chal lenge und er ar ticle III, sec tion 56

I n her se cond issue, Satterf ield argues th a

t c h a p te r 149 “sing les out Crown and Crown
a lon e ” fo r s pe c ia l tr e a tme nt i n v iol a tio n o f t he Te xas Con sti tut ion ’s pr oh ibi tio n ag a ins t spe c ia l la ws . See Tex. Cons t. art. I I I , § 56. This argument prese nts a fac ial challeng e to t h e s t at u t e, requiring Satterfield to demonstrate that there is “no possi ble s tate of fac ts” under which the s tatute would be constitutional. Se e Te

x as W or k e rs’ Com p. Com m’n v . G ar c ia , 893 S.W .2d 504, 520 (Tex. 1995). Cr ow n re sp on ds that c ha

pte r 14 9 is no t a sp e c ia l law be c a us e it is a pp lic a ble to a su bs tanti a l c la ss and its classifications are r easona ble. A s pe c ia l la

w i s li mit e d to a

pa rt ic ula r c la ss o f perso ns distin g uis he d b y so me char acte ristic other than g eog raphy
. Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon , 22 S.W .3d 444, 450 (Tex. 2000); Maple Run at Austin Mun. Uti l. Dist. v. Monaghan , 9 3 1 S
. W
. 2 d 9 4 1 , 9 4 5 ( T e x . 1 9 9 6 )
. A rt i c l e III , se c tio n 5 6 o f t

he Te xas Co ns ti tutio n e nume rate s th ir ty c on te xts in

wh ic h “ the L e g isl a tur e sh a ll not, ex ce p t as otherw ise provided in this Consti tution, pass any local or spe cialized law.” Additionally , “in all other case s wher e a g ener al law can be made a pplicable, no loca l or specia l law shall be ena cted.” Tex. Cons t. art. I I I , § 56. 2437 Br oad author ity

rests with the leg islature to make cl as sifications for le g islative purposes . Sheldon , 22 S.W .3 d at 45 0; J uli ff G ar de ns , LLC

v . Te x as Com m’n o n E

nv tl. Qu ali ty , 131 S.W .3d 271, 281 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). L eg islative classifications “must be broa d enoug h to include a substantial class and must be based on c hara cter istics legitimately distinguishing such cla ss from others with respe ct to the public purpose soug ht to be acc omplished by the proposed leg islation.” Sheldon , 2 2 S. W.3 d at 45 1 ( up ho ldi n g r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f s t a tut or y c la ssi fi c a tio n o f c la ss
a c tio ns inv olv ing mot or ve hic le lic e ns e e s be c a us e a uto mob ile is on e of c on sume rs ’ l arg e st a nd mos t imp or tant p ur c ha se s and

c la ss a c tio ns inv olv inga uto mob ile s affect many

ind ivi du a ls) ; J

uli ff Gardens , 131 S.W .3d at 2 8 1 (u pholding r easona bleness of statutory

classification of proposed landfi l l s beca

use those landf

ills were less r egulated than other s and their r esulting pollution had potential to affe ct population cente rs, aquatic habitat, and r ecr eational f ishing). I n deter mining whe ther a

statute is a spec ial law, it is ap p ropriate to examine the statute’s l egi s l at ive history
. Juliff Gardens , 1 31 S.W. 3d a t 28 2 n .7 . “ Th e pr ima

ry and ult imate t es t o f wh ether

the law is g ener al or spec ial is (1) whe ther ther e is a re asonable basis for the classification made by

the law, a

nd (2) whe th er t h e l aw operate s equally on all within the class.” Sheldon , 2 2 S
. W
. 3 d

at 4 5 1 (q u o t i n g Rodriguez v. Gonzales , 227 S.W .2d 791, 793 (Tex. 1950)). B e fo re a statut e wi ll b e nu lli fi e d by the c on sti tut ion a l pr os c ri pti on of art ic le I I I , s e c tio n 5 6, it mus t
c learly app ear that th e re is n o r e a so na ble ba sis fo r t

he c la ssi fi c a tio n a do pte d b y the le g isl a tur e to support the statute. County of Cameron v. W ilson , 326 S.W .2d 162, 167 (Tex. 1959). As this Court observe d, “I f there could exist a state of fac ts justifying the classification or restric tion complained of, courts will a ssume that it ex isted.” Inman v. Railroad Comm’n , 478 S.W .2d 124, 127 (Tex. Civ.38

Ap p . — Au s t i n 1 9 7 2 , wr i t re f’ d n . r. e. ) ( qu o t i n g Ree d v. City of W aco , 223 S.W .2d 247, 252 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1949, wr it ref’ d)).

B e c a us e Sa tte rf

ie ld d oe s n ot a lle g e that c ha pte r 1 49 a pp lie s une qu a lly

to t ho se wi thi n the def ined class, her special-la

w challeng e can s ucce ed only if she demonstrates the first prongof the spec ial-law te st: that the leg islative classifications in chapter 149 a re unr easona

ble and be ar no substantial r elation to obje ctives soug ht to be acc omplished by the ac t. See She ldon , 22 S.W .3d at 45 1; Monaghan , 931 S.W .2d at 946.

Re as ona blene

ss o f c las sif ic ations Satterfield a

rgues that cha

pter 149 “ cre ates a

n unconstitutional special class of one” and that its narr owly define d class is not rea sonably related to the statute’s “purpor ted g oals.” She specific ally

asser ts that: (1) details def

ining the c lass fit Crown and it is the only corpor ation known to have r aised the statutory defe nse; (2) a

class that includes only

Crown is not reasona

bly related to the objective of

s av i n g corpor ate suc cessor s on the verg e of ba nkruptcy ; and (3) a

senator’ s
r e m ar k a b o u tt h e “ C r o w nC o r

k an d S e a l a s b e s t o s i s s u e ” r e v e a l s t h a tc h ap t e r 1 4 9 c r e a t e d

o n l y a

“ pr e te nd ” c la ss.

1. Cl as sific at ion de ta ils First, Satterf

ield states that the deta ils de fining the class in c hapter 149 wer e tailore d to f it Crown’ s corpor ate history and that Crown has been unable to ide ntify another co rp o ration
e nc omp a sse d b y

the statut e ’s c la ssi fi c a tio ns . But she c on c e de s that Crown ha d no leg a l bur de n to make that identifi ca t i o n . As the par ty that initiated the challeng e to the constitutionality of39

chapte r 149, Satterf

ield had the bur den of de monst ra t i n g i t s unconstitutionalit y . See W alker v. Gutierrez , 111 S.W .3d 56, 66 (Tex. 2003). She cannot prevail by attempting to shift her burden of pr oo f t o Cr ow n. Sa tte rf

ie ld h a s n ot r e fe re nc e d any c a se str iki ng a statut e a s a sp e c ia l la w s ole ly be c a us e the po te nti a l c la ss s ize wa s sm a ll. Rathe r, th e tes t of a sp e c ia l la w i s w he the r t

he re is a
re a so na ble ba sis fo r t

he c la ssi fi c a tio n and

wh e the r t he law o pe ra

te s e qu a lly

on a ll w ith in t

he c la ss. Sheldon , 22 S.W .3d at 451. Mere ly beca use Crown is the only

entity to assert the a

pplicability

of
c ha pte r 1 49 thu s f

ar d oe s n ot m e an th a t any oth e r c or po ra te su c c e sso r t

hat ma y have fa ile d to do so is statutorily

ineligible. As the supre me cour t has rec og nized, the fac t that a statute that may have applied to only

one entity

when it was enac ted does not compel the c onclusion that it is a special or local law if

it is “not so inflexi bly fix ed” a s to prevent it from e ver be ing a pplicable to other s. Bex ar County v. Tynan , 9 7 S. W.2 d 4 67 , 4 69 -7 0 ( Te x. 19 36 ) (c on sid e ri ngle g isl a tio n a pp lic a ble to o nly one county

). Second, Satt erf

ield criticizes chapte r 149’s use of May 13, 1968, as the mer g er deadline f

or a suc cessor

corpor ation to become e ligible f o r t he asbe stos-liabilit y

limit ation. See Tex. Ci v . P rac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14 9. 00 2( a ). She c la ims the c la ssi fi c a tio n is unre a so na ble beca use the Te x as De partment of H ealth suspec ted the hazar ds of asbe stos si n ce 1958 and had adopted a workplac e re g ulation cappingthe conc entration of asbestos dust at 5 milli on particle s per cubic fee t of

air (“ mppcf” ). That r egulation approve d of the listed conc entrations as “g ener ally safe ” and noted that the conce ntrations “we re not maximum values” but could be momentar ily exceede d. Ho we ve r, Sa tte rf

ie ld h a s no t c le arl y

de mon str a te d th a t th e re is n o r e a so na ble ba sis for the leg islative classification concer ning the May

13, 1968 merg er de adline. See W ilson ,40

32 6 S. W.2 d at 16 7; se e als o Sm ith v. Dav is , 426 S.W .2d 827, 831 (Tex. 1968) (stating that mere differ ence of opinion, whe re rea sonable minds c ould dif fer , is insuff

icient basis fo r s t riking leg islation a s arbitra

ry or unrea sonable). I n 1968, the Americ an Confere nce of Gover nmental I ndustrial Hyg ienists ( ACGI H) tightene d the asbestos conce ntration standard sig nificantly , cutting the limit by

more than ha lf to 2 mppcf. H.J. of Tex., 78t h L eg ., R.S. 6044. The ACGI H first adopte d that c ha ng e on May 13 , 1 96 8, fo llo wi ngDr . I rv ing Se lik of f’ s issu anc e of his “ fa

mou s warn ing s in the mid-1960s about the dang ers of asbestos in the workpla ce.” Id
. According to the statement of leg islative intent, the classification that required the orig inal transfe r of succe ssor asbestos liabiliti es to have oc curr ed bef ore Ma y 13, 1968, was include d to conce ntrate the liability limit ation on innocent succ essor c orporations. Id
. a t6 0 4 3

- 4 4
. L o g i c a l l y,
su c c e sso rs that ha d n ot e ng a g e d in the a sb e sto s b us ine ss, did no t in te nd

to t a ke ov e r t

he ir prede cessor s’ asbe stos business, and merg ed b ef o re 1968 were unlikely

to have known a

bout any workplac e asbestos regulation—much less that Texas’s standard 5 mppc f limit was unsafe. Se e id
. Iam unper suaded that the merg er de adline in cha pter 149 is unre asonable
. T h i rd , S at t er fi el d

as s er t s t h at t h e s u cc es s o r- t o -s u ccessor p r o v is ion in c hapter 149 was de sig ne d s pe c if

ic a lly fo r C ro wn , w hic h ch ang e d it s st a te of inc or po ra tio n f ro m N e w Y or

k to Pennsy lvania by

merg er a nd consolidation in 1989. Idisag ree . Chapter 149 wa s intended to allow
succe ssors who re ceive only the same bundle of o ri gi n al asbe stos liabili ties throug h succe ssive merg ers to plead the liability limit s applicable to the first pre- 1968 succe ssor. Id . at 60 43 ; se e als o Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 149.002(a)
. W i t h o u t this provision, chapter 149 would be ineffe ctive to ac complish its l eg islative intent: co rp o ra t ions that curre ntly satisfy chapte r 149 but41

su bs equ e ntl y

me rg e wi th a

no the r c or

po ratio n w ou ld r e lin qu ish the ir e lig ibi lity

fo r t he lia bil ity limit ation, even thoug h their culpability for asbestos-r elated c laims would stil l be nonexist ent. And without this provision, as Crown notes , cl ai m an ts who could not sue the interme diate succ essor would have a

revived cause of ac tion ag ainst an equa lly innocent cor

poration that is even f

urther
remove d from the c orporation from which the liability derive d. Courts mu s tre

j ec ti n t er p re t at i o n s o f as t at u t e t h at d ef ea tt h e p u rp o s e o f t he leg islation,
so lon g a s ano the r r e a so na ble int e rp re tatio n e xists
. Nootsie, Ltd. v. W illiamson County Appraisal Di st. , 9 25 S.W. 2d

65 9, 66 2 ( Te x. 19 96 ); se e W e bb Cou nty

Ap praisal Di st. v . Ne w Lar e do Ho te l, Inc ., 792 S.W .2d 952, 954 (Tex. 1990) (ca utioning that the leg islature is not presumed to have done

“ a us e le ss a c t” ). I nc lus ion

of the su c c e sso r- to- su c c e sso r p ro vis ion in a statut e de sig ne d to a dd

re ss the lon g -t a ile d, un

pr e dic ta ble a sb e sto s- re late d li a

bil iti e s th a t ma

y ba nk ru pt s uc c e sso r c or

po ratio ns , see H. J. of

Te x., 7 8th

L e g ., R.S. 60 43 , b e ars a su bs tanti a l re latio n to the le g isl a tiv e ob je c tiv e s so ug ht. See She ldon , 2 2 S. W.3 d at 45 1; Monaghan , 931 S.W .2d at 946.

2. Bank ruptcy r isk Satterfield nex t contends that chapte r 149 is not rationally related to the objective of
aver ting ba nkruptcy for c orporate succ essors bec ause Crown is n o t at risk of bankr uptcy . For

the
rea sons that follow, Iconclude that Crown’ s i n cl u sion in the class of succ essor c orporations attempting to avert ba

nkruptcy is reasona

ble. Throug h May

2003, Crown compensated claimants in an a mo u n t that exceeded Mundet’s adjusted f

air marke t va lue almost six times—paying ove r $413 million. C rown states that its continued responsibility to pay such cla ims would have posed a bankruptcy threat. I t has alre ady42

ref inance d $1 billion of debt in 2003 to c ontinue its ope rations, and it will have to pa y $1 billion of that ref inance d debt in 2008. As Crown noted in its annual re port filed with the United States Se c ur iti e s a

nd Exc ha ng e Com mis sio n, the fate of re c e nt le g isl a tio n li mit ingsu c c e sso r l ia bil ity c ou ld materia lly

aff ect Crown’ s operations, financial position, and ca sh flow. Howeve r, cha

pter 149 d oes not requir e deviation from some threshold of solvenc y be fo re the statut e wi ll a

pp ly to a c or

po ra te su c c e sso r. Rathe r, c ha pte r 14 9 so ug ht to address unfairne ss to innocent successor corporations and stem neg ative ec onomic eff ects on e mploy ees a

nd pensioners. The scope of Crown’s succ essor liability is not premised on any

sale, manuf

actur e, or distribution of asbestos-containingproducts, and the duration of its liability befor e cha

pter 149 wa s
a lmo st i nf

ini te . U nli ke an a c tua l to rt fe a so r, Cr ow n w a s una ble to t a ke any

c or re c tiv e a c tio n to minimi ze its pot ential succ essor-r elated a sbestos liabilit y . J udg me nts a g a in s t C r o wn c a nn o t f unction as leg itimate deterr ents to the alleg ed tortious acts or omissions of Mundet. I t would not have bee n
unrea sonable for

the leg islature to include innocent corpor ate successors that have paid more than six tim e s th eir prede c e sso rs ’ a dju ste d f a ir mark e t va lue in a sb e sto s- re late d c la ims wi thi n theclassific ation of those elig ible for the liabil i t y l imit. There is a strongpresumption that the leg islature understands and appre ciates the needs of the people and that its discriminations are base d on adequate g rounds. En ro n Co rp . v . S pr ing In de p. Sc h. Di

st ., 922 S.W .2d 931, 934 (Tex. 1996); W illiams v. Razor Enters., Inc ., 70 S.W .3d 274, 275-76 (Te x . App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.).

3. P r e te nd c las s Satterfield f

urther c ontends that a senator’s remark about the “Crown Cork and Seal
a sb e sto s is sue” reve als th a t c ha pte r 1 49 c re a te d o nly

a pr e te nd c la ss . A “pr etende d” cla ss, as43

define d by

this Court, i s one that “ma nifest(s) a purpose to ev ad e t h e constit ution.” Pu bli c Ut il. Comm’n v. Southwest W

ater Serv., I

nc. , 636 S.W .2d 262, 265 (Tex. App.—Austin 1982, writ ref’ d
n . r. e. ) ( qu o t i n g Clark v. Finley , 54 S.W . 343, 346 (Tex. 1899)).

Cr ow n’ s invo lve me nt i n a sb e sto s lit ig a tio n did pr e c e de the le g isl a tur e ’s a c tio n w ith
re g ard to c ha pt e r 1 49 . D ur inga

me e tin g of

the Te xas S e nate State Af fa ir s Co mmi tte e , it s c ha ir descr ibed ar

ticle 17 of House Bill 4: Article 17, l i m i t at i ons in civil actions of liabiliti es re lating to c erta in merg ers or consolidations. This, members, is the Crown Cork and Seal asbestos issue. What we have put in this bill i s what I understand to be an a g ree d arr ang ement betwe en all of the par ties in this—i n this matter. Meetingon Proposed Senate Substitute for Tex. H.B
. 4, State Senate Affa irs Commi ttee, 79th L eg ., R.S., 13 (Apr. 30, 2003). I disag ree with Satter field’s sug g estion that this shorthand ref ere nce to the i s s u e i n Article 17 r evea ls a purpose to e vade the constitution t hroug h the cr eation of a prete nded class that would bene fit o nly Crown. Cf. Finley , 5 4 S. W. at 34 5 ( c iti ngPe nn sylva nia c a se in discussion of prete nded cla ss, which noted that its leg islature had eng ag ed in “a studied and constant eff ort” to eva de constitutional prohibition aga inst local and spec ial leg islation).

Th is C ourt

ha s c on sid e re d le g isl a tio n with highly sp e c if ic c la ssi fi c a tio ns , a lle g e dly applicable to only one entity , that rese mble Satterfield’ s specia l law challeng e to chapte r 149. See Juliff Gardens , 131 S.W .3d at 283. In our re view of the s u m m ar y judgme nt in Juliff Gardens , appellant e mphasized ex cer pts from a Senate fl o o r d i s cu ssion as evidenc e that one se nator wa s attempting to spe cifica lly “tar g et” the Juliff landfill with the leg i s lation. Id . at 282-83. The leg islative classifications at issue applied only to permits that had been re commended f or denia l byI n J uli ff Gardens v . Tex as Com m’n on E nv tl. Qu ali ty , we noted that specific events have 25 led t o numerous st atutes t hat were enacte d as laws of g ener al applica

bility , including the AMBE R aler t la w an d th e B r a dy b il l. 1 3 1 S. W. 3 d 2 7 1 , 2 8 2

- 8 3 ( T e x. Ap p . — A u s ti n 2 0 0 4 , n o p et.) (c iting Te x. Go v’ t Co de Ann. §§ 41 1. 35 1- .3 58 (We st 2 00 5) (Sta tew id e Am e ri c a ’s Mis sin g : B ro a dc a st Emerg ency

Response (AMB ER ) Al ert Sy stem for Abduc ted Children); 18 U.S.C.A. § 921-31 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008) (B rady Handgun Violence Prevention Ac t)).

44 a county commissioner s ’ re s o l ution, concer ning la ndfills containing ty

pe I V waste (brush, construction-de moliti on waste, a nd/or other non- putrescible, non- household rubbish), t h at were located w ithin 100 feet of a cana l used for public dr inking water or c rop i rrig ation, in counties with populations exceeding 225,000, and adjacent to the Gulf of Mex ico. Id . at 275. These statutory
c la ssi fi c a tio ns , amon g oth e rs , w e re ba sed on the fo llo wi ngfa c ts: ty pe I V l and fi lls we re le ss regulated than other s; the potential eff ects of polluti on would produce g reater ha rm to the population
c e nte rs , a qu a tic ha

bit a t, a nd fi sh in g i n c oa sta l c ounti e s; a nd it w ou ld b e unwi se to p la c e a land fi ll
ne ar l ow -c ir c ulatio n c ana ls or in areas su sc e pti ble to h ur ri c ane s, tid a l surg e s, and oth e r c lim a tic conditions. Id . at 284.

This Court held that the classifications we re rea sonable and not spec ifically targ eted at J uliff’s landf

ill. Id . at 28 3 & n. 8. W e cla ri fi ed that w he n p re se nte d w ithle g isl a tio n th a t is challeng ed as a

specia l law, “we revie w the rea sonablene ss of the statute’s c lassifications, . . . not the pre cipitating forc es that led to its enactment.” Id . at 28 3. Th a t th e le g isl a tio n ma y have ha d it s orig in in local controve rsy , which then led one senator to sponsor the particular ame ndment that was eventua lly

enac ted, did not rende r it a prohibited loca l or specia l law. Id . at 283-84. 25 Simi larly , revie w for possible inf ring ement of article I I I , section 56 in this case is not based on any prec ipitating forc es leading to the enac tment of chapte r 149 but whether its legislative45

classifications a

re rea s o n ab l e. See She ldon , 22 S.W .3d at 451. For the re asons that follow, I conclude that they

are . Cha pte r 1 49 is w ri tte n in

g e ne ra l te rm s, a

pp lic a ble to a ll w ith in t

he d efi ne d c la ss,
and do e s n ot s ing le out any

pa rt ic ula r m e mbe r o f t

he c la ss f or sp eci al tre a tme nt. Th e sp e c if ic
c la ssi fi c a tio ns in c ha

pte r 149 we re int e nd e d to inc lud e su c c e sso r co rp or a tio ns that “ we re the mos t inn oc e nt a

bo ut t he po te nti a l haza

rd s of as be sto s” and

“ a t th e g re a te st f

ina nc ia l pe ri l, e sp e c ia lly

tho se threatened with bankr

uptcy .” H.J. of Tex ., 78th L eg ., R.S. 6043. W hen the leg islation was considere d, conce rns were raised about the s ubstantial cost in jobs and pension benef its. Id . at 6044. To addre ss those conce rns and targ et the most innoce nt succe ssors, one cla ssification requir ed that the liability to be imposed must be based on the or igina l transfe r of suc cessor asbestos liabilities that
occur red pr ior to May

13, 1968. Id .; see also Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 149
. 0 0 1(3) (def ining “ succe ssor asbestos-r elated liabilities”), .002( a). S u b s e q u e nt s u c c e s s o r s ma

y qualify under the statute if they

rec eive only

th at same bundle of

orig inal asbestos liabilities through suc cessive
mer g e rs . H .J. o f T e x., 7 8th L e g ., R.S. 60 43 ; see also T e x. Ci v . Pr a c . & Re m. Code Ann. § 149.002(a)
. A n o th e r

c la s s if ic a ti o nin c h a p te r 1 4 9 r e s tr ic te d

th e li a b il it y li mi tati o nto s u c c e ssor corpor ations that did not continue their pre dece ssors’ business of mining, selling, or distributing
a sb e sto s f ibe rs , o r m anu fa c tur ing , d istri butin g , in s t a l l i n g , o r r e mov inga sb e sto s- c on ta ini ngpr od uc ts. Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. C od e Ann. § 149 .0 02 (b )( 5)
. Th e le g isl a tur e so ug ht t o a c c omp lis h it s g oa ls

“ wi tho ut l imi tin g e ve ry

ty pe of a sb e sto s li a

bil ity .” H.J
. of Te x., 7 8th L e g ., R.S. 60 43 ; se e als o Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 149.002(b) (8 ) (ex cluding from statute a succe ssor46

a sb e sto s- re late d li a

bil ity ari sin g fr om c e rt ain prem ise s li a bil ity c la ims ), .0 03 (a ), (b ) ( statut e is inapplicable to c orporations that have not y et exceede d their statutory limit ). Rather than de monstrating that it is a specia l la w, the pre cision of the cla ssifications in chapter 149 shows that it is nar

rowly tailored to ser

ve its purposes: to preve nt asbestos-re lated liabiliti es fr om ba

nkrupting innocent succe ssor corpor ations and cre ating a neg ative economic e ffe ct on employ ees a

nd pensioners. SeeH.J . of Tex., 78th L eg ., R
. S
. 6044. Throug h chapte r 149, the le g isl a tur e a dd

re sse d th e e c on omi c c on c e rn s th a t im pli c a te the a

bil ity of su c c e sso r c or

po ra tio ns to
c on tin ue to p ro vid e job s an d pe ns ion be ne fi ts. Th e se are matte rs of imp or tanc e to T e xas a

nd its citizens. See B arbier , 1 13 U. S. at 31 ; see also Robinson , 251 S.W .3d at 538.

Ba sed on this rec ord, I

conclude that a re as o n ab l e re lationship ex ists between the
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s an d

t h e o b j e c t i v e s s o u g h tt o b e a c c o mp l i s h e d b y c h a p t e r 1 4 9 an d t h a tart i c l e III , section 56 of the c onstitut ion is not vi olated. Se e Da v is , 426 S.W .2d at 830. The w isdom or expediency

of cha pter 1 4 9 i s t he leg islature’s pr erog ative, not ours. See id. a t 83 1. Sa tte rf ie ld provides alter

natives to the stated r easoningof th e l egis lature, but she doe s not contradict the signific ance of the a sbestos crisis to corpora tio n s , including those doing busine ss in Tex as, or the oth e r l e g isl a tiv e jus tif

ic a tio ns fo r ch a

pte r 1 49 , a

nd sh e ha s n ot s ho wn

that th e c la ssi fi c a tio ns se t f or th in chapter

149 are unrea sonable. F or t hese r easons, I conclude that Satterfield ha s not met her burden of demonstrating that chapte r 149 is a spec ial law. Havingconclude d that Satterfield’ s challeng es to cha pter 149 a s a re troac tive law and as a specia l law do not defe at the pre sumption of the statute’s validity , see Barshop , 925 S.W .2d47

at 629, consider ation must be g iven to the establis h m en t o f C rown’s a ffirmative defe nse under chapte r 149.
Crown’s su m m ary judgm ent burden

Al thoug h Satte rf

ie ld’ s se c on d is su e ur g e d th a t th e le g isl a tiv e c la ssi fi c a tio ns in
c ha pte r 1 49 we re ta ilo r- ma de fo r C ro wn , h e r t hir d is su e in si st s that c ha pte r 1 49 do e s n ot a

pp ly to Crown at all. I n her third issue, Satterfield ar g ues that summary judgme nt was improper

beca use her
ev i d en ce cr ea t eda f

ac t i s s u e ab o u t wh et h er C ro wn co n t i nu ed t h e as b es t o s b u s i n es s af t er “a cq u i ri n g” Mundet. Ba sed o n her inc orre ct interpre tation of section 149.002(b) (5) of the civil prac tice and
reme dies code , she alleg es that Crown wa s ineligible f or cha pter 149’s liability

limit ation. Stock purchase vs. m erger under section 149.002(b)( 5) The pa rties dispute when Crown beca me Mundet’s succ essor. Satterf ield asser ts that Crown bec ame Munde t’s succe ssor and first incurre d succe ssor asbestos-r elated liabilities in 1963, af ter Crown’ s $7 mill ion purcha se of Munde t’s stock. Crown conte nds that it became Mundet’s
su cc es s o r i n 1966 when the c orporations merg ed. The distinction between a merg er a nd a stock purcha se is signific ant bec ause of the text of chapter 149. T he rel ev an t s u b s ection of the statut e —n oti c e a

bly omi tte d fr om Satte rf

ie ld’ s bri e f— state s that th e su c c e sso r- lia bil ity lim itatio n is inapplicable to:
a succe ssor that, afte r a

merge r or consolidation , continued in the business of mining a sb e sto s o r i n the bu sin e ss of se lli ng or dis tr ibutin g a sb e sto s fi be rs or in t he bu sin e ss of manu fa c tur ing , dis tr ibutin g , r e mov ing , o r i ns ta lli nga sb e sto s- c on ta ini ngpr od uc ts wh ic h w e re the same or su bs tanti a lly

the same a s th ose produc ts p re vio us ly manufa cture d, distributed, removed, or installed by

the transf

eror .Stansbury is dece ased. 26 48 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem
. C o d e A nn . § 149.002(b)( 5) (e mphasis added) . Nothing in subsec tion 149.002(b)( 5) addre sses corpor ations who continue the business of asbe stos after a sto c k pu rc ha se . Neve rtheless, Satterf

ield emphasizes that succe ssor asbestos-r elated liabiliti es nee d not orig inate with cor

porate merg ers. She a sserts that succ essor a sbestos-re lated liabilities includes those “re lated in any

way to asbestos claims base d on the exe rc i s e o f co n t rol or the owne rship of stock of the c orporation before the merg er or consolidation.” See id. § 149.001(3). B ased on t e s t i m o n y f r o m a f o r m e r M u n d e te mp l o ye e , E
. J
. S t an s b u r y, Satterfield c ontends that Crown 26 continued Mundet’s a sbestos business afte r the 1963 stock purcha se, and that Crown was the ref ore ineligible, unde r subsec tion 149.002(b)(5), f or the statutory

liab i l i t y l imitation. The fallacy of Satterfield’ s sugg estion that subsection 149.002(b)( 5) applies to stoc k purcha ses is r evea led by the text of the statute.

Te sti mony a bo ut p re-me rge r e v e nts Satterfield r elies on Stansbury ’s 1983 de p o s it io n te s ti mo ny in a n o th e r la w s u it to a r g ue that there is a fac t issue about whether Crown continued Munde t’s as b es t o s business for seve ral
mon ths a ft e r i ts s toc k p ur c ha se . H ow e ve r, Stans bury ’s te sti mony re late s e xclu siv e ly to a c tiv ity b e fore t h e 1 9 6 6 Crown-Mundet mer g er. Stansbury testified that he wa s in charg e of Munde t’s operation in Houston between 1963 a nd 1964, which includes the time period whe n Crown purcha sed Mundet’s stock. He was a sked whe ther he knew Munde t employ ees that went to work for Crown when Mundet sold to Crown, and he responde d aff irmativel y . He a lso respondedI t is un dis pute d th a t Sta ns bury did no t pa rt ic ipate in the sto c k- purc ha se tr ans a c tio n, did 27 not work at the loc ation wher e the transaction was handled, and knew nothing about the tra nsaction or Mundet’s indepe ndent exist ence . I t is undisput ed that B -E-H acquir ed Mundet’s e mploy ees a s part of B -E-H ’s purc hase of 28 Mundet’s insulation divisi on on Fe bruar y 8, 1964.
49 aff irmatively

when a sked whether Crown continued to se ll, c ontrac t f or, and fill or ders for Munde t pr od uc ts, inc lud ingtho se c on ta ini nga sb e sto s, fo r t hr e e months
. 27 Pre-mer ger events a

re irr eleva

nt under subsec tion 149.002(b)(5). Se e id .; se e als o Robinson , 2 51 S.W. 3d at 54 0. Th a t su bs e c tio n a dd

re sse s a su c c e sso r’ s c on tin

uatio n o f i ts prede cessor ’s asbe stos business after the ir merg er a nd excludes such a successor from the statute’ s liability limit ation. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Re m. Code Ann

. § 149.002(b)( 5). The summar y -judg ment
e vid e nc e sh ows th a t Sta ns bury did no t w or k f or Cr ow n d

ur ingthe statut or ily

re le va nt t ime period— after

the 1966 Crown-Mundet merg er. Stansbury testified that he beg an workingfor B -E-H in Febr u ar y 1 964, when B -E-H purcha sed Mundet’s insulation division. His testimony did not 28 raise a fac t issue about whether Crown continued Mundet’s asbestos business afte r t he 1966 mer g er. Be cause Stansbury ’s testimony fail s t o al l eg e fa cts conc erninga post-mer g er c ontinuation of Mundet’s asbe stos business, it does not invoke subsec tion 149.002(b)(5).

Evidence in pre-merger bil l of sa le Satterfield a lso notes that Mundet’s bill of sale t o B- E-H in 1963 refer red to Mundet
a s “ a Di vis ion of Cr ow n Co rk

& Se a l,” and

wa s si g ne d b y

Cr ow n’ s c ha ir

man o f t he bo ard on be ha lf of “Munde t Cork Corpor ation, a Division of Crown Cork & Seal Company , I nc.” L ike Stansbury ’s test i m o ny , this evidence too, fails to raise a fac t question about whether Crown is excluded from50

chapte r 149’s limitation of liability beca use the bill of sa le pre dates the 1966 Crown-Mundet mer g er. The plain languag e of the statute conc erns a succe ssor’s continuation of its prede cessor ’s asb esto s- re late d b us ine ss “ afte r a mer g er or consolidation.” Se e id . ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; s e e als o Robinson , 251 S.W .3d at 540.

Th e e nti re ty

of Sa tte rf ie ld’ s summa

ry j u d g m e nt e v i de nc e re late s to pr e -m e rg e r e ve nts be fo re 19 66 , n on e of

wh ic h c on sti tut e c on tin uin g th e asb estos- re late d b us ine ss a s d e fi ne d in subsection 149
. 002(b)( 5). See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann

. § 149.002(b)( 5); se e als o Robinson , 251 S.W .3d at 540.

Crown ’s uncontr overte d evide nce Crown produc ed uncontr overte d summary judgme nt evidence from it s former
secr etar y and g ener al counse l, Richard Krzyzanowski, who aver red that Crown never

eng ag ed in the asbestos business. He e x plained that by the time of C rown’s 1966 me rg er w ith Mundet, Mundet had div e ste d itse lf of its pr e vio us ins ulatio n ope ra tio ns . Krzy

zan ow sk i fur

the r a ve rr e d th a t Cr ow n it se lf “neve r manufa cture d, distributed, adver tised, sold, or installed any as bestos-conta ining or other insulation products.”

Ba sed on this rec ord, I

conclude that Satterfield f ailed to raise an i ssue of material fa ct
conce rning Crown’s continuation in the business of asbe stos after the merg er that would trigg er the exclusion of section 149.002(b)(5) of the c ivil practice and re medies code and that Crown ha s demonstrated its entitlement to summary judgme nt based on the l imitation of liability in chapter

149.51 CO NC LU SION The theory of successor li ability serve s a useful function i n Texas law, but it is not
rec og nized as one of t he “gr eat and essential principles of l iberty and fr ee g overnme nt” that re ceive constitutional protection. SeeTe x. Con st. art . I . T he ma jor ity de c lare s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in g rantingsummary

judgme nt, but in doing so, it r ejec ts c erta in holding s of the Te x as Supreme Court and per suasive author ity

from the Fifth Ci rcuit, as well as principles recog nized in the author’s own prior opinions. Fur t h ermore, by acc epting Satterfield’ s invitation t o invalidate cha pter 149, the
ma jor ity unne c e ssa

ri ly bin ds the le g isl a tur e to e xistin g c ho ic e -o f- law r ule s. The trial c ourt ruled c orre ctly in g ranting this summary judgme nt. Satterfield fa iled to me e t he r he avy burd e n of de mon str a tin g that c ha pte r 14 9 is un c on sti tut ion a l a s a pp lie d to he r c a se under article Isection 16 or unde r ar ticle I I Isection 56 of the T exas Const itution, and Crown
c on c lus ive ly

e sta bli sh e d it s a ff

ir mativ e de fe ns e lim iti ng its su c c e sso r lia bil ity . A c c or din g ly , I

wo uld aff irm the trial cour

t’s order
.

W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and He nson Filed: August 29, 2008