J-S06045-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.F.F., M.F.I.F.F. 

AND J.D.L., MINOR CHILDREN

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: S.M.L., MOTHER No. 2756 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Decrees entered August 15, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County, Orphans’ 

Court, at No(s): 2014-0009

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, and FITZGERALD*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED APRIL 17, 2015

Appellant, S.M.L. (“Mother”), appeals from the decrees1entered in the 

Northampton County Court of Common Pleas involuntarily terminating her 

parental rights to L.F.F. (born in March of 2012), M.F.I.F.F. (born in 

November of 2010), and J.D.L. (born in February of 2009) (“Children”).2 

 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We note that on August 15, 2014, the court entered an order which 

“ORDERED and DECREED” that the Petition for Termination of Parental 

Rights as to the children was granted. On August 26, 2014, the court 

entered three separate final decrees terminating the parental rights of 

Mother to each child.

2 On August 15, 2014, the parental rights of T.L.O. (“Father 1”), the father 

of J.D.L., and L.F.I.F.F. (“Father 2”), father of L.F.F. and M.F.I.F.F., were 

terminated. Father 1 and Father 2 are not a party to the current appeal, nor 

did they file separate appeals. Father 1 is currently serving a fourteen to 

thirty-two year sentence in state prison following convictions for substance 

offenses. Father 2 is serving a sentence in Northampton Courty Prison, 

following a conviction for indecent assault on Mother’s oldest child, A.T., 

from another father. As a result of Father 2’s conviction, Father 2 was found 

to be a sexually violent predator, and is required to register as a sex 

offender for life. 
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Mother contends the trial court erred in finding (1) Children without parental 

care and control, (2) services available to her were not likely to remedy the 

conditions which led to placement, and (3) termination of her parental rights 

was in the best interests of Children. We remand.

We glean the facts from the trial court opinion. In May of 2010, the 

parties first became known to Northampton County Children and Youth 

(“CYF”) as a result of domestic issues between Mother and Father 2. CYF 

was concerned with domestic violence, inappropriate people in the family’s 

home, developmental needs of Children, financial stability, and Mother. In 

October 2010, Father 2 was convicted of reckless endangerment for 

assaulting Mother while she was pregnant with M.F.I.F.F. Mother was 

provided services through Lehigh Valley Families Together (“LVFT”). LVFT 

provided in-home therapy for Mother to address the domestic violence, to 

assist her with making referrals for Children, and help her become financially 

stable. 

On February 15, 2011, CYF obtained custody of A.T.,3J.D.L. and 

M.F.I.F.F. after Father 2 threw M.F.I.F.F. on a bed at Mother’s home when he 

was three months old. J.D.L. and M.F.I.F.F. have been in continuous care of 

CYF since their emergency placement on February 15, 2011. On February 

24, 2011, the Children were adjudicated dependent, and Mother was ordered 

to obtain a Protection From Abuse Order (“PFA”) against Father 2 and 

 

3 A.T. is Mother’s older child.
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comply with services. The order also directed Father 2 to have no contact 

with Children and to complete a batterer’s evaluation. Children were to 

remain in foster care. Mother was ordered to (1) comply with random urine 

screens; (2) participate in parenting education and life skills training; (3) 

participate in in-home services; (4) comply with the PFA that she obtained; 

and (5) obtain stable and legitimate income and housing. N.T., 7/15/14, at 

94. Mother was allowed weekly two-hour supervised visits with Children. 

On March 30, 2011, Father 2 was incarcerated for terroristic threats, 

simple assault, and harassment against Mother. On May 31, 2011, Father 2 

was released from jail. In July 2011, Mother amended her PFA order against 

Father 2 to permit contact between them and to have Father 2 reside in her 

home. In March of 2012, Father 2 and Children had supervised visits in the 

home. 

L.F.F. was born in March of 2012, and remained in the custody of 

Mother and Father 2. On April 19, 2012, CYF obtained emergency custody 

of L.F.F. after allegations were made that Father 2 sexually assaulted A.T., 

and Mother was non-compliant with her parenting classes. The trial court 

directed Mother to have no contact with Father 2.

Following a hearing, on June 28, 2012, L.F.F. was adjudicated 

dependent. The trial court found that Father 2 did not comply with domestic 

violence treatment and Mother did not comply with her parenting treatment. 

The trial court directed Mother and Father to complete those services and for 
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Children to remain in foster care. On July 29, 2012, Father 2 was found in 

Mother’s home and arrested for the outstanding warrant for the sexual 

abuse charges of A.T. On August 1, 2012, Mother was arrested and charged 

with hindering prosecution and obstructing justice for harboring Father 2. 

On October 18, 2012, a permanency review hearing was held. Mother 

and Father 2 attended the hearing even though they were incarcerated at 

the time. In November of 2012, Mother was convicted of obstruction of 

justice and was sentenced to two years of probation. Mother was ordered 

not to have contact with Father 2. 

On October 9, 2013, Father 2 was sentenced to one year to two years’ 

imprisonment for indecent assault of A.T., and was found to be a sexually 

violent predator.4 On October 18, 2013, a permanency review hearing was 

held. Mother attended the hearing, and Father 2 did not attend even though 

he was released from jail on parole. Following the hearing, the trial court 

found Mother’s progress was minimal, and found aggravated circumstances 

against Father 2 as a result of the sexual assault conviction. The trial court 

directed Father 2 to complete sex offender treatment and Father 2 was 

prohibited from having contact with his children or Mother. On October 28, 

2013, a probation violation was filed against Mother for allowing Father 2 to 

spend several nights at her home. 

 

4 At the hearing, the court took judicial notice that Father 2 had been found 

to be a sexually violent predator. N.T., 7/15/14, at 182.
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On November 8, 2013, the trial court found that Mother violated her 

probation and she was sentenced to an additional two years of probation. 

Mother was also directed not to have any contact with Father 2. On 

November 9, 2013, Father 2 violated his parole by contacting Mother. On 

November 27, 2013, Father 2 was sentenced to serve the balance of his 

sentence, and he remains incarcerated. 

On November 19, 2013, Mother violated her probation for using third 

parties to exchange letters and phone calls with Father 2. On November 22, 

2013, Mother was sentenced to one to two years in state prison, and Mother 

remains incarcerated. Mother’s last visit with Children was in November of 

2013.

On February 20, 2014, CYF filed petitions to involuntarily terminate 

Mother and Father 1’s parental rights to J.D.L., and Mother and Father 2’s 

parental rights to L.F.F. and M.F.I.F.F. In June 2014, Mother attempted to 

send Father 2 a Father’s Day card, which was intercepted by prison 

authorities. 

On July 15, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on the petitions. At 

the time of the hearing, all parents were incarcerated. At the hearing, Ms. 

Ryon Solis, Mother’s probation officer; Krista Welter, a licensed professional 

counselor for Forensic Treatment Services; Rebecca Sager,5a CYF 

 

5 Ms. Sager worked with the family from July of 2010 through November of 

2011. N.T. at 74.
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caseworker; Kristy Bernard,6a CYF caseworker; Talia Cestone,7a CYF 

caseworker; Donna Reeck,8a CYF caseworker; Father 1; and Father 2 

testified. On August 26, 2014, the trial court entered its decrees terminating 

Mother, Father 1, and Father 2’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), and changing Children’s permanency 

goals to adoption. 

Mother filed a timely notice of appeal, along with a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and 

(b). The trial court filed a statement “specify[ing] that the place in the 

record where the reasons of this lower court for the Order terminating the 

parental rights of [Mother] may be found in the Opinion and Order . . . dated 

August 15, 2014.” Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) 

Statement, 9/16/14.

Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in finding that the repeated and 

continued incapacity, neglect or refusal of [M]other have 

caused [Children] to be without parental care, control and 

subsistence necessary for their physical and mental wellbeing and the conditions and cause of this incapacity, 

neglect or refusal, as well as the conditions which led to 

 

6 Ms. Bernard received the case from Ms. Sager in November of 2011. N.T. 

at 132.

7 Ms. Cestone received the case from Ms. Bernard in August of 2012. N.T. at 

183.

8 Ms. Reeck received the case in May of 2013 from Ms. Cestone. N.T. at 

232.
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placement of [Children], cannot or will not be remedied by 

[M]other within a reasonable period of time?

2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in finding that the services or 

assistance made available to [M]other are not likely to 

remedy the conditions which led to the placement of 

[Children] in the foreseeable future?

3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in finding that the termination of 

parental rights and changing the goal to adoption would 

best serve the needs of [Children]?

Mother’s Brief at 3.

Our review is governed by the following principles.

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent 

evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, 

or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has 

granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental 

rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision 

the same deference that we would give to a jury verdict. 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (citations 

omitted). 

This Court has stated

[i]n a proceeding to terminate parental rights involuntarily, 

the burden of proof is on the party seeking termination to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of 

grounds for doing so. Our appellate review, however, does 

not require us to find clear and convincing evidence. We 

will affirm if the trial court’s findings are supported by 

competent evidence, even if the record could also support 

an opposite result.

In addition, we need only find competent evidence to 

support the trial court’s decision as to any one subsection 

of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) to affirm the termination.
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In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 806 (Pa. Super. 2005).

In terminating Mother’s parental rights, the trial court relied upon 

Section 2511(a)(1) and (b) which provide:

(a) General rule.─The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

 * * *

(b) Other considerations.─The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

We have explained this Court’s review of a challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence to support the involuntary termination of parental rights 

pursuant to section 2511(a)(1) as follows:

To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(1), the 

moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence 

of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to 

the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a 
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settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a 

refusal or failure to perform parental duties. In addition,

Section 2511 does not require that the parent 

demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to 

perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights 

may be terminated pursuant to [s]ection 2511(a)(1) 

if the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose 

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to 

perform parental duties.

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform 

parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental rights, the court must engage in three lines 

of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her 

conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between 

parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect 

of termination of parental rights on the child 

pursuant to [s]ection 2511(b).

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted).

The Supreme Court has defined parental duty as follows:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental 

duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation 

to the needs of a child. A child needs love, 

protection, guidance, and support. These needs, 

physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely 

passive interest in the development of the child. 

Thus, this Court has held that the parental obligation 

is a positive duty which requires affirmative 

performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a 

financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in 

the child and a genuine effort to maintain 

communication and association with the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, 

parental duty requires that a parent exert himself to 

take and maintain a place of importance in the 

child’s life.
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Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively 

with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every 

problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship 

to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult 

circumstances. A parent must utilize all available 

resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must 

exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed 

in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. 

Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more 

suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with . . . her 

physical and emotional needs.

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

Instantly, the trial court found that J.D.L. and M.F.I.F.F. have been in 

continuous care of CYF since 2011, and L.F.F. has been in continuous care of 

CYF since 2012. Trial Ct. Op., 8/15/14, at 12. The trial court opined: 

[Mother] has repeatedly placed [C]hildren in danger at the 

hands of Father 2 and has failed to avail herself of the 

myriad of services offered to her by [CYF]. Instead, she 

continued to surreptitiously pursue her relationship with 

Father 2, going as far as to use third parties to facilitate 

phone calls and send letters to Father 2. Mother continued 

to deny Father 2’s abuse of her eldest son, A.T., and in 

fact harbored Father 2 while there was a warrant for his 

arrest on the sexual assault charges. Mother has refused 

to establish a safe home, away from Father 2, for 

[C]hildren. Mother remains incarcerated for her willful 

violations of [c]ourt orders directing her to stay away from 

Father 2. As recently as a month before trial, Mother 

continued to correspond with Father 2. Like Father 2, 

Mother has not and cannot perform her parental duties. 

Id. at 11. 

Ms. Welter testified Mother was referred to her agency by CYF for 

protective parenting. N.T., 7/15/14, at 36-37. Protective parenting is 
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treatment provided to individuals in relationships with perpetrators or family 

members who have abused someone. Id. at 37. Mother reported a lengthy 

history of domestic violence perpetrated on her directly by Father 2. Id. at 

41. When an individual denies, excuses or minimizes behaviors like those 

perpetrated by Father 2, it is difficult to protectively parent a child. Id. at 

42. Mother continued to display disbelief regarding Father 2. Id. at 43. 

She did not believe Father 2 sexually abused her son. Id. at 43-44. Mother 

was an unsafe parent. Id. at 47. Mother presented as having a job 

although she had lost it. Id. at 52.

Ms. Sager testified. She made a referral to LVFT for in-home therapy. 

Id. at 80. Mother did not get “very far with either acknowledging or 

processing the domestic violence in the relationship.” Id. at 113. She “did 

not believe that any of the issues that lead to the initial dependency had 

been resolved or thoroughly addressed in order to feel safe having Children 

returned].” Id. at 116-17. Mother “was ordered to comply with random 

urine screens, parenting education and life skills training, in-home services, 

non-offending parenting, counseling[,] the PFA that she had obtained, and to 

obtain stable and legitimate income and housing.” Id. at 94. 

Ms. Bernard received the case from Ms. Sager in November of 2011. 

Id. at 132. Dr. Gill9recommended that Father 2 have no unsupervised 

contact with any minor children. Id. at 147. Ms. Bernard testified that 

 

9 We note the parties stipulated to Dr. Gill’s report. N.T. at 14. Our review 

of the record does not reveal Dr. Gill’s first name.
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Mother never accepted the possibility that Father 2 could harm Children after 

Father 2’s allegations of sexual abuse. Id. at 159. 

Ms. Cestone testified she received the matter through Ms. Bernard. 

Id. at 183. Mother, upon her release from prison, “would have to cooperate 

with random urine screens, mental health treatment, parenting instruction, 

and maintain stable housing, employment, and cooperate with non-offending 

parenting.” Id. at 188. Mother told Ms. Cestone that “she did not find 

[Father 2] to be a dangerous individual to anyone.” Id. at 199. When she 

was ready to transfer the case, Ms. Cestone did not think Mother was in a 

position to parent Children. Id. at 207.

Ms. Reeck testified that Mother was aware that Father 2 was 

designated a sexually violent predator. Id. at 238. Ms. Sager, Ms. Bernard, 

and Ms. Reeck testified that Mother did not complete her LVFT services, 

parenting classes, mental health treatment, and domestic violence therapy 

due to her lack of attendance and her refusal to discuss her relationship with 

Father 2. Id. at 99-101, 111, 165, 173, 238-39. 

We defer to a trial court’s determination of credibility, absent an abuse 

of discretion, and discern no such abuse in its finding credible the testimony 

of the CYF caseworkers and Ms. Welter. See In re S.H., 879 A.2d at 806. 

Moreover, the record makes apparent that Mother has failed or refused to 

perform parental duties. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1); In re Z.S.W., 946 

A.2d at 730; In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 855. Accordingly, we can discern 
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no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s conclusion. See In 

re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 383.

Mother argues that the trial court erred in finding that the termination 

of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of Children. 

Mother avers that a bond exists between Mother and Children, and thus 

termination of her parental rights would be “contrary to the intent and 

purpose of Pennsylvania statutes and appellate case law.” Mother’s Brief at 

13.

With regard to Section 2511(b), this Court has stated:

Once the statutory requirement for involuntary 

termination of parental rights has been established under 

subsection (a), the court must consider whether the child’s 

needs and welfare will be met by termination pursuant to 

subsection (b). In this context, the court must take into 

account whether a bond exists between child and parent, 

and whether termination would destroy an existing, 

necessary and beneficial relationship.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted).

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is 

a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest 

analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be 

considered by the court when determining what is in the 

best interest of the child. The mere existence of an 

emotional bond does not preclude the termination of 

parental rights. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate parents’ 

parental rights was affirmed where court balanced strong 

emotional bond against parents’ inability to serve needs of 

child). As we explained in In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483

(Pa. Super. 2010),

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial 

court can equally emphasize the safety needs of the 
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child, and should also consider the intangibles, such 

as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child 

might have with the foster parent. Additionally, this 

Court stated that the trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships and whether 

any existing parent-child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child. 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011).

We note from our review that the trial court recognized Section 

2511(b). However, the trial court did not complete an analysis of the nature 

of the parent-child bond and the effect on Children of permanently severing 

that bond. Without the trial court’s Section 2511(b) analysis of the bond 

between Mother and Children, and effect on Children from severing such a 

bond, we are constrained to remand this matter to the trial court for an 

opinion addressing the bond between Mother and Children, and the effect a

termination of parental rights would have on Children. On remand, the trial 

court shall conduct an analysis regarding this issue. 

Additionally, the trial court shall provide an analysis of its reason for 

changing the permanency goal to adoption pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351.

This Court has stated:

When we review a trial court’s order to change the 

placement goal for a dependent child to adoption, 

our standard is abuse of discretion. . . . We are 

bound by the trial court’s findings of fact that have 

support in the record. The trial court, not the 

appellate court, is charged with the responsibilities of 

evaluating credibility of the witnesses and resolving 

any conflicts in the testimony. In carrying out these 

responsibilities, the trial court is free to believe all, 

part, or none of the evidence. When the trial court’s 
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findings are supported by competent evidence of 

record, we will affirm even if the record could also 

support an opposite result. 

Next, we note that in matters of placement for a 

dependent child, the trial court must be guided by the best 

interests of the child—not those of his or her parents.

Placement of and custody issues pertaining to dependent 

children are controlled by the Juvenile Act [, which] place 

the focus of dependency proceedings, including change of 

goal proceedings, on the child. Safety, permanency, and 

well-being of the child must take precedence over all other 

considerations, including the rights of the parents.

At each review hearing for a dependent child who has been 

removed from the parental home, the court must consider 

the following, statutorily-mandated factors:

the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of 

the placement; the extent of compliance with the 

service plan developed for the child; the extent of

progress made towards alleviating the circumstances 

which necessitated the original placement; the 

appropriateness and feasibility of the current 

placement goal for the child; and, a likely date by 

which the goal for the child might be achieved. [42 

Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)]. 

* * *

When the child welfare agency has made reasonable 

efforts to return a foster child to his or her biological 

parent, but those efforts have failed, then the agency must 

redirect its efforts towards placing the child in an adoptive 

home. This Court has held that the placement process 

should be completed within 18 months. 

In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 532-33 (Pa. Super. 2007) (some citations 

omitted). We direct the trial court to address the change of goal to 

adoption. 
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Accordingly, we remand this case, and direct the trial court to file an 

opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), within fourteen days of the date of 

this memorandum.

Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction retained. Prothonotary 

instructed to issue new briefing schedule upon receipt of Rule 1925(a) 

opinion.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/17/2015