J-S47026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPRIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMIEL JOHNSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1062 EDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 15, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0801541-2004

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 24, 2024

Jamiel Johnson appeals pro se from the order denying his untimely-filed 

petition for post-conviction relief. The lower court treated this as a serial 

petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

46. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: In August 

2003, Johnson stabbed another man in a crack house in Philadelphia, causing 

his death. On September 21, 2005, a jury convicted him of first-degree 

murder and possession of an instrument of crime. On November 2, 2005, the 

trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of life without parole. On 

March 7, 2007, this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence, and, on October 

24, 2007, our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal. 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Commonwealth v. Johnson, 919 A.2d 289 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal 

denied, 934 A.2d 1276 (Pa. 2007).

Johnson filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition on March 26, 2008, but later 

withdrew it. On October 2, 2008, he filed another pro se petition, as well as 

an amendment to that petition on March 18, 2009. On November 12, 2009, 

the PCRA court appointed counsel. After receiving several continuance 

requests, the PCRA court removed PCRA counsel and appointed new counsel. 

Ultimately, Johnson requested the right to proceed pro se. After conducting 

a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998), 

the PCRA court permitted Johnson to proceed pro se. Thereafter, Johnson 

supplemented his pro se PCRA petition.

On February 8, 2013, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss 

Johnson’s PCRA petition. On March 27, 2013, the PCRA court issued a 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Johnson’s petition without a 

hearing. After being granted a continuance, Johnson filed a response. By 

order entered May 20, 2013, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. Johnson 

appealed. On September 16, 2014, this Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 107 A.3d 237 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (non-precedential decision). Johnson did not seek further 

review.1

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1

Instead, Johnson filed an unsuccessful petition for writ of habeas corpus in 

the federal judicial system. See Johnson v. Wetzel, 2019 WL 2339966 

(E.D.Pa. 2019).
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On September 22, 2020, Johnson filed a “Motion to Correct or Modify 

Illegal sentence,” which he subsequently supplemented with multiple filings. 

In these later documents, Johnson contended that his 2020 motion should be 

treated as a petition for habeas corpus relief not subject to the time 

restrictions of the PCRA. The PCRA court treated the 2020 motion as a second 

PCRA petition. On January 23, 2023, the PCRA court issued Rule 907 notice 

of its intent to dismiss Johnson’s second petition as untimely filed and 

establishing no time-bar exception. Johnson filed a response. By opinion and 

order entered March 15, 2023, the PCRA court dismissed Johnson’s petition.2

This appeal followed. The PCRA court did not require Pa.R.A.P. 1925

compliance. 

Johnson raises multiple substantive issues on appeal.3 Before we 

consider their merits, however, we first note that the PCRA court properly 

considered his latest filing for post-conviction relief as a serial PCRA petition. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (providing that the PCRA “shall be the sole means 

of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and 

statutory remedies for the same purpose . . . including habeas corpus”); 

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2 On March 20, 2023, Johnson filed a motion in which he stated that he was 

not properly served with the order denying his second PCRA petition. As a 

result, the PCRA court reentered its order and opinion on April 13, 2023.

3 Johnson has filed an application for leave to supplement his brief with a 

“subsidiary claim” that the trial court “lacked clear statutory authorization” to 

sentence him to life imprisonment without parole for his first-degree murder 

conviction. As explained supra, because we lack jurisdiction to consider this 

claim, we deny Johnson’s application as moot.
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Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 499 (Pa. 2016) (explaining 

that “claims that could be brought under the PCRA must be brought under 

that Act. . . . A claim is cognizable under the PCRA if the . . . conviction 

resulted from one of seven enumerated errors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9543(a)(2)”). 

Treating Johnson’s latest filing as a PCRA petition, we must next 

determine whether the PCRA court correctly concluded that it was untimely 

filed, and that Johnson failed to establish a time-bar exception. The timeliness 

of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. 

Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for 

relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed 

within one year of the date the judgment becomes final unless the petition 

alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the 

petition is met.

The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as 

follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the 

claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional 

right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s 

time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time 

on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 

2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the 

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). 
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Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of the date 

the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and 

proven an exception “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction 

over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal 

authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. 

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

Here, Johnson’s judgment of sentence became final on January 22, 

2008, ninety days after our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance 

of appeal and the time for filing a writ of certiorari with the United States 

Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13. 

Therefore, Johnson had until January 21, 2009, to file a timely petition. As 

Johnson filed the petition at issue in 2020, it is patently untimely unless he 

has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated 

exceptions applies. See Hernandez, supra.

Johnson has failed to plead and prove any exception to the PCRA’s time 

bar. Instead, he maintains that his request for habeas corpus relief exists 

outside the parameters of the PCRA. The PCRA court summarily rejected this 

claim:

Instantly, [Johnson] makes no attempt to invoke an 

exception to the PCRA’s time bar, [] arguing instead that the PCRA 

does not apply to his claims. It does. [Johnson’s] erroneous 

denial of the PCRA’s applicability falls short of satisfying his burden 

of demonstrating that one of the three statutory exceptions to the 

PCRA’s timeliness requirement applies to his petition. 
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PCRA Court Opinion, 3/15/23, at unnumbered 3 (citations omitted).

Our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusion. Section 

9543(a)(2)(vii) specifically affords relief under the PCRA when an illegality of 

sentence claim is raised. “Although legality of sentence is always subject to 

review within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or 

of the exceptions thereto. Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 

1999). A PCRA petitioner must present an illegal sentencing claim in a timely 

PCRA petition over which we have jurisdiction. Id. See also 

Commonwealth v. Whitehawk, 146 A.3d 266 (Pa. Super. 2016). 

Otherwise, the petitioner is too late to obtain relief, and the sentence will 

stand.

In sum, Johnson’s 2020 petition is cognizable under the PCRA, but it is 

untimely, and Johnson has failed to establish a time-bar exception. As such, 

both the PCRA court and this Court lack jurisdiction to consider his substantive 

claims. Derrickson, supra. 

Application for leave to supplement brief denied. Order affirmed.

Date: 1/24/2024