UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________

 )

CHINYE OKOLIE and TYRONE DUCKETT, )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) Civ. Action No. 13-1874 (EGS) 

 )

FUTURE SERVICES GENERAL TRADING )

& CONTRACTING COMPANY, W.L.L., )

 )

Defendant. )

__________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Chinye Okolie and Tyrone Duckett bring this lawsuit alleging 

that Future Services General Trading and Contracting Company 

(“Future Services”) injured them by negligently causing a car 

accident in Kuwait on December 4, 2010. Pending before the Court 

is Future Services’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. Upon consideration of the motion, the response and 

reply thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record, the 

Court GRANTS Future Services’s motion. 

I. Background

Chinye Okolie and Tyrone Duckett are residents of Texas. First 

Am. Compl., ECF No. 16 ¶ 4. In 2010, they appear to have been 

working with the United States in some capacity in Kuwait. See 

id. ¶¶ 5–6, 9, 13–15. Future Services is a company based in 

Kuwait that contracted to provide vehicles to the United States 

Government for use in Kuwait. See id. ¶¶ 5–6. The contract 
2

between Future Services and the United States contained a clause 

selecting the Court of Federal Claims as the appropriate forum 

for the resolution of contract-related disputes. See id. ¶ 5.

Future Services previously contracted to provide trucks to the 

United States Government for use in Iraq. See Ex. A to Def.’s 

Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 18-1. In 2009, Future Services filed a 

lawsuit against the United States in the Court of Federal 

Claims—as required by the contract between the two parties—

alleging that the United States had failed to return those 

trucks at the end of the lease term. See First Am. Compl., ECF 

No. 16 ¶ 5; Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 18 at 3.

On December 4, 2010, the plaintiffs were riding in a Future 

Services vehicle and driving alongside another Future Services 

vehicle. See id. ¶¶ 9, 11. The drivers of both vehicles “were 

operating them as the agents, servants, employees and/or 

representatives of the Defendant.” Id. ¶ 12. The drivers began 

to race each other “at a high speed,” and then the vehicle in 

which the plaintiffs were traveling “slammed into a vehicle 

stopped in front of it.” Id. ¶ 11.

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on November 26, 2013, alleging 

that Future Services negligently caused the accident. See 

Compl., ECF No. 1. After some delay in effecting service of 

process due to difficulties conducting service in Kuwait, 

plaintiffs filed in July 2014 proof that the defendant had been 
3

served. See Service Aff., ECF No. 9. Plaintiffs subsequently 

filed an amended complaint. See First Am. Compl., ECF No. 16. On 

October 3, 2014, Future Services moved to dismiss the First 

Amended Complaint, arguing that the Court lacks personal 

jurisdiction. See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Mem.”), ECF 

No. 18. The plaintiffs oppose the motion. See Opp. to Mot. to 

Dismiss (“Opp.”), ECF No. 20. Future Services filed its reply 

brief on October 23, 2014. See Reply in Supp. of Mot. (“Reply”), 

ECF No. 21. The motion is now ripe for adjudication.

II. Analysis

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a plaintiff 

bears the burden of establishing a factual basis for personal 

jurisdiction. See Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 

456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). To meet that burden, the plaintiff “must 

allege specific acts connecting [the] defendant with the forum.” 

Second Amendment Found. v. U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 

524 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (alteration in original). The Court need 

not treat all of a plaintiff’s allegations as true; rather, it 

“may receive and weigh affidavits and other relevant matter to 

assist it in determining the jurisdictional facts.” Buesgens v. 

Brown, 567 F. Supp. 2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2008) (quotation marks 

omitted). 

The Court may exercise one of two types of personal 

jurisdiction: “general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific 
4

or case-linked jurisdiction.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 

S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). The existence of 

general jurisdiction permits the Court to hear “any and all 

claims” brought against the defendant. See id. By contrast, 

“specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues 

deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that 

establishes jurisdiction.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Assessing whether the Court may exercise either type of 

jurisdiction “typically implicates a state’s jurisdictional 

statute or rule.” Alkanani v. Aegis Defense Servs., 976 F. Supp. 

2d 13, 21 (D.D.C. 2014) (quotation marks and alteration 

omitted); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 

(2014) (“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in 

determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.”). 

The D.C. Code provides a statute that speaks to general 

jurisdiction over foreign corporations, D.C. Code § 13-334, and 

another that speaks to specific jurisdiction, D.C. Code § 13-

423. See Gonzalez v. Internacional de Elevadores, S.A., 891 A.2d 

227, 232 (D.C. 2006).1

 1 Plaintiffs appear to be under the erroneous belief that a third 

method of establishing personal jurisdiction exists: When 

exercising jurisdiction “will not offend traditional notions of 

fair play and substantial justice” by virtue of the forum being 

an efficient location for resolving the dispute. See Opp. at 6–

7. This is an inaccurate statement of the law, which 

contemplates the exercise of personal jurisdiction only when the 
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A. The Court May Not Exercise General Jurisdiction.

The District of Columbia general-jurisdiction statute permits 

the exercise of personal jurisdiction over “a foreign 

corporation doing business in the District.” Id. § 13-334(a). 

This jurisdiction is contingent upon that corporation having 

been served through “the agent of the corporation or person 

conducting its business, or, when he is absent and can not be 

found, by leaving a copy at the principal place of business in 

the District, or, where there is no such place of business, by 

leaving a copy at the place of business or residence of the 

agent in the District.” Id. If a plaintiff fails to serve the 

foreign corporation in the District in this manner, she is 

“foreclosed from benefiting from [the statute’s] jurisdictional 

protection.” Gonzalez, 891 A.2d at 233 (quotation marks 

omitted); see also Gowens v. Dyncorp, 132 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 

(D.D.C. 2001) (where plaintiff served foreign-corporation 

defendant “at its headquarters in Virginia,” service did “not 

meet the requirements of D.C. Code § 13-334” and personal 

jurisdiction was therefore lacking). It is undisputed that 

plaintiffs served the defendant in Kuwait, not the District of 

Columbia, so the Court may not exercise general jurisdiction. 

See Mem. at 14–15; Service Aff., ECF No. 9.

 

requirements of specific or general jurisdiction have been met. 

See, e.g., Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
6

In any event, plaintiffs’ allegations would not establish 

general jurisdiction. The scope of the phrase “doing business” 

as used in the D.C. Code has been found to be “co-extensive with 

the reach of” general jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.

Day v. Corner Bank, 789 F. Supp. 2d 150, 155–56 (D.D.C. 2011). 

The Due Process Clause permits “[a] court [to] assert general 

jurisdiction over foreign . . . corporations . . . when their 

affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ 

as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” 

Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. It is undisputed that Future 

Services is not incorporated in the District of Columbia and 

does not have its principal place of business here. See Mem. at 

16; Opp. at 7–10. Indeed, the only contacts with the District 

that the plaintiffs allege are: (1) a lawsuit filed by Future 

Services in the Court of Federal Claims regarding an unrelated 

contract; and (2) the existence of contracts with the United 

States that contain a clause selecting the Court of Federal 

Claims as the appropriate forum for the resolution of disputes 

regarding those contracts. See First Am. Compl., ECF No. 16 ¶ 5; 

Opp. at 7–12. These minimal contacts are nowhere near sufficient 

to show that Future Services is “essentially at home” in the 

District of Columbia. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.2

 2 To the extent that plaintiffs’ mention of Marshall v. I-Flow, 

LLC, 856 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. 2012) is intended to support a 
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B. The Court May Not Exercise Specific Jurisdiction.

The District of Columbia specific-jurisdiction statute 

authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction under certain 

enumerated circumstances, including when the defendant has 

“transact[ed] any business in the District of Columbia.” D.C. 

Code § 13-423(a)(1). The D.C. Court of Appeals has indicated 

that the “transacting business” test is “coextensive with the 

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Gonzalez, 891 A.2d 

at 234. Accordingly “the defendant must have minimum contacts 

with the forum so that exercising personal jurisdiction over it 

would not offend traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “When 

jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, 

only a claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in this 

section may be asserted against him.” Id. § 13-423(b).

Plaintiffs raise two actions—the existence of contracts with the 

 

finding that general jurisdiction exists in this case, Opp. at 

5, plaintiffs are mistaken. Marshall found general jurisdiction 

on the basis of allegations, not present here, that:

Defendant has established and benefits from a 

partnership with the George Washington University 

Hospital, devotes an entire sales region to sales in 

Washington, D.C., profits from sales . . . to every 

major Washington, D.C. Hospital, and has obtained 

expert medical consulting services of prominent 

Washington, D.C. medical facilities and physicians.

Marshall, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 108 (quotation marks and alteration 

omitted).
8

United States that include forum-selection clauses designating 

the Court of Federal Claims as the appropriate forum for the 

resolution of contract disputes and Future Services’s lawsuit 

against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims—as 

bases for specific jurisdiction. See First Am. Compl., ECF No. 

16 ¶ 5; Opp. at 7–12.

The contract-related contacts may not be considered due to the 

“‘government contacts’ exception” to the specific-jurisdiction 

rule, which provides that “a nonresident’s entry into the 

District of Columbia for ‘the purpose of contacting federal 

governmental agencies cannot serve as a basis for personal 

jurisdiction.’” Alkanani, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 25 (quoting Savage 

v. Bioport, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 55, 62 (D.D.C. 2006)). Such 

contacts are “excluded from ‘the jurisdictional calculus.’” Id. 

(quoting Savage, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 62); see also United States 

v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (contacts with 

federal agencies within the District of Columbia “will not give 

rise to personal jurisdiction”).3

 3 Plaintiffs appear to argue that the Court may exercise personal 

jurisdiction because the contract between Future Services and 

the United States regarding the vehicles in which plaintiffs 

were riding is covered by 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-8, which makes a 

federal-government contractor “liable for . . . all actions or 

claims for loss of or damage to property or the injury or death 

of persons, resulting from the fault, negligence, or wrongful 

act or omission of the Contractor.” Plaintiffs’ argument is far 

from clear, but to the extent they intend to argue that this 

provision constitutes a waiver of personal jurisdiction or 
9

Even if both sets of contacts could be considered, they fail 

to satisfy the requirement that the facts giving rise to the 

cause of action “aris[e] from” the minimum contacts that form 

the basis for personal jurisdiction. See D.C. Code § 13-423(b); 

see also Novak-Canzeri v. Saud, 864 F. Supp. 203, 206 (D.D.C. 

1994) (“The claim itself must have arisen from the business 

transacted in the District or there is no jurisdiction.”).

The alleged negligent operation of vehicles by Future Services 

in Kuwait and resulting injuries to the plaintiffs are extremely 

attenuated from Future Services’s negotiation of contracts with 

the United States. Indeed, “an injury sounding in tort does not 

‘arise from’ a contract for services for the purpose of specific 

jurisdiction.” Alkanani, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 27. Plaintiffs’ 

argument to the contrary borders on the absurd: 

It can be said “but for” [sic] the agreement by Future 

Services to consent to the jurisdiction of Courts in 

the District of Columbia, it would not have received 

the contract with the U.S. Government, and the 

Plaintiffs would not have been injured by Defendant’s 

automobiles in which they were riding in [sic] at the 

time of their injures [sic].

Opp. at 11. “The critical test is whether the nonresident’s 

conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he or 

she should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” 

 

consent thereto, the Court agrees with the Eleventh Circuit that 

“[t]his section . . . makes no mention of a waiver of personal 

jurisdiction and does not alter the required constitutional 

analysis that the court must consider.” Baragona v. Kuwait Gulf 

Link Transport Co., 594 F.3d 852, 855 (11th Cir. 2010).
10

Trerotola v. Cotter, 601 A.2d 60, 64 (D.C. 1991) (quotation 

marks and alteration omitted). Future Services could not have 

anticipated being haled into a District of Columbia court in 

connection with an accident that occurred in Kuwait, based 

solely upon Future Services’s consent to the Court of Federal 

Claims adjudicating potential contract disputes with a third 

party.

Nor is there any reasonable connection between a lawsuit by 

Future Services against the United States seeking recovery for 

the alleged breach of an unrelated contract (involving the 

provision of different vehicles at a different time for use in a 

different country) and the tort claims the plaintiffs bring. 

Accordingly, none of the potential minimum contacts raised by 

the plaintiffs are sufficiently related to the actions 

underlying this lawsuit, leaving no support for the exercise of 

specific jurisdiction.

C. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Jurisdictional Discovery.

In the alternative, plaintiffs request that they be permitted 

to conduct jurisdictional discovery to “include at [a] minimum 

obtaining all contracts between Defendant and the United States 

Government.” Opp. at 12. Plaintiffs’ goal appears to be to learn 

“of all the relationships and transactions taken by Future 

Services in relation to the District of Columbia, the 

Plaintiffs, [and] the automobiles that they were riding in on 
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the date of their injury.” Id. at 12–13. The defendant opposes 

this request. See Reply at 10–12.

“Whether to permit jurisdictional discovery rests in the 

discretion of the district court.” In re Papst Licensing GMBH & 

Co. KG Litig., 590 F. Supp. 2d 94, 101 (D.D.C. 2008); see also 

FC Inv. Grp. v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008). Discovery is not warranted “where a plaintiff 

‘simply wants to conduct a fishing expedition in the hopes of 

discovering some basis of jurisdiction.’” In re Papst, 590 F. 

Supp. 2d at 101 (quoting Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC 

Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory, 283 F.3d 208, 215 n.3 (4th Cir. 

2002)). “In order to engage in jurisdictional discovery, the 

plaintiff ‘must have at least a good faith belief that such 

discovery will enable it to show that the court has personal 

jurisdiction over the defendant.’” FC Inv. Grp., 529 F.3d at 

1093–94 (quoting Caribbean Broad. Sys. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 

148 F.3d 1080, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 

For that reason, plaintiffs’ desire to learn “of all the 

relationships and transactions taken by Future Services in 

relation to the District of Columbia” cannot support 

jurisdictional discovery without a clear articulation of the 

jurisdictional basis plaintiffs intend to prove. Plaintiffs 

failed to provide such a justification. Their existing 

jurisdictional allegations fall far short of the standards for 
12

specific and general jurisdiction, and they have not described 

any fact that could be obtained in discovery to alter this 

conclusion. Indeed, plaintiffs seek merely to double down on 

their theory that the existence of contracts with the United 

States that contain a clause selecting the Court of Federal 

Claims as the forum for the resolution of any contract disputes 

somehow provides personal jurisdiction over this tort action. 

Jurisdictional discovery would not render this argument any more 

successful. See supra Part II.A–B.

D. The Case Will Be Dismissed Without Prejudice.

Future Services asks the Court to dismiss this case with 

prejudice. See Mem. at 18. Plaintiffs oppose this request, 

citing Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2005), 

Opp. at 13, and defendant did not address this citation. See 

Reply at 12. The Court follows the general rule described in the 

decision cited by the plaintiffs that “dismissals for lack of 

personal jurisdiction should be made without prejudice,” because 

a lack of jurisdiction in one court does not preclude a court of 

the appropriate forum from exercising jurisdiction. See Intera 

Corp., 428 F.3d at 620–21.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Future Services’s 

motion to dismiss this case. An appropriate Order accompanies 

this Memorandum Opinion.
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SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan

United States District Judge

April 21, 2015