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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 47716 & 47717

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CRYSTAL MAGSAMEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: October 16, 2020

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Gerald F. Schroeder, District Judge. Hon. David D. Manweiler, 

Magistrate. 

Decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court, 

affirming judgments of conviction and consecutive sentences of two years of 

probation, with 180 days in jail (170 days suspended), for two counts of driving 

without privileges, affirmed.

Anthony R. Geddes, Ada County Public Defender; Abby K. Broyles, Deputy Public 

Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Justin R. Porter, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

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LORELLO, Judge 

In these consolidated appeals, Crystal Magsamen appeals from a decision of the district 

court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court, affirming her judgments of conviction and 

sentences for two counts of driving without privileges (DWP). We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Magsamen pled guilty to two counts of DWP. I.C. § 18-8001. In exchange for her guilty 

pleas, the State dismissed four other cases, three of which included additional DWP charges. The 

magistrate court sentenced Magsamen to consecutive, two-year terms of probation, with 
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underlying jail sentences of 180 days (170 days suspended). Magsamen appealed her sentences to 

the district court, which affirmed. Magsamen again appeals. 

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the 

magistrate division, we review the magistrate court record to determine whether there is substantial 

and competent evidence to support the magistrate court’s findings of fact and whether the 

magistrate court’s conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 

415, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). However, as a matter of appellate procedure, our disposition of 

the appeal will affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 

968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus, we review the magistrate court’s findings and 

conclusions, whether the district court affirmed or reversed the magistrate court and the basis 

therefore, and either affirm or reverse the district court.

Appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Burdett, 

134 Idaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App. 2000). When a trial court’s discretionary decision 

is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the 

lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries 

of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices 

before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 

270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018). 

III.

ANALYSIS

Magsamen contends that the district court erred when it affirmed the sentences imposed by 

the magistrate court. Specifically, Magsamen argues that the district court erred because it “did 

not consider whether the trial court weighed the objectives of sentencing” but, instead, affirmed

the magistrate court based on its own conclusion that Magsamen did not have sufficient 

“justification for breaking the law” and on its own reasons why the sentences were appropriate. 

According to Magsamen, the district court should have concluded the magistrate court’s comments 

regarding the reasons for its sentences reflected an abuse of discretion. The State responds that 

Magsamen’s sentences are not excessive under any reasonable view of the facts and that the district 
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court’s decision is consistent with the applicable legal standards. We hold that Magsamen has 

failed to show the district court applied the incorrect legal standards in reviewing Magsamen’s 

sentences on intermediate appeal or otherwise erred in affirming her sentences.

Where a sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable 

and, thus, a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 

(1992). A sentence may represent such an abuse of discretion if it is shown to be unreasonable 

upon the facts of the case. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982). A sentence 

is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and 

to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution applicable to a 

given case. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). Where an 

appellant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate

court conducts an independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, 

the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 

771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, the 

appellate court considers the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 

P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 

In imposing sentence, the magistrate court noted that Magsamen had “18 driving without 

privileges” between 2016 and 2019 and commented, “God only knows how many times you drove 

without being charged.” The magistrate court also expressed concern that prior penalties had not 

deterred Magsamen from continuing to drive without privileges. Although the magistrate court 

credited Magsamen for reinstating her license, it considered such action a “remedial measure”

compared to the numerous times she “disregarded the laws of this state and the orders of this 

court.” Finally, the magistrate court noted that, based on Magsamen’s history of driving without 

privileges, “this would have been a felony under the old statute” that could have resulted in a prison 

sentence. The magistrate court, therefore, concluded the appropriate sentences were consecutive,

two-year probationary terms, with 180 days in jail (170 days suspended). Magsamen has not 

identified any factual error in the magistrate court’s sentencing remarks. 

At the oral argument held on intermediate appeal, Magsamen argued that an independent 

review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, 

and the protection of the public interest showed her sentences are excessive because: (1) her 
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offense was “not the most egregious crime”; (2) she was not violating other laws while driving 

without privileges nor “breaking the law in a malicious manner”; and (3) she had a valid license 

and insurance at the time of sentencing, which protected society. Magsamen also argued that the 

magistrate court abused its discretion because it “considered crimes other than the ones being 

sentenced for” as reflected in the magistrate court’s comment about the number of times 

Magsamen likely drove without privileges without being charged and failed to consider mitigating 

evidence. 

The district court issued a written decision on intermediate appeal. In response to 

Magsamen’s argument that her DWP offenses were not egregious, the district court noted that she

did not dispute she had eighteen DWP charges in three years and concluded that such a “record of 

violations is egregious.” Regarding Magsamen’s argument that the magistrate court considered 

uncharged offenses, the district court concluded that the argument was speculation and that, in any 

event, a court may consider allegations of uncharged misconduct and dismissed charges when 

imposing her sentences. The district court further concluded that Magsamen’s DWP record was 

“more than sufficient to support the sentence[s] imposed.” The district court next addressed 

Magsamen’s assertion that the magistrate court failed to consider the mitigating information that 

Magsamen was properly licensed and insured by the time of sentencing. On this point, the district 

court observed the magistrate court specifically acknowledged that information but concluded it 

was “not a strong mitigating factor.”

Finally, the district court addressed an argument presumably raised in Magsamen’s brief 

that the magistrate court failed to consider “alternative treatment programs and causes for a 

crime.”

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 The district court stated that Magsamen did not advance any such programs or causes on 

appeal or before the magistrate court other than the representation at sentencing that she drove 

without privileges because she is a single mother who is responsible for transporting her two 

children to school and doctors’ appointments. The district court rejected Magsamen’s argument 

 

1 Magsamen did not raise the alternative treatment options at the oral argument on 

intermediate appeal, nor is her intermediate appellate brief included in the record on appeal. To 

the extent Magsamen’s intermediate appellate brief is relevant to this appeal, missing portions of 

the record are presumed to support the district court’s decision. See State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 

541, 835 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Ct. App. 1992). 
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regarding alternative treatment programs and any unarticulated reasons for her offense as not 

preserved because she did not present the argument to the magistrate court. As for Magsamen’s 

preserved reason for driving without privileges--the need to transport her children--the district 

court concluded the reason was “insufficient justification for breaking the law as often as 

[Magsamen] did” and was not the type of offense that required an alternative treatment program. 

On this appeal, Magsamen first contends the district court erred because it held her 

sentences were appropriate based on its own conclusion that her justification for driving without 

privileges was inadequate rather than considering whether the magistrate court properly weighed 

the objectives of sentencing. We disagree. As noted, the appellate court conducts an independent 

review of the record in reviewing an excessive sentence claim. Reinke, 103 Idaho at 772, 653 P.2d 

at 1184. The district court’s written decision specifically recites this standard as well as the other 

standards applicable to review of sentencing decisions and concludes that, given Magsamen’s 

“history of repeatedly violating the law, the imposition of consecutive sentences was reasonable 

and was not excessive” nor an abuse of the magistrate court’s sentencing discretion. The district 

court’s specific discussion of the adequacy of Magsamen’s justification for driving without 

privileges was in response to her argument regarding alternative “causes” for committing crime. 

The district court did not err by expressly addressing each of Magsamen’s challenges to the 

magistrate court’s sentencing decision.

Magsamen’s second contention on this appeal is that the district court erred by not vacating 

her sentences in light of the magistrate court’s abuse of discretion, which she contends took three 

forms: (1) commenting that “God only knows how many times [Magsamen] drove without being 

charged”; (2) considering an “outdated” statute; and (3) failing to consider mitigating evidence 

such as Magsamen’s valid license and insurance at the time of sentencing “as well as only being 

sentenced to two charges versus the other charges the [magistrate court] considered.” Magsamen’s 

argument regarding the magistrate court’s consideration of an “outdated statute” is based on the 

magistrate court’s reference that Magsamen would have been subject to a felony under the prior 

statute given her history of driving without privileges. We decline to consider this argument 

because, based on the record before this Court, the argument is not preserved as it was not raised 

on intermediate appeal to the district court. See State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 668, 8 P.3d 657, 
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663 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating that, absent fundamental error, an issue not raised at trial or on 

intermediate appeal may not be raised at a subsequent stage of the appellate process). 

Magsamen has failed to show error in the district court’s resolution of her remaining claims 

that the magistrate court abused its sentencing discretion. Magsamen contends, in essence, that 

the district court erred by explaining why it believed her sentences are not excessive rather than 

discerning and evaluating the magistrate court’s reasons for imposing the sentences. However, 

this is the proper role of an appellate court in reviewing an excessive sentence claim. See Reinke, 

103 Idaho at 772, 653 P.2d at 1184 (explaining that the appellate court conducts an independent 

review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and 

the protection of the public interest in reviewing a contention that the sentencing court imposed an 

excessively harsh sentence). Indeed, the standard requiring an independent review of the record 

is necessary given that there is no requirement that sentencing courts articulate the reasons for 

imposition of a particular sentence. See State v. Martinsen, 128 Idaho 472, 475, 915 P.2d 34, 37 

(Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing that it is not mandatory for a sentencing court to set forth the reasons 

for imposing sentence). Where the sentencing court has set forth no reasons for imposition of a 

sentence, the appellate court draws its own impressions from the record and will affirm what it 

infers to be a reasonable exercise of sentencing discretion. Id. Even so, the magistrate court 

articulated the reasons for its sentence and the district court considered Magsamen’s complaints 

about those reasons on appeal, including her arguments regarding the magistrate court’s reliance 

on prior acts of driving without privileges and its consideration of mitigating evidence. Magsamen 

has failed to identify any error by the district court in conducting its appellate review of her 

sentencing claims. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

The district court applied the correct legal standards in reviewing Magsamen’s challenge 

to the sentences imposed by the magistrate court. The decision of the district court, on intermediate 

appeal from the magistrate court, affirming Magsamen’s judgments of conviction and sentences is 

therefore affirmed.

Chief Judge HUSKEY and Judge BRAILSFORD, CONCUR.