J-S19016-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ANTHONY JOHN VENERI

Appellant No. 1803 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 11, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0003526-1978

 CP-23-CR-0003713-1978

BEFORE: STABILE, J., JENKINS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED APRIL 21, 2015

Anthony John Veneri (“Appellant”), appeals from the order dismissing 

his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.

On January 31, 1979, a jury convicted Appellant of two robberies and 

related offenses. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 25 to 50 years’ 

incarceration to be served consecutively to a previously imposed sentence 

for another armed robbery conviction in Missouri. This Court affirmed 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence on November 19, 1982. See 

Commonwealth v. Veneri, 452 A.2d 784 (Pa.Super.1982). 

Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, his twelfth, on April 26, 2012. 

The petition did not plead or prove one of the timeliness exceptions, and the 

PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice on July 17, 2012. Appellant 
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responded with multiple filings.1 On July 17, 2013, the PCRA granted 

Appellant leave to amend his PCRA petition, to which he again responded 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s eighteen (18) post-Rule 907 notice filings included:

(1) “Motion to Amend PCRA Petition to Address Timeliness” 

dated 7/27/12;

(2) A letter received 8/9/12 stating that he wished to be 

appointed an attorney and if he was ordered to be present for a 

PCRA hearing that he would refuse as he was busy doing legal 

work;

(3) “Motion for Release from State Custody” dated 8/15/12;

(4) “Notice of Intent to Dismiss Defendant’s Motion for PostConviction Collateral Relief Without a Hearing in Twenty (20) 

Days” dated 8/21/12;

(5) “Motion to Amend PCRA Petition” dated 8/22/12;

(6) “Motion to Compel the Trial Court to Rule and Decide on 

Petitioner’s Post Conviction Collateral Relief” dated 8/21/12;

(7) “Motion for Petition of Writ of Habeas Corpus” based upon a 

claim that “the trial court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute 

petitioner’s cases” dated 9/6/12’;

(8) A letter to the court dated 9/20/12 asserting that the 

Petitioner should be released from state custody based upon 

ineffective assistance of counsel;

(9) “Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Action and For an 

Appointment of Counsel” filed 12/26/12;

(10) A letter to the court dated 1/16/13 reasserting claims 

raised in Petitioner[’]s PCRA petition;

(11) A letter to the court filed with the Office of Judicial Support 

on 2/7/13;

(12) “Petition to Supplement Petitioner’s Motion for Post 

Conviction Collateral Relief” filed 2/14/13 in which he claimed 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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with multiple filings.2 Ultimately, the PCRA court dismissed the petition as 

untimely on June 11, 2014. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on June 19, 

2014. The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement of matters complained of on appeal, and Appellant did not file 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

that he was not read his Miranda warnings and was given pizza 

and beer by the police in return for a confession in the instant 

case. He claims ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 

explore these allegations at the time of trial;

(13) “Supplement to the Memorandums of Laws in the Petition 

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” filed 3/5/13;

(14) A letter to the court dated 3/1/13;

(15) A letter to the court dated 4/1/13;

(16) “Declaration in Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis” filed 5/13/13;

(17) “Petition for Sentence Reduction” filed 5/13/13;

(18) A letter to the court dated 6/11/13.

Delaware County Court of Common Pleas Docket No. CP-23-CR-0003526-

1978, pp. 5-7; see also PCRA Court Memorandum and Order, July 17, 

2013, pp. 1-2.

2 After the PCRA court’s July 17, 2013 order granting leave to file an 

amended petition to address the timeliness of his petition, Appellant filed no 

less than two Amended PCRA petitions, five supplemental PCRA petitions, a 

“Petition for Extraordinary Circumstances for Release from State Custody 

Under the King’s Bench Rule”, a “Pro-Se Petition for Default Judgment or 

Release from State Custody”, a “Pro Se Petition Demanding Release from 

Illegal Confinement at SCI Fayette”, and at least four other petitions for 

writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, etc. See Delaware County Court of 

Common Pleas Docket No. CP-23-CR-0003526-1978, pp. 7-8.
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one.3 The PCRA court filed its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on November 13, 

2014.

 Appellant raises the following issues for review:

1. Whether[] the trial court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute 

Appellant’s case[]s?

2. Whether[] the bills of informations [sic] were void in limine 

[sic]?

3. Whether[] the Appellant had ineffective assistance of counsel?

Appellant’s Brief, p. 2 (all capitals omitted).

In reviewing an order denying PCRA relief, our well-settled standard of 

review is “to determine whether the determination of the PCRA court is 

supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA 

court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the 

findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 

191-192 (Pa.Super.2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

We must first consider the timeliness of the petition. “It is undisputed 

that a PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date that the 

judgment of sentence becomes final.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 

A.3d 649, 651 (Pa.Super.2013); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). “This time 

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3 Although he did not file a formal 1925(b) statement, Appellant did continue 

to file documents after the June 19, 2014 notice of appeal, including multiple 

petitions to vacate sentence, and multiple requests for writs of habeas 

corpus, mandamus, and an “extraordinary writ” from the Supreme Court of 

the United States.
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requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not 

ignore it in order to reach the merits of a petition.” Hernandez, 79 A.3d at 

651 (citing Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa.2000)). A 

judgment of sentence “becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, 

including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking 

the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). However, a facially untimely petition 

may be received where any of the PCRA’s three limited exceptions to the 

PCRA time bar are met. Hernandez, 79 A.3d at 651 (footnote omitted). 

These exceptions include:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). As our Supreme Court has repeatedly 

stated, the petitioner maintains the burden of pleading and proving that one 

of these exceptions applies. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 

1263, 1268 (Pa.2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 916 (2008); see also

Commonwealth v. Leggett, 16 A.3d 1144, 1146 (Pa.Super.2011) (“The 
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petitioner bears the burden to allege and prove [that] one of the timeliness 

exceptions applies.”). Further,

[a] petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within 

sixty days of the date the claim could first have been presented. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled to the 

exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year filing deadline, the petitioner 

must plead and prove specific facts that demonstrate his claim 

was raised within the sixty-day time frame under section 

9545(b)(2).

Hernandez, 79 A.3d at 651-652 (internal quotations omitted). 

Finally, a heightened standard applies to a second or subsequent PCRA 

petition to avoid “serial requests for post-conviction relief.” 

Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1043 (Pa.2011). “A second or 

subsequent request for relief under the PCRA will not be entertained unless 

the petitioner presents a strong prima facie showing that a miscarriage of 

justice may have occurred.” Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248, 

1251 (Pa.2006). Additionally, in a second or subsequent post-conviction 

proceeding, “all issues are waived except those which implicate a 

defendant’s innocence or which raise the possibility that the proceedings 

resulting in conviction were so unfair that a miscarriage of justice which no 

civilized society can tolerate occurred”. Commonwealth v. Williams, 660 

A.2d 614, 618 (Pa.Super.1995).

Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final over 30 years 

ago, in 1983. Accordingly, the instant petition, filed in 2012, is facially 

untimely. Thus, Appellant must plead and prove that his petition falls under 
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one of the Section 9545 exceptions set forth in the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).

Appellant’s PCRA petition did not allege a PCRA exception. None of his 

18 filings following the PCRA court’s 907 notice alleged a timeliness 

exception. Likewise, none of his multiple filings following the PCRA court’s 

July 17, 2013 order granting him permission to amend his petition alleged 

an exception. 

Appellant’s brief states:

5. One year time limitation, which allowed “untimely” claims 

when facts were unknown, see case; Com. v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 

911 [(Pa.Super.] 2000); Com. v. Austin, 721 A.2d 375 

([Pa.Super.]1998).

Also see case; Com. v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585 [(Pa.Super.] 2000); 

this case involved a situation where the facts upon which the 

claims were based, []were not known to the petitioner and could 

not have been discovered by him, until petition was on appeal.

Appellant’s Brief, pp. 5-6. To the extent this statement can be construed as 

an attempt to raise the “after-discovered evidence” exception, Appellant 

waived this claim by not raising it in his PCRA petition.4 Further, the 

statement does not allege any fact that Appellant claims he could not have 

ascertained through the exercise of due diligence. Finally, it does not meet 

____________________________________________

4

It is axiomatic that “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and 

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). As with 

direct appeals, this axiom applies in PCRA appeals where an appellant did 

not raise the claims before the PCRA court. Commonwealth v. Lambert, 

797 A.2d 232, 240-41 (Pa.2001).
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the heightened standard for second or subsequent PCRA petitions, as it does 

not implicate his actual innocence or raise the possibility that the 

proceedings resulting in his conviction were so unfair as to represent a 

miscarriage of justice. See Williams, supra. Accordingly, the petition 

remains time-barred.

Because Appellant’s instant PCRA petition is patently untimely and 

Appellant cannot avail himself of any of the PCRA’s time bar exceptions, the 

PCRA court did not err in denying this claim as untimely.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/21/2015