### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE June 14, 200 5 S es sio n
IN TH E MA TTEROF THE CONSERVATO RSHI P OF DORIS DAVENPORT DORIS DAVENPORT, ET AL 

### . v. RUTH ADAI R, ET AL 

### . Direc t Appeal from the P robate and F am ily Court for Cum berland Coun ty

No. 14260 Steve n C. Douglas, Ju dge

No. E2004-01505-COA- R3-CV - F ILED DECEMBE R 27, 2005

I n th is c on se rv a tor sh ip c a se , w e are a sk e d to e va luate the pr ob a te cou rt ’s de c isi on that a n e lde rl y fema le was me ntally

disabled and in ne ed of the court’s a ssistance. The elder ly fema le executed two po we rs of a tto rn e y fo r h e a lth c are ; one in 199 6 an d the oth e r in 200 3 af te r the nie c e s of the e lde rl y fe ma le fi le d th e ir

pe tit ion in th is ca se to a pp oin t a c on se rv a tor . T he a tto rn e y -i n- fa c t un de r b oth power s of attorne y

filed a c ounter-pe tition asking the probate court to appoint her conser vator ove r the elderly

fema le. The pr obate c ourt ruled that the pow er of attorney executed in 1996 was void due to improper execution and that the pow er of at t o rn ey executed in 2003 was void be cause it was
e xec ute d w hil e the e lde rl y fe ma le wa s me nta lly dis able d. Th e pr ob a te c ou rt fo un d th a t th e e lde rl y fema le’s niec es and the attorney -in-fa ct s hould not serve as conservators in this case . I nstead, the probate court a

ppointed the public g uardia n to serve a s the elder ly fema l e’ s co n s ervator. The
a tto rn e y -i n- fa c t a ndthe e lde rl y fe ma le fi le d a n a

pp e a l to thi s Cou rt . We a ff ir m in pa rt a ndre ve rs e in p art

.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e P robate and F am ily Court Aff irm ed in Par t; Re verse d in P art

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, in w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

Matthew B . Fr ére , D. David Sexton, Knox ville, TN, for A ppellant, Doris Da venport Paul T. Coleman, Irmie K. (I ke) B lanton, I I I , Knoxvi lle, TN, for Appellant, Te ddie J . Clark

David O. Day , Edwar d M. Grave s, I I I , Cookeville, TN, for A ppellees-2- OP IN ION

I. F A C TUA L B ACKG ROUND AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY
At the c e nte r of the pr e se nt co ntr ov e rs y is Do ri s L . D a ve np ort ( “ Ms. Da ve np ort” ), a n e lde rl y fem ale res id ent of

Cr os sv ill e , T e nn e sse e bo rn on No ve mbe r 2 3, 19 11 . O n A pril 1 1, 19 96 , M s. Dave nport executed a document entitled “Dur able Power of Attorney ” (her einaf ter re fer red to a s the

“ 19 96 Pow e r o f A tto rn e y ” ) w hic h p ro vid e d, in r e le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s: I, D O R IS L

. D A V E N P O R T , o f C u m b e r l a n d C o u n t y, Tenne ssee, in the e vent that I s hould become inc apac itated, as he re ina ft e r de fi ne d, do he re by app oin t NO EL D. CLAR K, SR., a s my true a nd lawful a ttorney

in fac t, if he is unable to ser ve then I here by appoint T E DD I E J ANE CLARK, as my alternate true a nd lawful
a tto rn e y in f a c t.

. . . . I also express my desire that should a court de em it nece ssary to c omm e nc e le g a l pr oc e e din g s o ve r m y e state a nd its ma na g e me nt, it is my wish that NOEL

D. CL ARK, SR., serve as my conser vator or g uardia n.
Th e 19 96 Pow e r o f A tto rn e y a lso pu rp orte d to e mpo we r the a tto rn e y in f a c t wi th the abil ity

to h a nd le Ms. Davenport’s financ ial matters in the eve nt of her inc apac itat i o n . Two witnesses sig ned the f o l l o w i n g a c k n o w l e d g m e n ta t t a c h e d t o t h e 1 9 9 6 P o w e r o f A t t o r n e y:
I decla re that DORI S L . DAVEN PORT, is personally known to me , that she signe d this Durable Power of Attorney

in my prese nce, and that she appea

rs to be of sound mind and under no duress, fr aud
or un du e infl ue nc e , I

a m no t th e pe rs on app oin te d a s a g e nt b y thi s document, nor a m I t h e h ea lth care provider or an employ ee of

the health ca re pr ovider for

DORI S L . DAVEN PORT. I fu rt h er d ec l ar e th at I am n o t re l at ed t o D O R IS L. DA VE NPO RT, by blo od , mar ri a g e , or ad op tio n, a nd to the be st o f m y knowledg e, I am not entitled to any part of her estate under a will now exis ting or

by operation of law.

The nota ry , who also happened to be one of the witnesse s, aff ix ed her signature to the doc ument indicating that she and the other witness subscribed to the af oreme ntioned decla

ration in her pr e se nc e . O n th e sa me da y that sh e ex ecut ed th e 1996 Pow e r o f A tto rn e y , M s. Da ve np ort a lso executed the “ Doris L . Dave nport Revoca ble I nter Vivos Trust” (her einaf ter ref err ed to a s the “1996-3-

I nter Vivos Trust”) naming Noel D. Clark, Sr. a s co-trustee . I n 1999, Ms. Davenport named a
succe ssor trustee to ser ve in the eve nt of the death or incapa city of Noel D. Clark, Sr., and she named Teddie Jane Clark ( “Ms. Clark”) to serve a s co-trustee in the event of the succe ssor trustee’ s death, incapa city , or re signation.

Ms. Clark serve d as a le g al sec reta ry to Noel D. Clark, Sr., Ms. Da venport’s attorney , prior to their marria g e. I n 1999, the succ essor trustee to the 1996 I nter Vivos Trust re signe d. On Fe bruary 10, 2000, Noel D. Clark, Sr. die d, and, as a result, Ms. Clark became the co- trustee ove r the 1996 In t e r V i v o s T ru s ta n d a t t o r n e y
- i n
- f a c tf o r M s
. D a v e n p o r tu n d e r

t h e 1 9 9 6 P o w e r o f

A t t o r n e y
. In November

of 2001, doctors dia g nosed Ms. Dave nport with having an inope ra b l e b rain tum or. There afte r, Ms. Clark beg an to take on a more a ctive role in Ms. Davenport’s daily car e.
On Oc tob e r 15 , 20 02 , Ruth Ad a ir (“ Mr s. Ad a ir ” ) a nd El iza be th Ho lli ng sw ort h (“ Ms. Hollingsworth”), Ms. Da venport’s nie ces ( herei n af t er collectively

ref err ed to as the “ Niece s” or

“ Ap pe lle e s” ), fi le d a

“ Pe tit ion fo r A pp oin tme nt o f Con se rv a tor of the Pe rs on a ndPr op e rt y of Do ri s Dave nport” in the Probate Co u r t o f Cumberland County , Tenne ssee. The rein, the N iece s alleg ed that Ms. Davenport suffe red from dementia a nd para noid delusions from advanc ed ag e and w as in nee d of a c on se rv a tor

. Th e Ni e c e s re qu e ste d that the pr ob a te c ou rt app oin t th e m c on se rv a tor s o ve r M s. Da ve np ort, a ndthe y

re questedthat th e c ou rt

app oin t a tto rn e y

C. D ou g la s F ie lds (“ Mr . F ie lds ” ) t o serve as the g uardia n ad litem for Ms. Da venport. The Nie ces a lso asked the pr obate c ourt to order Ms. D avenpor

t to underg o a medical examination, citing her ref usal to submit t o such examination. The probate co urt subsequently enter ed an or der dire cting Ms. Davenport to submi t to a medical
e xami natio n b y Dr . Reyna ldo A. Ol a e c he a (“ Dr . Ola e c he a ” ) an d an or de r ap po int ing Mr . F ie lds to serve as g uardia n ad litem for Ms. Da venport to investig ate the N iece s’ petition.

Dr . O la e c he a

su bs e qu e ntl y

e va luate d M s. Da ve np ort and su bmi tte d his r e po rt to the pr ob a te court indica ting that Ms. Da venport suff ere d from the following medic al problems: a br ain tumor,
a n o ld m y oc ard ia l in fa

rc tio n, g e ne ra lize d a

rt e ri os c le ro sis , s e nil ity , o ste oa rthrit is, a nddif

fi c ult y hearing. D r. Olae chea

rec ommended that the probate court a ppoint a conser vator for

Ms. Davenport be c a us e sh e “ is n ot a

ble to take c are of he r he a lth or he r a ff a ir s du e to ph y sic a l a nd me nta l hand ic aps
. . . . I n the eve nt that her mind g ets worse , she nee ds to sign pape rs for a nursing fa cil ity .” Dr

. Olaec hea a lso noted t hat M s. Dave nport’s brain tumor, while benign, “is grow ing slowly and may produce sever e mental inca pacity in time.”

On Janu ary

7, 20 03 , M s. Clark fi le d a “ Pe tit ion to Inte rv e ne ” in the ma tte r n oti ng that, pu rs ua nt t o th e 19 96 Pow e r o f A tto rn e y , h e r a bil ity to a c t a s Ms . D a ve np ort’ s a tto rn e y -i n- fa c t c ou ld be imp a ir e d b y

a dis po sit ion of

the Ni e c e s’ pe tit ion . M s. Cla rk a lso fi le d a

re sp on se to the Ni e c e s’ petition a ll e g in g th a t M s
. D a v e n p o r t d id n o t n e e d th e a s s is tan c e o f th e c o u r t, a n d s h e a s k e d the pr ob a te c ou rt

to d ism iss theNi e c e s’ pe tit ion a sse rt ing that Ms. Da ve np ort ha d th e re qu isi te c apa c ity to execute the 1996 Power of Attorney

and 1996 I nter Vivos Trust. Alternatively , Ms. Clark asserted that, i f the c ou rt

fo un d M s. Da ve np ort to be in n e e d o f the c ourt ’s ass is tan c e , th e c ou rt sh ou ld appoint Ms. Clark as conse rvator f or Ms. Dave nport bec ause the 1996 Power of Attorney and 1996 I nter Vivos Trust e vidence d Ms. Davenport’s d esire f or Ms. Clark to fulfill that role. The Niece s-4-

subsequently

filed an a nswer to Ms. Clark’ s petition and asked the c ourt to dismiss the petition for the fo llo wi ng re a so ns : ( 1) the 19 96 Pow e r o f A tto rn e y a mou nte d to a

nu lli ty sin c e it w a s impr op e rl y executed, spec ifically that one of the wit nesses was also the not ary , and the witnesse s did not swear

“ un de r p e na lty

of pe rj ury ” a s r e qu ir e d b y

statut e ; a nd(2 ) M s. Cla rk d id no t ha ve sta nd ing to int e rv e ne be c a us e the Ni e c e s h a d s ta tut ory priority fo r a pp oin tme nt

a s M s
. D a v e n p o r

t ’ s c o n s e rv a tor s. Ms. C l ark subse quently

filed an a mended pe tition t o intervene asserting that the 1996 Powe r of Attorney and the 1996 Inter Vivos Trust qua li fi ed as wr i tings sig ned by Ms. Davenport, as contemplated by

section 34-3- 103(1) of the Tennessee Code, there by establishing he r pre fer ence for Ms. Clark to serve a s her c onservator.

I n Marc h of 2003, the probate court held a hearing on Ms. Clark’ s petition to i nterve ne in the matter. Shortly

there afte r, the probate court entere d an orde r denying her petition and stating tha t the 1996 Power of

Attorney was “ a spring ing pow er of attorne y with specific c onditions precede nt inc or po rate d w ith in its te rm s that by a dmi ssi on ha ve no t be e n me t a nd it i s th e re fo re no t c ur re ntl y in e ff e c t.” Ms. Cla

rk su bs e qu e ntl y

fi le d a “ Mo tio n f

or I nte rl oc utory App e a l,” wh ic h th e pr ob a te court de nied. At some point during the pendenc y of t he li tigation, Ms. Dave nport secur ed the se rvice s of Dr. Vic tor Schueler

(“D r. Schuele r”) , a g eria tric psy chiatri s t an d medical doc tor. On Mar ch 26, 2003, Ms. Dave nport filed an answe r t o the Nieces’ petition to appoint a conse rvator a sserting that she did not need the assistan ce o f t h e co u rt , and she r equeste d that the proba te court dismi ss the Ni ec es’ pe tition. On J uly 17, 2003, Ms. Clark filed a c ompeting “ Petition for Appointment of Conservator” in the probate court a sserting that, i f t he probate court found Ms. Dave nport to be d i s ab l e d a n d i n n e e d o f

a s s i s t a n c e , t h e n t h e c o u r ts h o u l d ap p o i n tM s
. C l ark a s h e r c o n s e r v a t o r
. In support of her

petition, Ms. C lark c ited t o the direc tive of Ms. Dave nport in the 1996 Power of Attorney . Ms. Clark also noted t hat M s. Dave nport desig nated Ms. C lark to ser ve as he r conse rvator in documents she executed in 2003. Spec ifi ca l l y , Ms. Davenport signe d a docume nt entitled “Dur able Power

of Attorney

for He alth Care Re g arding Doris L . Dave nport ” o n M ar ch 7, 2003, wh ic h p ro vid e d, in r e le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
I , DORI S L . DAVEN PORT, .

. . do appoint TEDDIE J ANE CL ARK as m y true and lawful attorney -in-fa ct t o act on my behalf for health ca re, a s provided her ein.

. . . . NO MINA TI ON OF CO NSE RV AT OR . M y a tto rn e y -i n- fa c t, Teddie J. Clark, is nominate d to serve a s my conser vator or g uardia n, should one be a

ppointed by

a court of compete nt jurisdiction.

That same day , Ms. Dave nport signe d a document entitled “Dur able Power of Attorney

Reg arding Doris L . Dave nport” (he reina fter c ollectively ref err ed to as the “ 2003 Powers of A ttorney ”) w hich purported to a

ppoint Ms. C lark a s Ms. Davenport’s attorney -in-fa ct over her pr operty . The Nie ces-5-

fi le d a mot ion to s tr ike Ms. Cla

rk ’s pe tit ion a nd a c or

re sp on din g mot ion in limi ne a sk ing the pr ob a te c ou rt to r ule that th e doc ume nts e xec ute d b y Ms. Da ve np ort on Ma

rc h 7 , 2 00 3 w e re ina dmi ssi ble at trial.

On J uly 23, 2003, the proba te court he ld a hearing on the Niece s’ petition for the a ppointment
o f aco n s er v at o r f

o r M s
. Da v en p o rt

. T h e co u rt h ea rd fr o mn u m er o u s wi t n es s es d u ri n g t h e h ea ri n g, inc lud ing Ms. Da ve np ort. S ho rt ly the re a ft e r, the pr ob a te c ou rt e nte re d a n o rd e r r

uli ng a s f oll ow s:
The Petitioners have car

ried their bur den of pr oof by clea r and convincing evidenc e that the Responde nt doe s have a disabilitythat woul d re quire c erta in of her rights to be r emoved f rom her. T he Respondent should not be deprive d of her rig ht to vote. Howeve r, her
ab i l i t y t o m ak e f

i n a n c i a l d e c i s i o n s , h e r

ab i l i t y t o d i s p o s e o f

p r o p e r t y, to e xec ute contr a c ts o r o the r l e g a l in str ume nts , a ndhe r a

bil ity to consent t o m edical and mental examinations and treatment or ho sp ita lizatio ns is i mpair e d a nda c on se rv a tor

sh ou ld b e app oin te d to
ma na g e tho se ma tte rs . T he Cou rt fu rthe r f ind s th e re sp on de nt s ho uld not be allowed to ha ve a drivers license

. A c omp e tin g pe tition

fo r c on ser vat ors hi p h avi ng been re c e ntl y fi le d, the Cou rt fi nd s that the orig ina l Pe tition e rs sh ou ld ha ve tim e to conduct discovery in reg ard to the competing Petitioner Teddie Clark so the determination of who the conse rvator w ill be is reserve d. . . . The C o urt furthe r finds the 2003 Power s of Attorney filed with the petition of Teddie Clark a re not e ffe ctive and will not be re cog nized beca use t he dis abling char acte ristics exis ted prior to their execution.

I n th e sa me or de r, the pr ob a te c ou rt de nie d the Ni e c e s’ mot ion to s tr ike Ms. Cla rk ’s pe tit ion a ndthe ir motion in l imine.

Th e re a ft e r, the pa

rt ie s fi le d nu me ro us mot ion s a ndre sp on se s th e re to w ith the pr ob a te c ou rt

. Howeve r, w e ar e o n ly

c o n c e r n e d w ith o n e o f

th e s e mo ti o n s o n ap p e a l. M s
. Cl ark f il e d a mo ti on asking the probate court to remove Mr. F ields as g uardia n ad l i t em al l eging that he had not be en appointed pursuant to section 34-1-107 of t he Tennessee Code or t he local rules of the proba te court and that he f

ailed to perform adequately his duties as guar dian ad litem. On August 15, 2003, the probate court e ntere d an orde r denying Ms. Clark’ s motion t o remove the g uardia n ad l i t em. The p ro b at e court also order ed sua sponte th a t “ U p p e r Cu mb e r lan d D e v e lo p me n t D is tric t, O f f ic e of Public Guardian, A g ent Kelly Tay es [(hereina fter ref

err ed to a s the “Public Guar dian”) ] is appointed as Co n s e r v a to r

o f th e p e r s o n a n d p r o p e r ty

o f D o r is L

. D a v e n p o r t f

r o m th e p r e s e n t u n ti l th e c ourt appoints a permanent conser vator.” On the same da y that the trial court entere d the orde r addr essing Ms. Clark’s motion, she filed a “ Compl ai n t for De clar atory J udg ment” in the Chanc ery Court of Cumberland County

asking the court to declar e the rights a nd obligations of the parties unde r the 19 96 Pow e r o f A tto rn e y a ndthe 20 03 Pow e rs of At to rne y . T he c hanc e ry c ou rt su bs e qu e ntl y transfe rre d the complaint to the proba te court.-6-

On May 17, 2004, the proba te court entere d an orde r in this matter wher ein t he court ruled, in r e le va nt p art , a s f

oll ow s:
After h ea ri ng arg uments of counse l [ on April 28, 2004], the Court announced finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law. A transcript of the arg uments and ruling is separately filed with the Clerk and he reby

incorporated by

ref ere nce in this Or der. Ba sed upon
sa id r uli ng s, thi s Co urt he re by

OR DE RS: 1. Upon re mand of the D ecla ratory J udg ment from the [chance ry court], the Dec lara tory

J udg ment was c onsolidated in the Conservatorship a ction ref ere nced above. The following finding s of fa c ts, c on c lus ion s o f la w, a nd the ru lin g s se t fo rth h e re ina ft e r d isp os e of all cla ims set forth in t h e De cl aratory J udg ment action, and the Conservatorship a ction.

. . . . 4. The Court cla

rified a prior ruling that the 2003 Powers of At torne y we re e xec ute d a ft e r M rs . D a ve np ort w a s d ete rm ine d to be disabled by

her doc tor, making those documents invalid. 5. The Court found that the 1996 power of attorne y

was not executed under penalty of perjury as re quired by

statute; that one of the witnesse s purports to nota rize her ow n signature; and tha t the [P ublic Guar dian’s] action in revoking the financ ial power o f att orney w a s p r o p e r ; a n d t h a tt h e l a n g u a g e i n t h e [ 1 9 9 6 P o w e ro f A t t o r n e y] authorizing the appointment of a conser vator named “Noe l C l ar k” and not “T eddie J ane Clar k” as the person she desired to be appointed. Ba sed upon the above finding s of fac t, the C o u rt o rd ers that the 1996 power of attorney is void; is not properly executed and can’ t be consider ed for an y purpose; and that the [P ublic Guar dian] had the power to revoke the provisions dealing with the conser vator. 6. B a se d u po n a n e xami natio n o f the fa c ts as the y re la te to the pr iority of pe rs on s to be app oin te d a s Co ns e rv a tor pu rs ua nt t o T.C.A. section 34-3- 103, the court finds that there is no spouse; ther e are no c hil dr e n, that the pe tit ion ing nie c e s a re no t app ro pria te be c a us e they have f amily frictions with Mrs. Dave nport; and that Teddie J ane Clark is not appropria te for a ppointment be cause of fina ncial improprieties. It is in t he best interest of Doris L . Dave nport pursuant to T.C.A. § 34-3-103 that the [Publi c Gua rdi an ] be and is he reby
ap p o i n t e d a s t h e C o n s e r v a t o r o f t h e p e r s o n a n d p r o p e r t y

o f D o r i s L. Dave nport.-7-

The probate court went on to set forth the pa rame ters of the P u b lic Guar dian’s re sponsibili ties
re g ard ing Ms. Da ve np ort.

II. I SSU ES P R ESENTED
Ms. Da ve np ort a ndMs. Cla rk fi le d ti me ly no tic e s of app e a l to thi s Cou rt se e kin g app e llate revie w of the tria l court’s ruling s. Ms. Davenport presents the f ollowing issue f

or re view:

1. Whe the r the evid e nc e pr e se nte d at tria l c le arl y a ndc on vin c ing ly

e sta bli sh e d th a t Ms

. Dave nport is disabled and in nee d of the a ssistance of the court.

Ms. Da ve np ort is joi ne d b y Ms. Cla rk in p re se nti ng the fo llo wi ng iss ue s:
2. I f the re cord doe s establish that Ms. Davenport is in need of a c onservator, whethe r the trial court e rre d in appointing the Public Gua rdian a s her c onservator over Ms. Clark; 3. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in finding the 1996 Power of Attorney to be invalid; and 4. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in finding the 2003 Powers of Attorney to be invalid. Ms. Clark prese nts the following issues f or our r eview:

5. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in f inding that Ms. Clar

k eng ag ed in “f

inancial improprie ties”; and 6. Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d by de nying Ms. Cla rk ’s mot ion to r e mov e the g ua rd ia n a d li te m.
For the re as o n s s t at ed more fully here in, we af

firm in part a nd reve rse in part the decision of the pr ob a te c ou rt

. III
. S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW

When evaluating the issues prese nted by the parties in this appeal, we a re c og nizant of the fo l l o wi n g: Appell at e courts . . . may need to a

pply more than one standard of
re v i ew w h e n r ev i ew i n g a l o we r c o u rt ’s d ec i s i o n ap p o i n t i n g a conser vator. To e x plain, a petitio n for the appointment of a
conser vator re quires the lowe r cou rt to make leg al, fa ctual, and discretionary

determinations. Each of the se determ i nations require differ ent standar ds of re view.-8-

Crumle y v . P e rd ue , N o. 01 -A -0 1- 97 04 -C H- 00 16 8, 19 97 Te nn . A pp
. LEX I S 77 4, a t *7 (T e nn . Ct

. App. Nov. 7, 1997).

“ Un le ss o the rw ise re qu ir e d b y statut e , r e vie w o f f

ind ing s o f f

a c t by th e tria l c ou rt

in c ivi l actions shall be de novo upon the re cord of the trial c ourt, ac companied by a pre sumption of the
corr ectne ss of the finding , unless the pre pondera nce of the evidenc e is otherwise.” Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) (2005). When r eviewing a trial c ourt’s fa ctual findings which derive from the te stimony of witnesses, we are bound by the following leg al principle: Unlike appe llate courts, trial courts ar e able to observe witnesses as they testify and to assess their demea nor, which be st situates trial judge s t o ev aluate w itness cre dibilit y
. Se e Sta te v . P ru e tt , 788 S.W. 2d 55 9, 56 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 0) ; Bowman v. Bowman , 836 S.W .2d 56 3, 56 6 ( Ten n. Ct. Ap p. 19 91 ). Th us , tria l c ou rt s a re in the mos t fa vo ra ble po sit ion to r e so lve fa c tua l di sp ute s h ing ing on c re dib ili ty determinations. See Tenn-Tex Prope rties v. Brownell-Elec tro, Inc. , 77 8 S.W. 2d42 3, 42 5- 26 (T e nn . 1 98 9) ; Mi tc he ll v . A rc hib ald , 971 S.W. 2d 25 , 29 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 19 98 ). Ac c or din g ly , a pp e llate c ou rt s wi ll n ot r e -e va luate a

tr ia l j ud ge’s a sse ssm e nt o f w itn e ss c re dib ili ty absent clear and convincing evidence to the contra ry
. See H umphrey v. Dav id W

itherspoon, Inc. , 734 S.W .2d 315, 315-16 (Te nn. 1987); Bingham v. Dy ersburg Fabrics. Co., Inc. , 567 S.W .2d 169, 170 (Tenn. 1978)

. We lls v . T

e nn. B d. of

Re ge nts , 9 S.W .3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999)

. W e r e v i e w a

t r i a l c o u r t ’ s c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w u n d e r

a p u r e l y de novo standard of revie w, aff ording no presumption of cor rec tness to those findings. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 854 S

. W

. 2 d 8 7 , 9 1 (T en n
. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Estate of Adkin s v. White Con sol. Indu s., Inc. , 788 S.W .2d 815, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)) . Reg arding those dec isions which ar e wi t h in the discretion of a trial court, we employ

the following standard of revie w:
Under the abuse of discre tion standard, a trial court’s ruling “will be upheld so long as re asonable minds c an disag ree as to pr opriety of the decision made .” Sta te v . S c ott , 3 3 S. W. 3 d 7 4 6 , 7 5 2 ( T e n n. 2000); S t a t e v. Gilliland , 2 2 S. W. 3 d 2 6 6 , 2 7 3 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 0 )

. A tria l c ourt abuses its discre tion only when it “applies an inc orre ct leg al standar d,
or re ache s a decision which is a g ainst logic or re asoning that cause s an injustice t o t h e party

complaining .” State v. Shirley , 6 S.W .3d 243 , 2 4 7 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 9 )

. T h e ab u s e o f d is c r e ti o n s tan d ar d d o e s not permit the appe llate court to substi tute its judgment for th at o f t he trial court. Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 970 S.W .2d 920, 927 (Tenn. 1998).-9-

Eldridge v. Eldridge , 4 2 S. W.3 d 8 2, 85 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; see also State ex rel. V aughn v. Kaatrude , 21 S.W .3d 244, 248 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

I n this appeal, we are also ca lled upon to interpret certa in statutes. “Statutory interpre tation is a question of law, w hich we r eview de novo , with no presumption of corr ec t n es s gi v en to the courts below.” Sullivan v. Edwards Oil Co. , 1 4 1 S

. W

. 3 d 5 4 4 , 5 4 7 (T en n
. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Wallace v. Sta te , 121 S.W .3d 652, 656 (Tenn. 2003) ). When interpre ting statutory lang uag e, we also employ the following principles to g uide us in our ende avor:

I n construing any

statute, our “e ssential duty ” is “‘to a scertain and carryout the leg islature’s intent without unduly restric ting or expanding a

statute’s coverag e bey ond its intended scope .’” Lavin v. Jordon , 1 6 S

. W

. 3 d 3 6 2 , 3 6 5 (T en n
. 2 0 0 0 ) ( q u o t i n g Premium Fin. Corp. of Am. v. Crump Ins. Servs. of Me mphis, Inc. , 978 S.W .2d 91, 93 (Tenn. 1998 ))

. When the lang uag e of a statute is clear

and
un a mbi g uo us , “ le g isl a tiv e int e nt i s to be a sc e rt a ine d f ro m th e plain and o rd i nary

meaning of the statutory lang uag e used.” Gragg v. Gragg , 12 S.W .3d 412, 415 (Tenn. 2000). Howe ver, w hen this court fi nd s th a t ( 1) a statut e c a n le g iti mate ly be c on str ue d in v ari ou s w a y s, a nd(2 ) o ne of

tho se c on str

uc tio ns pr e se nts a

c on sti tut ion a l c on fl ic t, then “it is our duty

to adopt a con s t ru cti on which will sustain the statut e a nda vo id [tha t] c on sti tut ion a l con fl ic t, if its re c itatio ns pe rm it such a c onstruction.” Marion County B d

. o f Comm’rs v. M

arion County Election Comm’n , 5 9 4 S

. W

. 2 d 6 8 1 , 6 8 4

- 8 5 ( T e n n
. 1 9 8 0 )

. In
no case , though, is the judicia ry empower ed to s u b s t i tute its own po lic y jud g me nts fo r tho se of

theGe ne ra l A ssem bly

or to a do pt a construction t h at i s clea rly contra ry to the intent of the Ge nera l Assembly

. See , e.g. , Griffin v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. , 18 S.W .3d 195, 201 (Tenn. 2000)

. Sta te v . M

all ar d , 40 S.W .3d 473, 480 (Tenn. 2001)

. IV. D I S CUS S I ON
A. The Nee d for a Conservator

“ Th e pu rp os e of app oin tin g a g ua rd ia n, c on se rv a tor , or co mmi tte e is to saf e g ua rd the ri g hts of the inc omp e te nt by pr ote c tin g his pe rs on a ndby ma na g ing a ndpr e se rv ing his pr op e rt y .” 57 C.J.S. Mental He alth § 11 0 ( 19 92 ); see also In re Conservatorshi p of Grove s , 109 S.W .3d 317, 329 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (“Conser vatorship proce eding s provide a forum for determining whether a per son’s-10-

abil ity to re ma in auto no mou s h a s b e c ome imp a ir e d. ” ); In re Arm ster , No. M2000-00776-COA- R3- C V, 2 0 0 1 T en n
. Ap p
. LE XIS 7 9 7 , at * 1 2 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. Oc t

. 2 5 , 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Be ll v . I c ar d , 986 S.W .2d 550, 557 (Tenn. 1999) ) (“ [T] he purpos e o f a conse rvatorship proc eeding is to determine wh e the r a pe rs on is d isa

ble d s uc h th a t sh e ne e ds a c ou rt -a pp oin te d f

idu c iary to s up e rv ise , p ro te c t, and assist her pe rson, her property , or both.”). T he leg islature def ines a “ conser vator” as “a person or per sons appointed by

the court to provide partial or full supervision, protection and a ssistance of the per son or prope rty

or both of a disa

bled per son.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-101(4) (2003)

. Further, it define s a “disable d person” as “any person e ighte en (18) y ear s of ag e or olde r dete rmined by the court to be in need of partial or full supervision, protec tion a nd assistance by rea son of mental illness, phy sical illness or injury , developmenta l disa bility or other mental or phy sical inca pacity .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 34- 1-101(7) (2003).

Be fore the court may

appoint a conse rvator ove r the pe rson or property of an individual, the petitioner must prove the following by clea r and convincing evidenc e: (1) that the i n d i v i d u al for whom the conse rvatorship is soug ht “is fully or p ar t i ally

disabled,” a nd (2) that the individual for whom the conse rvatorship is soug ht “is in need of assistance from the c ourt.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 34 -1 -1 26 (2 00 3) ; se e als o He ndr ix v . M c Gi ll , N o
. 0 1 A 0 1

- 9 7 0 9

- P B

- 0 0 5 3 6 , 1 9 9 8 T e n n
. A p p
. LE X IS 27 5, a t *5 –6 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . A pr . 2 9, 19 98 ); Crumle y v . P e rd ue , No. 01-A- 01-9704-CH-00168, 1 9 9 7 T e n n
. A p p
. LE X I S 7 7 4 , a t* 5 ( T e n n
. C t

. A p p
. N o v
. 7 , 1 9 9 7 )

. T h i s C o u r th a s p r e v i o u s ly ad d re s s ed t h e c l ea r a n d co n v i n ci n g ev i d en ce s t an d ar d , s t at i n g:

Th e “ c le ar an d co nv inc ing e vid e nc e ” sta nd ardde fi e s p re c ise definition. Ma

jor s v . S mi th , 776 S.W .2d 538, 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). Wh i l e i t is more exacting tha n the pre pondera nce of the evidenc e standa

rd, Santosky v . Kramer , 4 55 U. S. at 76 6, 10 2 S. Ct.
a t 14 01 ; R e n te n b a c h E

n g 'g Co

. v
. G e n e r

a l R e a lty Ltd. , 707 S.W .2d 524, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), it does not re quire such c erta inty as the bey ond a re asonable doubt standard. B ra n d on v. W right , 838 S.W. 2d 53 2, 53 6 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 19 92 ); State v. Grov es , 735 S.W .2d 843, 846 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

. Clear a nd convincing evidenc e eliminates a ny s erious or substantial doubt concerning the corr ectne ss of the conclusions to be draw n from the e vidence

. See Ho d g es v. S.C. Toof

& Co. , 833 S.W .2d 8 9 6 , 9 0 1 n.3 (Tenn. 1992) . I t should produce in the fa c t- fi nd e r’ s mi nda

fi rm be lie f o r c on vic tio n w ith re g ard to the truth of the a lleg ations sought to be e stablished. In re Estate of Armstrong , 85 9 S.W.2 d 323 , 328 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 3) ; Brandon v. W right , 838 S.W. 2d a t 53 6; W

iltcher v. Bradley , 7 08 S.W. 2d40 7, 41 1 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1985).
O’Da n iel v. Messier , 9 0 5 S. W. 2 d 1 8 2 , 1 8 8 ( T e n n
. Ct

. A p p
. 1 9 9 5 )

. “ T h u s , in in v o lunta ry conser vatorship proc eeding s, the burden of proof is on the pe rson or pe rsons petition i ng for the appointment of a c onservator.” In re Con servatorship of Groves , 109 S.W .3d at 330.-11-

On appe al, Ms. Dave nport arg ues that the Nie ces f ailed to ca

rry t h ei r b u rden at trial of proving the ex istence of the first prong of the statute ( i.e. , that she is a disabled per son) by clea r and convincing evidenc e. I n their petition, the Niec es alleg ed that Ms. Dave nport suffe red f rom dementia a nd para noid delusions. Ms. Davenport a sserts that the only medical e vidence at trial
re g ard ing he r m e nta l c apa c ity c a me fr om h e r o wn e xpe rt , Dr . Sc hu e le r, wh o te sti fi e d th a t sh e is competent to ca

re f or her self. She conte nds that, since the Nie ces failed to prese nt medical proof of
a me ntal disability , the trial court erre d in finding that the rec ord conta ined clea r and c onvincing
e vid e nc e to s up po rt

its fi nd ing of su c h a disa

bil ity . Co nv e rs e ly , th e Ni e c e s c on te ndthat th e pr ob a te c ou rt didha ve me dic a l pr oo f i n th e fo rm of Dr . Ola e c he a ’s a ff ida vit to s up po rt

its fi nd ing that Ms

. Dave n p ort is disabled due to her mental incapa city . Moreove r, the Nie ces a ssert that there are no Tenne ssee statutes or

case s requiring that a petitioner pr ove the e x istence of a dis ability with expert
m e d i c a l t e s t i m o n y.

1.

The Pr obate Court’ s Consid eration of the Me dical Report

We beg in by

evaluating the trial court’s e videntiary ruli n g re g arding the “Me dical Ex amination Report” f

iled by Dr. Ola ec h ea in this case. The leg islature dire cts that a pe tition for t h e a p p o i n t m en to f aco n s er v at o r s h o u l d co n t ai n , am o n g o t h ert h i n gs , t h e f o l l o wi n g: (7) The name of

the re spondent’s phy sician or, whe re a ppropriate , responde nt’s psy cholog ist and either: (A) Asworn medica l examination report described in § 34-3- 10 5( c ); (B ) A s tatement that the r espondent ha s been e x amined but the sw or n me dic a l e xami natio n re po rt ha s n ot b e e n r e c e ive d b ut w ill be filed be fore the hea

ring ; or (C) A stateme nt that the responde nt refu s es t o be examined
vo lun tari ly , with a

re qu e st that th e c ou rt

dir e c t th e re sp on de nt t o submit t o medical e x amination[.]
Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-3-104( 7) (2003). I n the instant c ase, the Niece s indicated in their pe tition t hat Ms. Davenport refuse d to underg o a medica l examination. At the Niece s’ reque st, the probate court order ed Ms. Dave nport to underg o a medica l e x amination by Dr. Olaec hea pursuant to se ction 34-3- 10 5 o f the Te nn e sse e Cod e , w hic h p ro vid e s:

(a) I f t h e r e s p o n d e n t h a s b e e n e xa mi n e d b y a p h y s ic ian o r, w h e r e ap p r o p r i a t e , a

p s yc h o l o g i s t n o tm o r e t h a n n i n e t y ( 9 0 ) d a ys prior to the filing of the petition and the examination is pertinent, the report of the examination shall be submitt ed with the petition. I f the responde nt has not been e x amined within ninety (90) day s of the-12- filing of the petition, cannot g et out to be examined or refuses to be voluntarily exam ined , th e c ou rt sh a ll or de r the re sp on de nt t o s ub mit to e xami na tio n b y a ph y sic ia n or , wh e re app ro pria te , a ps y c ho log ist ide nti fi e d in the

p e t iti on a s th e re sp on de nt’ s p hy sic ia n o r p sy c ho log ist or, if the re spondent has no phy sician or psy cholog ist, a phy sician or psy cholog ist selected by

the court. The phy sician or psy cholog ist on completing the examination shall send a sworn written re port to the court with copie s to the petitioner and th e gu ardia n ad litem. The ph y sic ian ’s or ps

y c ho log ist ’s re

po rt sh all be ma de a pa rt o f th e c ou rt
re c or d

. (b) On motion by

the petitioner, the responde nt, the adver sary counsel, the g uardia n ad litem, or on its own init iative, the court may order the responde nt to submit to examination by such phy sicians and ps y c ho log ist s o r o the r s pe c ia lis ts wh o ha ve e xpe rt ise in the sp e c if ic disabilityof the re spondent

. The e x amining pe rson shall send a
sworn written report to the c ourt with copies to the petition er , the g uardia n ad litem and the person r equesting the sec ond examination. The c ourt may

assess the c ost of the sec ond examination against the propert y of the disabled pe rson or a g ainst the person r equesting the examination. (c ) E a c h p hy sic ia n’ s o r p sy c ho log ist ’s sw orn r e po rt sh a ll
co n t ai n t h e f

o l l o wi n g: ( 1 ) T h e r e s p o n d e n t ’ s m e d i c a l h i s t o r y; (2) A de scription of the nature a nd type of the re s p o n dent’s d i s ab i l i t y; (3) An opinion as to whether a conser vator is nee ded and the type and sc ope of the conser vator wi t h specific statement of the
rea sons for the r ecommendation of conser vatorship; and (4) An y o t h er ma tters as the c ourt dee ms nece ssary or advisable.

Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 4- 3- 10 5 ( 20 03 ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . D r. Ol a e c he a su bs e qu e ntl y

e va luate d M s. Dave nport and filed his r eport with the probate court re commending that a conse rvator be appointed over M s
. D a v e n p o r t d u e to h e r in ab il it y to c ar e f o r h e r h e a lth a n d a f

f a ir s b e c au s e o f p h y s ic al and mental handica

ps.
At the J uly 2003 hearing to determine whether Ms. Davenport was in nee d of a c onservator, the Niec es attempted to introduce Dr. Ola eche a’s “ Medica l Ex amination Report” into evidenc e. C o u n s e l f

o r M s
. D a v e n p o r tp r o m p t l y o b j e c t e d t o t h e i n tr o d u c t i o n o f t h e r e p o r ta s h e a r s a y. Re fe re nc ing the st atu te, th e pr ob a te c ou rt a ndc ou ns e l f

or the pa rt ie s d e bate d w he the r the pr ob a te court c ould proper ly consider the report as evidence since i t was made a part of the re cord pur suant to the statute. See Te nn . Co de An n. § 34 -3- 10 5(a) (2 00 3) . T he pr ob a te c ou rt ov e rr ule d M s. Dave nport’s objec tion and ruled that it could consider the re port when making a determination as-13-

to whether

Ms. Davenport was disabled since it wa s a p art of the rec ord pursua nt to the statute. Specific a ll y , th e p r o b a te c o u r t r u le d th a t “ [i ]t ’ s p ar t o f

th e r e c o r d , a n d I

in d ic a te d th a t I

w il l be
c on si d e r i n g t h a t a s e v i d e n c e , o v e r t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s
. ” M s
. D a v e n p o r t c o n t e n d s o n ap p e a l t h a t th is ruling constitutes error

since the pr obate c ourt could consider only the evidenc e prope rly admitted at trial whe n rende ring a dec ision in t his case. We a g ree
. The Te nnessee Rules of Evidence “shall g overn e v i d en ce rul ings in a ll trial courts of Tenne ssee e x cept a s otherwise pr ovided by statute or r ules of the Supre me Court of Tenne ssee.” Tenn. R. Evi d. 101 (2005). A s trict rea ding of section 34-3-105(a) of the Te nnessee Code ( i.e. , that it r e qu ir e s th e a dmi ssi on of a ph y sic ia n’ s o r p sy c ho log ist ’s re po rt i nc o n s e rv at o rs hip c a se s r e g ard le ss of objec tions based upon evidentiary rules re lated to hea

rsay , rele vance , reliability of expert opinion, authentication, etc.) would see mingly place it in direct conflict with the Te nnesse e Rules of Evidence

. “[W ]hi le the three branc hes of g overnme nt a re independe nt and co-e qual, they are to a deg ree interdepe ndent as well, with the functions of one branc h often overla pping that of another .” Sta te v . King , 9 7 3 S

. W

. 2 d 5 8 6 , 5 8 8 (T en n
. 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g Und e rwo od v . St ate , 529 S.W .2d 45, 47 (Tenn. 1975) ). Thus, we must determine whe ther the leg islature’s direc tive that a “phy sician’s or psy cholog ist’s report shall be ma de a part of the court re cord” in conservatorship case s constitutes an impermissible enc roac hment into the province of the judiciary

in violation of the separ ation of power s doctrine. See Martin v. Lear Corp. , 90 S.W .3d 626, 631 (Tenn. 2002) (noting that “the le g isl a tur e ha s no c on sti tut ion a l a uth or ity to e na c t ru le s that strike a t the he art of the c ou rt ’s e xer c ise of judicial powe r”)

. T h e T e n n e s s e e Su p r e me Co u r t h a s p r e v io u s ly a d d r e s s e d a n ap p ar e n t c o n f li c t betwee n a s t at u t e a n d t h e T en n es s ee R u l es o f E v i d en ce , s t at i n g:

The authority

of the Ge nera l Assembly to enac t rules of
e vid e nc e in ma ny

c ir c ums ta nc e s is no t qu e sti on e d b y thi s Co urt. Its power in this reg ard, how ever , is not unlimited, and any exercise of that po we r b y

the le g isl a tur e mu st ine vit ably y ie ld w he n it

se e ks to g ov e rn the pr a c tic e a ndpr oc e du re of the c ou rt s. On ly

the Sup re me Court has the inhere nt power to promulg ate rules g overning the prac tice and pro ce d u re of the c ourts of this state, see, e .g. , State v. Re id , 981 S.W .2d 166, 170 (Tenn. 1998) (“ I t is well settled that Tenne ssee c ourts have i n h ere nt power to make and enf orce re a so na ble ru le s o f p ro c e du re .” ); see also Tenn. Cod e Ann. §§ 16-3-401, -402 (1994), and this inher ent power “exists by virt u e of the establishment of a C o u rt an d not by larg ess of the le g islature,” Hayne s v. McKenzie Mem’l Hosp. , 6 67 S.W. 2d49 7, 49 8 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1984). Furthermore , beca use t he power t o control the pra ctice and proc edure of t he courts is inhere nt in the judiciary and nec essary “to enga g e in the complete performance of the judicial func tion,” c f. An de rso n Co un ty Qu ar te rly Cou rt v . J ud ge s o f th e 28 th J

ud ic ial Cir

. , 579 S.W .2d 875, 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978), this power cannot be-14- constituti o n al l y

exercised by

any other branch of g overnme nt, see Tenn. Const. art. I I , § 2 (“N o person or persons be longing to one of thes e d ep ar t m en t s s h al l ex er ci s e a n y o f t h e p o we rs p ro p er l y

belong ing to either of the others, except in the ca ses h ere in directe d or pe rm itt e d. ” ). I n this are a , “th e c ou rt is s up re me in f

a c t a s w e ll a s in name.” See B arger v. Broc k , 535 S.W .2d 337, 341 (Tenn. 1976)

. Despite the c lear

expressio n o f the sepa

ration of powe rs do c tr ine in A rt ic le I I

a nde lse wh e re , h oweve r, “ it i s impo ssi ble to prese rve pe rfe ctly

the ‘theor etical lines of de marcation betwee n the executive, leg islative and judicial bra nches of g overnme nt.’ I ndeed there is, by

nece ssity , a ce rtain amount o f overlap bec ause the three branc hes of g overnme nt are interdepe ndent.” Petition of Burson , 909 S.W .2d 768, 774 (Tenn. 1995) . I n recog nition of this i mportant principle, we have f

reque ntly acknow ledg ed the broad power of the Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y

to e sta bli sh ru le s o f e vid e nc e in f urthe ranc e of

its ability to enac t substantive law. Se e Da ug he rty v . S tat e , 21 6 T enn. 666, 393 S.W

. 2 d 739, 743 (Tenn. 1965) . But a s the Gene ral Assembly can constituti onally exercise onlythe leg islative power of the state , it s b ro a d a

bil ity to enact ru le s f

or us e in the c ou rt s mu st nece ssarily

be conf ined to those are as that ar e ap p ro priate to the
e xer c ise of

that po we r. Al tho ug h an ydis c us sio n o f the pr e c ise
c on tou rs of

thi s leg isl a tiv e po we r i s n ot a pp ro pria te in this c a se , it

is
su ff ic ie nt t o a c knowle dg e that su c h p ow e r e xists a nd that it is
nece ssarily

limit ed by

the very nature of the powe r itself. Notwithstanding the constitutional li mits of legislative pow er in this reg ard, the courts of this s t ate have, fr om time to ti me, consente d to the application of pr ocedur al or e vi dentiary rules promulg ated by

the leg islature. I ndeed, suc ho c c a sional acquie scenc e c a n b e e xpe c te d in the natur a l co urs e of e ve nts , a s th is p ra c tic e is
so me tim e s n eces sa

ry to f os te r a wo rk able mod e l of

g ov e rn me nt. W he n le gis lat iv e e na c tm e nts ( 1) are re as on ab le an d wo rk ab le with in the fra mewor k

alre ad y ad op te d b y the jud ic iar

y , a nd ( 2) wor k to
su pp le me nt t

he ru le s a lre ad

y pr om ulg ate d b

y the Su pre me Cou rt, th e n c o n s id

e r a ti o n s o f c o m it y a m o n g s t th e c o e q u a l b r a n ches of governm ent counsel that the courts not turn a bl ind eye

. See Ne wton v. Cox , 878 S.W .2d 105, 112 (Tenn. 1994) (upholding leg islative
re g ulatio n o f atto rn e y s w he n th e reg ulatio n ( 1) didno t “ dir e c tly
c on fl ic t wi th the Sup re me Cou rt ' s a uth ority ,” a nd (2 ) was mer e ly “desig ned to de cl ar e” public policy ). This Court has long held the view that comity and cooperation among the branches of g overnme nt are be ne fi c ia l to a ll, a ndc on sis te nt w ith c on sti tut ion a l pri nc ipl e s, such pra ctices a

re de sired and oug ht to be nurtured and maintained. Whil e it is so me tim e s dif fi c ult to p ra c tic a lly

a sc e rt a in w he re Artic le-15- I I , section 2 dra ws the line, th e distinction m ay be simply

stated as that betwee n cooper ation and coe rcion. Se e Ph oe nix Ne wsp ap e rs, In c . v . S up e rio r Co ur t , 1 80 Ariz. 159 , 8 82 P.2 d 1 28 5, 12 90 (A ri z. Ct

. App. 1993).
Sta te v . M

all ar d , 40 S.W.3 d 473 , 480 –8 2 (T e nn . 200 1) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . H ow e ve r, the su pr e me court noted tha t a leg islative enac tment may unconstitutionally infring e upon the pr ovince of the j u d i ci ar y i n s o m e i n s t an ce s , s t at i n g:

Just a s th e Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y ha s no c on sti tut ion a l po we r t o enac t rules that infring e upon the pr otections of the De clar ation of Rights, State v. Pilkey , 7 76 S.W. 2d94 3, 95 1 ( Te nn . 1 98 9) ; Tennessee Dep’ t of Hum. Servs. v . Vaughn , 595 S.W .2d 62, 63 (Tenn. 1980) , the legislature can have no constitutional authority to enact rules , either of e v ide nc e or

oth e rwi se , that stri ke at the v ery he art of a court’s
exe rcise of judicial power , see Pe ople v. J ackson , 69 I ll. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602, 604, 13 I ll. Dec. 667 ( I ll. 1977) (“I f t he power i s judicial in char acte r, the leg islature is expr es s l y prohibited from e x erc ising it.”). Am o n g th e s e in h e r e n t j u d ic ia l p o w e r s ar e th e p o w e r s to h e ar fac ts, to decide the issues of fa ct made by the pleading s, and to dec ide the questions of law involved. Se e Mo rro w v . Co rb in , 122 Tex. 553, 62 S.W. 2d64 1, 64 5 (T e x. 19 33 ). As a n e sse nti a l c or oll ary to the se pri n ciples, any

determination of what evide nce is re levant, either log ic a lly or legal ly , to a

fa c t a t is su e in l iti g a tio n is a po we r that is entrusted solely

to the car e and e x erc ise of the judiciary
. See O pinion
o f the Justice s , 1 4 1 N

. H

. 5 6 2 , 6 8 8 A

. 2 d 1 0 0 6 , 1 0 1 6 ( N

. H

. 1997). I ndeed, a “cou rt ’s constitutional function to independently decide
c o n tr o v e r s i e s i s i m p a i r e d i f i tm u s td e p e n d o n , o r

i s l i m i t e d b y, a no the r b ra nc h o f g ov e rn me nt i n d e te rm ini ng a nd e va luatin g the fa c ts of the c ontroversie s it must adjudicate .” Id . Cons equently , any leg islative enac tment that purports to remove the discretion of a tria l judge in making de terminations of l og ical or leg al relevanc y impairs the independe nt ope ration of the judicial branc h of g overnme nt, and no such mea sure c an be pe rmitted to stand.
Id . at 483 (e mphasis added)

. We must presume that the statutory lang uag e at issue is constitutional and that the leg islature did not intend to infringe upon the judicial authority o f t h e co u rt s o f this state to control the admissi b i l i t y of medica l evidence in conservatorship proce eding s. Se e id . We believe that the sta tut o r y l a n g u a g e e m p l o y e d b y

t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n s e c t i o n 3 4

- 3

- 1 0 5 ( a ) o f t h e T e n n e s s e e C o d e is

“ re a so na ble a ndwo rk able wi thi n th e fr a me wo rk ” of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f E vid e nc e , th e re fo re , it does not run af

o u l o f the sepa

ration of powe rs doctrine . The leg islature instructed that “[t] he-16-

ph y sic ia n’ s o r p sy c ho log ist ’s re po rt sh a ll be ma de a pa rt of the c ou rt re c or

d .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 34-3-105( a) ( 2003) (e mphasis a dded). “Our sear ch for a statute’s purpose beg ins with the words of t h e s t at u te itself.” In re Con servatorship of Clayton , 9 1 4 S. W. 2 d 8 4 , 9 0 ( T e n n
. Ct

. A p p
. 1995). I n asce rtaining the leg islature’s intent in ena cting a statute, we must give the words sele cted by the leg islature their pla in and ordinary meaning

. Se e Sta te v . Co llins , 166 S.W .3d 721, 725–26 (Tenn. 2005). Nowhe re in the statute doe s the leg islature dire ct that the re port shall be admitted as e vidence of disability and considered by the t rial court without being tested by the evidentiary rules. I n any g iven ca se, docume nts are f iled with the t ri al court whic h are made a part of the re c or

d ( i.e. , the complaint, the answe r, m otions, etc.), but they do not constitute evidence considere d by the trier of fac t when re ndering a dec ision in t he ca se. See , e.g. , Hillh aven Corp. v. State ex rel. Manor Care, Inc. , 565 S.W .2d 210, 212 (Tenn. 1978) (“A lleg ations in ple ading s are not, of course , evidenc e of the fa c ts a ve rr e d. ” ); Bob o v . G re go ry , No. 03A01-9408-CV-00280, 1995 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 28, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 1995) (citations omitted) (“ Pleading s do not constitute evidence .”).

Moreove r, the leg islature has e nacte d the following provision reg arding the opi n i o ns of
me dic a l pr of

e ssi on a ls:

I n th e tr ia l of

a ny c ivi l su it, the re sh a ll b e re c e ived in evi de nc e if
o ff er ed o n b eh al f o f a n y

p ar t y t h er et o , o p i n i o n s as t o m ed i ca l fi n d i n gs as a r esult of treatment or examination of the p arty , whether such op ini on s are ba se d o n s ub

je c tiv e or ob je c tiv e fi nd ing s; provided such op ini on s are tho se of p e rso ns oth e rwi se qu ali fie d a s m e dic al e

x pe rts

. I t is de cl ar ed t o be the intent of this sec tion that medical opinions based on subjec tive fin d i n gs ar e no long er to be excluded from evidenc e whe ther the opinion is from the tre ating expert or an e x pert called in f or purpose s of examination and evaluation.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-7-115 ( 2003) (e mphasis added) ; see also Johnson v. Scheve nell Ready Mix, I nc. , 608 S.W .2d 582, 584 (Tenn. 1980) (“U nder the above sta tute, the opinion of a qualified medical e x pert witness ba se d on subjective finding s alone is suffic ient to establish medical ca usation and the p e r ma n e n c y o f d is ab il it y , if th e e v id e n c e is f o u n d to b e c r e d ib le b y th e tria l judg e.”) (empha sis added)) . “[W ]e cannot revie w a statute in a vac uum.” In re Estat e of Luck , No. W2004- 01 55 4- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 5 T e nn
. Ap p. LEX I S 33 2, a t *6 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . Jun e 7, 20 05 ) ( no pe rm
. app. filed) . We must avoid a construction of a statute which would place it in conflict with or rende r it r e p u g n a n t to a n o th e r p r o v is io n in th e T e n nessee Code. See Te nn. E lec. Power Co. v. City of Chat tanooga , 114 S.W .2d 441, 444 (Tenn. 1937)

. I n th e ins ta nt c a se , the Ni e c e s ne ve r c a lle d Dr

. Ol a e c he a a s a wi tne ss n or

didthe y a tte mpt to qu a lif y him a s a n e xpe rt re g ard ing his me dic a l op ini on s. I ns te a d, the y simply a tte mpt e d to a dmi t hi s report at trial as conc lusive evidenc e of Ms. Da venport’s disability without ha ving suc h evidenc e proper ly tested by the evidentiary

rules

. W e conc lude that the leg islature did not intend for the
re po rt s o f p hy sic ia ns a nd ps y cho lo gists , w hic h mu st b e fi le d w ith the c ou rt in c on se rv a tor sh ip proce eding s pursuant t o the s tatute at issue, to be admitt ed int o evidenc e in contravention or in lieu-17-

of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f Ev ide nc e a nd se c tio n 24 -7 -1 15 of the Te nn e sse e Cod e
. Ac c or din g ly , to the extent that the probate court relied on Dr. Olaec hea’ s report a s evidenc e to support its decision that Ms. D avenport suf

fer ed from a mental disability , we find err or. See State v. D.W.J. , No. E2004- 02586-COA-R3-PT, 2005 Te nn. App. LEXI S 372, at *6–7 (Tenn. Ct. App. J une 29, 2005) ( finding that the trial court committed error by relying on doc uments filed with the court clerk, w hich wer e never proper ly admitted into evidence ).

2.

Other Evidence of Disabi lity

I n spite of t he inadmis sibili ty of Dr. Olaec hea’ s report, we must now determine whether the Ni e c e s p re se nte d cle ar an d co nv inc ing e vid e nc e that Ms . D a ve np ort su ff e rs fr om a me nta l di sa

bil ity so that the appointm ent of a conservator is warr anted in this case . On appe al, Ms. Dave nport, relying
on the re qu ir e me nt tha t a ph y sic ia n’ s o r p sy c ho log ist ’s re po rt mus t be fi led in co ns e rv a tor sh ip proce eding s, see Te nn . Co de An n. § 34- 3- 10 5 ( 20 03 ), arg ue s th a t th e pe tit ion e r i n a c on se rv a tor sh ip p ro ce ed i n g mu st

prese nt expert medical t estimony to establish the exis tence of a disability . I n the
a lte rn a tiv e , M s. Dav enport arg ue s th a t th e la y te sti mon y

pr e se nte d b y

the Ni e c e s a t tria l f

a ile d to
e sta bli sh by c le ar a nd c on vin c ing e vid e nc e that sh e is d isa ble d. We c a nn ot a g re e wi th e ith e r o f M s. Da ve np ort’ s a sse rt ion s.
W hi le th e le g isl a tur e re qu ir e s a re sp on de nt i n c on se rv a tor sh ip p ro c e e din g s to su bmi t to “examination by

a phy sician or, wher e appropriate, a psy cholog ist,” see Tenn. Code Ann. § 34- 3-105 (2 00 3) , n ow he re in T itl e 34 of the Te nn e sse e Cod e do we fin d th e re qu ir e me nt that pe tit ion e rs in
conser vatorship cases m ust prove disabilit y by expert medical proof

, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 34- 1- 101 et seq . (2003). To the contra ry , we f ind the following holding of the Super i o r C o u rt of Pennsy lvania to be instructive on this issue:

Medica l testimonyis of g reat sig nificanc e since it assists t he trial court in dete rmining the nature , severity , and consequenc es of a n a lle g e d in c omp e te nt’ s d isa bil ity

. . . . Ho we ve r, the app e llate c ourt s have ne ver adopted a rule of evidenc e which would require the use of expert testimony in a ll incompe tency proce eding s without ex ception. The testimony

of lay witnesses w h o h ave observed the alleg ed incompetent is admissible and hig hly probative since “[o] ne’s menta l
c apa c ity is b e st d e te rm ine d b y

his sp ok e n w or ds , h is a c ts, a ndhis conduct.” Ur

qu ha rt E sta te , 431 Pa. 134, 142, 245 A.2d 141, 146 (1968). See also W

eir b y Ga s

p er v. Ciao , 364 Pa.Super. 490, 494-495, 528 A.2d 616, 619-620 ( 1987) (c ourt may base fi n d ing of competenc y

on evidenc e provide d by lay witness). Although the introduction of expert testimony from ps y c hiatr ist s, ps y c hiatr ic nu rs e s, a nd oth e r he a lth c are pr of e ssi on a ls is to be encour ag ed, we cannot say that lay testimony alone c an neve r b e s u f f i c i e n tt o m e e tt h e h e a v y b u r d e n o f e s t ab l i s h i n g i n c o m p e t e n c y.-18-

In re Estat e of Wood , 533 A.2d 772, 774 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). We find such re asoning persua sive and conc lude that petitioners in conse rvatorship proc eeding s in this state are not require d to prove disabilityby

prese nting e x pert medic al proof.

We n ow dir e c t ou r attention to the te sti mon y of the oth e r w itn e sse s a t tria l. A t tria l, M s. Dave nport had he r own e x pert, Dr . Schueler , testify conce rning her mental ability . Dr. Schue ler, a g e ri a tr ic ps y c hiatr ist

a ndme dic a l do c tor , e val u at e d M s
. Da ve np ort a t th e re qu e st o f h e r l e g a l c ou ns e l. He a dminist ere d a “Mini-Me ntal Status Examination” to Ms. Dave nport to evaluate her cog nitive functioning , and she sc ored a twenty -five ( 25) out of a possible thirty (30) points. He stated that her
score fell within the normal scoring r ang e for an individ u al ei gh t y -five ( 85) y ear s of ag e or olde r, which is a scor e of twenty -five (25). Dr. Schue ler opined tha t Ms. Davenport was not in need of a conser vator. At trial, Ms. Clark a lso ex presse d h er o p i n i on that Ms. Davenport is able to car e for herse lf and doe s not need a conser vator. Despite the te stimonyoffe red by these witnesse s to the contra ry , the testimonyof the other lay witnesses cle arly

and conv i n cing ly

demonstrates that Ms. Davenport suffer s from a me ntal condition w hich rende rs her disable d. See Tenn. Code Ann. 34-1-101(7) (2003) (def ining “ disabled person” as a n i n d i v i d u al suffe ring from a me ntal illness or mental incapa city ). Ms. Dave nport of fe re d th e fo llo wi ng te sti mon y a t tria l: Q. Do y ou have Interne t at y our house? A. Yes, it works pa

rt of the time. Q. Do y o u co mmunicate with a lot of pe ople throug h the I nte rn e t? A. Part of the time. Q. B ut i t’ s n ot a

re a l I nte rn e t; i t’ s li ke in y ou r c arp e t, rig ht? A. I t is in t he ca

rpet on the f

loor. Q. I t is in the c arp e t on the fl oo r w he re y ou c on ne c t it ? A. Yeah. Q. And y ou talk to the outside world throug h that device ? A. I have tried it once or

twice.

B oy d Rape r (“ Mr

. Rape r” ), a lic e ns e d a uc tio ne e r a nd re a l e state br ok e r, te sti fi e d th a t he ha d b us ine ss dealing s with Ms. Davenport in 1999 wh en s h e aske d him to auction severa l items for her. H e visited her just prior to the proc eeding s in this case , and he te stified that, during their conve rsation, Ms. Dave np o r t w o u ldta lk “ ab o u t th in g s th a t r e a ll y d id n ’ t m ak e a

lo t o f s e n s e in a

n ormal
conver sation.” Ms. Dave nport told Mr. R aper about her I nterne t in the rug in front of her kitche n sink, and she informe d him to be car eful what he said in front of theI nterne t. Wayne Shadden ( “M r. S h ad d en ”) , p ar to wn ero f S h ad d en T i re C o m p an y , testified conc erning another incident involving Ms. Da venport. I n 2001, Ms. Dave nport drove her car at a hig h rate of sp e e d a c ro ss h is p arking lot a nd int o an oth e r ve hic le pa rk e d in fr on t of the bu sin e ss. Ac c or din g to Mr . Sh a dd e n, ha d it

no t be e n f

or the pa rk e d c ar, Ms. Da ve np ort w ou ld h a ve drive n h e r v e hic le int o-19-

the showroom of his business. When he g ot Ms. Davenport out of her ve hicle af ter the acc ident, he testified that she a

ppear ed “disillusioned” and w as not familiar with her surrounding s. Bill Gar rison (“Mr

. Gar rison”), Ms. Dave nport’s neighbor, testified that he charg ed Ms. Davenport $50.00 a w eek to mow her y ard. A bout two months prior to the proceeding s in this case , Ms. Dave nport informed M r
. G arr i s o n t h a t s h e w o u l d p a y h i m $ 8 0 0

. 0 0 t o m o w h e r yar d , b u t h e r e f u s e d t o a c c e p tt h e m o n e y. He testified that, over the c ourse of the p as t t wo y ear s, he has notice d Ms. Davenport’s level of intelligenc e drop dr amatica ll y . Mr. Gar rison rec ounted that Ms. Dave nport informed him on one
occa sion that she had people living in her baseme nt, which was not true

. Ms. Davenport’s rela tives also testified conc erning her de teriorating menta l condition. J oy Chapman (“ Ms. Chapman”), Ms. D avenport’s g reat niece and Mrs. Adair’ s daug hter, testified tha t Ms. Da ve np ort w a s u na

ble to r e c og nize he r d uring a re c e nt vis it. She state d th a t, d uring the vis it, Ms. Da ve np ort ta lke d to the kit c he n r ug a ndins truc te d M s. Cha pman to mov e he r fo ot bec a us e it was on he r I nterne t. Ms. Chapman also rec ounted see ing Ms. Da venport talk t o the rug as if she
we re se lli ng c a ttl e ov e r the I nte rn e t. On on e oc c a sio n, Ms. Da ve np ort c a lle d M s. Ho lli ng sw orth t o c ome to h e r h ou se . Wh e n M s. Hol li ngsw orth a rrive d, Ms. Da ve np ort a sk e d h e r h ow sh e g ot p a st the sh e ri ff

a n d o t h e r

m e n s t a n d i n g a tt h e e n d o f t h e d r i v e w a y , w h i c h w e r e n o tp r e s e n t

. Ms. Dave nport told her niec e that a Methodist preac her w as coming to execute Osama Bin L aden in he r fr o n ty ar d l at er t h at m o rn i n g, an d s h e wa s co n ce rn ed t h at a l o to f p eo p l e w o u l d b e c o m i n g t h ro u gh her house. Ms. D avenport also told Ms. H ollingsworth that she and her brother w ere the g overnor s of Ten ne sse e . In M arc h o f 2 00 3, Mr s. Ad a ir a ndhe r d a ug hte r, Ms. Cha pman, vis ite d M s. Dave nport at her home. Mrs. Adair testified that Ms. Dave nport informed her that she a nd Saddam Hussein wer e friends and that he r other a unt had di ed

. Af

t er l eaving Ms. Da venport’s r esidenc e, Mrs. Adair w ent to the nursing hom e where her aunt stay ed and verifie d that her aunt was still alive. Don Adair , Mrs. Adair’ s husband, testified that Ms. Dave nport ref err ed to the rug in fr ont of her sink
a s her I nte rn e t, an d she on c e re po rt e d tha t sev e ra l peo ple a nd a ra dio statio n w e re in h e r b a se me nt.

Dr. Schue ler, Ms. Da venport’s ow n expert, testified t hat “[ the l ay witnesses] were telling the truth, and she’ s t o l d m e s i m i l ar thing s.” I n fac t, Dr. Schuele r off ere d the following testimonyat tr ia l: Q. There ’s bee n a lot of testimony about ce rtain delusions that Doris has. Did y ou see a ny evide n ce o f any de lus ion s? A. Yes, I

did. Q. Ok a y , li ke wh a t? A. On all three meeting s, she has told me that a g entleman named J ohn Ray lives in her basement. And she’s pretty firm about that; i t doesn’t chang e. She’s not conc erne d that J ohn Ra y l i v es in her ba sement; it doesn’t bother he r. B ut s he be lie ve s th a t he liv es th ere. She did n’ t in vit e me to meet him or anything like that. She a lso feels that J ohn Ray-20- is somehow in the g rave l business and is hauling g rave l
so me wh e re so uthof

Chi c a g o, be c a us e the y are g oin g to b uil d
a new Russia n em b assy , or ac tually the ca pital of Russia, I be lie ve , s ou th o f C hic a g o — sh e ’s tol d me that. She has talked a

bout the I nterne t . . . .

. . . . Q. So y ou’re not conce rned tha t these delusions have
ne g a tiv e ly

a ff e c te d D oris, a t le a st at th e pr e se nt t ime , it that a c or re c t st a te me nt? A. Well, Iwould rathe r she didn’t ha ve the de lusions. W e f i n d t h o u g h t h a ti n d e l u s i o n a l d i s o r d e r s i n t h e e l d e r l y, the y are in cred ibl y

dif fi c ult to t re a t, anda c tua lly , a lmo st impossibl e to t re at. Something a bout the older brain, when the y de ve lop del us ion s, the y ’r e no t a s r e sp on siv e to medications. S o t ry ing to tre at these de lusions in any ag g ressive ma n n er, y ou probably end up with more side eff ects than a ny

potential benef

it . . . .

. . . . Q. Have y ou been a ble to rea ch a dia g nosis or a
c on c lus ion abo ut M s. Da ve np ort? A. Ye s. Q. Wha t is that? A. She has a de lusional disorder that is an Axis 1 diag nos i s i n p sy chiatry . Axi s 1 diag noses ar e major me ntal ill ne sse s. Despite a cknowledg ing the exis tence and seve rity of M s
. Davenport’s delusional disorder , Dr. Schueler continued to opine that she wa s not disabled to such an e x tent that a conse rvator ne eded to be appointed.

I mplicit in t he probate cour t ’s order ruling that Ms. Davenport is disabled is a finding reg arding the cr edibility of the witnesses. Specifica lly , the trial court discounted the testimony of Dr. Schue ler to the e x tent that he believe d that Ms. Davenport was not disabled. We find no clea r and convincing evidenc e in the rec ord to subve rt the trial court’s cre dibil i t yd et er m i nations. See We lls v . Te nn. Bd. of

Re ge nts , 9 S.W .3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999) . Even thoug h it was improper f or the probate court to c onsider Dr . Olaec hea’ s report, the testimonyof the lay witnesses in conjunction wi th the te sti mon y

of Dr . Sc hueler

c le arl y a ndc on vin c ing ly

e sta bli sh e d th a t Ms . D a ve np ort is a “disabled pe rson.” Ac cording ly , we a ffirm the pr obate c ourt’s ruling on this iss ue.-21- B. Nee d for the Court ’s Assistan ce Not only did the Niece s need to prove t hat M s. Dave nport is disabled by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, they

wer e also taske d with the burden of proving , by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, that she “is in nee d of assist ance from the c ourt befor e a f iduciary can be appointed.” T enn. Code Ann. § 34-1-126 (2003). Ms. D avenport a rg ues that she is not in need of the probate court’s a ssistance beca use she sig ned powe rs of a ttorney g iving Ms. Clark t he power t o make decisions reg arding her person a nd property . Ms. Davenport’s arg ument in this re g ard is e choed by Ms. Clark who contends that the trial court err ed in ruling that the 1996 Power of A ttorney and the 2003 Power s of Attorney
wer e void and of

no eff ect. We will addre ss the validity of ea ch of the se docume nts in turn.

1. The 1996 Power of Att orney The probate court ruled that the 1996 Power of Attorney was not proper ly executed and, a s a re sult, was void because of the f ollowing: (1) the witnesses did not sign t h e d o cu ment under penalty of per jury , and (2) one of the witness purported to notarize her own signature. More over, the court found that the 1996 Power of Attorney only authorized the appointment of Noe l D. Clark, Sr., and not Ms. Clark, as conse rvator. Finally , the probate court c oncluded that the Public Gua rdian had the po we r to revoke those provisions in the 1996 Power of Attorne y which dea lt with the appointment of a conser vator. Ms. Da venport c orre ctly notes the abse nce of

any evidenc e tending t o s h o w s h e w a s m e n t a l l y i n c ap a c i t a t e d a tt h e t i m e s h e e x e c u t e d t h e 1 9 9 6 P o w e r o f A t t o r n e y. The parties do not dispute that the 1996 Power of Attorney purports to be a

power of attorne y for he alth car e. The legi s l at u re has provided that “[a] durable power of attorne y

for he alth car e executed af

ter July1, 1991, is e ffe ctive to a uthorize the attorney

in fac t to make hea lth care decisions for the princi p al only

if the powe r of attorney

complies with this part.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-6- 202(a) (2003). Sec tion 34-6-203 of the Te nnessee Code, which g overns the r equire ment s for a pr op e rl y e xec ute d p ow e r o f atto rn e y fo r h e a lth c are , p ro vid e s, in r e le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s: (a ) An a tto rn e y in fa c t un de r a du ra ble po we r o f atto rn e y

fo r h e a lth
car e may not make hea lth care decisions unl ess all of the f ollowing require ments are satisfied: (1 ) Th e du ra

ble po we r of a tto rn e y fo r he a lth c are sp e c if ic a lly
a uth or ize s th e a tto rn e y

in the fa c t to make he a lth c are de c isi on s;

. . . . (3) The durable power

of attorne y

for he alth car e is executed by the fo llo wi ng me tho d: the du ra ble po we r of att orney

fo r h e a lth
c are is signed an d a cknowledge d before a notary public by the principal a n d is signed by at least two (2) witnesses who wi tnessed-22- the sig ning o

f th e ins tru me nt b

y the pr inc ipa l, w ith e ac h wi tne ss making the following declaration in subst ance : “ I d e c la r e u nder penalty of per jury u n d er the laws of Te nnessee that the per son who sig ne d th is d oc ume nt i s p e rs on a lly kn ow n to me to b e the princ ipa l; that th e pr inc ipa l si g ne d th is d ur able po we r o f atto rn e y in m y prese nce; that the principal appea rs to be of sound mind and under no duress, fr aud or undue influence ; that I am not the person a ppointed
as a tt o r n e y in f

a c t b y th is d o c u me n t; th a t I a m n o t a h ealth care p ro v ider, a n employ ee of a hea lth care provider, the operator of a health ca re institution nor an employ ee of an oper ator of a

health ca re instit ution; that Iam not related t o the principal by blood, marriag e, or adoption; that, to the best of my knowledg e, I do not, at the prese nt time , h a v e a

c laim a g a in s t an y

p o r ti o n o f

th e e s tate o f

th e p r in c ip al upon the principa l's de ath; and that, to the best of my knowledg e, I

am not entitled to any

part of the estate of the principal upon the death of the principa l under a

wil l o r co dicil thereto now e x isting, or by operation of law.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-6-203( a) (2001) (emphasis added)

. Ms. Dave nport and Ms. C lark c ontend that, w hil e the 19 96 Pow e r o f A tto rn e y ma y be ina rt fu lly dr a ft e d, the do c ume nt s a tis fi e s th e statut e at issue. Ms. Davenport had two individuals serve a s witnesses to the execution of the 1996 Power of At torne y , o ne of

wh om w a s th e no tary . A ft e r r e vie wi ng the la ng ua g e us e d by the le g isl a tur e in
se c tio n 3 4- 6- 20 3( a ) of the Te nn e sse e Cod e , we c on c lud e that the 19 96 Pow e r of At torne y mus t f a il for r easons not re lied on by the trial court or raise d by the parties on appea l. The statute provide s that a dura

ble power of attorne y

for he alth car e must be “sig ned and acknow ledg ed befor e a nota ry public by the principa l and is signe d by at least two (2) witnesses who witnessed the signing of the ins trume nt b y

the pr inc ipa l.” Te nn . Co de Ann

. § 34- 6- 20 3( a ) ( 20 01 ). Th e statut e , b y its e xpre ss lang uag e, re q uires that the doc ument be witnessed by two individuals separate and a part fr om the notary public. Stated differ ently , it is i mplicit from the statutory lang uag e used by

the leg islature that the witnesses to the power of attorney are to se rve a function separ ate and distinct from that of the notary public. Thus, t h e n o tary public in the instant case c ould not serve a s one of the w itnesses require d by

the statute. Ac cording ly , the notary public’s attempt to serve in her c apac ity as notary public and as a wi t n ess causes the 1996 Power of Attorney

to fail for la ck of pr oper e x ecution, as the do c ume nt c on ta ins on ly the sig na tur e of

on e va lidwi tne ss. Ms. Davenport and M s. Clark ra ise additional issues reg arding the re asons put forth by the trial court f

or finding the 1996 Power of Attorney invalid. Having determined that the 1996 Power of At torn ey is in va lidfo r the a fo re me nti on e d r e a so n, it i s n ot n e c e ssa ry that w e a dd re ss the se additional issues. They

are , there fore , prete rmitted.

2.-23- The 2003 Powers of Attor ney
The probate court ruled that Ms. Da venport wa s disabled at the time she e x ecute d the 2003 Pow e rs of

At torne y , th e re fo re , th e y we re vo id andof no effe c t a s w e ll. Ms. Da ve np ort a ndMs. Clark both contend that Ms. Dave nport had the r equisite ca pacity to enter into the 2003 Power s of Attorney . We cannot ag ree
. Reg arding the ca

pacity require d to enter into a dur able powe r of attorney , t h i s Court has state d a s f oll ow s:
Th e m e n t a l c ap a c i t y r e q u i r e d t o e xe c u t e a

g e n e r a l d u r a ble power of attorne y , revoc able living trust an d war ranty deed a re e sse nti a lly th e sam e a nde qu a te to the me nta l c apa c ity re qu ir e d to enter into a contra ct. Se e Lov e tt , 1989 WL 79142, at *1 (stating that the mental capa ci t ynece ssary to execute a de ed and a power of
a tto rn e y “ mus t be the c on sc iou s, vo lun tary a c t of the g ranto r o r i t w ill be held void; likewise, the de ed will be dec lare d void if the g rantor was menta lly

unbalanc ed, had no intelligent compre hension of the ac t being perf

ormed a nd was inca

pable of transac ting at the time of the transfe r”) (empha sis added). The pa rty attempting t o i n validate a contra ct base d on the theory of mental in ca pacity

bear s the burden of

proof. Knight v. Lancaster , 988 S.W .2d 172, 177 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). To set a side a de ed o r a co n tra ct , t h e p ro o f m u s tb e c l ea r, co gen t , an d co n v i n ci n g. Gre go ry v . G re go ry , 1996 Tenn. App. L EXI S 75, 1996 W L

47929,
a t* 8 ( T e n n
. C t

. A p p
. F e b

. 7 , 1 9 9 6 ); see al so My e rs v . M y e rs , 891 S.W .2d 2 1 6 , 2 1 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). When discussing the capa city nece ssary

to contrac t, the Knight

court stated:

“To avoid a c ontrac t it is insufficient to show
mere ly that the person was of unsound mind or insane wh e n it wa s ma de , b ut i t mu st a lso be sh ow n th a t th is unsoundness or insanity

was of suc h a cha

rac t er that he had no r easona

ble perc eption or under standing of the na tur e or

te rm s o f the c on tr a c t.

. . . t he mental inca

pacity . . . must . . . at the time [of the making of the contra ct constitute] s u ch impairment of re asoning power s as to m ake the person incapa

ble of acting rationally

in the transac tion involved, or such mental uns oundness as occa sions an inabilityto comprehe nd the subject of the contra ct and its nature and pr obable c onsequenc es . . . and the re-24- must be an entire loss o f a pe rson' s understanding as respe cts such tra nsaction.”

988 S.W

. 2d at 178 (quoting 17 C.J .S. Con tra c ts § 133(1)( e)) (empha sis added); se e als o R ob e rts v . R ob e rts , 827 S.W .2d 788, 792 (T e nn. Ct

. App. 19 91 ) ( a do pti ng a ndqu oti ng a t le ng th the sa me sta nd ard ). F urthe r, the c ou rt mus t on ly

c on sid e r the me nta l c apa c ity at the moment of e x ecution of the document. Harper v. W atkins , 670 S.W .2d 611, 629 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

In re Arm ster , N o. M2 00 0- 00 77 6- CO A- R3- CV , 20 01 Te nn
. Ap p. LEX I S 79 7, a t *2 3– 26 (T e nn . Ct

. App. Oct. 25, 2001) (citations omitted).

Ms. Cla rk a sk e d Joan ne Sto ne , wh o ha s n o p e rs on a l r e la tio ns hip to M s. Da ve np ort, andB e tty En g la nd , M s. Da ve np ort’ s c are take r, to w itn e ss the e xec uti on of the 20 03 Pow e rs of At torne y . B oth testified at trial a nd stated that on Marc h 7, 2003, the day Ms. D avenport sig ned the documents, they
we re p rese nt and believe d that Ms. Davenport was able to understand a nd compre hend the documents. B oth stated, howeve r, that Ms. Dave nport did not read the documents and that her attorney explained the m eaning of t he documents to her. Ms. Clark t estified that she t oo was pre sent when Ms. Davenport signed the 2003 Powers of Attorney and that Ms. Dave nport fully understood the ef fec t of the docume nts. I n response to this testimony , Ms. Chapman and Mrs. Adair testified that they visited Ms. Dave nport on the m orning of March 7, 2003, j ust prior to the execution of the 2003 Powers of A ttorney

. They stated that Ms. Dave nport did not mention the documents during their visit. Ms. C hapman a nd Mrs. Adair r ecounte d that, on the day Ms. D avenport signe d the 2003 Powers of Attorney , Ms. Dave nport also stated t hat t heir aunt died, but this turned out to be untrue. Mrs. Adair a lso rec ounted t hat M s. Dave nport said she was rela ted t o Saddam Hussein and owne d a compa ny , both of which we re not true

. I mpl ic it i n the pr ob a te c ou rt ’s ru lin g on thi s is su e is a fi nd ing that th e c ou rt

fo un d M s. Chapman and Mr s. Adair to be cre dible witnesses. We find no clea r and c onvincing evidenc e in the
rec ord to subvert this finding by the proba te court. S e e W e l l s v . T e n n . B d

. o f R ege nts , 9 S

. W .3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999). Ba sed on the testimony of Mrs. Ada ir and Ms. Chapman, the N iece s proved by clea r and convincing evidenc e that Ms. D avenport did not posse ss the requisite capa city to enter into the 2003 Powers of Attorne y . Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the tria l court’s ruling on this iss ue.
C. Selection of a Conservator On May 15, 2004, the probate court enter ed an “ Orde r Appointing Conservator” wher ein the
c ou rt , r e ly ing on se c tio n 3 4- 3- 10 3 o f the Te nn e sse e Cod e , h e ld that Ms . D a ve np ort ha d n o s po us e a ndno c hil dr e n; d ue to the fric tio n be tw e e n Ms. Da ve np ort andthe Ni e c e s, it w ou ld b e ina pp ro pr ia te to appoint the Niece s as conse rvator; a nd Ms. Clark was not a n appropriate choic e for conser vator du e to “ fi na nc ia l impr op ri e tie s. ” Ac c or din g ly , the pr ob a te c ou rt de te rm ine d th a t it

wa s in the be st-25-

interest of Ms. Da venport to appoint the Public Guar dian as c onservator over he r per son and p r o p e r t y. When making a

determination as t o which indi vidual or entit y should be appointed to ser ve as a c onservator over a

disabled per son, the courts of this state are subj ect to the following statutory direc tive:

Sub je c t to the c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio n o f w hat is in the be st interests of the disa

bled per son, the court shall consider the following persons in the orde r listed for a ppointment of the conservator: (1) The person or persons de signated in a writing sig ned by the alleg ed disabled pe rson; (2) The spouse of the disable d person; (3) Any child of the disabled pe rson; (4) Closest relative(s) of the disabled per son; and (5) Othe r per son(s).

Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-3-103 ( 2003). A trial c ourt has broa d discretion whe n selec ting a conser vator. See In re Shipe , N o. E2 00 3-0 16 47 -C OA -R 3- CV , 2 00 4 T e nn . A pp . L EX I S 47 9, a t *8 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. July 27 , 2 00 4) ; Crumle

y v . P e rd ue , N o
. 0 1

- A

- 0 1

- 9 7 0 4

- C H

- 0 0 1 6 8 , 1 9 9 7 T e n n
. A p p
. LE X IS 774, at *7–8 (Te nn. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 1997). Thus, we r eview the pro b at e co u rt ’s choice of a
conser vator un d er the abuse of discretion standa

rd of r eview. Se e In re Est ate of Po we rs , No. 02A01-9310-CH- 00227, 1994 Tenn. App. L EXI S 723, at *10–11 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 13, 1994). We beg in w ith Ms. Dave nport’s and Ms. Clar k’s arg ument that, even if the 1996 Power of Attorney is ineffe ctive, the probate court should have selec ted Ms. Clark as c onservator based upon Ms. Davenport’s intent, as stated in t he document, that she serve as he r conse rvator. Sec tion 34-6- 10 4 o f the Te nn e sse e Cod e pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s: (b) A principal may

nominate, by

a dura ble power of attorne y , the
conser vator . . . for c on sid e ra tio n by the co urt if protec tive proce edings for the principal’s per son or estate are there afte r c omm e nc e d. Th e c ou rt shall m a ke its appointment in acc ordance with t h e pri ncipal’s most rece nt nomination in a durable power of attorney ex cept for good cause or disqualif ication

. Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 4- 6- 104(b ) (20 03 ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see also In re Arm ster , No. M2000- 00776-COA-R3-CV, 2001 Te nn. App. LEXI S 797, at *15– 1 7 (T enn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2001). Section 34-3-103 of

the Tenne ssee Code pr ovides that the court “shall consider

. . . [t ]he person or persons de signated in a writing sig ned by t h e allege d disabled per son.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-3- 10 3( 1) (2 00 3) . T he 19 96 Pow e r o f A tto rn e y pr ov ide s a s f

oll ow s:-26- I also express my desire that should a court deem it necessa ry to c omm e nc e le g a l pr oc e e din g s o ve r m y e state a ndits ma na g e me nt, it is m y wish that NOEL

D. CL ARK, SR., serve as m y conser vator or g uardia n.
Ms. Da ve np ort e xpre ssl y dir e c te d that No e l D. Cla rk , Sr

. wa s to se rv e a s h e r c on se rv a tor , n ot M s. Cla rk . T he re fo re , s inc e the ind ivi du a l Ms . D a ve np ort de sig nate d a s h e r c on se rv a tor is d e c e a se d, Ms. Da ve np ort’ s d e sig na tio n o f a c on ser vat or in th e 19 96 Pow e r o f A tto rn e y is o f n o e ff

e c t. Ac c or din g ly , w e fi ndthi s a rg ume nt t o b e wi tho ut m e ri t.

Ne xt, Ms . Cl ark

arg ue s th a t th e pr ob a te c ou rt e rr e d in fi nd ing that sh e wa s n ot an a pp ro pr ia te choice for conservator due to “f inancial improprie ties.” Ms. Clark conte nds that the rec ord conta ins no proof that she eng ag ed in financ ial improprieties with Ms. Davenport’s financ es. We disag ree
. Ms. Da ve np ort hi re d M s. En g la nd a s her c are take r, a nd Ms. En g la nd te sti fi e d tha t sh e wo rk e d in thi s c apa c ity seve n to e ig ht h ou rs e a c h d a y , s e ve n d a y s a we e k. Ms. En g la nda dmi tte d th a t Ms

. Da ve np ort pai d he r fo r he r s e rv ic e s, bu t sh e a lso state d th a t Ms . Cl ark pa id h e r an a dd iti on a l a mou nt. She stated that Ms. Dave nport was a war e that Ms. Clark wa s pay ing he r the a dditio n al m oney for her “ extra time.” Ms. Clark testified that she pay s Ms. Engla nd for fo rt y -five hour s (45) of w ork
e a c h w e e k, in a dd iti on to w ha t Ms . D a ve np ort pay s h e r. Ms. Cha pman te sti fi e d th a t sh e a sk e d M s. En g la nd if Ms. Cla

rk wa s p a y ing he r m on e y

that Ms . D a ve np ort di d n ot kno w a bo ut, to w hic h M s. Eng land re plied that she wa s. Ms. Chapman also testified that Ms. Clar k subsequently admitted that she g ave Ms. Eng land money which Ms. Dave n p o rt was una war e of. Resolving this conflicting testimonyis purely a question of cre dibilit y which rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. See We lls v . T e nn. B d. of

Re ge nts , 9 S.W. 3d 77 9, 78 3 (T e nn . 199 9)

. Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff ir m th e pr ob a te court’s f inding that Ms. Clark is an ina ppropriate choice for c onservator.

F in all y , Ms

. Cla

rk arg ue s th a t th e Pub lic Gu ard ia n s ho uldno t be pe rm itt e d to c on tin ue to serve as conse rvator f

or Ms. Dave nport bec ause othe rs ar e qualifie d to fill thi s role. Ms. Clark cites to s e c tio n 3 4- 7- 10 4 o f the Te nn e sse e Cod e , w hic h p ro vid e s:

(h ) Wh ile pe rf

or min g c on se rv a tor sh ip d utie s, the dis tr ic t pu bli c conser vator shall continue t o seek a family membe r, friend, other pe r s o n , b a n k o r c o r

p o r a ti o n q u a li

fi e d a n d wi ll in g to s e r v e as conserv ator . I f such a n individual, bank or cor poration is located, the district public conservator sh all su bm it a mo tio n to the c ou rt for appointment of the qua lified and willing succe ssor conservator. Tenn. Code Ann. § 34- 7-104(h) (2003) ( emphasis adde d). We find this issue to be wholly without merit. As previously discussed, the rec ord supports the trial court’s conclusion that Ms. Clark is not
a n a pp ro pr ia te c on se rv a tor

. Th e Ni e c e s d o n ot c on te st the pr ob a te c ou rt ’s app oin tme nt o f the Pub lic Guar dian as c onservator for Ms. Da venport. The ref ore, the probate court’s decision that the Niec es are no t a pp ro pr ia te c on se rv a tor s d ue to the ir de te ri or a tin g re la tio ns hip wi th M s. Da ve np ort mu st stand. Further, Ms. Da venport is not marrie d, and she ha s no children.-27-

The Public Guar dian is empower ed “[ t] o serve as conse rvator f or disabled pe rsons six ty

(60) y ear s of ag e or olde r who ha ve no fa milymembers or other pe rson, bank or

corpor ation willing and able to se rve as conser vator.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-7-104( a)( 1) (2003). Whil e Ms. Clar k may be “willing” to serve a s Ms. Davenpor t ’s co n s ervator, the trial court, in ex erc ising its discretion, has determined that she is not “able” to serve. A ccor dingly , the probate court did not abuse its discretion by selec ting the Public Gua

rdian a s Ms. Davenport’s conser vator.

D. Rem oval of the Guardian A d Litem Ms. Clark arg ues that the probate court e rre d in de ny ing her motion to remove Mr. Fie lds as g ua rd ia n a d li te m in thi s c a se
. She c on te nd s that Mr

. F ie lds wa s app oin te d in c on tr a ve nti on of state statute and the local rules of the probate court; the Niece s “hand- picked” Mr. Fie lds as g uardia n ad litem, therefor e, he w as not appointed by the proba te court; and he fa iled to perform his duti es or exceede d his authority

in this case.

Whe n a pe tit ion fo r the app oin tme nt o f a c on se rv a tor

is f ile d, “th e court

sh a ll a pp oin t a g uardian ad li tem to repre sent the re spondent.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 34-1- 107(a) (1) ( 2003). The appointment of a particula r i ndividual as guar dian ad litem is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Gann v. Burton , 5 1 1 S

. W

. 2 d 2 4 4 , 2 4 6 ( T e n n. 19 74 ); Ca m pbe ll v . Ca mpbe ll , No. W2004-01608-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 438, at *6–7 (Tenn. Ct. App. J uly 25, 2005). Our re solution of this issue would have no bearing on the outcome of this ca se. I n any event, our revie w of the r ecor d reve als that the trial court did not a buse its discretion in deny ing Ms. Clark’ s mot ion . A c c or din g ly , w e fi ndthi s is su e to b e wi tho ut m e ri t.
V. C ONCL US I ON
For the af oreme ntioned rea sons, we rever se t he probate court’s evidentiary ruling reg arding the medica l report f

iled in this case, howe ver, due to other evide nce in the record, this err or does not
re qu ir e a re ma nd ; a ff

ir m th e pr ob a te c ou rt ’s ru lin g that Ms . D a ve np ort is dis able d; a ff ir m th e pr ob a te court’s r uling that Ms. Da venport is in need of a conservator beca use t he 1996 P ower

of Attorney
a ndthe 20 03 Pow e rs of At torne y are inv a lid ; af fi rm the pr ob a te c ou rt ’s app oin tme nt o f the Pub lic Gu ar d i an as conse rvator; a nd aff irm the trial court’s denial of Ms. Clark’ s motion t o remove the g u ar d i a n a d lite m. Ac c or di n g l y , c o s t s o f t h i s ap p e a l ar e t o b e t a xe dt o t h e A p p e l l a n t s , T e d d i e J. C l a rk a n d D o r i s D a v e n p o r t , a n d t h e i r s u r e t i e s , f

o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE