An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with 

the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA14-1100

Filed: 21 April 2015

Sampson County, Nos. 13 CRS 50318, 14 CRS 147

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

JOHNNY WILLIAMS

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 30 May 2014 by Judge W. Douglas 

Parsons in Sampson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 March 

2015.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Michael Bulleri, 

for the State. 

Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Jillian C. 

Katz, for defendant-appellant. 

INMAN, Judge.

Johnny Williams (“defendant”) appeals from judgment after a jury found him 

guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine, keeping and maintaining a dwelling 

house for keeping and using a controlled substance, trafficking in methamphetamine 

by manufacture, and trafficking in methamphetamine by possession. On appeal, 

defendant argues that the trial court erred by: (1) denying defendant’s motion to 

suppress evidence obtained following an unlawful search of his home; (2) instructing 
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

- 2 -

the jury on the theory of aiding and abetting on the charge of manufacturing 

methamphetamine; and (3) denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of 

maintaining a dwelling for keeping and using a controlled substance. 

After careful review, we conclude that the trial court did not err.

Background

On 6 February 2013, Tessie Cashwell (“Tessie”) called 911 and requested 

assistance from the Sampson County Sheriff’s Office (“Sheriff’s Office”) to help her 

retrieve personal belongings from the home of defendant, Tessie’s ex-boyfriend at the 

time.1 Deputy Jerry Cashwell (“Cashwell”)2 and Agent Brandon Pope (“Pope”) met 

Tessie at defendant’s residence at 1881 Harnett Church Road in Roseboro. Defendant 

allowed both officers to enter his home and wait while Tessie collected her personal 

items. 

Shortly thereafter, Captain Josuph Frischmann (“Captain Frischmann”) and 

Lieutenant Rhonda Medlin (“Lieutenant Medlin”), also of the Sheriff’s Office, arrived 

at defendant’s residence. Captain Frischmann met Cashwell on the front porch and 

asked if defendant was inside. Cashwell said that he was, so Captain Frischmann 

walked into the home. Once inside, Captain Frischmann saw defendant and 

explained that he was there to investigate for the presence of drugs at the property. 

 

1 Tessie and defendant married on 14 March 2014. 

2 Tessie and Deputy Cashwell are not related. 
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

- 3 -

Defendant informed Captain Frischmann that there were no drugs in the house but 

that he was “welcome to look.” After pausing briefly, defendant pointed to a door 

down the hallway and said, “It’s in there. I want them out.” Captain Frischmann 

walked toward the door, announced his presence, and then opened the door to find a 

woman and man lying on top of a bed. After escorting the individuals into the living 

room, Captain Frischmann asked defendant to step outside to talk. He then 

presented defendant with a consent form to search the premises, which defendant 

read and signed. 

A search of the house revealed a number of controlled substances and related 

paraphernalia, to wit: (1) one mason jar containing 310 grams of liquid 

methamphetamine; (2) one plastic bag containing an unspecified amount of a powder 

methamphetamine and pseudoephedrine mixture; (3) glass, plastic, and aluminum 

foil smoking devices; (4) a marijuana cigarette; and (5) multiple plastic baggies and 

rolling papers. Additionally, the search yielded several items consistent with the 

manufacture of methamphetamine, including: (1) a Pyrex dish with 

methamphetamine residue; (2) a razor blade coated with an off-white colored 

substance; (3) blue shop paper towels containing white residue, which Captain 

Frischmann testified were typically used as filters in the methamphetamine 

manufacturing process; (4) a one-gallon can of acetone; (5) one can of Coleman fuel; 

(6) a 50-pound bag of ammonium nitrate fertilizer; (7) a two-pound bottle of sodium 
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

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hydroxide crystal drain opener; (8) camouflage netting; and (9) a lighting system. A 

few hundred yards away from the house, officers found four plastic trash bags 

containing a curled-up white tube, an empty container of drain cleaner, plastic bottles 

containing white sludge and green liquid, and multiple pieces of burnt aluminum foil. 

At trial, defendant moved to suppress all evidence gained from the search. He 

argued that Captain Frischmann did not have consent to enter the house because his 

purpose was to investigate narcotics, whereas Cashwell and Pope were there to help 

Tessie collect her personal items. Thus, defendant argued that because the 

subsequent search stemmed from Captain Frischmann’s unlawful entrance, all 

evidence gained from the search should have been excluded. The trial court denied 

defendant’s motion. In its written order, the trial court concluded that defendant’s 

consent to the search of his home was voluntary, intelligent, and knowing, and that 

the evidence obtained pursuant to the search had not been tainted. 

 At the close of the State’s evidence, the trial court granted defendant’s motion 

to dismiss the charge of conspiracy. Over defendant’s objection, the trial court 

instructed the jury that it could convict defendant of the crime of manufacturing 

methamphetamine if it found that he aided or abetted any other individual in that 

crime. The jury found defendant guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine, 

maintaining a dwelling for the purpose of keeping and using a controlled substance, 
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

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and trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacture and possession. Defendant 

gave notice of appeal in open court. 

Discussion

I. Motion to Suppress

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to 

suppress. He contends that Captain Frischmann’s initial entry into the home was 

illegal under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore, all evidence obtained from the 

subsequent search should have been excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. Although 

we agree that Captain Frischmann’s entry was unlawful, the evidence was not 

sufficiently tainted to warrant application of the exclusionary rule. 

As a threshold matter, the State contends that defendant has failed to preserve 

this issue on appeal because: (1) the motion to suppress was improperly brought 

under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-975 (2013); (2) the motion was not timely; and (3) defense 

counsel failed to support the objection to the admission of the challenged evidence on 

the grounds stated in his brief. We disagree. 

Defense counsel claimed that, in pretrial discovery, he was informed by the 

State that Captain Frischmann arrived at defendant’s house contemporaneously with 

officers Cashwell and Pope, with no indication that Captain Frischmann had a 

separate purpose for being at the scene. Defense counsel entered his motion to 

suppress immediately after Captain Frischmann testified on cross-examination that 
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

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he walked into the home with an investigative purpose after officers Cashwell and 

Pope were already at the scene. Under section 15A-975(a), a defendant may move to 

suppress evidence during trial if “the defendant did not have reasonable opportunity 

to make the motion before trial[.]” Here, defendant had no reasonable opportunity to 

enter the suppression motion before trial, because he could not have known that 

Captain Frischmann entered defendant’s home with a different purpose than officers 

Cashwell and Pope until that information was elicited during testimony. 

Furthermore, defense counsel moved to suppress any evidence found in the 

subsequent search on the ground that such evidence was tainted by Captain 

Frischmann’s allegedly unlawful entry. This is the same argument that defendant 

now presents on appeal. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s motion was 

timely brought and sufficiently stated the grounds upon which it was entered. See 

generally State v. Roper, 328 N.C. 337, 361, 402 S.E.2d 600, 614 (1991). The State’s 

argument that this issue has not been preserved for appellate review is overruled. 

In our review of trial court orders addressing motions to suppress, “the trial 

court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, 

even if the evidence is conflicting. This Court must not disturb the trial court’s 

conclusions if they are supported by the [trial] court’s factual findings. However, the 

trial court’s conclusions of law are fully reviewable on appeal.” State v. Harwood, 221 
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

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N.C. App. 451, 454-55, 727 S.E.2d 891, 895-96 (2012) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Here, the trial court entered a written order denying defendant’s motion to 

suppress, which contained the following factual findings:

1. The officers were at the location of the search, the 

defendant’s house, as a result of a legitimate call to the 911 

center for assistance;

2. The defendant was not placed into custody at any time 

prior to or during the search of the premises;

3. The defendant was presented with a voluntary consent 

to search form by the officers, which was explained to him, 

and executed by the defendant prior to any search of the 

premises;

4. There were no threats, inducements or promises made 

to the defendant by any law enforcement officer;

5. The defendant voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly 

waived his Fourth Amendment rights, and consented to a 

search of his premises. 

Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that: (1) the consent form signed 

by defendant was valid and was given voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly; and 

(2) none of the evidence obtained pursuant to the search was tainted. 

Defendant challenges the trial court’s determination that he was presented 

with the consent form prior to any search of the residence.3 Specifically, he contends 

 

3 The trial court included this determination in its findings of fact, presumably based on the evidence 

showing that a full investigative search of the premises did not occur until after defendant signed the 
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

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that when Captain Frischmann walked through his front door with the subjective 

intent to investigate drug activity, he was not granted the same consent previously 

given to officers Cashwell and Pope, whom defendant allowed to enter his home for 

the specific purpose of assisting Tessie gather her belongings. Therefore, defendant 

argues that because Captain Frischmann entered his home without first obtaining a 

warrant or receiving consent, in the absence of exigent circumstances, his entrance 

constituted an unlawful search under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. We 

agree. 

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 

seizures, shall not be violated[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[G]enerally speaking, an 

intrusion into a residence is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 

for physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 

Amendment is directed.” State v. Barnes, 158 N.C. App. 606, 610, 582 S.E.2d 313, 

317 (2003) (quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “[i]t is a basic principle of Fourth 

Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are

 

consent form. However, defendant argues that Captain Frischmann’s entry, in and of itself, was a 

“search” under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Because this question requires the application 

of legal principles, we will consider the trial court’s finding to also be an implicit conclusion of law that 

Captain Frischmann’s entry did not constitute a search, which we will review de novo. See State v. 

Sparks, 362 N.C. 181, 185, 657 S.E.2d 655, 658 (2008) (“In distinguishing between findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, as a general rule, . . . any determination requiring the exercise of judgment or the 

application of legal principles is more properly classified a conclusion of law.” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). 
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

- 9 -

presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Smith, 346 N.C. 794, 798, 488 S.E.2d 210, 213 

(1977) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 

590, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 653 (1980) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line 

at the entrance to the house.”). 

However, it is well established that an exception to this rule exists when the 

search of a home is based upon lawful consent. See State v. Stone, 179 N.C. App. 297, 

304, 634 S.E.2d 244, 249 (2006). Consent refers to “a statement to the officer, made 

voluntarily . . . giving the officer permission to make a search.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 

15A-221(b) (2013). “[C]onsent . . . must be freely and intelligently given, without 

coercion, duress or fraud, and the burden is upon the [S]tate to prove that it was so, 

the presumption being against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.” 

State v. Vestal, 278 N.C. 561, 578-79, 180 S.E.2d 755, 767 (1971). The suspect may 

limit the scope or duration of a consent search. “The scope of a valid consent search 

is measured against a standard of objective reasonableness where the court asks 

‘what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between 

the officer and the suspect?’ ” State v. Hagin, 203 N.C. App. 561, 564, 691 S.E.2d 429, 

432 (2010) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297, 302 

(1991)). 

Here, evidence presented at trial showed that officers Cashwell and Pope 

arrived at defendant’s residence in response to a 911 call from Tessie requesting 
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

- 10 -

police assistance while she collected her personal belongings. Cashwell arrived first 

at the scene, followed closely by Pope—both of whom testified that they reported to 

defendant’s home in response to the request for domestic assistance. When he first 

approached the front door, Cashwell explained to defendant that the officers were 

there to assist Tessie, and defendant allowed them to enter his home while Tessie 

gathered her personal items. 

Shortly thereafter, Captain Frischmann walked in through the front door, 

found defendant, and stated that his purpose for being inside defendant’s home was 

to search for the presence of narcotics. It is undisputed that Captain Frischmann did 

not knock at the door or ask permission to enter defendant’s home—he simply walked 

in. 

Under these circumstances, we believe that Captain Frischmann’s entry 

constituted an unlawful search. He crossed the threshold of defendant’s home, which 

our Courts have recognized as “the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 

Amendment is directed.” Barnes, 158 N.C. App. at 610, 582 S.E.2d at 317 (quotation 

marks omitted). And under the analysis set out in Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 114 L. 

Ed. 2d at 302, this search exceeded the scope of consent defendant gave to Cashwell 

and Pope. The nature of the initial consent was for Cashwell and Pope to stand by 

while Tessie collected her belongings. Defendant did not give the officers consent to 

search—he merely allowed them to wait inside his home until Tessie was ready to 
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

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leave. Therefore, when Captain Frischmann walked in through defendant’s front 

door searching for the presence of narcotics, he was inherently exceeding the scope of 

that consent. The nature of Captain Frischmann’s presence in the home was 

investigative, not supportive. Based on this distinction, we conclude that no 

reasonable person would have understood defendant’s approval of Cashwell and Pope 

waiting for Tessie inside his living room to include consent for a third officer to show 

up later, walk in unannounced, and search for drugs. Because “[t]he scope of the 

search can be no broader than the scope of the consent,” State v. Jones, 96 N.C. App. 

389, 397, 386 S.E.2d 217, 222 (1989), Captain Frischmann’s initial entry into 

defendant’s home was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. 

Given the illegality of Captain Frischmann’s entry, we must determine 

whether that Fourth Amendment violation tainted the subsequent consent search of 

the home. It is true that “[e]vidence that is discovered as a direct result of an illegal 

search or seizure is generally excluded at trial as fruit of the poisonous tree[.]” State 

v. Jackson, 199 N.C. App. 236, 244, 681 S.E.2d 492, 497 (2009) (emphasis added). 

However, 

[w]e need not hold that all evidence is ‘fruit of the poisonous 

tree’ simply because it would not have come to light but for 

the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt 

question in such a case is whether, granting establishment 

of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant 

objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that 

illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable 

to be purged of the primary taint. 
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

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Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 455 (1963). The 

United States Supreme Court has articulated three nonexclusive factors that courts 

should consider in determining whether the taint from an illegal search has 

dissipated: (1) the time elapsed between the Fourth Amendment violation and the 

procurement of consent or confession; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; 

and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Brown v. Illinois, 422 

U.S. 590, 603-04, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 427 (1975). “[T]he Brown test does not require 

that each of the factors set forth be resolved in favor of the Government,” U.S. v. 

Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 549 (4th Cir. 1998) (quotation marks omitted), but rather, 

this analysis requires a “careful sifting of the unique facts and circumstances of each 

case,” U.S. v. Wellins, 654 F.2d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Schneckloth v. 

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973)). 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in 

Seidman is persuasive here. See State v. Wheeler, 202 N.C. App. 61, 67, 688 S.E.2d 

51, 55 (2010) (noting that decisions from the Fourth Circuit are not binding on this 

Court, but may be utilized as persuasive reasoning). In Seidman, the defendant was 

accused of embezzling funds from a labor union for which he served as Comptroller. 

Seidman, 156 F.3d at 544. The police arranged for Ronald Schoop (“Schoop”), one of 

the defendant’s alleged co-conspirators, to speak with the defendant at his home 

while wearing an electronic recording device. Id. at 545. Schoop knocked on the 
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

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defendant’s door repeatedly, but no one answered, so he opened the unlocked door 

and walked in. Id. The defendant was standing in a hallway near the door and led 

Schoop to the kitchen where the two talked for the next forty-five minutes. Id. At 

trial, the prosecution sought to admit incriminating statements made by the 

defendant during this conversation, but the defendant moved to suppress those 

statements as resulting from Shoop’s unlawful entry into the home. Id. at 547. 

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit court assumed, but did not decide, that Schoop’s 

entrance was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 549. However, in 

conducting the analysis set out by the United States Supreme Court in Wong Sun 

and its progeny, the court held that the taint created by the unlawful entry was 

purged by independent acts of the defendant. Id. at 550. Although the time between 

the unlawful entry and subsequent conversation was short, the court determined that 

the second and third Brown factors weighed against suppression of the incriminating 

statements. The court reasoned:

Almost immediately after Schoop entered the home, any 

taint arising from Schoop's entry was attenuated by 

Seidman's consent to the conversation. Shortly after 

Schoop opened the door to Seidman's house, Seidman shut 

the front door behind Schoop, and Seidman motioned him 

into the kitchen. These intervening acts indicated 

Seidman's willingness to engage in a conversation with 

Schoop. More importantly, shutting the door behind 

Schoop and motioning him into the kitchen were 

independent acts of free will by Seidman. . . . Seidman 

never asked Schoop to leave.
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

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The third [Brown] factor also weighs against suppression. 

. . . The degree of coercion resulting from the police officers' 

illegal acts in Wong Sun and Brown v. Illinois simply was 

not present here. . . . Schoop never made any threats to 

Seidman or exerted any force towards him. Seidman now 

claims on appeal that he did not ask Schoop to leave 

because Schoop intimidated him. . . . With the exception of 

Seidman's own testimony, there is simply no evidence to 

suggest that Schoop intimidated Seidman.

Id. at 549-50 (citations omitted). 

In this case, like in Seidman, Captain Frischmann’s unlawful entry was “at 

worst a minor and technical invasion” of defendant’s rights, Seidman, 156 F.3d at 

549, and defendant’s own independent acts of free will sufficiently attenuated the 

taint from the unlawful entry to justify the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion 

to suppress. As soon as Captain Frischmann walked into the home, he spoke with 

defendant, apprised him of his purpose for being there, and asked to search the 

residence for the presence of drugs. Defendant responded by saying that there were 

no drugs in the house, but that the officers were “welcome to look.” Defendant then 

paused, pointed to a bedroom down the hallway, and told Captain Frischmann, “It’s 

in there. I want them out.” Defendant’s immediate oral consent to search and request 

for Captain Frischmann to remove the individuals from a bedroom in his residence 

indicated a willingness on defendant’s behalf to allow Captain Frischmann to carry 

out his duties as an investigative officer. It is undisputed that defendant never asked 

Captain Frischmann to leave the home or stop his search once it began. Defendant 
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

- 15 -

even helped Captain Frischmann find incriminating evidence by telling him that the 

acetone was kept in the freezer. As in Seidman, the violation of defendant’s Fourth 

Amendment rights in this case “pales in comparison” to cases where the taint of an 

unlawful search or seizure was not sufficiently attenuated. See, e.g., Wong Sun, 371 

U.S. at 486, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 454 (holding that where multiple officers broke open the 

door of the defendant’s home and almost immediately handcuffed and arrested him, 

the defendant’s incriminating statements were not the result of free will under the 

circumstances sufficient to purge the taint of the unlawful entrance); Brown, 422 

U.S. at 592, 604-05, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 421, 428 (holding that the defendant’s 

incriminating statements were not the result of free will where they were made after 

officers broke into his home to conduct an illegal search and arrested the defendant 

while pointing their weapons at him). Defendant here consented to the search of his 

home twice—once orally after Captain Frischmann’s initial entry and again in 

writing after being presented with and reading a consent form shortly after Captain 

Frischmann removed the individuals from the back bedroom (at defendant’s request). 

There is no evidence that defendant was arrested, intimidated, or coerced in any way 

prior to giving either form of consent. 

Accordingly, based on the factors enunciated by the United States Supreme 

Court in Wong Sun and Brown, we conclude that the search of defendant’s residence 

and the evidence gained therefrom did not result from the exploitation of Captain 
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

- 16 -

Frischmann’s unlawful entry into the home. Any taint arising from the initial entry 

was purged by defendant’s independent acts of free will and his voluntary, knowing, 

and intelligent consents to search—both oral and written. Therefore, we conclude 

that the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress was free from error. 

II. Aiding and Abetting Instruction

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on 

aiding and abetting as a theory of criminal liability for the charge of manufacturing 

methamphetamine. We disagree.

“Properly preserved challenges to the trial court’s decisions regarding jury 

instructions are reviewed de novo, by this Court. But jury instructions are not 

reviewed in isolation.” State v. King, __ N.C. App. __, __, 742 S.E.2d 315, 319 (2013) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 This Court reviews jury instructions contextually and in 

its entirety. The charge will be held to be sufficient if it 

presents the law of the case in such manner as to leave no 

reasonable cause to believe the jury was misled or 

misinformed. The party asserting error bears the burden of 

showing that the jury was misled or that the verdict was 

affected by [the] instruction. Under such a standard of 

review, it is not enough for the appealing party to show that 

error occurred in the jury instructions; rather, it must be 

demonstrated that such error was likely, in light of the 

entire charge, to mislead the jury.

State v. Blizzard, 169 N.C. App. 285, 296–97, 610 S.E.2d 245, 253 (2005) (citation, 

quotation marks, and ellipses omitted). “It is generally error, prejudicial to 
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

- 17 -

defendant, for the trial court to instruct the jury upon a theory of a defendant’s guilt 

which is not supported by the evidence.” State v. Brown, 80 N.C. App. 307, 311, 342 

S.E.2d 42, 44 (1986). 

Aiding and abetting is a theory of criminal liability, not a substantive offense. 

See State v. Fuller, 179 N.C. App. 61, 67, 632 S.E.2d 509, 513 (2006). A jury 

instruction on aiding and abetting is proper where there is evidence: “(1) that the 

crime was committed by another; (2) that the defendant knowingly advised, 

instigated, encouraged, procured, or aided the other person; and (3) that the 

defendant’s actions or statements caused or contributed to the commission of the 

crime by the other person.” State v. Baskin, 190 N.C. App. 102, 111, 660 S.E.2d 566, 

573 (2008) (quotation marks omitted). 

We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence of all three elements 

here to support the trial court’s instruction on aiding and abetting for the charge of 

manufacturing methamphetamine. Defendant told officers at the scene that an 

acquaintance of his named Norman Ray Faircloth (“Faircloth”) was running a 

methamphetamine lab at a house on Hollandtown Road. Captain Frischmann 

testified that defendant was “nervous” during the search of his residence, and every 

time Captain Frischmann got near a piece of evidence, defendant “would come 

running in and tell [him] that [Faircloth] was cooking methamphetamine.” When 

asked about the methamphetamine manufacturing activities at Hollandtown Road, 
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

- 18 -

defendant told Captain Frischmann that “[t]hey took over my house.” Defendant also 

told the officers that he allowed Faircloth’s wife, Monica Dawson (“Dawson”), and her 

twelve-year-old daughter to sleep in his house for the previous week because he 

feared that they were unsafe at Faircloth’s residence. 

Defendant testified that he had witnessed Faircloth cook methamphetamine 

in the past, and that he allowed Faircloth to come “in and out” of defendant’s 

residence in the week leading up to the search of his home. Defendant claimed that 

his relationship with Faircloth was one built on deception, and that his intention 

behind allowing Faircloth to spend time in his residence was to gather information 

before informing the police about Faircloth’s drug activity. However, Captain 

Frischmann testified that police had been investigating Faircloth for over a year 

before the search of defendant’s residence, and defendant provided “very limited 

information” as to Faircloth’s methamphetamine production. The only information 

defendant gave Captain Frischmann before the search was that Faircloth was 

cooking methamphetamine, which was “common knowledge” according to Captain 

Frischmann. Furthermore, defendant testified that Dawson, his houseguest, actively 

assisted Faircloth in the manufacture of methamphetamine by washing out cookware 

and plastic dishes and pouring liquid methamphetamine into a filter during the 

manufacturing process. A Pyrex dish with methamphetamine residue, 310 grams of 

liquid methamphetamine, and blue shop paper towels containing white residue, 
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

- 19 -

sometimes used as filters in this endeavor, were all found in defendant’s residence. 

Defendant also stated that he had been allowing Faircloth and Dawson to use his 

vehicle during the week leading up the search, and that defendant had helped 

Faircloth unload a blue container with a bag of fertilizer from the trunk of his car. 

When asked by Captain Frischmann what materials were inside the blue container, 

defendant replied “meth lab items.” 

In sum, the State presented substantial evidence that Faircloth and Dawson 

were engaged in the manufacture of methamphetamine, and that, at the very least, 

defendant allowed them to use his home and his vehicle to carry that crime to fruition. 

Therefore, each of the elements needed to support a jury instruction on aiding and 

abetting for the crime of manufacturing methamphetamine were satisfied. See 

Baskin, 190 N.C. App. at 111-12, 660 S.E.2d at 573. Defendant’s argument is 

overruled. 

III. Maintaining a Dwelling

Defendant’s final argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying 

his motion to dismiss the charge of maintaining a dwelling for the purpose of keeping 

and using a controlled substance. We disagree. 

In ruling on a motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of evidence, the trial 

court must determine whether there is substantial evidence of each element of the 

offense charged. See State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 160, 322 S.E.2d 370, 387 (1984). 
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

- 20 -

“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78–79, 265 S.E.2d 

164, 169 (1980). When reviewing the evidence, the trial court must consider even 

incompetent evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, granting the 

State the benefit of every reasonable inference. State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 

313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984). Any contradictions or discrepancies in the evidence 

should be resolved by the jury. Id.

Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-108(a)(7) (2013) it is unlawful for any person to 

“knowingly keep or maintain any . . . dwelling house, building, . . . or any place 

whatever, which is resorted to by persons using controlled substances . . . or for the 

purpose of using such substances, or which is used for the keeping or selling of the 

same[.]” Payment of rent is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the defendant 

“keep or maintain” the building or house in question. See State v. Bowens, 140 N.C. 

App. 217, 221-22, 535 S.E.2d 870, 873 (2000). “The determination of whether a 

vehicle, or a building, is used for keeping or selling controlled substances will depend 

on the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Mitchell, 336 N.C. 22, 34, 442 S.E.2d 

24, 30 (1994). This Court has previously held that 

[t]he evidence showing that defendant resided in the house, 

that she was cooking dinner, and that she possessed 

cocaine and materials related to the use and sale of cocaine, 

is sufficient to allow conviction under G.S. 90-108(a)(7) for 

maintaining a dwelling used for the keeping or selling of 

controlled substances.
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

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State v. Rich, 87 N.C. App. 380, 384, 361 S.E.2d 321, 324 (1987).

Here, it is undisputed that: (1) defendant paid rent to reside at the property in 

question; and (2) the following were found in defendant’s residence: 310 grams of 

liquid methamphetamine; one plastic bag containing an unspecified amount of 

methamphetamine; glass, plastic, and tinfoil smoking devices; a marijuana cigarette; 

and rolling papers. Considered in the light most favorable to the State, this evidence 

was sufficient to show that defendant possessed controlled substances and related 

materials in the home for which he was a rent-paying tenant. Therefore, the State 

presented substantial evidence satisfying all elements of section 90-108(a)(7), and the 

trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss this charge. See, e.g., 

State v. Cowan, 194 N.C. App. 330, 337, 669 S.E.2d 811, 817 (2008). 

Conclusion

Because defendant’s independent acts of free will purged his consent to search 

from the taint of Captain Frischmann’s unlawful entry into his home, the trial court 

did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress. Additionally, the trial court’s 

instruction on aiding and abetting and denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss the 

charge of maintaining a dwelling were free from error. 

NO ERROR.

Judges ELMORE and GEER concur.
STATE V. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

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Report per Rule 30(e).