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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JEROME F. MOORE

(AC 39808)

DiPentima, C. J., and Bright and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, who had been sentenced to five years incarceration following

his conviction of possession of narcotics, appealed to this court from

the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, in

which he raised claims that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum. On the date of the offense, possession of narcotics in violation

of statute ([Rev. to 2013] § 21a-279) carried a sentence of imprisonment

of up to seven years for a first offense. Prior to the defendant’s conviction

and sentencing, but subsequent to his arrest, the legislature amended

§ 21a-279 (a) in 2015 and reclassified a first offense of § 21a-279 (a) as

a misdemeanor punishable by not more than one year of incarceration.

On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly determined that the 2015 amendment did not apply retroactively. He also

claimed that his five year sentence constituted an excessive and disproportionate punishment in violation of the state and federal constitutions. Held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that his five year sentence

exceeded the statutory maximum because the legislature expressed its

intent that the 2015 amendment apply retroactively: the fact that the

statute, as amended, contained no express statement that it applied

retroactively did not render the statute ambiguous, as the absence of

any language stating that the amendment applied retroactively indicated

that the legislature intended for the amendment to apply prospectively

only, which was consistent with precedent holding that the law in existence on the date of the offense governs and with the legislature’s

enactment of savings statutes demonstrating an intent that defendants

be prosecuted and sentenced in accordance with the statutes in effect

at the time of the crime, and because the statutory language was not

susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation, there was no

ambiguity requiring this court to look to the legislative history of the

amendment to ascertain the legislature’s intent, and, therefore, the trial

court correctly determined that the 2015 amendment did not apply

retroactively; moreover, the defendant’s claim that this court should

adopt the amelioration doctrine and apply it to his sentence was unavailing, as our Supreme Court previously has determined that that doctrine

is in direct contravention of our savings statutes and has expressly

declined to establish that ameliorative changes to criminal statutes apply

retroactively, and this court was bound by that precedent.

2. The defendant’s claim that his five year sentence constituted an excessive

and disproportionate punishment in violation of the state and federal

constitutions was unavailing; because the defendant failed to provide

an independent analysis of his state constitutional claim pursuant to

the factors set out in State v. Geisler (222 Conn. 672), which controlled

the defendant’s state constitutional claim, that claim was inadequately

briefed and deemed abandoned, and with respect to his federal constitutional claim, the defendant failed to demonstrate that his five year

sentence for a violation of § 21a-279 (a) was disproportionate and excessive in violation of the eighth amendment to the United States constitution, and, therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

his motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Argued November 29, 2017—officially released March 6, 2018

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crimes of possession of narcotics and possession

of narcotics with intent to sell, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Litchfield and tried to

the jury before the court, Shah, J.; verdict and judgment
of guilty of possession of narcotics; thereafter, the trial

court denied the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal

sentence, and the defendant appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Emily H. Wagner, assistant public defender, with

whom was Michael K. Courtney, public defender, for

the appellant (defendant).

Jennifer F. Miller, deputy assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were David Shepack, state’s

attorney, and David R. Shannon, senior assistant state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

BISHOP, J. The defendant, Jerome F. Moore, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion

to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, the defendant

claims that the court incorrectly concluded that (1)

the 2015 amendment to General Statutes § 21a-279 (a),

which the legislature passed during a special session

in June, 2015; see Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 2015,

No. 15-2, § 1; does not apply retroactively to his sentence,1 and (2) his five year sentence does not violate

the eighth amendment to the United States constitution

or article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On August 6, 2014, the defendant

was arrested for possession of twenty-eight bags of

heroin and charged with possession of narcotics in violation of § 21a-279 (a), and possession of narcotics with

intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278

(b). On the date of the offense, a violation of § 21a-279

(a) carried a sentence of imprisonment of up to seven

years for a first offense.2 See General Statutes (Rev. to

2013) § 21a-279 (a). Prior to the defendant’s conviction

and sentencing, but subsequent to his arrest, the legislature amended § 21a-279 (a), with an effective date of

October 15, 2015, and reclassified a first offense of

§ 21a-279 (a) as a misdemeanor punishable by not more

than one year of incarceration. See General Statutes

(Supp. 2016) § 21a-279 (a).

Following a jury trial, on April 1, 2016, the defendant

was found not guilty of possession of narcotics with

intent to sell in violation of 21a-278 (b), but guilty of

possession of narcotics in violation of § 21a-279 (a).

On May 27, 2016, the court, Shah, J., sentenced the

defendant, pursuant to § 21a-279 (a), to a period of five

years of incarceration.

On June 8, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to

correct an illegal sentence. On August 23, 2016, defense

counsel filed an amended motion to correct an illegal

sentence and a supporting memorandum of law, claiming that the defendant’s five year sentence exceeded

the statutory maximum set forth in § 21a-279 (a), as

amended by Spec. Sess. P.A. 15-2 (2015 amendment).

On the same day, the court heard arguments on the

amended motion.

On September 16, 2016, the court denied the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence, finding,

inter alia, that (1) ‘‘there is no language in either the

public act or its legislative history indicating a clear

intent to apply the amendment retroactively’’ and (2)

the sentence did not violate the defendant’s right against

excessive and disproportionate punishment under the

federal and state constitutions. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court
improperly denied his motion to correct an illegal sentence because (1) the legislature expressed its intent

that the 2015 amendment applies retroactively; and (2)

following the amendment to § 21a-279 (a), his sentence

now constitutes excessive and disproportionate punishment in violation of the state and federal constitutions.

‘‘We review claims that the court improperly denied the

defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence under

an abuse of discretion standard.’’ State v. Pagan, 75

Conn. App. 423, 429, 816 A.2d 635, cert. denied, 265

Conn. 901, 829 A.2d 420 (2003). We address each claim

in turn.

I

The defendant first claims that his five year sentence

exceeds the statutory maximum set forth in § 21a-279

(a) because the legislature expressed its intent that the

2015 amendment applies retroactively. He claims, as

well, that by reason of the rule of amelioration, the

statute should be applied retroactively. We are not persuaded.3

Whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the

2015 amendment may be applied retroactively to crimes

committed before its effective date of October 1, 2015,

is a question of law over which our review is plenary.

See State v. Kalil, 314 Conn. 529, 552, 107 A.3d 343

(2014); see also State v. Jackson, 153 Conn. App. 639,

643, 103 A.3d 166 (2014) (‘‘Whether a statute is to be

applied retroactively is a question of statutory construction. . . . Issues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review.’’

[Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]),

cert. denied, 315 Conn. 912, 106 A.3d 305 (2015).

‘‘In criminal cases, to determine whether a change

in the law applies to a defendant, we generally have

applied the law in existence on the date of the offense,

regardless of its procedural or substantive nature.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kalil,

supra, 314 Conn. 552; accord In re Daniel H., 237 Conn.

364, 377, 678 A.2d 462 (1996). ‘‘This principle is derived

from the legislature’s enactment of savings statutes

such as General Statutes § 54-194, which provides that

‘[t]he repeal of any statute defining or prescribing the

punishment for any crime shall not affect any pending

prosecution or any existing liability to prosecution and

punishment therefor, unless expressly provided in the

repealing statute that such repeal shall have that effect,’

and General Statutes § 1-1 (t), which provides that ‘[t]he

repeal of an act shall not affect any punishment, penalty

or forfeiture incurred before the repeal takes effect, or

any suit, or prosecution, or proceeding pending at the

time of the repeal, for an offense committed, or for the

recovery of a penalty or forfeiture incurred under the

act repealed.’ ’’ State v. Kalil, supra, 552. ‘‘It is obvious

from the clear, unambiguous, plain language of the savings statutes that the legislature intended that [defen-
dants] be prosecuted and sentenced in accordance with

and pursuant to the statutes in effect at the time of the

commission of the crime. Our courts have repeatedly

held that these savings statutes preserve all prior

offenses and liability therefor so that when a crime is

committed and the statute violated is later amended or

repealed, defendants remain liable under the revision

of the statute existing at the time of the commission

of the crime.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Jackson, supra, 153 Conn. App. 644–45.

‘‘We will not give retrospective effect to a criminal

statute absent a clear legislative expression of such

intent. . . . When the meaning of a statute initially may

be determined from the text of the statute and its relationship to other statutes . . . extratextual evidence

of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.

. . . When the meaning of a provision cannot be

gleaned from examining the text of the statute and

other related statutes without yielding an absurd or

unworkable result, extratextual evidence may be consulted. . . . Thus . . . every case of statutory interpretation . . . requires a threshold determination as to

whether the provision under consideration is plain and

unambiguous. This threshold determination then governs whether extratextual sources can be used as an

interpretive tool. . . . [T]he fact that . . . relevant

statutory provisions are silent . . . does not mean that

they are ambiguous. . . . [O]ur case law is clear that

ambiguity exists only if the statutory language at issue is

susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 643–44.

The defendant argues that extratextual evidence

should be considered in the present case because a

‘‘plain language reading of [the statute] results in an

absurd and unworkable result.’’ Specifically, the defendant asserts that Spec. Sess. ‘‘P.A. 15-2, § 1, was a budget

implementing bill and the legislature has a constitutional duty to pass a balanced budget.’’ He further contends that ‘‘[i]t would be absurd to conclude that the

legislature would vote to approve this budget implementing bill knowing that the projected fiscal savings

in the bill would not be realized . . . .’’ We disagree.

We begin with the ‘‘threshold determination as to

whether the provision under consideration is plain and

unambiguous.’’ State v. Jackson, supra, 153 Conn. App.

643. The effective date of the 2015 amendment is October 1, 2015. See Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 2015,

No. 15-2, § 1 (section ‘‘21a-279 of the general statutes is

repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof

[Effective October 1, 2015] . . . .’’). The amendment

contains no express statement that it applies retroactively. Its silence in this regard, however, does not render it ambiguous. Rather, the absence of any language

stating that the amendment applies retroactively indi-
cates that the legislature intended the amendment to

apply prospectively only. See State v. Kalil, supra, 314

Conn. 558; General Statutes §§ 54-194 and 1-1 (t).

Additionally, the legislature knows how to make a

statute apply retroactively when it intends to do so. See

State v. Kevalis, 313 Conn. 590, 604, 99 A.3d 196 (2014)

(‘‘it is a well settled principle of statutory construction

that the legislature knows how to convey its intent

expressly’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Thus,

if the legislature had intended the 2015 amendment

to apply retroactively, it could have used clear and

unequivocal language indicating such an intent. It did

not do so. A prospective only application of the statute

is consistent with our precedent and the legislature’s

enactment of the savings statutes; see State v. Kalil,

supra, 314 Conn. 552; and, therefore, the statutory language is not susceptible to more than one plausible

interpretation. See State v. Jackson, supra, 153 Conn.

App. 644. Because there is no ambiguity in the 2015

amendment, we need not look to its legislative history

to ascertain the legislature’s intent.4 We conclude that

the court correctly determined that the 2015 amendment does not apply retroactively to the defendant’s

sentence.

We also reject the defendant’s argument that we

should adopt the amelioration doctrine and apply it to

his sentence. ‘‘The amelioration doctrine provides that

amendments to statutes that lessen their penalties are

applied retroactively.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kalil, supra, 314 Conn. 552. Our Supreme

Court expressly has declined to establish that ameliorative changes to criminal statutes apply retroactively,

finding that ‘‘the doctrine is in direct contravention of

Connecticut’s savings statutes.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id.,

553. We are bound by this precedent.

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that, in the

absence of legislative intent that the 2015 amendment

applies retroactively, the defendant properly was sentenced pursuant to the statute in effect on the date of

the offense for which he was convicted.

II

The defendant next claims that his five year sentence

constitutes an excessive and disproportionate punishment in violation of the eighth amendment to the United

States constitution and article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the

Connecticut constitution. Specifically, the defendant

asserts that his ‘‘sentence is no longer graduated to the

offense’’ because Spec. Sess. ‘‘P.A. 15-2, § 1, and its

surrounding legislative history express a change in

criminal justice policy in this state, namely, that incarcerating rather than treating drug-dependent individuals no longer comports with our evolving standards of

decency.’’ In response, the state claims that the court

properly denied the defendant’s motion to correct
because he failed to establish that his punishment was

unconstitutional. The state further argues that this court

should not review the defendant’s state constitutional

claim because he failed to adequately brief the claim

under the well established Geisler5 analysis. We agree

with the state.

‘‘Our review of the defendant’s constitutional claims

is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Rivera, 177 Conn. App. 242, 252, 172 A.3d 260 (2017);

see also State v. Taylor G., 315 Conn. 734, 741, 110 A.3d

338 (2015) (‘‘[a] challenge to [t]he constitutionality of

a statute presents a question of law over which our

review is plenary’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

A

We first address the state’s argument that the defendant’s constitutional claim under article first, §§ 8 and 9,

of the Connecticut constitution is inadequately briefed.

Specifically, the state argues that the defendant failed

to analyze his claim pursuant to the Geisler factors,

and instead analyzed his claim under a two factor analysis set forth in State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 122 A.3d

1 (2015). The defendant maintains that, following Santiago, ‘‘[a] reviewing court engages in a two stage analysis

in determining whether a challenged punishment is

unconstitutionally excessive and disproportionate.

. . . First, the court looks to ‘objective factors’ to determine whether the punishment at issue comports with

contemporary standards of decency. . . . [Second,

the] court must [then] decide whether the constitution

permits imposition of the defendant’s . . . sentence.’’

We agree with the state that Geisler controls, and

accordingly, we conclude that the defendant’s state constitutional claim is inadequately briefed.

‘‘It is well established that federal constitutional law

establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for

such rights. . . . In several cases, our Supreme Court

has concluded that the state constitution provides

broader protection of individual rights than does the

federal constitution. . . . It is by now well established

that the constitution of Connecticut prohibits cruel and

unusual punishments under the auspices of the dual

due process provisions contained in article first, §§ 8

and 9. Those due process protections take as their hallmark principles of fundamental fairness rooted in our

state’s unique common law, statutory, and constitutional traditions. . . . Although neither provision of

the state constitution expressly references cruel or

unusual punishments, it is settled constitutional doctrine that both of our due process clauses prohibit governmental infliction of cruel and unusual punishments.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Rivera, supra, 177 Conn. App. 252–53. ‘‘In ascertaining the contours of the protections afforded under
our state constitution, we utilize a multifactor approach

that we first adopted in [Geisler].’’ State v. Santiago,

319 Conn. 935, 937 n.3, 125 A.3d 520 (2015). See footnote

5 of this opinion.

We reject the defendant’s argument that our Supreme

Court, in State v. Santiago, supra, 318 Conn. 1, abandoned the Geisler analysis for claims of cruel and

unusual punishment and instead broadly adopted a two

part test. Our review of Santiago does not support the

defendant’s interpretation. Contrary to the defendant’s

assertions, in Santiago, the Supreme Court did analyze

the defendant’s state constitutional claim pursuant to

the Geisler factors.6 See State v. Santiago, supra, 17–46.

We therefore conclude that Geisler still controls. We

note, as well, that this court recently has applied the

Geisler factors to a claim of cruel and unusual punishment, and we are bound by this court’s precedent. See

State v. Rivera, supra, 177 Conn. App. 251–75 (analyzing, pursuant to Geisler factors, defendant’s claim that

‘‘mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years of

incarceration without the possibility of parole imposed

on a juvenile homicide offender’’ constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment).

Absent from the defendant’s discussion of his state

constitutional claim is an independent analysis of the

Geisler factors. Accordingly, we deem abandoned his

claim under the state constitution, and we decline to

review it. See State v. Bennett, 324 Conn. 744, 748 n.1,

155 A.3d 188 (2017) (‘‘The defendant has asserted various claims under both the state and federal constitutions, but he has not provided an independent analysis

of the former in accordance with . . . Geisler . . . .

Therefore, we deem abandoned any state constitutional

claims.’’ [Citation omitted.]); see also MorrisseyManter v. Saint Francis Hospital & Medical Center,

166 Conn. App. 510, 526–27, 142 A.3d 363 (claim inadequately briefed on appeal deemed abandoned and court

declined to review it), cert. denied, 323 Conn. 924, 149

A.3d 982 (2016).

B

We next address the defendant’s argument that his

sentence is excessive and disproportionate in violation

of the eighth amendment to the United States constitution. The defendant argues that his sentence violates

the eighth amendment because it ‘‘is out of step with

our contemporary standards of decency and serves no

penological purpose,’’ given the change in criminal justice policy following the enactment of the 2015 amendment. We are unpersuaded.7

‘‘[T]he eighth amendment [to the United States constitution] mandates that punishment be proportioned and

graduated to the offense of conviction.’’ State v. Santiago, supra, 318 Conn. 20. ‘‘The eighth amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is
made applicable to the states through the due process

clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United

States constitution. . . . [T]he United States Supreme

Court has indicated that at least three types of punishment may be deemed unconstitutionally cruel . . .

[including] excessive and disproportionate punishments.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Dumas v. Commissioner of Correction, 168

Conn. App. 130, 135–36, 145 A.3d 355, cert. denied, 324

Conn. 901, 151 A.3d 1288 (2016).

In addressing an eighth amendment claim, ‘‘[a]

reviewing court engages in a two stage analysis [to

determine] whether a challenged punishment is unconstitutionally excessive and disproportionate. . . .

First, the court looks to objective factors to determine

whether the punishment at issue comports with contemporary standards of decency. . . . [This includes]

the historical development of the punishment at issue,

legislative enactments, and the decisions of prosecutors

and sentencing juries.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santiago, supra, 318

Conn. 21. Second, ‘‘courts must . . . bring their own

independent judgments to bear, giving careful consideration to the reasons why a civilized society may accept

or reject a given penalty. . . . Although the judgments

of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in

the balance, it is for [the court] ultimately to judge

whether the [constitution] permits imposition of the

. . . penalty . . . . This analysis necessarily encompasses the question of whether the penalty at issue

promotes any of the penal goals that courts and commentators have recognized as legitimate: deterrence,

retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. . . . A

sentence materially lacking any legitimate penological

justification would be nothing more than the gratuitous

infliction of suffering and, by its very nature, disproportionate.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 22–23.

The defendant first asserts that his five year sentence

no longer comports to contemporary standards of

decency. See id., 21. In support of this claim, the defendant relies primarily on the legislative history surrounding the 2015 amendment and remarks made by

the governor about how the 2015 amendment indicates

a ‘‘systematic change’’ in the treatment of those convicted of minor possession offenses.

The defendant’s focus on the remarks of our legislators does little to support his claim. It bears repeating

that the legislature knows how to make the application

of a statute retroactive when it wants to do so. See

State v. Kevalis, supra, 313 Conn. 604. It necessarily

follows that if the legislature had felt that ‘‘extended

periods of incarceration are no longer necessary or

appropriate forms of punishment for nonviolent drugs

offenders,’’ or that a sentence of greater than one year
for a first violation of § 21a-279 (a) constituted ‘‘cruel

and unusual punishment,’’ as the defendant argues, the

legislature would have so indicated by making the statute apply retroactively. It did not do so. See part I

of this opinion. Further undercutting the defendant’s

reliance on our legislators’ comments is the fact that

our legislature enacted the savings statutes, §§ 54-194

and 1-1 (t), to ensure ‘‘that [defendants] be prosecuted

and sentenced in accordance with and pursuant to the

statutes in effect at the time of the commission of the

crime. . . . [T]hese savings statutes preserve all prior

offenses and liability therefor so that when a crime is

committed and the statute violated is later amended or

repealed, defendants remain liable under the revision

of the statute existing at the time of the commission

of the crime.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Jackson, supra, 153 Conn. App. 644–45.

Furthermore, as the court noted in its memorandum

of decision, ‘‘contrary to the defendant’s assertions,

neither [Spec. Sess.] P.A. 15-2 nor its legislative history

indicate that a five year prison sentence for possession

of narcotics imposed based on a persistent history of

drug offenses and a failure to complete probation is

‘disproportionate and excessive . . . [as] judged by the

contemporary, evolving standards of decency that mark

the progress of a maturing society.’ ’’ We agree. As the

defendant concedes, many jurisdictions still treat simple possession as a felony. Further, the 2015 revision

to § 21a-279 (a) still permits a defendant to be charged

with a felony in certain circumstances. See General

Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 21a-279 (a) (3). Thus, the defendant has failed to demonstrate that his sentence no

longer comports to contemporary standards of decency

using objective indicia such as ‘‘the historical development of the punishment at issue, legislative enactments,

and the decisions of prosecutors and sentencing juries.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Santiago,

supra, 318 Conn. 21.

The defendant also has failed to demonstrate that

his five year sentence serves no legitimate penological

justification. Although the defendant argues that his

sentence offers no deterrent value to others who will

now receive a maximum sentence of up to one year

incarceration for the same offense, he fails to adequately rebut other recognized penological purposes—

retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.8 See

State v. Santiago, supra, 318 Conn. 22.

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the

court properly found that the defendant failed to demonstrate that his five year sentence for a violation of

§ 21a-279 (a) is disproportionate and excessive in violation of the eighth amendment to the United States constitution. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to correct

an illegal sentence.
The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 On August 6, 2014, the date the defendant committed the offense for

which he was convicted, General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 21a-279 (a) provided: ‘‘Any person who possesses or has under his control any quantity of

any narcotic substance, except as authorized in this chapter, for a first

offense, may be imprisoned not more than seven years or be fined not more

than fifty thousand dollars, or be both fined and imprisoned; and for a

second offense, may be imprisoned not more than fifteen years or be fined

not more than one hundred thousand dollars, or be both fined and imprisoned; and for any subsequent offense, may be imprisoned not more than

twenty-five years or be fined not more than two hundred fifty thousand

dollars, or be both fined and imprisoned.’’

At the time of the defendant’s conviction and sentencing, General Statutes

(Supp. 2016) § 21a-279 (a) provided: ‘‘(1) Any person who possesses or has

under such person’s control any quantity of any controlled substance, except

less than one-half ounce of a cannabis-type substance and except as authorized in this chapter, shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

‘‘(2) For a second offense of subdivision (1) of this subsection, the court

shall evaluate such person and, if the court determines such person is a

drug-dependent person, the court may suspend prosecution of such person

and order such person to undergo a substance abuse treatment program.

‘‘(3) For any subsequent offense of subdivision (1) of this subsection, the

court may find such person to be a persistent offender for possession of a

controlled substance in accordance with [General Statutes §] 53a-40.’’

Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 21a-279 (a) in

this opinion are to the 2013 revision of the statute.

2 The defendant has prior drug convictions, and thus, the state initially

charged the defendant as a persistent felony offender in a part B information.

Prior to sentencing, however, the state’s attorney withdrew that part B

information. Therefore, the defendant was sentenced as a first offender

pursuant to § 21a-279 (a).

3 We also disagree with the defendant’s contention that the principles set

forth in State v. Kalil, 314 Conn. 529, 107 A.3d 343 (2014), are inapplicable

to the present case. In Kalil, our Supreme Court addressed a situation

analogous to that of the present case. See id., 550–59 (concluding that

amendment to larceny statute did not apply retroactively, where defendant

committed crime prior to amendment but was convicted and sentenced

thereafter).

4 Even if we were to determine that the statute is ambiguous, so as to

implicate a review of its legislative history, we are not persuaded that

comments from legislators and the fiscal impact statement support the

defendant’s claim that a plain language reading of the statute leads to ‘‘absurd

and unworkable results.’’

As the court aptly noted in its memorandum of decision, ‘‘the legislature

was clearly aware of the many defendants waiting to be tried and sentenced

under the then-existing version of § 21a-279 (a) when they discussed and

passed [Spec. Sess.] P.A. 15-2. . . . [I]f the legislature had intended [Spec.

Sess.] P.A. 15-2 to apply retroactively, it would have used language clearly

indicating the act’s retroactive effect, which it did not, either in the public

act itself or the act’s legislative history.’’

Additionally, our Supreme Court has recognized that fiscal impact statements are not evidence of legislative intent. See Butts v. Bysiewicz, 298

Conn. 665, 688 n.22, 5 A.3d 932 (2010). The fiscal impact statement for the

2015 amendment itself even contains a disclaimer, which provides, in relevant part: ‘‘The preceding Fiscal Impact statement is prepared for the benefit

of the members of the General Assembly, solely for the purposes of information, summarization and explanation and does not represent the intent of the

General Assembly or either chamber thereof for any purpose.’’ (Emphasis

added.) Thus, the fiscal impact statement cannot be utilized as a fulcrum

to lever the statute’s plain meaning into ambiguity.

5

‘‘In order to construe the contours of our state constitution and reach

reasoned and principled results, the following tools of analysis should be

considered to the extent applicable: (1) the textual approach . . . (2) holdings and dicta of [the Supreme Court], and the Appellate Court . . . (3)

federal precedent . . . (4) sister state decisions or sibling approach . . .

(5) the historical approach . . . and (6) economic/sociological considerations.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684–85, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992); see also
State v. Saturno, 322 Conn. 80, 102, 139 A.3d 629 (2016).

6 As further support for our conclusion, subsequent to the release of the

decision in State v. Santiago, supra, 318 Conn. 1, the state filed a motion

to stay execution of the judgment in that case, arguing, inter alia, that it

‘‘lacked notice that [the Supreme Court] would consider [the various Geisler]

factors in evaluating the defendant’s claim.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v.

Santiago, supra, 319 Conn. 939. In denying the state’s motion, the court

noted that ‘‘the state’s analysis of the various Geisler factors [in its supplemental brief] refutes its contention that it lacked notice.’’ Id. The court

further noted that ‘‘as long as the state constitutional claim is adequately

briefed in accordance with Geisler, as it unarguably was in this case, it is

this court’s responsibility to identify and evaluate all of the relevant factors

and considerations so that we may reach the correct constitutional result.’’

(Emphasis omitted.) Id., 940.

7 We also reject the defendant’s argument that his five year sentence is

unconstitutional because it was not authorized by law. As we conclude in

part I of this opinion, the court correctly sentenced the defendant pursuant

to the statute that was in effect on the date he committed the crime, which

permitted a sentence of up to seven years of incarceration for a first offense.

See General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 21a-279 (a). Accordingly, the defendant’s five year sentence was authorized by law. See State v. Kalil, supra,

314 Conn. 552.

8

In its memorandum of decision, the court noted that its decision to

impose a five year sentence included, in relevant part, ‘‘the need to achieve

a specific [and] general deterrent effect, the need for incapacitation, the

need to effect rehabilitation, and the need to achieve justice.’’