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FRITZGERALD DIEUDONNE v. COMMISSIONER

OF CORRECTION

(SC 19140)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald,

Espinosa and Robinson, Js.

Argued January 8—officially released April 21, 2015

Michael Proto, assistant state’s attorney, with whom

were Tamara Grosso, assistant state’s attorney, and,

on the brief, David I. Cohen, state’s attorney, for the

appellant (respondent).

Damon A. R. Kirschbaum, for the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The petitioner, Fritzgerald Dieudonne,

was convicted of assaulting a police officer who had

attempted to restrain and arrest him. He filed a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present the testimony of

Jessie Boiteux, a purported eyewitness to the incident.

Boiteux testified at the habeas proceeding and corroborated the petitioner’s version of events, testifying that

the petitioner did not assault the officer or resist arrest.

The habeas court granted the petition, concluding that

both prongs of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d

674 (1984), were satisfied. The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, appealed from the habeas court’s

judgment, claiming that the habeas court, in determining that the prejudice prong of the Strickland test had

been satisfied, failed to apply the correct legal standard

and failed to properly weigh the totality of the evidence

presented at the petitioner’s habeas and criminal trials.

To prove prejudice under Strickland, the petitioner was

required to demonstrate that there was a reasonable

probability that the jury would have credited Boiteux’

testimony if it had been presented at the criminal trial

and that, in light of his testimony, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of that trial would

have been different. See id., 694–96. The AppellateCourt

affirmed the judgment of the habeas court upon concluding that the habeas court applied the correct legal

standard and properly considered the evidence in analyzing the Strickland prejudice prong. Dieudonne v.

Commissioner of Correction, 141 Conn. App. 151, 163,

60 A.3d 385 (2013). The respondent then filed a petition

for certification to appeal, which we granted, limited

to the following question: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court

properly apply the standards set forth in [Strickland]

with regard to burden of proof and weighing of the

evidence?’’ Dieudonne v. Commissioner of Correction,

308 Conn. 940, 66 A.3d 882 (2013).

After examining the entire record on appeal and considering the briefs and oral arguments of the parties,

we have determined that the appeal in this case should

be dismissed on the ground that certification was

improvidently granted.

The appeal is dismissed.