United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 22-1763

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

FRANCIS CAHILL, a/k/a Bruce Cossett,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. Lance E. Walker, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Barron, Lynch, Howard,

Circuit Judges.

Theodore M. Cooperstein, with whom Susan J. Clouthier and

Clouthier Cooperstein PLLC were on brief, for appellant.

Brian S. Kleinbord, Assistant United States Attorney, with 

whom Darcie N. McElwee, United States Attorney, was on brief, for 

appellee.

October 26, 2023
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Defendant Francis Cahill pleaded 

guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced 

him to a 72-month term of imprisonment, varying upward from the 

applicable guideline sentencing range (GSR). On appeal, Cahill 

challenges the court's acceptance of his guilty plea and its 

sentence. We conclude that there was no error and affirm the 

sentence and conviction. 

I. Background

Where, as here, the defendant challenges the district 

court's sentencing and its acceptance of his guilty plea, "we glean 

the relevant facts from the change-of-plea colloquy, the 

unchallenged portions of the presentence investigation report 

(PSR), and the record of the disposition hearing." United States

v. Vargas, 560 F.3d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 2009). Neither party in this 

case objected to the revised presentence report, upon which we 

rely. 

Francis Cahill was born in Vermont in 1949. In 1978,

at 28 years old and after a decade spent accruing multiple

convictions for assault, burglary, robbery, and other crimes, 

Cahill was convicted in Texas of murdering his father-in-law.1 

1 Cahill maintains that the gun at issue was defective and 

had discharged accidentally while he was out hunting with the 

victim. His account is directly contradicted by what the victim's 
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Ten years later, he was paroled to the State of Vermont, from which 

he absconded in May of 1991.

In July 1992, Cahill was convicted of possessing 

firearms as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), in the 

United States District Court for the District of Vermont. Because 

this appeal involves Cahill's second conviction under that 

statute, we briefly recount the details of that first case.

Cahill was accused of possessing no fewer than four

firearms between March of 1990 and May of 1992. Two of them were 

given to him by his brother. One was given to him by a 

correctional officer during a hunting trip. He kept that rifle

for five months, then gave it to a felon who had been convicted in 

Vermont of armed robbery and unlawful possession of a firearm. 

The fourth gun was a rifle he had borrowed from a friend. It was 

discovered in May of 1991 when Cahill placed a recorded call to 

another friend asking him to remove that gun from the location 

where Cahill had hidden it.2 

wife told the police at the time: namely, that Cahill, after 

shooting her husband, had held her and her daughter at gunpoint 

for approximately thirty minutes to prevent them from providing 

assistance. 

2 At the time, Cahill was detained at the Correctional 

Center in Vermont after being arrested and later charged with one 

count of burglary and two counts of assault. He had allegedly 

punched his ex-girlfriend in the head multiple times, stopping 

only when she promised not to leave him. She then reportedly went 

to the hospital but could not receive treatment because the 

defendant removed her from the premises. The same woman reported 
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Cahill was sentenced to 262 months of imprisonment and

five years of supervised release. He finished the custodial 

portion of his sentence in late 2010, at which point he was 

transferred to the custody of the Texas Department of Corrections 

to address a parole violation in connection with the 1978 murder 

conviction. In March of 2018, he was paroled to a halfway house 

in Texas, but absconded less than five months later. He then

returned to his native Vermont before settling in Corinth, Maine. 

In 2020, Cahill was once again accused of a serious criminal 

offense. As the presentence report notes, a Maine resident went 

to the police on May 15, 2020, with his ear bleeding and both 

forearms "bruised and bloody," claiming that Cahill had gone onto 

his property and hit him in the head with a crowbar. Contacted 

by the police, Cahill admitted that he had done so, but alleged 

that they had argued and that the victim had tried, unsuccessfully, 

to hit him first. Cahill was arrested based on the other party's 

account and his admission, but no charges were issued. 

an earlier incident in which the defendant had allegedly pushed 

her to the ground and dragged her. The burglary charge, also 

supported by the ex-girlfriend's statements to the police, 

involved the defendant's alleged breaking into a camp and stealing 

items.

The charges went forward but the court declared a mistrial 

after it discovered that jury members had improperly discussed the 

case among themselves. The State Attorney's Office then dismissed 

the case, noting that the defendant was already being prosecuted 

by the federal government under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 
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In 2021, with assistance from the FBI, the Denton, Texas 

Police Department discovered that Cahill might be in Maine. The 

Texas authorities then requested help from the Maine State Police, 

which determined Cahill's location through his driver's license

and the registration of the car he was known to drive. The 

defendant was arrested on August 17, 2021. After being advised 

of his rights under Miranda, he confessed to having two firearms 

by the dresser in his bedroom. 

The police obtained a warrant to search for those 

firearms but were unable to find them in Cahill's bedroom. The 

owner of the house, a friend of Cahill's, then admitted that he 

had moved the guns from his tenant's bedroom to his own closet. 

Afterwards, he gave the weapons, both loaded, to the officers. 

The police also found several boxes of ammunition and a firearm 

cleaning kit in Cahill's bedroom. 

A federal grand jury in Maine indicted Cahill in January 

2022 on one count of unlawful possession of a firearm in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), listing the 1978 murder conviction as 

the predicate felony. On March 31, 2022, he appeared at the United 

States District Court for the District of Maine and entered a 

guilty plea. The court sentenced him on October 3, 2022, to 

seventy-two months of imprisonment and three years of supervised 

release. 

Cahill timely filed a notice of appeal. He raises two 
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grounds of appeal to us: first, that the district court erred in 

accepting his guilty plea, and second, that its sentence was 

substantively unreasonable. We review each challenge in turn.

II. Discussion

A. Review of the defendant's guilty plea.

A guilty plea is constitutionally valid only if it is 

entered "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Bradshaw v. 

Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005). "[A] plea does not qualify as 

intelligent unless a criminal defendant first receives 'real 

notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and 

most universally recognized requirement of due process.'" Bousley

v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (quoting Smith v. 

O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941)). Accordingly, before it may 

accept a guilty plea, the court is required to "inform the 

defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, . . . 

the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading." 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). The record must show that the 

defendant "correctly understood the essential elements of the 

crime with which he was charged." See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 618.

The district court must also determine that there is a 

factual basis for the defendant's guilty plea. See Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 11(b)(3). "The purpose of this requirement is to 'protect a 

defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an 

understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing 
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that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.'" 

United States v. Ventura-Cruel, 356 F.3d 55, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2003) 

(quoting Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendment, Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11).

Cahill argues that the district court failed to assure 

itself, and to create a sufficient record demonstrating, that his 

guilty plea was constitutionally valid and in accordance with Rule 

11. Because he did not make this objection at the district court, 

plain error review applies. United States v. Guzmán-Merced, 984 

F.3d 18, 20 (1st Cir. 2020).

"The defendant's burden under the plain error standard 

is a heavy one." United States v. Ramirez-Benitez, 292 F.3d 22, 

27 (1st Cir. 2002). The defendant must prove "(1) an error, 

(2) that is clear or obvious, (3) which affects his substantial 

rights . . . and which (4) seriously impugns the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding." United States

v. Correa-Osorio, 784 F.3d 11, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2015).

To assess whether the court's acceptance of Cahill's 

guilty plea was valid under the principles set forth above, we 

review the record and, in particular, the transcript of the change 

of plea hearing. We hold that the plea colloquy sufficiently 

demonstrates that Cahill understood the nature of the charge 

against him.
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At the change of plea hearing, the district court, before 

accepting Cahill's guilty plea, asked him and his counsel "a few 

questions" to ensure that Cahill was pleading knowingly and 

voluntarily. The court first asked Cahill whether he was pleading 

guilty because he was actually guilty. It then asked Cahill's 

counsel whether he was "satisfied" of the defendant's actual guilt. 

Counsel responded that he was and that he "should indicate to the 

Court that [his] assessment of the prosecution's theory [was] based 

on . . . constructive possession." The court then asked whether 

Cahill had "receive[d] a copy of the indictment," had had "enough 

time to discuss the charge" with his counsel, and had had "the 

elements and the nature of the charge" explained to him by his 

counsel, obtaining affirmative answers to each question. The 

court then explained the rights that Cahill would waive by pleading 

guilty and the potential penalties that might be imposed. 

The court proceeded to ascertain whether there was an 

adequate factual basis for Cahill's guilty plea. It asked the 

prosecutor "to summarize the evidence the Government would expect 

to offer should the matter proceed to trial." The government 

indicated that a document describing such evidence, referred to as 

the "prosecution version," had been filed on the docket. Cahill's 

counsel confirmed to the Court that he had "reviewed" the 

prosecution version with Cahill "several times," that he was 

satisfied that the government could "produce the evidence 
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described in that document," and that a jury could find Cahill 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the admissible portion 

of that evidence. 

The court then asked Cahill whether he understood the 

evidence at issue in the case and had "read and discussed with 

[his] attorney" the "document . . . referred to as the prosecution 

version." Cahill confirmed that he had and that he did not 

"disagree with any of the information contained in that document." 

Faced with this record, Cahill, on appeal, mounts two 

closely adjacent arguments. First, he argues that the record 

fails to show, to a sufficient degree, that he understood the 

charge and that his plea was knowing and voluntary. Second, he 

argues that "[t]he district court erred by not explaining all the 

elements of the crime" before accepting his guilty plea. 

Cahill's arguments focus on his possible 

misunderstanding of the essential element of possession in the 

context of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Possession of a firearm may be 

actual or constructive. United States v. Gúzman-Montañez, 756 

F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014). "Constructive possession exists when 

a person knowingly has the power and intention at a given time to 

exercise dominion and control over an object either directly or 

through others." United States v. McLean, 409 F.3d 492, 501 (1st 

Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Cahill argues that his answers 

at sentencing show only that he knew the guns were in the room, 
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but not that he intended to exercise dominion or control over them. 

He argues that the court "did not explore and establish[] and [he] 

did not confirm" that he had the requisite intent, and so he may 

have pled guilty based on a mistaken understanding of the law and 

the government's burden. 

We discern no such error. Cahill's counsel assured the 

court that he had discussed and reviewed the indictment and the 

prosecution's statement of facts with his client. Cahill 

confirmed that account and told the court that his counsel had 

explained to him the nature and elements of the charge. As a 

general rule, the court is entitled to rely upon those assurances, 

and, absent any indication in the record of coercion, confusion,

or misrepresentation, we see no reason to depart from that rule. 

Contrary to Cahill's argument, the district court was not required

here to "explain the elements of each charge to the defendant on 

the record." Bradshaw, 545 U.S. at 183; see also United States

v. Cruz-Rivera, 357 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[Rule 11] does 

not require the court to explain the technical intricacies of the 

charges in the indictment."). "[T]he record accurately reflects 

that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were 

explained to [Cahill] by his own, competent counsel." Bradshaw, 

545 U.S. at 183. Cahill's plea is constitutionally valid.

Indeed, Cahill and his counsel provided not only general 

assurances that they understood the government's case, but, when 
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asked by the court whether he was satisfied that the defendant had 

pleaded guilty because he was actually guilty, his counsel stated

that he was and indicated that he "assess[ed]" the "prosecution's

theory" as "based on . . . constructive possession." The court

permissibly relied upon defense counsel's assurances that he had 

discussed the case with his client and, presumably, adequately 

counseled him as to his potential criminal liability. As the 

Supreme Court has noted, "[w]here a defendant is represented by 

competent counsel, the court usually may rely on counsel's 

assurance that the defendant has been properly informed of the 

nature and elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty." 

Bradshaw, 545 U.S. at 183.

Having probed the foundation for the counseled

defendant's guilty plea and found it to be solid, the court did 

not have to then explain to him the "intricacies" of constructive 

possession or the other legal doctrines that might be at issue in 

his case.3 See Cruz-Rivera, 357 F.3d at 13. Such is the rule;

3 Cahill also suggests that there was an inadequate 

factual basis for the plea because the element of possession was 

not sufficiently supported. We disagree. "To establish a 

sufficient factual foundation for a plea, 'the government need 

only show a rational basis in fact for the defendant's guilt.'" 

United States v. Torres-Vázquez, 731 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 2013) 

(quoting United States v. Ramos-Mejía, 721 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 

2013)). The government has shown in its statement of facts, which 

was accepted by the defense, that Cahill admitted to having two 

firearms in his bedroom and that the police were subsequently able 

to locate those guns along with ammunition and a weapons cleaning 

kit. The record plainly supports the existence of constructive 
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and it is sound, as it affords proper deference to the role of

defense counsel in our adversarial system.

B. Review of the sentence for substantive reasonableness.

The government recommended a sentence of sixty months of 

imprisonment, which exceeded the range of thirty to thirty-seven 

months calculated in the PSR. The report had noted, as potential 

grounds for a departure, that Cahill's criminal history category 

"substantially underrepresent[ed]" his criminal history and risk 

of recidivism, "as evidenced by [his] absconding from parole in 

the State of Texas and from supervised release from the District 

of Vermont in 2018." The report referenced, further, the fact 

that Cahill had confessed to hitting someone in the head with a 

crowbar in 2020. 

The government argued in favor of an upward variance or 

departure because of the defendant's history of violent crime and 

the fact that he had already been convicted in the past of unlawful 

possession of firearms. A longer sentence would be necessary, 

then, "to specifically deter the defendant from committing more 

crimes and to protect the public." 

The defense argued that a sentence above the guidelines 

range was not warranted. For one, Cahill had not used the guns 

at issue and he had kept them for an innocent purpose: so that 

possession for the purposes of the plea. 
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family members could go hunting when they came to visit. Cahill's 

advanced age and health issues also meant that he did not "pose an 

ongoing threat to the community." Finally, his convictions were

stale and not representative of his current self. 

After hearing character testimony from Cahill's 

witnesses and considering the parties' arguments, the court 

imposed its sentence. It began by adopting the PSR, as revised 

and accepted by the parties, as part of its findings. Noting that 

it had considered the Sentencing Guidelines and the factors listed 

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court then found that, due to Cahill's 

"unrelenting" criminal history and manifest "tendency toward 

violence," he "pose[d] a particular danger to the community," which 

was aggravated by his possession of firearms. The court expressly 

took into account Cahill's age and "physical condition," but found 

that an upward variance would be necessary to protect the public 

and to provide a "deterrent effect[] which perhaps m[ight] seize 

upon [Cahill] in this late season." Having explained its 

findings, the court imposed a sentence of seventy-two months of 

imprisonment and three years of supervised release. 

On appeal, Cahill argues that his seventy-two-month 

sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is excessive. 

"We review challenges to the substantive reasonableness of a 

sentence for abuse of discretion." United States v. Bruno-Campos, 

978 F.3d 801, 808 (1st Cir. 2020).
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"In the sentencing context, 'reasonableness is a protean 

concept.'" United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 

2011) (quoting United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 

2008)). "Even so, the inquiry is not standardless: the hallmarks 

of a substantively reasonable sentence are a 'plausible sentencing 

rationale' and a 'defensible result.'" United States v. MirandaDíaz, 942 F.3d 33, 42 (2019) (quoting Martin, 520 F.3d at 96). A 

"plausible sentencing rationale" is one that is "tailored to the 

facts and circumstances of the case at hand." Id. at 43. We 

undertake the reasonableness inquiry mindful that "it is not our 

task simply to second-guess a sentencing court's considered 

decisions about matters squarely within its discretion." Id. at 

42.

An "adequate explanation" is required when the district 

court imposes a variant sentence, as it did here. Bruno-Campos, 

978 F.3d at 809. But the court need not "be precise to the point 

of pedantry" when articulating its rationale. United States v. 

Del Valle-Rodríguez, 761 F.3d 171, 177 (1st Cir. 2014).

Here, the court did articulate a plausible rationale for 

its upwardly variant sentence: namely, that Cahill's criminal 

history, marked by violent crimes and a proclivity for reoffending,

meant that a longer sentence was necessary to protect the community 

and to specifically deter him.
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Cahill argues that the district court's reference to his 

"unrelenting" and "violen[t]" criminal history was supported 

solely by the 1978 murder conviction, which "was already accounted 

for in the PSR guidelines calculation." And so, the argument 

goes, there was no "factual basis" for that characterization and 

it could not support a variance. We disagree. The district court 

expressly adopted the entirety of the revised presentence 

investigation report, to which neither party objected, as part of 

its findings. That report amply supports the court's conclusion, 

which is, then, adequately explained. Given the report's sheer 

length, the court's choice to incorporate it by reference, rather 

than recite all of the defendant's past criminal conduct, was 

understandable. And, in any case, the court need only offer a 

"plausible sentencing rationale" that achieves a "defensible 

result," Miranda-Díaz, 942 F.3d at 42 (quotation omitted); it need 

not explicitly articulate all of the facts that it has considered 

in arriving at a conclusion, particularly when, as here, those 

facts are clear from the record.

Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding, 

based on the PSR, that Cahill was particularly inveterate in his 

recidivism and particularly resistant to the "normative 

expectations of civil society which are embodied in the criminal 

code." That he has collected more than a dozen convictions in his 

lifetime, much of which has been spent incarcerated, is proof 
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enough of that. But the timing of those convictions is also 

suggestive, in that they recur with almost clockwork regularity. 

In the past, after being convicted of serious crimes, the defendant 

has quickly reoffended. This happened, for example, in his 

twenties, when, after pleading guilty to misdemeanor assault for 

raping a woman at knifepoint and being given a non-custodial 

sentence, he continued to rack up multiple burglary convictions 

and parole violations. The pattern continued into his middle age, 

when Cahill violated his conditions of parole and earned his first 

felon-in-possession conviction shortly after serving the custodial 

portion of his murder sentence. In 2018, history repeated itself 

as Cahill once again absconded from parole soon after his release 

from prison and proceeded to squirrel away more guns in full 

defiance of the law. The same conduct, repeated over time, becomes 

even more concerning, as it shows undiminished disregard for the 

law and an inability to absorb the lessons that criminal punishment 

is meant to inculcate. See Miranda-Díaz, 942 F.3d at 43 ("[T]he 

appellant's repeated return to criminal behavior despite earlier 

encounters with the criminal justice system reflected an abject 

failure to renounce criminality and amply justified an upwardly 

variant sentence.").

The court's finding that Cahill's criminal history was 

marked by a tendency towards violence is also adequately explained 

and supported by the record. The murder conviction suffices to 
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establish that conclusion, not least because of the considerable 

deference we pay to the sentencing court's judgment. The court 

was certainly not required to credit Cahill's bare assertion that 

the homicide was accidental when there was a valid conviction to 

the contrary.

Finally, Cahill argues that the district court's 

"dismiss[al]" of the mitigating factors he had presented -- namely, his 

age, physical condition, and the alleged fact that the guns were meant 

to be used for hunting by guests -- was erroneous. First, the court 

did expressly consider those factors, so Cahill's argument consists of 

nothing but an attempt "to substitute his judgment for that of the 

sentencing court." Clogston, 662 F.3d at 593 (noting that the 

"weighting" of the "relevant [sentencing] factors" is "largely within 

the court's informed discretion"). And the court's finding that Cahill 

was a "danger to the community," in spite of his age and orthopedic 

issues, was supported by a "plausible sentencing rationale," see

Miranda-Díaz, 942 F.3d at 42 (quotation omitted). The very purpose of 

a weapon, and a firearm especially, is that it allows its bearer to 

inflict great harm regardless of his physical strength. Even the most 

enfeebled can pull a trigger.

Because the district court articulated a plausible 

sentencing rationale and achieved a defensible result, we hold that the 

sentence was substantively reasonable.

The appellant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.