1 Filed 12/12/13 P. v. Holdridge CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. BRENT JOHN HOLDRIDGE, Defendant and Appellant. A135692

(Humboldt County Super. Ct. Nos. CR1000371, CR1006116A & CR1001616)

In this appeal, defendant Brent John Ho ldridge challenges an order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pl eas in three criminal cases. Holdridge contends that, despite being promised probation with a susp ended sentence, he was sentenced to serve seven years eight months in state prison. According to Holdridge, he is entitled to withdraw his pleas because the enactment of the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of

2011 1 (Realignment Act) rendered it impossible for the court to co mply with the plea agreement and place him on probation. For reasons we shall explain, Holdridge’s argument lacks merit. The court’s decision to deny probation was consistent with his plea agreement and was not compelled by the Re alignment Act. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND Holdridge appeals from an order denying his motion to withdraw his pleas in three Humboldt County cases. For eas e of reference, and consistent with the identification of

1 Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011-2012, ch. 12, § 1.2 the cases in the abstract of judgment, we shall refer to case number CR1000371 as case A, case number CR1006116A as case B, and case number CR1001616 as case C. Also relevant to this appeal is Mendoci no County case number SCUKCRCR 09-93336202,

which we shall refer to as case D. The Mendocino County case—case D—was the subject of a separate appeal in Division One of this court but nonetheless bears upon the issues in this appeal because Holdridge’s pl ea agreement in cases A, B, and C turned on the sentence imposed by the Mendocino County Superior Court in case D. 2

Case A In January 2010, the Humboldt County Dist rict Attorney filed a complaint in case A charging Holdridge with sale of meth amphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), misdemeanor possession of mari juana while driving (Veh. C ode, § 23222, subd. (b)), and driving a vehicle without a license plate (Veh. C ode, § 5200, subd. (a)). In addition, as to the charge of selling methamphetamine, it was alleged that Holdridge had suffered two prior convictions for narcotics offenses (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c)).

Case C In March 2010, the Humboldt County Distri ct Attorney filed a complaint in case C charging Holdridge with sa le or transportation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a)) and sale of methampheta mine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)). Case D (Mendocino County) In April 2010, the Mendocino County Dist rict Attorney filed an information in case D charging Holdridge w ith transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) a nd possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). It was also alleged that Ho ldridge had suffered two prior convictions for

2 At the request of the Attorney General, we take judicial notice of the record and appellate opinion in case D ( People v. Holdridge (March 29, 2012, A134125 [nonpub. opn.]). (Evid. Code, §§ 452 , subd. (d), 459, subd. (a); People v. McKinzie (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1302, 1350, fn. 1.)3 narcotics offenses. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c).) The charges in case D resulted from a probation search of Holdridge’s car during a traffic stop in October 2009. (See People v. Holdridge, supra, A134125.) July 2010 Plea in Cases A and C In July 2010, Holdridge agreed to a conditional plea resolving cases A and C. In case A he agreed to plead gu ilty to sale of methampheta mine and admit suffering two prior narcotics convictions, and in case C he agreed to plead guilty to sale or transportation of marijuana. The remaini ng charges in cases A and C were to be dismissed. The plea agreement specified th at Holdridge was to be placed on probation after being sentenced to a ten-year term of imprisonment with execution of the sentence suspended.

Case B In October 2010, before Holdridge was se ntenced in cases A and C, the Humboldt County District Attorney file d a complaint in case B char ging Holdridge with possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Pen. Code, former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)), 3 and maintaining a place for selling or using methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366). As to the charge of possession of methamphetamine, it was a lleged that Holdridge was armed with a firearm during the commission of the offense. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) At a hearing conducted in November 2010, the parties agre ed to continue sentencing in cases A and C pending the outcome of case D in Mendocino County. January 2011 Plea in Case D In January 2011, Holdridge agreed to a plea resolving case D in Mendocino County. He agreed to plead no contest to possession of methamphetamine for sale and admitted one prior narcotics conviction in exchange for dismissal of the remaining

3 All further statutory references are to th e Penal Code unless otherwise specified. Former section 12021, subdivis ion (a)(1) was repealed and reenacted as section 29800, subdivision (a)(1). (See St ats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6.)4 charges. The plea was an op en plea with a maximum confinement time of six years. During the plea colloquy, the Mendocino Count y Superior Court admonished Holdridge that “[i]t’s an open plea, m eaning no representations are made to you as to whether you would be on probation or in custody or a prison term.” February 2011 Plea in Ca se B (plus Cases A and C) In February 2011, Holdri dge agreed to a plea resolving case B in Humboldt County. He agreed to enter a plea of guilty to possessi on of a firearm by a convicted felon in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges in cas e B. As part of the deal, he agreed that he would be subject to a maximum aggregate term of 10 years eight months in cases A, B, and C, with the un derstanding that execution of the sentence would be suspended and he woul d be placed on probation if he were granted probation in case D by the court in Mendocino County. In a lett er to the probation department, the deputy district attorney explained the terms of the plea as follows: “The defendant is facing a maximum term of ten years and eight months on all three of his pending felonies [in Humboldt County]. The terms of the plea are that if he is placed on a grant of probation in Mendocino County, he will al so receive probation here w ith the understanding it is 10 years, 8 months, execution of sentence suspe nded. If he receives prison in Mendocino County, he will also be sent to prison on our cases.” Consequently, unlike the earlier, July 2010 plea deal involving cases A and C in which Holdridge was promised probation with a suspended sentence, the February 2011 plea deal resolving all three of Holdridge’s Humboldt County cases (A, B, and C) offered the promise of probation only if the Mendocino County Superior Court first granted him probation in case D. July 2011 Sentencing in Cases A, B, and C In a supplemental probation report prep ared in April 2011, the Humboldt County probation department noted that the Me ndocino County probation department was recommending a prison sentence for Holdridge in case D. In anticipation of being sentenced to prison in case D in Mendoc ino County, Holdridge asked the Humboldt County Superior Court at a hearing on July 5, 2011, to impose the shortest possible5 prison sentence in cases A, B, and C. The Hu mboldt County Superior Court proceeded to impose an aggregate prison term of seven year s eight months in cases A, B, and C. July 2011 Motion to Withdraw Pleas On July 14, 2011, Holdridge filed a motion to withdr aw his pleas in cases A, B, and C. He argued that the prison sentence vi olated his plea agreement because he had not yet been sentenced in case D in Mendocino County. In response to the motion, the Humboldt County Superior Court offered to vacate the sentence in order to permit Holdridge to be sentenced firs t in case D in Mendocino County. In September 2011, with Holdridge’s consent, the Humboldt County Su perior Court vacated its sentence in cases A, B, and C while maintaining the pleas. Th e court continued sentencing in cases A, B, and C pending sentencing in cas e D in Mendocino County.

November 2011 Senten cing in Case D Holdridge was sentenced in case D in Mendocino County on November 4, 2011. As reflected in the probation report, Holdridge was presumptiv ely ineligible for probation under section 1203, subdivisi on (e)(4), because he had two prior felony convictions, although probation could be granted in an un usual case where the interests of justice would be served by that dis position. The court denied prob ation after finding no unusual circumstances that would justify a grant of probation to Holdridge. The court imposed a five-year split sentence under the Realignment Act, with two years to be served in county jail followed by three years unde r the mandatory supervision of the probation department. (See § 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B).) Before the court pronounced sentence, the prosecutor observed that Holdridge would likely be senten ced to prison upon his return to Humboldt County because his conviction in case B fo r being a felon in possession of a firearm disqualified him being sentenced under the Realignment Act. The prosecutor pointed out that Holdridge’s Realignment Ac t sentence in case D would likely be converted to a state prison sentence following sentencing in Humboldt County in cases A, B, and C, because “if he goes to [state prison] out of Humboldt, he’s going to go to [state prison] out of here as well, the way the Realignment law works.”6 January 2012 Resentencing in Cases A, B, and C Holdridge was returned to Humboldt County for senten cing in cases A, B, and C after being sentenced in case D in Mendoc ino County. In a supplemental probation report, the probation officer noted that Holdri dge was ineligible for sentencing under the Realignment Act as a result of his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in case B. The probation o fficer also concluded there were no unusual circumstances justifying a grant of probatio n after pointing out that Ho ldridge was presumptively ineligible for probation under section 1203, subdivision (e)(4). Th e probation officer recommended reimposing the seven years eight m onths sentence that had previously been imposed but vacated in order to allow Holdridge to be se ntenced first in case D in Mendocino County. At sentencing in Humboldt County on January 24, 2012, Holdridge offered to waive presentence credits for a 10-year term of felony probation consecutive to the fiveyear split sentence he received in case D in Mendocino County. The court responded that Holdridge was ineligible for probation unless there were un usual circumstances as set forth in the applicable rule of court. The court denied probation and imposed an aggregate state prison sentence of seven year s eight months in cases A, B, and C. Following the pronouncement of the sentence, the court advise d Holdridge that he had to file a notice of appeal within 60 days if he wished to challe nge the judgment or sentence. Holdridge did not file a notice of appeal within 60 days af ter the sentencing hearing in January 2012. Inst ead, Holdridge retained as s ubstitute counsel the attorney who had represented him in cas e D in Mendocino County. Postjudgment Motion to Withdraw Pleas On February 23, 2012, Ho ldridge’s substitute counsel filed a motion to withdraw his pleas in the Humboldt C ounty cases. Holdri dge claimed he was not advised at the time of his pleas that he was presumptively in eligible for probation. He also contended

he received ineffective assistance of counsel be cause his attorney failed to investigate the effect his plea would have upon his eligibility to serve his sentence in county jail under the Realignment Act. He fu rther argued that his Humboldt attorney never contacted7 counsel in Mendocino County to determine if there was any chance he would receive a probationary sentence in case D. Holdridge’s substitute coun sel later clarified that the motion to withdraw was primar ily limited to the plea in case B, in which Holdridge was convicted of being a felon in possession of a fi rearm. Holdridge sought to withdraw his plea in case B to the firearm possession count and, in its place, enter a guilty plea to the charge of possessing methamphetamine. Becau se the firearm possession count in case B was the only conviction preventing Holdridge from being eligible for sentencing under the Realignment Act, he would be eligible to serve his time lo cally in county jail in cases A through D if the firearm possess ion count were dismissed. April 2012 Hearing on Mo tion to Withdraw Pleas On April 19, 2012, the court held an ev identiary hearing on Ho ldridge’s motion to withdraw his pleas. Holdridge claimed he di d not understand that his probationary status in the Humboldt County cases (A through C) depended upon whether the court granted him probation in case D in Mendocino County. Nevertheless, his substitute counsel had previously acknowledged that the promise wa s that he would be given probation in Humboldt County if he were given probation in Mendocino Count y. Substitute counsel also acknowledged previo usly that Holdridge was not tec hnically ineligible for probation under his pleas but claimed that he was denied the opportunity to se rve his time in “local prison” under the Realignment Ac t as a result of his guilty pl ea to the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The prosecutor refused to restructure the plea agreement to a llow Holdridge to be sentenced under the Realignment Act and serve his time in county jail. The prosecutor argued that Holdridge’s testimony about his misunderstanding of the plea agreement was contradicted by the case files and the hearin g transcript, all of which reflected a promise of probation if Mendocino County granted proba tion, “though the odds of [that] were pretty slim.” Denial of Motion to Withdraw Pleas Following the evidentiary hearing on th e motion to withdraw pleas, the court found that Holdridge was adequa tely advised about the effect of his pleas and denied the8 motion. The court rejected Holdridge’s testimony as inaccurate and found he had consulted counsel for over two years durin g many appearances in his long-continued cases. According to the court, when Holdridge negotiated the 10 year eight month cap in cases A, B, and C, it was clear in the record of the plea that the Humboldt County court had delegated the prob ation decision to the Mendocino County court. The court had accepted the delegation of th e probation decision to th e Mendocino County court, reasoning that Holdridge might have “s ome advantage or some drug program or something else that he could convince that Mendocino County court there were sufficient unusual circumstances to justify granting him probation . . . .” Resentencing in Case D

After the court denied the motion to with draw the pleas in cases A, B, and C, it

declined to reconsider the seven year eight month aggr egate sentence it had imposed in those cases. The court resentenced Holdridge in case D, in which the Mendocino County court had originally imposed a Realignment Act split sentence that was to be served locally. In case D, the Humbol dt County court sentenced Ho ldridge to serve a two-year concurrent term for methamphetamine posse ssion and imposed but stayed a three-year enhancement for the prior narcotics conviction. On June 6, 2012, Holdridge filed noti ces of appeal from a purported judgment entered on April 19, 20 12, in cases A, B, and C. The Humboldt County Superior Court granted certificates of probable ca use in each of the appeals.

D ISCUSSION

1. Appealability and Standard of Review At the outset, we address the Attorney Ge neral’s contention that the appeal should be dismissed as untimely. The argument is premised on the fact that judgment was rendered on January 24, 2012, when the court denied probation, imposed a seven year eight month sentence, and advised Holdridge of his appeal rights, including the 60-day time limit for filing the notice of appeal. Hold ridge ultimately filed an appeal in cases A through C on June 6, 2012, when he purported to appeal from the court’s order of April 19, 2012, denying his motion to withdraw his pl eas. According to the Attorney General,9 the only judgment entered on April 19 was the term imposed on re sentencing Holdridge in case D, from which no appeal was taken. The Attorney General relies on the principle that there is no right to app eal from an order denying a moti on to vacate a judgment of conviction on a ground that could have been reviewed on appeal fro m the judgment. (See People v. Totari (2002) 28 Cal.4th 876, 882.) We agree with the Attorney General that the appeal is untimely as to the judgment in cases A, B, and C entered on January 24, 20 12. However, the appeal is timely as to the order of April 19, 2012, denying Holdridge’s motion to withdraw his pleas. (See § 1237, subd. (b) [appeal may be taken from any orde r after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the party].) A statutory motion to withdraw a plea under section 1018 may be made at any time before judgment has been entered upon a showing of good cause. ( People v.

Weaver (2004) 118 Cal.Ap p.4th 131, 145; In re Vargas (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1142; People v. Castaneda (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1612, 1616-1617.) “In a criminal case, judgment is rendered when the trial court orally pronounces sentence.” ( People v.

Ibanez (1999) 76 Cal.Ap p.4th 537, 543.) In this case, because the court had al ready pronounced Holdri dge’s sentence by

the time he filed his motion to withdraw his pleas, the motion does not qualify as a statutory motion to withdraw under secti on 1018. Instead, it is more properly characterized as a postjudgment , nonstatutory motion to w ithdraw the pleas. (See People v. Castaneda, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1616-1617.) As the Attorney General points out, a postjudgment motion to withdraw a plea is the equivalent of an application for a writ of error coram nobis . (See People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078 , 1096.) “ ‘The writ will proper ly issue only when the petitioner

can establish three elements: (1) that some fact existed which, without his fault or negligence, was not presented to the court at the trial and which would have prevented the rendition of the judgment; (2 ) that the new eviden ce does not go to the merits of the issues of fact determined at trial; and (3) th at he did not know nor could he have, with due diligence, discovered the f acts upon which he relies any sooner than the point at10 which he petitions for the writ.’ ” ( People v. Gallardo (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 987.)

It is well established that coram nobis does not lie for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. ( Ibid. ; accord People v. Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1104.) Because a postjudgment motion to vacate a plea is the equivalent of a petition for

writ of error coram nobis , we employ the same standard of review applicable to an appeal from such a writ proceeding. We will not dist urb the trial court’s decision unless the trial court abused its discretion. ( People v. Dubon (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 944, 951.)

2. Motion to Withdraw Pleas Holdridge’s primary contention on appeal is that the Realignment Act precluded the trial court from giving effect to the par ties’ plea agreement. He argues that he was promised probation but that changes in the law prevented the court from placing him on probation with a suspended sentence. He cl aims his plea bargain was “legally illusory” as a result of the Realignment Act. As we explain, Holdridge’s argument misconceives the basis for the motion to withdraw the plea s in the trial court and the effect of the Realignment Act. The Realignment Act “ ‘enacted sweepi ng changes to long-standing sentencing laws,’ including replacing prison commitments with county jail commitments for certain felonies and eligible defendants.” ( People v. Clytus (2012) 209 Cal.Ap p.4th 1001, 1004, fn. omitted.) Breaking with the historical pr actice of incarcerating all felons in state prison, the Legislature amended the Penal Code to make county jail the default location for incarcerating persons convicted of most nonserious, nonvio lent, and nonsexual felonies. (See § 1170, subd. (h)(2).) When a defendant is eligible to be sentenced under the Realignment Act, the sentencing court retains discretion to issue a “split sentence” in which part of the sentence is served in county jail and the remainder of the sentence is served under the supervision of the county probation officer in “mandatory supervision.” (§ 1170 , subd. (h)(5)(B); see People v. Kelly (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 297, 301.) The Realignment Act applies to “any person sentenced on or after Octobe r 1, 2011.” (§ 1170, subd. (h)(6).)11 In the trial court, Holdridge’s motion to withdraw his pleas was essentially premised on two contentions. First, he argued that he was not properly advised that he was presumptively ineligible for probation under section 1203, subdivision (e)(4) as a result of his prior felony convictions. He cl aimed that he would not have accepted a plea that conditioned his right to probation in cases A, B, and C upon the probation decision of the Mendocino County Superior Court in case D, when it was unlikely that the Mendocino court would have the power to gran t probation absent unusual circumstances. Second, he argued that his coun sel had failed to investigate th e consequences of his guilty plea to the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm in light of the Realignment Act. Recognizing that the felon in po ssession of a firearm conviction made him ineligible for sentencing under the Realignment Act, 4 Holdridge sought to withdraw his plea to that charge and renegotiate his plea deal in case B in order to dismiss that charge. Dismissal of the felon in possession of a fir earm charge would permit Holdridge to serve his sentence in county jail pursu ant to the Realignment Act. In effect, Holdridge sought to be placed on probation (or withdraw his pleas if that dispositi on was unavailable), or, in the alternative, restructure his plea deal so that he could serve his time in county jail instead of state prison. The trial court rejected Holdridge’s clai ms, reasoning that he was properly advised of the consequences of his plea. In essence, the court concluded that Holdridge accepted the plea deal well aware of the fact that it wa s unlikely he would be granted probation in case D in Mendocino County. As to the clai m that Holdridge should have been advised of the fact that his plea deal in case B woul d render him ineligible for sentencing under the Realignment Act, the trial court correctly observed that, as of February 4, 2011, the date of his guilty plea in that case, the Realignment Act had not yet been enacted. As the

4 A conviction for being a felon in posse ssion of a firearm is punishable as a felony. (§ 29800, subd. (a).) The statute does not specify that the sentence must be served in state prison or that the crime is punishable under section 1170, subdivision (h). (§ 29800, subd. (a).) In such a case, the senten ce must be served in state prison. (§ 18, subd. (a).)12 trial court stated, the Realignment Act was on ly a “twinkle in Jerry Brown’s eye at that time.” Consequently, counsel could not be expected to a dvise his client about the consequences of a law that did not yet even exist. At the time Holdridge entered his guilty pleas in cases A, B, and C, it was not possible to serve a felony sentence in county jail. Holdridge made his pleas without any expe ctation that he could serve his sentence in county jail instead of state prison. As noted above, a claim of ineffective assi stance of counsel is not cognizable in a postjudgment motion to vacate a plea, which is the equivalent of an application for a writ

of error coram nobis. ( People v. Gallardo, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 987; People v. Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1104.) Because Holdridg e’s claims in the trial court turned

on his assertion that he receive d ineffective assistance of counsel, the claims did not support a postjudgment motion to withdraw his pleas. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Holdridge’s motion. On appeal, Holdridge takes a different a pproach, arguing that the Realignment Act prevented the trial court from granting him probation and giving effect to his plea agreement. Holdridge has failed to explain how and in what manner the Realignment Act prevented the trial court from granting him a probationary sentence. He was presumptively ineligible for probation under section 1203, subdivision (e)(4) as a result of his prior convictions. It was the applica tion of section 1203, subdivision (e)(4) that effectively prevented the trial court from pl acing him on probation. That statute is wholly unrelated to the Reali gnment Act and was in effect at the time Holdridge entered his pleas. The Realignment Act made it ne ither more nor less likely that he would receive a probationary sentence. Simply pu t, the Realignment Ac t has no bearing upon whether the trial court could impose a probationa ry sentence or comply with the terms of Holdridge’s plea agreement. The only potential impact of the Rea lignment Act upon Holdridge is where he

would serve his sentence if the court denied probation—county jail or state prison. Insofar as Holdridge claims he was denied the opport unity to serve his se ntence in county jail, or to receive a split se ntence under the Realignment Act, he is not entitled to relief.13 He entered his plea agreement in case B befo re enactment of the Realignment Act. His plea was not contingent upon serving his senten ce locally; indeed, at the time he entered his plea his only option was to serve his sent ence in state prison if he did not receive probation. As the Attorney General observe s, after the enactment of the Realignment Act, there were probably “countless defendant s” in Holdridge’s po sition who would have preferred to renegotiate their plea agreements to eliminate convicti ons that disqualified them from being able to serve their felony se ntences locally in county jail. Like those defendants, Holdridge is not entitled to withdraw his plea simply because he could benefit from a change in the law that was not foreseen at the time he entered his plea.

We conclude the trial court acted well w ithin its discretion in denying Holdridge’s postjudgment motion to withdraw hi s pleas in cases A, B, and C.

3. Corrections to Abstract of Judgment Holdridge contends the abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect that the Humboldt County Superior Court imposed a $200 restitution fine in case D when it resentenced him in that case in April 2012. Th e Attorney General agre es that the abstract of judgment is defective, but not for the reason argued by Holdridge. In case D, the Mendocino Co unty Superior Cour t imposed a $1,000 restitution fine when it pronounced its split sentence under the Realignment Act in November 2011. When the Humboldt County Superior Court resentenced Holdridge in case D in April 2012, it not only imposed a concurrent pris on term in place of the Realignment Act sentence but also imposed a $2 00 restitution fine in place of the $1,000 restitution fine that had been imposed by the Me ndocino County Superior Court. At present, the abstract of judgment reflects the $1,000 restitution fine in case D or iginally imposed by the court in Mendocino County. Ho ldridge contends the abstract shou ld be corrected to reflect the $200 restitution fine that was subsequently imposed by the Humboldt County Superior

Court when it resentenced him in case D. Holdridge’s argument fails for a number of reasons. First, as noted above, Holdridge did not file an appeal in case D following his resentenci ng in April 2012. Consequently, a challenge to the sentence impos ed in case D is not cognizable in this14 appeal. 5 Further, even though we possess the inherent authority to correct an unauthorized sentence (see People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354), no grounds exist here to correct the sentence. Because a $1,00 0 restitution fine is within the discretionary limits for such fines (see § 1202.4, subd. (b )(1)), the sentence is not unauthorized. Moreover, on resentencing, the “[d]iscretionary decisions of the judges in the previous cases may not be changed by the judge in th e current case.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.452(3).) The Humboldt County Superior Court lacked the power to modify the discretionary decision of the Mendocino County Superior Court by reducing the restitution fine in case D to $200. Thus, th e abstract of judgment properly reflects a $1000 restitution fine in case D. The Attorney General has identified a number of errors in the abstract of judgment. Holdridge conc edes that the errors must be corrected. With respect to coun t A1 in box 1 of the abstract, th e conviction date is listed as July 2, 2011, the conviction is listed as one fo r sale or transportation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a)), and the senten ce is listed as the middle term of two years. The conviction date shou ld be July 2, 2010 , the conviction should be for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 1 1379, subd. (a)), and the sentence should be listed as the upper term of four years. With respect to count B2 in box 1 of the abstract, the c onviction date is listed as February 24, 2011. The correct date of the conviction is February 4, 2011. With respect to count C1 in box 1 of the abstract, the c onviction date is listed as July 2, 2011, and the conviction is listed as one for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a )). The conviction date should be July 2, 2010, and the

conviction should be for sale or transportation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a)).

5 It should also be noted that Divisi on One of this court upheld the $1,000 restitution fine in case D as part of its ea rlier decision affirming the judgment of the Mendocino County Superior Court. (See People v. Holdridge, supra, A134125.)15 Finally, in boxes 6 and 8 of the abstract, the aggregate sentence is listed as five years eight months. The correct aggregate sentence is seven years eight months.

D ISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to correct the abstract of judgment as follows: (1) count A1 should be lis ted as a conviction for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd . (a)), with a conviction date of July 2, 2010, and an upper term senten ce of four years; (2) count B2 should reflect a conviction date of February 4, 2011; (3) count C1 sh ould be listed as a conviction for sale or transportation of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a)), with a conviction date of July 2, 2010; and (4) the aggregate sentence in boxes 6 and 8 of the abstract should be listed as seven years eight months . The trial court shall forward a certified copy of the corrected abstra ct to the Department of Co rrections and Rehabilitation.

_ ____________ ____________ McGuiness, P.J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Pollak, J.

_____________ ____________ Siggins, J.