FILED

October 3, 1997

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

DIANA MORRIS, ) Tennessee Claims

) No. 012174

Claimant/Appellee )

)

v. ) Appeal No.

) 01A01-9612-BC-00569 

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

)

Defendant/Appellant )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

APPEAL FROM THE TENNESSEE CLAIMS COMMISSION

AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

HONORABLE W. R. BAKER, COMMISSIONER

John Knox Walkup

Attorney General and Reporter

Michael E. Moore

Solicitor General

Michael W. Catalano

Associate Solicitor General

Office of the Attorney General

Executive Offices

500 Charlotte Avenue

Nashville, TN 37243-0497

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

Bill Hodde

305 Rivergate Park Building

1994 Gallatin Road, North

Madison, TN 37115-2023

ATTORNEY FOR CLAIMANT/APPELLEE

VACATED and DISMISSED

WILLIAM H. INMAN, SENIOR JUDGE

CONCUR:

HENRY F. TODD, PRESIDING JUDGE, MIDDLE SECTION

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
1

The total award was for 484 weeks. So far as the record reflects, there were no postjudgment proceedings questioning this award and we will not further notice it. Neither do we address

the anom aly inherent in the com bination of these judgments. 

2TENN. CODE ANN. §9-8-307(a)(1)(k).

2

DIANA MORRIS, ) Tennessee Claims

) No. 012174

Claimant/Appellee )

)

v. ) Appeal No.

) 01A01-9612-BC-00569 

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

)

Defendant/Appellant )

O P I N I O N

This action was filed October 15, 1992 before the Tennessee Claims

Commission. The plaintiff sought two-fold relief: (1) benefits under the Workers’

Compensation Law, TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-101 et seq., and (2) damages for the

tort of alleged retaliatory discharge for filing a claim for workers’ compensation

benefits, as allegedly authorized by TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-301 et seq. The claims

were bifurcated.

The claim for workers’ compensation benefits was heard October 22, 1993. 

The Commissioner found that the plaintiff sustained a work related injury on August

24, 1990 during the course of her employment as an account clerk with the

Department of Corrections, and that she was 90 percent permanently partially

disabled as a result of this accident and entitled to benefits accordingly, plus 124

weeks for temporary total disability.1

With respect to that portion of the complaint seeking to recover damages for

the asserted tort of retaliatory discharge, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss

pursuant to RULE 12.02(1), TENN. R. CIV. P., for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

The Commissioner overruled the motion on January 30, 1995, holding that the

jurisdictional statute of the Claims Commission2 was sufficiently broad to
3

 “No . . . regulation or other device shall . . . operate to relieve any em ployer of any 

obligation . . . “

3

“accommodate a claim for damages for the tort of retaliatory discharge.” The claim

then lay fallow for 19 months when the Commission entered an Order, on September

9, 1996, that “the claimant has factually and legally established that she was

discharged because she filed a workers’ compensation claim,” but reserved the issue

of damages for a later determination. A judgment for damages in the amount of

$300,000.00 was entered on November 9, 1996.

The State appeals the award of damages for a retaliatory discharge and

presents for review the issues of (1) whether the Claims Commissioner erred in

holding that he had subject matter jurisdiction over the cause of action for retaliatory

discharge for filing a workers’ compensation claim against the State, and (2) whether

the Commissioner erred in holding that the claimant is entitled to damages in the

amount of $300,000.00 for retaliatory discharge when the only relief available for

retaliatory discharge is equitable relief. In light of our disposition of the case, we do

not reach the second issue.

The Tennessee Claims Commission is an administrative tribunal. TENN. CODE

ANN. § 9-8-301(a). It has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all monetary claims

against the State falling within certain enumerated categories, one of which, (k), is

alleged to confer jurisdiction in the Commission to entertain the subject action. 

TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(k) provides:

(K) Worker’s compensation claims by State employees, including injuries

incurred by national guard members, state defense force members, civil

air patrol members, civil defense agency personnel and emergency forest

fire fighters while on active duty and in the course of that duty;

(I) The Commission’s payment of these claims shall be in such amount

and subject to such limitations set forth in title 50, chapter 6 . . . 

In finding subject matter jurisdiction in this case, the Commissioner reasoned

that the 

“jurisdictional statute . . . incorporates the provisions of Title 50, Chapter

6 of the Tennessee Code (TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-101, et seq.) upon

which all worker’s compensation cases in the Claims Commission are

decided . . . a retaliatory discharge is a ‘device’ within the meaning of

TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-1143

"
4

and cited Anderson v. Standard Register Co., 857 S.W.2d 555 (Tenn. 1993) as

authority for his action.

Anderson did not address a jurisdictional issue. Neither was it concerned with

the creation of a cause of action. The issue was whether the facts as pleaded and

proved constituted the previously recognized tort of retaliatory discharge, and thus

Anderson is wholly inapposite to the case at hand.

The jurisdiction of the Claims Commission is not general. The legislature

clearly limited its jurisdiction to certain categorized claims, none of which is a claim

for damages for a retaliatory discharge. It is beyond peradventure that such a claim

is a disparate tort, for which the State has not consented to be sued. Absent specific

consent, the State is immune from liability for damages resulting from torts

committed by its employees. TENN. CONST., ART. 1, SECT. 17; Kirby v. Macon County,

892 S.W.2d 403 (Tenn. 1994).

To paraphrase Kirby, the Claims Commission Act was an ‘Act of Grace’ to the

extent it exposed the State Treasury to the payment of certain determined, described

claims, but not further or otherwise.

The firing of an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim was

recognized as an actionable tort by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Clanton v.

Cain-Sloan Company, 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984). This judicial remedy was

created thusly:

“In our opinion, a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, although

not explicitly created by the statute, is necessary to enforce the duty of the

employer, to secure the rights of the employee and to carry out the

intention of the legislature. A statute need not expressly state what is

necessarily implied in order to render it effectual.”

Related cases soon followed. In Van Cleave v. McKee Baking Co., 712 S.W.2d 94

(Tenn. 1986), the Court held that “[a] claim for damages for retaliatory discharge is

not part of a workers’ compensation claim but is a separate tort action . . . “ To the

same effect is Smith v. Lincoln Brass Works, 712 S.W.2d 470 (Tenn. 1986) in which

a claim for damages for retaliatory discharge was treated as a tort action that cannot

be joined with a workers’ compensation claim. See also, Weber v. Moss, 938

S.W.2d 387 (Tenn. 1996).
5

We need not belabor the point nor engage in analysis where none is required. 

The Tennessee Claims Commission is without jurisdiction to entertain claims against

the State for damages for the tort of retaliatory discharge.

The judgment is accordingly vacated and the action is dismissed at the costs

of the appellee, Diana Morris, and any surety on her undertaking.

___________________________________

William H. Inman, Senior Judge

CONCUR:

______________________________________

Henry F. Todd, Presiding Judge, Middle Section

______________________________________

William C. Koch, Jr., Judge