IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-60768

Summary Calendar

CHARLES D. COLLINS, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

JACKSON PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:12-CV-273

Before REAVLEY, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff Charles D. Collins appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 

Title IX retaliation and state-law claims against the school district where he 

had been employed. We AFFIRM. 

The plaintiff formerly worked as a math teacher and baseball coach at 

Callaway High School in the Jackson Public School District (“the District”). In 

July 2009, he drafted a Title IX complaint alleging discrimination against 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 20, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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female athletes by the District. A parent of a student filed the complaint with 

the United States Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”). 

In October 2009, the OCR notified the District’s then-superintendent Dr. 

Lonnie Edwards that it was conducting a Title IX investigation. 

In February 2010, Collins alleges Dr. Pamela Self, then-assistant 

principal of Callaway, created fraudulent observation documents that were

used to support Collins’s less-than-favorable summary-evaluation. In March, 

Collins filed an internal grievance with the District’s human resources 

department about the evaluation. Collins alleges that HR Director Carol 

Dorsey never investigated the grievance. In June, Collins filed a retaliation 

complaint with the OCR. 

In August 2010, Collins was transferred to the District’s Capital City 

Alternative School. In December, the OCR informed Collins that it was closing 

its investigation of his retaliation complaint due to insufficient evidence. On 

April 13, 2012, Collins received notice of nonrenewal of his teaching contract 

for the 2012-13 school year due to an expiring endorsement on his license. 

On April 23, 2012, Collins filed suit against the District in the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. He brought four 

retaliation claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and 

state-law claims for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 

defamation, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District filed a motion for 

summary judgment on all of Collins’s claims. The district court granted 

summary judgment dismissing Collins’s retaliation claims, finding that he 

failed to satisfy the elements required for a prima facie case. It then declined 

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Collins’s state-law claims and 

dismissed them without prejudice. Collins now appeals.

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DISCUSSION

A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. 

Berquist v. Washington Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2007). Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after 

adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make 

a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party's case . . . .” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

Collins argues that the District retaliated against him because of his 

involvement with the Title IX complaint filed in July 2009. He claims there 

were four acts of retaliation: (1) Dr. Self’s evaluation of Collins; (2) HR Director 

Dorsey’s failure to investigate Collins’s grievance; (3) Collins’s transfer to the 

Alternative School; and (4) the nonrenewal of Collins’s contract.1 

I. Title IX retaliation claims

The language of the anti-retaliation provision of Title IX and that of Title 

VII are similar and “should be accorded a similar interpretation.” Lowrey v. 

Texas A&M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 252 n.18 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations 

omitted). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show

that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) he suffered an adverse 

employment action, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected

activity and the adverse employment action. See Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 

314, 317 (5th Cir. 2014). 

The district court held that Collins failed to establish causation as to his

retaliation claims based on Dr. Self’s evaluation and Dorsey’s failure to 

1 Collins also raises two new claims on appeal that were not raised at the district court

– a “mixed motive” claim and a claim for indemnification. Claims raised for the first time on 

appeal will not be considered. Stewart Glass & Mirror, Inc. v. U.S. Auto Glass Discount Ctrs., 

Inc., 200 F.3d 307, 316-17 (5th Cir. 2000).

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investigate the grievance, because neither Dr. Self nor Dorsey knew of Collins’s 

involvement with the Title IX complaint. Unless a defendant knows that a 

plaintiff “engaged in any protected activity” at the time of the alleged 

retaliation, causation has not been shown. Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 

512 (5th Cir. 1999). In his deposition, Collins stated that Dr. Self was not 

aware that he participated in the Title IX complaint. As to Dorsey, Collins has 

provided no evidence that she was aware of Collins’s involvement with the Title 

IX complaint. Thus, the district court’s dismissal was proper.

As to Collins’s retaliation claim based on his transfer to the Alternative 

School, the district court held that he failed to provide evidence that the 

transfer constituted an adverse employment action. This court takes a “narrow 

view of what constitutes an adverse employment action . . . .” Breaux v. City 

of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). We have held

that a transfer “can be the equivalent of a demotion, and thus constitute an 

adverse employment action . . . if the new position proves objectively worse –

such as being less prestigious or less interesting or providing less room for 

advancement.” Thompson v. City of Waco, Tex., 764 F.3d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 

2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

The district court found that Collins had offered no evidence that the 

Alternative School was objectively worse than Calloway. The court in its order

quoted a section in Collins’s brief where Collins had explained why he believed 

the Alternative School was a demotion. Though the court was “inclined to 

believe” the statements, it held that such statements were not evidence usable 

on summary judgment. Arguments in briefs, like allegations in a complaint, 

are assertions, not evidence. Rule 56 requires that claimed facts be supported 

by citations “to particular parts of materials in the record, including 

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or 

declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other 

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materials[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A non-movant must “go beyond the 

pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial . . . .” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). Collins did not cite to the record for support on the

question of whether the Alternative School was “objectively worse.”2 

Furthermore, we have held that to establish causation on retaliation 

claims, “temporal proximity must be very close.” Gorman v. Verizon Wireless 

Tex., L.L.C., 753 F.3d 165, 171 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Close 

temporal proximity is lacking here, as Collins was transferred to the 

Alternative School more than nine months after the District was notified of the 

Title IX complaint. Id. (finding a lack of causation where ten months separated 

the protected activity and the adverse employment action). The district court 

properly dismissed this claim.

The district court dismissed Collins’s retaliation claim based on the 

nonrenewal of his contract due to a lack of argument on the issue in his 

response to the District’s motion for summary judgment. “Although we 

liberally construe the briefs of pro se appellants, we also require that 

arguments must be briefed to be preserved.” Price v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 

F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). On appeal, Collins refers 

in passing to the nonrenewal of his contract once in his initial brief and once 

2 Collins argues in his reply brief that the District conceded in its Answer that the 

Alternative School does not offer extracurricular activities and serves as a learning 

alternative for students with adjustment difficulties and disciplinary problems. Regardless 

of whether an Answer could be relied upon by the plaintiff on summary judgment, Collins 

did not refer to the Answer in the district court. Rule 56(c)(1)(A) requires that parties refer 

the court to the relevant sections of the record. A district court is required to review on 

summary judgment only those portions of the record identified by the parties. Celotex, 477 

U.S. at 324. We note that the motion may be “opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary 

materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves . . . .” Id.

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in his reply, and provides argument in neither. Thus, he has abandoned this 

argument on appeal. 

II. State-law claims

The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

Collins’s state-law claims because, once his retaliation claims were dismissed, 

there were “not any pending federal law claims.” Because it is our “general 

rule that courts should decline supplemental jurisdiction when all federal 

claims are dismissed or otherwise eliminated from a case,” the district court’s 

dismissal of the state-law claims without prejudice is affirmed. See Certain 

Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Warrantech Corp., 461 F.3d 568, 578 (5th 

Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).

AFFIRMED.

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