J-A02041-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

CLARA BROCK IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

AXA EQUITABLE LIFE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, CHRISTOPHER CONDRON, 

ANDERS MALMSTROM, EILEEN STASSA, 

MARY THOMAS, DANIEL J. ZUCKER, 

DRINKER BIDDLE & REACH, AND 

MARSHALL DENNEHEY WAGNER 

COLEMAN & GOGGIN

Appellees No. 1687 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Orders Entered April 23, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No: February Term, No. 2014 00855

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and WECHT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED APRIL 17, 2015

Appellant, Clara Brock, appeals pro se from the orders of the 

Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, granting Appellees’ 

motion to dismiss; dismissing Appellees Daniel J. Zucker, Esq., and Marshall 

Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin from this matter with prejudice; and 

barring Appellant from future litigation without leave of court. We affirm.

Brock appeals from the dismissal of her third pro se action filed against 

the same parties alleging extrinsic fraud in the maintenance of her whole 

term life insurance policy. This allegation is related to the same claims she 

raised against the same parties in two prior actions. The first action, 
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commenced on February 9, 2011, was filed against Appellee AXA based on 

claims of breach of contract and misrepresentation about her life insurance 

policy. It was dismissed after a bench trial. Her second action, commenced 

October 22, 2012, was filed against all Appellees and was based on claims of 

fraud, perjury, conspiracy to commit perjury, and judge tampering. That 

action was dismissed with prejudice after the trial court granted Appellees’ 

motion for summary judgment. For a more detailed recitation of the facts 

and procedural history leading up to this appeal, we direct the parties to the 

trial court’s detailed Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 

dated 7/25/14, at 1-6.

Brock avers here that the trial court erred in dismissing her case and 

barring her from further filings. She does not state a basis for the error, but 

summarily concludes, after reiterating her various allegations of fraud 

committed by Appellees, that the trial court order “must be rendered void, 

vacated.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. 

We need not reach the merits of Brock’s contention. Her appellate brief 

consists of general statements unsupported by discussion or citation to any 

legal authority as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119.1 

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1 Rule 2119(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provides: 

“The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to 

be argued; and shall have ... such discussion and citation of authorities as 

are deemed pertinent. 
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The Rules of Appellate Procedure state unequivocally that each 

question an appellant raises is to be supported by discussion and 

analysis of pertinent authority. Appellate arguments which fail to 

adhere to these rules may be considered waived, and arguments 

which are not appropriately developed are waived. Arguments 

not appropriately developed include those where the party has 

failed to cite any authority in support of a contention. This Court 

will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf 

of an appellant. [M]ere issue spotting without analysis or legal 

citation to support an assertion precludes our appellate review of 

[a] matter.

Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088-89 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal 

denied, 403 WAL 2014 (Pa. filed Dec. 10, 2014) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted).

Brock has failed to provide meaningful discussion of or citation to 

statutory or case law, and she has not otherwise developed or analyzed any 

issues that could be manifest in her allegations of fraud and trial court error. 

“The lack of analysis precludes meaningful appellate review.” Id. at 1089. 

Because Brock fails to provide any discussion of legal authority or even a 

coherent argument enabling us to determine the basis for her appeal, we 

conclude Brock’s appeal is waived.2

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2

“A pro se litigant is granted the same rights, privileges and considerations 

as those accorded a party represented by counsel; however, pro se status 

does not entitle a party to any particular advantage because of his or her 

lack of legal training.” First Union Mortg. Corp. v. Frempong, 744 A.2d 

327, 333 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citation omitted). We have warned that “any 

person choosing to represent h[er]self in a legal proceeding must, to a 

reasonable extent, assume that h[er] lack of expertise and legal training will 

be h[er] undoing.” Wilkins v. Marsico, 903 A.2d 1281, 1285 (Pa. Super. 

2006) (citation omitted). 
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Even if Brock had not waived her appeal, and if we were to presume 

that she was challenging the trial court’s application of Rule 233.1 to support 

its dismissal, we would deny relief.3 As the trial court noted, Pa.R.C.P. 233.1 

“was promulgated to stem a noted increase in serial lawsuits of dubious 

merit filed by pro se litigants disaffected by prior failures to secure relief for 

injuries they perceived but could not substantiate.” Trial Court Opinion at 6 

(quoting Gray v. Buonopane, 53 A.3d 829 (Pa. Super. 2012)). Rule 233.1 

provides:

Upon the filing of an action by a pro se plaintiff, a defendant may 

file a motion to dismiss a pending action provided that (1) the 

pro se plaintiff is alleging the same or related claims against the 

same or related defendants, and (2) the claims have already 

been resolved pursuant to a settlement agreement or a court 

proceeding. The new rule also gives the trial court discretion to 

bar the pro se litigant from filing further litigation against the 

same or related defendants raising the same or related claims 

without leave of court.

Pa.R.C.P. 233.1

The trial court here noted:

Appellant has litigated all claims regarding the funds within her 

Whole Life Insurance Policy and her attempts to collect them. 

One of her suits was fully adjudicated in a bench trial, the other 

dragged on through a year of pleadings before summary 

judgment was granted. In the instant case, despite Appellant’s 

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3 A challenge to the applicability of Pa.R.C.P. 233.1 presents a question of 

law. Our standard of review when considering a challenge to the 

applicability of Pa.R.C.P. 233.1 is de novo. See Sigall v. Serrano, 17 A.3d 

946, 949 (Pa. Super. 2011). We review an order granting a motion to 

dismiss for an abuse of discretion. See id. Our scope of review in both 

instances is plenary. See id.
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attempts to reframe the issue in the complaint as “extrinsic 

fraud,” it is clear from the pleadings that both the issues and the 

parties are the same.

Trial Court Opinion at 7.

Our review of the certified record, the parties’ briefs, and the lower 

court’s opinion, supports the dismissal of this action and the bar to 

Appellant’s future litigation without leave of the court. Accordingly, if we 

had not found waiver, we would adopt the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion 

as our own in support of our affirmance.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/17/2015