J. A26001/15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF H.D.V., 

A MINOR

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: T.M.R., MOTHER, : No. 720 MDA 2015

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Order Entered March 23, 2015,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County

Orphans’ Court Division at No. 67 ADOPT 2014

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT AND PLATT,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 05, 2015

T.M.R. (“Mother”) appeals from the order granting the petition filed by 

T.A.H., her great aunt (“Aunt”), which sought to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to her 14-year-old daughter, H.D.V. (“Child”), 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2) and (b) of the Adoption Act, 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2) and (b). We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

Child has lived with Aunt since 2004. (Notes of testimony, 11/14/14 at 6.) 

A custody order was entered on November 18, 2004, establishing primary 

physical custody with Aunt. (Id.) Mother and C.M.V. (“Father”)1agreed to 

this order; the order did not provide a set schedule of visitation and/or 

 

* Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

Father has filed a separate appeal at No. 778 MDA 2015 from the trial 

court’s order terminating his parental rights.
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partial custody for the parents. Mother and Father never married; however, 

they were in a 12-year relationship and are the parents of two other 

children, ages 7 and 8, who reside with Mother. (Notes of testimony, 

3/12/15 at 32-33.) Mother has maintained some form of contact with Child; 

such as, texting, and seeing her at family dinners and holidays.

After ending her relationship with Father, Mother married T.R. (Notes 

of testimony, 11/14/14 at 44-45.) At the time of the November 14, 2014 

hearing in this matter, Mother, T.R., and her other two minor children were 

homeless and living in a shelter called Carlisle CARES. (Id. at 44.) Mother 

testified she has two jobs. She is employed by Med Staffers; she goes into 

homes to provide home health care. (Id. at 79.) She has been employed in 

this capacity for a little over a year. (Id.) Mother has had a second job for 

two months. (Id.) Mother stated she is employed through EMS and cleans 

at Amazon.2 (Id.)

According to Aunt, Mother has never provided financial support or 

taken an active role in Child’s life. (Id. at 11, 13.) Aunt pays for Child’s 

private school tuition as well as health insurance. (Id.) Aunt takes Child to 

doctors’ appointments. (Id.) Even though Aunt has taken on the role of 

Mother for Child, Aunt has asked Mother to become more involved in Child’s 

life, but Mother has chosen not to. During the summer of 2014, Aunt 

applied for a passport for Child. During that process, Aunt had to contact 

 

2 No details were provided regarding EMS or Amazon.
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Mother and Father and ask for their cooperation. The parents ultimately 

complied. However, after Aunt realized she had to “go through hoops” to 

get the passport, she decided “it was time” that she adopted Child. (Id. at 

22.)

Aunt filed petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother and Father’s 

parental rights on August 7, 2014. Hearings were held on November 14, 

2014, and March 12, 2015. The trial court entered an opinion and order 

dated March 23, 2015, terminating the parents’ rights. Mother filed a timely 

notice of appeal along with a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The trial court filed a 

Rule 1925(a) opinion on May 27, 2015.

On appeal, Mother raises the following questions for our review:

1. Was the trial court’s decision to terminate the 

parental rights of Mother due to failure to 

perform parental duties under 

section 2511(a)(1) supported by sufficient 

evidence where, Mother took actions to 

maintain contact with the child, and perform 

parental duties, and her attempts to maintain 

contact and perform her duties were denied by 

the Petitioner?

2. Did the trial court make the necessary 

determination that the termination of parental 

rights would serve the best interests of the 

child, taking into primary consideration the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of the child?

3. Was the trial court’s decision to terminate the 

parental rights of Mother supported by clear 

and convincing evidence where there was no 
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consideration of child’s developmental, physical 

and emotional needs and welfare, the parents 

did not cause the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence, and the 

incapacity of Mother to remedy the situation 

was caused by environmental factors beyond 

her control?

Mother’s brief at 4.

We will address Mother’s issues together as they are interrelated. 

Basically, Mother asserts the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental 

rights under Section 2511(a)(1) and (b) was not supported by sufficient 

evidence. We review Mother’s appeal in accordance with the following 

standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s 

determination of a petition for termination of 

parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported

by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 

1179, 1190 (2010). If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if 

the trial court made an error of law or abused its 

discretion. Id.[] As has been often stated, an abuse 

of discretion does not result merely because the 

reviewing court might have reached a different 

conclusion. Id.[] Instead, a decision may be 

reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon 

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] 

discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for 

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in 

these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, 

appellate courts are not equipped to make the 
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fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where 

the trial judges are observing the parties during the 

relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous 

other hearings regarding the child and parents. 

[Id.] Therefore, even where the facts could support 

an opposite result, as is often the case in 

dependency and termination cases, an appellate 

court must resist the urge to second guess the trial 

court and impose its own credibility determinations 

and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported 

by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are 

not the result of an error of law or an abuse of 

discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012) (some citations 

omitted).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa.Super. 2009). “The 

standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so 

clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to 

a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in 

issue.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Here, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(1) and (b). We will focus on those subsections.

Section 2511 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in 

regard to a child may be terminated after a 

petition filed on any of the following grounds:
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(1) The parent by conduct continuing 

for a period of at least six months 

immediately preceding the filing of 

the petition either has evidenced a 

settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform 

parental duties. 

. . . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give 

primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control 

of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), 

the court shall not consider any efforts by the 

parent to remedy the conditions described 

therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

We have explained this court’s review of a challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence to support the involuntary termination of a parent’s rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) as follows:

To satisfy the requirements of 

section 2511(a)(1), the moving party must produce 

clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained 

for at least the six months prior to the filing of the 

termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to

relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or 

failure to perform parental duties.
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. . . .

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform 

parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental rights, the court must engage in three lines 

of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her 

conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between 

parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect 

of termination of parental rights on the child 

pursuant to Section 2511(b).

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citations omitted).

Under Section 2511(b), we must inquire whether the termination of 

Mother’s parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of Child. See In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 

1286-1287 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, sub nom. C.M.S. v. 

D.E.H., Jr., 897 A.2d 1183 (Pa. 2006); see also In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 

1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (stating that “the court must take into account 

whether a bond exists between child and parent, and whether termination 

would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.”). 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d at 

1287 (citation omitted). We must also discern the nature and status of the 

parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of 

permanently severing that bond. Id.

The focus in terminating parental rights under Section 2511(a) is on 

the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b). In re 

Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc). “In 
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cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, 

it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond 

analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the 

particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-763 (Pa.Super. 2008).

Instantly, regarding the considerations set forth in Section 2511(a)(1), 

the trial court found that while the parents may not have evidenced a 

“settled purpose” of relinquishing their claim, it is “manifest” that Mother 

and Father failed to perform parental duties for longer than the six months 

prior to the filing of the petition. (Trial court opinion, 3/23/15 at 2.) The 

trial court stated as follows:

There is no dispute that [Aunt] has cared for 

[Child] for at least the past eleven years. Nor, is 

there any question that the child desires to be 

adopted by [Aunt]. The initial custody arrangement 

was pursuant to an agreement between the parties, 

and neither parent has ever taken formal action to 

assume a greater role in their daughter’s life. In 

fact, they have not only acceded to the order, they 

have abdicated all responsibility. The fact that 

[Aunt] is a relative and that she has clearly been 

better able to care for [Child] does not alleviate their 

obligation to perform basic parental duties.

Id. at 1.

Mother contends that while her efforts to maintain contact with Child 

“were not Herculean,” she argues her personal situation should be taken into 

account. (Mother’s brief at 10.) It was undisputed that Mother has 

struggled throughout her adult life. Mother lost her home two years ago and 

was still living in a shelter. (Id. at 69.) Mother admitted she had credit 
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problems. (Id.) Mother also has had problems maintaining an automobile. 

(Id. at 14, 67.) Mother’s financial plight along with Father’s physical 

condition3 were documented and may have prevented them from providing a 

home for Child. However, these conditions do not excuse their utter failure 

to perform any parental duties or show Child even the most basic parental 

love and emotional support. Other than attending family gatherings on the 

holidays and the occasional Christmas play at Child’s school, Mother has 

done nothing to show any type of parental involvement in Child’s life.

We believe the following exchange between Aunt’s counsel and Mother 

is telling:

Q. How much of a priority have you made it to 

have a strong relationship with [Child] and be 

involved in her life?

[Mother:] I make it a point to text her a couple of 

times each month. I make it a point to -- I 

might not make it a point to call, but she’s flat 

out told me that she prefers to text.

Notes of testimony, 11/14/14 at 70.

This court has emphasized that a parent does not perform his or her 

parental duties by displaying a “merely passive interest in the development 

of the child.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal 

denied, 872 A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005). We have explained:

[T]his court has held that the parental obligation is a 

positive duty which requires affirmative 

performance.

 

3

Father has spina bifida and is confined to a wheelchair.
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This affirmative duty encompasses more than 

a financial obligation; it requires continuing interest

in the child and a genuine effort to maintain 

communication and association with the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, 

parental duty requires that a parent exert himself to 

take and maintain a place of importance in the 

child’s life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act 

affirmatively with good faith interest and effort, and 

not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the 

parent-child relationship to the best of his or her 

ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent

must utilize all available resources to preserve the 

parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable 

firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of 

maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental 

rights are not preserved by waiting for a more 

suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with 

. . . her physical and emotional needs.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

Mother attempts to blame Aunt for not facilitating more contact 

between her and Child. (Mother’s brief at 10.) Initially, we note Mother 

failed to seek legal help to secure visitation or a partial custody schedule if 

that is what she desired. At no time over the course of the last ten years did 

Mother seek assistance from the court system. 

The record shows Aunt facilitated the parents’ involvement in Child’s 

life by accommodating Father’s disability with her handicap-accessible 

vehicle, welcoming Mother and Child’s two siblings into her home for meals 

and housing, and providing financial assistance to Mother throughout 
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Mother’s economic setbacks. (Notes of testimony, 11/14/14 at 19-20, 62; 

3/12/15 at 65.) Evidently, Mother was content with this arrangement until 

Aunt filed the petition for termination of parental rights.

Our review of the record supports the trial court’s determination that 

Mother has failed to perform parental duties for the past 11 years and has 

abdicated her responsibility to act as a parent to Child. In determining that 

Aunt had sustained her burden under Section 2511(a)(1), we discern no 

error of law or abuse of discretion by the trial court.

Next, we turn our attention to Section 2511(b) to determine if the trial 

court properly found that termination was in the best interest of Child. With 

respect to Section 2511(b), this court has explained the requisite analysis as 

follows:

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether 

termination of parental rights would best serve the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 

1284, 1287 (Pa.Super.2005), this Court stated, 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and 

stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs 

and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed 

that the trial court must also discern the nature and 

status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently 

severing that bond. Id. However, in cases where 

there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and 

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. 

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa.Super. 

2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect 

analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of 

the particular case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010).
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When Mother was asked to describe her bond with Child, she replied, 

“I realize it could be better, but I do enjoy speaking with her. [Child] is very 

-- she’s a very intelligent young lady.” (Notes of testimony, 11/14/14 at 

76.) 

In its analysis of Section 2511(b), the trial court explained:

Although the words “best interests of the child” 

were not found in our brief opinion and order, let 

there be no doubt that we found the termination to 

serve just that purpose. Indeed, to force a 14 year 

old to remain legally tethered against her strongest 

desires to parents with whom she shares only a 

biological connection would be a disservice to her 

and to the law. [Child]’s sole parental bond is with 

[Aunt], her great aunt and the petitioner.

The fact that [Aunt] has no one to step in to 

care for the child should [Aunt] be incapacitated, as 

argued by parents, misses the inescapably sad point 

of this case -- [Child] is already a de facto orphan 

with respect to her biological parents and neither of 

them are capable of ever stepping into any breach 

that might occur. Frankly, we doubt [Child] would 

want them to and are more confident in her abilities 

to meet her needs. We will not cower in the murky 

shadow of this red herring. Clearly, the best 

interests of [Child] are served by this termination 

and the subsequent formal adoption by the only 

source of care and support she has ever known.

Trial court opinion, 5/27/15 at 2-3.

Here, our review of the record indicates there is competent evidence to 

support the trial court’s decision that termination of Mother’s parental rights 

best serves Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare. Mother has failed to put herself in a position to develop a parental 
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bond with Child. While Mother seeks credit for “putting her child first” and 

“selflessly ensur[ing] her child was safe and stable” by allowing Aunt to have 

custody of Child, the trial court saw that differently. Simply stated, Mother 

allowed Aunt to raise her child while taking no part in Child’s upbringing. 

Seeing Child a few times a year at family dinners and texting Child once or 

twice a month evinces Mother’s abdication of a parental role in Child’s life. 

Moreover, the trial court found the Child is bonded with Aunt and 

wants to be adopted by her. As such, we find that it was appropriate for the 

trial court to determine that the termination of Mother’s parental rights 

would not have a detrimental effect on Child and would be in Child’s best 

interest. In consideration of these circumstances and our careful review of 

the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or 

commit an error of law in finding competent evidence to support the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights to Child under Section 2511(b).

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s 

order involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).
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Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/5/2015