1 On Janua ry 1, 2005, the na

me of the Illinois Industrial C ommission was changed to th e Illi nois Work ers ’ Comp ensa tio n Comm is sion. See 820 ILCS 305/1(c ) (West 2 004). Docket No. 102723.



### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STA TE OF IL LINOIS

DON ALD D. R OBE RS ON, App ell ee, v. T HE IN DUS TR IA L COMMISSION (

P.I. & I . Motor Express, Inc., Appellant).

Opinion filed March 22, 2007.

JUSTICE FITZG ERALD delivered the judg ment of t he court , with opinion. Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Freem an, Kilbride, Garman, Karmeier, and Burke conc urred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

Do nald Roberson filed a claim for benefits under the Workers ’ Compensation Act (see

820 I LCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2004)) after he

was injured

whi le d eli ver in g a l oad of s tee l co il s fo r P. I. & I. Motor Express, Inc. (P.I. & I

. ). An arbitrator denied this claim, and the Illinois Industrial Commission 1 reversed the arbitrator’s decision, finding an employment rela tionship between Roberson and P.I. &

I.,

as well as a

causal r elationsh ip betwee n Roberson’s injury

and his work. The circuit court of Montgom ery Cou nty reversed the Commission’s decision, and the appellate court reversed the trial-2- court’s decision (No. 5–05–0279WC (unpublished o rde r under Su preme Court

Rule 23)), concluding that the Commission’s decision

was not against the manifest weight of the evidenc e. For the reasons that follow, we af

firm.

BACKGROUND Roberson worked for

P.I. & I . as an employee

truck driver

from March to May 2000, whe

n he bought his own truck. On May 15, 2000, Roberson signed an “I NDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR CONTRACT” with P.I. & I. Under the contrac t, Roberso

n would receive 78% of the gross re venue received by

P.I. & I . for each

load inexchang e for the

servic es of a driv er and the equipme nt listed in Appendix A to the cont

ract –nam ely , his t

ruck . App endi x A provided: “P. I. & I. MOTOR EXPRESS, I NC. hereby r

ece ipts forthe equipment hereinafter described, this rece iptbeing executed pursuant to [feder al regul ations] and to the exten

t as there in spec ifieda nd directed P.I . & I . MOTOR EX PRESS, I NC. shallduring t

he durat ion of this rec eipt have the exclusive possession, control and

use of the equipment and to the extent required by the Motor Carrier Act, P.I. & I . MOTOR EXPRESS, INC. shall be deemed to have assumed c omplete responsi bility for the operation of the equipment in the transportation

of the commodities; provided however, that this receip t shall

not affect the legal

relations between P.I. & I. MOTOR EXPRESS, INC. and the Contractor, his agents or employees

as set forth in this Independent Contractor Contract to which this receipt is an appendix ***.” Robersonwas responsible for all costs an d expenses associated with operating his truck, including fue l, to lls, license plates, and taxes. The cont

ract pe rmitted Rob erso n to have employe es, and he

was required to have worker’s compensation insurance coverage f

or himself an d a ny e mploy ees. The contract contained an opti on to obtain such cov erage

through P.I. & I. Rob erson al so was re quired to have liability

insuranc e cover

age. T he contr ac t provided that Robe rsonmust maintain and operate the equipment in complianc e with a ll applicable laws and regulations, notify P.I. & I . of any accide nts, and coo per ate wit h P .I. & I. in investigating any accide nts.-3- At its discretion, P.I. &I. could advance monies to Roberson or pay for items which were his responsibility; such monies would then be deducted

from Roberson’s weekly

settleme nts. Upon “

reasona ble request,” P.I. &

I. c ould ag

ree to “trip lease,” or broker, Roberson’s truck to another

motor carrier, in accordance with federal regulations and on t hre e co ndi ti ons : (1 ) th e ot her mo to r ca rri er a ppe are d on P. I. & I.’s approved list; (2) Roberson obtained a release number

fro m P .I. & I. before the trip; and

(3) P.I. & I . had no freight available to load. If these conditions were not met, P.I. & I . would not ag ree to tri p lease the truck. The contract specifically

provided that it was “not intend e d to

crea te an employee

/employer re l ationship” between Roberson and P.I

. & I., a nd f

urt her th at P .I. & I. “shall have no direction or control” of Roberson“except in the results to be obtained.” The parties agr ee d that the contract should be “ interpre ted in ac cordanc e with this expressed intent.” Either party c o ul d terminate the contract at any time upon written notice. Appendix C to the con

tr actwas an “EQUIPMENT A ND SERVICES TO INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR CONTRACT” unde r which Roberson leased a trailer from P.I . & I. Roberson w a s required to pay as re

nt 10% of the revenue re ce iv ed by P.I. & I . for each load. He was further required to opera te the trailer

in compliance with all app li cab le l aws and reg ul ati ons , an d t o no ti fy P. I. & I. of any accide nts. Robersonwas resp onsible for all expenses as sociate d with the trailer, except for “normal scheduled preventative maintenance,” and he agreed to follow P .I . & I .’s mainte nance sc hedules. This contr ac tprovided that any se rvice and repair of the trailer must be performed

accord ing to P.I . & I .’s instru

ctions, by P.I. & I. or at its de si gn at ed fa ci li ty. OnJanuary 5, 2001, Roberson left home for P .I. & I.’s

Granite City terminal to pick up a load. He then d rove to B ethlehe

m Steel in northwe st Ind iana, unloaded the vehicle, and reloaded it with two large steel co ils. The c oils were covered with a tar p and sec ured with chains and ratchet binders. I nstead of deli vering these coils to Red Bud, Illinois, Roberson

returne d home because he was experiencing mechanical problems

with his truck. Roberson advised P.I. & I . of the de la y, and P.I. & I . instructed him to deliver the load as soon as possible. On J anu ary 1 1, h e le ft h om e to del iv er t he l oad . In Red Bud,-4- Robersonremoved the tarp and chains from the steel coils, and began to unfasten the ratchet binders. A s he was pushi ng on a r atchet, it gave way . Roberson tumbled f orward , fell into

the side of one of the

co ils , and lande d on his bac k. Robers on felt pa

in, but con

tinued to work, be lieving

that it wou

ld go awa y. T hough he intended to sleep in his truck at P.I. & I .’s terminal and pick up a new load the nex t da y, Roberson’s pain increased, and he ag ain r etur ned h ome. The n ext morni ng, he visited an emergen cy r oom, compl aining o f pain in h is lower back, shoul der, an d neck , and n umbn ess in his ri ght leg. Emergency

room rec ords indic ate that R oberson i njured hi s back

w hile unloading his truck. According to the initial nurse evalua t io n form, as Roberson was removing a load with a ratche t binder , th e binder “let go, ” and

Roberson twisted his body. He fe lt a “pull and pop” in his lowe

r back, a nd pain we

nt up his b ack

to his neck. As time passed, the pain got worse. Roberson told the nurse, “I t feels like Ihad the crap beat out of me.” His back was tender, and he could not lay down on it. An X ray

of his back revealed

no abnormalities, and the i nitial diagnosis of the emergency room doctor was “acute bac k and neck strain with spasm.” Roberson was given pain medica tion, including Vicodin and Flexeril, advised to see his own physician, and instructed to stay off wor

k until January 15. OnJanuary 12, Robers on visited Dr. Assa Maye rsdorf, a

ne urologi st

with whom he had mad e an app ointment be fore th e accident to discuss nonconvulsive seizure episodes. Dr. May ers dorf’s office notes indicated that “[i]n the last two days,” Rob erso n had taken Vicodin and Flexeril “b ecause of low back pain which happene d when he

slept [ sic ] in the truck.” OnJanuary 15, Roberson visited his phy sician, Dr. Jose Ville gas. Inhis evidence deposition, Dr. Villegas stated that Roberson claimed he injured his shoulder and back four day s earlier while ratcheting

a load of steel. Roberson had stiffness and genera lizedpain in the lower back area, as well a s num bness in hi s righ t leg. Dr. Villegas’ initial d iagno sis was lumbosacral spine and cervical neck stra in. Dr. Villegas again examined Roberson on January 29, 2001. Roberson stated that his pain had continued and had bec ome more localized. He had trouble sleeping and

expe rience d tinglin

g and nu mbness in h

is legs. Dr. Villegas ordered phy sical therapy and a CT scan. According to Dr. Villegas, the CT scan showed that Roberson had a he rniated-5- disc inhis lower back, which was consistent with his symptoms. Dr. Villegas re e xamined Roberson on February 9 and 28, 2001. On February 9, Roberson showed

improvement, and on February 28, he had no back pain and

was rea dy t o resume work. Dr. Villegas opined that there was a causal relationship between Robe rson ’s acc ident at work and his b ack pain: “I have n’t seen Mr. Roberson for any prior history of back problems. *** And b ec ause of the symptoms and phy si cal findi ngs and

the CT ca

n, it seems

to corre late wel l to his back injury.” Robersonfiled a worker’ s compens a tion c laim on February 8, 2001. At the ar

bitration hearing , Roberson testifie d rega rding hi s relation ship with P.I. & I . Accord ing to R oberson, he would telephone P.I. & I . each morn in g to see if any loads were available. Before Roberson

began hauling a lo ad, P .I. &

I. re quired hi

m to perform pretrip inspections, and to keep and turn in a logbook bear ing P. I. & I.’s name a

nd logo. Roberson asserted that on several occasions P. I. & I. had

given him a “hot load” to deliver and return back as quickly as he could. Robersonacknowledged that he could choose his routes a nd where to obtain fuel or r epa irs . P .I. & I. provided him a debit ca rd that he could use at any tr

uck stop to buy fuel, pay

for repairs, o r obtain cash advanc es, and these expen ses were later de ducted f

rom his weekly settleme nts. Acc ording t

o Roberson, P.I . & I . helped h im

secure “bobtail

and dea d head” liability insurance coverage, a

nd the premiumswere a

lso deducted from his se tt le me nt s. Ad di ti on al ly, before the accident P.I. & I . d educt ed workers’ compensation insurance coverage premiums from his settlements. Robersonstated that P. I. & I. stopped

withholding taxes from his settlements after he entered the independent contractor contract. P.I . & I. provided a

camera with which to photog raph an accident scene or a da maged load. Robersonfurther stated

that once he started driving for P.I . & I., he did not make delive rie s for other trucking companies. He explained that he could have obtained authorization to haul loads for other companies, but that “[t]here w as just so much paperwork *** you just didn’t do it.” On direct examination, Roberson stated that he worked for three other tru

cking c ompanies

in 2000 be fore he

became

a P.I . & I . employ

ee. On cross-exa

mination, R

oberson state d h e-6- actually worked f or two of t

hose comp anies–Ca stle Tru cking, Inc., and AMS, LL C–after he entered the independent contra ctor contract with P.I. & I . Roberson also acknowledged that in 1992 he filed a worker’s compensation

claim for a lower back injury sustained while workingfor another trucki ng c ompany. Roberson’s applica tion asserted that his lower

back and left leg were injure d while lifting and mounting a truck tire, resulting in a “probable rupture d disc wi t h radiculopathy.”

That claim was denied. P. I. & I. perfor

med an annual rev iew of Roberson’s work. A Sep tember 17, 2001, l etter fr om P.I . & I . Safety

Director Patty Caldwell congratulated Roberson

on his profess ionalism a

nd quality effort. A copy of

this letter was placed i

n Roberson’s “personnel fi le for future reference.” A

December 3, 2001, l etter fr om Cardwe ll informed Roberson

that his ind

epende nt con tractor’s contract had been cancelled by

P.I. & I . effective November 30, 2001. P. I. & I. pr

esented the evide nce dep osition of i

ts president, Joseph Kerola. Kerola explained: “Independent

contractors in our

industry are g entlemen who

ownthei r own tractors or tractors and trailers. We pay them

a percentage of the re

venue they generate to provide the tractor, the trailer. They’re also res ponsible, they

purchas e their own

license plates, pay their own

fuel taxes, buy their own fue l, their own tires, tarps, maintenanc e. T he money we pay them, whic

h is

ona 1 09 9, is ve ry s imply the ir perc entage , and they pay all their own bills for that out of the money we pay the

m. As an independent

contractor, that i s a *** long -term le ase to us, they primarily, then, work f

or us. There’s nothing in there that prohibits them fromworking for other people as long as they let us know, and

that’s done because the Department of Transportation

requires a mot or car

rier, a licensed motor carrie rto k eep cer

tain rec ords as f

ar as dr iver’s li censes, random drug or alcohol t ests and some othe

r things like that, so they need to be le ased to a motor carrier primarily . *** Also, the work we have, if they choose not to work for

a week or so, the n they can c

hoose not to do that. They are totally their own boss.”-7- Kerola stated that when Roberson worked as an employ

ee dri ver , P .I. & I. had “100-percent control” over his work. B ut as an independent contractor, Robersonwas an “inde pendent b usinessma

n,” makin g his own deci sions. Kerola agreed that employ

ee drivers area ma

jo r ex pen se. P. I. & I. has very

few employe e drivers–“one or two at the most”–and 150 independent

con tra cto rs. P. I. & I. also has very f ew trucks, preferring instead to lease them from independent contractors. Ker ola stated that P. I. & I. require s only

that its ind epende

nt contra ctors comply

with Department

of T ran spo rta ti on ( DOT ) re gul ati ons , t hou gh P .I. & I. does ask its drivers “to call in daily to report their status.” According

to Kerola, P.I. & I . does not require independent contracto rs t o wear u

niforms, a

nd they may fuel and repair their trucks at their

discretion. Their routes arealso left to their discretion, as long as they

deliver loads in a timely manne r and keep P.I. &

I.’s customers happy. Ker

ola added that when driver s ar e given a load, they are als o given

“the par ameters w ith which that load needs hauled.” The drivers may then acc ept or re

ject the l oad. “B ut if

they accept it,” s tate d Ker

ola, “we e

xp ect them to follow standard procedures

. ” On this point, Kerola distinguished employe es from independent

contractors. P.I. & I . takes some control over the routes that employ ee or company

drivers take; to a degree, these drivers would be “dire cted on w

hat route s are ac ceptabl e and una ccepta ble because of the relationship with them and them driving a truck [ fo r which] we are

buy ing the f

uel, pay ing the t

olls, pay ing th e
m aintenance. We want to make sure it runs in the lanes a

nd route s that we feel arethe most economical.” Indepe ndent contractors do not receive such sug gestion s. Some independent contractors would take the same routes; some would not. Kerola stated tha

t indepen dent cont ractor s d o not need written permissionfor trip l eases. Becau se P.I . & I . is the “primary lease” and keeps records of its drivers, independent contractors mu st not ify P .I. & I. tha t they wish to work

for another company . P.I. & I . then sends

a form to that company stating that the driver’s records are in i ts possession and in order. Kerola further stated that drive rs primar i ly leased to P.I. & I ., like Roberson, are required by the DOT to keep a logbook, so the DOT can

determine whethe

r they are com ply ing with regulations regarding “hours of service.” P.I. &

I. tries to ensure that-8- its drivers–both e mp loyees and i ndepend ent contr actors–satisfy

these regula tions. “If not,” stated Ker

ola, “we do what we need to do to get them in compliance.” P. I. & I. does not withhold t ax es for independe nt contra ctors. According

to Kerola, P.I. & I . offers independent contractors the opportuni ty to partic ipate in c erta in pr og ra ms to sa ve th em mo ne y. Independent

contracto rs may

purchase occupational hazard insurance coverage, as well as equ ip men t i nsu ran ce c ove rag e, t hro ugh P. I. & I. Ke rola described these as “pass-through” programs; the insure r
covers the inde pen dent contractors directly ; P.I. & I . simply groups them tog ether to

obtain mor

e affor dable coverag e for the

m. P. I. & I. also prese

nted the evidence deposition of its regional manager , Charles B utts. Butt s stated that when Ro berson w as a

n employee driver, he was r

equired to repor t to work between 8 and 10 o’clock each morning. When he became an inde pendent contractor, he was not required

to repor t to work. Employees c an refuse one load; independent

cont ractors can refuse any load. Employees ar

e instructed where to obt ain fuel; independent contractors are not because they buy their own fuel. Accord

ing to Butts, once employe es d eliver their loads, they must report ba ck to the P.I. & I . termina l

. Independent

contractors are not required to d o so. But ts stated that P. I. & I. specifies

routes for its employee s, but notfor its independent contractors. According

to Butts , Ro ber son was pri mar il y lea sed to P. I. & I. That is, Roberson’s primary business wa s with P.I. & I . Butts insisted that P.I. & I. do es not re quir e pretr ip inspections, but the DOT do es– for any drivers , both empl oye es and ind epende nt contra ctors. The DOT also requires independent cont r actors to post logos of the company for which they

are driving on their trucks. Like Kerola, Butts insisted that P.I. & I . did not enfo rce the contract provision requiringwritten p ermission for trip leases. Roberson was “required to or asked

to call in and

just tell us that he was going to” trip lease. Butts stated tha t the an nual review was required by P.I. & I .’s liability insurer to deter mine whet

her it s dri vers had valid licenses and any unrepor

ted tickets or accidents. P.I. & I. was required by

the DOT to insure any truck, w hether owned by

the compa ny or an independent

contractor. Other insuranc e– cargo or worker’s-9- compensa tio n–wo uld

be the responsibility of the indepe ndent contractor. The arbitrator found that

Roberson was not P.I. & I .’s employee and that his injury was not work-r elated. The Industrial Commission

r eversed. Relying on Ware v. Industrial Comm’n , 318 Ill. App. 3d 1117 (2000), the Commission found that P.I. & I . “both had and exercised a right to control [Roberson’ s] work activities.” Appendix A of the independent contractor con tract p rovided P. I. &

I. wi th exclusive possession, control and use of R oberson’s equipment, as required by federa l regul ations. Roberson was required to report any accide nts to P.I. & I . and to maintai n the trailer he leased according to P.I . & I .’s instru

ctions. The C ommission added that the record contained “other indi ci a of con trol.” The Commission first add ressed t he provis ion in th e parties’ contract

stating that P.I. &

I. shall have no direction or c ontrol

over the contr

actor “ except in the results to be obtained.” The Commission characterized this as “a significant exception” because it could be i

nterpre ted to m ean that an employer could dictate to a contractor

th e te rms of delivery, a nd Roberson testified that he received all of his d

elivery instructi ons f

rom P.I. & I . The Commission also noted

that, while Roberson

could “tr ip lease ” with P. I. & I.’s consent, he

opted to drive exclusively for P.I . & I. be cause its trip lease requirements were so o nerous. Roberson, thus, was pri mar il y lea sed to P. I. & I. The Commission further highlighted the fact that Roberson was required to display P.I . & I. logos on his equipment and to pe rform pretrip inspections. T h e Commission acknowl edged

that these require ments were imp os ed by DOT r egulations, but P.I. & I .’s compliance with these regulations did not diminish its control over Roberson’s work. The Commission also found tha t the services Robersonprovided f

or P.I . & I . constitu

ted a re gular p art of its business: “It is not

as if [Roberson] was an outside contractor brought into perform a special service.” The Commission finally likened the partie s’ relationship to employment at-will beca use the contract cou l d be terminated upon

written notice alone, absent any allega tion of its breach. Ad di ti on al ly, the Commission found that Robers on su ffered a work-related

injury . Roberson provide d “a ver y de taile d acc ount of-10- his accide

nt,” whic h was con sistent wit

h the history he gave at the emergency

room. The Co mmission stated that the “puzzling in co ns is te nc y” about whe ther Robe rso n’ s back pain was caused by sleepingin his truck was insufficient to defeat the entire claim. The C ommission awarded Roberson 7 3/7 weeks of temporary tot a l disability and $5,708 in medical ex penses, and further found 10% pe rm an en t d is ab il it y. P. I. & I. sought judicial re view. T he tria l court found that the Commission’s decision was against the man i fest weight of the evidence, and rein stated the arbitra tor’s de cision. Rob erso n

appealed, and t he appe llate court reversed. Regar ding the issue of whether Robersonwas P.I. &

I.’s employ

ee, the appellate court initially noted that this deter mination is

fact spe cific. T

he appe llate court stated that here “[t]he parties’ relationship contained elem e nts of both independent

contractor and employ

ment status. Factors such

a s th e manner

in which c laimant w as paid; the partie s’ labeling of their relat ionsh ip; claimant providing his own tractor and trailer; claimant pay

ing for his own expenses, such

as insuranc e and fue l; and the f act that c laimant c ould

refuse loads a nd choose his own routes indicate an independent contractor status

. Onthe other hand, there were signifi can t elements of control present here. Most importantly , the contract gave emp loyer exclusive possession, use, and control of th e equipmen t. Although the contra ct contained a caveat that such exclusive posses s ion did not affect the parties’ legal relationship, the caveat is merely a labelingprovision, which is a factor of

lesser w eight. The fact of exclusivity and c ontrol remained.” No. 5–05 –0 279WC (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appella

te court further noted tha

t P.I. & I. controlle d m any aspects of R obe rso n’s wor k. H e wa s re qui red to di spl ay P. I. & I. logos, to co mm un ic at e w it h P .I. & I. re gu la rl y, and to mee t P .I. & I.’s pick-up and delivery sc

hedul e. Acco rding to

the appe llate cou

rt, Robersondid not work for other companies because it was too much trouble: “The parties contract allowed [Roberson] to trip lease, but placed restrictions on his ability to do so. Notably, one condition of-11- trip leasing

was t hat no fre ight of employe r was available to load.” The appella

te court conclude d that this c ase was clos e, but the Commission’s finding of an employ ment relationship was not aga

inst the manifest weight of the evidence. Regarding

the issue o f whet her Roberson’s injury was workrelated, the appellate court again c oncluded that the Commission’s finding was not a

gainst t he manif est weig ht o f th e evidence. According

to the appella

te court , the Commis sion found that, des pite some inconsistenc ies in

Roberson’s version o f the eve nts leadin g to his injurie s, he esse

ntially gave a plausible accoun t of the a ccident

. Ondenial of rehearing, all five justices of the appellate panel filed

a s tateme nt that the case involves a substantial question warranting consideration

by this court. We allowed P.I. & I .’s petition for leave to appeal. See 210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

ANA LYSIS Inworker ’s compe

nsation c ases the

Indu strial Comm

ission is the ultimate decisionmaker. Cushi ng v. Industrial Comm’n , 50 Ill. 2d 179, 181-82 (1971). The Commission must weigh the evidence presented at the arbitration hearing and deter mine wh ere th e preponderanceof that evidence lies. See Steiner v. Industrial Comm’n , 10 1 Il l. 2d 257, 2 60 (1984) ; Wagner Castings Co. v. Industrial Comm’n , 241 I ll. App. 3d 584, 594 ( 1993) (“ it is solely within the province of the Commission” to wei gh the evidence (emphas i s in orig inal)). A reviewing court will not set aside the C ommission’s decision unless its analysis is contrary to law (se e Butler Manufacturing

Co. v. Industrial Comm’n , 85 Ill. 2d 213, 216 (1981)) or its fact determinations are against themanifest weight of the evidence (see Shockley v. Industrial Comm’n , 75 Ill. 2d 189, 193 (1979)). Fact de

terminat ions are again st th e manifest weight of the evidence only when no rat ional trie r of fact could ha

ve agr eed with the agency . See D.J. Masonry Co. v. Industrial Comm’n , 295 Ill. App. 3d 924, 930 (1998). This case, a s framed

in the app ellate c ourt, pre sents two iss ues: (1) whether the Commission’s determination that an employme nt relation ship existedbet wee n R obe rso n an d P .I. & I. was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and (2) whether the Commission’s2 P.I. & I. elected to proceed on the arg

ument presented in

its petition and did not file a s eparate appella

nt’s bri ef.

-12- determination

that Roberson’s injury arose outof and

in the course of his employment was ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidence. Inits petition, 2 P.I. &

I. a ttempts to r

ecast th e first is sue

. According

to P.I. &I., the appell ate cour t’s employ

ment-re lationship anal ysi s conflicts with that of Earley v. Industrial Comm’n , 19 7 Il l

. App. 3d 309 (1990), i

n severa l respects, including the effect of feder al

r eg ulations on t he r ela ti ons hi p be twe en P .I. & I. an d R obe rso n. P .I. & I. asserts that on

these questions of

law our review should proceed de novo . Roberson respond s that the a ppellate court’s analy sis w as consistent with Earley , and the primary question is still whether he

was an emp lo yee o f P. I. & I. Roberson asser ts that on that fact issue

our review should be d

efere ntia l . Because the Commission’s decision

was not against the manifest weight of the ev ide nce, argues Roberson, this cour t should af

firm. An employment relationship is a prer equisite for an a

ward o f benefit s under the Act, and the question of whether a person is an employee remains “one of the most vexatiou s *** in t he law of compensation.” O’Brien v. Industrial Comm’n , 48 Ill. 2d 304, 307 (1971). The difficulty ar

ises notfrom

the compl exity

of the ap plicable leg al rules, bu

t from the fact-sp ecific n

ature of the inquir

y. N o rule has been, or

could be, adopted t

o gover n all cas es in

this area. Henry

v. Industrial Comm’n , 412 Ill. 279, 282 (1952). Ins tead, we have listed various factors that help determine when a person is an employee: whether the employer may control the manner in which the person performs the work; whether the employer

dictates the person’s schedule; whether the employer pays the pe rs on ho ur ly; whether the employer withholds income and social security taxes from the pe rson’s compensation; whether the employ er may discha

rge t h e person at will; and whe ther the employ er suppli es the pe

rson with materia ls and equipment. See Wenholdt v. Industrial Comm’n , 95 I ll. 2d 76, 81 (1983 ), quo ting Morgan Cab Co. v. Industrial Comm’n , 60 Ill. 2d 92, 97 (1975). Additionally, we ha ve also considered

whether the employer’ s general business encompasses the person’ s work:-13- “[B]eca use the theor

y of [worker’ s] compensation legislation is that the cost of industrial accidents should be borne by the

consumer as part of the cost of

the produ ct, this co urt has he ld that a worker whose servicesform a regular part of the cost of the prod uct, and whose

work doe s not const

itute a se parate businessw hich al lows a distinct channel through which the cost of an accide nt may flow, is pr

esumptive ly w

ithin the area of intended protect i o n of the compensation act.” Ragler Motor Sales v. Industrial Comm’n , 93 Ill. 2d 66, 71 (1982). No single factor is determinative, and the signific ance of thesefactors will change depending on the work involved. Luby v. I ndustrial Comm’ n , 82 I ll. 2d 353, 358-59 (1980). The determination rests on the totali ty o f the cir

cumstanc es. The rig ht to contr

ol the man

ner of the work is o ften ca lle d th e most important consideration. See Bauer v. Indus trial Comm’n , 51 I ll. 2d 169, 172 ( 1972); Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 212 I ll. 2d 1, 13 (2004) (“An

independent contractor is defined by the level of

control

over the manner of wor

k perf orman ce”), ci ting Hartley v . Red Ball Transit Co. , 344 Ill. 534, 539 (1931 ). Dis cussi ng Ware , the appella te court here noted that c ontract language re quired by fe deral regulations may indicate such con trol. More than 50 years ago, interstate motor car rie rs shielded themselves from liability for their drivers’ negl igence by leasing trucks fromindependent

contractors. Morris v. JTM Materials, Inc. , 78 S.W.3d 28, 37 (Te x . Ct. App.–Fort Worth 2002). Such arrang ements invariably led to abuse s that thr eaten ed pu bl ic sa fe ty,

as unscrupulous motor carriers leased inexpensive, and unsafe, equipment

from shallow-pocket

drivers. Harrisv. Mitch ell , 35 8 N. J. Super. 504, 507-08, 818 A.2d 443, 445 (2003 ). In 1956, Cong

ress amended the Interstate Commerce A ct and au

thorized the In

terstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to prescribe regul a tions governing leased equipment. See Pub. L. No. 84–957, reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163. In 1 995, Cong ress abo lished the

ICC; its functions were transferred to the DOT and the Surface Transportation Board, and many

sections of the I nte rs tate Commerce Act were

r ecodified. See Harris , 358 N.J. Super. at 508, 818 A.2d a t 445

. Section 14 102(a)(

4) of tha t Act cur rently provides :-14- “The Secretary

[of Transportation] m ay requir e a motor carrier providin g [i nterstate] transportation *** that uses motor vehicles not

owned by it to transport prope rty under a

n arrangement

with another part

y to *** have control of

and be responsi ble for operating those motor vehiclesin compliance with requi reme nts prescribed by the Secretary

on safety of operations and

equipment, and with other applicable law as if the motor veh

icles w ere own ed by the motor ca rrier.” 49 U.S.C. §14102(a)(4) (2000). See Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. v. Brada Mille r Freight Systems, Inc. , 42 3 U. S. 28, 39, 46 L. Ed. 2d 169, 178, 96 S. Ct. 229, 235 (1975). The DOT requires a motor vehicle lease to provide that “ the authorized

carrier lessee shall have exclusive possession, control, and

use of t he equipment for the durati on of the l ease. T he lease shall further provide t

hat the a uthorized carrie r lessee shall assu

me complete responsibility for the opera tion o f the equipment for the durationof the lease.” 49 C.F.R. §376.12(c)(1) (2005 ). This regulation, like its pr

ecursors, preve

nts motor carriers from escaping lia bility t o injured persons by c laiming that their drivers were independent

contractors, rather

than employees. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v . Frankar t , 69 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (1977); Schedler v. Rowley Inte rstate Transportation Co. , 68 Ill. 2d 7, 13 (1977); Hershberger v. Home Transp ort Co. , 103 Ill. App. 3d 348, 352 (1982); Stonerock v. Miller Brothers Paving, Inc. , 72 Ohio App. 3d 123, 128, 594 N.E.2d 94, 97 (1991) (“These regula tions, and the statute pursuant to which they

were pr omulgat ed, wer e crea ted in

or der to correct widespread abuses by authorized interstate carries who would immunize themselves from liability to the pub lic b y leasingtruck s from third parti es”), c itin g America n Truc king Associations v. United States , 344 U.S. 298, 303, 97 L. Ed. 337, 352, 73 S. Ct. 307, 311 (1953). Pursuant to this regul ati on, some courts have characterized independent

co ntract or lessors as “statutory employees” of

motor carrier lessees. See, e.g. , Harris , 358 N.J. Super. at 509, 818 A.2d at 446, quot ing Cox v. Bond

Transportation, Inc. , 53 N.J. 186, 201, 249 A.2d 579, 587 ( 1969); Tamez v. Southwestern Motor Transport, Inc. , 155 S.W.3d 564, 57 3 (Tex. Ct. App.–San Antonio 2004) (“an-15- intersta te carrier is vicariously

liable as a matter of

l aw under the [regula tions] for the negligence of its statutory employ

ee drivers”). This is a legislative fiction, of course, intended

to shift re sponsibilit

y for the safe use of le ased equ

ipment to the motor c arrier in order to protect the pu blic. Harri

s , 358 N.J. Super. at 510, 818 A.2d at 446. The statutory

scheme c

reated by C ongre ss plainly

accept s a distinction between employees and independent cont r actors. See Pouliot v. Paul Arpin Van Lines, Inc. , 292 F. Supp. 2d 374, 383 (D. Conn. 2003) (“the existence of a lease under re gulations that impose liability betwee n the car rier-le ssee and

the public

does not have any impact on the type of re lations hip that exists between the carrierlessee and the contractor-lessor”). I ndeed , a s P.I. & I . observes, 49 C.F.R. §37 6.12(c) (4) (200 5) provid es: “Nothing in the provisions required by pa ragraph (c)(1)of this section is intended to affect whether the lessor or drive r provided by the lessor is an independent contractor or an employee of the auth orized carrier lessee. An independent contractor r elationsh

ip may exist when a

carrie r complie s w it

h 49 U.S.C. 14102 and the attendant administrative requirements.” Inshort, the regulation requiring a motor carrier to have exclusive possession, control, and use of leased equipme nt does not mandate that the driver is an employe e for all purposes. “While a lessee cannot free its elf of its federally imposed duties when protection of the pub lic is a t stake, the feder al requi rements a

re not so r

adically intrusive as to absolve lessors * ** of othe rwiseexisting obligations under applica ble state tort law d octrine s or under cont

ract s allocating financial risk among private par ti es .” (Emphasis added.) Carolina Casualty Insurance Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America , 595 F.2d 128, 138 (3d Cir. 1979). Freedom of contract require s that parties may structur e their relationship as they see

fit, provided they do not neglect the requirements of federal law. See Riddle v. Trans-Cold Express, Inc. , 530 F. Supp. 186, 189-90 (S.D. Ill. 1982) (“the lessor and lessee of equipment operated under an I.C.C. certificate a

re free to agree, by

contract, as to rights affecting their relationship, so long

as the ir duty to the ge

neral public is not diminished”). Compliance with federal regulations is merely a factor that may

be considered

in

a co mm on la w a na lys is o f whether a driver is an employ ee of a-16- truckingc ompany. Universal Am-Can, Ltd. v. Worker’s Compensation Appea l Board, 563 Pa. 480, 489, 762 A.2d 328, 332 (2000); Toomer v. United Resin Adhesives, Inc. , 652 F. Supp. 219, 229 (N.D. Ill. 1986). Ware and Earley

are consistent on

this point. Both cases state that contract language require d by feder al regulations is a consideration indetermining whether the trucking c ompany had the right

to control the driver’s work. See Ware , 318 Ill. A pp. 3d at 1 123; Earley , 197 I ll. App. 3d at 314. These cas es, ho wever, reach differe nt results on different facts. P.I. & I .’s argument thus reduces to simpl y th is: the Commission relied upon Ware , when it should have followed Earley

. In Ware , a tru ck driver was injured while making delivery for a truckingco mp an y. At the time of the accident, the driver and the company we re operating under an “Equipment Lease Agreement Between Ind ependent Contractor and Carrier.” The agreement provided that the d

river wo uld lease his tr uck t o the comp any

in return for a percentage of

the gross revenue that the company received for each load . Un der the agreement, the compa ny would have “exclusive possession, control, and use” of the truck “for the limited purpose of complying

with state and federal transportation law.” The driver was required to shave and occ asionally to wear a
un iform, and the company arranged for his work. The c ompany woul d issue a trave l order, instructi ng the d riv er what

load he would be hauli ng, when to pick it up, and when and where to deliver it. The travel order included rout e info rmation, which the driver was not required to fo l low unless he was hauling hazardous materials. The company dictated how the driver should o per ate and maintain h is truck, particularly in cold we ather. The driver was responsible for inspecting the truck and its trailer, and he was re quired to notify the company if he had an accident. The company ’s logo was display ed on the side of the driver’s truck, and it was registered in the company ’s name, as required

by federa l regul ations. The driver

was forb idden to drive mor e hours than allowe d by

those re gulations. The driver shouldered all the costs associated with operating the truck. The comp any

did not with

hold income or soci al secur ity taxes for the driver. The company paid for liability insurance on the truck while it was in its service and for “bobtail” insurance on the truck whil e it was not in its service; the cost of the bobtail insurance was-17- charged to the driver. Under th e lease , the driv er was r equired to procure worker ’s c ompen sation insu rance, and he wa s allowed to enroll in an occupational accident plan through the c ompany. The le ase allowed the driver to hire employ ees and to use his truck for other firms, sub

ject to th e compa ny’s approva l. The lease could be terminated by either

party upon written notice

. Anarbitrator determined that the driver was an employe e of the

co mp an y, and the Commissi on reversed. The trial court confirmed this decision, but the appellate court foun d that it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Ware , 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1127. The appella te court concluded t

hat the e

vidence indic ated that the company both had and exercised a right to control the driver’s work. Ware , 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1123. Th e court recognized that the company exercised this control to ensure it co mplied with federal regulations or customer demands, but held that the motivation for its actions was “irrelevant.” Ware , 31 8 Il l. App. 3d at 1123. The court stated that a showing of

control may ar

ise “ ‘by introducing

detailed regulations *** and pro ving th at the emp loyer was p ersonal ly responsi ble for their observance.’ “ Ware , 318 Ill. App. 3d a t 1123, quoting 3 A. Larson & L . Larson, Worker’s Compensat ion Law §61.05(3), at 61–9 (2000). The appellate court fu

rther stated that the driver’s work was “intimate ly

r elated” to the company’s business. Ware , 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1124-25. The driver “had no customers of his own. He worked exclusive ly

for [the c ompany

], served customers designate d by [the comp any ], and was pai d a perc entage of what [the company] rec eived fr om t hese customers.” Ware , 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1124-25. The company’s

busi ness w as hau ling fr eigh t for its customers; the driver’s work, likewise, was hauling freight for t he company ’s custome

rs. Ware , 318 Ill. App. 3 d at 11 25. Th e driv er was e ngaged i n a lon g, continuou s, and exclus ive rela tionship with

the compa

ny, and he did nottrip lease. Ware , 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1126. Therelatio nship was akin to at will employment and could be ter minated absent a breach by either party

. Ware , 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1126. Additionally , th e appella te court stated that the company provided a trailer for the driver, and he sometimes wore a uniform. Ware , 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1125-26.-18- The appellate court

declined to give much weight to the facts that the contract designated the driver a n independent

contractor and

that the company

did not with

hold taxes. Ware , 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1127. Considering the factors in their totality , the court stated that “strong evidence ex ist s that [the driver] was an employee ,” and the Commission’s decision

to the con

trary was ag ainst the manife st weight of that evidence. Ware , 318 Ill. Ap p. 3d at 1126. See also Peesel v. Industrial Comm’n , 2 24 I ll. App. 3d 711 (1992) (holding th at the Commission’s decision that a driver was not an employee was against the manifest weight of the e vidence). In Earley , a truck

drive r was i njure d whil e maki ng a delivery for

a trucking company . The driver and the company were parties to a one-yea r equipment lease. Under the lease, the driver would provide the truck, the trailer, and a driver, in return for a perce ntage o f th e grossrevenue for each load that he hauled. From

these payments, the company deducted the d

ri ver’s workers’ compensation insurance premiums and any c ash advances, but it did not withhold income or

so cial security

taxes for t

he drive r. The dr iver bor e all the c osts associated

with operating the equipment. Thedriver even paid for the truck’s licenses, but they we re in bo th hi s name and the company ’s

name. The driver could hire employees, but they had to be approved by the company bef

ore they c ould haul an y loads. Either the company would call the driver with work, or the driver would call the compa ny for work. The company

told the driver where and when to pick up and deliver loads, but the driver chose his route. The driver wasinstructed to notify the company

if he had an accident. He primarily worked for the company

, but he wa s permitte d to trip lease. Trip leases were

ar ra ng ed th ro ug h t he co mp an y. The arbitrator determined that the driver was not an employ ee of the company, and the

Commission affirmed. The trial court confirmed

the Commission’s decision, and t h e appellate court affirmed. The appella

te court initially noted that the driver c ontended the Commission’s decision was erroneous as a matter of law, citing federalregulations. Earley , 197 Ill. App. 3d at 314. The court

stated: “The ICC’s rules *** require a lea se agreement , such a s the

one here, to include a provision that the authorized carrier has exclusive possession, c ontrol, and use of the leased equipment-19- for the durationof the lease. Therefore, bec ause Federal law requires [the company] to have the exclusive possession and

co ntrol provision s in the lea se, [the dr iver] arg ues that th

is confers upon [the company] the right to control the work ***, thereby creating an employee status *** as a matter of law. While the ICC rules and regu lations are a factor to consider indetermin

ing a cl aimant’s

employ ment s tatus, thes e rules are not conclusive ***.” Earley , 197 Ill. App. 3d at 314. The appella

te court then

stated that some facts indicated that the driver was an employe e, while others indicated that he was an independent

contractor. Earley , 197 Ill. App. 3d at 315. The company could direct the driver when and where to pick up and deliver

loads, butthe driver chose his own route. Earley , 197 Ill. App. 3d at 315. He worked solely for the

company, and e

ven his trip leases were arrang ed by the company. Earley , 197 I ll. App. 3d at 315. The court observed, however, that the driver was paid for trip lease s as he was paid for other loads; he received a flat percentage of the revenue genera

ted by his work. Earley , 197 Ill. App. 3d at 315. According to the court, the

c ompan y “was only intere sted in the end result, i.e. , that the shipments

be transported within a

given time to a customer, and that the details of

how th is w as accomplished were left to [the driver].” Earley , 197 I ll. App. 3d at 317. The driver paid his own income and social security taxes, as well as the costs of operati ng his eq uipment. Earley , 197 Ill. App. 3d at 316. The court then considered the nexus between the driver’s wor k and the company’s business: “I n trucking cases such

as this, thi s is a closeconsideration.” Earley , 197 Ill. App. 3d at 316. The driver and the company we

re in the same bus ine ss: transporting shipments for p rofi t. Earley , 197 I ll. App. 3d at 316. Re gardin

g the ri ght to discharge, the appe llate court noted that the lease could be terminated by either par

ty for any reason. Earley , 197 Ill. App. 3d at 316. The lease la

beled the driver a s an independent contractor, but according to the court, this factor was controversial: “I t has been he ld that the label given by

the parties in a written

agreement will not be dispositive of the e mp lo ym ent status , but that the facts of the ca se must be considered to determine what the individual’s empl oym ent status is. [Citation.] Fur ther, althoug h a contr actual a greement is a fact or to consider, it does not, as a matter of law, determine an-20- individual’s employ

ment statu s. [Citation.]” Earley , 197 Ill. App. 3d at 31 7-18. In a close ca se, however, the contract’s desig nation of a person as an independent contractor may tip the balance by establishing the parties’ intent. Earley , 197 Ill. App. 3d at 318, quoting 1C A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation §46.30, at 8–263- 8–264 (19 86) . In this case, the court found that calling the driver a n independent

contractor

wa s not “a sham label, ” and the lease indicated the parties’ intent. Earley , 197 Ill. App. 3d at 318. Giventhe competing inferences arising from the facts, it was the Commission’s province

to determine the drive

r’s employme

nt status. Earley , 197 Ill. App. 3d at 318. The court conclude d that the Commission’s decision

was not a

gainst t he manif est weig ht o f the evidence. Earley , 197 Ill. App. 3d at 318. Ce rt ai nl y, the case

before us is similar in some respects to Earley , just as it is simil ar in some

respects to Ware . But the question before

us is not whether the Commission’s decision tracked one case when it should have track

ed anothe

r. The question is w

hether t h e Commission’s decision

was ag ainst the manifest w eight of the evidence. We turn to that evidence. T he contract between Roberson and P.I . & I. provided that th e parties did

not intend

to create an employ

ment rela tionship, a

nd both parties c ould termi

nate the contract at any

time upon written notice. Appendix A of the le ase ga

ve P.I . & I . the exclu sive posse ss i on, control, and use of

Roberson’s truck, but

th e co nt rac t s tat ed t hat P. I. & I. ha d no contr

ol over Ro

berson, “ except in the result s to be obtained.” That is, P.I . & I . did not dicta te Robers on’s rout

es, as long as, according to Kerola, “he delivers [loads] in a timely manner that keeps our customers h appy .” The c ontract require d Roberson to operate his truck in compliance with appli cable laws and regula tions. Robersontestified that

he was required to perform pretrip inspections and to post P.I. & I . logos on his truck, bu t Butts te stified that these

were DOT requirements for a ny of its drivers. Ker ola testified that independent

contractors are required by the DOT to keep a logbook,

so the DOT can determine whether they are complying

wi t h

re gulations regar

ding hou rs of ser vice. P.I . & I . ensure s its driv er s comply with these regulations . T ellingly , Kerola stated tha

t if its drivers stray from

these re gulations, P.I . & I . does wha t it needs t

o do to get the m in complia

nce. P.I . & I . even ke eps pers onnel file s a nd-21- perfor ms annual reviews of its drivers as required by its insurer. R oberson was required to notify

P.I. & I . if he had an accident, and P.I. & I . provided him with a camera to photograph any damage. The contrac t s tated tha

t P.I. & I. could all ow trip le ases if it preapproved

the other motor ca rrier, i ssued a r

elease to Roberson, and had no freight

availab le for Rob erson to haul. But ts tes ti fie d t hat P. I. & I. does not enforce the contract requirement of written permission, and Kerola testified that P.I. & I . does not require written permission for trip lea s es. But K

erola a dded that independ ent contr actors mu st not ify P .I. & I. that they

wish to wor k fo r an ot her mo to r ca rri er. P. I. & I., a s the “pr

imary lease” of these drivers , thenmust send a

form to the o ther carr ier stating that the drivers’ records ar e in order. Robersontestified that he did not drive for othe r compan ies beca use he found the authorization process too b urdensome. The r ecord is unclear whether Roberson

actu all y had trip lease s with two other

com pan ies whi le h e wa s pr im ari ly le ase d t o P .I. & I. Butts testified that Roberson was not required to report to work each morning , but Ker

ola testif ied that P. I. &

I. a sks its driv ers “to callindaily

to repor t their status.” Roberson confirmed this, stating that he telephoned P.I. & I . each morning to see if any loads were available. Roberson

also testi fied tha

t P.I. & I. occasionally

gave h im

a “hot load” to deliver quickly . According to Kerola, drivers are given parameters in which loads must be hau le d. If drivers acc ept such parameters, P.I. &

I. expects them to follow “standard proce dures.” Roberson was paid a

percentage of the

gross revenue that P.I . & I. receiv ed for the loads he deliver ed. From his week

ly s ettlemen

ts Robersonpaid the costs and expenses o f opera

ting histruck, a s well

as his own taxes. Additionally, he paid for his ow n wo rker’s compensation

and liability insurance c overa ge , though he obtained suchcovera

ge thro ugh P.I . & I . P.I. & I. provides such ser vices onl y to drivers primarily doi

ng bu siness wit

h the comp any . P.I. & I. also provided Roberson

with a deb it

card, which he

could use to purcha se fuel, pay for r

epairs, o r o btain cash advances, which were late r deducte d from his s ettlemen ts. Robersonhad his own truck, but he leased a tra il er f rom P. I. & I. He not only paid rent on the trailer –10% of the grossrevenue for each load, or ap proximatel

y one-eig hth of his c ompensat

ion–he al so maintained

it to P.I. & I.’sspecif

ica ti ons . S ee 3 A. La rso n & L.-22- Larson, Worker’s Compensation Law §61.07(3), at 61–19 (2006) (“control may be re alistically inferre d even when the employ er owns only a part of the equipment, if that part is of c ons iderable size and value”). Fi na ll y, Roberson’s work fell entirely within the scope of P .I. & I.’s bus in ess . P .I. & I. , for e conomic reasons, used independent contractor

drivers almost exclusively, and Roberson wa s prim arily leased to P.I. & I . for nearly eight months before his accident. See 3 A. Larson & L . Larson, Worker’s Compensation Law § 61.07(5), at 61–21 (2006) (“there is a growing tendency to classify owner

-drivers of trucks as employees w

hen they per

form continuous service which is an integral part of the employ er’s business”). This is a close case. The same reasoning em plo yed in Earley

to uphold the Commission’s decision l eads us t o do the same. The evidence here wa s well bal anced; i twas the Industrial Commission’s province to weigh it and d eci de among competing inferenc es. See Earley , 197 Ill. App. 3d at 318. The C ommission f

ound Rober

son to be an employee

of P.I. & I . We cannot say that decision was ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidence. Withrespect to the sec ond issue, P.I. & I. a rgues t hat the a ppellate courterred in concluding that the Commission’s decision o n causation was not against the manifest weight of the evide nce. Accordi ng to P.I. & I ., the record does not support Roberson’s testimony regar ding his work and injury . P.I. & I . points to various discrepancies between Rob e rson’s testimony and the re cord. Roberson predictably

responds that the appellate court did not err. As the appellate court correctly observed, Roberson’s testimony pr ovi ded a detailed account of this accident, consistent with the history he gave at the emerg ency room on the mor ning aft er

the accide nt, and to Dr. Villegas four days late r. Roberson

testified that he notified P.I. & I . of this accident, an d Kerola an d Butts did not dispute his testimony. The Commission noted a “puzzling in co ns is te nc y” in Dr. Mayersdor f’s records, but the statement in Dr. Mayersdor

f’s records tha

t Rob erson hur

t his back

sleeping in his truck is neither puz zli ng nor inconsistent. The emergenc y room record s i ndicate

that Rober

son was pr

escribe d Vicodin

and Flexeril after he slipped in his truck. Dr. Maye rsdorf’ s recor ds indicate that Robersonwas prescribed

those same painkil lers aft er he “s lept” in h

is truck two days ear

lier. Dr. Villegas testified that it was unlikely that-23- Robersoncould her

nia te a disc , as shown

by t he MRI test, in his sleep. Absent any evide

nce that Roberson

slept in his

truck on the day of the accident, i t seems likely that “slept” is a ty pographical or tr anscr iption error for “slipped.” The findings of fact made by

the Commission were not against the manifest weight of the evidenc e.

CONCLUSIO

N For the r easons that we ha

ve state d, we af

firm.

Affirmed.