Filed 12/12/22 In re L.T. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re L.T., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.H.,

Defendant and Appellant.

D080778

(Super. Ct. No. EJ4686C)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Gary M. Bubis, Judge. Affirmed.

Emily Uhre, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County 

Counsel, and Lisa M. Maldonado, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
2

J.H. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her 

parental rights over L.T. The sole issue in this case is whether reversal of 

the order is warranted because the San Diego County Health and Human 

Services Agency (Agency) failed to comply with state law interpreting the 

Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (ICWA)). 

Specifically, Mother argues the Agency failed to comply with its initial 

inquiry duties under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision 

(b)1 because it neglected to interview extended family members about L.T.’s 

possible Indian ancestry. Mother also contends the Agency failed to satisfy 

its further inquiry obligations under section 224.2, subdivision (e), after 

receiving information giving rise to a reason to believe L.T. may have Navajo 

heritage from the maternal side of the family. 

The Agency concedes its initial inquiry was deficient but contends the 

error was harmless. The Agency also concedes that further inquiry was 

required, but contends its further inquiry was sufficient, and argues any 

error was nonetheless harmless. 

We grant the Agency’s motion to augment the record to include an 

addendum report filed in L.T.’s siblings’ dependency case on September 7, 

2022, showing Navajo Nation denied that the family is enrolled or is eligible 

for enrollment with Navajo Nation. Based thereon, we conclude any further 

inquiry deficiency was harmless error. We also conclude the Agency’s initial 

inquiry was deficient but that the errors were harmless under In re Benjamin 

M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735 (Benjamin M.). The order is therefore affirmed 

for lack of prejudicial error. 

1 All further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, 

unless otherwise indicated.
3

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Agency initiated this dependency proceeding under section 300, 

subdivision (b) on behalf of L.T. in June 2021, alleging L.T. had suffered or 

was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness due to 

Mother’s ongoing substance abuse. L.T. was placed with paternal 

grandparents, who were found to be the prospective adoptive parents. 

A. ICWA Inquiries Regarding Paternal Family

In its petition, the Agency indicated that it asked L.T.’s father, L.T.S. 

(Father)2 about L.T.’s Indian status and that the inquiry gave no reason to 

believe L.T. is an Indian child. 

In its detention report, the Agency reported that Father denied having 

any Indian heritage on June 2, 2021. Father stated he would like paternal 

grandfather and paternal grandmother to be considered for placement. The 

Agency reported speaking with paternal grandfather, who denied that 

anyone in his family has Indian heritage. The Agency also reported speaking 

with paternal grandmother, but did not report asking her about L.T.’s 

possible Indian heritage. 

In its jurisdiction and disposition report, the Agency reported that 

Father again denied Indian heritage on June 16, 2021. The Agency reported 

that a paternal great-aunt was present when the Agency went to paternal 

grandparents’ home on one occasion, but did not indicate speaking with her 

or asking her about L.T.’s possible Indian heritage. The Agency also reported 

sending relative notification letters to ten individuals with the same last 

name as Father, whose relationship to L.T. was listed as “Relative.” The 

2 Father is not a party to this appeal.
4

Agency had not received a response from any of the ten individuals. The 

Agency reported calling two of the ten individuals, who the Agency later 

identified as paternal uncle and paternal aunt, and leaving each a voicemail 

requesting a return call. 

B. ICWA Inquiries Regarding Maternal Family and ICWA Finding

In its detention report, the Agency stated that it attempted to interview 

Mother regarding L.T.’s possible Indian heritage, however, Mother was not 

able to complete the interview because she was incapacitated and arrested for 

being under the influence of substances. The Agency reported interviewing 

maternal grandmother, who stated that her family may have Indian heritage 

through a Navajo tribe in Idaho. She did not have any additional 

information. 

The Agency also reported speaking with two maternal aunts, but did 

not indicate asking them about potential Indian heritage. Additionally, the 

Agency reported attempting to speak with maternal great-grandmother by 

telephone, but could not leave a voicemail because the phone was 

disconnected. The Agency also reported calling and leaving a voicemail for 

maternal uncle B.P. 

In its jurisdiction and disposition report, the Agency indicated that 

Mother mentioned having another brother, maternal uncle D.P. The Agency 

reported that Mother claimed maternal great-great-grandmother was “part 

of” the Navajo tribe, but did not know her membership status. Mother denied 

that she herself or maternal grandmother were members or ever lived on a 

reservation. Mother stated maternal grandmother would have more 

information. Maternal grandmother subsequently denied that she was a 

member of a tribe, but reported that her mother, maternal great-
5

grandmother claimed Navajo heritage. Maternal grandmother stated she 

would try to obtain more information. 

The Agency reported that it sent certified inquiry letters and follow-up 

e-mails to Navajo Nation, the Ramah Navajo Chapter of the Navajo Nation 

(Ramah Navajo Chapter), and the United States Department of the Interior 

Bureau of Indian Affairs Navajo Regional Office (BIA Navajo Regional 

Office). 

At the initial jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court deferred on 

making a finding regarding ICWA, acknowledging that the Agency was 

waiting to hear a response from the Navajo tribe. 

In its July 20, 2021 addendum report for the contested jurisdiction and 

disposition hearing, the Agency reported that it e-mailed follow-up inquiry 

letters and attempted phone calls to Navajo Nation, the Ramah Navajo 

Chapter, and the BIA Navajo Regional Office. The Agency reported a 

representative from the Ramah Navajo Chapter indicated Navajo Nation 

oversees all ICWA inquires for all of Navajo. Subsequently, the Agency 

received a letter from the Ramah Navajo Chapter stating the Ramah Navajo 

Chapter could not confirm or deny that L.T., Mother, or Father were 

members or eligible for membership, and that the inquiry information would 

be forwarded to the Navajo Nation ICWA Office to be processed. The Agency 

received a letter from Navajo Nation dated June 28, 2021, stating the tribe 

was still verifying enrollment or eligibility for enrollment. The Agency also 

received a letter from the BIA Navajo Regional Office acknowledging receipt 

of the inquiry. 

At the July 20, 2021 contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the 

juvenile court found that reasonable inquiry was made regarding ICWA and 

that ICWA did not apply to the proceedings. 
6

In its report for the contested section 366.26 hearing, the Agency 

reported receiving a letter from Navajo Nation dated July 8, 2021, indicating 

that they were unable to verify L.T.’s eligibility for tribal membership based 

on the ancestry provided, and that the intake would therefore be closed. The 

Agency reported that it reached out to Navajo Nation’s ICWA representative 

to review the letter and was awaiting a response to confirm that L.T. is not 

eligible for membership. 

At the June 23, 2022 contested section 366.26 hearing, the court 

referenced Navajo Nation’s July 8, 2021 letter, and acknowledged that 

Navajo Nation indicated they could not verify L.T.’s eligibility for 

membership. After the Agency confirmed that was correct, the court 

confirmed its finding that ICWA did not apply to the proceedings. 

II.

DISCUSSION

Mother argues the Agency failed to satisfy its initial inquiry obligations 

under section 224.2, subdivision (b), because it did not ask extended family 

members about L.T.’s potential Indian ancestry. Mother also contends the 

Agency failed to satisfy its further inquiry obligations under section 224.2, 

subdivision (e), after receiving information giving rise to a reason to believe 

L.T. may have Navajo heritage from the maternal side of the family. 

A. Applicable Law

Congress enacted ICWA to address concerns regarding the separation 

of Indian children from their tribes through adoption or foster care placement

with non-Indian families. (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7.) Under 

California law adopted pursuant to ICWA, the juvenile court and Agency 

have an “affirmative and continuing duty to inquire” whether a child “is or 

may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah W., at p. 9.) An 
7

“Indian child” is defined in the same manner as under federal law, i.e., as 

“any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member 

of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is 

the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe[.]” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); 

accord Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting the federal definition].) 

As outlined by this court in In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052 

(D.S.), “section 224.2 creates three distinct duties regarding ICWA in 

dependency proceedings. First, from the Agency’s initial contact with a 

minor and his family, the statute imposes a duty of inquiry to ask all involved 

persons whether the child may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b).) 

Second, if that initial inquiry creates a ‘reason to believe’ the child is an 

Indian child, then the Agency ‘shall make further inquiry regarding the 

possible Indian status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as 

practicable.’ (Id., subd. (e), italics added.) Third, if that further inquiry 

results in a reason to know the child is an Indian child, then the formal notice 

requirements of section 224.3 apply.” 

During the first stage of initial inquiry, “[s]ection 224.2, subdivision (b) 

specifies that once a child is placed into the temporary custody of a county 

welfare department, such as the Agency, the duty to inquire ‘includes, but is 

not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, 

extended family members, others who have an interest in the child, and the 

party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an 

Indian child.’ ” (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1048-1049.) 

ICWA defines “ ‘extended family member’ ” by “the law or custom of the 

Indian child’s tribe” or, absent such law or custom, as “a person who has 

reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt 

or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, 
8

first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c) 

[“ ‘extended family member’ . . . defined as provided in [§] 1903” of ICWA].)

After a “reason to believe” that an Indian child is involved has been 

established, further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child 

is required. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) The duty of further inquiry includes 

(1) interviewing the parents and extended family members; (2) contacting the 

Bureau of Indian Affairs and State Department of Social Services for 

assistance in identifying the names and contact information of the tribes in 

which the child may be a member, or eligible for membership; and 

(3) contacting tribes and anyone else who might have information regarding 

the child’s membership or eligibility in a tribe; contact with a tribe “shall 

include” information identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe to make 

a membership or eligibility determination. (Id., subd. (e)(2)(A-C).) 

“On appeal, we review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings for 

substantial evidence.” (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1051.) However, 

where the facts are undisputed, we independently determine whether ICWA’s 

requirements have been satisfied. (Ibid.)

B. Further Inquiry

Mother argues the duty of further inquiry was triggered based on 

Mother’s claim that maternal great-great-grandmother was “part of” the 

Navajo tribe and maternal grandmother’s statement indicating maternal 

great-grandmother claimed Navajo heritage. Mother asserts the Agency’s 

further inquiry was inadequate in three ways. First, Mother contends the 

Agency failed to make the required further ICWA inquiry of the two maternal 

aunts with whom the Agency had contact. Second, Mother contends the 

Agency failed to take reasonable steps to locate and obtain information from 

other maternal extended family members: (1) maternal uncle D.P., who 
9

Mother mentioned; and (2) maternal uncle B.P., who did not return the 

Agency’s call. Third, Mother contends the Agency failed to make a sufficient 

effort to speak with maternal great-grandmother, who Mother contends was 

the person most likely to have relevant information. We need not resolve 

whether the Agency’s further inquiry was adequate because we conclude any 

error was nonetheless harmless. 

Because the claimed failures concern the Agency’s state statutory 

duties to further inquire regarding L.T.’s possible Indian ancestry, we may 

not reverse unless error is prejudicial under state law. (Cal. Const., art. VI, 

§ 13 [“No judgment shall be set aside . . . unless, after an examination of the 

entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the 

error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”]; People v. 

Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [miscarriage of justice may be found when 

court concludes it is reasonably probable result more favorable to appellant 

would have been reached in absence of error].) That is, any error “ ‘must be 

held harmless unless the appellant can show a reasonable probability that he 

or she would have enjoyed a more favorable result in the absence of the 

error.’ ” (In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 318.) In the ICWA context, 

the question of harmless error is sometimes phrased as “whether there is 

‘ “no basis to believe” ’ a different result would occur as to the child’s Indian 

status.” (In re Z.N. (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 282, 300 (In re Z.N.).)

In answering this question, we first address the Agency’s motion to 

augment filed on November 2, 2022. The Agency sought to augment the 

record on appeal with a report that the Agency filed on September 7, 2022, in 

the juvenile dependency matter involving L.T.’s siblings. The report 

indicates that on August 31, 2022, the “Navajo Office of Vital Records verified

there was no record found on the family that they are enrolled or eligible for 
10

membership with the Navajo Nation.” Attached to the report is an e-mail 

from a Navajo Nation representative to the Agency stating the same. 

Under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d) we may take judicial 

notice of a record of any court of this state. Code of Civil Procedure section 

909 also allows appellate courts to “accept evidence in dependency cases ‘to 

expedite just and final resolution for the benefit of the children involved.’ ” 

(In re Carrie M. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 530, 535.) That right, however, should 

be exercised sparingly and only under exceptional circumstances. (In re Zeth 

S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405, 408, fn. 5 (Zeth S.).)

We conclude this is one of the rare cases where it is appropriate to take 

judicial notice of evidence outside of the appellate record. There is already an 

order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights in L.T.’s case. 

Admission of the Agency’s report filed in L.T.’s siblings’ case would not 

merely expedite a resolution in L.T.’s case, but it would promote the finality 

of the order terminating parental rights and prevent further delay to L.T.’s 

stability. 

Mother objects to our consideration of the evidence based on the 

following language from Zeth S., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 405: “It has long 

been the general rule and understanding that ‘an appeal reviews the 

correctness of a judgment as of the time of its rendition, upon a record of 

matters which were before the trial court for its consideration.’ ” Mother 

points out that this rule reflects the distinction between the trial court as the 

trier of fact and the appellate court as deciding questions of law. 

We take judicial notice here, however, not to assess whether the order 

terminating parental rights was based on an insufficient further inquiry by 

the Agency, but rather to assess whether there was resulting prejudice, 

which is a question of law for this court to decide, not one for the trier below. 
11

(In re Z.N., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 299 [taking judicial notice of 

documents filed in a half siblings’ cases for purpose of assessing prejudice]; 

see also In re A.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 832, 842 [taking judicial notice of a 

document filed in a sibling’s or half sibling’s case for purpose of assessing 

prejudice].) The Agency’s report filed in L.T.’s siblings’ case shows that the 

Navajo Nation denied that the family was enrolled or eligible for 

enrollment.3 Even if the Agency conducted further inquiries of the 

individuals identified by Mother in this case, there is no reasonable 

probability that Navajo Nation would have determined that L.T. was eligible 

for membership when the tribe already determined that L.T.’s siblings were 

not eligible. Thus, any further inquiry error was harmless.4 

C. Initial Inquiry

Mother argues the Agency failed to satisfy its initial inquiry obligations 

as to paternal and maternal sides of the family. 

3 Mother argues Navajo Nation’s e-mails to the Agency are unreliable. 

The issue, however, is the adequacy of the Agency’s further inquiry. We are 

granting judicial notice of the report that the Agency filed in L.T.’s siblings’ 

case, which is a certified copy of a record filed in the juvenile court, to 

demonstrate what additional inquiry could be made and what response would 

be received. While Navajo’s Nation’s e-mail to the Agency is attached to the 

report, we are not relying on the accuracy of an unsworn or unauthenticated 

e-mail.

4 In its November 2, 2022 motion to augment, the Agency also sought to 

augment the record with a September 8, 2022 minute order from L.T.’s 

siblings’ case, showing that the juvenile court in that matter confirmed its 

finding that ICWA did not apply to that proceeding. We decline to take 

judicial notice of this document because it matters not whether there was an 

ICWA finding in L.T.’s sibling’s case, but rather whether documents from 

that case show lack of prejudicial error in L.T.’s case. (In re Z.N., supra, 181 

Cal.App.4th at p. 300.)
12

On the paternal side, Mother contends: (1) the Agency failed to conduct 

an ICWA inquiry of paternal grandmother despite her availability; (2) the 

Agency failed to conduct an ICWA inquiry of a great-aunt who was present 

when a social worker conducted a visit of paternal grandparents’ home; (3) 

the Agency failed to make reasonable follow-up efforts to contact paternal 

uncle and paternal aunt after they did not return the Agency’s phone call; 

and (4) the Agency failed to make a meaningful effort to contact eight other 

paternal relatives after the Agency sent relative notification letters but did 

not receive any response. 

On the maternal side, Mother raises issue with the same individuals 

that Mother raised in her argument regarding further inquiry. Mother 

argues: (1) the Agency failed to conduct an ICWA inquiry of two maternal 

aunts despite having contact with these extended family members; (2) the 

Agency failed to take reasonable steps to locate and obtain information from 

maternal uncle D.P., who Mother mentioned, and the Agency failed to follow 

up with maternal uncle B.P., who did not return the Agency’s phone call;) and 

(3) the Agency failed to make a sufficient effort to contact maternal greatgrandmother, who Mother contends was particularly important as potentially 

having Navajo heritage. 

We conclude the Agency’s failure to conduct an ICWA inquiry of 

paternal great-aunt was not error because the applicable definition of 

“ ‘extended family member’ ” does not include a great-aunt. (See 25 U.S.C. 

§ 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c) [“ ‘extended family member’ . . . defined as 

provided in [§] 1903” of ICWA].) Likewise, while maternal greatgrandmother may have been subject to the Agency’s further inquiry 

obligations, a great-grandmother is not included in the definition of 

“ ‘extended family member’ ” subject to the Agency’s initial inquiry obligation. 
13

(Ibid.; compare with § 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C) [further inquiry includes 

contacting “any other person that may reasonably be expected to have 

information regarding the child’s membership, citizen status, or eligibility”].) 

The Agency’s failure to follow up on its efforts to contact paternal uncle, 

paternal aunt, the eight other paternal relatives who did not respond to the 

Agency’s relative notification letters, or maternal uncle B.P. was also not 

error because the Agency “is not required to ‘cast about’ for information or 

pursue unproductive investigative leads.” (In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 1053.) For the same reason, the Agency’s failure to attempt to locate 

and contact maternal uncle D.P. was not error. The Agency, however, did 

have contact with paternal grandmother and two maternal aunts. Because 

these individuals each qualify as extended family members under section 

224.2, the Agency’s failure to ask them about L.T.’s possible Indian heritage 

was a violation of the Agency’s initial inquiry obligation.5

5 On November 9, 2022, the Agency filed a second motion to augment. 

The Agency sought to augment the record on appeal with two additional 

documents purportedly filed in L.T.’s siblings’ case for the purpose of showing 

the Agency conducted additional ICWA inquiries of certain family members. 

However, unlike the report attached to the Agency’s November 2, 2022 

motion to augment, these additional documents are not certified copies. As 

such, it is not clear these documents were filed or made part of a court record 

and we decline to consider these documents for that reason. The Agency’s 

November 9, 2022 motion also sought to augment the record with a 

September 8, 2022 reporter’s transcript from L.T.’s siblings’ case for the 

purpose of showing the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply in that 

proceeding. As with the minute order from that hearing, we decline to 

consider the reporter’s transcript because it matters not whether there was 

an ICWA finding in L.T.’s sibling’s case, but rather whether documents from 

that case show lack of prejudicial error in L.T.’s case. (In re Z.N., supra, 181 

Cal.App.4th at p. 300.)
14

The Courts of Appeal have applied varying analytical frameworks to 

evaluate whether errors in the ICWA initial inquiry are prejudicial. We need 

not address these various approaches because this division has adopted the 

approach articulated in Benjamin M. (In re Y.M. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 901, 

916). Under this approach, error is harmless unless “the record indicates 

that there was readily obtainable information that was likely to bear 

meaningfully upon whether the child is an Indian child” and that “the 

probability of obtaining meaningful information is reasonable.” (Benjamin 

M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 744.) 

Here, any information the Agency may have obtained from an inquiry 

of the two maternal aunts was not likely to bear meaningfully on whether 

L.T. is an Indian child where both Mother and maternal grandmother 

identified only possible Navajo heritage and Navajo Nation already denied 

that the family was enrolled or eligible for enrollment. The failure to conduct 

an ICWA inquiry of paternal grandmother was also harmless error under the 

Benjamin M. standard. Not only did Father and paternal grandfather both 

deny possible Indian heritage, but paternal grandmother and paternal 

grandfather lived together and presumably would have discussed the issue if 

paternal grandmother had contradictory information. Thus, it is not likely 

that an inquiry of paternal grandmother would have revealed information 

likely to bear meaningfully on the issue of L.T.’s Indian status. 

In sum, while the Agency’s failure to ask the two maternal aunts and 

paternal grandmother about L.T.’s potential Indian ancestry was a violation 

of section 224.2, subdivision (b), we conclude such error was harmless.
15

III.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights is affirmed. The 

Agency’s November 2, 2022 motion to augment is granted, in part as to the 

addendum report filed in L.T.’s siblings’ case on September 7, 2022, and 

denied in part as to the September 8, 2022 minute order in L.T.’s siblings’ 

case. The Agency’s November 9, 2022 motion to augment is denied.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, J.

DATO, J.