COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Alston, Ch afin and Senior Judge Haley

ROBERT WILLIAMS v. Record No. 1582-15-2
PRINCE GEORGE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES MEMORANDUM OPINION * PER CURIAM ROBERT WILLIAMS APRIL 26, 2016 v. Record No. 1752-15-2
PRINCE GEORGE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE GEORGE COUNTY James F. D’Alton, Jr., Judge (Jessica B. Mauger, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. (Kevin B. O’Donnell; Joan M. O’Donnell; John A. Kirkland, Guardian ad litem for the minor child, on brief), for appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication. Robert Williams (fathe r) appeals orders terminating his pa rental rights an d approving the goal of adoption. Father argues that the trial cour t erred by finding that the evidence was sufficient to (1) terminate his parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B)(2) and (C)(2) because “the conditions which led to the negl ect and abuse could be substantially corre cted to allow the children’s safe return” and (2) change the perm anency plan goal to adoption because he had “substantially complied” with the recommendations and re quests of the Prince George DepartmentUNPUBLISHED- 2 - of Social Services (the Department). Upon reviewing the reco rd and briefs of the parties, we conclude that the trial court did not err. Accord ingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
BACKGROUND We view the evidence in the light most favor able to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). Father and Tiffany Nimrick (mother) are the biol ogical parents of a child, who was born in March 2007. The Department first became involved with th e family in April 2014 . It investigated a complaint alleging that the child was being neglected. There were concer ns about the child’s hygiene, dental care, and the patern al grandmother’s ability to care for the child . At the time, the child was living with hi s paternal grandmother, and father was living in Virgin ia Beach. The Department and the paternal grandm other entered into a safety plan. The child’s behavior was “out of control.” He recently participated in a VICAP assessment, which recommended psychological treatment and a day treatment counselor. In May 2014, the Department followed up with the paternal grandmother to check on her compliance with the agreed upon services in th e safety plan. The pate rnal grandmother had not followed the safety plan, and the child’s behavior had worsened. Father was now living in the paternal grandmother’s home and “was causing a lot of problems with the ho me.” The Department subsequently learned that the police had been ca lled to the home seven times between May and July
2014. On June 2, 2014, the Hope well Juvenile and Do mestic Relations District Court (“the Hopewell J&DR court) conducted a custody hearing. The child ha d been the subject of a custody matter for several years. The Hopewell J&DR c ourt entered a protective order that mandated the- 3 - father and paternal grandmother to comply with th e safety plan and cooperate with the Department. The matter was transferred to the Prince George J uvenile and Domes tic Relations Dist rict Court (the Prince George J&DR court). The Department conducted a family partnershi p meeting on the same day, June 2, 2014. Some of the goals included father and paternal grandmother (1) obtaining individual and family therapy, (2) seekin g psychiatric services and therapy fo r the child, and (3) improving their relationship. Throughout the summer of 20 14, the paternal gra ndmother reported inci dents of father’s anger and volatility. She st ated that in August 20 14, father had thrown a crutch at the child and almost struck him. Based on these incidents, th e Department removed the ch ild from the home. On August 21, 2014, the Prince George J&DR court entere d an emergency removal order. On October 21, 2014, the Prince George J& DR court entered an adjudicatory order finding that the child has been abused or neglected. It also entered a dispositiona l order approving the initial foster care service plan with concurrent goals of return to own home and re lative placement. Father told the Department that he was diag nosed with oppositional defiance disorder. The Department required the father to complete a psychological evaluatio n, participate in counseling, obtain stable housing and employment, participate in parenting classes, and submit to background checks and random drug screens. The Departme nt referred father for a psychological evaluation and counseling. Father sought mental health services, including medicat ion management, through District 19 Community Services Board. By March 2015, father had not consistently participated in treatment for his mental health issues and missed several appointments related to his medication management. He did not participate in family couns eling to address issues with the paternal grandmother, but he told the Department that she refused to participate. In addition, he did not participate in individual- 4 - counseling or parenting classes. The Department determined that “father made minimal progress toward the goals outlined by” the Department. The child has extensive needs. When the child entered fo ster care, he wa s diagnosed with ADHD and had symptoms of a mood disorder. Since October 2014 , he has been seeing Melissa Findlay, a licensed clinical social worker. Ms. Findlay described the child as “extremely hyperactive, inattentive a nd impulsive.” She opined that “the conflict in the child’s home caused traumatic responses.” The child needs “a stable, consistent, matu re parent to be able to provide constant structure and attention to meet his needs and address th e ongoing behaviors he has.” Despite these cha llenges, the child was thri ving in foster care. On March 10, 2015, th e Prince George J&DR court approved a new foster ca re plan with the goal of adoption. Fa ther appealed this order to the circuit court. On April 6, 2015, the Department filed a petition to terminate father’s parental rights. After a hearing on July 14, 20 15, the Prince George J&DR court en tered an order terminating father’s parental rights. Father appealed this order to th e circuit court. The parties appeared before the circuit court on September 22, 2015. At the conclusion of the Department’s evidence, father made a motion to strike, which the trial court denied. Father did not present any evidence. After hearing arguments, the trial court found that it was in the child’s best interests to terminate father’s parental righ ts and approve the perman ency planning goal of adoption. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is en titled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unle ss plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Martin v. Pittsylvania Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16- 5 - (1986). When considering termination of parental rights, “the paramount consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463. Father argues that the trial court erred in terminat ing his parental righ ts and approving the goal of adoption. He contends he was making progress in the Department’s goals because he contacted District 19 for mental health services and me dication management. He acknowledges that he has not consistently participated in treatment for his mental hea lth, but asserts that this can be corrected in “a reasona ble amount of time.” The trial court terminat ed father’s parental rights pursua nt to Code § 16.1-283(B), (C)(1), and (C)(2). According to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2), a court may terminate parental rights if: The parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child wa s placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditio ns which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. In Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 271, 616 S.E.2d 765, 772 (2005) (quoting City of Newport News Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Winslow, 40 Va. App. 556, 562-63, 580 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2003)), the Court explained, [S]ubsection C termination decisions hinge not so much on the magnitude of the problem that cr eated the original danger to the child, but on the demonstrated fa ilure of the parent to make reasonable changes. Considerably more “retrospective in nature,” subsection C requires the court to determine whether the parent has been unwilling or unable to remedy the problems during the period in which he has been offered rehabilitation services. The Department presented evidence that fa ther made “minimal progress” toward the Department’s goals. He did not substantially remedy the situation th at led to the child being placed in, and remaining in, foster care. Father did not take any parenting classes or participate in individual counseling. He did pa rticipate in mental health servi ces through District 19, but his- 6 - participation was inconsistent. He did not particip ate in family counseling. Father has been unable and unwilling to remedy his situation. The child’s counselor testified that the “child has needs above and beyond a normal child of his age.” He was “disconn ected” from his father. The counselor further explained that “the child’s placement in foster care did not ca use the abnormal behaviors.” She op ined that if the child did not address his issues “immediately,” he would be at “high risk of developing anti-social behaviors.” The evidence proved that fath er had not addressed his own mental health issues, despite the services provided by the Department. At the time of the trial, he was not in a position to address the child’s needs. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capa ble of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that it was in the chil d’s best interests to terminate father’s parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). 1 Furthermore, it did not err in approving the goal of adoption because, as discussed above, father had not substantially remedied the situation th at led to the child remain ing in foster care. In addition, there were no relativ es available for placement.

1 When a trial court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, we need only consider whether any one of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial court, and if so, we need not address the other grounds. See Fields v. Dinwiddie Cty. De p’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 8, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005) (the Court affirmed termination of parental rights under one subsection of Code § 16.1-283 and did not need to address termination of parental rights pursuant to another subsection). Therefore, we will not consider whether the trial court erred in terminating father’s parental right s pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C)(1).- 7 - CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the tr ial court’s rulings are affirmed. Affirmed.