Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 228 / Wednesday, November 29, 2023 / Rules and Regulations 83329 

B. The creditor makes a commitment 

at consummation to extend a total 

amount of credit in excess of the 

threshold amount in effect at the time of 

consummation. In these circumstances, 

the loan remains exempt under 

§ 1026.3(b) even if the total amount of 

credit extended does not exceed the 

threshold amount. 

ii. Subsequent changes. If a creditor 

makes a closed-end extension of credit 

or commitment to extend closed-end 

credit that exceeds the threshold 

amount in effect at the time of 

consummation, the closed-end loan 

remains exempt under § 1026.3(b) 

regardless of a subsequent increase in 

the threshold amount. However, a 

closed-end loan is not exempt under 

§ 1026.3(b) merely because it is used to 

satisfy and replace an existing exempt 

loan, unless the new extension of credit 

is itself exempt under the applicable 

threshold amount. For example, assume 

a closed-end loan that qualified for a 

§ 1026.3(b) exemption at consummation 

in year one is refinanced in year ten and 

that the new loan amount is less than 

the threshold amount in effect in year 

ten. In these circumstances, the creditor 

must comply with all of the applicable 

requirements of this part with respect to 

the year ten transaction if the original 

loan is satisfied and replaced by the 

new loan, which is not exempt under 

§ 1026.3(b). See also comment 3(b)–6. 

6. Addition of a security interest in 

real property or a dwelling after account 

opening or consummation. i. Open-end 

credit. For open-end accounts, if after 

account opening a security interest is 

taken in real property, or in personal 

property used or expected to be used as 

the consumer’s principal dwelling, a 

previously exempt account ceases to be 

exempt under § 1026.3(b) and the 

creditor must begin to comply with all 

of the applicable requirements of this 

part within a reasonable period of time. 

See comment 3(b)–4.ii. If a security 

interest is taken in the consumer’s 

principal dwelling, the creditor must 

also give the consumer the right to 

rescind the security interest consistent 

with § 1026.15. 

ii. Closed-end credit. For closed-end 

loans, if after consummation a security 

interest is taken in real property, or in 

personal property used or expected to 

be used as the consumer’s principal 

dwelling, an exempt loan remains 

exempt under § 1026.3(b). However, the 

addition of a security interest in the 

consumer’s principal dwelling is a 

transaction for purposes of § 1026.23, 

and the creditor must give the consumer 

the right to rescind the security interest 

consistent with that section. See 

§ 1026.23(a)(1) and its commentary. In 

contrast, if a closed-end loan that is 

exempt under § 1026.3(b) is satisfied 

and replaced by a loan that is secured 

by real property, or by personal property 

used or expected to be used as the 

consumer’s principal dwelling, the new 

loan is not exempt under § 1026.3(b), 

and the creditor must comply with all 

of the applicable requirements of this 

part. See comment 3(b)–5. 

7. Application to extensions secured 

by mobile homes. Because a mobile 

home can be a dwelling under 

§ 1026.2(a)(19), the exemption in 

§ 1026.3(b) does not apply to a credit 

extension secured by a mobile home 

that is used or expected to be used as 

the principal dwelling of the consumer. 

See comment 3(b)–6. 

8. Transition rule for open-end 

accounts exempt prior to July 21, 2011. 

Section 1026.3(b)(2) applies only to 

open-end accounts opened prior to July 

21, 2011. Section 1026.3(b)(2) does not 

apply if a security interest is taken by 

the creditor in real property, or in 

personal property used or expected to 

be used as the consumer’s principal 

dwelling. If, on July 20, 2011, an openend account is exempt under § 1026.3(b) 

based on a firm commitment to extend 

credit in excess of $25,000, the account 

remains exempt under § 1026.3(b)(2) 

until December 31, 2011 (unless the 

firm commitment is reduced to $25,000 

or less). If the firm commitment is 

increased on or before December 31, 

2011, to an amount in excess of $50,000, 

the account remains exempt under 

§ 1026.3(b)(1) regardless of subsequent 

increases in the threshold amount as a 

result of increases in the CPI–W. If the 

firm commitment is not increased on or 

before December 31, 2011, to an amount 

in excess of $50,000, the account ceases 

to be exempt under § 1026.3(b) based on 

a firm commitment to extend credit. For 

example: 

i. Assume that, on July 20, 2011, the 

account is exempt under § 1026.3(b) 

based on the creditor’s firm 

commitment to extend $30,000 in 

credit. On November 1, 2011, the 

creditor increases the firm commitment 

on the account to $55,000. In these 

circumstances, the account remains 

exempt under § 1026.3(b)(1) regardless 

of subsequent increases in the threshold 

amount as a result of increases in the 

CPI–W. 

ii. Same facts as paragraph 8.i of this 

section except, on November 1, 2011, 

the creditor increases the firm 

commitment on the account to $40,000. 

In these circumstances, the account 

ceases to be exempt under § 1026.3(b)(2) 

after December 31, 2011, and the 

creditor must begin to comply with the 

applicable requirements of this part. 

* * * * * 

By order of the Board of Governors of the 

Federal Reserve System, acting through the 

Secretary of the Board under delegated 

authority. 

Michele Taylor Fennell, 

Deputy Associate Secretary of the Board. 

Brian Shearer, 

Senior Advisor, Consumer Financial 

Protection Bureau. 

[FR Doc. 2023–25048 Filed 11–28–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4810–AM–P; 6210–01–P 

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 

CORPORATION 

12 CFR Part 327 

RIN 3064–AF93 

Special Assessment Pursuant to 

Systemic Risk Determination 

AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation (FDIC). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FDIC is adopting a final 

rule to implement a special assessment 

to recover the loss to the Deposit 

Insurance Fund (DIF or Fund) arising 

from the protection of uninsured 

depositors following the closures of 

Silicon Valley Bank, Santa Clara, CA, 

and Signature Bank, New York, NY. The 

FDIC will collect the $16.3 billion 

special assessment at a quarterly rate of 

3.36 basis points, multiplied by an 

insured depository institution’s (IDI) 

estimated uninsured deposits, reported 

for the quarter that ended December 31, 

2022, adjusted to exclude the first $5 

billion in estimated uninsured deposits 

from the IDI, or for IDIs that are part of 

a holding company with one or more 

subsidiary IDIs, at the banking 

organization level. The FDIC will collect 

the special assessment over eight 

quarterly assessment periods, although 

the collection period may change due to 

updates to the estimated loss pursuant 

to the systemic risk determination or if 

assessments collected change due to 

corrective amendments to the amount of 

uninsured deposits reported for the 

December 31, 2022, reporting period. 

DATES: The final rule is effective on 

April 1, 2024, with the first collection 

for the special assessment reflected on 

the invoice for the first quarterly 

assessment period of 2024 (i.e., January 

1 through March 31, 2024), with a 

payment date of June 28, 2024. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Division of Insurance and Research: 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with RULES1
83330 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 228 / Wednesday, November 29, 2023 / Rules and Regulations 

1See FDIC PR–16–2023. ‘‘FDIC Creates a Deposit 

Insurance National Bank of Santa Clara to Protect 

Insured Depositors of Silicon Valley Bank, Santa 

Clara, California.’’ March 10, 2023. https://

www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/2023/ 

pr23016.html. See also FDIC PR–18–2023. ‘‘FDIC 

Establishes Signature Bridge Bank, N.A., as 

Successor to Signature Bank, New York, NY.’’ 

March 12, 2023. https://www.fdic.gov/news/pressreleases/2023/pr23018.html. 

2 12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G). As used in this final 

rule, the term ‘‘bank’’ is synonymous with the term 

‘‘insured depository institution’’ as it is used in 

section 3(c)(2) of the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. 1813(c)(2). 

3 12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G). See also: FDIC PR–17– 

2023. ‘‘Joint Statement by the Department of the 

Treasury, Federal Reserve, and FDIC.’’ March 12, 

2023. https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/ 

2023/pr23017.html. See also: ‘‘Remarks by 

Chairman Martin J. Gruenberg on Recent Bank 

Failures and the Federal Regulatory Response 

before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 

Urban Affairs, United States Senate.’’ March 27, 

2023. https://www.fdic.gov/news/speeches/2023/ 

spmar2723.html. 

4A bridge bank is a chartered national bank that 

operates under a board appointed by the FDIC. It 

assumes the deposits and certain other liabilities 

and purchases certain assets of a failed bank. The 

bridge bank structure is designed to ‘‘bridge’’ the 

gap between the failure of a bank and the time 

when the FDIC can stabilize the institution and 

implement an orderly resolution. 

5FDIC PR–21–2023. ‘‘Subsidiary of New York 

Community Bancorp, Inc. to Assume Deposits of 

Signature Bridge Bank, N.A., From the FDIC.’’ 

March 19, 2023. https://www.fdic.gov/news/pressreleases/2023/pr23021.html. The purchase and 

assumption agreement did not include 

approximately $4 billion of deposits related to the 

former Signature Bank’s digital-asset banking 

business. The FDIC announced that it would 

provide these deposits directly to customers whose 

accounts are associated with the digital-asset 

banking business. 

6FDIC PR–23–2023. ‘‘First-Citizens Bank & Trust 

Company, Raleigh, NC, to Assume All Deposits and 

Loans of Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, N.A., From the 

FDIC.’’ March 26, 2023. https://www.fdic.gov/news/ 

press-releases/2023/pr23023.html. 

7 12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii)(I). 

8 12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii)(III). 

Ashley Mihalik, Associate Director, 

Financial Risk Management, 202–898– 

3793, amihalik@fdic.gov; Kayla 

Shoemaker, Senior Policy Analyst, 202– 

898–6962, kashoemaker@fdic.gov; Legal 

Division: Sheikha Kapoor, Assistant 

General Counsel, 202–898–3960, 

skapoor@fdic.gov; Ryan McCarthy, 

Counsel, 202–898–7301, rymccarthy@

fdic.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents 

I. Background 

A. Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, 

and the Systemic Risk Exception 

B. Legal Authority and Policy Objectives 

C. The Proposed Rule 

II. The Final Rule 

A. Description of the Final Rule 

B. Estimated Special Assessment Amount 

C. Rate for the Special Assessment 

D. Assessment Base and Scope of 

Application for the Special Assessment 

1. Comments Received on the Calculation 

of the Special Assessment 

2. Comments on the Reporting Date of 

Uninsured Deposits for Special 

Assessment Base 

3. Comments Recommending Exclusions 

From Uninsured Deposits for Special 

Assessment Base 

4. Final Assessment Base for the Special 

Assessment 

E. Prior Period Amendments 

F. Initial Collection Period for the Special 

Assessment 

1. Comments Received on the Initial 

Collection Period 

2. Adjustments to the Loss Estimate, 

Amendments to the Reported Amount of 

Estimated Uninsured Deposits and the 

Initial Collection Period for the Special 

Assessment 

G. Extended Special Assessment Collection 

Period 

H. One-Time Final Shortfall Special 

Assessment 

I. Collection of Special Assessment and 

Any Shortfall Special Assessment 

J. Payment Mechanism for the Special 

Assessment and Any Shortfall Special 

Assessment 

K. Mergers, Consolidations, and 

Terminations of Deposit Insurance 

L. Accounting Treatment 

M. Request for Revisions 

III. Analysis and Expected Effects 

A. Analysis of the Statutory Factors 

1. The Types of Entities That Benefit 

2. Effects on the Industry 

3. Capital and Earnings Analysis 

4. Economic Conditions 

B. Alternatives Considered 

C. Effective Date and Application Date of 

the Final Rule 

IV. Administrative Law Matters 

A. Regulatory Flexibility Act 

B. Paperwork Reduction Act 

C. Riegle Community Development and 

Regulatory Improvement Act 

D. Plain Language 

E. Congressional Review Act 

I. Background 

A. Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, 

and the Systemic Risk Exception 

On March 10, 2023, Silicon Valley 

Bank was closed by the California 

Department of Financial Protection and 

Innovation, followed by the closure of 

Signature Bank by the New York State 

Department of Financial Services. The 

FDIC was appointed as the receiver for 

both institutions.1

Section 13(c)(4)(G) of the FDI Act 

permits the FDIC to take action or 

provide assistance to an IDI for which 

the FDIC has been appointed receiver as 

necessary to avoid or mitigate adverse 

effects on economic conditions or 

financial stability, following a 

recommendation by the FDIC Board of 

Directors (Board), with the written 

concurrence of the Board of Governors 

of the Federal Reserve System (Board of 

Governors), and a determination of 

systemic risk by the Secretary of the 

U.S. Department of Treasury (Treasury) 

(in consultation with the President).2

On March 12, 2023, the Secretary of 

the Treasury, acting on the 

recommendation of the Board and Board 

of Governors, and after consultation 

with the President, invoked the 

statutory systemic risk exception to 

allow the FDIC to complete its 

resolution of both Silicon Valley Bank 

and Signature Bank in a manner that 

fully protects depositors.3 The full 

protection of depositors, rather than 

imposing losses on uninsured 

depositors, was intended to strengthen 

public confidence in the nation’s 

banking system. 

On March 12 and 13, 2023, the FDIC 

transferred deposits—both insured and 

uninsured—and substantially all assets 

of these banks to newly created, fullservice FDIC-operated bridge banks, 

Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, N.A. 

(Silicon Valley Bridge Bank) and 

Signature Bridge Bank, N.A. (Signature 

Bridge Bank), in an action designed to 

protect depositors of these banks.4 The 

transfer of deposits was completed 

under the systemic risk exception 

declared on March 12, 2023. 

On March 19, 2023, the FDIC 

announced it entered into a purchase 

and assumption agreement for 

substantially all deposits and certain 

loan portfolios of Signature Bridge 

Bank.5 On March 27, 2023, the FDIC 

entered into a purchase and assumption 

agreement with First-Citizens Bank & 

Trust Company (First Citizens), with 

loss-sharing provided on the 

commercial loans it purchased from 

Silicon Valley Bridge Bank.6

B. Legal Authority and Policy Objectives 

Under section 13(c)(4)(G) of the FDI 

Act, the loss to the DIF arising from the 

use of a systemic risk exception must be 

recovered from one or more special 

assessments on IDIs, depository 

institution holding companies (with the 

concurrence of the Secretary of the 

Treasury with respect to holding 

companies), or both, as the FDIC 

determines to be appropriate.7 As 

required by the FDI Act, the special 

assessment, detailed below, is intended 

and designed to recover the losses to the 

DIF incurred as the result of the actions 

taken by the FDIC to protect the 

uninsured depositors of Silicon Valley 

Bank and Signature Bank following a 

determination of systemic risk.8

Section 13(c)(4)(G) of the FDI Act 

provides the FDIC with discretion in the 

design and timeframe for any special 

assessments to recover the losses to the 

DIF as a result of a systemic risk 

determination. As detailed in the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 228 / Wednesday, November 29, 2023 / Rules and Regulations 83331 

9 12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii)(III). 

10See 88 FR 32694 (May 22, 2023). 11As used in this final rule, the term ‘‘banking 

organization’’ includes IDIs that are not subsidiaries 

of a holding company as well as holding companies 

with one or more subsidiary IDIs. 12See comments on the proposal, available at 

https://www.fdic.gov/resources/regulations/federalregister-publications/2023/2023-specialassessments-systemic-risk-determination-3064- 

af93.html. 13 12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G). 

sections that follow, and as required by 

section 13(c)(4)(G) of the FDI Act, the 

FDIC considered the types of entities 

that benefit from any action taken or 

assistance provided under the 

determination of systemic risk, 

economic conditions, the effects on the 

industry, and such other factors as the 

FDIC deemed appropriate and relevant 

to the action taken or assistance 

provided.9

C. The Proposed Rule 

On May 11, 2023, the Board approved 

a notice of proposed rulemaking (the 

proposed rule, or proposal) to 

implement a special assessment, as 

required by the FDI Act, to recover the 

loss to the DIF arising from the 

protection of uninsured depositors 

following the closures of Silicon Valley 

Bank and Signature Bank.10 The FDIC 

proposed to collect a special assessment 

that would be approximately equal to 

the losses attributable to the protection 

of uninsured depositors at these two 

failed banks, which were estimated to 

total $15.8 billion. 

The FDIC proposed an annual special 

assessment rate that would be derived 

by dividing the loss estimate 

attributable to the protection of 

uninsured depositors by the assessment 

base calculated for all IDIs subject to the 

special assessment. The proposed 

assessment base (special assessment 

base) was equal to an IDI’s estimated 

uninsured deposits as reported in the 

Consolidated Reports of Condition and 

Income (Call Report) or Report of Assets 

and Liabilities of U.S. Branches and 

Agencies of Foreign Banks (FFIEC 002) 

as of December 31, 2022, adjusted to 

exclude the first $5 billion of uninsured 

deposits at the banking organization 

level.11

In response to the proposal, the FDIC 

received 312 comment letters from 

depository institutions, depository 

institution holding companies, trade 

associations, members of Congress, and 

other interested parties.12 As further 

detailed below, the majority of 

commenters expressed support for the 

proposal and for the scope of 

application of the proposed rule, 

including the $5 billion deduction 

applied to the special assessment base. 

Other comment letters suggested the 

exclusion, or different treatment, of 

certain types of uninsured deposits 

included in the special assessment base, 

different reporting dates of estimated 

uninsured deposits used to calculate the 

assessment base, or adjustment of the $5 

billion deduction from the special 

assessment base. Commenters 

additionally discussed a range of other 

matters that are addressed in the 

relevant sections below. 

II. The Final Rule 

A. Description of the Final Rule 

After careful consideration of the 

comments received on the proposal and 

analysis of the applicable statutory 

factors, the FDIC is adopting, as final, 

the proposed special assessment, with 

clarifications to promote transparency 

and a modification to apply any 

corrective amendments to estimated 

uninsured deposits for the December 31, 

2022, reporting period to the calculation 

of the special assessment, following 

adoption of the final rule. 

The special assessment implemented 

through this final rule will recover the 

loss to the DIF arising from the 

protection of uninsured depositors 

following the closures of Silicon Valley 

Bank and Signature Bank. The total 

amount collected for the special 

assessment will be approximately equal 

to the estimated losses attributable to 

the protection of uninsured depositors 

at these two failed banks, which are 

currently estimated to total $16.3 

billion. 

The majority of commenters 

expressed support for the proposal and 

for the scope of application, including 

the $5 billion deduction applied to the 

assessment base for the special 

assessment. While some commenters 

broadly objected to the collection of a 

special assessment, the FDIC is required 

by the FDI Act to take this action in 

connection with the systemic risk 

determination announced on March 12, 

2023.13 In the FDIC’s view, the final 

rule, consistent with the proposed rule, 

reflects an appropriate balancing of the 

goal of applying the special assessment 

to the types of entities that benefited the 

most from the protection of uninsured 

depositors provided under the 

determination of systemic risk while 

ensuring equitable, transparent, and 

consistent treatment. The final rule, 

consistent with the proposed rule, also 

allows for payments to be collected over 

an extended period of time in order to 

reduce the likelihood of overcollecting 

and to mitigate the liquidity effects of 

the special assessment by requiring 

smaller, consistent quarterly payments. 

B. Estimated Special Assessment 

Amount 

To determine the cost of the failures 

attributable to the cost of covering 

uninsured deposits pursuant to the 

determination of systemic risk, the FDIC 

determined the percentage of deposits 

that were uninsured at the time of 

failure and applied that percentage to 

the total cost of the failure for each 

bank. 

At Signature Bank, for which 67 

percent of deposits were uninsured at 

the time of failure, the portion of the 

total estimated loss of $0.9 billion that 

is attributable to the protection of 

uninsured depositors is $0.6 billion. 

The cost estimate for the sale of the 

Signature Bridge Bank to New York 

Community Bancorp decreased 

following the issuance of the proposal 

from $2.4 billion to approximately $0.9 

billion. The decline in the cost estimate 

was primarily attributable to recoveries 

from assets in receivership that were 

higher than previously estimated offset, 

in part, by higher costs of liabilities 

assumed by the receivership. 

At Silicon Valley Bank, for which 88 

percent of deposits were uninsured at 

the time of failure, the portion of the 

total estimated loss of $17.8 billion that 

is attributable to the protection of 

uninsured depositors is $15.7 billion. 

The cost estimate for the sale of the 

Silicon Valley Bridge Bank to First 

Citizens was revised following the 

issuance of the proposal from $16.1 

billion to approximately $17.8 billion 

mainly due to recoveries from assets in 

receivership that were less than 

previously anticipated and higher costs 

of liabilities assumed by the 

receivership. 

The revised cost estimates form the 

basis for the current special assessment 

calculation in this final rule. In total, of 

the $18.7 billion in estimated losses at 

the two banks and incurred by the DIF, 

the estimated loss attributable to the 

protection of uninsured depositors is 

$16.3 billion, an increase of 

approximately $500 million from the 

estimate of $15.8 billion described in 

the proposal. 

As with all failed bank receiverships, 

these loss estimates will be periodically 

adjusted as assets are sold, liabilities are 

satisfied, and receivership expenses are 

incurred. The exact amount of losses 

incurred will be determined when the 

FDIC terminates the receiverships. As 

noted below, the amount of the special 

assessment will be adjusted as the loss 

estimates change. 


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83332 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 228 / Wednesday, November 29, 2023 / Rules and Regulations 

14The proposed rule noted that the special 

assessment rate in the proposal was subject to 

change prior to any final rule depending on any 

adjustments to the loss estimate, mergers or failures, 

or amendments to reported estimates of uninsured 

deposits. Estimates of the special assessment rate 

and expected effects in the proposed rule generally 

reflected any amendments to data reported through 

February 21, 2023, for the reporting period that 

ended December 31, 2022, while estimates for this 

final rule reflect any amendments as of November 

2, 2023. Given the closure of First Republic Bank, 

San Francisco, CA, announced on May 1, 2023, 

estimates in the proposed rule and this final rule 

exclude First Republic Bank in addition to Silicon 

Valley Bank and Signature Bank. See FDIC: PR–34– 

2023. ‘‘JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, 

Columbus, Ohio Assumes All the Deposits of First 

Republic Bank, San Francisco, California.’’ May 1, 

2023. https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/ 

2023/pr23034.html. 

15The special assessment rate, base, and expected 

effects in this final rule reflect any amendments to 

data as of November 2, 2023, for the reporting 

period that ended December 31, 2022. 

16Estimated uninsured deposits are reported in 

Memoranda Item 2 on Schedule RC–O, Other Data 

for Deposit Insurance Assessments of both the Call 

Report and FFIEC 002. IDIs with less than $1 billion 

in total assets as of June 30, 2021, were not required 

to report the estimated amount of uninsured 

deposits on the Call Report for December 31, 2022. 

Therefore, for IDIs that had less than $1 billion in 

total assets as of June 30, 2021, the amount and 

share of estimated uninsured deposits as of 

December 31, 2022, would be zero. 

17Among the groups of banks commenters stated 

should be exempt from the special assessment were: 

banks under a range of other asset or uninsured 

deposit thresholds, banks not considered 

systemically important financial institutions, 

Community Development Financial Institutions 

(CDFIs), Minority Depository Institutions (MDIs), 

rural banks, and mutual banks. 

Comments Received on the Estimated 

Special Assessment Amount 

One commenter suggested that the 

special assessment should recover the 

entire amount of estimated losses. As 

proposed, and as required by statute, the 

FDIC will recover through the special 

assessment the $16.3 billion estimated 

loss incurred as a result of the actions 

taken by the FDIC pursuant to the 

determination of systemic risk, which, 

in the case of the determination 

pursuant to the closures of Silicon 

Valley Bank and Signature Bank, was to 

protect uninsured depositors. 

C. Rate for the Special Assessment 

The proposed special assessment rate 

was derived by dividing the loss 

estimate attributable to the protection of 

uninsured depositors by the assessment 

base calculated for all IDIs subject to the 

special assessment as of December 31, 

2022. As described in detail below, the 

proposed assessment base was equal to 

estimated uninsured deposits reported 

for the quarter that ended 

December 31, 2022, after applying the 

$5 billion deduction. 

Under the final rule, the FDIC will 

impose a special assessment rate equal 

to approximately 13.4 basis points 

annually, an increase from the 12.5 

basis point annual rate in the 

proposal.14 Amendments to reported 

estimated uninsured deposits filed since 

the adoption of the proposed rule have 

resulted in a lower total assessment 

base. The decline in the total assessment 

base combined with the increase in the 

cost estimate have resulted in a higher 

annual rate relative to the proposal.15 As 

of November 2, 2023, the total 

assessment base was $6.0 trillion. The 

special assessment rate will not change 

following the date of adoption of this 

final rule through the duration of the 

initial eight-quarter collection period. 

The resulting quarterly rate is 3.36 

basis points, or an annual rate of 

approximately 13.4 basis points. Over 

the initial eight-quarter collection 

period, the FDIC projects that it will 

collect an amount sufficient to recover 

estimated losses attributable to the 

protection of uninsured depositors of 

Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank, 

which are currently estimated to total 

$16.3 billion, totaling approximately 

$2.0 billion per quarter. 

D. Assessment Base and Scope of 

Application for the Special Assessment 

Under the proposal, each IDI’s 

assessment base for the special 

assessment would be equal to estimated 

uninsured deposits as reported in the 

Call Report or FFIEC 002 for the quarter 

that ended December 31, 2022, after 

applying the $5 billion deduction.16 As 

a result of this deduction, most small 

IDIs and IDIs that are part of a small 

banking organization would not pay 

anything towards the special 

assessment. The special assessment 

would not be applicable to any banking 

organizations with total assets under $5 

billion. 

1. Comments Received on the 

Calculation of the Special Assessment 

The majority of commenters stated 

that community banks should be 

exempt from the special assessment. 

The FDIC received 63 comments related 

to the calculation of the special 

assessment base and the scope of 

application for the special assessment, 

or the calculation of the special 

assessment rate. Some of these 

commenters stated that certain groups of 

banks should be exempt from or pay 

less of the special assessment, while one 

commenter recommended that all banks 

be subject to the special assessment.17

One commenter said that U.S. global 

systemically important banks (GSIBs) 

did not benefit from the actions taken 

under the determination of systemic risk 

and that although GSIBs served as a 

source of strength to the banking sector, 

they are responsible for a 

disproportionate share of the special 

assessment. 

One commenter noted that given that 

the FDIC is required by statute to 

recover the estimated amount of loss 

attributable to the protection of 

uninsured depositors following the 

determination of systemic risk, any 

changes to the proposed special 

assessment base will necessarily 

redistribute the obligation among 

banking organizations subject to the 

special assessment. 

Several commenters recommended 

alternative measures for the special 

assessment base, including total assets, 

total deposits, uninsured deposits as a 

percentage of total deposits, an 

institution’s regular risk-based deposit 

insurance assessment base, or to 

otherwise take a more risk-based 

approach to calculating the special 

assessment base. One commenter 

recommended a more detailed 

approach, stating that the special 

assessment base should be the entire 

deposit base, or alternatively the entire 

assessment base applied for regular 

quarterly deposit insurance 

assessments, for the largest institutions 

and uninsured deposits for all other 

banks, and that the rate for the special 

assessment should incorporate an 

adjusted tangible equity capital ratio 

and a scalar to factor in interest rate 

risk. 

With the rapid collapse of Silicon 

Valley Bank and Signature Bank in the 

space of 48 hours, concerns arose that 

risk could spread more widely to other 

institutions and that the financial 

system as a whole could be placed at 

risk. Shortly after Silicon Valley Bank 

was closed on March 10, 2023, a 

number of institutions with large 

amounts of uninsured deposits reported 

that depositors had begun to withdraw 

their funds. 

The extent to which IDIs rely on 

uninsured deposits for funding varies 

significantly. Uninsured deposits were 

used to fund nearly three-quarters of 

assets at Silicon Valley Bank and 

Signature Bank. On average, the largest 

banking organizations by asset size fund 

a larger share of assets with uninsured 

deposits, as depicted in Table 1 below, 

based on data as of December 31, 2022, 

the most recently available date 

reflecting the amount of uninsured 

deposits in each institution near or at 

the time the determination of systemic 

risk was made. Among banking 

organizations that report uninsured 

deposits, those with total assets between 


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$1 billion and $5 billion are generally 

the least reliant on uninsured deposits 

for funding, with uninsured deposits 

averaging 27.9 percent of assets, 

compared with the largest banking 

organizations with total assets greater 

than $250 billion, which had uninsured 

deposits that averaged 35.1 percent of 

assets. 

TABLE 1—AVERAGE SHARE OF ASSETS FUNDED BY UNINSURED DEPOSITS, BY BANKING ORGANIZATION ASSET SIZE, 

BASED ON DATA FOR THE DECEMBER 31, 2022, REPORTING PERIOD 1

[Percent] 

Asset size of banking organization 

Average share of 

assets funded by 

uninsured deposits 

[percent] 

$1 to $5 Billion ......................................................................................................................................................................... 27.9 

$5 to $10 Billion ....................................................................................................................................................................... 28.9 

$10 to $50 Billion ..................................................................................................................................................................... 32.4 

$50 to $250 Billion ................................................................................................................................................................... 33.3 

Greater than $250 Billion ......................................................................................................................................................... 35.1 

1Table reflects data for the December 31, 2022, reporting period, and incorporates amendments, mergers, acquisitions and failures through 

November 2, 2023. 

Uninsured deposit concentrations of 

IDIs, meaning the percentage of 

domestic deposits that are uninsured, 

also vary significantly. At Silicon Valley 

Bank, 88 percent of deposits were 

uninsured at the point of failure 

compared to 67 percent at Signature 

Bank. On average, the largest banking 

organizations by asset size reported 

significantly greater uninsured deposit 

concentrations relative to smaller 

banking organizations, as illustrated in 

Table 2 below, based on data as of 

December 31, 2022. Banking 

organizations with total assets between 

$1 billion and $5 billion generally 

reported the lowest percentage of 

uninsured deposits to total domestic 

deposits, averaging 33.0 percent, 

compared with the largest banking 

organizations with total assets greater 

than $250 billion, which averaged 50.4 

percent. 

TABLE 2—UNINSURED DEPOSITS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DOMESTIC DEPOSITS, BY BANKING ORGANIZATION ASSET

SIZE, BASED ON DATA FOR THE DECEMBER 31, 2022, REPORTING PERIOD 1

[Percent] 

Asset Size of banking organization 

Ratio of uninsured 

deposits to total 

domestic deposits 

[percent] 

$1 to $5 Billion ......................................................................................................................................................................... 33.0 

$5 to $10 Billion ....................................................................................................................................................................... 35.0 

$10 to $50 Billion ..................................................................................................................................................................... 40.3 

$50 to $250 Billion ................................................................................................................................................................... 42.8 

Greater than $250 Billion ......................................................................................................................................................... 50.4 

1 Reflects reporting amendments to estimated uninsured deposits, mergers, acquisitions, and failures through November 2, 2023. 

Following the announcement of the 

systemic risk determination, the FDIC 

observed a significant slowdown in 

uninsured deposits leaving certain 

institutions, evidence that the systemic 

risk determination helped stem the 

outflow of these deposits while 

providing stability to the banking 

industry. 

As of March 31, 2023, banks in all 

asset size groups experienced quarterly 

declines in uninsured deposit balances, 

but these declines were particularly 

severe and widespread among banks 

between $50 billion and $250 billion in 

total assets. In addition, between 

December 31, 2022, and March 31, 2023, 

the eight U.S. GSIBs reported a 

weighted average decline in uninsured 

deposits of 2.1 percent, albeit slower 

than the industry average of 

approximately eight percent. However, 

changes in uninsured deposit balances 

over this time period varied widely for 

the GSIBs. Two of the eight GSIBs 

experienced growth in uninsured 

deposits of 2.6 percent and 2.0 percent 

over this period while the other six 

GSIBs experienced declines, some 

significant, ranging between less than 

two percent to nearly 17 percent. 

Defining the assessment base for the 

special assessment as estimated 

uninsured deposits reported as of 

December 31, 2022, and deducting $5 

billion from a banking organization’s 

assessment base, serves several 

purposes. First, banking organizations 

that reported $5 billion or less in 

estimated uninsured deposits as of 

December 31, 2022, would not be 

subject to the special assessment. 

Banking organizations that reported 

more than $5 billion in estimated 

uninsured deposits would pay based on 

the marginal amounts of uninsured 

deposits they reported, helping to 

mitigate a ‘‘cliff effect’’ that might 

otherwise apply if a different method, 

such as applying an asset size threshold, 

were used to determine applicability, 

and thereby ensuring more equitable 

treatment. Otherwise, a situation may 

arise in which a banking organization 

just over a particular size threshold 

would pay a special assessment, while 

a banking organization just below such 

size threshold would pay none. 

In general, large banks and regional 

banks, and particularly those with large 

amounts of uninsured deposits, were 

the banks most exposed to and likely 

would have been the most affected by 

uninsured deposit runs but for the 

determination of systemic risk. Indeed, 

shortly after Silicon Valley Bank was 


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18Some IDIs that report less than $5 billion in 

estimated uninsured deposits will be subject to the 

special assessment if they are part of banking 

organizations with multiple IDIs that report a 

combined total of estimated uninsured deposits in 

excess of $5 billion. 

19 12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii)(III). 

closed, a number of institutions with 

large amounts of uninsured deposits 

reported that depositors had begun to 

withdraw their funds. The failure of 

Silicon Valley Bank and the impending 

failure of Signature Bank raised 

concerns that, absent immediate 

assistance for uninsured depositors, 

there could be negative knock-on 

consequences for similarly situated 

institutions, depositors and the financial 

system more broadly. Generally 

speaking, larger banks benefited the 

most from the stability provided to the 

banking industry under the systemic 

risk determination. With the $5 billion 

deduction from the assessment base, the 

banks that benefited the most—banks of 

larger asset sizes and that hold greater 

amounts of uninsured deposits—will be 

responsible for paying the special 

assessment. 

Second, the $5 billion deduction from 

the assessment base results in most 

small IDIs and IDIs that are part of a 

small banking organization not paying 

anything towards the special 

assessment. The special assessment is 

not applicable to any banking 

organizations with total assets under $5 

billion.18

Finally, deducting $5 billion from the 

assessment base of estimated uninsured 

deposits at the banking organization 

level rather than at the IDI level for 

banking organizations with more than 

one subsidiary IDI ensures that banking 

organizations with similar amounts of 

estimated uninsured deposits pay a 

similar special assessment, regardless of 

banking organization structure. For 

example, a banking organization with 

multiple IDIs with large amounts of 

estimated uninsured deposits will not 

have an advantage over other banking 

organizations with only one subsidiary 

IDI with a similarly large amount of 

estimated uninsured deposits because 

instead of excluding $5 billion of 

estimated uninsured deposits for each 

IDI in one banking organization, the $5 

billion deduction will be distributed 

across multiple affiliated IDIs. 

In implementing special assessments, 

the FDI Act requires the FDIC to 

consider the types of entities that 

benefit from any action taken or 

assistance provided pursuant to the 

determination of systemic risk.19 The 

assessment base of estimated uninsured 

deposits with the $5 billion deduction 

ensures that the banks that benefited 

most from the assistance provided 

under the systemic risk determination 

will be charged a special assessment to 

recover losses to the DIF resulting from 

the protection of uninsured depositors, 

with banks of larger asset sizes and that 

hold greater amounts of uninsured 

deposits paying a higher special 

assessment. For these reasons, the FDIC 

is adopting the proposed exclusion of 

the first $5 billion from estimated 

uninsured deposits from the assessment 

base for the special assessment, without 

change. 

2. Comments on the Reporting Date of 

Uninsured Deposits for Special 

Assessment Base 

Under the proposal, each IDI’s 

assessment base for the special 

assessment would be equal to estimated 

uninsured deposits as reported in the 

Call Report or FFIEC 002 for the 

December 31, 2022, reporting period, 

after applying the $5 billion deduction. 

The FDIC sought comment on whether 

the special assessment base should be 

equal to estimated uninsured deposits 

reported as of December 31, 2022, or 

reported as of some other date, and the 

reasons for using a different date. 

Two commenters expressed support 

for the proposed December 31, 2022, 

reporting date for uninsured deposits to 

determine the special assessment base. 

Thirteen commenters, including two 

trade associations and three letters from 

members of Congress, requested that 

estimated uninsured deposits reported 

as of a more recent date than December 

31, 2022, be used to calculate the 

assessment base for the special 

assessment. Most of these commenters 

suggested an alternative date, such as 

March 31, 2023, or June 30, 2023, while 

others suggested that the assessment 

base should reference the estimated 

uninsured deposits reported as of each 

quarter-end during the collection period 

or did not specify a date. Some 

commenters that supported a later 

reporting date said that institutions, 

particularly mid-sized and regional 

banks, that reported declines in 

uninsured deposit balances after 

December 31, 2022, should not be 

charged a special assessment on 

uninsured deposit balances that they no 

longer hold or that are now insured. 

In the FDIC’s view, estimated 

uninsured deposits as of December 31, 

2022, most closely approximate an 

institution’s vulnerability to significant 

deposit withdrawals in the absence of 

the determination of systemic risk, and 

therefore reflect the institutions that 

most benefited from such 

determination. An assessment base that 

is calculated using the amount of 

uninsured deposits as of December 31, 

2022, would result in transparent and 

consistent payments, best approximate 

an institution’s vulnerability to deposit 

withdrawals, and would result in a 

more simplified framework for 

calculating the special assessment. For 

these reasons, the FDIC is adopting as 

final the proposed special assessment 

base of estimated uninsured deposits as 

of December 31, 2022. 

3. Comments Recommending 

Exclusions From Uninsured Deposits for 

Special Assessment Base 

Under the proposed rule, the 

assessment base for the special 

assessment would be adjusted to 

exclude the first $5 billion from 

estimated uninsured deposits reported 

as of December 31, 2022, applicable 

either to the IDI, if an IDI is not a 

subsidiary of a holding company, or at 

the banking organization level, to the 

extent that an IDI is part of a holding 

company with one or more subsidiary 

IDIs. The FDIC sought comment on 

whether it should consider an 

exemption for specific types of deposits 

from the special assessment base, and 

on what basis. 

Multiple commenters supported the 

exclusion of, or different treatment for, 

certain types of uninsured deposits 

included in the proposed assessment 

base for the special assessment of 

estimated uninsured deposits reported 

as of December 31, 2022, less the $5 

billion deduction. 

a. Collateralized Deposits 

The FDIC received 25 comments 

requesting that the FDIC either exclude, 

or provide a different treatment for, 

collateralized deposits in the calculation 

of the special assessment base. In 

particular, commenters requested such 

treatment for the uninsured portion of 

public deposits, or deposits of states and 

political subdivisions that are secured 

or collateralized as required under state 

law (also referred to as preferred 

deposits). These commenters reasoned 

that collateralized deposits are more 

stable than other uninsured deposits 

because they are secured, and therefore 

pose little risk to the DIF. Seven of these 

commenters requested the exclusion of 

additional types of collateralized 

deposits, including collateralized 

operational deposits or trust-related 

deposits that are required to be 

collateralized under federal or state law 

(e.g., fiduciary funds awaiting 

investment or distribution), from the 

special assessment base. 

Banks report preferred deposits 

annually for the December 31 Call 

Report date, but they do not report other 


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20Call Report Schedule RC–E, Part I, 

Memorandum item 1.e. requires reporting of 

preferred deposits (uninsured deposits of states and 

political subdivisions in the U.S. which are secured 

or collateralized as required under state law). 21The commenter defined operational deposits as 

residual cash custody banks hold for their clients 

in deposit accounts to facilitate day-to-day 

transactional activities related to client investment 

assets. 22See 79 FR at 61502 (Oct. 10, 2014). 

types of collateralized deposits such as 

those mentioned by the commenters.20

Given that preferred deposits represent 

only a subset of collateralized deposits, 

providing an exclusion or different 

treatment for this subset of deposits 

would result in preferential treatment 

for this subset of collateralized deposits 

on the sole basis that these are the only 

type of collateralized deposits for which 

data were collected. 

Moreover, even if banks reported data 

on all collateralized deposits, in the 

FDIC’s view, the presence of collateral 

does not fully mitigate run risk. 

Collateral may not always be sufficient 

to cover the full amount of such a 

deposit, depending on the economic 

environment, and particularly in the 

event of a liquidity crisis during which 

loss in value may need to be realized. 

Further, in certain types of resolutions, 

collateralized deposits reduce the assets 

available to the FDIC as receiver to 

satisfy claims, including the FDIC’s 

subrogated claim as deposit insurer, and 

result in a higher loss to the DIF in the 

event of a bank failure compared to a 

bank holding the same level of deposits 

that are not collateralized. 

b. Custody Bank Adjustments 

The FDIC received one joint comment 

from three custody banks stating that 

the special assessment base should be 

adjusted to mitigate the 

disproportionate and unwarranted 

impact on the custody bank business 

model and on sound asset-liability and 

risk management practices. The 

commenters proposed various 

adjustments: that the FDIC should allow 

custody banks to exclude domestic 

deposit balances placed with the 

Federal Reserve from the measure of 

estimated uninsured deposits used to 

calculate the assessment base for the 

special assessment; that the FDIC 

should allow custody banks to deduct 

75 percent of the domestic operational 

deposits 21 from the assessment base for 

the special assessment; or that the FDIC 

should retain the regular risk-based 

assessment methodology for the special 

assessment while maintaining the 

exclusion of the first $5 billion in 

estimated uninsured deposits. 

The FDIC disagrees. The banks that 

benefited most from the assistance 

provided under the systemic risk 

determination were large banks and 

those that held greater amounts of 

uninsured deposits, regardless of the 

assets that those deposits were used to 

fund. Custody banks, especially those 

whose primary business is fiduciary and 

custodial and safekeeping, hold large 

amounts of uninsured deposits and 

many of those uninsured deposits are 

from depositors with large deposit 

balances. Further, while certain deposits 

held by custody banks, such as 

operational deposits, may be more 

stable than non-operational funding, in 

the event of idiosyncratic stress, 

counterparties likely would reduce the 

amount of their operational deposits.22

The adjustments proposed in the joint 

comment letter would result in custody 

banks paying significantly lower 

amounts of the special assessment 

despite holding significant amounts of 

uninsured deposits. 

c. Intercompany Deposits 

The FDIC received 12 comments 

requesting the exclusion of, or different 

treatment for, intercompany deposits in 

the calculation of the special assessment 

base. Commenters argued that 

intercompany deposits, such as the 

deposits of subsidiaries that are not IDIs, 

deposits of other affiliates such as sister 

companies that are not IDIs, or deposits 

of a parent holding company of the IDI, 

are stable and present minimal run risk 

because entities within the banking 

organization’s structure are unlikely to 

withdraw funds in a crisis. Further, 

some commenters argued that 

intercompany deposits would not result 

in a loss to the DIF because they would 

not be provided deposit insurance 

coverage or would not need deposit 

insurance coverage in the event of the 

bank’s failure. Some commenters noted 

that the methodology for including 

intercompany deposits in the 

assessment base for the special 

assessment may lead to double-counting 

certain deposits at the banking 

organization level for banking 

organizations with multiple IDIs, to the 

extent an IDI’s deposits with its 

affiliates are funded with uninsured 

deposits it has taken from a depositor. 

There is no clear evidence that 

intercompany deposits are more stable 

relative to other deposits. 

Organizational structures, board 

members, governance, and decision 

making can differ between entities 

within the same banking organization. 

Likewise, the behavior of creditors, 

including uninsured depositors, of each 

entity can differ. Further, an affiliated 

entity’s deposits at a bank are insured to 

the same extent as an unaffiliated 

entity’s deposits in the event of the 

bank’s failure. Each depositor is entitled 

to deposit insurance as permitted by 

law, and to pro rata receivership 

distribution on the remaining, 

uninsured balances. Additionally, it is 

not possible to accurately estimate the 

portion of uninsured deposits that are 

intercompany deposits using existing 

items on the Call Report. 

Deposits are the most common 

funding source for many banks. 

Depositors and other creditors are often 

differentiated by their stability and 

customer profile characteristics. While 

some uninsured deposit relationships 

remain stable when a bank is in good 

condition, such relationships might 

become less stable due to their 

uninsured status if a bank experiences 

financial problems or if the banking 

industry experiences stress events. 

Any revisions to the methodology for 

calculating the special assessment base, 

such as excluding or adjusting for 

certain types of uninsured deposits, 

would change the allocation of the 

special assessment, but the FDIC is 

required by statute to recover the full 

amount of the losses to the DIF incurred 

as the result of the systemic risk 

determination. As a result, any 

exclusion for a type of uninsured 

deposits from the special assessment 

base would reduce the amount of the 

special assessment for banking 

organizations that hold those excluded, 

uninsured deposits, and increase the 

assessment burden for all other banks 

holding other types of uninsured 

deposits. For this reason, and for the 

reasons described above, and consistent 

with the proposal, the FDIC is not 

excluding any particular type of 

uninsured deposits from the assessment 

base for the special assessment. 

4. Final Assessment Base for the Special 

Assessment 

Following careful consideration of the 

comments, and for the reasons 

described above, the FDIC is adopting as 

final the proposed assessment base for 

the special assessment, while applying 

any corrective amendments to estimated 

uninsured deposits reported for the 

December 31, 2022, reporting period in 

calculating the assessment base. The 

methodology adopted in this final rule 

ensures that the banks that benefited 

most from the assistance provided 

under the systemic risk determination 

will be charged a special assessment to 

recover losses to the DIF resulting from 

the protection of uninsured depositors, 

with banks of larger asset sizes and that 

hold greater amounts of uninsured 


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23 IDIs with less than $1 billion in total assets as 

of June 30, 2021, are not required to report the 

estimated amount of uninsured deposits on the Call 

Report for December 31, 2022. Therefore, for IDIs 

that had less than $1 billion in total assets as of June 

30, 2021, the amount and share of estimated 

uninsured deposits as of December 31, 2022, is 

zero. 

24As used in this final rule, the term ‘‘affiliate’’ 

has the same meaning as defined in section 3 of the 

FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. 1813(w)(6), which references the 

Bank Holding Company Act (‘‘any company that 

controls, is controlled by, or is under common 

control with another company’’). See 12 U.S.C. 

1841(k). 

25The special assessment rate, base, and expected 

effects in this final rule reflect any amendments to 

data as of November 2, 2023, for the reporting 

period that ended December 31, 2022. These 

estimates may change depending on any subsequent 

amendments to reported estimates of uninsured 

deposits. 

deposits paying a higher special 

assessment. 

Consistent with the proposal, each 

IDI’s assessment base for the special 

assessment will be equal to estimated 

uninsured deposits as reported in the 

Call Report or FFIEC 002 as of December 

31, 2022, after applying the $5 billion 

deduction. The deduction of the first $5 

billion from estimated uninsured 

deposits in the assessment base for the 

special assessment is applicable either 

to the IDI, if an IDI is not a subsidiary 

of a holding company, or at the banking 

organization level, to the extent that an 

IDI is part of a holding company with 

one or more subsidiary IDIs.23

For a banking organization that has 

more than one subsidiary IDI, the 

assessment base for the special 

assessment is equal to the IDI’s total 

estimated uninsured deposits reported 

for the quarter that ended December 31, 

2022, less its share of the $5 billion 

deduction, which is based on its share 

of total estimated uninsured deposits 

held by all IDI affiliates in the banking 

organization.24 Table 3 provides an 

example of the calculation of the special 

assessment for a banking organization 

with three subsidiary IDIs. 

TABLE 3—CALCULATION OF THE SPECIAL ASSESSMENT WITHIN A BANKING ORGANIZATION WITH MORE THAN ONE

INSURED DEPOSITORY INSTITUTION SUBSIDIARY

[Dollar amounts in millions] 

Column A Column B Column C Column D Column E 

Estimated 

uninsured 

deposits as 

reported as of 

December 31, 2022 

IDI share of 

banking 

organization 

estimated 

uninsured deposits 

[percent] 

IDI Share of 

$5 billion 

deduction 

(Column B * 

$5 billion) 

Assessment 

base for 

special 

assessment 

(Column A 

¥Column C) 

IDI share of 

special assessment 

(Column D * 26.9 

basis points)/ 

current loss estimate 

[percent] 

IDI A ............................................. $50,000 50 $2,500 $47,500 0.79 

IDI B ............................................. 40,000 40 2,000 38,000 0.63 

IDI C ............................................. 10,000 10 500 9,500 0.16 

Based on data reported for the quarter 

that ended December 31, 2022, and as 

illustrated in Table 4 below, the FDIC 

estimates that 114 banking 

organizations, which include IDIs that 

are not subsidiaries of a holding 

company and holding companies with 

one or more subsidiary IDIs and which 

comprise 81.3 percent of industry 

assets, will be subject to the special 

assessment, including 48 banking 

organizations with total assets over $50 

billion and 66 banking organizations 

with total assets between $5 and $50 

billion. No banking organizations with 

total assets under $5 billion would pay 

the special assessment, based on data 

for the December 31, 2022, reporting 

period.25

TABLE 4—BANKING ORGANIZATIONS REQUIRED TO PAY SPECIAL ASSESSMENT, BASED ON DATA REPORTED FOR THE

DECEMBER 31, 2022, REPORTING PERIOD 1

Asset size of banking organization 

Number of 

banking 

organizations 

required to 

pay special 

assessment 

Percentage of 

all banking 

organizations 

in asset size 

category 

required to 

pay special 

assessment 

[percent] 

Share of 

special 

assessment 

[percent] 

Share of 

industry 

assets 

[percent] 

Greater than $50 billion ....................................................................................... 48 1.1 95.3 74.5

Between $5 and $50 billion ................................................................................. 66 1.5 4.7 6.8 

Under $5 billion .................................................................................................... 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 

Total .............................................................................................................. 114 2.6 100.0 81.3 

1 Reflects reporting amendments to estimated uninsured deposits, mergers, acquisitions, and failures through November 2, 2023. 

E. Prior Period Amendments 

Under the proposal, amendments to 

an IDI’s Call Report for the December 

31, 2022, reporting period made after 

the date of adoption of any final rule 

would not have affected an institution’s 

rate or base for the special assessment. 

The FDIC is finalizing this aspect of 

the rule, as proposed, but in calculating 

the special assessment, will apply any 

amendments made by IDIs to correct the 

reporting of estimated uninsured 

deposits that are confirmed through, or 

associated with the result of, the FDIC’s 


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26FDIC Financial Institution Letter (FIL 37–2023), 

Estimated Uninsured Deposits Reporting 

Expectations. https://www.fdic.gov/news/financialinstitution-letters/2023/fil23037.html. 

27See section 3(y)(3) of the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. 

1813(y)(3). 

28Consistent with the FDIC’s practice of 

conducting reviews under Section 7(b)(4) of the FDI 

Act to confirm the correctness of any assessment, 

the FDIC will review an institution’s reporting 

methodology for estimated uninsured deposits and 

related items. See 12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(4). 

29As proposed, the assessment base and rate 

would be calculated as of the date the final rule is 

adopted; however, under the final rule, this is 

calculated on November 2, 2023, shortly before the 

date of adoption, for operational and administrative 

reasons. 

30 Interest payments collected will be applied to 

any remaining amount of the special assessment 

Continued 

review of an institution’s reporting 

methodology (as described below). 

Following the issuance of the 

proposed rule, the FDIC observed that 

some IDIs were reporting or filing 

amendments to the reporting of 

estimated uninsured deposits for the 

December 31, 2022, reporting period in 

a manner that is inconsistent with the 

instructions to the Call Report. For 

example, some institutions incorrectly 

reduced the reported amount of 

uninsured deposits to the extent that 

they are collateralized by pledged 

assets; this is incorrect because in and 

of itself, the existence of collateral has 

no bearing on the portion of a deposit 

that is covered by federal deposit 

insurance. Additionally, some 

institutions incorrectly reduced the 

amount of uninsured deposits reported 

on Schedule RC–O by excluding certain 

intercompany deposit balances. 

The FDIC did not receive any 

comments on the proposed treatment of 

prior period amendments. Some 

commenters, however, raised concerns 

about the accuracy of the amount of 

estimated uninsured deposits reported 

on the Call Report. The FDIC received 

two comment letters indicating that 

banks may be reporting uninsured 

deposits differently, or in an 

inconsistent manner, and one comment 

letter indicating that some banks were 

confused about whether to include 

collateralized deposits in the amount of 

estimated uninsured deposits reported 

on the Call Report. 

On July 24, 2023, the FDIC issued a 

Financial Institution Letter (FIL) on 

Estimated Uninsured Deposits 

Reporting Expectations, reiterating 

longstanding instructions and stating 

that each IDI is responsible for the 

accuracy of the data reported in its Call 

Report and for filing amendments as 

necessary to ensure Call Report 

accuracy.26 The FIL stated that, 

consistent with the requirement to file 

accurate Call Reports, IDIs that 

incorrectly reported uninsured deposits 

should amend their Call Reports by 

making the appropriate changes to the 

data and submitting the revised data 

file. 

As a general matter, the amount of 

estimated uninsured deposits reported 

on the Call Report is monitored as one 

of many indicators of safety and 

soundness, and its accuracy, as with all 

items collected on the Call Report, is of 

the utmost importance. The reported 

amount of estimated uninsured deposits 

is also used to determine the amount of 

estimated insured deposits in 

calculating the DIF reserve ratio, which 

is the ratio of the DIF balance to all 

insured deposits.27

The FDIC is conducting a review 

(Assessment Reporting Review) of the 

reporting methodology for estimated 

uninsured deposits and related items on 

the Call Report because of the 

importance of these items as indicators 

of safety and soundness.28 The 

Assessment Reporting Review may 

result in amendments to uninsured 

deposits and related items reported on 

the Call Report if the FDIC determines 

that an institution is not reporting these 

items in accordance with the 

instructions. Given the planned 

Assessment Reporting Review, in 

calculating this special assessment this 

final rule applies any amendments 

made by IDIs to correct the reporting of 

estimated uninsured deposits that are 

confirmed through, or associated with 

the result of, the FDIC’s review of an 

institution’s reporting methodology. 

Under the final rule, the special 

assessment rate and each banking 

organization’s special assessment base 

has been calculated using estimated 

uninsured deposits for the December 31, 

2022, reporting period as reported on 

November 2, 2023.29 Amendments 

made to an institution’s December 31, 

2022, Call Report through November 2, 

2023, have been accounted for in the 

calculations, as proposed. In addition, 

under the final rule, certain 

amendments filed after November 2, 

2023, will affect the calculation of an 

institution’s special assessment base, as 

described below. 

In particular, if, as part of the FDIC’s 

Assessment Reporting Review of an 

institution’s reporting methodology 

(described above), the FDIC finds that, 

as of November 2, 2023, an institution 

was not reporting uninsured deposits 

for the December 31, 2022, reporting 

period in accordance with the Call 

Report instructions, and the institution 

files a corrective amendment as a result 

of the FDIC’s review after November 2, 

2023, the FDIC will adjust the special 

assessment base based on such 

corrective amendment for such 

institution, and any affiliates, as 

applicable, for all collection periods. 

Additionally, if an institution files an 

amendment to the reporting of 

estimated uninsured deposits for the 

December 31, 2022, reporting period 

after November 2, 2023, and the FDIC 

finds that such amendment brings the 

reporting of uninsured deposits into 

compliance with the Call Report 

instructions, the FDIC will adjust the 

special assessment base based on such 

corrective amendment for such 

institution, and any affiliates, as 

applicable, for all collection periods. If 

such institution is part of a banking 

organization with multiple subsidiary 

IDIs, such corrective amendments will 

also affect the distribution of the $5 

billion deduction from the banking 

organization’s assessment base for all 

collection periods. 

Prior period amendments filed after 

November 2, 2023, that are not the 

result of corrections to errors or 

misreporting will not affect an 

institution’s special assessment base. 

Modifications to an institution’s special 

assessment base will take effect 

beginning the collection quarter 

following the date of amendment, and 

the FDIC will apply such modifications 

retroactively to the first quarterly 

collection period, as applicable. 

Any retroactive special assessment 

amount due will be included, in full, on 

the invoice for the quarter following the 

date of the amendment. If the 

amendment resulted in a downward 

revision of the assessment base for the 

special assessment, the banking 

organization will be credited the 

amount the institution overpaid, with 

interest, and such amount, including 

interest, will be applied to any 

remaining amount of the special 

assessment due from the banking 

organization beginning in the quarter 

following the date of the amendment. In 

the unlikely event a credit remains after 

the special assessment collection period 

has ended, the excess credit amount 

will be refunded to the banking 

organization, with interest. The FDIC 

will pay interest on credited amounts 

resulting from amendments to correct 

the reporting of estimated uninsured 

deposits that are confirmed through, or 

associated with the result of, the FDIC’s 

Assessment Reporting Review of an 

institution’s reporting methodology and 

will collect interest on any retroactive 

special assessment amounts due to the 

FDIC as a result of such amendments.30


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while the amount of interest paid by the FDIC will 

be added to the amount required to recover 

estimated losses. 

31 12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii)(III). 

32Amendments to the reporting of estimated 

uninsured deposits may result in a higher amount 

collected, but the increase may not be of a 

magnitude large enough to cease collection early. 

F. Initial Collection Period for the 

Special Assessment 

Under the proposal, the special 

assessment would be collected 

beginning with the first quarterly 

assessment period of 2024 (i.e., January 

1 through March 31, 2024), with an 

invoice payment date of June 28, 2024. 

In order to mitigate the risk of 

overcollecting as the loss estimates for 

the failed banks are periodically 

adjusted, to preserve liquidity at IDIs, 

and in the interest of consistent and 

predictable assessments, the special 

assessment would be collected over 

eight quarters. 

1. Comments Received on the Initial 

Collection Period 

The FDIC received three comments on 

the length of the initial collection 

period, with one commenter requesting 

a longer collection period to help with 

cash flow, one commenter requesting a 

shorter collection period given the 

ability of the banking industry to repay 

the DIF for the special assessment as 

quickly as possible, and one commenter 

suggesting that banks should have the 

option to fully fund obligations prior to 

the end of the proposed collection 

period. 

The FDIC is required by statute to 

place the excess funds collected through 

the special assessment in the DIF.31 By 

spreading out the collection period over 

eight quarters, a length of time that 

would enable the FDIC to develop a 

more accurate estimate of loss, and 

allowing for early cessation after the 

FDIC has collected enough to recover 

actual or estimated losses, the FDIC 

mitigates the risk of overcollecting. 

Reducing the length of the collection 

period could also adversely impact 

liquidity. Therefore, the FDIC is 

adopting the initial collection period of 

eight quarters as proposed, with a 

modification to allow corrective 

amendments to estimated uninsured 

deposits for the December 31, 2022, 

reporting period, following adoption of 

the final rule. 

2. Adjustments to the Loss Estimate, 

Amendments to the Reported Amount 

of Estimated Uninsured Deposits and 

the Initial Collection Period for the 

Special Assessment 

The estimated loss attributable to the 

protection of uninsured depositors 

pursuant to the systemic risk 

determination is currently estimated to 

total $16.3 billion. However, loss 

estimates for failed banks are 

periodically adjusted as assets are sold, 

liabilities are satisfied, and receivership 

expenses are incurred. As proposed, 

under the final rule, the FDIC will 

review and consider any revisions to the 

loss estimate each quarter of the 

collection period. Given the planned 

review of the reporting methodology for 

estimated uninsured deposits, in 

calculating the special assessment, the 

final rule will additionally apply any 

amendments to correct the reporting of 

estimated uninsured deposits that are 

confirmed through, or associated with 

the result of, the FDIC’s review of an 

institution’s reporting methodology. 

If, prior to the end of the eight-quarter 

collection period, the FDIC expects the 

loss to be lower than the amount it 

expects to collect from the special 

assessment, due to revisions to the loss 

estimate or due to amendments applied 

to estimated uninsured deposits, the 

FDIC will cease collection of the special 

assessment before the end of the initial 

eight-quarter collection period, in the 

quarter after it has collected enough to 

recover actual or estimated losses.32 The 

FDIC will provide notice of any 

cessation of collections at least 30 days 

before the next payment is due. 

G. Extended Special Assessment 

Collection Period 

Under the proposal, if, at the end of 

the eight-quarter collection period, the 

estimated or actual loss exceeds the 

amount collected, the FDIC would 

extend the collection period over one or 

more quarters as needed in order to 

collect the difference between the 

amount collected and the estimated or 

actual loss at the end of the eightquarter collection period, (the shortfall 

amount), after providing notice of at 

least 30 days before the first payment of 

any extended special assessment is due. 

The FDIC did not receive any 

comments on the extended special 

assessment collection period, and is 

finalizing as proposed, while, in 

calculating the special assessment, 

applying any amendments to correct the 

reporting of estimated uninsured 

deposits that are confirmed through, or 

associated with the result of, the FDIC’s 

review of an institution’s reporting 

methodology. 

In the event that an extended 

collection period is needed, the FDIC 

will collect the shortfall amount on a 

quarterly basis. The assessment rate for 

any extended special assessment will 

equal the shortfall amount divided by 

the total amount of uninsured deposits 

less the $5 billion deduction for each 

banking organization subject to the 

special assessment, adjusted for failures 

or amendments to correct the reporting 

of estimated uninsured deposits 

resulting from the FDIC’s Assessment 

Reporting Review of an institution’s 

reporting methodology that occurred 

before or during the initial eight-quarter 

collection period. In the interest of 

consistency and predictability, the 

quarterly rate will not exceed the 3.36 

basis point quarterly special assessment 

rate applied during the initial eightquarter collection period, and such 

extended special assessment will be 

collected for the minimum number of 

quarters needed to recover the shortfall 

amount at such quarterly rate. 

The assessment base for such 

extended special assessment will be as 

described above, based on estimated 

uninsured deposits reported as of 

November 2, 2023, for the December 31, 

2022, reporting period, adjusted for 

amendments to correct reporting 

resulting from the FDIC’s review of an 

institution’s reporting methodology, 

with a $5 billion deduction for each 

banking organization. 

H. One-Time Final Shortfall Special 

Assessment 

The exact amount of losses will be 

determined when the FDIC terminates 

the receiverships. Receiverships are 

terminated once the FDIC has 

completed the disposition of the 

receivership’s assets and has resolved 

all obligations, claims, and other 

impediments. The termination of the 

receiverships to which this special 

assessment applies may occur years 

after the initial eight-quarter collection 

period and any extended collection 

period. 

In the likely event that a final loss 

amount at the termination of the 

receiverships is not determined until 

after the initial collection period and 

any extended collection period, and if 

losses at the termination of the 

receiverships exceed the amount 

collected through such special 

assessment, the FDIC proposed to 

impose a one-time final shortfall special 

assessment to collect the final shortfall 

amount. 

Comments Received on the One-Time 

Final Shortfall Special Assessment 

The FDIC received four comments on 

the one-time final shortfall special 

assessment. One supported the 

proposed calculation. One commenter 

recommended that if the amount 

collected exceeds the final loss estimate, 


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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 228 / Wednesday, November 29, 2023 / Rules and Regulations 83339 

33See FDIC BankFind Suite: Bank Failures & 

Assistance Data, available at: https://

banks.data.fdic.gov/explore/failures. See also FDIC 

Failed Bank List, available at: https://www.fdic.gov/ 

resources/resolutions/bank-failures/failed-banklist/. 

34See 12 CFR 327.3(c). 

35See 12 CFR 327.6(c). 

36See 12 CFR 327.6(c). 

37FDIC PR–21–2023. ‘‘Subsidiary of New York 

Community Bancorp, Inc. to Assume Deposits of 

Signature Bridge Bank, N.A., From the FDIC.’’ 

March 19, 2023. https://www.fdic.gov/news/pressreleases/2023/pr23021.html. 

that the excess collected should be 

credited against future assessments. One 

commenter requested that the 

assessment base methodology be 

adjusted to incorporate a risk-based 

component. One commenter said that 

the one-time final shortfall special 

assessment should be calculated at the 

end of a recommended one-year 

payment period. 

The FDIC would only collect a onetime final shortfall special assessment if 

the final loss amount at the termination 

of the receiverships is not determined 

until after the initial collection period 

and any extended collection period, and 

if losses at the termination of the 

receiverships exceed the amount 

collected through such special 

assessment. 

For the reasons described above, the 

FDIC is adopting the one-time final 

shortfall special assessment as 

proposed, while, in calculating the 

special assessment, applying any 

amendments to correct the reporting of 

estimated uninsured deposits that are 

confirmed through, or associated with 

the result of, FDIC’s review of an 

institution’s reporting methodology. 

The assessment base for such onetime final shortfall special assessment 

will be as described above, based on 

estimated uninsured deposits reported 

as of November 2, 2023, for the 

December 31, 2022, reporting period, 

adjusted for amendments to correct 

reporting resulting from the FDIC’s 

review of an institution’s reporting 

methodology, with a $5 billion 

deduction for each banking 

organization. 

The FDIC will determine the 

assessment rate for the one-time final 

shortfall special assessment based on 

the amount needed to recover the final 

shortfall amount and the total amount of 

estimated uninsured deposits reported 

for the quarter that ended December 31, 

2022, adjusted for amendments to 

correct reporting resulting from the 

FDIC’s review of an institution’s 

reporting methodology up to the 

determination of the shortfall amount, 

after applying the $5 billion deduction. 

The entire one-time final shortfall 

special assessment will be collected in 

one quarter so that there are no missed 

amounts due to amendments or failures 

and to streamline the operational impact 

on banking organizations. The FDIC will 

provide banking organizations notice of 

at least 45 days before payment of any 

one-time final shortfall special 

assessment is due and will consider the 

statutory factors, including economic 

conditions and the effects on the 

industry, in deciding on the timing of 

such payment. 

The FDIC will notify each IDI subject 

to a one-time final shortfall special 

assessment of the final shortfall special 

assessment rate and its share of the final 

shortfall assessment no later than 15 

days before payment is due. The notice 

will be included in the IDI’s invoice for 

its regular quarterly deposit insurance 

assessment. 

I. Collection of Special Assessment and 

Any Shortfall Special Assessment 

The special assessment and any 

shortfall special assessment will be 

collected at the same time and in the 

same manner as an IDI’s regular 

quarterly deposit insurance assessment. 

Invoices for an IDI’s regular quarterly 

deposit insurance assessment will 

disclose the amount of any special 

assessment or shortfall special 

assessment due. 

Comments Received on Communication 

of Loss Estimates 

Two commenters requested that the 

FDIC communicate any revisions to the 

loss estimate and updates on the 

collection of the special assessment. To 

increase transparency and in response 

to comments on the proposal, the FDIC 

is clarifying that it plans to 

communicate any changes to the loss 

estimate, as applicable, and to provide 

updates on the collection of the special 

assessment to banking organizations 

subject to the special assessment. Such 

updates will be communicated 

primarily through quarterly assessment 

invoices issued to institutions subject to 

the special assessment. The FDIC also 

publishes estimated losses and other 

data on bank failures and assistance on 

its publicly available website.33

J. Payment Mechanism for the Special 

Assessment and Any Shortfall Special 

Assessment 

Each IDI is required to take any 

actions necessary to allow the FDIC to 

debit its special assessment and any 

shortfall special assessment from the 

bank’s designated deposit account used 

for payment of its regular assessment. 

Before the dates that payments are due, 

each IDI must ensure that sufficient U.S. 

dollar funds to pay its obligations are 

available in the designated account for 

direct debit by the FDIC. Failure to take 

any such action or to fund the account 

would constitute nonpayment of the 

special assessment. Penalties for 

nonpayment will be as provided for 

nonpayment of an IDI’s regular 

assessment.34

K. Mergers, Consolidations, and 

Terminations of Deposit Insurance 

Under the proposed rule, if an IDI 

were to acquire—through merger or 

consolidation—another IDI following 

the adoption of this final rule or during 

any special assessment collection 

period, the acquiring IDI would be 

required to pay the acquired IDI’s 

special assessment, if any, including 

any unpaid special assessment, in 

addition to its own special assessment, 

from the quarter of the acquisition 

through the remainder of all special 

assessment collection periods. Under 

the proposal, in the event that the FDIC 

extends the collection period or imposes 

a one-time final shortfall assessment, 

each banking organization’s assessment 

base would be adjusted for mergers or 

failures that occurred during the eightquarter collection period. 

Under the proposed rule, when the 

insured status of an IDI is terminated 

and the deposit liabilities of the IDI are 

not assumed by another IDI, the IDI 

whose insured status is terminating 

must, among other things, continue to 

pay assessments, including the special 

assessment, for the assessment periods 

that its deposits are insured, but not 

thereafter.35

When an IDI voluntarily terminates its 

deposit insurance under the FDI Act, 

under the proposal the IDI whose 

insured status is terminating must, 

among other things, continue to pay 

assessments for the assessment periods 

that its deposits are insured.36

Comments Received on Mergers, 

Consolidations, and Terminations of 

Deposit Insurance 

One commenter expressed concern 

that use of the December 31, 2022, 

reporting date ignores recent acquisition 

activity while another commenter 

requested clarification that the estimates 

in the proposed rule exclude the 

uninsured deposits that New York 

Community Bank assumed following its 

acquisition of Signature Bank in March 

2023.37 One commenter requested 

clarification of the point at which 

obligation to pay the special assessment 

would end if a bank were to voluntarily 

terminate its insured status during the 

collection period, noting that this is 


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38See 12 CFR 327.6(c). 

39FASB ASC paragraph 450–20–25–2. 

40See General Instructions to the Call Report, 

available at: https://www.fdic.gov/resources/ 

bankers/call-reports/crinst-031-041/2022/2022-12- 

generalinstructions.pdf. 

41Existing regulation 12 CFR 327.4(c) allows an 

IDI to submit a request for review of the IDI’s risk 

assignment. Because the amount of an IDI’s special 

assessment or shortfall special assessment is not 

determined based on the IDI’s risk assignment, the 

request for review provision under 12 CFR 327.4(c) 

would not be applicable to an IDI’s special 

assessment or shortfall special assessment. 

42 12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii)(III). 

43 12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii)(III). 

relevant to when the special assessment 

is reflected under International 

Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 

accounting principles. 

The FDIC is clarifying that the 

uninsured deposits of First Republic 

Bank, Silicon Valley Bank, and 

Signature Bank, which failed prior to 

the adoption of the proposed rule, were 

excluded from the proposed calculation 

of the assessment rate and base for the 

special assessment, and the estimated 

expected effects in the proposed rule 

and in this final rule, and is providing 

clarification that such exclusion will be 

adopted in the final rule. This exclusion 

was intended to prevent 

disincentivizing any potential future 

acquisition activity following the 

adoption of the proposed rule, 

particularly given the uncertainty in the 

banking sector at the time the proposal 

was adopted. 

The FDIC is adopting as final the 

proposed provisions related to mergers, 

acquisitions, and terminations of 

deposit insurance, with two 

adjustments. First, in the event that the 

FDIC extends the collection period or 

imposes a one-time final shortfall 

assessment, each banking organization’s 

assessment base will not be adjusted for 

mergers or failures that occurred after 

the adoption of this final rule or during 

the eight-quarter collection period. In 

the FDIC’s view, each banking 

organization’s assessment base reflects 

its relative benefit from the assistance 

provided under the systemic risk 

determination. This treatment would 

ensure that an acquiring bank’s special 

assessment, and any special assessment 

assumed for an acquired bank, 

continues to reflect each banking 

organization’s relative benefit from the 

assistance provided under the systemic 

risk determination, and would have the 

result that a banking organization 

subject to the special assessment that 

acquires another banking organization 

also subject to the special assessment 

would derive benefit from the $5 billion 

deduction for both special assessment 

payments. The FDIC is also clarifying 

that the special assessment base of the 

acquiring bank in a merger or 

consolidation that occurred prior to the 

March 12, 2023, determination of 

systemic risk would be adjusted to 

include the uninsured deposits of the 

acquired bank and would derive benefit 

of a single $5 billion deduction. 

Calculating the assessment base in this 

manner best reflects the structure of the 

banking organization at the time the 

determination of systemic risk was 

made, and reflects the organization’s 

relative benefit from the assistance 

provided. 

Second, in order to avoid 

incentivizing banks to voluntarily 

terminate their insured status to avoid 

paying the special assessment under the 

final rule, the FDIC will require any 

bank that voluntarily terminates its 

insured status after the adoption of this 

final rule or during any special 

assessment collection period to pay the 

entire remaining amount of its special 

assessment at the same time its 

obligation to pay regular deposit 

insurance assessments would end.38

L. Accounting Treatment 

Each institution should account for 

the special assessment in accordance 

with U.S. generally accepted accounting 

principles (GAAP). In accordance with 

Financial Accounting Standards Board 

Accounting Standards Codification 

Topic 450, Contingencies (FASB ASC 

Topic 450), an estimated loss from a loss 

contingency shall be accrued by a 

charge to income if information 

indicates that it is probable that a 

liability has been incurred and the 

amount of loss is reasonably 

estimable.39 Therefore, an institution 

will recognize in the Call Report and 

other financial statements the accrual of 

a liability and estimated loss (i.e., 

expense) from a loss contingency for the 

special assessment when the institution 

determines that the conditions for 

accrual under GAAP have been met. In 

addition, the General Instructions to the 

Call Report provide guidance on ASC 

Topic 855, Subsequent Events, which 

may be applicable.40

Similarly, each institution should 

account for any shortfall special 

assessment in accordance with FASB 

ASC Topic 450 when the conditions for 

accrual under GAAP have been met. 

Comments Received on Accounting 

Treatment 

The FDIC received two comments that 

supported restructuring the special 

assessment as a prepaid expense that 

could be amortized over a multi-year 

period. 

Structuring the special assessment as 

a prepaid expense would reduce the 

one-time effect on income but would 

also reduce liquidity by the full amount 

of the special assessment at payment. In 

the FDIC’s view, the proposed structure 

of the special assessment best promotes 

maintenance of liquidity, which will 

allow institutions to absorb any 

potential unexpected setbacks while 

continuing to meet the credit needs of 

the U.S. economy. 

For these reasons, the FDIC is 

declining to restructure the special 

assessment as a prepaid expense. 

M. Request for Revisions 

An IDI may submit a written request 

for revision of the computation of any 

special assessment or shortfall special 

assessment pursuant to existing 

regulation 12 CFR 327.3(f).41

III. Analysis and Expected Effects 

A. Analysis of the Statutory Factors 

Section 13(c)(4)(G) of the FDI Act 

provides the FDIC with discretion in the 

design and timeframe for any special 

assessments to recover the losses from 

the systemic risk determination. As 

detailed in the sections that follow, and 

as required by the FDI Act, the FDIC has 

considered the types of entities that 

benefit from any action taken or 

assistance provided under the 

determination of systemic risk, effects 

on the industry, economic conditions, 

and any such other factors as the FDIC 

deems appropriate and relevant to the 

action taken or the assistance 

provided.42

1. The Types of Entities That Benefit 

In implementing special assessments 

under section 13(c)(4)(G) of the FDI Act, 

the FDIC is required to consider the 

types of entities that benefit from any 

action taken or assistance provided 

pursuant to determination of systemic 

risk.43

With the rapid collapse of Silicon 

Valley Bank and Signature Bank in the 

space of 48 hours, concerns arose that 

risk could spread more widely to other 

institutions and that the financial 

system as a whole could be placed at 

risk. Shortly after Silicon Valley Bank 

was closed on March 10, 2023, a 

number of institutions with large 

amounts of uninsured deposits reported 

that depositors had begun to withdraw 

their funds. The extent to which IDIs 

rely on uninsured deposits for funding 

varies significantly. Uninsured deposits 

were used to fund nearly three-quarters 

of the assets at Silicon Valley Bank and 

Signature Bank. On March 12, 2023, the 

Board and the Board of Governors voted 

unanimously to recommend, and the 


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44 12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G). See also: FDIC PR–17– 

2023. ‘‘Joint Statement by the Department of the 

Treasury, Federal Reserve, and FDIC.’’ March 12, 

2023. https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/ 

2023/pr23017.html. 

45The number of banking organizations subject to 

the special assessment may change after the 

publication of the final rule depending on any 

mergers, consolidations, failures, or other 

terminations of deposit insurance, or amendments 

to reported estimates of uninsured deposits. 

46Some IDIs that report less than $5 billion in 

estimated uninsured deposits will be subject to the 

special assessment if they are part of banking 

organizations with multiple IDIs that report a 

combined total of estimated uninsured deposits in 

excess of $5 billion. 

47All income statement items used in this 

analysis were adjusted for the effect of mergers. 

Institutions for which four quarters of non-zero 

earnings data were unavailable, including insured 

branches of foreign banks, were excluded from this 

analysis. 

48The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 placed a 

limitation on tax deductions for FDIC premiums for 

banks with total consolidated assets between $10 

and $50 billion and disallowed the deduction 

entirely for banks with total assets of $50 billion or 

more. However, the definition of FDIC premiums 

under the Act is limited to any assessment imposed 

under section 7(b) of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 

1817(b)), and therefore does not include special 

assessments required under section 13(c)(4)(G) of 

the FDI Act. See the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Public 

Law 115–97 (Dec. 22, 2017). 

49The analysis does not incorporate any tax 

effects from an operating loss carry forward or carry 

back. 

Treasury Secretary, in consultation with 

the President, determined that the FDIC 

could use emergency systemic risk 

authorities under the FDI Act to 

complete its resolution of both Silicon 

Valley Bank and Signature Bank in a 

manner that fully protects depositors.44

The full protection of depositors, rather 

than imposing losses on uninsured 

depositors, was intended to strengthen 

public confidence in the nation’s 

banking system. 

In the weeks that followed the 

determination of systemic risk, efforts to 

stabilize the banking system and stem 

potential contagion from the failures of 

Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank 

ensured that depositors would continue 

to have access to their savings, that 

small businesses and other employers 

could continue to make payrolls, and 

that other banks could continue to 

extend credit to borrowers and serve as 

a source of support. In general, large 

banks and regional banks, and 

particularly those with large amounts of 

uninsured deposits, were the banks 

most exposed to and likely would have 

been the most affected by uninsured 

deposit runs. Indeed, shortly after 

Silicon Valley Bank was closed, a 

number of institutions with large 

amounts of uninsured deposits reported 

that depositors had begun to withdraw 

their funds. The failure of Silicon Valley 

Bank and the impending failure of 

Signature Bank raised concerns that, 

absent immediate assistance for 

uninsured depositors, there could be 

negative knock-on consequences for 

similarly situated institutions, 

depositors, and the financial system 

more broadly. 

Following the announcement of the 

systemic risk determination, the FDIC 

observed a significant slowdown in 

uninsured deposits leaving certain 

institutions, evidence that the systemic 

risk determination helped stem the 

outflow of these deposits while 

providing stability to the banking 

industry. 

Between December 31, 2022, and 

March 31, 2023, banks in all asset size 

groups experienced quarterly declines 

in uninsured deposit balances, but these 

declines were particularly severe and 

widespread among banks between $50 

billion and $250 billion in total assets. 

Between December 31, 2022, and March 

31, 2023, the eight U.S. GSIBs reported 

a weighted average decline in uninsured 

deposits of 2.1 percent, but changes in 

uninsured deposit balances over this 

time period varied widely. Two of the 

eight GSIBs experienced growth in 

uninsured deposits of 2.6 percent and 

2.0 percent over this period while the 

other six GSIBs experienced declines, 

some significant, ranging between less 

than two percent to nearly 17 percent. 

Generally speaking, larger banks 

benefited the most from the stability 

provided to the banking industry under 

the systemic risk determination. Under 

the final rule, the banks that benefited 

most from the assistance provided 

under the systemic risk determination 

will be charged a special assessment to 

recover losses to the DIF resulting from 

the protection of uninsured depositors, 

with banks of larger asset sizes and that 

hold greater amounts of uninsured 

deposits paying a higher special 

assessment. 

2. Effects on the Industry 

In calculating the assessment base for 

the special assessment, the FDIC will 

deduct $5 billion from each IDI or 

banking organization’s aggregate 

estimated uninsured deposits reported 

for the quarter that ended December 31, 

2022. As a result, any institution that 

did not report any uninsured deposits as 

of December 31, 2022, will not be 

subject to the special assessment. 

Additionally, most small IDIs and IDIs 

that are part of a small banking 

organization will not pay anything 

towards the special assessment. Some 

small and mid-size IDIs will be subject 

to the special assessment if they are 

subsidiaries of a banking organization 

with more than $5 billion in uninsured 

deposits and such IDIs report positive 

amounts of uninsured deposits after 

application of the deduction, or if they 

directly hold more than $5 billion in 

estimated uninsured deposits as of 

December 31, 2022, which for smaller 

institutions would constitute heavy 

reliance on uninsured deposits. 

Based on data reported for the quarter 

ended December 31, 2022, and as 

captured in Table 4 above, the FDIC 

estimates that 114 banking organizations 

will be subject to the special 

assessment, including 48 banking 

organizations with total assets over $50 

billion and 66 banking organizations 

with total assets between $5 and $50 

billion. No banking organizations with 

total assets under $5 billion will pay a 

special assessment, based on data 

reported as of December 31, 2022.45 46 It 

is anticipated that the same banking 

organizations subject to the special 

assessment would also be subject to any 

extended special assessment or one-time 

final shortfall special assessment, absent 

the effects of any amendments to 

estimated uninsured deposits, mergers, 

consolidations, failures, or other 

terminations of deposit insurance that 

occur through the determination of such 

extended special assessment or one-time 

final shortfall special assessment. 

3. Capital and Earnings Analysis 

The FDIC has analyzed the effect of 

the special assessment on the capital 

and earnings of banking organizations, 

including IDIs that are not subsidiaries 

of a holding company. This analysis 

incorporates data on estimated 

uninsured deposits reported by banking 

organizations for the December 31, 

2022, reporting period, including 

amendments filed through November 2, 

2023, and assumes that pre-tax income 

for the quarter in which a banking 

organization will recognize the accrual 

of a liability and an estimated loss (i.e., 

expense) from a loss contingency for the 

special assessment, will equal the 

average of their pre-tax income from 

July 1, 2022, through June 30, 2023.47

To avoid the possibility of 

underestimating effects on bank 

earnings and capital, the analysis also 

assumes that the effects of the special 

assessment are not transferred to 

customers in the form of changes in 

borrowing rates, deposit rates, or service 

fees. The analysis considers the effective 

pre-tax cost of the special assessment in 

calculating the effect on capital.48 49

A banking organization’s earnings 

retention and dividend policies 

influence the extent to which the 

special assessment affects equity capital 


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50The analysis uses four percent as the threshold 

because IDIs generally need to maintain a Tier 1 

leverage ratio of 4.0 percent or greater to be 

considered ‘‘adequately capitalized’’ under Prompt 

Corrective Action Standards, in addition to the 

following requirements: (i) total risk-based capital 

ratio of 8.0 percent or greater; (ii) Tier 1 risk-based 

capital ratio of 6.0 percent or greater; (iii) common 

equity tier 1 capital ratio of 4.5 percent or greater; 

and (iv) does not meet the definition of ‘‘well 

capitalized.’’ Beginning January 1, 2018, an 

advanced approaches or Category III FDICsupervised institution will be deemed to be 

‘‘adequately capitalized’’ if it satisfies the above 

criteria and has a supplementary leverage ratio of 

3.0 percent or greater, as calculated in accordance 

with 12 CFR 324.10. See 12 CFR 324.403(b)(2). 

Additionally, Federal Reserve Board-regulated 

institutions must generally maintain a Tier 1 

leverage ratio of 4.0 percent or greater to meet the 

minimum capital requirements, in addition to the 

following requirements: (i) total capital ratio of 8.0 

percent; (ii) Tier 1 capital ratio of 6.0; (iii) common 

equity tier 1 capital ratio of 4.5; and (iv) for 

advanced approaches Federal Reserve Boardregulated institutions, or for Category III Federal 

Reserve Board-regulated institutions, a 

supplementary leverage ratio of 3 percent. See 12 

CFR 217.10(a)(1). For purposes of this analysis, Tier 

1 capital to assets is used as the measure of capital 

adequacy. 

51Estimated effects on capital are calculated 

based on data reported as of June 30, 2023, on the 

Call Report and the Consolidated Financial 

Statements for Holding Companies (FR Y–9C), 

respectively, for IDIs that are not subsidiaries of a 

holding company or that are part of a banking 

organization with only one subsidiary IDI required 

to pay special assessments, and for banking 

organizations, to the extent that an IDI is part of a 

holding company with more than one subsidiary 

IDI required to pay the special assessment. 

52There were two banking organizations that 

would be required to pay the special assessment 

that were unprofitable based on average quarterly 

income from July 1, 2022, to June 30, 2023. 

53Earnings or income are quarterly income before 

assessments and taxes. Quarterly income is 

assumed to equal average income from July 1, 2022, 

to June 30, 2023. 

54For regular deposit insurance assessment 

purposes, a large bank is generally defined as an 

institution with $10 billion or more in total assets, 

and a highly complex bank is generally defined as 

an institution that has $50 billion or more in total 

assets and is controlled by a parent holding 

company that has $500 billion or more in total 

assets, or is a processing bank or trust company. See 

12 CFR 327.8(f) and (g). 

levels. A banking organization may 

reduce the effect of recognizing the 

accrual of a liability and an estimated 

loss (i.e., expense) from a loss 

contingency for the special assessment 

or shortfall special assessment, by 

adjusting downward the amount of 

dividends. This analysis instead 

assumes that a banking organization 

will maintain its dividend rate (that is, 

dividends as a percentage of net 

income) unchanged from the weighted 

average rate reported from July 1, 2022, 

through June 30, 2023. In the event that 

the ratio of Tier 1 capital to assets falls 

below four percent, however, this 

assumption is modified such that the 

banking organization retains the amount 

necessary to reach a four percent 

minimum and distributes any remaining 

funds according to the dividend payout 

rate.50

The FDIC estimates that it will collect 

the estimated loss from protecting 

uninsured depositors at Silicon Valley 

Bank and Signature Bank of 

approximately $16.3 billion, over the 

initial eight-quarter collection period. 

Banking organizations will recognize 

the accrual of a liability and an 

estimated loss (i.e., expense) from a loss 

contingency for the special assessment 

when the institution determines that the 

conditions for accrual under GAAP have 

been met. This analysis assumes that the 

effects on capital and earnings of the 

entire amount of the special assessment 

to be collected over eight quarters 

would occur in one quarter only. 

Given the current loss estimate and 

the assumptions in the analysis, the 

FDIC estimates that, on average, the 

special assessment will decrease the 

dollar amount of Tier 1 capital of 

banking organizations required to pay 

the special assessment by an estimated 

62 basis points.51 No banking 

organizations are estimated to fall below 

the minimum capital requirement (a 

four percent Tier 1 capital-to-assets 

ratio) as a result of the special 

assessment. 

For the four quarters that ended June 

30, 2023, the banking industry reported 

net income of $290.5 billion, nearly 13 

percent higher than for the four quarters 

that ended June 30, 2022, and above the 

pre-pandemic average. The effect of the 

special assessment on a banking 

organization’s income is measured by 

calculating the amount of the special 

assessment as a percent of pre-tax 

income (hereafter referred to as 

‘‘income’’). 

While the special assessment is 

allocated based on estimated uninsured 

deposits reported at the banking 

organization level, IDIs will be 

responsible for payment of the special 

assessment. The FDIC analyzed the 

effect of the special assessment on 

income reported at the IDI-level for IDIs 

subject to the special assessment that 

are not subsidiaries of a holding 

company or that are subsidiaries of a 

holding company with only one IDI 

subsidiary. For IDIs that are subsidiaries 

of a holding company with more than 

one IDI subsidiary, the FDIC analyzed 

the effect of the special assessment by 

aggregating the income reported by all 

IDIs subject to the special assessment 

within each banking organization since 

the IDIs will be responsible for payment. 

The FDIC analyzed the impact of the 

special assessment on banking 

organizations that were profitable based 

on their average quarterly income from 

July 1, 2022, to June 30, 2023.52

The effects on income of the entire 

amount of the special assessment to be 

collected over eight quarters are 

assumed to occur in one quarter only. 

Given the assumptions and the 

estimated loss amount, the FDIC 

estimates that the special assessment 

would result in an average one-quarter 

reduction in income of 20.4 percent for 

banking organizations subject to the 

special assessment.53

Comments Received on the Effect of the 

Special Assessment on Capital and 

Earnings 

The FDIC received 13 comments, 

including three comments from trade 

associations, suggesting modifications to 

change the timing of, or otherwise 

mitigate the effect of the special 

assessment on capital, earnings, and 

regular deposit insurance assessments. 

Seven commenters supported an 

optional transition period or a similar 

approach to allow banking organizations 

to phase in the effects of the special 

assessment on their regulatory capital 

ratios over the eight-quarter collection 

period. 

One commenter said that for purposes 

of calculating requirements and 

guidance related to levels of dividends 

and stock repurchases, and for 

examination findings related to 

earnings, the reduction in earnings 

resulting from the payment of the 

special assessment should be 

disregarded, or at least be amortized 

over the collection period. The same 

commenter also requested an 

adjustment to eliminate the impact of 

the special assessment on regular 

quarterly deposit insurance assessments 

for large banks and highly complex 

banks.54

As described above, given the loss 

estimate and the assumptions applied in 

the analysis, the FDIC estimates that, on 

average, the special assessment will 

decrease the dollar amount of Tier 1 

capital of banking organizations subject 

to the special assessment by an 

estimated 62 basis points. No banking 

organizations are estimated to fall below 

the minimum capital requirement (a 

four percent Tier 1 capital-to-assets 

ratio) as a result of the special 

assessment. As described above, the 

effect of the special assessment on Tier 

1 capital is minimal and is not 

estimated to cause any institutions to 

fall below the minimum capital 

requirement; therefore, the FDIC is not 

adopting a transition period to phase in 

the special assessment’s effect on 

regulatory capital. 


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55FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile, Second 

Quarter 2023. https://www.fdic.gov/analysis/ 

quarterly-banking-profile/qbp/2023jun/. 

56Statement of Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman of 

the FDIC on ‘‘Recent Bank Failures and the Federal 

Regulatory Response,’’ before the United States 

Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 

Affairs. March 28, 2023. https://

www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 

Gruenberg%20Testimony%203-28-23.pdf. 

57 12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii)(I). In implementing 

special assessments, the FDIC is required to 

consider the types of entities that benefit from any 

action taken or assistance provided under the 

determination of systemic risk, effects on the 

industry, economic conditions, and any such other 

factors as the FDIC deems appropriate and relevant 

to the action taken or the assistance provided. See 

12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii)(III). 

Table 5 shows that approximately 66 

percent of profitable banking 

organizations subject to the proposal are 

projected to have a special assessment 

of less than 20 percent of one quarter’s 

income, including 23 percent with a 

special assessment of less than 5 percent 

of income. Another 34 percent of 

profitable banking organizations subject 

to the proposal are projected to have a 

special assessment equal to or exceeding 

20 percent of one quarter’s income. 

TABLE 5—ESTIMATED ONE-QUARTER EFFECT OF ENTIRE AMOUNT OF THE SPECIAL ASSESSMENT ON INCOME FOR

PROFITABLE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS SUBJECT TO THE SPECIAL ASSESSMENT 1

Special assessment as percent of income 

Number of 

banking 

organizations 

Percent of 

banking 

organizations 

Assets of 

banking 

organizations 

[$ billions] 

Percent 

of assets 

Over 30 .......................................................................................................... 15 14 5,838 30

20 to 30 .......................................................................................................... 23 21 6,308 32 

10 to 20 .......................................................................................................... 28 25 5,504 28 

5 to 10 ............................................................................................................ 20 18 805 4 

Less than 5 .................................................................................................... 25 23 1,034 5 

Total ........................................................................................................ 111 100 19,489 100

1 Income is defined as quarterly pre-tax income. Quarterly income is assumed to equal the average of income from July 1, 2022, through June 

30, 2023. For purposes of this analysis, the effects on income of the entire amount of the special assessment to be collected over eight quarters 

are assumed to occur in one quarter only. The special assessment as a percent of income is an estimate of the one-time accrual of the full eight 

quarters of the special assessment as a percent of a single quarter’s income. Profitable banking organizations are defined as those having positive average income for the 12 months ending June 30, 2023. Excludes two banking organizations that would be required to pay the special assessment that were unprofitable. Also excludes one foreign banking organization subject to the special assessment. Some columns do not add 

to total due to rounding. Special assessment estimates are based on uninsured deposits for the December 31, 2022, report date and incorporate 

amendments, mergers, acquisitions and failures through November 2, 2023. 

In order to preserve liquidity at IDIs, 

and in the interest of consistent and 

predictable assessments, the special 

assessment will be collected over eight 

quarters. The special assessments is 

applicable for the first quarterly 

assessment period of 2024. Given that 

the proposal was approved by the Board 

and published in the Federal Register in 

May 2023, institutions were provided 

time to prepare and plan for the special 

assessment. 

4. Economic Conditions 

On September 7, 2023, the FDIC 

released the results of the Quarterly 

Banking Profile, which provided a 

comprehensive summary of financial 

results for all FDIC-insured institutions 

for the second quarter of 2023. Overall, 

key banking industry metrics remained 

favorable in the quarter.55

Net income declined from the 

previous quarter due to accounting 

gains on failed bank acquisitions that 

occurred in the first and the second 

quarter. However, excluding these 

nonrecurring gains, net income was 

relatively flat from the prior quarter. Net 

income remained relatively high by 

historical measures in the second 

quarter, although the banking industry 

reported a tighter net interest margin 

and funding pressures driven by 

increasing rates paid on deposits as well 

as high rates paid on non-deposit 

liabilities. Loan expansion continued, 

asset quality metrics were favorable, and 

the banking industry remained wellcapitalized. 

The banking industry continues to 

face significant downside risks from the 

effects of inflation, rising market interest 

rates, and geopolitical uncertainty. 

These risks could cause credit quality 

deterioration and weakness in 

profitability, which may lead to more 

stringent underwriting standards, a 

slowdown in loan growth, higher 

provision expenses, and liquidity 

constraints. Also, commercial real estate 

portfolios are under pressure from 

higher interest rates as loans mature and 

require refinancing, and office 

properties are experiencing weak 

demand for space and softening 

property values. 

Despite these challenges, the state of 

the U.S. banking system remains sound 

and institutions are well positioned to 

absorb a special assessment.56

B. Alternatives Considered 

While the FDIC is required by statute 

to recover the loss to the DIF arising 

from the use of a systemic risk 

determination through one or more 

special assessments, section 13(c)(4)(G) 

of the FDI Act provides the FDIC with 

discretion in the design and timeframe 

for any special assessments to recover 

the losses from the systemic risk 

determination.57 The FDIC considered 

several alternatives while developing 

this final rule, but believes, on balance, 

that the proposed special assessment is 

the most appropriate and 

straightforward manner in which to 

collect the special assessment. 

Accordingly, and after consideration of 

the statutory factors as described above, 

the FDIC is adopting as final the 

proposed special assessment, with 

changes to promote transparency and to 

apply any corrective amendments to the 

reporting of estimated uninsured 

deposits to the calculation of the special 

assessment. Brief descriptions of the 

alternatives, along with explanations of 

why the final rule is preferable to the 

alternatives, are as follows: 

Alternative 1: One-Time Special 

Assessment 

The first alternative the FDIC 

considered would have imposed a onetime special assessment. Under this 

alternative, the FDIC would impose the 

one-time special assessment in the 

quarter ending March 31, 2024, and 

collect payment for such special 

assessment on June 28, 2024, at the 

same time and in the same manner as 

an IDI’s regular quarterly deposit 

insurance assessment. The aggregate 


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58 12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii)(III). 

59 12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii)(III). 

60 IDIs with less than $1 billion in total assets as 

of June 30, 2021, were not required to report the 

estimated amount of uninsured deposits on the Call 

Report for December 31, 2022. Therefore, for IDIs 

that had less than $1 billion in total assets as of June 

30, 2021, the amount and share of estimated 

uninsured deposits as of December 31, 2022, would 

be zero. 

61 IDIs with less than $1 billion in total assets as 

of June 30, 2021, were not required to report the 

estimated amount of uninsured deposits on the Call 

Report for December 31, 2022. Therefore, for IDIs 

that had less than $1 billion in total assets as of June 

30, 2021, the amount and share of estimated 

uninsured deposits as of December 31, 2022, would 

be zero. 

amount of a one-time special assessment 

would equal the entire initial loss 

estimate. Calculation of the special 

assessment, including the special 

assessment rate, would be the same as 

proposed, but instead of collecting the 

amount over eight quarters, the FDIC 

would collect the entire amount in one 

quarter. 

Once actual losses are determined as 

of the termination of the receiverships, 

and if the actual losses exceeded the 

amount collected under the one-time 

special assessment, the FDIC would 

impose a shortfall special assessment to 

collect the amount of losses in excess of 

the amount collected. Collection of the 

entire shortfall special assessment 

would also occur in one quarter. 

Conversely, if the amount collected 

under the one-time special assessment 

exceeded actual losses, the FDIC is 

required by statute to place the excess 

funds collected in the DIF.58

Similar to this alternative, one 

commenter suggested that banks should 

have the option to fully fund obligations 

prior to the end of the proposed time 

period. While under both the final rule 

and this alternative, the estimated 

amount of the special assessment would 

be recognized with the accrual of a 

liability and an estimated loss (i.e., 

expense) from a loss contingency when 

the institution determines that the 

conditions for accrual under GAAP have 

been met, which impacts capital and 

earnings, this alternative would 

additionally require payment of the 

entire amount in the second quarter of 

2024, and would impact liquidity 

significantly in one quarter. The FDIC 

rejected this alternative in order to 

spread the liquidity impact over 

multiple quarters and to mitigate the 

risk of overcollecting. 

Alternative 2: Asset Size Applicability 

Threshold 

A second alternative the FDIC 

considered would be to base 

applicability on an asset size threshold 

as an alternative to deducting the first 

$5 billion in estimated uninsured 

deposits in calculating an IDI or banking 

organization’s assessment base for the 

special assessment. One commenter 

supported this approach. 

As described previously, in 

implementing special assessments, the 

FDI Act requires the FDIC to consider 

the types of entities that benefit from 

any action taken or assistance provided 

pursuant to the determination of 

systemic risk.59 Large banks and 

regional banks, and particularly those 

with large amounts of uninsured 

deposits, were the banks most exposed 

to and likely would have been the most 

affected by uninsured deposit runs had 

those occurred as a result of the bank 

failures. Larger banks also benefited the 

most from the stability provided to the 

banking industry under the systemic 

risk determination. 

While both the methodology adopted 

under the final rule, including the $5 

billion deduction from estimated 

uninsured deposits, and an alternative 

asset-size-based applicability threshold 

would effectively remove the smallest 

institutions from eligibility, the 

deduction of $5 billion from each 

banking organization’s estimated 

uninsured deposits in calculating the 

special assessment helps to mitigate a 

‘‘cliff effect’’ relative to applying a 

different threshold for applicability, 

such as applying an asset size threshold, 

thereby ensuring more equitable 

treatment. With an asset size threshold, 

an IDI just above such threshold would 

pay a significant amount in special 

assessments, while an IDI just below 

such threshold would pay none. The 

FDIC rejected this alternative for these 

reasons. 

Alternative 3: Assessment Base Equal to 

All Uninsured Deposits, Without $5 

Billion Deduction 

A third alternative the FDIC 

considered would be to eliminate the $5 

billion deduction from the assessment 

base for the special assessment, and 

allocate the special assessment among 

IDIs based on each IDI or banking 

organization’s total estimated uninsured 

deposits as of December 31, 2022. This 

alternative would result in a special 

assessment imposed on every IDI that 

reported a non-zero amount of estimated 

uninsured deposits as of December 31, 

2022, or nearly 100 percent of all IDIs 

with total assets of $1 billion or more.60

Relative to the methodology applied in 

final rule, more IDIs would pay the 

special assessment under this 

alternative, and IDIs with greater 

amounts of uninsured deposits would 

generally pay a lower special 

assessment relative to the methodology 

applied in the final rule since the 

special assessment would be allocated 

across a significantly larger number of 

institutions. As stated previously, the 

majority of commenters expressed 

support for the proposal and for the 

scope of application, including the $5 

billion deduction applied to the 

assessment base for the special 

assessment. 

Given the FDIC’s statutory 

requirement to consider the types of 

entities that benefit from any action 

taken or assistance provided under the 

determination of systemic risk in 

implementing special assessments, and 

given the general support for the 

deduction of $5 billion from the 

assessment base for the special 

assessment, the FDIC rejected this 

alternative in favor of allocating the 

special assessment to larger institutions 

with the largest amounts of uninsured 

deposits as of December 31, 2022, and 

that experienced significant and 

widespread declines in uninsured 

deposits between December 31, 2022, 

and March 31, 2023, with the result that 

smaller institutions would not have to 

contribute to the special assessment. In 

general, large banks and regional banks, 

and particularly those with large 

amounts of uninsured deposits, were 

the banks most exposed to and likely 

would have been the most affected by 

uninsured deposit runs. Generally 

speaking, larger banks benefited the 

most from the stability provided to the 

banking industry under the systemic 

risk determination. 

Alternative 4: Special Assessment Based 

on Each Institution’s Percentage of 

Uninsured Deposits to Total Deposits 

A fourth alternative the FDIC 

considered would be to allocate the 

special assessment among IDIs based on 

each IDI’s estimated uninsured deposits 

as a percentage of their total domestic 

deposits reported as of December 31, 

2022, as a proxy for reliance on 

uninsured deposits at the time the 

determination of systemic risk was 

made and uninsured depositors of the 

failed institutions were protected. 

Similar to the third alternative, this 

would result in a special assessment 

imposed on every IDI that reported a 

non-zero amount of estimated 

uninsured deposits as of December 31, 

2022, or nearly 100 percent of IDIs with 

total assets of $1 billion or more.61 Two 

commenters supported an assessment 

base for the special assessment equal to 

uninsured deposits as a percentage of 

total deposits or to otherwise apply a 


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62See 12 CFR 327.5. 

calculation that would result in a larger 

special assessment for institutions with 

a greater reliance on uninsured deposits 

for funding. 

Under this alternative, IDIs with a 

greater reliance on uninsured deposits 

would generally pay the greatest amount 

of the special assessment; however, the 

special assessment would be allocated 

across a large number of institutions, 

unless a threshold is imposed. Even 

with a threshold based on assets or 

another measure, this alternative would 

result in institutions of vastly different 

asset sizes and with different dollar 

amounts of uninsured deposits paying a 

similar dollar amount of the special 

assessment. For example, an institution 

just above the asset threshold would pay 

the same special assessment as a much 

larger institution with the same reliance 

on uninsured deposits. It also would 

result in some smaller banking 

organizations paying potentially 

significant amounts of the special 

assessment, and the larger banks that 

have high amounts of uninsured 

deposits and benefited the most from 

the stability provided to the banking 

industry under the systemic risk 

determination, but that do not have high 

uninsured deposit concentrations, 

paying a smaller share of the special 

assessment. 

In general, large banks and regional 

banks, and particularly those with large 

amounts of uninsured deposits, were 

the banks most exposed to and likely 

would have been the most affected by 

uninsured deposit runs. Generally 

speaking, larger banks benefited the 

most from the stability provided to the 

banking industry under the systemic 

risk determination. The FDIC rejected 

this alternative for these reasons and 

because the methodology in the final 

rule results in a larger special 

assessment for similarly sized banking 

organizations reporting greater 

concentrations of uninsured deposits. 

Alternative 5: Charge IDIs for 50 Percent 

of Special Assessment in Year One 

Based on Uninsured Deposits as of 

December 31, 2022; Charge for the 

Remainder in Year Two Based on 

Uninsured Deposits Reported as of 

December 31, 2023 

Under the final rule and all 

alternatives described above, the special 

assessment would initially be calculated 

based on an estimated amount of losses, 

as the exact amount of losses will not 

be known until the FDIC terminates the 

two receiverships. A fifth alternative the 

FDIC considered would be to collect 50 

percent of the special assessment during 

the initial four-quarter collection period 

based on estimated uninsured deposits 

reported by all IDIs as of December 31, 

2022, and collect the remaining special 

assessment for an additional fourquarter collection period based on an 

updated estimate of losses pursuant to 

the systemic risk determination and 

estimated uninsured deposits reported 

by all IDIs as of December 31, 2023. 

Under this alternative, for the initial 

four-quarter collection period the 

special assessment would be allocated 

to all IDIs based on each IDI or banking 

organization’s estimated uninsured 

deposits as a share of estimated 

uninsured deposits reported by all IDIs 

as of December 31, 2022, as a proxy for 

the amount of uninsured deposits in 

each institution at the time the 

determination of systemic risk was 

made and uninsured depositors of the 

failed institutions were protected. Such 

methodology would allocate the special 

assessment to the institutions that had 

the largest amounts of uninsured 

deposits at the time of the determination 

of systemic risk. 

The remaining special assessment 

would be based on an updated estimate 

of losses as of December 31, 2023, and 

would be allocated to IDIs with total 

assets of $1 billion or more, based on 

each IDI or banking organization’s 

estimated uninsured deposits as a share 

of estimated uninsured deposits 

reported by all IDIs as of December 31, 

2023, in order to reflect amounts of 

uninsured deposits that did not run off 

following the determination of systemic 

risk. The FDIC rejected this alternative 

because in the FDIC’s view, estimated 

uninsured deposits as of December 31, 

2022, most closely approximate an 

institution’s vulnerability to significant 

deposit withdrawals in the absence of 

the determination of systemic risk, and 

therefore reflect the institutions that 

most benefited from such 

determination. Additionally, three 

commenters supported the use of an 

alternative measure in the special 

assessment base specifically for the 

reason that they believe use of 

uninsured deposits in the assessment 

base discourages banks from holding 

uninsured deposits. This alternative 

may also change the timing of accrual of 

the contingent liability by banks. The 

final rule’s allocation methodology 

based on amounts of uninsured deposits 

as of December 31, 2022, would result 

in transparent and consistent payments, 

and a more simplified framework for 

calculating the special assessment. 

Alternative 6: Apply Special 

Assessment Rate to Regular Assessment 

Base, With or Without Application of a 

$5 Billion Deduction 

A sixth alternative the FDIC 

considered is to apply a special 

assessment rate to an institution’s 

regular quarterly deposit insurance 

assessment base (regular assessment 

base) for that quarter, with or without 

applying a $5 billion deduction. 

Generally, an IDI’s assessment base 

equals its average consolidated total 

assets minus its average tangible 

equity.62 Under this alternative, the 

FDIC estimates that it would need to 

charge an annual assessment rate of 3.97 

basis points over two years to recover 

estimated losses without the $5 billion 

deduction, or 4.84 basis points with the 

$5 billion deduction; however, a 

significantly larger number of banking 

organizations would be subject to the 

special assessment relative to the 

proposal. Two commenters supported 

use of the regular assessment base to 

calculate the special assessment. 

Under this alternative, the IDIs with 

the largest assessment base would pay 

the greatest amount of the special 

assessment. IDIs for which certain assets 

are excluded in the calculation of the 

regular assessment base would pay a 

lower special assessment due to their 

smaller assessment base. 

This alternative would result in 

smaller banking organizations, 

regardless of reliance on uninsured 

deposits for funding, paying potentially 

significant amounts of the special 

assessment. Further, IDIs engaged in 

trust activities, or with fiduciary and 

custody and safekeeping assets, and for 

which certain assets are excluded from 

their regular assessment base, would 

pay lower amounts of the special 

assessment due to these exclusions, 

despite holding significant amounts of 

uninsured deposits. The FDIC rejected 

this alternative for these reasons. 

In the FDIC’s view, the final rule 

reflects an appropriate balancing of the 

statutory requirement to apply the 

special assessment to the types of 

entities that benefited the most from the 

protection of uninsured depositors 

provided under the determination of 

systemic risk while ensuring equitable, 

transparent, and consistent treatment 

based on amounts of uninsured deposits 

at the time of the determination of 

systemic risk. The final rule also allows 

for payments to be collected over an 

extended period of time in order to 

mitigate the liquidity effects of the 

special assessment by requiring smaller, 


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63 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. 

64The SBA defines a small banking organization 

as having $850 million or less in assets, where an 

organization’s ’’assets are determined by averaging 

the assets reported on its four quarterly financial 

statements for the preceding year.’’ See 13 CFR 

121.201 (as amended by 87 FR 69118, effective 

December 19, 2022). In its determination, the ’’SBA 

counts the receipts, employees, or other measure of 

size of the concern whose size is at issue and all 

of its domestic and foreign affiliates.’’ See 13 CFR 

121.103. Following these regulations, the FDIC uses 

an insured depository institution’s affiliated and 

acquired assets, averaged over the preceding four 

quarters, to determine whether the insured 

depository institution is ’’small’’ for the purposes of 

RFA. 

65 5 U.S.C. 601(2). 

66 June 30, 2023, Call Report data, the most 

current Call Reports for which the FDIC can 

determine which insured depository institutions are 

‘‘small’’ for purposes of RFA. 

67 44 U.S.C. 3501–3521. 

68 12 U.S.C. 4802(a). 

69 12 U.S.C. 4802(b). 

70Public Law 106–102, section 722, 113 Stat. 

1338, 1471 (1999), 12 U.S.C. 4809. 

71 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq. 

72 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(3). 

consistent quarterly payments. On 

balance, in the FDIC’s view, the final 

rule best promotes maintenance of 

liquidity, which will allow institutions 

to absorb any potential unexpected 

setbacks while continuing to meet the 

credit needs of the U.S. economy. 

C. Effective Date and Application Date 

of the Final Rule 

The FDIC is issuing this final rule 

with an effective date of April 1, 2024. 

The first collection for the special 

assessment will be reflected on the 

invoice for the first quarterly assessment 

period of 2024 (i.e., January 1 through 

March 31, 2024), with a payment date 

of June 28, 2024, and the FDIC will 

continue to collect the special 

assessment for an anticipated total of 

eight quarterly assessment periods. 

Because the estimated loss pursuant to 

the systemic risk determination will be 

periodically adjusted, and to allow for 

any corrective amendments to the 

amount of uninsured deposits reported 

for the December 31, 2022, reporting 

period applied to the calculation of the 

special assessment, the FDIC retains the 

ability to cease collection early, impose 

an extended special assessment 

collection period after the initial eightquarter collection period to collect the 

difference between losses and the 

amounts collected, and impose a onetime final shortfall special assessment 

after both receiverships terminate. 

IV. Administrative Law Matters 

A. Regulatory Flexibility Act 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) 

generally requires an agency, in 

connection with a final rule, to prepare 

and make available for public comment 

a final regulatory flexibility analysis that 

describes the impact of the final rule on 

small entities.63 However, a final 

regulatory flexibility analysis is not 

required if the agency certifies that the 

final rule will not have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. The Small 

Business Administration (SBA) has 

defined ‘‘small entities’’ to include 

banking organizations with total assets 

of less than or equal to $850 million.64

Certain types of rules, such as rules of 

particular applicability relating to rates, 

corporate or financial structures, or 

practices relating to such rates or 

structures, are expressly excluded from 

the definition of ‘‘rule’’ for purposes of 

the RFA.65 Because the final rule relates 

directly to the rates imposed on FDICinsured institutions, the final rule is not 

subject to the RFA. Nonetheless, the 

FDIC is voluntarily presenting 

information in this RFA section. 

The FDIC insures 4,654 institutions as 

of June 30, 2023, of which 3,373 are 

small entities.66 As discussed 

previously, the final rule implements a 

special assessment on IDIs that are part 

of banking organizations that reported 

$5 billion or more in uninsured deposits 

for the reporting period that ended 

December 31, 2022. Given that no small 

entity has reported $5 billion or more in 

uninsured deposits, the FDIC does not 

believe the final rule will have a direct 

effect on any small entity. 

The FDIC invited comments regarding 

the supporting information provided in 

the RFA section in the proposed rule, 

but did not receive comments on this 

topic. 

B. Paperwork Reduction Act 

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 

1995 67 (PRA) states that no agency may 

conduct or sponsor, nor is the 

respondent required to respond to, an 

information collection unless it displays 

a currently valid Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) control number. The 

FDIC’s OMB control numbers for its 

assessment regulations are 3064–0057, 

3064–0151, and 3064–0179. The final 

rule does not create any new, or revise 

any of these existing assessment 

information collections pursuant to the 

PRA; consequently, no submissions in 

connection with these OMB control 

numbers will be made to the OMB for 

review. 

C. Riegle Community Development and 

Regulatory Improvement Act 

Section 302(a) of the Riegle 

Community Development and 

Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 

(RCDRIA) 68 requires that the Federal 

banking agencies, including the FDIC, in 

determining the effective date and 

administrative compliance requirements 

of new regulations that impose 

additional reporting, disclosure, or other 

requirements on IDIs, consider, 

consistent with principles of safety and 

soundness and the public interest, any 

administrative burdens that such 

regulations would place on depository 

institutions, including small depository 

institutions, and customers of 

depository institutions, as well as the 

benefits of such regulations. Subject to 

certain exceptions, new regulations and 

amendments to regulations prescribed 

by a Federal banking agency which 

impose additional reporting, 

disclosures, or other new requirements 

on insured depository institutions shall 

take effect on the first day of a calendar 

quarter which begins on or after the date 

on which the regulations are published 

in final form.69

The final rule does not impose 

additional reporting, disclosure, or other 

new requirements on insured depository 

institutions, including small depository 

institutions, or on the customers of 

depository institutions. Accordingly, 

section 302 of RCDRIA does not apply. 

The FDIC invited comments regarding 

the application of RCDRIA in the 

proposed rule, but did not receive 

comments on this topic. Nevertheless, 

the requirements of RCDRIA have been 

considered in setting the final effective 

date. 

D. Plain Language 

Section 722 of the Gramm-LeachBliley Act 70 requires the Federal 

banking agencies to use plain language 

in all proposed and final rulemakings 

published in the Federal Register after 

January 1, 2000. FDIC staff believes the 

final rule is presented in a simple and 

straightforward manner. The FDIC 

invited comments regarding the use of 

plain language in the proposed rule but 

did not receive any comments on this 

topic. 

E. Congressional Review Act 

For purposes of the Congressional 

Review Act, the OMB makes a 

determination as to whether a final rule 

constitutes a ‘‘major’’ rule.71 If a rule is 

deemed a ‘‘major rule’’ by the OMB, the 

Congressional Review Act generally 

provides that the rule may not take 

effect until at least 60 days following its 

publication.72

The Congressional Review Act defines 

a ‘‘major rule’’ as any rule that the 

Administrator of the Office of 


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73 5 U.S.C. 804(2). 

Information and Regulatory Affairs of 

the OMB finds has resulted in or is 

likely to result in: (1) an annual effect 

on the economy of $100,000,000 or 

more; (2) a major increase in costs or 

prices for consumers, individual 

industries, Federal, State, or local 

government agencies or geographic 

regions; or (3) significant adverse effects 

on competition, employment, 

investment, productivity, innovation, or 

on the ability of United States-based 

enterprises to compete with foreignbased enterprises in domestic and 

export markets.73

The OMB has determined that the 

final rule is a major rule for purposes of 

the Congressional Review Act and the 

FDIC will submit the final rule and 

other appropriate reports to Congress 

and the Government Accountability 

Office for review. 

List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 327 

Bank deposit insurance, Banks, 

Banking, Savings associations. 

Authority and Issuance 

For the reasons stated in the 

preamble, the Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation amends 12 CFR part 327 as 

follows: 

PART 327—ASSESSMENTS 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 327 

is revised to read as follows: 

Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1813, 1815, 1817–19, 

1821, 1823. 

■ 2. Add § 327.13 to read as follows: 

§ 327.13 Special Assessment Pursuant to 

March 12, 2023, Systemic Risk 

Determination. 

(a) Special Assessment. A special 

assessment shall be imposed on each 

insured depository institution to recover 

losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund, as 

described in paragraph (b) of this 

section, resulting from the March 12, 

2023, systemic risk determination 

pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G). The 

special assessment shall be collected 

from each insured depository institution 

on a quarterly basis as described in this 

section during the initial special 

assessment period as defined in 

paragraph (i) of this section and, if 

necessary, the extended special 

assessment period as defined in 

paragraph (j) of this section, and if 

further necessary, on a one-time basis as 

described in paragraph (m) of this 

section. 

(b) Losses to the Deposit Insurance 

Fund. As used in this section, ‘‘losses to 

the Deposit Insurance Fund’’ refers to 

losses incurred by the Deposit Insurance 

Fund resulting from actions taken by the 

FDIC under the March 12, 2023, 

systemic risk determination, as may be 

revised from time to time. 

(c) Calculation of quarterly special 

assessment amount. An insured 

depository institution’s special 

assessment for each quarter during the 

initial special assessment period and 

extended special assessment period 

shall be calculated by multiplying the 

special assessment rate defined in 

paragraph (i)(2) or (j)(3) of this section, 

as appropriate, by the institution’s 

special assessment base as defined in 

paragraph (i)(3) or (j)(4) of this section, 

as appropriate. 

(d) Invoicing of special assessment. 

For each assessment period in which 

the special assessment is imposed, the 

FDIC shall advise each insured 

depository institution of the amount and 

calculation of any special assessment 

payment due in a form that notifies the 

institution of the special assessment 

base and special assessment rate 

exclusive of any other assessments 

imposed under this part. The FDIC shall 

also advise each insured depository 

institution subject to the special 

assessment of any revisions, if any, to 

losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund as 

defined in paragraph (b) of this section. 

This information shall be provided at 

the same time as the institution’s 

quarterly certified statement invoice 

under § 327.2 for the assessment period 

in which the special assessment was 

imposed. 

(e) Payment of quarterly special 

assessment amount. Each insured 

depository institution shall pay to the 

Corporation any special assessment 

imposed under this section in 

compliance with and subject to the 

provisions of §§ 327.3, 327.6, and 327.7. 

The date for any special assessment 

payment shall be the date provided in 

§ 327.3(b)(2) for the institution’s 

quarterly certified statement invoice for 

the calendar quarter in which the 

special assessment was imposed. 

(f) Uninsured deposits. For purposes 

of this section, the term ‘‘uninsured 

deposits’’ means an institution’s 

estimated uninsured deposits as 

reported in Memoranda Item 2 on 

Schedule RC–O, Other Data For Deposit 

Insurance Assessments in the 

Consolidated Reports of Condition and 

Income (Call Report) or Report of Assets 

and Liabilities of U.S. Branches and 

Agencies of Foreign Banks (FFIEC 002) 

for the quarter ended December 31, 

2022, reported as of the later of: 

(1) November 2, 2023, adjusted for 

mergers prior to March 12, 2023; or 

(2) The date of the institution’s most 

recent amendment to its Call Report or 

FFIEC 002 for the quarter ended 

December 31, 2022, if such amendment 

arises from, or is confirmed through, the 

FDIC’s Assessment Reporting Review. 

Institutions with less than $1 billion in 

total assets as of June 30, 2021, were not 

required to report such items; therefore, 

for purposes of calculating the special 

assessment or a shortfall special 

assessment under this section, the 

amount of uninsured deposits for such 

institutions as of December 31, 2022, is 

zero. 

(g) $5 billion deduction from the 

special assessment base—institution’s 

portion. For purposes of this section, an 

institution’s portion of the $5 billion 

deduction shall equal the ratio of the 

institution’s uninsured deposits to the 

sum of the institution’s uninsured 

deposits and the uninsured deposits of 

all of the institution’s affiliated insured 

depository institutions, multiplied by $5 

billion. 

(h) Affiliates. For the purposes of this 

section, an affiliated insured depository 

institution is an insured depository 

institution that meets the definition of 

‘‘affiliate’’ in section 3 of the FDI Act, 

12 U.S.C. 1813(w)(6). 

(i) Special assessment during initial 

special assessment period—(1) Initial 

special assessment period. The initial 

special assessment period shall begin 

with the first quarterly assessment 

period of 2024 and end the earlier of the 

last quarterly assessment period of 2025 

or the first quarterly assessment period 

that the aggregate amount of special 

assessments collected under this section 

meets or exceeds the losses to the 

Deposit Insurance Fund, where amounts 

collected and losses are compared on a 

quarterly basis. 

(2) Special assessment rate during 

initial special assessment period. The 

special assessment rate during the 

initial special assessment period is 3.36 

basis points on a quarterly basis. 

(3) Special assessment base during 

initial special assessment period—(i) 

The special assessment base for an 

insured depository institution during 

the initial special assessment period 

that has no affiliated insured depository 

institution shall equal: 

(A) The institution’s uninsured 

deposits; minus 

(B) $5 billion; provided, however, that 

an institution’s assessment base cannot 

be negative. 

(ii) The special assessment base for an 

insured depository institution during 

the initial special assessment period 

that has one or more affiliated insured 

depository institutions shall equal: 


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83348 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 228 / Wednesday, November 29, 2023 / Rules and Regulations 

(A) The institution’s uninsured 

deposits; minus 

(B) The institution’s portion of the $5 

billion deduction; provided, however, 

that an institution’s special assessment 

base cannot be negative. 

(j) Special assessment during 

extended special assessment period—(1) 

Shortfall amount. The shortfall amount 

is the amount of losses to the Deposit 

Insurance Fund, as reviewed and 

revised as of the last quarterly 

assessment period of 2025, that exceed 

the aggregate amount of special 

assessments collected during the initial 

special assessment period. 

(2) Extended special assessment 

period. If there is a shortfall amount 

after the last quarterly assessment 

period of 2025, the special assessment 

period will be extended, with at least 30 

day notice to insured depository 

institutions, to collect the shortfall 

amount. The length of the extended 

special assessment period shall be the 

minimum number of quarters required 

to recover the shortfall amount at a rate 

under paragraph (j)(3) of this section 

that is at or below 3.36 basis points per 

quarter. 

(3) Assessment rate during extended 

special assessment period. The 

quarterly assessment rate during the 

extended special assessment period will 

be the shortfall amount, divided by the 

total amount of uninsured deposits, 

adjusted for mergers, consolidation, and 

termination of insurance as of the last 

quarterly assessment period of 2025, 

minus the $5 billion deduction for each 

insured depository institution or each 

institution’s portion of the $5 billion 

deduction, divided by the minimum 

number of quarters that results in the 

quarterly rate being no greater than 3.36 

basis points. 

(4) Assessment base during the 

extended special assessment period. (i) 

The special assessment base for an 

insured depository institution during 

the extended special assessment period 

that has no affiliated insured depository 

institution shall equal: 

(A) The institution’s uninsured 

deposits; minus 

(B) $5 billion; provided, however, that 

an institution’s special assessment base 

cannot be negative. 

(ii) The special assessment base for an 

insured depository institution during 

the extended special assessment period 

that has one or more affiliated insured 

depository institutions shall equal: 

(A) The institution’s uninsured 

deposits; minus 

(B) The institution’s portion of the $5 

billion deduction, adjusted for 

termination of insurance as of the last 

assessment period of 2025; provided, 

however, that an institution’s special 

assessment base cannot be negative. 

(k) Effect of mergers, consolidations, 

and other terminations of insurance on 

the special assessment—(1) Final 

quarterly certified invoice for acquired 

institution. The surviving or resulting 

insured depository institution in a 

merger or consolidation shall be liable 

for any unpaid special assessment or 

one-time final shortfall special 

assessment outstanding at the time of 

the merger or consolidation on the part 

of the institution that is not the resulting 

or surviving institution consistent with 

§ 327.6. 

(2) Special assessment for quarter in 

which the merger or consolidation 

occurs and subsequent quarters. If an 

insured depository institution is the 

surviving or resulting institution in a 

merger or consolidation or acquires all 

or substantially all of the assets, or 

assumes all or substantially all of the 

deposit liabilities, of an insured 

depository institution, then the 

surviving or resulting insured 

depository institution or the insured 

depository institution that acquires such 

assets or assumes such deposit 

liabilities, shall be liable for the 

acquired institutions’ special 

assessment from the quarter of the 

acquisition through the remainder of the 

initial and extended special assessment 

period, including any one-time final 

shortfall special assessment. 

(3) Other termination. When the 

insured status of an institution is 

terminated, and the deposit liabilities of 

such institution are not assumed by 

another insured depository institution, 

the special assessment and any shortfall 

special assessment shall be paid 

consistent with § 327.6(c). When an 

insured depository institution 

voluntarily terminates its deposit 

insurance, the institution shall be liable 

for any unpaid special assessment or 

one-time final shortfall special 

assessment outstanding at the time of 

the termination and all future special 

assessments, if any, the institution 

would have been invoiced through the 

remainder of the initial or extended 

special assessment period, as 

applicable, including any one-time final 

shortfall special assessment for which 

the institution has been given notice 

before termination. Any special 

assessment or one-time final shortfall 

special assessment liabilities will be 

included, in full, on the final quarterly 

assessment invoice following voluntary 

termination. 

(l) Corrective reporting amendments— 

(1) Recalculation of quarterly special 

assessment amount. Corrective 

amendments to an institution’s 

uninsured deposits that arise from, or 

are confirmed through, the FDIC’s 

Assessment Reporting Review will 

apply retroactively beginning the first 

quarterly collection period of the initial 

special assessment period. An 

institution’s special assessment base 

and portion of the $5 billion deduction, 

along with the portion of the $5 billion 

deduction allocated to the institution’s 

affiliated insured depository 

institutions, will be recalculated for 

prior collection quarters. Any 

overpayment or underpayment in prior 

collection quarters as a result of the 

recalculation will be invoiced as 

described in paragraph (l)(2) of this 

section. 

(2) Invoicing overpayment and 

underpayment. Any underpayment of 

the special assessment by an institution 

as the result of corrective amendments 

to uninsured deposits will be included, 

in full and with interest, on the invoice 

for the quarter following the date a 

corrective amendment is filed. If a 

corrective amendment results in an 

overpayment of the special assessment, 

the institution will be credited the 

overpayment amount, with interest, and 

such amount will be applied to the 

institution’s subsequent special 

assessment invoices beginning in the 

quarter following the date of the 

amendment. If any excess credit amount 

remains after the end of the initial and 

any extended special assessment 

period(s), the excess credit amount shall 

be refunded to the institution. Payment 

and collection of interest on amounts 

resulting from overpayment and 

underpayment of the special assessment 

shall be consistent with § 327.7. 

(m) One-time final shortfall special 

assessment. If the aggregate amount of 

the special assessment collected during 

the initial and any extended special 

assessment period(s) do not meet or 

exceed the losses to the Deposit 

Insurance Fund, as calculated after the 

receiverships resulting from the March 

12, 2023, systemic risk determination 

are terminated, insured depository 

institutions shall pay a one-time final 

shortfall special assessment in 

accordance with this paragraph. 

(1) Notification of one-time final 

shortfall special assessment. The FDIC 

shall notify each insured depository 

institution of the amount of such 

institution’s one-time final shortfall 

special assessment no later than 45 days 

before such shortfall assessment is due. 

(2) Aggregate one-time final shortfall 

special assessment amount. The 

aggregate amount of the one-time final 

shortfall special assessment imposed 

across all insured depository 

institutions shall equal the losses to the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 228 / Wednesday, November 29, 2023 / Rules and Regulations 83349 

Deposit Insurance Fund, as of 

termination of the receiverships to 

which the March 12, 2023, systemic risk 

determination applied, minus the 

aggregate amount of the special 

assessment collected under this section 

through initial and extended special 

assessment periods, including the net 

amount of interest paid or received as a 

result of overpayments and 

underpayments. 

(3) One-time final shortfall special 

assessment rate. The final shortfall 

special assessment rate shall be the 

aggregate final shortfall special 

assessment amount divided by the total 

amount of uninsured deposits, as 

described in paragraph (f) of this 

section, adjusted for mergers, 

consolidation, and termination of 

insurance as of the assessment period 

preceding the final shortfall special 

assessment period, minus the $5 billion 

deduction for each insured depository 

institution or each institution’s portion 

of the $5 billion deduction. 

(4) One-time final shortfall special 

assessment base—(i) The one-time final 

shortfall special assessment base for an 

insured depository institution that has 

no affiliated insured depository 

institution shall equal: 

(A) The institution’s uninsured 

deposits; minus 

(B) $5 billion; provided, however, that 

an institution’s one-time final shortfall 

special assessment base cannot be 

negative. 

(ii) The one-time final shortfall 

special assessment base for an insured 

depository institution that has one or 

more affiliated insured depository 

institutions shall equal: 

(A) The institution’s uninsured 

deposits; minus 

(B) The institution’s portion of the $5 

billion deduction, adjusted for 

termination of insurance as of the 

assessment period preceding the final 

shortfall assessment period; provided, 

however, that an institution’s one-time 

final shortfall special assessment base 

cannot be negative. 

(5) Calculation of one-time final 

shortfall special assessment. An insured 

depository institution’s final shortfall 

special assessment shall be calculated 

by multiplying the final shortfall special 

assessment rate by the institution’s onetime final shortfall special assessment 

base. 

(6) One-time final special assessment. 

The one-time final shortfall special 

assessment shall be collected on a onetime quarterly basis after losses to the 

Deposit Insurance Fund are determined 

after termination of the receiverships to 

which the March 12, 2023, systemic risk 

determination applied. 

(7) Payment, invoicing, and mergers. 

Paragraphs (d), (e), and (k) of this 

section are applicable to the one-time 

shortfall special assessment. 

(n) Request for revisions. An insured 

depository institution may submit a 

written request for revision of the 

computation of any special assessment 

or shortfall special assessment pursuant 

to this part consistent with § 327.3(f). 

(o) Special assessment collection in 

excess of losses. Any special assessment 

collected under this section that exceeds 

the losses to the Deposit Insurance 

Fund, as of termination of the 

receiverships to which the March 12, 

2023, systemic risk determination 

applied, shall be placed in the Deposit 

Insurance Fund. 

(p) Rule of construction. Nothing in 

this section shall prevent the FDIC from 

imposing additional special assessments 

as required to recover current or future 

losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund 

resulting from any systemic risk 

determination under 12 U.S.C. 

1823(c)(4)(G). 

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 

By order of the Board of Directors. 

Dated at Washington, DC, on November 16, 

2023. 

James P. Sheesley, 

Assistant Executive Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2023–25813 Filed 11–28–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6714–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2023–2152; Project 

Identifier MCAI–2023–00798–T; Amendment 

39–22607; AD 2023–23–05] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier, 

Inc., Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Bombardier, Inc., Model BD–100–1A10 

airplanes. This AD was prompted by a 

design review of the avionic 

architecture of the pitch trim indication 

and alerting system that revealed 

software errors could generate 

misleading pitch trim indication to the 

crew, leading to incorrect horizontal 

stabilizer positioning at takeoff. This AD 

requires revising the Emergency 

Procedures and Normal Procedures of 

the existing airplane flight manual 

(AFM) to ensure the horizontal 

stabilizer is correctly configured prior to 

takeoff. The FAA is issuing this AD to 

address the unsafe condition on these 

products. 

DATES: This AD is effective December 

14, 2023. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in this AD 

as of December 14, 2023. 

The FAA must receive comments on 

this AD by January 16, 2024. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 

11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

regulations.gov. Follow the instructions 

for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail 

address above between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

AD Docket: You may examine the AD 

docket at regulations.gov under Docket 

No. FAA–2023–2152; or in person at 

Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 

5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this final rule, the mandatory 

continuing airworthiness information 

(MCAI), any comments received, and 

other information. The street address for 

Docket Operations is listed above. 

Material Incorporated by Reference: 

• For service information identified 

in this final rule, contact Bombardier 

Business Aircraft Customer Response 

Center, 400 Coˆte-Vertu Road West, 

Dorval, Que ́bec H4S 1Y9, Canada; 

telephone 514–855–2999; email ac.yul@

aero.bombardier.com; website 

bombardier.com. 

• You may view this referenced 

service information at the FAA, 

Airworthiness Products Section, 

Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 

216th St., Des Moines, WA. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195. 

It is also available at regulations.gov 

under Docket No. FAA–2023–2152. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Gabriel Kim, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, 

Westbury, NY 11590; telephone 516– 

228–7300; email 9-avs-nyaco-cos@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 


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