J-A09023-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

NAJEE EURE, :

:

Appellee : No. 2540 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order July 31, 2014,

Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0002958-2014

BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED APRIL 21, 2015

Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (“the Commonwealth”), 

appeals from the order entered on July 31, 2014, denying its motion for 

reconsideration of the trial court’s order quashing the charge against 

Appellee, Najee Eure (“Eure”), of persons not to possess, use, manufacture, 

control, sell or transfer firearms.1 After careful review, we reverse the trial 

court’s order and remand for trial.

The facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On the 

evening of February 11, 2014, Officer Matthew York (“Officer York”), along 

with two state parole agents and two police officers, visited Eure’s home, 

located at 2603 Reed Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Officer York was 

accompanying the parole agents on a parole compliance check for Eure, who 

 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
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was part of the Focused Deterrence Program as a convicted felon. During 

the visit, Officer York recovered a black and silver Ruger .45 caliber handgun 

from between the mattress and box spring of the bed in the middle upstairs 

bedroom of Eure’s home.

On February 21, 2014, police arrested Eure, charging him with persons 

not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms. At a 

preliminary hearing on March 13, 2014, the Commonwealth presented the 

testimony of Officer York. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the 

trial ordered Eure’s case held for court. On June 10, 2014, Eure filed a 

motion to quash the charge against him, averring that the Commonwealth 

failed to present sufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing to sustain a 

prima facie case against Eure for the above-referenced charge. Motion to 

Quash, 6/10/14, ¶ 7. Specifically, Eure asserted that the Commonwealth 

failed to produce “any actual or direct evidence that [Eure] is the person 

who possessed the firearm found in the middle bedroom of the house.” 

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash, 6/10/14, ¶ 2. Eure asserts 

that “[t]he Commonwealth believes that it has established a prima facie case 

through the circumstantial evidence that [because Eure] lives at that house, 

he and he alone must have possessed that gun.” Id. Therefore, Eure 

contends, “[t]he Commonwealth is relying on a tenuous inference based on 

circumstantial evidence[,]” and “[t]hat inference is not enough sustain the 

Commonwealth’s burden at the preliminary hearing.” Id.
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On June 12, 2014, the trial court granted Eure’s motion to quash at 

the conclusion of a hearing on the motion. On June 20, 2014, the 

Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order 

granting Eure’s motion to quash. On July 14, 2014, the trial court vacated 

its June 12, 2014 order granting Eure’s motion to quash, pending its 

determination of the Commonwealth’s motion for reconsideration. On July 

31, 2014, the trial court denied the Commonwealth’s motion for 

reconsideration. On September 2, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a timely 

notice of appeal and concise statement of the errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.

On appeal, the Commonwealth raises one issue for our review and 

determination: did the evidence at the preliminary hearing, viewed in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, establish a prima facie case 

against Eure for the charge of persons not to possess, use, manufacture, 

control, sell or transfer firearms? Commonwealth’s Brief at 1. 

We begin by acknowledging our standard of review:

[I]t is settled that the evidentiary sufficiency, or lack 

thereof, of the Commonwealth’s prima facie case for 

a charged crime is a question of law as to which an 

appellate court’s review is plenary. See 

[Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 865 

(Pa. 2003)]. Indeed, the trial court is afforded no 

discretion in ascertaining whether, as a matter of law 

and in light of the facts presented to it, the 

Commonwealth has carried its pre-trial, prima facie 

burden to make out the elements of a charged 

crime.
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Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880 A.2d 505, 513 (Pa. 2005). 

Furthermore, our Supreme Court has stated the following with regard 

to establishing a prima facie case:

At the preliminary hearing stage of a criminal 

prosecution, the Commonwealth need not prove the 

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but 

rather, must merely put forth sufficient evidence to 

establish a prima facie case of guilt. Huggins, 836 

A.2d at 866 (citing Commonwealth v. McBride, [] 

595 A.2d 589, 591 ([Pa.] 1991)). A prima facie case 

exists when the Commonwealth produces evidence 

of each of the material elements of the crime 

charged and establishes probable cause to warrant

the belief that the accused committed the offense. 

McBride, 595 A.2d at 591 (citing Commonwealth 

v. Wojdak, [] 466 A.2d 991 ([Pa.] 1983)). 

Furthermore, the evidence need only be such that, if 

presented at trial and accepted as true, the judge 

would be warranted in permitting the case to be 

decided by the jury. Huggins, 836 A.2d at 866.

Id. at 513-14. “When deciding whether a prima facie case was established, 

we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, and we are to consider all reasonable inferences based on 

that evidence which could support a guilty verdict.” Commonwealth v. 

McCullough, 86 A.3d 896, 898-99 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). 

“The weight and credibility of the evidence is not a factor at this stage.” Id.

at 899 (quotations and citation omitted).

Section 6105(a)(1) defines the crime of persons not to possess, use, 

manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms as follows:
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(a) Offense defined.—

(1) A person who has been convicted of an 

offense enumerated in subsection (b), within 

or without this Commonwealth, regardless of 

the length of sentence or whose conduct meets 

the criteria in subsection (c) shall not possess, 

use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or 

obtain a license to possess, use, control, sell, 

transfer or manufacture a firearm in this 

Commonwealth.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1). Importantly, the Commonwealth may prove 

illegal possession of a firearm by constructive possession. Commonwealth 

v. Cruz, 21 A.3d 1247, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic 

construct to deal with the realities of criminal law 

enforcement. Constructive possession is an 

inference arising from a set of facts that possession 

of the contraband was more likely than not. We 

have defined constructive possession as “conscious 

dominion.” We subsequently defined “conscious 

dominion” as the power to control the contraband 

and the intent to exercise that control. To aid 

application, we have held that constructive 

possession may be established by the totality of the 

circumstances.

Id. (quotations and citations omitted).

The trial court explained its reasoning for dismissing the charge 

against Eure as follows:

[The Commonwealth] here failed to establish any 

real evidence that the bedroom where the gun was 

found was under the exclusive possession and 

control of [Eure], or ... that he ever exercised 

dominion over it, and thus failed to establish the 

existence of any evidence that would demonstrate 
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that he ever knowingly had the power or the 

intention at a given time to exercise dominion and 

control over the weapon that was found there, either 

directly or through others.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/15/14, at 9. 

We disagree. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth and considering all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 

we conclude that the Commonwealth established a prima facie case against 

Eure for the charge of persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, 

sell or transfer firearms. The certified record on appeal reveals the 

following. Eure is a convicted felon and subject to section 6105(a)(1).2 See

N.T., 3/13/14, at 23. While Eure was not present for the compliance check, 

Officer York stated that he knew him well, that he knew him to live at 2603 

Reed Street for his entire police career, and that 2603 Reed Street was the 

address he was released to from state parole. Id. at 6. Officer York 

reported that Eure’s mother, who was home at the time in question, 

answered the door and told Officer York that Eure’s room was the back 

upstairs bedroom, but that he stayed in the middle upstairs bedroom. Id. at 

14-15. Officer York testified that he observed clothing in both the middle 

and back bedrooms, but that he observed a black North Face jacket in the 

middle bedroom that he had seen Eure wearing approximately one month 

prior. Id. at 7, 16. Officer York further stated that he also noticed that the 

 

2

 Additionally, Eure has not contested the fact that he is subject to section 

6105(a)(1).
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bed in the middle bedroom, although unmade, was dressed with sheets 

while the bed in the back bedroom contained no sheets. Id. at 21. 

Specifically, Officer York testified:

The back bedroom, in my opinion, was not lived in, 

Your Honor. There [were] no sheets on the bed. 

There was no indication to me that anyone had 

stayed in there recently. The middle bedroom[] was 

lived in. There [were] sheets on the bed. The 

blankets were strewed. There was clothing 

throughout the bedroom on the floor, indicative that 

someone was living in there.

Id. Finally, Officer York reported that he recovered the black and silver 

Ruger .45 caliber handgun from between the mattress and box spring of the 

bed in the middle bedroom. Id. at 5.

Officer York’s testimony supports a reasonable inference that Eure was 

in possession of the firearm recovered from the middle bedroom of his 

home. Officer York’s testimony indicated that Eure’s mother indicated that 

Eure used the middle bedroom and that upon entering it, it was apparent 

that Eure slept in and kept his belongings in the middle bedroom. 

Therefore, because the middle bedroom was the room from which Officer 

York recovered the firearm, the reasonable inference that follows is that 

Eure had the power to control the firearm and the intent to exercise that 

control. See Cruz, 21 A.3d at 1253. Accordingly, because Eure is subject 

to section 6105(a)(1), we conclude that the trial court erred in granting the 
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motion to quash the charge against Eure of persons not to possess, use, 

manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms and remand the case for trial.

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/21/2015