2020 IL App (3d) 190351WC-U 

Nos. 3-19-0351WC, 3-19-0352WC 

Order filed April 21, 2020 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

 IN THE

 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

 THIRD DISTRICT

 WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION DIVISION

______________________________________________________________________________ 

KURT MONTGOMERY, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

 ) of Will County 

Petitioner-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, ) 

 ) Nos. 18MR2295 

v. ) 18MR1942 

 ) 

THE ILLINOIS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ) 

COMMISSION et al., ) 

 ) Honorable 

(Caterpillar Logistics Services, Inc., ) John C. Anderson 

 Respondent-Appellee/Cross-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

 JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justices Hoffman, Hudson, and Barberis concurred in the 

judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Because the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission issued an interlocutory 

decision instead of a final decision, the circuit court lacked subject-matter 

jurisdiction.

¶ 2 In 2011, petitioner, Kurt Montgomery, filed with the Illinois Workers’ 

Compensation Commission (Commission) a section 8(a) petition. See 820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 

2010). He sought to compel respondent, Caterpillar Logistics Services, Inc., to cover the cost of 
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past and future medical treatment for a workplace injury he suffered on April 8, 1994. In 2018, 

the Commission issued its decision. Both parties sought review in the Will County circuit court. 

In 2019, the court confirmed the Commission’s decision. Both parties appeal.

¶ 3 We hold that because the Commission issued an interlocutory decision instead of 

a final decision, the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, we vacate the 

circuit court’s judgment and remand this case to the Commission for further proceedings. 

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 In the section 8(a) hearing, petitioner submitted invoices from 20 medical 

providers. The invoices covered the period of July 20, 2001, to May 18, 2017, and totaled over 

$50,000. Also, petitioner submitted bills and receipts that, he claimed, represented expenses 

incidental to his medical treatment for the workplace injury. Such alleged incidental expenses 

totaled an additional $32,000. Respondent disputed the reasonableness and necessity of these 

medical bills and incidental expenses.

¶ 6 In its decision, the Commission ordered payment of the following medical 

expenses:

 “(7) Respondent shall pay all outstanding reasonable and related medical 

bills.

 * * * 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED BY THE COMMISSION that Respondent pay 

reasonable, necessary, and related medical expenses under § 8(a) of the Act, subject to 

the fee schedule in § 8.2 of the Act [(id. § 8.2)].” 

¶ 7 In similar general terms, the Commission ordered respondent to pay the following 

incidental expenses: 
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“(5) All bills for necessary and related treatment, attendant care and travel 

are to be directed for approval and payment to Respondent. *** 

 * * * 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COMMISSION that all bills for 

necessary and related treatment, attendant care and travel are to be directed for 

approval and payment to Respondent.” 

¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 9 To be appealable, a decision by the Commission must be final. American 

Structures, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 99 Ill. 2d 40, 43-44 (1983). A decision by the Commission 

that includes a generalized reward requiring further determination is an interlocutory decision, 

which a circuit court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to review. International Paper Co. v. 

Industrial Comm’n, 99 Ill. 2d 458, 466 (1984). 

¶ 10 For example, in Consolidated Freightways v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation 

Comm’n, 373 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1078 (2007), the Commission issued a decision in which it 

ordered the employer to provide the claimant with “ ‘meaningful vocational rehabilitation.’ ” 

Section 8(a) already required the employer to provide meaningful vocational rehabilitation. Id. at 

1080. The dispute was what, specifically, meaningful vocational rehabilitation would entail in 

that case. Merely telling the employer, in so many words, to follow the statute failed to resolve 

the dispute. See id. Thus, the Commission’s order was interlocutory and not appealable. See id.

at 1079-80. 

¶ 11 Similarly, in the present case, the Commission entered an interlocutory order by 

reciting respondent’s statutory duty to pay reasonable and necessary medical and incidental 

expenses, without specifying which of petitioner’s claimed expenses that respondent had to pay 
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pursuant to that statutory duty. Respondent did not dispute that, under section 8(a), it was obliged 

to pay “all outstanding reasonable and related medical bills” and “[a]ll bills for necessary and 

related treatment, attendant care and travel.” See 820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2010). Rather, the 

dispute was which of the medical bills and invoices that petitioner submitted were reasonable and 

necessary. The Commission’s order is interlocutory and unappealable because it leaves that 

dispute unresolved. See Consolidated Freightways, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 1079-80. 

¶ 12 The circuit court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to review orders by the 

Commission that are interlocutory or “ ‘inherently incomplete.’ ” Id. at 1079. A judgment by a 

circuit court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction is void. Rojas v. Illinois Workers’ 

Compensation Comm’n, 406 Ill. App. 3d 965, 970 (2010). We have an independent duty to 

vacate void judgments. Schak v. Blom, 334 Ill. App. 3d 129, 134 (2002). 

¶ 13 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 14 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the circuit court’s judgment and remand this 

case to the Commission for further proceedings. 

¶ 15 Vacated and remanded.