IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

January 15, 2015 Session

CHRISTY L. GRIFFITH v. GLEN H. GRIFFITH

 Appeal from the Chancery Court for Bradley County

No. 2013-CV-126 Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor

No. E2014-00892-COA-R3-CV-FILED-APRIL 14, 2015

This divorce case involves issues of property classification, valuation, and division. The 

parties were married for fifteen years, with one child born of the marriage. At the time 

the parties married, the husband owned an interest in his family‟s motorcycle dealership. 

The husband inherited remaining interests in that dealership from his parents during the 

marriage. At trial, the court found that the dealership was a separately owned asset that 

became marital property by reason of transmutation. The trial court also made 

determinations regarding the value of the dealership and the real property upon which it 

operates. Following these determinations, the trial court rendered what it considered to 

be an equitable division of the parties‟ marital assets. Husband has appealed. Because 

we determine the trial court‟s classification and valuation of the dealership to be in error, 

as well as the valuation of the business-related real property, we further determine the

overall distribution of marital assets to be in error. We vacate the trial court‟s judgment 

with regard to those issues and remand for further proceedings. The balance of the trial 

court‟s judgment is affirmed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed in Part, Vacated in Part; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D.

SUSANO, JR., C.J., and D. MICHAEL SWINEY, J., joined.

Joshua H. Jenne, Cleveland, Tennessee, for the appellant, Glen H. Griffith.

H. Franklin Chancey, Cleveland, Tennessee, for the appellee, Christy L. Griffith.
2

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Christy L. Griffith (“Wife”), and the defendant, Glen H. Griffith 

(“Husband”), were married in September 1998. One child was born to their marriage on 

January 11, 2000.1 Following the parties‟ separation on May 1, 2013, Wife filed a 

complaint for divorce on May 28, 2013. At the time of the divorce hearing, Wife was 

forty-four years old while Husband was fifty-seven years of age. 

Husband owns a Kawasaki dealership in Cleveland known as Griffith‟s Kawasaki

(“the Business”), which has been owned by his family since before his birth. At the time 

of the parties‟ marriage, Husband owned a one-third interest regarding the Business. He 

subsequently inherited the remaining two-thirds interest upon the deaths of his parents in 

2001. The parties own the real property upon which the Business is located, 150 Worth 

Street (“Worth Street Property”), as tenants by the entirety. Following the deaths of his 

parents in 2001, Husband inherited a fifty-percent interest in the Worth Street Property. 

The remaining fifty-percent interest was owned by his uncle. The parties subsequently 

obtained a joint loan to purchase the uncle‟s ownership interest, thereby acquiring title to 

the Worth Street Property as tenants by the entirety. The installment payments relative to

the loan for the purchase of the Worth Street Property have been made by the Business.

In addition to the Business and the Worth Street Property, Husband inherited from 

his parents three vacant lots behind the Business. One of those lots was subsequently 

sold to a third party. Husband retained ownership of the other two lots. In recent years, 

Husband entered into an agreement to sell the Business to Mr. Tony Oglesby for 

$225,000.00. That sale, however, was never consummated. Husband received earnest 

money of $25,000.00, which he deposited into the Business‟s account and used for 

expenses. He testified at trial that he considered the $25,000.00 earnest money deposit to 

be a debt of the Business.

Wife had worked for the Bank of Cleveland for twenty-two years at the time of 

trial. Regarding her employment, she earned between $90,000.00 and $100,000.00 per 

year for the past few years. Wife testified that she had the ability to work and earn this 

level of income for many more years. Husband, by contrast, had never been employed 

outside of the Business. Husband‟s earnings for the last four years averaged

approximately $8,000.00 per year, which he asserted was due to a downturn in the 

economy and a reduction in the demand for recreational vehicles. By contrast, Wife 

testified that Husband had, in previous years, earned approximately $400.00 to $500.00

 

1 No issues are raised regarding co-parenting in this appeal.
3

per week from the Business. Since Husband‟s income had dropped, Wife was 

responsible for paying the mortgage on the marital residence and most all other 

household bills.

Wife claimed that while Husband was inattentive to the Business, their marriage, 

and their child, he instead spent inordinate amounts of time on other pursuits, including 

gambling. Wife attempted to demonstrate at trial that Husband satisfied numerous 

personal expenses through the Business while writing many checks from the Business‟s 

account simply to cash. Wife also established that the deposits to the Business‟s account 

did not comport with the Business‟s reported sales. Wife admitted that the Worth Street 

Property had been appraised in 2012 at a value of $190,000.00, although she believed 

that the value of a garage attached to that property should be added, such that the total 

value of the Worth Street Property would be $240,000.00.

The parties‟ marital residence was located on twenty acres of real property. The 

premises were purchased from Husband‟s family in 2006 for $227,000.00. The home 

and real property appraised in May 2012 for $300,000.00. Wife stated at trial that the 

appraisal was disappointing as she believed the home to have been worth more. At the 

appraised value, the home essentially maintained no equity.

Upon the outset of trial, the parties, pursuant to local rule, presented a master asset 

and liability list in which they purportedly stipulated as to the classification and division 

of certain assets. The parties listed the Business as Husband‟s separate property. Wife‟s 

counsel, however, asserted during his opening statement that there was an issue of 

transmutation that would be addressed during the parties‟ testimony. Following the 

presentation of proof, which included a large volume of testimony regarding the parties‟ 

respective contributions to the Business, Wife‟s counsel indicated in closing that she did 

not intend to stipulate that the Business was Husband‟s separate property. Rather, her 

intent was simply to list the Business and its value as a disputed asset, which Husband 

claimed was his separate property. 

Upon the conclusion of trial, the court took the matter under advisement. In later

announcing its rulings from the bench, the court noted that the Business was stipulated on 

the master asset list to be Husband‟s separate property; however, the court found that the 

proof did not support a determination that the Business was Husband‟s separate property. 

The court ruled that the Business was marital property by operation of transmutation, 

based on Wife‟s direct and indirect contributions during the marriage. The court, inter 

alia, awarded the Business to Husband in the overall division of marital assets. 

With regard to the $25,000.00 alleged debt owed to the potential buyer of the 

Business, representing the buyer‟s earnest money deposit, the trial court stated:
4

The husband received $25,000.00 from Tony Oglesby as earnest money for 

a potential purchase of the Kawasaki business and which Husband 

deposit[ed] in the business checking account. The Court is unable to 

determine whether these funds are subject to repayment by the husband or 

the business. In any event, whether the funds represent an asset or a debt 

they are awarded to the husband as part of an equitable division of property.

Further, regarding the Worth Street Property, the trial court determined its value to 

be $240,000.00 based on Wife‟s expressed opinion of its value, notwithstanding the 

$190,000.00 appraisal. The court divided all marital assets between the parties. In so 

doing, the court awarded Wife one hundred percent of her retirement investments, which 

included her 401(k) and bank stock. The court also ordered the marital residence to be 

sold. Husband has appealed the trial court‟s classification, valuation, and division of 

marital property.

II. Issues Presented

Husband presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in its classification of the parties‟ assets 

and debts.

2. Whether the trial court erred in its valuation and division of the 

marital estate.

3. Whether Husband should be awarded attorney‟s fees on appeal.

III. Standard of Review

As this Court has previously explained:

Dividing a marital estate necessarily begins with the systematic 

identification of all of the parties‟ property interests. The second step is to 

classify each of these property interests as either separate or marital 

property. Tennessee is a “dual property” state. Accordingly, property 

cannot be included in the marital estate unless it fits within the definition of 

“marital property” in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A) (2005). By the 

same token, “separate property,” as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-

121(b)(2), should not be included in the marital estate. 
5

Questions regarding the classification of property as either marital or 

separate, as opposed to questions involving the appropriateness of the 

division of the marital estate, are inherently factual. Accordingly, the 

appellate courts review a trial court‟s decisions classifying property using 

the familiar standard of review in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).

Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

The value of marital property is also a fact question. See Wallace v. Wallace, 733 

S.W.2d 102, 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). As this Court explained:

a trial court‟s decision with regard to the value of a marital asset will be 

given great weight on appeal. In accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), 

the trial court‟s decisions with regard to the valuation and distribution of 

marital property will be presumed to be correct unless the evidence 

preponderates otherwise. 

The value of a marital asset is determined by considering all relevant 

evidence regarding value. The burden is on the parties to produce 

competent evidence of value, and the parties are bound by the evidence 

they present. Thus the trial court, in its discretion, is free to place a value 

on a marital asset that is within the range of the evidence submitted. 

Wallace, 733 S.W.2d at 107 (internal citations omitted).

Regarding the equitable division of marital property, our Supreme Court has 

elucidated:

This Court gives great weight to the decisions of the trial court in dividing 

marital assets and “we are disinclined to disturb the trial court‟s decision 

unless the distribution lacks proper evidentiary support or results in some 

error of law or misapplication of statutory requirements and procedures.” 

Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). As such, 

when dealing with the trial court‟s findings of fact, we review the record de 

novo with a presumption of correctness, and we must honor those findings 

unless there is evidence which preponderates to the contrary. Tenn. R. 

App. P. 13(d); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 

(Tenn. 1993). Because trial courts are in a far better position than this 

Court to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, the weight, faith, and 

credit to be given witnesses‟ testimony lies in the first instance with the 
6

trial court. Roberts v. Roberts, 827 S.W.2d 788, 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1991). Consequently, where issues of credibility and weight of testimony 

are involved, this Court will accord considerable deference to the trial 

court‟s factual findings. In re M.L.P., 228 S.W.3d 139, 143 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2007) (citing Seals v. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg. Co., 984 

S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tenn. 1999)). The trial court‟s conclusions of law, 

however, are accorded no presumption of correctness. Langschmidt v. 

Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d 741, 744–45 (Tenn. 2002).

Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tenn. 2007).

IV. Classification and Valuation of the Business

Husband asserts that the trial court erred in its classification of the Business as 

marital property because he owned a one-third interest in the Business before the parties‟ 

marriage and inherited the remaining two-thirds interest upon the deaths of his parents. 

As Husband points out, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(b)(2) (2014) defines 

separate property in pertinent part as that owned by a party before marriage or acquired 

by a party at any time by “gift, bequest, devise or descent.” 

Husband also contends that the trial court erred in determining that this asset had 

been transmuted into marital property because (1) the parties‟ stipulated in the master 

asset list that the Business was Husband‟s separate property, and (2) the proof did not 

support that transmutation had occurred. With regard to this asset, the trial court stated:

And it appears that the Kawasaki dealership was stipulated as being 

his separate property and I‟m not sure that‟s what the facts of this case bear 

out and that‟s one of the things that have puzzled me in how to deal with 

that because am I bound by their stipulations of that fact.

The parties have been married for many years and I think that it‟s 

been through a big part of the wife‟s efforts that Mr. Griffith has been able 

to continue to operate the dealership. It‟s certainly with her efforts that

they were able to purchase his two-thirds interest in that business and 

building.

And there was certainly some sort of argument to be made that it 

may have transmuted to marital property but I have the stipulation that it 

was separate property. So I‟m not sure legally what that [provides] me to 

deal with this but I‟m going to try and give you what I think is the best way 

to divide these assets and these debts.
7

* * *

As far as husband‟s motorcycle shop is concerned, certainly I find 

that that has transmuted into marital property. 

* * *

And the Kawasaki dealership is stipulated as his separate property 

although I‟m taking that into consideration that he would probably not have 

that . . . business if it weren‟t for wife‟s ability to – if not directly contribute 

to that business, at least pick up the slack at home so that he could continue 

to keep his money from his business. 

I don‟t find his testimony about the value of the business or its cash 

flow to be credible. And I‟m not saying that I don‟t believe his testimony. 

I‟m saying that I don‟t think he is as strong of a business person to have a 

credible opinion about his business. I think that his deposits don‟t match 

his sales. I think he‟s taking cash from the business and running personal 

expenses through the business such that he probably doesn‟t have a good 

feel for either the value of the business or how to maximize profits from the 

business.

But for those reasons and because I don‟t feel good about the value 

of the Kawasaki business and whether it was, in fact, separate property I‟m 

awarding that business to him. 

Husband initially argues that the trial court erred in ignoring the parties‟ 

stipulation in the master asset list that the Business was Husband‟s separate property. 

Husband posits that stipulations “are binding on the parties as well as the court.” See

Bearman v. Camatsos, 385 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Tenn. 1964). Wife contends, however, that 

there was no stipulation that this asset was Husband‟s separate property. Rather, Wife 

states that her intent by listing this asset as Husband‟s separate property in the master 

asset list was that Husband would be awarded this asset in the division. Wife states that 

she never agreed that the asset should be classified as Husband‟s separate property, as 

clearly shown by her testimony at trial regarding transmutation.

As our sister court has explained: “A stipulation is an agreement between counsel

with respect to business before a court. Stipulations are favored and should be 

encouraged and enforced by the courts, since they expedite the business of the courts.” 

State v. Ford, 725 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986) (emphasis in original) 
8

(quoting 83 C.J.S. Stipulations § 1). Further, “stipulations will be rigidly enforced by the 

courts of this State.” Bearman, 385 S.W.2d at 93. 

Following our thorough review of the transcript in this matter, we agree with Wife 

that there was no enforceable stipulation that this asset was Husband‟s separate property. 

At the beginning of trial, the parties presented a master asset list to the court, which listed 

the Business as Husband‟s separate property. Wife‟s counsel, however, offered during

his opening statement that there was a question regarding transmutation that would be 

addressed through the parties‟ testimony. 

As the trial continued, both parties were questioned regarding their respective 

contributions to the Business. At the conclusion of the proof, Wife‟s counsel insisted 

during closing that Wife did not intend to stipulate that the Business was Husband‟s 

separate property. Rather, her intent was simply to list the Business and its value as a 

disputed asset that Husband claimed as his separate property. Having reviewed the 

proceedings in their entirety, we do not find that the master asset list, which identified the 

Business as Husband‟s separate property, constituted a stipulation of the parties regarding 

the issue of classification of that asset.

That being established, we note that the Business was clearly Husband‟s separate 

property because he (1) owned a one-third respective interest before the parties‟ 

marriage, and (2) inherited the remaining two-thirds interest upon the deaths of both of 

his parents in 2001. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 (a)(2)(A) and (D).2 We must, 

therefore, determine whether the trial court properly classified the Business as a marital 

asset on the basis of transmutation. 

Wife posits that it was only through her efforts that Husband was able to retain the 

Business by the time of trial. She asserts that she performed bookkeeping services for the 

Business, obtained loans against her 401(k) investment to pay the property taxes for the 

Worth Street Property where the Business operated, and co-signed the loan to purchase 

the outstanding interest in the Worth Street Property from Husband‟s uncle. Wife also 

made indirect contributions during the marriage as a wage earner and homemaker. Wife 

contends that all of these factors support the trial court‟s determination that transmutation 

 

2

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121 (a)(2) defines “separate property” as:

(A) All real and personal property owned by a spouse before marriage . . . . 

* * *

(D) Property acquired by a spouse at any time by gift, bequest, devise or descent . . . .
9

occurred. We disagree.

As our Supreme Court has explained:

[Transmutation] occurs when separate property is treated in such a way as to 

give evidence of an intention that it become marital property. . . . The 

rationale underlying these doctrines is that dealing with property in these 

ways creates a rebuttable presumption of a gift to the marital estate. This 

presumption is based upon the provision in many marital property statutes 

that property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be marital. The 

presumption can be rebutted by evidence of circumstances or 

communications clearly indicating an intent that the property remain 

separate.

Langschmidt v. Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d 741, 747 (Tenn. 2002) (citing HOMER H. 

CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 16.2 at 

185 (2d ed.1987)). As Wife points out, this Court has also previously explained:

Four of the most common factors courts use to determine whether real 

property has been transmuted from separate property to marital property

are: (1) the use of the property as a marital residence; (2) the ongoing 

maintenance and management of the property by both parties; (3) placing 

the title to the property in joint ownership; and (4) using the credit of the 

non-owner spouse to improve the property. Accordingly, our court has 

classified separately owned real property as marital property when the 

parties agreed that it should be owned jointly even though the title was 

never changed, or when the spouse owning the separate property conceded 

that he or she intended that the separate property would be converted to 

marital property.

Fox v. Fox, No. M2004-02616-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 2535407 at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Sept. 1, 2006) (internal citations omitted).

In this case, the asset in question is an ongoing business operation, not real 

property as in Fox. See id. However, even if the factors enumerated in Fox are applied 

to the Business herein, there is no proof to support application of transmutation. Factor 

number one is clearly inapplicable because the asset at issue is a business entity. Factor 

number two does not support a theory of transmutation as the only act performed by Wife 

to maintain the Business was to assist with certain bookkeeping tasks. Wife admitted that 

Husband handled all day-to-day aspects of operating the business, including writing 

checks, paying expenses, paying and managing employees, and generally keeping the 
10

business going. There was a dearth of evidence that Wife ever worked in or managed the 

Business. 

With regard to factor number three, there was no proof that Wife‟s name was ever 

placed on the Business, jointly or otherwise. Regarding factor number four, while there 

was evidence that Wife used the strength of her credit to help Husband purchase his 

uncle‟s interest in the Worth Street Property upon which the Business operated, the real 

property was treated as a distinct and separate asset from the Business itself. There was 

an absence of proof that Wife ever used her credit to aid or improve the Business.

Further, this Business was not treated by the parties in such a way as to evince an 

intention that it become marital property. Husband never conceded that it was jointly 

owned or should be considered a marital asset. As such, there was no gift to the marital 

estate, and the Business remained Husband‟s separate property. The trial court therefore

erred in determining that the Business was transmuted to marital property based on the 

evidence presented.

Regarding the valuation of this asset, Husband also takes issue with the trial 

court‟s treatment of the $25,000.00 “debt” owed by the Business to Tony Oglesby. Both 

parties testified at trial that Mr. Oglesby and Husband entered into an agreement whereby 

Mr. Oglesby would purchase the Business for $225,000.00. In furtherance of the 

intended transaction, Mr. Oglesby remitted an earnest money payment to Husband in the 

amount of $25,000.00, which Husband deposited into the account of the Business and 

utilized to pay bills. Unfortunately, the proposed purchase of the Business was never 

completed. According to Husband, this failure was due to prohibitive corporate 

requirements that Kawasaki placed upon new dealership owners. Husband thus testified 

that the Business was obligated to repay the $25,000.00 earnest money deposit to Mr. 

Oglesby.

As pertinent to this issue, the trial court explained in its memorandum opinion:

The Tony Oglesby. I don‟t have any proof on that other than 

[Husband‟s] testimony that he‟s kept $25,000 that he lists as a debt and I‟m 

listing it as an asset that he has kept. I don‟t know where it is. I don‟t 

know if he‟s going to pay it back. I don‟t have proof that he owes it back. 

I don‟t have proof of why that deal fell through or that it may go through. I 

find that the testimony concerning that is shady at best and certainly doesn‟t 

clarify the legal status between Mr. Oglesby and the sale of the Kawasaki 

Business itself.
11

In its written final judgment, the court addressed this item as follows:

h) The husband received $25,000.00 from Tony Oglesby as earnest 

money for a potential purchase of the Kawasaki business and which 

Husband deposit[ed] in the business checking account. The Court is 

unable to determine whether these funds are subject to repayment by 

the husband or the business. In any event, whether the funds 

represent an asset or a debt they are awarded to the husband as part 

of an equitable division of property.

i) The Kawasaki business, stipulated as Husband‟s separate property, 

is declared to have been transmuted to marital property and the same 

shall be and hereby is awarded to Husband. In light of the Court‟s 

findings set forth in above paragraph (h), the Kawasaki business is 

assigned a net value of $192,754.36.

The trial court therefore adjusted the value of the Business, which the parties stipulated to 

be $225,000.00, to $192,754.36. The trial court ostensibly arrived at this amount by 

adding the $25,000.00 earnest money deposit to the stipulated value of $225,000.00 and 

then subtracting the other Business debts, which totaled $57,246.54.3 Thus, the trial court 

treated the $25,000.00 earnest money deposit as an asset. 

Husband posits that the trial court erred in treating the $25,000.00 earnest money 

deposit as an asset of the Business. We agree. Both parties testified at trial that Husband 

received this earnest money deposit from a potential buyer of the Business. Further, both

parties testified that Husband deposited this money into the Business‟s checking account 

and subsequently spent it on business-related expenses. While Husband was the only 

person to testify that the money had to be repaid to Mr. Oglesby, and the trial court 

considered Husband‟s testimony regarding this issue to be “shady at best,” such does not 

provide a proper basis for adding the value of the $25,000.00 earnest money deposit to 

the stipulated value of the Business. Undisputed were the circumstances that this money 

had been received and spent. Had the court found the proof insufficient regarding 

whether this amount was actually a debt, it should have simply disregarded it.

Having concluded that the trial court erred in both the classification and valuation 

of the Business, we further conclude that this case must be remanded for a proper 

determination of the Business‟s value. We vacate the trial court‟s classification of the 

Business as marital property due to transmutation as well as the trial court‟s 

determination of the Business‟s value. We accordingly also vacate the court‟s overall 

 

3 We note that $250,000.00 minus $57,246.54 is actually $192,753.46. This apparent mathematical error 

in the amount of 90¢ does not affect our analysis.
12

distribution of marital property. Upon remand, the trial court is directed to consider any

additional proof regarding whether the $25,000.00 amount constitutes a debt in order to 

properly value the Business. See Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, No. W1999-01684-COA-R3-

CV, 2000 WL 633462 at *2-3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 11, 2000) (affirming the trial court‟s 

consideration of additional proof regarding the value and distribution of marital assets on 

remand from this Court) (quoting First Tennessee Bank Nat’l Assoc. v. Hurd Lock and 

Mfg. Co., 816 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (“„[T]his court, in its original 

opinion, envisioned and intended that the trial judge, on remand, take all action necessary 

to do complete justice, including the reception of additional proof.‟”)). The court should 

then adjust the equitable division of marital property to account for the re-classification 

of the Business as Husband‟s separate property, which analysis will further require 

consideration of the proper value of this separate property. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-

121(c)(6) (“In making equitable division of marital property, the court shall consider all 

relevant factors including . . .[t]he value of the separate property of each party . . . .”).

V. Valuation of Worth Street Property

Husband further asserts that the trial court erred in its valuation of the Worth 

Street Property. Husband provided no testimony at trial regarding the value of this real 

property. On the master asset list, Wife valued this property at $240,000.00 while 

Husband valued it at $190,000.00. During her testimony, Wife acknowledged that the 

Worth Street Property was appraised in 2012 and assigned a value of $190,000.00. 

According to Wife, this appraisal did not include the garage, which was also a component 

of the Business property. Wife explained that when she reviewed the tax appraisal for the 

garage, which was $50,000.00, she added this amount to the appraised value of 

$190,000.00 to arrive at her total value of $240,000.00. Husband‟s counsel objected to 

this testimony, however, based on the best evidence rule. See Tenn. R. Evid. 1002. 

Counsel asserted that the tax appraisal should be produced; the court sustained that 

objection. The tax appraisal was never introduced, and no further testimony was 

presented on this matter.

Husband now asserts that the trial court erred in accepting Wife‟s valuation of the 

Worth Street Property. According to Husband, the $190,000.00 appraisal value included 

the garage for which Wife added value, as evinced by the declaration on the first page of 

the appraisal report stating that it includes lots “10 & 10.1.” Husband asserts that the 

Worth Street Property “technically includ[es] two lots identified by map and parcel 

reference as Lot 10 and Lot 10.01,” and that the rear lot, or lot 10, is the lot with the 

garage referred to by Wife in her testimony. We note, however, that the parties presented

no evidence regarding this issue at trial. Although Wife did testify that the garage had a 

separate tax appraisal, no tax records were introduced to demonstrate such fact. No 

witness discussed whether the Worth Street Property was comprised of one or two lots. 
13

Moreover, the appraisal report also states, “This property is a 2 story commercial 

building consisting of 5604 S/F per public records with a 1250 S/F BMT,” making no 

mention of a garage. Thus, without additional explanation, we cannot determine whether 

the respective appraisal included the garage, as Husband asserts, or whether the garage

value should be added, as Wife asserts.

Having concluded that this case must be remanded for revaluation of the Business

and a proper division of marital assets, we vacate the trial court‟s determination of value 

as to the Worth Street Property because we conclude that the evidence preponderates 

against it. See Wallace, 733 S.W.2d at 107. Upon remand, the trial court is directed to 

hear proof regarding the value of the Worth Street Property and whether the garage value 

should be added accordingly. See Wilkerson, 2000 WL 633462 at *2-3.

VI. Attorney‟s Fees on Appeal

Husband argues that he should be granted an award of attorney‟s fees on appeal. 

He correctly notes that fee awards on appeal are within the discretion of this Court, with 

the relevant factors to be considered being: (1) the ability of the requesting party to pay 

fees, (2) the requesting party‟s success on appeal, (3) whether the requesting party sought 

the appeal in good faith, and (4) any other equitable factors that need to be considered. 

See Luplow v. Luplow, 450 S.W.3d 105, 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). Having considered 

the record herein and the above factors, we determine that an award of fees on appeal is 

not warranted in this case.

VII. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we vacate the trial court‟s classification of the 

Business as marital property, as well as the trial court‟s valuation of the Business and the 

Worth Street Property. We also vacate the trial court‟s overall division of marital assets. 

The trial court‟s judgment is affirmed in all other respects. Costs on appeal are taxed 

equally to the parties. This case is remanded to the trial court, pursuant to applicable law, 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

_________________________________ 

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE