NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TODD ALBRIGHT, an individual, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

ALLIANT SPECIALTY INSURANCE 

SERVICES, INC., a California Corporation 

doing business in Washington; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-35770 

D.C. No. 3:17-cv-05062-RBL 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 28, 2019**

Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

In 2016, Alliant Insurance Services, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alliant Specialty 

Insurance Services, Inc., (together, “Alliant”) were negotiating contracts, called “cobroker agreements,” with Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. (“AJG”), under which two 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without 

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 30 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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brokerages that AJG had recently acquired would sell and service Alliant’s insurance 

products. An Alliant employee circulated a draft co-broker agreement containing a 

term that excluded one of AJG’s brokers, Todd Albright, from performing any work 

under the agreement. Albright sued Alliant, claiming the term defamed him in 

several states, tortiously interfered with his business expectancy, and negligently 

injured him. The district court granted summary judgment in Alliant’s favor and 

denied Albright’s motion for partial summary judgment on choice of law. It also 

denied Albright’s motion for reconsideration. Albright appeals these rulings. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

The district court did not err by applying Washington law to Albright’s 

defamation claims and denying Albright’s motion for partial summary judgment on 

choice of law. There is no outcome-determinative difference between the law of 

Washington and the laws of California, Illinois, and Oklahoma as they relate to the 

resolution of Albright’s defamation claims. All four states recognize a conditional 

“common interest” privilege for otherwise-defamatory communications that is lost 

when the declarant is motivated by malice or otherwise abuses the privilege. See 

Moe v. Wise, 989 P.2d 1148, 1154–58 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999); see also Taus v. 

Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1209–10 (Cal. 2007); Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing and 

Amin., Inc., 619 N.E.2d 129, 134–36 (Ill. 1993); Trice v. Burress, 137 P.3d 1253, 

1260 n.15 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006); Thornton v. Holdenvill Gen. Hosp., 36 P.3d 456, 
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461 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001). Given the absence of a “real” conflict between the 

relevant laws, the district court properly applied Washington law and denied 

Albright’s motion for partial summary judgment. See Seizer v. Sessions, 940 P.2d 

261, 264 (Wash. 1997). 

Nor was there error in granting summary judgment in Alliant’s favor on 

Albright’s defamation claims. The allegedly defamatory co-broker agreements were 

communicated in furtherance of a “legitimate business relationship” between Alliant 

and AJG, and thus were covered by the common interest privilege. See Corbin v. 

Madison, 529 P.2d 1145, 1151 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). Albright’s evidence does not

create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Robert Shearer, the author of 

the co-broker agreement, was motivated by malice when he drafted and published 

the relevant language. 

There was also no error in granting summary judgment in Alliant’s favor on 

Albright’s tortious interference claims. Albright presented insufficient evidence that 

Alliant “interfered for an improper purpose or used improper means” to exclude him 

from a business expectancy. Leingang v. Pierce Cnty. Med. Bureau, Inc., 930 P.2d 

288, 300 (Wash. 1997).

There was no abuse of discretion in denying Albright’s motion for 

reconsideration. Albright fails to show clear error in the district court’s underlying 

ruling on the motions for summary judgment, and the newly discovered evidence he 
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presented to the district court did not create an issue of material fact as to the 

existence of malice. Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 940, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). 

AFFIRMED.