J-A05041-15

2015 PA Super 84

BYOUNG SUK AN, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

VICTORIA FIRE & CASUALTY CO., D/B/A 

TITAN AUTO INSURANCE AND MATTHEW 

GILMORE AND ZAINAB WALKER,

Appellees No. 2120 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered June 23, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No(s): 2013-006320

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, and ALLEN, JJ.

OPINION BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED APRIL 17, 2015

Appellant, Byoung Suk An, appeals from the order dated June 20, 

2014, and entered June 23, 2014, denying his motion for summary 

judgment.1 On appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court’s determination 

____________________________________________

1 Both Appellant and Appellee, Victoria Fire and Casualty Company 

(‘Victoria”), filed motions for summary judgment and the trial court disposed 

of each motion with a separate order. Both orders were dated June 20, 

2014, and both were entered June 23, 2014. Appellant’s notice of appeal 

stated that he was appealing the order denying his motion for summary 

judgment. Typically, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is 

interlocutory and not appealable. French v. United Parcel Service, 547 

A.2d 411, 413 (Pa. Super. 1988). The procedural history of this case, 

however, presents us with a unique scenario. Here, the orders were 

executed on the same date and both were filed on the same date. While an 

appeal would properly lie from the trial court’s order granting Victoria’s 

motion for summary judgment, we deem Appellant’s failure to identify that 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A05041-15

- 2 -

that the “named driver only” automobile policy issued to Zainab Walker 

(“Walker”) does not violate section 1718(c) of the Pennsylvania Motor 

Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”), 75 Pa.C.S. § 1718(c), and is 

not contrary to public policy. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

On August 2, 2012, Appellant filed a complaint in the Montgomery 

County Court of Common Pleas against Matthew Gilmore (“Gilmore”) and 

Walker. In the underlying complaint, Appellant alleged he was injured in a 

motor vehicle accident on March 20, 2011, which involved a vehicle owned 

by Walker and operated by Gilmore.2 The complaint included a count 

against Gilmore for negligent operation of Walker’s vehicle and a count 

against Walker for negligently entrusting her vehicle to Gilmore. At the time 

of the alleged accident, the motor vehicle owned by Walker was insured 

under a Pennsylvania Personal Automobile Policy (“Policy”) issued by Titan 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

specific order, issued on the same date, as an oversight. Indeed, had the 

trial court issued a single order disposing of both motions for summary 

judgment, the appeal would be proper. Additionally, in conjunction with the 

trial court’s decision to grant Victoria’s motion for summary judgment, the 

issues in this case have been finally decided. Thus, based on the specific 

facts of this case, we interpret Appellant’s notice of appeal to be from the 

trial court’s order granting Victoria’s motion for summary judgment and 

proceed to address the merits of his claims. “[I]nterests of judicial economy 

allow us to ‘regard as done that which ought to have been done.’” Hill v. 

Thorne, 635 A.2d 186, 188 (Pa. Super. 1993) (quoting McCormick v. 

Northeastern Bank of Pennsylvania, 561 A.2d 328, 330, n. 1 (Pa. 

1989)). 

2 The record reflects that Gilmore was a friend of Walker’s teenage son, 

Aquil, and that Aquil had given Gilmore permission to drive the car at the 

time of the accident. Walker Deposition, 11/5/13, at 10-18. 
J-A05041-15

- 3 -

Indemnity Company d/b/a Titan Auto Insurance and underwritten by Victoria 

Fire and Casualty Company (“Victoria”).3 The Policy did not provide liability 

coverage for any person not listed as a named driver on the Policy. Walker 

was the sole driver listed on the Policy. 

Appellant filed an action for declaratory judgment on March 26, 2013, 

seeking a declaration by the court that Victoria had a duty to defend and 

provide insurance coverage to Walker and Gilmore for all claims arising out 

of the alleged motor vehicle accident. On February 12, 2014, Victoria filed a 

motion for summary judgment claiming it had no duty to defend or 

indemnify Walker or Gilmore because the Policy specifically stated that 

Victoria “will not provide coverage when the driver of your auto is not listed 

on the policy.” Victoria’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 2/12/14, at 3. 

Appellant subsequently filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on March 

26, 2014, arguing the “named driver only” Policy violates section 1718(c) of 

the MVFRL and is against public policy. Appellant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, 3/26/14, at 7-9. Oral argument on the cross-motions for 

summary judgment was held.

On June 23, 2014, the trial court entered an order denying Appellant’s 

motion for summary judgment, and a separate order granting Victoria’s 

____________________________________________

3 Appellant did not plead, and the record does not reflect, that Gilmore was 

insured by another motor vehicle insurance policy at the time of the accident

or that he sought first party benefits.
J-A05041-15

- 4 -

motion for summary judgment, thereby dismissing Appellant’s action for 

declaratory judgment. Appellant timely appealed. 

Appellant presents the following issues for our review, which we set 

forth verbatim:

A. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and 

abused its discretion in finding that Victoria Fire & Casualty 

Company does not have a duty to provide insurance coverage 

and a defense to Matthew Gilmore and Zainab Walker for any 

and all claims arising out of a March 20, 2011 motor vehicle 

accident involving Byoung Suk An, including, but not limited to, 

claim number 80011002887 and the lawsuit filed by Byoung Suk 

An in connection therewith in the Montgomery County Court of 

Common Pleas, case number 2012-21107, when the “named 

driver only” coverage exclusion contained in the subject 

automobile insurance policy issued by Victoria Fire & Casualty 

Company conflicts with and is contrary to the “named driver 

exclusion” of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial 

Responsibility Law, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1718(c)(2), and is therefore 

invalid?

B. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and 

abused its discretion in finding that Victoria Fire & Casualty 

Company does not have a duty to provide insurance coverage 

and a defense to Matthew Gilmore and Zainab Walker for any 

and all claims arising out of a March 20, 2011 motor vehicle 

accident involving Byoung Suk An, including, but not limited to, 

claim number 80011002887 and the lawsuit filed by Byoung Suk 

An in connection therewith in the Montgomery County Court of 

Common Pleas, case number 2012-21107, when the “named 

driver only” coverage exclusion contained in the subject 

automobile insurance policy issued by Victoria Fire & Casualty 

Company conflicts with and is contrary to public policy in 

Pennsylvania, and is therefore invalid?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.

Our standard of review with respect to a trial court’s decision to grant 

or deny a motion for summary judgment is as follows:
J-A05041-15

- 5 -

A reviewing court may disturb the order of the trial court only 

where it is established that the court committed an error of law 

or abused its discretion. As with all questions of law, our review 

is plenary.

In evaluating the trial court’s decision to enter summary 

judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the 

summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. The rule states that 

where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment 

may be entered. Where the non-moving party bears the burden 

of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or 

answers in order to survive summary judgment. Failure of a 

nonmoving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue 

essential to his case and on which it bears the burden of proof

establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a 

matter of law. Lastly, we will view the record in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved 

against the moving party.

Matharu v. Muir, 86 A.3d 250, 255 (Pa. Super. 2014).

Appellant first argues that the trial court committed an error of law 

and abused its discretion in ruling that 75 Pa.C.S. § 1718(c) is inapplicable 

to the Policy in the present case. Appellant’s Brief at 14. The trial court 

concluded that section 1718(c) refers to “named driver exclusion” policies 

which exclude a particular driver, as opposed to the situation presented in 

the Policy currently at issue, where only the named driver is provided 

coverage. Appellant contends that Victoria’s “named driver only” coverage 

impermissibly expands the legislature’s exclusion outlined in section 1718(c) 

to include “any person not listed as an insured on your policy” without 

requiring that the first named insured request that the person be excluded 

from coverage, or a determination as to whether the excluded person is 
J-A05041-15

- 6 -

insured on another policy of motor vehicle liability insurance. Id. Appellant 

asserts that Victoria’s Policy impermissibly rewrites section 1718(c) to 

exclude from coverage any person not listed as an insured, thereby turning 

section 1718(c)(2) “on its head.” Id. at 17. Because the coverage 

exclusion at issue is repugnant to the MVFRL, Appellant contends, the Policy 

must be deemed invalid by this Court. Id. As such, Appellant maintains 

that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that the trial court 

committed an error of law and abused its discretion by denying Appellant’s 

motion for summary judgment. Id. 

The legal principles to be applied in reviewing coverage questions 

arising under insurance contracts are well settled:

The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of 

law for the court. Our standard of review, therefore, is plenary. 

In interpreting the language of an insurance policy, the goal is 

“to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the 

language of the written instrument.” The polestar of our inquiry 

is the language of the insurance policy. When analyzing a 

policy, words of common usage are to be construed in their 

natural, plain, and ordinary sense. When the language of the 

insurance contract is clear and unambiguous, a court is required 

to give effect to that language. Although a court must not resort 

to a strained contrivance or distort the meaning of the language 

in order to find an ambiguity, it must find that contractual terms 

are ambiguous if they are subject to more than one reasonable 

interpretation when applied to a particular set of facts. Where a 

provision of a policy is ambiguous, the policy provision is to be 

construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer. 

Continental Cas. Co. v. Pro Machine, 916 A.2d 1111, 1118 (Pa. Super. 

2007) (internal citations omitted). Further, courts should not “under the 

guise of judicial interpretation,” expand coverage beyond that provided in 
J-A05041-15

- 7 -

the policy. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Zerance, 479 A.2d 949, 

953 (Pa. 1984). 

A “named driver exclusion” in an automobile policy excludes coverage 

in a situation where coverage under the policy would otherwise be extended. 

See, e.g., Donegal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fackler, 835 A.2d 712, 717 

(Pa. Super. 2003) (exclusion applied to the use of a motor vehicle “to which 

the terms of the policy would ordinarily be extended” and “whether or not 

such operation was with the express or implied permission of a person 

insured under [the] policy.”) Section 1718(c) of the MVFRL specifically 

addresses such exclusions, as follows:

(c) Named driver exclusion.--An insurer or the first named 

insured may exclude any person or his personal representative 

from benefits under a policy enumerated in section 1711 or 1712 

when any of the following apply:

(1) The person is excluded from coverage while 

operating a motor vehicle in accordance with the act 

of June 5, 1968 (P.L. 140, No. 78), relating to the 

writing, cancellation of or refusal to renew policies of 

automobile insurance. 

(2) The first named insured has requested that the 

person be excluded from coverage while operating a 

motor vehicle. This paragraph shall only apply if the 

excluded person is insured on another policy of 

motor vehicle liability insurance. 

75 Pa.C.S. § 1718(c).

A review of Walker’s application for coverage and Policy reveals the 

following. On February 12, 2011, Walker executed and signed a Titan Lite 

Pennsylvania Auto Application (“Application”). Application, 2/12/11. In the 
J-A05041-15

- 8 -

Application, Walker agreed to and initialed the following applicant 

warranties:

1. I have LISTED all persons who will be permitted at any time 

to operate any vehicle that is either identified on the 

Declarations or added to the policy after the date of 

application.

2. A person that is NOT LISTED or disclosed to my agent (see 

number 3 below) WILL NOT be permitted at any time to 

operate any vehicle that is either identified on the 

Declarations or added to the policy after the date of the 

Application.

3. I will notify my agent before any person that is not LISTED is 

permitted at any time to operate my vehicle that is either 

identified on the Declarations or added to the policy after the 

date of the Application.

Id. at 8 (unnumbered pages). In the questionnaire section of the 

Application, Walker initialed and agreed to the following statement:

11. I understand that the policy being applied for WILL 

NOT provide coverage when a vehicle listed in the Vehicle 

Information section of the Application is being operated by any 

driver that is NOT LISTED in the Driver Information section of 

the application.

Id. at 8. 

That Application also included the following statement: 

APPLICANT’S STATEMENT – READ BEFORE SIGNING

WARNING

PLEASE NOTE: In order for us to offer you this low cost Lite

product, your policy contains a number of coverage restrictions. 

This policy will not provide coverage when the driver of your 

auto is not listed on the policy. This policy will not provide 

coverage when you are driving a vehicle other than those listed

on the Declaration page. Automatic coverage for a newly 
J-A05041-15

- 9 -

acquired auto is also restricted to 72 hours after the purchase or 

lease of that auto. 

Id. at 5. Walker was the only driver identified on the Application. Id. at 1.

Based on the Application, Victoria issued the Policy to Walker. The 

Policy included the following statement:

Pennsylvania Personal Automobile Policy

PLEASE NOTE: IN ORDER FOR US TO OFFER YOU THIS LOWCOST EXPRESS PRODUCT, YOUR POLICY CONTAINS A NUMBER 

OF COVERAGE RESTRICTIONS. THIS POLICY WILL NOT 

PROVIDE COVERAGE WHEN THE DRIVER OF YOUR AUTO IS NOT 

LISTED ON THE POLICY. 

Policy, 4/24/13, at 1. Additionally, the following provision was included 

under the “auto liability” heading:

AUTO LIABILITY

(for damage or injury to others caused by your auto)

COVERAGE AGREEMENT

* * *

COVERAGE EXCLUSIONS

This coverage does not apply to:

1. Bodily injury or property damage arising out of 

the ownership, maintenance or use of your auto 

by any person not listed as an insured on your 

policy.

Id. at 5-6. As noted, Walker was the only driver identified in the Policy. 

As previously discussed, section 1718(c) addresses policies wherein an 

insured specifically excludes a driver who would otherwise be covered from 

benefits under the policy. An insured can exclude the named driver when 
J-A05041-15

- 10 -

circumstances outlined in either subsection 1718(c)(1) or (2) apply. 75 

Pa.C.S. § 1718(c). A review of Walker’s Policy, however, reveals that the 

Policy did not include a named driver exclusion as outlined in 75 Pa.C.S. § 

1718(c). Instead, Walker’s Policy provided coverage only for the driver 

named in the Policy. As was clearly outlined for Walker in the Application 

and memorialized in the Policy, coverage was provided to the named driver 

only, in exchange for substantially reduced premiums paid by Walker. 

Thus, the Policy at issue does not conflict with, nor is it contrary to, 

section 1718(c), as alleged by Appellant. Rather, section 1718(c) is 

inapplicable to the Policy in this case. The “named driver only” Policy is not 

contemplated by section 1718(c).4

Following Appellant’s argument to its logical end, pursuant to section 

1718(c)(2), an insurer would not be liable for damages caused by any (and 

every) driver only if any (and every) driver was 1) specifically excluded by 

the named insured and 2) was insured under another policy. Such a 

____________________________________________

4 Our research has revealed no specific provision in the MVFRL or 

Pennsylvania state case law addressing a “named driver only” insurance 

policy. For purposes of this discussion, we note that our research revealed 

an unpublished federal district case, Infinity Indem. Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 

2012 WL 1994772 (E.D. Pa. 2012), applying Pennsylvania law, that 

addresses both the “named driver only” policy and the “named driver 

exclusion.” That court explained that “named driver exclusions” exclude a 

specific, identifiable individual or risk. “Named driver only” policies, 

conversely, provide coverage only for the identified person. The federal 

district court concluded that the “named driver only” policies were not 

invalid. Id. at *4. 
J-A05041-15

- 11 -

requirement is absurd, and we cannot conclude that this was intended in the 

drafting of section 1718(c) of the MVFRL. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1) (“In 

ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of a 

statute the following presumptions, among others, may be used: (1) That 

the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of 

execution or unreasonable.”). Appellant’s attempt to interpret a “named 

driver only” policy within the strictures of section 1718(c), that addresses 

“named driver exclusion” provisions, is misdirected, as is evidenced by the 

absurd conclusion of the argument identified above. Simply put, the “named 

driver exclusion” provision contemplated by section 1718(c) and “named 

driver only” policies are entirely different creatures. 

Accordingly, Appellant’s assertion that the Policy provided by Victoria 

improperly stretches the provisions of section 1718(c) is unfounded. We hold 

that section 1718(c) is inapplicable to the Policy at issue in this case. We 

further conclude that the Policy language is clear and unambiguous in 

limiting coverage only to the named driver. As a result, we cannot agree 

that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in determining that section 

1718(c) did not apply and in subsequently denying Appellant’s motion for 

summary judgment and granting Victoria’s motion for summary judgment. 

Appellant next argues that the “named driver only” Policy at issue in 

this case conflicts with, and is contrary to, public policy in Pennsylvania, and 

is therefore invalid. Appellant’s Brief at 18. Appellant maintains that a 
J-A05041-15

- 12 -

corollary to the cost containment aims behind the MVFRL, as identified by 

the trial court, is the concern about limiting the number of uninsured 

motorists on Pennsylvania highways. Id. It is Appellant’s position that 

Victoria’s “named driver only” policies increase the number of uninsured 

motorists on Pennsylvania roads to the extent that Victoria denies coverage 

to “any person not listed as an insured on your policy” without reference to 

whether the excluded person is insured on another liability insurance policy. 

Id. at 19. This is the very situation addressed by section 1718(c)(2), 

Appellant contends, with its requirement that an excluded person be insured 

on another policy of motor vehicle liability insurance in order for the “named 

driver exclusion” to apply. Id.

“In construing a policy of insurance, we are required to give plain 

meaning to a clear and unambiguous contract provision unless such 

provision violates a clearly expressed public policy.” Williams v. GEICO 

Government Employees Ins. Co., 32 A.3d 1195, 1199-1200 (Pa. 2011). 

Our Supreme Court has consistently been reluctant to invalidate contractual 

provisions due to public policy concerns. Id. at 1200. 

Generally, a clear and unambiguous contract provision must be 

given its plain meaning unless to do so would be contrary to a 

clearly expressed public policy. When examining whether a 

contract violates public policy, this Court is mindful that public 

policy is more than a vague goal which may be used to 

circumvent the plain meaning of the contract. As this Court has 

stated:

Public policy is to be ascertained by reference to the 

laws and legal precedents and not from general 
J-A05041-15

- 13 -

considerations of supposed public interest. As the 

term “public policy” is vague, there must be found 

definite indications in the law of the sovereignty to 

justify the invalidation of a contract as contrary to 

that policy[.] ... Only dominant public policy would 

justify such action. In the absence of a plain 

indication of that policy through long governmental 

practice or statutory enactments, or of violations of 

obvious ethical or moral standards, the Court should 

not assume to declare contracts ... contrary to public 

policy. The courts must be content to await 

legislative action.

* * *

It is only when a given policy is so obviously for or 

against the public health, safety, morals or welfare 

that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard 

to it, that a court may constitute itself the voice of 

the community in so declaring [that the contract is 

against public policy].

Id. (quoting Eichelman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 711 A.2d 1006, 1008 (Pa. 

1998)). Additionally, Pennsylvania public policy regarding automobile 

insurance has been codified by the Pennsylvania MVFRL. See Erie Ins. 

Exchange v. Baker, 972 A.2d 507, 511 n.7 (Pa. 2008) (“[A]n enactment by 

the legislature- such as the MVFRL– is indeed the embodiment of public 

policy.”). 

Our Supreme Court had the opportunity to address public policy 

concerns arising from the interpretation of automobile insurance policies in 

Progressive Northern Ins. Co. v. Schneck, 813 A.2d 828 (Pa. 2002). 

The insured in Schneck had named her husband as an excluded driver 

pursuant to section 1718(c)(2) because he had a suspended driver’s license. 
J-A05041-15

- 14 -

Id. at 219. In recognizing the exclusion as being consistent with public 

policy, the Court stated that:

The overarching public policy of the Motor Vehicle Financial 

Responsibility Law (MVFRL) is concern over the increasing cost of 

insurance premiums . . . [t]his public policy is exemplified by [75 

Pa.C.S.] § 1718(c), which permits named driver exclusions. 

These exclusions are designed by insurers to avoid covering 

someone with a bad driving record or in a high-risk category . . . 

since the premium for such coverage would be exceedingly high. 

Id. at 831-832 (internal citations omitted). The Court thus concluded that 

the “to the extent that a named driver exclusion operates to bar UM/UIM 

coverage because of foregone liability coverage, the result is consistent with 

the public policy of cost containment and consumer choice.” Id. at 832. In 

so holding, the Court reiterated its observation that “[w]hile cost 

containment is not the only objective of the statute, it has become an 

increasingly significant one, and it is apparent that the General Assembly 

has been employing the vehicle of free consumer choice with greater latitude 

and frequency in furtherance of this objective.” Id. See also Fackler, 835 

A.2d at 717 (in holding that the “named driver exclusion” was valid and that 

the insurance company was not obligated to defend, indemnify or provide 

liability coverage to the driver or insured, this Court found that the exclusion 

was “completely consistent” with the public policy of the MVFRL as set forth 

by our Supreme Court).

Although the above cases dealt with “named driver exclusions,” we 

find them to be instructive in addressing the issue presented by this matter. 
J-A05041-15

- 15 -

Thus, we hold that the provision of low-cost, affordable policies in return for 

motor vehicle liability coverage of only the named driver, and the 

concomitant risk reduction, does not violate public policy. We cannot 

conclude that this type of policy is “so obviously for or against the public 

health, safety, morals or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion 

in regard to it.” Williams, 32 A.3d at 1200. Therefore, we may not 

constitute the voice of the community in declaring that the contract is 

against public policy. Any such determination is a question for the 

legislature. Id. (“In the absence of a plain indication of [dominant public] 

policy through long governmental practice or statutory enactments, or of 

violations of obvious ethical or moral standards, the Court should not 

assume to declare contracts . . . contrary to public policy. The courts must 

be content to await legislative action.”). Accordingly, Appellant is entitled to 

no relief on his second claim.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/17/2015