J-S60011-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JULIO CESAR MARTINEZ-OCASIO

Appellant No. 61 MDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 21, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0002495-2012

BEFORE: OTT, J., STABILE, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED APRIL 21, 2015

Julio Cesar Martinez-Ocasio appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed on October 21, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of York County. 

Martinez-Ocasio was tried by a jury and convicted on charges of aggravated 

assault by vehicle and recklessly endangering another person (REAP).1 

Martinez-Ocasio received a sentence of nine to 23 months’ incarceration 

followed by 24 months of probation.2 In this timely appeal, Martinez-Ocasio 

____________________________________________

1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732.1 and 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705, respectively. Additionally, the 

trial court found Martinez-Ocasio guilty of the summary traffic offenses of 

reckless driving, careless driving, and failure to drive at a safe speed. 75 

Pa.C.S. §§ 3736, 3714, and 3361, respectively. He was charged with, but 

acquitted of, illegal racing. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3367.

2 There were two trials. The first, held in January 2013, resulted in 

Martinez-Ocasio’s conviction on the above stated charges. However, the 

jury could not reach a verdict on the additional charge of aggravated 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S60011-14

- 2 -

claims his convictions of aggravated assault by vehicle and REAP were 

against both the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough 

review of the submissions by the parties, relevant law, and the certified 

record, we affirm.

With one clarification, we adopt the factual and procedural history as 

recited by the trial court in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion:

On August 10, 2011 at approximately 6:30 p.m., Dana Briggs 

(the “Victim”) suffered serious bodily injury as a result of an 

automobile collision occurring along Route 30 in East York, 

Pennsylvania. The Victim was traveling eastbound in Route 30 

en route to her residence when a BMW collided with a Mercedes 

in the westbound lane, thereby causing the Mercedes to cross 

the center median and strike the Victim’s Chevrolet. [MartinezOcasio] was the operator of said BMW. The Victim lost 

consciousness as a result of the collision, and she remained in a 

coma for approximately one month thereafter. The Victim spent 

the following two months in a hospital and rehabilitation facility, 

and symptoms of her injuries persisted through the date of trial.

The speed limit governing the stretch of roadway in question is 

forty (40) miles per hour. The evidence presented at trial shows 

a number of speed limit and other warning signs were 

prominently posted and would have been visible to [MartinezOcasio] as he traveled westbound on Route 30. The evidence 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

assault. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702. He was retried in September 2013, and was 

acquitted of aggravated assault. For reasons that are unclear from the 

official record, the prior charges of which he was convicted, were again 

submitted to the jury, which acquitted him on aggravated assault by vehicle 

but convicted him of reckless endangerment. Counsel for Martinez-Ocasio 

clarifies in the appellate brief that, “This appeal addresses only the first trial 

and the verdict thereof.” Appellant’s Brief at 12, n. 2. 
J-S60011-14

- 3 -

also indicates the collision occurred on a roadway that is highly 

congested most evenings. More specifically, the collision ensued 

as [Martinez-Ocasio’s] vehicle approached the congested 

intersection of Route 30 and North Hills Road, adjacent to North 

Hills Elementary School and various retail stores.

At trial, Timothy K[ie]hl testified he witnessed the collision while 

traveling westbound on Route 30. Mr. K[ie]hl observed the BMW 

pass him in a “flash”, traveling at a speed he estimated to be 

one hundred (100) miles per hour. Similarly, Constance Arnold, 

another eyewitness to the collision, testified that she heard “a 

loud sound, like a whiz, fly by” her just prior to the collision. 

The expert reconstructionist who testified at trial was unable to 

form any conclusions with regard to the speed at which 

[Martinez-Ocasio’s] vehicle was traveling.

Mr. K[ie]hl’s opinion was that the drivers of the BMW and 

Mercedes were racing each other. Anthony Miller, the driver of 

the Mercedes, admitted to police that it probably appeared as 

though the cars were racing. A written statement signed by 

[Martinez-Ocasio] describes the Mercedes as “the car that was 

racing previously against me.” The testimony clearly indicates 

the vehicles weaved in and out of traffic just prior to impact. 

Kathy Ermolovich provided eyewitness testimony that the impact 

was a result of [Martinez-Ocasio’s] attempt to “wedge’” his BMW 

between two vehicles traveling in close proximity to one another 

in the left lane. [Martinez-Ocasio’s] vehicle collided with the 

Mercedes as a result, and the Mercedes then crossed the median 

and struck the Victim’s vehicle. An on-scene inspection of the 

vehicles failed to uncover any obvious mechanical defects in any 

of the vehicles other than those caused by the collision itself.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/30/2014, at 2-3 (record citations omitted). 3

____________________________________________

3

In his brief, Martinez-Ocasio correctly notes Ermolovich actually testified it 

was the convertible, that is, Miller’s Mercedes Benz, which tried to wedge 

itself between two other vehicles. See Martinez-Ocasio’s Brief at 10. This 

testimony will be discussed when we address the weight of the evidence 

claim.
J-S60011-14

- 4 -

In consideration of the above, Martinez-Ocasio argues his conviction of 

aggravated assault by vehicle is against the weight4and sufficiency of the 

evidence. Our standard of review for such claims is well-settled and oftrepeated.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine 

“whether the evidence introduced at trial and all reasonable 

inferences derived from that evidence, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, was sufficient 

to establish beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of 

first-degree murder.” Evidentiary sufficiency is a question of law, 

and thus, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of 

review is plenary.

Commonwealth v. Burno, 94 A.3d 956, 969 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

The weight given to trial evidence is a choice for the factfinder. If 

the factfinder returns a guilty verdict, and if a criminal defendant 

then files a motion for a new trial on the basis that the verdict 

was against the weight of the evidence, a trial court is not to 

grant relief unless the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to 

shock one’s sense of justice.

When a trial court denies a weight-of-the-evidence motion, and 

when an appellant then appeals that ruling to this Court, our 

review is limited. It is important to understand we do not reach 

the underlying question of whether the verdict was, in fact, 

against the weight of the evidence. We do not decide how we 

would have ruled on the motion and then simply replace our own 

judgment for that of the trial court. Instead, this Court 

determines whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

reaching whatever decision it made on the motion, whether or 

not that decision is the one we might have made in the first 

instance.

____________________________________________

4 This claim was preserved by post-sentence motion.
J-S60011-14

- 5 -

Moreover, when evaluating a trial court’s ruling, we keep in mind 

that an abuse of discretion is not merely an error in judgment. 

Rather, it involves bias, partiality, prejudice, ill-will, manifest 

unreasonableness or a misapplication of the law. By contrast, a 

proper exercise of discretion conforms to the law and is based on 

the facts of record.

Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 107 A.3d 206, 212-13 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citations omitted). 

Also regarding the weight of the evidence, “the finder of fact may 

believe all, some or none of a witness’s testimony.” Commonwealth v. 

Sloan, 67 A.3d 808, 814 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Finally, “[i]t 

is the responsibility of the factfinder to reconcile conflicts in the evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Fant, 398 A.2d 704, 708 (Pa. Super. 1979) (citation 

omitted).

The statutory requirements to be convicted of aggravated assault by 

vehicle are found at 75 Pa.C.S. §3732.1.

(a) Offense.--Any person who recklessly or with gross 

negligence causes serious bodily injury to another person while 

engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or 

municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle 

or to the regulation of traffic, except section 3802 (relating to 

driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance), is 

guilty of aggravated assault by vehicle, a felony of the third 

degree when the violation is the cause of the injury.

75 Pa.C.S. §3732.1(a).5

____________________________________________

5

For purposes of Section 3732.1, a person acts recklessly if he, engages in 

conduct that violates a law or ordinance governing the operation of motor 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S60011-14

- 6 -

The statutory requirements for REAP are:

A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he 

recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another 

person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.

For purposes of REAP, a person acts recklessly when he or she acts in 

“conscious disregard of a known risk of death or great bodily injury to 

another person.” See Commonwealth v. Klein, 795 A.2d 424, 427-28 

(Pa. Super. 2002)(citation omitted). 

Finally, “[a]s with other elements of crime, the trier of fact may infer 

criminal intent, knowledge and recklessness from circumstantial evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Moore, 395 A.2d 1328, 1332 (Pa. Super. 1978).

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

vehicles and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 

the driving conduct will cause death, the nature and degree of the risk being 

such that it is grossly unreasonable for him to disregard it. See Pa.SSJI 

(Crim) 17.3732.1(3).

Similarly, a person acts in a grossly negligent manner if he or she is driving 

in violation of applicable traffic laws and should be aware of a substantial 

and unjustifiable risk that the driving conduct will cause death, the nature 

and degree of the risk being that it is grossly unreasonable for him or her to 

fail to recognize the risk. See Pa.SSJI (Crim) 17.3732.1(4). Jurors are 

further instructed to consider all relevant facts and circumstances, including 

the nature and intent of the driving conduct and the circumstance known to 

the driver. Id.
J-S60011-14

- 7 -

The parties stipulated that the victim suffered serious bodily injury as 

a result of the accident. Accordingly, the question at issue was whether 

Martinez-Ocasio engaged in reckless or grossly negligent conduct which 

caused the victim’s injuries. Specifically, Martinez-Ocasio argues the 

Commonwealth failed to prove causation, in that the other driver (Anthony 

D. Miller) was the sole cause of the accident. We disagree.

The central failure of Martinez-Ocasio’s argument is that it relies upon 

an interpretation of the evidence that is most favorable to him, not to the 

Commonwealth, as verdict winner. Viewed through the proper standard, 

there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict on both aggravated assault 

by vehicle and REAP.

We note, 

[c]riminal responsibility is properly assessed against one whose 

conduct was a direct and substantial factor in producing the 

death even though other factors combined with that conduct to 

achieve the result.

Thus, “[a] defendant cannot escape the natural consequences of 

his act merely because of foreseeable complications.” So long as 

the defendant's conduct started the chain of causation which led 

to the victim's death, criminal responsibility for the crime of 

homicide may properly be found.

Commonwealth v. Shoup, 620 A.2d 15, 18-19 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citations 

omitted). 

The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that Miller and MartinezOcasio were engaged in racing-type behavior, on a heavily traveled road, at 
J-S60011-14

- 8 -

approximately 6:30 p.m. This conduct took place in a 40 M.P.H. speed limit 

zone that was well posted, with additional signs warning drivers of traffic 

congestion. All relevant witnesses testified how both cars sped past them. 

One witness, Timothy Kiehl, testified he was driving in the left hand lane 

when Martinez-Ocasio’s BMW sped past him on the right, travelling at 

approximately 100 miles per hour. The Mercedes Benz sped by next, and 

passed the BMW. It appeared to Kiehl that the two cars were racing. 

Although at trial he could not remember seeing the BMW and Mercedes Benz 

colliding, he concluded they did based upon the scrape marks he saw on the 

BMW immediately after the accident. N.T. Trial, 1/7-10/2013, at 109-113. 

Photographic evidence, Commonwealth Exhibit 53, shows scrape marks on 

the rear driver’s side wheel well and quarter panel of Martinez-Ocasio’s 

BMW, just as Kiehl described. Another witness, Constance Arnold, was 

alerted to the sound of the cars as they sped past. Sergeant Brian Wilbur of 

the Springettsbury Township Police Department testified that MartinezOcasio described Miller’s Mercedes Benz as “the car that was previously 

racing against me.” See N.T. Trial, 1/7-10/2013, at 174. The handwritten 

note and diagram provided to Sergeant Wilbur by Martinez-Ocasio stated he 

slowed to 40+ miles per hour, the posted speed limit, and attempted to 
J-S60011-14

- 9 -

change lanes to avoid hitting the car in front of him. See Commonwealth 

Exhibit 776(emphasis added). Further, the note and diagram both indicate 

that as a result of the attempted lane change, the Mercedes Benz and 

Martinez-Ocasio’s BMW collided, after which the Mercedes Benz crossed the 

median and struck the victim’s car. Id. Miller told the police at the scene, 

and testified at trial, that he lost control of his car after Martinez-Ocasio tried 

to change lanes in front of him, and in doing so, struck the front of his car. 

N.T. Trial, 1/7-10/2013, at 181, 369. Finally, the expert report authored by 

Corporal Gary W. Mainzer, Pennsylvania State Police, indicated that the 

Mercedes Benz was travelling between 57 and 73 miles per hour when Miller 

lost control of it.7 N.T. Trial, 1/7-10/2013, at 297, Commonwealth Exhibit 

73. 

Our review of the certified record confirms the presentation of 

evidence demonstrating Martinez-Ocasio drove in a reckless manner, which 

____________________________________________

6 The exhibit numbers on the evidence provided in the certified record 

correspond to the second trial. The statement and diagram were marked as 

Commonwealth Exhibit 18 at the first trial. See N.T. Trial, 1/7-10/2013, at 

182-83. We refer to the exhibit numbers as marked in the certified record.

7 Although Corporal Miller had no physical evidence by which to estimate 

Martinez-Ocasio’s speed, the jury would have been entitled to infer that he 

was travelling at a similar speed, based upon the other eyewitness 

testimony presented at trial as well as Martinez-Ocasio’s statement given to 

Sergeant Wilbur.
J-S60011-14

- 10 -

forced him to change lanes to avoid hitting the car in front of him, which 

caused him to clip Miller’s Mercedes Benz, sending it into oncoming traffic. 

There was clearly sufficient evidence to support a determination of 

causation. Martinez-Ocasio is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Martinez-Ocasio’s final claim is that the guilty verdicts were against 

the weight of the evidence. As noted previously, our task is to determine 

whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Martinez-Ocasio’s 

post-trial motion, not to reweigh the evidence ourselves. Ferguson, supra. 

Our review of the certified record requires us to find no abuse of discretion in 

this regard. 

The evidence, as recounted above, provides ample support for the 

verdict, and accordingly, we find no fault with the trial court’s conclusion the 

verdict does not shock one’s sense of justice. We noted previously that 

Kathy Ermolovich testified, “It almost seemed like it [the black convertible] 

wedged itself in between the car that was in front and behind it.” N.T. Trial, 

1/7-10/2013, at 128. See Footnote 3, supra. However, the fact-finder is 

responsible for reconciling any conflict in testimony. All the other evidence 

produced at trial indicates it was Martinez-Ocasio’s BMW that was changing 

lanes. The photographs of the BMW demonstrate scrapes along the driver’s 

side rear quarter–panel. This evidence permitted the jury to reasonably 

infer it was the BMW that was attempting to change from the middle lane to 

the left most lane when it struck the front of Miller’s Mercedes Benz. 
J-S60011-14

- 11 -

Further, as already noted, Martinez-Ocasio confirmed both in his statement 

to the police after the accident and in his hand drawn diagram of the 

accident it was he who was changing lanes. 

The jurors were free to believe all, some or none of the evidence 

presented. Here, in light of the evidence presented, the verdict does not 

shock one’s sense of justice. Accordingly, the denial of the post-trial motion 

regarding weight of the evidence must be affirmed. Because all elements of 

both REAP and aggravated assault by vehicle were proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt and the verdict was not against the weight of the 

evidence, Martinez-Ocasio is not entitled to relief. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/21/2015