1

Filed 4/17/15 In re Jonathan A. CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re Jonathan A., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JONATHAN A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A141302

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. SJ13022106)

Jonathan A. appeals from an order declaring him a ward of the court. The juvenile 

court deemed him ineligible for deferred entry of judgment (DEJ; Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 790 et seq.).

1 Jonathan contends that the juvenile court was required to obtain a report 

from the probation department regarding his suitability for DEJ and hold a hearing on 

that issue before entering a dispositional order. We disagree and affirm the juvenile 

court’s disposition.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 14, 2013, just after midnight, Christian E., Robert L., and 

Francisco H. approached a woman in a liquor store parking lot and threatened to shoot 

unless she exited her vehicle. The victim did not surrender the vehicle, and Christian, 

Robert, and Francisco punched her and pulled her out of the car. Once she was on the 

 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2

ground, they continued to punch, kick, and pull large clumps of her hair out. Jonathan, 

who was 15 years old at the time, stood behind the other three with a scarf covering his 

face.

When the victim ran for help, Jonathan and the three others got into her car and 

drove away. When police attempted to stop them, Christian drove the car into a patrol 

vehicle and fled at a “high rate of speed.” The chase ended a mile later when Christian 

crashed the car into a wall. Police detained Jonathan, who was still in the right rear 

passenger seat wearing his seatbelt, without incident. At a field show up, the victim

identified all four individuals as being involved in the robbery and assault.

The Alameda County District Attorney filed a section 602 wardship petition

against Jonathan alleging robbery (count one) and assault by means of force likely to 

produce great bodily injury (count two). (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 245, subd. (a)(4).) The 

district attorney filed Judicial Council Forms, form JV-750 (“Determination of Eligibility

Deferred Entry of Judgment—Juvenile”), stating that Jonathan was not eligible for DEJ 

because the petition alleged an offense listed in section 707, subdivision (b).2

On December 30, 2013, Jonathan admitted the robbery allegation, in exchange for 

dismissal of the assault allegations. His counsel conceded a factual basis for Jonathan’s 

admission, but he also referred to the intake reports and noted that Jonathan “was not one 

of the ones who physically did the act but stood in the background . . . .” At the 

January 14, 2014 disposition hearing, the court adjudged Jonathan a ward of the court and

ordered him removed from his parents’ home for suitable placement.

Thereafter, the court appointed new counsel for Jonathan, who filed a motion to 

vacate the disposition pursuant to section 778.

3 In the motion, Jonathan asserted that his

 

2 Both robbery and “[a]ssault by any means of force likely to produce great bodily 

injury” are listed. (§ 707, subd. (b)(3), (14).)

3 Section 778, subdivision (a)(1), provides in relevant part: “Any parent or other 

person having an interest in a child who is a ward of the juvenile court or the child 

himself . . . through a properly appointed guardian may, upon grounds of change of 

circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action in which the child 
3

prior counsel had ineffectively represented his interests by failing to conduct an adequate 

investigation of both the alleged offense and the appropriate disposition. With this 

motion pending, Jonathan filed, on March 17, 2014, a timely notice of appeal from the 

original disposition order. On March 27, the juvenile court granted the motion. All 

dispositional findings and orders were set aside, and a new disposition hearing was 

scheduled.

Jonathan then filed a motion to vacate his prior admission. On April 23, 2014, by 

stipulation, Jonathan withdrew his prior plea and admitted the “reasonably related” felony 

offense of being an accessory after the fact to a robbery. The minute order from the 

hearing states: “Based on [the prosecution’s] oral motion, the petition is amended to 

change Count 1 from [Penal Code section] 211 (F) to [Penal Code section] 32 (F).” 

However, the reporter’s transcript shows no mention of a motion to amend the petition. 

Instead, the transcript shows the following colloquy between the juvenile court and 

counsel:

“[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, what we’re going to do this morning is, the minor is 

going to be withdrawing his plea to the 211 and entering a new and different plea, that 

being an admission to a reasonably related offense, a felony violation of Penal Code 

Section 32, which counsel will agree is a reasonably related offense. His maximum 

exposure will be three years in a locked facility.

“THE COURT: So, [defense counsel], is here with the minor. . . . Is this your 

understanding, [defense counsel]?

“[Defense counsel]: That’s right, Your Honor.” (Italics added.)

After Jonathan waived his jurisdictional rights and admitted being an accessory 

after the fact to the robbery, the juvenile court stated: “I find the minor has made a 

knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights, and understands the nature and consequences 

of doing so. He’s described by [section] 602 in that he committed [a] felony violation of 

 

was found to be a ward of the juvenile court for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside 

any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court.”
4

[Penal Code section] 32, reasonably related to the robbery in count one. Count two is 

dismissed with facts and restitution open.” (Italics added.) The court ordered Jonathan 

detained at juvenile hall, set the maximum time of confinement at three years, and 

scheduled a new disposition hearing.

At the disposition hearing, Jonathan argued that he was now eligible for DEJ and 

that the court and the district attorney should reassess his eligibility. Specifically, 

defense counsel said, “I do believe that [Jonathan] is, in fact, eligible for [DEJ]” because 

the minute order characterized the recent admission as “the petition is amended to 

change—and that’s an important word—count 1 from 211 to a [Penal Code section] 32.” 

(Italics added.) Counsel argued that the assault allegation in count two had been 

dismissed as a result of the earlier plea deal, and thus the new order dismissing count two

“was irrelevant and non-existent because the 245 had already been dismissed.” He 

concluded: “[T]he only valid . . . charge before [Jonathan] was the [Penal Code 

section] 32.”

The court disagreed. The court explained: “Well, I think perhaps there’s a 

mistake on the minute order, in any event. Even if he is eligible, he’s not suitable, so I’ll 

make an order that he could be eligible based on the language of the minute order. My 

understanding was that he pled and admitted to a lesser or reasonably-related crime. I’m 

sure that when I made my finding I didn’t say it was as charged as a 32 but it was a 

reasonably-related crime to Count 1. I don’t have the transcript, but that’s what I always 

say. I’m quite sure I said that. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . So if that error is there or can be interpreted 

as an error, I’m telling you right now that he’s not going to get [DEJ] whether he’s . . . 

eligible for it or not. He’s not suitable.” Defense counsel asked for a hearing on DEJ 

suitability, to which the court responded: “Believe me. This case has been here a lot, and 

I’ve read a lot, and there’s nothing more I’m going to read that’s going to change my 

mind.”

At the conclusion of the disposition hearing, the juvenile court adjudged Jonathan

a ward of the court and placed him in the custody of the probation department for suitable 

placement. Counsel renewed Jonathan’s request for DEJ. The court replied that “[t]here 
5

was never any finding of eligibility” and “that even if he had been eligible, [the court] 

would have denied suitability.” Before any briefing had been filed on the appeal from the 

January 14, 2014 order, Jonathan filed a timely notice of appeal from the new disposition 

order.

4

II. DISCUSSION

“ ‘The DEJ provisions of section 790 et seq. were enacted as part of 

Proposition 21, The Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998, in 

March 2000. The sections provide that in lieu of jurisdictional and dispositional 

hearings, a minor may admit the allegations contained in a section 602 petition and waive 

time for the pronouncement of judgment. Entry of judgment is deferred. After the 

successful completion of a term of probation, on motion of the prosecution and with a 

positive recommendation from the probation department, the court is required to dismiss 

the charges. The arrest upon which judgment was deferred is deemed never to have 

occurred, and any records of the juvenile court proceeding are sealed. (§§ 791, 

 

4 We requested supplemental briefing from the parties regarding the juvenile 

court’s jurisdiction to vacate the original disposition after the first notice of appeal was 

filed. The People rely on the general rule that “[i]t is black letter law a trial court loses 

jurisdiction to vacate its own judgment once a party files a notice of appeal, thus shifting 

jurisdiction over the cause to the Court of Appeal. [Citations.]” (People v. Malveaux

(1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1434.) However, we agree with Jonathan, that Malveaux is 

distinguishable in that sections 775 and 778 were not addressed. (Malveaux, at pp. 1434–

1436.) Section 775 provides: “Any order made by the court in the case of any person 

subject to its jurisdiction may at any time be changed, modified, or set aside, as the judge 

deems meet and proper, subject to such procedural requirements as are imposed by this 

article.” (Italics added.) And other courts have declined to find “a jurisdictional analogy 

. . . between an appeal from a wardship adjudication and a stay of proceedings pending a 

criminal appeal.” (In re Katherine R. (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 354, 356 [“[w]ardship, or 

jurisdiction over the person of a minor, is a continuing condition or status for the welfare

of the child and changed circumstances must be considered in any proceeding concerning 

the child’s status, even though such changed circumstances may develop during the 

pendency of an appeal”].) Pursuant to Katherine R. and sections 775 and 778, the 

juvenile court retained jurisdiction to make its March 27, 2014 order vacating its January 

disposition.
6

subd. (a)(3),[5] 793, subd. (c).)’ ” (In re Kenneth J. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 973, 976; 

In re Luis B. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1121–1122.) The procedures for considering 

DEJ reflect a “ ‘strong preference for rehabilitation of first-time nonviolent juvenile 

offenders’ ” and limit the court’s power to deny DEJ such that denial of DEJ to an 

eligible minor who wants to participate is proper only when the juvenile court finds that 

“ ‘the minor would not benefit from education, treatment and rehabilitation.’ [Citation.]” 

(In re A.I. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1434.)

“The determination of whether to grant DEJ requires consideration of ‘two distinct 

essential elements of the [DEJ] program,’ viz., ‘eligibility’ and ‘suitability.’ [Citation.]” 

 

5 Section 791, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part: “The prosecuting 

attorney’s written notification to the minor shall also include all of the following: [¶] . . .

[¶] (3) A clear statement that, in lieu of jurisdictional and disposition hearings, the court 

may grant [DEJ] with respect to any offense charged in the petition, provided that the 

minor admits each allegation contained in the petition and waives time for the 

pronouncement of judgment, and that upon the successful completion of the terms of 

probation, as defined in Section 794, the positive recommendation of the probation 

department, and the motion of the prosecuting attorney, but no sooner [than] 12 months 

and no later than 36 months from the date of the minor’s referral to the program, the court 

shall dismiss the charge or charges against the minor. [¶] (4) A clear statement that upon 

any failure of the minor to comply with the terms of probation, including the rules of any 

program the minor is directed to attend, or any circumstances specified in Section 793, 

the prosecuting attorney or the probation department, or the court on its own, may make a 

motion to the court for entry of judgment and the court shall render a finding that the 

minor is a ward of the court pursuant to Section 602 for the offenses specified in the 

original petition and shall schedule a dispositional hearing.”

Section 791, subdivision (b), provides: “If the minor consents and waives his or 

her right to a speedy jurisdictional hearing, the court may refer the case to the probation 

department or the court may summarily grant [DEJ] if the minor admits the charges in the 

petition and waives time for the pronouncement of judgment. When directed by the 

court, the probation department shall make an investigation and take into consideration 

the defendant’s age, maturity, educational background, family relationships, 

demonstrable motivation, treatment history, if any, and other mitigating and aggravating 

factors in determining whether the minor is a person who would be benefited by 

education, treatment, or rehabilitation. The probation department shall also determine 

which programs would accept the minor. The probation department shall report its 

findings and recommendations to the court. The court shall make the final determination 

regarding education, treatment, and rehabilitation of the minor.”
7

(In re C.W. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 654, 659.) Jonathan argues that the juvenile court 

“made two legal errors: it decided Jonathan was ineligible for DEJ, and then without 

referring the case to probation for investigation and report and without holding a hearing, 

it decided Jonathan was unsuitable for DEJ.” The People argue that no suitability

determination was required in this case because Jonathan was not eligible for DEJ. We 

agree with the People.

We independently review the juvenile court’s ruling because it presents a question 

of statutory construction based on undisputed facts. (In re James H. (2007) 

154 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1083.) The DEJ provisions apply “whenever a case is before the 

juvenile court for a determination of whether a minor is a person described in Section 602 

because of the commission of a felony offense,” if certain conditions apply. (§ 790, 

subd. (a).) At the time relevant herein,6 “ ‘ “[s]ection 790 ma[de] a minor eligible for 

DEJ if all the following circumstances exist: [¶] ‘(1) The minor has not previously been 

declared to be a ward of the court for the commission of a felony offense. [¶] (2) The 

offense charged is not one of the offenses enumerated in subdivision (b) of Section 707. 

[¶] (3) The minor has not previously been committed to the custody of the Youth 

Authority. [¶] (4) The minor’s record does not indicate that probation has ever been 

revoked without being completed. [¶] (5) The minor is at least 14 years of age at the time 

of the hearing. [¶] (6) The minor is eligible for probation pursuant to Section 1203.06 of 

the Penal Code.’ (§ 790, subd. (a)(1)–(6).)” ’ [Citations.]” (In re Joshua S. (2011) 

192 Cal.App.4th 670, 676, italics added (Joshua S.).)

“If the child admits each allegation contained in the petition as charged and waives 

the right to a speedy disposition hearing, the court may summarily grant [DEJ].” (Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 5.800(d)(2).) If the child is eligible, but the juvenile court does not 

summarily grant DEJ, it “ ‘must conduct a hearing at which “the court shall consider the 

declaration of the prosecuting attorney, any report and recommendations from the 

probation department, and any other relevant material provided by the child or other 

 

6 Section 790 has since been amended. (Stats. 2014, ch. 919, § 4.)
8

interested parties.” ([Former Cal. Rules of Court, rule] 1495(f) [(now rule 5.800(f))], 

italics added.)’ [Citation.]” (Joshua S., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 677.) “Under 

proper circumstances the court may refuse DEJ even to minors eligible under section 790, 

subdivision (a). [Citation.] While section 790 et seq. might be clearer on the matter, we 

conclude such denial is proper only when the trial court finds the minor would not benefit 

from education, treatment and rehabilitation.” (Martha C. v. Superior Court (2003) 

108 Cal.App.4th 556, 560–561.) “ ‘The court is not required to ultimately grant DEJ, but 

is required to at least follow specified procedures and exercise discretion to reach a final 

determination once the mandatory threshold eligibility determination is made. 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Joshua S., at p. 678.)

Jonathan asserts that, despite the prosecutor’s initial finding of ineligibility, he was 

eligible for DEJ because he ultimately admitted only being an accessory to robbery—an 

offense not listed in section 707, subdivision (b). He maintains that his eligibility “was 

not governed by the vacated original petition; it was governed by the allegations he was 

asked to admit in the amended section 602 petition.” (Italics added.)

Jonathan relies on Joshua S., in which our colleagues in Division Two held that a 

minor does not need to admit the original charges against him in order to be eligible for 

DEJ. (Joshua S., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at pp. 680–682.) In that case, the section 602 

petition alleged that Joshua S. possessed cocaine base for sale and falsely represented his 

identity to a peace officer. He was determined to be eligible for DEJ. Thereafter, the 

possession count was amended to allege that Joshua S. was an accessory to a felony. He

admitted the amended count and the second count was dismissed. Another wardship 

petition was filed, alleging four felony counts—possession of marijuana for sale, two 

counts of transportation or sale of marijuana, and unlawful carrying of a loaded firearm. 

Joshua S. was again determined to be eligible for DEJ. He filed a motion to suppress 

evidence, which apparently was not heard. He then admitted to an amended count of 

possession of cannabis and the remaining counts were dismissed. The juvenile court 

committed Joshua S. to a juvenile rehabilitation facility without considering DEJ. (Id. at 

pp. 674–675.)
9

On appeal, Joshua S. argued that the matter must be remanded because the 

juvenile court failed to exercise its mandatory discretion to grant or deny DEJ. 

(Joshua S., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 675.) The court reviewed the DEJ procedures 

outlined above and observed: “ ‘While the court retains discretion to deny DEJ to an 

eligible minor, the duty of the prosecuting attorney to assess the eligibility of the minor 

for DEJ and furnish notice with the petition is mandatory, as is the duty of the juvenile 

court to either summarily grant DEJ or examine the record, conduct a hearing, and make 

“the final determination regarding education, treatment, and rehabilitation . . . .” 

[Citations.] . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 677–678.)

Joshua S. contended that the prosecutor’s burdens had been met, but that the 

juvenile court failed to make the DEJ determination required by sections 790 and 791. 

(Joshua S., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 678.) The court rejected the People’s argument 

that the court properly did not consider DEJ because Joshua S. had not admitted all of the 

allegations of the petitions, but rather, had negotiated a plea to reduced charges. (Id. at 

pp. 678–679.) The court reasoned: “[Joshua S.] did not initially admit the allegations of 

the petition, but neither did he insist on a jurisdictional hearing. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [A] minor 

is not required to forego the right to a suppression hearing in order to accept DEJ. No 

part of a jurisdictional hearing was undertaken in the present case. When the suppression 

motion was denied . . . , [Joshua S.] admitted a reduced charge. In the [other] case, 

[Joshua S.] apparently did not pursue the suppression motion but rather admitted an 

amended petition. . . . [Joshua S.] did not reject DEJ and then seek to take advantage of it 

after contesting the allegations against him. [¶] We are not persuaded by [the People’s] 

assertion that the DEJ procedures require the minor to admit the charge initially alleged 

in the petition rather than a reduced one, as long as the admission precedes a contested 

jurisdictional hearing. A minor is not entitled to DEJ where he or she does not ‘ “admit 

the allegations” of the section 602 petition . . . “ ‘in lieu of jurisdictional and dispositional 

hearings.’ ” ’ [Citations.] . . . Here, however, no jurisdictional hearing was held.” (Id. at 

pp. 679–680.)
10

The Joshua S. court also rejected the People’s contention that Joshua S. should not 

be considered for DEJ after negotiating a plea agreement reducing his legal responsibility 

because to do so “would remove [a] minor’s incentive to ‘expedite the process by a full 

admission of responsibility.’ ” (Joshua S., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 681.) The court 

explained: “[T]he process in the present case was expedited: [Joshua S.] admitted the 

allegations of the (amended) petition right after the denial of his suppression motion . . . , 

with no attempt to litigate the petitions. Thus, DEJ could have been granted, if found 

appropriate, ‘in lieu of jurisdictional and disposition hearings’ (§ 791, subd. (a)(3)). And 

[Joshua S.] did admit responsibility for his offenses, albeit not full responsibility for the 

initially charged offenses. In requiring a minor to ‘admit[] each allegation contained in 

the petition,’ section 791, subdivision (a)(3), does not specify that the petition cannot be 

amended where, as here, the amendment does not follow and is not the consequence of 

the minor contesting one or more of the allegations of the initial petition. [Citation.] The 

circumstances of this case are consistent with the goal of expediting juvenile wardship 

proceedings and avoiding contested jurisdictional hearings. Further, making DEJ 

unavailable to a minor who admits an amended petition without contesting the allegations 

of the initial petition would not serve the [stated statutory] goal of increasing 

rehabilitation for first-time nonviolent offenders . . . . [Citations.]” (Joshua S., at p. 681.) 

Accordingly, the matter was remanded so that the juvenile court could determine whether 

to grant or deny DEJ. (Id. at pp. 673, 682.)

Similar to Joshua S., Jonathan admitted being an accessory to robbery without 

requesting a contested jurisdiction hearing. Nonetheless, Joshua S. is distinguishable 

because in that case the minor was explicitly determined at the outset to be eligible for 

DEJ and neither the original charges nor the amended charges included an offense 

enumerated in section 707, subdivision (b). (Joshua S., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 674.)7

 

7 In his reply brief and at oral argument, Jonathan cited In re T.J. (2010) 

185 Cal.App.4th 1504 for the proposition that the allegations of the section 602 petition 

do not govern. Instead, “[w]hat matters is whether the minor admits [charges not listed in 
11

Here, Jonathan’s characterization of the original section 602 petition as having 

been vacated is flawed. Despite some ambiguity in the record, the section 602 petition 

was never amended to charge only offenses not enumerated in section 707, 

subdivision (b). The reporter’s transcript does not reflect that the prosecution moved to 

amend the section 602 petition to substitute the accessory charge for the robbery charge. 

Instead, it appears the juvenile court relied on the parties’ consent to sustain a finding that 

Jonathan had committed an offense other than one specifically alleged in the petition or 

necessarily included therein.8 (See People v. Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 136 & fn. 19 

 

section 707, subdivision (b),] before the jurisdictional hearing.” In T.J., the wardship 

petition alleged that the minor had committed three forcible lewd acts on a child under 

the age of 14. Because the allegations included an element of force, the minor was 

deemed ineligible for DEJ. (T.J., at p. 1509.) However, following a contested 

jurisdictional hearing, the prosecution dismissed the third count, for insufficiency of the 

evidence. The juvenile court also found that the element of force was unsupported for the 

other two counts, but that the lesser offense of lewd acts on a child had been proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at pp. 1508, 1509.) The minor argued that he became 

eligible for DEJ because “the charges remaining against him were ‘limited to violation of 

Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), an offense which is not enumerated in 

subdivision (b) of . . . section 707.” (T.J., at p. 1512.) The reviewing court rejected the 

argument, explaining: “[E]ven if he had satisfied section 790, he had not done so in the 

manner required by the notice provisions of section 791, subdivision (a)(3). The minor 

had not admitted any allegations, and he necessarily had not done so in lieu of the 

jurisdictional hearing that had just been conducted.” (T.J., at p. 1512, fn. omitted.) The 

T.J. court merely assumed, without deciding, that a minor could establish eligibility for 

DEJ under section 790, solely on the basis of the remaining charges. We decline to 

extend T.J. or Joshua S. as Jonathan suggests. Opinions are not authority for propositions 

not considered. (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 566.)

8 “Under California law, a lesser offense is necessarily included in a greater 

offense if either the statutory elements of the greater offense, or the facts actually alleged 

in the accusatory pleading, include all the elements of the lesser offense, such that the 

greater cannot be committed without also committing the lesser. [Citations.]” (People v. 

Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 117–118, fn. omitted.) Looking solely at the statutory 

elements, the crime of accessory after the fact is not a lesser included offense to robbery. 

(People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 291–292, disapproved on other grounds by 

People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 637–638; Pen. Code, §§ 32, 211.) 

Furthermore, the section 602 petition does not allege all of the elements of the offense 

actually admitted by Jonathan. Count one alleged: “[O]n or about December 14th, 2013, 
12

[“our decision does not foreclose the parties from agreeing that the defendant may be 

convicted of a lesser offense not necessarily included in the original charge”]; In re 

Robert G. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 437, 445 [“a wardship petition under section 602 may not be 

sustained upon findings that the minor has committed an offense or offenses other than 

one specifically alleged in the petition or necessarily included within an alleged offense, 

unless the minor consents to a finding on the substituted charge”].)

An offense enumerated in section 707, subdivision (b)—robbery—remained. That 

the minute order may have suggested otherwise is of no moment when the reporter’s 

transcript is clear regarding the intent of the parties and the court. (People v. Smith

(1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599 [when harmonization is not possible, “that part of the record 

will prevail, which, because of its origin and nature, is entitled to greater credence”]; 

In re Evans (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 213, 216 [same]; In re Karla C. (2010) 

186 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1259–1260, fn. 9 [juvenile court’s oral pronouncement prevails 

when its written order is internally inconsistent].) We conclude that the juvenile court’s 

oral pronouncement, which did not include any discussion of amendment of the section 

602 petition, prevails over the minute order. 

In any event, even if the minute order is correct that the section 602 petition was 

amended to substitute the accessory charge for the robbery charge, we cannot agree with 

Jonathan that, after he withdrew his prior admission, the felony assault count remained 

dismissed. This argument is inconsistent with both the reporter’s transcript and the 

minute order. Furthermore, Jonathan’s interpretation of the record would allow him to 

repudiate a plea bargain agreement without restoring the prosecution’s quid pro quo. We 

will not assume that this was the parties’ intent. (See People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 

208, 215 [“when the defendant withdraws his guilty plea or otherwise succeeds in 

attacking it, counts dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain may be restored”]; In re Ricardo 

C. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 688, 699 [“court could not proceed to apply and enforce 

 

. . . [Jonathan] did then and there commit a FELONY, to wit: ROBBERY, a violation of 

Section 211 of the Penal Code . . . , in that [Jonathan] did then and there rob [the victim] 

of 1996 VOLVO, PURSE & PERSONAL PROPERTY.”
13

certain parts of the plea bargain, while ignoring the provision that had been material to 

the People’s agreement to the bargain”].) The juvenile court did not err in finding 

Jonathan ineligible for DEJ.

III. DISPOSITION

The disposition order is affirmed.

_________________________

BRUINIERS, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

SIMONS, Acting P. J.

_________________________

NEEDHAM, J.