This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains regulatory documents having general

applicability and legal effect, most of which

are keyed to and codified in the Code of

Federal Regulations, which is published under

50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.

The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by

the Superintendent of Documents. Prices of

new books are listed in the first FEDERAL

REGISTER issue of each week.

Rules and Regulations Federal Register

1997 

Vol. 80, No. 10 

Thursday, January 15, 2015 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–1058; Directorate 

Identifier 2014–SW–065–AD; Amendment 

39–18053; AD 2014–26–02] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus 

Helicopters (Previously Eurocopter 

France) 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus 

Helicopters (previously Eurocopter 

France) Model EC155B1 and AS 365 N3 

helicopters with a certain automated 

flight control system (AFCS) and with a 

Garmin global positioning system (GPS) 

installed. This AD requires revising the 

Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) to 

prohibit using the autopilot coupled 

with a Localizer/Instrument Landing 

System (LOC/ILS) or Very High 

Frequency Omnidirectional Range 

(VOR) approach. This AD is prompted 

by a report of unpredictable and 

unexpected roll oscillations during 

coupled LOC or VOR approaches.This 

condition, if not corrected, could result 

in loss of helicopter control. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

January 30, 2015. 

We must receive comments on this 

AD by March 16, 2015. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Docket: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: Send comments to the U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery: Deliver to the 

‘‘Mail’’ address between 9 a.m. and 

5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov or in person at the 

Docket Operations Office between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the economic 

evaluation, and other information. The 

street address for the Docket Operations 

Office (telephone 800–647–5527) is in 

the ADDRESSES section. Comments will 

be available in the AD docket shortly 

after receipt. 

For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Airbus Helicopters, 

Inc., 2701 N. Forum Drive, Grand 

Prairie, TX 75052; telephone (972) 641– 

0000 or (800) 232–0323; fax (972) 641– 

3775; or at http://

www.airbushelicopters.com/techpub. 

You may review the referenced service 

information at the FAA, Office of the 

Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 

2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort 

Worth, Texas 76137. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

George Schwab, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, Safety Management Group, 

Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 2601 

Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 

76137; telephone (817) 222–5110; email 

george.schwab@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

This AD is a final rule that involves 

requirements affecting flight safety, and 

we did not provide you with notice and 

an opportunity to provide your 

comments prior to it becoming effective. 

However, we invite you to participate in 

this rulemaking by submitting written 

comments, data, or views. We also 

invite comments relating to the 

economic, environmental, energy, or 

federalism impacts that resulted from 

adopting this AD. The most helpful 

comments reference a specific portion of 

the AD, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. To ensure the docket 

does not contain duplicate comments, 

commenters should send only one copy 

of written comments, or if comments are 

filed electronically, commenters should 

submit them only one time. We will file 

in the docket all comments that we 

receive, as well as a report summarizing 

each substantive public contact with 

FAA personnel concerning this 

rulemaking during the comment period. 

We will consider all the comments we 

receive and may conduct additional 

rulemaking based on those comments. 

Discussion 

We were informed that an Airbus 

Helicopter Model EC155B1 helicopter 

experienced intermittent, unpredictable 

roll oscillations while attempting to 

capture the inbound course during 

coupled ILS and LOC approaches. 

Airbus Helicopters analyzed the issue 

through flight and laboratory tests and 

determined that, under certain 

circumstances related to physical 

location of the helicopter during 

initialization of the GPS, the Garmin 

GPS equipment declares the helicopter’s 

position as invalid on the data output 

bus, even though the GPS correctly 

displays the position and other 

information. APM2000, part number 

416–00297–163, an Airbus Helicopters 

AFCS, utilizes this GPS position from 

the output data bus to estimate ground 

speed. When the helicopter’s position is 

declared invalid, the APM2000 AFCS 

calculates the estimated ground speed at 

zero, causing an adverse effect on the 

vectoring calculations (angle, speed, 

intercepts, etc.), which results in the 

unpredictable and unexpected roll 

oscillations. 

Airbus Helicopters reported that 

while it plans further tests on Model 

EC155 helicopters to determine shortand long-term solutions, it proposes in 

the interim that pilots, shortly before 

taxiing, confirm that the Garmin 

equipment is properly displaying the 

helicopter’s ‘‘true present position’’ and 

then press the AP RST (autopilot reset) 

switch overhead. Airbus Helicopters 

states that these steps will ensure the 

system functions correctly. The 

European Aviation Safety Agency has 

declined to issue an AD. 

We have determined that an unsafe 

condition exists whenever a helicopter 

with this part-numbered autopilot 

system installed attempts a coupled 


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1998 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 10 / Thursday, January 15, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 

LOC/ILS or VOR approach, and that this 

condition is not corrected by resetting 

the autopilot before taxiing. Rather, the 

issue continues until the autopilot 

system is manually disconnected. The 

pilot is not alerted that an issue exists 

until the VOR, LOC, and glide slope 

indications on the flight instrument 

panel when the intercept course capture 

fails to perform as expected. The 

autopilot system is intended to reduce 

a pilot’s workload and for that reason is 

required to be functional when a single 

pilot is operating the helicopter under 

instrument flight rules. We are 

including the Model AS 365 N3 

helicopter in this AD because these 

helicopters may have the same 

technology installed and could 

experience the same unsafe condition. 

FAA’s Determination 

These helicopters have been approved 

by the aviation authority of France and 

are approved for operation in the United 

States. We are issuing this AD because 

we evaluated all the relevant 

information and determined the unsafe 

condition exists and is likely to exist or 

develop on other helicopters of these 

same type designs. 

Related Service Information 

Airbus Helicopters has issued 

Technical Agreement AE–155–14–003– 

22, dated June 27, 2014, for Model 

EC155B1 helicopters, which advises of 

two procedures in order to prevent an 

anomaly with the autopilot in the LOC 

mode. The first procedure is to only stay 

on the GPS test page for a short time, 

and the second procedure is to reset the 

autopilot before taxiing. 

AD Requirements 

This AD requires before further flight, 

revising the RFM by inserting a copy of 

this AD or by making pen-and-ink 

changes to prohibit using the autopilot 

coupled with a LOC/ILS or VOR 

approach. This AD also requires, for 

Model EC155B1 helicopters, revising 

the RFM to prohibit certain procedures 

for resetting the autopilot before taxiing. 

Interim Action 

We consider this AD to be an interim 

action. The design approval holder is 

currently developing a modification that 

will address the unsafe condition 

identified in this AD. Once this 

modification is developed, approved, 

and available, we might consider 

additional rulemaking. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD will affect 

16 helicopters of U.S. Registry and that 

labor costs average $85 an hour. Based 

on these estimates, we expect that 

making pen-and-ink changes to the 

flight manual will require a half workhour for a labor cost of about $43 per 

helicopter, or $688 for the U.S. fleet. No 

parts are needed. 

FAA’s Justification and Determination 

of the Effective Date 

Providing an opportunity for public 

comments prior to adopting these AD 

requirements would delay 

implementing the safety actions needed 

to correct this known unsafe condition. 

Therefore, we find that the risk to the 

flying public justifies waiving notice 

and comment prior to the adoption of 

this rule because the unsafe condition 

can adversely affect control of the 

helicopter and the required corrective 

actions must be accomplished before 

further flight. 

Since an unsafe condition exists that 

requires the immediate adoption of this 

AD, we determined that notice and 

opportunity for public comment before 

issuing this AD are impracticable and 

contrary to the public interest and that 

good cause exists for making this 

amendment effective in less than 30 

days. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this AD will not 

have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national Government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed, I certify 

that this AD: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); 

3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in 

Alaska to the extent that it justifies 

making a regulatory distinction; and 

4. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared an economic evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD and placed it in the AD docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2014–26–02 Airbus Helicopters (Previously 

Eurocopter France): Amendment 39– 

18053; Docket No. FAA–2014–1058; 

Directorate Identifier 2014–SW–065–AD. 

(a) Applicability 

This AD applies to Model EC155B1 and AS 

365 N3 helicopters with an automated flight 

control system APM2000 Auto Pilot Module, 

part number 416–00297–163, with a Garmin 

GNS- or GTN-series global positioning 

system (GPS) installed, certificated in any 

category. 

(b) Unsafe Condition 

This AD defines the unsafe condition as an 

autopilot software design that incorrectly 

calculates the estimated ground speed at 

zero. This condition results in unpredictable 

roll oscillations during a coupled Very High 

Frequency Omnidirectional Range (VOR) or 

Localizer/Instrument Landing System (LOC/ 

ILS) approach, which could result in loss of 

helicopter control. 

(c) Effective Date 

This AD becomes effective January 30, 

2015. 

(d) Compliance 

You are responsible for performing each 

action required by this AD within the 

specified compliance time unless it has 

already been accomplished prior to that time. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 10 / Thursday, January 15, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 1999 

(e) Required Actions 

Before further flight, insert a copy of this 

AD in the Rotorcraft Flight Manual or make 

the following pen-and-ink changes: 

(1) In the Eurocopter EC 155B1 Flight 

Manual, under Limitations (Prohibited 

Maneuvers) add: ‘‘Coupled LOC/VOR 

approaches.’’ 

(2) In the Airbus Helicopters Flight Manual 

EC155B1: 

(i) Under Limitations, add: ‘‘Autopilot 

coupled with a LOC/ILS or VOR approach is 

prohibited.’’ 

(ii) Under Normal Procedures, remove 

paragraphs 4.2 (Power-on GPS on Ground or 

In Flight) and 4.3 (Pre-taxiing checklist) in 

their entirety. Performing the procedures in 

Paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3 is prohibited. 

(3) In the Eurocopter Flight Manual AS 365 

N3, under Limitations, add: ‘‘Autopilot 

coupled with a LOC/ILS or VOR approach is 

prohibited.’’ 

(f) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Safety Management 

Group, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this 

AD. Send your proposal to: George Schwab, 

Aviation Safety Engineer, Safety Management 

Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 2601 

Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; 

telephone (817) 222–5110; email 

george.schwab@faa.gov. 

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 

CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 

14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that 

you notify your principal inspector, or 

lacking a principal inspector, the manager of 

the local flight standards district office or 

certificate holding district office, before 

operating any aircraft complying with this 

AD through an AMOC. 

(g) Additional Information 

For service information identified in this 

AD, contact Airbus Helicopters, Inc., 2701 N. 

Forum Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75052; 

telephone (972) 641–0000 or (800) 232–0323; 

fax (972) 641–3775; or at http://

www.airbushelicopters.com/techpub. You 

may review a copy of the service information 

at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, 

Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., 

Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas 76137. 

(h) Subject 

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) 

Code: 2210, Autopilot System. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on December 

4, 2014. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Acting Directorate Manager, Rotorcraft 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2015–00543 Filed 1–14–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–0582; Directorate 

Identifier 2014–NM–065–AD; Amendment 

39–18060; AD 2014–26–09] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier, 

Inc. Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are superseding 

Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2014–03– 

05, for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model 

BD–700–1A10 airplanes. AD 2014–03– 

05 required modification of the air data 

probes and sensors. This new AD 

continues to require modification of the 

air data probes and sensors. This new 

AD also adds airplanes to the 

applicability. This AD was prompted by 

a report that the manufacturer has 

determined that some completion 

centers used the heater current/brake 

temperature monitor unit (HBMU) logic 

circuit to control the line voltage of the 

drain mast heaters. We are issuing this 

AD to detect and correct an 

unannunciated failure of two pitot static 

probe heaters, which could affect 

controllability of the airplane in icing 

conditions. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

February 19, 2015. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of April 1, 2014 (79 FR 10331, 

February 25, 2014). 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov/

#!docketDetail;D=FAA-2014-0582; or in 

person at the Docket Management 

Facility, U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC. 

For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Bombardier, Inc., 400 

Coˆte-Vertu Road West, Dorval, Que ́bec 

H4S 1Y9, Canada; telephone 514–855– 

5000; fax 514–855–7401; email thd.crj@

aero.bombardier.com; Internet http://

www.bombardier.com. You may view 

this referenced service information at 

the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., 

Renton, WA. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, 

call 425–227–1221. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Assata Dessaline, Aerospace Engineer, 

Avionics and Flight Test Branch, ANE– 

172, FAA, New York Aircraft 

Certification Office, 1600 Stewart 

Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 

11590; telephone 516–228–7301; fax 

516–794–5531. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to supersede AD 2014–03–05, 

Amendment 39–17742 (79 FR 10331, 

February 25, 2014). 

AD 2014–03–05 applied to certain 

Bombardier, Inc. Model BD–700–1A10 

airplanes. The NPRM published in the 

Federal Register on August 26, 2014 (79 

FR 50880). 

Transport Canada Civil Aviation 

(TCCA), which is the aviation authority 

for Canada, has issued Canadian 

Airworthiness Directive CF–2012–32, 

dated December 13, 2012 (referred to 

after this as the Mandatory Continuing 

Airworthiness Information, or ‘‘the 

MCAI’’), to correct an unsafe condition 

for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model BD– 

700–1A10 airplanes. The MCAI states: 

The aeroplane manufacturer has 

determined that some completion centers 

used the Heater/Brake Monitoring Unit 

(HBMU) logic circuit to control the line 

voltage of the drain mast heaters. This same 

logic circuit is also used to control the line 

voltage of the number 2 pitot static (PS) 

probe heater. Since the drain mast heaters are 

connected in parallel with the number 2 PS 

probe heater circuit, a number 2 PS probe 

heater failure may not be detected by the 

fault monitoring capabilities of the HBMU. 

The unannunciated failure of two PS probe 

heaters could adversely affect the aeroplane’s 

flight characteristics in icing conditions. 

This [Canadian] AD mandates a 

modification to the existing drain mast heater 

wiring to correct the fault-monitoring 

capabilities of the HBMU and eliminate the 

potential dormant failure of the number 2 PS 

probe heater. 

You may examine the MCAI in the 

AD docket on the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov/

#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2014-0582- 

0002. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

received no comments on the NPRM (79 

FR 50880, August 26, 2014) or on the 

determination of the cost to the public. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the available data and 

determined that air safety and the 


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