NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

GUILLERMO LOPEZ, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 13-0720 PRPC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2003-006174-001 DT

The Honorable Crane McClennen, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Diane Meloche

Counsel for Respondent

Guillermo Lopez, Florence

Petitioner
STATE v. LOPEZ

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maurice Portley delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined. 

 

P O R T L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Petitioner Guillermo Lopez petitions this court to review the 

dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief and grant him relief. We 

have considered the petition for review and, for the reasons stated, grant 

review, but deny relief. 

¶2 Lopez was indicted and convicted by a jury of four counts of 

sexual assault, four counts of aggravated assault and one count of 

kidnapping.1 He was subsequently sentenced to nine aggravated sentences

for an aggregate prison term of one hundred years. An appeal was filed 

and we affirmed Lopez’s convictions and sentences. State v. Lopez, 

1 CA-CR 03-0828 (Ariz. App. May 6, 2004) (mem. decision). Lopez now 

seeks review of the summary dismissal of his second petition for postconviction relief. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32.9(c). 

¶3 Lopez presents two issues for review. He first contends the 

trial court erred by considering his two prior felony convictions (which he 

admitted to when testifying on his own behalf) to enhance his sentences,

because those priors were too old to be considered as “historical prior 

felony convictions” pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 

13-604(V)(1) (2002). Lopez did not raise the issue on direct appeal. As a 

result, because any claim Lopez could have raised on direct appeal is 

precluded, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a), and none of the 

exceptions under Rule 32.2(b) apply, we deny relief.

¶4 Lopez next contends the opinions in State v. Schmidt, 220 Ariz. 

563, 208 P.3d 214 (2009), and State v. Perrin, 222 Ariz. 375, 214 P.3d 1016 

(App. 2009), are significant changes in the law that require us to grant relief. 

Specifically, he contends that both cases require a trial court to find at least 

two aggravating circumstances before the court may impose any 

aggravated sentence. See A.R.S. § 13-702(C) (2002) (aggravating 

 

1 Lopez was found not guilty of count six, theft.
STATE v. LOPEZ

Decision of the Court

3

circumstances for sentencing purposes). We disagree that those opinions 

are significant changes in the law.

¶5 Here, the sole aggravating circumstance the trial court used 

to aggravate each conviction was the physical, emotional and financial 

harm Lopez caused the victim. See A.R.S. § 13-702(C)(9) (physical, 

emotional and/or financial harm to the victim as an aggravating 

circumstance). But neither Schmidt nor Perrin would justify a resentence.

¶6 In Schmidt, our supreme court held a trial court may not 

impose an aggravated sentence based solely on the existence of a “catchall” aggravating circumstance. Schmidt, 220 Ariz. at 564, ¶ 1, 208 P.3d at 

215.2 If a trial court wishes to rely on a “catch-all” aggravating circumstance 

to impose an aggravated sentence, the State must also establish the 

existence of at least one enumerated aggravating circumstance. Id. at 566, 

¶ 11, 208 P.3d at 217. Schmidt, as a result, does not apply here because the 

trial court did not rely on a catch-all factor to aggravate the sentences, and 

Schmidt does not otherwise stand for the proposition that a trial court must 

always find at least two aggravating circumstances before it may impose an 

aggravated sentence.3 

 

2 When Lopez committed the offenses in 2002, the “catch-all” circumstance 

was “any other factor that the court deems appropriate to the ends of 

justice.” A.R.S. § 13-702(C)(19). 

3 It is important to note that our supreme court clarified Schmidt in State v. 

Bonfiglio, 231 Ariz. 371, 295 P.3d 948 (2013). Schmidt provides that a trial 

court may rely on a catch-all factor if there is also a “properly found

specifically enumerated factor [that makes] the defendant eligible for a 

sentence greater than the presumptive” sentence. Bonfiglio, 231 Ariz. at 373, 

¶ 10, 295 P.3d at 950. Schmidt does not provide that a court may rely on a 

catch-all factor only if it also relies on that enumerated factor to impose an 

aggravated sentence. Id. In Bonfiglio, the trial court enhanced Bonfiglio’s 

sentence with his prior convictions, but relied only upon a catch-all factor 

to aggravate his sentence. Proof that Bonfiglio had prior convictions, even if 

only for purposes of sentence enhancement, satisfied Schmidt because prior 

convictions were also an enumerated aggravating factor. Id. at 372, ¶ 3, 295 

P.3d at 949. This allowed the trial court to impose an aggravated sentence 

based on the existence of a catch-all factor even if that was the only 

aggravating factor the court relied upon. Id. at 374, ¶ 11, 295 P.3d at 951. 

Finally, Bonfiglio overruled State v. Zinsmeyer, 222 Ariz. 612, 218 P.3d 1069 
STATE v. LOPEZ

Decision of the Court

4

¶7 Moreover, in Perrin, the appellate court held that a trial court 

may not impose a substantially aggravated sentence pursuant to the former 

A.R.S. § 13-702.01 unless the court finds at least two enumerated 

aggravating circumstances. Perrin, 222 Ariz. at 378, ¶ 9, 214 P.3d at 1019. 

The court here did not sentence Lopez to a “substantially aggravated”

sentence pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-702.01, and Perrin does not otherwise stand 

for the proposition that a trial court must always find the existence of two 

aggravating circumstances before it may impose any aggravated sentence.4 

Consequently, because neither case is a significant change in the law that 

impacts Lopez, we deny relief.

¶8 Having reviewed the two issues Lopez raised in the petition 

for review, we deny relief.

 

(App. 2009), a case Lopez also cites as a significant change in the law. 

Bonfiglio, 231 Ariz. at 374, ¶ 15, 295 P.3d at 951. 

4 While these are not the grounds upon which the trial court dismissed the 

petition for post-conviction relief, we may affirm a decision of a trial court 

on any basis which is supported by the record. State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 

191, 199, 735 P.2d 801, 809 (1987).