alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, 

 Petitioner 

 v. 

DREW ALIA, 

 Respondent 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

No. 2153 Disciplinary Docket No. 3 

Board File Nos. C1-13-631 and 

C1-15-265 

Attorney Registration No. 200247 

(Philadelphia) 

O R D E R 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 17th day of April, 2015, an Order and Rule to Show Cause 

having been entered by this Court on March 31, 2015, and no response to the Rule 

having been filed, it is ORDERED that: 

1. The Rule is made absolute and Respondent is placed on temporary 

suspension until further action by this Court; 

 2. Respondent shall comply with the provisions of Pa.R.D.E. 217; and 

 3. The President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 

County, in accordance with Pa.R.D.E. 217(g), shall enter such orders as may be 

necessary to fully protect the rights of Respondent’s clients or fiduciary entities 

with which he is involved. 

 This Order constitutes an imposition of public discipline within the meaning of 

Pa.R.D.E. 402, pertaining to confidentiality.
# EUR-Lex - 21979D0331(02) - EN

Avis juridique important

*|*

# 21979D0331(02)

**EEC-Tunisia Cooperation Council Decision No 3/78 of 12 December 1978 amending the Protocol on the definition of the concept of 'originating products' and methods of administrative cooperation to the Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Tunisia **

*
Official Journal L 080 , 31/03/1979 P. 0045 - 0086 *

EEC-TUNISIA COOPERATION COUNCIL DECISION No 3/78 of 12 December 1978 amending the Protocol on the definition of the concept of originating products and methods of administrative cooperation to the Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Tunisia

THE COOPERATION COUNCIL,

Having regard to the Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Tunisia, and in particular Title I thereof,

Having regard to Protocol 2 on the definition of the concept of originating products and methods of administrative cooperation, and in particular Article 28 thereof,

Whereas it is necessary to replace the Lists A and B contained in Annexes II and III to the Protocol and to introduce a specific rule on sets as a result of the changes made to the Customs Cooperation Council nomenclature which entered into force on 1 January 1978,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

Annexes II and III to the Protocol on the definition of the concept of originating products and methods of administrative cooperation shall be replaced by the texts annexed to this Decision.

Article 2

Sets, as defined in General Rule 3 of the Customs Cooperation Council nomenclature, shall be regarded as originating when all component articles are originating products. Nevertheless, when a set is composed of originating and non-originating articles, the set as a whole shall be regarded as originating provided that the value of the non-originating articles does not exceed 15% of the total value of the set.

Done at Brussels, 12 December 1978.

For the Cooperation Council

The President

K. von DOHNANYI

ANNEX II

LIST A

List of working or processing operations which result in a change of tariff heading without conferring the status of originating products on the products undergoing such operations, or conferring this status only subject to certain conditions

TABLE POSITION

ANNEX III

LIST B

List of working or processing operations which do not result in a change of tariff heading, but which do confer the status of originating products on the products undergoing such operations

TABLE POSITION
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-1582

R. PHILLIP DUTO,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION; NORTHROP

GRUMMAN CORPORATION,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, District Judge. (CA-97-

1024-MJG)

Submitted: January 31, 2000 Decided: March 14, 2000

Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael E. Marr, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Glen D. Nager,

Thomas M. Beck, JONES, DAY, REAVIS & POGUE, Washington, D.C., for

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* Although the district court's order is marked as "filed" on

March 26, 1999, the district court's records show that it was

entered on the docket sheet on March 29, 1999. Pursuant to Rules

58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the

date that the order was physically entered on the docket sheet that

we take as the effective date of the district court's decision.

See Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986).

2

PER CURIAM:

R. Phillip Duto appeals the district court’s order granting

summary judgment to Defendants in Duto’s action filed under the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Duto maintains that the

district court erred in finding that he did not create a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether Westinghouse Electric Corporation’s stated reasons for his lay off were pretextual and that

the lay off was actually motivated by age discrimination. See

Vaughan v. MetraHealth Cos., 145 F.3d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1998).

We have reviewed the formal briefs, the materials submitted in

the joint appendix, and the district court’s thorough and wellreasoned opinion, and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we

affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Duto v.

Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. CA-97-1024-MJG (D. Md. Mar. 29,

1999).* (J.A. at 417-59). We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Cornelius Howell, Appellant.

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Jerome Hornblass, J.), convicting defendant, after jury trial, of burglary in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to *2-Vz*to 5 years imprisonment, unanimously affirmed.

We reject defendant’s argument that the trial court gave an erroneous circumstantial evidence charge because it did not use the specific words "the inference of guilt is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and the evidence excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Such instruction must be given only "in substance” *(People v Sanchez,*61 NY2d 1022, 1024). Although the circumstantial evidence charge herein was somewhat disorganized, it conveyed the appropriate standards *(see, People v Adams,*69 NY2d 805).

As defendant neither requested an alibi charge, nor raised any objection that no alibi charge was given, defendant has failed to preserve the issue for appellate review (CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event, although defendant testified that at the time of the burglary he was engaged in a scam involving subway tokens at a subway station located several blocks from the burglary scene, defense counsel understandably did not highlight this offered alibi testimony in summation. Rather, defense counsel argued, essentially, misidentification and lack of direct evidence. Thus, it appears that defendant’s failure to either request an alibi charge, or object that such a charge was not given, constituted purposeful trial strategy, and the trial court did not err in failing to give, *sua sponte,*an alibi charge *(see, e.g., People v Lester,*163 AD2d 201, *lv denied*76 NY2d 988). Concur—Milonas, J. P., Rosenberger, Ellerin, Kassal and Smith, JJ.
#### National Westminster Bank USA, Appellant, v Sardi’s Incorporated, Formerly Known as 234 W. 44 Restaurant Corp., et al., Defendants, and Stuart Lichtenstein, Respondent.

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Burton S. Sherman, J.), entered November 21, 1990, which, *inter*
      *471
      *alia,*denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, unanimously modified, on the law, to grant plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and otherwise affirmed, with costs. The clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $200,000 plus interest and costs.

The IAS court found that the individual defendant does not dispute that he signed the loan guaranty at issue and that there is a default thereunder and a balance due. But, nevertheless, it incorrectly denied plaintiff summary judgment based upon defendant’s conclusory allegations that he was unaware that it was a personal guaranty; that he advised the bank that he was unwilling to personally guarantee the loan; and, that the closing of the loan was adjourned so that another guarantor could be secured, which, it found, raised an issue as to whether defendant was fraudulently induced to sign the guaranty.

As held in several recent cases, where a guaranty is clear and unambiguous on its face and, by its language, absolute and unconditional, the signer is conclusively bound by its terms absent a showing of fraud, duress or other wrongful act in its inducement *(see, Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v Weiss,*169 AD2d 632; *State Bank v Patel,*167 AD2d 242). In order to create a genuine issue of fact, defendant is required to offer more than his own conclusory and unsubstantiated statements *(State Bank v Patel, supra,*at 243).

Defendant has failed to make the factual showing necessary to defeat plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. Concur— Rosenberger, J. P., Wallach, Kupferman, Kassal and Smith, JJ.
#### Robert D. O’Connell, P. C., Appellant, et al., Plaintiff, v Schlegel Corporation et al., Respondents, and Charles P. Schlegel, II, Intervenor-Respondent.

(Appeal No. 1.)

—Order unanimously affirmed with costs. Memorandum: In affirming the order of Supreme Court, we note our acknowledgement of the concession by intervenor-defendant Charles P. Schlegel, II that issues pertaining to stock ownership and/or entitlement to merger consideration have been competently placed in issue *1025by plaintiffs. Moreover, we perceive no error in the strategy employed by Supreme Court in managing this litigation. By granting plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their reply to intervenor-defendant’s counterclaim, the court placed both plaintiffs and intervenor-defendant in position fully to litigate their dispute regarding stock ownership and/or entitlement to merger consideration. (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Boehm, J.—Intervention.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Balio, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
<PAGE>
                                                                     EXHIBIT 4.7


                              CERTIFICATE OF TRUST

                                       OF

                              DEFS CAPITAL TRUST I


         THIS Certificate of Trust of DEFS Capital Trust I (the "Trust"), dated
as of April 30, 2002, is being duly executed and filed by the undersigned, as
trustee, to form a business trust under the Delaware Business Trust Act (12 Del.
C. ss.3801, et seq.).

         1.       Name. The name of the business trust formed hereby is DEFS
                  Capital Trust I.

         2.       Delaware Trustee. The name and business address of the trustee
                  of the Trust with a principal place of business in the State
                  of Delaware are Chase Manhattan Bank USA, National
                  Association, 500 Stanton Christiana Rd., Building 4,
                  3rd Floor, Newark, Delaware 19713.

         3.       Effective Date. This Certificate of Trust shall be effective
                  upon filing.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being the sole trustee of the
Trust, has executed this Certificate of Trust as of the date first-above
written.

                                    CHASE MANHATTAN BANK USA, NATIONAL
                                    ASSOCIATION, not in its individual capacity
                                    but solely as trustee of the Trust

                                    By:   /s/ John J. Cashin
                                       -----------------------------------------
                                       Name:  John J. Cashin
                                       Title: Vice President
EXHIBIT NO. 23(a)



INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT




We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No.
33-33520 on Form S-8, Registration Statement No. 33-5134 on Form S-3,
Post-Effective Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement No. 33-38349 on Form
S-3, Registration Statement No. 333-69237 on Form S-3, and Registration
Statement No. 333-70679 on Form S-8 of Carolina Power & Light Company, of our
report dated February 9, 1999 appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of
the Company for the year ended December 31, 1998.



/s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP 

Raleigh, North Carolina
March 19, 1999
# C_2016202EN.01005701.xml

| 7.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 202/57 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 202/57

---

Article 22

(ex Article 19 TEC)

(ex Article 19 TEC)

1.   Every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. This right shall be exercised subject to detailed arrangements adopted by the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament; these arrangements may provide for derogations where warranted by problems specific to a Member State.

2.   Without prejudice to Article 223(1) and to the provisions adopted for its implementation, every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. This right shall be exercised subject to detailed arrangements adopted by the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament; these arrangements may provide for derogations where warranted by problems specific to a Member State.

---
Motion for Rehearing Granted; Memorandum Opinion filed March 17, 2015 

Withdrawn; Appeal Reinstated and Order filed April 21, 2015. 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00749-CV

JANELL SUE MARIN, Appellant

V.

JOEL JOSEPH MARIN, Appellee

On Appeal from the 300th District Court

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 56502

ORDER

On March 17, 2015, this court issued an opinion dismissing this appeal. On, 

March 17, 2015, appellant filed a motion for rehearing. The motion is granted. 

This court’s opinion filed March 17, 2015, is withdrawn, and our judgment 

of that date is vacated. The appeal is ordered reinstated. 

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Jamison, and Donovan.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In connection with
the accompanying Quarterly Report of Equus Total Return, Inc. (the Fund) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2009 (the Report), I, LSheryl D. Hudson, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | To my knowledge, the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Fund.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                    |  |  |  |                                           
|------------------- |  |  |  | ------------------------------------------
|Dated: May 14, 2009 |  |  |  | /s/ LSheryl D. Hudson                    
|                    |  |  |  | LSheryl D. Hudson Chief Financial Officer
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, August 24, 2020.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, August 24, 2020

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A21I0021. JOHN ALVIN HARMON et al. v. JEFFREY T. COPELAND et al. .

Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby DENIED.

LC NUMBERS:

19CV0458
<TABLE> <S> <C>

 <ARTICLE>                          5
 <LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
COMPANY'S  FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS  CONTAINED IN THE COMPANY'S 10-Q FOR THE PERIOD
ENDED MARCH 31, 1999 AND IS  QUALIFIED  IN ITS  ENTIRETY  BY  REFERENCE  TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
 </LEGEND>
         
    <S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                       3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                  JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                    MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                                   29
<SECURITIES>                                              0
         <RECEIVABLES>                                9,363
<ALLOWANCES>                                            968
<INVENTORY>                                             393
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                      9,552
<PP&E>                                               12,084
<DEPRECIATION>                                        1,953
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                       20,761
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                 7,409
<BONDS>                                               3,295
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                     0
<PREFERRED>                                               0
<COMMON>                                              3,261
<OTHER-SE>                                            3,529
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         20,761
<SALES>                                               9,712
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                      9,758
<CGS>                                                 8,037
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                         9,688
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                          0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                        140
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                      110
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                           9
<INCOME-TAX>                                              0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                       9
<DISCONTINUED>                                            0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                           0
<CHANGES>                                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                                              9
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                          0.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          0.00
        

</TABLE>
# C_2016202EN.01035501.xml

| 7.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 202/355 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 202/355

---

52.   Declaration by the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic on the symbols of the European Union

Declaration by the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic on the symbols of the European Union

Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic declare that the flag with a circle of twelve golden stars on a blue background, the anthem based on the "Ode to Joy" from the Ninth Symphony by Ludwig van Beethoven, the motto "United in diversity", the euro as the currency of the European Union and Europe Day on 9 May will for them continue as symbols to express the sense of community of the people in the European Union and their allegiance to it.

---
AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed April 21, 2015.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-14-01072-CR

TONY J. STEED, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F-1451467-T

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Francis, Brown, and Stoddart

Opinion by Justice Stoddart

Tony J. Steed waived his right to a jury trial and entered an open plea of guilty to 

aggravated assault of a public servant with a deadly weapon. The trial court admonished 

appellant of his rights, received evidence, including appellant’s signed judicial confession and 

stipulation of evidence, found him guilty, and sentenced him to ten years in prison. The trial 

court certified appellant’s right to appeal. 

On appeal, appellant’s attorney filed a brief in which she concludes the appeal is wholly 

frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967). The brief presents a professional evaluation of the record showing why, in effect, 

there are no arguable grounds to advance. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 811–12 (Tex. 

Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Counsel delivered a copy of the brief to appellant. See Kelly v. 

State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (identifying duties of appellate court and 
–2–

counsel in Anders cases).

Appellant filed a pro se response raising several issues. After reviewing counsel’s brief, 

appellant’s pro se response, and the record, we agree the appeal is frivolous and without merit. 

See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (explaining appellate 

court’s duty in Anders cases). We find nothing in the record that might arguably support the 

appeal. 

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/ Craig Stoddart/

CRAIG STODDART

JUSTICE

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

141072F.U05
–3–

Court of Appeals

S

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

TONY J. STEED, Appellant

No. 05-14-01072-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F-1451467-T.

Opinion delivered by Justice Stoddart. 

Justices Francis and Brown participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 21st day of April, 2015.