to a fair and impartial jury. See id. Accordingly, Lopez-Bonilla fails to 

demonstrate a statutory or constitutional basis for reversal based on the 

non-disclosure of the jury panel information. 

To the extent Lopez-Bonilla claims that a Batson v. Kentucky, 

476 U.S. 79 (1986), violation resulted from the district court's denial of the 

motion for jury panel information in that the State avoided peremptory 

challenges and race-neutral explanations by using the information, he 

fails to support this contention with any cogent argument or relevant 

authority, and we decline to address it. See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 

669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987). 

Second, Lopez-Bonilla claims that the district court 

improperly denied the defense expert the right to use her PowerPoint 

presentation while testifying in order to aid the jury regarding the subject 

of eyewitness identification. We review the "district court's evidentiary 

rulings for an abuse of discretion." Chavez v. State, 125 Nev. 328, 339, 213 

P.3d 476, 484 (2009). The district court ruled that the expert could give 

testimony based on the scientific studies, journals, and information she 

had gathered to create the PowerPoint presentation, provided that the 

testimony was relevant and probative to the case, but disallowed the 

PowerPoint presentation because it found some of the presentation to be 

extremely inflammatory, prejudicial, inappropriate, and biased. 

Furthermore, the district court noted that because the PowerPoint 

presentation was not timely distributed, there was no opportunity to 

refine and choose the appropriate slides. At trial, the expert testified at 

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length about the reliability of eyewitness identification, including the 

effects of trauma on memory, wrongful convictions based on faulty 

eyewitness testimony, and problems in eyewitness cross-racial 

identification. Based on the record, we conclude that Lopez-Bonilla has 

not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion by excluding 

the PowerPoint presentation. 

Third, Lopez-Bonilla contends that the State committed 

prosecutorial misconduct during rebuttal closing argument by briefly 

displaying photographs of him and the codefendant with the word "guilty" 

across the front. When reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, 

we first consider whether the prosecutor's conduct was improper and then 

determine whether any improper conduct warrants reversal. Valdez v. 

State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1188, 196 P.3d 465, 476 (2008). Lopez-Bonilla's 

codefendant objected to the photographs, conceding that their limited use 

was proper but objecting to any prolonged display, and the district court 

sustained the objection the second time the photographs were shown. It 

does not appear that Lopez-Bonilla objected to the use of the photographs, 

and even assuming error, we conclude that Lopez-Bonilla fails to establish 

that it affected his substantial rights. See Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 

545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003); cf. Watters v. State, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 94, 

313 P.3d 243, 246-49 (2013) (holding that the use of a PowerPoint 

presentation during opening statement that includes a slide of the 

defendant's booking photograph with the word "GUILTY" written across it 

is error as it undermines the presumption of innocence); Artiga-Morales, 

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Saitta 

130 Nev. Adv, Op. No. 77, 335 P.3d at 182 (rejecting same argument made 

by co-defendant). 

Having considered Lopez-Bonilla's contentions and concluded 

that no relief is warranted, we 

ORDER the jOgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

cc: Hon. Janet J. Berry, District Judge 

Story Law Group 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Washoe County District Attorney 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

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