alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, August 31, 2021.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, August 31, 2021

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A22I0014. VIVIAN N. EDWARDS v. THE STATE.

Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby DENIED.

LC NUMBERS:

21CR00157
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1505 

To amend title IV–A of the Social Security Act, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 5, 2019 

Mr. ARRINGTON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend title IV–A of the Social Security Act, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protecting Family Re5 sources and Training Options Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. STRENGTHENING PROGRAM INTEGRITY THROUGH 

7 IMPROPER PAYMENTS REVIEW. 

8 Section 404 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 

9 604) is amended by adding at the end the following: 

10 ‘‘(l) APPLICABILITY OF IMPROPER PAYMENTS

11 LAWS.— 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•HR 1505 IH

1 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Improper Payments 

2 Information Act of 2002 and the Improper Pay3 ments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 shall 

4 apply to a State in respect of the State program 

5 funded under this part in the same manner in which 

6 such Acts apply to a Federal agency. 

7 ‘‘(2) REGULATIONS.—Within 2 years after the 

8 date of the enactment of this subsection, the Sec9 retary shall prescribe regulations governing how a 

10 State reviews and reports improper payments under 

11 the State program funded under this part.’’. 

12 SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE. 

13 The amendments made by this Act shall take effect 

14 on October 1, 2019. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
#### Elissa NOLFI, a minor, by Philomena Nolfi Mangine, her guardian and Philomena Nolfi Mangine, in her own right, and Richard Reading, Plaintiffs, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a corporation, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. Mary DUCSAY, formerly Mary Drain, and Alex Drain, and Mt. Lebanon Motors, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corp., Third-Party Defendants. Mary DUCSAY, formerly Mary Drain, and Alex Drain, Individuals, Plaintiffs, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a corporation, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. MT. LEBANON MOTORS, INC., a Pennsylvania Corporation, Third-Party Defendant. Mt. Lebanon Motors, Inc., Appellant.

No. 14409.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued Oct. 24, 1963.

Decided Nov. 7, 1963.

*374Before STALEY and GANEY, Circuit Judges, and NEALON, District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Mt. Lebanon Motors, Inc., a third-party defendant in two separate civil actions arising out of the same automobile accident, has appealed from an order of the district court denying its motion to consolidate the actions. The appeal must be dismissed, for the order denying consolidation is clearly interlocutory in character, see Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Miller Mfg. Co., 276 F.2d 955 (C.A. 6, 1960); Skirvin v. Mesta, 141 F.2d 668, 671-672 (C.A. 10, 1944); 5 Moore’s Federal Practice 1204, and is not within that class of interlocutory orders made appealable by 28 U.S.C. § 1292. Nor does the instant order involve rights so separable from and collateral to rights asserted in the principal actions as to make it appealable under the doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Compare, McAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65 (C.A.2, 1958).

The appeal will be dismissed.
# C_2016203EN.01004101.xml

| 7.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 203/41 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 203/41

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Article 134

1.   A Scientific and Technical Committee is hereby set up; it shall be attached to the Commission and shall have advisory status.

The Committee must be consulted where this Treaty so provides. The Committee may be consulted in all cases in which the Commission considers this appropriate.

2.   The Committee shall consist of forty-two members, appointed by the Council after consultation with the Commission.

The Members of the Committee shall be appointed in their personal capacity for five years. Their appointment shall be renewable. They shall not be bound by any mandatory instructions.

The Scientific and Technical Committee shall each year elect its chairman and officers from among its Members.

---
trial court"); Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 

(2009) (providing that a district court's factual findings will be upheld if 

not clearly erroneous and if supported by substantial evidence). 2 

Appellant also contends that the district court's time 

management during the three-day evidentiary hearing prevented her from 

adequately presenting her case. Because appellant provides only limited 

excerpts from the evidentiary hearing transcript, we cannot conclude that 

the district court abused its discretion in its administration of the 

hearing. 3 Cuzze v. Univ. & Dray. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 

P.3d 131, 135 (2007) ("When an appellant fails to include necessary 

documentation in the record, we necessarily presume that the missing 

portion supports the district court's decision."); Zupancic v. Sierra Vista 

Recreation Inc., 97 Nev. 187, 192-93, 625 P.2d 1177, 1180 (1981) 

(providing that hearing and trial procedures are matters vested in the 

sound discretion of the trial court). 

Finally, appellant contends that the district court abused its 

discretion when it found that respondent was the prevailing party 

regarding custody and thus was entitled to a portion of his attorney fees. 

A party prevails if it succeeds on any significant issue in litigation which 

achieves some of the benefit it sought in bringing suit. Valley Elec. Ass'n 

v. Overfield, 121 Nev. 7, 10, 106 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2005). As respondent 

2Although appellant also argues that an order terminating 

respondent's parental rights should have been entered following the 

December 14, 2010, hearing, this issue was resolved by the district court 

order filed March 14, 2011, which appellant does not address on appeal. 

3Similarly, appellant's argument that the district court assumed 

facts not in evidence fails for lack of a full transcript. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 2 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A attfro 
Gibbons Pickering 

, J. 

J. 

was awarded joint legal custody and increased custodial time with the 

children, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

when it determined that respondent prevailed on these issues. Rivero v. 

River°, 125 Nev. 410, 440, 216 P.3d 213, 234 (2009) ("This court reviews 

the district court's award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion."). 

Additionally, we note that the district court order for attorney fees was 

also based on contempt and bad faith litigation tactics. 4 See NRS 22.100; 

NRS 18.010(2)(b). 

For the reasons discussed above, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 5 

cc: Eighth Judicial District Court, Dept. J 

Rachell A. Rhein 

Noah C. Rhein 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

4Appellant additionally argues that the district court drew an 

improper inference from her invocation of her Fifth Amendment right 

against self-incrimination. Appellant, however, was not held in contempt 

regarding the matter in which she invoked her right against selfincrimination, and thus, she lacks grounds to raise this issue on appeal. 

5We conclude that appellant's additional arguments lack merit. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 3 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A
<PAGE>
                                                                     EXHIBIT 15

Goody's Family Clothing, Inc.
Knoxville, Tennessee

We have made a review, in accordance with standards established by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, of the unaudited interim financial
information of Goody's Family Clothing, Inc. as of and for the thirteen weeks
ended May 3, 2003 and May 4, 2002, as indicated in our report dated May 20,
2003; because we did not perform an audit, we expressed no opinion on that
information.

We are aware that our report referred to above, which is included in your
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended May 3, 2003, is
incorporated by reference in Registration Statements Nos. 333-32357, 33-51210,
33-68520, 333-00052 and 333-09595 on Form S-8.

We also are aware that the aforementioned report, pursuant to Rule 436(c) under
the Securities Act of 1933, is not considered a part of the Registration
Statement prepared or certified by an accountant or a report prepared or
certified by an accountant within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of that Act.



/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP
Atlanta, Georgia
May 22, 2003
EXHIBIT 32.2

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                            AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report of American Bar Association
Members/State Street Collective Trust (the "Company") on Form 10-Q/A for the
period ending September 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Beth M. Halberstadt, as Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to and for purposes of 18
U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:


         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
         or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
         of the Company.




                                                     /s/ Beth M. Halberstadt
                                                     ------------------------
                                                     Beth M. Halberstadt
                                                     Chief Financial Officer
                                                     July 11, 2005
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Joe Dixon, Appellant.

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Rockland County (Kelly, J.), rendered May 24, 1989, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that his conviction of murder in the second degree cannot stand because the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to cause the victim’s death. At trial, three of the People’s witnesses testified that they observed the defendant and the victim standing near each other arguing. They then saw the defendant swing his hand toward the victim and the victim fall to the ground with blood spilling from his chest. One of the People’s witnesses observed a butcher’s knife in the defendant’s hand just before the victim fell to the ground, while another prosecution witness claimed to have seen the defendant displaying a knife in close temporal proximity to the events at issue. The defendant’s intent to cause death is manifest from the totality of the circumstances and from his stabbing the victim at close range, near the heart *(see, People v Horton,*18 NY2d 355, *cert denied*387 US 934; *People v Jackson,*18 NY2d 516; *People v Williams,*160 AD2d 753; *People v Nelson,*110 AD2d 858). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt.

*690To the extent that the defendant challenges the credibility of certain of the prosecution’s witnesses because of their criminal histories and involvement with illegal drugs, we note the well settled principle that resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses *(see, People v Gaimari,*176 NY2d 84, 91). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record *(see, People v Garafolo,*44 AD2d 86, 88). The jury’s determination to credit the testimony of the People’s witnesses finds support in the record and we decline to disturb it. Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15 [5]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions, including those raised by his supplemental *pro se*brief, are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Thompson, J. P., Bracken, Eiber and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
lfe5D-/¥

ELECTRONIC RECORD

COA # 07-14-00149-CR OFFENSE: 49.02

Dennis Ray Cook v. The State of

STYLE: Texas COUNTY: Lubbock

COA DISPOSITION: Affirmed TRIAL COURT: County Court at Law No 1

DATE: 10/30/14 Publish: NO TCCASE#: 2012-472,011

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

CCA#:

Dennis Ray Cook v. The State of

STYLE: Texas 1650-/4

PRO SB. Petition CCA Disposition:

FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IN CCA IS: DATE:

'RcFOjtTb JUDGE:

DATE: O^llill20tX

JUDGE: Pm. CjMs^^

SIGNED:

PUBLISH:

PC:

DNP:

MOTION FOR

REHEARING IN CCA IS:

JUDGE:

ELECTRONIC RECORD
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1138 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        H.R.1138

                     One Hundred Sixteenth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE FIRST SESSION

          Begun and held at the City of Washington on Thursday,
           the third day of January, two thousand and nineteen

                                 An Act

 
  To reauthorize the West Valley demonstration project, and for other 
                                purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. WEST VALLEY DEMONSTRATION PROJECT.
    (a) Reauthorization.--Section 3(a) of the West Valley Demonstration 
Project Act (Public Law 96-368; 42 U.S.C. 2021a note) is amended by 
striking ``$5,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1981'' 
and inserting ``$75,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2020 through 
2026''.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment 
of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit to Congress a report 
that describes--
        (1) the volumes, origins, and types of radioactive waste at the 
    Western New York Service Center in West Valley, New York;
        (2) what options have been identified for disposal of each such 
    type of radioactive waste;
        (3) what is known about the costs of, and timeframes for, each 
    such option;
        (4) the benefits and challenges of each such option, according 
    to the State of New York and the Department of Energy; and
        (5) as of the date of enactment of this Act--
            (A) how much has been spent on the disposal of radioactive 
        waste associated with the demonstration project prescribed by 
        section 2(a) of the West Valley Demonstration Project Act; and
            (B) what volumes and types of radioactive waste have been 
        disposed of from the Western New York Service Center.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```
# C_2016203EN.01003101.xml

| 7.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 203/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2016

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Official Journal of the European Union

C 203/31

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Article 75

The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to commitments relating to the processing, conversion or shaping of ores, source materials or special fissile materials and entered into:

| (a) | by several persons or undertakings, where the material is to return to the original person or undertaking after being processed, converted or shaped; or |
| --- | --- |

(a)

by several persons or undertakings, where the material is to return to the original person or undertaking after being processed, converted or shaped; or

| (b) | by a person or undertaking and an international organisation or a national of a third State, where the material is processed, converted or shaped outside the Community and then returned to the original person or undertaking; or |
| --- | --- |

(b)

by a person or undertaking and an international organisation or a national of a third State, where the material is processed, converted or shaped outside the Community and then returned to the original person or undertaking; or

| (c) | by a person or undertaking and an international organisation or a national of a third State, where the material is processed, converted or shaped inside the Community and is then returned either to the original organisation or national or to any other consignee likewise outside the Community designated by such organisation or national. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

by a person or undertaking and an international organisation or a national of a third State, where the material is processed, converted or shaped inside the Community and is then returned either to the original organisation or national or to any other consignee likewise outside the Community designated by such organisation or national.

The persons and undertakings concerned shall, however, notify the Agency of the existence of such commitments and, as soon as the contracts are signed, of the quantities of material involved in the movements. The Commission may prevent the commitments referred to in subparagraph (b) from being undertaken if it considers that the conversion or shaping cannot be carried out efficiently and safely and without the loss of material to the detriment of the Community.

The materials to which such commitments relate shall be subject in the territories of the Member States to the safeguards laid down in Chapter 7. The provisions of Chapter 8 shall not, however, be applicable to special fissile materials covered by the commitments referred to in subparagraph (c).

---
Exhibit 99.6
  CEO AND CFO SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION
 
  February 3, 2014
 
 Securities and Exchange Commission
 450 Fifth Street, N.W
 Washington, D.C. 20549
 
 
 
 Ladies and Gentlemen:
 
 The certification set forth below is being submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission for the purpose of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.
  Claude Mongeau, President and Chief Executive Officer, and Luc Jobin, Executive Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer, of Canadian National Railway Company, each certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:
  1.
the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and
  2.
the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Canadian National Railway Company.
  
  /s/ Claude Mongeau

/s/ Luc JobinClaude Mongeau

Luc JobinPresident and Chief Executive Officer
Executive Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer
# C_2016202EN.01008501.xml

| 7.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 202/85 |
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7.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 202/85

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Article 92

(ex Article 72 TEC)

(ex Article 72 TEC)

Until the provisions referred to in Article 91(1) have been laid down, no Member State may, unless the Council has unanimously adopted a measure granting a derogation, make the various provisions governing the subject on 1 January 1958 or, for acceding States, the date of their accession less favourable in their direct or indirect effect on carriers of other Member States as compared with carriers who are nationals of that State.

---
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-40916 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee

v. MOISES BELMARES-DELGADO Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 7:07-CR-158-1
Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Moises Belmares-Delgado (Belmares) pleaded guilty to attempting to enter the United States unlawfully after previous deportation. Belmares was sentenced at the bottom of the guidelines imprisonment range to a 57-month term ofimprisonment and to a two-year period ofsupervised release. Belmares gave timely notice of his appeal. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D October 3, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 07-40916

2 Belmares contends that this case should be summarily remanded for resentenci ng in light of G all v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007), and Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007). Reviewing this contention for plain error, we find nothing in the record indicating that the district court felt constrained by this court’s pre-G all jurisprudence. See United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 530 F.3d 381, 387-88 (5th Cir. 2008); U nited States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 339 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed (Aug. 20, 2008) (No. 08-5988). Instead, the record reflects that the district court imposed a guidelines sentence because of the need to punish Belmares and to deter him from future criminal conduct and because the guidelines sentence satisfied the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Belmarescontends that the district court failed toexplain adequately and justify its sentence in terms ofthe factors in § 3553(a). Under the circumstances of this case, the district court’s explanation for imposing a sentence at the bottom ofthe guidelines range isadequate tosatisfy this “court that [the district judge] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007). Belmares argues that his within-guidelines sentenc e should not be presumed to be reasonable under United Statesv. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006), because the 16-level enhancement provided by U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 is not “empirically grounded.” We rejected a similar argument in Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d at 338-39. The judgment is AFFIRMED.