Wind om w a s tr e a te d at a ho sp ita l, a

nd his tr e a tme nt inc lud e d thre e sta ple s to c los e his 1 head w ound. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-07-00711- CR

Wil lie Al e xa nde r , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 390TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- DC-07 -20 3347 , HO NORAB LE JULIE H . KO CUREK , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Wil lie Alexand er ap p eals from a convic tion by a jury of the off

ense of ag g ravated assault with a dea dly

wea pon. See Tex. Pena l Code Ann. § 22.02(a) (2) (West Supp. 2007). The jury assessed punishmen t at s ev en y ear s’ imprisonment. I n one issue, appe llant contends that the evidenc e wa s leg ally

and fa ctually

insufficient to support hi s conviction. For the re asons that follow,
we a ffirm the judg ment of convic tion.
BACK GR OUND

At trial, the evide nce show ed that appe llant eng ag ed in a s t ru gg le with J ames Windom outside Wi ndom’s home on the night of J une 12, 2007. Windom rec eived multiple injuries fr om t he inc ide nt i nc lud inga

he a d w ound

that r e qu ir e d me dic a l tr e a tme nt. 1Wit nesses re fer to the tool using diffe rent ter ms—“heavy -duty

wre nch,” “ vice- g rip ,” 2 “pliers,” and “g rip pliers.” There is also a picture of the tool in the rec ord. We ref er to it as the “tool.” 2

I n addition to W indom, witnesses for the State i n cl uded Windom’s wife, Dawn Windom; a neig hborhood secur ity office r, Luis Montilla; and a police office r, B rian Na rciso. Mrs. Windom testified that she a nd her husband wer e in their home on the night of the incident and that Windom ’s truck, w ith his work tools i n the truck’ s panel c ompartments, was pa rked in fr ont of their house . When s h e h ea rd a nois e that sounded “ like somebody was rummag ing thr oug h a truck” o u t s i d e their house , she re ported the noise to Windom, and he we nt outside to investigate. Mrs. Windom observe d her h u s band strug g ling with appe llant near Windom ’s truck a

nd saw Windom “blockingfrom the punc hes [appellant] was throwingat him.” She ca lled the police a fter the tw o me n c on tin

ue d th e ir str ug g le ou t of

he r s ig ht. Wind om t e sti fi e d th a t w he n h e we nt o uts ide to inv e sti g a te , he sa w a pp e lla nt b y his truck a nd, as he a

pproa ch ed appellant, a

ppellant told Wi ndom, “[I ]f y ou come ove r her e, I ’ll kick y our ass.” Windom then heard appellant close a storag e panel on the truck. A ppellant bac ked aw ay f r o m t h e tr u c k an d , a s h e d id

s o , Wi n d o m o b s e r

v e d a tool in appellant’s ha

nd. Windom did not 2

re m em b er eng ag ing in f

isticuffs with appellant, but did re call that appe llant threate ned him and str uc k h im o n th e he a d w iththe too l.

Luis Montilla testified that, as he arr ived at the sce ne, he obse rved the strug g le and
saw a pp e lla nt s tr ike Wind om w ith the too l, kno c kin g Wind om dow n. Mo nti lla a lso str ug g le d w ith appe l l ant, but was a

ble to restra in and handc uff him. Nar ciso testified that he w as the fir st police of fi c e r t o a rr ive a t th e sc e ne and

that he re c ov e re d th e too l.3 Appellant testified a s the only witness for the defe nse. He testified that he wa s in the
su bd ivi sio n w itha

fr ie nd wh o h a d r e la tiv e s in

the are a and that he wa

nte d to loo k a t a

tr uc k b e c a us e he had a friend w ho was int ere sted in buy ing it. He testified that Windom ’s t ruck was not that truck, that he did

no t take any

thi ngfr om Wi nd om’ s tr

uc k, and that h e nev e r s a id a

wo rd to Wi nd om. Appellant testified that he was car rying “g rip pliers,” a tool he used to ope rate the “e merg ency brake
re le a se ” on

his tr uc k. Al tho ug h h e a dmi tte d to str iki ngWindo m on th e head wit h h is h and

wh ile holding the “ g rip pliers” a nd to smoking crac k coca ine on the day of t he incident, he testi fied that Windom and Montilla took turns “punching ” him, that he was i n j u re d in the incident, and that he was justified in using f

orce as an a ct of self

-def ense. The jury found appe llant guilty

of ag g ravated assault with a d ea d l y wea pon and assessed punishment at seven y ear s’ imprisonment. The trial court e ntere d judgme nt in accor dance with the jury ’s ver dict. This appea l followed.
AN AL YSI S On a pp e a l, a pp e lla nt d oe s n ot c on te st the jur y ’s fi nd ingthat he c omm itt e d a ssa ult
. He c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e is le g a lly and fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o u

ph old his c on vic tio n b e c a

us e there was “ no evidenc e that the wr ench [ tool] was displ ay ed or used i n a manner which e stablishes the intent to cause death or serious bodily

injury .” His complaint addr esses the ag g ravating e lement of the offe nse—that he used or exhibit ed a de adly wea pon. See Tex. Penal C ode Ann. § 22.02(a). Appellant conte nds that, to support a dea dly wea pon finding , there must be evidenc e that the we apon
w a s u s e d w i t h t h e i n t e n tt o c a

u s e d e a t h o r

s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n

j u r y.4 A p e rs on is guil ty of the of fe ns e of a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult if th e pers on c omm its
an a ssa ult and the pe rs on

e ith e r ( 1) c a

us e s se ri ou s b od ily

inj ur y to ano th er, or

(2 ) u se s o r e xhibi ts a dea dly wea pon during the c o m m ission of the assault. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 22.02(a) (We st Su pp . 2 00 7) . “ Se ri ou s b od ily inj ur y ” is d e fi ne d a s “ bo dil y inj ur y that c re a te s a su

bs tanti a l r isk of death or that cause s death, serious perma nent di sfig ureme nt, or protra cted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or org an.” Id
. § 1.07(a) (46) (West Supp. 2007). The pe nal code de fi ne s “ de a dly

we a po n” a s: (A ) a fi re arm or any thi ng manif

e stl y de sig ne d, ma de , or

a da pte d f or the purp os e of inflicting death or

serious bodily

injury ; or ( B ) any

thing th a t i nth e ma

n n e r o f it s u s e o r in te n d e d u s e is c a p a b le o f c a u sing d e a t h o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n

j u r y.
Id . § 1.0 7 (a )(17) (West Supp. 2007). Fac tors that a jury may consider in de termining whether an object is a de adly

wea pon include: (1) the phy sical proxi mity betwee n parties, (2) threats or words used b y t h e assailant, (3) the size and shape of the objec t, (4) the manne r in which the a ssailant alleg edly u s ed t h e o b

j ec t , and (5) the potential of the obje ct to inflict death or se rious injury
. See Br own v . S

tat e , 716 S.W .2d 946, 947 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Th e c ourt of c ri min a l a

pp e a ls h a s c on sid e re d th e qu e sti on of wha t evi den c e is require d to suppor

t a deadly wea pon finding
. Se e Mc Cai n v . S tat e , 22 S.W.3 d 497 , 503 (T e x. Cr im. App. 2000). In M

c C ain , appellant ha d a butche r knife in his bac k pocket whe n he attac ked the complainant. Id . at 499. Althoug h complainant saw the knife in appe llant’s back poc ket during the attack, a ppellant neve r “touc hed, bra ndished, ref

err ed to, or overtly

display ed the knife in any way .” Id
. I n upholding the conviction for ag g ravated robbery , the court of criminal appe als addre ssed whatTo su pp or t hi s c on te nti on that the State mus t pro ve int e nt to c a us e de a th o r s e ri ou s b od ily 3 injury , appellant r elies on Bu i v . S tat e , 964 S.W .2d 335 (Tex. A pp.—Texarkana

1998, pet. re f’d.) , and Tho ma s v . S

tat e , 821 S.W .2d 6 1 6 (T ex . C rim. App. 1991). The se ca ses do not support ap p el l an t ’s ar g ument. I n Thomas , t h e i s s u e w a s w h e t h e r a “ s h an k ” w a s a

d e a d l y w e a p o nw i thi n su bs e c tio n ( A) of

the pe na l c od e ’s de a dly

we a po n d e fi nit ion
. 82 1 S. W.2 d at 61 7. I n th a t c on te xt, the cour t concluded that “the State is not require d to show that a knife of this kind was a ctually used or intended to b e u s ed i n a m an ner c apable of ca using de ath or ser ious bodily injury .” Id. at 621. I n Bui , the issue was whether the evidenc e wa s leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt to support the “jury ’s finding that the Dura flame log was a deadly wea pon.” 964 S.W .2d at 341-42. The court e x plained wh at t h e S t at e h adt o p ro v e t o s u p p o rt a d ea d l y

we ap o nfi n d i n g: A Dura flame logis not a deadly wea pon per se , but it can bec ome o n e if, in t he manner of its use, it is capa

ble of causing death or serious bodily injury
. . . . Since the Duraflame log is not a dea dly wea pon per se , the State must have shown that the Dura flame logwas c apable of causing death or serious bodi ly injury in the manner o f it s u s e b y [d e f

e n d an t]
. . . . I t is n o t n e c e s s ar y to s h o w th a t th e D u r a f la me log actua lly did cause serious bodily injury
. . . . Fur ther, the State did not nee d to prove th a t [ d e f e n d an t] intended

to use the Dur aflame log in such a manne r, if it proved that he did u s e t h e l o g i na

m an n e r t h a tc o u l d

c a u s e d e a t h o r

s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n

j u r y. Bui , 964 S.W .2d at 343 (interna l citations omit ted). 5 is require d to establish the dea dly wea pon element unde r sec tion 1.07(a)( 17)(B ). Id . The c ourt of criminal appe als conc luded that the State is not require d to prove spec ific intent to use the object a s a dea dly wea pon:
Th e pr ov isi on ’s pla in langua g e do e s no t re qu ir e that the a c tor a c tua lly int e nd de a th or serious bodily

injury ; an object is a de adly wea pon if the ac tor intends a use of the object in which it would be c apable of ca using de ath or ser ious bodi l y injury . The place ment of the wor d “ca pable” in the provision enable s the s tatute t o cover conduct that th re a te ns de a dly

fo rc e , e ve n if the a c tor

ha s n o in te nti on

of a c tua lly us ingde a dly forc e.
Id. a t 5 0 3
. T h e f

o c u s i s o nt h e “ c a

p a b i l i t y” o f t h e o b j e c t ’ s u s e t o c a

u s e d e a t h o r

s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n

j u r y,
n o tt h e a c t o r ’ s i n t e n t t o u s e t h e w e a p o n t o c a u s e d e a t h o r

s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n

j u r y. Id . In th is c on te xt, 36

we turn to our r eview of the leg al and f

actua l sufficienc y

of the e vidence to support appellant’s conviction of a g g ravated assault with a de adly wea pon. I n assessing the leg al suffic iency of the evidenc e to suppor

t a criminal convic tion, we revie w t he evidence in the l ight most favor able to the verdict to deter mine whether

any rational trier
o f f a c t c o u ld h a v e f

o u n d th e e s s e n ti a l e le me n ts o f th e c r im e b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b le d o u bt. Jack son
v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 3 0 7 , 319 (1979) ; D ric ha s v . S tat e , 175 S.W .3d 795, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). View ing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the verdic t, we assume that the trier of fac t resolved c onflicts in the testimony , weig hed the evidenc e, and drewrea sonable infe renc es in a
manner that supports the verdic t. Cla y ton v . S tat e , 235 S.W .3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Viewingthe evidenc e in the light most favor able to the ve rdict, appe llant admitted strikin g W i n d o m wi t h his hand while holding “pliers.” Windom testified that appe llant’s act of striking him on the hea d with the tool was “deliber ate,” that appellant “ threatened be fore doing it,” and that appe llant’s swing was “intentionally thrown.” Montilla testified that he w itnessed appe llant striking Windom with the tool and, after a ppellant struck Windom, W indom was “c onked out.” Additionally , Nar ciso testified that the “he avy -duty wre nch” w eig hed appr ox imately one pound and
was c apable of ca

using e ither ser ious bodily injury or death: Q: Of

fi c e r N arc iso , in y our e xpe ri e nc e of be inga po lic e of fi c e r, have y ou

de a lt wi th a va ri e ty of c a se s th a t ha

ve inv olv e d d e a dly

we a po ns ? A: Ye s. Q: I n addit i o n to the traditional things like knives a nd g uns, have you had an opportun i t y

to deal with ca ses wher e ther e’s a deadly wea pon other than a knife or a g un?7

A: Ye s. * * * Q: And base d on y our training an d ex perie nce, w ould y ou consider that the wr e nc h [to ol] that is State ’s Exhi bit 7 th a t y ou

re c ov e re d th a t ni g ht, that in the manner

of its use it could be consider ed somethi n g ca p ab le of c ausing either se rious bodily

injury or eve n death? A: Ye s. Viewingthe evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the verdic t, we conc lude that the evide nce w as leg ally sufficie nt to support the conviction of ag g ravated assault with a de adly wea pon. I n e va luatin g the fa c tua l su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , we vie w a ll o f t he e vid e nc e in a neutr al light a

nd ask if the pr oof of gui lt is aga inst the gr eat we ight a nd preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Zul ian i v . S

tat e , 97 S.W .3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We ma y set as i d e t he verdic t if the evidenc e is so weak that the ver dict is clear ly wrongand manife stly

unjust, or the verdic t is ag ainst the gre at weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. W

ats on v . S tat e , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414-15 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006).

Viewingthe evidenc e in a ne utral lig ht, appel l an t testified that he wa s only in the neig hborhood to look at a truc k that a friend was interested in buy ing, that he did not take any thing from Windom’s truck or say any thin g t o W i n d o m , and that he w as ac ting in self- defe nse. The testimony of Mrs. Windom, W indom, and Montill a, however, was t hat appe llant was the a g g ressor
and that he de lib e rate ly

str uck W in do m withthe too l. It w a s w ith in t he pr ov inc e of

the jur y to deter mine the cr edibility

of t he witnesses and the weig ht to be given to their testimony
. See M osley

v . S tat e , 983 S.W. 2d 24 9, 25 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ) ( jur y is e xclu siv e jud g e of

wi tne ss c re dib ili tyThere wer e seve ral inconsistenc ies in appellant’ s testimony . For example, his testim ony 4 re g a r d i n g t h e e xt e n to f

h i s i n j u r i e s c o n f

l i c t e d w i t h t h e m e d i c a l r e c o r d s an d o t h e r w i t n e sse s’ te sti mony . App e lla

nt’ s te sti mony

that hi s h e art

rate inc re a se d d

ue to h ig h b lood pres su re a lso conflicte d with his admissi on that he smoked cra ck coca ine on the day of the incident and Na rciso’s testimony that smoking c rac k coca ine ca n elevate a pe rson’s hea

rt rate
. 8 and of we ig ht t o b e g ive n th e ir

te sti mony , a

nd it i s th e e xclu siv e pr ov inc e of the jur y to r e c on c ile conflicts within the evidence ). The jur y could have conclude d that appellant’ s testimony that he wa s actingin self-defe n s e wa s not credible. I t was within the province of the jury to rec oncile the 4 conflicts in appe llant’s testimony and to judg e his cre dibilit y . See id. We conclude that the evidenc e is not so weak as t o b e cl ea rly wrongand manife stly

unjust and that the verdic t is not aga inst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e.
CO NC LU SION Havingconclude d the evidence is leg ally and factually sufficie nt to support the jury ’s
ve r d ic t o f a g g r a v a te d a s s a u lt w it h a d e a d ly w e a

p o n , w e o v e r

r u le a p p e ll an t’ s is s u e an d a f

f irm the trial court’ s judgme nt of conviction.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: Jul y

9, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh