If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

ROBIN E. SILAS,

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

May 25, 2023

v Nos. 359472; 362867

Macomb Circuit Court

EVELYN A. MCKENNEY, LC No. 2012-004854-DM

Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellee,

and

JODI DEBRECHT SWITALSKI,

Appellee.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and BORRELLO and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In Docket No. 359472, plaintiff Robin Silas appeals as of right the trial court’s 

November 17, 2021 order requiring him to pay one-half of appellee Jodi Switalski’s lawyerguardian ad litem fees in this postjudgment custody dispute. In Docket No. 362867, plaintiff 

appeals as of right the trial court’s August 16, 2022 order requiring him to pay $1,500 to Switalski 

and $1,000 to defendant Evelyn A. McKenney as a sanction for filing a frivolous postjudgment 

motion that sought, among other relief, to enforce plaintiff’s parenting time and to remove 

Switalski as the children’s lawyer-guardian ad litem. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we 

affirm in Docket No. 359472, but reverse the portion of the trial court’s August 16, 2022 order 

requiring plaintiff to pay Switalski’s and defendant’s attorney fees in Docket No. 362867.

I. BACKGROUND

The parties divorced in 2013. They have two minor children. Pursuant to a consent order,

plaintiff was granted sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ children. Plaintiff remarried 

in 2013. Defendant subsequently accused the children’s stepmother of manipulating and 

emotionally abusing the children, isolating them, falsely reporting that they have serious mental 
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illnesses, and forcing them to receive alternative medical treatments. In 2018, the parties entered 

into a consent order granting them joint legal and physical custody of the children. 

In 2020, defendant moved to change custody and requested sole physical and legal custody 

of the children. She alleged that the stepmother was harming the children by “diagnosing” them 

with mental disorders that were not confirmed by any qualified practitioner. Pursuant to a 

stipulated order entered on December 17, 2020, the trial court appointed Switalski as guardian ad 

litem for the children. Although the order referred to Switalski as a “guardian ad litem” (GAL), it 

also provided that Switalski would have the duties and powers of a lawyer-guardian ad litem 

(LGAL) as defined in MCL 712A.17d. The order further provided that “[t]he GAL’s fees are 

$300.00 per hour and shall be equally shared by the parties ($150.00/hour).” Additionally, any 

objection to the GAL’s billing invoices were required to be brought to the GAL’s attention within 

seven days of the billing date, “otherwise the billing shall be deemed agreed to.” Plaintiff 

stipulated to the entry of this order. 

After conducting an investigation, Switalski filed an ex parte emergency motion to award 

defendant sole legal and physical custody of the children. Switalski alleged that the stepmother’s 

“pathological” behavior had harmed the children. Switalski believed that the stepmother’s habit 

of diagnosing the children with mental and emotional conditions indicated that she suffered from 

a factitious disorder known as Munchausen syndrome by proxy. 

Plaintiff opposed the petition, but in September 2021 the parties agreed to entry of a consent 

order awarding them joint legal custody of the children, but awarding sole physical custody to 

defendant. Plaintiff’s visitation would be supervised by Dr. Ross Beckley in a therapeutic setting. 

Switalski subsequently moved for a show-cause order to require plaintiff to pay her fees. Although 

plaintiff had not previously objected to any of Switalski’s billing invoices, he opposed Switalski’s 

motion and argued that Switalski’s requested fees were excessive in part because she had 

overstepped the bounds of her duties as a GAL. Following a hearing, the trial court determined 

that Switalski had been appointed as an LGAL and ordered plaintiff to pay his one-half share of

Switalski’s fees. Plaintiff now appeals that order in Docket No. 359472. 

In October 2021, Dr. Beckley temporarily discontinued the therapeutic sessions because 

the sessions had become hostile. In June 2022, plaintiff moved to “enforce” the September 2021 

consent custody order by reinstating his visitation sessions. He also requested new psychological 

evaluations of the children by a neutral practitioner and requested Switalski’s removal as LGAL. 

In accordance with a referee’s recommendation, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion and 

ordered plaintiff to pay Switalski’s and defendant’s attorney fees as a sanction for filing a frivolous 

motion. Plaintiff challenges the trial court’s imposition of sanctions in Docket No. 362867. 

II. DOCKET NO. 359472

Plaintiff argues that Switalski was never duly appointed as an officer of the court because 

the appointment order did not clearly specify whether she was appointed as a GAL or an LGAL, 

and accordingly, all of her requested fees are unreasonable, thereby relieving him of liability for 

any of her fees. Although plaintiff challenged the reasonableness of some of Switalski’s fees in 

the trial court, he never argued that any ambiguity regarding Switalski’s status as a GAL or an 
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LGAL invalidated all of her requested fees or his obligation to pay any of her fees. Therefore, this 

issue is unpreserved.

To the extent that this issue involves the interpretation of a stipulated order, such an order 

is treated as a contract between the parties, subject to principles of contract interpretation. Andrusz 

v Andrusz, 320 Mich App 445, 453; 903 NW2d 636 (2017). Issues involving the interpretation of 

a contract are reviewed de novo as a question of law. Innovation Ventures v Liquid Mfg, 499 Mich 

491, 507; 885 NW2d 861 (2016). To the extent that this issue also involves the application of 

statutes and court rules, such issues are reviewed de novo as questions of law. Safdar v Aziz, 501 

Mich 213, 217; 912 NW2d 511 (2018). “Review of an unpreserved error is limited to determining 

whether a plain error occurred that affected substantial rights.” Rivette v Rose-Molina, 278 Mich 

App 327, 328; 750 NW2d 603 (2008). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain-error rule, three 

requirements must be met: (1) an error must have occurred; (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or 

obvious, and (3) the plain error affected substantial rights.” Id. at 328-329 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

Plaintiff’s obligation to pay Switalski’s fees is expressly addressed in the December 17, 

2020 stipulated order. Further, regarding the nature of Switalski’s appointment, the order cites

MCL 722.27(1)(d)(3)1as authority for Switalski’s appointment, but it also states that “[t]he GAL’s 

powers and duties are those defined by MCL 712A.17d,” which specifies the powers and duties of 

an LGAL. To the extent that the order is internally inconsistent, however, plaintiff stipulated to 

its entry, thereby consenting to Switalski’s appointment and to his obligation to pay one-half of 

Switalski’s fees, at the agreed rate of $300 an hour. 

“A consent judgment is in the nature of a contract, and is to be construed and applied as 

such.” Laffin v Laffin, 280 Mich App 513, 517; 760 NW2d 738 (2008). “If no reasonable person 

could dispute the meaning of ordinary and plain contract language, the Court must accept and 

enforce contractual language as written, unless the contract is contrary to law or public policy.” 

Id. “In general, consent judgments are final and binding upon the court and the parties, and cannot 

be modified absent fraud, mistake, or unconscionable advantage.” Id. To the extent that the 

stipulated order was ambiguous regarding the nature of Switalski’s appointment, it was not 

ambiguous as to the payment of her fees. The order clearly provides that her fee would be $300 

an hour, and that her fees would be equally shared by the parties. Although we agree that there 

are differences between a GAL and an LGAL, and that each serves distinct roles, there is also 

substantial overlap in their roles. See Farris v McKaig, 324 Mich App 349, 358; 920 NW2d 377 

(2018). In any event, the distinction is immaterial to plaintiff’s agreement to pay Switalski’s fees 

at the stipulated rate pursuant to an order that also specified that Switalski would have all the 

powers and duties of an LGAL. Furthermore, in addition to specifying that Switalski’s fees would 

be equally shared by the parties, and specifying that Switalski would have the powers and duties 

of an LGAL, the stipulated order further provided:

 

1 MCL 722.27(1)(d) authorizes a court to use a guardian ad litem in a child custody dispute. 

However, that subsection is not further divided, so it is apparent that the citation to “MCL 

722.27(1)(d)(3)” is erroneous. 
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Any objection to the GAL's billing must be brought to her attention, in 

writing, within seven (7) days of the billing date, otherwise the billing shall be 

deemed agreed to. 

Switalski presented evidence that she submitted invoices in April, June, and September 2021, and 

plaintiff did not timely object to these invoices. To the extent that plaintiff believed that Switalski 

was improperly charging for LGAL services, it was incumbent upon him to timely object to those 

invoices and identify any services he believed were unauthorized. Plaintiff having stipulated to 

bringing forth any objection to Switalski’s billings within a timely manner as prescribed by the 

contract, is bound by the contract. Because plaintiff stipulated to the agreement and failed to bring 

his objections within a timely manner as outlined in the stipulated contract, we affirm the trial 

court’s November 17, 2021 order requiring plaintiff to pay his one-half share of Switalski’s fees. 

III. DOCKET NO. 362867

In Docket No. 362867, plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding 

Switalski and defendant attorney fees as a sanction for having to respond to plaintiff’s 

postjudgment motion to enforce the September 2021 consent order. 

This Court reviews a trial court’s decision whether to award or deny sanctions for a 

frivolous filing for an abuse of discretion. Sprenger v Bickle, 307 Mich App 411, 422-423; 861 

NW2d 52 (2014). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is outside the range of 

principled outcomes. Hardrick v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 294 Mich App 651, 659-660; 819 NW2d

28 (2011). “However, the court’s underlying factual findings, including a finding of frivolousness, 

are reviewed for clear error.” Sprenger, 307 Mich App at 423. A finding is clearly erroneous 

when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.

American Alternative Ins Co, Inc v York, 252 Mich App 76, 80; 650 NW2d 729 (2002), aff’d 470 

Mich 28 (2004).

Preliminarily, plaintiff’s reliance on MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a) in support of his argument that 

it was improper to award defendant and Switalski their attorney fees without determining their 

inability to pay them, or determining his ability to pay, is misplaced. Neither the referee nor the 

trial court relied on MCR 3.206(D) as authority for the award of attorney fees. Rather, attorney 

fees were awarded as a sanction under MCR 1.109 and MCL 600.2591, because the trial court 

agreed with Switalski that plaintiff’s postjudgment motion was frivolous. 

MCR 1.109 provides, in pertinent part:

(5) Effect of Signature. The signature of a person filing a document, 

whether or not represented by an attorney, constitutes a certification by the signer 

that:

(a) he or she has read the document;

(b) to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief formed after 

reasonable inquiry, the document is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 

existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal 

of existing law; and
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(c) the document is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to 

harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.

(6) Sanctions for Violation. If a document is signed in violation of this rule, 

the court, on the motion of a party or on its own initiative, shall impose upon the 

person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which 

may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the 

reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the document, including 

reasonable attorney fees. The court may not assess punitive damages.

(7) Sanctions for Frivolous Claims and Defenses. In addition to sanctions 

under this rule, a party pleading a frivolous claim or defense is subject to costs as 

provided in MCR 2.625(A)(2). The court may not assess punitive damages. 

MCL 600.2591 provides, in pertinent part:

(1) Upon motion of any party, if a court finds that a civil action or defense 

to a civil action was frivolous, the court that conducts the civil action shall award 

to the prevailing party the costs and fees incurred by that party in connection with 

the civil action by assessing the costs and fees against the nonprevailing party and 

their attorney.

(2) The amount of costs and fees awarded under this section shall include 

all reasonable costs actually incurred by the prevailing party and any costs allowed 

by law or by court rule, including court costs and reasonable attorney fees.

(3) As used in this section:

(a) “Frivolous” means that at least 1 of the following conditions is met:

(i) The party’s primary purpose in initiating the action or asserting the 

defense was to harass, embarrass, or injure the prevailing party.

(ii) The party had no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying 

that party's legal position were in fact true.

(iii) The party's legal position was devoid of arguable legal merit.

(b) “Prevailing party” means a party who wins on the entire record.

“The frivolous claims provisions impose an affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a 

reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal viability of a pleading before it is signed.” Attorney 

General v Harkins, 257 Mich App 564, 576; 669 NW2d 296 (2003), overruled on other grounds 

by Garg v Macomb Co Community Mental Health Servs, 472 Mich 263, 283-285; 696 NW2d 646 

(2005). “The reasonableness of the inquiry is determined by an objective standard.” Id. “The 

focus is on the efforts taken to investigate a claim before filing suit, and a determination of 

reasonable inquiry depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.” Id. “That the alleged facts 

are later discovered to be untrue does not invalidate a prior reasonable inquiry.” Id. 
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A review of the record in this matter leads us to conclude that plaintiff’s motion to enforce 

the September 2021 consent order was not frivolous. The consent order stated, in pertinent part:

The Plaintiff shall continue receiving therapeutic parenting time with the 

minor children, as directed by Dr. Beckley, and Dr. Beckley shall continue to be 

the facilitator of the parenting time. Any changes/modifications to the Plaintiff’s 

parenting time shall be as recommended by Dr. Beckley, or as agreed upon by the 

parties. Either party may object to any recommendation(s) made by Beckley, and 

the parties shall retain the right to file a Motion seeking relief from the Court, in 

regard to the modification(s)/recommendation(s). 

Plaintiff’s motion addressed a stalemate situation that arose when a recommended “cooling 

off” period that began in October 2021 extended for several months with no resolution in sight. 

Plaintiff’s request for new psychological evaluations by a neutral provider was not objectively 

unreasonable given the lack of progress over the preceding six to eight months. His request to 

remove Switalski as LGAL also was not inherently unreasonable considering that Dr. Beckley had 

indicated that he could manage the therapeutic process without the assistance of an LGAL. 

Additionally, the referee did not make specific findings in support of the recommendation to 

impose sanctions, other than referencing Switalski’s statement that it took her 3.65 hours to read 

plaintiff’s motion, a seemingly bloated amount of time to simply read a motion. 

Switalski argues that plaintiff’s motion was frivolous because he knew that he could not 

meet the standard for proving that modification of the custody arrangement was in the children’s 

best interests. A party seeking to modify a custody or a parenting-time order “must first establish 

proper cause or a change of circumstances before the court may proceed to an analysis of whether 

the requested modification is in the child’s best interests.” Stoudemire v Thomas, ___ Mich App 

___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 360441); slip op at 4, quoting Lieberman v Orr, 319 

Mich App 68, 81; 900 NW2d 130 (2017). “When resolving important decisions that affect the 

welfare of the child, the court must first consider whether the proposed change would modify the 

established custodial environment.” Stoudemire, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4, quoting 

Pierron v Pierron, 486 Mich 81, 86; 782 NW2d 480 (2010). It should be obvious that Switalski’s 

argument before the trial court and this Court is devoid of merit because plaintiff’s motion was not 

attempting to change custody or the children’s established custodial environment. Rather, plaintiff

was attempting to move forward from the stalemate that had been ongoing since October 2021, 

and which had prevented him from exercising parenting time with the children consistent with the 

September 2021 consent order. Consequently, plaintiff was not required to demonstrate proper 

cause or a change of circumstances.

As to the issue of removal of Switalski, we note plaintiff’s legitimate concerns over the 

expenses and time that the LGAL has caused in these proceedings. Plaintiff has legitimate 

concerns regarding Switalski’s introduction of her husband, a former Macomb County judge, 

during a zoom hearing for no apparent reason. Additionally, we note that Switalski made a number 

of accusations in the beginning of this matter, mostly against the stepmother of the children, which 

lead to a CPS investigation. However, despite the fact that Switalski’s accusations led to the 

removal of the children from plaintiff’s sole custody, the CPS investigation found no evidence of 

the alleged medical and emotional abuse. And, as previously stated, the therapist working with 

the parties opined they could do so without the aid of Switalski. Hence, following our review of 
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the record in this matter, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court 

clearly erred by finding that plaintiff’s motion was frivolous, and accordingly, erred by awarding 

Switalski and defendant attorney fees as a sanction for having to respond to plaintiff’s motion. 

Sprenger, 307 Mich App at 423. Therefore, we reverse the portion of the August 16, 2022 order 

awarding defendant and Switalski attorney fees.

Affirmed in Docket No. 359472, and reversed in part in Docket No. 362867. No part 

having prevailed in full, no costs are awarded. MCR 7.219(A).

/s/ Anica Letica 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan