IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-30839

M. KATHLEEN MCKINNEY, Regional Director of Region Fifteen of the 

National Labor Relations Board, for and on behalf of the National Labor 

Relations Board, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

CREATIVE VISION RESOURCES, L.L.C., 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents the question of whether a district court abuses its 

discretion by granting injunctive relief under § 10(j) of the National Labor 

Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), absent specific findings that the 

enjoined conduct was egregious or otherwise exceptional. M. Kathleen 

McKinney, the National Labor Relations Board’s regional director, sought and 

obtained a temporary injunction requiring Creative Vision Resources, L.L.C., 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 13, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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to negotiate and bargain in good faith with a labor union.1 Creative Vision 

appeals the district court’s grant of injunctive relief, arguing that such relief 

was not equitably necessary under the circumstances of this case. 

We conclude that the district court abused its discretion because it 

ordered injunctive relief supported only by general findings of harm that do 

not evince exceptional or egregious conduct or harms in the context of the 

NLRA. Nor did the district court address adequately the effect of the excessive 

passage of time between the onset of the alleged wrongful activities and the 

issuance of the injunction. The district court’s order enjoined conduct in 2014 

in an attempt to preserve a status quo as it existed in 2011. Because we 

conclude that the district court’s findings are insufficient, we VACATE the 

district court’s order issuing injunctive relief and REMAND the case. 

I.

The relevant facts in this case are materially undisputed and relate to a 

work force of “hoppers,” persons who work on the back end of garbage trucks. 

The hoppers here are supplied by appellant Creative Vision to a waste disposal 

company called Richard’s Disposal, Inc., in New Orleans, Louisiana. 

In August 2005, Richard’s entered into a contract with a company called 

Berry to provide hoppers for its garbage trucks.2 Local 100, Service Employees 

International Union (“SEIU”), a labor union, represented Berry’s hoppers in 

their collective bargaining agreements between 2007 and 2009. Local 100 

1 Although McKinney filed the petition and is technically listed as the PlaintiffAppellee in this case, she took action on behalf of the National Labor Relations Board. 

Accordingly, we treat the National Labor Relations Board as the Plaintiff-Appellee and refer 

to it as “the NLRB” or “the Board” herein. 

2 “Berry” actually refers to a number of different business entities. The district court 

treated them as a single entity, however, and we do the same. 

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disaffiliated from SEIU in October 2009, but it continued to represent the 

hoppers as Local 100, United Labor Unions.3 

In 2010, Alvin Richard III, the son of the owner of Richard’s and an 

executive of Richard’s, formed Creative Vision, apparently to provide hoppers

to Richard’s. Creative Vision distributed hiring applications to the Berry 

hoppers who worked for Richard’s in May 2011, and on June 1, 2011, Richard’s 

informed Berry that it no longer needed Berry’s services. Beginning on June 

2, 2011, Creative Vision supplied the hoppers for Richard’s garbage trucks. 

Creative Vision employed the same hoppers as Berry—at least forty-three of 

the forty-four hoppers had been employed by Berry and had been represented 

by Local 100.

After Creative Vision began servicing Richard’s trucks, Local 100 

contacted Creative Vision, asking that it recognize and bargain with Local 100

as the exclusive representative of Creative Vision’s hoppers. According to 

Local 100, Creative Vision is a successor to Berry, and, as such, Creative Vision 

is required to bargain with the union. Local 100 claims that Creative Vision 

refused to recognize or bargain with it, and it filed an unfair labor practice 

charge against Creative Vision on June 17, 2011, alleging violations of the 

NLRA. The NLRB investigated and issued an administrative complaint 

against Creative Vision on March 30, 2012. The parties then prepared for a 

trial on the allegations before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).4

On July 25, 2012, however, the NLRB also filed a petition for injunctive 

relief in the federal district court. In the petition, the NLRB sought to enjoin

Creative Vision to recognize and bargain in good faith with Local 100 based on 

3 From the hoppers’ perspective, their relationship with the union was largely 

unchanged as a result of the disaffiliation. 

4 During this time, the NLRB points out that the parties also engaged in settlement 

negotiations. 

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the allegations before the ALJ. The petition lingered in the federal district 

court for almost two years. 

While the petition was pending in the district court, a number of events 

occurred in the administrative proceedings before the NLRB. The ALJ issued 

a decision siding with the NLRB on some of the claims against Creative Vision 

on January 7, 2013. The district court placed the ALJ’s decision into the record 

on January 24, 2013. Creative Vision and the NLRB filed exceptions to the 

ALJ’s ruling, and, as far as the record before us shows, that ruling is currently 

pending before the NLRB for decision. 

After the ALJ issued his ruling, the NLRB filed a motion in the district 

court on February 19, 2013, seeking an expedited ruling on the petition for the 

§ 10(j) injunction. At the same time, however, Creative Vision moved to 

dismiss the petition, arguing that injunctive relief was now a moot point in the 

light of the protracted delay in pursuing injunctive relief. On September 9, 

2013, the district court denied both the motion to expedite and the motion to 

dismiss, leaving the petition for injunctive relief pending before the district 

court. After these rulings, the district court took no further action until July 

8, 2014, when it granted the petition and entered an injunction, enjoining

Creative Vision to recognize and bargain with the union. It concluded that an 

injunction was needed to preserve the status quo ante in anticipation of the 

NLRB’s ultimate decision on the merits of the case. Creative Vision filed this

timely appeal, challenging the district court’s order granting the injunction 

under § 10(j) of the NLRA.

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II.

A.

1.

As this case involves a claim for injunctive relief under § 10(j), we turn 

first to the relevant statutory text for the standards of review. Section 10(j) 

provides as follows:

The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint . . . 

charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an 

unfair labor practice, to petition any United States district court, 

within any district wherein the unfair labor practice in question is 

alleged to have occurred or wherein such person resides or 

transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining 

order. Upon the filing of any such petition the court shall cause 

notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall 

have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or 

restraining order as it deems just and proper.

29 U.S.C. § 160(j). We recognize that “[t]he words of this section are 

unquestionably vague and provide little help to the [d]istrict [c]ourt.” Boire v. 

Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 479 F.2d 

778, 787 (5th Cir. 1973) (“Teamsters”). Nonetheless, we have observed as an 

initial insight “that § 10(j) does not authorize the Regional Director to seek an 

injunction in every unfair labor practice case.” Id.

The proper framework for reviewing a § 10(j) petition is a subject of some 

differences among the circuits. This Circuit, along with a number of other 

circuits, has adopted a two-part test. Specifically, this Court addresses: “(1) 

whether the Board, through its Regional Director, has reasonable cause to 

believe that unfair labor practices have occurred, and (2) whether injunctive 

relief is equitably necessary, or, in the words of the statute, ‘just and proper.’” 

Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1188–89 (5th Cir. 1975) 

(“Pilot Freight”). Other circuits apply a more traditional, four-part test for 

injunctive relief that requires the NLRB to show, among other things, a 

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sufficient likelihood of irreparable harm. See Chester ex rel. NLRB v. Grane 

Healthcare Co., 666 F.3d 87, 93–94 (3d Cir. 2011) (identifying various courts 

that have rejected the two-part test).

At the outset, Creative Vision argues that we should overrule our twopart test based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. Natural Resources 

Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008).5 In Winter, the Supreme Court reversed 

the Ninth Circuit’s judgment affirming the district court’s grant of injunctive 

relief based on possible future harm. Id. at 33. Specifically, the Court held 

that 

[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that 

he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer 

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 

the public interest.

Id. at 20. The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s standard, explaining that 

“[i]ssuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable 

harm is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an 

extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the 

plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22. 

Because Winter dealt with injunctive relief in a significantly different 

context from § 10(j) relief, it does not perfunctorily control here, especially 

given precedents of this Court that bind us. Specifically, we have reaffirmed 

our two-part test in the years following Winter, but we have also underscored

5 The injunctive relief in Winter arose in a different factual context. In Winter, an 

environmental protection organization sought a preliminary injunction against Naval testing 

in the Pacific, arguing that the testing would negatively impact various marine mammals. 

555 U.S. at 16–18. Obviously, the environmental organization was not invoking the specific 

injunctive relief authorized in § 10(j), which applies only in the context of labor violations. 

Thus, Winter does not mandate that we apply its test instead of our longstanding two-part 

test that specifically applies to § 10(j) injunctions. 

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that “the principles of equity inform an evaluation for § 10(j) relief.” Overstreet 

v. El Paso Disposal, L.P., 625 F.3d 844, 851 (5th Cir. 2010). The Third Circuit 

applies the same two-part test, reasoning that the four equitable prongs in 

Winter are incorporated into the two-prong test. Chester, 666 F.3d at 98. The 

Chester court observed that the first prong of the two-prong test evaluates the 

likelihood of success on the merits, and the remaining three factors inform 

whether such relief is “just and proper.” Id. at 99. Similarly, courts that apply 

the four-part analysis in the § 10(j) context necessarily “have made 

modifications . . . to accommodate the purposes and goals of the NLRA.” Id. at 

97. 

Given these explanations of the two-prong test, with which we agree, we 

are persuaded that our two-prong review of § 10(j) petitions for injunctive relief 

is not inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, and consequently, we do not 

overrule that standard. We are mindful, however, of the Supreme Court’s 

directive in Winter that “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy 

never awarded as of right.” 555 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added). Thus, we 

emphasize that the NLRB must establish both prongs of our two-part test with 

reasonable clarity in order to obtain injunctive relief. 

2.

Only one part of the two-part test is at issue in this appeal; Creative 

Vision concedes that the NLRB has satisfied the first prong of the analysis. 

Thus, this appeal turns on the second prong: whether the NLRB has shown 

that injunctive relief was just and proper based on the balance of the equities. 

See Overstreet, 625 F.3d at 851. We review the district court’s decision as to 

this prong for abuse of discretion. Id. at 850. 

B.

The abuse of discretion standard is often an elusive one, but a district 

court typically abuses its discretion if it: “(1) relies on clearly erroneous factual 

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findings; (2) relies on erroneous conclusions of law; or (3) misapplies the law to 

the facts.” Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 677 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Critically, “[w]here a district court rests its legal 

analysis on an erroneous understanding of governing law, it has abused its 

discretion.” Langbecker v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 476 F.3d 299, 306 (5th Cir. 

2007). Put another way, “[a] district court abuses is discretion when it 

misconstrues its proper role, ignores or misunderstands the relevant evidence, 

and bases its decision upon considerations having little factual support.” 

Arlook ex rel. NLRB v. S. Lichtenberg & Co., 952 F.2d 367, 374 (11th Cir. 1992). 

III.

Turning to this appeal, we hold that the district court abused its 

discretion in granting injunctive relief. The second prong for injunctive relief—

that the proposed relief is “just and proper”—does not apply to the NLRB’s 

petition for relief, certainly not at this time point in the litigation. Specifically, 

the district court rested its decision on the broad and general assumption that

injunctive relief may issue whenever the unfair labor practice at issue causes 

harm, without considering the specific impact on the union or its employees in 

this case. Upon reviewing the relevant law, we conclude that the district court 

failed to make sufficient factual findings suggesting that Creative Vision’s 

conduct was egregious or otherwise exceptional so as to warrant a § 10(j) 

injunction, particularly when the injunction issued several years after Creative 

Vision commenced the allegedly wrongful conduct. 

A.

Although a § 10(j) injunction involves discretion, its purpose is to 

“prevent erosion of the status of the parties pending [the NLRB’s] final 

decision.” Pilot Freight, 515 F.2d at 1188 (emphasis added). Our use of the 

term “erosion” necessarily implies that injunctive relief seeks to preserve the 

status quo ante when that status quo is capable of being preserved. Put 

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another way, injunctive relief serves its purpose, and should issue, when: (1) 

the employer’s alleged violations of the NLRA and the harm to the employees 

or to the union are concrete and egregious, or otherwise exceptional; and (2) 

those harms, as a practical matter, have not yet taken their adverse toll, such 

that injunctive relief could meaningfully preserve the status quo among the 

employer, the union, and the employees, that existed before the wrongful acts 

occurred.6 

Our caselaw adopts both of these principles. As to the first, we have been 

clear that a § 10(j) injunction is an “extraordinary remedy” to be employed only 

in the event of “egregious unfair labor practices.” Id. at 1192. To constitute

“egregiousness” for purposes of § 10(j), a labor practice must lead to exceptional 

injury, as measured against other unfair labor practices. The NLRA prohibits 

specific unfair conduct between adversaries, and most, if not all, conduct that 

is prohibited by the NLRA has the potential to, and often does, cause serious 

harm to competing unions, to the work force, and/or to employers. Yet, we have 

recognized that the NLRB’s administrative procedures should generally

control and that “measures to short-circuit the NLRB’s processes should be 

sparingly employed.” Id. To confine § 10(j) injunctive relief to its proper role, 

the NLRB must show, and the district court must find, that the unfair labor 

6 We recognize an ambiguity in the existing precedents as to whether we measure the 

injury by considering harms to the union, employees, or both. In Pilot Freight, this Court 

tended to balance the harm by considering the impact solely on the employer on one side and 

the union on the other. See 515 F.2d at 1194. In Overstreet, we looked in part to the “cause 

of the anti-Union sentiment among the workers.” 625 F.3d at 856. Other courts look more 

directly to the effects of unfair labor practices on both the union and the workforce 

collectively. See, e.g., Maram v. Universidad Interamericana de P.R., Inc., 722 F.2d 953, 959 

(1st Cir. 1983) (finding irreparable harm because “this was a discharge of the entire workforce 

in the face of unionization”). We recognize that there is often a necessary interplay between 

the workforce and the union when assessing harms as a result of unfair labor practices. We 

need not establish an exact standard in this case, though, because the district court’s 

findings, and indeed the record, are inadequate under any framework.

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practice, in the context of that particular case, has caused identifiable and 

substantial harms that are unlikely to be remedied effectively by a final 

administrative order from the NLRB.

The second principle, considered in the conjunctive with the first 

principle above, establishes that § 10(j) relief is only appropriate when “any 

final order of the NLRB would be meaningless and the remedial purposes of 

the Act will be frustrated without an injunction to preserve the status quo.” 

Overstreet, 625 F.3d at 851. Thus, injunctive relief should issue when harms 

are ongoing, yet incomplete and likely further to harm the union or its 

supporters in the workforce. For example, if a harm is of a routine character 

in the NLRA context, the parties usually can redress such wrongs under the 

NLRB administrative processes. See Muffley ex rel. NLRB v. Spartan Mining 

Co., 570 F.3d 534, 545–46 (4th Cir. 2009) (approving of the district court’s 

decision narrowly to tailor its injunctive relief to preserve “a critical mass of 

bargaining unit employees . . . such that, if the Board approves the ALJ’s 

proposed order, the union will be able to reassert its role as representative of 

those employees”).

In sum, a district court reviewing a petition for § 10(j) injunctive relief 

should provide only relief that is necessary and must issue specific findings of 

fact that suggest harm requiring § 10(j) injunctive relief. See Overstreet, 625 

F.3d at 851 (recognizing that equitable principles such as irreparable harm 

inform this Court’s existing § 10(j) analysis). In the light of this background, 

we turn to the district court’s findings in this case.

B.

We thoroughly have reviewed the relevant record, the district court’s 

order, and the reasons supporting its injunctive order. This review indicates

that the district court has not pointed to the type of conduct or current harms 

that warrant § 10(j) relief. Instead, the district court relied in large part on

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generalizations to support its conclusion that the NLRB was entitled to an 

injunction. The district court’s order fails to address adequately relevant and 

key facts in the case before it, including the three-year delay between the 

union’s filing of its complaint and the issuance of the injunction. 

Cases from this Circuit and other circuits provide an appropriate

contrast. For example, in Teamsters, this Court affirmed a § 10(j) order

enjoining a union from striking. 479 F.2d at 782. We concluded that such 

relief was appropriate because the company would be compelled either to resist 

the strike, which “quite clearly would result in severe financial loss to the 

Company as well as a significant decline in important public services,” or 

acquiesce to it, allowing the union “to get a toe-hold on the Florida operation 

that would prove most difficult to overcome.” Id. at 788. Thus, in Teamsters

substantial, identifiable harms would occur in the absence of an injunction

regardless of the action the company chose. 

Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that injunctive relief should 

issue in a case of egregious employer misconduct in which the employer 

“engaged in a panoply of unfair labor practices” by firing employees as a result 

of a labor dispute, enforcing new workplace rules, and engaging in other 

threatening activity to dissuade union participation. Arlook, 952 F.2d at 369–

71. The Arlook court emphasized that the union recently had been certified 

and, more importantly, there was evidence of a pervasive fear among the work 

force that they would be retaliated against for providing any support for the 

union. Id. at 373. Thus, the court noted that “[t]he Company has not merely 

fired a few employees, or altered one or two minor rules. Rather, the 

allegations span the gamut of labor violations.” Id. at 374 (emphasis added). 

Because the wrongs were so egregious, “[w]ithout an injunction, the Board’s 

ability to foster peaceful labor negotiations through normal procedures would 

be imperiled.” Id. Other circuits have similarly required § 10(j) relief when an 

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unfair labor practice tends to decimate an entire work force. See Hirsch v. 

Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 147 F.3d 243, 247–48 (3d Cir. 1998) (remanding so that 

the district court could enjoin a company from selling a manufacturing plant 

when the company sought to shut down a Pennsylvania plant, lay off the work 

force there, and move the work to a plant in Georgia in order to avoid 

negotiations with a union); Maram v. Universidad Interamericana de Puerto 

Rico, Inc., 722 F.2d 953 (1st Cir. 1983) (remanding for issuance of an injunction 

in a case involving “a discharge of the entire workforce in the face of 

unionization”). 

These cases provide a defining contrast to the findings in the district 

court’s order. In its order, the district court stated that Creative Vision’s

“failure as successor to negotiate with the Union disrupted the status quo ante, 

and temporary injunctive relief will restore that status quo.” To be sure, this 

result is not an uncommon consequence in successor cases that arise before the 

NLRB. The district court did not articulate specifically how this particular

conduct created an egregious case of refusal to bargain. The district court did

not explain, for example, how Creative Vision’s work force or the union suffered 

egregious or otherwise exceptional harm within the context of the usual NLRA 

cases as a result of Creative Vision’s failure to bargain. Nor did it indicate the 

reasons a § 10(j) injunction is now more appropriate to address these issues

than a Board order enforced through processes established under the NLRA. 

To the contrary, the district court, in fact, concluded that it could not identify 

“any reason why restoring the bargaining relationship now would be less 

effective than later NLRB relief.” ROA.879. This statement of the district court 

is clearly contrary to Pilot Freight, as injunctive relief must be affirmatively 

more effective than a final decision from the NLRB. 515 F.2d at 1192. 

Critically, the district court’s findings do not support a conclusion that 

Creative Vision’s conduct was in the egregious category, as compared to other 

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unfair labor practices, as our Circuit plainly requires. Id. Injunctive relief

may be warranted, for example, when unfair labor practices cause severe antiunion sentiment to emerge, but the district court made no factual finding 

suggesting that such sentiment has developed here. Cf. Overstreet, 625 F.3d 

at 856–57 (concluding that a district court could issue an injunction based in 

part on evidence that the employer’s activities had been “a direct cause” of antiunion sentiment and that the actions “led to several petitions to decertify the 

Union as the workers’ representative”). To the point, the district court’s 

findings do not indicate specific, egregious or exceptional, employer conduct or 

harms in this case that support a § 10(j) injunction, as this Court’s precedent

plainly requires.7 See Pilot Freight, 515 F.2d at 1192. The district court’s 

omissions are particularly pronounced on these facts because it issued the 

injunction some three years after the alleged unfair labor practices were 

initiated. Thus, we conclude that the district court and the NLRB have failed 

to articulate either evidence or reasons, in the context of the NLRA violations,

that justify resorting to an injunction. 

On appeal, the NLRB argues that the injunction should issue because 

the unfair labor practice here is failure to bargain in the successorship context: 

that is, where a new employer takes over a pre-existing group of unionized 

employees and refuses to bargain with the employees’ “former” union. The 

NLRB points to the Supreme Court’s decision in Fall River Dyeing & Finishing 

Corp. v. NLRB, which recognized that a union is especially vulnerable when 

7 The NLRB does make several references to specific harms in its brief. Specifically, 

it stated that Creative Vision hoppers now have fewer holidays, that several employees have 

faced discipline without union support or grievance procedures, and that Creative Vision may

alter the hoppers’ terms of employment without adequate consultation. We emphasize, 

however, that the district court did not address any of these points, or counterpoints thereto,

when it considered equitable necessity. Although we can certainly sympathize with the 

employees, who have fewer benefits, these grievances will be addressed by the Board’s 

administrative remedy. 

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negotiating with a successor employer because it is “uncertain about the new 

employer’s plans, and cannot be sure if or when the new employer must 

bargain with it.” 482 U.S. 27, 39 (1987). Fall River, however, does not involve 

§ 10(j) of the NLRA, and consequently does not authorize an injunctive remedy 

as a substitute for the established administrative remedy. Indeed, the Fall 

River Court addressed a final NLRB administrative decision that had

proceeded under the appropriate administrative framework, which lends some 

support to the point that the administrative process can deal effectively with 

many successorship cases. See id. at 34–35.

Nonetheless, the NLRB points us to various other courts that have 

referenced Fall River in the § 10(j) context.8 See, e.g., Small v. Avanti Health 

Sys., LLC, 661 F.3d 1180, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 2011). To the extent that Small

authorizes injunctive relief based solely on the type of labor practice at issue, 

we find it unpersuasive. Indeed, we note that the Small court relied 

substantially on speculative and generalized harms, emphasizing, for example,

“that failure to bargain will likely cause a myriad of irreparable harms.” Id. at 

1191 (emphasis added). In its brief, the NLRB engages in a similar line of 

reasoning, pointing out that Creative Vision’s conduct discourages 

participation in the union without offering specifics regarding the impact in 

this case. Although we certainly acknowledge that the type of unfair labor 

8 To that end, the NLRB’s counsel urged at oral argument that the NLRB’s policy is 

to seek injunctive relief when the successor employer fails to bargain with the pre-existing 

union. In support, it filed a series of policy analyses from the Department of Labor suggesting 

that failure to bargain in this context is often an appropriate candidate for injunctive relief. 

To the extent that these documents establish a policy to seek injunctive relief in these cases, 

we decline to read them to demonstrate that the NLRB is entitled to injunctive relief in all

cases where a successor employer refuses to negotiate with the union. At most, these 

documents suggest that we should require fewer additional facts to support injunctive relief 

in successorship cases than in other cases, but they do not support the view that injunctive 

relief should issue in every case without due consideration of the specific facts in that case. 

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practice plays a role in the quantity of proof that must be offered to establish 

egregious or exceptional harm, we hold that the district court must articulate 

specific reasons to justify the issuance of an injunction based on the facts in 

the specific case. 

We recognize that any unfair labor practice may cause, and often does 

cause, serious harms affecting the rights of workers and labor unions. In many 

cases, the union is weakened as a result of unfair labor practices on the part of 

employers, and individual employees may lose important benefits of their 

employment as a result. We do not downplay the serious consequences of many 

unfair labor practices. The remedy for such practices, however, typically lies 

with the NLRB’s administrative process—not with the district courts, which 

are often poorly equipped to deal with these complex and nuanced cases in a 

field of specialty law. Injunctive relief in the federal district court under § 10(j) 

is available and appropriate when the unfair labor practices are particularly 

egregious or otherwise exceptional, as compared to other NLRA violations. See 

Pilot Freight, 515 F.2d at 1192. Both the NLRB and the district court have 

failed to articulate facts that suggest the administrative process is insufficient 

to afford relief in this case as it now appears before us. 

IV.

In sum, we hold that the NLRB and the district court have failed to 

establish specific egregious or exceptional harms in the context of this case that 

warrant § 10(j) relief. The alleged unfair labor practices here, although 

significant, are not of the egregious or exceptional category, when compared to 

other NLRA violations. Because the petition for injunctive relief has been 

pending for several years and is now before the NLRB for a final decision, the 

extraordinary remedy of a § 10(j) injunction is unnecessary as far as appears 

on the record before us. Thus, the district court abused its discretion by 

granting this injunction. We therefore remand this case for such further 

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proceedings and reconsideration in the light of this opinion, as may be deemed 

appropriate in the discretion of the district court. 

VACATED and REMANDED. 

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