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16-2439-cv 

Lambe v. Atlas Solar Holdings LLC.

 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE 

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

 At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York on the 

1st day of September, two thousand seventeen. 

Present: JON O. NEWMAN, 

 ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 

 PETER W. HALL, 

 Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________________________ 

TROY LAMBE, SUNRAY SOLAR INC., MAX 

DIVERSIFIED INC., 

 Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Appellees, 

 v. 16-2439-cv 

ATLAS SOLAR HOLDINGS, LLC, YOSSEF KAHLON, 

AKA JOSSEF KAHLON, 

 Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellants. 

_____________________________________________________ 

 

Appearing for Appellants: Kathyrn C. Cole, Farrell Fritz, P.C.(James M. Wicks, Sarah M. 

Baird, on the brief), Uniondale, NY 

Appearing for Appellees: Paul W. Verner, Verner Simon, New York, NY. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Wexler, J.). 
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ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED. 

 Atlas Solar Holdings, LLC and Yossef Kahlon (together, the “Kahlon Defendants”) 

appeal from (1) the February 2, 2016 judgment in favor of plaintiffs Troy Lambe, Sunray Solar 

Inc., and Max Diversified Inc. (together, “Plaintiffs”) entered in the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of New York (Wexler, J.); (2) the January 29, 2016 order granting 

Plaintiffs’ motion for a directed verdict on the Kahlon Defendants’ counterclaim for fraud; and 

(3) the July 1, 2016 order denying the Kahlon Defendants’ motion to amend the judgment. We 

assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of 

issues for review. 

 The Kahlon Defendants argue that the district court exceeded its discretion in not 

allowing them to seek a post-judgment setoff against the jury award pursuant to New York 

General Obligations Law § 15-108. We disagree. “[T]he New York Court of Appeals warned 

that ‘as an affirmative defense, General Obligations Law § 15–108(a) must be pled by a 

tortfeasor seeking its protection.’” Schipani v. McLeod, 541 F.3d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing 

Whalen v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 92 N.Y.2d 288, 292 (1998)). A party may move “at 

any point before final judgment is entered” to amend its answer to assert a setoff pursuant to 

Section 15-108. Id. at 159. 

The Kahlon Defendants argue amendment of their answer was unnecessary because their 

answer already pled a setoff as an affirmative defense. Their answer pled, in relevant part, that: 

The relief sought by Plaintiff against Defendants, if any be found, 

must be set off, reduced, abated and/or apportioned to the extent 

that Plaintiff’s actions or omissions or bad faith caused or 

contributed to the damages and/or to the extent that Plaintiff’s 

actions and/or omissions caused damage to Defendants. 

App’x at 142. 

 This pleading is inadequate because the setoff it describes was to occur “to the extent that 

Plaintiff’s actions or omissions or bad faith caused or contributed to the damages . . . .” A plain 

reading of the defense, as pled, means any award to the Plaintiffs must be decreased to the extent 

that the Plaintiffs caused or contributed to the damages. The answer does not satisfy New York’s 

requirement that a Section 15-108 setoff be pled as an affirmative defense. 

 The district court did not exceed its discretion in denying the motion to amend postjudgment. “When the moving party has had an opportunity to assert the amendment earlier, but 

has waited until after judgment before requesting leave, a court may exercise its discretion more 

exactingly.” State Trading Corp. of India, Ltd. v. Assuranceforeningen Skuld, 921 F.2d 409, 418 

(2d Cir. 1990). 

 Moreover, the Kahlon Defendants failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal. The 

Kahlon Defendants make their argument regarding the district court’s denial of its motion to 
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amend in a footnote in their opening brief. Appellants’ Br. at 36 n. 13. “We do not consider an 

argument mentioned only in a footnote to be adequately raised or preserved for appellate 

review.” United States v. Restrepo, 986 F.2d 1462, 1463 (2d Cir. 1993). In their reply brief, the 

Kahlon Defendants reverse their position by stating in a footnote that they are not seeking to 

amend the answer. Appellants’ Reply Br. at 7 n.5 (“we do not seek to amend our Answer.”). 

 We have considered the remainder of the Kahlon Defendants’ arguments and find them 

to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk