J-S18043-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

CHRISTOPHER HANSON

Appellant No. 2275 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 3, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0000421-1984

 CP-39-CR-0001582-1983

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, J., and MUNDY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED APRIL 17, 2015

Appellant, Christopher Hanson, appeals pro se from the June 3, 2014 

order dismissing, as untimely, his serial petition for relief filed pursuant to 

the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After 

careful review, we affirm.

A previous panel of this Court summarized the relevant procedural 

history of this case as follows.

On July 14, 1984, a jury found Appellant guilty of 

second-degree murder, rape and criminal 

conspiracy.1 On January 30, 1986, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment. This Court 

affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on August 

31, 1987, and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s 

petition for allowance of appeal on March 23, 1988. 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 3121(a) and 903(a), respectively.
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See Commonwealth v. Hanson, 534 A.2d 130 (Pa. 

Super. 1987) (unpublished memorandum), appeal 

denied, 544 A.2d 1341 (Pa. 1988). Appellant has 

since filed numerous PCRA petitions as well as 

federal habeas corpus petitions, none of which have 

garnered him relief.

Appellant filed [a previous] pro se PCRA 

petition on February 9, 2010. Therein, Appellant 

alleged an exception to the PCRA time-bar based on 

newly discovered evidence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(ii). Appellant offered as newly 

discovered evidence a December 7, 2009 written 

statement by Colie B. Chappelle, Esquire (Attorney 

Chappelle) stating that Appellant’s co-conspirator, 

Timothy Seip entered into a secret plea agreement 

with the Commonwealth in exchange for Seip’s 

testimony at Appellant’s trial. On March 31, 2010, 

the PCRA court entered an order notifying Appellant 

of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition 

without a hearing pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 907. The PCRA court ultimately 

dismissed the petition on July 6, 2010 and Appellant 

filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. 

On June 8, 2011, this Court vacated and 

remanded for further proceedings. Commonwealth 

v. Hanson, 31 A.3d 737 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(unpublished memorandum at 3). The panel 

concluded that Attorney Chappelle’s written 

statement could support an exception to the PCRA 

time-bar.

Although the agreement, much like Appellant’s 

guilt, was determined in an earlier proceeding 

based upon evidence therein presented, new 

evidence may be presented to challenge a prior 

determination. Here, the affidavit and its 

contents constitute the previously unknown 

facts upon which Appellant’s claim is based. 

The PCRA court erred in determining these 

facts could not support application of the timebar exception.
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Id. (unpublished memorandum at 2-3).

On remand, the PCRA court held a hearing on 

Appellant’s petition. On June 11, 2012, the PCRA 

court entered an order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA 

petition on the merits.

Commonwealth v. Hanson, 82 A.3d 472 (Pa. Super. 2013) (unpublished 

memorandum at 1-3), appeal denied, 83 A.3d 414 (Pa. 2013). Appellant 

filed a notice of appeal, and this Court affirmed the PCRA court’s order on 

June 27, 2013, concluding that his PCRA petition was untimely and the PCRA 

court was without jurisdiction to entertain Appellant’s claims. Id. Our

Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allocatur on December 31, 

2013. Id.

On April 8, 2014, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition. On April 

15, 2014, the PCRA court issued its Rule 907 notice. Appellant filed two pro 

se responses on May 19, 2014. The PCRA court entered its order dismissing 

Appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely on June 3, 2014. On July 2, 2014, 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.2

____________________________________________

2 Although Appellant’s notice of appeal was docketed on July 28, 2014, 

Appellant has provided a copy of the cash slip used by the Department of 

Corrections to mail his notice of appeal to the PCRA court. The cash slip 

bears a date of July 2, 2014. Under the prisoner mailbox rule, “a pro se

prisoner’s document is deemed filed on the date he delivers it to prison 

authorities for mailing.” Commonwealth v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34, 38 

(Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 46 A.3d 715 (Pa. 2012). 

As a result, we deem Appellant’s notice of appeal filed on July 2, 2014, and 

therefore timely. We further note that Appellant and the PCRA court have 

complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.
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On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review.

Should Appellant be granted PCRA relief based on 

new evidence in the form of an affidavit signed by 

Timothy Mark Seip, dated March 28, 2014[?] In that 

affidavit, attached to Appellant’s 907 notice, Exhibit 

“A”, Seip claimed that he was coerced to testify 

against Appellant [], and was assured of an 

undisclosed plea agreement with [A]ttorney Makoul 

and [P]rosecutor Tomsho, and would receive the 

death sentence if he, (Seip), rejected this plea 

agreement[.]

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

We begin by noting our well-settled standard of review. “In reviewing 

the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court’s 

determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). “The scope of review is limited to the findings 

of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level.” Commonwealth v. 

Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). “It is well-settled 

that a PCRA court’s credibility determinations are binding upon an appellate 

court so long as they are supported by the record.” Commonwealth v. 

Robinson, 82 A.3d 998, 1013 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). However, this 

Court reviews the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo. Commonwealth 

v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

Before we may address the merits of Appellant’s arguments, we must 

first consider the timeliness of Appellant’s PCRA petition because it 
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implicates the jurisdiction of this Court and the PCRA court. 

Commonwealth v. Davis, 86 A.3d 883, 887 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). Pennsylvania law makes clear that when “a PCRA petition is 

untimely, neither this Court nor the trial court has jurisdiction over the 

petition.” Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237, 241 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 103 (Pa. 2014). The “period for 

filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling; 

instead, the time for filing a PCRA petition can be extended only if the PCRA 

permits it to be extended[.]” Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 

2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, Ali v. 

Pennsylvania, 135 S. Ct. 707 (2014). This is to “accord finality to the 

collateral review process.” Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 

(Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). “However, an untimely petition may be 

received when the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the 

three limited exceptions to the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), are met.” Commonwealth v. 

Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). The PCRA 

provides, in relevant part, as follows.

§ 9545. Jurisdiction and proceedings

...

(b) Time for filing petition.—
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(1) Any petition under this subchapter, 

including a second or subsequent petition, shall 

be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment becomes final, unless the petition 

alleges and the petitioner proves that: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim 

previously was the result of interference 

by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of 

the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or 

laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is 

predicated were unknown to the 

petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due 

diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional 

right that was recognized by the 

Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after 

the time period provided in this section 

and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively. 

(2) Any petition invoking an exception 

provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within 

60 days of the date the claim could have been 

presented. 

...

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).

In the case sub judice, Appellant was sentenced on January 30, 1986, 

this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on August 31, 1987, 

and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allocatur on March 23, 

1988. See Hanson, supra at 1. As a result, Appellant’s judgment of 
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sentence became final on June 21, 1988, when the time for Appellant to file 

a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court expired. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (stating, “a judgment becomes final at the 

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme 

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the 

expiration of time for seeking the review[]”); U.S. S. Ct. R. 13(1) (stating “a 

petition for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment in any case ... is timely 

when it is filed with the Clerk of this Court within 90 days after entry of the 

judgment[]”). Appellant’s instant April 8, 2014 petition was filed almost 26 

years after his judgment of sentence became final and more than 17 years 

after the PCRA’s grace period ended, so it was therefore patently untimely.3 

However, Appellant argues that two time-bar exceptions apply in this case. 

Specifically, Appellant raises the governmental interference and the newlydiscovered fact exceptions to the time-bar. Appellant’s Brief at 7-8.

____________________________________________

3 The 1995 amendments to the PCRA initiated the current one-year timebar. The 1995 amendments also granted prisoners whose judgment of 

sentence had become final more than one year before the implementation of 

the time-bar, one year from the effective date of the amendments to file 

their first PCRA petition. Act of November 17, 1995, P.L. 1118, No. 32 

(Spec. Sess. No. 1), § 3(1). Under this provision “a petitioner’s first PCRA 

petition, that would otherwise be considered untimely because it was filed 

more than one year after the judgment of sentence became final, would be 

deemed timely if it was filed by January 16, 1997.” Commonwealth v. 

Thomas, 718 A.2d 326, 329 (Pa. Super. 1998) (en banc). However, our 

Supreme Court has noted this grace period does not apply to second or 

subsequent PCRA petitions. Commonwealth v. Crews, 863 A.2d 498, 501 

(Pa. 2004).
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In order to meet the statutory requirements of the governmental 

interference exception, “[the a]ppellant was required to plead and prove that 

his failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by 

government officials with the presentation of the claim [or claims] in 

violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the 

Constitution or laws of the United States....” Commonwealth v. Chester, 

895 A.2d 520, 523 (Pa. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted; emphasis in original). A defendant claiming this exception must 

also show that “the information could not have been obtained earlier with 

the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 

1248, 1253 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted). 

Likewise, our Supreme Court has previously described a petitioner’s 

burden under the newly-discovered evidence exception as follows. 

[S]ubsection (b)(1)(ii) has two components, which 

must be alleged and proved. Namely, the petitioner 

must establish that: 1) “the facts upon which the 

claim was predicated were unknown” and 2) “could 

not have been ascertained by the exercise of due 

diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (emphasis 

added). 

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Pa. 2007) (emphasis in 

original). “Due diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps 

to protect his own interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not 

have learned the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence. This 
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rule is strictly enforced.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d 44, 53 (Pa. 

Super. 2011) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 50 A.3d 121 (Pa. 2012).

Additionally, as this Court has often explained, all of the time-bar 

exceptions are subject to a separate deadline.

The statutory exceptions to the timeliness 

requirements of the PCRA are also subject to a 

separate time limitation and must be filed within 

sixty (60) days of the time the claim could first have 

been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). 

The sixty (60) day time limit ... runs from the date 

the petitioner first learned of the alleged afterdiscovered facts. A petitioner must explain when he 

first learned of the facts underlying his PCRA claims 

and show that he brought his claim within sixty (60) 

days thereafter.

Id. (some citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has held that Section 

9545(b)(2) also requires a showing of due diligence insofar that a petitioner 

must file the petition within 60 days that the claim could have first been 

presented. Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 350 (Pa. 2013), 

cert. denied, Edmiston v. Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 639 (2013).

As noted above, Appellant has consistently averred in previous PCRA 

petitions that the Commonwealth offered Seip a secret plea deal in exchange 

for his testimony against Appellant. See Hanson, supra at 2. In his latest 

PCRA petition, Appellant argues that he has discovered, through an affidavit 

from Seip, that the Commonwealth threatened to seek the death penalty 

against Seip, if Seip did not accept its plea offer. Appellant’s Brief at 7.
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As to the governmental interference exception, Appellant avers the 

following.

After receiving Seip’s affidavit indicating that 

Seip had been in discussions for a lenient sentence in 

exchange for his testimony, Appellant filed the PCRA 

informing of such actions. Appellant also acquired 

transcripts of Seip’s guilty plea, and had learned of 

these discussions by [ADA] Tomsho and [Attorney] 

Chappelle, after the Hughes affidavit in 2006. 

Appellant acted diligently in suspecting that the 

Commonwealth may have allso [sic] concealed 

threats to Seip, now evidenced by Seip’s affidavit 

wherein he states he would get the death penallty 

[sic] if he rejected the plea agreement. Appellant 

had proven the applicability of the governmental 

interference exception under [S]ection 9545(b)(1)(i).

Id. In addition, Appellant avers that Seip’s affidavit constitutes previously 

unknown facts so as to satisfy the time-bar exception at Section 

9545(b)(1)(ii). Id. at 8 n.2; Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3.

As this Court explained in our 2013 memorandum disposing of 

Appellant’s last PCRA petition, Seip actually testified at Appellant’s February 

19, 2008 PCRA hearing, during which he discussed his plea negotiations 

with the Commonwealth. Hanson, supra at 8-9, quoting N.T., 2/19/08, at 

27-28. Specifically, at said hearing, Seip was called to testify as Appellant’s 

own witness, about Seip’s plea negotiations with the Commonwealth. 

Appellant repeatedly asked Seip whether he received a promise of a five to 

ten year sentence from the Commonwealth in exchange for testifying 

against Appellant, to which Seip responded in the negative. N.T., 2/19/08, 

at 15-16, 18-20, 22-25. 
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As noted above, Appellant has had knowledge of a purported plea 

bargain between Seip and the Commonwealth since 2008. See Hanson, 

supra at 2. Whether Seip was cooperating with the Commonwealth to gain 

a favorable sentence, or whether his cooperation was induced through the 

threat of a negative consequence, such as the imposition of the death 

penalty, is immaterial. Because Appellant had knowledge of the alleged plea 

agreement in 2008, Appellant possessed sufficient information to form the 

underlying basis for the time-bar exception he now alleges in 2015. 

Therefore, Appellant has failed to prove that he filed the instant PCRA 

petition within 60 days that the claim could have first been presented. See 

Edmiston, supra; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). As a result, the PCRA court 

correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of 

Appellant’s claims. See id.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the PCRA court properly 

dismissed Appellant’s serial PCRA petition as untimely filed. Accordingly, the 

PCRA court’s June 3, 2014 order is affirmed.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/17/2015