alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Charge questions for presentation #2 on Algae Mass Production

Intrinsic Hazards and Effects Data

1) Besides toxins and the potential for harmful algal blooms (HABs), what other hazards may 

be associated with the mass production of algae? (e.g., invasiveness, ecological effects, 

effects on aquatic food webs, etc)

a. How can these hazards be best detected/monitored? How can these hazards be best 

measured?

b. What types of data can be collected and should we request/gather during the 

submission process in order to evaluate these potential hazards?

2) What algae data are available to help determine the risk posed by algal mass production

during the submission process?

a. Are data available about natural occurring or wild-type algae, when found or grown in 

high concentrations that can be used to evaluate the effects of engineered algae mass 

grown for commercial purposes?

Exposure Considerations

3) What potential hazards do different containment systems pose and should be considered 

and evaluated during a risk assessment?

a. How can a submitter demonstrate a containment system is secure or poses no threat to 

the surrounding environment?

Charge questions for presentation #3 on Advanced Genetic Engineering

4) What information should be included when submitting information on the construct used 

to develop a new organism in which the genetic code has been altered using synthetic 

biology techniques? 

a. Should data requirements be different for these organisms? If so, why?

5) How can the predicted function of a genetically engineered construct be shown to be 

limited to the purpose for which it was designed?

a. How can a construct based on a gene known to encode multiple functions (i.e. under 

different conditions or in other species) be shown to be contained? 

6) When assessing xenonucleic acids-based constructs, what biological containment methods 

are best employed?

a. What information can be used to confirm that a biological containment method is safe 

and poses no risk to the environment? 

b. What differences exist and should be consider when assessing the risk of RNA versus 

DNA modifications?

Charge question for concluding session

7) What questions have we not asked that are relevant to our task? What have we missed?
#### Guy T. HELVERING, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, v. The MIDWEST INVESTMENT COMPANY.

No. 2014.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Nov. 20, 1939.

Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and J. P. Wenchel, Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue, of Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

*1015Thomas D. Lyons, of Tulsa, Okl., for respondent.

Before LEWIS and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Petition dismissed on motion of petitioner.
AMY BUBLAK 

COUNCILNtEMBER 

DFPARTMENTOF 

••.••:cfcT OPERATIONS 

^GiOOCi -U.. A R^2U 

OFncE OF THE Cii-Y COUNCI L 

156 S. BROADWAY, SUITE 230 I TUilLOCK, CALIFORNJA 95380 PHONE 209-668-5540 F.AX 209-658-5668 

August 9.2010 

Ray LaHood, Sccrclar)'ofTransporta(ion 

U.S. Depanment of'rraiisportation 

400 7"'Street, SW 

Waiiliington, DC 20590 

Dear Mr. Secretary, 

On behalf of the City of Tiuiock, I am pleased to ivrite in support of the SCASDP grant application .submitted by 

the City of Mode.stn, which, if awarded, will be used to initiate direct daily passenger air service between Modesto 

and Portland or Seattle: We recognize the importance of quality, dependable commercial air service to the local 

economy through improved access for visitors, and most importantly, to support area business and industry, 

organizations and institutions. 

New direct/non-stop service lo an airline hub other titan San Francisco is critically important to the health and 

groivth of the Modesto business community. The contemplated improvements to our local air sendee will provide 

a significant boost to economic development in our area. Local hu.<;incss travelers have been very vocal about the 

need for air travel from Modesto City-County Airport and have pledged their support. 

As congestion on area roadways and gasoline prices both increase, air travelers are burdened by lengthy dri%'es to 

distant airports. The addition of a new hub will proWde a welcome solution for those in our community, as well as 

travelers lium outlying areas of the central valley and the foothills region. 

We are coramitlcd to tlie long-term success of air travel at Modesto City-County Airport, and are pleased to have 

this opportunity lo voice our support for this grant application. This is a project that has strong community support, 

and with your help, can pro\'ide substantial benefits to the community. For these reasons, I urge you to strongly 

consider Modesto City-County Airport as a worthy recipient of the Small Commimity Air Service Development 

Program grant. 

Sincerely, 

T^-^r::^:: 

AlvrV' BUBLAK 

Councilmembcr 

AB.kcw 

Modesto City-County Airport - Small Community Air Service Development Grant - August 2010 51
# Washington_county_differentials
# C_2012326EN.01039301.xml

| 26.10.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 326/391 |
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26.10.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 326/391

---

CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

TITLE V

CITIZENS' RIGHTS

CITIZENS' RIGHTS

Article 46

Diplomatic and consular protection

Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which he or she is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that Member State.

---
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A15A1201. MEDLEY v. MEDLEY.

Appellant’s brief and enumerations of error were due to be filed on March 23,

2015. Because they have not been filed, this appeal is DISMISSED pursuant toCourt

of Appeals Rules 13, 15 (a), and 23 (a).

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

03/27/2015

March 27, 2015
#### Monica Lynn COLEMAN, petitioner, v. Lori SIMPSON, Trustee.

No. 02-744.

Jan. 21, 2003.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.
# C_2016202EN.01003001.xml

| 7.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 202/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 202/30

---

Article 24

(ex Article 11 TEU)

(ex Article 11 TEU)

1.   The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.

The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded. The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States, in accordance with the Treaties. The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is defined by the Treaties. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to these provisions, with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

2.   Within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action, the Union shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States' actions.

3.   The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action in this area.

The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.

The Council and the High Representative shall ensure compliance with these principles.

---
PROMISSORY NOTE


Vancouver, British Columbia
April 30, 2002

                                                                    $US 5,490.00

FOR  VALUE  RECEIVED, the undersigned promises to pay to the order of Edwin Lao,
the  principal sum of Five Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Dollars ($US5,490.00) in
legal  tender.  Payment  shall  be  made  upon  the  successful completion of an
initial  public  offering  of  the  common  stock  of  Corporate Development and
Innovation  Inc  and  sale  of  all registered shares pursuant to such offering.

     1.     Default.     If any payment is not paid when due, or if Obligors
            -------
breach any other agreement with the holder of this note, Obligors will be in
default.  Upon default, the holder may declare the unpaid principal balance and
all accrued interest and unpaid late charges, if any, immediately due and
payable, without notice, and Obligors will then pay that amount.

          The holder may employ attorneys or other agents to collect amounts due
under this note if Obligors are in default or to otherwise enforce the terms of
this note and any agreement securing this note, and Obligors agree to pay all
fees, costs and expenses incurred by the holder as a consequence of default by
Obligors.  Such fees, costs and expenses include attorneys' fees whether or not
litigation is commenced and including any appeal, fees or expenses incurred in
any bankruptcy, receivership, or other insolvency proceedings, any anticipated
post-judgment collection charges, and all other costs of collection, including
court costs.  The holder may delay enforcing any of its rights under this note
without forfeiting such rights.

     2.     Waiver.     The Obligors hereby severally waive presentment, demand
            ------
for payment, protest, notice of nonpayment or dishonor, and any relief, waiver
or discharge arising from any extension of time for payment granted before, at
or after maturity, or for any other causes.

     3.     Obligors.     "Obligors" as used in this note means all makers,
            --------
signers and co-signers, guarantors, sureties, and endorsers.


                                                      /s/
                                       -----------------------------------------
                                       Corporate Development and Innovation Inc.



<PAGE>
MATTHEW GOEDECK

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 15

- 4338

________ _____________________/

Opinion filed April 6, 2016.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Alachua County

. Mark W. Moseley , Judge

.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public

Defender, Tallahassee , for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

WOLF, WINOKUR, and WINSOR, JJ., CONCUR.
# C_2012326EN.01004701.xml

| 26.10.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 326/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 326/1

---

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

PART THREE

UNION POLICIES AND INTERNAL ACTIONS

UNION POLICIES AND INTERNAL ACTIONS

TITLE IX

EMPLOYMENT

EMPLOYMENT

Article 146

(ex Article 126 TEC)

(ex Article 126 TEC)

1.   Member States, through their employment policies, shall contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in Article 145 in a way consistent with the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union adopted pursuant to Article 121(2).

2.   Member States, having regard to national practices related to the responsibilities of management and labour, shall regard promoting employment as a matter of common concern and shall coordinate their action in this respect within the Council, in accordance with the provisions of Article 148.

---
#### James D. MILNE, Appellant, v. Esther S. ANDERSON, Appellee.

No. 2416.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Sept. 6, 1976.

*403Charles K. Cranston, of Gallagher, Cran-ston & Snow, Anchorage, for appellant.

A. Robert Hahn, Jr., of Hahn, Jewell & Stanfill, Anchorage, for appellee.

OPINION

Before BOOCHEVER, C. J., and RABI-NOWITZ, CONNOR, ERWIN and BURKE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This litigation was initiated when appel-lee Esther Anderson filed a complaint in district court against appellant James Milne. Anderson’s claim for relief was grounded on a promissory note given her by Milne for a loan of $4,000. In the district court action Anderson asserted that there was an unpaid balance due of $3,269, plus interest, costs and attorney’s fees. As part of his answer, Milne alleged a counterclaim in the amount of $4,287, based upon a sale of real estate from Anderson to Milne.

Since the validity of, and balance owing by Milne under the promissory note was stipulated to at trial, the non-jury trial involved only issues raised by Milne’s counterclaim. In a memorandum opinion the district court, James A. Hanson, Superior Court Judge presiding, ruled that Milne was entitled to $756.43 of the amount he claimed.

After judgment was entered in the district court, Milne appealed to the superior court. Thereafter, Superior Court Judge Ralph E. Moody entered an order in which he found in part that Judge Hanson’s judgment in the district court action was in effect a judgment of the superior court. More particularly, the order in question states:

> Judicial notice is taken of the fact that Judge James A. Hanson is a Superior Court Judge in the State of Alaska. The Superior Court has general jurisdiction to try all cases arising in the State pursuant to AS 22.10.020. The Court finds that the Judgment is in effect a Judgment of the Superior Court of the State of Alaska because of the general jurisdiction conferred upon Judge James A. Hanson pursuant to the foregoing statute.

Judge Moody’s order then provided for dismissal of Milne’s appeal with directions permitting Milne to appeal to this court as in cases initially arising in superior court.

In our recent opinion in *Stephens v. Hammersley,*550 P.2d 1268, 1269 (Alaska 1976), we said:

> When a judge sits by assignment in a specific court, he has the same jurisdiction as the judge in whose stead he presides, and he acts in the same capacity as a regular member of that court. The acts and decisions of the trial judge in this case were the acts and decisions of a district court judge. Under Appellate Rule 45, a superior court judge, acting as an intermediate appellate judge, may properly rule on decisions rendered by the district court, and this is so regard*404less of the fact that a superior court judge was presiding. We therefore must reverse the decision of the superior court as to its jurisdiction to entertain the appeal . . . . (footnotes omitted)

*Stephens v. Hammersley*is controlling and we therefore reverse Judge Moody’s jurisdictional order and remand the matter to the superior court for determination of the merits of Milne’s appeal.

Remanded.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-12-00737-CV

Rick Wood, Appellant

v.

Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 261ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-GN-09-003280, HONORABLE STEPHEN YELENOSKY, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Rick Wood has filed an unopposed motion to dismiss his appeal. We

grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a).

__________________________________________

David Puryear, Justice

Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton and Henson

Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion

Filed: November 20, 2012
An equal opportunity employer 1220 L Street, Northwest Russell White

Washington, DC 20005

- 4070 Health Sciences Manager

Tel 202

- 682

- 8344

Fax 202

- 682

- 8270

whiter@api.org

November 15 , 2012

Byron J. Bunker,

Division Director

Compliance Division

Office of Transportation and Air Quality US Environmental Protection Agency

2000 Traverwood Drive

Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105

RE: CAA Section 211(b) Fuels and Fuel Additives Health Effects Testing Regulation:

Final Report for Gasoline DIPE Vapor Condensate : Embryo

- Fetal Toxicity Study in Rats by

Inhalation Exposure (Study No. 0 5

- 4287)

Dear Mr. Bunker :

The American Petroleum Institute (API), on behalf of the Section 211(b) Research Group (RG),

is submitting the following information to EPA as partial fulfillment of the CAA Section 211(b)

Alternative Tier 2 requirements of the testing regulation:

 Final Report for Gasoline DIPE Vapor Condensa te: Embryo

- Fetal Toxicity Study in

Rats by Inhalation Exposure (Study No. 05

- 4287)

I f you require further information or have any questions regarding this submission, please

contact me.

Regards,

Russell D. White

Enclosures on CD : 1) Final Report for Gasoline DIPE Vapor Condensate: Embryo

- Fetal

Toxicity Study in Rats by Inhalation Exposure (Study No. 05

- 4287)

Cc: Joe Sopata, EPA (via email)
#### In the Matter of William Hall, Petitioner, v Vincent Del Castillo, as Chief of the New York City Transit Authority Police Department, et al., Respondents.

—Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondent New York City Transit Authority Police Department, dated October 21, 1988, which, after a hearing, dismissed the petitioner from his position as a Transit Police Officer.

Adjudged that the determination is confirmed and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.

The petitioner, who was employed as a police officer by the New York City Transit Authority Police Department, was charged with committing forcible sexual acts against two women, and assaulting them. The petitioner was convicted of assault in the third degree arising out of these two incidents, but was acquitted of the rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse charges. After a disciplinary hearing, the petitioner was dismissed from service.

Our scope of review is limited to ascertaining whether or not the Hearing Officer’s finding that the petitioner was guilty of the charges against him in the disciplinary proceeding is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact *(see, Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. v New York State Div. of Human Rights,*77 NY2d 411, 417; *Matter of Berenhaus v Ward,*70 NY2d 436, 443). Here, the testimony of each of the victims, if true, established all of the facts necessary to sustain the charges against the petitioner. The petitioner chose not to testify at the hearing. He contends that the testimony of the victims was incredible and should not have been believed. However, a Hearing Officer’s decision to credit the testimony of a witness "is largely unreviewable by the courts, who are disadvantaged in such matters because their review is confined to a lifeless record” *(Matter of Berenhaus v Ward, supra,*at 443). Upon reviewing this record, we conclude that the testimony thus credited provided substantial evidence for the determination under review.

The petitioner contends that the Hearing Officer should have recused herself because she had already rendered a decision on this case after an ex parte hearing, which decision was vacated. We find that in this case the Hearing Officer was *744not required to recuse herself as a matter of law, and that she did not improvidently exercise her discretion in declining to do so *(see, People v Moreno,*70 NY2d 403, 405-406; *People v Tartaglia,*35 NY2d 918, 919-920). Moreover, the punishment imposed was not so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness *(see, Matter of Berenhaus v Ward, supra; Matter of Ahsaf v Nyquist,*37 NY2d 182; *Matter of Pell v Board of Educ.,*34 NY2d 222).

We have reviewed the petitioner’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit *(see, Matter of Dean v Bradford,*158 AD2d 772). Thompson, J. P., Kunzeman, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.
From: Chris Hornback [ mailto:CHornback@NACWA.ORG ]

Sent: Monday, June 09, 2014 2:44 PM To: Behl, Betsy Subject: RE: 2014 Draft Updates t o EPA Recommended Human Health Ambient Water Quality Criteria

Betsy

– Thanks again for meeting with us last week to discuss the bacteriophage criteria development efforts.
On the human health criteria, NACWA is actively reviewing the draft updates, but w ould like to request another 30

- 60 days beyond July 14 to complete its review. The technical nature of these issues will dictate that we get some outside assistance to help in preparing our comments. We don’t have the expertise in

- house, but we would lik e to review everything carefully.
Please let me know if the Agency would consider an extension.
Thank you,

Chris

_______________________________________________________________________________ Chris Hornback | Senior Director, Regulatory Affairs | Nationa l Association of Clean Water Agencies (NACWA) (O) 202/833

- 9106 | (M) 703/798

- 5714 | chornback@nacwa.org
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA & WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 7024.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Nov. 27, 1939.

John J. Quinn, U. S. Atty., and Thorn Lord, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Trenton, N. J., for appellant.

John A. Laird, of Newark, N. J., for appellee.

Before BIGGS, MARIS, and BIDDLE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal is without merit. See United States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 3 Cir., 204 F. 705. The Government failed to prove its case. In this connection we note that the suit was instituted on February 7, 1933, but was not tried until November 23, 1938, over five and a half years later.

Affirmed.
THE STATE OF TEXAS

MANDATE

TO THE 71ST DISTRICT COURT OF HARRISON COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Court of Appeals District of Texas, on the 2nd 

day of October, A.D. 2014, the cause upon appeal to revise or reverse your Judgment was 

determined; and therein our said Court made its order in these words:

David Eron Bouknight, Appellant

v.

Cynthia Dianne Bouknight, Appellee

No. 06-14-00034-CV

Trial Court No. 06-0896

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court 

below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We note that the appellant, David Eron Bouknight, has adequately indicated his inability 

to pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court in this 

behalf, and in all things to have it duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

WITNESS, the Hon. Josh R. Morriss, III, Chief Justice of our said Court of Appeals, with 

the seal thereof annexed, at the City of Texarkana, this the 14th day of April, A.D. 2015.

DEBRA K. AUTREY, Clerk