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RENDERED: MARCH 17, 2016 

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2015-SC-000359-MR 3ml; 

CURTIS HOWARD APPELLANT 

ON APPEAL FROM GARRARD CIRCUIT COURT 

V. HONORABLE C. HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE 

NO. 12-CR-00077 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER 

AFFIRMING 

Following the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss, Curtis Howard 

entered a conditional guilty plea to three counts of incest, one count of firstdegree sexual abuse, and to being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO) 

and was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment.' The charges arose from 

allegations that Howard had sexual intercourse with his adult stepdaughter. 

Howard now appeals as a matter of right and argues that the incest statute 

does not criminalize consensual sexual intercourse between non-blood related 

adults who never had a parent/child relationship. We disagree and affirm the 

trial court's judgment. 

1Howard was originally indicted on six counts of incest, six counts of firstdegree rape, six counts of first-degree sodomy, and being a second-degree PFO. Half 

of the rape and sodomy charges were alleged to have been committed against his wife 

and the other half were against his stepdaughter. It is not clear from the record why 

Howard plead guilty to being a first-degree PFO. 
I. ANALYSIS. 

Kentucky's incest statute states: 

A person is guilty of incest when he or she has sexual intercourse 

or deviate sexual intercourse, as defined in KRS 510.010, with a 

person whom he or she knows to be an ancestor, descendant, 

uncle, aunt, brother, or sister. The relationships referred to herein 

include blood relationships of either the whole or half blood 

without regard to legitimacy, relationship of parent and child by 

adoption, relationship of stepparent and stepchild, and 

relationship of step-grandparent and step-grandchild. 

Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 530.020(1). Howard concedes that the plain 

language of the statute criminalizes sexual intercourse between a stepparent 

and a stepchild; however, he argues that, based on the ordinary meaning of the 

word "child," "stepchild" refers only to the minor child of one's spouse by a 

former partner. Given that definition, Howard argues KRS 530.020 does not 

criminalize sexual intercourse between a stepfather and his adult 

stepdaughter. Because this reading of the statute fails to comport with the 

complete definition of "child," the remainder of KRS 530.020, and persuasive 

case law, we disagree. 

While we do not wholly reject Howard's interpretation of "child," we find 

that it is incomplete. The Oxford American Dictionary defines "child" as "a 

young human being below the age of puberty" and also as "one's son or 

daughter (at any age)." The Oxford American Dictionary of Current English 130 

(Oxford University Press 1999). Thus, contrary to Howard's contention, the 

definition of "child" is not limited to a minor; rather, the term applies to an 

offspring of a parent, regardless of age. In the context of KRS 530.020(1), 

"stepchild" refers to the son or daughter of one's spouse by a former partner at 

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any age. Therefore, we hold that Kentucky's incest statute criminalizes sexual 

intercourse between a stepparent and a stepchild, regardless of age and 

consent. 

This interpretation is further bolstered by a full reading of KRS 530.020. 

The second section of the statute provides: 

(a) Incest is a Class C felony if the act is committed by consenting 

adults. 

(b) Incest is a Class B felony if committed: 

1. By forcible compulsion as defined in KRS 510.010(2); or 

2. On a victim who is: 

a. Less than eighteen (18) years of age; or 

b. Incapable of consent because he or she is physically 

helpless or mentally incapacitated. 

(c) Incest is a Class A felony if: 

1. Committed on a victim less than twelve (12) years of age; 

or 

2. The victim receives serious physical injury. 

KRS 530.020(2). Where section (1) of the statute does not mention age, 

subsection (2)(a) clearly characterizes incest between consenting adults as a 

Class C felony. After reading both sections of the statute together, it becomes 

clear that the age of the victim is not an element of the offense except for 

determining the class of the felony committed. Thus, the General Assembly 

undoubtedly intended to prohibit sexual intercourse with an adult stepchild 

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and a minor stepchild alike. Howard's argument that Kentucky's incest statute 

does not criminalize sexual intercourse between related, consenting adults 

must fail because the statute contemplates and prohibits such a scenario. 

This interpretation of KRS 530.020 is not novel; the Court of Appeals has 

construed stepparent-incest similarly in at least two published opinions. In 

2004, the Court, in Dennis v. Commonwealth, 156 S.W.3d 759, 762 (Ky. Ct. 

App. 2004), held that Kentucky's incest statute 2prohibited sexual intercourse 

between a stepparent and stepchild. Dennis argued that KRS 530.020 

prohibited sexual intercourse between a stepparent and stepchild only if a 

blood relationship also existed. Id. at 760-61. The Court disagreed, 

considering legislative commentary from 1974 and a Kentucky Attorney 

General Opinion, which both interpreted KRS 530.020 to prohibit sexual 

intercourse between a stepparent and a stepchild, regardless of blood 

relationship. Furthermore, the Dennis Court noted that the Supreme Court 

had impliedly concluded that KRS 530.020 prohibited sexual intercourse 

between a stepparent and stepchild. Id. at 762 (citing Talbott v. 

Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 85 n. 1 (Ky.1998) (in dicta, the Court noted 

that "sexual intercourse between stepparent and stepchild is incest[.]") and 

Collins v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569 (Ky. 1997) (the Court affirmed an 

incest conviction against a defendant who sexually abused his stepdaughter 

without addressing the fact that the victim was his stepdaughter)). 

2We note that the Dennis Court interpreted a prior version of KRS 530.020; 

however, the substance of the statute as to stepparent-incest has remained 

unchanged. 

4 
In Raines v. Commonwealth, 379 S.W.3d 152 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012), the 

Court of Appeals considered the effect of age on stepparent-incest. There, 

Raines argued that KRS 530.020 3did not criminalize sexual intercourse 

between a stepfather and an adult stepdaughter who was not related by blood. 

Id. at 153-54. After briefly discussing Dennis, the Court disagreed with Raines 

and found that a plain reading of KRS 530.020 did not include the victim's age 

as an element of the crime and that "the primary element for incest [was] the 

relationship of the parties." Id. at 154. Therefore, the Court held that "the 

legislative intent [was] to prohibit sexual intercourse between persons with 

such relationships, including stepparents and stepchildren." Id. 

The Raines Court found further support for its holding in the 

unpublished decision in Jones v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-002639-MR, 

2007 WL 288280 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2007). On nearly identical facts to 

Raines, the Court considered Jones's Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 

(RCr) 11.42 motion, in which Jones argued that his trial counsel was ineffective 

for advising him to plead guilty to incest. Id. at *1-*2. Jones, like Howard 

herein and Raines, maintained that KRS 530.020 only prohibited sexual 

intercourse between a stepparent and a minor stepchild. Id. at *2. The Court 

disagreed, reasoning that "stepchild" encompassed both an adult and minor 

child of one's wife or husband and finding that the "family unit is equally 

threatened by sexual relations between a stepparent and adult stepchild as 

3Again, we note that the Raines Court considered a version of KRS 530.020 

that was slightly different from the version interpreted in Dennis as well as the version 

interpreted herein. Those differences do not alter the analysis as to stepparent-incest. 

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between a stepparent and minor stepchild." 4 Id. at *3. The Raines Court 

concurred with this reasoning and holding without reservation. Raines, 379 

S.W.3d at 155. 

Howard urges this Court to overrule Raines and Jones, but we are not 

persuaded. Both cases are factually on point and present nearly identical 

issues and arguments to the case at hand. While it is true that Jones is an 

unpublished decision and its procedural posture is framed differently, i.e. 

considering the stepparent-incest issue in the context of an RCr 11.42 appeal, 

the analysis and reasoning of the substantive law is nonetheless relevant and 

persuasive. Furthermore, Raines adopts Jones's reasoning to support its 

nearly identical holding. 

We are also persuaded by Raines and Jones on the merits of their 

reasoning. As stated above, the complete definition of "child" includes minor 

and adult offspring of a parent. To ignore this portion of the definition is 

untenable. Moreover, it is evident that sexual intercourse between a 

stepparent and an adult stepchild threatens the family unit, and Howard's 

arguments to the contrary do not persuade us to depart from this position. 

Howard submits two cases from outside of Kentucky that he argues 

support his contention; however, we do not find them persuasive. Both Beam 

v. State, 1 So. 3d 331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) and Commonwealth v. Rahim, 

4Special Judge Miller dissented from Jones, saying, "I do not interpret KRS 

530.020 as criminalizing sexual relationships between a stepparent and a stepchild 

over 18 years of age as it does not deprecate the family unit nor implicate hereditary 

risk. I do not believe the legislature intended the term "stepchild" to apply to a person 

over 18 years of age." Id. 

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805 N.E.2d 13 (Mass. 2004) interpret state statutes which require sexual 

relations between individuals related by consanguinity, or blood, for incest to 

be committed. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 826.04 (West 2006) and Mass. Gen. Laws 

Ann. ch. 272 § 17 (West 2002). KRS 530.020 requires no such relationship 

and by its own terms contemplates incest between non-blood relatives, 

including a parent and a child by adoption, a stepparent and a stepchild, and a 

step-grandparent and a step-grandchild. 5KRS 530.020(1). Therefore, because 

Kentucky's incest statute is wholly different from those of Florida and 

Massachusetts, the cases interpreting those statutes are distinguishable and 

not persuasive. 

II.. CONCLUSION. 

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's denial of 

Howard's motion to dismiss and judgment. 

All sitting. All concur. 

5Howard argues that this Court should consider Bradford v. Commonwealth, 

345 S.W.3d 245 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011), wherein the Court of Appeals held that the 

General Assembly did not intend to extend the reach of KRS 530.020 to the stepgrandparent/step-grandchild relationship. We note that this case has been overruled 

by statute, as the following year the General Assembly amended KRS 530.020(1) to 

explicitly include the relationship of step-grandparent and step-grandchild. 2012 Ky. 

Acts ch. 148, § 4 (effective July 12, 2012). 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: 

Jason Apollo Hart 

Department of Public Advocacy 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: 

Andy Beshear 

Attorney General 

Jason Bradley Moore 

Assistant Attorney General 

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