alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Joseph Cross, Appellant.

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New *314York County (John C. Leonforte, J.), rendered November 17, 1980, convicting defendant, *in absentia,*of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and sentencing him, *in absentia,*to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of from *ZVi*to 7 years, unanimously affirmed.

On information from an unidentified informant, police officers approached a storefront social club. Through a window, an officer saw defendant climb on top of a juke box and drop an object into an elevated air-conditioner mounted on the building wall adjacent to the doorway. A woman then opened the door and the officers entered. A loaded revolver was recovered from a well inside the air-conditioner.

Contrary to defendant’s assertions, guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the People, and considering that credibility is a matter to be determined by the trier of fact, the evidence conclusively established that defendant possessed a loaded and operable gun *(People v Malizia,*62 NY2d 755, 757, *cert denied*469 US 932). Further, contrary to defendant’s contentions, it was unnecessary for each piece of circumstantial evidence to point to no conclusion other than guilt, as it is a totality of the evidence which, as here, must lead to that conclusion *(People v Cathey,*38 AD2d 976). While the People must prove that possession of a weapon in the third degree took place outside defendant’s home or place of business, the social club herein does not meet the definition of a place of business where money is exchanged for products or services and where there is public access *(see, People v Rodriguez,*68 NY2d 674).

Defendant’s remaining arguments are unpreserved as a matter of law, and we decline to reach them (CPL 470.05 [2]). Were we to reach the merits, we would find no error, first, because the court need not marshal or refer to the evidence to any greater extent than is necessary to render the charge intelligible *(People v Culhane,*45 NY2d 757, 758, *cert denied*439 US 1047). Second, the charge did not unfairly emphasize the People’s view of the evidence nor provide the jury with an insight into the court’s personal view of guilt or innocence. In examining the charge as a whole, the court properly charged the jury on reasonable doubt and conveyed the appropriate burden of proof *(People v Goodfriend,*64 NY2d 695). In any event, in light of the overwhelming proof of guilt, any error must be considered harmless. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Carro, Kupferman, Asch and Rubin, JJ.
# C_2016202EN.01014401.xml

| 7.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 202/144 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 202/144

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Article 215

(ex Article 301 TEC)

(ex Article 301 TEC)

1.   Where a decision, adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union, provides for the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a joint proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission, shall adopt the necessary measures. It shall inform the European Parliament thereof.

2.   Where a decision adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union so provides, the Council may adopt restrictive measures under the procedure referred to in paragraph 1 against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities.

3.   The acts referred to in this Article shall include necessary provisions on legal safeguards.

---
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1492 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1492

  To update the map of, and modify the maximum acreage available for 
            inclusion in, the Yucca House National Monument.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 4, 2019

  Mr. Tipton introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To update the map of, and modify the maximum acreage available for 
            inclusion in, the Yucca House National Monument.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Yucca House National Monument 
Boundary Revision Act''.

SEC. 2. YUCCA HOUSE NATIONAL MONUMENT AMENDMENTS.

    (a) Boundary Adjustment.--The boundaries of Yucca House National 
Monument are revised to include the approximately 160 acres of land 
generally depicted as ``Proposed Expansion Tract'' on the map entitled 
``Yucca House National Monument Proposed Boundary Revision'', numbered 
318/105,085, and dated August 2010.
    (b) Map.--The map referred to in subsection (a) shall be on file 
and available for public inspection in appropriate offices of the 
National Park Service of the Department of the Interior.
    (c) Acquisition.--Within the lands described in subsection (a), the 
Secretary of the Interior may acquire lands and interests in lands by 
donation. The Secretary of the Interior may pay administrative costs of 
such donations with appropriated funds.
                                 <all>
```
#### Jack A. MARCHMAN, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. M-76-743.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

March 10, 1977.

Edward E. Sutter, Alva, and David E. Pepper, Oklahoma City, for appellant.

Larry Derryberry, Atty. Gen., Robert L. McDonald, Asst. Atty. Gen., Alan Foster, Legal Intern, for appellee.

OPINION

BUSSEY, Presiding Judge:

The Appellant, Jack A. Marchman, Jr., hereinafter referred to as defendant, was charged by Information in Case No. CRM-75-263, with the crime of Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor, in violation of 47 O.S.1971, § 11-902, in the District Court, Major County. A jury returned a verdict of guilty assessing punishment of imprisonment in the county jail for ninety (90) days and a fine of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00). On the 1st day of June, 1976, the District Court, Major County, pronounced judgment and sentence in accordance with the verdict of the jury. From said judgment and sentence, the defendant has filed this timely appeal.

We deem a recital of the facts unnecessary in this case. We first note that the defendant’s only assignment of error is that State’s Exhibit No. 2, the written breathalyzer report, was improperly admitted into evidence. After a careful review of the record, we feel that the trial court properly admitted the written report; however, we *564do not reach that issue in this case since the admission of the written report was, at best, cumulative. Prior to the admission of the written report, the following colloquy took place between the District Attorney and the officer who administered the breathalyzer test:

> “Q. Okay. Did you follow this form?

> “A. Yes, sir.

> “Q. Is this your usual procedure in running a breathalyzer test?

> “A. Yes, sir.

> “Q. Okay. And did you run such a test then on the defendant?

> “A. Yes, sir, I did.

> “Q. And what were the results of that test?

> “A. .16%, sir.

> “Q. Okay. Now could you elaborate a little further and explain to the jury what you mean by his testing .16%? “A. In the State of Oklahoma .10% — the breathalyzer has a face on it which reads in hundredths per cent blood alcohol concentration, and .16 is what the test showed. In the State of Oklahoma .10% is evidence that the subject has had enough to drink.

> “Q. Okay. When we are talking about .16%, referring to .16% of what?

> “A. Of alcohol — some alcoholic beverage — blood alcohol percentage in his blood.” [Tr. 11-12]

Thus, the test result was before the jury without objection. The subsequent admission of the written report, had it been error, would have been merely cumulative. See, *Hauschildt v. State,*Okl.Cr., 554 P.2d 77 (1976) and *Constabile*v. *State,*Okl.Cr., 513 P.2d 588 (1973).

There being no error which would justify either reversal or modification by this Court, the judgment and sentence appealed from is accordingly *AFFIRMED.*

BLISS and BRETT, JJ., concur.
# C_2016202EN.01018701.xml

| 7.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 202/187 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 202/187

---

Article 320

(ex Article 277 TEC)

(ex Article 277 TEC)

The multiannual financial framework and the annual budget shall be drawn up in euro.

---
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1415 

To designate the Federal Building and United States Courthouse located 

at 401 Southeast 1st Avenue, Gainesville, Florida, as the ‘‘Maurice 

M. Paul Federal Building and United States Courthouse’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 27, 2019 

Mr. YOHO (for himself, Mr. DIAZ-BALART, Mrs. MURPHY, Mr. RUTHERFORD, 

Mr. GAETZ, and Mr. POSEY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To designate the Federal Building and United States Courthouse located at 401 Southeast 1st Avenue, Gainesville, 

Florida, as the ‘‘Maurice M. Paul Federal Building and 

United States Courthouse’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION. 

4 The Federal Building and United States Courthouse 

5 located at 401 Southeast 1st Avenue, Gainesville, Florida, 

6 shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Maurice M. Paul 

7 Federal Building and United States Courthouse’’. 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1415 IH

1 SEC. 2. REFERENCE. 

2 Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 

3 paper, or other record of the United States to the Federal 

4 Building and United States Courthouse referred to in sec5 tion 1 shall be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Maurice 

6 M. Paul Federal Building and United States Courthouse’’. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
Order entered April 14, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-00685-CV

ASSOCIATED AIR CENTER LP, ET AL, Appellants

V.

TARY NETWORK LTD. AND CITADELLA INTERNATIONAL GROUP LTD.,

Appellees

On Appeal from the 162nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 10-01620

ORDER

The April 10, 2015 unopposed motion of appellees Tary Network Ltd. and Citadella 

International Group Ltd. for immediate issuance of the mandate is GRANTED, and the Clerk of 

the Court is ORDERED to issue the mandate immediately.

/s/ MOLLY FRANCIS 

JUSTICE
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Gaston Randle, Appellant.

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: We have reviewed the issues raised by defendant on appeal and we determine that none requires reversal. Whether defendant established his affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance was properly a ques*1009tion of fact for resolution by the jury. There are no facts in the record to support defendant’s contention that the court conducted a second *Sandoval*hearing in chambers in the absence of defendant. Defendant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel and his sentence is not harsh and excessive. Finally, we determine that the court did not err in failing to give the charge mandated by CPL 60.55 (2) in connection with the defense of extreme emotional disturbance. CPL 60.55 (2) refers to the "affirmative defense of lack of criminal responsibility, by reason of mental disease or defect” and it has no application to the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. Moreover, if the failure to give the charge was error, it was harmless. There was overwhelming proof of defendant’s guilt and there was no probability that, if the charge had been given, the verdict would have been different. (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Wolfgang, J.—Murder, 2nd Degree.) Present—Doerr, J. P., Boomer, Green, Pine and Davis, JJ.
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Jerry Leon McNeil, Appellant

No. 06-14-00195-CR v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

Appeal from the 115th District Court of 

Marion County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 

F13586). Opinion delivered by Chief 

Justice Morriss, Justice Moseley and Justice 

Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court 

below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We note that the appellant, Jerry Leon McNeil, has adequately indicated his inability to 

pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED APRIL 14, 2015

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
# C_2016203EN.01004701.xml

| 7.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 203/47 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 203/47

---

Article 194

1.   The members of the institutions of the Community, the members of committees, the officials and other servants of the Community and any other persons who by reason of their duties or their public or private relations with the institutions or installations of the Community or with Joint Undertakings are called upon to acquire or obtain cognisance of any facts, information, knowledge, documents or objects which are subject to a security system in accordance with provisions laid down by a Member State or by an institution of the Community, shall be required, even after such duties or relations have ceased, to keep them secret from any unauthorised person and from the general public.

Each Member State shall treat any infringement of this obligation as an act prejudicial to its rules on secrecy and as one falling, both as to merits and jurisdiction, within the scope of its laws relating to acts prejudicial to the security of the State or to disclosure of professional secrets. Such Member State shall, at the request of any Member State concerned or of the Commission, prosecute anyone within its jurisdiction who commits such an infringement.

2.   Each Member State shall communicate to the Commission all provisions regulating within its territories the classification and secrecy of information, knowledge, documents or objects covered by this Treaty.

The Commission shall ensure that these provisions are communicated to the other Member States.

Each Member State shall take all appropriate measures to facilitate the gradual establishment of as uniform and comprehensive a security system as possible. The Commission may, after consulting the Member States concerned, make recommendations for this purpose.

3.   The institutions of the Community, their installations and also the Joint Undertakings shall be required to apply the rules of the security system in force in the territory in which each of them is situated.

4.   Any authorisation granted either by an institution of the Community or by a Member State to a person carrying out his activities within the field covered by this Treaty to have access to facts, information, documents or objects covered by this Treaty which are subject to a security system, shall be recognised by every other institution and every other Member State.

5.   The provisions of this Article shall not prevent application of special provisions resulting from agreements concluded between a Member State and a third State or an international organisation.

---
Petition for Writ of Mandamus Dismissed as Moot and Memorandum 

Opinion filed February 10, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00600-CV

IN RE LARRY TAYLOR, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS STATE 

SENATOR FOR DISTRICT 11, Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

212th District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 14CV0395

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On July 24, 2014, relator Larry Taylor, in his official capacity as State 

Senator for District 11, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this court. See Tex. 

Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221 (West 2004); see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In his 

petition, relator asks this court to compel the presiding judge of the 212th District 

Court of Galveston County to vacate an order that denied relator’s motion to quash 
2

a deposition subpoena and subpoena duces tecum or for a protective order, and that 

granted a motion to compel the deposition of relator.

On November 3, 2014, we abated this original proceeding in order to enable 

the parties in the underlying litigation to finalize a settlement that would obviate 

the need for the challenged discovery. In our abatement order, we directed relator 

to periodically advise this court of the status of the settlement discussions in the 

underlying litigation. In fulfillment of that requirement, relator filed a letter with 

this court on February 3, 2015, stating that “the discovery issues and rulings giving 

rise to this mandamus proceeding are now moot.” Relator further enclosed with his 

letter a copy of an agreement between the parties to this original proceeding that 

resolves the discovery dispute at issue in this proceeding.

Based on relator’s representation to this court and the corresponding 

agreement he has provided, relator’s request for mandamus relief has been 

rendered moot. Accordingly, we dismiss as moot relator’s petition for writ of 

mandamus.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Donovan and Brown.
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT**

 

I, John R. Howe, Executive Vice President, Chief FinancialOfficer of The Cato Corporation, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that on the date ofthis Certification:

 

1.    the AnnualReport on Form 10-K of the Company for the annual period ended January 29,2011 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.    the informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Dated:March 29, 2011

|   |                      |
|--------|---------------------------|
|   | /s/  John R. Howe         |
|   | John  R. Howe             |
|   | Executive  Vice President |
|   | Chief  Financial Officer  |

 

 

 

70

 

----
Lowest HHI Counties and those Comprising Each Region and Federal OrdersDecember 2008

Prepared by:   Market Administrator's Office   Minneapolis, Minnesota   May 2011
391 A.2d 711

#### Ratner, Appellant, v. Beneficial Finance Company of Greensburg.

Submitted June 21, 1977.

Jon M. Lewis, for appellant; John T. Tierney, III, and Stephen J. Miller, for appellee.

Order affirmed.

WATKINS, former P. J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-7672

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH DIBRUNO, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, 

Chief District Judge. (3:06-cr-00430-FDW-1; 3:11-cv-00297-FDW)

Submitted: April 16, 2015 Decided: April 20, 2015

Before AGEE and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joseph DiBruno, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Joseph DiBruno, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The 

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues 

a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B)

(2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

DiBruno has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny DiBruno’s motion for a certificate of appealability and 

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 
3

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Quarterly Report of American HomePatient, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2004 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Robert L. Fringer, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

      (1)   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.

This Certification is executed as of November 2, 2004.

                     /s/ Robert L. Fringer
                     --------------------------------
                     Robert L. Fringer
                     Principal Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
# C_2012326EN.01004701.xml

| 26.10.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 326/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 326/1

---

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

PART SIX

INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

TITLE I

INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER 3

THE UNION'S ADVISORY BODIES

SECTION 2

SECTION 2

THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

Article 306

(ex Article 264 TEC)

(ex Article 264 TEC)

The Committee of the Regions shall elect its chairman and officers from among its members for a term of two and a half years.

It shall adopt its Rules of Procedure.

The Committee shall be convened by its chairman at the request of the European Parliament, the Council or of the Commission. It may also meet on its own initiative.

---