No. 03-14-00716-CV

In the Court of Appeals 

for the 

Third Court of Appeals District Court of Texas 

Sitting at Austin, Texas 

Janos Farkas, Appellant 

vs.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C. n/k/a 

Buckley Madole, P.C., Appellee 

On Appeal from the 201st District Court 

Travis County, Texas 

Appellee’s Brief, 

Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C. n/k/a Buckley Madole, P.C. 

Buckley Madole, P.C. 

Sammy Hooda SBN: 24064032 

Luke Madole SBN: 12801800 

14841 Dallas Parkway, Suite 425 

Dallas, Texas 75254 

Telephone: (972) 643-6600 

Facsimile: (972) 643-6699 

Email: sammy.hooda@buckleymadole.com 

Attorney for Appellee 

Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C., n/k/a 

Buckley Madole, P.C. 

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 

ACCEPTED

03-14-00716-CV

4961709

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

4/20/2015 6:23:29 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 4/20/2015 6:23:29 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
BRICE, VANDER LINDEN & WERNICK, P.C, APPELLEE’S BRIEF

Case Number: 03-14-00716-CV

Page: 1

No. 03-14-00716-CV

In the Court of Appeals

for the

Third Court of Appeals District of Texas

Sitting at Austin, Texas

Janos Farkas, Appellant

vs.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C. n/k/a 

Buckley Madole, P.C., Appellee

On Appeal from the 201st District Court

Travis County, Texas

Appellee’s Brief,

Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C. n/k/a Buckley Madole, P.C.

Buckley Madole, P.C.

Sammy Hooda SBN: 24064032

Luke Madole SBN: 12801800

14841 Dallas Parkway, Suite 425

Dallas, Texas 75254

Telephone: (972) 643-6600

Facsimile: (972) 643-6699

Email: sammy.hooda@buckleymadole.com

Attorney for Appellee

Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C., n/k/a

Buckley Madole, P.C.

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
BRICE, VANDER LINDEN & WERNICK, P.C, APPELLEE’S BRIEF

Case Number: 03-14-00716-CV

Page: 2

Table of Contents

Table of Contents.......................................................................................................2

Identity of the Parties and Counsel ............................................................................3

Index of Authorities...................................................................................................4

Statement of the Case.................................................................................................6

Statement Regarding Oral Argument ........................................................................7

Issues Presented for Review ......................................................................................8

1. Whether trial court erred in denying Frakas’ partial motion for summary 

judgment, and in granting Brice’s traditional and no-evidence motion for 

summary judgment on Farkas’ claims for violations of the Texas Debt Collection 

Act, Texas Finance Code and Chapter 12 of the Civil Practice and Remedies 

Code. .......................................................................................................................8

Statement of Facts......................................................................................................9

Summary of the Argument.......................................................................................10

Argument and Authorities........................................................................................11

I. Standards of Review.......................................................................................11

A. Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment ...............................................11

B. No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment ............................................11

II. The trial court did not err in granting Brice’s traditional and no-evidence 

motion for summary judgment on Farkas’ claims for violations of the Texas Debt 

Collection Act, Texas Finance Code and Chapter 12 of the Civil Practice and 

Remedies Code. ....................................................................................................12

A. Brice is entitled to the affirmative defense of attorney immunity as to 

Farkas’ TDCA and TFC claims.........................................................................13

B. Farkas’ CPRC Chapter 12 violation claims fail as a matter of law. ...........16

Conclusion and Prayer .............................................................................................19

Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................21

Certificate of Service ...............................................................................................21
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Identity of the Parties and Counsel

(1) Appellant Represented by:

Janos Farkas William D. Davis

(Plaintiff in the underlying action) Bar No. 00796444

bdavis@capital-ip.com

DAVIS & ASSOCIATES

P.O. Box 1093

Dripping Springs, Texas 78620

512-858-9910 (Telephone)

512-858-2357 (Fax)

(2) Appellee Represented by:

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. B. David Foster

(Defendant in the underlying action) Bar No. 24031555

dfoster@lockelord.com

Susan A. Kidwell

Bar No. 24032626

skidwell@lockelord.com

LOCKE LORD, LLP

600 Congress Ave. Suite 2200

Austin, Texas 78701

512-305-4700 (Telephone)

512-305-4800 (Fax)

(3) Appellee Represented by:

Brice, Vander Linden, P.C., Sammy Hooda 

n/k/a Buckley Madole, P.C. Bar No. 24064032

(Defendant in the underlying action) sammy.hooda@buckleymadole.com 

Luke Madole

Bar No. 12801800

luke.madole@buckleymadole.com;

BUCKLEY MADOLE, P.C.

14841 Dallas Parkway, Suite 425

Dallas, Texas 75254

972-643-6600 (Telephone)

972-643-6699 (Fax)
BRICE, VANDER LINDEN & WERNICK, P.C, APPELLEE’S BRIEF

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Index of Authorities

Cases

Butler v. Lilly, 533 S.W.2d 130, 131-34 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

1976, writ dism’d).................................................................................................12

Campbell v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., et al., 2012 WL 

1839357 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012).....................................................................13

Dolcefino v. Randolph, 195 S.W.3d 906, 917 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2000, pet. denied)..................................................................................................11

Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W3d 48, 493 (Tex. 2001)................................17

Iqbal v. Bank of America, N.A., et al., 559 Fed. Appx. 363 (5th Cir. 2014)...........13

Kiggundu v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 2606359, at *7 (S.D. 

Tex. June 30, 2011)...............................................................................................16

Kruegel v. Murphy, 126 S.W. 343 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1910, writ ref’d).......12

Marsh v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 888 F. Supp. 2d 805, 812-14 (W.D. Tex. 

2012) .....................................................................................................................15

Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 771 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1978, 

writ ref’d n.r.e.).....................................................................................................12

Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985).........................10

Purported Lien or Claim Against Bond v. Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel, 

LLP, No. G-12-188, 2013 WL 1619691, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2013)........18

Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995) ............10

Rojas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al., 2014 WL 2547770 (5th Cir. June 6, 2014)

...............................................................................................................................13

Taco Bell Corp. v. Cracken, 939 F.Supp. 528, 532 (N.D. Tex. 1996)....................12

Statutes

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 12.002..................................................................19

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 12.002(a).............................................................17

Rules

TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).............................................................................................11

TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) .............................................................................................11

TEX. R. CIV. P. 736.1(d)....................................................................................................................17
BRICE, VANDER LINDEN & WERNICK, P.C, APPELLEE’S BRIEF

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Constitutional Provisions

Tex. Const. Art. XVI § 50(r)....................................................................................18

Legislative History

House Comm. On Criminal Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1185, 75th 

Leg., R.S. (1997)...................................................................................................18

Senate Jurisprudence Committee, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1185, 75th Leg., R.S. 

(1997)....................................................................................................................18
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Statement of the Case

Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C., n/k/a Buckley Madole, P.C. (“Brice”), 

is a law firm hired to assist banks with the foreclosure process. In this case, Brice 

was retained by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) to assist in the foreclosure 

of 6315 Farmdale Lane, Austin, Texas 78749 (“Property”). Appellant, Janos Farkas’

(“Farkas”) had failed pay his residential mortgage as contractually agreed. In 

discharging its duties as Wells Fargo’s attorney, Brice sent Farkas notices advising 

of the default on his residential mortgage and, ultimately, Brice filed an expedited 

foreclosure proceeding under Rule 736 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on 

behalf of Wells Fargo. 

The trial court rightly granted Brice’s traditional and no-evidence motion for 

summary judgment and rightly denied Farkas’ partial motion for summary 

judgment. Below, Farkas failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact or present 

more than a scintilla of evidence in support of his claims against Brice. Furthermore, 

Brice asserted the affirmative defense of attorney immunity. Texas law is clear –

attorneys are immune from claims like those asserted by Farkas, and must remain 

immune in the interest of orderly administration of the civil justice system. Thus, 

Brice now submits its Appellee’s Brief in support of trials court’s judgment granting 

its motion for summary judgment against all of Farkas’ claims.
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Statement Regarding Oral Argument

Appellee, Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C., n/k/a Buckley Madole, 

P.C., does not request oral argument in this matter. 
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Issues Presented for Review

1. Whether trial court erred in denying Frakas’ partial motion for 

summary judgment, and in granting Brice’s traditional and no-evidence motion for 

summary judgment on Farkas’ claims for violations of the Texas Debt Collection 

Act, Texas Finance Code and Chapter 12 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
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Statement of Facts

On January 11, 2007, Farkas executed a Wells Fargo Home Equity Account 

Agreement and Disclosure Statement (“Account Agreement”) and a Texas Deed of 

Trust (the “Deed of Trust”) securing a home equity line of credit of $103,441.00. 

[CR 47-61, 70-83] The Account Agreement and Deed of Trust will collectively be 

referred to as the “Loan.”

Farkas subsequently defaulted on the Loan in September 2010, and Brice, 

acting as foreclosure counsel on behalf of Wells Fargo sent a Notice of Default and 

Intention to Accelerate to Farkas on April 21, 2011. [87-88] Farkas failed to cure the 

default, and Brice then sent Farkas a notice on June 23, 2011 that the debt was being 

accelerated. [CR 90-91] On September 15, 2011, Brice sent Farkas notice of its 

application for an order allowing foreclosure. [CR 92-149] The Rule 736 proceeding 

filed regarding the Property was subsequently abated and dismissed by operation of 

law when Farkas filed an independent lawsuit on December 5, 2011, which is the 

subject of this appeal. TEX. R. CIV. P. 736.11(c).

Farkas does not dispute that he is in default. Instead, Farkas challenges Wells 

Fargo’s ability to foreclose and alleges Brice violated the Texas Debt Collection Act 

(“TDCA”), Texas Finance Code (“TFC”) § 382.001 et seq., and Chapter 12 of the 

Civil Practice and Remedies Code (“CPRC”). [CR 9-12] The trial court did not err 

because Brice was entitled to summary judgment on all of Farkas’ claims.
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Summary of the Argument

The trial court did not err in granting Brice’s motion for summary judgment 

while denying Farkas’ motion for partial summary judgment. In its motion for 

traditional and no-evidence summary judgment Brice successfully disproved an 

element of Farkas’ causes of action and/or specifically (and successfully) challenged 

the evidentiary support for an element of Farkas’ claims. The summary judgment 

evidence conclusively established Brice’s affirmative defense of attorney immunity 

on all of Farkas’ claims demonstrating that all actions taken by Brice were during 

the course of its representation of Wells Fargo and solely in its capacity as legal 

counsel for Wells Fargo in furtherance of protecting Wells Fargo’s interest in the 

Property at issue herein.
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Argument and Authorities

Fakas’ brief as to Appellee Brice, focuses on Brice’s inability to assert 

attorney immunity as an affirmative defense against the claims alleged by Farkas. 

Thus, Brice’s brief is limited in response to it being entitled to the affirmative 

defense of attorney immunity on all of Farkas’ claims. 

I. Standards of Review

A. Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment

A party who moves for traditional summary judgment must establish that no 

genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 

546, 548 (Tex. 1985). If the movant seeks summary judgment on a claim for which 

movant does not bear the burden of proof, the movant may meet its burden by either 

conclusively negating at least one essential element of the respondent’s claim or by 

pleading and conclusively establishing each element of an affirmative defense to the 

claim. Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995).

B. No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment

A party may move for summary judgment “on the ground that there is no 

evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which the 

adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). A no-
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evidence motion for summary judgment must specifically state the elements for 

which there is no evidence. Id. “The court must grant the motion unless the 

respondent produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material 

fact.” Id. Any such evidence must be competent. Dolcefino v. Randolph, 195 S.W.3d 

906, 917 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).

II. The trial court did not err in granting Brice’s traditional and noevidence motion for summary judgment on Farkas’ claims for violations of 

the Texas Debt Collection Act, Texas Finance Code and Chapter 12 of the 

Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 

Farkas’ asserted claims against Brice for violations of the Texas Debt 

Collection Act (“TDCA”), Texas Finance Code (“TFC”) § 382.001 et seq., and 

Chapter 12 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code (“CPRC”), relying entirely on 

one or more of the following allegations: 1) various notices incorrectly name Wells 

Fargo Home Equity as either current mortgagee or mortgage servicer and there is no 

evidence in the property records of a transfer from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. to Wells 

Fargo Home Equity; 2) the notice of default and acceleration reference the wrong 

loan number and therefore are ineffective; 3) various notices improperly refer to a 

potential non-judicial foreclosure of Farkas’ home equity loan; and 4) various 

notices misstate the amount of the debt. [CR 4-12]
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A. Brice is entitled to the affirmative defense of attorney immunity as 

to Farkas’ TDCA and TFC claims.

In general, attorneys are immune from suits by their client’s adversaries for 

conduct undertaken in their capacity as attorneys. See, e.g., Butler v. Lilly, 533 

S.W.2d 130, 131-34 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ dism’d) (an 

attorney enjoys “qualified immunity,” with respect to non-clients, for action taken 

in connection with representing a client in adversarial circumstances). Based on 

overriding public policy, Texas courts have consistently held that an opposing party 

“does not have a right of recover, under any cause of action, against another attorney 

arising from his discharge of his duties in representing a party.” See Taco Bell Corp. 

v. Cracken, 939 F.Supp. 528, 532 (N.D. Tex. 1996). Attorneys have an absolute right 

to “practice their profession, to advise their clients and interpose any defense or 

supposed defense, without making themselves liable for damages.” See Kruegel v. 

Murphy, 126 S.W. 343 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1910, writ ref’d). The courts have 

also held that attorney immunity applies whether the attorney is providing his serves 

within the context of litigation, or simply in a business transaction; the immunity 

extends to non-litigation conduct as well as litigation conduct. See Martin v. Trevino, 

578 S.W.2d 763, 771 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Texas 

law is clear – attorneys are immune from claims like Plaintiff’s and must remain 

immune in the interest of orderly administration of the civil justice system. 
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Farkas argument that Brice is not entitled to attorney immunity is premised 

on the fact that Brice is not an “attorney-at-law” and no attorney has been named as 

a defendant. Farkas further claims that qualified immunity is only applicable for 

attorneys in litigation, and the Brice’s conduct complained of relates to actions 

outside of litigation. However, Texas law holds opposite of both of these theories 

and as such these theories fail as a matter of law. There are three leading cases on 

point that have developed the attorney immunity defense in the foreclosure context. 

See Rojas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al., 2014 WL 2547770 (5th Cir. June 6, 

2014); Iqbal v. Bank of America, N.A., et al., 559 Fed. Appx. 363 (5th Cir. 2014); 

Campbell v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., et al., 2012 WL 

1839357 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012). 

All three of these cases arose from foreclosure proceedings being pursued by 

banks against homeowners that were in default under the terms of their mortgages. 

The banks retained legal counsel to assist them in pursuing their rights to foreclose 

and within that process a lawsuit was filed naming numerous parties, including the 

attorneys and/or the law firms representing the banks. In all three cases the courts 

reached the conclusion that the attorneys and law firms representing the banks during 

the foreclosure process were protected by attorney immunity from the plaintiffs’ 

claims. See Iqbal, 559 Fed. Appx. at 365 (“they [plaintiffs] contend their claims 

against BDFTE [law firm] were viable because BDFTE [law firm] did not qualify 
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for attorney immunity. We disagree. BDFTE [law firm] was retained to assist in the 

foreclosure, and the action complained of by the Iqbals [plaintiffs] are within the 

scope of their [law firm] representation. The Iqbals [plaintiffs] argue that attorney 

immunity applies only in the ligiation context, but that stance is not in line with 

Texas law”); Rojas, 2014 WL 2547770 at *2 (“attorneys are generally immune from 

suits brought under Texas law against them by their adversaries if the action arises 

out of the duties involved in representing a client. We have previously held that 

BDFTE [law firm] has immunity for its acts as foreclosure counsel”)

Similarly, Brice is entitled to attorney immunity against all of the claims 

asserted by Farkas, because all conduct complained of was performed by Brice 

during the course of their representation of Wells Fargo and solely in its capacity as 

legal counsel for Wells Fargo in furtherance of protecting Wells Fargo’s interest in 

the Property at issue. Iqbal, 559 Fed. Appx. at 365 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing, Campbell, 

No. 03-11-00429-CV, 2012 WL 1839357, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Austin, May 18, 

2012) (affirming dismissal on grounds of attorney immunity in wrongful foreclosure 

case against attorneys retained by Wells Fargo to assist in foreclosure)). Brice was 

retained by Wells Fargo to assist in the foreclosure of the Property. The only 

communication Brice had with Farkas was in its capacity as “legal counsel for Wells 

Fargo in an adverse relationship with Plaintiff.” [CR 352-353] The actions Farkas 

complains of herein were within the scope of Brice’s representation of Wells Fargo 
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in the foreclosure proceeding against the Property. Therefore, under Texas law Brice

is immune from suits brought against it by its clients’ adversaries (i.e., Farkas) if the 

action arises out of the duties involved in representing a client. Rojas, 571 Fed. 

Appx. at 278 (5th Cir. 2014) (“We have previously held that BDFTE [a law firm 

defendant] has immunity for its acts as foreclosure counsel”). Thus, Farkas’ claims 

against Brice for violations of the TDCA and TFC § 382.001 et seq., fail as a matter 

of law. 

B. Farkas’ CPRC Chapter 12 violation claims fail as a matter of law.

Frakas’ claims that the notices and correspondences sent by Brice on behalf 

of Wells Fargo violates CPRC Chapter 12 also fails as a matter of law because the 

notices and correspondence: 1) do not create a lien or claim against real property; 

and 2) were never recorded. [CR 10-12]

First, section 12.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code only 

applies to documents which create a fraudulent lien or claim, not to documents 

pertaining to when, where, how, or by whom a valid lien may be enforced. See Marsh 

v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 888 F. Supp. 2d 805, 812-14 (W.D. Tex. 2012). 

Under Chapter 12, a person “may not make, present, or use a document” with 

knowledge that it is a “fraudulent lien or claim against real or personal property or 

[against] an interest in real or personal property,” and with intent that it “be given 
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the same legal effect as . . . a valid lien or claim.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 

12.002(a). A necessary element of Farkas’ section 12.002 claim, therefore, is that 

the document alleged to be fraudulent is (or purports to be) a “lien or claim.” 

Though, Farkas’ brief does not expressly state the actions taken by Brice in 

violation of CPRC 12, Farkas does insinuate (and has argued in the summary 

judgment evidence included in the record) that Brice’s filing of the Rule 736 

application seeking an order to allow foreclosure violated CPRC 12. Brice, on behalf 

of Wells Fargo, sent Plaintiff notices and correspondence related to the default on 

the Loan. Thereafter, Brice, on behalf of Wells Fargo, filed a Rule 736 application 

and included the statutory notices that were sent to the Farkas as required by the 

rules. See TEX. R.CIV. P. 736.1(d). Thus, the notices and correspondence sent herein 

are, at best, documents relating to the enforcement of a valid lien and do not 

themselves create a lien or claim against real property. See Kiggundu v. Mortg. Elec. 

Registration Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 2606359, at *7 (S.D. Tex. June 30, 2011)

(documents used to foreclose on real property are not actionable under section 

12.002 if the underlying note and deed of trust are valid). 

Farkas would have this Court believe that filing a proceeding required under 

the Texas Constitution and provided for by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure is a 

violation of CPRC 12. If this is the rule then every Rule 736 application that is filed 

can be abated by filing an independent lawsuit alleging CPRC 12 violations. Surely, 
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this was not the intent of the Texas Legislator and the Texas Supreme Court, and 

surely that is not the plain meaning of CPRC 12. Under Texas rules of statutory 

construction, the Court “must construe statutes as written and, if possible, ascertain 

legislative intent from the statute’s language. Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 

S.W3d 48, 493 (Tex. 2001).

The legislative history provides that the purpose of this section was to “create 

a private cause of action against a person who files fraudulent judgment liens or 

fraudulent documents purporting to create a lien or claim against real or personal 

property in favor of a person aggrieved by the filing.” House Comm. On Criminal 

Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1185, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (emphasis 

added); see also Senate Jurisprudence Committee, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1185, 

75th Leg., R.S. (1997). 

The filing of the Rule 736 application is contrary to the plain meaning and the 

legislative intent of CPRC 12. The Rule 736 application is filed pursuant to the rules 

promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court, which power is derived from the Texas 

Constitution. See Tex. Const. Art. XVI § 50(r). Its purpose is to enforce, not create, 

the lien. It is unimaginable that the Texas Legislators and the Texas Supreme Court 

were oblivious to the fact that creating Rule 736 will allow every application to be 

in violation of CPRC 12. The 736 application filed herein was filed to obtain a court 

order required to proceed with a non-judicial foreclosure sale against Plaintiff’s real 
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property. See Marsh, 888 F.Supp.2d at 813 (W.D. Tex. 2012) (“the Court concludes 

in order to state a fraudulent lien claim under Section 12.002, a party must allege the 

challenged instrument purported to create a lien or claim against property”). Thus, it 

is absurd to purpose that by following the rules, Brice subjected itself to liability for 

violation of CPRC 12. 

Lastly, Farkas’ fraudulent lien claim fails because Brice did not file nor record 

either of the documents at issue; rather, they were simply mailed to Farkas. [CR 4-

8, 10-12] This is fatal to a section 12.002 claim because Chapter 12 (which governs 

"Liability Related to a Fraudulent Court Record or a Fraudulent Lien or Claim Filed 

Against Real or Personal Property") only applies to documents that are filed or 

recorded in the public property records. See generally TEX.CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE

§ 12.002; see also Purported Lien or Claim Against Bond v. Barrett Daffin Frappier 

Turner & Engel, LLP, No. G-12-188, 2013 WL 1619691, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 

2013) ("Section 12.002 prohibits a person from filing fraudulent documents under 

certain circumstances. . . .") (emphasis added).

Conclusion and Prayer

As shown above the trial court did not err in granting Brice’s traditional and 

no-evidence motion for summary judgment. Farkas has not shown that he has 

evidence to support all of the elements on any of his cause of action, Farkas did not 
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produce summary judgment evidence that raised a genuine issue of material fact, 

and Brice is entitled to the affirmative defense of attorney immunity as a matter of 

law on all of Farkas’ claims. 

Appellee, Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C., n/k/a Buckley Madole, 

P.C., prays that this Honorable Court affirm the judgment of the trial trail court 

rendered in its favor on all of Farkas’ claims, that all costs of the appeal be taxed 

against Farkas, and for such other relief, general and special, legal and equitable, to 

which it may be justly entitled. 

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Sammy Hooda

Sammy Hooda SBN: 24064032

Luke Madole SBN: 12801800

Buckley Madole, P.C.

14841 Dallas Parkway, Suite 425

Dallas, Texas 752542

Telephone: (972) 643-6600

Facsimile: (972) 643-6699

Email:sammy.hooda@buckleymadole.com

Attorney for Appellee

Brice, Vander Linden & Wernick, P.C., f/k/a 

Buckley Madole, P.C.
BRICE, VANDER LINDEN & WERNICK, P.C, APPELLEE’S BRIEF

Case Number: 03-14-00716-CV

Page: 21

Certificate of Compliance

I certify that the foregoing Brief of Appellee Brice, Vander Linden & 

Wernick, P.C. n/k/a Buckley Madole, P.C. contains 2,682 words (excluding the

sections expected under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1)). 

Certificate of Service

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served on the 

following counsel of record, in accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 9.5, on this 17th day of April, 2015.

VIA Electronic Service

Bill Davis

Davis & Associates

P.O. Box 1093

Dripping Springs, Texas 78620

bdavis@capital-ip.com

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

JANOS FARKAS

VIA Electronic Service

Dave Foster

Locke Lord, LLP

600 Congress Avenue, Suite 2200

Austin, Texas 78701

dfoster@lockelord.com

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.

/s/ Sammy Hooda

Sammy Hooda