UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ ALEN DEAN O’BRYANT, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. SCOTT NUNN, Warden, Respondent - Appellee. No. 22-6098 (D.C. No. 5:21- CV-00153-R) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER DENYING CERTIFIC ATE OF APPEALABILITY *

________________ _________________ Before HARTZ , BALDOCK , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ An Oklahoma jury convicted petitioner Alen Dean O’Bryant of four counts of child sexual abuse and the stat e court sentenced him to four consecutive terms of life imprisonment. Mr. O’Bryant argues his convictions violat ed his constitutional rights because he received ineffect ive assistance of trial couns el, state witnesses and the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for the victim and otherwise prejudiced Mr. O’Bryant, and cumulative error rende red the trial fundamentally unfair. After failing to obtain relief in the state courts, Mr. O’Bryant submitted a federal habeas corpus petiti on under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied the

* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 16, 2022 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 12 petition and declined to issue a certificate of appealability (“COA”). Mr. O’Bryant subsequently applied for a COA from this c ourt. Because Mr. O’Bryant fails to make a substantial showing of a c onstitutional violation, we d ecline to issue a COA and we dismiss this matter.
I. BACKGROUND In 2018, an Oklahoma jury convicted Mr . O’Bryant of four counts of child sexual abuse. The jury heard testimony from the child, her mother, and individuals to whom she allegedly disclosed the abuse: her school principal, her school counselor, the Department of Human Services (“DH S”) caseworker handling her case, the medical examiner, and the fore nsic interviewer. The jury also heard from two defense witnesses: a friend of the child’s family, who was also the child’s pediatrician, and an expert witness who was a pediatric psychol ogist. The court sentenced Mr. O’Bryant to four consecutive life sentences. On direct appeal, Mr. O’Bryant argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendmen t rights. As relevant here, he argued counsel performed deficiently by failing to (1) presen t extrinsic evidence to impeach the child’s mother, who testified she beli eved her daughter’s allegations against Mr. O’Bryant after an initial period of doubt; (2) object to the introduction of a video recording of the forensic interview of the child as cumula tive; (3) object to testimony by various witnesses who improp erly vouched for the child’s credibility, particularly the medical examiner, who tes tified she found the ch ild’s statements to be consistent with her statements in the fo rensic interview; and (4) adequately advise Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 23 Mr. O’Bryant of his right to testify by failing to prepare hi m to testify, perform mock examinations or cross-examinations, or disc uss what to expect if he did choose to testify, rendering his waiv er of his right to testif y involuntary and unknowing. Mr. O’Bryant argued these fa ilures prejudiced him. As relevant here, Mr. O’Bryant also argued the trial court allowed testimony by various witnesses that bol stered the child’ s credibility in violation of state evidentiary law. He particular ly objected to the medical ex aminer’s testimony that in the majority of cases, children do not lie about sexual abuse; that she found the child’s statements reliable b ecause they were consistent with her statements in the forensic interview; and that in 95% of cas es in which sexual a buse has occurred there are no abnormal medical findings that woul d indicate abuse. Mr. O’Bryant also argued the prosecutor improperly vouched fo r the child’s truthfulness and called Mr. O’Bryant a liar, rendering his trial fundamentally unfair in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Finally, he ar gued cumulative error denied him a fair trial. 1 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeal s (“OCCA”) affirmed Mr. O’Bryant’s conviction in a Summary Opinion. The OCCA concluded Mr. O’Bryant was not denied the effective assi stance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), because counsel’s actions did not fall below reasonable standards of

1 Mr. O’Bryant also argued the trial c ourt erred under state evidentiary law by admitting hearsay evidence and the state st atute allowing child hearsay evidence to be introduced violated the Sixth Amendm ent. Mr. O’Bryant does not renew these arguments in his habeas petition. Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 34 professional conduct and any objections to the complained-of ev idence would have been overruled. It also concluded the medi cal examiner did not impermissibly vouch for the child. The OCCA further determ ined Mr. O’Bryant had forfeited his arguments as to other witne sses and the prosecutor by faili ng to object at trial, and on plain error review, the OCCA determined th e statements were not improper. Finally, the OCCA concluded there were no individual errors that could have contributed to cumulative error. Mr. O’Bryant sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. After reviewing the petition on the merits and receiving the recommendation of a magist rate judge, the district court denied relief and declined to issue a COA. As to the ineffective assi stance of counsel claim, th e district court concluded the OCCA’s determination that Mr. O’Brya nt suffered no such deprivation to be reasonable because (1) the decision not to introduce extrin sic evidence was a reasonable tactical decision, (2) any objection to the co mplained-of testimony would have been overruled, and (3) Mr. O’Bryant cannot show he was unaware of his right to testify because he explic itly waived that right and alleged no facts showing his counsel stopped him from exercising it. The district court also determined th at the OCCA’s conclusion the allegedly vouching testimony did not deny Mr. O’Bryant a fair trial was reasonable. As to the medical examiner’s testimony, the district court reasoned that even if it constituted “vouching” it did not deny Mr. O’Bryant a fa ir trial because (1) it was not used to Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 45 bolster the child’s credibility ; instead, it was given in response to the defense’s theory that the lack of me dical findings meant lack of abuse, and that is the only purpose for which the prosecution used it; a nd (2) the jury had a chance to evaluate the child’s credibility for itself by hearing her testify and undergo cross-examination. The district court found the OCCA’s decisi on as to the other wi tnesses’ allegedly vouching testimony reasonable for similar reasons: the jury heard from the child herself in direct and cross- examination, and the prosecu tor’s statements were not made to bolster the child’s credibility but to respond to a theory the defense had put forward that the child. had fa bricated the allegations. As to the alleged prosecutorial misconduc t, the district court determined the OCCA’s decision was reasonable because it was not improper for the prosecutor to draw “‘the jury’s attention to evidence that would enhan ce or diminish a witness’s credibility’”; the prosecutor was not making the statements to bol ster credibility but to show that the defense theory made no sense; and the prosecutor did not indicate any personal belief in the witnesses’ cr edibility or indicate he knew something more than the evidence showed. ROA Vol. I at 248 (quoting Thornburg v. Mullin , 422 F.3d 1113, 1132 (10th Cir. 2005)). Furthermore, the distri ct court noted the trial court instructed the jurors that th ey “alone were to determine the credibility of witnesses.” Id. The district court further indicated that the prosecutor’s referr ing to Mr. O’Bryant as a liar was intended to point out an in consistency in the de fendant’s story and therefore within the bounds of proper prosecutorial conduc t. The district court also Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 56 noted that, even if these ac ts constituted misconduct, they were not so inappropriate as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. Finally, the district court concluded the OCCA’s decision on cumulative error was not contrary to or an unreasonable app lication of clearly es tablished federal law because Mr. O’Bryant had not established the existence of two or more errors. The district court declined to issue a COA because Mr. O’Br yant had not demonstrated that reasonable jurists would find th e constitutional clai ms debatable. Mr. O’Bryant now seeks a COA from this court.
II. DISCUSSION A federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in li ght of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2 ). This is a highly deferential standard designed to allow federal cour ts to interfere with state- court decisions only in cases of “‘extreme malfunctions in the state crimin al justice systems’” on issues of federal law. Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (S tevens, J., concurring in j udgment)). “Federal habeas relief is not available to correct state law errors.” Leatherwood v. Allbaugh , 861 F.3d 1034, 1043 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing Estelle v. McGuire , 502 U.S. 62, 67 –68 (1991)). Where the state court decision rested on an independent and adequate state procedural ground, such as fa ilure to make a trial objection, the claim is procedurally Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 67 barred from habeas review unless the state c ourt proceeded to review for plain error and denied relief because the clai m lacked merit under federal law. Cargle v. Mullin , 317 F.3d 1196, 1206 (10th Cir. 2003) (“In such a case, there is no independent state ground of decision and, thus , no basis for procedural ba r. Consistent with that conclusion, the state court’ s disposition would be entitle d to § 2254(d) deference because it was a form of merits review .” (internal citation omitted)). Because Oklahoma’s plain error test is virtually identical to a fede ral due process analysis, the OCCA’s application of its plain error test “constitute[s] an adj udication on the merits of [a] due process claim.” Hancock v. Trammell , 798 F.3d 1002, 1011 –12 (10th Cir. 2015). Before this court may examine the me rits of a § 2254 petition, the petitioner must obtain a COA from either the distri ct court or this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). “A [COA] may issue . . . onl y if the applicant ha s made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To show the denial of a constitutional right, the “applican t should ‘include refe rence to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts that entitle [him] to relief.’” Leatherwood , 861 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Gray v. Netherland , 518 U.S. 152, 162–63 (1996)). We will grant a C OA only if the petitione r “‘sho[ws] that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matte r, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the is sues presented were adequate to deserve encourag ement to proceed further.’” Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336 ( 2003) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 78 The district court declined to i ssue a COA, so we must consider Mr. O’Bryant’s application for a COA at the outset. Fe d. R. App. P. 22(b)(2). A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Mr. O’Bryant first seeks a COA on wh ether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He contends trial counsel pe rformed deficiently by failing to present impeachment evidence, object to prejudicial testimony, a nd adequately advise him of his right to testify. To show ineffectiv e assistance of counsel, a pe titioner must show both that counsel’s performance “fell below an objectiv e standard of reasonableness” and “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687–88. “Our review of counsel’s performance under the first prong of Strickland is a highly deferential one” and “the petitioner b ears a heavy burden when it comes to overcoming that presumption.” Harmon v. Sharp , 936 F.3d 1044, 1058 (10th Cir. 2019) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “To be deficient, the performance must be outside the wide rang e of professionally competent assistance. In other words, it must have been co mpletely unreasonable, not merely wrong.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The Strickland standard “calls for an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of c ounsel’s performance, not c ounsel’s subjective state of mind.” Harrington , 562 U.S. at 110. Finally, to show prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate “that there is a reasonabl e probability that, but for counsel’s Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 89 unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694. In the § 2254 context, a state prisoner’s ta sk in showing ineffe ctive assistance is even greater because we also defer to the state court’s determination that counsel’s performance was not deficient. See Harmon , 936 F.3d at 1058 (describing review of ineffective assistance claims in § 2254 petitions as “doubly de ferential” (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance , 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009))). “W hen § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argum ent that counsel satisfied Strickland ’s deferential standard.” Harrington , 562 U.S. at 105. The OCCA determined trial counsel’s actions did not fall below reasonable standards of professional conduct and tr ial counsel had not chosen a deficient strategy. Reasonable jurists would agree that the district court properly denied habeas relief under our highly de ferential standard.
1. Failure to Present Extrinsic Evidence Mr. O’Bryant argues counsel ought to have presented extrinsic evidence to try to impeach the child’s mother. At trial, the child’s mo ther testified she had initially disbelieved her daughter’s allegations but had come to believe them when she watched the video of the forensic interview in which the child described the abuse in detail. Mr. O’Bryant suggests counsel ought to have pr esented evidence implying the child’s mother in fact never believed the child; she had onl y claimed to do so to get her children back from state custody. Th e proffered evidence, Mr. O’Bryant Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 910 maintains, would have included a statement from the child’s mother about her initial disbelief of the allegations and the pressure she felt from DHS to say she believed the child as well as affidavits, photographs, and text messages showing the child’s mother continuing a relationshi p with Mr. O’Bryant even af ter she claimed to believe he had sexually abused the child. As the district court correctly found, the OCCA’s decision that these omissions did not constitute ineff ective assistance of coun sel was consistent with Strickland because the omissions were not unreasonable. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687–88. To be constitutionally deficient, the actions of c ounsel must be “completely unreasonable, not merely wrong, so that they bear no re lationship to a possibl e defense strategy.” Fox v. Ward , 200 F.3d 1286, 1296 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). The alleged evidence woul d have been largely redundant of the child’s mother’s live testim ony—she admitted her initial a nd prolonged disbelief of her daughter’s story, testifie d extensively about the pressu re she felt from DHS to say she believed her daughter to get her children back, and e xplained she did not want to separate from Mr. O’Bryant but felt inte nse pressure from DHS to do so. Deciding not to introduce duplicative evidence is a reasonable tactical decision. See DeRosa v. Workman , 679 F.3d 1196, 1218–19 (10th Cir. 2012). Moreover, there is no r easonable probability this evidence would have led jurors to acquit Mr. O’Bryant. Duplicativ e evidence is “of only marginal value” and we generally refuse to fi nd its omission prejudicial. Hanson v. Sherrod , 797 F.3d 810, 832 (10th Cir. 2015). Furthermore, the jurors had plenty of evidence with which Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 1011 to make their own determination of the ch ild’s credibility regard less of whether her mother believed her: they heard the child testify about the abuse, saw the video recording of the forensic interview, a nd heard other witnesse s testify about the child’s disclosures of abuse. Because counsel’s failure to introduce extrinsic evidence wa s neither deficient nor prejudicial, reasonable jurists would no t debate that the di strict court properly denied habeas relief on this basis. 2. Failure to Object to Cumula tive and “Vouching” Testimony Mr. O’Bryant next argues counsel was ineffective for fail ing to object to certain evidence including (1) the video r ecording of the fore nsic interview as cumulative of the child’s live testimony, an d (2) the medical examiner’s testimony as impermissibly “vouching” for the child under state law. As the district court rightly determined , the OCCA’s decision that counsel was not deficient on these grounds was reasonable because th ese objections would have been futile. The OCCA found the video recording was not cumulative and the challenged testimony did not constitute impermissible vouchi ng under Oklahoma law. Thus, any such objecti on would have been overruled, and failing to make futile objections is neither de ficient nor prejudicial. See Sperry v. McKune , 445 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining failure to make meritless argument at trial was not ineffective); Parker v. Scott , 394 F.3d 1302, 1321 (10th Ci r. 2005) (denying habeas relief where counsel failed to object to allegedly vouc hing statements because the statements did not imperm issibly vouch for the witness under Oklahoma law); Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 1112 Jackson v. Shanks , 143 F.3d 1313, 1320 (10th Ci r. 1998) (explaining counsel’s failure to make futile argument was ne ither deficient nor prejudicial). 3. Failure to Advise Mr. O’Brya nt of His Right to Testify Mr. O’Bryant argues trial counsel failed to advise him adequately regarding his right to testify in his defense. He admits he acknowledged at trial that he had discussed his right to testify with counsel and waived his right to do so, but he argues now he was not fully informed because “there was no mock direct examination, and no sample cross-examination, no discussion of what questions to expect, from either defense counsel or the State, and no preparation at all for what that might have been like or why it was important .” COA Request at 19. The OCCA’s determination that counsel performed adequately is entitled to deference. Harmon , 936 F.3d at 1058. But even if the OCCA’s decision was unreasonable and counsel should have done more to prepare Mr. O’Bryant to testify, Mr. O’Bryant has not shown that failure to do so prejudiced hi m. He suggests he would have chosen to testify if he ha d been better informed because he was defenseless without his own testimony. But he was not defenseless—defense counsel vigorously cross-examined the State’s witn esses throughout the trial and put on two defense witnesses to un dermine the State’s evid ence and raise doubts about Mr. O’Bryant’s guilt. Furthermore, Mr. O’ Bryant does not explain what testimony he would have given or why it would have ov ercome the extensiv e evidence the jury ultimately found credible. In sum, he ha s not shown a reasonable probability of a different outcome had his counsel further di scussed the possibility of testifying. Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 1213 Because reasonable jurists would not debate the dist rict court’s denial of habeas relief due to counsel’s failure to more fully inform him of his right to testify, Mr. O’Bryant is not entitled to a COA on this issue.
B. Due Process Mr. O’Bryant argues that various trial c ourt failures and prosecutorial misconduct rendered his trial fundamenta lly unfair in violation of his due process rights. A criminal trial is fundamentally unfair in violation of due proce ss if it is “fatally infected” with acts “of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.” Lisenba v. California , 314 U.S. 219, 23 6 (1941). “[A]part from trials conducted in violation of express constitutional mandates, a constitutionally unfair trial takes place only where the barriers and safeguards are so relaxed or for gotten . . . that the proceeding is more a spectacle or trial by ordeal th an a disciplined contest.” United States v. Augenblick , 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969) (first citing Moore v. Dempsey , 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923) (explaining trial would be constitutionally voi d if “counsel, jury and judge were swept to the fatal end by an irresistible wave of public passion”); then citing Rideau v. Louisiana , 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) (finding due proce ss violation where court denied change of venue because local television program showed defendant confe ssing such that a loca l trial “could be but a hollow formality”), overruled on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619 (1993); and then citing Brown v. Mississippi , 297 U.S. 278, 285 –87 (1936) (holding conviction and sentence based on brutally co erced confession to violate due process)). The district court properl y concluded Mr. O’Bryant showed no denial of due process to justify habeas relief. Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 1314 1. Vouching for the Child Mr. O’Bryant argues he was deprived of due process because the trial court allowed various witnesses to vouch for the credibility of the child— i.e. , the witnesses allegedly told the jury whom to believe an d thereby invaded the province of the jury as the arbiters of credib ility. He primarily objects to the medical examiner’s testimony that (1) most child ren’s disclosures of sexual abuse are true, (2) she found the child’s statements to her to be consistent with what she had been told of the forensic interview, and (3) the lack of medical finding s indicating sexual abuse did not rule out sexual abuse but was in fact the norm in sexual abus e cases. He also objects to (1) the DHS caseworker’s testimon y that she did not think the child was lying because the child never faltered in he r story; (2) the forensic interviewer’s statements that the acts described by the child were not something a child would talk about unless they actually happ ened; and (3) the child’s mo ther’s statement that she eventually came to believe the child’s allegations. Mr. O’Bryant argued this claim to th e OCCA exclusively under state law. Analyzing the claim under state law, the O CCA found these witnesses did not engage in impermissible vouching. The OCCA e xplained that the me dical examiner’s testimony “incidentally corroborated the other evidence but it did not tell jurors what result to reach.” ROA Vol. I at 153. As for the other witnesses, the OCCA found the objection to their testimony waived for lack of objection at trial. Proceeding to review for plain error, the court determined the testim ony did not improperly vouch for the victim or tell the ju ry what result to reach. Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 1415 Mr. O’Bryant has not shown that the OCCA’s resolution of this issue was contrary to established federal constitu tional law. At the state-court level, Mr. O’Bryant based his objection exclusivel y on state evidentiary rules, and “[a] habeas applicant cannot transform a state law claim into a federal one merely by attaching a due process label.” Leatherwood , 861 F.3d at 1043; see also Marshall v. Lonberger , 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1 983) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules”). To the extent the OCCA reviewed for pl ain error, its decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of a ny clearly established federal due process standard. Mr. O’Bryant point s to no Supreme Court case clearly establishing that vouching testimony violates th e Due Process Clause or re nders a trial fundamentally unfair. Cf. Parker , 394 F.3d at 1310 (rejecting argum ent by habeas petitioner that vouching testimony violated due process because no Supreme Court case was on point). The only Supreme Court case Mr. O’Bryant cites in support of his argument is Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward , 140 U.S. 76, 88–89 (1891), which upheld a jury instruction that the ju ry could reject a diagnosis made by a medical expert if it did not find it credible, explaining that it was the jury’s province to de termine the credibility of testimony and weigh it against contrary evidence. Aetna stands for the general principle that the jury is the arbiter of credibility; Aetna does not discuss “vouching” testimony at all or estab lish that such testimony violates due process. Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 1516 Furthermore, even if the challenged testimony constituted impermissible vouching, it did not render the trial fundame ntally unfair because these statements had minimal, if any, effe ct on the trial’s outcome. See Hanson , 797 F.3d at 843 (“An inquiry into the fundamental fairness of the trial requires an examin ation of the entire proceedings, including the strength of the evidence against the [petitioner].”). The jury heard from the child herself and coul d make its own credibility determinations based on the child’s testimony and other te stimony corroborating it, including others’ testimony about the child’s disclosures to them and about their professional experiences with and/or understanding of childhood disclosures of sexual abuse. Furthermore, the judge provided cautionary inst ructions to the jury about their role as the sole arbiters of credibility. Mr. O’Bryant attempts to shore up his ar gument with cases from this and other circuits about the impermissibility of vouc hing testimony. Such authority cannot substitute for a Supreme Court case on point. See Grant v. Trammell , 727 F.3d 1006, 1020 (10th Cir. 2013) (“‘[C]ircuit precedent ma y [not] be used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprude nce into a specific legal rule.” (quoting Marshall v. Rodgers , 569 U.S. 58, 64 (2013) (per curiam))). Furthermore, vouching testimony could be impermissible for any numb er of reasons without rendering the trial fundamentally unfair. 2 See, e.g. , United States v. Vest , 116 F.3d 1179, 1185 (7th Cir.

2 None of the circuit court cases Mr. O’Bryant cites determined vouching testimony rose to the level of a constitutional error. See United States v. Hill , 749 F.3d 1250, 1263 (10th Cir. 2014) (determining such testim ony violated only the Federal Rules of Evidence); Parker v. Scott , 394 F.3d 1302, 1310– 12 (10th Cir. 2005) Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 1617 1997) (finding such testimony improper unde r the Federal Rules of Evidence but concluding it did not render the trial unfair). Finally, even if vouching testimony might render a trial fundamentally unfair, Mr. O’Bryant has not shown it rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. The Supreme Court has found trials fundame ntally unfair in circumstan ces in which the unfairness so pervaded every aspect of the trial that it rendered the trial a sham. See Lisenba , 314 U.S. at 236–37 (explaini ng use of a coerced confessi on to obtain a guilty verdict rendered a trial fundamentally unfair); Moore , 261 U.S. at 89–92 (concluding a trial was fundamentally unfair where petitioners were convicted of murder and sentenced to death at a time of inflamed public opi nion due to a race riot and they were represented by an attorney ap pointed at the beginning of the forty-five-minute trial). The challenged evidence here— limited in scope and duration, largely offered to rebut defense theories rather than bolster credibility , and tempered by in structions from the court—did not undermine the trial’s basic integrity.

(determining that the OCCA had not ruled unreasonably by de nying relief based on allegedly vouching tes timony very similar to the testimony here); Nimely v. City of New York , 414 F.3d 381, 398 (2d Ci r. 2005) (determining vouchi ng testimony violated the Federal Rules of Evidence); United States v. Vest , 116 F.3d 1179, 1185 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding such testimony improper unde r the Federal Rules of Evidence but concluding the district cour t did not plainly err because of the judge’s cautionary instructions and the limited duration of the testimony); Engesser v. Dooley , 457 F.3d 731, 736–38 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding it reasonable for th e state court to find witness’s testimony about another witnes s’s credibility not to render the trial fundamentally unfair); United States v. Alcantara-Castillo , 788 F.3d 1186, 119 7–98 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding a due process error based on prosec utorial misconduct in eliciting vouching testimony but not based on the presence of the vouching testimony itself). Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 1718 In sum, reasonable jurists would agree th at the district cour t properly denied habeas relief on this ground because there is no clearly established constitutional rule against vouching testimony, and even if th e challenged testimony was improper, it did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.
2. Prosecutorial Misconduct Mr. O’Bryant contends th at several statements by the prosecutor in closing arguments violated his due process right s, including (1) vouching for the child by calling her description of a buse unexpected and shocking and suggesting her mother was being truthful when she said she believ ed the child, and (2) calling Mr. O’Bryant a liar for telling a police offi cer he could not have abused the child because he was impotent while his ex-wife testified his impotence was successfully treated at the time. The OCCA noted that none of the allege d misconduct was objected to at trial and determined there was no plain error be cause the prosecutor’s statements were proper comments on the evidence or were made in response to the arguments of defense counsel. The district court correctly determ ined the OCCA’s rejection of the prosecutorial misconduct claim was not cont rary to clearly established constitutional law. To be sure, the Supreme Court has been clear that prosecuto rs must not inject their personal opinions about evidence into a trial. See Darden v. Wainwright , 477 U.S. 168, 180–83 (1986); id. at 189–92 (Blackmun, Brenna n, Marshall and Stevens, JJ., dissenting); United States v. Young , 470 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985); Donnelly v. Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 1819 DeChristoforo , 416 U.S. 637, 647, 648 n.23 (1974). The purpose of this rule is to prevent the jury’s misapprehension that the prosecutor posse sses evidence not presented at trial and to avoid inducing th e jury to trust the government’s judgment rather than its own. Young , 470 U.S. at 13. However, in Darden , Young , and Donnelly , even egregious violations of this rule were held not to render the trial fundamentally unfair because, in context, they would not have prejudiced the jury. Darden , 477 U.S. at 181–82; Young , 470 U.S. at 16–20; Donnelly , 416 U.S. at 643– 48. This is because “the t ouchstone of due process anal ysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not th e culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips , 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). The only case Mr. O’Bryant cites in wh ich the Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor’s comments rendered a trial f undamentally unfair involved pervasive misbehavior presenting an intole rable risk of prejudice. In Berger v. United States , 295 U.S. 78 (1935), the prosecutor misstate d the facts and the testimony, suggested statements had been made to him personally out of court, and assumed prejudicial facts not in evidence. See 295 U.S. at 85–89. The Court reiterated that a prosecutor’s obligation “in a criminal prosecu tion is not that it shall win a cas e, but that justice shall be done” and a prosecutor must “refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction,” especially given jurors’ general faith that prosecutors are behaving with integrity. Id. at 88. This was especially true in a weak case that depended on the testimony of an accomplice with a long criminal record. Id. at 88–89. In such circumstances, “prejudice to the cause of the a ccused is so highly pr obable that we are Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 1920 not justified in assuming its nonexistence.” Id. at 89. The Court noted the “misconduct was pronounced and persistent ,” not “slight or confined to a single instance.” Id. Here, to determine that th e OCCA’s rejection of th e prosecutorial misconduct claim was unreasonable, a jurist would need to view the prosecutor’s few isolated comments in closing arguments as not just improper but capable of overpowering the jury’s ability to make its own credibility dete rmination. In the cont ext of this trial, no reasonable jurist would take that view. On the contrary, all reasonable jurists would agree that the district court properly denied habeas relief on this issue.
3. Cumulative Error Mr. O’Bryant contends that the cumulative effect of th e errors at trial rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. The OCCA disagreed, determining there could be no accumulated error because there was no indi vidual error. Reasonable jurists would not quarrel with the district court’s denial of habeas relief on th is ground because, if there were errors, they were insufficient to render the trial fundamentally unfair. Thus, Mr. O’Bryant is not entitled to a COA on this issue.
III. CONCLUSION Mr. O’Bryant has not made a substantia l showing of denial of a constitutional right. Reasonable jurists would therefore agree that the dist rict court properly denied his habeas petition. Thus, we DENY Mr. O’Bryant’s application for a COA and Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 2021 DISMISS this matter. Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge Appellate Case: 22-6098 Document: 010110784513 Date Filed: 12/16/2022 Page: 21