United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 14, 2015*

Decided April 14, 2015

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 14-1857

BEVERLY THOMPSON and 

ROBERT ROCK,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

GREGORY P. RUDDY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of 

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 11 C 4425

Harry D. Leinenweber,

Judge.

O R D E R

Beverly Thompson and Robert Rock, successive owners of a property in the City 

of Joliet, sued the City and two of the City’s employees over alleged civil-rights 

violations in connection with a suit by the City to enforce its ordinances. The City and 

its employees prevailed in this federal action, in part on the pleadings and in part at 

summary judgment. Thompson and Rock contend in this appeal only that they were 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is 

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

 
No. 14-1857 Page 2

not afforded an adequate opportunity during discovery to pursue their claims. We 

affirm the judgment.

According to the complaint Gregory Ruddy, a civil engineer with the City, 

accused Thompson of placing fill on her property without the necessary permits. That 

ordinance violation was prosecuted, ultimately unsuccessfully, by Mary Kucharz, a 

lawyer for the City. Thompson and Rock responded to the ordinance-enforcement 

proceeding by filing this federal lawsuit, in which they sought relief against Ruddy and 

Kucharz under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), asserting they conspired to deprive the plaintiffs of 

equal protection due to their economic class, and the City of Joliet under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), asserting that the 

City failed to supervise Ruddy and Kucharz. They also brought a supplemental 

malicious-prosecution claim against all defendants.

The district court screened the complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and 

allowed the plaintiffs to proceed on their malicious-prosecution and Monell claims, and 

only against Ruddy and the City. (Kucharz was dismissed from the suit on grounds of 

absolute prosecutorial immunity.) The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim under § 1985 

because they alleged only a conspiracy to discriminate against them based on 

socioeconomic status, which is not an actionable basis for a claim under § 1985. Several 

months later, in June 2012, the court, on the defendants’ motion, dismissed the 

malicious-prosecution claim insofar as it related to Rock because the ordinanceenforcement proceeding had been brought only against Thompson.

After the defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims in 

November 2012, Thompson and Rock, citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d), sought additional 

time for discovery, asserting generally that they were, at that time, unable to respond 

adequately to the defendants’ statement of facts. The district court agreed to provide the 

plaintiffs an additional month to secure counsel or respond to the defendants’ motion. 

After that deadline passed, the plaintiffs asked for, and received, four more extensions 

of time—totaling 11 additional months—in which to conduct discovery.

In March 2014 the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. 

The undisputed evidence, the court concluded, showed no malice behind the 

ordinance-enforcement proceeding, vitiating any claim of malicious prosecution. Nor

did the record contain any evidence that Thompson and Rock had been treated 

differently by the City for an irrational or impermissible reason; without an underlying 

constitutional violation, the court continued, the City was not liable under Monell.
No. 14-1857 Page 3

On appeal the plaintiffs contend only that the district court erred by not giving 

them sufficient time for discovery. Summary judgment is improper if the non-moving 

party has not had a “fair opportunity” to conduct whatever discovery is necessary to 

rebut the factual basis of the motion. Grayson v. O’Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 815 (7th Cir. 2002); 

see Celotrex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986). But district judges have wide 

latitude in managing discovery and determining whether a party has had such a fair 

opportunity. See Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 886–87 (7th Cir. 2011). Thompson and 

Rock received all of the additional time they sought. They had the opportunity to 

depose key City employees, and were able to depose at least Ruddy. They provide no 

reason why 11 months (plus the time between the filing of defendants’ answer and 

motion for summary judgment) did not suffice to serve upon the defendants the 

necessary interrogatories or requests for production, nor do they point to any specific 

evidence they were unable to or prevented from obtaining.

AFFIRMED.