[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 13-15651

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-00350-SCJ-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

EMMANUEL ASANTE, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(April 6, 2015)

Before MARCUS, JILL PRYOR and EBEL,

* Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge:

__________________ * Honorable David M. Ebel, United States Circuit Judge for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by 

designation.

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Emmanuel Asante pled guilty to two firearms offenses and the district court 

sentenced him at the bottom of the advisory sentencing guideline range to forty-six 

months in prison. Asante claims that the district court erred in calculating his 

sentencing range because the court enhanced his offense level for both trafficking 

and exporting firearms without sufficient evidence to support either enhancement. 

He further contends that, even if there was evidence to support each of those 

enhancements, to apply both in Asante=s case impermissibly double-counted the 

same conduct. We reject each of those arguments and further conclude that 

Asante=s sentence at the bottom of the properly calculated sentencing range was 

not substantively unreasonable. Lastly, we reject Asante=s complaint that the 

district court should have redacted information in the presentence report (“PSR”) 

regarding threats he made against the prosecutor and a magistrate judge who 

denied Asante=s request for pretrial release on bond. Therefore, having jurisdiction 

under 18 U.S.C. ' 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. '1291, we AFFIRM.

BACKGROUND

Asante pled guilty to 1) conspiring to make false statements to a federally 

licensed firearms dealer; and 2) making, or aiding and abetting, false statements 

regarding information that a federally licensed firearms dealer is required to keep 

in his records. See 18 U.S.C. '' 2, 371, 924(a)(1)(A). These offenses were part of 

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a scheme whereby Asante, who could not lawfully possess a firearm, would pay 

his co-defendant, Johnny White, to buy weapons for Asante.1

 When White 

purchased the firearm underlying Asante=s convictions, White falsely represented 

to a federally licensed firearms dealer that he, White, was the intended owner. The 

district court sentenced Asante at the bottom of his advisory sentencing guideline 

range, to forty-six months in prison, for each firearms offense, the sentences to run 

concurrently. 

DISCUSSION

I. The district court properly enhanced Asante=s offense level for both 

trafficking and exporting firearms

Asante claims that the district court erred in calculating his advisory 

guideline range by improperly enhancing his offense level for both trafficking and 

exporting firearms. Asante specifically contends that there was insufficient 

evidence to justify applying either of those enhancements in his case and that, even 

if there was sufficient evidence to support each of those enhancements, it was 

impermissible double-counting to apply both to him. 

 1

Asante could not lawfully possess firearms because 1) he is a citizen of Ghana 

admitted to the United States on a non-immigrant student visa; and 2) at the time of these 

offenses Asante was unlawfully in the United States, having overstayed his student visa. 

See 18 U.S.C. ' 922(g)(5)(A), (B). 

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A. The Government presented sufficient evidence for the district court 

to find that each of the enhancements applied to Asante 

When, as here, Athe government seeks to apply an enhancement under the 

Sentencing Guidelines over a defendant=s factual objection, [the United States] has 

the burden of introducing sufficient and reliable evidence to prove the necessary 

facts by a preponderance of the evidence.@ United States v. Isaacson, 752 F.3d 

1291, 1305 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 

S. Ct. 990 (2015). This court reviews the district court=s application of the 

sentencing guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See id. 

1. Evidence before the sentencing court

The evidence before the sentencing court included the following: After 

tracing a firearm found at a Maryland crime scene back to White, who lived in 

Georgia, agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (AATF@) 

questioned White about nine guns he had purchased during an eight-month period. 

White explained that he had purchased most of those weaponsCfive to seven 

gunsCfor a friend who could not buy firearms himself. That friend, Asante, told 

White that he was transporting the guns in order to make some money. Asante 

would designate which firearms White should buyCusually smaller caliber 

weapons which Asante could more easily transport, tell White where to buy guns, 

and then give White the means with which to buy the weapons. 

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At the ATF agents= request, White called Asante and asked him why ATF 

agents would be asking White about the guns White bought for Asante. During 

that recorded call, Asante told White that there should be no problem with those 

guns because they were out of the country, having been hidden in cars that were 

then shipped to Jamaica, where Asante=s people retrieved them. In a second 

recorded call, Asante told White that Asante=s brother in Jamaica had all but one of 

the smuggled guns. And Asante=s brother knew who had the last gun; there was no 

problem with that gun, either. 

2. There was sufficient evidence to apply the trafficking 

enhancement, U.S.S.G. ' 2K2.1(b)(5), to Asante 

To calculate the offense level of a firearms offender like Asante, the district 

court begins with U.S.S.G. ' 2K2.1. Section 2K2.1(b)(5), at issue here, increases 

the offense level by four if the firearms offender Aengaged in the trafficking of 

firearms.@ In order for this offense-level enhancement to apply in a given case, the 

Government must prove that the defendant 1) transported or transferred, or 

received with the intent to transport, two or more firearms to someone else; 

2) knowing that the defendant=s conduct would result in another=s unlawful 

possession, use or disposal of those firearms. U.S.S.G. ' 2K2.1, app. n.13(A).2

 

 2

More precisely, the trafficking enhancement states that it: 

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Asante does not challenge the Government=s proof of the first circumstance, that he 

transferred, or received with the intent to transfer, more than two firearms to 

someone else. But Asante contends the Government failed to prove that he 

A[k]new or had reason to believe@ that his conduct would result in another=s 

unlawful possession, use or disposal of the firearm. There are two ways the 

Government can prove that second circumstance. See id. We address each of 

those two manners of proof next. 

a. The Government failed to prove that Asante knew or 

had reason to believe that his conduct would result in the 

transfer of a firearm to an individual Awhose possession or 

receipt of the firearm would be unlawful@ 

 

applies, regardless of whether anything of value was exchanged, if the 

defendantC

(i) [t]ransported, transferred, or otherwise disposed of two or more

firearms to another individual, or received two or more firearms with the 

intent to transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of firearms to another 

individual; and

(ii) [k]new or had reason to believe that such conduct would result in the 

transport, transfer, or disposal of a firearm to an individualC

(I) Whose possession or receipt of the firearm would be 

unlawful; or

(II) Who intended to use or dispose of the firearm 

unlawfully.

U.S.S.G. ' 2K2.1, app. n.13(A). 

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The Government could first prove that the defendant A[k]new or had reason 

to believe that [his] conduct would result in the transport, transfer, or disposal of a 

firearm to an individual . . . [w]hose possession or receipt of the firearm would be 

unlawful.@ Id., app. n. 13(A)(ii)(I). The guidelines narrowly define an 

A[i]ndividual whose possession or receipt of the firearm would be unlawful@ to 

Amean[] an individual who (i) has a prior conviction for a crime of violence, a 

controlled substance offense, or a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence; or 

(ii) at the time of the offense was under a criminal justice sentence, including 

probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape.@ Id., 

app. n. 13(B). Because the Government failed to present any evidence that Asante 

knew that his conduct would result in a firearm being transferred to such an 

individual, the district court erred in finding that the trafficking enhancement 

applied on this basis. 

b. There was sufficient evidence to find that Asante knew 

or had reason to believe that his conduct would result in the 

transfer of a firearm to an individual Awho intended to use 

or dispose of the firearm unlawfully@ 

The second way the trafficking enhancement can apply is if the Government 

proves that the defendant A[k]new or had reason to believe that [his] conduct would 

result in the transport, transfer, or disposal of a firearm to an individual . . . [w]ho 

intended to use or dispose of the firearm unlawfully.@ Id., app. n.13(A)(ii)(II). 

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Asante contends that the district court erred in finding that the trafficking 

enhancement applied to him on this basis, because the Government presented no 

evidence as to whom Asante transferred the firearms or what the individuals along 

the chain of possession intended to do with the weapons. 

Even without such information, however, the trafficking enhancement can 

apply if the circumstances, known to the defendant when he transferred the 

firearms, or received the firearms with the intent to transfer them, established that 

the defendant A[k]new or had reason to believe@ that his conduct would result in the 

transfer of a firearm to someone A[w]ho intended to use or dispose of the firearm 

unlawfully.@ Id. Critically, in applying the trafficking enhancement in this 

manner, a court looks, not to what actually happened to the firearms, but instead to 

the circumstances known to the defendant. Several unpublished Eleventh Circuit 

decisions have applied the trafficking enhancement in this way. In United States v. 

Hernandez, for example, this court upheld applying the trafficking enhancement 

based on the circumstances known to Defendant Salvador Luna. 572 F. App=x 

962, 963 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished). Those circumstances 

included the following:

[Luna] was recruited by an individual whom he knew only by his first 

name, Jose; Luna knew that Jose had recruited other individuals to 

purchase firearms; Luna paid [his co-defendant] Sergio Hernandez to 

purchase six firearms; Jose gave Luna a Jeep vehicle to transport the 

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firearms to Mexico; Luna registered the Jeep in his name; Luna knew 

Jose hid the firearms in the door panels of the Jeep; Luna drove the 

Jeep to Mexico in exchange for $3,000 upon delivery of the firearms 

to Jose=s brother; and Luna previously had transported cars to Mexico 

on numerous occasions, where he Alegalized@ them.

Id. From these circumstances, we held that the sentencing

court reasonably inferred that Luna knew the guns would be disposed 

of unlawfully because he knew of Jose=s clandestine tactics and 

because Luna used a straw man to purchase the firearms and 

smuggled them into Mexico . . . . Luna=s use of surreptitious methods 

to acquire and to deliver the firearms eliminated any plausible belief 

that those firearms would be used for innocent, or legal, purposes.

Id. (internal quotation marks, alterations omitted). 

We similarly upheld application of the trafficking enhancement in United 

States v. West, based on the suspicious circumstances known to the defendant, and 

not on the transferees who actually ended up with the firearms nor on what those 

transferees actually did with the firearms. 563 F. App=x 745, 746-47 (11th Cir. 

2014) (per curiam) (unpublished). In fact, because the defendant there, West, sold 

the firearms at issue to undercover officers, there was no evidence that the firearms 

actually ended up being transferred to someone Awho intended to use or dispose of 

the firearm unlawfully.@ Id. at 747. Still, we upheld applying the trafficking 

enhancement because the evidence established that West A>had reason to believe=

that the undercover officers would take the guns to the New York area and resell 

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them to individuals who would dispose of or use them illegally.@ Id. That 

evidence included the following:

(1) West sold a total of seven guns to the undercover officers over 

several transactions; (2) the undercover officers told West that they 

intended to re-sell the guns Aup north@ in the New York area at double 

the price they paid West; (3) one of the undercover officers later told 

West that he made $800 selling a 9mm pistol that he had purchased 

from West for $275; (4) the undercover officers sought and purchased 

guns, such as assault rifles and handguns, designed for use on humans, 

not for hunting; (5) one undercover officer asked West about the serial 

numbers on the guns, and, when West indicated the guns were stolen, 

the officer told West that the officer would have to Ado some work@ to 

the guns, meaning he would have to obliterate the serial numbers; and 

(6) West was careful not to handle the guns with his bare hands and 

wiped the guns off before giving then to the undercover officers.

Id.; see also United States v. McMillar, 518 F. App=x 867, 868-69 (11th Cir. 2013) 

(per curiam) (unpublished) (upholding application of trafficking enhancement 

because defendant knew or had reason to believe firearms would end up with one 

who would unlawfully use or dispose of the firearm, where defendant sold firearms 

to undercover officers who told the defendant that the officers made a profit selling 

guns in New York, they wanted to buy only smaller weapons that could be 

concealed, and they could sell the guns in New York for twice what they paid for 

them in Georgia); United States v. Grinnage, 309 F. App=x 334, 335-36 (11th Cir. 

2009) (per curiam) (unpublished) (upholding applying trafficking enhancement 

because defendant had reason to believe he was transferring firearm to one who 

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intended to use or dispose of it unlawfully, where undercover officer to whom the 

defendant sold the firearm told defendant that the officer spent the money he made 

selling guns at a tattoo parlor in order to Amake it look legit@).3

 

We adopt the reasoning of these unpublished decisions. Applying it here, 

we conclude that the evidence at Asante=s sentencing was sufficient for the district 

court to find that, at the time Asante received and transferred the firearms, he 

A[k]new or had a reason to believe@ that his conduct would result in the transfer of 

a firearm to one A[w]ho intended to use or dispose of the firearm unlawfully.@ That 

evidence included the following: Asante used a straw buyer, his co-defendant 

White, to purchase five to seven guns unlawfully; during the scheme, Asante told 

White that he was Atransporting@ the firearms in order to make some money; and, 

 3 Other circuits have applied this same reasoning, though also mostly in unpublished 

decisions. See United States v. Marceau, 554 F.3d 24, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2009) (upholding 

application of trafficking enhancement, after finding defendant knew or had reason to know that 

he was transferring firearm to one who intended to use or dispose of the weapon unlawfully 

because he stated that he intended to steal firearms, bring them to Vermont, remove the serial 

numbers, and then exchange the guns for drugs, and he acted in accord with his stated intent); 

United States v. Melvin, 463 F. App=x 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (upholding 

application of trafficking enhancement, after finding defendant knew or had reason to know that 

he was transferring firearm to one who intended to use or dispose of the weapon unlawfully 

because of the number and type of firearms involved, the fact that defendant was being paid the 

Ablack market rate,@ and the Asecretive nature of the transactions@); United States v. Walker, 375 

F. App=x 68, 71 (2d Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (upholding application of trafficking enhancement, 

after finding defendant knew or had reason to know that he was transferring firearm to one who 

intended to use or dispose of the weapon unlawfully because the defendant delivered the firearms 

Ain a furtive manner@ and Avouched that the guns were either fully automatic or could be 

converted to fully automatic weapons@); cf. United States v. Green, 360 F. App=x 521, 524-25 

(5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished) (applying same analysis but holding there was 

insufficient evidence to support applying the trafficking enhancement because there was no 

evidence of what the defendant knew or had reason to believe). 

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to facilitate Asante=s transportation of the firearms, he directed White to buy 

smaller caliber guns. The evidence further supports the inference that Asante knew 

that the firearms he obtained from White would be hidden in cars that were being 

shipped to Jamaica, where Asante=s brother would retrieve the smuggled firearms. 

This evidence was sufficient for the district court to apply the trafficking 

enhancement to Asante because he A[k]new or had reason to believe@ that his 

conduct would result in the transfer of these firearms to one A[w]ho intended to use 

or dispose of the firearm[s] unlawfully.@

3. There was sufficient evidence to apply the exporting 

enhancement, U.S.S.G. ' 2K2.1(b)(6)(A), to Asante 

In addition to enhancing Asante=s offense level for trafficking firearms, the 

district court applied an additional four-level enhancement for exporting firearms, 

U.S.S.G. ' 2K2.1(b)(6)(A).4

 Based on the recorded calls, during which Asante 

assured his co-defendant White that the guns White bought for Asante were 

smuggled out of the United States in cars sent to Jamaica, where Asante=s brother 

retrieved them, we reject Asante=s argument that the Government failed to present 

enough evidence for the district court to find that the firearms actually left the 

 4

Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(A) applies A[i]f the defendant . . . [p]ossessed any firearm or 

ammunition while leaving or attempting to leave the United States, or possessed or transferred 

any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be 

transported out of the United States.@ 

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United States. Asante argues only that perhaps he was lying to White when Asante 

told White the guns were out of the country. But the district court deemed 

Asante=s statements during the recorded calls to be credible, and A[w]e accord great 

deference to the [sentencing] court=s credibility determinations,@ United States v. 

Barsoum, 763 F.3d 1321, 1333 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(addressing credibility of drug quantity witnesses).5

B. Applying both the trafficking and the exporting enhancements to 

Asante did not amount to impermissible double-counting 

Asante next argues that applying both the trafficking and exporting 

enhancements impermissibly double-counted his involvement in shipping the 

firearms out of the United States. We review this argument de novo. See United 

 5 To the extent Asante argued for the first time during oral argument that there was 

insufficient evidence to establish, by a preponderance, that he “possessed or transferred” the 

firearms “with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that [they] would be transported out of the 

United States,” we reject that argument. There was sufficient evidence before the district court 

to support the implicit finding that, at the time Asante “possessed or transferred” the firearms, he 

knew, intended, or had reason to believe that the firearms would be transported out of the United 

States. That evidence included Asante’s statements, during the two recorded calls between 

Asante and White, that the guns were hidden in cars and sent out of the United States to Jamaica; 

Aevery car that we sent made it safely@; Amy@ (Asante=s) people had been able to take everything 

out of the cars; AI have not talked to anybody there in the last week to see if anyone has a 

problem@ with the guns, but Asante agreed to check; after checking with his Abrother,@ Asante 

assured White that, of the five guns sent to Jamaica, Asante=s brother had four of them and the 

brother would check with the person who had the fifth. In a later, unrecorded call, Asante told 

White that there was no problem with the fifth gun, either. In addition to these recorded calls 

that occurred after the guns were already in Jamaica, at the time Asante was buying guns through 

White, Asante told White that Asante was transporting the guns in order to make money. 

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States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317, 1339 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 

1188 (2015).

AImpermissible double counting occurs only when one part of the 

[Sentencing] Guidelines is applied to increase a defendant=s punishment on account 

of a kind of harm that has already been fully accounted for by application of 

another part of the Guidelines.@ United States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 894 (11th 

Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 764 (2014). But 

[d]ouble counting a factor during sentencing is permitted if the 

Sentencing Commission intended that result and each guideline 

section in question concerns conceptually separate notions relating to 

sentencing. We presume that the Commission intended to apply 

separate sections cumulatively unless otherwise specified, and, as a 

result, a defendant asserting a double counting claim has a tough task.

Flanders, 752 F.3d at 1340 (citations, internal quotation marks omitted). 

Applying both the trafficking and the exporting enhancements to Asante was 

not impermissible double-counting. We start with the presumption that the 

Sentencing Commission intended that these two enhancements, listed separately in 

U.S.S.G. ' 2K2.1, be applied cumulatively. See Flanders, 752 F.3d at 1340. Next, 

adopting the reasoning of United States v. Villa Carvajal, 516 F. App=x 808, 811 

(11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished), we conclude that each of these 

enhancements addresses Aconceptually separate notions relating to sentencing,@

Flanders, 752 F.3d at 1340. Villa-Carvajal reasoned that the trafficking and 

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exporting enhancements Aaddress two different kinds of harm.@ 516 F. App=x at 

811. The trafficking enhancement increases a firearm offender=s offense level for 

conduct that he knows or has reason to believe will result in a firearm being 

transferred to someone whose possession or use of that weapon is unlawful, 

regardless of whether that unlawful use or possession occurs in or out of the United 

States. Id. The exporting enhancement, on the other hand, is concerned instead 

with a firearm offender=s conduct undertaken with the intent to export firearms out 

of the United States, even if the offender was not trafficking (meaning he did not 

know or have a reason to believe that the weapon would be possessed or used by 

another unlawfully). Id. Because these two enhancements are aimed at different 

harms, neither enhancement Afully account[s]@ for both harms, Cubero, 754 F.3d 

888, 894. See United States v. White, 663 F.3d 1207, 1217 (11th Cir. 2011). 

Therefore, applying both enhancements to Asante did not amount to impermissible 

double-counting. See Villa Carvajal, 516 F. App=x at 811; see also United States v. 

Mendoza, 556 F. App=x 326, 327 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) 

(rejecting similar double-counting argument). 

II. Asante=s sentence is not substantively unreasonable

Properly including the four-level enhancement for trafficking firearms and 

the four-level enhancement for exporting firearms, the district court calculated 

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Asante=s offense level to be 21 and his criminal history category to be III, resulting 

in an advisory guideline range of forty-six to fifty-seven months in prison. The 

district court imposed a sentence at the bottom of that range, forty-six months, for 

each of Asante=s two convictions, to run concurrently. 

Asante contends that this sentence was substantively unreasonable. We 

review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. See

United States v. Baldwin, 774 F.3d 711, 729 (11th Cir. 2014). In doing so, we will 

Anot automatically presume a sentence within the guidelines range is reasonable,@

but we Aordinarily expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be reasonable.@ 

United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation 

marks, alteration omitted). We Awill remand for resentencing only if the district 

court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the [18 U.S.C.] ' 3553(a) 

[sentencing] factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of 

reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.@ Baldwin, 774 F.3d at 731 

(internal quotation marks omitted). It is Asante=s burden to show that his sentence 

is substantively unreasonable. See id. at 731-32.

Asante has not met his burden. Before sentencing Asante to forty-six

months in prison, the district court considered and discussed the ' 3553(a) factors 

and rejected Asante=s request for a sentence below the guidelines advisory range. 

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In doing so, the court noted that Asante=s relevant offense conduct, particularly in 

exporting firearms outside the United States, was very serious; a significant 

sentence was necessary to deter others from sending illegal firearms to poor 

countries; Asante=s prior criminal history, though nonviolent, Awas not very 

good@

6

; even though Asante apologized, he did not really appear remorseful; and 

the fact that Asante had a wife and two young daughters did not warrant a belowguideline sentence. The district court, thus, carefully weighed the ' 3553(a) 

factors before imposing a sentence within, but at the bottom of, the advisory 

guideline range. We cannot say that sentence was the product of a Aclear error of 

judgment,@ nor that it was Aoutside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by 

the facts of th[is] case,@ Baldwin, 774 F.3d at 731. 

III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to redact from 

the PSR information that Asante threatened the prosecutor and a magistrate 

judge 

Lastly, Asante argues that the district court should have redacted information 

in the PSR indicating that Asante, during a phone call he made from jail to his 

wife, threatened the prosecutor and the magistrate judge who denied Asante 

 6 Asante had five prior convictions: forging coin and bank notes; obtaining money under 

false pretenses; two convictions for marijuana possession; and manufacturing a controlled 

substance, cocaine. Asante had two additional convictions for driving while his license was 

revoked or suspended, and an additional nine traffic citations. Within one year of entering the 

United States to study, at age nineteen, Asante had already been convicted of forging coin and

bank notes. 

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pretrial release. Although the district court did not consider the threats when it 

sentenced Asante, the court nevertheless refused to redact this information, ruling 

it was important information for the Bureau of Prisons to have. 

As a general matter, 18 U.S.C. ' 3661 provides that A[n]o limitation shall be 

placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a 

person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and 

consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.@ Furthermore, Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 32(d)(2)(A) requires the PSR to include information about the 

defendant=s history and characteristics, including Aany circumstances affecting the 

defendant=s behavior that may be helpful in imposing sentence or in correctional 

treatment,@ Rule 32(d)(2)(A)(iii). Rule 32(d)(3), on the other hand, excludes only 

three narrow categories of information from the PSR: 1) Aany diagnoses that, if 

disclosed, might seriously disrupt a rehabilitation program@; 2) Aany sources of 

information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality@; and 3) Aany other 

information that, if disclosed, might result in physical or other harm to the 

defendant or others.@

The information at issue here, Asante=s threats against the prosecutor and 

magistrate judge, does not fall into any of the categories of information that cannot

be included in the PSR. Cf. United States v. Bartlett, 416 F. App=x 508, 510-11 

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(6th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (holding accusation that defendant had sexually 

assaulted a child, without more, is too speculative to fall within Rule 32(d)(3)(C)=s 

exclusion of information that might harm the defendant). Arguably its falls into 

the category of information regarding Asante=s history and characteristics which 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d)(2)(A) requires the PSR to contain. But even if the rules do 

not require the PSR to contain the information about Asante=s threats, the district 

court had discretion to include it in the PSR. See Bartlett, 416 F. App=x at 510-11; 

United States v. Bahr, No. 3:11-CR-00028-BR, 2014 WL 4631198, at *7-*9 (D. 

Or. Sept. 15, 2014). And the court did not abuse its discretion here in refusing to 

redact from the PSR the information about the threats. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Asante=s concurrent forty-six-month 

sentences and the district court=s decision not to redact from the PSR information 

regarding threats Asante made against the prosecutor and a magistrate judge. 

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