alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Emil Martin SUNTER, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 14363.

Supreme Court of Utah.

May 24, 1976.

*185Bryce K. Bryner, Helper, for defendant and appellant.

Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Earl F. Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, Ronald B. Boutwell, Carbon County Atty., Price, for plaintiff and respondent.

TUCKETT, Justice:

The defendant appeals from a verdict and judgment of the District Court of Carbon County finding him guilty of attempted burglary in violation of Section 76-4-101(1), U.C.A.1953 as amended. The defendant is here seeking a reversal.

The only claim of error made by the defendant in this court is the trial court’s failure to submit to the jury an instruction on the possession of an instrument for burglary or theft.

On July 8, 1975, the defendant was observed in the vicinity of the Regis Club in Helper, Utah. The defendant proceeded to the rear of the building and after a short time returned to his vehicle. Officers thereafter examined the building and observed that a screen had been partially removed and there was other physical evidence that an entry had been attempted. There was some evidence that the defendant carried with him a pry bar at the time he went to the rear of the building, also when he returned to his vehicle.

Burglary is defined by the statutes, Section 76-6-202(1), in the following language :

> A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person.

The defendant claims that the crime set forth in Section 76-6-205 is an included offense within the burglary statute. Said crime is defined as follows:

> Any person who manufactures or possesses any instrument, tool, device, article, or other thing adapted, designed, or commonly used in advancing or facilitating the commission of any offense under circumstances manifesting an intent to use or knowledge that some person intends to use the same in the commission of a burglary or theft is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

For the crime of manufacture or possession of an instrument for burglary or theft to be necessarily included in the offense of burglary as charged in the information all of the elements of the lesser offense of the possession of an instrument for burglary must not only be a part of the greater offense of burglary but must also be embraced within the legal definition thereof. The gist of the offense of burglary is the unlawful entry into a building. No entry or attempted entry is a necessary element of the crime defined by Section 76-6-205, and we conclude that that offense is not necessarily embraced within the offense of burglary.1

We find no error in the decision of the court below, and the judgment of that court is affirmed.

HENRIOD, C. J., and ELLETT, CROCKETT and MAUGHAN, JJ., concur.

1

. *State v. Woolman,*84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 640; *State v. Vickers,*549 P.2d 449 (Utah).
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.6

                               JO-ANN STORES, INC.

                  LIST OF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS WHO PARTICIPATE IN
         THE REGISTRANT'S 1979 SUPPLEMENTAL RETIREMENT PLAN, AS AMENDED


-        David Bolen
-        Brian Carney
-        Rosalind Thompson
-        Mike Edwards
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-15-00173-CR

IN RE Stephen Guy FOSTER

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Jason Pulliam, Justice

Delivered and Filed: April 15, 2015

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED

On March 27, 2015, relator Stephen Guy Foster filed a pro se petition for writ of mandamus 

complaining of the trial court’s order denying his motion for judgment nunc pro tunc. For the 

following reasons, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus.

Foster was arrested in March 2013 and charged with the felony offense of intoxication 

assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.07 (West 2011). He was released on bond the following 

day, after signing a pre-trial agreement establishing the conditions of his release. In December 

2014, Foster entered into a plea agreement on the charge, accepting a five-year sentence. Foster 

has remained incarcerated since that time. 

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2013CR8420, styled The State of Texas v. Stephen Guy Foster, pending in 

the 437th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Lori I. Valenzuela presiding.

 
04-15-00173-CR

Foster filed a motion for judgment nunc pro tunc in the trial court in February 2015. In his 

motion, Foster asserted he was entitled to additional time credits for the time he served on pre-trial 

release. The trial court denied the motion for judgment nunc pro tunc, concluding there was no 

error in the defendant’s judgment. Foster now seeks mandamus relief from this court, requesting 

an order compelling the trial judge to amend the final judgment of conviction and sentence to 

correct a clerical error.

“The purpose of a nunc pro tunc order is to correctly reflect from the records of the court

a judgment actually made by it, but which for some reason was not entered of record at the proper 

time.” Alvarez v. State, 605 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). An error in the entry of 

judgment is clerical if it did not arise as the result of judicial reasoning. Id. The trial court has 

found that the judgment in this instance accurately reflected the trial court’s action. Although 

Foster contends the alleged error in his sentence may have been clerical in nature, the record does 

not support his assertion. Therefore, we cannot conclude the trial court clearly abused its discretion 

in denying the motion for judgment nunc pro tunc.

Because we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relator’s motion 

for judgment nunc pro tunc, this court is of the opinion that relator is not entitled to the relief 

sought by mandamus. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is denied. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 52.8(a).

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH

- 2 -
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

GARY L. GREGG AND MARY E. GREGG,

Petitioners

v.

AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL, INC., 

AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., 

RIVERSOURCE LIFE INSURANCE 

COMPANY AND ROBERT A. KOVALCHIK,

Respondents

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 255 WAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 29th day of March, 2023, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 128 Engrossed in House (EH)]

<DOC>
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. CON. RES. 128

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That, in the enrollment of the bill H.R. 1520 the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives shall make the following correction:
     Amend the title so as to read: ``Making further continuing 
appropriations for fiscal year 2021, and for other purposes.''.

            Passed the House of Representatives December 21, 2020.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
116th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                            H. CON. RES. 128

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

     Directing the Clerk of the House of Representatives to make a 
               correction in the enrollment of H.R. 1520.
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> UT
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET STATEMENT OF INCOME, STATEMENT OF RETAINED EARNINGS AND STATEMENT OF CASH
FLOWS CONTAINED IN FORM 10K OF CANAL ELECTRIC COMPANY FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED
DECEMBER 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<BOOK-VALUE>                                  PER-BOOK
<TOTAL-NET-UTILITY-PLANT>                      189,854
<OTHER-PROPERTY-AND-INVEST>                      2,833
<TOTAL-CURRENT-ASSETS>                          11,372
<TOTAL-DEFERRED-CHARGES>                        24,392
<OTHER-ASSETS>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 228,451
<COMMON>                                        38,080
<CAPITAL-SURPLUS-PAID-IN>                       27,088
<RETAINED-EARNINGS>                              5,390
<TOTAL-COMMON-STOCKHOLDERS-EQ>                  70,558
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-NET>                                 0
<SHORT-TERM-NOTES>                              54,815
<LONG-TERM-NOTES-PAYABLE>                            0
<COMMERCIAL-PAPER-OBLIGATIONS>                       0
<LONG-TERM-DEBT-CURRENT-PORT>                        0
<PREFERRED-STOCK-CURRENT>                            0
<CAPITAL-LEASE-OBLIGATIONS>                      9,988
<LEASES-CURRENT>                                   564
<OTHER-ITEMS-CAPITAL-AND-LIAB>                  92,526
<TOT-CAPITALIZATION-AND-LIAB>                  228,451
<GROSS-OPERATING-REVENUE>                       47,288
<INCOME-TAX-EXPENSE>                            13,648
<OTHER-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                      22,095
<TOTAL-OPERATING-EXPENSES>                      35,743
<OPERATING-INCOME-LOSS>                         11,545
<OTHER-INCOME-NET>                              12,808
<INCOME-BEFORE-INTEREST-EXPEN>                  24,353
<TOTAL-INTEREST-EXPENSE>                         3,949
<NET-INCOME>                                    20,404
<PREFERRED-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                          0
<EARNINGS-AVAILABLE-FOR-COMM>                   20,404
<COMMON-STOCK-DIVIDENDS>                       238,213
<TOTAL-INTEREST-ON-BONDS>                        2,389
<CASH-FLOW-OPERATIONS>                       (116,699)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 6 (Wednesday, January 9, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Page 1865]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-00174]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders; 
Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: Communication Disorders Review Committee.
    Date: February 14-15, 2013.
    Time: February 14, 2013, 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: Baltimore Marriott Waterfront, 700 Aliceanna Street, 
Baltimore, MD 21202.
    Time: February 15, 2013, 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: Baltimore Marriott Waterfront, 700 Aliceanna Street, 
Baltimore, MD 21202.
    Contact Person: Shiguang Yang, DVM, Ph.D., Scientific Review 
Branch, Division of Extramural Activities, NIDCD, NIH, 6120 
Executive Blvd., Suite 400C, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301-435-1425, 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#d5acb4bbb2a6bdbc95bbbcb1b6b1fbbbbcbdfbb2baa3"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="0a736b646d7962634a64636e696e24646362246d657c">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.173, 
Biological Research Related to Deafness and Communicative Disorders, 
National Institutes of Health, HHS)


    Dated: January 3, 2013.
Anna Snouffer,
Deputy Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2013-00174 Filed 1-8-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Ayda Torres, Appellant.

—Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Antonio Brandveen, J.), rendered October 4, 1989, convicting defendant of two counts of reckless endangerment in the first degree and sentencing her to concurrent five year terms of probation, unanimously affirmed.

The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, shows that defendant chased after several teenage boys, accusing them of stealing property from her. She continued the chase, armed with a knife, and eventually stabbed one of the youths and an innocent bystander. Under these circumstances, her guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt and we find her conviction supported by the weight of the evidence. In particular, it is apparent that the risk of death created by her conduct was both substantial and unjustifiable. *(People v Gatto,*168 AD2d 296, *lv denied*77 NY2d 877.)

The trial court committed no error in refusing to give a missing witness charge with respect to some of the other teenage boys who were in the group which defendant attacked. Defendant failed to demonstrate that the testimony of these witnesses would be material and non-cumulative. *(People v Gonzalez,*68 NY2d 424.) Concur—Carro, J. P., Rosenberger, Asch and Kassal, JJ.
CAUSE NO. ______________________

MARK JOSEPH SHUMSKI, § IN THE TEXAS COURT OF 

 Appellant, §

§

v. §

§

§ CRIMINAL APPEALS

§

§

§

§

STATE OF TEXAS § IN AND FOR THE STATE OF 

 Appellee. § TEXAS

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO EXTEND DEADLINE TO FILE PETITION

FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW PURSUANT TO T.R.A.P RULE 10(5)(b)

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW DEFENDANT MARK JOSEPH SHUMSKI and files this

his MOTION TO EXTEND DEADLINE TO FILE PETITION FOR

DISCRETIONARY REVIEW PURSUANT TO T.R.A.P RULE 10(5)(b). In

Support of this Motion Defendant offers to this Honorable Court the following:

I.

This cause was originally filed in the Second Court of Criminal Appeals,

however, pursuant to Order, the case was transferred to the Honorable 11th

Court of Appeals. 

PD-0408-15

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 4/13/2015 12:00:00 AM

Accepted 4/15/2015 4:08:53 PM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK
II.

On March 5, 2015, The Honorable 11

th

 Court of Appeals affirmed the 271

st

,

Wise County District Court proceedings. The appellate cause number is 11-

13-00054-CR, styled Mark Joseph Shumski, appellant v. The State of

Texas, Appellee. There are no pending motions nor requests for rehearing

pending in the 11

th Court of Appeals regarding this matter.

III.

Petitioner respectfully requests an extension be granted to file this petition

for discretionary review. The request for extension is made within the

fifteen (15) days allowable by T.A.R.P. 10(5)(b) and is not designed for

delay but so that justice may be done. Co-Counsel on this appeal had has

pneumonia for approximately two and one-half weeks hindering the prompt

completeness of the pdr.

IV.

Petitioner as of this day has completed and has contemporaneously filed the

pdr electronically, however, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court

grant the extension to file and allow the pdr to be timely filed with this

Court.
Respectfully submitted,

By: _/s/_________________________

PAUL BELEW

State Bar No. 00794926

LAW OFFICES OF PAUL BELEW, PLLC.

P.O. Box 1026

Decatur, Texas 76234

Telephone No. (940) 627 - 6400

Telecopier No. (940) 627 - 6408

pbelew@gmail.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that a true copy of the above Motion has this day been served on

attorney for the State on this, the 12

TH

 day of April 2015 by:

______ Hand delivery

______ Certified mail, return Receipt Requested

__x___ Sent by electronic mail before 5:00 p.m.

_/s/_______________________

PAUL BELEW

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that attorney for Petitioner has conferred with the State on this

matter, and the State of Texas is not opposed to the granting of this Motion on the

12

TH

 day of April 2015.

_/s/_______________________

PAUL BELEW
Organic Enforcement Quarterly Update 

National Organic Program (NOP) Activities | Fiscal Year 2021, Third Quarter 

455 Cases in Progress 449 Closed Cases by Outcome 

As of 6/30/2021 12 Months ending 6/30/2021 

Prohibited Substance 

47% 

22% 

1% 

9% 

3% 

15% 

3% 

63% 

17% 

4% 

7% 

8% 

1% 

Cases in Progress are based on allegations, complaints, and surveillance, and are not in themselves proof of wrongdoing. Administrative Actions are 

warnings/notices to businesses, often uncertified, and are critical in establishing that violators are aware of the rules, to support future enforcement action. 

Voluntary

Compliance 

Referred for Criminal 

Investigation 

No Violation 

Referred for 

Investigation 

Settlement, Civil 

Administrative Actions 

Fraudulent Certificates Posted 

Uncertified 

Operations Making 

Labelling Error 

Penalty, Appeal 

Organic Claims Fraud 

Prohibited Practice 

Pesticide Residue 

Investigations & Inquiries by Fiscal Year 

900 140% 

800 120% 700 100% 

500 * Fiscal year 2021 600 80% 

numbers as of 400 60% 300 40% 200 20% 6/30/2021 100

0 0% 

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 * 

Completed Investigations 127 279 260 285 390 360 470 335 413 448 255 

Resolved Inquiries 30 197 248 386 392 

New Investigations 183 278 215 411 548 508 395 370 374 391 297 

Total Incoming 183 278 215 411 548 508 425 567 622 777 689 

Percentage completed 69% 100% 121% 69% 71% 71% 118% 94% 106% 107% 94% 

Risk-based oversight helps secure global supply chains 

When goods are fraudulently represented as organic, it disrupts the organic market and 

creates a competitive disadvantage for organic operations that play by the rules. Working 

with U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Federal Grain Inspection Service; Animal, Plant 

Health Inspection Service; and Agricultural Marketing Service’s labs, NOP staff developed 

protocols for intercepting and testing suspect imports for pesticide residue and genetically 

modified organisms at the border. The first test targeted several suspect shipments by an 

importer and yielded immediate results – the company paid a civil penalty of more than 

$100,000 and they are paying for third-party testing of future shipments with results being 

reported directly to NOP for a prescribed period. 

NOP continues to build resources to better monitor shipping trends and target ongoing surveillance and enforcement resources to 

high-risk regions, companies, and even individual shipments. The Strengthening Organic Enforcement final rule will make the use of 

electronic import certificates mandatory for all imports, further increasing the quality and volume of data available to aid in 

international surveillance and enforcement actions. 

For additional details on the National Organic Program, visit www.ams.usda.gov/Organic. 

USDA is an equal opportunity provider, employer, and lender. 

NOP staff sampling product at a U.S port.
#### STATE of Utah in the Interest of Kenneth Eugene MARQUEZ, a person under eighteen years of age.

No. 14571.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Feb. 7, 1977.

James T. Massey of Salt Lake County Bar Legal Services, Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Earl F. Dorius, Paul M. Tinker, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent.

HALL, District Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the juvenile court committing a juvenile to the Utah State Industrial School upon a finding of guilt of the offense of burglary and theft.

The facts of this case are that the victim left his home in the morning at which time all windows and doors were secure. On his return that evening he discovered the back door had been forced open, the garage window had been pushed in and several items of value were missing from the living area. There was no entry possible to the living area from the garage. Two days later, the Salt Lake Police Department observed a latent print on the pushed in window and the same was lifted and compared with the fingerprint record of the juvenile previously on file and identified as his print.

The appellant presents two basic claims of error, (1) that a fingerprint record was admitted in evidence without sufficient foundation and (2) that the evidence was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

As to the first claim of error, the record reveals that the fingerprint record was made on June 20, 1973, at a time when General Order No. 3, Rule 39, Utah Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, was in effect and which did not require the destruction of such records. The testimony was that the record was made during the regular course of business, filed and ultimately removed from the file and identified by the witness at time of trial. Such is the showing required by U.R.E. 63(13) for the admissibility of a business record as an exception to the hearsay rule. It is the prerogative of the trial court to determine when such foundation is laid and sufficient showing of the credibility of the evidence is *343established.1 The ruling of the trial court in this regard will not be overturned unless there is a showing of an abuse of discretion. The record in this case does not reveal such an abuse.

In regard to the second claim of error, this court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the decision reached below.2 The record is clear that a burglary and theft was actually committed, that a garage window was punched out on the same day and upon which the fingerprint was found. The print was found to be that of the appellant who was unknown to the victim and no evidence was offered to explain the presence of the print at the crime scene. Such evidence is substantial and supports the finding of guilt.

The judgment is affirmed.

ELLETT, MAUGHAN, CROCKETT and WILKINS, JJ., concur.

HENRIOD, C. J., does not participate herein.

1

. *State v. Davie,*121 Utah 184, 240 P.2d 265 (1952).

2

. *State v. Sullivan,*6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957).