alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Adalberto Lopez, Appellant. Thomas F. Hartnett, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

—Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed August 9, 1990, which ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because he voluntarily left his employment without good cause.

The evidence established that claimant failed to return to work after the expiration of his leave of absence or to contact his employer until a month after expiration of his leave. Furthermore, according to the employer, claimant could have continued his employment if he had returned to work at the end of his leave. Under these circumstances, the conclusion by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board that claimant abandoned his employment and was therefore disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because he voluntarily left his job without good cause was supported by substantial evidence and must be upheld *(see, Matter of David [Ross],*55 AD2d 770). To the extent that claimant offered conflicting evidence, this merely presented a question of credibility which was for the Board to resolve *(see, Matter of Baker [Hartnett],*147 AD2d 790, *appeal dismissed*74 NY2d 714).

Casey, J. P., Yesawich Jr., Mercure, Crew III and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
*, rout*'-»F Ma,,^ AM* U0,33fc-«*

)H DENIED

C

APR 20 2015

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# C_2012326EN.01004701.xml

| 26.10.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 326/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 326/1

---

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

PART THREE

UNION POLICIES AND INTERNAL ACTIONS

UNION POLICIES AND INTERNAL ACTIONS

TITLE XV

CONSUMER PROTECTION

CONSUMER PROTECTION

Article 169

(ex Article 153 TEC)

(ex Article 153 TEC)

1.   In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer protection, the Union shall contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their right to information, education and to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests.

2.   The Union shall contribute to the attainment of the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 through:

| (a) | measures adopted pursuant to Article 114 in the context of the completion of the internal market; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

measures adopted pursuant to Article 114 in the context of the completion of the internal market;

| (b) | measures which support, supplement and monitor the policy pursued by the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

measures which support, supplement and monitor the policy pursued by the Member States.

3.   The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt the measures referred to in paragraph 2(b).

4.   Measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 3 shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures. Such measures must be compatible with the Treaties. The Commission shall be notified of them.

---
CLERK’S RECORD - CRIMINAL RECEIVED: 4/14/2015 SHORT-TERM? ☐ Yes ☒ No

 REVIEWED: 4/14/2015 PRECEDENCE? ☐ Yes ☒ No

CAUSE NO. 06-15-00049-CR TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 1424225

STYLE: Kelly Ray Tadlock v. The State of Texas 

TYPE PLEA/TRIAL: Not Guilty/Bench 

OFFENSE: Indecency w/child by sexual contact – 20 years 

DATE SENTENCE IMPOSED OR DATE OF JUDGMENT: 3/3/2015 (CR at 127) 

TEX. R. APP. P. 4.1 Computing Time

M4NEW TRIAL: N/A (CR at ) Timely? ☐ Yes ☐ No 

(Not relevant to extending timetable for appealing denial of DNA testing or for deferred adjudication; CCA hasn’t said re: revocations) 

TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4 Time to File and Amend Motion – 30 days after sentence imposed or suspended in open court. 

NOTICE OF APPEAL: 3/3/2015 (CR at 133) Timely? ☒ Yes ☐ No 

TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2 Criminal Cases 

(a) By the Defendant. A notice of appeal that complies with Rules 25.2(c)(1) and (2) must be filed: 

(1) within 30 days after the day sentence is imposed or suspended in open court, or after the day the trial court enters an appealable order; or 

(2) within 90 days after the day sentence is imposed or suspended in open court if the defendant timely files a motion for new trial. 

(b) By the State. If the State is making an appeal under Code of Criminal Procedure article 44.01(a) or (b), a notice of appeal that complies with Rules 

25.2(c)(1) and (2) must be filed within 20 days after the day the trial court enters the order, ruling, or sentence to be appealed. Also, the District 

Attorney must sign it. 

CERTIFICATION OF RIGHT OF APPEAL: ☒ Yes (CR at 129) ☐ No (Send Cert. Defect Ltr.) 

The trial court shall enter a certification of the defendant’s right of appeal in every case in which it enters a judgment of guilt or other appealable 

order. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). 

The certification should be part of the record when notice is filed, but may be added by timely amendment or supplementation under this rule or Rule 

34.5(c)(1) or Rule 37.1 or order of the appellate court under Rule 34.5(c)(2). The appeal must be dismissed if a certification that shows the defendant 

has the right to appeal has not been made part of the record under these rules. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d). 

☒ is not a plea-bargain case, D has the right of appeal 

☐ is a plea-bargain case, but matters raised and ruled on pretrial and not w/drawn, D has right of appeal 

☐ is a plea-bargain case, but T/C has given permission, D has right of appeal 

☐ is a plea-bargain case, NO right of appeal 

☐ D has waived the right of appeal 

Other Defect: ☒ Yes ☐ No Explain: Wrong cause number handwritten at top

COMMENTS: CR filed 04/14; RR due 05/04
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM TUT SYSTEMS,
INC. AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                          26,934
<SECURITIES>                                   107,717
<RECEIVABLES>                                   15,924
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (537)
<INVENTORY>                                     15,353
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               170,639
<PP&E>                                          10,461
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (2,857)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 245,863
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           13,973
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            15
<OTHER-SE>                                     229,443
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   245,863
<SALES>                                         20,345
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                21,014
<CGS>                                           11,234
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   11,234
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                13,302
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (139)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1,180)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,180)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,180)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.08)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.08)


</TABLE>
#### Anne D. Owen, Respondent, v Frances Leventritt, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Myriam J. Altman, J.), entered January 8, 1990, which, *inter alia,*denied defendant Leventritt’s motion to dismiss the fifth cause of action, unanimously modified, on the law, defendant’s motion is granted and the fifth cause of action is dismissed as against defendant Leventritt and, as so modified, the order is otherwise affirmed, without costs.

This is an action apparently arising from a long-standing dispute between neighbors in an Eastside cooperative building regarding plaintiff’s terrace gardens.

The fifth cause of action, as limited by the IAS court is based upon statements allegedly made by defendant Leventritt at a public meeting of the cooperative’s shareholders that, if the court refused to dismiss plaintiffs lawsuit against *472her, she would have no alternative but to kill her. However, these statements, which were later reported to the then pregnant plaintiff who was not present at the meeting, were insufficient to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, liability for which is predicated "on the basis of extreme and outrageous conduct, which so transcends the bounds of decency as to be regarded as atrocious and intolerable in a civilized society”. *(Freihofer v Hearst Corp.,*65 NY2d 135, 143.)

A person may recover "only 'where severe mental pain or anguish is inflicted through a deliberate and malicious campaign of harassment or intimidation’ *(Nader v General Motors Corp.,*25 NY2d 560, 569).” *(Doe v American Broadcasting Cos.,*152 AD2d 482, 483.) Not only is there no allegation or evidence of such a campaign, the statements were not made directly to plaintiff, but were made in a public meeting during discussions of then pending litigation. *(See, Smukler v 12 Lofts Realty,*156 AD2d 161, 163; *Martin v Citibank,*762 F2d 212, 220.) Mere threats, annoyance or other petty oppressions, no matter how upsetting, are insufficient to constitute the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. *(Roth v El Al Israel Airlines,*709 F Supp 487, 490-491, quoting *James v Saltsman,*99 AD2d 797, 798.) Concur—Carro, J. P., Milonas, Rosenberger and Kupferman, JJ.
# C_2016202EN.01009701.xml

| 7.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 202/97 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 202/97

---

Article 121

(ex Article 99 TEC)

(ex Article 99 TEC)

1.   Member States shall regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and shall coordinate them within the Council, in accordance with the provisions of Article 120.

2.   The Council shall, on a recommendation from the Commission, formulate a draft for the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union, and shall report its findings to the European Council.

The European Council shall, acting on the basis of the report from the Council, discuss a conclusion on the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union.

On the basis of this conclusion, the Council shall adopt a recommendation setting out these broad guidelines. The Council shall inform the European Parliament of its recommendation.

3.   In order to ensure closer coordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of the economic performances of the Member States, the Council shall, on the basis of reports submitted by the Commission, monitor economic developments in each of the Member States and in the Union as well as the consistency of economic policies with the broad guidelines referred to in paragraph 2, and regularly carry out an overall assessment.

For the purpose of this multilateral surveillance, Member States shall forward information to the Commission about important measures taken by them in the field of their economic policy and such other information as they deem necessary.

4.   Where it is established, under the procedure referred to in paragraph 3, that the economic policies of a Member State are not consistent with the broad guidelines referred to in paragraph 2 or that they risk jeopardising the proper functioning of economic and monetary union, the Commission may address a warning to the Member State concerned. The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, may address the necessary recommendations to the Member State concerned. The Council may, on a proposal from the Commission, decide to make its recommendations public.

Within the scope of this paragraph, the Council shall act without taking into account the vote of the member of the Council representing the Member State concerned.

A qualified majority of the other members of the Council shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a).

5.   The President of the Council and the Commission shall report to the European Parliament on the results of multilateral surveillance. The President of the Council may be invited to appear before the competent committee of the European Parliament if the Council has made its recommendations public.

6.   The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may adopt detailed rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4.

---
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER ON MOTION

Cause number: 01-15-00197-CV

Style: Leticia B. Loya

v. Vitol, Inc., Michael Metz, and Antonio Maarraoui

Date motion filed*: April 8, 2015

Type of motion: Appellant’s motion demonstrating proof of payment to court reporter and requesting relief

pursuant to Rule 37

Party filing motion: Appellant

Document to be filed:

Is appeal accelerated? No

If motion to extend time:

Original due date:

Number of previous extensions granted: Current Due date:

Date Requested:

Ordered that motion is:

 Granted

If document is to be filed, document due: 

 The Court will not grant additional motions to extend time absent extraordinary circumstances.

 Denied

 Dismissed (moot)

 Other: _____________________________________ 

The court reporter’s record was filed with this Court on April 10, 2015. Accordingly, appellant’s motion is 

dismissed as moot.

 

Judge’s signature: /s/ Terry Jennings

 Acting for the Court 

Panel consists of ____________________________________________

Date: April 16, 2015
WARNING: THE EDGAR SYSTEM ENCOUNTERED ERROR(S) WHILE PROCESSING THIS SCHEDULE.

<TABLE> <S> <C>

                                                                EXHIBIT 27.1
                                                                ------------

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED CONDENSED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BRADLEY REAL ESTATE FOR THE YEAR
ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1995 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> US DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                         697,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                9,382,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (711,000)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            18,034,000
<PP&E>                                     189,405,000
<DEPRECIATION>                            (27,591,000)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             180,545,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        6,053,000
<BONDS>                                     39,394,000
<COMMON>                                       112,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                 135,098,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               180,545,000
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            36,572,000
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               16,119,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             7,317,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           4,705,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              8,431,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          8,431,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 8,431,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .85
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .85
        

</TABLE>
DENIED and Opinion Filed April 20, 2015

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-15-00484-CV

IN RE STEPHEN C. SCANLON, Relator

On Appeal from the 303rd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DF-10-04599

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Francis, Myers, and Schenck

Opinion by Justice Myers

Relator filed this petition for writ of mandamus after the trial court denied his motion for 

enforcement of the possession order in this suit affecting the parent-child relationship. Relator 

contends the trial court committed plain legal error in interpreting the language of its order. 

Ordinarily, to obtain mandamus relief, a relator must show both that the trial court has clearly 

abused its discretion and that relator has no adequate appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. 

Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). We conclude the relator has failed 

to establish a right to relief. We deny the petition for writ of mandamus. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8.

150484F.P05

/Lana Myers/

LANA MYERS

JUSTICE
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 53 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. J. RES. 53

  Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to 
   require that the Supreme Court be composed of not more than nine 
                               justices.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 25, 2019

  Mr. Gallagher (for himself and Mr. Norman) submitted the following 
 joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
  Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to 
   require that the Supreme Court be composed of not more than nine 
                               justices.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled   (two-thirds of each House 
concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be 
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when 
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States 
within seven years after the date of its submission for ratification:

                              ``Article--

    ``Section 1. The Supreme Court shall be composed of not more than 
nine justices.
    ``Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation.''.
                                 <all>
```
##### 



Exhibit 99.1
 LETTER AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
MANOR CARE, INC.
AND
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, LONDON BRANCH
 Letter Agreement) Counterparty JPMorgan
  Convertible Notes
 Note Hedge Transaction Note Hedge Confirmation)
 Warrant
Transaction Warrant
Confirmation
 Merger Transaction Buyer Merger Agreement Purchase Price Share
   Payments and/or Deliveries with respect to the Note Hedge Confirmation.
 a)
    
    the Note Hedge Transaction will terminate on the closing date of the Merger Transaction
(the Merger Closing Date); and
 b)
    
    JPMorgan will deliver to Counterparty, no later than on the second business day
following the Merger Closing Date (the Payment Date), with respect to the Note Hedge
Transaction, an amount in cash in immediately available funds, a number of Shares (each
such Share, valued at the Purchase Price) or a combination of cash and Shares (each such
Share, valued at the Purchase Price), at the election of JPMorgan, equal to (i) the
Purchase Price minusthe Strike Price (as defined in the Note Hedge
 1




---



##### 



Confirmation) multiplied by(ii) the Number of Options (as defined in the Note Hedge
Confirmation) multiplied bythe Option Entitlement (as defined in the Note Hedge
Confirmation).
 Payments with respect to the Warrant Confirmation.
 a)
    
    the Warrant Transaction will terminate on the Merger Closing Date; and
 b)
    
    Counterparty will deliver, on the Payment Date, with respect to the Warrant Transaction
an amount in cash in immediately available funds equal to $47,000,000.00 plus(i) the
Number of Warrants (as defined in the Warrant Confirmation) multiplied by(ii) the
difference between (A) the Purchase Price and (B) the Strike Price (as defined in the
Warrant Confirmation).
 Termination of Letter Agreement Carlyle Termination Notice
 Amendments to Merger Agreement
 Representations and Warranties of the Counterparty.
     2




---



##### 



Effectiveness.
 Notices
  
  th
 Accounts for Payment or Delivery
  
    
 3




---



##### 



No Reliance, etc.
 Governing Law
 Counterparts.
 Role of Agent JPMSI
 No Third Party Beneficiaries
 4




---



##### 



J.P. Morgan Securities Inc., as agent for
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National AssociationBy:
    /s/ Sudheer TegulapalleName:
    Sudheer TegulapalleTitle:
    Executive Director Manor Care, Inc.By:
    /s/ Paul A. OrmondAuthorized SignatoryName: Paul A. OrmondTitle: Chairman, President
and Chief Executive Officer 5