J-S15031-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

K.L.S., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

T.L.S.,

v.

A. & E.E. No. 1651 MDA 2013

Appeal from the Order entered September 18, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County, 

Civil Division, at No(s): 934 of 2011

BEFORE: LAZARUS, WECHT, and JENKINS, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED APRIL 15, 2015

K.L.S. (“Mother”) appeals, pro se, from the order entered on 

September 18, 2014, in the Columbia County Court of Common Pleas, Civil 

Court Division, (1) finding T.L.S. (“Father”) not in contempt of its order 

granting Mother visitation rights, and (2) suspending Mother’s visitation with 

their two minor daughters, K.S., born in June of 2002, and R.S., born in 

August of 2003 (collectively, the “Children”). We affirm the order insofar as 

it determines that Father was not in contempt, and vacate and remand the 

order to the extent it suspends Mother’s visitation with Children. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

Mother and Father were married on October 10, 2001. Ms. Sue Hoffman’s 

Custody Evaluation Report, 12/26/13, at 1 (“Hoffman Report”). After they 

married, Mother and Father lived with A.E. and E.E. (“Maternal 

Grandparents”) at their residence in Berwick, Pennsylvania. Id. Mother 
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gave birth to the couple’s first daughter, K.S., in June of 2002, and to their 

second daughter, R.S., in August of 2003. Id. On September 1, 2003, 

Mother, Father, and Children moved into the marital residence, located in 

Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania. Id. 

During this time, Mother worked as a firefighter in the fire company 

where Father worked as the fire chief. Trial Ct. Op., 10/23/14, at 3. At 

some point in 2008, Mother began an extramarital affair with C.B., a 

teenage fellow-firefighter. Hoffman Report at 2. 

On May 13, 2009, police arrested Mother and charged her with 

multiple felony counts in connection with two arsons. In its 1925(a) opinion, 

the trial court related the facts pertaining to Mother’s arrest as follows: 

[Mother’s] boyfriend, [C.B.], had pleaded guilty to crimes 

arising out of the two arsons involved in [Mother’s] two 

cases and to several other arson related crimes in 

Columbia County and Lycoming County. The two fires. . . 

were the “Belles” fire and the “Albertson” fire. On March 

16, 2009, [Mother] and [C.B.] had discussed setting 

several fires and scouted out locations, including the Belles 

and Albertson houses. [Mother] and [C.B.] were 

firefighters. They apparently wanted to have more 

opportunities to extinguish fires. On March 16, 2009, both 

[Mother] and [C.B.] together went to the Belles house and 

set it afire. Mr. Belles escaped uninjured. . . . On or about 

May 11, 2009, [C.B.] set the Albertson house afire, 

injuring Reuben and Pauline Albertson. [Mother] and 

[C.B.] had conversations after March 16, 2009, and before 

the fire was set at the Albertson location. [Mother] did not 

go to the Albertson fire location or help set the house afire.

Trial Ct. Op., 10/23/14, at 2 (citation omitted). 

On January 28, 2011, following trial, a jury convicted Mother of three 

counts of Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Third Degree Murder, ten Arsonrelated counts, and one count of Burglary. Id. On April 17, 2011, Mother 
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was sentenced to a term of incarceration of seventeen to thirty-four years. 

Id. She is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at 

Cambridge Springs (“SCI Cambridge Springs”), located in Crawford County, 

Pennsylvania. Master’s Report, 8/2/13. Father has since filed for divorce. 

Id.

The instant custody matter began on June 17, 2011 when Mother filed 

a complaint seeking visitation with Children. On June 20, 2011, Maternal 

Grandparents, who visited regularly with Children until Father discontinued 

contact upon Mother’s incarceration, also filed a complaint seeking partial 

physical and shared legal custody of Children. According to Father, he 

terminated Maternal Grandparents’ contact because of their statements in 

defense of Mother regarding her criminal convictions, which Father believed 

upset the Children. Master’s Report, 8/31/11. The trial court consolidated 

the two complaints and referred the matter to a Specially Appointed Master 

(the “Master”).

On August 24, 2011, the Master held a conference with the parties. 

On August 31, 2011, the Master issued a report recommending that Father 

have primary physical and legal custody of Children and that Maternal 

Grandparents have partial physical custody of Children.1 Master’s Report, 

8/31/11. On September 1, 2011, the trial court issued an interim order 

ratifying the Master’s recommendations and allowing the parties twenty days 

to file objections to the recommendations. On September 15, 2011, both 

 

1 Although it was still pending, the Master’s Report paid little attention to 

Mother’s complaint. See Master’s Report, 8/31/11. The Report 

concentrated instead on explaining its recommendation to award primary 

physical and legal custody to Father and partial physical custody to Maternal 

Grandparents. Id.
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Father and Maternal Grandparents filed exceptions to the Master’s 

recommendations. Maternal Grandparents also filed a petition for civil 

contempt against Father for failure to comply with the visitation schedule set 

forth in the trial court’s order.

The trial court held a pre-hearing conference on October 7, 2011, at 

the conclusion of which it denied all exceptions as well as Maternal 

Grandparents’ contempt petition. The trial court awarded two visitation 

make-up days to Maternal Grandparents. The trial court further directed 

that a licensed psychologist conduct a custody evaluation to address (1) 

whether it was in Children’s best interest to visit Mother in prison, and (2) 

the appropriate frequency of Maternal Grandparents’ periods of physical 

custody of Children. Order, 10/12/11.2 On November 29, 2011, the trial 

court issued an order directing Father to schedule a conference call with the 

court-appointed psychological evaluator and Maternal Grandparents. Order, 

11/30/11.

On January 25, 2013, Mother notified the trial court by letter that she 

would no longer be represented by counsel for Maternal Grandparents and 

would be proceeding pro se. That same day, Mother filed a petition for civil 

contempt against Father for failure to proceed with the psychologist’s 

custody evaluation as required by the trial court’s order. Thereafter, the 

trial court issued a rule to show cause why Father should not be found in 

contempt and a hearing on the matter was scheduled for March 25, 2013.

 

2 While not explicitly mentioning Mother’s complaint, presumably the trial 

court’s order following the hearing on Father and Maternal Grandparents’ 

exceptions to the Master’s Report disposed of both Mother’s and Maternal 

Grandparents’ complaints, which the court previously consolidated.
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On February 6, 2013, Mother filed a motion requesting visitation with 

Children and a separate motion requesting that the trial court allow her 

telephone and written correspondence with Children. On February 8, 2013, 

the trial court issued an order, deferring action on Mother’s motions until 

resolution of the custody evaluation. On March 11, 2013, Mother filed a 

motion requesting documents from the therapists/psychological 

professionals that had been treating Children prior to her incarceration. 

Mother also filed a motion requesting that she be allowed to participate via 

telephone/video conference in the contempt hearing scheduled for March 25, 

2013. On March 19, 2013, the trial court issued an order denying Mother’s 

motion to participate in the contempt hearing and granting her motion for 

documents, directing Father to provide such documents to Mother within 30 

days. Subsequently, the contempt hearing was continued to an 

undetermined future date to be scheduled by praecipe.

By letter dated May 7, 2013, Maternal Grandparents requested that 

the trial court review the existing custody arrangement previously 

formulated by the Master, with a view to increasing Maternal Grandparents’ 

periods of partial physical custody. A custody review conference with the 

Master was scheduled for July 31, 2013. On June 17, 2013, Mother filed a 

petition for civil contempt against Father for failure to provide her with the 

aforementioned documents, as required by the trial court’s order. On June 

24, 2013, Mother filed a praecipe requesting that the previously continued 

contempt hearing be placed on the next list of arguments before the trial 

court. The trial court then scheduled a contempt hearing for August 1, 

2013.
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On July 31, 2013, Father informed the trial court by letter that he met 

with the court-appointed psychological evaluator on February 19, 2013, and 

that Children met with the psychological evaluator on February 26, 2013. 

That same day, the custody review conference before the Master took place. 

On August 1, 2013, the trial court held the contempt hearing. Immediately 

following the hearing, the trial court issued an order finding Father not in 

contempt, changing the court-appointed psychological evaluator to Ms. 

Hoffman, and directing Father to arrange for a custody evaluation with Ms. 

Hoffman as soon as possible. Order, 8/2/13. The trial court also stated that 

it would hold a telephone conference with Mother as well as a conference 

with Father and Maternal Grandparents upon receipt and review of Ms. 

Hoffman’s report. Id. On August 2, 2013, the Master issued his report from 

the July 31, 2013 custody review conference, in which it recommended that 

the custody arrangement in place should remain unchanged. Master’s 

Report, 8/2/13. On August 7, 2013, the trial court issued an order, ratifying 

the Master’s recommendations. On August 20, 2013, Maternal Grandparents 

filed exceptions to the Master’s recommendations.

On December 26, 2013, Ms. Hoffman submitted her custody 

evaluation report to the trial court. On April 9, 2014, the trial court held a 

conference to address Maternal Grandparents’ exceptions as well as the 

existing custody arrangement in light of Ms. Hoffman’s report. At the 

conclusion of the conference, the trial court issued an order denying 

Maternal Grandparents’ exceptions and instructing all of the parties to 

comply with Ms. Hoffman’s recommendations. Order, 4/9/14. Specifically, 

the trial court granted Mother visitation with Children to occur in prison, with 
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the first visit to occur within 30 days of the order, and that such visits shall 

occur at least every other month from 8:45 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.3 Id.

On April 26, 2014, Father took Children to SCI Cambridge Springs to 

visit with Mother, arriving at 12:00 p.m. instead of 8:45 a.m., as required by 

the trial court’s order. On May 6, 2014, Mother filed a petition for civil 

contempt against Father for failure to arrive for the visit at the courtdesignated time as well as a petition requesting modification of the existing 

custody order. On May 14, 2014, the trial court denied Mother’s petition for 

modification and, on June 19, 2014, dismissed her contempt petition without 

a hearing. The next visit with Mother was scheduled to take place on June 

22, 2014, however, upon arriving at SCI Cambridge Springs, Children 

refused to enter the prison to see Mother and, as a result, the visit was 

cancelled. On July 3, 2014, Maternal Grandparents filed a praecipe for a 

hearing, seeking to increase their periods of partial physical custody. On 

July 7, 2014, Mother filed another petition for civil contempt against Father 

for failure to proceed with visitation as scheduled. Again, Mother’s petition 

 

3 The trial court’s ordered, in relevant part:

3. The [c]ourt further DIRECTS that the recommendation [of Dr. 

Sue Hoffman in her report of December 26, 2013] is modified to 

the extent that [Father] shall transport the children to the State 

Correctional Institution to visit the children, although the 

[maternal] grandparents shall actually enter the prison with the 

children to effectuate the visitation. Father, at his option, may 

accompany the children also into the prison, although he shall 

remain in the waiting area during the visitation, if possible. Said 

visitation shall be designed to maximize the time available at the 

prison for the visitations which this Court understands are from 

8:45 a.m. until 3:30 p.m. on visitation days.

Trial Court Order, April 9, 2014.
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was dismissed without a hearing on July 10, 2014. The next visit with 

Mother was scheduled to occur in August 2014 but did not take place. On 

July 23, 2014, Maternal Grandparents filed a motion for contempt against 

Father, on Mother’s behalf, for failure to proceed with visitation as scheduled 

with respect to Mother.

On September 17, 2014, the trial court held a contempt hearing. 

Although the trial court had arranged for Mother to appear by telephone 

conference from prison, she was placed on hold without the trial court or the 

other parties realizing it and, as such, did not participate in the hearing. 

Trial Ct. Op., 10/23/14, at 4. During the hearing, the trial court interviewed 

Children, inquiring into each child’s opinion of having to visit Mother in 

prison. During her interview, K.S. stated, “I really don’t want to go up 

there.” N.T., 9/17/14, at 3. When asked by the trial court whether she 

cared about seeing Mother, K.S. responded, “No, after what she’s done and 

what she didn’t care about us, I do not want to go up there ever.” Id. 

Similarly, R.S. testified:

I don’t want to go and I will not go. It sucked the first time I 

went and the second time I went I wasn’t even going to go in. I 

got out of the truck, went over hugged my pap, walked over to 

my gram, said “Hi, how are you doing? I’m not going in ‘cause 

the first time sucked. Bye.” Got back in the truck and left.

Id. at 8. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued the 

underlying order, in which it ruled as follows: 

[A]fter having talked to the [Children] concerning the motion for 

contempt in this matter, the [trial court] finds [Father] not in 

contempt. The [trial court] notes that a finding of contempt 

must be based on willfulness. The [trial court] finds that in light 

of the spoken attitude of the [Children], [] the [trial court] 

cannot make a finding of willfulness. Although the [trial court] 
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believes it is in the best interest of [Children] to have regular 

contact with [Mother] pursuant to [Ms. Hoffman’s] findings and 

recommendations, the [trial court] acknowledges that the facts 

in this particular situation are extraordinarily complicated and 

the [inter-]personal relationships have become exceedingly 

dysfunctional because of the facts. The [trial court] finds that 

there is a prima facie showing from the [Children] that forcing 

them to have contact with [Mother] at this point would be futile 

and counterproductive. The portion of the [c]ourt [o]rder 

requiring the same is suspended. The [trial court] strongly 

suggests that [Father] make arrangements for [Children] to 

undergo counseling to address the issues in this matter. In the 

[trial court’s] opinion, failure to do so may have negative 

ramifications for [Children] in the future. . . . [E]xcept as 

amended hereby, the controlling custody [o]rder in this matter 

shall remain in full force and effect. . . and the parties are 

directed to comply with the terms thereof.

Trial Ct. Op., 9/18/14, at 1-2 (unpaginated). On October 1, 2014, Mother 

filed a timely notice of appeal but failed to simultaneously file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal, in contravention of Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).4 On October 17, 2014, Mother filed a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal.5

 

4 On October 1, 2014, Mother also filed a petition requesting that Father 

undergo a mental examination, a motion for transcripts of the September 

17, 2014 contempt hearing, a motion for leave to engage in discovery, and a 

motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem. On October 3, 2014, the 

trial court issued an amended order, appointing attorney John McDaniel as 

guardian ad litem, granting Mother’s motion for transcripts, and denying 

both Mother’s petition for a mental examination of Father and her motion for 

leave to engage in discovery.

5 Although Mother failed to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), 

relating to children’s fast track appeals, we decline to dismiss or quash her 

appeal. See In re K.T.E.L, 983 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa.Super. 2009) (holding 

that the failure to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

with the notice of appeal will result in a defective notice of appeal, to be 

disposed of on a case-by-case basis). Here, Mother filed the Rule 1925(b) 

statement sixteen days after filing the notice of appeal. However, since the 

misstep was not prejudicial to any of the parties and did not impede the trial 
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Mother purports to assert eighteen (18) issues on appeal.6 We distill 

her prolix issues to two claims bearing on our determination of this appeal: 

 

court’s ability to issue a thorough opinion, the procedural error was 

harmless. Cf. J.P. v. S.P., 991 A.2d 904 (Pa.Super. 2010) (appellant 

waived all issues by failing to timely comply with the trial court’s direct order 

to file a concise statement).

6

In her brief on appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in not notifying [Mother] of the 

date and time of the [September 17, 2014 contempt 

hearing], as [Mother] is pro se and a party-ininterest[?] 

2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in not finding [Father] in 

[c]ontempt, as he failed to support, and in fact 

discouraged [Children] from visiting [Mother] per the 

[c]ourt [o]rder[?] 

3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in its findings, as Father has 

systematically embarked on a course of conduct to 

discourage [Children] from visiting Mother pursuant to 

the [c]ourt [o]rder[?]

4. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in not conducting a full hearing 

on the contempt petition, as none of the parties were 

permitted to testify[?]

5. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in not allowing Mother to 

participate in the September 17, 2014 contempt 

hearing, as she was a party-in-interest[?]

6. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in not allowing Mother to 

participate in the September 17, 2014 contempt 

hearing, testify[,] and question witnesses, as she is pro 

se[?]

7. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in considering and arriving at 

its determination partially based on the content of [Ms. 

Hoffman’s report] while denying the litigants the 

opportunity to cross-examine [Ms. Hoffman] in open 

court[?]
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8. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in suspending the [c]ustody 

[o]rder of April 11, 2014, as this is not a proper remedy 

in a contempt proceeding[?]

9. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in suspending the order 

requiring visitation with Mother at [SCI Cambridge 

Springs], as Mother, who is the primary party in 

interest, was not permitted to participate in the 

[September 17, 2014 contempt hearing][?]

10. Did the trial court err in entering a[] [custody order] in 

the September 17, 2014 hearing[,] as the hearing was 

on [Maternal Grandparents’] contempt petition [and] 

the [trial court] lacked jurisdiction[?]

11. Did the trial court err in dismissing [Mother’s] 

contempt petition[,] filed on May 2, 2014[,] without [a] 

hearing[?]

12. Did the trial court err in dismissing [Mother’s] 

contempt petition[,] filed [on] June 30, 2014[,] without 

[a] hearing[?]

13. Did the trial court [j]udge, the Honorable [Thomas A. 

James, Jr.], err in not recusing himself from [the] 

current case due to his prior involvement in [Mother’s] 

[p]rotection from abuse matters[] and criminal 

prosecution[?]

14. Did the trial court [j]udge, the Honorable [Thomas A. 

James, Jr.], err in expressing prejudice and bias against 

[Mother] and in favor of [Father] prior to and during the 

September 17, 2014 contempt hearing[?]

15. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt [j]udge, the Honorable [Thomas 

A. James, Jr.], err in conducting [ex parte] 

communications with counsel for [Father] and with 

counsel for [Maternal Grandparents] before and during 

the September 17, 2014 [contempt hearing][?]

16. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in conducting an [ex parte] 

hearing with the opposing counsels when [Mother] was 
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(1) that the trial court erred in finding Father was not in contempt (see

Claims 2, 3, and 4), and (2) that the trial court erred by suspending her 

visitation with Children without allowing her an opportunity to be heard or 

notice and a hearing tailored specifically to custody modification (see Claims 

5, 6, 8, 9, and 16). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding 

that Father was not in contempt. However, we agree with Mother that the 

trial court erred by sua sponte modifying the custody order.

As to Mother’s first claim, it is well-established that “each court is the 

exclusive judge of contempts against its process.” G.A. v. D.L., 72 A.3d 

264, 269 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). To that end, our scope and 

standard of review are familiar: “In reviewing a trial court’s finding on a 

contempt [motion], we are limited to determining whether the trial court 

 

available by telephone, and in fact had been contacted 

by Ms. Kristen Holterling of the Honorable [Thomas A. 

James, Jr.’s] office and placed on hold for 

approximately forty (40) minutes with the expectation 

of participating in the September 17, 2014 contempt 

hearing, however, was excluded from participation[?]

17. Did the trial court err in not granting [Mother’s] motion 

to compel compliance with a [s]ubpeona for telephone 

records in the [p]ossession of the Department of 

Corrections at [SCI Cambridge Springs], which 

contained documented evidence relevant to the 

disposition of this contempt matter[?]

18. Did the trial court err by failing to completely develop 

the record by failing to include in the transcripts the 

entire content of the proceedings conducted on 

September 17, 2014, and by not allowing the testimony 

or evidence of non-interested/non-familial parties[?] 

Mother’s Brief at 4-6.
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committed a clear abuse of discretion. This Court must place great reliance 

on the sound discretion of the trial judge when reviewing an order of 

contempt.” Flannery v. Iberti, 763 A.2d 927, 929 (Pa. Super. 2000) 

(citations omitted).

Here, the trial court determined that Father’s conduct did not 

constitute willful disregard of its previous order and, thus, decided to not 

hold Father in contempt. We find that there is ample evidence in the record 

to support the trial court’s conclusion and, accordingly, discern no abuse of 

discretion in its finding that Father was not in contempt.

We now turn our attention to Mother’s due process claim. It is wellsettled that “[p]rocedural due process requires, at its core, adequate notice, 

opportunity to be heard, and the chance to defend oneself before a fair and 

impartial tribunal having jurisdiction over the case.” Garr v. Peters, 773 

A.2d 183, 191 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

“Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 

situation demands.” In re Adoption of Dale A., II, 683 A.2d 297, 300 

(Pa. Super. 1996) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 

(1976)).

As we have explained, notice and an opportunity to be heard are a 

crucial aspect of child custody proceedings:

Formal notice and an opportunity to be heard are fundamental 

components of due process when a person may be deprived in a 

legal proceeding of a liberty interest, such as physical freedom,

or a parent’s custody of her child. Both notice and an 

opportunity to be heard must be afforded at a meaningful time 

in a meaningful manner. As previous panels of this Court have 

explained: [n]otice, in our adversarial process, ensures that 

each party is provided adequate opportunity to prepare 

and thereafter properly advocate its position, ultimately 
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exposing all relevant factors from which the finder of fact may 

make an informed judgment. 

Everett v. Parker, 889 A.2d 578, 580 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted) (emphasis supplied).

At the September 17, 2014 hearing, the trial court had before it only 

Maternal Grandparents’ motion for contempt filed on Mother’s behalf. 

Notwithstanding the fact that no petition for modification was pending, at 

the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court proceeded sua sponte to modify 

its previous custody order, entered on April 11, 2014, suspending the 

visitation rights granted to Mother by that order. None of the parties were 

on notice that such modification was sought, or that it could be ordered. 

In Langendorfer v. Spearman, 797 A.2d 303 (Pa. Super. 2002), this 

Court expressly held that a trial court “may not permanently modify a 

custody order without having a petition for modification before it.” Id. at 

308. In that case, the mother filed a contempt petition alleging that the 

father willfully violated a custody order. Id. at 305-06. In a subsequent 

order, the trial court found the father to be in contempt, granted the mother 

sole legal and primary physical custody, and restricted the father’s visitation 

with the children to supervised visits. Id. at 306-07. We found that the 

father’s due process rights were violated because he had no notice that 

custody was at issue. Id. at 309. Our words in Langendorfer bear 

reproducing at length here:

In the instant case, Mother’s petition for contempt in no way 

implicates custody, i.e., she did not request any change in 

custody. Furthermore, the order to appear received by the 

parties from the court that scheduled the contempt hearing did 

not notify the parties that custody was at issue. Also the record 

and more particularly the docket do not indicate that Mother’s 

contempt petition and Father’s petition for temporary 
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modification were consolidated for any purpose. Moreover, the 

transcript of the hearing reveals that only the contempt petition 

was before the court. Finally, the court’s order, quoted above 

and delivered from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing, 

references only Mother’s contempt petition and Father’s 

response thereto. Accordingly, we conclude that only Mother’s 

contempt petition was before the court on March 5, 2001.

In addition to the foregoing, we emphasize that Father’s 

due process rights were violated by the actions taken by the 

court, because Father had no notice that custody would be at 

issue in the proceedings. “Notice, in our adversarial process, 

ensures that each party is provided adequate opportunity to 

prepare and thereafter properly advocate its position, ultimately 

exposing all relevant factors from which the finder of fact may 

make an informed judgment.” [Choplosky v. Choplosky, 584 

A.2d 340, 342 (Pa. Super. 1990).] Without notice to the parties 

that custody was at issue, the trial court could not “assume that 

the parties ha[d] either sufficiently exposed the relevant facts or 

properly argued their significance. Consequently neither we nor 

the trial court can make an informed, yet quintessentially crucial 

judgment as to whether it was in the best interests of the [child] 

involved to give sole legal [and physical] custody to the mother.” 

Id. at 343.

Having concluded that a modification petition was not 

before the court at the time of the hearing on Mother’s contempt 

petition and that Father did not have notice that custody would 

be an issue, we conclude that the court committed a clear abuse 

of discretion in ordering a change in custody.

Id. at 308-09 (footnotes omitted). In short, to modify a custody 

arrangement, an interested party must petition the trial court for 

modification. Thereafter, if the trial court schedules a hearing on the 

modification petition, the opposing party is on notice that custody 

modification will be at issue, in fact and in law.

Here, as in Langendorfer, Mother had no notice that custody was at 

issue and, thus, had no opportunity to prepare for a modification hearing. 

Consequently, Mother was denied her due process rights to notice and a 
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hearing. Furthermore, although the trial court had arranged for Mother to 

appear at the September 17, 2014 hearing by telephone conference from 

prison, she was placed on hold without the trial court or the other parties 

realizing it. As such, Mother was denied the opportunity to be heard and to 

participate in the hearing. In its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the 

trial court characterizes this oversight as “harmless error” because it would 

not have allowed Mother to question Children during the hearing. Trial Ct. 

Op., 10/23/14, at 4. We disagree with the trial court’s reasoning in this 

regard. While we acknowledge that the trial court would have been well 

within its discretion in precluding Mother from questioning the Children, 

Mother could nevertheless have testified or presented evidence in her own 

right at the hearing. At the very least, Mother could have argued against 

the trial court’s sua sponte modification of her visitation rights.

We conclude, therefore, that the trial court abused its discretion and 

deprived Mother of her due process rights to notice and a hearing by 

suspending Mother’s visitation with Children where no modification petition 

was pending before the court. . 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s September 18, 2014 order 

insofar as it finds that Father was not in contempt. We vacate and remand 

the order, however, to the extent it suspends Mother’s visitation with 

Children. 

Order affirmed in part and vacated in part, as set forth hereinabove. 

Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/15/2015