******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
LANCE WARGO v. COMMISSIONER

OF CORRECTION

(SC 19231)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and

Vertefeuille, Js.

Argued March 18—officially released April 14, 2015

Christopher Duby, assigned counsel, with whom, on

the brief, was Freesia Singngam, assigned counsel, for

the appellant (petitioner).

James A. Killen, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Matthew Gedansky,

state’s attorney, and Erika Brookman, assistant state’s

attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The petitioner, Lance Wargo, was convicted of, inter alia, murder and arson in connection

with the death of his wife as the result of a fire at their

house. See State v. Wargo, 255 Conn. 113, 763 A.2d 1

(2000). The petitioner brought this habeas action claiming that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance

due to a conflict of interest that arose when the attorney

represented the petitioner in both a fire damage claim

against his homeowner’s insurance carrier and at his

criminal trial. The habeas court determined that there

was no legal authority supporting the petitioner’s position that the claimed conflict of interest adversely

affected his trial attorney’s performance by causing the

attorney to refrain from filing a motion to suppress on

the ground of the attorney’s own unethical conduct.

Therefore, the habeas courtrendered judgment denying

the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Appellate

Court affirmed the habeas court’s judgment, concluding

that the habeas court properly found that the petitioner’s trial attorney had advised him regarding the risks

in cooperating with the insurance carrier’s investigation, but that the petitioner was adamant in pursuing

his insurance proceeds claim and maintaining his innocence. Wargo v. Commissioner of Correction, 144

Conn. App. 695, 704, 73 A.3d 821 (2013). It also concluded that the habeas court had properly determined

that,regardless of whetherthe petitioner’s trial attorney

had a conflict, his failure to file a motion to suppress did

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because

there was no legal authority for the ground suggested

by the petitioner. Id., 705. Thereafter, we granted the

petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal limited

to the following issue: ‘‘Did the AppellateCourt properly

affirm the judgment of the habeas court rejecting the

petitioner’s claim that he was entitled to a writ of habeas

corpus with respect to his conviction of murder and

arson because the attorney in his criminal case was

burdened by a conflict of interest arising out of his

representation of the petitioner on a contingency fee

basis in connection with his claim against his insurance

company for payment for the losses he sustained as a

result of the same fire that formed the basis of the arson

charge?’’ Wargo v. Commissioner of Correction, 310

Conn. 944, 80 A.3d 908 (2013).

After examining the entire record on appeal and considering the briefs and oral arguments of the parties,

we have determined that the appeal in this case should

be dismissed on the ground that certification was

improvidently granted.

The appeal is dismissed.