14-1635-cv 

Wright v. City of Syracuse, et al. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order 

filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 16th day of April, two thousand fifteen. 

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

 ROBERT D. SACK, 

 GERARD E. LYNCH, 

 Circuit Judges, 

 

GUYNELL WRIGHT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. No. 14-1635-cv 

CITY OF SYRACUSE, JEFFREY T. WRIGHT, ANDREW 

NOLAN, DONALD THOMPSON, ROBERT CALKIN,

JOHN M. O’CONNOR, III, THOMAS SCIMONE, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

JOHN DOE, JANE DOE, 

Defendants. 

 

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: A.J. BOSMAN, Bosman Law Office, Rome, 

NY. 
2 

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: ANN MAGNARELLI ALEXANDER, Assistant 

Corporation Counsel, for Robert Stamey, 

Corporation Counsel, Syracuse, NY. 

 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

New York (Glenn T. Suddaby, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiff-appellant Guynell Wright appeals from the District Court’s March 31, 2014 

judgment granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing the complaint in its 

entirety. 

 BACKGROUND 

Wright’s racial discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and due process claims 

principally stem from the termination of his employment by the City of Syracuse (the “City”) on 

February 24, 2010. Wright—an African-American man—had been employed by the City since 1988 

as a laborer in the Street Cleaning Bureau of the City’s Department of Public Works (“DPW”). He 

was a member of the AFSCME Local 400 bargaining unit (“Local 400”) and his employment was 

covered by a collective bargaining agreement between Local 400 and the City. 

During the course of Wright’s employment, the City subjected him to official discipline on 

several occasions. For instance, between 1993 and 2007, Wright was suspended eight times for a 

variety of infractions, including reporting late and failing to report for work, fighting with and 

threatening co-workers, insubordination, and theft of City property. In January 2009, Wright was 

terminated for another incident of insubordination, in which he was accused of acting belligerent 

and threatening to a supervisor. The City, however, entered into a settlement agreement with Local 

400 to permit Wright to continue working. Finally, in February 2010, Wright was detained by the 

police after attempting to turn in scrap metal belonging to the City to a commercial recycling facility. 

For this offense, Wright’s employment was terminated. 

DISCUSSION 

Wright’s operative complaint asserts 21 causes of action under multiple statutes, including 42 

U.S.C. §§ 2000e et. seq. (“Title VII”); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”); id. § 1981 (“Section 1981); 

and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (“NYSHRL”). The District 

Court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint in its 

entirety. 
3 

We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts “in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in that party’s 

favor.” Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 2011). Summary judgment 

is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Where the record taken as a whole could 

not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Upon de novo review, we agree with the District Court that defendants are entitled to 

summary judgment. First, Wright waived several of his claims on appeal by failing to address them 

in his briefs. See Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Issues not sufficiently 

argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.”). 

Specifically, he waived his claims for breach of contract, violation of the New York State 

Constitution, and punitive damages, as well as his claims against John and Jane Doe. 

As to his remaining claims, Wright’s briefs fail to differentiate them by the statutory cause of 

action or the defendant sued. Rather, Wright has simply grouped his claims into four categories—

discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and deprivation of due process. We address 

each of these categories of claims in turn.1 

First, Wright’s discrimination claims under Title VII are analyzed under the burden-shifting 

analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To establish a prima facie

case of intentional discrimination, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he is a member of a protected 

class; (2) that he was qualified for the position he held; (3) that he suffered an adverse employment 

action; and (4) that the adverse action took place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of 

discrimination. Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d 193, 202 (2d Cir. 2012). We agree with the District 

Court that Wright has failed to establish that any of the adverse employment actions he suffered—

including his termination—took place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of racial 

discrimination.2 Even if Wright did make out a prima facie case of discrimination, however, 

 1

 New York courts “require the same standard of proof for claims brought under the 

NYHRL as for those brought under Title VII.” Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 174 F.3d 261, 264 n.1 (2d 

Cir. 1999), and, for present purposes, those brought under sections 1981 and 1983, see Paterson v. 

Cnty. Of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2004) (“Most of the core substantive standards that apply 

to claims of discriminatory conduct in violation of Title VII are also applicable to claims of 

discrimination in employment in violation of § 1981 or the Equal Protection Clause.”). Accordingly, 

our holdings with respect to Wright’s Title VII claims for discrimination, retaliation, and hostile 

work environment apply with equal force to any analogous Section 1981, Section 1983, or NYHRL 

claims. 

2

 To the extent that Wright argues that the district court erred in failing to apply a “cat’s 

paw” theory of liability to his discrimination claim, that argument is unavailing. Even assuming that 
4 

defendants here provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for these adverse actions, and 

Wright failed to provide any evidence that these reasons were pretext for racial discrimination. 

Rather, the record shows that Wright was given several opportunities to keep his job, despite his 

continued and serious misconduct. We therefore affirm the dismissal of Wright’s discrimination 

claims. 

Second, Wright’s retaliation claims under Title VII are also analyzed under the McDonnell 

Douglas burden shifting framework. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must 

show: “(1) participation in a protected activity; (2) that the defendant knew of the protected activity; 

(3) an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and 

the adverse employment action.” See Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Even assuming that Wright engaged in protected activities known to 

defendants, there is no evidence—either direct or circumstantial—to support a causal connection 

between these activities and any of the adverse employment actions suffered by Wright. Again, the 

record reflects that the disciplinary actions taken against Wright—including his termination—were 

due to his persistent and serious misconduct, not due to his engaging in protected activities. We 

therefore affirm the dismissal of Wright’s retaliation claims. 

Third, to establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff is required to 

provide evidence that his workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and 

insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment and create 

an abusive working environment.” Redd v. New York Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 175 (2d Cir. 2012) 

(internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted). We agree with the District Court that none of the 

incidents cited by Wright to support this claim rose to the level of severity or pervasiveness to 

establish a hostile work environment claim on the basis of his race. We therefore affirm the 

dismissal of Wright’s hostile work environment claims. 

Fourth, Wright asserts that his termination violated his rights under Due Process Clause of 

the Constitution. It is well settled that procedural due process is satisfied “if the government 

provides notice and a limited opportunity to be heard prior to termination, so long as a full 

adversarial hearing is provided afterwards.” Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 171 (2d Cir. 2001). In this 

case, before he was terminated, Wright was: (1) informed of the disciplinary charges against him; 

(2) afforded a disciplinary hearing; and (3) permitted to grieve his termination. Wright now argues 

that the Article 78 proceeding provided after his termination by New York state law was not an 

adequate adversarial hearing. We have previously held, however, that “[a]n Article 78 proceeding . . . 

 

such a theory applies, see Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 117–18 (2d Cir. 2011), Wright fails to adduce 

evidence of any act by his supervisors that was motivated by discriminatory animus, with the specific 

intent to cause his termination, and was the proximate cause of his termination. Cf. Staub v. Proctor 

Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 (2011). Accordingly, even under a “cat’s paw” theory, the 

circumstances of Wright’s termination do not give rise to an inference of racial discrimination. 
5 

constitutes a wholly adequate post-deprivation hearing for due process purposes.” Id. at 175. We 

therefore affirm the dismissal of Wright’s due process claim. 

Finally, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Wright’s Section 1983 claims brought 

against the City, pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Because 

Wright failed to establish individual liability on his claims of discrimination, retaliation, hostile work 

environment, and deprivation of due process, his claim of liability against the City for these 

purported violations fails as a matter of law. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). 

CONCLUSION 

We have considered all of the arguments raised by Wright on appeal and find them to be 

without merit. For the reasons stated above, the March 31, 2014 judgment of the District Court is 

AFFIRMED. 

 FOR THE COURT, 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court