alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD MANUEL BURGOS,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

ROBERT LONG; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 14-15279

D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01906-JAM-AC

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 7, 2015** 

Before: FISHER, TALLMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Former California state prisoner Richard Manuel Burgos appeals pro se from

the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726

FILED

APR 16 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Burgos failed

to show a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether prison staff were

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs with regard to his cell

assignment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (“[A] prison

official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment . . . unless the official

knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health[.]”).

The district court acted within its discretion in denying Burgos’s motion to

compel defendants to respond to his late discovery requests and in denying his

motion to supplement his opposition to summary judgment with a declaration from

another inmate. See Kulas v. Flores, 255 F.3d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting

forth standard of review for a district court’s rulings concerning discovery and

evidentiary issues).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Burgos’s motions to

appoint counsel because Burgos did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances. 

See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of

review and requirements for appointment of counsel).

Burgos’s challenge to the denial of his motions for temporary restraining

order and preliminary injunction is moot. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v.

2 14-15279
Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1992) (when underlying claims have been

decided, the reversal of a denial of preliminary relief would have no practical

consequences, and the issue is therefore moot).

AFFIRMED.

3 14-15279
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 80 (Wednesday, April 25, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 24727-24728]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-9874]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke; Notice 
of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. App.), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable materials, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: Neurological Sciences Training Initial Review 
Group; NST-1 Subcommittee.
    Date: June 4-5, 2012.
    Time: 8 a.m. to 6 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: Best Western Tuscan Inn, 425 North Point Street, San 
Francisco, CA 94133.

[[Page 24728]]

    Contact Person: Raul A. Saavedra, Ph.D., Scientific Review 
Officer, Scientific Review Branch, Division of Extramural Research, 
NINDS/NIH/DHHS, NSC, 6001 Executive Blvd., Suite 3208, MSC 9529, 
Bethesda, MD 20892-9529, 301-496-9223, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#f28193938497968080b29c9b9c9681dc9c9b9adc959d84"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="4e3d2f2f382b2a3c3c0e2027202a3d6020272660292138">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.853, 
Clinical Research Related to Neurological Disorders; 93.854, 
Biological Basis Research in the Neurosciences, National Institutes 
of Health, HHS)

    Dated: April 18, 2012.
Jennifer S. Spaeth,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2012-9874 Filed 4-24-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P


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06/10/2010 14:46 FAX 2024935142 FAA + DMS 1001/00 1 

WISCONSIN 

AVIATION I ',.•• •JON 

May 11, 2010 

Hearing Docket, Room 2014, AGC-400 

Federal Aviation Administration 

600 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

\/ Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk 

Mr. Joe Conte 

Enforcement Division, A6C-300 

Office of the Chief Counsel 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20591 ^010-05 ^ /l^P'OS^^VDj 

RE: Request for Hearing / Wisconsin Aviation, Inc. - Case #2007SW910050 

To Whom It Concerns: 

Wisconsin Aviation, Inc. hereby requests a hearing in accordance with Subpart G of Part 13 of 

the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 C.F.R. 13, Subpart G), in regard to Case # 2007SW910050. 

We request that the hearing be held at a location as close to Watertown, Wisconsin as possible. 

Sincerely, 

(J;( / 

Ireffery Baum 

President 

Wisconsin Aviation, Inc. 

1741 River Drive 

Watertown, Wisconsin 53094 

920.261,4567 

Certified Mall 

Dane County Regional Aifpon 

3606 Corben Court - Madison, Wi ^wiw 

e00-534-53!><J 

CORPORATF HEADQUARTERS 

Wstertown Monidpal Airpori 

1741 RIvc- Drive • Watcrlowii, WI !>;ii)!M 

800-657-0761 

Dodge Coiiniy Airpori 

N6491 State Hwy 26 • Juneiau, WI S^lOrii-) 

000-219-0907 

W J 3 C O ;J J J'-J y ] T I O M o \-i\
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16
- 4069

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. DERRELL V. WALKER , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Richmond

. M. Hannah Lauck , District Judge. ( 3:15

- cr - 00049

- MHL

- 1 )

Submitted : December 6, 2019 Decided: December 18, 2019

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and THACKER , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

. Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. Pratt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, Nia Ayanna Vidal, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Richmond , Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, Richard D. Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding pre cedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: In March 2015, Derrell V. Walker pled guilty to two counts of brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2018), and aiding and abetting in those crimes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). On appeal, Walker reiterates his arguments

— rejected by the district court in denying Walker’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea

— that Hobbs Act robbery, the offense underlying his § 924(c) convictions, does not qualify as a crime of violence. We affirm. “We review de novo the question whether an offense qualifies as a crime of
violence.” United States v. Mathis , 932 F.3d 242, 263 (4th Cir. 2019), petitions for cert. filed , Nos. 19

- 6423 & 19

- 6424 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2019). Section 92 4(c) defines a crime of violence as a felony offense that: (A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another [(the “force clause”)], or (B) that[,] by its nature, involves a substant ial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense [(the “residual clause”)]. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3).
B oth the United States Supreme Court and this court have ruled that the residual
cl ause in § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Davis , 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019); United States v. Simms , 914 F.3d 229, 237 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied , 140 S. Ct. 304 (2019). However, because we recently held that Hobbs Act robb ery qualifies categorically as a crime of violence under the force clause of § 924(c)(3)(A) , Mathis , 932 F.3d at 265

- 66 , we find no error in the district court’s rejection of Walker’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea on this basis

.3 Accordingly, we affi rm the district court’s judgment. We deny as moot Walker’s motion to file a pro se supplemental brief raising additional arguments and authorities
related to this issue. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
#### John T. SHAYNE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STANLEY & SONS, INC., aka Stanley Abstract and Title Co, a Utah Corp.; and George B. Stanley et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. 16106.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Jan. 14, 1980.

David S. Young of Stewart, Young & Paxton, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.

D. Gary Christian of Kipp & Christian, Salt Lake’City, for defendants and respondents.

WILKINS, Justice:

Plaintiff appeals from summary judgment granted to defendants and the dismissal of his complaint, by the District Court of Duchesne County, Utah. The complaint alleged fraud, and breach of confidential relationship against all of the defendants and conflict of interest on the part of Defendant George B. Stanley (who, plaintiff alleged, was plaintiff’s legal counsel) in the conveyance of certain real property located in Duchesne County, Utah.

The Court entered its summary judgment1 on the basis of what it termed “findings of undisputed facts”.2 Plaintiff *776has not objected to this procedure below or on appeal, and has not designated any of these findings as facts which are in dispute.

The record, particularly plaintiff’s answers to interrogatories, supports the Court’s findings that there is no material fact in dispute, and that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

In his answers to defendants’ interrogatories, plaintiff stated that he could not designate any specific fraud on the part of defendants, but had “instigated this action in order to determine what acts were instigated by defendants . ■ . . to deceive plaintiff.” See Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which requires fraud to be pleaded with particularity.

Plaintiff also admitted that he had never engaged the services of George B. Stanley as his legal counsel. Similarly, plaintiff stated that he had not engaged the services of the title insurance company prior to the time of the conveyance of the real property, which conveyance he alleged was fraudulent.

There is, in the record, substantial basis for the District Court to have determined that the material facts were not genuinely in dispute.

Plaintiff also attempts to raise an allegation of negligence on the part of defendants, here on appeal. ' As he did not raise this issue below, we do not discuss it.3 Affirmed. Costs to defendants.

CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, HALL and STEWART, JJ., concur.

1

. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

2

. While we do not find any specific authority in our rules of civil procedure for findings in a case where summary judgment is granted, this Court concludes that such findings may be helpful in some cases. We believe, however, if the District Court chooses to enter such findings that counsel for both parties should be given an opportunity to stipulate to such facts, *776or the Court should identify those parts of the record which sustain its finding that the fact is undisputed.

3

. *Nelson v. Newman,*Utah, 583 P.2d 601 (1978); *Maltby v. Cox Construction Co., Inc.,*Utah, 598 P.2d 336 (1979).
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. (S) 1350



(ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002)



In connection with Amendment No. 1 to the periodic report of Dynegy Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-Q/A for the period ended March 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Nick J. Caruso, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, hereby certify as of the date hereof, solely for the purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code, that to the best of my knowledge:



|(1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods
indicated.
|--- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                    |  |  |  |     |  |                                                                    
|------------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: July 20, 2004 |  |  |  | By: |  | /S/ NICK J. CARUSO                                                 
|                    |  |  |  |     |  | Nick J. Caruso Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Dynegy Inc. and will be retained by Dynegy Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 6 (Wednesday, January 9, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Page 1854]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-00258]



[[Page 1854]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. PR13-21-000]


Minnesota Energy Resources Corporation; Notice of Petition for 
Rate Approval

    Take notice that on January 2, 2013, Minnesota Energy Resources 
Corporation (MERC) filed a rate election pursuant to section 
284.123(b)(1) of the Commission's regulations and to revise its 
Statement of Operating Conditions. MERC proposes to utilize rates that 
conform to the recently revised rates approved by the Minnesota Public 
Utilities Commission, as more fully detailed in the petition.
    Any person desiring to participate in this rate filing must file in 
accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice 
and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214). Protests will be considered 
by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to be taken, 
but will not serve to make protestants parties to the proceeding. Any 
person wishing to become a party must file a notice of intervention or 
motion to intervene, as appropriate. Such notices, motions, or protests 
must be filed on or before the date as indicated below. Anyone filing 
an intervention or protest must serve a copy of that document on the 
Applicant. Anyone filing an intervention or protest on or before the 
intervention or protest date need not serve motions to intervene or 
protests on persons other than the Applicant.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and 
interventions in lieu of paper using the ``eFiling'' link at http://www.ferc.gov. Persons unable to file electronically should submit an 
original and 7 copies of the protest or intervention to the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 
20426.
    This filing is accessible on-line at http://www.ferc.gov, using the 
``eLibrary'' link and is available for review in the Commission's 
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an ``eSubscription'' 
link on the web site that enables subscribers to receive email 
notification when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For 
assistance with any FERC Online service, please email 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#50161502131f3e3c393e35032520203f222410363522337e373f26"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="6c2a293e2f2302000502093f191c1c031e182c0a091e0f420b031a">[email protected]</span></a>, or call (866) 208-3676 (toll free). For 
TTY, call (202) 502-8659.
    Comment Date: 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time on Monday, January 14, 2013.

    Dated: January 3, 2013.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2013-00258 Filed 1-8-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


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#### Insurance Corporation of Ireland Limited, Appellant-Respondent, v KCC New York Syndicate Corp. et al., Respondents-Appellants, and J. L. Kelley, Inc., Respondent.

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Eugene L. Nardelli, J.), entered June 26, 1990, which dismissed the complaint as against all of the defendants, unanimously affirmed, with costs. The appeal by defendants-respondents-appellants from so much of the same judgment as dismissed their cross-claim against defendant J. L. Kelley, Inc. is dismissed as academic, without costs.

Plaintiff’s contention that a contract of reinsurance was in place by January 18, 1982, when defendants-reinsurers, through their agent, defendant J. L. Kelley, Inc., telexed to plaintiffs agent, Peek Puckle International, their acceptance of plaintiffs offer to purchase reinsurance on certain specified terms, has no support in the record. Rather, the series of telexes exchanged between Peek Puckle and Kelley between January 4, 1982 and January 22, 1982 indisputedly show that the contract was formed on January 22, 1982, when Peek Puckle telexed Kelley advising it to "please bind” as per the terms of Kelley’s telex of January 18, 1982. The fact that the telex of January 18 might itself have been confirmatory of a telephone conversation between Peek Puckle and Kelley earlier that day, does not raise an issue of fact as to whether there was a meeting of the minds on January 18, given that the telex of January 18 plainly advised: "will await your INSTRUCTIONS IF WE ARE TO BIND.”

As the contract of reinsurance came into effect on January 22, 1982, after the loss sustained by plaintiffs insured on *363January 20, which plaintiff concededly knew of no later than January 21, it follows that the warranty of no known or reported losses given in Peek Puckle’s telex to Kelley of January 22 was breached by plaintiff, rendering the binder of January 22 unenforceable. The documentary evidence, especially Peek Puckle’s Cover Note to plaintiff on February 2, 1982, establishes that the parties understood that the warranty was to extend through January 22.

We have considered plaintiff’s other arguments and find them without merit. Concur—Milonas, J. P., Rosenberger, Ellerin, Kassal and Smith, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1238 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1238

To direct the Secretary of Agriculture to treat certain planted soybean 
   crops as harvested commodity crops under the Market Facilitation 
                                Program.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 14, 2019

Mr. Abraham (for himself, Mr. Estes, Mr. Kelly of Mississippi, and Mr. 
    Guest) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                        Committee on Agriculture

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To direct the Secretary of Agriculture to treat certain planted soybean 
   crops as harvested commodity crops under the Market Facilitation 
                                Program.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PLANTED CROP TREATED AS HARVESTED CROP.

    If the Secretary of Agriculture determines that market conditions 
have discouraged or prevented a producer of a soybean crop from 
harvesting such crop or entering such crop in to the stream of 
commerce, the Secretary shall, for purposes of the Market Facilitation 
Program under part 1409 of title 7, Code of Federal Regulations 
(established pursuant to the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act 
(15 U.S.C. 714 et seq.)) treat such soybean crop as an eligible crop 
for payments under such Market Facilitation Program.
                                 <all>
```
OS COURT OF APP! FIRST,DISTRICT
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£ 0001372104 APR 07 2015

RE:

style: Doctors Practice Management, Inc.
vy. Medical Mutimedia Advertising, Inc.

on April 07, 2015, the Court today GRANTED court reporter's(s) request

for extension of time to file the reporter's record in the referenced cause
to and including May 07, 2015.

T. c. Case # 2013-36797 Christopher A. prine, Clerk of the Court

Trey Bergman

3605 Katy Freeway A oy
ee Houston, TX 77007 a IA j

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