This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

2214 

Vol. 78, No. 7 

Thursday, January 10, 2013 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

10 CFR Part 73 

[NRC–2011–0018] 

RIN 3150–AI49 

Enhanced Weapons, Firearms 

Background Checks, and Security 

Event Notifications 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Supplemental proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC or the Commission) 

is proposing regulations that would 

implement its authority under Section 

161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 

as amended (AEA), and revise existing 

regulations governing security event 

notifications. The NRC proposed new 

regulations on February 3, 2011, that 

would implement its authority under 

Section 161A. The NRC is now 

proposing to further revise its 

regulations that address the voluntary 

application for enhanced weapons 

authority, preemption authority, and the 

mandatory firearms background checks 

under Section 161A to include as a class 

of designated facilities at-reactor, 

independent spent fuel storage 

installations (ISFSIs). 

DATES: Submit comments on this 

supplemental proposed rule by 

February 25, 2013. Submit comments 

specific to the information collection 

burden aspects of this supplemental 

proposed rule by February 11, 2013. 

Comments received after these dates 

will be considered if it is practical to do 

so, but the NRC is able to assure 

consideration only for comments 

received on or before these dates. 

ADDRESSES: You may access information 

and comment submissions related to 

this supplemental proposed rule, which 

the NRC possesses and are publicly 

available, by searching on http:// 

www.regulations.gov under Docket ID 

NRC–2011–0018. You may submit 

comments by any of the following 

methods (unless this document 

describes a different method for 

submitting comments on a specific 

subject): 

• Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2011–0018. Address 

questions about NRC dockets to Carol 

Gallagher; telephone: 301–492–3668; 

email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. 

• Email Comments to: 

Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov. If you 

do not receive an automatic email reply 

confirming receipt, then contact us at 

301–415–1677. 

• Fax Comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 301– 

415–1101. 

• Mail Comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, ATTN: 

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. 

• Hand Deliver Comments to: 11555 

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 

20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. 

(Eastern Time) Federal workdays; 

telephone: 301–415–1677. 

For additional direction on accessing 

information and submitting comments, 

see ‘‘Accessing Information and 

Submitting Comments’’ in the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this document. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. 

Margaret E. Stambaugh, Office of 

Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone: 

301–415–7069; email: 

Margaret.Stambaugh@nrc.gov; or Mr. 

Philip Brochman, Office of Nuclear 

Security and Incident Response, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone: 

301–415–6557; email: 

Phil.Brochman@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents 

I. Accessing Information and Submitting 

Comments 

II. Background 

III. Discussion 

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis 

V. Guidance 

VI. Criminal Penalties 

VII. Compatibility of Agreement State 

Regulations 

VIII. Availability of Documents 

IX. Plain Writing 

X. Voluntary Consensus Standards 

XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental 

Impact 

XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement 

XIII. Regulatory Analysis 

XIV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification 

XV. Backfitting and Issue Finality 

I. Accessing Information and 

Submitting Comments 

A. Accessing Information 

Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2011– 

0018 when contacting the NRC about 

the availability of information for this 

supplemental proposed rule. You may 

access information related to this 

supplemental proposed rule, which the 

NRC possesses and is publicly available, 

by any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2011–0018. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may access publicly 

available documents online in the NRC 

Library at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html. To begin the search, 

select ‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and 

then select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS 

Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, 

please contact the NRC’s Public 

Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 

1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by 

email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. The 

ADAMS accession number for each 

document referenced in this document 

(if that document is available in 

ADAMS) is provided the first time that 

a document is referenced. In addition, 

for the convenience of the reader, the 

ADAMS accession numbers are 

provided in a table in Section VIII, 

‘‘Availability of Documents,’’ of this 

document. 

• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and 

purchase copies of public documents at 

the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. 

B. Submitting Comments 

Please include Docket ID NRC–2011– 

0018 in the subject line of your 

comment submission, in order to ensure 

that the NRC is able to make your 

comment submission available to the 

public in this docket. 

The NRC cautions you not to include 

identifying or contact information that 

you do not want to be publicly 

disclosed in your comment submission. 

The NRC will post all comment 

submissions at http:// 

www.regulations.gov as well as enter the 

comment submissions into ADAMS. 


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The NRC does not routinely edit 

comment submissions to remove 

identifying or contact information. 

If you are requesting or aggregating 

comments from other persons for 

submission to the NRC, then you should 

inform those persons not to include 

identifying or contact information that 

they do not want to be publicly 

disclosed in their comment submission. 

Your request should state that the NRC 

does not routinely edit comment 

submissions to remove such information 

before making the comment 

submissions available to the public or 

entering the comment submissions into 

ADAMS. 

II. Background 

A. Implementation of Section 161A of 

the AEA 

On August 8, 2005, President Bush 

signed into law the Energy Policy Act of 

2005 (EPAct), Public Law 109–58, 119 

Stat. 594 (2005). Section 653 of the 

EPAct amended the AEA by adding 

Section 161A, ‘‘Use of Firearms by 

Security Personnel’’ (42 U.S.C. 2201a). 

Section 161A of the AEA provides the 

NRC with authority that will enhance 

security at designated NRC licensee and 

certificate holder facilities. As required 

by Section 161A.d, the provisions of 

Section 161A took effect when the 

Commission, with the approval of the 

U.S. Attorney General, published the 

approved Firearms Guidelines in the 

Federal Register (FR) on September 11, 

2009 (74 FR 46800). The issued 

Firearms Guidelines may be found on 

http://www.regulations.gov under 

Docket IDs NRC–2008–0465 and NRC– 

2011–0018. 

Section 161A requires the 

Commission to designate the classes of 

facilities, radioactive material, and other 

property eligible to apply for 

preemption or enhanced weapon 

authority. Section 161A also mandates 

that all security personnel with duties 

requiring access to covered weapons, as 

defined in the Firearms Guidelines, who 

are engaged in the protection of 

Commission-designated facilities, 

radioactive material, or other property 

owned or operated by an NRC licensee 

or certificate holder, be subject to a 

fingerprint-based background check by 

the U.S. Attorney General and a firearms 

background check against the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) National 

Instant Background Check System 

(NICS). 

B. October 2006 Proposed Rule— 

Implementation of Section 161A of the 

AEA 

In parallel with the development of 

the Firearms Guidelines, the NRC 

initiated a rulemaking to develop 

implementing regulations. On October 

26, 2006, the NRC published proposed 

regulations (71 FR 62664) to implement 

the provisions of Section 161A as part 

of a larger proposed amendment to its 

regulations under parts 50, 72, and 73 

of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR), ‘‘Power Reactor 

Security Requirements.’’ These 

proposed implementing regulations 

were based upon the draft version of the 

Firearms Guidelines that existed in 

September 2006. 

The NRC had proposed that the 

provisions of Section 161A would apply 

only to power reactor facilities and 

Category I Strategic Special Nuclear 

Material (Cat. I SSNM) facilities (i.e., 

facilities possessing or using formula 

quantities or greater of strategic special 

nuclear material). This would permit 

these two highest risk classes of 

licensed facilities to apply to the NRC 

for Section 161A authority (either 

combined enhanced weapons authority 

and preemption authority or stand-alone 

preemption authority). The NRC had 

also indicated that it would consider 

making Section 161A authority 

available to additional classes of 

facilities, radioactive material, or other 

property (including ISFSIs) in a 

separate, future rulemaking. 

C. February 2011 Proposed Rule— 

Implementation of Section 161A of the 

AEA 

Once the approved Firearms 

Guidelines were published in the FR on 

September 11, 2009 (74 FR 46800), the 

NRC continued developing the 

proposed rulemaking based upon the 

Firearms Guidelines. On February 3, 

2011, the NRC published proposed 

regulations in the FR (76 FR 6200) that 

would implement the provisions of 

Section 161A and make several changes 

to the security event notification 

requirements in 10 CFR part 73 to 

address imminent attacks or threats 

against power reactors as well as 

suspicious events that could be 

indicative of potential reconnaissance, 

surveillance, or challenges to security 

systems by adversaries. The public was 

provided a total of 180 days to review 

and comment on the February 2011 

proposed rule and associated guidance. 

III. Discussion 

Section 161A allows the NRC to 

authorize licensees and certificate 

holders to use, as part of their protective 

strategies, an expanded arsenal of 

weapons, including machine guns and 

semi-automatic, large-capacity, assault 

weapons. As indicated in the February 

2011 proposed rule, an NRC licensee or 

certificate holder interested in obtaining 

Section 161A authority (either 

combined enhanced weapons authority 

and preemption authority or preemption 

authority alone) could voluntarily apply 

to the NRC to take advantage of this new 

authority. Licensees and certificate 

holders within the designated classes 

eligible to apply for Section 161A 

authority would be required to complete 

the firearms background check 

requirements mandated by Section 

161A and the Firearms Guidelines. 

In a recent letter, a licensee requested 

that the NRC grant preemption authority 

for two operating power reactors and the 

at-reactor ISFSI co-located at the plant 

site (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML113610556). The February 2011 

proposed rule did not contemplate atreactor ISFSIs under the applicability 

statement, but rather identifies ISFSIs as 

a class of facility that would be 

considered for inclusion under a future 

rulemaking. The staff’s intent in the 

February 2011 proposed rule was first to 

establish the regulatory framework for 

granting preemption and enhanced 

weapons authority to those facilities 

deemed to be of greatest significance 

(i.e., power reactors and Cat. I SSNM 

facilities). In light of the request from 

the licensee, the staff recommended to 

the Commission in SECY–12–0027 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML113130015) 

that at-reactor ISFSIs be designated as a 

class of licensees eligible to apply for 

the authority granted under Section 

161A. In Staff Requirements 

Memorandum SRM–SECY–12–0027 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML12124A377), 

the Commission disapproved the staff’s 

recommendation in SECY–12–0027 

regarding the issuance of confirmatory 

orders for at-reactor ISFSIs. Instead, the 

Commission directed the staff to 

consider expanding the scope of the 

current enhanced weapons rule to 

include at-reactor ISFSIs. This 

supplemental proposed rule responds to 

the Commission’s direction. 

In this supplemental proposed rule, 

the NRC would add at-reactor ISFSIs to 

the scope of the enhanced weapons 

proposed rule. The NRC considers an atreactor ISFSI to be an ISFSI whose 

physical security program is conducted 

as a support activity of the co-located 

power reactor facility licensed under 10 

CFR parts 50 or 52. As previously noted, 

the NRC is taking this approach to 

address the facilities of highest concern 

first. At-reactor ISFSIs have been added 


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to the facilities of highest concern 

because the same security personnel 

and weaponry that protect a power 

reactor, also protect the at-reactor ISFSI. 

An ISFSI that is co-located with a power 

reactor facility that has been 

decommissioned (i.e., the power 

complex and spent fuel pool have been 

removed), but has not yet terminated its 

reactor license, does not rely on the 

power reactor security force to 

implement its protective strategy. 

Therefore, an ISFSI co-located at a 

decommissioned power reactor is not 

considered an at-reactor ISFSI for the 

purposes of this supplemental rule. The 

NRC considers this approach consistent 

with that for a standalone ISFSI, which 

was never co-located with a power 

reactor. 

The February 2011 proposed rule 

recommends adding two new sections 

to 10 CFR part 73. The proposed 

§ 73.18(c) would identify the specific 

classes of licensee facilities, radioactive 

material, and other property designated 

by the Commission under Section 161A 

that would be eligible to apply for 

stand-alone preemption authority or for 

combined enhanced weapons authority 

and preemption authority. The 

proposed § 73.19(c) would identify the 

specific classes of facilities, radioactive 

material, and other property designated 

by the Commission under Section 161A 

that would be subject to the firearms 

background check requirements. In this 

supplemental proposed rule, the NRC 

would designate three classes of 

facilities as subject to the requirements 

of proposed §§ 73.18 and 73.19: power 

reactor facilities, at-reactor ISFSIs, and 

Cat. I SSNM facilities. 

In the February 2011 proposed rule 

that would implement the Firearms 

Guidelines, the NRC proposed 

amendments to 10 CFR part 73 by 

adding new definitions, processes for 

obtaining enhanced weapons, 

requirements for firearms background 

checks, and event notification 

requirements for stolen or lost enhanced 

weapons. This supplemental proposed 

rule continues those proposed changes 

and adds to or modifies the following 

regulations in 10 CFR part 73: 

• Section 73.2, Definitions. 

• Section 73.18, Authorization for use 

of enhanced weapons and preemption 

of firearms laws. 

• Section 73.19, Firearms background 

checks for armed security personnel. 

• Section 73.51, Requirements for the 

physical protection of stored spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive 

waste. 

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis 

A. Overview 

The following section-by-section 

analysis discusses proposed revisions to 

the NRC’s regulations that were not part 

of the proposed rule published on 

February 3, 2011 (76 FR 6200). At this 

time, the NRC is only seeking comments 

on the revisions proposed by this 

supplemental rule. The NRC will 

address public comments on both the 

February 2011 proposed rule and this 

supplemental proposed rule in the 

Federal Register notice for the final 

rule. 

This supplemental proposed 

rulemaking to 10 CFR part 73 would 

revise two new sections (§§ 73.18 and 

73.19) proposed to be added to the 

NRC’s regulation in the February 2011 

rule, and revise two existing sections 

(§§ 73.2 and 73.51) to make conforming 

changes. 

B. Definitions (§ 73.2) 

New definition for the term At-reactor 

independent spent fuel storage 

installation or at-reactor ISFSI would be 

added in alphabetical order to the 

definitions in § 73.2(a). The NRC would 

consider an at-reactor ISFSI to be an 

ISFSI whose physical security program 

is conducted as a support activity of the 

co-located power reactor facility 

licensed under 10 CFR parts 50 or 52. 

C. Authorization for Use of Enhanced 

Weapons and Preemption of Firearms 

Laws (§ 73.18) 

Paragraph (c) would list the 

designated classes for either stand-alone 

preemption authority or combined 

enhanced weapons authority and 

preemption authority. In addition to the 

classes of facilities identified in the 

February 2011 proposed rule, the NRC 

would include at-reactor ISFSIs within 

the designated classes. The NRC 

continues to intend to specify any 

additional classes of authorized 

facilities, radioactive material, and other 

property in a separate, future 

rulemaking. 

D. Firearms Background Checks for 

Armed Security Personnel (§ 73.19) 

In paragraph (c), the NRC would 

designate the classes of facilities, 

radioactive material, and other property 

that are appropriate for firearms 

background checks. In addition to the 

classes of facilities identified in the 

February 2011 proposed rule, the NRC 

would include at-reactor ISFSIs within 

the designated classes. The NRC intends 

to specify any additional classes of 

authorized facilities, radioactive 

material, and other property in a 

separate, future rulemaking. 

E. Requirements for the Physical 

Protection of Stored Spent Nuclear Fuel 

and High-Level Radioactive Waste 

(§ 73.51) 

In paragraph (b)(4), the NRC would 

add a conforming change to provide a 

cross reference to the new firearms 

background check requirements in 

§ 73.19 for armed security personnel. 

Additionally, the NRC would provide 

implementation schedule information 

for future licensees. This conforming 

change is identical to the conforming 

changes proposed to §§ 73.46 and 73.55 

for Cat. I SSNM and power reactor 

facilities, respectively, in the February 

2011 proposed rule (see Sections V.F 

and V.G at pp 6221 and 6222 of that 

Federal Register notice). 

V. Guidance 

The NRC prepared a new draft 

regulatory guide (DG), DG–5020, 

‘‘Applying for Enhanced Weapons 

Authority, Applying for Preemption 

Authority, and Accomplishing Firearms 

Background Checks under 10 CFR part 

73’’ (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML100321956), which contains detailed 

guidance on the implementation of the 

proposed requirements for applying for 

enhanced weapons and conducting 

firearms background checks. The DG 

was made available for public comment 

on February 3, 2011 (76 FR 6086). 

Public comments and supporting 

materials related to DG–5020 can be 

found on http://www.regulations.gov by 

searching on Docket ID NRC–2011– 

0015. 

However, DG–5020 did not include 

at-reactor ISFSIs under the applicability 

section; rather, the DG reserved a 

section for additional facilities to be 

added by future rulemakings or 

Commission orders. The addition of atreactor ISFSIs facilities to the DG as an 

eligible class of licensees to receive 

preemption authority would not 

appreciably change the guidance 

contained in the DG. A licensee with an 

at-reactor ISFSI would have to take the 

same steps to request this authority as 

the facilities currently listed in the DG 

(i.e., power reactor and Cat. I SSNM 

facilities). 

The NRC will issue a final regulatory 

guide coincident with the publication of 

a final rule that will include at-reactor 

ISFSIs in the applicability section of 

DG–5020 so that it conforms to the 

requirements of the supplemental 

proposed rule. Since those conforming 

changes to the DG do not constitute a 

significant change to the guidance, the 

NRC has determined that further public 


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and stakeholder opportunity to 

comment on DG–5020 is not necessary 

for this supplemental proposed rule 

notice. 

VI. Criminal Penalties 

For the purposes of Section 223 of the 

AEA, as amended, the Commission is 

proposing to amend 10 CFR part 73 

under Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of 

the AEA. Criminal penalties, as they 

apply to regulations in 10 CFR part 73, 

are discussed in § 73.81. The new 

§§ 73.18 and 73.19 are issued under 

Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA. 

Violations of these new sections are 

subject to possible criminal penalties; 

and therefore they are not included in 

§ 73.81(b). 

VII. Compatibility of Agreement State 

Regulations 

Under the ‘‘Policy Statement on 

Adequacy and Compatibility of 

Agreement States Programs,’’ approved 

by the Commission on June 20, 1997, 

and published in the FR (62 FR 46517; 

September 3, 1997), this supplemental 

proposed rule is classified as 

compatibility Category ‘‘NRC’’ and new 

§§ 73.18 and 73.19 are designated as 

Category ‘‘NRC’’ regulations. 

Compatibility is not required for 

Category ‘‘NRC’’ regulations. The NRC 

program elements in this category are 

those that relate directly to areas of 

regulation reserved to the NRC by the 

AEA or the provisions of Title 10 of the 

CFR, and although an Agreement State 

may not adopt program elements 

reserved to the NRC, it may wish to 

inform its licensees of certain 

requirements via a mechanism that is 

consistent with the particular State’s 

administrative procedure laws, but does 

not confer regulatory authority on the 

State. 

VIII. Availability of Documents 

The NRC is making the documents 

identified in the following table 

available to interested persons through 

one or more of the following methods as 

indicated. 

Document PDR Web NRC Library 

(ADAMS) 

Firearms Guidelines ................................................................................................................ X X ML082560848 

Environmental Assessment (October 2006 proposed rule) ................................................... X X ML061920093 

Regulatory Analysis Regulatory Analysis-appendices (October 2006 proposed rule) ........... X X ML061380803 

ML061380796 

ML061440013 

Information Collection Analysis ............................................................................................... X X ML092640277 

NRC Form 754 ........................................................................................................................ X X ML092650459 

Commission: SECY–08–0050 (April 17, 2008) ...................................................................... X X ML072920478 

Commission: SECY–08–0050A (July 8, 2008) ....................................................................... X X ML081910207 

Commission: SRM–SECY–08–0050/0050A (August 15, 2008) ............................................. X X ML082280364 

Letter Opinion from Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives’ Office of Enforcement on the Transfer of Enhanced Weapons (January 5, 2009).X X ML090080191 

Proposed Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications rule (February 3, 2011).X X ML103410132 

DG–5020 ‘‘Applying for Enhanced Weapons Authority, Applying for Preemption Authority, 

and Accomplishing Firearms Background Checks under 10 CFR Part 73’’ (February 3, 

2011).

X X ML100321956 

Letter of Christopher E. Earls, on Behalf of Nuclear Energy Institute, on the proposed 

‘‘Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks and Security Event Notifications’’ 

rule, Request for 90-Day Extension to Comment Period (February 15, 2011).

X ........................ ML110480470 

Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Application 

for Stand-Alone Preemption Authority Under 42 U.S.C. 2201a (December 22, 2011).

X ........................ ML113610556 

Commission: SECY–12–0027 (February 17, 2012) ............................................................... X X ML113130015 

Commission: SRM–SECY–12–0027 (May 3, 2012) ............................................................... X X ML12124A377 

NUREG/BR–0058, ‘‘Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,’’ Revision 4 (September 30, 2004).X X ML042820192 

IX. Plain Writing 

The Plain Writing Act of 2010 (Pub. 

L. 111–274), requires Federal agencies 

to write documents in a clear, concise, 

and well-organized manner. The NRC 

has written this document to be 

consistent with the Plain Writing Act as 

well as the Presidential Memorandum, 

‘‘Plain Language in Government 

Writing,’’ published June 10, 1998 (63 

FR 31883). The NRC requests comment 

on the supplemental proposed rule with 

respect to the clarity and effectiveness 

of the language used. 

X. Voluntary Consensus Standards 

The National Technology Transfer 

and Advancement Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 

104–113), requires that Federal agencies 

use technical standards that are 

developed or adopted by voluntary 

consensus standards bodies, unless 

using such a standard is inconsistent 

with applicable law or is otherwise 

impractical. In this supplemental 

proposed rule, the NRC proposes to use 

standards from applicable firearms 

standards developed by nationally 

recognized firearms organizations or 

standard setting bodies or from 

standards developed by (1) Federal 

agencies, such as the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security’s Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center, the U.S. 

Department of Energy’s National 

Training Center, and the U.S. 

Department of Defense; (2) State lawenforcement training centers; or (3) 

State Division (or Department) of 

Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) 

Training Academies. The NRC invites 

comment on the use of consensus 

standards. 

XI. Finding of No Significant 

Environmental Impact 

In the proposed rule published on 

February 3, 2011, the Commission 

determined under the National 

Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as 

amended, and the Commission’s 

regulations in subpart A of 10 CFR part 

51, that the proposed rule, if adopted, 

would not be a major Federal action 

significantly affecting the quality of the 

human environment and, therefore, an 

environmental impact statement is not 

required. 

The determination of the 

environmental assessment for this 


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supplemental proposed rule is that there 

will be no significant offsite impact to 

the public from this action. Availability 

of the environmental assessment is 

provided in Section VIII, ‘‘Availability 

of Documents,’’ of this document. Due 

to the nature of the changes to the 

firearms background checks and 

enhanced weapons provisions presented 

in this supplemental proposed rule, the 

assumptions in the February 2011 

proposed rule have not changed. 

Accordingly, the Commission is not 

seeking additional comments on the 

environmental assessment. 

XII. Paperwork Reduction Act 

Statement 

The proposed rule published on 

February 3, 2011 (76 FR 6200), would 

impose new or amended information 

collection requirements that are subject 

to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(44 U.S.C 3501, et seq.). These new or 

amended information collection 

requirements were submitted to the 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) for review under clearance 

numbers 3150–0002 and 3150–0204. 

The existing requirements for part 73 

were previously approved by OMB, 

approval number 3150–0002. 

This supplemental proposed rule does 

not contain new or amended 

information collection requirements not 

already identified in the February 3, 

2011, proposed rule. However, it would 

apply these requirements to the atreactor ISFSI class of designated 

facilities. The estimated number of 

respondents and licensee burden remain 

unchanged from the February 2011 

proposed rule. The inclusion of atreactor ISFSI facilities will be reflected 

in the revised OMB clearance package 

prepared for the final rule. 

The NRC is seeking public comment 

on the potential impact of the 

information collections contained in 

this supplemental proposed rule and on 

the following issues: 

1. Is the proposed collection of information 

necessary for the NRC to properly perform its 

functions? Does the information have 

practical utility? 

2. Is the burden estimate accurate? 

3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, 

utility, and clarity of the information to be 

collected? 

4. How can the burden of the information 

collection be minimized, including the use of 

automated collection techniques or other 

forms of information technology? 

A copy of the OMB clearance package 

for the proposed rule may be viewed 

free of charge at the NRC PDR, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Room O1–F21, Rockville, 

Maryland 20852. The OMB clearance 

package and supplemental proposed 

rule are available at the NRC’s Web site, 

http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/doccomment/omb/ for 30 days after the 

signature date of this document. 

Send comments on any aspect of 

these proposed regulations related to 

information collections, including 

suggestions for reducing the burden and 

on the above issues, by February 11, 

2013 to the Information Services Branch 

(T–5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 

205550001, or by email to 

INFOCOLLECTS.Resource@nrc.gov; and 

to the Desk Officer, Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

NEOB–10202 (3150–0002 and 3150– 

0204), Office of Management and 

Budget, Washington, DC 20503. You 

may also email comments to 

Chad_S_Whiteman@omb.eop.gov or 

comment by telephone at 202–395– 

4718. 

Public Protection Notification 

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, 

and a person is not required to respond 

to, a request for information or an 

information collection requirement 

unless the requesting document 

displays a currently valid OMB control 

number. 

XIII. Regulatory Analysis 

The NRC prepared a draft regulatory 

analysis for the proposed rule published 

on February 3, 2011, (see Section VIII, 

‘‘Availability of Documents,’’ of this 

document). The analysis examined the 

costs and benefits of the Implementation 

of Section 161A of the AEA. The 

regulatory analysis has been updated to 

reflect the addition of at-reactor ISFSI 

facilities. 

The NRC is taking action to conform 

implementing regulations to the 

Firearms Guidelines issued by the 

Commission, with the approval of the 

U.S. Attorney General. The 

requirements identified by this 

supplemental proposed rule were also 

identified in the February 2011 

proposed rule. In this regulatory 

analysis, the NRC is providing a 

summary of the cost and benefit 

estimates from the February 2011 

proposed rule and noting the changes 

necessitated by this supplemental 

proposed rule. The NRC considers the 

costs and benefits associated with 

applying for enhanced weapons to be 

unchanged from those described by the 

draft regulatory analysis in the February 

2011 proposed rule, as the plans and 

analysis required to accompany an 

application have not changed. However, 

additional requirements have been 

added because of the addition of atreactor ISFSI facilities. These proposed 

regulations have been developed to be 

consistent with the issued Firearms 

Guidelines. This regulatory analysis was 

developed following the guidance 

contained in NUREG/BR–0058, 

‘‘Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,’’ 

Revision 4, issued September 2004 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML042820192). 

1. Statement of the Problem and 

Objective 

The NRC is proposing regulations that 

would implement its authority under 

Section 161A of the AEA and revise 

existing regulations governing security 

event notifications. On September 11, 

2009, with the approval of the U.S. 

Attorney General, the NRC published 

the Firearms Guidelines (74 FR 46800); 

these guidelines relate to the NRC’s 

implementation of the new statutory 

authority. 

The NRC proposed new regulations 

on February 3, 2011 (76 FR 6200), that 

would implement the new statutory 

authority. The NRC is now proposing 

further revisions that will address the 

voluntary application for enhanced 

weapons and the mandatory firearms 

background checks under Section 161A 

to include as a class of designated 

facilities called at-reactor ISFSIs. 

2. Identification and Analysis of 

Alternative Approaches to the Problem 

Because this rulemaking is in 

response to the statutorily mandated 

provisions of Section 161A of the AEA 

and the direction provided by the 

Firearms Guidelines issued by the 

Commission, there are no acceptable 

alternatives to the proposed rulemaking. 

Application for enhanced weapons 

authority and preemption authority 

under Section 161A is voluntary; 

however, licensee and certificate holder 

compliance with the firearms 

background checks under Section 161A 

is mandatory for certain designated 

classes of licensees. Consequently, the 

no-action option is used only as a basis 

against which to measure the costs and 

benefits of this rulemaking. 

3. Estimation and Evaluation of Values 

and Impacts 

In general the parties that would be 

affected by this supplemental proposed 

rule are the licensees and certificate 

holders (there is no impact on 

applicants since they are not subject to 

the firearms background check 

requirements), the NRC, the public 

surrounding the plants, the on-site 

employees of the licensees and 

certificate holders, the FBI, and the 


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Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 

and Explosives (ATF). 

The following attributes are expected 

to be affected by this rulemaking. Their 

impacts are quantified where possible. 

Impacts to accident-related attributes 

are qualified because estimates of 

occurrences of possible attacks and their 

successful repulsions are unknown. 

Further, even if reliable estimates were 

available, they would be considered 

Safeguards Information and not to be 

released for public dissemination. 

• Safeguards and Security 

Considerations—The proposed actions 

regarding access to enhanced weapons 

and mandatory firearms background 

checks will comply with statutory 

requirements and provide high 

assurance that public health and safety 

and the common defense and security 

will be enhanced because of licensees’ 

and certificate holders’ increased ability 

to repulse an attack. 

• Industry Implementation—The 

supplemental proposed rule would 

require licensees and certificate holders 

with at-reactor ISFSI facilities to subject 

their security personnel to a fingerprintbased background check and a firearms 

background check against the NICS. 

Also, the rule would give licensees and 

certificate holders in Commissiondesignated classes of facilities the 

option to apply for combined enhanced 

weapons authority and preemption 

authority or standalone preemption 

authority. If a licensee or certificate 

holder is so inclined, it must submit 

plans and analysis to the NRC on their 

proposed deployment of enhanced 

weapons. The NRC must then act on the 

request. If the NRC approves the 

request, a licensee or certificate holder 

would apply to ATF to transfer the 

authorized enhanced weapons to its 

facility. Industry would need to develop 

procedures to comply with these 

requirements. 

For purposes of this analysis, the NRC 

staff assumed that all licensees and 

certificate holders who fall within the 

proposed designated classes of facilities 

would take advantage of making use of 

enhanced weapons protection (i.e., 65 

operating power reactor sites (which 

includes 53 at-reactor ISFSI facilities), 

15 decommissioning power reactor 

sites, and 2 Cat. I SSNM facilities for a 

total of 82 facilities). The staff assumed 

that the licensee’s or certificate holder’s 

security personnel required to protect 

the operating power reactor site would 

also protect any at-reactor ISFSI facility 

without any increase in onsite staff. 

Since the total number of facilities is the 

same as was used in the draft regulatory 

analysis in the February 2011 proposed 

rule, the industry implementation cost 

and assumptions have not changed and 

are summarized in Table 1. 

TABLE 1 

Enhanced Weapons Costs 

Enhanced weapons cost per site .................................................................................................................................................... $50,000 1⁄2 staff year to change security, training and qualification, contingency response plans and security event notification reports 

and to develop the weapons safety assessment and submit these documents to the NRC for its review and approval per 

site ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 80,000 1⁄4 staff year to complete ATF paperwork, acquire the enhanced weapons, develop new training standards and then train security personnel, and deploy the weapons per site ..................................................................................................................... 40,000 

Total individual site’s implementation cost for the voluntary enhanced weapons regulations ......................................... 170,000 

Total enhanced weapons implementation cost for the industry 1 ..................................................................................... 13,940,000 

Firearms Background Checks Costs 

1⁄6 staff year to establish a program for the mandatory firearms background checks per site ...................................................... 26,700 

Total program cost for mandatory firearms background checks to industry 1 .................................................................. 2,190,000 

NRC fees and staff time to complete NRC Form 754 for the mandatory firearms background checks for each operating reactor and Cat. I SSNM facility ......................................................................................................................................................... 11,400 

NRC fees and staff time to complete NRC Form 754 for the mandatory firearms background checks for each decommissioned reactor site ........................................................................................................................................................................ 5,700 

Total industry cost for performing the first-time background checks ................................................................................ 849,000 

Total industry implementation costs .................................................................................................................................. 16,979,000 

1Please note that throughout this analysis sums may not equal shown total values because of rounding. Also, this cost analysis does not include any transfer tax payments required from a licensee to register an enhanced weapon with ATF under the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. 

Chapter 53), since those costs fall under ATF’s sole regulatory purview. 

• Industry Operation—Enhanced 

weapon inventories’ requirements of the 

February 2011 proposed rule, both 

monthly and semi-annually, would 

result in operating expenses for 

industry. Since the total number of 

facilities, including sites with at-reactor 

ISFSIs, are the same as was used in the 

draft regulatory analysis in the February 

2011 proposed rule, the industry 

inventory cost and assumptions have 

not changed and are summarized in 

Table 2. 


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TABLE 2 

Annual Enhanced Weapons Costs 

Monthly and semi-annual automatic weapon inventories cost per site .................................................................................................. $5,600 

Total enhanced weapons implementation cost for the industry ...................................................................................................... 460,000 

Total enhanced weapons implementation cost for the industry with a 7 percent discount rate over remaining lifetime ............... 6,100,000 

Total enhanced weapons implementation cost for the industry with a 3 percent discount rate over remaining lifetime ............... 11,200,000 

Annual Firearms Background Checks Costs 

Annual mandatory firearms background checks per site ........................................................................................................................ 3,800 

Total program cost for mandatory firearms background checks to industry with a 7 percent discount rate over remaining lifetime ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 3,401,000 

Total program cost for mandatory firearms background checks to industry with a 3 percent discount rate over remaining lifetime ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 6,468,000 

With respect to the security event 

notification reporting requirements, 

cyber and physical intrusions, 

suspicious activity reports, 

unauthorized operation or tampering 

events, reporting enhanced weapons 

being lost or stolen or adverse ATF 

findings, and the impact of events 

requiring entry in the safeguards event 

log the addition of at-reactor facilities 

will not have an impact on this analysis. 

The total industry operating costs are 

the sum of the recurring inventory 

requirements ($6.1 million given the 7 

percent real discount rate and $11.2 

million with the 3 percent rate), the 

background checks ($3.7 million at 7 

percent and $6.5 million at 3 percent), 

and the security event notification 

reports ($15.1 million using the 7 

percent rate and $28.6 million with the 

3 percent rate). This total is estimated to 

range from $24.9 million (7 percent) to 

$46.3 million (3 percent rate) which is 

unchanged from the February 2011 

proposed rule. 

• NRC Implementation—The NRC’s 

implementation costs include the labor 

cost for the development of the final 

rule and the supporting regulatory 

guidance (two regulatory guides and the 

weapons safety assessment). The NRC 

would also need to develop appropriate 

inspection procedures to confirm 

compliance with this rule. As with the 

cost associated with the industry 

implementation, the addition of the atreactor facilities will not increase the 

labor cost to the NRC beyond what was 

outlined in the February 2011 proposed 

rule. The NRC’s implementation costs 

are summarized in Table 3. 

TABLE 3 

NRC Implementation Costs 

Develop final rule, final regulatory guidance, and inspection procedures .............................................................................................. $280,000 

NRC review of each licensee’s and certificate holder’s security plan, training and qualification plan, contingency response plan, 

weapons safety assessment, and one round of Requests for Additional Information questions ....................................................... 3,280,000 

Total NRC Implementation Costs ..................................................................................................................................................... 3,600,000 

• NRC Operation—The NRC would 

need to inspect the licensees’ and 

certificate holders’ periodic inventories, 

recordkeeping, and training and 

qualification of enhanced weapons as a 

result of this rule. The addition of the 

at-reactor facilities will not increase the 

operational cost to the NRC beyond 

what was assumed in the February 2011 

proposed rule. The NRC’s operational 

costs are summarized in Table 4. 

TABLE 4 

NRC Inventory Inspection Costs 

1st year of NRC inspections of licensee’s and certificate holder’s automatic weapon inventories ........................................................ $131,200 

Annual NRC inspections of licensee’s and certificate holder’s automatic weapon inventories after 1st year ....................................... 65,600 

Total NRC costs for inspections of licensee’s and certificate holder’s automatic weapon inventories of the industry with a 7 

percent discount rate over remaining lifetime .............................................................................................................................. 934,000 

Total NRC costs for inspections of licensee’s and certificate holder’s automatic weapon inventories of the industry with a 3 

percent discount rate over remaining lifetime .............................................................................................................................. 1,665,000 

NRC Records Inspection Costs 

1st year of NRC record inspections of licensee’s and certificate holder’s background checks ............................................................. 131,200 

Annual NRC record inspections of licensee’s and certificate holder’s background checks after 1st year ............................................ 65,600 


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TABLE 4—Continued 

Total NRC costs for record inspections of licensee’s and certificate holder’s background checks of the industry with a 7 percent discount rate over remaining lifetime .................................................................................................................................... 934,000 

Total NRC costs for record inspections of licensee’s and certificate holder’s background checks of the industry with a 3 percent discount rate over remaining lifetime .................................................................................................................................... 1,665,000 

NRC’s total operating costs with a 7 percent discount rate ............................................................................................................ 1,900,000 

NRC’s total operating costs with a 3 percent discount rate ............................................................................................................ 3,300,000 

• Regulatory Efficiency—The 

proposed action would result in 

enhanced regulatory efficiency through 

regulatory and compliance 

improvements based upon statutory 

mandates involving the voluntary 

possession of enhanced weapons and 

mandatory firearms background checks 

at power reactor facilities, at-reactor 

ISFSIs, and Cat. I SSNM facilities. The 

proposed action would also result in 

enhanced regulatory efficiency 

involving the NRC’s ability to monitor 

ongoing security events at a range of 

licensed facilities, and the ability to 

rapidly communicate information on 

security events at such facilities to other 

NRC-regulated facilities and other 

government agencies, as necessary. 

• Public Health (Accident)—The 

proposed action could reduce the risk 

that public health will be affected by 

radiological releases because of the 

increased likelihood of a successful 

repulsion of an attack. 

• Occupational Health (Accident)— 

The proposed action could reduce the 

risk that occupational health will be 

affected by radiological releases because 

of the increased likelihood of a 

successful repulsion of an attack. 

• Off-Site Property—The proposed 

action could reduce the risk that off-site 

property will be affected by radiological 

releases because of the increased 

likelihood of a successful repulsion of 

an attack. 

• On-Site Property—The proposed 

action could reduce the risk that on-site 

property will be affected by radiological 

releases because of the increased 

likelihood of a successful repulsion of 

an attack. 

• Other Government Agencies—The 

FBI would be affected by this rule 

because of its role in processing the 

mandatory fingerprint checks and 

firearms background checks the statute 

requires. The ATF would be affected by 

this rule because of its involvement 

with the approval to transfer enhanced 

weapons to and from an authorized NRC 

licensee or certificate holder. Note: The 

FBI’s fees for fingerprinting checks are 

incorporated within the NRC’s fee 

previously discussed. The FBI does not 

charge a fee for processing firearms 

background checks. Also, as previously 

noted in the February 2011 proposed 

rule, the ATF taxes to transfer enhanced 

weapons are not included in this 

analysis. 

Attributes that are not expected to be 

affected under any of the rulemaking 

options include the following: 

occupational health (routine); public 

health (routine); environmental 

considerations; general public; 

improvements in knowledge; and 

antitrust considerations. 

4. Presentation of Results 

Section 161A of the AEA requires 

several modifications to 10 CFR part 73. 

The pertinent sections and appendices 

which are being revised in this 

supplemental proposed rule are §§ 73.2, 

‘‘Definitions,’’ 73.18, ‘‘Authorization for 

use of enhanced weapons and 

preemption of firearms laws,’’ 73.19, 

‘‘Firearms background checks for armed 

security personnel,’’ and 73.51, 

‘‘Requirements for the physical 

protection of stored spent nuclear fuel 

and high-level radioactive waste.’’ 

The fundamental incentive for a 

licensee or certificate holder to choose 

to obtain enhanced weapons is to 

increase their defensive capabilities to 

provide high assurance that public 

health and safety and the common 

defense and security will be adequately 

protected from any attempts at 

radiological sabotage. A licensee’s or 

certificate holder’s decision to apply for 

enhanced weapons authority is 

voluntary. They must evaluate for their 

specific site whether the costs and 

benefits of using enhanced weapons are 

appropriate in general; and if 

appropriate in general, which specific 

types of weapons are appropriate for 

their particular site and protective 

strategy. The firearms background 

checks will provide assurance that 

security personnel possessing enhanced 

weapons are not barred under Federal 

and State law from receiving, 

possessing, transporting, or using any 

covered weapons and ammunition. The 

NRC staff notes that while licensees and 

certificate holders would be required to 

pay an excise tax when transferring 

enhanced weapons, the tax is not 

considered a cost of this proposed rule 

because it is a result of ATF regulations. 

The total industry enhanced weapons 

implementation costs is $13,940,000. 

The total enhanced weapons mandatory 

background checks program costs to the 

industry is $2,190,000, and the total 

first-time background checks for the 

industry is $849,000. The sum of the 

total industry implementation cost is 

$17.0 million. The industry operating 

costs for this supplemental proposed 

rule when discounted as flows of funds 

and based on the assumed lengths of 

lives of the various facilities ranged 

from $9.5 million to $17.7 million, 

given the 7 percent and 3 percent real 

discount rates, respectively. 

The total costs to industry, including 

both implementation and operating 

expenses for this supplemental 

proposed rule are estimated to range 

from $26.5 million to $34.7 million, 

again given the 7 percent and 3 percent 

real discount rates, respectively. 

The NRC’s implementation costs are 

almost $3.6 million. The recurring or 

annual costs are calculated to have a 

present value of $1.9 million (7 percent 

rate) to $3.3 million (3 percent rate). 

Therefore, the total estimated NRC costs 

range from about $5.5 million (7 percent 

rate) to $6.9 million (3 percent rate). 

The total quantitative costs estimates 

for this supplemental proposed 

rulemaking are estimated to be from 

$32.0 million (7 percent) to $41.6 

million (3 percent). 

• Disaggregation 

In order to comply with the guidance 

provided in Section 4.3.2 (Criteria for 

the Treatment of Individual 

Requirements) of the NRC’s Regulatory 

Analysis Guidelines, the NRC 

conducted a screening review to ensure 

that the aggregate analysis does not 

mask the inclusion of individual rule 

provisions that are not cost-beneficial 

when considered individually and not 

necessary to meet the goals of the 

rulemaking. Consistent with the 

Regulatory Analysis Guidelines, the 

NRC evaluated, on a disaggregated basis, 

each new regulatory provision expected 

to result in incremental costs. Given that 

the NRC is required to comply with 

Section 161A of the AEA, the NRC 


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believes that each of these provisions is 

necessary and cost-justified based on its 

resulting qualitative benefits, as 

previously discussed. 

5. Decision Rationale 

Relative to the ‘‘no-action’’ 

alternative, the supplemental proposed 

rule would cost the industry from 

around $26.5 million to $34.7 million 

over the average lifetime of the plants. 

The total NRC costs would range from 

$5.5 million to slightly under $7 

million. Total costs of the supplemental 

proposed rule are estimated to range 

from around $32 million to $42 million. 

The requirements in this supplemental 

proposed rule are the result of the new 

Section 161A of the AEA. The NRC 

concluded that for all of these 

requirements, and their corresponding 

costs, the proposed approach is 

appropriate. 

Although the NRC did not quantify 

the benefits of this rule, the staff did 

qualitatively examine benefits and 

concluded that the rule would provide 

safety and security-related benefits. 

Offsetting this net cost, the NRC 

believes that the rule would result in 

substantial non-quantified benefits 

related to safety and security, as well as 

enhanced regulatory efficiency and 

effectiveness. Therefore, the NRC 

believes that the rule is cost-justified for 

several qualitative reasons. First, the 

supplemental proposed rule would 

provide increased defensive capability 

of licensees and certificate holders and 

thus would increase the assurance that 

a licensee can adequately protect an atreactor ISFSI facility against an external 

assault. Second, the supplemental 

proposed rule would provide a 

mechanism to accomplish a statutory 

mandate to verify that security officers 

protecting such facilities are not 

disqualified under Federal or State law 

from possessing or using firearms and 

ammunition. Lastly, as previously 

indicated, application for enhanced 

weapons authority and preemption 

authority under Section 161A is 

voluntary. 

Based on the NRC’s assessment of the 

costs and benefits of the supplemental 

proposed rule on licensee and certificate 

holder facilities, the agency has 

concluded that the supplemental 

proposed rule provisions would be 

justified. 

6. Implementation 

The final rule is to take effect 60 days 

after publication in the FR. A 

compliance date of 180 days after 

publication of the final rule will also be 

established for some provisions of this 

rule. The NRC staff does not expect this 

rule to have any impact on other 

requirements. 

XIV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification 

In accordance with the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the 

NRC certifies that this rule would not, 

if promulgated, have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. With respect 

to the enhanced weapons and firearms 

background check provisions, this 

supplemental proposed rule affects only 

the licensing and operation of nuclear 

power reactors, at-reactor ISFSIs, and 

fuel cycle facilities authorized to 

possess and use Category I quantities of 

SSNM. The companies that own or 

operate these facilities or conduct these 

activities do not fall within the scope of 

the definition of ‘‘small entities’’ 

presented in the Regulatory Flexibility 

Act or the size standards established by 

the NRC (10 CFR 2.810). 

XV. Backfitting and Issue Finality 

The NRC evaluated the aggregated set 

of requirements in this supplemental 

proposed rule that constitute backfitting 

in accordance with 10 CFR 50.109, 

70.76, 72.62, and the finality provisions 

in 10 CFR part 52. The NRC’s evaluation 

of changes in accordance with 10 CFR 

10.109, 70.76, and the finality 

provisions in 10 CFR part 52 is 

described in the draft regulatory 

analysis on the proposed rule published 

on February 3, 2011. The Availability 

information for the draft regulatory (and 

backfit) analysis is provided in Section 

VIII, ‘‘Availability of Documents,’’ of 

this document. This analysis examined 

the costs and benefits of the alternatives 

considered by the NRC. The regulations 

in 10 CFR 72.62 pertain to changes in 

requirements for ISFSI facilities, which 

is the subject of the supplemental 

proposed rule. However, the 

supplemental proposed rule will not 

change the requirements from the 

proposed rule; it simply applies the 

proposed requirements to an additional 

class of facilities. Therefore the 

evaluation of changes presented in the 

proposed rule from February 2011 also 

applies to this supplemental proposed 

rule and the evaluation is in accordance 

with 10 CFR 72.62. 

The provisions of this supplemental 

proposed rule do not constitute 

backfitting because they are voluntary in 

nature, and would therefore not impose 

modifications or additions to existing 

structures, components, or designs, or 

existing procedures or organizations. 

These provisions include those related 

to application for the use of enhanced 

weapons and/or preemption authority. 

Other provisions of the rule 

implementing Section 161A of the AEA, 

such as the mandatory firearms 

background checks, are not backfits 

because they implement mandatory 

provisions required by statute. 

To the extent that some of the specific 

implementing details of the firearms 

background checks described in this 

proposed rule are not specifically 

mandated by statute, or the Firearms 

Guidelines issued by the Commission 

with the approval of the U.S. Attorney 

General, the Commission believes that 

such measures are essential for the 

effective implementation of the rule’s 

requirements, and thus necessary for the 

adequate protection to the health and 

safety of the public and are in accord 

with the common defense and security. 

Therefore, for the reasons previously 

stated, a backfit analysis is not required 

and has not been completed for any of 

the provisions of this supplemental 

proposed rule. 

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73 

Criminal penalties, Export, Hazardous 

materials transportation, Import, 

Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants 

and reactors, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements, Security 

measures. 

For the reasons set out in the 

preamble and under the authority of the 

AEA, as amended; the Energy 

Reorganization Act of 1974, as 

amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553; the NRC 

proposes to amend 10 CFR part 73 and 

proposes to further amend 10 CFR part 

73, as proposed to be amended at 76 FR 

6200, February 3, 2011, as follows: 

PART 73—PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF 

PLANTS AND MATERIALS 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 73 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: Atomic Energy Act sections 53, 

147, 161, 223, 234, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 

2167, 2169, 2201, 2273, 2282, 2297(f), 

2210(e)); Energy Reorganization Act sections 

201, 204 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844); Government 

Paperwork Elimination Act section 1704, 112 

Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note); Energy 

Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109–58, 119 Stat. 

594 (2005). 

Section 73.1 also issued under Nuclear 

Waste Policy Act sections 135, 141 (42 U.S.C. 

10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also issued 

under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96–295, 94 Stat. 789 

(42 U.S.C. 5841 note). 

■ 2. In § 73.2, paragraph (a), a definition 

for ‘‘At-reactor independent spent fuel 

storage installation’’ is added in 

alphabetical order to read as follows: 

§ 73.2 Definitions. 

* * * * * 

(a) * * * 


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At-reactor independent spent fuel 

storage installation or at-reactor ISFSI 

means an ISFSI whose physical security 

program is conducted as a support 

activity of the co-located power reactor 

facility licensed under parts 50 or 52 of 

this chapter. 

* * * * * 

■ 3. In § 73.18, paragraph (c), as 

proposed to be added at 76 FR 6233, 

February 3, 2011, is revised to read as 

follows: 

§ 73.18 Authorization for use of enhanced 

weapons and preemption of firearms laws. 

* * * * * 

(c) Applicability. (1) Stand-alone 

preemption authority. The following 

classes of facilities, radioactive material, 

or other property are designated by the 

Commission pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

2201a— 

(i) Power reactor facilities; 

(ii) Facilities authorized to possess or 

use a formula quantity or greater of 

strategic special nuclear material, where 

the material has a radiation level less 

than or equal to 1 Gray (Gy) (100 Rad) 

per hour at a distance of 1 meter (m) (3.3 

feet [ft]), without regard to any 

intervening shielding; and 

(iii) At-reactor independent spent fuel 

storage installations. 

(2) Combined enhanced-weapons 

authority and preemption authority. The 

following classes of facilities, 

radioactive material, or other property 

are designated by the Commission 

under 42 U.S.C. 2201a— 

(i) Power reactor facilities; 

(ii) Facilities authorized to possess or 

use a formula quantity or greater of 

strategic special nuclear material, where 

the material has a radiation level less 

than or equal to 1 Gy (100 Rad) per hour 

at a distance of 1 m (3.3 ft), without 

regard to any intervening shielding; and 

(iii) At-reactor independent spent fuel 

storage installations. 

* * * * * 

■ 4. In § 73.19, paragraph (c), as 

proposed to be added at 76 FR 6237, 

February 3, 2011, is revised to read as 

follows: 

§ 73.19 Firearms background checks for 

armed security personnel. 

* * * * * 

(c) Applicability. For the purposes of 

firearms background checks, the 

following classes of facilities, 

radioactive material, or other property 

are designated by the Commission at 42 

U.S.C. 2201a— 

(1) Power reactor facilities; 

(2) Facilities authorized to possess or 

use a formula quantity or greater of 

strategic special nuclear material, where 

the material has a radiation level less 

than or equal to 1 Gray (100 Rad) per 

hour at a distance of 1 meter (3.3 feet), 

without regard to any intervening 

shielding; and 

(3) At-reactor independent spent fuel 

storage installations. 

* * * * * 

■ 5. In § 73.51, paragraph (b)(4) is added 

to read as follows: 

§ 73.51 Requirements for the physical 

protection of stored spent nuclear fuel and 

high-level radioactive waste. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(4)(i) The licensee shall ensure that 

the firearms background check 

requirements of § 73.19 of this part are 

met for all members of the security 

organization whose official duties 

require access to covered weapons or 

who inventory enhanced weapons. 

(ii) For licensees who are issued a 

license after [effective date of final rule], 

the licensee shall ensure that the 

firearms background check 

requirements of § 73.19 of this part are 

met for all members of the security 

organization whose official duties 

require access to covered weapons or 

who inventory enhanced weapons. 

Additionally and notwithstanding the 

implementation schedule provisions of 

§ 73.19(b), such licensees shall ensure 

that the firearms background check 

requirements of § 73.19 are satisfactorily 

completed within 180 days of the 

issuance of the license, or within 180 

days of the implementation of a 

protective strategy that uses covered 

weapons, whichever is later. 

(iii) The provisions of this paragraph 

are only applicable to licensees subject 

to this section who store spent nuclear 

fuel in an at-reactor ISFSI. 

* * * * * 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day 

of December, 2012. 

R.W. Borchardt, 

Executive Director for Operations. 

[FR Doc. 2013–00237 Filed 1–9–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–1305; Directorate 

Identifier 2010–SW–041–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Eurocopter 

Deutschland GmbH Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for 

Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH 

(Eurocopter) Model BO–105A, BO– 

105C, BO–105S, BO–105LS A–1, BO– 

105LS A–3, EC135 P1, EC135 P2, EC135 

P2+, EC135 T1, EC135 T2, EC135 T2+, 

MBB–BK 117 A–1, MBB–BK 117 A–3, 

MBB–BK 117 A–4, MBB–BK 117 B–1, 

MBB–BK 117 B–2, MBB–BK 117 C–1, 

and MBB–BK 117 C–2 helicopters with 

certain part-numbered cantilever 

assemblies, cyclic stick locking devices, 

or cyclic stick holder assemblies 

installed. This proposed AD would 

require modifying and identifying the 

cyclic stick cantilever or lock. This 

proposed AD is prompted by pilots 

inadvertently taking off with the cyclic 

locked. The proposed actions are 

intended to prevent a pilot taking off 

with the cyclic in the locked position, 

which could result in loss of control of 

the helicopter. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by March 11, 2013. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Docket: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: Send comments to the U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery: Deliver to the 

‘‘Mail’’ address between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov or in person at the 

Docket Operations Office between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 


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