[Cite as Niepsuj v. Stoner, 2015-Ohio-4564.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

NINTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

SUMMIT COUNTY, OHIO 

VINCENT M. NIEPSUJ, : O P I N I O N 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 CASE NO. 27734

 - vs - : 

TRACY STONER, et al., : 

 Defendants-Appellees. : 

Civil Appeal from the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. 

Case No. CV 2014 10 4759. 

Judgment: Affirmed. 

Vincent M. Niepsuj, pro se, 400 West Ave., Suite A 1, Buffalo, NY 14224 (PlaintiffAppellant). 

Sherri Bevan Walsh, Prosecuting Attorney, and Heaven Dimartino, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, Summit County Safety Building, 53 University Ave., 6th Floor, 

Akron, OH 44308 (For Defendant-Appellee Tracy Stoner). 

Brian M. Spiess, Montgomery, Rennie & Johnson, 36 East Seventh Street, Suite 2100, 

Cincinnati, OH 45202; Kimberly Riley, Montgomery, Rennie & Johnson, 14701 Detroit 

Avenue, Suite 555, Cleveland, OH 44107 (For Defendants-Appellees John P. Quinn 

and Carol J. Dezso).

TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Vincent M. Niepsuj, appeals the judgment of the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the motions to dismiss his amended 
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complaint filed by appellees, Magistrate Tracy Stoner, Judge John Quinn, and Judge 

Carol Dezso. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the court below. 

{¶2} On October 20, 2014, appellant filed a complaint against Magistrate 

Stoner. On November 21, 2014, appellant filed an amended complaint, adding Judge 

Quinn and Judge Dezso as defendants. The amended complaint alleged violations of 

42 U.S.C. §1983, R.C. 2305.09(D), and R.C. 2305.10, stating appellees “are individually 

responsible for compensatory and punitive reparations under the above captioned * * * 

laws within a companion underlying context of legal fraud and intentional 

misrepresentation.” 

{¶3} Appellees filed motions to dismiss appellant’s amended complaint: 

Magistrate Stoner filed individually, and Judge Quinn and Judge Dezso filed jointly. On 

February 23, 2015, the trial court issued a judgment entry granting the motions to 

dismiss, stating: “(1) plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead a claim against the [defendants,] 

(2) plaintiff’s claims against the judges may not be raised in a collateral action seeking 

to alter domestic court proceedings, and (3) the [defendants] are absolutely immune 

from plaintiff’s claims for damages.” 

{¶4} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from this entry and raises four 

assignments of error: 

[1.] The Trial Court erred in granting dismissal and abused its 

discretion by not considering—in fact ignoring—that Magistrate 

Stoner was not a bona fide magistrate at the time of the April 13, 

2011 CPO ‘full evidentiary hearing’ in the Domestic Relations 

Court, as she was not sworn in per ORC 3.21 and ORC 3.22. 

[2.] The Trial Court erred in granting dismissal and abused its 

discretion by not entertaining a jurisdictional consideration of 

whether any Court officer has any qualifications or authority to 

diagnose what is essentially a mental illness (trauma) particularly 
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without observing the persons deemed to be so afflicted, and 

particularly in what seems to be quasi-criminal Civil Protection 

Order Proceeding enveloping the high burden of PROOF criminal 

statute RC 2903.211. 

[3.] The Trial Court erred in granting dismissal and abused its 

discretion in not considering the Claim against Appellee Stoner in 

terms of any theory of Fraud or Negligent Misrepresentation. 

[4.] The Trial Court erred in granting dismissal and abused its 

discretion in supporting the Appellees’/Defendants’ contention that 

Appellant’s cure lay in the appeal process, alone, particularly when 

the Appellate Court ruled in CA 26015 (on December 4, 2012) that 

Appellee Dezso didn’t have jurisdiction to rule (October 19, 2012) 

on Appellant’s (June 10, 13 2011) Motion to Vacate in Summit 

County case DR 2011-04-0968. 

{¶5} An appellant carries the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error on 

appeal. Snype v. Cost, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2012-P-0001, 2012-Ohio-3892, ¶6, citing 

State ex rel. Fulton v. Halliday, 142 Ohio St. 548, 549 (1944) and App.R. 9. An 

appellant’s brief must include “[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant 

with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in 

support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 

record on which appellant relies.” App.R. 16(A)(7). 

{¶6} Pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2), “[t]he court may disregard an assignment of 

error presented for review if the party raising it fails to identify in the record the error on 

which the assignment of error is based or fails to argue the assignment separately in the 

brief, as required under App.R. 16(A).” See also Harris v. Nome, 9th Dist. Summit No. 

21071, 2002-Ohio-6994; Tally v. Patrick, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2008-T-0072, 2009-

Ohio-1831. “It is not the obligation of an appellate court to search for authority to 

support an appellant’s argument as to an alleged error.” Harris, supra, ¶15, citing 

Kremer v. Cox, 114 Ohio App.3d 41, 60 (9th Dist.1996). If there is an argument that 
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can support an appellant’s assignments of error, “‘it is not this court’s duty to root it out.’” 

Id., quoting Cardone v. Cardone, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 18349 & 18673, 1998 Ohio 

App. LEXIS 2028 (May 6, 1998). 

{¶7} In his brief on appeal, appellant’s assignments of error are largely 

indecipherable, and he has not cited to any portion of the record at hand to support his 

assigned errors. Further, appellant does not rely on any relevant legal authority; rather, 

he supports his disjointed arguments with emotionally charged annotations of trial court 

proceedings held not only in this action, but in many others within the last fifteen years, 

and with exhibits that were not before the trial court. We are therefore permitted, under 

App.R. 12(A)(2), to disregard appellant’s assignments of error. 

{¶8} At oral argument, appellant acknowledged that he really has no claim 

against Judge Quinn and Judge Dezso. Therefore, his continued pursuit of litigation 

against them does not appear to be in good faith. Appellant indicated his primary 

complaint is against Magistrate Stoner due to some alleged defect in the administration 

of her oath. 

{¶9} When a trial court is presented with a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, 

“[t]he factual allegations of the complaint and items properly incorporated therein must 

be accepted as true.” Vail v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 279, 280 

(1995) (citations omitted). We review a trial court’s ruling on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion 

de novo. Perrysburg Twp. v. City of Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, ¶5. 

Therefore, our scrutiny is limited to the “four corners” of appellant’s amended complaint 

and any items properly incorporated therein. 
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{¶10} Initially, we note that appellant filed multiple exhibits with this court, stating 

“the following exhibits were brought to the attention of the [Domestic Relations] Court.” 

Not only are these exhibits irrelevant to the proceedings at hand, they were also not 

incorporated into appellant’s amended complaint. We are therefore not permitted to 

consider these exhibits. 

{¶11} Further, appellant does not argue or otherwise establish how a defect in 

the administration of Magistrate Stoner’s oath would establish a cause of action in his 

favor. In fact, the law appellant does cite actually supports the magistrate. R.C. 3.22 

states, in pertinent part: “Each person chosen or appointed to an office under the 

constitution or laws of this state, and each deputy or clerk of such officer, shall take an 

oath of office before entering upon the discharge of his duties. The failure to take such 

oath shall not affect his liability * * *.” Therefore, accepting as true appellant’s allegation 

that there was a defect in the administration of the oath, Magistrate Stoner does not 

lose immunity and is not liable to appellant for any such failure. In addition, appellant 

does not allege any defect with Magistrate Stoner’s appointment under Civ.R. 53(A). As 

a result, there is no set of facts consistent with appellant’s amended complaint that 

would allow him to recover. See Huffman v. Willoughby, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2007-L040, 2007-Ohio-7120, ¶18. 

{¶12} Pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2) and the opinion of this court, appellant’s 

assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County Court of 

Common Pleas is affirmed. 

{¶13} We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the 

Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into 
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execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to 

App.R. 27. 

{¶14} Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the 

journal entry of judgment, and it shall be stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals 

at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the 

Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties 

and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

{¶15} Costs taxed to appellant. 

_____________________________________ 

 PRESIDING JUDGE TIMOTHY P. CANNON 

 Eleventh Appellate District, 

 Sitting by Assignment. 

 

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J., 

Eleventh Appellate District, 

Sitting by Assignment, 

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., 

Eleventh Appellate District, 

Sitting by Assignment, 

concur.