1 

Filed 4/16/15 In re V.V. CA4/2 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION TWO 

In re V.V., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

N.V., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 E061985 

 (Super.Ct.No. SWJ1300364) 

 OPINION 

 APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John M. Monterosso, 

Judge. Affirmed. 

 Diana W. Prince, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2 

Defendant and appellant N.V. (mother) is the biological mother of V.V., the child 

who is the subject of this dependency proceeding. She appeals from the juvenile court’s 

orders denying her petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 388, and 

terminating her parental rights with respect to the child pursuant to section 366.26. She 

contends the court should have granted her further reunification services and authorized 

liberalized visitation, instead of terminating her parental rights and establishing a 

permanent plan of adoption for the child. We affirm. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

 On June 4, 2013, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services 

(DPSS) filed a dependency petition with respect to the newborn girl V.V. Mother had 

received no prenatal care, the child was born at 35 weeks’ gestation, and both mother and 

child tested positive for amphetamines. The father of the child was unknown; mother 

declined to identify him to the social worker. Mother reported to the social worker that 

she was currently “staying at a friend’s house because she lost her home.” Mother had 

one other child, a daughter who was staying with a maternal cousin. Mother indicated 

that she was unemployed, and planned to get money from unemployment and relatives to 

support her and the child. 

 1 All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code 

unless otherwise noted. 

2 We here summarize only those facts necessary for context, and those directly 

relevant to mother’s claims of error. An exhaustive factual and procedural history is 

unnecessary to the disposition of the matter. 
3 

On June 5, 2013, the juvenile court detained the child, and on August 8, 2013, it 

sustained the petition, finding that she came within section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure 

to protect) and (g) (no provision for support). Despite the recommendation from DPSS 

that mother be denied reunification services, the court ordered services to be provided, 

finding that to do so would be in the best interest of the child. 

On October 8, 2013, the child was placed with her maternal aunt. The aunt had 

begun visiting the child in July 2013, prior to placement. DPSS reported to the court in 

January 2014 that the child was doing well in the aunt’s home, and was “truly attached to 

her caretaker and the rest of the family,” which also included three older cousins who 

“surrounded [her] with love.” 

In the meantime, mother failed to participate in the reunification services offered 

to her. In January 2014, DPSS reported that mother had been referred to individual 

therapy, parent education, and substance abuse treatment, but had not followed up on any 

of those referrals. She was referred to drug testing, but failed to show up. The court had 

ordered visitation to occur twice a week; mother had not visited with the child even a 

single time. 

In an addendum report filed February 26, 2014, DPSS reported that mother had 

called the social worker on February 10, 2014, interested in obtaining new referrals and 

visiting with the child. On February 20, 2014, after mother had a clean drug test, a visit 

between mother and child was arranged. Mother interacted well with the child during the 

visit, but the social worker observed that there was no bond between mother and 

daughter, because of the lack of previous visitation. 
4 

On March 6, 2014, the court terminated mother’s reunification services, and set a 

section 366.26 hearing. Mother’s visitation was reduced to one supervised visit per 

month, with additional visitation authorized. 

On March 12, 2014, mother filed a notice of intent to file writ petition. The 

petition was dismissed, however, pursuant to a withdrawal filed on March 24, 2014. 

On May 12, 2014, mother filed a section 388 petition, requesting that the court 

reinstate reunification services and authorize liberalized visitation. The changed 

circumstances cited as the basis of the petition are a clean hair follicle drug test on 

March 5, 2014, mother’s subsequent entry into and completion of a 45-day inpatient drug 

treatment program, and the circumstance that she had “established a stable 

residence . . . .” Mother also had begun visiting with the child as permitted by the court’s 

orders, and she believed that they had “established a nurturing and loving bond.” The 

court set the matter for a hearing. 

In a section 366.26 report filed June 5, 2014, and again in an addendum report 

filed June 23, 2014, DPSS recommended that the parental rights of mother and the 

unknown father or fathers of the child be terminated, and that the child remain in the care 

of the maternal aunt, who was now a prospective adoptive parent. DPSS acknowledged 

that mother’s visits with the child had gone well; she had visited with the child twice a 

week from February 20, 2014, until March 6, 2014, and monthly thereafter until June 12, 

2014, when visitation was increased to twice monthly, in accordance with the court’s 

orders. Mother’s older daughter, as well as the older daughter’s caretaker, a maternal 

cousin, also participated in the visits in a positive manner. 
5 

Nevertheless, the social worker observed that the child had “no bond” to mother, 

despite mother’s recent efforts to build one, and credited the circumstance that visits with 

mother had gone well to the child “being a happy and stable baby while being cared for 

by [mother’s] sister.” The lack of any visitation by mother in the first eight months of the 

child’s life, followed by the limited visitation allowed by the court thereafter, left simply 

“not enough time to truly establish a bond with a child that is nearing one year old.” In 

contrast, the child was “very attached and bonded” to her current caretaker and 

prospective adoptive parent, her maternal aunt, who had provided “the only home that 

[the child] knows[,] a home that has provided for all of her needs since she was four 

months old . . . .” Further, though mother now had a stable residence, she was still 

without a job—her only source of income was food stamps—and she was being 

supported by other family members. DPSS also noted that the maternal aunt had 

expressed willingness to continue visitations between the child and her older sibling. 

Mother’s section 388 petition was heard on September 15, 2014. Mother’s 

testimony was presented, pursuant to stipulation, in the form of a letter to the court, dated 

June 19, 2014. Among other things, the letter states that mother had been homeless until 

February 2014, but since then had been sober and living in a stable residence, with the 

assistance of her cousin (the older daughter’s caretaker). Mother had completed an 

inpatient rehabilitation program, and continued attending outpatient counseling weekly, 

as well as church twice weekly. She had attended every scheduled visit with the child 

since February 2014, and expressed hope that she would be able to reunite permanently 

with both her daughters in the future. 
6 

The court found mother had established changed circumstances, given her 

“remarkable turnaround,” but decided the requested change of order would not be in the 

child’s best interest, and denied mother’s section 388 petition on that basis. The court 

then proceeded to section 366.26 matters, terminating parental rights and setting adoption 

as the child’s permanent plan. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

 “Under section 388, a person with an interest in a dependent child may petition the 

court to change, modify, or set aside a previous court order. The petitioning party has the 

burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is a change of 

circumstances or new evidence, and the proposed modification is in the child’s best 

interest. [Citations.]” (In re Daniel C. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445.) “In 

determining whether the petition makes the necessary showing, the court may consider 

the entire factual and procedural history of the case. [Citation.]” (In re Justice P. (2004) 

123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189.) Importantly, given the circumstances of this case, “[a]fter the 

termination of reunification services, the parents’ interest in the care, custody and 

companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point, ‘the focus 

shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability’ [citation], and in fact, there 

is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interest of the child. 

[Citation.] A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the 

proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before 
7 

it, that is, the best interest of the child.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317. 

(Stephanie M.).) 

 “The grant or denial of a section 388 petition is committed to the sound discretion 

of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is 

clearly established. [Citation.]” (In re Shirley K. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 65, 71.) 

“‘“The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the 

bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the 

facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial 

court.”’ [Citation.]” (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319.) 

B. Analysis 

 This appeal turns on whether mother has shown that the juvenile court abused its 

discretion by determining the best interest of the child would not be served by granting 

mother’s requested modification of its prior orders.3 Because the trial court’s decision 

did not exceed the bounds of reason, we find no abuse of discretion. 

As noted, mother’s burden on the second prong of the section 388 analysis was to 

show that the child’s best interests, and in particular the need of the child for permanency 

and stability, would be served by the requested change. (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th 

at p. 317.) Her petition in essence presented the court with two basic options: (1) deny 

any further reunification services and terminate mother’s parental rights, freeing the child 

 3 The trial court found, and DPS has not contested on appeal, that mother showed 

a genuine change of circumstances. We therefore need not discuss that portion of the 

section 388 analysis further. 
8 

for likely adoption by the only parent she had ever known, with whom she had developed 

a strong mutual attachment, and who was prepared to provide her a permanent, stable and 

loving home; or (2) delay adoption in favor of further reunification services for mother 

who (a) only recently had obtained stable housing for herself, (b) who continued to have 

no independent means of supporting herself or any of her children, (c) whose sobriety, 

while commendable, remained a relatively new phenomenon, and (d) to whom the child 

could not yet have developed a bond going beyond that of a friendly visitor, because of 

mother’s complete absence from the first part of her life, and only occasional visits 

thereafter. To say the least, the trial court’s conclusion that the first option would better 

serve the child’s need for permanency and stability did not exceed the bounds of reason. 

Mother emphasizes on appeal the factors listed in In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 

Cal.App.4th 519 (Kimberly F.), which include “(1) the seriousness of the problem which 

led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the 

strength of the relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent and 

caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or 

ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been.” (Id. at p. 532.) These factors, 

however, do not account for the need of the child for permanency and stability 

emphasized in Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317. (See In re J.C. (2014) 226 

Cal.App.4th 503, 527 [declining to apply Kimberly F. factors on this basis].) Even 

accepting mother’s application of the Kimberly F. factors—and there is room for 

argument with respect to her analysis—she fails to show that the trial court abused its 

discretion in determining the child’s best interests. She points to nothing in the record, 
9 

and upon review we discern nothing in the record, compelling the conclusion that the 

child’s need for permanency and stability would be furthered by her proposed 

modification. 

 Mother is to be commended for her efforts to improve her life. We express our 

hope that by continuing to do so, she will eventually be able to have a healthy 

relationship of some sort—even if not a parental relationship—with the child, given that 

the prospective adoptive parent is the child’s maternal aunt. Nevertheless, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion when it concluded mother had not shown the child’s best 

interests would be served by further delaying permanency and stability in favor of 

rewarding mother for her recent hard work and efforts to reunify. 

III. DISPOSITION 

 The orders appealed from are affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 HOLLENHORST 

 Acting P. J. 

We concur: 

 KING 

 J. 

 MILLER 

 J.