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TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 

State of California
 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN
 

Attorney General
 

OPINION : 

: No. 94-1208 

of : 

: May 30, 1995 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN :
 

Attorney General :
 

:
 

MAXINE P. CUTLER :
 

Deputy Attorney General :
 

:
 

THE HONORABLE FRED AGUIAR, MEMBER OF THE CALIFORNIA 

ASSEMBLY, has requested an opinion on the following questions: 

1. May law enforcement officers be compensated under the victims of crime program 

for injuries sustained while performing official duties? 

2. If law enforcement officers may be compensated under the victims of crime 

program, are their claims to be treated differently from the claims of other victims? 

CONCLUSIONS 

1. Law enforcement officers may be compensated under the victims of crime program 

for injuries sustained while performing official duties. 

2. Under the victims of crime program, the claims of law enforcement officers are not 

to be treated differently from the claims of other victims. 

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ANALYSIS
 

The California Victims of Crime Act (Gov. Code, '' 13959-13969.3; "Act")1 

was 

enacted in part to provide monetary assistance when residents of California suffer injury or death as a 

direct result of criminal conduct. (' 13960, subd. (a).) The program is administered by the State 

Board of Control ("Board"), which is directed to approve compensation applications "if a 

preponderance of the evidence shows that as a direct result of the crime, the victim or a derivative 

victim incurred an injury which resulted in a pecuniary loss." (' 13964.)2 Claims are paid from a 

restitution fund containing fines assessed against criminal defendants. (' 13969; see 77 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 180, 181, fn. 2 (1994).) The two questions presented for resolution concern 

applications for compensation filed with the Board by law enforcement officers. 

1. Eligibility of Law Enforcement Officers 

We are first asked whether law enforcement officers injured while performing official 

duties3 may receive benefits under the Act for injuries sustained. We conclude that they may recover 

for their pecuniary loss in such circumstances. 

In analyzing this question, we may rely upon several principles of statutory 

interpretation. "In construing a statute, our principal task is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature." 

(Yoshisato v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 978, 989.) "We do so by first turning to the words 

themselves, giving them their ordinary meaning. [Citations.]" (People v. Broussard (1993) 5 Cal.4th 

1067, 1071.) "`[W]hen statutory language is . . . clear and unambiguous there is no need for 

construction . . . .'" (Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 73.) A "`court has no power to rewrite the 

statute so as to make it conform to a presumed intention which is not expressed' . . . [also,] [t]he sweep 

of a statute should not be enlarged by insertion of language which the Legislature has overtly left out 

. . . ." (People v. Branno (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 971, 977; see also Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court 

(1991) 53 Cal.3d 1082, 1097.) "When the Legislature `has employed a term or phrase in one place and 

excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.' . . ." (Pasadena Police Officers Assn. 

v. City of Pasadena (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564, 576.) 

The declared purposes of the Act are stated in section 13959, which provides: 

"It is in the public interest to assist residents of the State of California in 

obtaining restitution for the pecuniary losses they suffer as a direct result of criminal 

1

All references hereafter to the Government Code are by section number only. 

2

As defined in the Act (' 13960, subd. (a)(2)), a "derivative victim" is a member of the victim's family or financially 

dependant upon the victim. 

3

With respect to injuries sustained by an officer while not acting within the scope of his or her employment, it is 

conceded that the officer would be eligible for compensation under the terms of the program. 

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acts. This article shall govern the procedure by which crime victims may obtain 

restitution through compensation from the Restitution Fund." 

The term "victim" for purposes of the Act is defined in section 13960, subdivision (a)(1) as follows: 

"`Victim' means a resident of the State of California, a member of the military 

stationed in California, or a family member living with a member of the military 

stationed in California who sustains injury or death as a direct result of a crime."4 

Section 13960.2, subdivision (a) states: 

"Notwithstanding Section 13960, for purposes of this article, `victim` does not 

include any person who is convicted of a felony until that person has been discharged 

from probation or has been released from a correctional institution and has been 

discharged from parole, if any. . . ." 

Section 13960.5 additionally provides: 

"(a) Notwithstanding Section 13960, `victim' shall also include nonresidents 

of this state who suffer injury or death as a direct result of crimes occurring within the 

state. 

"(b) This section shall be operative only during those time periods during 

which the board determines that federal funds are available to the state for the 

compensation of victims of crime." 

Section 13960 generally defines a "victim" for purposes of the Act as one who is a 

California resident. We find the language of the statute to be clear and unambiguous with respect to its 

application to law enforcement officers. It does not exclude such officers, while certain other residents 

are specifically excluded by the Legislature. There is nothing illogical or unreasonable in finding that 

a law enforcement officer may sustain "injury or death as a direct result of a crime" while performing 

official duties. 

In contrast to the provisions of the Act, the Legislature has specifically excluded law 

enforcement officers from the compensation provisions of a related statutory scheme. Under the Good 

Samaritan Act ('' 13970-13974.1), persons may be compensated for injury, death, or damage sustained 

while preventing the commission of a crime, apprehending criminals, or rescuing a person in danger, 

when not compensated under the provisions of the Act. (' 13970.) Expressly excluded from this 

compensation program are: "a peace officer, fireman, lifeguard, or person whose employment includes 

the duty to protect the public safety acting within the course and scope of such employment." ('

4

The definition of "victim" contained in section 13960 does not control the Legislature's use of the term in section 13967, 

subdivision (c), concerning the payment of restitution by a criminal defendant who has been denied probation. (People v. 

Crow (1993) 6 Cal.4th 952, 560; People v. Broussard, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 1072.) 

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13971.) Had the Legislature intended to exclude law enforcement officers from the compensation 

provisions of the Act, it easily could have done so as it did in similar legislation.5 

We reached the same conclusion in an informal letter opinion issued in 1974 

(Cal.Atty.Gen., Indexed Letter, No. 74-34 (March 4, 1974)). We stated: 

"Government Code section 13961 provides as follows: 

"`A victim of a crime as used in this chapter is any person who sustains injury 

to himself, or pecuniary loss as a result of physical injury or death of another person on 

whom he is financially dependent, and which is the consequence of an act considered to 

be a public offense, as defined by Penal Code section 15, whether the actor is 

criminally liable or not.' (Emphasis added.) 

"It is clear from the language of Government Code section 13961, supra, that 

the Legislature did not intend to exclude law enforcement personnel or their financial 

dependents from the purview of the victim program, as the statute by its terms applies 

to any person who is a victim of a crime. A basic precept of statutory construction is 

that if the words of a statute are clear, the tribunal charged with interpreting the statute 

may not alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the 

statute or from its legislative history. 45 Cal.Jur.2d section 105, p. 619; People v. 

Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175. 

"It should be noted that the definition of victim has been reenacted substantially 

without change in section 13960 of S.B. 149 which supersedes the present statute 

(effective July 1, 1974). Since neither the present act or its successor has placed any 

qualification upon the definition of a victim within the meaning of the act, it must be 

conclusively presumed that the Legislature intended that no such qualification should 

be grafted onto the statute by judicial or quasi-judicial interpretation. 

"It should be noted also that the companion act to the Victim of Violent Crime 

Act, the `Good Samaritan Act' (Government Code section 13970 et seq.), specifically 

excludes from eligibility law enforcement personnel and `other persons whose 

employment includes the duty to protect the public safety' (Government Code section 

13971). The Legislature was therefore aware of the special consideration associated 

with the inclusion of law enforcement officers as potential claimants under the two acts, 

and chose to exclude them from participation in the Good Samaritan Program but not in 

the Victim of Violent Crime Program. It is apparent, therefore, that law enforcement 

officers and their families are eligible to receive benefits under the Victim Program." 

(Fn. omitted.) 

5

Although the chapter heading for the Act (article 1) and Good Samaritan Act (article 2) is denominated "Indemnification 

of Private Citizens," the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that "`[t]itle or chapter headings are unofficial and do not alter 

the explicit scope, meaning, or intent of a statute. [Citations.]'" (People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 293-294.) 

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In the past 20 years, the Legislature has amended the statute defining the term "victim" on numerous 

occasions and has continued to use broad language that does not exclude law enforcement officers. 

(See, e.g., Stats. 1985, ch. 1130, ' 4; Stats. 1987, ch. 1357, ' 2; Stats. 1989, ch. 515, ' 1; Stats. 1992, 

ch. 682, ' 1; Stats. 1994, ch. 1242, ' 1.) 

In answer to the first question, therefore, we conclude that law enforcement officers 

may be compensated under the victims of crime program for injuries sustained while performing 

official duties.6 

2. Amount of Compensation For Law Enforcement Officers 

The second question presented concerns whether the compensation application of a law 

enforcement officer is to be treated differently under the Act from the applications of other victims. 

We conclude that all applications are to be treated the same by the Board. 

Under the terms of the Act, a victim suffers a pecuniary loss for which compensation is 

to be granted when he or she has suffered an actual out-of-pocket expense as a direct result of a crime 

for which he or she will not be compensated from any other source. (County of Alameda v. State 

Board of Control (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1107; Burnsed v. State Bd. of Control (1987) 189 

Cal.App.3d 213, 217.) "Pecuniary loss" includes loss of income or support and medically related 

expenses, including in-patient and out-patient mental health counseling expenses necessary as a direct 

result of the crime. (' 13960, subd. (d).) 

Significantly, the restitution fund administered by the Board is a source of last resort 

and every other collateral source of compensation must be exhausted before a crime victim is 

considered to have suffered a pecuniary loss. (County of Alameda v. State Board of Control, supra, 14 

Cal.App.4th at 1107, 1111; see Fierro v. State Bd. of Control (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 735, 740.) 

Collateral benefits received from other sources include, but are not limited to, all forms of private and 

public insurance (medical, disability, wage loss, liability and casualty); all forms of public and private 

assistance (Medi-Cal, social security, state disability, worker's compensation, and Medicare); and any 

amounts of restitution paid directly by the criminal defendant. (County of Alameda v. State Board of 

Control, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at 1107.) 

It may well be that a law enforcement officer, just as any other claimant, may obtain 

"collateral benefits" for the injuries sustained. (See, e.g., Lab. Code, ' 4850.) To the extent that law 

enforcement officers receive benefits reimbursing them for their out-of-pocket expenses, any benefits 

available from the Board would be reduced. (See Burnsed v. State Board of Control, supra, 189 

Cal.App.3d at 219.) 

6

Since we conclude that law enforcement officers are eligible under the program, the "derivative victims" of such officers 

would also be eligible. 

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We reached the same conclusion in our 1974 informal opinion (Cal.Atty.Gen., Indexed 

Letter, No. 74-34, supra) regarding the Board's treatment of claims submitted by law enforcement 

officers. We stated: 

"Claims filed pursuant to Government Code section 13960 et seq. by law 

enforcement officers or their financial dependents should be treated in the same manner 

as claims by private citizens because the provisions of the statute relating to 

subrogation of rights provide an adequate safeguard against double recovery by the 

claimant whether or not he is a law enforcement officer. Government Code section 

13963 provides in pertinent part: 

"`A claim shall be reduced to the extent that the claimant has received 

indemnification from any other source. If a claim is paid under this chapter the state 

shall be subrogated to the rights of the claimant to who such claim was paid against any 

person causing the damage or injury for which payment was made to the extent of the 

payment of the claim. The state may recover the amount of the claim paid in a 

separate action, or may intervene in an action brought by the claimant.' 

"Law enforcement officers injured in the course and scope of their employment 

are covered by the Workmen's Compensation provisions of the Labor Code. If the 

Workmen's Compensation award is reduced to a final settlement at the time the claim is 

heard by the State Board of Control, the Board may, as has been its practice, adjust the 

award made pursuant to the victim program accordingly. If, on the other hand, no final 

disposition has been achieved in the Workmen's Compensation proceeding, the Board 

may make its award contingent on claimant's agreement to a lien on the expected 

Workmen's Compensation benefits. Similarly, if a civil action against the perpetrator 

of the crime or some third party is contemplated, a lien agreement may be obtained 

pursuant to Government Code section 13963 and filed with the appropriate court. 

"This in fact has been the practice of the Board in claims brought by private 

citizens who are not law enforcement officers that have Workmen's Compensation or 

civil actions pending as a result of the injury they sustained. It has proven to be an 

adequate assurance against double recovery by the private claimant and there is nothing 

to indicate that this would not be true of the claimant who is a law enforcement officer 

as well." 

In answer to the second question, therefore, we conclude that under the victims of 

crime program the claims of law enforcement officers (and persons dependent upon them for support) 

are not to be treated differently from the claims of other victims. 

* * * * * 

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