PRESENT: Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, McClanahan, and 

Powell, JJ., and Koontz, S.J. 

TONY WILLIAMS 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 141046 CHIEF JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 

 April 16, 2015 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 

erred by "inferring" that the trial court took judicial notice 

that the situs of an offense was within its territorial 

jurisdiction. We also consider under what circumstances an 

appellate court may properly take judicial notice of a fact not 

clearly noticed in the trial court. Finally, we decide whether 

the evidence was sufficient to prove venue in this case. 

I. Facts and Proceedings 

 The appellant, Tony Williams ("Williams"), was tried in 

the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk ("trial court") and 

convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine 

(third offense) in violation of Code § 18.2-248. At trial, 

Norfolk Police Investigator Issoufou Boubacar ("Investigator 

Boubacar") testified that he was working as an undercover 

narcotics officer on the night of March 1, 2013, when he came 

into contact with Williams in the 1700 block of O’Keefe Street, 

which he testified is located in the City of Norfolk. 
2

Investigator Boubacar told Williams he wanted to buy "hard"1

cocaine, and Williams "agreed to assist . . . in buying [the] 

crack cocaine." 

 Williams got into Investigator Boubacar's vehicle and 

instructed him "to drive to the 800-block of Fremont Street." 

Investigator Boubacar testified that the two men "drove over 

there." Once they arrived, Investigator Boubacar told Williams 

he wanted to buy 20 dollars' worth of cocaine and gave Williams 

20 dollars of "Norfolk City recorded money." 

 Investigator Boubacar watched Williams get out of the 

vehicle and meet another man to make the purchase. Williams 

and the other individual were approximately 10 to 15 feet away 

from Investigator Boubacar during the transaction. When 

Williams returned to the vehicle, he handed Investigator 

Boubacar "two plastic [bags] containing [an] off-white hard 

substance," which later testing confirmed to be approximately 

0.2 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance. 

Williams then instructed Investigator Boubacar to return to the 

1700 block of O'Keefe Street. When Investigator Boubacar and 

Williams returned to that location, an arrest team took 

Williams into custody. 

 1

 Testimony explained that "hard" is a street name for 

crack cocaine. 
3

 At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's evidence, Williams 

moved to strike on two grounds: (1) that the Commonwealth 

failed to present sufficient evidence to establish chain of 

custody2 and (2) that the Commonwealth failed to prove venue.3 

Williams argued that the Commonwealth failed to establish venue 

because, while Investigator Boubacar testified that the initial 

place of meeting – the 1700 block of O'Keefe Street – was in 

Norfolk, the Commonwealth never proved that the 800 block of 

Fremont Street was also located within the corporate limits of 

the City of Norfolk. Williams maintains that the evidence 

established that all the elements of the offense were committed 

in the 800 block of Fremont Street, therefore, the evidence was 

insufficient to prove venue. 

 The Commonwealth responded by arguing that Investigator 

Boubacar's testimony was sufficient for the trial court to take 

judicial notice of venue, stating, "I think it's reasonable for 

the Court to take judicial notice that [Investigator Boubacar 

and Williams] were still within the City of Norfolk" when the 

drug transaction took place because Investigator Boubacar had 

testified "to initially coming into contact with the defendant 

 2

 This question is not before the Court. 

3

 While want of venue is properly raised by a motion to 

dismiss the indictment, we have impliedly upheld the use of a 

motion to strike the evidence to challenge venue. See Randall 

v. Commonwealth, 183 Va. 182, 185, 31 S.E.2d 571, 572 (1944). 

In the present case, the Commonwealth has not challenged the 

procedural mechanism used in raising this issue. 
4

in the City of Norfolk on O'Keefe Street, and . . . to the 

relatively short drive to Fremont Street." The trial court 

overruled both motions to strike at the conclusion of the 

parties' arguments, stating, "I overrule the motions," without 

commenting on judicial notice. 

 Williams presented no evidence and renewed his motions to 

strike, which the trial court again denied. The court 

immediately thereafter found the defendant guilty of the 

offense and ordered a presentence report. On August 16, 2013, 

following presentation of the presentence report, the trial 

court sentenced Williams to ten years' imprisonment, and an 

additional one year suspended conditioned on one year of postrelease supervision. 

 Williams appealed to the Court of Appeals and assigned 

error to the trial court's finding that the Commonwealth 

presented sufficient evidence to establish venue. In a 

published opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed Williams's 

conviction, holding that it could infer that the trial court 

had taken judicial notice of the fact that the 800 block of 

Fremont Street is located within the corporate limits of the 

City of Norfolk and, therefore, the evidence was sufficient to 

prove venue. Williams v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 458, 466-

67, 758 S.E.2d 553, 557 (2014). The Court of Appeals held that 

while the trial court never explicitly stated that it was 
5

taking judicial notice of the fact that the 800 block of 

Fremont Street was in Norfolk, in overruling William's motion 

to strike on venue, the Commonwealth specifically requested the 

trial court to do so and, therefore, it "can be safely 

inferred" that the trial court took judicial notice of that 

fact. Id. at 466, 758 S.E.2d at 557. 

 Williams appealed the judgment of the Court of Appeals to 

this Court, and we awarded an appeal on the following 

assignments of error: 

1. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court 

had taken judicial notice that the situs of the possession 

with intent to distribute was within the City of Norfolk 

and therefore within the territorial jurisdiction of the 

Court. 

2. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court 

had venue over the offense of conviction because the 

evidence of record did not establish a strong presumption 

that the offense was committed within the territorial 

jurisdiction of the trial court. 

II. Analysis 

A. Venue and Judicial Notice 

 The burden is on the Commonwealth to establish venue. 

Ware v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 520, 522, 201 S.E.2d 791, 793 

(1974). A criminal charge cannot be sustained unless the 

evidence furnishes the foundation for a "strong presumption" 

that the offense was committed within the territorial 

jurisdiction of the court. Harding v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 
6

543, 548, 110 S.E. 376, 378 (1922); Butler v. Commonwealth, 81 

Va. 159, 163 (1885). 

 "The taking of judicial notice is generally within the 

discretion of the trial court." Ryan v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 

439, 446, 247 S.E.2d 698, 703 (1978). However, the question 

whether the Court of Appeals erred by inferring that the trial 

court took judicial notice that the situs of the offense was 

within the corporate limits of the City of Norfolk is a mixed 

question of law and fact, which this Court reviews de novo. 

See Commonwealth v. Morris, 281 Va. 70, 76, 705 S.E.2d 503, 505 

(2011)("We review questions of law de novo, including those 

situations where there is a mixed question of law and 

fact")(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 "Judicial notice is a short cut to avoid the necessity for 

the formal introduction of evidence in certain cases where 

there is no need for such evidence." Williams v. Commonwealth, 

190 Va. 280, 291, 56 S.E.2d 537, 542 (1949). Whether a trial 

court will exercise its discretion to take judicial notice of a 

fact "depends partly on the nature of the subject, the issue, 

the apparent justice of the case, partly on the information of 

the court and the means of information at hand, and partly on 

the judicial disposition." Randall v. Commonwealth, 183 Va. 

182, 186, 31 S.E.2d 571, 572 (1944). 
7

 It is well-established that a trial court may take 

"judicial notice of geographical facts that are matters of 

common knowledge, or shown by maps in common use." McClain v. 

Commonwealth, 189 Va. 847, 853, 55 S.E.2d 49, 52 (1949). Such 

notice may supplement other facts proved to establish venue, or 

in some circumstances, "the judge may, by judicial notice, 

dispense with proof" of venue. See Randall, 183 Va. at 188, 31 

S.E.2d at 573 (holding that a trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in taking judicial notice of the fact that the halfway house referred to in evidence was located in York County, 

because the trial court's "certificate [was] a statement that 

its location in that county was a matter of wide public 

knowledge" within the limits of that court's territorial 

jurisdiction). 

i. Taking Judicial Notice in Trial Court 

 In Keesee v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 174, 217 S.E.2d 808 

(1975), the evidence at trial proved that all of the offenses 

took place at "'Hill's Department Store' and on its adjacent 

parking lot" but no evidence was offered to prove that "Hill's 

Department Store" was located in the City of Lynchburg. 216 

Va. at 175, 217 S.E.2d at 809-10. We recognized that 

geographical facts that are matters of common knowledge in a 

jurisdiction can be judicially noticed, but stated that in this 

case "the record fail[ed] to show that the trial court took 
8

judicial notice of the location of the store property." Id. at 

175, 217 S.E.2d at 810. Because the record failed to show that 

judicial notice of the store's location had been taken by the 

trial court, the evidence was insufficient to establish venue, 

and the conviction was reversed and remanded. Id. 

 As the Court of Appeals has correctly observed, Keesee

stands for the proposition that 

[while] a trial court need not intone the words 

"judicial notice" in order to notice a fact, the 

evidence, the arguments of the parties and the 

statements of the trial court must demonstrate 

clearly that the trial court has taken judicial 

notice of the fact before a party may rely upon such 

notice on appeal. 

Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 197, 201, 597 S.E.2d 210, 

212 (2004)(quoting Dillard v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 340, 

346-47, 504 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998)); see also Sutherland v. 

Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 378, 383, 368 S.E.2d 295, 298 (1988). 

 Turning to the record in this case, the Commonwealth 

argued to the trial court: 

Investigator Boubacar did testify initially to coming 

into contact with the defendant in the City of 

Norfolk on O'Keefe Street, and I believe testified to 

the relatively short drive to Fremont Street. Based 

on that, Your Honor, I think it's reasonable for the 

Court to take judicial notice that they were still 

within the City of Norfolk. 

(Emphasis added.) While the Commonwealth asked the trial court 

to take judicial notice "that [Investigator Boubacar and 

Williams] were still in the City of Norfolk" when the offense 
9

occurred, the Commonwealth did not argue that the location of 

the 800 block of Fremont Street was a matter of common 

knowledge, nor did the Commonwealth request that the trial 

court take judicial notice that the address was located within 

the corporate limits of the City of Norfolk by reference to a 

map of common use. The Commonwealth argued that the evidence 

already in the record was sufficient for the trial court to 

find that venue had been established. 

 Because the trial court subsequently denied the motion to 

strike the evidence on venue without commenting on the issue of 

judicial notice, we are unable to discern whether the trial 

court decided to take judicial notice of the location of the 

offense, or whether the trial court simply accepted the 

Commonwealth's sufficiency argument on the issue of venue, 

based upon the evidence adduced from testimony. 

 Additionally, because the trial court did not indicate 

that it was taking judicial notice of the fact that the 800 

block of Fremont Street was within its territorial 

jurisdiction, it deprived Williams of the opportunity to object 

to the trial court's action or dispute the accuracy of any 

"facts" noticed prior to the trial court's ruling on his 

motion. See Va. R. Evid. 2:201(c)(a party is entitled upon 

request "to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of 

taking judicial notice"). Cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
10

v. Powell, 227 Va. 492, 497, 318 S.E.2d 393, 395 (1984)(holding 

that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice sua sponte

of certain facts that were not included in the parties' 

stipulation because "State Farm had no prior opportunity to be 

heard either to dispute the 'facts' or to object to the court's 

action"). Therefore, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred 

in inferring that the trial court had taken judicial notice 

that the situs of the offense was located within its 

territorial jurisdiction. 

ii. Taking Judicial Notice in Appellate Court 

 While we have determined that we cannot hold that the 

trial court took judicial notice that the situs of the offense 

was within the City of Norfolk, that does not end our analysis. 

The Court of Appeals also observed in a footnote, and the 

Commonwealth has argued on appeal to this Court, that an 

appellate court also "has the discretionary power to take 

judicial notice of the official municipal street maps of the 

City of Norfolk." Williams, 63 Va. App. at 466-67 n.6, 758 

S.E.2d at 557 n.6. 

 Rule 2:201(b) states: "Judicial notice may be taken at any 

stage of the proceeding." We have recognized that appellate 

courts may take judicial notice of geographical facts that are 

so well known that they are matters of common knowledge in the 

Commonwealth. See, e.g., Buttery v. Robbins, 177 Va. 368, 374, 
11

14 S.E.2d 544, 546 (1941)(taking judicial notice that the 

"Skyline Drive is in the Shenandoah National Park" because 

"[t]hat is a matter of common knowledge"). However, as we 

stated in Keesee, there is a range of procedural postures in 

which issues arise, and the existence of differing records, and 

hence some geographical facts will not be the subject of 

judicial notice on appeal. See 216 Va. at 175, 217 S.E.2d at 

810 (reversing conviction because the record did not show that 

the location of "Hill Department Store" was a "matter of common 

knowledge susceptible of being judicially noticed"). We have 

also declined to take judicial notice of certain documents when 

they were not relied upon in the trial court. See Commonwealth 

v. Woodward, 249 Va. 21, 23, 452 S.E.2d 656, 657 (1995). 

 The fact that the 800 block of Fremont Street is in the 

City of Norfolk is not a matter of common knowledge susceptible 

of being judicially noticed by this Court. While it is true 

that a street address is a geographical fact that is typically 

ascertainable by reference to a map of common use, no map was 

proffered or referenced in the trial court. In this case we 

will not exercise our discretion to take judicial notice. 

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

 On appeal, we review "whether the evidence, when viewed in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, is sufficient to 
12

support the [trial court's] venue findings." Cheng v. 

Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 36, 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990). 

 Code § 19.2-244 provides that "the prosecution of a 

criminal case shall be had in the county or city in which the 

offense was committed." As noted earlier, the Commonwealth has 

the burden "to prove venue by evidence which is either direct 

or circumstantial." Pollard v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 723, 725, 

261 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1980). Such evidence, when viewed in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, must give rise to a 

"'strong presumption' that the offense was committed within the 

jurisdiction of the court." Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 

798, 802, 651 S.E.2d 637, 639 (2007)(quoting Cheng, 240 Va. at 

36, 393 S.E.2d at 604). 

 "The failure to clearly prove venue is usually due to 

inadvertence, flowing naturally from the familiarity of court, 

counsel, witnesses, and jurors with the locality of the crime"; 

therefore this Court "will generally and properly lay hold of 

and accept as sufficient any evidence in the case, direct or 

otherwise, from which the fact may be reasonably inferred." 

Randall, 183 Va. at 187, 31 S.E.2d at 573 (quoting West v. 

Commonwealth, 125 Va. 747, 750, 99 S.E. 654, 654-55 (1919) and 

Byrd v. Commonwealth, 124 Va. 833, 839, 98 S.E. 632, 634 

(1919)). 
13

 Neither the allegation of venue set forth in the 

indictment, nor the fact that the Norfolk police conducted the 

investigation in this case, standing alone, may support an 

inference that the crime took place within the trial court's 

territorial jurisdiction. See Keesee, 216 Va. at 175, 217 

S.E.2d at 810 ("The mere fact that the local police department 

was involved in the investigation of the crimes and that 

warrants recited proper venue, standing alone as they do here, 

will not suffice."). 

 The Commonwealth failed to present evidence concerning 

whether the 800 block of Fremont Street, where Williams 

possessed and sold the crack cocaine, is located within the 

City of Norfolk. Although the Commonwealth argued to the trial 

court that Investigator Boubacar had "testified to the 

relatively short drive to Fremont Street" from O'Keefe Street, 

the evidence does not support this argument. Investigator 

Boubacar testified that he met Williams in the 1700 block of 

O'Keefe Street, in the City of Norfolk; that he and Williams 

"drove over there," – referring to the 800 block of Fremont 

Street; and that after the transaction was completed they 

returned to the 1700 block of O'Keefe Street, where an arrest 

team took Williams into custody. Williams's signed confession 

introduced into evidence only indicates that he met 

Investigator Boubacar in the 1700 block of O'Keefe Street and 
14

does not mention the 800 block of Fremont Street or whether the 

crime occurred within the City of Norfolk. Nothing in the 

record indicates the distance between the two locations, the 

route of travel, or even the duration of the entire encounter. 

 Even with all reasonable inferences drawn in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth, we hold that this evidence 

was insufficient to create a "strong presumption" that the 

offense was committed in the City of Norfolk. Therefore, the 

Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proof regarding venue 

in this case. 

III. Conclusion 

 The record does not clearly reflect that the trial court 

took judicial notice that the situs of the offense was within 

the corporate limits of the City of Norfolk, and absent such 

judicial notice, the evidence was insufficient to prove venue. 

Therefore, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals. 

 However, "[p]roof of venue . . . is not regarded as 

material, so far as the merits of the prosecution are 

concerned, and so the allegation of venue is not a part of the 

crime." Randall, 183 Va. at 187, 31 S.E.2d at 573. Because 

failure to offer proof establishing proper venue "did not stem 

from evidentiary insufficiency with respect to the guilt or 

innocence of the defendant," Pollard, 220 Va. at 726, 261 
15

S.E.2d at 330, we will remand the case to the Court of Appeals 

with directions that it remand the case to the circuit court 

for a new trial, if the Commonwealth be so advised. 

Reversed and remanded. 

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE McCLANAHAN joins, dissenting. 

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion 

that the Court of Appeals erred by “inferring” that the trial 

court took judicial notice that the situs of the offense was 

within the City of Norfolk. In my opinion, the trial court 

implicitly took judicial notice of venue by overruling 

Williams’ motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence after 

the Commonwealth stated the trial court could and should take 

judicial notice that the 800 block of Fremont Street is located 

within the boundaries of the City of Norfolk. 

As the majority recognizes, the trial court did not need 

to explicitly state it was taking judicial notice of the 

location of Fremont Street. 

“[A] trial court need not intone the words 

‘judicial notice’ in order to notice a 

fact, [however] the evidence, the arguments 

of the parties and the statements of the 

trial court must demonstrate clearly that 

the trial court has taken judicial notice 

of the fact before a party may rely upon 

such notice on appeal.” 
16

Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 197, 201, 597 S.E.2d 210, 

212 (2004) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Dillard v. Commonwealth, 

28 Va. App. 340, 347, 504 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998)). Here the 

evidence, the arguments of counsel, and the statements of the 

trial court all clearly demonstrate that the trial court took 

judicial notice of the location of the 800 block of Fremont 

Street. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals. 

The evidence in this case shows that Norfolk Police 

Investigator Boubacar met Williams on O’Keefe Street in the 

City of Norfolk and arranged the drug deal. The deal itself 

occurred on the 800 block of Fremont Street. Williams was 

indicted in the City of Norfolk. The trial court did not 

question whether the 800 block of Fremont Street was outside of 

the City of Norfolk once Williams raised the venue issue. The 

addition of the street name draws a distinction between 

evidence that is insufficient to support the inference, and 

evidence that is sufficient for that purpose. 

 Indeed, our jurisprudence clearly supports a finding that 

the evidence is sufficient to support an inference when the 

street name is provided, coupled with the often pronounced 

legal principle that 

[a] trial court may take judicial notice of 

those facts that are either (1) so 

“generally known” within the jurisdiction 
17

or (2) so “easily ascertainable” by 

reference to reliable sources that 

reasonably informed people in the community 

would not regard them as reasonably subject 

to dispute. 

Taylor v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 1, 7-8, 502 S.E.2d 113, 

116, (1998) (quoting Ryan v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 439, 445, 

247 S.E.2d 698, 703 (1978)) (citing 2 McCormick on Evidence 

§ 328 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); Charles E. 

Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia, § 19-2 (3d ed. 1988)). 

In West v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 747, 99 S.E. 654 (1919), 

we stated: 

[i]n the case at bar there is no direct 

proof that the crime was committed at 

Petersburg, but the following circumstances 

fully warrant the inference that it did 

take place there: The indictment charged 

that the property was stolen in the city of 

Petersburg, and belonged either to E. A. 

Robertson or to his wife. The case was 

tried at Petersburg, and the witness 

Worrell testified that he was employed as a 

detective with “the local police force,” 

went with Wilkerson, another police 

officer, to investigate the case, found the 

stolen property at the prisoner’s home, 

then went to the home of Mrs. Robertson and 

brought her to the prisoner’s home to 

identify the property. Wilkerson testified 

“that he was employed as a detective with 

the local police department, and went to 

see Mrs. E. A. Robertson in response to a 

telephone call from her advising him that 

certain articles were missing from her 

home, and went with the officer, Worrell, 

to the home of Frances West and found the 

alleged stolen articles there; that he 

remained at her home while Officer Worrell 

went to get Mrs. Robertson to identify the 
18

various stolen articles.” C. E. Perkinson 

testified “that he was employed as a 

detective with the local police department, 

and assisted in the investigation of the 

West case.” E. A. Robertson and wife 

testified that the property was stolen from 

their home on Sycamore street. 

Id. at 750-51, 99 S.E. at 655. From these facts, this Court 

upheld a finding of venue stating, 

[t]he record in this case shows that the 

court, counsel, jurors and witnesses must 

necessarily have been familiar with the 

location of the Robertson home on Sycamore 

street. 

Id. at 752, 99 S.E. at 655. The Court also noted that the 

facts in West “raise[d] a violent presumption that the 

Robertson house was within the local jurisdiction of the court, 

and we do not feel warranted in reversing the judgment upon 

this point.” Id. 

 A review of the evidence in West demonstrates that in 

addition to testimony regarding the location charged in the 

indictment and the fact that police officers from the relevant 

jurisdiction investigated the crime, the only other fact 

related to the issue of venue was a street name. 

Keesee v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 174, 217 S.E.2d 808 

(1975), provides additional support for the proposition that 

evidence of venue set forth in the indictment and evidence that 

the local police department conducted the investigation, 

coupled with a street name and the fact that a trial court may 
19

take judicial notice of facts that are “generally known” or 

“easily ascertainable” are sufficient to establish venue. 

Ryan, 219 Va. at 445, 247 S.E.2d at 703. In finding the facts 

establishing that the local police department investigated the 

crime, the car was towed to the local impound lot, and the 

warrants identified the city and the name of the establishment 

were insufficient, we specifically stated, “[t]he record fails 

to reveal even the street on which the store is located.” 

Keesee, 216 Va. at 175, 217 S.E.2d at 810 (emphasis added). 

The clear implication was that this fact would have made a 

difference to the Court’s decision. 

 Similarly, in Hart v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 726, 109 S.E. 

582 (1921), emphasis was placed upon the fact that the victim 

lived “on a certain road,” was “going along said road from her 

home toward her place of work . . . , and that the point in the 

road at which she was assaulted was on the side of the road 

‘coming to Staunton.’” Id. at 735, 109 S.E. at 584. The Court 

found that “when the facts proved . . . are considered along 

with the fact of which the court will take judicial notice 

. . . it appears that the venue has been proved by the 

Commonwealth beyond any reasonable doubt.” Id. at 739, 109 

S.E. at 586. The Court also noted that 

it is a geographical fact, shown by any map 

in common use, and thus a matter of common 

knowledge, that the city of Staunton is 
20

located within the county of Augusta, and 

is so located therein that the county of 

Augusta surrounds, and, beyond all 

question, extends for a distance of over 

fifteen miles to the west of the corporate 

limits of the city of Staunton. The court 

will, therefore, take judicial notice of 

that fact. 

Id. at 735-36, 109 S.E. at 584-85. Therefore, the evidence 

supports a finding that the trial court took judicial notice of 

venue and properly did so. 

Likewise, in the instant case, the arguments of the 

parties and the statements of the trial court demonstrate that 

the trial court took judicial notice of the fact of venue. At 

the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case, Williams made a 

motion to strike on two bases, venue and chain of custody. In 

response to the venue argument, the Commonwealth made one 

assertion, that the trial court should take judicial notice of 

the location of the 800 block of Fremont Street. With only one 

argument raised regarding venue and one response given, the 

trial court’s response was, “I overrule the motions.” As the 

Court of Appeals found, the only logical conclusion is that the 

trial court, in response to the venue challenge, actually took 

judicial notice that the 800 block of Fremont Street is in 

Norfolk. 

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Powell, 227 

Va. 492, 318 S.E.2d 393 (1984) is inapposite because in that 
21

case, the trial court took judicial notice of certain facts sua 

sponte, thereby depriving the defendant of the opportunity to 

be heard and to object. Id. at 497-98, 318 S.E.2d at 395. 

Here, Williams was heard and indeed raised the issue of venue. 

The Commonwealth’s only response was to ask the trial court to 

take judicial notice of the fact of venue. After overruling 

Williams’ motion, the trial court asked, “Anything else, Mr. 

Pollack?” to which Williams’ counsel responded, “No, Your 

Honor.” Clearly, Williams had an opportunity to be heard, to 

dispute the facts, and to object. 

Therefore, the evidence indicates that the trial court 

took judicial notice of the fact of venue and that based on our 

precedent, it properly did so. See Hart, 131 Va. at 735-36, 

739, 109 S.E. at 584-86; West, 125 Va. at 750-52, 99 S.E. at 

655. I would therefore find that the Court of Appeals did not 

err in affirming the trial court’s judgment and would decline 

to address Williams’ second assignment of error as moot.