alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-50028

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ANGEL RENE HERNANDEZ, also known as Angel Hernandez, also known as 

Angel Renee Hernandez,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:12-CR-538-1

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Angel Rene Hernandez pleaded guilty to 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and was 

sentenced to 144 months in prison. He contends for the first time on appeal 

that the district court erred in assigning criminal history points to two of his 

prior convictions. The Government urges us to enforce the appellate waiver in 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 16, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 14-50028 Document: 00513007815 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/16/2015
No. 14-50028

the plea agreement. Hernandez does not address the appeal waiver in his 

opening brief, and he has not filed a reply brief to respond to the Government’s 

argument. We review the validity of the appeal waiver de novo. See United 

States v. Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 2002). 

Hernandez waived his right to appeal his sentence unless it was the 

result of an upward departure, ineffective assistance of counsel, or 

prosecutorial misconduct. The waiver was knowing and voluntary, as the 

record shows that Hernandez knew of his right to appeal and that he was 

giving up that right in the plea agreement. See United States v. Portillo, 

18 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1994). Because the plain language of the waiver 

provision applies to Hernandez’s challenge to his criminal history category, we 

enforce the waiver. See United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 

2005). Counsel for Hernandez is cautioned that pursuing an appeal contrary 

to a valid waiver is a needless waste of judicial resources that could result in 

sanctions. See United States v. Gaitan, 171 F.3d 222, 223-24 (5th Cir. 1999).

AFFIRMED.

2

 Case: 14-50028 Document: 00513007815 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/16/2015
H. R. 1472 

One Hundred Sixteenth Congress 

of the 

United States of America 

AT THE SECOND SESSION 

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Friday, 

the third day of January, two thousand and twenty 

An Act 

To rename the Homestead National Monument of America near Beatrice, Nebraska, 

as the Homestead National Historical Park. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. HOMESTEAD NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The first section of the Act of March 19, 

1936 (16 U.S.C. 450u), is amended by striking ‘‘designated’’ and 

all that follows through the end and inserting ‘‘designated the 

‘Homestead National Historical Park’.’’. 

(b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, regulation, 

document, paper, or other record of the United States to the unit 

of the National Park System known as ‘‘The Homestead National 

Monument of America’’ shall be considered to be a reference to 

the ‘‘Homestead National Historical Park’’. 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
Opinion issued April 16, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-14-00319-CV

———————————

BEVERLY SCOTT, GWENDOLYN CARPENTER, DERRICK SCOTT,

AND SAMMIE SCOTT, Appellants

V.

DR. ROBIN LYNN ARMSTRONG, CURTIS J. BICKERS, AND 

VUJASINOVIC & BECKCOM PLLC, Appellees

On Appeal from the 234th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2012-33615

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Eula Mae Scott passed away in January 2009. Her family, including her 

daughter, appellant Beverly Scott, filed a lawsuit nearly four years later, in 

November 2012. The lawsuit alleged various claims against various defendants, 
2

who filed summary-judgment motions asserting various defenses and affirmative 

defenses. Appellee Robin Lynn Armstrong, a medical doctor facing a wrongfuldeath claim, asserted a limitations defense. Appellees Curtis J. Bickers and 

Vujasinovic & Beckcom, PLLC, former attorneys for the Scott family, faced a 

breach-of-contract claim. Their summary-judgment motion disputed two elements 

of the contract claim, the existence of a valid contract, and breach. Summary 

judgment was granted in favor of all the appellees.

Several members of the Scott family filed a notice of appeal.* In their

appellate brief, they reiterate factual allegations contained in the trial-court 

pleadings, but they do not present any argument that summary judgment was 

incorrectly granted as to any appellee. Moreover, their brief does not comply with 

the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1, including the 

necessity to state the issues presented and to make a clear and concise argument for 

their contentions with appropriate citations to legal authorities and the record. See 

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. 

Because pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys, 

see Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978), we must 

conclude that the appellants have waived any other grounds they may have 

 * The appellants are Beverly Scott, Gwendolyn Carpenter, David Scott, and 

Sammie Scott. Only Beverly, Gwendolyn, and David signed the pro se 

appellants’ brief.
3

intended to present for appellate review. See Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Nabors 

Drilling USA, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 118, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, 

pet. denied).

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. All pending motions are denied as 

moot.

Michael Massengale

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Massengale.
Exhibit 32.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In  connection  with  the  Quarterly Report of Wireless Telecom Group, Inc. (the
"Company")  on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending September 30, 2005 as filed with
the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on  the  date  hereof (the "Periodic
Report"),  I,  Paul  Genova,  Chief  Financial  Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant  to  18  U.S.C.  Sec  1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to  Sec  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The  Periodic  Report  fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in
all  material  respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.



                                        /s/ Paul Genova
                                        -------------------------------
                                        Paul Genova
                                        Chief Financial Officer
                                        November 9, 2005







The  foregoing  certification  is  being  furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section  1350  and  is  not  being  filed as part of the Report or as a separate
disclosure  document.
# C_2016202EN.01006901.xml

| 7.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 202/69 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 202/69

---

Article 52

(ex Article 46 TEC)

(ex Article 46 TEC)

1.   The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.

2.   The European Parliament and the Council shall, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, issue directives for the coordination of the abovementioned provisions.

---
<PAGE>

                                EXHIBIT (10)(b)
                                ---------------


                        OPINION AND CONSENT OF ACTUARY
<PAGE>

               [Transamerica Life Insurance Company Letterhead]

April 10, 2002


Transamerica Life Insurance Company
4333 Edgewood Road NE
Cedar Rapids, Iowa  52499-0001

Re:    Retirement Builder Variable Annuity Account
       Portfolio Select Variable Annuity
       Registration on Form N-4            SEC File No. 333-7509

Dear Sir/Madam:

With regard to the above registration statement, I have examined such documents
and made such inquiries as I have deemed necessary and appropriate, and on the
basis of such examination, have the following opinions:

Fees and charges deducted under the Portfolio Select Variable Annuity policies
are those deemed necessary to appropriately reflect:

(1)    the expenses incurred in the acquisition and distribution of the
       policies,

(2)    the expenses associated with the development and servicing of the
       policies,

(3)    the assumption of certain risks arising from the operation and management
       of the policies and/or riders to the policy and that provides for a
       reasonable margin of profit.

Fees and charges assessed against the policy values in the Variable Account
include:

(i)    Service Charge and Administrative Charge

(ii)   Mortality and Expense Risk Fee (M&E)

(iii)  Taxes (including Premium and other Taxes if applicable)

(iv)   Surrender Charges

(v)    Any applicable rider fees or charges

The magnitude of each of the individual charges listed above in (i) through (v)
is established in the pricing of the Portfolio Select Variable Annuity, to
achieve a reasonable Return on Investment (ROI), which is within the range of
industry practice with respect to comparable variable annuity products.
<PAGE>

Transamerica Life Insurance Company
April 10, 2002
Page 2

Except by coincidence, it is not expected that actual charges assessed in a
given year would exactly offset actual expenses incurred. Acquisition expenses
(as well as major product and/or systems development expenses) are incurred "up
front" and recovered, with a reasonable profit margin, through future years'
charges. In addition, the company cannot increase certain charges under the
policies in the pricing process.

Therefore, in my opinion, the fees and charges deducted under the policies, in
the aggregate, are reasonable in relation to the services rendered, the expenses
expected to be incurred, and the risks assumed by the company.

I hereby consent to the use of this opinion, which is included as an Exhibit to
the Registration Statement.



/s/ R. Gene Hauser
-------------------------------------
R. Gene Hauser
Associate Actuary
Transamerica Life Insurance Company
# C_2012326EN.01004701.xml

| 26.10.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 326/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 326/1

---

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

PART FOUR

ASSOCIATION OF THE OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES

ASSOCIATION OF THE OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES

Article 201

(ex Article 185 TEC)

(ex Article 185 TEC)

If the level of the duties applicable to goods from a third country on entry into a country or territory is liable, when the provisions of Article 200(1) have been applied, to cause deflections of trade to the detriment of any Member State, the latter may request the Commission to propose to the other Member States the measures needed to remedy the situation.

---
Exhibit 32.1
 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO
 18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 
 
 In
connection with the Quarterly Report of American Mortgage Acceptance Company
(the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2008 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), James
L. Duggins, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Robert L. Levy, as
Chief Financial Officer of the Company each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:
 
 
 (1)  The Report fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 
 (2)  The information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 
 
 By:
            /s/
      James L. Duggins
            
            By:
            /s/
      Robert L. LevyJames
      L. Duggins
              Chief
      Executive Officer
              May
      9, 2008
            
            
            Robert
      L. Levy
              Chief
      Financial Officer
              May
      9, 2008
 
 
 A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Craig L. Darrell, Respondent, v Marianne Yurchuk, Appellant, et al., Defendant.

—In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant Marianne Yurchuk appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Wood, J.), entered December 20, 1989, which, *inter alia,*granted the plaintiff’s motion to vacate his default in complying with a prior conditional order of preclusion and granted him leave to serve a late bill of particulars.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

"Public policy favors a determination on the merits * * * and the sound discretion of Special Term is to be given some latitude in determining what is an excusable default” *(Krystofic v Rapisardi,*112 AD2d 196, 197; *see also, Sawh v Bridges,*120 AD2d 74, 77-78). While it is true that the delay in serving a bill of particulars was lengthy (approximately two years), under the particular circumstances of this case it was not an improvident exercise of discretion to relieve the plaintiff of his default *(see, Davis v Sapa,*107 AD2d 1005; *Batista v St. Luke’s Hosp.,*46 AD2d 806). The plaintiff established a reasonable excuse for the delay *(see, Juers v Barry,*114 AD2d 1009; *Davis v Sapa, supra),*and the verified bill of particulars indicated the merits of the action *(see, Wilenski v Auricchio Monuments,*102 AD2d 824). Moreover, we note from the record herein that the appellant was not prejudiced by the delay and that there is no indication that the plaintiff ever intended to abandon the action *(see, Wilenski v Auricchio Monuments, supra; Batista v St. Luke’s Hosp., supra).*

We have considered the appellant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Balletta, J. P., Miller, O’Brien and Ritter, JJ., concur.
# EUR-Lex - 12012M015 - EN

Important legal notice

*|*

# 12012M015

**Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union - TITLE III: PROVISIONS ON THE INSTITUTIONS - Article 15 **

*
Official Journal C 326, 26/10/2012, p. 0023 - 0024 *

Article 15

1. The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political directions and priorities thereof. It shall not exercise legislative functions.

2. The European Council shall consist of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, together with its President and the President of the Commission. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall take part in its work.

3. The European Council shall meet twice every six months, convened by its President. When the agenda so requires, the members of the European Council may decide each to be assisted by a minister and, in the case of the President of the Commission, by a member of the Commission. When the situation so requires, the President shall convene a special meeting of the European Council.

4. Except where the Treaties provide otherwise, decisions of the European Council shall be taken by consensus.

5. The European Council shall elect its President, by a qualified majority, for a term of two and a half years, renewable once. In the event of an impediment or serious misconduct, the European Council can end the President's term of office in accordance with the same procedure.

6. The President of the European Council:

(a) shall chair it and drive forward its work;

(b) shall ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council;

(c) shall endeavour to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council;

(d) shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the European Council.

The President of the European Council shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The President of the European Council shall not hold a national office.

--------------------------------------------------
#### Robert Beason, Respondent, v Delena L. Sloane, Appellant.

—Order unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs, and matter remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings, in accordance with the following Memorandum: Supreme Court did not err by refusing to apply the Child Support Standards Act to this matter because the court’s decision was rendered before the effective date of the Act *(see, Matter of Patricia F. v Guiseppe F.,*145 Misc 2d 1050). Although the court failed to articulate the factors it considered when determining the award of child support, in our view the record is sufficiently developed to allow this court to make its own factual findings *(see, Deckert v Deckert,*147 AD2d 920, 921; *Gainer v Gainer,*100 AD2d 533, 534).

Defendant earns a higher salary than does plaintiff and defendant claims the tax exemption for the child, which gives her greater available *income.*Moreover, plaintiff provides other benefits to the child, including the purchasing of toys and clothes. Plaintiff also bears half the cost of the child’s day care expenses, as well as the cost of all unreimbursed medical and dental expenses, and all of the costs associated with his visitation with the child. According to the trial testimony, the child is in excellent health and has no special needs. Upon our review of the record and considering the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (7) (former [a]), we conclude that the court’s award of child support in the amount of $75 per week is fair and reasonable.

The court erred, however, by failing to make the award of child support retroactive to the date of defendant’s application therefor, which, in this case, is the date defendant served her answer and counterclaim, which included a request for child support *(see, Thomas v Thomas,*161 AD2d 1151, 1152; *Culnan v Culnan,*142 AD2d 805, *lv dismissed*73 NY2d 994). Plaintiff is entitled to a credit against the total amount of retroactive support for all amounts paid pursuant to the temporary order. Therefore, we remit this matter to Supreme Court to determine the amount of retroactive support owing and the manner in which plaintiff must pay this amount. (Appeal from *1017Order of Supreme Court, Livingston County, Cicoria, J.—Child Support.) Present—Doerr, J. P., Boomer, Green, Pine and Davis, JJ
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

April 17, 2015

No. 04-15-00072-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF C.M.O.,

From the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013-PA-01068

Honorable Dick Alcala, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The appellant's first motion to extend time to file brief is hereby GRANTED. Appellant's 

brief is due on or before May 4, 2015.

_________________________________

Jason Pulliam, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 17th day of April, 2015.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
EXHIBIT 31(iii)

SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION

I, James E. Huston, certify that



| | 1. | I have reviewed this Form 10-K/A of Camco Financial Corporation; and
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                    |  |                                         
|------------------- |  | ----------------------------------------
|Date: July 13, 2012 |  | /s/ James E. Huston                     
|                    |  | James E. Huston, Chief Executive Officer
|                    |  | (Principal Executive Officer)
**EXHIBIT 23****CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMWe have issued our report dated February 20, 2007, accompanying the consolidated financialstatements in the Annual Report of Camco Financial Corporation on Form 10-K for the year endedDecember 31, 2006. We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of said report in theRegistration Statements of Camco Financial Corporation on Forms S-8, File No. 333-94113, effectiveJanuary 5, 2000 and File Nos. 333-90142, 333-90152, 333-90158 and 333-90166 effective June 10,2002./s/ PLANTE MORAN PLLCAuburn Hills, Michigan
# C_2016202EN.01015601.xml

| 7.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 202/156 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 202/156

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Article 245

(ex Article 213 TEC)

(ex Article 213 TEC)

The Members of the Commission shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties. Member States shall respect their independence and shall not seek to influence them in the performance of their tasks.

The Members of the Commission may not, during their term of office, engage in any other occupation, whether gainful or not. When entering upon their duties they shall give a solemn undertaking that, both during and after their term of office, they will respect the obligations arising therefrom and in particular their duty to behave with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance, after they have ceased to hold office, of certain appointments or benefits. In the event of any breach of these obligations, the Court of Justice may, on application by the Council acting by a simple majority or the Commission, rule that the Member concerned be, according to the circumstances, either compulsorily retired in accordance with Article 247 or deprived of his right to a pension or other benefits in its stead.

---