alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jeffrey Coleman, Appellant.

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Delin, J.), rendered May 26, 1989, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and sentencing him to an indeterminate term of four *574years to life imprisonment, and the payment of $650 in restitution.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by vacating the provision thereof which requires the defendant to pay $650 in restitution; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

That part of the judgment which ordered restitution in the sum of $650 to reimburse the Nassau County Police Department for the money used in the cocaine sale upon which this prosecution was premised must be vacated. A law enforcement agency is not a "victim” within the meaning of Penal Law § 60.27 such that it is qualified to receive restitution for "public monies * * * expended in the pursuit of solving crimes” *(People v Rowe,*152 AD2d 907, 908, *affd*75 NY2d 948). Thompson, J. P., Kunzeman, Eiber, Rosenblatt and Ritter, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 4.40

                                  AMENDMENT TO:

                   1. 10% PROMISSORY NOTE DATED MARCH 9, 2001
           2. 8% SENIOR SECURED PROMISSORY NOTES DATED JULY 25, 2000
          3. 8% SENIOR SECURED PROMISSORY NOTE DATED FEBRUARY 19, 2002

      AMENDMENT, dated April 12, 2002, (the "Amendment") by and between
Milestone Scientific Inc., a Delaware corporation, having its principal offices
at 220 South Orange Avenue, Livingston, New Jersey 07039 (the "Company"), and K.
Tucker Andersen (the "Lender"), having an address c/o Cumberland Associates LLC,
1114 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036.

      For good and valuable consideration, the sufficiency of which is hereby
acknowledged, the undersigned hereby agree to the following amendments to the:

      1.    10% Promissory Note dated March 9, 2001 in the amount of $500,000;
      2.    8% Promissory Note dated July 25, 2001 in the amount of $1,000,000;
            and
      3.    8% Promissory Note dated February 19, 2002 in the amount of
            $150,000.

between the Company and the Lender (collectively the "Notes"):

1.    The maturity dates of all the Notes are hereby extended to August 1, 2003
      except for a $500,000 balance on the 8% Promissory Note dated July 25,
      2001, which remains December 31, 2003

2.    It is confirmed that there are no restrictions on the Company's right to
      obtain additional unsecured loans so long as they bear a maturity date
      that is subsequent to August 1, 2003.

            IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have caused this Amendment to be
executed as of the date first above written.

                                             MILESTONE SCIENTIFIC INC.


                                             By: _______________________________
                                                     Leonard Osser, Chairman and
                                                     Chief Executive Officer


                                                 _______________________________
                                                     K. TUCKER ANDERSEN
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-6239

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

FREDDIE L. D. MORGAN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District 

Judge. (3:10-cr-00288-JRS-1)

Submitted: April 24, 2012 Decided: May 24, 2012

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Freddie L. D. Morgan, Appellant Pro Se. Brandon Michael Santos, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Freddie L. D. Morgan appeals the district court’s 

order denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) motion. The 

foregoing provision permits modification of a defendant’s term 

of imprisonment when such term is “based on a sentencing range 

that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing 

Commission,” in accordance with the Commission’s statutory 

authority to review and revise the Sentencing Guidelines. See

id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)). Morgan’s sentence, however, 

was not based on the Guidelines, but was instead premised on 21 

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), in conformance with the mandatory 

minimum term of imprisonment therein prescribed at the time he 

committed the offenses of conviction. Prior to Morgan’s trial 

and sentencing, § 841 was amended to increase the threshold 

quantity of certain controlled substances triggering specific 

mandatory minimums, yet Morgan pursued no appeal.

Section 3582, which by its terms is limited to 

modification of Guidelines sentences, is not the appropriate 

vehicle to seek relief from a mandatory minimum sentence imposed 

by statute. See United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d 183, 187 (4th 

Cir. 2010) (“[A] defendant who was convicted of a crack offense 

but sentenced pursuant to a mandatory statutory minimum sentence 

is ineligible for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2).”) (citation 

omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of 
3

relief. United States v. Morgan, No. 3:10-cr-00288-JRS-1 (E.D. 

Va. Jan. 20, 2012). We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                   CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. (S)1350

       (ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002)

In connection with the periodic report of Dynegy Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Bruce A. Williamson,
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify as of the
date hereof, solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the
United States Code, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d),
as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at
the dates and for the periods indicated.

Date: May 15, 2003
                                           /s/ Bruce A. Williamson
                                           ----------------------------
                                           Bruce A. Williamson
                                           President and Chief Executive Officer
**Exhibit 32**

**Section 906Certification**

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 As AdoptedPursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Bresler &Reiner, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31,2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), the undersigned officers of the Company certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, that:

(1)         The Report fully complieswith the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended and

(2)         Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|        |       | /s/ SIDNEY M. BRESLER                                    |
|--------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
|   | ** ** | **Sidney M. Bresler**                                    |
|   | ** ** | **Chief Executive Officer**                              |
|   | ** ** | /s/  DARRYL M. EDELSTEIN                                 |
|   | ** ** | **Darryl M. Edelstein**                                  |
|   | ** ** | **Executive Vice President—Finance & CFO** |

 

Dated: June 28, 2007

----
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

NOTICE REGARDING DOCUMENTS FILED IN CASE

STAYED FOR BANKRUPTCY

Appellate case name: Latrice Harris v. Highland Knolls Community Association

Appellate case number: 01-15-00284-CV

Trial court case number: 908487

Trial court: County Civil Court at Law No. 2 of Harris County

This appeal is stayed pursuant to appellee Highland Knolls Community Association’s

Notice of Stay, filed in this Court on April 14, 2015, stating that appellant, Latrice Harris, has 

filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of Title 11, United States Code, in Case 15-31978, In 

re Latrice Harris, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas. See

11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000) (automatic stay in bankruptcy). Until the parties notify the Court that 

the bankruptcy has concluded and move to reinstate the case, the Court will take no further 

action other than to receive and hold any documents tendered during the period of suspension. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 8.2.

Unless a party successfully moves to reinstate or sever, this appeal will be an inactive 

case on the Court’s docket. See TEX. R. APP. P. 8.3. 

Clerk’s signature: /s/ Christopher A. Prine

Date: April 16, 2015
PSP Instruction 343i March 2017 Page 1 of 1 

Instructions for Completing Optional PSP Form 343 

Packers may use optional form P&SP-343 to document a basic set of contract terms for verbal 

contracts. 

Packers as defined in 9 CFR 206.1 must provide written descriptions for all terms of a verbal 

contract and attach that written description to form P&SP-342. This form may be used as that 

written description. 

A verbal contract includes purchases of swine by a packer from a producer under which: 

1) The purchase is not a negotiated purchase. That is, the transaction

a) Results in a price to be determined at a later date, or

b) Establishes delivery dates more than 14 days after the date on which the swine are

committed to the packer

2) The terms of the purchase are not formally documented.

If you have any questions about the form or completing the form, please contact the Midwestern 

Regional office using one of the following methods. 

Phone Email Fax

515-323-2579 SwineContractLibrary@usda.gov 515-323-2590

request to speak to the Swine 

Contract Library staff

attention Swine Contract 

Library staff

Line Subject Instruction

1 Base Price 

Determination

A description of terms used to determine base price. This may 

include a complete description of any reports used and adjustments 

made to the reported price. For example: AMS National Daily 

Direct Hogs Morning, Base Market Hog, plus $1.00

2 Application of Ledger The terms of the ledger or accrual account. This may include the 

window or target price and terms regarding application of ledger 

conditions.

3 Carcass Merit 

Premiums and 

Discounts

A description of the carcass merit premiums and discounts. This 

may include the determination of lean percent or other 

characteristics of the carcass that are used to determine the amount 

of the premiums and discounts and how those premiums and 

discounts are applied.

4 Noncarcass Merit 

Premiums and 

Discounts

A description of any noncarcass merit premiums and discounts 

used. For example: $1.50 for delivery before 7:00 am.

5 Length of Agreement The term or length of the verbal agreement.

6 Other Provisions A description of any other conditions or terms.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6029

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KEON MOSES, a/k/a Black,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, Chief District 

Judge. (1:02-cr-00410-CCB-2; 1:14-cv-03763-CCB)

Submitted: April 9, 2015 Decided: April 15, 2015

Before MOTZ and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Keon Moses, Appellant Pro Se. Andrea L. Smith, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Keon Moses seeks to appeal the district court’s order 

denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order 

is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). 

A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that

Moses has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny 

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Prepared by R.R. Donnelley Financial -- Letter Agreement Regarding Interest-Free Loan


  
 EXHIBIT 10.3 
  
 March 20, 2002 
  
  
  
 Mr. Joseph A. Pendergast 
 330 McCloud Place 
 Danville, California 94526 
  
 Re:    Interest-Free Loan Obligation 
  
 Dear Joe: 
  
 I have calculated the obligation that remains between Larscom and you as explained below: 
  
 
	 Original loan amount:
 	 	 $80,000.00
 
	 Forgiveness (amortization) period:
 	 	 48 months
 
	 Employment start date:
 	 	 October 2, 2000
 
	 Employment termination date:
 	 	 February 22, 2002
 
	 Months of employment:
 	 	 17
 
	 Remaining months on loan:
 	 	 31
 
	 Loan amount forgiven (17/48x $80,000):
 	 	 $28,333.33
 
	 Loan balance owed Larscom:
 	 	 $51,666.67
 

 
  
 As we agreed, before you left Larscom’s employment, the loan balance owed
Larscom ($51,667.67) is to be repaid in full by no later than 6 months from your termination, which would be by September 22, 2002. Also, as we agreed, if there is any litigation about the loan, the prevailing party is entitled to recover its
reasonable attorneys fees and costs from the other party, in addition to all other allowable remedies. 
  
 Larscom has reported 15
months of “loan forgiveness” on your W-2s for the years 2000 and 2001 and “grossed up” your income accordingly. Larscom will report the remaining 2 months of “loan forgiveness” for completion of your employment during
2002. Larscom will report this amount in your 2002 W-2 and “gross it up” at a 40% rate to help provide for your taxes on this portion of your income; i.e., we will retain the 40% in its entirety for the required withholding amounts for the
2 months of forgiveness and for the gross-up amount itself.             
  
 Sincerely, 
  
 /s/    Daniel L. Scharre 

Daniel L. Scharre 
 President and Chief Executive
Officer             
  

	 	Ag
	reed: 
 

  

	 	/s/  
	  Joseph A. Pendergast 
 


	 	Jos
	eph A. Pendergast
```

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 125 (Tuesday, June 30, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 37161]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-15910]

[[Page 37161]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Part 52

[EPA-R06-OAR-2011-0079; FRL-9929-69-Region 6]

Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Texas; 
Revision To Control Volatile Organic Compound Emissions From Storage 
Tanks and Transport Vessels

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Withdrawal of direct final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is withdrawing a 
direct final rule published on May 13, 2015 because relevant adverse 
comments were received. The rule pertained to EPA approval of a Texas 
State Implementation Plan (SIP) revision for control of volatile 
organic compound (VOC) emissions from degassing of storage tanks, 
transport vessels and marine vessels. In a separate subsequent final 
rulemaking EPA will address the comments received.

DATES: The direct final rule published at 80 FR 27251 on May 13, 2015, 
is withdrawn effective June 30, 2015.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Robert M. Todd, (214) 665-2156, 
todd.robert@epa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Throughout this document wherever ``we,'' 
``us,'' or ``our'' is used, we mean the EPA. On May 13, 2015 we 
published a direct final rule approving a Texas State Implementation 
Plan (SIP) revision for control of volatile organic compound (VOC) 
emissions from degassing of storage tanks, transport vessels and marine 
vessels (80 FR 27251). The direct final rule was published without 
prior proposal because we anticipated no adverse comments. We stated in 
the direct final rule that if we received relevant adverse comments by 
June 12, 2015 we would publish a timely withdrawal in the Federal 
Register. We received relevant adverse comments and accordingly are 
withdrawing the direct final rule. In a separate subsequent final 
rulemaking we will address the comments received.

List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 52

    Environmental protection, Air pollution control, Incorporation by 
reference, Ozone, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Volatile 
organic compounds.

    Dated: June 18, 2015.
Ron Curry,
Regional Administrator, Region 6.
[FR Doc. 2015-15910 Filed 6-29-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
```
# C_2012326EN.01004701.xml

| 26.10.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 326/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 326/1

---

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

PART SIX

INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

TITLE I

INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER 2

LEGAL ACTS OF THE UNION, ADOPTION PROCEDURES AND OTHER PROVISIONS

SECTION 1

SECTION 1

THE LEGAL ACTS OF THE UNION

Article 291

1.   Member States shall adopt all measures of national law necessary to implement legally binding Union acts.

2.   Where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed, those acts shall confer implementing powers on the Commission, or, in duly justified specific cases and in the cases provided for in Articles 24 and 26 of the Treaty on European Union, on the Council.

3.   For the purposes of paragraph 2, the European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall lay down in advance the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers.

4.   The word ‘implementing’ shall be inserted in the title of implementing acts.

---
# C_2012326EN.01020101.xml

| 26.10.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 326/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 326/1

---

PROTOCOL (No 11)

ON ARTICLE 42 OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,

BEARING IN MIND the need to implement fully the provisions of Article 42(2) of the Treaty on European Union,

BEARING IN MIND that the policy of the Union in accordance with Article 42 shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in NATO, under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework,

HAVE AGREED UPON the following provision, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union:

The European Union shall draw up, together with the Western European Union, arrangements for enhanced cooperation between them.

---
• Raised on pasture

• Humane treatment

• No growth hormones or 

 antibiotics

Meat, Dairy & Eggs C

M

Y

CM

MY

CY

CMY

K

Final.pdf 4 2/23/2024 9:32:35 AM
### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE February 21, 2018 Session **CRYSTAL HERPST v. PARKRIDGE MEDICAL CENTER, INC.**  **ET AL** 

### .

**Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County No. 15C1351**  **Ward Jeffrey Hollingsworth, Judge**

**___________________________________ No. E2017**  **- 00419**  **- COA** **- R3**  **- CV** 

**___________________________________**
W. NEAL M CB RAYER, J., concurring
. I concur in the majority’s conclusion that it was unnecessary for the trial court to treat the motions of Le A nthony A. Hardy, M.D., Parkridge Medical Center, Inc. Chattanooga Diagnostic Associates, LLC, and Columbia Medical Group
- Parkridge, Inc. to dismiss as motion s for summary judgment. B ut I reach that conclusion without resort to the pleadings filed in another cas e. Examining the allegations of the complaint filed in this action only, Crystal Herpst filed outside the applicable statute of limitations. S o on the basis of the pleadings filed in this case I would affirm the dismissal of the complaint. The complaint filed by Ms. Herpst contains all the information necessary to determine that her action was untimely. As the majority explains , the factual allegations made by Ms. Herpst demonstrate that she had constructive notice of her medical malpractice claim by July 3, 2013
. Ms. Herpst filed suit on November 13, 2015, well outside of the one - year statute of limitations provided for under Tennessee Code Annotated § 29
- 26
- 116 (a) (2012)
. In resp onse to the motions to dismiss , Ms. Herpst raised the issue of the saving statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 28
- 1
- 105(a) (2017)
. B ut to determine that the saving statute does not apply one mu st look no further than the complaint filed in this action. The complaint alleges that Ms. Herpst “originally f iled suit for damages on November 6, 2014, Herpst vs. Parkridge Medical Center, Inc. et al, Circuit Court, Hamilton County, TN No. 14C1329, which case was voluntarily non - suited on January 12, 2015. ” 1

1 Apparently, Ms. Herpst anticipated the assertion of the statute of limitations by the def endants. Ordinarily, the burden of producing evidence that the saving statute applies falls on the plaintiff when the statute of limitations is asserted as a bar to the action. Knox Cty. v. Moncier, 455 S.W.2d 153, 158 (Tenn.2

Because the complaint filed by Ms. Herpst in this action contains all the information needed to resolve the motions to dismiss, I find it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the complaint filed by Ms. Herpst in the original suit was “outside of the pleadings
. ” See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02. Thus, I do not join in part III of the opinion.

_________________________________ W. NEAL M CBRAYER, JUDGE

1970) (opinion on petition torehear). But, when in anticipation of the defense, the plaintiff alleges facts “which would bring his cau s e of action within the s aving statute, and the se f acts are not specifically deni ed by the defendant, he is then relieved from the statutory bar and need not produce any proof pertaining thereto.” Id
.