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No. 03-12-00558-CV

______________________________________________________ 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

AUSTIN, TEXAS 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

HAPPY JACK RANCH, INC. & FREDERICK J. BEHREND, 

Appellants 

VS. 

HH&L DEVELOPMENT, INC., MATTHEW STOLHANDSKE, 

TRUSTEE, & MICHAEL STRNAD, 

Appellees 

_______________________________________________________ 

ON APPEAL FROM THE 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 

COMAL COUNTY, TEXAS, CAUSE NO. C2010-1022A 

HON. CHARLES RAMSEY, PRESIDING 

____________________________________________________________________________ 

APPELLEE STRNAD’S MOTION FOR REHEARING 

_________________________________________________________ 

Ted Cackowski

SBN: 03575900

ATTORNEY AT LAW

1141 N. Loop 1604 E. #105

San Antonio, TX 78232

Tele: 210 383 7277

Email: TedCLaw@aol.com

ACCEPTED

03-12-00558-CV

4781058

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

4/7/2015 6:32:36 AM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 4/7/2015 6:32:36 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
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No. 03-12-00558-CV

______________________________________________________

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS JUDICIAL DISTRICT

AUSTIN, TEXAS

______________________________________________________________________________

HAPPY JACK RANCH, INC. & FREDERICK J. BEHREND,

Appellants

VS.

HH&L DEVELOPMENT, INC., MATTHEW STOLHANDSKE,

TRUSTEE, & MICHAEL STRNAD,

Appellees

_______________________________________________________

ON APPEAL FROM THE 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,

COMAL COUNTY, TEXAS, CAUSE NO. C2010-1022A

HON. CHARLES RAMSEY, PRESIDING

____________________________________________________________________________

APPELLEE STRNAD’S MOTION FOR REHEARING

TO THE HONORABLE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:

Appellee Michael Strnad asks this Court to revisit its decision and affirm 

the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Michael Strnad.
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I. Rehearing points:

(i) Point One- Any error as to Appellee’s 

attorneys’ fees was not preserved:

This court reversed as to attorney’s fees, 

noting that it was error to award fees under 

the UDJA for an essentially Trespass to Try 

Title claim. The error, which not complained 

of in the Trial Court, nor assigned as error 

or briefed in this Court, was waived.

(ii) Point Two- There is statutory basis in 

Property Code to support an award of 

attorneys’fees to Appellee Strnad: 

Absent findings of fact, conclusions of law, 

objection in the trial court and briefing in 

this Court, a general pleading for attorneys’ 

is sufficient to support recovery of 

attorney’s fees under any applicable statute.

The statutory basis for attorney’s fees in 

the Property Code is a specific remedy for an 

improper claim by an undisclosed beneficiary 

such as Behrend. The trial court’s award of 

attorney’s fees to Michael Strnad has a 

statutory basis in the Property Code that 

was not subsumed by the less specific and 
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more remote Trespass to Try Title Statute.

As against a defendant not in possession, the 

assertion of an equitable right, such as 

cancellation of a deed procured by fraud, is 

not governed by the trespass-to-try-title 

statute.

(iii) Point Three- A Appellant Behrend’s

improper invocation of UDJA is sufficient to award

fees to a Defendant: 

A Plaintiff prosecuting what is essentially 

a Trespass to Try Title suit may not plead 

alternatively under the UDJA to recover 

attorneys’ fees. However, a Defendant, such 

as Strnad, who is forced to defend an improper 

proceeding under the UDJA may receive his 

attorneys’ fees. Even if Appellants

erroneously invoked the UDJA, it was not 

error for Judge Ramsey to award attorney’s 

fees to Strnad under the UDJA necessary for 

the defense of the misconceived action. Even 

the absence of subject matter jurisdiction 
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does not deprive the defending party of fees 

once the plaintiff invokes the UDJA.

II. Introduction 

1. This is the third1suit Behrend has prosecuted against Strnad seeking 

declaratory relief regarding the four properties that at the time of this suit 

were titled in the name of Appellee HH&L DEVELOPMENT. In this suit 

Behrend insists that the Declaratory Judgment Act required that Strnad be a 

defendant. In the 2003 default judgment Beherend obtained attorney’s fees. 

A result that was only possible because it was a default. Behrend likely will 

continue to use the judgment for attorneys in the default judgment suit to 

relentlessly pursue Strnad through litigation if Strnad is not awarded 

offsetting attorneys fees in this case. 

2. Coinmach did not hold that a Plaintiff erroneously prosecuting a Trespass 

to Try Title suit under the UDCJ was unwaivable error. There is line of cases 

holding to the error is waivable, including the Third Court. Appellants did 

not make the necessary complaint in the trial court to preserve error. There 

 

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In Note 1 of this Court’s opinion the Court observes : “The record is unclear as to whether 

Behrend's original petition in this prior suit sought a declaration regarding the four tracts 

at issue in this suit.” An examination of the property descriptions confirms the identity of 

the subject four properties in all three suits. See 1.) CAUSE NO. C2003-0969B, in which 

the default judgement was taken against Strnad in 2003 [Tracts IX, X, XI, XII, CR pgs, 

351, 352]; 2.) CAUSE NO. C2003-0325A, non suited after pending for six years, [Tracts 

III, IV, V, VI, CR pg. 92]; and 3.) this suit, No.C2010-1022A below, [CR pgs. 344, 345]. 

Though title originated in Happy Jack Ranch, Happy Jack Ranch was not a party in the 

first two suits. Ron Flake, who was Brhrend’s attorney in 1993 provided an affidavit.

Flakes affidavit came after Judge Ramsey’s May 25, 2012 order of dismissal [CR pg. 663]. 

Mr. Flake averred [CR pg. 709] as follows:” ...acting as Mr. Behrend's attorney and as 

president of Happy Jack Ranch, Inc., I conveyed properties held by Happy Jack Ranch, 

Inc. to Michael Strnad. During the year 1993 the following four tracts were conveyed to 

Mr. Stmad in this manner: [ legal descriptions of the four subject properties followed.]”
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was no mention of the Trespass to Try Title statute, nor any argument that 

attorneys' fees were erroneously awarded because the suit was, in substance, 

a Trespass to Try Title suit. The specific ground was never complained of in 

the trial court, nor assigned as error and briefed in this Court. Behrend

expressly pled [ CR pg. 344] the UDJA and filed an affidavit for $54,139.71

in fees and expenses [CR pg. 424]. Attorney Caziers affidavit included fees,

not only this suit, but also included time and charges for C2003-0325A [ CR 

pg. 411] which was non suited after pending for six years.

3. Strnad was not in possession or seeking possession of the properties.

Coinmach was a clear application of the construction maxim that that a 

specific statutory scheme governs a more general scheme. As to Strnad, 

Behrend sought, as an undisclosed beneficiary, a declaration for the 

cancellation of a deed. The legislature, just as it provided a specific treatment 

of Trespass to Try Title in the Property Code, so also provided a specific 

treatment for the claims of undisclosed beneficiaries in Property Code. The 

specific legislative remedy for a defendant resisting the claims of an 

undisclosed beneficiary includes attorneys fees. 

4. Strnad’s pleading for attorney’s fees was general and not restricted to any 

specific statute. Because there were no findings of fact or conclusions of law,

the award for attorney fees should be affirmed under any applicable legal 

theory. Because the claim against Strnad was for deed cancellation and Strnad 

was not in possession of the property, the claim was not subsumed in the 

Trespass to Try Title statute. The specific attorney’s fees remedy in the 

Property Code for a party defending against an undisclosed beneficiary was 

not eliminated by Coinmach. Coinmach stands for proposition that a 

“plaintiff” may not proceed alternatively under UDJA to recover its attorney's 
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fees. [emphasis provided]. As will be seen below a “defendant” is accorded 

different treatment. A “defendant,” such as Strnad, who is forced to defend 

a suit improperly invoking the UDJA, may recover fees under the UDJA.

III. Argument and Authorities

A. Point One-Error Waived 

5. The Trespass to Try Title statute was not mentioned in any brief before this 

Court, nor was it mentioned in any pleading or hearing in the trial court. 

6. In Krabbe v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 46 S.W.3d 308 (Tex.App. —

Amarillo 2001), as in this case, both appellant and appellee pled for and 

sought attorney's fees. The Court in Krabbe opined that any complaint that 

the suit was in essence Trespass to Try Title claim was waived:

“Appellants did not preserve error in regard to the argument that attorneys' 

fees were erroneously awarded because the suit was, in substance, a trespass 

to try title suit. Because the error was not preserved and we have previously 

failed to find reversible error in the trial court's ruling that the lease did not 

terminate, we overrule appellant's second issue.”
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7. Krabbe v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 46 S.W.3d 308 (Tex.App. —

Amarillo 2001) was cited favorably in Wheeler v. Phillips, 03-10-00221-CV

where Justice Goodwin opined:

“We note that Wheeler did not urge at the trial court level that appellees' 

claim for declaratory relief was in essence an action for trespass to try title. 

See Krabbe v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 46 S.W.3d 308, 320-21 (Tex. 

App.--Amarillo 2001, pet. denied) (any error in permitting trespass-to-trytitle claim under UDJA may be waived absent objection to that procedure); 

see also Archaeological Conservancy v. Wilson Land & Cattle Co., No. 03-

08-00061-CV, 2010 Tex.App. LEXIS 2385, at *16 n.5 (Tex. App.--Austin 

Mar. 30, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.).”

8. In PLAINTIFFS' SECOND AMENDED ORIGINAL PETITION TO 

QUIET TITLE Behrend expressly pled [CR pg 344] the Declaratory 

Judgments Act:

Because this is a suit under the Declaratory Judgments Act, Defendant 

Michael Strnad is joined as a part defendant pro forma only to the extent his 

rights may be affected by any judgment of the Court.

9. It is clear that Appellant Behrend was proceeding under the Declaratory 

Judgement Act. In his Motion or New Trial [CR pg. 688] Behrend argued:

“For that reason, on January 30, 2012 Plaintiff amended its pleadings asking

that the Court quiet title only as to the four tracts described in the deeds 

from Stolhandske to HH&L Development, Inc. Plaintiffs' live pleadings 

allege only a cause of action against HH&L Development, Inc. Stmad and 
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Stolhandske are included as nominal parties only because the Declaratory 

Judgments Act requires the joinder of any party whose rights may be 

affected by the Court's ruling.”

10. Behrend also argued that his claim was invoking the UDJA in 

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT STRNAD'S AMENDED 

MOTION TO DISMISS [CR pg 392].

11. It significant to note, that though Behrend captioned all his pleadings as 

“Quiet Title ” [ CR pgs. 9, 189, 343] , Behrend’s appellate council also 

characterized his suit as one for “declaratory relief. ” In Appellants’ Brief at 

page 8, in note 17, appellate council argues:

“(1 CR 215-19). Behrend’s partial summary judgment motion essentially

reiterates the claims and arguments found within his petition for declaratory

judgment. (1 CR 215-19).”

12. The Supreme Court explained the fundamental unfairness of allowing an 

error to be complained of for the first time on appeal. In Mansions in the 

Forest, L.P. v. Montgomery County, 365 S.W.3d 314, 55 Tex.Sup.Ct. J. 624 

(Tex. 2012) the Court opined:

There are " important prudential considerations" behind our rules on 

preserving error. In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 350 (Tex.2003). First, 

requiring that parties initially raise complaints in the trial court conserves 

judicial resources by providing trial courts the opportunity to correct errors 

before appeal. Id. Second, judicial decision-making is more accurate when 

trial courts have the first opportunity to consider and rule on error. Id. (" 
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Not only do the parties have the opportunity to develop and refine their 

arguments, but we have the benefit of other judicial review to focus and 

further analyze the questions at issue." ). Third, a party " should not be 

permitted to waive, consent to, or neglect to complain about an error at trial 

and then surprise his opponent on appeal by stating his complaint for the 

first time." Id. (quoting Pirtle v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex.1982) 

(per curiam)). For these reasons, to preserve this issue for appeal, the 

County needed to present its complaint to the trial court.

B. Point Two –Statutory Basis in Property Code

13. Strnad’s prayer for attorney’s fee was general and without statutory 

reference. See FIRST AMENDED ORIGINAL ANSWER OF MICHAEL 

STRNAD [CR pg. 44] as follows:

Defendants pray that Plaintiffs take nothing, that they have their costs, 

attorney's fees and all other relief to which they may be entitled at law or in 

equity.

14. Judge Ramsey did not make any findings of facts or conclusions of law. 

A general pleading will support and award of attorneys’ fees under any legal 

theory. See Smith v. Deneve, 285 S.W.3d 904 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009) as 

follows:

Second, Deneve also pleaded paragraph 16, in which she separately and 

broadly asserted that she had to hire a lawyer to defend the suit and that 

Smith should have to pay for it. There was apparently no such broad 
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pleading in Kreighbaum . We conclude that Deneve's pleadings were 

sufficiently general to allow her to rely on any applicable provisions of law 

to support an award of attorneys' fees.

15. This Court cites Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 

S.W.3d 909, 926 56 Tex. Sup.Ct. J. 77 (Tex. 2013) for its conclusion that “As 

such, the trespass-to-try-title statute was the appellants' exclusive remedy, and 

the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees under the 

UDJA.” See Coinmach Corp., 417 S.W.3d at 926. In Coinmach, the Court 

did not go so far as to say that any and all claims and statutory remedies of 

all parties related to the same factual nucleus must be merged into the trespass 

to try title claim of the party seeking possession. In Coinmach, the Court did 

not subsume the DTPA claim and other torts into the trespass to try title 

envelope.

16. There is no hint in Coinmach that the attorney’s fees allowed in a DTPA 

claim, for example, would be disallowed merely because the suit also 

involved a claim for possession. In this case, Strnad did not have possession 

and was not claiming possession. Behrend’s only claim against Strnad, as 

prayed for in his petition, was essentially for the cancellation of a deed 

procured by fraud.

2

 That claim is not governed by the trespass-to-try-title 

 

2

 Behrend specifically prayed: “Declaring that the deeds from Defendant Stmad to 

Defendant Stolhandske, and in turn the deeds from Defendant HH&L Development, Inc., 

are void and convey no interest, ordering such deeds removed from the title to the 

property and quieting title in Plaintiff Behrend;....” [CR pg 348]. [emphasis provided]
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statute. In Wilhoite v. Sims, 401 S.W.3d 752 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013) the Court 

opined:

The assertion of an equitable right, such as cancellation of a deed procured 

by fraud, is not governed by the trespass-to-try-title statute. Id. " Such an 

assertion is clearly distinguishable from the claim of right to title and 

possession of real property, which is the sine qua non of a suit in trespass to 

try title." 

17. This Court credited Strnad’s defense under the trust provisions of the 

Property Code as follows [Opinion pg. 8]:

Moreover, regardless of whether Strnad held the properties in trust for 

Behrend, the existence of the trust would not render Strnad’s prior 

conveyances to Stolhandske void. Rather, the Legislature has provided that 

when “property is conveyed or transferred to a trustee in trust but the

conveyance or transfer does not identify the trust or disclose the names of 

the beneficiaries, the trustee may convey, transfer, or encumber the title to 

the property without subsequent question by a person who claims to be a 

beneficiary under the trust.” Tex. Prop. Code § 114.082.

18. The legislature permits a person, such as Strnad, who must defend the 

claims of an undisclosed beneficiary, Behrend here, to recovery attorney’s 

fees. Tex. Prop. Code § 114.064 provides as follows:
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(a) In any proceeding under this code the court may make such award of 

costs and reasonable and necessary attorney's fees as may seem equitable 

and just.

19. Because Judge Ramsey made no findings of fact or conclusions of law , 

this Court this Court should affirm based on any applicable legal theory. In 

Holt v. Kelso, 03-11-00258-CV this Court stated the well established law:

We therefore imply "that the trial court made all findings necessary to 

support its judgment." See Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 

1990); see also BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 

794 (Tex. 2002); Brazos River Auth. v. Gilliam, 429 S.W.2d 949, 951 (Tex. 

Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting that letter of trial court 

"helpful in giving the trial court's view of the controversy" but that appellate 

court was "governed by well recognized rule" that, "in the absence of 

findings of fact and conclusions of law the appellate court will presume that 

all fact issues having support in the evidence were found in support of the 

judgment"). We also must affirm the judgment "if it can be upheld on any 

legal theory that finds support in the evidence." Worford, 801 S.W.2d at 

109; see BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794.

20. The Court in Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 

S.W.3d 909, 56 Tex. Sup.Ct. J. 77 (Tex. 2013) did not extend its ruling to all 

situations indirectly related to “determinations of possessory interests in 

property” : 

Aspenwood points out that, since our decision in Martin, some courts of 

appeals have held that the UDJA remains an appropriate alternative avenue 
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to determine property interests, at least when the dispute involves 

construction of a written agreement. See, e.g., Roberson v. City of Austin, 

157 S.W.3d 130, 133 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, no pet.) (UDJA available to 

determine validity of an easement agreement); Florey v. Estate of 

McConnell, 212 S.W.3d 439, 449 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied) 

(UDJA available in suit to determine validity of deed of trust). While we 

neither approve nor disapprove of the holdings in these cases, we note that 

they distinguish themselves from cases that involve determinations of 

possessory interests in property. Roberson, 157 S.W.3d at 136; Florey, 212 

S.W.3d at 449.

21. Like the cases distinguished in Coinmach, the claims against Strnad were 

not for possession because Strnad was not in possession. Florey v. Estate of 

McConnell, 212 S.W.3d 439 (Tex.App.—Austin 2006) was one of the cases 

distinguished in Coinmach, see above. The Court in Florey opined that the 

legislature likely did not intend for the trespass to try title statute to displace 

every other statutory remedy however indirectly related to a claim for 

possession. In Florey the Court opined:

Although a declaration regarding the validity of the deed of trust could 

ultimately have impacted title and possessory rights to the property, we 

doubt that the legislature intended for the trespass-to-try title statute to 

displace or subsume every statutory or common law claim (e.g., suits to 

rescind deeds) having such an impact. See generally 17 William V. 

Dorsaneo, Texas Litigation Guide § 257.01[3] [a], [4] (2005). The Estate's 

suit has a more indirect impact on title and possession to real property than 

the boundary dispute in Martin, and we conclude that its rationale does not 

apply here.
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22. Behrend was seeking possession and title from Appellee HH&L 

DEVELOPMENT. Strnad did not have possession. Behrend’s claims and 

express prayer in his last live pleading were clear that his claims against 

Strnad sought in essence cancellation of a deed allegedly procured by fraud. 

Such a claim is not a suit in trespass to try title. As the Court explained in 

Wilhoite v. Sims, 401 S.W.3d 752 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013).

The issue in this case was whether the quitclaim deed was voidable by 

being obtained by fraud, not whether Wilhoite's title was superior to Sims's. 

A suit for cancellation of a deed is an assertion of an equitable right, namely, 

the right to have a voidable deed cancelled. It is not a claim of right to title 

and possession of real property. See Tompkins v. Holman, 537 S.W.2d 98, 

99 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The assertion of an 

equitable right, such as cancellation of a deed procured by fraud, is not 

governed by the trespass-to-try-title statute. Id. " Such an assertion is 

clearly distinguishable from the claim of right to title and possession of 

real property, which is the sine qua non of a suit in trespass to try title." 

Id. [emphasis added] 

C. Point Three-Improper Invocation of UDJA is sufficient

23. An improper invocation of the UDJA is sufficient basis for a court to 

award attorneys’ to the defending party. See Devon Energy Production Co., 

L.P. v. KCS Resources, LLC, 14-13-00348-CV as follows:
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Under the UDJA, the trial court has authority to award attorneys' fees and 

costs "[i]n any proceeding under this chapter." See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. 

Code § 37.009. By seeking declaratory relief, Devon initiated a "proceeding 

under this chapter" that falls squarely within the plain language of Section 

37.009.

...

Devon "invoked" the UDJA through its pleadings. KCS, therefore, was 

eligible to recover its attorneys' fees as a party defending a claim for 

declaratory relief. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hallman, 159 S.W.3d 640, 641–

43 (Tex. 2005); Bradt, 905 S.W.2d at 759–60; see also Corcoran v. 

Atascocita Cmty. Improvement Ass'n, Inc., No. 14-12-00982-CV, 2013 WL 

5888127, at *9–12 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 31, 2013, pet. 

denied) (mem. op.) (affirming award of attorney's fees to third-party 

defendant against whom appellants filed suit). Therefore, regardless of 

whether Devon prevailed on its own claims, the trial court had jurisdiction 

over KCS's attorneys' fee claim for the defense of that litigation.

24. The Court in Devon further opined that even the absence of subject matter 

jurisdiction does not deprive the defending party of fees once the plaintiff 

invokes the UDJA :

According to the Texas cases interpreting the UDJA on which KCS relies, 

the absence of subject matter jurisdiction over Devon's claims at the 

inception of the litigation has no effect on whether KCS could recover its 

fees under the UDJA for defending against them when Devon's pleadings 

invoked the statute. We therefore sustain KCS's cross-issue

25. As detailed above above, Behrend’s counsel expressly pled in the trial 

court and argued in his Motion for New Trial that his petition was cast under 
17

the Declaratory Judgment Act. That characterization was reiterated by 

appellate counsel in their briefing in this Court. The word “trespass” is

never used in any brief in this Court, nor in any of Behrend’s three petitions 

in the trial Court. Strnad was not in possession of the property. The only claim 

involving Strnad, as prayed for in Behrend’s petitions, was essentially for 

the cancellation of a deed procured by fraud. That claim is not governed by 

the trespass-to-try-title statute. In Wilhoite v. Sims, 401 S.W.3d 752 

(Tex.App.-Dallas 2013) the Court opined:

The assertion of an equitable right, such as cancellation of a deed procured 

by fraud, is not governed by the trespass-to-try-title statute. Id. " Such an 

assertion is clearly distinguishable from the claim of right to title and 

possession of real property, which is the sine qua non of a suit in trespass to 

try title." 

26. In “PLAINTIFFS' ORIGINAL PETITION TO QUIET TITLE” [CR pg. 

16] Behrend alleged as follows:

6. Cause of Action Against Defendants Stolhandske and Strnad. As shown 

by the Default Judgment this Court has already judicially declared that 

Defendant Strnad owns and owned no title whatsoever to the properties in 

question. Plaintiffs allege that the special warranty deeds from Defendant 

Strnad to Defendant Stolhandske are void as a matter of law and convey no 

interest whatsoever to Defendant Stolhandske. Said deeds constitute a cloud 

on Plaintiffs title and the Court should declare such deeds void and

ineffective and quiet title in Plaintiff Behrend. [emphasis added]

...
18

8. All Parties Joined. All persons who have or claim any interest that may 

be affected by this Court's declarations have been made parties to this suit.

9. Attorney's Fees. Plaintiffs seek all reasonable and necessary attorney's 

fees in this case, which include the following:

27. “PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED ORIGINAL PETITION TO QUIET 

TITLE” restated the same claim against Strnad verbatim. [ CR pg.195]. See 

also Behrend’s second amended petition [CR pg. 348]. In Behrend’s Motion 

for New Trial he forcefully argued that he was proceeding under the 

Declaratory Judgement Act [CR pg. 688]:

“For that reason, on January 30, 2012 Plaintiff amended its pleadings asking

that the Court quiet title only as to the four tracts described in the deeds 

from Stolhandske to HH&L Development, Inc. Plaintiffs' live pleadings 

allege only a cause of action against HH&L Development, Inc. Stmad and 

Stolhandske are included as nominal parties only because the Declaratory 

Judgments Act requires the joinder of any party whose rights may be 

affected by the Court's ruling.” [emphasis added]

IV. Conclusion and Prayer

28. All the years (now 12) of Behrend’s relentless pursuit of Strnad was

predicated upon his claim that Strnad was his trustee. The bogus nature of 

Behrend’s claimed status as Strnad’s beneficiary that underpinned the 2003 

default Judgment against Strnad was confessed in affidavit of Behrend’s 

attorney Ron Flake to be bogus. For reasons that are not clear, the affidavit 

[CR pg 709] was filed after Judge Ramsey had ruled. According to Flake, 
19

title proceeded directly from Happy Jack to Strnad. There was no mention of 

a trust in Flake’s affidavit. Behrend was simply a majority shareholder.

29. Behrend will continue to use the judgment for attorneys in the 2003 

default judgment suit to relentlessly pursue Strnad through litigation if Strnad 

is not awarded offsetting attorneys fees in this case.

30. For the above reasons, the Court is requested to reconsider it reversal of 

attorneys’ fees and credit the discretion of Judge Ramsey who was familiar 

with the parties and the facts.

.
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Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Ted Cackowski

_________________________

TED CACKOWSKI

SBN: 03575900

1141 N. Loop 1604 E. #105

San Antonio, TX 78232

Tele: 210 383 7277

Facs: 866-271-5336 

Email: TedCLaw@aol.com

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

MICHAEL STRNAD 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that the foregoing document contains 3901 words 

according to the word count of the computer program used to prepare it, in

compliance with Rule 9.4(i)(2), excluding exempt items.

/s/ Ted Cackowski
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify by my signature below that a true and correct copy of

the foregoing document has been served on counsel of record for all parties 

via E-filing on the date it was filed.

/s/ Ted Cackowski

Ms. Kimberly S. Keller

Keller Stolarczyk, P.L.L.C.

234 West Bandera Road, #120

Boerne, TX 78006

Shane Stolarczyk

SBN: 24014182

KELLER STOLARCZYK PLLC

234 West Bandera Road #120

Boerne, Texas 78006

Allen Cazier,

Law Offices of Allen Cazier

8626 Tesoro Drive, Suite 500

San Antonio, Texas 78217

Mr. Pascual Madrigal

Law Offices of Pascual Madrigal

9504 N. IH 35, Suite 316

San Antonio, TX 78233

Mr. Matt C. Stolhandske

1004 South St. Mary’s

San Antonio, TX 78205