REVISED

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-10247

PAUL CURTIS LEGGETT, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

OFFICER GLADYS LAFAYETTE, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:13-CV-155

Before JOLLY and DENNIS, Circuit Judges, and RAMOS*, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:**

Paul Curtis Leggett brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

various jailers, including Officer Gladys Lafayette. The district court entered 

a final order granting partial summary judgment for the defendants as to all 

claims except one claim of mail tampering against Lafayette. Leggett did not 

* District Judge of the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. ** Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 10, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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appeal from that judgment. Lafayette moved for summary judgment on the 

remaining claim, arguing that Leggett failed to exhaust the jail’s 

administrative grievance procedures before filing suit, as required by the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Leggett 

countered that those procedures were not “available” to him because the jail 

failed to timely provide him with a copy of the jail’s inmate handbook, which 

described the grievance process. The district court credited Lafayette’s 

evidence that Leggett had in fact received the inmate handbook at booking and 

granted summary judgment for Lafayette. For the reasons set out below, we

AFFIRM summary judgment for Lafayette and DENY Leggett’s pending 

motion for appointment of counsel.

BACKGROUND

Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Leggett, a former inmate of the 

Tarrant County Correctional Center, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 against three employees of the jail, including Officer Lafayette. In his 

complaint, Leggett alleged that Officer Lafayette—the jail’s mail room 

officer—opened his mail and removed contents that caused a disruption in his 

application for disability benefits with the Veterans Administration (“VA”). 

Specifically, Leggett alleged that Officer Lafayette removed a pre-paid 

envelope that was enclosed in his mail. Leggett further alleged that other 

officers did not allow him to use the copier in the library and were responsible 

for his watch and rings disappearing from his prison bin. Leggett sought 

compensation for his interrupted disability application and the loss of his 

jewelry. 

The district court issued an opinion and order of partial dismissal under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The court determined 

that Leggett could proceed with his claim against Officer Lafayette for 

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disrupting his mail, but concluded that Leggett failed to allege a constitutional 

violation against the other officers. Thus, the district court dismissed all of 

Leggett’s § 1983 claims, except for his claim against Officer Lafayette, and 

entered a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) as to the 

dismissed claims.

Officer Lafayette subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on 

the remaining claim, arguing that Leggett had failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies, as required by the PLRA. Although Leggett filed an 

initial grievance regarding the removal of the stamped, pre-addressed 

envelope, there was no evidence that he made use of the jail’s appeals process

before commencing the instant action. In support of her summary judgment 

motion, Lafayette submitted evidence that all inmates receive a copy of the 

inmate handbook upon being booked in the jail and that copies of the handbook 

are widely available to prisoners in the confinement areas of the jail. The 

inmate handbook sets forth the jail grievance process, which includes filing an 

initial grievance; appealing the initial grievance to the Grievance Appeal 

Board; and then appealing to the sheriff within five days of receiving the 

Grievance Appeal Board’s decision. Officer Lafayette also offered evidence 

indicating that Leggett had signed a form acknowledging his receipt of the 

handbook at booking and subsequently signed other documents that 

referenced the handbook.

In response, Leggett offered his own signed declarations stating that he 

did not receive an inmate handbook at the time he was booked into the Tarrant 

County Correctional Center. Leggett explained that at the time of his booking, 

he was placed on suicide watch, was given only a paper uniform to wear, and 

was not given any documents. He thus contended that he should not be held 

accountable for failing to exhaust the jail’s administrative remedies.

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The district court rejected Leggett’s claim that he did not receive a copy 

of the inmate handbook and was, therefore, unaware that he was required to 

appeal the denial of his initial grievance. The district court thus issued an 

order granting Lafayette’s motion for summary judgment. Leggett 

subsequently filed a motion for appointment of counsel, as well as a timely 

notice of appeal. 

ANALYSIS

I.

The district court initially dismissed all of Leggett’s claims except for his 

claim against Lafayette based on her interference with his mail. The district 

court entered final judgment on those other claims under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(b) and Leggett did not appeal from that judgment. Although 

Leggett reasserts those claims in his brief on appeal, we lack jurisdiction to 

consider them now. See, e.g., Meadaa v. K.A.P. Enters., L.L.C., 756 F.3d 875, 

879 (5th Cir. 2014) (“A proper Rule 54(b) judgment is a final judgment for all 

purposes on the adjudicated claims.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

II.

The principal issue on this appeal is whether Lafayette was entitled to 

summary judgment because Leggett failed to exhaust administrative remedies 

prior to filing suit in federal court. The PLRA states that:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under 

section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Whether administrative remedies were “available” is a 

question of law, but the resolution of that question sometimes turns on 

questions of fact. Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010). “We 

review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a § 1983 suit for failure to exhaust 

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administrative remedies.” Alexander v. Tippah Cnty., Miss., 351 F.3d 626, 629 

(5th Cir. 2003). Here, Leggett offered three signed declarations stating that 

he was not notified of the grievance process until after the limitations period 

for appealing his grievance had passed, because the jail did not provide him 

with an inmate handbook until approximately a year after he entered the jail. 

Leggett’s declarations constitute competent summary-judgment evidence and 

the district court erred in failing to credit them. See Ion v. Chevron USA, Inc., 

731 F.3d 379, 382 n.2 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 

1866 (2014) (per curiam). Thus, the district court erred when it concluded that 

Leggett had failed to create a fact dispute regarding the timing of his receipt 

of the inmate handbook. That fact dispute is immaterial, however, if it does 

not excuse Leggett’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Dillon, 

596 F.3d at 268.

The issue is whether the jail staff’s failure to provide Leggett with an 

inmate handbook at the relevant time rendered the jail’s administrative 

grievance procedures “unavailable,” thereby excusing Leggett’s failure to 

exhaust them. See id. The best case favoring Leggett’s position is Dillon v. 

Rogers. There, Dillon was transferred to a temporary jail following Hurricane 

Katrina. Id. at 265. Dillon was allegedly beaten and mistreated by guards at 

the temporary facility, resulting in hearing loss and other injuries. Id. Dillon 

later filed suit under § 1983, alleging civil rights violations, but the district 

court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss because Dillon had failed to 

exhaust administrative remedies. Id. On appeal, Dillon explained that he did 

not file a grievance once he had been transferred to a permanent facility 

because he was told by a corrections officer and inmate counsel that he could 

not file a grievance for abuse that he suffered at a different facility. Id. at 267. 

The Dillon court noted that this circuit adheres to a “strict” approach to the 

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exhaustion requirement, refusing to accept mere “substantial compliance” with 

administrative procedures, but also stated that we had “long recognized the 

importance of ensuring that inmates have avenues for discovering the 

procedural rules governing their grievances.” Id. at 268. We sent the case 

back to the district court for discovery after concluding that we could not 

“determine whether administrative remedies were ‘available’ for Dillon”

because there was no evidence as to what Dillon knew or could have discovered 

about the grievance process, what the process entailed (the record did not 

contain a copy of the inmate handbook), or whether “emergency procedures” 

suspending consideration of grievances from transferred inmates were in force 

at the relevant time. Id. at 267, 269.

Like in Dillon, the record in this case does not conclusively establish

what Leggett knew about the administrative grievance procedures. Unlike in 

Dillon, however, the key portions of the inmate handbook are contained in the 

record and the uncontested evidence indicates that copies of the handbook were 

readily available to inmates in the confinement areas of the jail (to which 

Leggett had access). Furthermore, there is no suggestion that anyone ever 

misled Leggett about the grievance process or attempted to dissuade him from 

making use of it. The summary-judgment evidence establishes that Leggett 

had “avenues for discovering the procedural rules governing [his] grievances.” 

Id. at 268. Thus, even if Leggett was subjectively unaware of the procedures, 

the record sets out the substance of those procedures and indicates that the 

information was available to Leggett.

Several of our unpublished cases also indicate that although Leggett did 

not receive a copy of the inmate handbook at booking, that fact did not render 

the jail’s administrative grievance procedures unavailable. In Manemann v. 

Garrett, for example, we concluded that the plaintiff prisoner was unaware of 

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the jail’s grievance policy but affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure 

to exhaust because the record indicated that the jail had a grievance policy and 

there was no evidence that the plaintiff “ever asked for information about filing 

a grievance and was refused such information or was given incorrect 

information.” 484 F. App’x 857, 858 (5th Cir. 2012); see also Huff v. Neal, 555 

F. App’x 289, 296 n.6 (5th Cir. 2014) (concluding that grievance procedures 

were available where inmate “could have discovered” deadline for filing a 

formal complaint); Gonzalez v. Crawford, 419 F. App’x 522, 523 (5th Cir. 2011) 

(“[Plaintiff prisoner’s] alleged ignorance of the exhaustion requirement, or the 

fact that he might have misconstrued the language in the handbook, does not 

excuse his failure to exhaust.”); Palermo v. Miller, 196 F. App’x 234, 235 (5th 

Cir. 2006) (upholding dismissal of prisoner’s § 1983 claim for failure to exhaust 

where prisoner mistakenly believed it was unnecessary to file a Step 2 

grievance). 

Even if Leggett was not informed of the relevant grievance procedure, 

uncontested record evidence indicates that a specific grievance procedure was 

in place at the time, its contours were knowable, and no one attempted to 

dissuade Leggett from using it. As a result, although the district court erred 

in rejecting Leggett’s evidence that he did not receive an inmate handbook at 

booking, summary judgment for Lafayette was nevertheless appropriate. See 

Vuncannon v. United States, 711 F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 2013) (“We are not 

limited to the district court’s reasons for its grant of summary judgment and 

may affirm the district court’s judgment on any grounds supported by the 

record.” (quotation marks omitted)). 

III.

Leggett briefly argues that the district court failed to respond to his

“motion to amend judgment,” in which he noted deficiencies in some of 

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Lafayette’s summary-judgment evidence. The district court struck Leggett’s 

motion because it did not include a completed certificate of service as required 

by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d), or a certificate of conference or 

inability to confer as required by local rules. We have previously affirmed a 

district court’s decision to strike a motion for failure to include a certificate of 

service. See Victor F. v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 793 F.2d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 

1986). The district court did not abuse its discretion by striking Leggett’s 

motion for that reason here. See United States v. Jett, 48 F.3d 530 at *1 (5th 

Cir. 1995) (unpublished).

IV.

Lastly, we consider Leggett’s pending motion for appointment of counsel 

in the instant appeal. Appointment of counsel in a § 1983 case is warranted if 

the case presents “exceptional circumstances.” Freeze v. Griffith, 849 F.2d 172, 

175 (5th Cir. 1988). This case turns on a straightforward application of the

PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. The district court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying Leggett’s requests for counsel and we will not appoint counsel now. 

See id.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment and DENY Leggett’s renewed motion for appointment of counsel.

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