PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1434

WORLD FUEL SERVICES TRADING, DMCC, d/b/a Bunkerfuels,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

HEBEI PRINCE SHIPPING COMPANY, LTD.,

Claimant – Appellant,

and

M/V HEBEI SHIJIAZHUANG, her engines, tackle, equipment, 

appurtenances, etc., in rem,

Defendant,

T. PARKER HOST, INC.,

Claimant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Mark S. Davis, District 

Judge. (2:13-cv-00173-MSD-DEM)

Argued: January 28, 2015 Decided: April 17, 2015

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion, in 

which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Harris concurred.
2

ARGUED: Steven Michael Stancliff, CRENSHAW, WARE & MARTIN, 

P.L.C., Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Mark T. Coberly, 

VANDEVENTER BLACK, LLP, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. ON 

BRIEF: James L. Chapman, IV, CRENSHAW, WARE & MARTIN, P.L.C., 

Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Dustin M. Paul, VANDEVENTER 

BLACK, LLP, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
3

AGEE, Circuit Judge:

World Fuel Services Trading, DMCC, (“DMCC”) brought this in 

rem action against the M/V HEBEI SHIJIAZHUANG (“the Vessel”)

seeking to enforce a maritime lien for the supply of necessaries

under the Federal Maritime Lien Act (“FMLA”), 46 U.S.C. § 

31342(a). The district court held that DMCC was entitled to a 

maritime lien for the amount due for marine fuel (referred to as 

“bunkers”) provided to the Vessel, and granted DMCC’s motion for 

summary judgment. Hebei Prince Shipping Company, Limited, 

(“Hebei Prince”), the owner of the Vessel, appeals. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court in favor of DMCC.

I.

A.

To provide context for the underlying dispute, we begin 

with a brief review of maritime lien law. A maritime lien is 

“[a] lien on a vessel, given to secure the claim of a creditor 

who provided maritime services to the vessel[.]” Black’s Law 

Dictionary 1065 (10th ed. 2014). “It arises by operation of law 

and exist[s] as a claim upon the property.” Id. (quoting 

Griffith Price, The Law of Maritime Liens 1 (1940)); see also

Triton Marine Fuels Ltd., S.A. v. M/V PAC. CHUKOTKA, 575 F.3d 

409, 416 (4th Cir. 2009) (“‘[M]aritime liens are stricti juris
4

and cannot be created by agreement between the parties; instead, 

they arise by operation of law, often depending on the nature 

and object of the contract.’” (quoting Bominflot, Inc. v. M/V 

HENRICH S, 465 F.3d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 2006)). 

Congress enacted the FMLA in 1910, which altered several

then-existing common law principles governing when a maritime 

lien would arise under United States law. See id. at 417. That 

initial legislation “provide[d] a single federal statute for the 

determination of maritime liens, and by providing this uniform 

scheme, the statute confer[red] domestic suppliers of 

necessaries with the same lien rights as previously enjoyed only 

by foreign suppliers under the common law.” Id. at 418. The 

next major change to the FMLA occurred in “1971, when Congress 

enacted legislation essentially to void ‘no lien’ clauses in 

charters, as long as the supplier did not have actual knowledge 

of such clause.” Id. at 418 n.5. Most recently, the FMLA was 

recodified as part of the Commercial Instruments and Maritime 

Liens Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 31301-31343. For ease of reference, 

however, we will continue to refer to the relevant statutes as 

the “FMLA.” “Despite [these] recodifications, the fundamental 

purposes underlying the FMLA have remained unchanged.” Triton 

Marine, 575 F.3d at 417-18.

Generally speaking, a maritime lien arises more readily 

under the FMLA than under the laws of other maritime countries. 
5

E.g., Bominflot, 465 F.3d at 147 (“The United States as well as 

a number of civil law nations . . . allow for broader use and 

enforcement of maritime liens[.]”). As a result, which nation’s

law governs a particular maritime contract may be significant in 

determining whether, or to what extent, a maritime lien exists. 

B.

Hebei Prince, a corporation organized under the laws of 

China, owns the Vessel, which is registered in Hong Kong. The 

Vessel was leased to a Greek corporation, Tramp Maritime 

Enterprises Ltd. (“Tramp Maritime”) under three consecutive time 

charters (maritime contracts of ship charter) covering the 

period from May 23, 2012 to November 28, 2012. The terms of the 

time charters prohibited Tramp Maritime from incurring “any lien 

or encumbrance” against the Vessel. (J.A. 86.)

In October 2012, Tramp Maritime emailed Aristades P. Vogas 

of Bunkerfuels Hellas in Athens, Greece, to arrange for the 

purchase of bunkers to be delivered to the Vessel while it was 

docked at a port in the United Arab Emirates. The email reply

from Vogas confirming the transaction (“the Bunker 

Confirmation”) identifies the “seller” as “BUNKERFUELS A 

DBA/DIVISION OF WFS Trading DMCC” and the “buyer” as “MV HEBEI 

SHIJIAZHUANG AND HER OWNERS/OPERATORS AND TRAMP MARITIME 

ENTERPRISES LTD.” (J.A. 21.) It also identifies APSCO JEDDAH 
6

as the “physical supplier” of the bunkers. (J.A. 21.) The 

Bunker Confirmation further states:

ALL SALES ARE ON THE CREDIT OF THE VSL. BUYER IS 

PRESUMED TO HAVE AUTHORITY TO BIND THE VSL WITH A 

MARITIME LIEN. DISCLAIMER STAMPS PLACED BY VSL ON THE 

BUNKER RECEIPT WILL HAVE NO EFFECT AND DO NOT WAIVE 

THE SELLER’S LIEN. THIS CONFIRMATION IS GOVERNED BY 

AND INCORPORATES BY REFERENCE SELLER’S GENERAL TERMS 

AND CONDITIONS IN EFFECT AS OF THE DATE THAT THIS 

CONFIRMATION IS ISSUED. THESE INCORPORATED AND 

REFERENCED TERMS CAN BE FOUND AT WWW.WFSCORP.COM. 

ALTERNATIVELY, YOU MAY INFORM US IF YOU REQUIRE A COPY 

AND SAME WILL BE PROVIDED TO YOU.

(J.A. 21.) 

APSCO JEDDAH delivered the bunkers to the Vessel according 

to the terms of the Bunker Confirmation. The Vessel’s chief 

engineer signed the delivery notices and attached a “no lien” 

stamp, which stated “Bunkering Services and the bunkers are 

ordered solely for the account of Charterers and not for owners. 

Accordingly no lien or other claims whatsoever against the 

Vessel or her owners can arise.” (J.A. 19, 20.) 

Tramp Maritime subsequently received an invoice for the 

bunkers purporting to be from “BUNKERFUELS A Division of World 

Fuel Services Trading, DMCC” requesting payment. (J.A. 22.) 

The invoice stated that the amount due could be wire-transferred 

to a Bank of America account for “World Fuel Services Europe, 

Ltd.” (J.A. 22.) Neither Tramp Maritime nor any other party 

paid the invoice.
7

DMCC then filed this in rem action in the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia asserting it 

was owed $809,420.50 for the unpaid bunkers,1 and that it was 

entitled to enforce a maritime lien on the Vessel under the 

FMLA. It also moved for the court to issue a maritime warrant 

for the arrest of the Vessel, which was expected to port in 

Norfolk, Virginia, within fourteen days. The district court 

issued an order for the maritime arrest warrant, which was 

executed on the Vessel when it docked in Norfolk. Hebei Prince 

later posted a cash bond so that the Vessel could be released 

before resolution of the underlying complaint. 

DMCC moved for summary judgment, which Hebei Prince 

opposed. Hebei Prince then filed a cross-motion for summary 

judgment, relying on the same grounds raised in its opposition 

to DMCC’s motion. Challenging nearly every aspect of DMCC’s 

claim, Hebei Prince argued: (1) DMCC was not a party in privity

to the Bunker Confirmation and thus could not assert a maritime 

lien; (2) Greek law should apply to every aspect of the 

contractual dispute; (3) the Bunker Confirmation did not 

successfully incorporate the General Terms & Conditions on which 

DMCC relied; (4) the General Terms & Conditions could not apply 

to DMCC even if DMCC sought to incorporate them; (5) the General 

 1 This amount reflected the amount due for the bunkers plus 

a contract-based administrative fee for past-due sums.
8

Terms & Conditions’ choice-of-law provision did not “choose” 

United States statutory maritime law such as the FMLA; (6) DMCC 

had actual knowledge of the prohibition of liens in Tramp 

Maritime’s time charter and thus could not rely on the FMLA’s 

presumption to bind the Vessel; and (7) principles of comity 

require rejecting the application of United States law to this 

transaction. 

In a thorough opinion, the district court rejected all but 

one of Hebei Prince’s arguments, and, in any event, that one 

area of agreement did not alter the court’s ultimate holding. 

See World Fuel Servs. Trading, DMCC v. M/V HEBEI SHIJIAZHUANG, 

12 F. Supp. 3d 792 (E.D. Va. 2014). In sum, the district court 

concluded that the Bunker Confirmation successfully incorporated 

the General Terms & Conditions DMCC relied upon to establish

that United States law, including the FMLA, governed the 

existence and enforcement of a maritime lien. The district 

court also held that “no genuine issue of material fact 

regarding the existence of a maritime lien in this matter 

[exists and that], as a matter of law, [DMCC was] entitled to a 

maritime lien against the [V]essel.” Id. at 810. 

Following briefing and a hearing on the amount of damages 

to be awarded, the district court entered final judgment 

awarding DMCC $813,740.10. Hebei Prince noted a timely appeal. 
9

Jurisdiction exists for the reasons discussed below in Section 

II.A. 

II.

Hebei Prince raises the same arguments on appeal that it 

did in the district court. As for relief, it alternatively 

argues that we should dismiss the case for lack of admiralty 

jurisdiction, vacate the district court’s award of summary 

judgment to DMCC and remand to resolve disputed issues of 

material fact, or vacate the district court’s judgment and enter 

final judgment in its favor. 

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo, applying the same standard as the district court. FDIC v. 

Cashion, 720 F.3d 169, 173 (4th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is 

appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In addition to construing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to Hebei Prince, the non-movant, we 

also draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Cashion, 720 

F.3d at 173.

To the extent Hebei Prince challenges not just the grant of 

summary judgment, but the district court’s jurisdiction, we

review legal conclusions regarding jurisdiction de novo and 
10

factual findings for clear error. Flame S.A. v. Freight Bulk 

Pte. Ltd., 762 F.3d 352, 356 (4th Cir. 2014).

A.

Throughout its brief, Hebei Prince argues that the district 

court lacked admiralty jurisdiction and therefore the case 

should be dismissed. DMCC responds that Hebei Prince confuses

the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction with the merits of 

DMCC’s claim of a maritime lien arising under the FMLA. We 

agree with DMCC. 

The Supreme Court noted the distinction, specifically in 

the admiralty context, between establishing a court’s 

jurisdiction and the determination of the merits of a cause of 

action over a century ago in The Resolute, 168 U.S. 437 (1897):

Jurisdiction is the power to adjudicate a case 

upon the merits, and dispose of it as justice may 

require. As applied to a suit in rem for the breach of 

a maritime contract, it presupposes-First that the 

contract sued upon is a maritime contract; and second, 

that the property proceeded against is within the 

lawful custody of the court. These are the only 

requirements necessary to give jurisdiction. Proper 

cognizance of the parties and subject-matter being 

conceded, all other matters belong to the merits.

. . . [T]he question of lien or no lien is not one 

of jurisdiction, but of merits.

It is true that there can be no decree in rem 

against the vessel except for the enforcement of a lien 

given by the maritime law . . .; but, if the existence 

of such a lien were a question of jurisdiction, then 
11

nearly every question arising upon the merits could be 

made one of jurisdiction. 

Id. at 439-40 (emphasis added). This admiralty-specific 

language is consistent with the Supreme Court’s general 

statements in the non-admiralty context separating 

jurisdictional questions from those concerning the merits of an 

action. E.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 

Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.4 (2014) (“‘[T]he absence of a 

valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not 

implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s 

statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.’” 

(quoting Verizon Md., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 

U.S. 635, 642-43 (2002)). 

Here, Hebei Prince acknowledges that the Bunker 

Confirmation was a maritime contract. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. 

Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 24 (2004) (stating that whether a contract 

is a “maritime contract,” “depends upon the nature and character 

of the contract, and the true criterion is whether it has 

reference to maritime service or maritime transactions” 

(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Similarly, 

Hebei Prince does not contest that the Vessel was physically 

within the “lawful custody of the court” at the time of its 

arrest. See In re Millennium Seacarriers, Inc., 419 F.3d 83, 94 

(2d Cir. 2005) (“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction lies in the 
12

district court where the vessel or other res is located, but 

that jurisdiction does not attach until the vessel is arrested 

within the jurisdiction.”). Thus, under the standard 

articulated in The Resolute, it is clear that the district court 

possessed admiralty jurisdiction.2 See Logistics Mgmt., Inc. v. 

One (1) Pyramid Tent Arena, 86 F.3d 908, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(conducting this inquiry); see also Wilkins v. Commercial Inv. 

Trust Corp., 153 F.3d 1273, 1276 (11th Cir. 1998) (same). 

As a result, Hebei Prince’s arguments that DMCC does not 

have an enforceable maritime lien under the FMLA do not 

implicate admiralty jurisdiction, but rather go to the merits of 

DMCC’s action. The district court had admiralty jurisdiction to 

consider DMCC’s claim, and we have jurisdiction over this appeal 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

 2 The Ninth Circuit has held that admiralty jurisdiction can 

arise under the FMLA even where it would not also arise under 

common law admiralty jurisdiction. See Ventura Packers, Inc. v. 

F/V JEANINE KATHLEEN, 305 F.3d 913, 919 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“Although a maritime contract may support admiralty 

jurisdiction, it is not an essential prerequisite to a civil 

action in admiralty to enforce a statutory necessaries lien.”). 

But see E.S. Binnings, Inc. v. M/V SAUDI RIYADH, 815 F.2d 660 

(8th Cir. 1987) (concluding plaintiff could not proceed on a 

claim seeking enforcement of an FMLA maritime lien because the 

underlying contract was not a maritime contract and so the 

district court lacked admiralty jurisdiction), overruled on 

other grounds by Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 

603, 612 (1991). We need not delve into that question here

because jurisdiction exists in this case under traditional 

principles establishing admiralty jurisdiction. 
13

B.

Before addressing Hebei Prince’s substantive challenges to 

the district court’s decision, we consider its threshhold

arguments as to which country’s law applies to the issues of 

contract formation. 

In the district court, Hebei Prince argued that under 

Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), Greek law determined 

issues of contract between the parties, including whether DMCC 

was in privity of contract to the agreement and whether the 

Bunker Confirmation contained a binding choice-of-law provision. 

DMCC contended United States law applied, but that it made no 

real difference as the principles of contract law were the same 

under either country’s law and would lead to the same result in 

its favor. After examining the terms of the Bunker Confirmation

and the parties’ arguments, the district court decided the most 

prudent course was to assume that Hebei Prince was correct and 

apply Greek law to any contract formation issues. As a 

corollary, the district court observed that it would reach the 

same conclusions on contract formation issues under United 

States law as it did applying Greek law. 

On appeal, the parties do not make particularly robust 

arguments either as to the district court’s choice of Greek law, 

its articulation of Greek contract law principles, or its 

conclusion that the same analysis would result under United 
14

States law. Hebei Prince instead maintains that the court erred 

in its application of Greek law to the factual record. DMCC, in 

turn, maintains that while the district court should have 

applied United States law based strictly on the choice-of-law 

provision, it prevails under either country’s law. 

In Lauritzen, the Supreme Court set forth several factors 

for federal courts sitting in admiralty to consider in 

determining what country’s law governs: “(1) the place of the 

wrongful act; (2) the law of the flag; (3) the allegiance of the 

injured party; (4) the allegiance of the defendant shipowner; 

(5) the place of contract; (6) the inaccessibility of a foreign 

forum; and (7) the law of the forum.” Trans-Tec Asia v. M/V 

HARMONY CONTAINER, 518 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 

Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 583-92).

In Triton Marine, however, we found it unnecessary to 

conduct a Lauritzen choice-of-law analysis because the contract 

at issue contained a choice-of-law clause. See Triton Marine, 

575 F.3d at 413; see also Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 588-89 (“Except 

as forbidden by some public policy, the tendency of the law is 

to apply in contract matters the law which the parties intended 

to apply.”). Relying on prior Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit 

case law, we concluded that “absent compelling reasons of public 

policy, a choice-of-law provision in a maritime contract should 

be enforced,” and a Lauritzen choice-of-law analysis was 
15

unnecessary. Triton Marine, 575 F.3d at 415; see also

Bominflot, Inc., 465 F.3d at 148 (holding that the choice of law 

question was “made easy” by the party’s contractual provision 

agreeing that English law would apply).3 Thus, for the reasons 

set forth in Triton Marine and Bominflot, Inc., a Lauritzen

choice-of-law analysis is unnecessary in this case. 

Moreover, we agree with the district court that the 

applicable law on the issues of contract formation would be the 

same whether Greek or United States law is applied. As we 

discuss in the context of the individual arguments below, Greek 

contract law does not differ in any material respect from the 

 3 The choice-of-law clause at issue in Triton Marine was 

located in the body of the contract. 575 F.3d at 413. In 

Bominflot, we avoided the Lauritzen choice-of-law analysis based 

on a choice-of-law provision that was incorporated by reference. 

465 F.3d at 148; see also Hawkespere Shipping Co., Ltd. v. 

Intamex, S.A., 330 F.3d 225, 233 (4th Cir. 2003) (“‘Where the 

parties specify in their contractual agreement which law will 

apply, admiralty courts will generally give effect to that 

choice.’” (quoting Chan v. Soc’y Expeditions, Inc., 123 F.3d 

1287, 1297 (9th Cir. 1997)). These cases thus counsel that if 

we applied United States law to the question, we would enforce a 

contract’s choice-of-law provision. Applied here, so long as 

the General Terms were successfully incorporated to the Bunker 

Confirmation, see analysis infra II.D at 28 n.6, it would govern 

the dispute.

Although Hebei Prince asserts various reasons why an 

otherwise incorporated choice-of-law provision should not be 

enforced against it, none demonstrates a compelling public 

policy. For example, we have previously rejected arguments that 

enforcing such provisions adversely affects the interests of—and 

works a fundamental unfairness against—a vessel owner who was 

not party to the contract containing the choice-of-law 

provision. See Triton Marine, 575 F.3d at 413-16. 
16

corresponding principles of United States law. For this reason, 

too, we need not resolve the choice-of-law question, as it makes 

no discernible difference to the relevant analysis in the case 

at bar. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 838

n.20 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 

part) (“If the laws of both states relevant to the set of facts 

are the same, or would produce the same decision in the lawsuit, 

there is no real conflict between them.” (quotation marks and 

citation omitted)); Hammersmith v. TIG Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 220, 

230 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that a conflict of law analysis is 

unnecessary if the laws of each jurisdiction are the same, or 

would lead to the same result, because there is no “conflict” in 

the law that needs to be resolved); Okmyansky v. Herbalife Int’l 

of Am., Inc., 415 F.3d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen 

resolution of a choice-of-law determination would not alter the 

disposition of a legal question, a reviewing court need not 

decide which body of law controls.”); Fin. One Pub. Co. v. 

Lehman Bros. Special Fin., Inc., 414 F.3d 325, 331 (2d Cir. 

2005) (“[W]e [do] not have occasion to embark on a choice-of-law 

analysis in the absence of an actual conflict between the 

applicable rules of two relevant jurisdictions.”); Cruz v. Am. 

Airlines, Inc., 356 F.3d 320, 331-32 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (same); 

Modern Equip. Co. v. Cont’l W. Ins. Co., 355 F.3d 1125, 1128 n.7 

(8th Cir. 2004) (same); Schneider Nat’l Transp. v. Ford Motor 
17

Co., 280 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2002) (same). We will 

therefore follow the district court’s approach in using 

principles of Greek law pertaining to contract formation, but 

noting the parallel analysis under United States law.

C.

Hebei Prince argues that the district court erred at the 

outset of the case as it contends that the record does not 

establish DMCC as a party in the underlying transaction and 

therefore without any right to bring the in rem action. 

Essentially, Hebei Prince contends DMCC was not in privity of 

contract with Tramp Maritime because it has not shown that it 

was an actual party to the Bunker Confirmation.4

 Consequently, 

Hebei Prince posits that DMCC cannot seek to enforce a maritime 

lien against the Vessel based on that agreement and that this 

problem requires dismissal of the suit or, at the very least, 

remand to resolve a genuine issue of material fact as to DMCC’s 

 4 Hebei Prince acknowledges that the Bunker Confirmation 

formed a contract between Tramp Maritime and another entity, but 

it disputes that DMCC is that other entity. In other words, 

Hebei Prince asserts that Tramp Maritime entered into an 

agreement with Bunkerfuels Hellas or even the entity identified 

on the Bunker Confirmation as “BUNKERFUELS A DBA/DIVISION OF WFS 

TRADING DMCC,” but that no evidence in the record demonstrated 

that DMCC is either related by law to Bunkerfuels Hellas or is 

“BUNKERFUELS A DBA/DIVISION OR WFS TRADING DMCC.” (Cf. J.A. 

21.)
18

standing to bring an action based on the Bunker Confirmation.

We disagree.

Applying principles of Greek agency law, the district court 

concluded that Vogas had entered into the agreement with Tramp 

Maritime on behalf of his principal, DMCC. See World Fuel 

Servs. Trading, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 802 (“The Greek doctrine of 

‘ostensible authority’ is much like the agency law recognized in 

the United States, where ‘[t]he essential underlying principle 

in the agency relationship is the power of an agent to commit 

his principal to business relations with third parties.’”

(citation omitted)). The district court emphasized that in 

contrast to the record DMCC pointed to as evidence that it was 

the seller of bunkers to Tramp Maritime, Hebei Prince presented 

no “specific facts” supported in the record that created a 

“‘genuine issue for trial,’ as to whether [DMCC] was a party to 

the contract.” See id. at 804 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)).

We agree with the district court that the record permits no 

conclusion but that DMCC sold Tramp Maritime the bunkers 

specified in the Bunker Confirmation through its agent, Vogas. 

Because DMCC filed a verified complaint, it contains a sworn 

statement indicating that its contents are “true and correct 

based upon [the] personal knowledge and documents available to” 

DMCC, and we can treat those components of it as “the equivalent 
19

of an opposing affidavit for summary judgment purposes.” 

Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991); see also

Supp. Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims R. C(2) (requiring 

that the complaint in an in rem action be verified). (See J.A. 

18, containing the verification of Richard D. McMichael, a 

“Director of WORLD FUEL SERVICES TRADING, DMCC.) The verified 

complaint states that “World Fuel Services Trading, DMCC, d/b/a 

Bunkerfuels” entered into the agreement memorialized in the 

Bunker Confirmation for its subcontractor APSCO to deliver 

bunkers to the Vessel. (J.A. 14.) Consistent with this 

assertion, the Bunker Confirmation identifies the seller of the 

bunkers as “BUNKERFUELS A DBA/DIVISION OF WFS Trading DMCC.” 

(J.A. 21.) Even more clearly, the invoice Tramp Maritime 

received after the bunkers had been delivered refers to 

“BUNKERFUELS A Division of World Fuel Services Trading, DMCC.” 

(J.A. 22.)

While DMCC’s name as specified in the verified complaint is 

“World Fuel Services Trading, DMCC,” nothing in the record 

suggests that the “WFS Trading DMCC” identified on the Bunker 

Confirmation refers to an entity other than DMCC. All the 

record evidence points to the same conclusion: “WFS Trading 

DMCC” is “World Fuel Services Trading, DMCC,” and “WFS” is 

simply an acronym for “World Fuel Services” rather than a formal 

designation of a separate entity. Examples of this practice 
20

exist throughout this case: the website listed in the Bunker 

Confirmation (www.wfscorp.com) uses the elongated “World Fuel 

Services” throughout the website, the bunker invoice refers to 

both “World Fuel Services” and “WFS,” as do other items in the 

record. (J.A. 21, 22.) Indeed, in other contexts, even Hebei 

Prince’s filings use “WFS” and “World Fuel Services” 

interchangeably. 

Furthermore, in his sworn declaration and deposition 

testimony, Jos Heijmen, the Senior Vice President of Credit & 

Risk Management of World Fuel Services Corporation, explained 

the relationship between the various entities. He stated that 

World Fuel Services Corporation is the parent corporation of 

“the World Fuel Services Group of Companies,” which includes 

DMCC. (J.A. 252.) He observed that DMCC “is part of a network 

of affiliated and related companies that provide fuel to oceangoing vessels throughout the world, doing business under the 

trade name ‘Bunkerfuels.’” (J.A. 252.) He noted that 

Bunkerfuels Hellas is the Athens, Greece branch of a World Fuel 

Services subsidiary, and that it “provide[s] marketing and 

promotion services to Greek ship operators/owners and local 

suppliers.” (J.A. 252.) He stated that when a Bunkerfuels 

Hellas employee receives a bunker inquiry, the transaction is 

automatically routed through “the World Fuel’s affiliated 

company located in the geographic region of the world where the 
21

bunkers will be delivered to the vessel.” (J.A. 252.) And he 

identified DMCC as World Fuel Service’s “provider of bunker fuel 

for ocean-going vessels in the [United Arab Emirates] and the 

Middle East,” and that DMCC is organized under the laws of the 

United Arab Emirates with its principal place of business in 

Dubai. (J.A. 251.) 

Heijmen also explained that Vogas is an employee of

Bunkerfuels Hellas, and is authorized “to enter into contracts 

with [Greek vessel operators/owners like Tramp Maritime] on 

behalf of and for the World Fuel Services affiliate located 

where the ship required and was supplied bunkers,” including 

transactions on behalf of DMCC. (J.A. 252-53.) He specifically 

stated that Vogas was authorized “by World Fuel Services 

Trading, DMCC, in October 2012 to act and enter on behalf of 

World Fuel Services Trading, DMCC into the contract with Tramp 

Maritime Enterprises, Ltd. that is at issue in this case.” 

(J.A. 253.)

Hebei Prince’s attempts to ignore or explain away this 

testimony amounts to no more than conjecture. Without record 

evidence to support its assertions, Hebei Prince speculates that 

DMCC may not be the entity it purports to be, that documents 

cannot mean what they say on their face, and that entities are 

not related in the only way they are described above. Hebei 

Prince’s parsing of Heijmen’s declaration and deposition 
22

testimony goes beyond any common-sense reading of those 

documents. In sum, it attempts to manufacture doubt where none 

exists to obscure the relationship between DMCC and the 

transaction at issue. Based on the record in this case, the 

district court did not err in concluding that Hebei Prince 

failed to show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Vogas entered into the Bunker Confirmation as the agent of the 

seller, DMCC. 

Lastly, Hebei Prince asserts that even if Vogas was DMCC’s 

agent, that fact “was not accurately disclosed and was 

misleading.” (Opening Br. 19.) We readily reject that notion. 

The Bunker Confirmation hardly disguises the identity of the 

seller, “BUNKERFUELS A DBA/DIVISION OF WFS Trading DMCC.” (J.A. 

21.) Regardless of the effectiveness of the incorporation by 

reference, the Bunker Confirmation also refers to and directs 

readers to the “SELLER’S GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS . . . 

FOUND AT WWW.WFSCORP.COM.” (J.A. 21 (emphasis added).) In 

addition, the email addresses provided for both Vogas and 

Bunkerfuels Hellas contain the domain “wfscorp.com.” (J.A. 21

(emphasis added).) The Bunker Confirmation plainly provides 

notice of Vogas’ association with WFS subsidiary DMCC.

For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not 

err in concluding that DMCC was in privity of contract with 

Tramp Maritime. It follows that regardless of its eventual 
23

success on the claim, DMCC could assert a cause of action based 

on an alleged breach of the Bunker Confirmation, including a 

claim that it had an enforceable maritime lien under the FMLA.

D.

Next, we address whether the district court erred in 

concluding Greek law would recognize the language contained in 

the Bunker Confirmation to validly incorporate World Fuel 

Service’s General Terms & Conditions (“General Terms”). As 

noted, the Bunker Confirmation states it is

GOVERNED BY AND INCORPORATES BY REFERENCE SELLER’S 

GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS IN EFFECT AS OF THE DATE 

THAT THIS CONFIRMATION IS ISSUED. THESE INCORPORATED 

AND REFERENCED TERMS CAN BE FOUND AT WWW.WFSCORP.COM. 

ALTERNATIVELY, YOU MAY INFORM US IF YOU REQUIRE A COPY 

AND SAME WILL BE PROVIDED TO YOU.

(J.A. 21.) 

The undisputed evidence in the record reflects that to 

reach the text of the General Terms on wfscorp.com, a user must 

click on two more links: either by clicking on a link labeled 

“Marine” and then on a second link labeled “Marine Terms and 

Conditions,” which contains a .pdf version of the General Terms, 

or by hovering over a “By Sea” graphic, clicking on the link 

“learn more,” and then clicking on a link labeled “Marine Terms 

and Conditions.” (J.A. 316, 321-28.) 
24

The parties submitted declarations from Greek attorneys 

stating their respective opinions on whether and when terms are 

incorporated by reference, and whether and when a choice of law

provision is enforceable under Greek law. Unsurprisingly, 

although the attorneys agreed about these broader points of 

Greek law, they disagreed about whether the Bunker Confirmation 

satisfied them.

The district court ruled that no genuine issue of material 

fact existed as to whether the Bunker Confirmation validly 

incorporated the General Terms. Based on the information 

provided by both parties, the district court noted that Greek 

law respected choice of law provisions, and also authorized

contracts to incorporate other documents by reference. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 44.1 (stating, in relevant part, that “[i]n 

determining foreign law, the court may consider any relevant 

material or source, including testimony, whether or not 

submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of 

Evidence”). The district court observed that Hebei Prince’s 

Greek attorney witness stated that such provisions must be 

drafted in “a clear, plain and explicit way” to be valid. World 

Fuel Servs. Trading, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 804. And it also 

observed that DMCC’s Greek attorney witness stated that Greek 

law recognized that terms can be incorporated by reference so 

long as the contracting parties obtain knowledge of their 
25

contents or be given the opportunity to obtain such knowledge. 

The court then held that the Bunker Confirmation’s language 

satisfied both of these standards. That is, it was 

“sufficiently clear and explicit to direct Tramp [Maritime] – as 

well as anyone else who received the bunker confirmation – to 

the General Terms.” Id.

The district court also rejected Hebei Prince’s argument 

that the General Terms lacked the requisite clarity because the 

preamble did not identify DMCC by name. The court first

observed that the preamble to the General Terms provided a nonexclusive list of corporations to which it applied, so DMCC’s 

absence had no significance. Then, the court noted that the 

preamble stated that the General Terms applied to “‘all 

subsidiaries of [WFS],’” and that the record evidence showed 

DMCC was a subsidiary of WFS. Id. at 796. Lastly, the court 

stated that since the Bunker Confirmation incorporated the 

General Terms, DMCC had adopted the document regardless of what 

the General Terms preamble purported its applicability to be.

Hebei Prince’s arguments on appeal echo those it made to 

the district court, that the Bunker Confirmation did not validly 

incorporate the General Terms because it does not identify the 

specific internet site where those provisions could be located. 

In addition, it asserts that because the preamble to the General 
26

Terms does not specifically refer to DMCC or Bunkerfuels, the 

document does not clearly apply to the transaction at issue. 

The district court did not err in concluding that the 

Bunker Confirmation validly incorporated the General Terms into 

the agreement. The Bunker Confirmation plainly expresses that 

it incorporates the terms of another specific document, the 

General Terms. Consequently, Tramp Maritime, along with any 

other reader of the Bunker Confirmation, was immediately put on 

notice of the existence of a specific additional document that 

contained provisions that were also part of the Bunker 

Confirmation. In addition, the Bunker Confirmation provides two 

means of obtaining a copy of the General Terms: visiting the 

wfscorp.com website or asking for a copy. Although individuals 

in search of the General Terms need to click on two internal 

links to reach the text, the terms are readily found through

wfscorp.com links identified by such relevant language as “By 

Sea,” “Marine,” and “Marine Terms and Conditions.” See One 

Beacon Ins. Co. v. Crowley Marine Servs., Inc., 648 F.3d 258, 

266-70 (5th Cir. 2011) (using a similar standard (unambigious, 

clear, specific, conspicuous, and explicit) for valid 

incorporation by reference to conclude that terms and conditions 

available four clicks into the website contained in the contract 

were validly incorporated). Moreover, had any reader asked for 

a copy of the referenced document, the text would have been 
27

readily reviewable in that form as well.5 On its face, then, the 

Bunker Confirmation effectively incorporated the General Terms.

As the district court concluded, the incorporation was

“sufficiently clear and explicit to direct” readers to the 

General Terms and it “explicitly offered Tramp [Maritime] ‘the 

opportunity to obtain knowledge’ of the General Terms.” World 

Fuel Servs. Trading, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 804. 

The language in the preamble to the General Terms does not 

alter this conclusion. The preamble does not purport to 

identify an exhaustive list of entities to which it applies. 

Instead, it states that the group of companies to which it 

applies “includes, but is not limited to” certain delineated 

companies. (J.A. 23.) The preamble also states that it applies 

to “the World Fuel Services corporation Marine Group of 

companies . . . and their respective trade names, subsidiaries, 

affiliates and branch offices. This list includes all 

subsidiaries of [WFS] who have sold, are selling or will sell 

marine petroleum products and services, whether or not in 

existence on the effective date.” (J.A. 23.) For the reasons 

already identified in part II.C, supra, DMCC and Bunkerfuels 

fall within the network of WFS marine companies. Accordingly,

 5 Hebei Prince does not contend that it or Tramp Maritime 

ever requested a written copy of the General Terms. Nor does it 

contend that the website access procedure described above is 

inaccurate.
28

the General Terms do not create doubt as to their applicability 

to DMCC or otherwise undermine the Bunker Confirmation’s 

incorporation of the General Terms by reference.6

 

E.

Having concluded that the Bunker Confirmation validly 

incorporated the General Terms as part of the formation of the 

governing contract between the parties, we turn to Hebei 

Prince’s contention that the General Terms’ choice-of-law 

provision does not encompass the FMLA. In that regard, the 

General Terms provide, in pertinent part:

The General Terms and each Transaction shall be 

governed by the General Maritime Law of the United 

States and, in the event that the General Maritime Law 

of the United States is silent on the disputed issue, 

the law of the State of Florida, without reference to 

any conflict of laws rules which may result in the 

application of the laws of another jurisdiction. The 

General Maritime Law of the United States shall apply 

with respect to the existence of a maritime lien, 

 6 Even if we had bypassed Greek law and instead applied 

United States law, we would reach the same result and conclude 

that the choice-of-law clause was successfully incorporated. 

“Under general contract principles, where a contract expressly 

refers to and incorporates another instrument in specific terms 

which show a clear intent to incorporate that instrument into 

the contract, both instruments are to be construed together.” 

One Beacon Ins. Co., 648 F.3d at 267 (citing 11 Williston on 

Contracts § 30:25 (4th ed. 1999)). For the reasons articulated 

above, the parties’ intent here is clearly expressed by the 

provisions in the Bunker Confirmation stating that it would be 

governed by the General Terms, as well as the language informing 

Tramp Maritime (or any reader) of two means of acquiring the 

text of the General Terms. 
29

regardless of the country in which Seller takes legal 

action.

(J.A. 34.)

The district court rejected Hebei Prince’s argument that 

the phrase “General Maritime Law of the United States” did not 

include the FMLA. Observing that United States maritime law has 

developed through both case law and statutes, the district court 

noted that “‘when a statute resolves a particular issue, . . . 

the general maritime law must comply with that resolution.’” 

World Fuel Servs., 12 F. Supp. 3d at 806 (quoting Norfolk 

Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 817 

(2001)). The court then traced the evolution of the FMLA from 

its original enactment in 1910 through its various amendments, 

which slowly altered principles previously established in the 

“general maritime law” concerning maritime liens under United 

States law. It concluded that since “general maritime” 

principles “must” give way to conflicting statutes where 

Congress has spoken on a particular issue, “the General Maritime 

Law of the United States” essentially changes to be consistent 

with the statutory principles. Accordingly, the district court 

ruled that the General Terms’ choice of “General Maritime Law of 

the United States” included the FMLA. Id. at 807-08.

Citing to various cases and the legislative history of the 

FMLA, Hebei Prince contends this was error because the phrase 
30

“General Maritime Law of the United States” is generally 

construed as a term of art to only encompass maritime case law 

rather than maritime statutory law.7 Hebei Prince argues that 

under this construction of the term, DMCC faces a Catch-22 

conundrum. On the one hand, the General Terms would not allow 

DMCC to rely on a maritime lien arising under the FMLA because 

“General Maritime Law of the United States” excludes statutory 

law. On the other hand, DMCC could not obtain a maritime lien 

under case law because the FMLA is now the sole means of 

obtaining a maritime lien for the provision of necessaries under 

 7 For example, Hebei Prince observes that the Supreme Court 

has frequently distinguished between statutory and general 

maritime law. See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 

Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986) (“Absent a relevant statute, the 

general maritime law, as developed by the judiciary, applies.”). 

In addition, it relies on the Fifth Circuit’s discussion in 

McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 731 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 

2013), in which the court stated:

There are two primary sources of federal maritime law: 

common law developed by federal courts exercising the 

maritime authority conferred on them by the Admiralty 

Clause of the Constitution (“general maritime law”), 

and statutory law enacted by Congress exercising its 

authority under the Admiralty Clause and the Commerce 

Clause (“statutory maritime law”).

 

Id. at 507-08. Although it is unrelated to Hebei Prince’s 

argument, we note that the panel decision in McBride has 

subsequently been vacated in light of the grant of 

rehearing en banc, 743 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2014), and en 

banc decision, 768 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2014). The en banc 

dissent still reiterates this same general principle. 768 

F.3d at 405 (Higginson, J., dissenting).
31

United States law. Consequently, Hebei Prince argues that the 

General Terms do not entitle DMCC to a maritime lien.

To be sure, the General Terms’ choice-of-law provision 

could have been written in a way that would avoid this question 

entirely. In Triton Marine, for example, the relevant clause 

stated that the “agreement shall be governed by and construed in 

all particulars by the laws of the United States of America[.]” 

575 F.3d at 412. So, too, the Ninth Circuit has reviewed a 

choice-of-law provision that selected “the general maritime laws 

of the United States and applicable United States Statutes.” 

Flores v. Am. Seafoods Co., 335 F.3d 904, 918 n.8 (9th Cir. 

2013). Either of these constructions clearly incorporates 

federal statutory maritime laws such as the FMLA.

But even assuming, without deciding, that Hebei Prince’s 

reading of the term “General Maritime Law of the United States” 

is correct and the FMLA is not part of the “General Maritime Law 

of the United States,” Hebei Prince still cannot prevail. This 

is so because the General Terms alternatively provides if the 

“General Maritime Law of the United States is silent on the 

disputed issue, the law of the State of Florida [governs.]” 

(J.A. 34.) 

Florida law resolves the issue in favor of DMCC because 

Florida law must be deemed to include United States law—by case 

law or by statute. The Supreme Court has long stated that “‘a
32

fundamental principle in our system of complex national polity’ 

mandates that ‘the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the 

United States are as much a part of the law of every state as 

its own local laws and Constitution.’” Fidelity Fed. Sav. & 

Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 157 (1982) (quoting 

Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 490 (1879)). A choice-oflaw provision directing us to the laws of Florida thus 

encompasses federal statutory law, including the FMLA. See

Atkinson v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 866 F.2d 396, 398-99

(11th Cir. 1989) (concluding, based in part on Fidelity Fed. 

Sav. & Loan Ass’n, that “Georgia law includes federal law” where 

a choice-of-law provision selected “the laws of the State of 

Georgia” but was silent as to federal statutory law’s 

applicability). Accordingly, the General Terms’ choice-of-law 

provision authorizes DMCC to pursue a maritime lien under the 

FMLA.

F.

Hebei Prince alternatively argues that even if the FMLA 

applies to the transaction, DMCC is still not entitled to a 

maritime lien because it has not satisfied all of the 

requirements under the FMLA. Once again, we disagree.

In relevant part, the FMLA provides that “a person 

providing necessaries to a vessel on the order of . . . a person 
33

authorized by the owner” “has a maritime lien on the vessel” and 

“may bring a civil action in rem to enforce the lien.” 46 

U.S.C. § 31342(a). The FMLA creates a presumption that 

charterers (e.g., Tramp Maritime) have such “authority to 

procure necessaries for” the Vessel. See § 31341(a)(4)(B). 

Hebei Prince contends that it produced proof rebutting this

statutory presumption that Tramp Maritime had such authorization

here. Alternatively, Hebei Prince maintains that the record 

demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 

presumption applies. It asserts DMCC had actual knowledge that 

Tramp Maritime was not authorized to enter into agreements that 

would give rise to a maritime lien against the Vessel and points 

to two prior contracts between Bunkerfuels Hellas and Tramp 

Maritime, where Tramp Maritime had placed no-lien stamps on the 

delivery receipts. Hebei Prince contends these prior acts

provided DMCC cognizable notice that Tramp Maritime could not 

procure necessaries in an agreement that would bind the Vessel. 

In addition, Hebei Prince maintains that upon seeing the no-lien 

stamp affixed to the delivery receipt for the bunkers at issue 

here, DMCC’s sub-contractor APSCO could—and should—have engaged 

in self-help to immediately reclaim the bunkers. Hebei Prince 

asserts DMCC’s failure to take such prompt action following 

actual notice of the no-lien provision caused it to waive the 

right to a maritime lien.
34

We agree with the district court that no triable issue of 

fact exists on this issue. The statutory presumption discussed 

above can be rebutted only by proof that the seller had actual 

knowledge that the charterer lacked the ability to bind the 

vessel as part of the contract for necessaries. See Triton 

Marine, 575 F.3d at 418 n.5 (observing that in 1971 Congress 

recodified the FMLA “essentially to void ‘no lien’ clauses in 

charters, as long as the supplier did not have actual knowledge 

of such clause”); Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc. v. PROFESSOR 

VLADIMIR POPOV MV, 199 F.3d 220, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1999) 

(discussing cases in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits holding the 

same, as well as recounting the changes in the statute leading 

to this conclusion). Put another way, “a supplier of 

necessaries ordered by a § 31341(a) entity subject to a no-lien 

clause not made known to the supplier has a maritime lien.” 

Lake Charles Stevedores, 199 F.3d at 225. 

None of the evidence Hebei Prince relies on demonstrates 

that DMCC had actual knowledge of the no-lien provision in Tramp 

Maritime’s charter party. Hebei Prince does not contend that it 

or Tramp Maritime ever notified DMCC or Bunkerfuels Hellas of 

the terms of their charter party. This is so despite the Bunker 

Confirmation clearly stating that Tramp Maritime “is presumed to 

have authority to bind the [Vessel] with a maritime lien.” 

(J.A. 21.) The Bunker Confirmation thus plainly contemplated 
35

that a presumption of authority to obligate the Vessel existed, 

and there is no evidence that anyone attempted to notify DMCC to 

the contrary at any point between Tramp Maritime receiving the 

Bunker Confirmation and accepting delivery of the bunkers.

The no-lien stamps affixed to prior delivery notices when 

Tramp Maritime was operating under prior charter parties is 

insufficient to provide actual knowledge of the current charter

party. Those prior stamps say nothing about the terms of Tramp 

Maritime’s charter to operate the Vessel at the time it entered 

into the agreement set forth in the Bunker Confirmation. 

The primary case Hebei Prince relies upon to satisfy its 

burden, Belcher Oil Co. v. M/V GARDENIA, 766 F.2d 1508 (11th 

Cir. 1985), materially differs from the facts here. In Belcher 

Oil, the supplier was notified prior to delivery of the bunkers 

that the charter party contained a no-lien clause prohibiting 

the charterer from obligating the vessel. Id. at 1510. Only as 

“corroborat[ion]” of this finding of actual knowledge did the 

Eleventh Circuit also note that the charterer had put disclaimer 

stamps on the bunkering certificates for prior deliveries from

the same seller. However, the presumption against lien 

authority was only rebutted because the evidence showed the 

supplier actually knew the charterer was bound by a no-lien 

clause before delivery of the fuel. By contrast, there is no 

proof in this case that DMCC actually knew that the operative 
36

charter party contained a no-lien clause. Accordingly, Hebei 

Prince cannot rebut the presumption based on prior contracts 

between Tramp Maritime and Bunkerfuels.

Hebei Prince’s second argument fares no better, as the nolien stamps affixed to the delivery notices did not provide 

timely actual notice of any no-lien clause in the charter party. 

This is so for at least two reasons. First, the Bunker 

Confirmation states that “[d]isclaimer stamps placed by [anyone] 

on the bunker receipt will have no effect and do not waive the 

seller’s lien.” (J.A. 21.) Despite this language, Tramp 

Maritime never contacted DMCC to convey the terms of the charter 

party or that it viewed the no-lien stamps as effective. 

Moreover, anyone reading the terms of the Bunker Confirmation 

would have reason to believe that even if a no-lien stamp was 

placed on the delivery receipt, it would be of no effect. Given 

the terms of the Bunker Confirmation, DMCC and its subcontractor 

APSCO both had reason to believe that any no-lien stamps were 

ineffective. 

Second, delivery of the bunkers fulfilled DMCC’s obligation

under the Bunker Confirmation, and notice at that point of the 

no-lien provision would be too late to alter the terms of the 

existing agreement. Contrary to Hebei Prince’s assertion, DMCC 

was not required to engage in self-help and demand immediate 

return of the bunkers upon learning that a no-lien stamp had 
37

been affixed to the delivery notice. The out-of-circuit case it 

relies on for this assertion is not binding on us. See Ferromet 

Res. v. Chemoil Corp., 5 F.3d 902, 903 (5th Cir. 1993). More 

importantly, the FMLA’s provisions were not at issue before that

court, and it did not discuss the presumption that arises under 

§ 31341(a) or what evidence is sufficient to rebut it. Id. 

Ferromet Resources involved a tort claim brought by the 

charterer against a supplier after the supplier of bunkers 

refused to unmoor from alongside the vessel until the delivery 

notice was signed without a no-lien stamp. The Eleventh Circuit

held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to when 

the supplier was notified that the charterer lacked authority to 

incur liens. If it was before delivery, then the charterer 

could likely recover damages incurred as a result of the delay 

caused by the supplier’s refusal to unmoor. Id. at 905. If the 

supplier was not notified of the no-lien clause until delivery, 

then the supplier may have been entitled to engage in self-help. 

Id. Nothing in Ferromet Resources suggests that a supplier must

engage in self-help or attempt to retrieve delivered bunkers 

simply because a no-lien stamp has been placed on the delivery 

receipt.

Accordingly, we conclude that § 31341(a)’s presumption of 

authority to procure necessaries applies to the Bunker 

Confirmation transaction. Hebei Prince failed to demonstrate or 
38

even proffer evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact 

as to whether DMCC had actual knowledge of Tramp Maritime’s lack 

of authority to bind the Vessel. 

Given that the remaining § 31342(a) requirements are either 

uncontested or have already been resolved in DMCC’s favor, we 

also conclude that DMCC was entitled to bring this action to 

enforce a maritime lien against the Vessel. 

G.

Hebei Prince’s final, comity-themed argument echoes 

throughout its brief. It contends that United States law with 

respect to maritime liens is so “out of step with existing 

international conventions and the law of other major maritime 

nations” that the Court should find a way to conclude no lien 

arose under the facts of this case. (Opening Br. 51.) As Hebei 

Prince acknowledges, its arguments align with those previously 

rejected in other cases, most directly Triton Marine. “‘[A] 

panel of this court cannot overrule, explicitly or implicitly, 

the precedent set by a prior panel of this court. Only the 

Supreme Court or this court sitting en banc can do that.’” 

Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 271 n.2 (4th 

Cir. 2002) (quoting Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 312 n.4 

(4th Cir. 2001)). Accordingly, we need not engage this argument 

further.
39

III.

For the reasons explained above, we affirm the judgment of 

the district court granting summary judgment to DMCC. 

AFFIRMED