IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-50287

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

CHARLES WILLIAM ST. CLAIR, VI, also known as Chipper, also known as 

Charles StClaire, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 6:13-CR-153

Before DAVIS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL, District 

Judge.*

PER CURIAM:**

Charles William St. Clair, VI, appeals his sentence, arguing that the 

district court misapplied the career offender guideline of the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines. The district court clearly erred in applying the career 

* District Judge of the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

** Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 13, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 14-50287

offender guideline because his prior burglary convictions under Texas Penal 

Code § 30.02(a)(3) were not crimes of violence. But this error did not affect St. 

Clair’s substantial rights. Accordingly, we AFFIRM, but we do so without 

prejudice to St. Clair’s ability to apply for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(2).

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

A jury found St. Clair guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute at least 500 grams of methamphetamine. His Presentence 

Investigation Report (“PSR”) assessed his criminal history category as VI, and 

he does not appeal this assessment. The PSR also attributed 940 grams of “Ice” 

methamphetamine to him, resulting in a base offense level of 36. Using the 

base offense level, his Guidelines imprisonment range was 324 to 405 months. 

U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A. The PSR also recommended applying the career offender 

guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. The PSR alleged that St. Clair had at least two 

prior Texas burglary convictions, allowing the application of the career 

offender guideline. Accordingly, the PSR recommended using the career 

offender guideline to raise his offense level to 37, rather than the base offense 

level of 36. Using the increased offense level of 37, St. Clair’s new Guidelines 

imprisonment range was 360 months to life. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A.

St. Clair lodged several objections, but his only objection to the

application of the career offender guideline was that his three burglary 

convictions were part of a continued course of criminal conduct, so they should 

be counted as one prior conviction. The district court overruled this objection, 

and St. Clair has not appealed this ruling. Instead, St. Clair argues for the 

first time on appeal that two of his prior Texas burglary convictions do not 

qualify as crimes of violence.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because St. Clair did not present the current issue to the district court, 

we review it for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Under plain error 

review, we will reverse only if: (1) there is an error that has not been 

intentionally abandoned; (2) the error is “clear or obvious, rather than subject 

to reasonable dispute”; (3) the error “affected the appellant’s substantial 

rights”; and (4) this court chooses to exercise its discretion because the “error 

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 

2012) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (quoting 

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)).

DISCUSSION

It is undisputed that two of St. Clair’s three prior convictions were for 

violations of Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a)(3). He argues that these two 

convictions were not for crimes of violence, and, therefore, the career offender 

guideline does not apply.

The career offender guideline only applies to a defendant with “at least 

two prior felony convictions of . . . a crime of violence.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). 

Because St. Clair only has three potentially qualifying prior convictions, the 

career offender guideline does not apply if St. Clair’s two convictions under 

§ 30.02(a)(3) are not crimes of violence.

For our purposes, the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) definition 

for a “violent felony” is identical to the career offender guideline definition for 

a “crime of violence.” Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), with U.S.S.G. 

§ 4B1.2(a)(2).1 Moreover, we generally treat cases dealing with the career 

1 The only difference between the definitions is that ACCA provides that a “burglary” 

is a violent felony, whereas the Guidelines provide that a “burglary of a dwelling” is a crime 

3

 

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offender guideline “interchangeably” with cases dealing with the ACCA. 

United States v. Moore, 635 F.3d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Thus, 

our precedent regarding ACCA’s definition of a violent felony is directly 

applicable to the Guidelines definition of a crime of violence.

United States v. Constante held that a conviction under § 30.02(a)(3) is 

not a generic burglary for ACCA purposes because it does not require a person 

to enter a building with the intent to commit a felony or theft, which is required 

under the generic definition of burglary. 544 F.3d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 2008) (per 

curiam). Constante also held that, because a conviction under § 30.02(a)(3) is 

not a generic burglary, it is not a violent felony. Id. Constante repeatedly 

stated that a conviction under § 30.02(a)(3) is not a violent felony. Id. at 585–

87. The district court plainly erred by holding to the contrary.2

But St. Clair fails on the third prong of plain error review because the 

error did not affect his substantial rights. The imprisonment range that the 

district court applied was 360 months to life. The correct imprisonment range 

was 324 to 405 months, and he was actually sentenced to 360 months. Thus, 

the correct imprisonment range overlaps with the erroneously-applied 

of violence. Here, St. Clair has not contested that his burglary convictions were for burglaries

of dwellings, so this difference is irrelevant. 2 In United States v. Ramirez, an unpublished opinion, a panel held that Constante’s 

relative silence about one part of ACCA’s definition of a violent felony means that Constante

did not resolve whether § 30.02(a)(3) is a violent felony. Ramirez, 507 F. App’x 353, 354 (5th 

Cir. 2013) (per curiam). Relying on Ramirez, Judge Dennis issued an opinion on a singlejudge matter, holding that treating § 30.02(a)(3) as a violent felony is not clear or obvious 

error. United States v. Emeary, 773 F.3d 619, 622–23 (5th Cir. 2014) (Dennis, J., in 

chambers).

But Constante clearly held that a conviction under § 30.02(a)(3) is not a violent felony. 

See 544 F.3d at 584, 586–87. Neither we nor the Ramirez panel could overrule the 

precedential decision of a previous panel. United States v. Traxler, 764 F.3d 486, 489 (5th 

Cir. 2014). Further, Ramirez is unpublished and is therefore non-precedential. See 5TH CIR. 

R. 47.5.4. It is clear and obvious that a district court cannot diverge from a precedential 

opinion’s holding, regardless of subsequent non-precedential decisions such as Ramirez and 

Emeary. Accordingly, the district court’s error was plain.

4

 

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imprisonment range, and St. Clair was actually sentenced to a term that falls 

within the correct imprisonment range. “[W]here the resulting sentence falls 

within both the correct and incorrect guidelines, we do not assume, in the 

absence of additional evidence, that the sentence affects a defendant’s 

substantial rights.” United States v. Blocker, 612 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 2010)

(per curiam). Here, there is no such additional evidence. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the error did not affect St. Clair’s substantial rights.3

However, because we hold that the district court plainly erred by basing 

St. Clair’s sentence on the career offender guideline, the application of the 

career offender guideline cannot be considered to be one of the “guideline 

application decisions” upon which St. Clair’s sentence is based. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.10(b)(1). Accordingly, our decision today does not prejudice St. Clair’s 

ability to file a motion for reduction of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

based on Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.10(d)–(e).4

CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM, but we do so without prejudice to St. Clair’s ability to apply 

for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

3 We therefore do not reach the fourth prong of plain error review.

4 We note the narrowness of this holding. We hold only that, because we decide on 

direct appellate review that there was a plain error, this error is not one of the “guideline 

application decisions” that is held constant for a § 3582(c)(2) motion. Specifically, we do not 

hold that a defendant can raise a plain error challenge to a guideline application decision in 

a freestanding § 3582(c)(2) motion. 

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