alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
OMB No. 0581-0178

(Rev. 5/2017) Destroy previous editions.

PRUNE MARKETING COMMITTEE

MARKETING ORDER NO. 993

The Secretary

United States Department of Agriculture

Washington, D.C. 20250

Dear Secretary:

I hereby accept the appointment to the position set forth in the “Selection Order” attached to my letter of

notification. I agree to serve during the period for which I am appointed and until my successor has been 

selected and has qualified.

In accepting this appointment, I also agree to serve to the best of my ability in administering the terms and 

provisions of the marketing order and the regulations issued thereunder.

When acting in my official capacity as a Prune Marketing Committee representative, I shall engage in 

only those activities that are authorized under the marketing order. I also understand that the Committee 

cannot become involved in lobbying and political activities.

Sincerely,

_____________________________________________

Signature

_____________________________________________

Name - Please Print

_____________________________________________

Address

_____________________________________________

City, State, Zip Code

_____________________________________________

Date
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Marilyn Kell y Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y Mary Beth Kell y Brian K. Zahra,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk May 24, 2011

d0516 

# Order

May 24, 2011

142623

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 142623 COA: 295432 Wayne CC: 09-014229-FC TANISHA A. HOLLIS, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the applicati on for leave to appeal the December 21, 2010 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
# C_2012326EN.01004701.xml

| 26.10.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 326/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 326/1

---

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

PART THREE

UNION POLICIES AND INTERNAL ACTIONS

UNION POLICIES AND INTERNAL ACTIONS

TITLE V

AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE

AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE

CHAPTER 5

POLICE COOPERATION

Article 88

(ex Article 30 TEU)

(ex Article 30 TEU)

1.   Europol's mission shall be to support and strengthen action by the Member States' police authorities and other law enforcement services and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy.

2.   The European Parliament and the Council, by means of regulations adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall determine Europol's structure, operation, field of action and tasks. These tasks may include:

| (a) | the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of information, in particular that forwarded by the authorities of the Member States or third countries or bodies; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of information, in particular that forwarded by the authorities of the Member States or third countries or bodies;

| (b) | the coordination, organisation and implementation of investigative and operational action carried out jointly with the Member States' competent authorities or in the context of joint investigative teams, where appropriate in liaison with Eurojust. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the coordination, organisation and implementation of investigative and operational action carried out jointly with the Member States' competent authorities or in the context of joint investigative teams, where appropriate in liaison with Eurojust.

These regulations shall also lay down the procedures for scrutiny of Europol's activities by the European Parliament, together with national Parliaments.

3.   Any operational action by Europol must be carried out in liaison and in agreement with the authorities of the Member State or States whose territory is concerned. The application of coercive measures shall be the exclusive responsibility of the competent national authorities.

---
# C_2016203EN.01004701.xml

| 7.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 203/47 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 203/47

---

Article 192

Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks.

They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.

---
<Page>




                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We consent to the reference to our firm under the captions "Experts" and
"Financial Statements" and to the use of our reports dated April 26, 2002, in
the Registration Statement (Form N-4 No. 333-62662) and related Prospectus of
The American Separate Account 5 dated May 1, 2002.


                                                     /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

New York, New York
April 29, 2002
(111 de-e--um 

Pickering 

"71 

Gibbons 

process. 2 Cf. Huckabay Props., Inc. v. NC Auto Parts, LLC, 130 Nev. Adv. 

Op. No. 23, 322 P.3d 429, 434 (2014) (recognizing that, under 'general 

agency principles," "an attorney's act is considered to be that of the 

client"). 

Additionally, because appellants' remaining arguments in 

support of writ relief had not been made in justice bourt, the district court 

was within its discretion to determine that those arguments did not 

warrant the district court's extraordinary intervention. 3 See Smith v. 

Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 679, 818 P.2d 849, 851, 

853 (1991) (recognizing that writ relief is an extraordinary remedy and is 

discretionary with the presiding court). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

J. 

j, 

2Based on counsel's same statements, the district court was also 

within its discretion in concluding that (1) the agreement to accept service 

of process was conditioned only on the temporary writ of restitution being 

vacated and (2) appellants had waived the right to seek dismissal for 

failure to timely serve process. Similarly, because the record contains 

conflicting evidence as to what documents were served on appellants' 

counsel, the district court was within its discretion to conclude that service 

on counsel had been properly made. 

3Although the district court did not explicitly address appellants' 

argument regarding the justice court's lack of jurisdiction, that argument 

lacked merit. See NRS 4.370(1)(h); NRS 40.255(1). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 1947A (4140.4 
cc: Hon. James Todd Russell, District Judge 

David Wasick, Settlement Judge 

T M Pankopf PLLC 

Pite Duncan, LLP 

Storey County Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 3 

(0) I94Th
**For fastest processing, please attach this form and a PDF shipping label in an email to DairySanitaryCerts@ams.usda.gov.

DA-248 (01/2013)

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of race, color, national origin, age, disability, and where applicable, sex, marital status, familial status, parental status, religion, sexual orientation, genetic information, political beliefs, reprisal, or because all or part of an individual’s income is derived from any public assistance program.  (Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Persons with disabilities who require alternative means for communication of program information (Braille, large print, audiotape, etc.) should contact USDA’s TARGET Center at (202) 720-2600 (voice and TDD).

 To file a complaint of discrimination, write to USDA, Director, Office of Civil Rights, 1400 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20250-9410, or call (800) 795-3272 (voice) or (202) 720-6382 (TDD). USDA is an equal opportunity provider and employer.
EXHIBIT 10.12



Stephen Kenwood

2073 - 149th Street,

Surrey, BC, Canada, V4A 8L4



Longbow Mining Corp.

186 Stevens Drive,

West Vancouver, BC, Canada, V7S 1C4



I, Stephen Kenwood, hold in trust for Longbow Mining Corp. a 100% undivided interest in ten mineral claims, namely:  Wyatt 1 (Tenure Number 391984), Wyatt 2 (Tenure Number 391985), Wyatt 3 (Tenure Number 391986), Wyatt 4 (Tenure Number 391987), Wyatt 5 (Tenure Number 391988), Wyatt 6 (Tenure Number 391989), Wyatt 7 (Tenure Number 391990), Wyatt 8 (Tenure Number 391991), Madi (Tenure Number 392221), Gabi (Tenure Number 392222), located in the Vernon Mining District.


I will deliver full title on demand to Longbow Mining Corp. for as long as the claims are in good standing with the Province of British Columbia.


 

/s/ "Stephen Kenwood"

Stephen Kenwood
STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

FREDERICK RODDY

NO. 2023 KW 1116

FEBRUARY 16, 2024

In Re: Frederick Roddy, applying for supervisory writs, 19th

Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, 

No. DC - 21- 04680. 

BEFORE: WELCH, WOLFE, AND STROMBERG, JJ. 

WRIT DENIED AS MOOT. The records of the East Baton Rouge

Parish Clerk of Court reflect that the requested documents were

mailed to relator on September 18, 2023.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Leonardo A. Nunez, Appellant.

—Judgment unanimously af*1052firmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from his conviction of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree. He contends that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence; that it was error to admit the cocaine into evidence; that the identity of the cocaine was insufficiently established; that he was deprived of a fair trial by the court’s evidentiary rulings and jury instructions; and that the sentence of 25 years to life is excessive.

The verdict is not against the weight of the evidence *(see, People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495). The proof establishes that defendant participated in the sale by taking the drugs to the location of the sale and suggests that he left with the sale proceeds. Defendant’s culpable mental state was established by accomplice testimony, by defendant’s false statements before the Grand Jury, and by the wire tap evidence.

Admission of the cocaine was erroneous in the absence of testimony tending to establish its identity and unchanged character. Nonetheless, the error does not require reversal of defendant’s conviction, which rests on proof that sufficiently establishes the identity between the substance sold to the undercover officer and that determined by the chemist to be cocaine *(see, People v Hentschel,*80 AD2d 943, 944, *affd*54 NY2d 740; *People v Reed,*53 AD2d 786, *affd*44 NY2d 799).

The photographs were properly admitted by the court to show that defendant had made false statements, thus evincing consciousness of guilt. The wiretap evidence did not violate CPL 700.15 (4), was not irrelevant, and did not violate the hearsay rule. Further, the court did not err in allowing the investigating officer to read his English translation of the telephone conversations.

Reversal is not required as a result of the court’s instructions. On the whole, the charge on intent was accurate and not prejudicial to defendant.

Finally, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to the maximum term of 25 years to life. (Appeal from Judgment of Onondaga County Court, Cunningham, J.—Criminal Sale Controlled Substance, 1st Degree.) Present—Denman, J. P., Boomer, Pine, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
Exhibit 23.1
 
 Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm
 
 
 We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (No. 333-232492) on Form N-2 and on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-227117, 333-207296, 333-177433, 333-177432, 333-118681) of Capital Southwest Corporation and Subsidiaries (collectively, the Company) of our reports dated June 2, 2020, relating to the consolidated financial statements, schedule of investments in and advances to affiliates of the Company listed in Schedule 12-14, our report dated June 2, 2020, attached as an exhibit to Capital Southwest Corporation’s annual report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2020 (the Form 10-K), on the senior securities table as of March 31, 2020, 2019, and 2018, as set forth in Part II, Item 5 of the Form 10-K, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Capital Southwest Corporation, appearing in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Capital Southwest Corporation for the year ended March 31, 2020. We also consent to the references to us under the headings “Senior Securities” and “Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Report” in the Form 10-K.
 
 
 /s/ RSM US LLP
 
 Chicago, Illinois
 June 2, 2020
STYLE

v.

RE: Case No. 14-1039 DATE

COA #: 12-13-00038-CV TC#: 08-CV-30

JOAQUIN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT

SHELBY COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, ET A

Today the Supreme Court of Texas denied 

for rehearing of the above-referenced petiti

review.

MS. CATHY S. LUSK

CLERK, TWELFTH COURT OF 

1517 WEST FRONT, SUITE 

TYLER, TX 75702
#### Hindi T. Mermelstein, Appellant, v City of New York et al., Respondents.

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eugene L. Nardelli, J.), entered August 29, 1990, which granted the motions of defendants, the City of New York and New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC), to dismiss the complaint, is unanimously modified, on the law and on the facts, to the extent of denying the motion of defendant HHC to dismiss the complaint, the complaint is reinstated, and except as so modified, otherwise affirmed, without costs.

In September 1987, Dr. Hindi T. Mermelstein (plaintiff) commenced a personal injury action against the City of New York (City) and the Health and Hospitals Corporation to recover damages. The complaint alleges, in substance, that on January 4, 1987, due to defendants’ negligence in not properly safeguarding the psychiatric admitting office, located in Bellevue Hospital, New York County, where she was working as a physician, a patient assaulted and severely beat her.

Thereafter, in their amended answer, defendants, although admitting that they both operated Bellevue Hospital, denied any negligence, and contended that plaintiff’s exclusive remedy is Workers’ Compensation. Subsequently, the defendant City moved to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that the City was not a proper party to the action (CPLR 3211 [a] [7]), and defendant HHC moved to dismiss the complaint, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (CPLR 3211 [a] [2]). The Motion *486Court granted the motions of both defendants, and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appeals.

After our review of the record, we find that, while plaintiff claims that, at the time of the incident, she was solely employed by the New York University Medical Center (NYU), where she was a resident physician in psychiatry, she admits that HHC paid her salary, and had the power to terminate her. Further, we find in the record conflicting evidence. Although plaintiff received instruction from NYU personnel about her duties at Bellevue, she admits that she was assigned to Bellevue by the NYU residency office, in accordance with an “affiliation contract” between HHC and NYU. Further, HHC paid, as employer, on behalf of plaintiff, Workers’ Compensation benefits to a physician, who treated her for her injuries.

We stated, in *Brooks v Chemical Leaman Tank Lines*(71 AD2d 405, 407 [1st Dept 1979]), “where the elements of the employment or of the particular work being done bespeak both general and special employment the question is one of fact for the jury”.

Applying the legal authority, *supra,*to the circumstances of the instant matter, we find that, in view of the complex agreement between NYU and HHC’s Bellevue facility, there is a triable issue of fact as to who was plaintiff’s actual employer at the time of the incident, and therefore, we further find that the Motion Court erred in granting the motion of defendant HHC to dismiss the complaint.

Accordingly, we modify the order to the extent of denying the motion of defendant HHC, and reinstate the complaint. Concur—Rosenberger, J. P., Kupferman, Ross, Asch and Kassal, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Consolidated Balance Sheets, the Consolidated Statement of Operations and
the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows, and is qualified in its entirety
by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                       5,607,587
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               26,974,196
<ALLOWANCES>                                 1,004,537
<INVENTORY>                                 31,580,175
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            66,383,302
<PP&E>                                      35,030,105
<DEPRECIATION>                              19,542,880
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              84,161,239
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       37,593,500
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     3,591,681
<OTHER-SE>                                  16,270,944
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                84,161,239
<SALES>                                    115,054,806
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           115,054,806
<CGS>                                       72,916,837
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               72,916,837
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            31,252,037
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           3,799,760
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              7,086,172
<INCOME-TAX>                                 2,676,458
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          3,601,178
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 3,601,178
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.05
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.00
        

</TABLE>
Renee Magee

JUDGE, 337TM DISTRICT COURT

Harris County Criminal Justice Center

1201 Franklin

Houston, Texas 77002

(713) 755-7746

April 14, 2015

W,0l4-ot

Abel Acosta

Clerk, Court of Criminal Appeals

P.O. Box 12308, Capitol Station

Austin, Texas 78711

Re: AGUILAR, CRISTIAN

CCA No. WR-82-014-01

Trial Court Case No. 1388321-A

RECEIVED

eOURT OFORMINAL APPEALS

17 20*h

AbslAcosta,Clerk

Request for extension to file supplemental findings of fact

Dear Mr. Acosta,

The 337th District Court is in receipt of the ORDERfrom the Court of Criminal Appeals

dated January 14, 2015.

This court will respectfully request a 60-day extension from the April 14, 2015 deadline

to file its supplemental findings offact in this case.

This court has been working to prepare the supplemental findings of fact, however

requests this additional time to properly research and prepare a complete findings to submit to

the Court ofCriminal Appeals.

Sincerely,

Renee Magee

Judge, 337th District Court

Harris County, Texas
<B><P ALIGN="RIGHT">EXHIBIT 10.14</P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER"></P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER">AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO THE<BR>
1993 STOCK OPTION/STOCK ISSUANCE PLAN</P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER">(AS AMENDED AND RESTATED EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 4, 2001)</P>
<P ALIGN="CENTER">OF<BR>
ActionPoint, INC.</P>
</B><P ALIGN="JUSTIFY">Sections 7.1 and 7.2 of the 1993 Stock Option/Stock
Issuance Plan of ActionPoint, Inc. shall be amended in their entirety to read as
follows:	</P>
<OL>
<OL>
<DIR>
<DIR>

<OL>

<B><P ALIGN="JUSTIFY"><LI>Initial Grants.</B>  Each Outside Director who first
becomes a member of the Board from and after November 5, 1993 until (i) the
closing of the merger of the Company and Captiva Software Corporation
("Captiva") and the election of certain members of Captiva's board of
directors as members of the Board, pursuant to that certain Agreement and Plan
of Reorganization among the Company, Captiva and Condor Merger Corp. (the
"Merger Agreement"), or (ii) the termination of the Merger
Agreement, shall receive a one-time grant of an NSO covering 10,000 Common
Shares.  Each Outside Director who first becomes a member of the Board after the
events specified in either of clause (i) or (ii) of the preceding sentence shall
receive a one-time grant of an NSO covering 20,000 Common Shares.  The numbers
set forth in the preceding two sentences shall be subject to adjustment in
accordance with Article 9.  NSOs granted under this Section 7.1 shall
be granted on the date when such Outside Director first joins the Board and
shall become exercisable in four equal annual installments as the Outside
Director completes each year of continuous Service after the date of grant.  An
Outside Director who previously was an Employee of the Company shall not receive
a grant under this Section 7.1.</LI></P>
<B><P ALIGN="JUSTIFY"><LI>Annual Grants</B>.  At the conclusion of each regular
annual meeting of the Company's stockholders held in the year 1995 or
thereafter, each Outside Director who then has served as an Outside Director for
six months or more, and who will continue serving as a member of the Board
thereafter, shall receive an NSO covering 5,000 Common Shares.  The number
set forth in the preceding sentence shall be subject to adjustment in accordance
with Article 9.  NSOs granted under this Section 7.2 shall become
exercisable in full when the Outside Director completes four years of continuous
Service after the date of grant.  An Outside Director who previously was an
Employee shall not receive grants under this Section 7.2.</LI></P></OL>
</DIR>
</DIR>
</OL>
</OL>
<DIR>
<DIR>

<P ALIGN="JUSTIFY">Adopted by the Board of Directors:  April 19,
2002</P>
<P ALIGN="JUSTIFY">Adopted by the Stockholders:  _______,
2002</P></DIR>
</DIR>
391 A.2d 694

#### Commonwealth v. Ortiz, Appellant.

Submitted March 20, 1978.

William F. Ochs, Jr., Public Defender, for appellant; Charles M. Guthrie, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

HOFFMAN and SPAETH, JJ., dissented.

The evidence was insufficient to prove that appellant committed the burglary. *Commonwealth v. Rosciolo,*454 Pa. 59, 309 A.2d 396 (1973). *See, In re Gonzalez,*255 Pa.Super. 217, 386 A.2d 586 (1978).