NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 14-3985

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DR. JEFFREY DAVID ISAACS,

Appellant

v.

ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS; DR. MARC 

BERTRAND; DR. JIM YONG KIM; EDWARD 

KAPLAN; DR. AMY WAER; MARY HITCHCOCK 

MEMORIAL HOSPITAL; UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 

HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER; JOHN DOE #1 & #2; 

NEW HAMPSHIRE BOARD OF MEDICINE; 

TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

__________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 13-cv-05708)

Chief District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker

__________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

April 1, 2015

Before: FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 7, 2015)

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OPINION*

____________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute 

binding precedent.
2

Jeffrey Isaacs appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his amended 

complaint. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

On September 30, 2013, Isaacs filed suit in the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania and later amended his complaint. Isaacs alleged that, 

after graduating from a Caribbean medical school in 2010, he was accepted to a surgery 

residency at the University of Arizona Health Sciences Center. After he began this 

residency, he believes someone communicated with University of Arizona officials about 

his “confidential” attendance at and departure from a California medical school that 

predated his attendance at the Caribbean medical school. Isaacs claimed that he was told 

on the second day of his surgical residency by Program Director Amy Waer, M.D. that he 

was not qualified for the residency, but, based on his suspicion that University of Arizona 

officials improperly had communicated with his California medical school, he decided to 

resign within six weeks of his arrival. In his view, University of Arizona officials 

constructively terminated him. He did not sue the University at this time.

In 2011, Isaacs accepted a position as a psychiatry resident at Dartmouth College

and the Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital in New Hampshire. As part of his 

application for the residency, Isaacs submitted an application for a training license to the 

New Hampshire Board of Medicine, and on that application he listed his prior surgical 

residency at the University of Arizona. Isaacs began his psychiatry residency in June, 

2011. On February 3, 2012, Isaacs, who suffers from a neuropsychiatric illness, filed a 

disability discrimination and wrongful termination complaint pro se in the United States 

District Court for the District of New Hampshire, see Isaacs v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock 

Medical Center, D.C. Civ. No. 12-cv-00040, against Dartmouth College and the Mary 
3

Hitchcock Memorial Hospital. Dartmouth and the Hospital were represented by Edward 

M. Kaplan. 

Isaacs was subjected to an investigation as a result of his failure to disclose, on his 

2010 Electronic Residency Application Service (“ERAS”) application, his prior 

enrollment at the California medical school, his prior residency experience at the 

University of Arizona, and his Arizona training license. In March 2012, Isaacs was 

terminated from his Dartmouth psychiatry residency, in part because he omitted this 

information when he applied to Dartmouth and because he did not disclose his California 

history on his New Hampshire training license application. At his request, he was 

granted the opportunity to participate in the Fair Hearing process by Dr. Marc Bertrand, a 

Dartmouth dean. Hearings were scheduled in New Hampshire but Isaacs declined to 

attend; he had returned home to Pennsylvania. 

The New Hampshire Board of Medicine also commenced an investigation to 

determine whether Isaacs committed professional misconduct in failing to disclose that 

he had attended the California medical school and the circumstances of his departure 

from that school. The Board scheduled an adjudicatory/disciplinary hearing against 

Isaacs and sent him a Notice of Hearing, which ordered him to travel to Concord to 

participate in the proceeding and, if appropriate, be subjected to sanctions. Isaacs 

declined and his New Hampshire training license was revoked.

In April 2014, the District Court in Isaacs’ New Hampshire case granted the 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 

affirmed on January 5, 2015, C.A. No. 14-1544.
4

The amended complaint that Isaacs filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 

September 2013 contained four tort or contract causes of action and a request for 

injunctive relief. Isaacs alleged in Count I that all defendants, other than the New 

Hampshire Board of Medicine, conspired against him to terminate his medical training in 

New Hampshire. Count II alleged that all defendants, except the Board of Medicine, 

intended to cause him severe emotional distress. Count III alleged that the Trustees of 

Dartmouth College and the Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital breached a contract by 

offering him a hearing at an inconvenient location (New Hampshire) after he had already 

been terminated, and Count IV alleged that the Dartmouth defendants obstructed justice 

in his New Hampshire litigation. Count V alleged that Isaacs is entitled to injunctive 

relief in the form of an order enjoining the defendants from continuing their conspiracy to 

deny him medical training. As a result of the unlawful conspiracy, Isaacs claimed, his 

federal training subsidy has been exhausted and he has no further opportunity to become

a licensed physician in the United States. Moreover, he contended that information 

relating to his attendance and departure from the California medical school is confidential 

pursuant to a settlement agreement1and under the Family Educational Rights & Privacy 

Act (“FERPA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.

With respect to diversity jurisdiction in the Pennsylvania federal court, Isaacs 

alleged that he completed his ERAS applications to the University of Arizona and 

Dartmouth College in Pennsylvania; that the Dartmouth College defendants mailed two 

letters to him in Pennsylvania, one terminating him from his psychiatry residency and one 

offering him a fair hearing in New Hampshire concerning this termination; that he 

 

1

Isaacs filed suit in federal court in California against his medical school. The case 

settled.
5

completed license application documents while in Pennsylvania which later became the 

subject of misconduct allegations made by the New Hampshire Board of Medicine; and 

that the Board mailed a letter to his home in Pennsylvania, demanding that he attend a 

hearing in New Hampshire over whether it was an improper action on his part not to 

disclose his California history on his license application.

All defendants -- Marc Bertrand, Edward Kaplan, the Mary Hitchcock Memorial 

Hospital, former Dartmouth President Jim Yong Kim, the Trustees of Dartmouth College, 

the Arizona Board of Regents, the University of Arizona Health Sciences Center, Dr. 

Amy Waer, and the New Hampshire Board of Medicine -- filed motions to dismiss the 

amended complaint based on a lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) or sovereign immunity. After Isaacs submitted his opposition to 

these motions, the District Court, in an order entered on August 25, 2014, granted the 

motions, holding that personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was 

lacking as to seven of the defendants, and that the Arizona Board of Regents and 

University of Arizona Health Sciences Center are protected from suit in federal court by 

the Eleventh Amendment.

Isaacs appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise 

plenary review over the District Court’s determination to grant a motion to dismiss. See

Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 2004). A plaintiff must allege sufficient facts 

to establish personal jurisdiction when a defendant raises the defense of a lack of personal 

jurisdiction. See Mellon Bank v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992). If the 

defendant contradicts the plaintiff’s allegations through opposing affidavits, as the

defendants did here, a plaintiff must present particular evidence in support of personal 
6

jurisdiction. Id. The District Court’s findings of facts with respect to personal 

jurisdiction are reviewed for clear error. Stranahan Gear Co., Inc. v. NL Industries, Inc., 

800 F.2d 53, 56 (3d Cir. 1986).

We will affirm. A federal court sitting in diversity must look to the forum state’s 

long-arm statute to determine if personal jurisdiction is permitted over the defendant, and 

then must determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction violates the Due Process Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment. See IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 258-

59 (3d Cir. 1998). Because Pennsylvania has chosen to exercise jurisdiction to the fullest 

extent possible, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5322(b), the federal due process principle of 

“minimum contacts” with the forum state and the requirement that the exercise of 

jurisdiction comport with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” control. 

Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Such minimum contacts are established when 

there is “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 

conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of 

its laws.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting Hanson 

v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 

These due process principles have been characterized as falling under either 

specific or general jurisdiction. General jurisdiction grants courts the ability to hear “any 

and all claims” against out-of-state defendants “when their affiliations with the state are 

so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” 

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Op., S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). General 

jurisdiction is invoked when the plaintiff’s cause of action arises from the defendant’s 
7

non-forum related activities. Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consolidated Fiber Glass 

Prods. Co., 75 F.3d 147, 150 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation 

removed). Specific jurisdiction, in contrast, is present where the plaintiff’s cause of

action arises out of a defendant’s forum-related activities, such that the defendant “should 

reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in that forum.” Id. at 151 (quoting WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). The exercise of 

specific jurisdiction is permissible where: (1) the defendant purposely directed his 

activities at the forum state; (2) the plaintiff’s claim arises out of and relates to at least 

one of those specific activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with fair play 

and substantial justice. See Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 2007).

A separate route to specific personal jurisdiction is available to victims of 

intentional torts; this is the “effects test” stemming from the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-90 (1984), which holds that intentional torts aimed at 

a forum state and causing injury within that state can subject a tortfeasor to jurisdiction in 

that state. Id. The effects test requires the plaintiff to show that: “(1) [t]he defendant 

committed an intentional tort; (2) [t]he plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum 

such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the harm suffered by the plaintiff 

as a result of that tort; and (3) [t]he defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the

forum such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of the tortious activity.” 

Marten, 499 F.3d at 297 (quoting IMO Indus., Inc., 155 F.3d at 265-67).

In analyzing the general and specific personal jurisdiction and Calder effects test

issues raised by Isaacs’ suit against the New Hampshire and Arizona defendants, the 

District Court made thorough findings of fact with respect to each of the seven 
8

defendants who were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, and then applied those 

facts to the governing law. Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, 

and because Isaacs in his brief on appeal has failed to persuade us that even one of the 

Court’s findings was clearly erroneous, we will only summarize those findings necessary 

to illustrate why personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, under any 

of the three separate routes identified, is so plainly lacking here. 

Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital is a teaching hospital located in New 

Hampshire, organized under the laws of that state and with its principal place of business 

in that state. It does not serve patients or maintain any programs in Pennsylvania, and 

does not pay taxes in Pennsylvania. Mark Bertrand does not teach or practice medicine 

in Pennsylvania or conduct any business there. Edward Kaplan is not licensed to practice 

law in Pennsylvania, does not pay taxes there, and does not target clients from 

Pennsylvania. Dartmouth College is an institution of higher learning located in New 

Hampshire, with its principal place of business there. Dartmouth College does not 

maintain an office or facility in Pennsylvania, has no officers or employees there, 

maintains no registered agent for service of process there, and does not own any real 

property there. Dr. Kim does not now reside in nor has he ever resided in Pennsylvania, 

he does not own real property or lease property there, and he has never been employed by 

an institution or organization there. The New Hampshire Board of Medicine, located in 

Concord, New Hampshire, is authorized to take action only regarding the practice of 

medicine in New Hampshire. Amy Waer is a resident of Tucson, Arizona and has no 

business, professional or personal association with Pennsylvania.
9

These seven defendants’ contacts with Pennsylvania do not even approach the 

level of contact needed to attain general or specific personal jurisdiction, or personal 

jurisdiction under the effects test, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The allegations 

in the amended complaint have nothing to do with Pennsylvania, the alleged harms did 

not occur in Pennsylvania, and these defendants do not purposely avail themselves of the 

privileges of conducting activities within Pennsylvania to the degree necessary to confer

jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction is not established by the mailing of a few letters to 

Isaacs after he returned to his home in Pennsylvania, or by the fact that he completed his 

ERAS and license applications in Pennsylvania. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Op., 131 S. 

Ct. at 2851; Marten, 499 F.3d at 299. In addition, Isaacs’ vague assertion that he has 

experienced an injury in Pennsylvania due to his termination from his New Hampshire 

residency and alleged constructive discharge from his University of Arizona residency 

will not suffice to establish jurisdiction under the effects test, for the reasons given by the 

District Court.

Specifically with respect to Dartmouth College, where the assertion of personal 

jurisdiction is at least not frivolous, the District Court found that it recruits athletes and 

faculty in Pennsylvania, and targets highly-qualified Pennsylvania high school students 

through emails and its website and admits them, among other similar things. 

Nevertheless, as the District Court correctly determined, these de minimis contacts, which 

any national university may have, do not relate to the allegations in Isaacs’ amended 

complaint and are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania. Cf. Gehling v. St. George’s School of Medicine, Ltd., 773 F.2d 539, 541-

43 (3d Cir. 1985) (fact that some of school’s students are Pennsylvania residents does not 
10

signify a relevant business contact). See also Gallant v. Trustees of Columbia University, 

111 F. Supp.2d 638, 641-42 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“While the plaintiff here has presented 

more contacts than those considered ... in Gehling, none of these additional contacts 

demonstrate that Columbia has purposefully directed its activities to, or availed itself of, 

Pennsylvania[; rather,] they are the result of Columbia’s general participation in the type 

of interstate activity in which any nationally prominent educational institution would 

engage.”). The District Court properly held that Duchesneau v. Cornell University, 2009 

WL 3152125 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2009), which in any event we are not bound by, could be 

distinguished on its facts because, unlike Dartmouth College, Cornell University 

registered with the Pennsylvania Secretary of State and obtained a license to do business 

in Pennsylvania, operated a long-standing Mid-Atlantic Regional Office in Pennsylvania, 

and paid state and local taxes for its Pennsylvania employees. Id. at *4. Moreover, to the 

extent that Isaacs was harmed, Pennsylvania is not the focal point of the harm, nor did 

Dartmouth College expressly aim tortious conduct at Pennsylvania.

As to the Arizona Board of Regents and University of Arizona Health Sciences 

Center, the District Court properly held that these defendants are entitled to immunity 

from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, which immunizes States and their 

agencies from suits for damages in federal court, see Pennhurst State School v. 

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-02 (1984). The Eleventh Amendment extends to the 

Arizona Board of Regents and the University, see Rutledge v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 660 

F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1981), abrogated on other grounds by Haygood v. Younger, 

769 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
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For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dismissing 

the amended complaint as to all defendants.