If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re J.M. ROGERS, Minor. September 21, 2023

No. 365238

St. Clair Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 21-000138-NA

Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the order terminating his parental rights to his minor child, 

JMR, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)1, (g), (j), (k)(ii), and (m)(i). We affirm for the reasons stated in 

this opinion.

I. BASIC FACTS

The underlying facts are set forth in respondent’s prior appeal:

Respondent and his wife, the mother of the couple’s four children, were 

married for over 24 years. When their divorce was finalized in 2020, the couple 

had two adult sons and two minor daughters, ETR and JMR. The minor daughters 

lived with their mother and initially visited with respondent. The minors did not 

 

1

It is unclear whether the court found grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights under 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) or (b)(ii). The court’s written order cites to subdivision (b)(ii), but the 

court referenced subdivision (b)(i) when making its oral ruling following the dispositional hearing. 

We need not determine which subdivision the court intended to rely upon. As explained below, 

the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was 

proper under subdivision (k)(ii). Accordingly, whether the court intended to make findings under 

(b)(i) or (b)(ii), termination is still proper. See In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 

(2011) (“Only one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to 

terminate a respondent's parental rights, even if the court erroneously found sufficient evidence 

under other statutory grounds.”).
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have overnight visits with respondent purportedly because he did not have beds for 

them.

In 2021, ETR disclosed that she was sexually abused by respondent between 

2016 and 2019. She alleged that respondent committed improper acts at the family 

dinner table and that she woke up to being violated by respondent. It was submitted 

that ETR had medical and emotional conditions that were exacerbated during the 

alleged period of abuse. Additionally, when ETR attended a school at which 

respondent was both a teacher and a coach, her symptoms increased to such an 

extent that she transferred to a different school. After ETR disclosed her abuse, her 

mother, now divorced from respondent, alleged that she was forced into a sexual 

act by respondent in the bathroom when ETR and JMR were on the other side of 

the door asking questions.

Respondent was interviewed by the police as a result of the allegations. He 

denied committing any sexual acts with ETR. But respondent did admit to forcing 

himself on his wife during their marriage. On August 31, 2021, felony charges 

were filed against respondent arising from the allegations raised by ETR and her 

mother, his now ex-wife.

On November 9, 2021, a third amended petition was filed seeking the 

termination of respondent’s parental rights. [In re Rogers Minors, unpublished per 

curiam opinion of the Court of Appeal, issued November 3, 2022 (Docket No. 

360160), p 1-2.]

In the third amended petition, petitioner requested the court take jurisdiction over ETR and JMR 

under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2) and terminate respondent’s parental rights.

In his prior appeal, respondent argued the trial court “violated his right to due process by 

relying solely upon his no contest plea at the adjudication phase to conclude that the statutory 

grounds for termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Rogers, unpub op

at 3. This Court agreed and remanded “for further proceedings, including a dispositional hearing 

at which the trial court should allow the parties to present evidence relevant to the statutory grounds 

for termination and make findings regarding the existence of a statutory ground for termination on 

the basis of legally admissible evidence.” Id. at 8. Because ETR had turned 18 years old, the 

proceedings on remand were limited to JMR only. Id.

Thereafter, the trial court held the dispositional hearing.2 At the hearing, petitioner called 

licensed professional counselor, Charissa Isaacs. According to Isaacs, JMR “tends to repress and 

has a focus in eating disorders—disordered eating. She also is exhibiting significant people 

 

2 At the beginning of the hearing, petitioner explained that respondent had been convicted of one 

count of criminal sexual conduct with intent to penetrate under MCL 750.520g(1). As a result, 

petitioner asked the court to allow it to amend the petition so that the statutory grounds for 

termination considered would include MCL 712A.9(m)(i). The court granted petitioner’s motion.
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pleasing behaviors, even at her own expense.” Further, because of respondent’s abuse of her sister, 

JMR reported feeling “anxious” and “fearful,” and stated she did not want respondent in her life. 

Respondent’s ex-wife also testified that in October 2022, respondent was found guilty of one count 

of criminal sexual conduct with intent to penetrate.3 Regarding JMR, respondent’s ex-wife stated

JMR was “very angry and hurt and afraid” because of the sexual abuse respondent inflicted upon 

her mother and sister. JMR did not want to continue a relationship with respondent.

Clinical and forensic psychologist, Dr. Michael Abramsky, testified on behalf of 

respondent. Dr. Abramsky conducted a psychological evaluation of respondent. He noted that

respondent’s children consistently expressed anger toward him and that his ex-wife reported 

respondent sexually abused her. However, he opined that despite those “red flags” respondent was 

not a risk to children because the children all denied seeing respondent abuse ETR or their mother

and respondent’s psychological evaluations appeared normal.

Respondent’s co-worker and friend, David George, also testified on respondent’s behalf. 

George stated respondent was a good parent and actively engaged in his children’s lives. George 

never witnessed respondent exhibit any inappropriate behaviors toward ETR, JMR, or his students, 

but he admitted that he had no way of knowing whether respondent sexually abused ETR. He also 

acknowledged respondent was accused of inappropriately touching a student at school. Finally, 

respondent’s mother testified, describing respondent and JMR’s relationship as loving and 

affectionate before the accusations of sexual abuse arose. She never had any concerns about the 

children’s safety or respondent’s ability to provide for his family.

Following the hearing, the court found statutory grounds to terminate respondent’s parental 

rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), (k)(ii), and (m)(i), and that terminating respondent’s 

parental rights was in JMR’s best interests.

II. STATUTORY GROUNDS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding statutory grounds to terminate his 

parental rights. We review for clear error a trial court’s finding “that a ground for termination has 

been proven by clear and convincing evidence. . . .” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 

40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “A trial court’s decision is 

clearly erroneous if although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. at 41 

(quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). “This Court gives deference to a trial court’s 

special opportunity to judge the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses who 

appear before it.” In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 710; 859 NW2d 208 (2014).

 

3 The judgment of conviction was admitted as an exhibit.
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B. ANALYSIS

At the initial adjudication and dispositional hearing, respondent-father “stipulated to the 

use of the [third amended] petition for the factual basis to support the assumption of jurisdiction.” 

In re Rogers, unpub op at 2. As part of this stipulation, respondent affirmed he was not contesting 

the allegations contained in the third amended petition were true and could be used in a later 

proceeding. Id. Although this Court reversed the trial court’s prior order terminating respondent’s 

parental rights, it did not disturb the validity of his plea. Id. at 7. Therefore, the allegations in the 

third amended petition can be considered as evidence to support the current termination of 

respondent’s parental rights. See In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 316; 964 NW2d 881 (2020).

To terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(ii), there must be clear and 

convincing evidence the parent abused the child or sibling of the child, the abuse included 

“criminal sexual conduct involving penetration,” and “there is a reasonable likelihood that the 

child will be harmed if returned to the care of the parent.” The third amended petition states 

respondent “put his penis inside of [ETR’s] vagina,” and did so on several occasions between 

2016, and 2019. At the dispositional hearing, respondent’s ex-wife and Isaacs confirmed that in 

June 2021, ETR disclosed respondent sexually abused her during this time period. Based on that 

evidence, the court found respondent sexually abused ETR, that ETR was JMR’s sibling, and that

the abuse involved penetration. Given the sexual abuse, and its impact upon JMR, there is a 

reasonable likelihood that JMR would be harmed if returned to respondent’s care. Further, 

although Dr. Abramsky concluded respondent was not a danger to JMR, the trial court did not 

credit that testimony. Because “[t]his Court gives deference to a trial court’s special opportunity 

to judge the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses who appear before it,” In 

re TK, 306 Mich App at 710, this finding will not be disturbed. Because there is clear and 

convincing evidence to find there were statutory grounds for termination under MCL 

712A.19b(k)(ii), the trial court did not err in terminating respondent’s parental rights.

III. BEST INTERESTS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Respondent next argues that the trial court erred by finding that it was in JMR’s best 

interests to terminate his parental rights to her. A trial court’s best-interests finding is reviewed 

for clear error. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 40.

B. ANALYSIS

[T]he focus at the best-interest stage has always been on the child, not the 

parent. In assessing whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best 

interests, the trial court should weigh all evidence available to it. Courts may 

consider such factors as the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting 

ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages 

of a foster home over the parent’s home. Other considerations include the length 

of time the child was in care, the likelihood that the child could be returned to her 

parents’ home within the foreseeable future, if at all, and compliance with the case 
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service plan. [In re Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson Minors, 311 Mich App 49, 63-64; 

874 NW2d 205 (2015) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

“The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence . . .” In re White, 303 

Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). Children’s placement with relatives generally weighs 

against termination, and the trial court must address this factor when determining whether 

termination is in the children’s best interests. In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 164; 782 NW2d 747 

(2010).

Respondent argues that termination was not in JMR’s best interests because JMR was 15 

years old and had a positive relationship with respondent before the sexual-abuse allegations. 

Moreover, respondent was only convicted of sexually assaulting his ex-wife; there is no conviction 

arising from the alleged abuse of ETR. The trial court, however, found that respondent sexually 

abused not only his ex-wife, but also his daughter. The abuse of respondent’s ex-wife was, in fact, 

domestic violence. And, notwithstanding the prior positive bond between respondent and JMR, 

the trial court found that respondent’s sexual abuse of JMR’s mother and sister had destroyed the 

bond. JMR expressly stated that she did not want to have contact with respondent, and she reported 

feeling anxious and fearful. Additionally, the court considered that JMR was living with her 

mother, who appears able to provide the stability and permanency JMR needs. On this record, the 

trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in 

JMR’s best interests.

Affirmed.

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron