1 

 2017 IL App (5th) 160474 

 NO. 5-16-0474 

 IN THE 

 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

FIFTH DISTRICT 

________________________________________________________________________ 

ERIC E. GREGG, ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Saline County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 15-L-29

 ) 

BRUCE RAUNER, Governor of Illinois, ) Honorable 

 ) Todd D. Lambert, 

 Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

________________________________________________________________________ 

 JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

 Justice Barberis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

 Justice Overstreet dissented, with opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 The plaintiff, Eric Gregg, filed a complaint against the defendant, Illinois Governor 

Bruce Rauner (Governor Rauner), to challenge his removal from the Illinois Prisoner Review 

Board (IPRB). Governor Rauner moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, in pertinent part, 

that his decision to remove Gregg from the IPRB was not judicially reviewable. The trial 

court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that Governor Rauner’s decision was reviewable 

under the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Lunding v. Walker, 65 Ill. 2d 516 (1976), 

because the IPRB is a quasi-judicial board, independent from the executive branch.

Following a trial on Gregg’s complaint, the court concluded that Gregg was wrongfully 

NOTICE

Decision filed 09/08/17. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
2 

terminated and entered an injunction prohibiting Governor Rauner from interfering or 

preventing Gregg from exercising his appointed duties with the IPRB and barring Governor 

Rauner from appointing Gregg's replacement. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and 

remand for further proceedings. 

¶ 2 In May 2012, Governor Patrick Quinn nominated Gregg to be a member of the IPRB.

At that time, the Governor’s office provided Gregg with a statement of economic interests 

form to complete, which related to his income and any gifts he had received in 2011. On 

May 20, 2012, Gregg returned the completed form in which he wrote “None” in the space 

provided to identify any gift valued over $500.

¶ 3 Gregg was not appointed to the IPRB until April 26, 2013, because he was recovering 

from an illness. Upon his appointment, the Governor’s office filed his May 2012 statement 

of economic interests form with the Illinois Secretary of State’s office. He did not complete a 

statement of economic interests form for calendar year 2012.

¶ 4 In September 2013, during Governor Quinn’s administration, Charles Will notified a 

senior legal advisor in the Illinois Department of Corrections that Gregg had failed to list 

income and a gift received on his statement of economic interests form. According to Will, 

Gregg had received a medical lift chair as a gift on April 4, 2013, which was not reported on 

his statement of economic interests form. Ken Tupy, the IPRB’s legal counsel at the time, 

investigated these complaints, but neither the IPRB nor the Governor’s office took any 

action. On November 7, 2013, the Illinois Senate approved Gregg’s appointment for a sixyear term to end on January 21, 2019.
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¶ 5 On December 8, 2014, Gregg filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. On December 22, 

2014, his bankruptcy attorney filed a form entitled “Chapter 13 Statement of Your Current 

Monthly Income and Calculation of Commitment Period,” which indicated that Gregg had 

received a net monthly income of $4027 from operating a business. Gregg signed the 

document under penalty of perjury, declaring that the information on the form was true and 

correct.

¶ 6 Tupy received a letter from a Belleville News-Democrat reporter, inquiring as to 

whether the $4027 net income listed on Gregg’s bankruptcy filing constituted a violation of 

section 3-3-1(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-3-1(b) (West 2014)), 

which prohibits IPRB members from engaging in any other business or employment.

¶ 7 In August 2015, Gregg’s attorney filed an amended Chapter 13 statement of current 

monthly income form, which attributed the monthly business income to Gregg’s wife. On 

September 16, 2015, Gregg received a letter from Jason Barclay, General Counsel for the 

Governor’s Office, informing him that the Governor’s office had received complaints that he 

had violated the terms of his appointment by receiving outside income and by filing an 

inaccurate statement of economic interests form.

¶ 8 On September 20, 2015, Gregg sent a letter to Barclay, explaining that his bankruptcy 

was triggered due to delinquent medical bills, that his bankruptcy attorney had inadvertently 

placed his wife’s business’s income in “[his] column” on the bankruptcy filing, and that his 

attorney had acknowledged the clerical error and had filed an amended form to correct the 

error. The letter also addressed the allegations that he had filed an inaccurate statement of 

economic interests form. Specifically, the letter explained that a community fundraiser was 
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held on his behalf to offset the cost of his medical bills; that the raised funds were placed in 

an account with a local church, and he did not have access to the account; that he did not 

know how much each person had contributed; that the statement of economic interests form 

was completed on May 20, 2012, during his illness and recovery but before he received the 

medical lift chair as a gift; and that the information from the Belleville News-Democrat 

appeared to be supplied by an individual who was terminated from his city employment 

while Gregg was mayor.

¶ 9 On October 2, 2015, Governor Rauner terminated Gregg’s appointment with the IPRB 

for malfeasance or complete incompetence and neglect of duty, explaining that Gregg’s 

response acknowledged and constituted an admission that he had filed a false statement 

under oath in federal bankruptcy proceedings and that his 2012 statement of economic 

interests form—which included a verification that the information contained therein was 

true, correct, and complete—was incorrect.

¶ 10 Gregg then filed a complaint, seeking a declaration that his removal was not for cause 

and requesting an injunction reinstating him. Governor Rauner filed a motion to dismiss the 

complaint, arguing, among other things, that his decision to remove Gregg from the IPRB 

was not judicially reviewable because the IPRB is part of the executive branch of 

government and his decisions with respect to boards under this authority are not subject to 

judicial review. On June 9, 2016, the trial court entered an order by docket entry, finding that

Governor Rauner’s decision to remove Gregg was reviewable under the Illinois Supreme 

Court’s decision in Lunding v. Walker, 65 Ill. 2d 516 (1976), because the IPRB, though a 
5 

part of the executive branch, is a quasi-judicial board that is independent of the executive 

branch.

¶ 11 Following the trial held on Gregg’s complaint, the trial court entered a written order 

on September 26, 2016, reiterating its previous decision that Governor Rauner’s decision to 

remove Gregg from the IPRB was judicially reviewable and concluding that Gregg was 

wrongfully terminated because his conduct did not constitute malfeasance, neglect of duty, 

or incompetence and, thus, did not amount to “cause” under article V, section 10, of the 

Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, § 10) or section 3-3-1(c) of the Unified Code of 

Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-3-1(c) (West 2014)). Governor Rauner appeals.

¶ 12 On appeal, Governor Rauner argues that his decision to remove Gregg from the IPRB 

is not judicially reviewable. Alternatively, he argues that Gregg’s removal for cause was 

valid. Because we conclude that the Governor’s removal authority is not judicially 

reviewable, we need not address Governor Rauner’s alternative argument.

¶ 13 The Illinois Constitution grants the Governor the authority to nominate and, with the 

advice and consent of the Illinois Senate, to appoint “all officers whose election or 

appointment is not otherwise provided for.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, § 9(a). The Governor 

also has the authority to “remove for incompetence, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office 

any officer who may be appointed by the Governor.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, § 10. Also, the 

statute creating the IPRB allows the Governor to remove any member “for incompetence, 

neglect of duty, malfeasance or inability to serve.” 730 ILCS 5/3-3-1(c) (West 2014).

¶ 14 The Illinois Supreme Court set forth the general rule that once the Governor has 

determined that he has a basis to remove someone for incompetence, neglect of duty, or 
6 

malfeasance, separation of powers prohibits the courts from questioning the Governor’s 

determination of cause. Wilcox v. People ex rel. Lipe, 90 Ill. 186, 205 (1878). In making this 

decision, the court noted that not only does the Illinois Constitution divide the three distinct 

branches of government, but it also expressly prohibits the exercise of any of the power 

properly belonging to one by either of the others. Id.

¶ 15 In Lunding, the supreme court revisited the Wilcox decision in light of the 1970 

Illinois Constitution1 and concluded that a member of a board that required complete 

independence from executive control to perform his quasi-judicial obligations is entitled to 

seek judicial review of the Governor’s exercise of his constitutional removal authority.

Lunding, 65 Ill. 2d at 518, 527-28. There, plaintiff, who was a member of the State Board of 

Elections (Board of Elections), which is charged with the supervision of election laws and 

administration of registration, was removed from his part-time appointed position by the 

Governor for “neglect of duty.” Id. at 518, 527-28. The court analogized a trilogy of federal 

cases2 that defined the limits of the President’s removal power and determined that the 

Governor should have greater discretion to remove an official “[w]ithin the executive branch 

itself” than those whose tasks require absolute freedom from executive control.Id. at 523-24.

¶ 16 The court concluded that, because of the unique character of the Board of Elections, 

the Governor could only remove a board member for cause and that the determination of the 

 1

The removal provision set forth in the 1970 Illinois Constitution was carried over from the 1870 

Constitution with only minor changes. The delegates at the 1970 Constitutional Convention recognized the

Wilcox rule when determining the Governor’s removal authority.

2

The three federal cases discussed by Lunding are Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), 

Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 

(1958). 
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adequacy of cause is judicially reviewable. Id. at 518-19. In support of its decision that the 

Governor’s removal power should not be absolute, the court examined the constitutional 

debates at the 1970 Constitutional Convention where the delegates discussed the creation of 

the Board of Elections. Id. at 526-27. The court found that the delegates contemplated that 

the Board of Elections would be a highly independent board and not amenable to political 

influence or discipline in the discharge of their official duties. Id. at 527. In other words, the 

court concluded that the Board of Elections was to be nonpartisan and neutral because the 

integrity of the election process required neutrality in the administration of elections. Id. at 

526-27. 

¶ 17 The court further noted that the Board of Elections—unlike most other State agencies, 

boards, and commissions—is constitutionally mandated and that the Illinois Constitution 

requires that no political party shall have a majority of members on the Board of Elections. 

Id. at 526. The court concluded that if the Wilcox holding were extended and applied to the 

removal of the Board of Elections’ members, “the political independence of that body 

envisioned by the delegates to the constitutional convention and sought to be achieved by the 

legislature would be jeopardized.” Id. at 527. The court recognized the Wilcox rule and 

reiterated that the Governor’s judgment to remove an appointed officer would not be subject 

to judicial challenge where the removed executive officer was directly responsible to the 

Governor. Id. at 525-27. However, where the appointed officer needed independence to 

discharge quasi-judicial duties, cause for removal was judicially reviewable.Id. Accordingly, 

the court concluded that, because the Board of Elections was constitutionally mandated and 

politically independent, the Governor could remove its members only for cause and that the 
8 

decision of what constituted cause was judicially reviewable. Id. at 527-28. The court limited 

its holding to “this particular factual setting.” Id. at 529. 

¶ 18 Applying the Lunding exception, the court in Ford v. Blagojevich concluded that 

members of the Illinois Industrial Commission (Industrial Commission) are entitled to the 

same protection from removal at the Governor’s whim as members of the Board of 

Elections. Ford v. Blagojevich, 282 F. Supp. 2d 898, 905 (C.D. Ill. 2003). The court 

concluded that, although the Industrial Commission is not constitutionally mandated, the 

legislative act establishing it indicates an intention to create a neutral, bipartisan board whose 

duty is to administer the Worker’s Compensation Act. Id. The court noted that the Industrial 

Commission has a balance of membership politically and that it is charged with reviewing 

arbitrator decisions in worker’s compensation cases, which requires it to assess witness 

credibility, resolve conflicts in evidence, weigh evidence, draw reasonable inferences from 

the evidence, and determine questions of fact. Id. Thus, the court concluded that because 

“political independence was the primary factor” the Lunding court relied upon and those 

“same strong considerations for political independence” exist in the case before it, the 

Industrial Commission members can only be removed for cause, and a Governor’s removal 

decision is subject to judicial review. Id.

¶ 19 Here, finding Lunding dispositive, the trial court concluded that members of the IPRB 

are entitled to the same protection from removal as the members of the Board of Elections 

and that Governor Rauner’s decision to remove Gregg for cause was subject to judicial 

review. We disagree. 
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¶ 20 Like the Industrial Commission, the IPRB is not constitutionally mandated. Section 3-

3-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-3-1 (West 2014)) establishes the 

IPRB, and the procedures employed by the IPRB in carrying out their duties are set forth in 

section 1610.10 of the Illinois Administrative Code (20 Ill. Adm. Code 1610.10 et seq. 

(2014)). The IPRB is independent of the Department of Corrections and consists of 15 

members appointed by the Governor with advice and consent of the Senate. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-

1(a), (b) (West 2014). The members must have five years of actual experience in one or a 

combination of the enumerated fields, which include penology, corrections work, law 

enforcement, sociology, law, education, social work, medicine, psychology, and other 

behavioral sciences. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-1(b) (West 2014). At least six of the appointed 

members must have at least three years experience in “juvenile matters.” 730 ILCS 5/3-3-

1(b) (West 2014). No more than 8 of the 15 IPRB members may be members of the same 

political party. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-1(b) (West 2014). 

¶ 21 The IPRB’s primary functions consist of the following: being the paroling authority 

for sentenced persons, the board of review for revocation of sentence credit cases or 

reduction in credit cases, the board of review and recommendation for the Governor’s 

exercise of executive clemency, the authority for establishing release dates for certain 

prisoners, the authority for setting conditions for parole and mandatory supervised release 

(MSR) and determining whether a violation of parole or MSR conditions warrants revocation 

or the imposition of other sanctions, and the authority for determining whether an aftercare 

release condition violation warrants revocation. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-2 (West 2014). 
10 

¶ 22 Gregg argues that the IPRB is a quasi-judicial body that requires independence from 

executive control to fulfill its statutory duties. We disagree. Unlike the Board of Elections 

and the Industrial Commission, there is no indication that the legislature intended the IPRB 

to be a neutral, bipartisan board whose duties require absolute freedom from the executive 

branch. The IPRB is authorized to set release dates for certain prisoners, and those decisions 

are not subject to judicial review. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-2.1(a), (h)(3) (West 2014). “The [IPRB] 

grants parole as an exercise of grace and executive discretion as limited or defined by the 

Illinois General Assembly in duly adopted legislation.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1610.50(a)(2014). 

In making parole decisions, the IPRB is not bound by strict rules of evidence, may hear 

witness testimony as well as testimony from the inmate, and may consider documentary 

evidence. 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1610.40(b) (2014). 

¶ 23 Quasi-judicial proceedings adjudicate disputed facts in a particular case. Walters v. 

Department of Labor, 356 Ill. App. 3d 785, 789 (2005). Rather than an objective 

adjudication of the facts, the parole-release decision is a subjective determination based on 

the available relevant information, which is not limited to facts admitted at the parole 

hearing. 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1610.50(a), (b) (2014). The parole hearing is meant “to gather 

information and views” and “is not an adversarial proceeding.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1610.40(a)

(2014). The parole decision differs from traditional judicial decision-making in that the 

decision “involves a synthesis of record facts and personal observation filtered through the 

experience of the decisionmaker.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris v. Irving, 90 

Ill. App. 3d 56, 61 (1980). Thus, the IPRB’s parole decision-making authority is a policy 
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determination as to whether parole is justified rather than a quasi-judicial adjudication of the 

facts. 

¶ 24 Also, regarding the IPRB’s executive clemency power, the IPRB serves as a “board of 

review and recommendation for the exercise of executive clemency by the Governor.” 730 

ILCS 5/3-3-1(a)(3) (West 2014). The Governor’s executive clemency powers are extremely 

broad and cannot be controlled by either the courts or the legislature. People ex rel. Madigan 

v. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d 457, 473 (2004). Although the IPRB advises the Governor regarding 

clemency petitions, the Governor’s clemency decisions are left wholly to his discretion.

Once the Governor makes a decision on a clemency application, he communicates that 

decision to the IPRB. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-13(d) (West 2014). Thus, the IPRB acts as an advisor 

to the Governor, and the IPRB’s relationship to the Governor in the executive clemency 

process establishes that it is not an independent agency but a traditional part of the executive 

branch. 

¶ 25 Although we recognize that the IPRB does perform some quasi-judicial functions, 

those duties do not make the IPRB a quasi-judicial agency for which political independence 

is necessary for the integrity of its processes. If the exercise of some judicial functions were

sufficient to fall within the Lunding exception, the exception would quickly subsume the 

Wilcox rule. Thus, the exercise of some quasi-judicial duties by itself is insufficient to 

remove the agency from Wilcox’s general rule of judicial nonreviewability and place it 

within the Lunding exception. “An entity with quasi-judicial powers is not, as a matter of 

law, a quasi-judicial body at all times.” Parrillo, Weiss & Moss v. Cashion, 181 Ill. App. 3d 

920, 926 (1989). 
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¶ 26 In support of his argument that the IPRB is an agency that requires complete 

executive independence, Gregg analogizes the IPRB to the Federal Trade Commission 

(Commission), which is the subject of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 

Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). The issue in Humphrey’s was 

whether the President’s removal power was limited to removal for cause. Id. at 619. The 

Court evaluated the Commission’s duties—which included issuing complaints, giving notice 

of hearings, issuing written reports, and issuing cease and desist orders—and concluded that 

the Commission “is an administrative body created by Congress to carry into effect 

legislative policies embodied in the statute in accordance with the legislative standard therein 

prescribed, and to perform other specified duties as a legislative or as a judicial aid.” Id. at 

620, 628. Thus, the Court found that such a body could not be characterized “as an arm or an 

eye of the executive.” Id. at 628. 

¶ 27 The Court further concluded that the Commission was meant to be nonpartisan; that it 

must, from the very nature of its duties, act with entire impartiality; that it was charged with 

the enforcement of no policy except the policy of law; and that its duties were neither 

political nor executive but predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative. Id. at 624.

Thus, the Court concluded that the congressional intent was to “create a body of experts who

shall gain experience by length of service—a body which shall be independent of executive 

authority, except in its selection, and free to exercise its judgment without the leave or 

hindrance of any other official or any department of the government.” (Emphasis omitted.)

Id. at 625-26. Accordingly, the Court determined that no removal could be made during the 
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prescribed term for which the officer is appointed, except for one or more of the causes set 

forth in the applicable statute. Id. at 632. 

¶ 28 The IPRB is distinguishable from the Commission because the IPRB acts as an agent 

of the executive branch by performing executive functions and aids in the exercise of 

traditional executive power. Also, the IPRB is not an agency that requires complete freedom 

from executive control to perform its statutory obligations. Lunding created a narrow 

exception to the Wilcox rule for appointed board members who required complete political 

independence to discharge their statutory obligations because executive influence would 

undermine the decisions made in the exercise of those obligations. Because the IPRB does 

not fall within the Lunding exception, we conclude that its members are removable by virtue 

of the Governor’s removal power set forth in the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. 

V, § 10), and section 3-3-1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-3-1(c) 

(West 2014)), and that a removal decision is not subject to judicial review. 

¶ 29 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Saline 

County and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. 

¶ 30 Reversed and remanded. 

¶ 31 JUSTICE OVERSTREET, dissenting. 

¶ 32 For the following reasons, I respectfully dissent. The authority of the Governor to 

appoint members of the IPRB does not arise from section 9 of the Illinois Constitution, 

which involves appointments “not otherwise provided for.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, § 9(a). 
14 

Instead, the appointment and the removal of members of the IPRB are provided for in section 

3-3-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections. See 730 ILCS 5/3-3-1(b) (West 2014) (IPRB 

“shall consist of 15 persons appointed by the Governor by and with the advice and consent of 

the Senate”); 730 ILCS 5/3-3-1(c) (West 2014) (“Any member may be removed by the 

Governor for incompetence, neglect of duty, malfeasance or inability to serve.”). The 

Governor’s authority to appoint and remove members of the IPRB is consistent with the 

IPRB’s role as board of review and recommendation for the exercise of executive clemency 

by the Governor. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-1(a)(3) (West 2014). However, this task is but one of the 

functions of the IPRB. Indeed, the supreme court has described the responsibilities of the 

IPRB as “two separate and distinct functions. One is to act as the Governor’s agent in 

hearing applications for executive clemency, in which the Board has no power to grant a 

pardon, reprieve or commutation, but merely to submit a recommendation to the Governor, 

who is free to accept or reject the recommendation.” People ex rel. Abner v. Kinney, 30 Ill. 

2d 201, 205 (1964); see also 730 ILCS 5/3-3-1(a)(3) (West 2014). “The other is when it sits 

as an administrative body with the power to make final decisions in parole matters. The latter 

power has been granted it by the legislature.” Kinney, 30 Ill. 2d at 205; see also Hill v.

Walker, 241 Ill. 2d 479, 486 (2011) (IPRB “is an administrative agency created by the 

legislature” that determines, inter alia, “whether an eligible inmate should be granted or 

denied parole”); 730 ILCS 5/3-3-1(a)(1), (1.5), (2), (4), (5) (West 2014). 

¶ 33 With regard to the IPRB’s role as an administrative body with the power to make final 

decisions in parole matters, the legislative language reveals an intent to create an 

independent board that is quasi-judicial in nature, tasked with hearing and deciding parole 
15 

matters. See People ex rel. McGee v. Hill, 350 Ill. 129, 134 (1932) (Board of Pardons and 

Paroles is vested with “quasi-judicial power”); Brown v. Duncan, 361 Ill. App. 3d 125, 131 

(2005) (“Quasi-judicial hearings are those which concern agency decisions affecting a small 

number of people on individual grounds based on a particular set of disputed facts that have 

been adjudicated.”); Cashion, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 926 (a quasi-judicial body exercises 

judgment and discretion, hears and determines facts and decisions, makes binding orders and 

judgments, affects personal rights of private persons, and imposes penalties). The IPRB is 

tasked with hearing and deciding aftercare release for juveniles adjudicated delinquent; 

reviewing cases involving revocation, suspension, or reduction of sentence; establishing 

release dates; setting conditions for parole, mandatory supervised release, and aftercare 

release; and determining whether a violation of those conditions warrants revocation. See 

730 ILCS 5/3-3-1(a)(1), (1.5), (2), (4), (5) (West 2014); see also 730 ILCS 5/3-3-2(a)(1)-(11) 

(West 2014) (IPRB shall, inter alia, conduct hearings and decide conditions, time of 

discharge, and revocation of parole and mandatory supervised release; conduct hearings and 

impose sanctions for violations of parole, mandatory supervised release, and aftercare 

release; conduct hearings and decide time and conditions of aftercare release; conduct 

hearings and decide cases for violations of Department of Corrections rules with respect to 

sentence credits; and conduct hearings and decide release dates for certain prisoners).Indeed, 

the IPRB’s “mission is to function under statutory authority as a quasi-judicial body with a 

primary focus on public safety” (www.illinois.gov/prb (last visited Aug. 23, 2017)). See 

Rodriguez v. Illinois Prisoner Review Board, 376 Ill. App. 3d 429, 430 (2007) (court may 

take judicial notice of information department has provided on its official website). The 
16 

parole considerations before the IPRB are to be adjudicated on the merits of each claim by a 

body free from control or coercive influence. See Lunding, 65 Ill. 2d at 524. 

¶ 34 Like the State Board of Elections in Lunding and the Industrial Commission in Ford, 

the IPRB was established to be neutral, bipartisan, and independent in the performance of its 

significant responsibilities. See 730 ILCS 5/3-3-1(a) (West 2014) (IPRB is independent of 

the Department of Corrections); 730 ILCS 5/3-3-1(b) (West 2014) (no more than 8 of 15 

IPRB members may be members of the same political party). The legislative action in 

providing for neutral bipartisan membership on the IPRB (730 ILCS 5/3-3-1(b) (West 

2014)), coupled with the awarding of specific terms to its members (730 ILCS 5/3-3-1(c) 

(West 2014)), are strong considerations for political independence for the IPRB. See 

Lunding, 65 Ill. 2d at 527-28; Ford, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 905. This need for political 

independence to discharge quasi-judicial duties supports the conclusion that the members of 

the IPRB can only be removed for cause, i.e., “incompetence, neglect of duty, malfeasance 

or inability to serve” (730 ILCS 5/3-3-1(c) (West 2014)), and a Governor’s decision 

removing an IPRB member is subject to judicial review. See Ford, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 905; 

see also Kosoglad v. Porcelli, 132 Ill. App. 3d 1081, 1088 (1985) (because the Board of Fire 

and Police Commissioners, like State Board of Elections in Lunding, was intended by the 

General Assembly to be “ ‘neutral, bipartisan[,] and independent,’ ” the statutory scheme 

authorized judicial review of the adequacy of the cause for removal of its members). Thus, I 

would conclude that the adequacy of the cause for removal cited by the Governor is 

judicially reviewable. 
 2017 IL App (5th) 160474 

 

 NO. 5-16-0474 

 IN THE 

 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

 FIFTH DISTRICT 

__________________________________________________________________________

ERIC E. GREGG, ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Saline County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 15-L-29

 ) 

BRUCE RAUNER, Governor of Illinois, ) Honorable 

 ) Todd D. Lambert, 

 Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

__________________________________________________________________________

Opinion Filed: September 8, 2017 

__________________________________________________________________________

Justices: Honorable Thomas M. Welch, J. 

 Honorable John B. Barberis, J., 

 Concurred 

 Honorable David K. Overstreet, J., 

 Dissented 

__________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, State of Illinois, David L. Franklin, 

for Solicitor General, Brett E. Legner, Deputy Solicitor General, 100 

Appellant West Randolph Street, 12th Floor, Chicago, IL 60601 

__________________________________________________________________________

Attorney Thomas F. Crosby, Winters, Brewster, Crosby, and Schafer, LLC, 

for 111 West Main, P.O. Box 700, Marion, IL 62959 

Appellee 

__________________________________________________________________________