Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 16, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00150-CR

JASON B. JACKSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 176th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1333636

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Jason B. Jackson was convicted of possession with intent to 

deliver more than one but less than four grams of cocaine, a second-degree felony. 

See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.102(3)(D), 481.112(a), (c) (West 

2010). Appellant presents one issue for review: whether the evidence is legally 

sufficient to show that appellant possessed the cocaine. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 18, 2012, the Texas Department of Family and Protective

Services (DFPS) received a tip that Shelley Fisher was with her children at a motel, 

selling drugs with her boyfriend. Patrick Marcil, a DFPS caseworker, was assigned 

to investigate. Marcil requested assistance from law enforcement. Deputy Brandon 

Herlong of the Harris County Constable’s Office, Precinct Five, responded.

Herlong met Marcil in the parking lot outside the motel. The two knocked 

on the door to room 208. Fisher gave them permission to enter. The room was 

dark. Herlong used his flashlight to scan the room. Herlong and Marcil saw Fisher, 

appellant, and two young children in the room.

Herlong observed appellant walking away from a clothes rack in the 

bathroom area of the room. There was a coat hanging on the rack. The coat was 

moving.

Herlong searched the coat and found a plastic pill container. Inside the pill 

container, Herlong discovered a clear plastic baggy containing a white powdery 

substance. The contents of the baggy tested positive for cocaine and weighed 2.524 

grams.

The room contained items normally associated with the narcotics trade. A 

digital scale was on the counter next to the sink. Herlong saw a white powdery 

substance on the scale. Marcil observed small Ziploc-style baggies on the counter.

Appellant was indicted for knowing possession with intent to deliver cocaine 

weighing more than one gram and less than four grams. The case was tried to a

jury. Appellant did not put on any evidence. After the guilt-innocence phase, 

appellant moved for an instructed verdict, which was denied. The jury convicted 

appellant of the charged offense. The trial court subsequently sentenced appellant 

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to five years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal 

Justice. This appeal followed.

In his sole issue on appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Appellant argues that because the evidence 

does not link him to the cocaine, the State did not prove the possession element of 

the charged offense.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we “consider all of 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, 

based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational fact finder 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We defer to the 

factfinder’s (1) resolution of conflicts in testimony; (2) evaluation of the credibility 

and weight of the evidence; and (3) responsibility to draw reasonable inferences 

from basic facts to ultimate facts. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2010). This standard applies equally to circumstantial and direct evidence.

Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). In reviewing 

cases based on circumstantial evidence, we need not find that the State’s evidence 

negated every reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant’s guilt. See Geesa v. 

State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 160–61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), overruled on other 

grounds, Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Our role 

“is restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence when a factfinder does not act 

rationally.” Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 517. Accordingly, we will uphold the verdict 

unless a rational factfinder must have had a reasonable doubt as to any essential

element. Id. at 518.

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APPLICABLE LAW

A person commits a second-degree felony offense if he knowingly possesses 

with intent to deliver over one but less than four grams of cocaine. Tex. Health & 

Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.102(3)(D), 481.112(a), (c). When an accused is charged 

with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove: (1) the 

defendant exercised actual care, custody, control, or management over the 

contraband and (2) the accused knew the object he possessed was contraband. 

Flores v. State, 440 S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013), 

judgment vacated on other grounds, 427 S.W.3d 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); see

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39) (West Supp. 2014). Possession can be 

established with direct or circumstantial evidence. Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 

402, 405–06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The evidence must establish, to the requisite 

level of confidence, that the accused’s connection with the drugs was more than 

just fortuitous. Id. at 406. This is the so-called “affirmative links” rule. Id.

When, as here, the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where 

the contraband is found, the record must contain additional facts and circumstances 

linking the defendant to the contraband. Flores, 440 S.W.3d at 188. We must 

consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether the defendant 

is linked to the contraband. Id. Mere presence at the scene where contraband is 

found does not establish possession. Id. However, presence or proximity might be 

sufficient to establish possession when combined with other direct or 

circumstantial evidence—i.e., “links.” Id. We have established a nonexhaustive list 

of potential links that, individually or in combination, might establish the 

defendant’s possession of contraband: 

(1) the defendant’s presence when a search is conducted;

(2) whether the contraband was in plain view, 

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(3) the defendant’s proximity to and the accessibility of the narcotic; 

(4) whether the defendant was under the influence of narcotics when 

arrested; 

(5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or narcotics 

when arrested; 

(6) whether the defendant made incriminating statements when 

arrested; 

(7) whether the defendant attempted to flee; 

(8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures; 

(9) whether there was an odor of contraband; 

(10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; 

(11) whether the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place

where the drugs were found; 

(12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed; 

(13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; 

and 

(14) whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness 

of guilt. 

Olivarez v. State, 171 S.W.3d 283, 291 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no 

pet.). “The number of linking factors present is not as important as the ‘logical 

force’ they create to prove the crime was committed.” Id. The absence of various 

links does not constitute evidence of innocence to be weighed against the links 

present. Flores, 440 S.W.3d at 189.

ANALYSIS

The thrust of appellant’s argument is that, under these factors, the State did 

not link him to the cocaine. We disagree. 

Factor (1) favors a link because appellant was present when the police 

arrived and searched the motel room. See Watson v. State, 861 S.W.2d 410, 415–

16 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1993, pet. ref’d). 

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Factor (2) does not link appellant to the cocaine because the cocaine was 

hidden in a coat pocket. See Flores, 440 S.W.3d at 189.

Factor (3) favors a link. Appellant was seen in close proximity to the coat 

containing the cocaine and was observed moving away from the coat. The deputy

saw the coat moving as appellant moved away from it towards the bathroom. The 

jury reasonably could have inferred that appellant was in close proximity to and 

could access the cocaine. See Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 409 n.24 (noting that link 

can be established when contraband is hidden in a place tied to the accused); 

Flores, 440 S.W.3d at 189.

Factors (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8) do not link appellant to the cocaine. The 

record does not show at the time of arrest that he was under the influence of any 

drugs; possessed other contraband or narcotics; made incriminating statements;

attempted to flee; or made furtive gestures.

Factor (9) does not link appellant to the cocaine because the record does not 

indicate whether the contraband in this case had an odor.

Factor (10) favors a link. See Flores, 440 S.W.3d at 190. Herlong and Marcil

saw in plain view a scale and baggies on the counter next to the sink. According to 

Herlong and Marcil, these items are normally associated with the narcotics trade. 

Additionally, Herlong observed a white powdery substance on the scale that he 

believed was either cocaine or methamphetamine.

Appellant contends factor (11) does not favor a link because he was merely a 

guest in a hotel room visiting his girlfriend. The evidence indicates, however, that 

Fisher and appellant were sharing the motel room. When Herlong and Marcil 

arrived, appellant and Fisher were not fully dressed. Fisher was wearing only a tshirt, and appellant was wearing only boxer shorts. The children were sleeping. 

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The call received by DFPS indicated both Fisher and appellant were in the motel 

room together selling drugs. The jury rationally could have inferred from 

appellant’s and Fisher’s shared occupancy and state of undress at the time of 

Herlong’s and Marcil’s early-morning entry that appellant had at least a right of 

possession with regard to the motel room. This factor favors a link.1 See id.

(finding that indicators of possession support the inference of a right of 

possession); Watson, 861 S.W.2d at 415–16 (finding affirmative links to defendant 

even though defendant was not the registered occupant of motel room).

Factor (12), like factor (2), does not link appellant to the cocaine because the

cocaine was found in an enclosed space, a coat pocket.

Factors (13) and (14) do not link appellant to the cocaine. The record 

contains no evidence that appellant had a large amount of money or that 

appellant’s conduct indicated a consciousness of guilt.

In sum, upon entering the motel room shared by appellant and Fisher, 

Deputy Herlong observed appellant walking away from a jacket hanging on the 

motel-room clothes rack in the bathroom. The jacket was moving. When Deputy

Herlong searched the jacket, he found a pill bottle containing a plastic baggy. The 

plastic baggy contained a white powdery substance that later tested positive for 

cocaine. Herlong and Marcil saw drug paraphernalia, a scale and plastic baggies,

on the counter in plain view. From these facts, a juror rationally could have 

concluded that appellant had recently manipulated the moving jacket. A juror

could have determined that appellant hid the pill bottle containing cocaine in the 

jacket pocket when Marcil and Herlong arrived. Therefore, a juror rationally could 

have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant exercised the requisite 

1 Although appellant asserts that the room was registered to Fisher, the record contains no 

evidence establishing the identity of the person renting the room.

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care, custody, control, or management over the contraband and, based on the 

presence of other drug paraphernalia and appellant’s attempt to conceal the pill 

bottle from Marcil and Herlong, that appellant knew the substance possessed was 

contraband.2

CONCLUSION

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that 

the evidence of links between appellant and the cocaine was legally sufficient to 

support the jury’s verdict that he possessed the cocaine. We affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

/s/ Marc W. Brown

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jamison, Busby, and Brown.

Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

2 This case is distinguishable from Allen v. State, 249 S.W.3d 680 (Tex. App.—Austin 

2008, no pet.). There, the evidence only established that the defendant was present in an 

apartment in which she did not reside when cocaine was found secreted throughout the house—

in a plastic bag buried in a closed dog food bag; under the kitchen sink; in a kitchen cabinet; and 

on a platter on top of a refrigerator. Id. at 694–99. The Austin Court of Appeals held that this 

evidence was legally insufficient to support a conviction for cocaine possession. Id. at 704. Here, 

in contrast, the evidence indicates that appellant was sharing possession of the motel room with 

Fisher; the cocaine was found in the pocket of a moving jacket in close proximity to appellant; 

the cocaine was immediately apparent when Herlong opened the pill bottle; and drug 

paraphernalia was seen in plain sight.

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