Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-CR-500 |April 20, 2015 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Victoria L. Bailey

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Jesse R. Drum

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Keandre Arnold,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 20, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1407-CR-500

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court.

The Honorable Kurt M. Eisgruber, 

Judge.

Cause No. 49G01-1305-FA-35062

Barteau, Senior Judge

Statement of the Case

[1] Keandre Arnold appeals the sentence he received for his convictions of 

attempted murder, a Class A felony, Indiana Code sections 35-42-1-1 (2007) 
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and 35-41-5-1 (1977), and invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor, Indiana 

Code section 35-46-1-15.1 (2010). We affirm.

Issue

[2] Arnold presents one issue for our review, which we restate as: whether the trial

court abused its discretion in sentencing Arnold.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In May 2013, Arnold shot a gun at Aaron Coats in an attempt to kill Coats. 

Based upon this incident, Arnold was charged with attempted murder and 

invasion of privacy. The trial court sentenced Arnold to forty years on the 

attempted murder conviction and 365 days on the invasion of privacy 

conviction, to be served concurrent with the forty years. The final four years of 

Arnold’s sentence were to be served in a community corrections program. 

Arnold now appeals his sentence.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Arnold contends the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to an 

aggregate forty-year sentence. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound 

discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of 

discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 

875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or 

the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. 
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When imposing a sentence for a felony, a trial court must enter a sentencing

statement including reasonably detailed reasons for imposing a particular 

sentence. Id. at 491. A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to issue a 

sentencing statement, gives reasons for imposing a sentence that are not 

supported by the record, omits reasons clearly supported by the record and 

advanced for consideration, or considers reasons that are improper as a matter 

of law. Id. at 490-91. Remand for resentencing may be appropriate if we 

cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same 

sentence had it properly considered the reasons supported by the record. Id. at 

491.

[5] Arnold alleges that error occurred when a factor that is improper as a matter of 

law was considered in determining his sentence. Specifically, he claims the trial 

court abused its discretion by finding as an aggravating circumstance the fact 

that he fired a gun into a home. At sentencing, the trial court remarked that 

“shots were fired at that residence. That’s huge. It’s a huge aggravator in your 

instance.” Tr. p. 177. Arnold argues this is an improper aggravating 

circumstance because it constitutes a material element of the offense of 

attempted murder.

[6] The nature and circumstances of an offense is a proper aggravating factor. 

McCann v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ind. 2001). Arnold is correct, though, 

that a factor constituting a material element of an offense may not be used as an 

aggravating circumstance. See Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Ind. 

2000). However, when the trial court evaluates the nature and circumstances of 
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an offense, it may properly consider the particularized circumstances of the 

factual elements as an aggravating factor. McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 

589-90 (Ind. 2007).

[7] In order to convict Arnold of attempted murder, the State had to prove that he 

intentionally took a substantial step toward killing Coats by shooting a handgun 

at him. See Appellant’s App. p. 22; see also Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1, 35-41-5-1. 

The evidence at trial showed that at the time of this incident, Coats was at 

home with his girlfriend and her three daughters. The interior wood door was 

open but an exterior storm door closed the house to the outside. Through the 

storm door, the girls saw someone approaching the house. Coats went to the 

door and a man asked for one of the girls. Arnold then appeared, said 

“Remember me? I’m gonna kill ya,” and began shooting. Tr. p. 62. Coats saw 

the gun and told his family to run. Bullets entered the exterior of the home and 

exited into the interior of the home, and one bullet pierced the couch in the 

living room where the three girls had been sitting.

[8] In sentencing Arnold, the trial court relied on the danger created by firing a gun 

into a room full of people as it considered the unique circumstances of this 

offense. This finding is supported by the evidence and is a proper comment 

upon the nature and circumstances of Arnold’s offense. See Hape v. State, 903 

N.E.2d 977, 1001-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in recognizing danger posed to community during car chase as 

aggravating circumstance in sentencing for offense of resisting law 

enforcement), trans. denied. Thus, the trial court did not err in finding as an 
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aggravating circumstance the fact that shots were fired into a room full of 

people.

[9] Moreover, additional aggravating factors exist to support Arnold’s enhanced 

sentence. At sentencing, the trial court stated that “[t]he aggravators clearly 

overwhelm the mitigators.” Tr. p. 177. The court then discussed the 

aggravating circumstances, beginning with the fact that Arnold cut off his home 

detention ankle monitor just days before he attacked Coats, who was also the 

victim in Arnold’s previous case. The court labeled this a “worst case scenario” 

and then turned to Arnold’s juvenile record, which it stated was another “huge 

aggravator” and that Arnold had “built quite a record” for being only eighteen. 

Id. Thus, given the severity of the additional aggravators, we are not persuaded 

that the trial court would have imposed a different sentence even in the absence 

of the aggravating circumstance of firing a gun into a room full of people.

Conclusion

[10] For the reasons stated, we conclude the trial court did not err in finding 

Arnold’s act of firing a gun into a room full of people as an aggravating 

circumstance when it determined his sentence upon his convictions of 

attempted murder and invasion of privacy.

[11] Affirmed.

[12] Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.