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Filed 4/15/15 P. v. Williams CA1/4 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION 4 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

TERRY WILLIAMS, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 A138843 

 (Contra Costa County 

 Super. Ct. No. 51222181) 

 Defendant appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of 

first degree residential burglary. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a).) He contends the 

magistrate improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence found in an illegal search 

and that the court erred in admitting statements obtained in violation of Miranda v. 

Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) into evidence. We shall affirm the judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 The evidence at the preliminary hearing showed that defendant lived with his 

grandmother in a home next door to the victim’s residence. In November 2012, the 

victim received an automatic e-mail from his home video surveillance system showing 

photos of a person on the side of his house and in his living room, and a picture of a shoe. 

He called the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Department. Deputy Sheriff Joseph England 

was dispatched to the victim’s home to investigate. 

 England found a shattered window and an alarm keyboard box that had been 

pulled from the wall. England concluded the home had been burglarized. He conducted 

an “area canvass” to investigate whether neighbors in the area had information about the 
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burglary. He went to the house next door and spoke with defendant, who said he had 

been home but had not heard or seen anything. As they spoke, Reginald Ward parked in 

the street and walked up the driveway of the house. He told England he had been gone at 

work all day and had no information. It appeared to England that Ward had just gotten 

home. 

 When the victim returned home later that day, he found that a television, three 

outdoor cameras, and a blanket were missing. He also thought that over $4,000 in cash 

was missing, but later found the money undisturbed. He told England he had noticed a 

television wire stuck to the fence that separated the neighbors’ houses. 

 The next day, the victim showed England the still images from his cell phone. He 

told England the person in the images looked familiar and might be his next door 

neighbor. One of the pictures showed the culprit’s shoe. England asked the victim about 

his next-door neighbors, and was told that an elderly woman, an approximately 50-year 

old man, and a young man lived in the home.1

 

 England went back to defendant’s home and knocked on the front door, and Ward 

answered. England showed him the pictures and Ward said the person in the images 

looked like defendant, and that the shoe from the picture looked like defendant’s shoe. 

England asked Ward if any of the missing items were in the house, and Ward replied that 

“he did not believe so, but let’s come inside and check.” England asked what Ward’s 

relationship was to defendant, and Ward said he was defendant’s uncle. 

 Ward led England through the house, and they did not see the missing items. 

England asked Ward what was in the shed in the backyard. Ward led England to the 

unlocked shed, where he found a television and blanket consistent with the victim’s 

account of what had been stolen. Although it contained a futon, the shed did not appear 

to be a bedroom. 

 England asked Ward whether defendant was staying in the shed. Ward told him 

he did not know, and that he would have to check with defendant’s grandmother, who 

 1

 Ward was approximately 54 years old. 
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owned the house.2

 England “froze” the investigation and Ward called the grandmother, 

who was in Texas. Defendant’s grandmother told England that Ward had been housesitting while she was away, and gave him permission to continue the search. England 

showed the television and blanket to the victim, who said they were his. 

 England later returned to defendant’s home and asked to speak with defendant in 

private. Defendant led him into his bedroom inside the house. The door was open. 

England told defendant that he had reviewed video surveillance and found the blanket 

and television, and that he knew that defendant had committed the burglary. Defendant 

placed his head down and said nothing. England said he needed to know where the 

stolen cash was, and defendant said it would take a few days to get the money back. 

England told defendant he needed to leave with him and go in his patrol car. Defendant 

reached for a pair of shoes, which England recognized from the photos taken by the home 

surveillance system. 

 England handcuffed defendant, placed him in the patrol car, and advised him of 

his Miranda rights. Defendant answered in the affirmative when England asked him 

whether he understood his rights. Defendant then admitted to committing the burglary, 

hiding the items in the shed, and damaging the surveillance system. 

 Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in the shed and his statements to 

England under Penal Code section 1538.5 on the grounds that they were obtained during 

an illegal warrantless search. The magistrate denied the motion. In doing so, the 

magistrate found that defendant had a sufficient expectation of privacy in the shed to 

bring the motion, but that in the circumstances, it was reasonable for England to believe 

Ward had authority to consent to the search. 

 At trial, defendant moved to dismiss the information pursuant to Penal Code 

section 995 on the grounds that the magistrate erred in denying his motion to suppress. 

The trial court denied the motion. 

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 England also testified that after Ward opened the shed door, he said he believed 

defendant used it. 
4

 Defendant also made a motion in limine to exclude the statements he made to 

England, contending they were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The trial 

court reviewed the transcript of the preliminary hearing and heard additional evidence. 

England testified that when he arrived at the defendant’s home the day after the burglary, 

defendant was sitting in the living room. England asked defendant to speak with him in 

private, and defendant agreed. Another uniformed deputy sheriff was standing outside 

the front door. The other deputy stood in the hallway outside the bedroom door while 

England and defendant spoke in the bedroom. Defendant sat on the bed and England 

stood near the doorway. The first thing England told defendant was that he had seen the 

surveillance video and knew defendant had committed the burglary. Defendant put his 

head down. England next asked about the cash, and when defendant made an 

incriminating response, England ended the interview, handcuffed him, and placed him in 

the patrol car. The interview was brief. At no point during the interview in the bedroom 

did England tell defendant he was free to leave. 

 Before arresting defendant, England did not handcuff him or draw his weapon. He 

did not ask any questions between arresting defendant and advising him of his Miranda

rights. Defendant said he understood his rights. Defendant was 18 years old. 

Defendant’s adoptive mother (his grandmother) testified that he had been in a special 

educational program at school and that he displayed difficulties in understanding her in 

her everyday dealings with him. 

 The trial court denied the motion to exclude defendant’s statements to England. In 

doing so, the court found that defendant was not in a custodial setting when England 

questioned him in the bedroom, and that defendant spoke with England voluntarily. 

 At trial, England testified that after he advised defendant of his Miranda rights, 

defendant told him that he had taken the video cameras off the wall and thrown them into 

the sewer and that he put the television set and blanket into the shed. He said he 

committed the burglary because he needed money to travel to San Francisco, and that he 

planned to sell the stolen property. 

 A jury found defendant guilty of first degree burglary. 
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II. DISCUSSION 

A. Third-Party Consent to Search 

 Defendant contends the magistrate erred in denying his motion to suppress 

evidence found as a result of Ward’s consent to search the premises. According to 

defendant, the evidence gathered after the search of the home and shed should be 

suppressed because Ward was only a temporary house-sitter and lacked authority to 

consent to the search of the shed. 

 Our standard of review is well settled. A defendant may challenge a magistrate’s 

ruling on a motion to suppress on appeal, following a conviction by plea or at trial. 

(People v. Mena (2012) 54 Cal.4th 146, 156.) Where a defendant’s motion challenging 

the reasonableness of a search is based upon the evidence adduced at the preliminary 

hearing, the trial court is bound by the factual findings of the magistrate. (Anderson v. 

Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 533, 538-539.) “On appeal, we do not review the 

findings of the [trial] court since it acts as a reviewing, and not a fact-finding court. 

Rather, ‘the appellate court disregards the findings of the trial court and reviews the 

determination of the magistrate who ruled on the motion to suppress.’ [Citation.] ‘In 

doing so, “all presumptions are drawn in favor of the factual determinations of the 

[magistrate] and the appellate court must uphold the [magistrate’s] expressed or implied 

findings if they are supported by substantial evidence.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Snead

(1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 380, 384, fn. omitted.) 

 Although entry into a house without a warrant is presumptively unlawful, the 

presumption is rebutted if the law enforcement officer’s entry is made pursuant to valid 

consent. (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 222; Florida v. Jimeno (1991) 

500 U.S. 248, 251.) “[T]he consent of one who possesses common authority over 

premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that 

authority is shared.” (United States v. Matlock (1974) 415 U.S. 164, 170.) 

 Here, as defendant points out, consent was initially given not by the homeowner 

but by Ward, who was house-sitting, and the search encompassed the shed, over which 

defendant contends Ward lacked actual or apparent authority. These facts are not 
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dispositive. Warrantless entry is valid if consent is given by a third party, so long as the 

law enforcement officer has a reasonable belief that the third party possesses common 

authority over the premises, even if the third party does not, in fact, have that authority. 

As our high court has explained, “[A] guest who has the run of the house in the 

occupant’s absence has the apparent authority to give consent to enter an area where a 

visitor normally would be received. [Citations.] Furthermore, the police may assume, 

without further inquiry, that a person who answers the door in response to their knock has 

the authority to let them enter. [Citation.]” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 

703.) 

 We conclude that it was reasonable for Deputy England to believe Ward had 

authority to consent to the search of the premises, including the shed. The victim had 

told England that the home was inhabited by three occupants, including a person 

matching Ward’s description. England was told that Ward was defendant’s relative. 

Each time England went to defendant’s home, Ward was present, once apparently coming 

home after work and arriving on the property as England spoke to defendant. Ward 

answered the door when England visited the home for the second time. When England 

conducted the initial area canvass, defendant answered the front door, suggesting to 

England that defendant lived in the house, and not in the shed. In short, Ward appeared 

to live at the house, and defendant gave no indication that he lived in the shed. 

 We recognize that the magistrate concluded defendant had an expectation of 

privacy in the shed. However, Ward presented himself to England as someone who had 

authority to consent to the search of the shed, and there was no indication that when 

England looked into the shed, there was reason to believe it was not a common area. 

Contrary to defendant’s argument, Ward’s lack of knowledge whether the stolen items 

were in the shed did not suggest that Ward never used the shed, but only that he had no 

knowledge of the contents of the shed at that time.3

 On this record, England could 

 3

 Defendant relies on Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 497 U.S. 177, 188 for the 

proposition that Ward’s lack of knowledge about the contents of the shed should have put 

England on inquiry notice about its mutual use. That case, however, is inapposite, as it 
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reasonably conclude that Ward had the “run of the house,” including the backyard and 

the shed. Thus, the third-party consent to the search of the house and shed is valid, and 

the magistrate properly denied the motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search. 

B. Admissibility of Defendant’s Statements 

 Defendant contends the trial court violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment 

of the United States Constitution by admitting the statements he made to England. 

According to defendant, he was in custody when he made his initial statement to England 

in his bedroom and he could not properly be questioned without receiving Miranda

warnings. Defendant also argues that his further statements, made after he received his 

Miranda advisements, were inadmissible because they were made only after he had 

already made incriminating admissions, and there was no showing the taint of the earlier 

improperly obtained statements had been dissipated. 

 “In applying Miranda, . . . one normally begins by asking whether custodial 

interrogation has taken place. ‘The phrase “custodial interrogation” is crucial. The 

adjective [custodial] encompasses any situation in which “a person has been taken into 

custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 

[Citations.] The noun [interrogation] “refers not only to express questioning, but also to 

any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are 

reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” ’ ” (People v. 

Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 732.) In reviewing a ruling of whether a defendant is in 

custody, the court “must accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and 

inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if they are substantially supported.” (People 

v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 128.) The court determines independently, based on 

the undisputed facts and those properly found by the trial court, whether the challenged 

statements were legally obtained. (Ibid.) 

 

addresses the very different question of whether a hotel clerk can validly consent to a 

search of a hotel patron’s room. 
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 The Miranda rule does not apply to every situation involving the questioning of a 

criminal suspect: “Miranda applies to questioning under the coercive conditions of 

official ‘custody.’ [Citation.] “Custody” means ‘a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom 

of movement” of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’ ” (People v. Boyer (1989) 

48 Cal.3d 247, 271 (Boyer).) The Miranda rule requires that a person being interrogated 

must be told of his or her Miranda rights when “in custody at the station or otherwise 

deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” (Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477.) 

“The test for whether an individual is in custody is objective.” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 

19 Cal.4th 353, 401.) First, we examine the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. 

This inquiry is strictly factual, and we apply to it the deferential substantial evidence 

standard. Second, we ask whether a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not 

at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave; this is a determination we make 

independently. (Id. at pp. 401-402.) Among the objective indicia of custody are: 

“(1) the site of the interrogation, (2) whether the investigation has focused on the subject, 

(3) whether the objective indicia of arrest are present, and (4) the length and form of 

questioning.” (Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 272; accord, People v. Moore (2011) 51 

Cal.4th 386, 395.) 

 For example, in Boyer, officers determined that the defendant was a possible 

suspect in a double homicide case. (Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d. at p. 263.) Detectives went 

to the defendant’s home, with two police officers guarding the rear of the house as the 

detectives knocked on the front door in order to detain the defendant if he tried to flee. 

(Ibid.) As the suspect emerged from the rear, law enforcement told him to “freeze.” 

(Ibid.) An officer asked the defendant whether he would voluntarily accompany them to 

the station, and he agreed. (Id. at p. 264.) The defendant was frisked for weapons before 

entering the patrol car, and was told to take a seat in the back. (Ibid.) At the police 

station, officers advised him of his Miranda rights after leading him to an interrogation 

room, where he later confessed to the crime. (Id. at pp. 264–265). The defendant 

contended that his incriminating statements were not admissible because he was 

unlawfully detained. (Id. at p. 267.) The court agreed, concluding that the indicia of 
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arrest were present during the initial encounter at the home, where law enforcement 

“suggested they did not intend to take no for an answer.” (Id. at p. 268.) 

 In contrast, in Green v. Superior Court, the court found that a custodial 

interrogation had not taken place when the defendant was asked if he could be 

interviewed by two officers, who then drove him to the police station and conducted the 

interview in a room without windows and with a locked door. (Green v. Superior Court

(1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 131.) The initial interview lasted for over an hour. (Ibid.) The 

defendant was asked to wait while the officers attended to other matters, and the 

defendant complied with the request, after which the officers resumed their questioning. 

(Id.) Defendant was never told he was free to leave. (Id. at p. 132.) The court held that 

the circumstances did not present a custodial interrogation because the evidence did not 

“compel the conclusion that defendant could not have left whenever he wanted during the 

interview.” (Id. at p. 136.) 

 In our view, a reasonable person in defendant’s situation would have realized he 

was free to end the conversation. We recognize that England told defendant he knew he 

had committed the burglary and that the trial court found England’s suspicion had 

focused on defendant.4

 However, the other objective indicia of arrest were not present. 

Defendant was not restrained or told he could not leave. The questioning took place in 

his own home rather than an interrogation room. Defendant was asked if he could be 

spoken with in private, and led England into his own bedroom. No facts suggest 

defendant was compelled to agree to the interview. Although a second officer stood in 

the hallway, the door to the bedroom where the questioning took place remained open. 

Moreover, the questioning was very brief. In the circumstances, we agree with the trial 

 4

 In People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1, our Supreme Court 

disapproved Boyer to the extent it suggested an officer’s subjective suspicion was an 

independently relevant factor in establishing custody. However, the degree to which an 

investigation has focused on a defendant may still be considered as part of the totality of 

the circumstances of an interrogation in order to determine how a reasonable person in 

the defendant’s circumstances would have understood his situation. (People v. Moore, 

supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 395.) 
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court that defendant was not in custody at the time he made his first incriminating 

statement, and it was therefore not obtained in violation of Miranda. 

 Because defendant’s first statement to England was not obtained in violation of 

Miranda, we reject his contention that his later, post-Miranda statements were tainted by 

any illegality. 

III. DISPOSITION 

The judgment is affirmed. 

 _________________________ 

 Rivera, J. 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

Reardon, Acting P.J. 

_________________________ 

Streeter, J.