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SJC-11762

RONALD RENAUD vs. COMMONWEALTH. 

Suffolk. March 3, 2015. - April 17, 2015.

Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 

& Hines, JJ.

Erroneous Conviction. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss. 

Evidence, Identity.

Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 

May 16, 2013.

A motion to dismiss was heard by Thomas A. Connors, J. 

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 

transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

Jeffrey T. Collins, Assistant Attorney General, for the 

Commonwealth.

Timothy St. Lawrence for the defendant.

Stephanie Roberts Hartung & Drew Glassroth, for New England 

Innocence Project & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

HINES, J. After a jury-waived trial in the District Court, 

a judge found the plaintiff, Ronald Renaud, guilty of malicious 

destruction of property, breaking and entering in the daytime, 
2

and larceny over $250. On appeal, the Appeals Court overturned 

Renaud's convictions, concluding that the evidence was 

insufficient to support them.1 See Commonwealth v. Renaud, 81 

Mass. App. Ct. 261, 263, 265 (2012). Renaud thereafter filed a 

complaint in the Superior Court under G. L. c. 258D, the 

erroneous convictions statute, seeking compensation for his 

erroneous convictions. The Commonwealth moved to dismiss the 

complaint, which a judge denied,2 and the Commonwealth appealed. 

See Irwin v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 834, 835 (2013) ("Because 

the erroneous convictions statute provides only a limited waiver 

on the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity, we conclude that the 

doctrine of present execution applies to claims brought under 

that statute, and thus that interlocutory appeal is 

appropriate"). We transferred the case here on our own 

initiative to determine whether, under G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (B), 

the reversal of Renaud's convictions due to insufficient 

evidence amounts to "grounds which tend to establish" his 

innocence, thus rendering him eligible to obtain relief under 

 

1 The plaintiff had served more than 490 days in a house of 

correction for the sentence he received on these convictions. 

2 In his denial of the Commonwealth's motion, the Superior 

Court judge inadvertently labeled his decision as one in 

response to the Commonwealth's motion for a judgment on the 

pleadings. 
3

the statute. We conclude that it does. We therefore affirm the 

denial of the motion to dismiss.

Background and prior proceedings.

3 The relevant facts, as 

introduced by the Commonwealth before it closed its case, are 

that a break-in occurred in a Falmouth home. Renaud, 81 Mass. 

App. Ct. at 262. Four television sets, a digital video disc 

player, and items of sports memorabilia were missing. Id. No 

one was seen perpetrating the break-in or stealing the property 

from the home. Id. While examining the living room after being 

called to the scene, a police officer recovered from the floor 

an electronic bank transfer (EBT) card bearing the name of the 

plaintiff. Id. The EBT card had been cut into three separate 

pieces and was taped together. Id. The owner of the home and 

the residents thereof did not recognize the plaintiff's name. 

Id. The police officer, however, did recognize the name and was 

aware that the plaintiff recently had resided in Falmouth. Id. 

at 263. 

The next day, a detective telephoned the plaintiff's 

cellular telephone and recognized his voice. Id. The detective 

informed the plaintiff that someone had found his EBT card on 

the side of the road. Id. The plaintiff stated that he did not 

 

3 The background is derived from the facts set forth in the 

Appeals Court's decision. See Irwin v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 

834, 835 (2013). 
4

know that his card was missing and that he would have to go home 

and "check because he had not really looked for it." Id. The 

detective informed the plaintiff that if he wanted to pick up 

the card, he would have to come to the police station. Id. The 

plaintiff did not do so. Id. 

The Appeals Court reversed the plaintiff's convictions, set 

aside the verdicts, and entered judgments in favor of the 

plaintiff because it determined that the Commonwealth's evidence 

was insufficient to prove that the plaintiff was the person who 

had committed the charged crimes. Id. at 263, 265. The Appeals 

Court noted that "[t]he convictions here were based almost 

entirely on the fact that an EBT card bearing [the plaintiff's 

name] was found on the floor of the living room of the 

burglarized house." Id. at 263. Although the Appeals Court 

determined that, because the EBT card bore the plaintiff's name, 

that it could reasonably be inferred that he was at one point in 

possession of it, the court concluded that "the Commonwealth has 

presented no evidence that [the plaintiff] possessed, and 

subsequently dropped, his EBT card during the crime[s]." Id. at 

264. The Appeals Court went on to state that "the fact that the 

card was found taped together in three pieces evidences that it 

had been discarded by its owner on some prior occasion." Id. 

In sum, the Appeals Court reasoned, "ownership of an EBT card 

cannot allow a fact finder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
5

that the owner of the card was in possession of it during the 

commission of a crime." Id. Concerning the Commonwealth's 

arguments regarding the facts that the plaintiff lived in the 

same town where the crimes were committed and was known to 

police, the Appeals Court concluded that those facts only showed 

that the plaintiff may have had the ability to commit the 

crimes, but were not proof that he did in fact commit them. Id. 

The Appeals Court did not find significant the fact that the 

plaintiff did not retrieve his EBT card from police where he had 

not been ordered to do so. Id., citing Commonwealth v. 

Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 453 (2008) (where detective did not 

order defendant to do anything, consciousness of guilt 

instruction not warranted where detective told defendant about 

criminal charges against him, asked him to call back later, and 

he did not call back).

Statutory overview. The erroneous convictions statute was 

enacted to ensure that "those erroneously convicted but 

factually innocent be afforded equal opportunities to obtain 

compensation." Irwin, 465 Mass. at 847. Notably, the statute 

"waives sovereign immunity 'for an erroneous felony conviction," 

G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (A), then establishes the class of claimants 

'eligible to obtain relief.' [Id. at § 1 (B)]." Irwin, supra

at 841-842. 
6

In order to be entitled to compensation under the statute, 

the "threshold matter of eligibility as a member of the class of 

claimants eligible to pursue relief" must be decided. Id. at 

842. Then, a claimant must establish at trial, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that he or she did not commit the offense 

charged. Id. at 839. 

As relevant here, concerning eligibility, G. L. c. 258D, 

§ 1 (B) (ii), provides:

"The class of persons eligible to obtain relief under 

this chapter shall be limited to the following: . . . 

those who have been granted judicial relief by a state 

court of competent jurisdiction, on grounds which tend to 

establish the innocence of the individual as set forth in 

clause (vi) of subsection (C),[4] and if (a) the judicial 

relief vacates or reverses the judgment of a felony 

conviction, and the felony indictment or complaint used to 

charge the individual with such felony has been dismissed . 

. . and (b) at the time of the filing of an action under 

this chapter no criminal proceeding is pending or can be 

brought against the individual by a district attorney or 

the attorney general for any act associated with such 

felony conviction." 

"We have interpreted the word 'grounds' in that statute as 

meaning 'basis.'" Irwin, 465 Mass. at 843. We concluded that 

"the requirement that judicial relief must have been granted on 

'grounds which tend to establish the innocence' of a claimant 

 

4 General Laws c. 258D, § 1 (C) (vi), provides that a 

claimant must establish that he or she "did not commit the 

crimes or crime charged in the indictment or complaint or any 

other felony arising out of or reasonably connected to the facts 

supporting the indictment or complaint, or any lesser included 

felony."
7

does not limit the threshold question of eligibility for relief 

'to individuals whose convictions were vacated or reversed 

strictly on the basis "of compelling or overwhelming exculpatory 

evidence," that is, on the grounds that they were actually 

innocent.'" Id. at 844, quoting Guzman v. Commonwealth, 458 

Mass. 354, 359 (2010). "Rather, 'grounds which tend to 

establish' a plaintiff's innocence require that a conviction be 

overturned 'on grounds resting upon facts and circumstances 

probative of the proposition that the claimant did not commit 

the crime.'" Irwin, supra, quoting Guzman, supra. Last, "[w]e 

have cautioned, however, that such grounds must 'tend[] to do 

more than merely assist the defendant's chances of acquittal.'" 

Irwin, supra, quoting Guzman, supra at 360.

Discussion. The Commonwealth argues that it was entitled 

to have the plaintiff's complaint dismissed because the 

plaintiff did not meet his threshold burden of proving 

eligibility, specifically, that his convictions were overturned 

"on grounds which tend to establish [his] innocence" under G. L. 

c. 258D, § 1 (B) (ii). The Commonwealth advances separate 

arguments in support of its position. 

The Commonwealth first argues that the only claimants 

eligible under the statute are those who are "in fact, 

innocent." As previously indicated supra, we have expressly 

rejected this interpretation. See Irwin, 465 Mass. at 844. 
8

Although § 1 (B) (ii) references § 1 (C) (vi), the eligibility 

requirement is "separate and distinct from the merits of the 

claim of relief that a claimant must establish at trial," namely 

that he or she did not commit the charged offense. Irwin, supra

at 839, 842. The Commonwealth improperly conflates the two 

stages set forth in the statute. 

Next, the Commonwealth contends that, although the Appeals 

Court's grounds for reversal concerned the Commonwealth's 

ability to prove the plaintiff's guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt, the grounds did not tend to establish his actual 

innocence. The Commonwealth asserts that, "categorically," 

insufficient evidence of guilt does not necessarily equate to 

actual innocence.5 We do not disagree with this broad statement. 

However, contrary to the Commonwealth's contention, there is no 

need for us to make any "categorical" pronouncement. Rather, 

the unique facts of this case inform our decision. Here, the 

 

5 Our cases addressing the erroneous convictions statute 

have not addressed this issue. Our decision in Irwin, 465 Mass. 

at 835, 855, involved the erroneous admission of evidence of the 

plaintiff's prearrest silence as purportedly probative of his 

innocence. In Guzman v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 354, 359-360, 

363-365 (2010), the underlying convictions were overturned based 

on new evidence of exculpatory testimony from two witnesses whom 

defense counsel failed to call to testify at trial. In Drumgold

v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 367, 376-377 (2010), we were faced 

with a new trial that had been granted based on newly discovered 

evidence that would have challenged the credibility of a key 

prosecution witness and the nondisclosure of exculpatory 

evidence relating to the credibility of another prosecution 

witness. 
9

Commonwealth's "insufficient evidence" pertained to the identity 

of the defendant. As such, we conclude that the Commonwealth's 

inability to establish, viewed in a light most favorable to it, 

that the plaintiff was the person who committed the crimes, is 

entirely "probative of the proposition that [the plaintiff] did 

not commit the crime[s]." See Guzman, 458 Mass. at 362. This 

case is not one where there exists other evidence offered by the 

Commonwealth implicating the plaintiff in the charged crimes.

6 

Cf. Irwin, 465 Mass. at 855 (noting that "exclusion of the 

nonprobative and irrelevant evidence would have had no bearing 

on the weight of the remaining evidence"). We add that the 

grounds on which the plaintiff sought relief "do more than 

merely assist [his] chances of acquittal," Guzman, supra at 360; 

the grounds required his actual acquittal. In the circumstances 

of this case, a reversal of the plaintiff's convictions based on 

the absence of evidence that he was the person who committed the 

crimes is probative of innocence and the plaintiff has satisfied 

his threshold burden of establishing eligibility under the 

statute. Our conclusion does not entitle the plaintiff to 

relief. He is entitled to relief only if he proves at trial by 

 

6 We agree with the reasoning of the Appeals Court 

concerning the significance, or lack thereof, of the facts at 

trial pertaining to the defendant residing in the area where the 

crimes were committed, being known to police, and not retrieving 

his electronic bank transfer card from police. See Commonwealth

v. Renaud, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 261, 264-265 (2012).
10

clear and convincing evidence that he did not commit the 

offenses charged.

Order denying motion to

 dismiss affirmed.