J-S24022-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JAMES MILES, A/K/A JAMES MYLES,

Appellant No. 2678 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order entered September 5, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-51-CR-0713191-1970

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED APRIL 17, 2015

James Miles, a/k/a James Myles (“Appellant”) appeals pro se from the 

order denying his serial petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to 

the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We 

affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the pertinent facts and protracted 

procedural history as follows:

On February 26, 1972, [Appellant] was found guilty by 

a jury presided over by the Honorable Victor DiNubile of 

Murder, Rape, and Conspiracy. On December 18, 1972, 

[Appellant] was sentenced to a term of [] life 

imprisonment on the Murder charge, with concurrent 

sentences of seven and [one-]half to fifteen years on the 

Rape count, and one to two years on the Conspiracy count. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of 

sentence on March 16, 1977.

On April 19, 1978, [Appellant] filed a counseled petition 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA). After 
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review, relief was denied on March 7, 1980. The dismissal 

was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court on June 

25, 1982. 

On May 14, 1984, [Appellant] filed his second PCHA 

petition, which was dismissed on October 29, 1985 and 

affirmed by the Superior Court on August 19, 1986. The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur on March 2, 

1987. 

On November 10, 1994, [Appellant] filed a petition 

pursuant to the [PCRA], which had gone into effect on April 

13, 1988. This petition was denied on December 7, 1994, 

and the dismissal [was] affirmed by the Superior Court on 

August 12, 1997. [Appellant] also filed a writ of habeas 

corpus on February 2, 2001. It was treated as a PCRA 

petition and dismissed as untimely on May 9, 2001.

On March 27, 2003, [Appellant] filed a Motion for DNA 

Testing pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1. A hearing was 

held and [Appellant’s] request was denied on August 26, 

2004. The Superior Court affirmed the denial of the 

motion on June 23, 2005.

On September 5, 2007, [Appellant] filed his fifth 

petition for post conviction relief. It was dismissed [as 

untimely] on October 7, 2009. The dismissal was affirmed 

by the Superior Court on May 28, 2010. The Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court denied allocatur on October 19, 2010.

[Appellant] filed the instant petition, his sixth, on 

August 23, 2011. After conducting an extensive and 

exhaustive review of these filings, the record and 

applicable case law, this Court found that [Appellant’s 

PCRA petition] was untimely filed. Therefore, this Court 

did not have jurisdiction to consider [Appellant’s] PCRA 

petition and[,after issuing Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice,] it was 

dismissed.

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/12/14, at 1-2.
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Appellant filed a timely pro se appeal to this Court, in which he 

challenges the PCRA court’s determination that he failed to establish an 

exception to the PCRA’s time bar. The PCRA court did not require Pa.R.A.P. 

1925 compliance.

This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a 

petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is 

supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 799 n.2 (Pa. 2005). The PCRA 

court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the 

findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164,

1166 (Pa. Super. 2001). Moreover, a PCRA court may decline to hold a 

hearing on the petition if the PCRA court determines that the petitioner’s 

claim is patently frivolous and is without a trace of support in either the 

record or from other evidence. Commonwealth v. Jordan, 772 A.2d 1011 

(Pa. Super. 2001).

The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. 

Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010) (citation 

omitted). Thus, if a PCRA petition is untimely, neither an appellate court nor 

the PCRA court has jurisdiction over the petition. Id. “Without jurisdiction, 

we simply do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims” 

raised in an untimely petition. Id.
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Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or 

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, an 

exception to the time for filing the petition. Commonwealth v. GamboaTaylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Under 

these exceptions, the petitioner must plead and prove that: “(1) there has 

been interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; or 

(2) there exists after-discovered facts or evidence; or (3) a new 

constitutional right has been recognized.” Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 

A.2d 586, 591 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). A PCRA petition 

invoking one of these statutory exceptions must “be filed within sixty days of 

the date the claim first could have been presented.” Gamboa-Taylor, 753 

A.2d at 783. See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Moreover, exceptions to 

the time restrictions of the PCRA must be pled in the petition, and may not 

be raised for the first time on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 

A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not 

raised before the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first 

time on appeal.”).

Before addressing the timeliness of Appellant’s latest PCRA petition, 

the PCRA court considered whether Appellant could seek the relief he 

requested via a serial post-conviction petition. The PCRA court explained:

Before looking at the [PCRA’s timeliness exceptions], this 

Court must determine whether [Appellant] can be afforded 
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relief under the PCRA. [Appellant] claimed that he is 

subject to an illegal sentence due to an incomplete 

judgment of sentence. Specifically, [Appellant] claimed 

that he is unlawfully being detained on a DC-300B Court 

Commitment Form, rather than a sentencing order entered 

by a judge. Upon review, this claim was not cognizable 

under the PCRA. Because [Appellant’s] claim fell outside 

the eligibility requirements of the PCRA, this court [treated 

Appellant’s sixth PCRA petition as a] Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus [and addressed it] on the merits.

That said, this court found [Appellant’s] claims to be 

completely without merit. The Honorable Judge DiNuble 

[sic] entered a sentencing order in this matter on 

December 18, 1972. The original sentencing order is 

being maintained by the Clerk of Courts of this court as 

part of [Appellant’s] file in this matter. Therefore, 

[Appellant’s] Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus for lack of 

a sentencing order was demonstrably frivolous and was 

therefore denied.

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/12/14, at 3 (footnote omitted). We agree.

As this Court has recently noted, our Supreme Court has held “that a 

claim that a defendant’s sentence is illegal due to the inability of the 

[Department of Corrections] to ‘produce a written sentencing order related 

to [his] judgment of sentence’ constitutes a claim legitimately sounding in 

habeas corpus.” Joseph v. Glunt, 96 A.3d 365, 368 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted). In Joseph, after reviewing relevant case law, we 

determined that “courts confronting this issue in the past have deemed a 

record of the valid imposition of a sentence as sufficient authority to 

maintain a prisoner’s detention notwithstanding the absence of a written 

sentencing order under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9764(a)(8).” Id. at 372. Here, as in 
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Joseph, a review of the record contains a legitimate sentencing order. 

Thus, Appellant is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. 

In response to the PCRA court’s Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to 

dismiss, Appellant maintained that his claim should be considered under the 

PCRA and that he established an exception to the PCRA’s time bar. We 

disagree.

Because Appellant did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the 

United States Supreme Court following our Supreme Court’s denial of 

allocatur, for PCRA purposes, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final 

ninety days thereafter, on June 14, 1977. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); 

U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 20 (repealed). Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition over 

three decades later. As a result, his PCRA petition is patently untimely 

unless he has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the 

enumerated exceptions applies. See Commonwealth v. Beasley, 741 

A.2d 1258, 1261 (Pa. 1999).

Appellant has failed to prove the applicability of any of the exceptions 

to the PCRA’s time restrictions. Appellant asserts that he recently 

discovered that his “judgment of sentence order is not [] binding in being 

authorized by a signed and sealed official document, that constitutes [an] 

illegal sentence[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 5 (emphasis removed). According to 

Appellant, discovery of this fact rendered his latest petition timely under 

section 9545(b)(1)(ii). This exception requires that “the facts upon which 

the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have 
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been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(1)(ii).

The PCRA court rejected Appellant’s claim, and reasoned:

[Appellant] claimed that his petition was timely since 

the petition was filed within 60 days of receiving the 

judgment of sentencing from the Clerk of Courts, which he 

states was on July 26, 2011. [Appellant] is mistaken. 

Even if [Appellant’s] petition had been considered under 

the PCRA, [Appellant] would not have been afforded relief. 

To be timely, the statue clearly states that a petition 

invoking one of the exceptions must be submitted within 

60 days of when it first could have been presented. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). In this instance, [Appellant’s] 

judgment of sentence and DC-300 B Commitment Form 

have been discoverable since the 1970s, and [presenting] 

this claim over 30 years later did not meet the 60-day 

requirement.

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/12/14, at 4.

Our review of the record readily supports the PCRA court’s conclusion 

that Appellant did not timely raise his claim of newly discovered evidence. 

Additionally, because Appellant’s sentence is a matter of public record, his 

eligibility for the time-bar exception fails.1 See Commonwealth v. 

Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 352 (Pa. 2013) (holding that to qualify for the 

____________________________________________

1 Within his brief, Appellant raises a claim that all prior counsel were 

ineffective for failing to discover the defect in his “sentencing order.” See 

Appellant’s Brief at 8-9. Because Appellant inappropriately raises this claim 

for the first time on appeal, it is waived. See generally, Pa.R.A.P. 302. In 

addition, claims of ineffectiveness do not constitute interference by 

governmental officials under the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(4).
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newly-discovered exception under the PCRA, the facts must be unknown to 

the petitioner, not discoverable through reasonable diligence, and not part of 

the public record); see also Commonwealth v. Heredia, 97 A.3d 392, 

395, n.6 (explaining that PCRA petitioner could not assert the newlydiscovered facts exception to the PCRA’s time bar based on a DC-300B 

commitment form because the information contained therein was not new).

In sum, the PCRA court correctly determined that Appellant is not 

entitled to habeas corpus relief, and that it would lack jurisdiction to 

consider Appellant’s latest petition under the PCRA. We therefore affirm the 

PCRA court’s order denying Appellant post-conviction relief.

Order affirmed.

 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/17/2015