SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1234-16T4

SUZANNE SOLBERG NAGLE,

Plaintiff-Respondent/ 

Cross-Appellant,

v.

THOR SOLBERG, JR., and 

LORRAINE P. SOLBERG,

Defendants-Appellants/ 

Cross-Respondents,

and

SOLBERG AVIATION 

COMPANY and SOLBERG 

AVIATION CO., INC.,

Defendants.

___________________________

Argued May 28, 2019 – Decided June 13, 2019

Before Judges Sabatino, Haas and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Hunterdon County, Docket No. C014022-11.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Lawrence S. Berger argued the cause for 

appellants/cross-respondents (Berger & Bornstein, 

LLC, and Sobel Han & Cannon, LLP, attorneys; 

Lawrence S. Berger and Gregory J. Cannon, on the 

briefs).

William D. Wallach argued the cause for 

respondent/cross-appellant (McCarter & English, LLP, 

attorneys; William D. Wallach, on the briefs).

PER CURIAM

In this business dispute among the three siblings who have long owned

and operated Solberg-Hunterdon Airport ("SHA"),1 defendants Thor Solberg, 

Jr., 2and Lorraine P. Solberg ("Thor" and "Lorraine") appeal from a final 

judgment awarding plaintiff Suzanne Solberg Nagle ("Suzanne") various forms 

of relief, including attorney fees, for minority shareholder oppression and 

related claims. The judgment followed a multi-day bench trial intermittently 

spanning two months and several post-trial hearings. 

Thor's estate and Lorraine argue on appeal, among other things, that the 

 

1

 The failed condemnation of that airport was the subject of a related appeal, 

Twp. of Readington v. Solberg Aviation Co., No. A-3964-15 (App. Div. Mar. 1, 

2019), decided earlier this term and this court's prior opinion remanding the case 

for trial. See Twp. of Readington v. Solberg Aviation Co., 409 N.J. Super. 282 

(App. Div. 2009).

2 Thor passed away in December 2017.
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attorney fee award was incommensurate with the extent of the relief Suzanne 

obtained, and improperly based in part on services relating to partnership claims, 

that the court misinterpreted the parties' partnership documents, and that the 

court abused its discretion in granting damages for Thor's long-term occupancy 

of a residence on the airport property. Suzanne cross-appeals, contending the 

damages awarded to her for Thor's use of the residence and the remedies granted 

to her in other respects were insufficient.

For the reasons that follow, we reject the appeal and cross-appeal and 

affirm all aspects of the final judgment.

I.

As noted in our introduction, Thor (now deceased), Lorraine, and Suzanne 

are siblings. Their father, Thor Solberg, Sr., was a renowned pilot who 

established SHA in 1939 and acquired over the next several decades a 

considerable amount of land surrounding the airport facilities. See generally

Twp. of Readington, 409 N.J. Super. at 289, 291. 

After Thor Sr. and his wife passed away, the parties formed Solberg 

Aviation Company, a New Jersey partnership, in April 1977, for the purpose of 

owning and managing the property comprising SHA and the surrounding land.

The partnership's members were Thor, Lorraine, Suzanne, and each of their 
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parents' estates, with each sibling ultimately having an equal one-third interest.

Among other things, the partnership agreement specified that each partner 

would "participate in the management" of the business and be empowered to 

"determine all questions relating to [its] conduct," and required that its books 

and records be maintained at its principal offices and that all partners have 

access to them at all times. An additional partnership document in July 1977

authorized the siblings to jointly execute certain documents, including 

mortgages, on behalf of the partnership. The agreement was initially set to run 

through March 2006, and was duly extended once by Thor and Lorraine through 

June 30, 2008, but apparently was not renewed thereafter.

The siblings also established Solberg Aviation Co., Inc., a New Jersey 

corporation, which operates SHA and leases the land on which the airport sits 

from the partnership. The siblings held equal shares. Each served as an officer: 

Thor as president, Suzanne as corporate secretary, and Lorraine as assistant 

secretary. 

In practice, Thor and Lorraine shared responsibility for operating the 

airport's flight school, maintaining aircraft, leasing hangar space, and selling jet 

fuel, and Thor was additionally responsible for arranging financing and filing 

the entities' tax returns. Suzanne, meanwhile, managed the airport's 
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A-1234-16T4

maintenance shop and handled the bulk of the accounting.

In addition to sharing the profits from the family business, the parties each 

earned a small salary from the corporation and enjoyed several perks. Those 

perks included Suzanne's use of hangar space at the airport for her personal 

aircraft. 

Moreover, Thor took advantage of the long-term use of a residence on the 

airport property on Pulaski Road, where he had lived since 1971. He occupied 

the residence without reimbursement to the partnership for either its rental value 

or, with the exception of a single payment, for property taxes, but did maintain 

and improve the property. Suzanne asked Thor to pay rent over the years and 

also brought the issue up with Lorraine, but without success. She failed to 

introduce any competent expert evidence at trial to demonstrate the property's 

fair market rental value, but records showed that $150,297.20 had been incurred 

in property taxes during the period of Thor's occupancy that fell within the 

statute of limitations. For his part, Thor initially failed to produce any records 

at trial to substantiate any of the improvements he had made to the property,

until an accounting was conducted after the trial.

According to Suzanne, there was little acrimony among the partners early 

on in their business activities. Friction arose in more recent years, leading to
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what the trial court ultimately found was considerable mismanagement of the 

family business's affairs, from which Suzanne had been left out in many 

respects. For instance, Thor had habitually filed the entities' tax returns late 

since at least 2003, incurring substantial penalties. Billing for the airport and 

flight school also ran substantially late, in part because Thor asked to review 

bills on certain accounts before they were sent to customers and then failed to 

do so sometimes for years. However, the court found that all the partners had 

been inattentive in their responsibilities for billing.

With respect to paying expenses, Suzanne complained that she had no 

access to records for certain of the corporate bank accounts, at least one of which 

Thor had recently established and directed that the statements be sent to his own 

residence. Suzanne testified that she began to withhold making large deposits 

until she was about to write checks, so that she could be sure the necessary funds 

to cover them would be in the accounts, but Thor claimed her habit of doing so

inspired him to open the new account in the first place.

Suzanne did have access at least to the general ledger, which Thor 

maintained. But the ledger entries were not up to date, in part because the parties 

had failed to keep up with billing, and in part because Thor often deliberately 

delayed making adjustments to ensure a proper allocation between the 
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partnership and corporation, given the family business's limited cash flow.

Most notably, the general ledger from 2001 through 2012 nominally 

showed that Thor owed more than $600,000 to the partnership, an amount he 

claimed at trial was no longer accurate but that he nonetheless had failed to take 

any steps to correct. The court found Thor's testimony to be lacking in 

credibility in several respects, and found his testimony on cross-examination to 

be "very evasive" on this subject in particular.

Among the specific transactions from which Suzanne was excluded was a

$450,000 mortgage loan from November 2006, executed by Thor and Lorraine 

without Suzanne's knowledge and not recorded until February 2008. Suzanne 

disputed as improperly diverted only about $53,000 of those funds, which, 

according to Thor, the partnership spent on public relations and other work 

related to defending the partnership in its longstanding litigation with 

Readington Township over the municipality's attempted condemnation of the 

airport property. But Thor failed to provide invoices for or otherwise adequately 

justify some of those expenses, and the court ultimately found $16,000 of them 

improper on that basis.

Later, when the property comprising Thor's residence became the subject 

of a tax lien foreclosure in 2012, Thor failed to notify Suzanne and initially 
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declined to redeem the lien or even answer the foreclosure complaint, though he 

acknowledged on cross-examination that the partnership's bank accounts had 

sufficient funds for him to do so. He ultimately did redeem the lien a year later, 

but at considerable extra cost in interest and legal fees to the partnership.

II.

In May 2011, Suzanne filed a complaint in the Chancery Division against 

Thor and Lorraine and, nominally, the siblings' business entities, setting forth 

claims for minority shareholder oppression, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach 

of the parties' partnership agreement. Thor and Lorraine filed an answer and 

counterclaim against Suzanne. 

Judge Edward M. Coleman held a bench trial on the matter from February 

4 to March 13, 2014, and issued an oral decision on May 5, 2014, finding in 

Suzanne's favor on her claims and granting, among other relief, an award of 

attorney fees and the appointment of a special fiscal agent to sort out and 

monitor the family business's financial affairs. The judge issued a judgment to 

that effect on July 18, 2014, and an amended judgment on September 29, 2014.

The court found from the evidence that Thor and Lorraine had oppressed 

Suzanne as a minority shareholder by withholding information from her, leaving 

her out of corporate decision-making, and generally mismanaging the business 
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A-1234-16T4

to her detriment. The court found defendants had breached the partnership 

agreement and their fiduciary duties to Suzanne on largely the same grounds 

and, in the former respect, especially by executing mortgages without her 

participation. Thor, moreover, had long inappropriately used the residence on 

the property for his own benefit without any compensation.

As a consequence, the court ordered in the initial judgment that defendants 

return to the partnership $150,297.20 for property taxes incurred on the 

residence during Thor's occupancy, $47,000 for redemption of the tax lien on 

the same property, and $16,000 for the funds improperly diverted from the 

$450,000 mortgage, and, as mentioned, ordered that an accounting be 

performed, with the expectation that Thor could turn out to owe as much as the 

$600,000 shown on the general ledger. Further, the court awarded Suzanne 

$329,018.13 in attorney fees, the full amount she had sought. The court also

prohibited Thor from competing with the partnership through his separate 

company, Thor Solberg Aviation, LLC ("TSA"), except to the extent of his 

service as a pilot.

Judge Coleman issued an order appointing John H. Coyle as special fiscal 

agent on May 19, 2014, and authorized the retention of Thomas S. Wagner of 

Wagner & Associates, LLC, to conduct a forensic accounting regarding certain 
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issues that remained in dispute. Wagner issued a report on June 10, 2015. Judge 

Coleman conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding the report's findings and 

recommendations over several days in December 2015. 

In the course of the subsequent court-mandated accounting, however, 

Thor finally produced records substantiating expenditures he had made to 

improve the residence, as well as other transactions shedding light on the 

business's finances and relevant to the amount he nominally owed in the general 

ledger. As more fully discussed infra, pursuant to the court-appointed 

accountant's recommendations, the court ultimately amended the judgment to 

grant Thor a $200,000 credit for the improvements he had made to the residence 

and, with respect to his loan balance, reflecting that, rather than owing money 

to the partnership, he was actually owed $190,437 by the partnership.

Nonetheless, the court declined to modify Suzanne's attorney fee award, noting 

that fundamentally she had still prevailed on her claims, earned the appointment 

of the special fiscal agent, and thereby rectified the family business's affairs for 

her own and her siblings' benefit.

The judge issued an oral decision on January 4, 2016, adopting the 

findings in the report. The judge thereafter denied Thor and Lorraine any 

modification of the attorney fee award in light of those findings on February 19, 
11 A-1234-16T4

2016, and issued a second amended final judgment on October 11, 2016.

Thor and Lorraine appealed on various grounds, and Suzanne has crossappealed. Thor has since passed away, although his estate has not been formally 

substituted in his stead as a party to this appeal.

III.

In considering the parties' competing arguments in the appeal and crossappeals, we are guided by well-settled principles. We must give considerable 

deference to the findings of the judge who presided over this nonjury trial and 

the post-trial proceedings, so long as they have credible support in the record. 

Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974). 

Such deference is especially warranted where those findings depend on the 

court's credibility determinations made after observing the witnesses testify. 

Balsamides v. Protameen Chems., Inc., 160 N.J. 352, 367-68 (1999). We also 

must recognize the trial judge's "feel for the case" developed in presiding over 

the lengthy proceedings. Pheasant Bridge Corp. v. Twp. of Warren, 169 N.J. 

282, 291-92 (2001).

Because this dispute was litigated in the Chancery Division, we also must 

be mindful of the broad equitable authority vested in the Chancery judge in 

doing justice, and in fashioning remedies suited to the particular circumstances 
12 A-1234-16T4

of the case. See, e.g., Marioni v. Roxy Garments Delivery Co., 417 N.J. Super. 

269, 275 (App. Div. 2010); Mitchell v. Oksienik, 380 N.J. Super. 119, 130-31 

(App. Div. 2005)

We review de novo, however, the trial judge's rulings on pure questions 

of law. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 

378 (1995).

A.

In their appeal, Thor's estate and Lorraine argue that: (1) the trial court's 

award of attorney's fees to Suzanne was unjustified and excessive; (2) the court 

erred in its disposition of the issues concerning Thor's occupancy of the 

residence on the airport property; (3) the court misinterpreted the partnership 

agreement and related documents and applied that mistaken interpretation to the 

entire family business, including the corporation; (4) the court incorrectly found 

Lorraine and Thor were estopped from bringing any claim against Suzanne for 

her use of a company hangar for her personal airplane; and (5) the court should 

have required Suzanne to reimburse the partnership for the costs of professional 

services expended on preliminary land use approvals.3

We have considered each of these points in light of the record and the 

 

3 We have reorganized and renumbered the points on appeal.
13 A-1234-16T4

applicable standards of review. Having done so, we affirm the trial court's 

challenged decisions, substantially for the reasons articulated by Judge Coleman 

in his successive rulings. The judge clearly exhibited a "feel for the case" and, 

on the whole, ruled in a fair and equitable manner in addressing the litany of 

issues the parties called upon him to decide. We add a few amplifying issuespecific comments.

1.

We are unpersuaded the counsel fee award to Suzanne must be set aside. 

Thor's estate and Lorraine principally argue that the fees were awarded 

prematurely, before the post-trial accounting later revealed that Thor was 

entitled to a $200,000 credit for capital improvements he made to the airport 

property. They also contend the fee award must be confined to legal services 

expended on Suzanne's statutory oppressed shareholder claim and not services 

relating to her claims for breach of the partnership agreement or fiduciary duties. 

Neither of these arguments compel reversal or a remand to recalculate the fee 

award.

In general, appellate courts defer considerably to the sound discretion of 

trial judges in their disposition of counsel fee applications. Packard-Bamberger 

& Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001). Here, a fee award to Suzanne was 
14 A-1234-16T4

legally authorized under the oppressed shareholder statute, N.J.S.A. 14A:12-

7(10), which allows the trial court "in its discretion" to award counsel fees to a 

minority shareholder if one or more defendants have "acted arbitrarily, 

vexatiously, or otherwise not in good faith." 

Judge Coleman's findings of oppression and what he termed as "gross 

mismanagement" on the part of Thor and Lorraine have ample support in the 

record. The post-trial accounting that produced a financial adjustment in Thor's 

favor does not eliminate the trial court's sound basis for awarding fees to 

Suzanne. 

When he declined to reduce the fee award following the accounting, Judge 

Coleman observed that Thor's then-probable debt was "only one factor" that had 

informed his prior decision to award fees. As the judge further noted, through 

plaintiff's efforts in litigating the case, she had sparked the appointment of the 

special fiscal agent and "corrected the [business's] management deficiencies on 

[a] going-forward basis." Suzanne's proven claims of oppression and 

mismanagement were compensable wrongs, in and of themselves. A feeshifting award may be justified even if the amount of damages recovered by the 

plaintiff are not proportional. Szczepanski v. Newcomb Med. Ctr., Inc., 141 

N.J. 346, 366 (1995).
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The fee award did not have to be diminished to take into account Suzanne's 

counsel's efforts on the companion breach of partnership claim. We recognize 

the partnership agreement, as contrasted with the oppressed shareholder statute, 

contains no fee-shifting provision. However, given the close nexus between the 

siblings' partnership and the corporation, the entities' common ownership and 

operation, and the overlapping factual background underlying Suzanne's claims 

of wrongdoing, the legal work expended by Suzanne's counsel on the corporate 

claim and the partnership claim was surely intertwined. 

We discern no reason to remand the fee award for recalculation, even if 

this issue had been raised by defendants below. Moreover, we have doubts as 

to whether it would be feasible or fruitful to attempt to segregate professional 

time spent on "shareholder issues" from "partnership issues."

The balance of the arguments presented for reducing the fee award –

including the claim that plaintiff's law firm's senior attorney (who billed at a 

reduced hourly rate) should have delegated tasks to a colleague with a lower 

billing rate – lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

2.

Thor's estate and Lorraine argue that Suzanne should have been estopped 

from making any claims arising from Thor's long-term use of the residence, 
16 A-1234-16T4

contending she acquiesced to that use. They further contend that Suzanne's 

claims relating to the residence are barred as a matter of law, because she did 

not present expert proof of the fair market value of Thor's occupancy. We 

disagree.

Suzanne testified that she asked Thor to pay rent for his use of the 

residence but he rebuffed her. Suzanne also testified she brought the subject up 

with Lorraine, but to no avail. Hence, Suzanne was effectively outvoted, and 

therefore it was understandable that she ultimately pursued the claim in the 

litigation. 

In addition, although Suzanne did not present expert testimony concerning 

the market value of Thor's use of the premises, the unpaid local property taxes 

incurred during Thor's occupancy represented an equitable measure of relief to 

Suzanne.

In any event, the post-accounting offset for Thor's proven capital 

expenditures on the residence cancelled out Suzanne's monetary recovery on her 

affirmative claim. There is no unjust result that requires appellate relief to 

Thor's estate and Lorraine on this issue. R. 2:10-2.

3.

We are likewise unconvinced that the trial court misapplied the siblings' 
17 A-1234-16T4

partnership agreement and the subsequent related agreement. 4 The later 

instrument expressly required the siblings to act "jointly" on the entity's behalf 

in connection with the execution of mortgages, deeds, contracts, and other 

documents. 

Thor's estate and Lorraine argue that this provision pertained only to the 

signing of formal transactional documents, and not to underlying decisionmaking regarding such transactions. However, Suzanne testified that the parties 

had contemplated that they would all need to agree "jointly" on such 

transactions. Whether or not her testimony on that subject is dispositive of the 

parties' intent, the record indisputably shows that the $450,000 mortgage loan 

which precipitated Suzanne's lawsuit was not executed with her signature. In 

fact, the evidence shows the funds were borrowed without Suzanne's knowledge, 

much less her consent. 

The trial court did not err in concluding that defendants had breached their 

partnership and co-shareholder obligations to Suzanne concerning, at the very 

least, the loan transaction.

 

4

 That agreement is labeled an "Acknowledgment" but is referred to by the trial 

court as an "Addendum."
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4.

Little needs to be said about the trial court's finding that Lorraine and Thor 

waived any claim to rent from Suzanne for her use of hangar space for her 

personal aircraft. Thor acknowledged on cross-examination at trial that 

Suzanne's use of the hangar was a perk equally available to all of the siblings. 

The trial judge reasonably relied upon that concession in deeming the hangar 

space counterclaim against Suzanne waived. Given that concession, it was not 

manifestly inequitable or illogical for the court to treat Suzanne's use of the 

hangar space differently from Thor's exclusive use of the sole residence located 

on the property.

5.

We find no merit in appellants' contention that the trial court was obligated 

to require Suzanne to reimburse them for her acquisition of the preliminary 

subdivision approvals. The court-approved fiscal agent and forensic accountant 

both recommended that these approvals should run with the portion of the airport 

land that Suzanne had acquired through foreclosure. Judge Coleman reasonably 

adopted those recommendations. The soundness of the judge's decision is not 

undermined by appellants' argument that the site plan work was only preliminary 

in nature and not "final." The court's wide discretion over the equities in the 
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case was not misapplied in its disposition of this issue.

B.

In her own points on cross-appeal, Suzanne argues that the trial court: (1) 

unfairly barred her from presenting lay opinion testimony on the fair market 

value of Thor's use of the residence, and inequitably applied recoupment 

principles in granting Thor the credit for his capital improvements to the 

premises; (2) did not adequately enjoin Thor from competing with the family 

businesses; and (3) should have required a further accounting of funds allegedly 

due to the family business from a third party named Dan Devine.

Applying the same standard of appellate review we have already recited 

and applied to the contentions of Thor's estate and Lorraine, we are similarly 

unpersuaded by Suzanne's arguments for altering the final judgment.

1.

The trial judge did not misapply his wide discretion over evidentiary 

rulings when he precluded Suzanne from presenting lay opinion testimony about 

the market value of Thor's occupancy of the residence. Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 

N.J. 6, 16 (2008) (recognizing the well-settled discretion afforded to civil trial 

judges over evidentiary matters). Under Evidence Rule 701, lay opinion 

testimony is only admissible in the trial court's discretion if it is "rationally based 
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on the perception of the witness" and "will assist" the trier of fact. N.J.R.E. 701. 

As Judge Coleman noted, Suzanne admitted she had not been inside of the 

residence in years and thus lacked an appropriate factual basis upon which to 

form a competent lay opinion of its current rental value. In any event, as we 

have already noted, the judge did equitably take into account the property taxes 

accumulated on the premises, which Thor had failed to pay.

Nor did the trial judge misapply principles of recoupment in granting Thor 

credit for his capital improvements. The judge reasonably accepted the forensic 

accountant's opinion that Thor's expenditures improved an asset the partnership 

continued to hold. The fact that those expenditures partially occurred before 

Thor began occupying the residence in 2001 is not dispositive. A counterclaim 

for recoupment is not time-barred so long as the main action seeking affirmative 

monetary recovery is timely. Beneficial Fin. Co. of Atl. City v. Swaggerty, 86 

N.J. 602, 609 (1981). 

Moreover, the timing of Thor's expenditures largely, if not precisely, 

coincided with the underlying loans that also were in dispute. We also reject 

Suzanne's contention that the proofs of capital improvements Thor presented to 

the forensic accountant were made too late. Suzanne had fair notice Thor was 

seeking an offset, and the court could reasonably conclude it would be 
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inequitable to deny him one once he substantiated the improvements.

2.

Despite Suzanne's argument to the contrary, the trial judge did not 

misapply his equitable powers by allegedly failing to enjoin Thor sufficiently 

from competing with the family businesses. The amended final judgment issued 

after the trial broadly enjoined defendants "from engaging in any activity or 

conduct that directly competes with the [parties' corporation or partnership], 

including but not limited to . . . the provision of services to third parties by 

[Thor's company TSA,] except for pilot services." Notably, Wagner, the courtappointed forensic accountant, conducted a review of three years of TSA's 

financial records, and found no transactions attributable to services undertaken 

in direct competition with the family business.

Suzanne contends that the court should have broadened the terms of the 

injunction because of testimony Thor provided in the post-trial proceedings 

acknowledging that SHA could "theoretically" hire pilots to provide to third 

parties at least some pilot services Thor provided through TSA. Judge Coleman 

reasonably concluded that this testimony did not require further anti-competitive

relief. 

Nor are we persuaded the judge was obligated to draw an adverse 
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inference against Thor because of his alleged non-compliance with subpoenas 

issued by Suzanne. See Torres v. Pabon, 225 N.J. 167, 181 (2016) (outlining 

the court's discretionary authority to apply an adverse inference, noting the 

inference is "not invariably available.") (quoting State v. Hill, 199 N.J. 545, 561 

(2009)). Moreover, the issue of prospective injunctive relief against Thor 

individually is mooted by his death during the pendency of the appeal.

3.

Lastly, we reject Suzanne's cross-appeal demanding a remand to delve 

further into funds allegedly owed to the family businesses by Dan Devine for 

fuel, hangar, and maintenance fees for two of his planes housed at the airport. 

The judge credited Devine's testimony explaining the pertinent business 

arrangements, and concluded Devine did not owe the Solberg family businesses 

any funds, particularly given the "substantial benefit" the Solbergs derived from 

the relationship with Devine. There is substantial credible evidence in the record 

to sustain the trial court on this subject. Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 483-84.

C.

In sum, neither the appellants nor the cross-appellant have demonstrated 

that the trial court's rulings produced an unjust result. R. 2:10-2. On the whole, 

the trial judge commendably dealt with these intra-family business issues 
23 A-1234-16T4

thoughtfully and fairly. There is no reason to disturb the final judgment.

To the extent we have not commented on any other points raised by the 

parties, they lack sufficient merit to warrant written discussion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.