# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 19, 2015

Decided March 20, 2015

Before

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 14

‐ 1518 Appeal from the

United States District Court

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

‐ Appellee

,

v

.

ARTURO FLORES,

Defendant

‐ Appellant

. for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 11 cr 643

‐ 1

J ames B. Zagel,

J udge

.

O R D E R

Arturo Flores pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess and distribute one kilogram

or more of a mixture containing heroin and 500 grams or more of a mixture containing

cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and was sentenced below the guidelines range to

168 months’ imprisonment. Flores filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer

asserts that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California

,

386 U.S. 738 (1967). Flores has not accepted our invitation to comment on counsel’s

motion. See 7 TH C IR

. R. 51(b). Counsel submitted a brief explaining the nature of this case

and addressing the issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve.

Because the analysis in counsel’s brief appears to be thorough, we limit our discussion to NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited onl y in accordance with Fed. R. A pp

. P. 32.1No. 14

‐ 1518 Page 2

the issues identified in that brief. See United States v. Bey

, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014);

United States v. Wagner

, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

Counsel begins by considering whether Flores could challenge the voluntariness

of his guilty plea but neglects to say whether he consulted with his client about this

possibility. See United States v. Konczak

, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v.

Knox

, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). This uncertainty does not require that we deny

this Anders submission, however, because the discussion in the brief and our own review

of the record persuade us that any challenge to the guilty plea would be frivolous. Flores

did not move to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court, and thus we would review

the plea colloquy only for plain error. See United States v. Vonn

, 535 U.S. 55, 59, 62–63

(2002); United States v. Davenport

, 719 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013). The transcript of the

colloquy shows that the district court complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. The court notified Flores that he could be prosecuted for perjury if he lied

during the hearing, F ED

. R. C RIM

. P. 11(b)(1)(A), advised Flores of the constitutional

rights he was waiving by pleading guilty and forgoing a trial, F ED

. R. C RIM

. P.

11(b)(1)(B)–(F), ensured that Flores understood the charges against him and the penalties

he faced, F ED

. R. C RIM

. P. 11(b)(1)(G)–(M), and verified that no one had threatened or

coerced him into entering into the plea agreement, F ED

. R. C RIM

. P. 11(b)(2). The

government proffered a factual basis for the plea, which Flores acknowledged was

correct. F ED

. R. C RIM

. P. 11(b)(3).

Counsel next considers whether Flores could argue that the district court

inappropriately adopted a guidelines range agreed upon by the parties rather than

calculate the range on its own. But as counsel rightly points out, the court correctly

calculated the low end of the range, 188 months, based on a total offense level of 36 and

criminal

‐ history category I. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(2), cmt. n.8(D) (2013).

Counsel also addresses whether Flores could argue that the district court erred at

sentencing by not asking him directly whether he had read the presentence report.

See F ED

. R. C RIM

. P. 32(i)(1)(A). But as counsel notes, the district court verified with trial

counsel that he had discussed the presentence report with Flores; any such argument

would thus be frivolous. See United States v. DeLeon

, 704 F.3d 189, 197 (1st Cir. 2013).

Counsel also considers whether Flores could argue that the district court erred by

not considering three of his arguments in mitigation—that he should have been

sentenced leniently based on his impoverished childhood, the costs associated with

continuing to incarcerate a foreign national facing removal, and his poor health. But theNo. 14

‐ 1518 Page 3

first two mitigating arguments are “stock” arguments that district courts need not

explicitly address. See United States v. Cheek

, 740 F.3d 440, 455–56 (7th Cir. 2014) (difficult

childhood); United States v. Mendoza

, 576 F.3d 711, 722 (7th Cir. 2009) (deportation). As

for his argument concerning his poor health, Flores did not explain why his health

conditions warranted a lighter sentence, and, further, the district court discussed the

ability of the Bureau of Prisons to adequately provide for Flores’s medical treatment.

See Rita v. United States

, 551 U.S. 338, 360 (2007); United States v. Collins

, 640 F.3d 265, 271

(7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Allday

, 542 F.3d 571, 573 (7th Cir. 2008).

Finally, counsel considers whether Flores could challenge the reasonableness of

his prison sentence and properly concludes that such a challenge would be frivolous.

Flores’s 168

‐ month sentence is below the low end of his calculated guidelines range of

188 to 235 months. Counsel gives no reason to disregard the presumption that this

below

‐ guidelines sentence is reasonable, see United States v. Womack

, 732 F.3d 745, 747

(7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Liddell

, 543 F.3d 877, 885 (7th Cir. 2008), and we see none.

The district court adequately considered the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,

including Flores’s personal characteristics (noting that some defendants are particularly

gifted at carrying out drug transactions and that Flores had “certain gifts that are worth

something”) and the need to impose a sentence that reflected the seriousness of the

offense (noting that the guidelines would be amended later that year to reflect a lower

sentence for Flores’s offense of conviction).

Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is

DISMISSED.