COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00156-CR

REGINALD FRITZ BELL APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 371ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1319218D

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant Reginald Fritz Bell appeals the trial court’s judgment adjudicating 

him guilty of indecency with a child and sentencing him to fifteen years’ 

confinement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11 (West 2011). In one point, Bell 

argues that the trial court reversibly erred by allowing a law-student intern from 

the district attorney’s office to question two witnesses and make closing 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
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arguments during the punishment hearing that followed the trial court’s

adjudication of guilt. We will affirm.

The facts of this case are not in dispute. And Bell does not dispute that he 

pleaded “true” to each of the State’s alleged violations in its petition to proceed to 

adjudication. Bell also does not challenge the trial court’s having adjudicated him 

guilty based upon his pleas. See Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim.

App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (holding that a defendant’s plea of true to any of the 

State’s alleged violations, standing alone, is sufficient to support a trial court’s 

revocation of community supervision). Rather, Bell argues that Phillip Hall, an 

apparent law student and intern at the district attorney’s office who purportedly

sat “second chair” to Tarrant County Assistant District Attorney Erin W. Cofer 

during the adjudication proceedings below, should not have been allowed to 

question witnesses nor make closing arguments without the trial court first having

found that Hall was a “qualified law student” in accordance with the Supreme 

Court of Texas’s promulgated rules that govern when a law student may 

participate in court proceedings. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 81.102(b)(3) (West 

2013) (stating that the supreme court may promulgate rules that govern and 

allow law students to practice law). The State argues that because Bell did not 

object at trial to Hall’s participation, Bell has failed to preserve this alleged error 

for our review. We agree with the State.

As a general rule, to preserve a complaint for our review, a party must 

have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states 
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the specific grounds for the desired ruling if they are not apparent from the 

context of the request, objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Layton v. 

State, 280 S.W.3d 235, 238–39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Here, Bell did not object 

in the trial court that Hall was not a “qualified law student.” Therefore, Bell failed 

to preserve this alleged error for our review, and we overrule his sole issue. See 

Marbut v. State, 76 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, pet. ref’d) (holding 

that defendant forfeited appellate review of alleged procedural violations in 

appointing an attorney pro tem by failing to object in the trial court).

Having overruled Bell’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

/s/ Bill Meier

BILL MEIER

JUSTICE

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and MEIER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: April 16, 2015