UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1795

MELISSA BEDIAKO, on her own behalf and on behalf of all 

others similarly situated,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

AMERICAN HONDA FINANCE CORPORATION,

Defendant – Appellee.

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AMERICAN FINANCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION,

Amicus Supporting Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:11-

cv-00001-RWT)

Argued: May 14, 2013 Decided: August 1, 2013

Before Sandra Day O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Retired), Supreme 

Court of the United States, sitting by designation, and WYNN and 

DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, 

in which Justice O’Connor and Judge Wynn joined.

ARGUED: Cory Lev Zajdel, Z LAW, LLC, Owings Mills, Maryland, 

for Appellant. Donald M. Falk, MAYER BROWN LLP, Palo Alto, 
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California, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: David M. Ross, WILSON 

ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER LLP, Washington, D.C., for 

Appellee. Robert L. Wise, BOWMAN AND BROOKE LLP, Richmond, 

Virginia, for Amicus Supporting Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

Melissa Bediako, on behalf of a putative class, asserts 

that American Honda Finance Corporation (“Honda Finance”) 

violated Maryland’s Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions, 

Md. Code, Com. Law § 12-1001 et seq. (“CLEC”), by providing 

inadequate notice of private sales of repossessed automobiles. 

The district court dismissed Bediako’s complaint, concluding 

that her claim was time barred, failed to allege actionable 

damages, and failed on the merits. Because we conclude that 

Bediako has failed to allege actionable damages, we affirm.

I.

A.

In 2004, Bediako, a citizen of Maryland, purchased a used 

automobile with financing she obtained by executing a Retail 

Installment Sale Contract (“RISC”). A provision in the RISC 

chose CLEC as the governing law for the agreement. The RISC was 

subsequently assigned to Honda Finance, a California 

corporation. 

Bediako eventually defaulted on her payment obligations. 

As a result, Honda Finance repossessed her vehicle on or before 

April 28, 2005. Thereafter, Honda Finance notified Bediako in 

writing that it would sell the car at a private sale after May 

15, 2005, but that she could get the vehicle back at any time 
4

before the sale if she paid her entire outstanding obligation. 

J.A. 45. Honda Finance also informed Bediako that she could 

reinstate her contract if she paid the current arrearage within 

fifteen days, and told her the exact location where her vehicle 

was stored. J.A. 46-47.

On July 1, 2005, after Bediako failed to act, Honda Finance 

sold her vehicle in a private sale. Honda Finance subsequently 

sent a post-sale notice to Bediako demanding payment on a 

deficiency of $7,036.80, which remained due on her account after 

crediting the proceeds of the sale. Bediako made three payments 

after the sale (all in 2008), which totaled $375. 

B.

In 2010, Honda Finance filed a lawsuit against Bediako in 

Maryland state court to collect the remaining debt, but it later 

dismissed the action without prejudice. Honda Finance has said 

repeatedly in this action that it has abandoned its deficiency 

claim against Bediako. 

While Honda Finance’s deficiency action was pending in 

2010, Bediako filed a putative class action complaint against 

Honda Finance in Maryland state court alleging defects in the 

pre-sale notice, namely that Honda Finance systematically sold 

repossessed property at private sales at unknown locations, on 

unknown dates, and at unknown times, contrary to CLEC’s 

requirements. Bediako asserted claims for declaratory judgment, 
5

breach of contract, restitution, unjust enrichment, violations 

of CLEC, and violations of Maryland’s Consumer Protection Act. 

Honda Finance removed the action to federal court and filed 

a motion to dismiss asserting that Bediako’s claims were not 

timely and failed as a matter of law. Bediako then voluntarily 

dismissed the suit. Three months later, however, she refiled 

essentially the same complaint in the Southern Division of the 

United States District Court for the District of Maryland. 

Honda Finance then moved to dismiss Bediako’s complaint on 

largely the same grounds as its prior motion to dismiss. 

The district court granted Honda Finance’s motion to 

dismiss. First, the court concluded that Bediako’s claims were 

time barred because the RISC is a contract for the sale of goods 

subject to the four-year statute of limitations in section 2-275 

of Maryland’s Uniform Commercial Code. Second, the court 

concluded that the purported CLEC violation did not result in 

any actionable damages to Bediako because CLEC permits Honda 

Finance to recover the principal amount of its loan 

notwithstanding the alleged CLEC violation. Finally, the court 

concluded that Honda Finance’s notice, which advised Bediako of 

the location of the vehicle and the date after which Honda 

Finance would conduct a private sale, comported with the 

requirements of CLEC. Bediako filed a motion for 
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reconsideration, which the district court summarily denied. 

Bediako timely appealed.

II.

The issues before us on appeal are whether the district 

court erred in concluding that (1) Bediako failed to state a 

claim because Honda Finance has not collected more than the 

principal amount of her loan; (2) Bediako’s claim is time barred 

under section 2-725 of Maryland’s Uniform Commercial Code; and 

(3) Honda Finance complied with CLEC’s notice requirements 

before conducting a private sale of Bediako’s automobile. We 

consider only the first issue because it is dispositive of the 

appeal.

We review de novo the district court’s grant of Honda 

Finance’s motion to dismiss. Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 

Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 

2012). To survive a motion to dismiss, Bediako must allege 

“sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible on its 

face.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Bediako’s claims in this appeal are premised on a violation 

of the CLEC provisions requiring notice before a creditor may 

sell collateral securing a loan. If a creditor violates the 

CLEC notice requirements, it “may collect only the principal 

amount of the loan and may not collect any interest, costs, 
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fees, or other charges with respect to the loan.” CLEC § 12-

1018(a)(2). In addition, CLEC section 12-1021(k)(4) provides, 

in the case of certain notice violations, that “the credit 

grantor shall not be entitled to any deficiency judgment to 

which he would be entitled under the loan agreement.” 

Bediako maintains that the district court improperly 

dismissed her claims for failure to allege actual damages 

because CLEC entitles her to relief without proving actual 

damages. Bediako relies primarily on CLEC section 12-

1018(a)(2), which she argues allows her monetary, equitable, and 

declaratory relief for inadequate notice of a private sale. 

Looking to an analogous passage in Maryland’s Secondary Mortgage 

Loan Law (“SMLL”), section 12-413, Bediako cites Duckworth v. 

Bernstein, 466 A.2d 517, 526 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983), among 

other Maryland cases, for her claim that an accounting and 

declaratory order stating the amount of her debt is mandatory. 

Honda Finance responds that Bediako has no remedy under 

section 12-1018(a)(2) because it never collected more than the 

principal amount of Bediako’s loan. According to Honda Finance, 

Bediako’s request for declaratory, equitable, and monetary 

relief is flawed because the plain text of CLEC section 12-1018 

provides no remedy until the creditor has collected more than 

the principal amount of the loan. 
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We agree with Honda Finance and the district court that 

Bediako’s claims fail as a matter of law because of her failure 

to allege actual, compensable damages. Sections 12-1018(a)(2) 

and 12-1021(k)(4) simply do not provide any relief for Bediako. 

Section 12-1018(a)(2), by its plain terms, limits a 

debtor’s relief under CLEC to any amounts paid in excess of the 

principal amount of the loan. As the district court aptly 

noted, all of Bediako’s payments, plus the amount Honda Finance 

recovered in the private sale of her automobile, fall far short 

of the original principal amount of the loan.1

 Unlike the Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act, which, as Bediako notes, provides 

for statutory damages as long as the claimant can establish a 

violation, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2), CLEC does not provide for 

any fixed statutory damages beyond the plaintiff’s actual loss. 

To the contrary, CLEC section 12-1018(a)(2) expressly permits 

creditors to recover the principal amount of a loan. 

Accordingly, Bediako has no right to monetary relief under 

section 12-1018(a)(2). 

 1 Bediako owed a principal amount of $16,234.75. Assuming 

that she made all of her payments until the day Honda Finance 

repossessed her automobile, these payments totaled $4,308.72. 

After accounting for the proceeds of the sale ($7,900) and her 

subsequent payments ($375), at least $3,701.03 of the principal 

remains uncollected. Bediako suggests that the district court 

failed to consider other illegal fees Bediako might have paid, 

but she does not allege that she actually paid any such fees.
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Section 12-1021(k)(4), which bars a creditor from obtaining 

a deficiency judgment in the case of certain notice violations, 

fails to save Bediako’s claims as well. CLEC expressly provides 

that section 12-1021(k)(4) applies only to notice violations 

with respect to public sales, and therefore provides no relief 

to Bediako or the putative class. See CLEC § 12-1021(k)(1) 

(“The provisions of this subsection apply to a public sale of 

property . . . .”). 

Nor may Bediako salvage her suit by relying on a potential

award of nominal damages. Maryland courts have refused to allow 

nominal damages in certain consumer protection cases, requiring 

proof of actual damages. See Frazier v. Castle Ford, Ltd., 27 

A.3d 583, 589 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (“[N]ominal damages are 

not available in an action . . . for a deceptive trade practice 

under the Consumer Protection Act . . . .”), rev’d on other 

grounds, 59 A.3d 1016 (Md. 2013). The purpose of this 

restriction is “to prevent aggressive consumers who were not 

personally harmed by the prohibited conduct . . . from 

instituting suit as self-constituted private attorneys general 

over relatively minor statutory violations.” Lloyd v. Gen. 

Motors Corp., 916 A.2d 257, 280 (Md. 2007) (internal quotations 

omitted). A similar limitation requiring actual damages is 

implicit in the language of section 12-1018(a)(2), which 

provides no remedy beyond recovery of payments in excess of the 
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principal amount of the loan. The limitation is more explicit 

in section 12-1016(c)(2), which provides that the Commissioner 

of Financial Regulation may only award a CLEC complainant a 

refund of (1) the amount a creditor has collected in excess of 

that expressly permitted by CLEC, or (2) the amount a creditor

is expressly not permitted to collect.2

 Considering these two 

provisions in harmony and looking to CLEC as a whole, we 

conclude that CLEC does not permit an award of nominal damages, 

but rather requires an actual loss to sustain the claims alleged 

by Bediako.

Finally, Bediako’s request for equitable and declaratory 

relief also fails. Even assuming that declaratory relief is 

available under CLEC when the debtor has paid less than the full 

principal amount, Bediako has no right to such relief. Honda 

 2 Bediako suggests that section 12-1016 implies that there 

is a broader right to statutory damages under section 12-

1018(a)(2) because to proceed under section 12-1016 the 

complainant must waive his or her right to “rais[e] or assert[] 

against the credit grantor in any subsequent forum any claim, 

defense, setoff, recoupment, penalty for violation, or right of 

any kind based on the matters addressed in the complaint or the

hearing.” CLEC § 12-1016(b)(3)(i). We read this provision, 

however, to simply state that a complainant who has pursued a 

remedy with the Commissioner under section 12-1016 may not have 

a second bite at the apple in another forum. We also note that 

a section 12-1016 proceeding provides a remedy independent of 

actual damages--the Commissioner may order the creditor to cease 

and desist from unlawful practices. CLEC § 12-1016(c)(1). No 

such remedy is provided under the civil remedy provision of 

section 12-1018(a)(2).
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Finance has repeatedly abandoned any claim for a deficiency 

judgment against Bediako, and such a claim would now be time 

barred under the applicable statute of limitations. In the 

absence of an actual controversy concerning Bediako’s liability 

for a deficiency judgment, the federal courts lack authority 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 to issue declaratory relief.3

In short, even if Bediako has adequately alleged a 

violation of CLEC’s notice provisions, she is unable to state a 

claim because she has suffered no actual damages that are 

compensable under CLEC.4

 3 Bediako has attempted to salvage her claims by contending 

that the debt remains listed on her credit report. However, 

this argument was not raised in her opening brief and is waived. 

United States v. Hudson, 673 F.3d 263, 268 (4th Cir. 2012).

4 Honda Finance also contends that because Bediako has not 

suffered a compensable loss, she lacks Article III standing to 

pursue her claims. We disagree, as Bediako has alleged “an 

invasion of a legally protected interest” that is concrete and 

particularized, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 

560 (1992), that is, Honda Finance’s purported failure to comply 

with the notice provision of CLEC when repossessing and selling 

her automobile. While a statute may not enlarge the boundaries 

of Article III standing, a party certainly may enforce a 

statutory right in federal court. See, e.g., Havens Realty 

Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 374 (1982). Thus, Bediako has 

alleged an injury-in-fact sufficient to provide standing even 

if, as we have concluded, the claim fails on the merits. 
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III.

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court.

AFFIRMED