matter of law. Id. at 308, 167 P.3d at 409. A genuine issue of material 

fact exists when a reasonable jury could return a verdict .for the 

nonmoving party. Id. 

First, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed 

the complaint to the extent that appellant raised claims alleging violations 

of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the State and the Board of Parole Commissioners 

are not persons and cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. 

Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-71 (1989). Further, nothing in 

the complaint indicates that the Executive Secretary of the Board was 

sued in her individual capacity, and an official acting in her official 

capacity is not a person and cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 Id. 

at 71. 

Appellant did not provide cogent argument in support of his 

claims of contempt and harassment, and thus, these claims were properly 

dismissed for failing to establish the elements of a claim for relief. 

Stockmeier, 124 Nev. at 316, 183 P.3d at 135. 

Regarding appellant's claim for declaratory relief that NRS 

213.1215 is unconstitutionally vague, the district court did not err in 

dismissing this claim as appellant failed to establish the elements of a 

'An official acting in her official capacity could be sued for 

prospective injunctive relief. See id. at 71. Nothing in the complaint 

suggests that appellant was seeking prospective injunctive relief 

regarding the actions of the Executive Secretary in sending him a letter 

denying his motion for reconsideration. The only prospective injunctive 

relief sought was an order of release on parole. We note that such relief 

was inappropriate in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 as a 

challenge to the fact or duration of confinement must be brought in a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Wilkinson IL Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 

78 (2005). 

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claim for relief. See Stockmeier, 124 Nev. at 316, 183 P.3d at 135. 

Appellant failed to show that the terms of the statute were so vague that 

men of common intelligence were required to guess as to its meaning or 

that the terms of the statute encouraged differing applications. See Nev. 

Comm'n on Ethics v. Ballard, 120 Nev. 862, 868, 102 P.3d 544, 548 (2004). 

Appellant's claim of negligence, that the Board of Parole 

Commissioners failed to apply the correct standard for denial of parole as 

set forth in NRS 213.1215, cannot be fairly construed as a claim raised 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and thus, this claim was not barred by the * 

definition of person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Likewise, the Board's 

decision regarding application of the mandatory standard set forth in NRS 

213.1215 is not subject to a claim of immunity pursuant to NRS 

41.032(2). 2Nevertheless, the claim was properly denied. In the 

proceedings on the motion to dismiss, the district court was presented 

2The district court correctly observed that the Board had absolute 

quasi-judicial immunity in the discretionary decision of whether to grant 

or deny parole, and the Board had absolute quasi-judicial immunity in its 

finding that "there is a reasonable probability that the prisoner will be a 

danger to public safety if parole is granted." See Stockmeier v. State, Bd. 

of Parole Comm'rs, 127 Nev. Op. No. 19, 255 P.3d 209, 215 (2011); see also 

State of Nev. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court (Ducharm), 118 Nev. 609, 616, 

55 P.3d 420, 424 (2002). However, the decision to apply the standard for 

parole release mandated by the legislature in NRS 213.1215 would not be 

subject to immunity as it is a ministerial act and not a discretionary act. 

Pittman v. Lower Court Counseling, 110 Nev. 359, 364, 871 P.2d 953, 956 

(1994), overruled on other grounds by Nunez v. City of N. Las Vegas, 116 

Nev. 535, 1 P.3d 959 (2000). Further, while quasi-judicial immunity 

would not extend to declaratory or injunctive relief, see Stockmeier, 127 

Nev. Adv. Op. No. 19, 255 P.3d at 215, this order has already addressed 

the fact that the claims for declaratory (constitutionality of 213.1215) and 

injunctive (release on parole) relief were properly dismissed by the district 

court. 

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with a copy of the order denying mandatory parole showing that the Board 

applied the standard set forth in NRS 213.1215. In light of this evidence, 

this court will review the dismissal order regarding this claim as though it 

were an order granting summary judgment. Witherow, 123 Nev. at 307- 

08, 167 P.3d at 409. Because the order denying mandatory parole release 

belies appellant's claim, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 

respondents were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

cc: Hon. Richard Wagner, District Judge 

Ricky D. Lewis 

Attorney General/Dep't of Public Safety/Carson City 

Pershing County Clerk 

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