Case No. 13-14-00667-CV

In the 

Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District 

of Texas at Corpus Christi – Edinburg 

IN THE ESTATE OF

MILDRED OZELLA FAVOR PURSLEY, 

A.K.A. MILDRED F. PURSLEY, DECEASED

On Appeal from the Probate Court, 

 Hidalgo County, Texas 

Cause No. P-34,801-A 

BRIEF OF APPELLEES HAROLD WAYNE PURSLEY, JR.,

AND ROLLAND HUGH PURSLEY

Edmundo O. Ramirez 

Texas Bar No. 16501420 

eor@ekrattorneys.com 

Minerva I. Zamora 

Texas Bar No. 24037765 

miz@ekrattorneys.com

Daniel Koeneke 

Texas Bar No. 24083320 

daniel@ekrattorneys.com

ELLIS, KOENEKE & RAMIREZ, L.L.P. 

1101 Chicago Avenue 

McAllen, Texas 78501 

Telephone: (956) 682-2400 

Facsimile: (956) 682-0820 

Attorneys for Appellees, Harold 

Wayne Pursley, Jr., and Rolland 

Hugh Pursley 

April 17, 2015 Oral Argument Requested

ACCEPTED

13-14-00667-CV

THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS

4/17/2015 6:54:47 PM

DORIAN RAMIREZ

CLERK

 FILED IN 13th COURT OF APPEALS CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS 4/17/2015 6:54:47 PM DORIAN E. RAMIREZ Clerk
2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS......................................................................................... 2

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... 5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................................ 9

1. Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 9

2. Disposition in Trial Court ......................................................................... 9

STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT ............................................................. 11

ISSUES PRESENTED........................................................................................... 12

STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................... 14

1. The 1975 Will........................................................................................... 14

2. Brief History ............................................................................................ 15

3. Competing Summary Judgment Motions................................................. 17

4. Trial Court’s Decision............................................................................. 18

5. Rocky’s Argument of Ambiguity .............................................................. 19

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................................................................... 21

ARGUMENT......................................................................................................... 25

I. ROCKY WAIVED ANY APPEAL OF THE ISSUE OF 

 AMBIGUITY ............................................................................... 25

A. Rocky Failed to Specifically Plead Ambiguity ...................... 25

B. Rocky Conceded that there Are No Fact Issues to Be Decided 

by the Jury............................................................................... 28

C. Rocky Failed to Present Evidence and Request a Ruling from 

the Trial Court on the Issue of Ambiguity.............................. 29
3

D. Rocky Failed to Incorporate a Complaint as to Ambiguity in 

his Motion for New Trial ........................................................ 30

II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE 

1975 WILL WAS A CONTRACTUAL WILL DUE TO THE FACT 

THAT THE 1975 WILL WAS JOINTLY EXECUTED AND SETS 

FORTH A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO DISPOSE OF ALL THE 

PROPERTY OWNED BY HAROLD W. PURSLEY AND 

MILDRED F. PURSLEY.................................................................. 31

A. Introduction............................................................................. 31

B. Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley Jointly Executed the 

1975 Will................................................................................. 32

C. The 1975 Will Contained a Comprehensive Plan to Dispose of 

all the Property Owned by the Parties .................................... 33

C.1. The 1975 Will Provided for a Gift to the Survivor which 

Was Not Absolute or Unconditional ............................ 33

C.1.a. Rebuttal of Rocky’s Argument Regarding 

Absolute and Unconditional Gifts...................... 38

C.2. The Balance Remaining at the Survivor’s Death Is 

Jointly Disposed of in the Secondary Dispositive 

Provisions of the 1975 Will.......................................... 39

C.2.a. Rebuttal of Rocky’s Argument Regarding the 

Remaining Balance Being Jointly Disposed of in 

the Secondary Dispositive Provisions of the 1975 

Will..................................................................... 43

III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE 

2007 WILL AND 2010 CODICIL BREACHED THE TERMS OF 

THE 1975 WILL ............................................................................... 46

A. The 1975 Will Provided a Class Gift to Rocky, Harold Jr., and 

Rolland in Equal Shares.......................................................... 46
4

B. The 1975 Will Became Effective Upon the Probate of the Will 

and Members of the Class Were Vested at the Time of Harold 

W. Pursley’s Death ................................................................. 46

C. The Class Membership Under the 1975 Will Was Ascertained 

at the Time Fixed for Distribution .......................................... 48

D. Rebuttal of Rocky’s Argument that the Plain Language of the 

1975 Will Demonstrates there Was No Breach...................... 49

E. Rebuttal of Rocky’s Argument that the Rules of Construction 

Demonstrate There Was No Breach ....................................... 52

F. Rebuttal of Rocky’s Argument that the 1975 Will Does Not 

Create a Class Gift .................................................................. 55

IV. MILDRED F. PURSLEY CAUSED THE 1975 WILL TO BE 

PROBATED AND ACCEPTED THE BENEFITS UNDER IT, 

THUS IT WOULD BE MANIFESTLY UNJUST TO ALLOW HER 

TO DISAVOW IT AND ITS OBLIGATIONS ................................ 59

V. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT ROCKY

SUFFICIENTLY PLEAD AMBIGUITYAND THAT THIS CLAIM 

WAS NOT WAIVED, AS A MATTER OF LAW THE TERMS OF 

THE1975 WILL ARE NOT AMBIGUOUS..................................... 60

VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 62

PRAYER................................................................................................................ 64

CERTIFICATE OF RULE 9.4(i) COMPLIANCE ............................................... 65

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .............................................................................. 66

APPENDICES ....................................................................................................... 67
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases 

Alviar v. Gonzalez, 

725 S.W.2d 297 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ................ 36-38

Barnhill v. Moore, 

630 S.W.2d 817 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, no writ) ...................................26

Bernard v. L. S. S. Corp., 

532 S.W.2d 409 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.)............................27

Boone v. Stone, 

142 S.W.2d 936 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1940, writ dismissed, judgment 

correct) ............................................................................................................... 40-42

Caples v. Ward, 

179 S.W. 856 (Tex. 1915) ........................................................................................36

Dougherty v. Humphrey, 

424 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1968) .................................................................. 21, 34, 38-39

Edds v. Mitchell, 

184 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. 1945) ........................................................................ 36, 38-39

Ellis v. Bruce, 

286 S.W.2d 645 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.) .........................36

Guilliams v. Koonsman, 

279 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. 1955) .............................................................................. 41-42

Hagood v. Hagood, 

186 S.W. 220 (Tex.Civ.App. –Fort Worth 1916, writ ref’d)...................................40

Hamm v. Millennium Income Fund, L.L.C., 

178 S.W.3d 256 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) .....................31

Houston v. Schuhmann, 

92 S.W.2d 1086, (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1936, writ ref’d).............. 22, 43, 47-48

5
In re Estate of Ayala, 

702 S.W.2d 708 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1985, no writ) ......................................54

In re Estate of Johnson, 

781 S.W.2d 390 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied) ........ 21, 35, 38 

Lewis v. E. Texas Fin. Co., 

146 S.W.2d 977 (Tex. 1941) .............................................................................. 23, 61 

Lorenz v. Janssen, 

116 S.W.3d 421 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) ...................... 46, 47

Manes v. Dallas Baptist Coll., 

638 S.W.2d 143 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ...................................62

Methodist Hospitals of Dallas v. Amerigroup Texas, Inc., 

231 S.W.3d 483 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied) ..........................................53

Mitchell v. Mitchell, 

244 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. 1951) ....................................................................................52

Morris v. Williams, 

92 S.W.2d 541 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1936, writ ref’d) ....................................... 39 

Newman v. Tropical Visions, Inc., 

891 S.W.2d 713 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) ..................99

Novak v. Stevens, 

596 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. 1980) .............................................................................. 26-27

Odeneal v. Van Horn, 

678 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1984) ........................................................................ 31, 37-38

O'Grady v. Gerald D. Hines, Inc., 

683 S.W.2d 763 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) .........................61

Ohrt v. Union Gas Corp., 

398 S.W.3d 315 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi—Edinburg 2012, pet. denied) .........28

Perry Homes v. Cull, 

6
258 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2008) ....................................................................................28

Reynolds v. Estate of Benefield, 

995 S.W.2d 885 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1999, pet. denied) ...................... 22, 32-33, 38 

San Antonio Machine & Supply Co. v. Allen, 

268 S.W. 532 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1925, no writ) ............................. 26, 60

Sanderson v. First National Bank in Dallas, 

446 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e.)........................... 45, 57

Sinnott v. Gidney, 

322 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. 1959) ...................................................................45-46, 56-57 

Skyline Furniture, Inc. v. Gifford, 

433 S.W.2d 950 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1968, no writ) ................................. 30, 60 

Sullivan v. Skinner, 

66 S.W. 680, (Tex.Civ.App. 1902, writ refused) .....................................................42

Gonzales v. Norris of Houston, Inc., 

575 S.W.2d 110 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.) .....26

Vickers v. Vickers, 

553 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1977, no writ) ...................................26 

Vickrey v. Gilmore, 

554 S.W.2d 36 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1977, no writ) ...................................... 59-60

Weidner v. Crowther, 

301 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. 1957) ........................................................................ 23, 58-59

Weir v. Smith, 

62 Tex. 1 (Tex. 1884)...............................................................................................36

Wiemers v. Wiemers, 

683 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. 1984) ............................................................ 22, 23, 32, 58-59

Wilkes v. Wilkes, 

488 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. 1972) .............................................................................. 39-40

7
Statutes and Rules 

Tex. Estates Code § 254.004 ....................................................................................32

Tex. Estates Code § 201.002 .............................................................................. 22, 42 

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 ........................................................................................... 29-30

Tex. R. Civ. P. 94 ............................................................................................... 25, 28 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a ........................................................................................... 26-27

Other Authorities 

Corpus Juris, vol. 69, p. 80, Wills, s 1136 ...............................................................52

9 Tex. Prac., Texas Law Of Wills § 30.4 (3d ed.) ...................................................39

Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills & Don. Trans.) 

§ 14.2 TD No. 4 (2004) ............................................................................................45

Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills & Don. Trans.) (2011) ..............................57

Lewis M. Simes & Allan F. Smith, Law of Future Interests 

§ 740 (2d ed. 1967 &Current Supp ..........................................................................45

8
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

 1. Nature of the Case. 

 

 This case concerns the Estate of Mildred F. Pursley. At issue is whether the 

Last Will and Testament of Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley, executed 

on April 29, 1975, is a contractual will, providing for a class gift to Rocky Pursley, 

Harold Wayne Pursley, Jr., and Rolland Hugh Pursley in equal shares, which is 

binding on the Estate of Mildred F. Pursley. (See 1CR57 (exhibit A) / App. A). 

 2. Disposition in Trial Court. 

After Mildred F. Pursley’s death, Rocky Pursley filed an Application to 

Probate the will which Mildred F. Pursley executed on April 13, 2007 (hereinafter 

the “2007 Will”), and the First Codicil to the 2007 Will which was executed on 

January 13, 2010 (hereinafter the “2010 Codicil”). (1CR5-21). Rocky’s

Application to Probate was filed in the Probate Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, 

Judge Homero Garza presiding. Id. In response to Rocky’s Application, Harold Jr. 

and Rolland filed their Application for Temporary Administration Pending Will 

Contest, and their Opposition To Probate of Will and for Issuance of Letters 

Testamentary, Petition for Imposition of a Constructive Trust and Petition for 

Probate of Will and for Issuance of Letters Testamentary. (1CR22, 31). 

 On December 30, 2013, Harold Jr. and Rolland filed a Motion for Summary 

Judgment wherein they requested that the trial court impose a constructive trust on 

9
the estate in order to enforce the terms of the 1975 contractual Will disposing of 

the estate to the children of the marriage in equal shares. (1CR27). Subsequently, 

Rocky filed a No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment on the same issues. 

(1CR87). 

 The trial court granted Harold Jr. and Rolland’s Summary Judgment and 

imposed a constructive trust on the estate in favor of the dispositive terms of the 

1975 Will providing for a class gift to Rocky, Harold Jr., and Rolland in equal 

shares. (2CR208, 270). Subsequently, the trial court severed the Summary 

Judgment and executed a Final Judgment in the severed cause. (1CR267, 270). 

10
STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT 

Appellees believe that oral argument would assist the Court in deciding the 

issues involved, and therefore respectfully request an oral argument pursuant to 

Rule 39 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

11
ISSUES PRESENTED

I. Rocky waived any appeal of the issue of ambiguity. 

A. In the alternative, as a matter of law the terms of the 1975 Will are not 

ambiguous. 

II. The Trial Court did not err in granting summary judgment that the 1975 Will 

was a contractual will. 

A. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment finding that 

the language contained in paragraph IV., “any child or children of this 

marriage,” provided for the remainder of the estate to be conveyed as 

a class gift to Rocky Pursley, Harold Wayne Pursley, Jr., and Rolland 

Hugh Pursley. 

B. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment finding that 

Harold W. Pursley’s intent was that at his passing (if he died first), 

and at the subsequent passing of his wife, any estate left over was to 

go to and vest in his beloved children Harold Wayne Pursley, Jr., 

Rolland Hugh Pursley, and Rocky Joe Pursley, share and share alike. 

C. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment finding that 

the proferred Will executed by Mildred F. Pursley dated April 13, 

2007 and Codicil dated January 13, 2010 breached the 1975 

contractual will. 

III. The trial court did not err in imposing a constructive trust in favor of the 

devisees of the 1975 Will to the extent necessary to enforce the terms of the 

1975 contractual Will disposing of the remainder of the estate to Rocky 

Pursley, Harold Wayne Pursley, Jr., and Rolland Hugh Pursley in equal 

shares. 

12
Case No. 13-14-00667-CV

In the 

Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District 

of Texas at Corpus Christi – Edinburg 

IN THE ESTATE OF

MILDRED OZELLA FAVOR PURSLEY, 

A.K.A. MILDRED F. PURSLEY, DECEASED

On Appeal from the Probate Court, 

 Hidalgo County, Texas 

Cause No. P-34,801-A 

BRIEF OF APPELLEES 

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: 

 COME NOW Appellees Harold Wayne Pursley, Jr. and Rolland Hugh 

Pursley and file this their Appellees’ Brief, requesting that the Court affirm the 

trial court’s Final Judgment. Parties will be referred to as in the trial court or by 

name. References to the Clerk’s Record will be to {volume}CR{page}, and 

references to the Appendices will be to App{tab}. References to the Statement of 

Facts will be to SOF § {section}.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 

1. The 1975 Will. 

On or about April 29, 1975, Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley, as 

husband and wife, jointly executed the “Last Will and Testament of Harold W.

Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley” (hereinafter the “1975 Will”). (1CR57 (exhibit 

A)1

 / App. A). The 1975 Will was jointly executed by Harold W. Pursley and 

Mildred F. Pursley, husband and wife, and set forth a comprehensive plan to 

dispose of all their property. (1CR57 (exhibit A) / App. A). 

Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley executed the same will, “being of 

sound mind, memory and understanding in view of the certainty of death and the 

uncertainty of life, and being desirous of making the best disposition of our 

worldly affairs, do hereby make and publish this our Last Will and Testament,” at 

the same time and place, and before the same witnesses. (1CR57 (exhibit A) / App. 

A). (Emphasis added). 

As stated above, the 1975 Will set forth a comprehensive plan to dispose of 

all of Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley’s property. (See id.). Specifically, 

the 1975 Will provides that all of Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley’s 

property shall go to the survivor for the survivor’s lifetime. (See id.). Upon the 

 

1

 Exhibits are from Harold Pursley Jr. and Rolland Pursley’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment.1CR44. 

14
death of the survivor, the property is to be distributed to the children of Harold W. 

Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley as a class gift in equal shares. (See id.). 

 In part, the 1975 Will provides as follows: 

Harold W. Pursley and 

Mildred F. Pursley’s 1975 

Will

We, Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley, husband and 

wife, of the County of Hidalgo, State of Texas, being of sound 

mind, memory and understanding in view of the certainty of 

death and the uncertainty of life, and being desirous of making 

the best disposition of our worldly affairs, do hereby make and 

publish this our Last Will and Testament.

It is our will and desire that the survivor of us, Harold W. 

Pursley or Mildred F. Pursley, as the case may be, shall, with the 

rights and authority below given, have all the estate of every 

description, real, personal or mixed, which either of us may own, 

to be used, occupied, enjoyed, conveyed and expended by and 

during the life of such survivor shall desire and that upon the 

death of such survivor, any of such estate then remaining shall 

go to and vest in any child or children of this marriage.

2. Brief History. 

On May 10, 1980, Harold W. Pursley died, leaving all his estate to pass 

through the 1975 Will. (1CR61 (exhibit B) / App. B). At the time of his death, 

Harold W. Pursley had three children, Rocky Joe Pursley, Harold Wayne Pursley, 

Jr., and Rolland Hugh Pursley, all three being the children of Mildred F. Pursley. 

On May 20, 1980, Mildred F. Pursley filed an Application to Probate the 

1975 Will and have Letters Testamentary issued in her name. (1CR61 (exhibit B) / 

App. B). The Court then entered an Order Admitting Will to Probate and 

Authorizing Letters Testamentary. (1CR63 (exhibit C) / App. C.) Pursuant to the 

15
court’s order, Mildred F. Pursley was appointed as Independent Executrix of her 

husband’s estate. (1CR63 (exhibit C) / App. C). She then filed her written Oath as 

Independent Executrix and was issued Letters Testamentary. (1CR65 (exhibit D) / 

App. D, 66 (exhibit E) / App. E). 

As seen by Mildred’s Application for Probate of Will and Issuance of 

Letters Testamentary referenced above, Harold “left a valid written Will (‘Will’) 

dated April 29, 1975 which was never revoked.” (1CR61 (exhibit B) / App. B). 

Thus, it is clear that neither Harold W. Pursley nor Mildred F. Pursley revoked the 

1975 Will before Harold W. Pursley’s death. (1CR61 (exhibit B) / App. B) 

On February 10, 1981, as the Independent Executrix of her husband’s estate, 

Mildred F. Pursley filed the Inventory, Appraisement, and List of Claims.2

(1CR67, 76 (exhibit F) / App. F). As seen by this Inventory, Appraisement, and 

List of Claims, Mildred F. Pursley received a substantial benefit from probating the 

1975 Will. (1CR67, 76 (exhibit F) / App. F). Under the express terms of the joint 

and contractual 1975 Will, Mildred F. Pursley was to enjoy the benefit of this 

property for her lifetime. (1CR57 (exhibit A) / App. A). 

After Harold W. Pursley died and his ability to amend the 1975 Will was 

terminated, Mildred F. Pursley executed a Last Will and Testament, the 2007 Will, 

on April 13, 2007, approximately 27 years after the 1975 Will was probated. 

 

2

 At the time the Inventory, Appraisement and List of Claims was filed, Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley 

owned certain assets, the majority of which was real property, worth approximately $531,775.50. Today, that real 

property is worth approximately three million dollars. 

16
(1CR57 (exhibit A) / App. A., 61 (exhibit B) / App. B., 77 (exhibit G) / App. G). 

Subsequently, Mildred F. Pursley executed a First Codicil, the 2010 Codicil, to the 

2007 Will on January 13, 2010. (1CR83 (exhibit H) / App. H). The 2007 Will and 

2010 Codicil provide for a distribution of the majority of the estate to Rocky, with 

a minor percentage to Rolland. (77 (exhibit G) / App. G, 83 (exhibit H) / App. H). 

The 2007 Will and 2010 Codicil failed to provide a disposition of any part of the 

estate to Harold Jr. (See id.). 

After Mildred F. Pursley’s death, Rocky filed an Application to Probate the 

2007 Will and 2010 Codicil in the Probate Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, Judge 

Homero Garza presiding. (1CR5-21). In response to Rocky’s Application, Harold 

Jr. and Rolland filed their Application For Temporary Administration Pending Will 

Contest and Opposition to the probating of the 2007 Will and 2010 Codicil. 

(1CR22, 31). 

 3. Competing Summary Judgment Motions. 

 Motions for Summary Judgment were filed by both Rocky and Appellee. In 

Harold Jr. and Rolland’s Motion For Summary Judgment, Response to Summary 

Judgment Motion, Reply to Summary Judgment Motion and brief thereto, Harold 

Jr. and Rolland contend that: (1) the 1975 Will was a contractual will which was 

not revoked and became binding on the death of Harold W. Pursley; (2) the 1975 

will provided for a class gift to Rocky, Harold Jr., and Rolland in equal shares; (3) 

17
the rights of Rocky, Harold Jr., and Rolland, as members of the class, under the 

1975 Will were vested at Harold Pursley’s death; (4) the 2007 Will and 2010 

Codicil breached the terms of the 1975 Will; (5) Mildred F. Pursley caused the 

1975 Will to be probated and accepted substantial benefits under it, thus it would 

be manifestly unjust to permit Mildred F. Pursley to disavow the 1975 Will and its 

obligations after Harold W. Pursley had fully performed by abiding by its terms; 

and (6) a constructive trust must be imposed on the estate in favor of Rocky, 

Harold, Jr., and Rolland as equal beneficiaries of the estate. (1CR44, 113, 161, 

165, 182, 197). In response to Harold Jr. and Rolland’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, Rocky “responded and filed a no-evidence summary judgment motion 

claiming his brothers had no evidence (1) that the 1975 Will is contractual, (2) that 

the alleged contract was breached, and (3) of undue influence.” Appellant Brief at 

17; (1CR87). 

4. Trial Court’s Decision.

The trial court denied Rocky’s No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment 

and granted Harold Jr. and Rolland’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (2CR209 / 

App. J). After severing its summary judgment ruling into a separate action, on 

November 20, 2014, the trial court executed a “Final Judgment” in which the trial 

court held that: 

 IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the will executed by 

Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley on April 29, 1975 is a contractual will. 

18
The language in paragraph IV. “any child or children of this marriage” provided 

for the remainder of the estate to be conveyed as a class gift and therefore, 

mandates the distribution to all persons identified in that class, those being all the 

children. 

 IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the court concludes 

(reading the 1975 will as a whole instrument) that it was the intent of Harold W. 

Pursley when he executed the 1975 will with his wife, that at his passing (if he 

died first) and at the subsequent passing of his wife, any estate left over was to go 

and vest in his beloved children Harold Wayne Pursley, Jr., Rolland Hugh Pursley 

and Rocky Joe Pursley, share and share alike. 

 IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the proferred will 

executed by Mildred F. Pursley dated April 13, 2007 is a breach of the 1975 

contractual will. Further, the proferred First Codicil executed by Mildred F. 

Pursley dated January 13, 2010 is a breach of the 1975 contractual will. 

 IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that a constructive trust 

be imposed on the Estate in favor of the devisees of the 1975 Will to the extent 

necessary to enforce the terms of the 1975 contractual Will. 

(2CR267-69; 2CR270-71 / App. K).

 5. Rocky’s Argument of Ambiguity.

In addition to Rocky’s allegations that (1) the 1975 Will is not contractual, 

and (2) even if the 1975 Will was contractual, the 2007 Will and 2010 Codicil did 

not breach the terms of the 1975 Will, Rocky is also now alleging that the 1975 

Will is ambiguous. See Appellant Brief at 38. Specifically, despite the fact that 

Rocky made no mention of any alleged ambiguity in his Motion for Summary 

Judgment, nor did he address the issue of ambiguity in his subsequent Response, 

Brief or Reply, Rocky now seeks to reverse the trial court’s Final Judgment based 

on the argument that the 1975 Will is ambiguous. (See id.); (1CR87, 100, 192, 

205). 

19
Rocky’s only previous pleading mentioning the ambiguity issue is Rocky’s 

Supplemental Application for Probate Will. (1CR95-96). The relevant section of 

Rocky’s Supplemental Application for Probate Will provides as follows:

In the alternative, and only in the event that the 1975 will is determined not to be 

an unambiguously noncontractual will and that the 2007 will and the 2010 codicil 

are determined to breach such will, then such 1975 will is ambiguous and parol 

testimony should be admitted to demonstrate that it was not intended to be 

contractual. 

(1CR95-96).

Significantly, as illustrated above, nowhere in this pleading does Rocky set 

forth what specifically he claims is ambiguous in the 1975 Will. (See id.). Thus, 

the record fails to contain any pleadings by which Rocky’s request could be 

sustained as he failed to set out the specific words and phrases claimed to be 

ambiguous.(See id.).

Further, as seen by the transcript of the August 20, 2014 Pre-Trial Hearing, 

Rocky’s attorney made no objection to the statement by opposing counsel that both 

parties agree that the only issue is a matter of law, thus a jury trial is not necessary. 

(See 2CR250 (exhibit1) / App. I).

Subsequent to the summary judgment ruling, but prior to the execution of 

the Final Judgment, Rocky filed a Motion For New Trial and/or Modification of 

Judgment which was overruled. (2CR237). As seen by the Motion For New Trial 

and/or Modification of Judgment, Rocky failed to address the issue of ambiguity. 

(See id.). 

20
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 

In accordance with the Texas Supreme Court opinions referenced herein, it 

is apparent that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment and 

finding that (1) the 1975 Will was a contractual will as a matter of law, and (2) the 

language in paragraph IV. “any child or children of this marriage” provided for the 

remainder of the estate to be conveyed as a class gift to Rocky Pursley, Harold 

Wayne Pursley, Jr., and Rolland Hugh Pursley. See Argument § 2. Specifically, the 

language of the 1975 Will mirrors the wills addressed in Dougherty v. Humphrey, 

Novak v. Stevens and In re Estate of Johnson wherein both the Texas Supreme 

Court and Appellate Court held that the language contained in the wills was 

sufficient to prove that the wills were contractual. See Dougherty v. Humphrey, 424 

S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. 1968); Novak v. Stevens, 596 S.W.2d 848, 851-52 (Tex. 

1980); See In re Estate of Johnson, 781 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex.App. –Houston 

1989, writ denied). 

Further, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment finding that 

Mildred F. Pursley’s 2007 Will and 2010 Codicil breached the terms of the 1975 

Will. In the present case, the 1975 Will (which was agreed upon and executed by 

both Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley) was a contractual will due to the 

fact that: 1) the 1975 Will was jointly executed by both Harold W. Pursley and 

Mildred F. Pursley; and 2) the 1975 Will contained a comprehensive plan for 

21
disposition of all their “worldly affairs” to Rocky Pursley, Harold Wayne Pursley, 

Jr., and Rolland Hugh Pursley as a class gift.1

 (1CR57 (exhibit A) / App. A). 

Rocky’s argument is that the term “or” gave Mildred the right to unilaterally 

disregard her husband’s wishes and “the option of whether to give the property to 

one or all children.” See Appellant’s Brief at 32. However, Rocky’s analysis 

ignores the principles relating to class gifts and the well-recognized legal meaning 

of the language “any child or children.” See Argument § 2. b. 2.; see Texas 

Estates Code § 201.002 (b)(2) & (b)(3) (utilizing the phrase “child or children”) 

(emphasis added). 

 Further, in accordance with Houston v. Schuhmann, the gift vested in the 

three children at the time of Harold’s death, subject to any after-born children. See 

Houston v. Schuhmann, 92 S.W.2d 1086, 1089 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1936, 

writ ref’d) (internal citations omitted). The gift therefore had vested in Harold, Jr., 

Rolland, and Rocky on May 10, 1980, the date of their father’s death. As such, the 

three children could not later be divested of their vested interest. Any subsequent 

will or codicil revoking Harold Jr.’s and/or Rolland’s vested interest in the 

property would in fact be in violation of the distribution of property under the 1975 

Will. 

 

1

 The two prong test used to determine whether a comprehensive plan exists, as relied on in Reynolds v. Estate of 

Benefield, is as follows: (1) the gift to the survivor is not absolute and unconditional, even though it may initially 

appear to be so; and (2) the balance remaining from the estate of the first to die and the estate of the last to die is 

treated as a single estate and jointly disposed of by both testators in the secondary dispositive provisions of the will.

Reynolds v. Estate of Benefield, 995 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, pet. denied) (citing Wiemers v. 

Wiemers, 683 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tex. 1984). 

22
 As stated in the Statement of Facts: 1) Harold W. Pursley fully performed by 

abiding by the 1975 Will until his ability to amend it was terminated by death; 2) 

Mildred F. Pursley caused the 1975 Will to be probated in the Estate of Harold W. 

Pursley; 3) Mildred F. Pursley acted as the Independent Executrix of the Estate of 

Harold W. Pursley, in accordance with the 1975 Will; and 4) Mildred F. Pursley 

accepted substantial benefits by probating the 1975 Will. See SOF § 1. Thus, under 

the reasoning of the Texas Supreme Court in Wiemers v. Wiemers, it would be 

manifestly unjust to permit Mildred F. Pursley, the surviving spouse, to disavow 

the 1975 Will. See Wiemers v. Wiemers, 683 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tex. 1984) 

(quoting Weidner v. Crowther, 301 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex. 1957)). 

 Lastly, Rocky waived any right to appeal the issue of ambiguity. See

Argument § 1. In the alternative, if this Court finds that Rocky sufficiently plead 

ambiguity and that his claim was not waived, the terms of the 1975 Will are not 

ambiguous. Specifically, the 1975 Will is so worded that it can be given a “certain” 

or “definite legal meaning or interpretation.” Lewis v. E. Texas Fin. Co., 146 

S.W.2d 977, 980 (Tex. 1941). 

 In conclusion, the 1975 Will made a class gift to all the children of the 

marriage. The use of the words “any” and “or” certainly did not eliminate the class 

gift, nor did it make a disposition to only one or two children proper. The members 

of the class living at the time (the three sons) received a vested interest at the death 

23
of Harold W. Pursley. Subsequently, at the death of Mildred F. Pursley, the class 

was ascertained. Therefore, Mildred F. Pursley’s changing of the dispositive 

provision to anyone other than all three children is a violation of the terms of the 

1975 Will. Due to the fact that Mildred F. Pursley had no authority or power to 

revoke the 1975 Will, the 1975 Will is binding upon the Estate of Mildred F. 

Pursley, rendering all other subsequently executed, inconsistent wills 

unenforceable. 

 As such, the trial court did not err in imposing a constructive trust in favor of 

the devisees of the 1975 Will to the extent necessary to enforce the terms of the 

1975 contractual Will, thus this Court should affirm the trial court’s ruling.

24
ARGUMENT 

I. ROCKY WAIVED ANY APPEAL OF THE ISSUE OF 

 AMBIGUITY. 

 

 Rocky waived any right to appeal the issue of ambiguity by: (1) failing to 

sufficiently plead ambiguity; (2) conceding that ambiguity was not an issue by 

agreeing that there were no fact issues to be decided by the jury; (3) failing to 

present evidence and request a ruling from the trial court regarding the issue of 

ambiguity; and (4) failing to incorporate a complaint as to ambiguity in his motion 

for new trial. 

A. Rocky Failed to Specifically Plead Ambiguity. 

 Rocky failed to make any argument of ambiguity in his Motion for 

Summary judgment or in any oral arguments to the court. (1CR87, 100, 192, 205). 

Significantly, he only vaguely referenced ambiguity as an alternative argument in 

one pleading before the trial court’s Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, 

without providing any explanation as to what exactly he claimed was ambiguous. 

As set forth in detail below, Rocky has failed to properly plead ambiguity. 

(1CR95-96). 

 Rule 94 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that a party plead 

any matter constituting an affirmative defense. See Tex. R.Civ.P. 94. As such, the 

Texas Supreme Court has found that failure of a party to properly plead an 

affirmative defense constitutes a waiver of that defense. “Ambiguity is an 

25
affirmative defense which must be raised at the trial court level.” Gonzales v. 

Norris of Houston, Inc., 575 S.W.2d 110, 113 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 1978, writ refused n.r.e.). 

 The claim of ambiguity in a contract must be raised by the pleadings, and in 

the absence of such a pleading the court will not hear evidence as to the intention 

of the parties which is different from that expressed in the contract. See Vickers v. 

Vickers, 553 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1977, no writ) (“Thus, in 

the case at bar, the husband not only failed to plead ambiguity in the judgment, he 

failed to offer any evidence in support of such contention. Point one is overruled”). 

“[I]f a party contends that a written agreement is ambiguous, it too must be 

specifically pled.” Barnhill v. Moore, 630 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tex.App.—Corpus 

Christi 1982, no writ). 

 The party must set out the specific words and phrases claimed to be 

ambiguous, or to be modified or explained by parol evidence, and also set forth the 

proposed modifications and explanations. See San Antonio Machine & Supply Co. 

v. Allen, 268 S.W. 532, 533 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1925, no writ). 

“Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer 

or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.” Tex. 

R. Civ. P. 166a. As the Court of Appels in Newmann v. Tropical Visions, Inc., 

expressly stated:

26
Appellants' fifth point of error claims the release or “express consent” is 

ambiguous. Appellants, however, failed to plead ambiguity in their petition and 

failed to raise it in their response to the defendants' motion for summary 

judgment. They accordingly waived the issue, see Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c), and the 

point is overruled. 

Newman v. Tropical Visions, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

1994, writ denied) (emphasis added). 

In Bernard v. L. S. S. Corp., the court of appeals held that where the 

appellant failed to plead ambiguity and the questions presented to the trial court 

were solely questions of law relating to the interpretation of the contract, the issue 

of ambiguity was considered waived. See Bernard v. L. S. S. Corp., 532 S.W.2d 

409 (Tex.Civ.App. –Austin 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 

In the present case, Rocky only made one reference to any issue of 

ambiguity prior to the trial court’s ruling on Harold Jr. and Rolland’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment. (1CR95-96). Specifically, Rocky’s “Supplemental 

Application for Probate Will” provides as follows:

The April 29, 1975 will is unambiguous and is not a contractual will and in any 

event the disposition call [sic] for by the April 13, 2007 will and January 13, 2010 

codicil are not inconsistent with and do not breach any alleged contract that is part 

of the April 29, 1975 will. In the alternative, and only in the event that the 

1975 will is determined not to be an unambiguously [sic] noncontractual will 

and that the 2007 will and the 2010 codicil are determined to breach such 

will, then such 1975 will is ambiguous and parol testimony should be 

admitted to demonstrate that it was not intended to be contractual. 

(1CR95-96).

27
As seen by Rocky’s Supplemental Application, in addition to it not making 

sense, Rocky wholly fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 94 and Texas case 

law. Specifically, Rocky not only fails to specify the alleged ambiguous potion of 

the 1975 Will, but also fails to provide the trial court with the correct meaning or 

construction thereof. 

 Further, Rocky failed to mention or plead the issue of ambiguity in his 

Motion for Summary Judgment, nor did Rocky’s counsel make any oral statement 

or present an argument or evidence supporting a claim of ambiguity at any hearing 

before the trial court. 

B. Rocky Conceded that there Are No Fact Issues to Be Decided 

 by the Jury. 

Rocky waived his right to claim ambiguity in the 1975 Will by conceding at 

a hearing before the trial court that there are no fact issues in this matter. (See 

2CR250 (exhibit1) / App. I). “[W]aiver is the intentional relinquishment of a right 

actually or constructively known or intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming 

that right.” Ohrt v. Union Gas Corp., 398 S.W.3d 315, 329 (Tex.App.—Corpus 

Christi—Edinburg 2012, pet. denied) (citing Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 

580, 602–03 (Tex. 2008). “The elements of waiver include (1) an existing right, 

benefit, or advantage held by a party; (2) the party's actual or constructive 

knowledge of its existence; and (3) the party's actual intent to relinquish the right 

or intentional conduct inconsistent with the right.” Id.

28
 On August 20, 2014, Parties attended a pre-trial hearing in the Probate Court 

of Hidalgo County. During the hearing, counsel for Harold Jr. and Rolland, 

Edmundo O. Ramirez, stated as follows: 

MR: RAMIREZ: Edmundo Ramirez for the movants, Your Honor, We’ve got a 

pretrial, Your Honor, and we have dueling summary judgments, for lack of a 

better term. We’ve argued them, and we’ve briefed them, and both parties agree 

that the only issue is a matter of law, and so we urge the Court to Rule. 

THE COURT: I guess we got these jury trial settings before we realized there was 

going to be a pending motion for summary judgment. 

MR. RAMIREZ: Right, right, we’ve refined it down to summary judgments. 

THE COURT: I have that case on my desk, and I’m going on vacation next week, 

so by Friday I’ll have a ruling for the parties.

MR RAMIREZ: Thank you. 

MR. MURRAY: Thank, Your Honor. 

(2CR250 (exhibit1) / App. I). (Emphasis added). 

As seen by the transcript of the August 20, 2014 hearing, Rocky’s counsel 

made no objection to Mr. Ramirez’s statement and did not dispute the fact that the 

parties agreed that the only issue was a matter of law. In doing so, Rocky 

intentionally relinquished his right to allege a claim of ambiguity and present parol 

evidence. (See 2CR250 (exhibit1) / App. I). 

C. Rocky Failed to Present Evidence and Request a Ruling from 

 the Trial Court on the Issue of Ambiguity. 

Rocky failed to properly plead ambiguity and failed to properly present his 

claim to the trial court for a ruling. In accordance with Rule 33.1 of the Texas 

29
Rules of Appellate Procedure, as a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for 

appellate review, the record must reflect that: 

(1) the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, 

objection, or motion that: 

(A) stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party 

sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the 

trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were 

apparent from the context; and 

(B) complied with the requirements of the Texas Rules of Civil or 

Criminal Evidence or the Texas Rules of Civil or Appellate 

Procedure; and 

(2) the trial court:

(A) ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or 

implicitly; or 

(B) refused to rule on the request, objection, or motion, and the 

complaining party objected to the refusal. 

“[A] person seeking to establish ambiguity in a written contract has the 

burden of pleading the ambiguity by setting out that portion of the contract that it is 

claimed is ambiguous, and definitely pleading the meaning or construction thereof 

as relied on by him.” Skyline Furniture, Inc. v. Gifford, 433 S.W.2d 950, 954 

(Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1968, no writ).

 In the present case, Rocky not only failed to state the grounds with 

“sufficient specificity,” but also wholly failed to present the claim of ambiguity to 

the trial court for a ruling. 

D. Rocky Failed to Incorporate a Complaint as to Ambiguity in 

his Motion for New Trial. 

30
 An affirmative defense that is not pleaded or proved and on which findings 

are not obtained is waived and cannot be preserved by raising the affirmative 

defense for the first time in a motion for new trial. See Hamm v. Millennium 

Income Fund, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 256, 268 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, 

pet. denied).

 Despite the fact that Rocky failed to bring the ambiguity complaint to the 

trial court’s attention during the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, 

Rocky could have preserved the ambiguity complaint by incorporating it in his 

motion for new trial. However, the complaint was not preserved, as Rocky failed to 

discuss or even mention the ambiguity complaint in his “Motion For New Trial 

and/or to Modify Judgment.” (2CR237).

II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE 1975 

WILL WAS A CONTRACTUAL WILL DUE TO THE FACT THAT 

THE 1975 WILL WAS JOINTLY EXECUTED AND SETS FORTH A 

COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO DISPOSE OF ALL THE PROPERTY 

OWNED BY HAROLD W. PURSLEY AND MILDRED F. PURSLEY. 

A. Introduction. 

In Texas, a pre-1979 will is a contractual will if it is jointly executed and 

sets forth a comprehensive plan to dispose of all the property owned by the parties.

See Odeneal v. Van Horn, 678 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Tex. 1984). A comprehensive 

plan provides for the disposition of property on the death of one of the parties and 

31
upon the death of both parties. The two prong test used to determine whether a 

comprehensive plan exists is as follows: 

(1) the gift to the survivor is not absolute and unconditional, even though it may 

initially appear to be so; and (2) the balance remaining from the estate of the first 

to die and the estate of the last to die is treated as a single estate and jointly 

disposed of by both testators in the secondary dispositive provisions of the will. 

Reynolds v. Estate of Benefield, 995 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1999, pet. 

denied). 

There is no law mandating that a contractual will executed prior to 1979 

must expressly recite that a contract exists. Under Section 252.004 of the Texas 

Estates Code, contractual wills executed after September 1, 1979 must state that a 

contract exists. There is no such corollary provision for contractual wills executed 

prior to 1979, such as the 1975 Will at issue here. Wiemers, 683 S.W.2d at 356 

(stating that only contractual wills executed on or after September 1, 1979 must 

expressly recite that a contract exists) (citing Tex. Estates Code Ann. § 254.004). 

However, despite this fact, Rocky still argues that “no law prohibits the court from 

considering the fact that the 1975 Will makes no reference to any sort of contract.”

See Appellant Brief at 35. Rocky’s argument is without merit. Id. 

B. Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley Jointly Executed the 

 1975 Will. 

Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley executed the same will, “being of 

sound mind, memory and understanding in view of the certainty of death and 

the uncertainty of life, and being desirous of making the best disposition of our 

32
worldly affairs, do hereby make and publish this our Last Will and 

Testament,” at the same time and place, and before the same witnesses. (1CR57 

(exhibit A) / App. A). (Emphasis added). It is unmistakably apparent from the four 

corners of the document that Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley jointly 

executed the 1975 Will. 

C. The 1975 Will Contained a Comprehensive Plan to Dispose of All 

 the Property Owned by the Parties. 

As stated above, the two prong test used to determine whether a 

comprehensive plan exists, as relied on in the Reynolds case, mandates that the gift 

to the survivor not be absolute and unconditional, and the balance remaining from 

the two estates be treated as a single estate and jointly disposed of in the will. See

Reynolds, 995 S.W.2d at 887. 

C. 1. The 1975 Will Provided for a Gift to the Survivor which 

 Was Not Absolute or Unconditional. 

 For the convenience of this Court, Harold Jr. and Rolland provide the 

following charts comparing the terms of the 1975 Will with the terms of similar 

wills which the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Appellate Courts have held to 

provide gifts to survivors which were not absolute and unconditional and 

incorporate sufficient language, on their face, to evidence contractual wills. 

33
The Pursley 1975 Will* / The Will in Dougherty v. Humphrey

*It is our will and desire that the survivor of us, Harold W. Pursley or Mildred F. Pursley, 

It is our will and desire that the survivor of us, J. W. Dougherty or Callie Dougherty,

*as the case may be, shall, with the rights and authority below given, have all the

as the case may be, shall, with the rights and authority below given, have all the

*estate of every description, real, personal or mixed, which either of us may own

estate of every description, real, personal, or mixed, which either or both of us, may own, 

*to be used, occupied, enjoyed, conveyed and expended by and during the life of 

to be used, occupied, enjoyed, conveyed and expended by and during the life of

*such survivor, as such survivor shall desire and that upon the death of such survivor

such survivor, as such survivor shall desire, and that upon the death of such survivor

*any of such estate then remaining shall go to and vest in any child or children

any of such estate then remaining shall be divided equally among the persons following

*of this marriage.

Mrs. Nellie May Woods, Mrs. Vera Bidwell, Mrs. Leola Williams, Miss Callie Lee Daugherty,

Sam Dougherty and Basil Daugherty.

Dougherty, 424 S.W.2d at 619.

In Dougherty, the Texas Supreme Court found that the survivor “held the property 

as a life tenant with the right to dispose of the property in any way he say fit during 

his lifetime,” with the restriction that any property remaining at his death would 

pass to the named-children. Id. Thus, the Texas Supreme Court held that the 

survivor was bound by the provisions of the will as to any property covered by the 

will which was remaining at his death. Id.

34
Novak v. Stevens, 596 

S.W.2d 848, 851-52 (Tex. 

1980).

It is our will and desire that the survivor of us P. Y. Tate or 

Jessie Marie Moore Tate, as the case may be, shall with the 

rights and authority below given, have all the estate of every 

description, real, personal or mixed which either or both of us 

may own, to be used, occupied, enjoyed and conveyed and 

expended and give deeds, bill of sale or dispose of in any manner 

that the survivor may see fit to do during the life of such 

survivor, and that upon the death of such survivor, any of the 

said estate then remaining shall be given to the following 

person: RHONDA RAY MYRICK, the daughter of Eddie Ray 

Myrick, subject to the following conditions, WITHOUT BOND

In Novak, the Texas Supreme Court provided the following explanation: 

We reverse the judgments of the courts below and construe the 1968 will as a 

contract which should be enforced by impressing a constructive trust upon 

the property in the Tate estate. 

Novak, 596 S.W.2d at 851-52 (emphasis added). 

In re Estate of 

Johnson,781 S.W.2d 390, 

392 (Tex.App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 1989, writ 

denied).

It is our will and desire that the survivor of us, JAMES 

LOURINE JOHNSON, SR., or EMMA JEAN OLDHAM 

JOHNSON, as the case may be, shall, with and subject to the 

exceptions hereinafter made, have all of the property, real, 

personal and mixed and of every kind and description which 

either or both of us may own, jointly or separately, or to which 

we may be entitled, at the time of the death of the first of us, to be 

owned in fee simple and full ownership by such survivor, 

however, any of such property remaining at the time of the death 

of the survivor of us to pass and be owned in accordance with the 

provisions hereinafter set forth in this Will.

In In re Estate of Johnson, the Houston Court of Appeals found that the language 

of the will did not grant the survivor an absolute and unconditional gift and was 

sufficient on its face to establish a contractual will. In re Estate of Johnson, 781 

S.W.2d at 392. 

35
As referenced above, Section IV of the 1975 Will starts out by outlining the 

life estate: “It is our will and desire that the survivor of us, Harold W. Pursley or 

Mildred F. Pursley, as the case may be, shall, with the rights and authority below 

given, have all the estate of every description....to be used, occupied, enjoyed, 

conveyed and expended by and during the life of such survivor, as such survivor 

shall desire.” (1CR57 (exhibit A) / App. A). (Emphasis added). 

It is well recognized in Texas that “[w]here the language of the will 

manifests the intention of the testator to pass the right to possess, use or enjoy 

property during his life, a life estate is created.” Alviar v. Gonzalez, 725 S.W.2d 

297, 299 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Ellis v. Bruce, 

286 S.W.2d 645, 649 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). In the 1975 

Will at issue, it is apparent that the survivor of Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. 

Pursley was to receive and enjoy all property, “during the life of such survivor.” 

(1CR57 (exhibit A) / App. A). 

Further, a life estate is not converted into a fee simple merely because the 

life tenant is given the power of full disposition. In Edds v. Mitchell, the Texas 

Supreme Court explained as follows: 

Important also is the rule established by the decisions in this state and in the 

great majority of the other states that the added full power of disposition 

given to the life tenant...does not raise the life estate to a fee.

Edds v. Mitchell, 184 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Tex. 1945) (emphasis added) (citing Weir v. 

Smith, 62 Tex. 1, 9 (Tex. 1884) and Caples v. Ward, 345 S.W. 856, 858 (Tex. 1915)).

36
In Alviar v. Gonzalez, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals discussed the 

creation of a life estate for the purposes of finding whether a contractual will 

exists. In Alviar, the property was given to the survivor “to be used, occupied, 

enjoyed, conveyed and expended by and during the lifetime of such survivor, as 

such survivor shall desire.” Alviar v. Gonzalez, 725 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.App.—

Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (emphasis added). The court in Alviar held 

that the will left a life estate in the survivor even though the survivor had the full 

power of disposition. See id. at 299 (holding “the will conveyed a life estate to the 

surviving spouse, with the additional right to expend or dispose of the property.”). 

As seen by the terms of the 1975 Will, the language in Alviar is wholly consistent 

with the language used in the will at issue. (1CR57 (exhibit A) / App. A). 

In the Odeneal v. Van Horn case, Parkes Van Horn and Virginia Van Horn 

executed a will, with similar provisions as the 1975 Will at issue, where the 

survivor of the two was to receive: 

[A]ll property, real, personal and mixed, both community and separate, that we 

may own at the time of the death of the first of us to die so that the survivor of us 

shall have, own and hold all such property for and during his or her natural life 

with remainder in fee simple upon the death of the survivor to W. CLYDE 

ODENEAL. 

Odeneal, 678 S.W.2d at 942.

37
In holding that the will in Odeneal was contractual and binding, the court 

found this was “language on its face which has been found to evidence an intent to 

contract.” Id. 

Therefore, in accordance with the opinions in Novak, Dougherty, Edds, In re 

Estate of Johnson, Odeneal, Alviar and Reynolds, the terms contained in the 1975 

Will expressly show that the parties created a gift to the survivor which was not 

absolute or unconditional, and which was created with the intent to be bound by 

such disposition. Accordingly, the 1975 Will satisfies the first prong of the 

Reynolds test. 

C. 1. a. Rebuttal of Rocky’s Argument Regarding 

 Absolute and Unconditional Gifts. 

In complete disregard for the Texas Supreme Court opinions cited above, 

Rocky alleges that “it is nonsensical to construe the 1975 Will as contractual.” See

Appellant Brief at 38. (Emphasis added). Specifically, Rocky alleges that because 

the language in the 1975 Will gives the survivor the right of full disposition, 

Harold, Jr., and Rolland’s “reading would be absurd and arbitrary,” as the 1975 

Will must be construed as giving fee simple to the survivor. See Appellant Brief at 

38. (Emphasis added). 

 Rocky not only fails to provide any supporting authority for this position, 

but he also makes an argument that is in direct conflict with the Texas Supreme 

38
Court’s opinion that giving the life tenant full disposition does not raise the life 

estate to a fee simple. See Edds,184 S.W.2d at 825; Dougherty, 424 S.W.2d at 619. 

C. 2. The Balance Remaining at the Survivor’s Death Is Jointly 

 Disposed of in the Secondary Dispositive Provisions of the 

 1975 Will. 

The remainder of the estate is expressly disposed of under the terms of the 

1975 Will. Specifically, the 1975 Will states “that upon the death of such survivor, 

any of such estate then remaining shall go to and vest in any child or children of 

this marriage.” (1CR57 (exhibit A) / App. A). The above-stated terms 

unconditionally show that the 1975 Will provided for a disposition, by class gift, of 

the remaining estate of both Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley after the 

survivor of the two had passed away. (Id.). 

“The most common class designation is ‘children.’” 9 Tex. Prac., Texas Law 

Of Wills § 30.4 (3d ed.). The term “child or children” implies the widest sense, an 

offspring of either sex and of any age, designating those persons who are entitled 

to receive the one-half of the estate under the law of descent and distribution. See 

Morris v. Williams, 92 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1936, writ ref’d). 

A devise constitutes a “class gift” when it grants property to a group of 

persons “bearing a certain relationship to the testator or to each other.” Wilkes v. 

Wilkes, 488 S.W.2d 398, 403 (Tex. 1972). Those included in the group satisfy the 

39
requirement “when they can be designated by the same general name as 

...‘brothers’ or ‘sisters.’” Id. 

“A ‘class,’ as used in the law of wills, is where several persons answering 

the same description sustain the same relation to the legacy so that one word 

describes them all; each takes an equal share in the property, and each takes 

originally, and not by way of substitution or derivatively, and each takes 

absolutely.” Hagood v. Hagood, 186 S.W. 220, 225 (Tex.Civ.App.–Fort Worth 

1916, writ ref’d). 

 Further, as evidenced in Boone v. Stone, the language “any child or 

children” has a definite legal meaning which mandates the distribution to all 

persons identified in that class, those being all the children. See Boone v. Stone, 

142 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex.Civ.App.–Fort Worth 1940, writ dismissed, judgment 

correct). In Boone v. Stone, the will provided: 

Item 3. That said Jerome S. Stone shall hold said property and estate, however, in 

trust for my daughter, Helen Stone Anderson, beneficiary, and for the education, 

maintenance and support of any child or children she may have, for and during 

her natural life. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

The court in Boone stated that “[b]riefly analyzing the will, we find that 

uppermost in testator's mind was the intention to bestow the objects of his bounty 

upon his widowed daughter, her child, the minor, and any child or children that 

should thereafter be born to her, as well also any child or children that should be 

40
born to the son.” Id. at 940 (emphasis added). “So intent was the testator that his 

daughter and her children then born or to be born should be amply provided 

for, he gave power to the trustee to dispose of the corpus of the estate, if necessary, 

for such purposes.” Id. (Emphasis added). 

 In Guilliams v. Koonsman, the Texas Supreme Court analyzed the following 

devise in the will of J.J. Koonsman, which states as follows: 

I give and devise to my son, Alvin Koonsman, all of my undivided interest in all 

of the remainder of my real property situated in Scurry County, Texas, which I 

may own at the time of my death, and to his child or children if any survive him, 

and in the event of Alvin’s death without issue surviving him, then to my son and 

daughter, Jesse J. Koonsman and Mrs. Cora Guilliams, share and share alike, and 

to their heirs and assigns forever. 

Guilliams v. Koonsman, 279 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Tex. 1955). 

[O]n the other hand, if the devise had been to Alvin Koonsman “and to his child 

or children,” without other qualifying or limiting language, and at the effective 

date of the will there was a child or children of Alvin Koonsman in esse, the great 

majority of the courts of this country, following the Second Resolution of Wild's 

case (6 Coke 16b, 77 Eng.Rep. 277), would treat it as vesting the fee title in Alvin 

Koonsman and his child or children in being at the effective date of the will as 

joint tenants or tenants in common. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

What is the meaning of the words “and to his child or children if any survive him”

following the devise to Alvin? We have been cited to and have found no case 

squarely in point. If the words “if any survive him” had been omitted and we were 

to follow the weight of authority, heretofore noted, we would be compelled to 

hold that Alvin and his son, John Billy, took the first estate created as cotenants. 

But those words were not omitted, and we ascribe to them a two-fold effect: first 

they limited the interest of Alvin Koonsman to a life estate, and secondly, they 

operated to make the remainder to be taken by the child or children of Alvin 

contingent rather than vested.

1

Id. at 405-6 (emphasis added). 

 

1 Unlike the 1975 Will, this will contained specific language, “if any survive him,” which cause the gift to be 

contingent rather than vested. 

41
As in Guilliams v. Koonsman and Boone v. Stone, the Appellate Court in 

Sullivan v. Skinner held that the legal meaning of the language “any child or 

children” mandates the distribution to all children in fee simple. See Sullivan, 66 

S.W. 680, 681 (Tex.Civ.App. 1902, writ refused) (emphasis added). The Will in 

Sullivan v. Skinner provided as follows: 

For the term of her natural life, with full power to receive, for her sole and 

separate use and no other, the rents and profits of the same, and on her death the 

same to belong to any child or children of the said Harriet Ida Vance

(Skinner). Should no child or children survive her, then the store and lot to pass to 

the next of kin, as provided by law. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

In analyzing the will in Sullivan, the Appellate Court stated “[f]rom this it is 

apparent that Harriet Ida Vance, now Skinner, took only a life estate in the 

property, and the remainder went to her children in fee simple.” Id. 

 Further, Section 202.002 of the Texas Estates Code provides a good example 

of the use and definite legal meaning of the language “child or children.” See Tex. 

Estates Code § 201.002. Specifically, Section 202.002 (b)(2) and (b)(3) state as 

follows: 

(2) two-thirds of the personal estate descends to the person’s child or children, 

and the descendants of a child or children; and 

(3) the surviving spouse is entitled to a life estate in one-third of the person’s land, 

with the remainder descending to the person’s child or children and the 

descendants of a child or children.

Tex. Estates Code § 201.002 (emphasis added). 

42
 As set forth in the case law and statute cited above, the terms “any child or

children” and “child or children” have a definite legal meaning which create a 

class gift that cannot be limited to any certain children of the class. Accordingly, 

any contention that Mildred F. Pursley had the right to distribute the property to all 

or just one of her children and that the 1975 Will did not jointly dispose of the 

remaining balance in the secondary dispositive provisions is without merit. 

 In Houston, the Amarillo Court of Appeals stated: 

The general rule is that a devise or bequest to a class, if no time for vesting is 

fixed will take effect at the death of the testator. But where the will either by 

express words or necessary implication fixes a different time, and the whole 

class is not then completed, the devise or remainder will vest in those then 

existing who will hold it subject to be opened so as to let in after-born persons 

who shall belong to the class at the time fixed by the will for its final completion. 

Houston, 92 S.W.2d at 1089 (emphasis added). 

In the present case, the 1975 Will states “any child or children of the 

marriage.” (1CR57 (exhibit A) / App. A). At the time of Harold’s death, Harold Jr., 

Rolland, and Rocky, the children of the marriage, were alive. In accordance with 

Houston v. Schuhmann, the gift vested in the three children at the time of Harold’s 

death, subject to any after-born children. Due to the fact that the gift had vested in 

Harold, Rolland and Rocky on May 10, 1980, the date of their father’s death, the 

three children could not later be divested of their vested interest. 

C. 2. a. Rebuttal of Rocky’s Argument Regarding the 

 Remaining Balance Being Jointly Disposed of in 

 the Secondary Dispositive Provisions of the 

 1975 Will. 

43
Rocky attempts to convince this Court that due to the use of the words “any” 

and “or,” the 1975 Will did not jointly dispose of the remaining interest, after the 

death of the survivor, in a comprehensive plan because it “left the future interest, if 

any, to be determined at the survivor’s discretion.” See Appellant Brief at 36. 

Specifically, Rocky argues that because the language does not give the remaining 

estate to any particular child, the 1975 Will “did not jointly dispose of that 

remaining interest in a comprehensive plan.” See Appellant Brief at 36. 

 Next, Rocky attempts to muddy the waters by arguing that the 1975 Will 

fails to “give the alleged remainder interest to any person or persons in specifically 

defined shares” because it does not incorporate language such as share and share 

alike, equally or divided equally. See Appellant Brief at 37. 

 Not only do Rocky’s arguments lack supporting authority, they are in 

conflict with the authority cited above. Thus, these arguments are without merit. 

As evidenced by the numerous cases cited above, the language “any child or 

children” and “child or children” has a definite legal meaning which mandates the 

distribution to all persons identified in that class, e.g., all the children. See

Argument § C. 2. 

 Further, contrary to Rocky’s contention, a class gift is not required to “give 

the alleged remainder interest to any person or persons in specifically defined 

shares.” See Appellant Brief at 37. Instead, the Texas Supreme Court has held that 

44
it is presumed that a class gift is divided equally amongst the members of the class. 

See Sinnott v. Gidney, 322 S.W.2d 507, 512 (Tex. 1959). (“[I]n case of real doubt 

as to the meaning of a will, the law favors a construction that gives equal 

treatment to all heirs of the same class”) (emphasis added). 

 “There is abundant authority to the effect that words in a will stating that the 

persons are to take ‘equally’ or ‘share and share alike’ or ‘divided equally’ are 

without significance on the question of a class gift.” Sanderson v. First National 

Bank in Dallas, 446 S.W.2d 720, 725 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e.) 

(emphasis added). 

 “It is well accepted that the transferor is presumed to have intended each 

member of the class to share equally in the subject matter of the gift.” Restatement 

(Third) of Property (Wills & Don. Trans.) § 14.2 TD No. 4 (2004) at Comment a. 

(citing Lewis M. Simes & Allan F. Smith, Law of Future Interests § 740 (2d ed. 

1967 & Current Supp.)). As stated in the Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills & 

Don. Trans.) (2011), which Rocky attached to his brief as Tab I of the Appendix, 

“[i]n the case of a single-generation class gift, the transferor’s presumptive intent is 

that each member of the class is to share equally in the subject matter of the gift.” 

See Appellant Brief Tab I of the Appendix at comment a.

Accordingly, the fact that the 1975 Will does not use language such as 

“share and share alike,” “equally,” or “divided equally” is insignificant. Further, 

45
even if the 1975 Will did contain language to rebut this presumption, which it does 

not, the Texas Supreme Court has specifically held that “[i]n case of real doubt as 

to the meaning of a will, law favors a construction that gives equal treatment 

to all heirs of the same class.” Sinnott, 322 S.W.2d at 512. 

Therefore, Rocky’s allegation that the 1975 Will did not jointly dispose of 

that remaining interest in a comprehensive plan is without merit. 

III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE 2007 

 WILL AND 2010 CODICIL BREACHED THE TERMS OF THE 1975 

 WILL. 

A. The 1975 Will Provided a Class Gift to Rocky, Harold Jr., and 

 Rolland in Equal Shares. 

As evidenced by the authority cited in Argument Section II, it is apparent 

that the 1975 Will provided for a class gift, in equal shares, to all the children of 

the marriage which were alive at Harold W. Pursley’s death. Therefore, Mildred F. 

Pursley’s 2007 Will and 2010 Codicil, which distributes the majority of the estate 

to Rocky with a minor percentage to Rolland and fails to provide any disposition 

of the estate to Harold Jr., wholly breached Paragraph IV of the 1975 Will. (1CR57 

(exhibit A) / App. A, 77 (exhibit G) / App. G, 83 (exhibit H) / App. H). 

B. The 1975 Will Became Effective Upon the Probate of the Will and 

 Members of the Class Were Vested at the Time of Harold W. 

 Pursley’s Death.

 A contractual will becomes effective immediately upon probating the will 

when the first spouse dies. See Lorenz v. Janssen, 116 S.W.3d 421, 425 

46
(Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.). Therefore, the rights of the 

beneficiaries under a contractual will can be declared by a court in spite of the 

continued life of the surviving spouse. See id. In Lorenz v. Janssen, the Corpus 

Christi Court of Appeals held that the rights of all beneficiaries and remaindermen 

who took under the contractual will vested at the time the surviving spouse 

probated the will following the death of the first spouse. See id. at 426. This 

created a “present interest” in the grandchildren while the surviving spouse kept 

possession of her life estate. See id. at 425-26.

 Further, the court in Houston v. Schuhmann stated the following:

The general rule is that a devise or bequest to a class, if no time for 

vesting is fixed will take effect at the death of the testator. But 

where the will either by express words or necessary implication 

fixes a different time, and the whole class is not then 

completed, the devise or remainder will vest in those then 

existing who will hold it subject to be opened so as to let in afterborn persons who shall belong to the class at the time fixed by the 

will for its final completion.

Houston, 92 S.W.2d at 1089 (emphasis added). 

In the present case, the 1975 Will states that all the estate remaining at the 

death of the survivor “shall go to and vest in any child or children of this 

marriage.” (1CR57 (exhibit A) / App. A). Under the general rule, all three sons had 

a vested interested at the death of Harold W. Pursley. According to the court in 

Houston v. Schuhmann, the gift will vest in those existing at the time of the testator 

(here, Harold W. Pursley)’s death, subject to any after-born children. See Houston, 

47
92 S.W.2d at 1089. Further, nothing in the 1975 Will indicates that surviving 

Mildred F. Pursley was a condition precedent to vesting. (1CR57 (exhibit A) / 

App. A). Therefore, the three sons acquired a vested interest on May 10, 1980, the 

date of their father’s death. 

Thus, although the class membership may not yet be ascertained, all three 

children of Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley acquired a vested interest at 

Harold W. Pursley death. In accordance with Houston v. Schuhmann, due to the 

fact that the gift had vested in Harold Jr., Rolland and Rocky on May 10, 1980, the 

date of their father’s death, the three children could not later be divested of their 

vested interest. See Houston, 92 S.W.2d at 1089. Therefore, any subsequent will or 

codicil revoking Harold Jr.’s and/or Rolland’s vested interest in the property would 

in fact be in direct breach with the distribution of property under the 1975 Will. 

C. The Class Membership Under the 1975 Will Was Ascertained at 

 the Time Fixed for Distribution. 

Texas law presumes class membership is ascertained at the death of the 

testator if the will established no other time for ascertainment. See id. In cases such 

as the one at bar, where the will provides that distribution to the class will not 

occur until the expiration of a life estate, the class membership will not be 

ascertained until the time fixed for distribution. See id. This is in harmony with the 

analysis under Houston v. Schuhmann, in that here the existing class members 

48
(Harold Jr., Rolland, and Rocky) are vested, subject to any after-born class 

members that may be ascertained later. 

In the present case, at the death of Mildred, the class members were 

ascertained. Specifically, the class members ascertained were Harold Jr., Rolland, 

and Rocky. Therefore, any subsequent will or codicil revoking Harold Jr.’s and/or 

Rolland’s interest in the property would in fact be in direct breach of the 

distribution of property set forth in the 1975 Will. 

D. Rebuttal of Rocky’s Argument that the Plain Language of the 

 1975 Will Demonstrates there Was No Breach.

Rocky argues that “[t]he 1975 Will provides in Paragraph IV that upon death 

of the survivor, the “estate then remaining shall go to and vest in any child or 

children of this marriage. That is exactly what happened.” Appellant Brief at 24. 

(Emphasis added). In making this argument, Rocky’s primary contention is that 

“[t]he word ‘or’ is disjunctive. Thus, the 1975 Will gave the survivor of Mildred 

and Harold, Sr., the option of devising the property to one or more of the children 

of the marriage.” Id. at 29. Rocky cites the rules of construction which he contends 

support his allegations. 

Harold Jr. and Rolland do not dispute the rules of construction cited by 

Rocky. However, it is apparent that Rocky’s analysis is in direct conflict with the 

same rules on which his argument is based. For example, the rules of construction 

mandate that “the court must give the words used their plain and ordinary 

49
meaning,” and that “[c]ourts are not permitted to construe the plain language of a 

contact to make it embrace something it was not intended to include.” Id. Here, the 

authority cited in Argument Section II. clearly supports the trial court’s ruling that 

the plain and ordinary meaning of “any child or children” implies a class gift to all

the living children of the marriage. Argument § II. Thus, since “[c]ourts are not 

permitted to construe the plain language of a contact to make it embrace something 

it was not intended to include,” and “may not rewrite the agreement of the parties 

to insert something that the parties could have included but did not,” Rocky’s 

contentions that “any child or children” means that Mildred F. Pursley had the 

right to unilaterally pick who she wanted to disperse the remainder of the estate to 

are without merit. Appellant Brief at 26. 

 Also, Rocky states that “[i]n construing a contract, the court’s primary goal 

is to ascertain the intent of the parties.” Id. at 25. While the word “or” is in fact 

disjunctive, here the language which Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley 

specifically chose to incorporate into the 1975 Will, as seen by the wills referenced 

in Argument Section II, has a very specific and definite legal meaning. See

Argument § II. 

Rocky next contends that if Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley had 

intended to give the property to all three children equally, they could have easily 

have said so. Appellant Brief at 29. “This is especially true since the will was 

50
prepared by an attorney.” Id. While Rocky attempts to show that the use of an 

attorney evidences the fact that Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley could 

have utilized different language, Harold Jr. and Rolland believe that the use of an 

attorney reinforces their interpretation of the terms utilized in the 1975 Will. This 

is because an attorney would have knowledge of the fact that the language “any 

child or children” would convey a class gift in equal shares to Rocky, Harold Jr., 

Rolland, and any after-born child or children. Further, an attorney would know that 

even though the word “or” is disjunctive, in the contractual will and trust context, 

the legal definition of the particular phrase “any child or children” has a more 

specific legal meaning than what Rocky offers to this Court.

In a last-ditch effort to muddy the waters, Rocky also provides an 

inapplicable analogy which is as follows: 

If a contract created a fund for scholarships for any graduate or graduates of 

McAllen High School, the administrators of the fund would have the discretion to 

give a scholarship to one or more graduates. 

Id. at 30. 

As this Court can see, this argument is entirely nonsensical and wholly 

inapplicable. Rocky’s argument again ignores the case law providing that “any 

child or children” has a specific legal meaning in the context of a testamentary 

distribution which supersedes Rocky’s interpretation. 

The Texas Supreme Court has held that “where the meaning of the language 

used in the will has been settled by usage and sanctioned by judicial decisions, it is 

51
presumed to be used in the sense that the law has given to it, and should be so 

construed, unless the context of the will shows a clear intention to the contrary.” 

Mitchell v. Mitchell, 244 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex. 1951) (quoting Corpus Juris, vol. 

69, p. 80, Wills, s 1136) (internal citations omitted). 

“[T]his will clearly shows that it was drawn for the testatrix by an attorney, 

who was familiar with the decisions of the courts, and he used the technical terms 

to carry out the intentions of the testatrix; and it may be assumed that such terms 

used in the will were used correctly and intentionally.” Id. (internal citations 

omitted). 

 Further, Rocky’s argument assumes that an imaginary contract for a 

scholarship fund can create a testamentary class gift, which it cannot. Rocky also 

fails to take into account that here we are dealing with a contractual will, jointly 

executed by a husband and wife who had only three children, not an imaginary 

scholarship fund for thousands of students, none of whom have a familial 

relationship with the signatories of the contract. 

E. Rebuttal of Rocky’s Argument that the Rules of Construction 

 Demonstrate there Was No Breach.

 As in his previous arguments, Rocky contends that the plain language of the 

contract demonstrates there was no breach. Appellant Brief at 30. Further, Rocky 

states: 

52
[V]iewing the contract as a whole and harmonizing the various provisions also 

supports the result that the survivor has the option to give the property to one or 

more of the children. This is because Mildred and Harold, Sr., could have 

mandated that the property go equally to all three children, as they did in 

Paragraph V, but they did not do so. 

Id. at 30-31. 

However, Rocky fails to recognize that the harmonizing canon may be 

utilized by the court “[w]hen provisions of a contract appear to conflict.” 

Methodist Hospitals of Dallas v. Amerigroup Texas, Inc., 231 S.W.3d 483, 491 

(Tex.App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied). 

 In the present case, the harmonizing canon is inapplicable as the terms of 

Paragraphs V and VI do not conflict with each other. (1CR57 (exhibit A) / App. 

A). Specifically, the provisions in Paragraph V would not cause the provisions in 

Paragraph VI to be of no effect, and vice versa. (See id.). Therefore, they are not 

conflicting. 

 Instead, in the 1975 Will, Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley 

decided to incorporate two different provisions for two wholly separate and distinct 

situations in relation to their death. Assuming that Harold W. Pursley and Mildred 

F. Pursley did in fact “die in the same accident or disaster, or within the same 

week,” the terms in Paragraph IV would not preclude the remaining estate to vest 

in Harold Jr., Rocky, and Rolland. (See id.). 

 While Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley could have mandated that 

the property go equally to all three children, with legal counsel, it is likely that the 

53
language “any child or children” was used to protect against the pretermission 

statute. Specifically, if a child of Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley had 

been born after the 1975 Will was executed and was not otherwise provided for, 

the pretermission statute would have required that the after-born child be entitled 

to the same portion of the testator’s estate as if the testator had died intestate. In re 

Estate of Ayala, 702 S.W.2d 708, 710-11 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1985, no writ). 

Thus, by utilizing this language, Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley 

ensured that any after-born child, otherwise not provided for, would not take onethird of the two-thirds life estate in the separate real and personal property of the 

first to die, which Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley intended to devise to 

the survivor. In using the same analysis, if Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. 

Pursley were to in fact die together as contemplated in Paragraph V., the 

pretermission statute would not affect the distribution of the life estate to the 

survivor, as they would both be deceased and no other child could be born of the 

marriage. 

Rocky next argues that “[i]nserting into the contract the restriction that the 

property go to all three children equally would also violate the presumption that 

because the parties used dramatically different language in Paragraph V and the 

provision in question, that difference was intentional.” Appellant Brief at 31. 

Harold, Jr. and Rolland do not agree with Rocky’s conclusion. Here, Harold, Jr. 

54
and Rolland contend that it is more likely that this language was incorporated into 

the 1975 Will in order to provide for any future children of the marriage. Thus, due 

to the fact that Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley did not have any other 

children, the remaining estate is to be devised to the three children in equal shares.

Finally, Rocky contends that “the tortured construction proffered by Harold 

Jr., and Rolland runs afoul of the rule that a contractual will should be construed 

narrowly.” Id. at 31. Again, Rocky’s argument is in direct conflict with the rule 

being relied upon. Specifically, under the interpretation of both the trial court and 

Harold Jr. and Rolland, the terms of the 1975 Will are being construed narrowly in 

accordance with the supporting authority cited above. Therefore, construing the 

1975 Will to mean that Mildred F. Pursley could pick and choose any or all 

children to devise the remaining estate would not only rewrite the agreement, but 

would also provide greater rights and authority to Mildred F. Pursley than what 

was provided for in the 1975 Will.

F. Rebuttal of Rocky’s Argument that the 1975 Will Does Not 

 Create a Class Gift.

Rocky states, “arguing that the bequest is a class gift begs the question by 

assuming that all class members are to receive a gift. Instead, as pointed out above, 

the use of the disjunctive word ‘or’ clearly gives the survivor the option of whether 

to give the property to one or all children.” Id.at 32. 

55
 As evidenced by the authority cited in Argument Section II., the language 

“any child or children” mandates the distribution to all persons identified in that 

class, e.g. all the children. See Arguments § II.

Rocky argues that “even in the case of a class gift, the presumption that the 

bequest is to be divided equally among all class members applies only if the will 

does not indicate a different intention.” Appellant Brief at 32. According to 

Rocky, a different intention is unmistakably evidenced by the distinction between 

Paragraphs IV’s use of ‘any child or children’ and Paragraph V which named the 

children ‘share and share alike.’” Id. at 32-33. In making this allegation, Rocky 

purports to rely on Sinnott v. Gidney. Id. at 33; See Sinnott, 322 S.W.2d at 512. 

However, Rocky fails to disclose that the Texas Supreme Court in Sinnott v. 

Gidney expressly stated “[i]n case of real doubt as to the meaning of a will, the 

law favors a construction that gives equal treatment to all heirs of the same 

class.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Further, the issues presented in Sinnott v. Gidney are drastically different 

from those in the present case. Specifically, the Texas Supreme Court in Sinnott v. 

Gidney stated “[t]he question presented by this appeal is whether debts, funeral 

expenses, estate taxes and expenses of administration of the estate of Katie 

Keliehor, deceased, are payable out of the personal property bequeathed by Item 

Second of her will or the real property devised by Item Third.” Id at 509. Further, 

56
in analyzing the will, the Supreme Court found that “[t]he present instrument 

makes it quite clear, however, that the testatrix did not intend for her heirs to have 

equal treatment. She declared that nothing was being left to one brother and then 

gave petitioner all of the personal property plus one-fifth of whatever might pass 

under the residuary clause.” Id at 512 (basing its finding on language in the Will 

stating “I make no bequest to my brother, Joseph E. Keliehor, whom I love very 

much”) (emphasis added). Unlike the will in Sinnott v. Gidney, Paragraphs V and 

VI in the 1975 Will at issue simply provide for distinct distributions in the event of 

different situations. (1CR57 (exhibit A) / App. A). 

 Lastly, in making this argument, Rocky again fails to acknowledge the wellrecognized legal principle that “the effect that words in a will stating that the 

persons are to take ‘equally’ or ‘share and share alike’ or ‘divided equally’ are 

without significance on the question of a class gift.” Sanderson, 446 S.W.2d at 725 

(emphasis added). Also, “it is well accepted that the transferor is presumed to have 

intended each member of the class to share equally in the subject matter of the gift 

(a per capita distribution).” Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills and Donative 

Transfers) §14.2 (2011). 

IV. MILDRED F. PURSLEY CAUSED THE 1975 WILL TO BE 

 PROBATED AND ACCEPTED THE BENEFITS UNDER IT, THUS 

 IT WOULD BE MANIFESTLY UNJUST TO ALLOW HER TO 

 DISAVOW IT AND ITS OBLIGATIONS. 

57
Mildred F. Pursley caused the 1975 Will to be probated and accepted a 

substantial amount of assets from her husband’s estate. (1CR57 (exhibit A) / App. 

A., 61 (exhibit B) / App. B., 67 (exhibit F) / App. F). The Texas Supreme Court 

has specifically held that in such situations it would not be equitable to allow only 

one party to a contractual will to benefit from it, explaining as follows:

It would be manifestly unjust to permit the surviving party to the contract to 

disavow it and its obligations, as those obligations are incorporated in their will, 

after the other party has fully performed by abiding by it until his ability to revise 

it has been terminated by death. 

Wiemers, 683 S.W.2d at 357 (quoting Weidner, 301 S.W.2d at 624). 

As the Texas Supreme Court has expressly held, “[o]ne party to a mutual 

will may not render it unenforceable after the death of the other party by declaring 

a revocation” Weidner, 301 S.W.2d at 624. 

In Wiemers, George Wiemers and Ida J. Wiemers executed a joint will in 

1951. Wiemers, 683 S.W.2d at 355. When George Wiemers died in 1960, the joint 

will was admitted into probate. See id. at 356. The surviving spouse, Ida J. 

Wiemers, executed a new will in 1972 which attempted to revoke the 1951 joint 

will. See id. Upon her death, the 1972 will was admitted to probate. See id. Suit 

was brought to enforce the 1951 will. See id. The Texas Supreme Court held the 

1951 joint will was contractual and thus binding on Ida J. Wiemers, explaining as 

follows: 

The Wiemers will... disposes of all the real property and distributes that property 

according to a common plan. The Wiemers will does contain reciprocal 

58
provisions, each disposing of “my part and portion” of the 125 acres; however, 

the preceding paragraph expresses George and Ida's joint will and desire to 

distribute “the whole of our real estate.” As we held in Weidner v. Crowther, 157 

Tex. 240, 301 S.W.2d 621 (1957), “[i]t would be manifestly unjust to permit the 

surviving party to the contract to disavow it and its obligations, as those 

obligations are incorporated in their will, after the other party has fully performed 

by abiding by it until his ability to revise it has been terminated by death.” 

Id. at 357. 

Here, as seen by the Application For Probate, Harold died without revising 

or terminating the 1975 Will. (1CR61 (exhibit B) / App. B). After Harold had fully 

performed his obligations under the 1975 Will and his ability to amend it was 

terminated by his death, on April 13, 2007, approximately 27 years after the 1975 

Will had been probated, in an attempt to disavow the 1975 Will, Mildred F. 

Pursley executed the 2007 Will and the 2010 Codicil. (1CR57 (exhibit A) / App. 

A, 61 (exhibit B) / App. B, 77 (exhibit G) / App. G, 83 (exhibit H) / App. H). Thus, 

under the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Wiemers, it would be manifestly 

unjust to permit Mildred, the surviving party, to disavow the 1975 Will. 

Further, in Vickrey v. Gilmore, the Waco Court of Appeals held that the 

survivor was without power to execute a subsequent codicil to the joint will when 

she caused the joint will to be probated upon her husband’s death and accepted the 

benefits from it, explaining: 

After John F. Vickrey died, Belle F. Vickrey caused the joint will to be probated 

and accepted the benefits under it [...] it was beyond the power of Belle F. 

Vickrey to make and execute the codicil in question changing said 1954 joint will. 

Vickrey v. Gilmore, 554 S.W.2d 36, 38-39 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1977, no writ) (internal 

citations omitted).

59
In Vickrey, the trial court held, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, that 

the 1954 joint will was contractual as a matter of law and thus Belle F. Vickrey 

was without power to execute the codicil in question. 

Similar to the facts presented in Vickrey, here 1) Harold W. Pursley and 

Mildred F. Pursley executed a joint will in 1975; 2) when Harold W. Pursley died, 

Mildred caused the 1975 Will to be admitted to probate; and 3) Mildred F. Pursley 

accepted substantial benefits from said will. SOF § 1. 

Therefore, Mildred F. Pursley was without the power to execute any new 

will or codicil, due to the fact that the 1975 Will was binding on her and her estate.

V. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT ROCKY 

 SUFFICIENTLY PLEAD AMBIGUITY AND THAT THIS CLAIM 

 WAS NOT WAIVED, AS A MATTER OF LAW THE TERMS OF 

THE 1975 WILL ARE NOT AMBIGUOUS. 

As evidenced in the Arguments Section I. A., “a person seeking to establish 

ambiguity in a written contract has the burden of pleading the ambiguity by setting 

out that portion of the contract that is claimed is ambiguous, and definitely 

pleading the meaning or construction thereof as relied on by him.” Skyline 

Furniture, Inc., 433 S.W.2d at 954. Specifically, the party must set out in specific 

allegations the words and phrases claimed to be ambiguous, or to be modified or 

explained by parol evidence, and also set forth those modifications and 

explanations. See San Antonio Machine & Supply Co., 268 S.W. at 533. 

60
In the present case, Rocky merely makes a vague reference to ambiguity in 

one of his pleadings, his “Supplemental Application for Probate Will.” (1CR95-

96). Rocky wholly failed to set out “in specific allegations the words and phrases 

claimed to be ambiguous.” Id. However, even if this Court finds that Rocky’s 

pleadings satisfied the requirements in the authority cited above, the terms of the 

1975 Will are not ambiguous. 

In discussing the issue of ambiguity the Supreme Court of Texas has 

affirmed the following rules:

 If a written contract is so worded that it can be given a certain or definite legal

meaning or interpretation, it is not ambiguous. 

It follows that parol evidence is not admissible to render a contract 

ambiguous, which, on its face, is capable of being given a definite certain 

legal meaning. 

This rule obtains even to the extent of prohibiting proof of circumstances 

surrounding the transaction when the instrument involved, by its terms, plainly 

and clearly discloses the intention of the parties, or is so worded that it is not 

fairly susceptible of more than one legal meaning or construction. 

Lewis, 136 Tex. at 154. 

“A contract is ambiguous only when, after the application of established 

rules of construction, the proper meaning of the contract remains genuinely 

uncertain.” O'Grady v. Gerald D. Hines, Inc., 683 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex.App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). “If a contract is so worded that it can be given 

a definite and certain legal meaning, it is not ambiguous. When a contract is 

susceptible to a legal meaning, construction of the written instrument is one of law 

61
for the court.” Manes v. Dallas Baptist Coll., 638 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Tex.App.—

Dallas 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 

As seen by the wills referenced in Argument Section II, the language “any 

child or children” has a very specific and definite legal meaning to which the trial 

court adhered. See Argument § II; (2CR208-09/App. J., 270-71/App. K). 

VI. CONCLUSION 

In conclusion, the 1975 Will made a class gift to all the children of the 

marriage. The use of the words “any” and “or” certainly did not eliminate the class 

gift, nor did it make a disposition to only one or two children proper. The 

members of the class living at the time, Rocky, Harold Jr., and Rolland received a 

vested interest at the death of Harold W. Pursley. Subsequently, at the death of 

Mildred, the class was ascertained. Therefore, Mildred’s changing of the 

dispositive provision to anyone other than all three brothers in equal shares is a 

violation of the terms of the 1975 Will. Due to the fact that Mildred F. Pursley had 

no authority or power to revoke the 1975 Will, the 1975 Will is binding upon the 

Estate of Mildred F. Pursley, rendering all other subsequently executed, 

inconsistent wills unenforceable. 

 Further, Rocky failed to properly plead the issue of ambiguity, and waived 

his right to a jury trial. In doing so, Rocky effectively waived his right to an appeal 

on the issue of ambiguity. In the alternative, if this Court finds that Rocky’s 

62
pleadings satisfied the requirements cited above, the terms of the 1975 Will are not 

ambiguous as a matter of law. As the language “any child or children” has a 

definite and certain legal meaning. 

 As such, the trial court did not err in imposing a constructive trust in favor of 

the devisees of the 1975 Will, Rocky, Harold Jr., and Rolland, in equal shares, to 

the extent necessary to enforce the terms of the 1975 contractual Will. Therefore, 

this Court should affirm the trial court’s ruling.

63
PRAYER 

For the foregoing reasons, Harold Jr. and Rolland respectfully request that 

this Court uphold the trial court's November 20, 2014 Final Judgment granting 

Harold Jr. and Rolland’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Harold Jr. and Rolland 

also request such further relief to which they may be entitled. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

 ELLIS, KOENEKE & RAMIREZ L.L.P. 

 1101 Chicago Avenue 

 McAllen, Texas 78501 

 Telephone (956) 682-2440 

 Facsimile (956) 682-0820 

 

 By: /s/ Edmundo O. Ramirez 

EDMUNDO O. RAMIREZ 

 State Bar No. 1650142 

 eor@ekrattorneys.com 

 THOMAS D. KOENEKE 

 State Bar No. 11652500 

 tdk@ekrattorneys.com

 MINERVA I. ZAMORA 

 State Bar No. 24037765 

 miz@ekrattorneys.com

 DANIEL KOENEKE 

 State Bar No. 24083320 

 daniel@ekrattorneys.com

 Attorneys for Appellees Harold Pursley, 

 Jr., and Rolland Pursley 

64
CERTIFICATE OF RULE 9.4(i) COMPLIANCE 

In compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), I certify 

that the number of words in this Brief of Appellees, excluding those matters listed 

in Rule 9.4(i)(1) is 13,210 words per the word processing program used for its 

preparation (Microsoft Word). 

/s/ Daniel Koeneke 

 Daniel Koeneke 

65
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 I certify that the foregoing document was electronically filed with the Clerk 

of the Court using the electronic case filing system of the Court. I also certify that a 

true and correct copy of the foregoing was served on the following counsel of 

record on April 17, 2015 as follows: 

Recipient: Attorney for: Served by:

J. Joseph Vale 

jvale@atlashall.com

Charles C. Murray

ccmurray@atlashall.com

Atlas, Hall & Rodriguez, LLP

818 Pecan/P.O. Box 3725

McAllen, Texas 78501

Appellant, Rocky 

Pursley

Electronically if available, 

or by facsimile and e-mail

Marlane A. Meyer

Mmeyer308@aol.com

Meyer & Guerrero, L.L.P.

308 N. 15th Street

McAllen, Texas 78501

Temporary 

Administrator, 

PlainsCapital Bank

Electronically if available, 

or by facsimile and e-mail

 

 

 /s/ Daniel Koeneke 

 Daniel Koeneke 

66
APPENDICES 

Tab Date Document

A 04/29/1975 1975 Will (Exhibit A)

B 05/20/1980 Application For Probate of Will and Issuance of 

Letters Testamentary (Exhibit B)

C 06/03/1980 Order Admitting Will to Probate and 

Authorizing Letters Testamentary (Exhibit C)

D 06/04/1980 Oath (Exhibit D)

E 06/04/1980 Letters Testamentary (Exhibit E)

F 02/10/1981 Inventory, Appraisement, and List of Claims

(Exhibit F)

G 04/13/2007 2007 Will (Exhibit G)

H 01/13/2010 2010 Codicil (Exhibit H)

I 08/20/2014 Pre-Trial Hearing Transcript (Exhibit 1)

J 08/22/2014 Order on Motions for Summary Judgment

K 11/20/2014 Final Judgment

67
TAB A

OF THE APPENDIX
57

... ! 

VtJl 

/?/tl .,j? 

11last Dill anh Qfest~nt 

OF 

HAROLD W. PURSLEY and MILDRED F. 

We, HAROLD W. PURSLEY and MILDRED F. PURSLEY, husband and 

wife{~ of .the CC?_unty of Hidalgo, State of Texas, being of sound mind, memory and 

understanding in view of the certainty of death and the uncertainty of life, and 

J:e ing desirous of making the best disposition of our worldly affairs, do hereby 

make arl.ptblish this our Last Will and Testament, to-wit: 

I. 

We do hereby revoke all wills and codicils and testamentary instrument 

heretofore made by us. 

II. 

We direct that all our just debts, including all expenses of last 

illness and funeral and burial, shall be paid by our Executor as soon as reasonably 

convenient after our death. 

Ill. 

We hereby direct that no other action shall be had in the County Court 

or ln any other Court in relation to the setUement of or administration upon our 

estate other than the probating and recording of this Will and the return of an 

inventory, appraisement and list of claims. 

IV. 

It is our will and deslre that the survivor of us, Harold W. Pursley or 

Mildred F. Pursley, as the case may be, shall, with the rights and authority below 

given, have all the estate of every description, real, personal or mixed, which 

either of us may own, to be used, occupied, enjoyed, conveyed and expended by 

and during the life of such survivor, as such survivor shall desire and that upon the 

death of such survivor, any of such estate then remaining shall go to and vest in 

...2~~~. VJ-<~~ ~la'.di/..6 d. /-2~,. Harold W. Pursley r • Mildred F. Pursley (/' 

,__EIIIII!IX~H~IB1111T-~ Page I·.of 4 pages A 
58

VOi. 3fn,,,.F u •.. ., 81 

any child or children of this marriage. 

v. 

In the event that we shall both die In the same accident or disaster, or 

within the same week, then all of such estate of every description, real, personal 

or mixed, 'Which either or both of us may own at the time of the first of such deaths, 

or 1f the order of such deaths is not ascertained, at the time of either of such deaths 

shall without respect to which of us may survive the other, go to and vest !n our 

beloved children, HAROLD WAYNE PURSLEY, JR., ROLlAND HUGH PURSLEY and 

ROCKY JOE PURSLEY, share and share alikeVI. 

It is our wllla'ld desire that the survivor of us, Harold w. Pursley or 

Mildred F. Pursley, whichever the case may be, shall be the Independent Executor 

or Executrix of this our Will a:rl of our estate and direct that no bond shall be required of any Executor or Executr.bc herein appointed. In the event of both of our 

deaths .1n a mutual accident or disaster, or after the death of the survivor of us, 

then 1n such event, we hereby appoint an OfflCBrof the First State Bank and Trust of 

Edinburg, Hidalgo County, Texas, in whom we repose trust and confidence, as 

Independent Executor of this our Will and estate and direct that no bond be required 

of him. 

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, we have hereunto subscribed and signed thes 

presence at Edinburg, Texas, m· the presence of the witnesses whose names are 

affixed hereto and whom we lave requested to sign their nmaes hereto as witness, 

and ln the presence of said witnesses we have declared and published the foregoing 

.,,_ AP/f!I'L.-

as our Last Will on the .e?- day of~. A. D. 1975. 

Mildred F • Pursley 

Page 2 of 4. pages 
59

VOl 

The foregoing was on this date signed by Harold W. Pursley and 

Mlldred F. Pursley, 1n our presence, and in the presence of each of us, and at the 

time of their subscribing said instrument, they declared that 1t was their Will' and 

at their request and 1n their presence, and in the presence of each other, we have 

y.,t APR/.Lsubscrlbed our names as witnesses thereto on the .:ff - d~y of ~, A. D. 

1975. 

Witness 

THE STATE OF TEXAS § 

COUNTY OF HIDALGO § 

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared 

HAROLD W. PURSLEY and MILDRED F. PURSLEY, 

and ___ _.E..,r..,n...,e=s,.tin=a.._V.._a.....,s:::a ... u,.,e~z.._ _____ , known to me to be the testators and the 

witnesses, respectively, whose names are subscribed tot he annexed or foregoing 

instrument in their respective capacitites, and all of said persons being by me duly 

sworn, the sald HAROLD W. PURSLEY and MILDRED F. PURSLEY, Testators, 

declared to me and to said witnesses in my presence that said instrument ls their 

Last Will and Testament, and that they had willingly na de and executed it as their 

free act and deed for the purposes therein expressed: and the witnesses, each on 

his oath stated to me, in the presence and hearing of the said testators, that said 

testators had declared to them that said instrument is their Last Will and Testament, 

and that they executed same as such and wanted each of them to sign it as a witnes 

and upon their oath each witness stated further that they did sign the same as 

witnesses in the presence of said Testators and at their request, that they were at 

that time each nineteen years of age or over, were lawfully married and were of 

sound mind, and that each of said witnesses was then at least fourteen years of ag • 

~ .~ 

Page 3 of 4 pages 
60

SUBSCRmED AND ACKNOWLEDGED BEFORE ME by the said HAROLD W. 

PURSLEY and MILDRED F. PURSLEY, Testators, and SUBSCRmED AND SWORN TO 

BEFORE ME by the said Jennie H. Gonzalez AND Ernest!na Vasquez 

v.t. ,4P£/L 

-----------' witnesses, on this the &"9 -· day of ~, A. D. !975 • 

Page 4 of 4 pages 

• -----~~ :.r.' 

Notacy Publ!c in and for Hid 

Texas. 
TAB B

OF THE APPENDIX
61

ESTATE CF 

HAK>ID W. PURSLE'l 

DICEASID 

s 

s 

s 

11\'".•· 

IN 'lHE OCXJNIY a::xJRI' Kr lAW 

OF 

HIDAI.ro a:::xJN1Y, TEXAS 

APPLICATICN .R:R PR::IW\'IE CF WIIL AID 

ISSU.AriCE CF I.E:ITERS '!EST~ 

Mildred F. Pursley, (Applicant") furnishes the followinq information 

to the Court for the probate of the written Will of Harold W. Pursley 

("Decedent") and for issuance of Letters Testamentary: 

1. Applicant is an individual interested 1n this Estate, domiciled 

in and residing· at Edinburg, Hidalgo County, Texas. 

2. Decedent died on May 10, 1980, in Edinburg. Hidalgo County, 

Texas. at the age of sixty one (61) years. 

3. This Court has jurisdiction and venue because Decedent was 

domiciled and had a fixed place of r.esidence 1n this county on the date 

of his death. 

4. Decedent owned real and personal property described generally as 

home, cash, securities, automobiles, livestock, household goods. and 

personal effects of a probable value in excess of $200,000.00. 

' 

5. Decedent left a valld written Will ("Will") dated April 29, 

1975 which was never revoked and is filed herewith. 

6. The subscribing witnesses to the Will and their present addresses 

are Jennie H. Gonzalez, Edinburg, Texas, and Ernestina Vasquez. address 

unknown. 

7. No child or children were born to or adopted by Decedent after 

the date of the wm. 

EXHIBIT 

JB 
62

.......... ~ 

• 

8. Decedent was never divorded. 

9. A necessity exists for- the administration of this estate. 

10. Decedent's Will named Applicant to serve without bond or other 

security as Independent Executrix, in which capacity, Applicant would not 

be disqualified by law from serving as such or from accepting Letters 

Testamentary, and Applicant would be entitled to such Letters. 

WHEREFORE, Applicant prays that citation issue as required by law to 

all persons interested in this Estate; that the will be admitted to 

probate; that Letters Testamentary be issured to Applicant; and that all 

other orders be entered as the Court may deem proper. 

Respectfully submitted, 

~~~JL~ Dennis E. Hendrix 

P.O. Box 1016 

Edinburg, Texas 78539 

512-381-8496 

ATTORNEY FOR APPLICANT 

-2-
TAB C

OF THE APPENDIX
63

.· ··., 

ESTATECF 

HAR:JID W PURSLEY 

DECEASID 

s 

s 

s 

fiLED 

JU~f 3 1980 

S/u~IUO> ~1!'. lil.fRK ~~lfkfQa~, Toaa -~·-4'¢4 a&~ IN 'IHE CXlJNlY a:uRT Kr J.A.V 

OF 

HID.AI.G:l 

ORDER ADMITI'lliG WIIL 'IO P.R:SA'IE ANJ 

AIJIH)RI ZlliG LE'ITERS 'IEST.AMEl\ITAR{ 

On this day came on to be heard the Application For Probate of Will 

and Issuance of Letters Testamentary filed by Nlildred F. Pursley 

("Applicant") in the Estate of Harold W. Pursley, .I:eceased("Decedent"). 

The Court, having heard the evidence and having reviewed the Will 

and the other documents filed herein, finds that the allegations 

contained in the Application are true; that notice and citation have been 

given in the rranner and for the length of time required by law; that 

Decedent is dead and that four years have not elapsed since the date of 

Decedent's death; that this Court has jurisdiction and venue of the 

Decedent's estate; that Decedent left a Will dated April 29, 1975, 

executed ~th the formalities and solemnities and under the circumstances 

required by law to rrake it a valid Will; that on such date Decedent had 

attained the age of 18 years and v.as of sound mind; that such Will was 

not revoked byDecedent; that no objection to or contest of the probate 

of such Will has been filed; that all of the. necessary proof required for 

the probate of such will has been rrade; that such Will is entitled to 

probate ; that 1 n said Will , Decedent named W ldred F. Purs 1 ey as 

Independent Executrix, to serve without bond, v.ho is duly qualified and 

not disqualified by law to act as such and to receive Letters 

Testamentary; that a necessity exists for the administration of this 

estate; and that no interested person has applied for the appointment of 

appraisers and none are deemed necessary by the Cburt. 

It is therefore CEDERID, .AD]UCGED JlND DECREED that such Will is 

admitted to probate, and the Clerk of this Cburt is ORDERED to 

EXHIBIT 

~~ .. b 
64

• 

record the Will, together with the Application in the Minutes of this 

Court. 

It is further ORDERED, A~JUDGED and DECREED that no bond or other 

security 1s required and that upon the taking and filing of the Oath 

required by law, Letters Testamentary shall issue to Mlldred F. Pursley 

who is appointed as Independent Executrix of Decedent's Will and Estate, 

and no other action shall be had in this Court other than the return of 

an Inventory. Appraisement and List of Claims as required by law. 

SIGNED AND ENTERED this 3,e.o day of ~ , 1980. 

~~J~Jk~ Dennis E. Hendrix 

P.O. Box 1016 

Edinburg, Texas 78539 

381-8496 

ATTORNEY FOR APPLICANT 

-2-
TAB D

OF THE APPENDIX
65

ESTA'IE OF 

HAIOID W. PlJRSI.m{' 

Da:::::EAS.fD 

NO. 14,054 

s 

s 

s 

OA.TH 

.. ·-·- ---------

FILED 

J:J~I 41980 

SAhlu, ~., "a.dtK 

-~4rw ~·-~·'-· • ._. IN mE a:::iJmy CXXJR.I' AT IAW 

OF 

Hl.DAIG) c:x:x.JNIY, TEXAS 

I do solemnly swear that the writing wh'ich has been offered for 

probate is the last Will of Harold w. Pursley, so far as I know or 

believe, and that I will well and truly perform all the duties of 

Independent Executrix of said Will and of the Estate of Harold W. 

Pursley, Deceased. 

Mildred 

%1~~~A F. Pursley ~,.. Independent Executrix 

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME by MILDRED F. PURSLEY' 

:this.. . ..3t""s(.. day of June, 1980, to certify which, witness my hand and . ·.·' se·ai<'of.loffice. 

_;. ··.J~~~~~~i~i~t~ :. . . . . . . "· . . ~jJ"'-' •. ~·;. :. ... 

. ·. ; 't;}~~i{(:~J.:~~:} ( 

~& • ~MIN.ERVA 0. DJJJ11 

OtarY PUbUC1il andfO~lgo County, Texas 

EXHIBIT 

ID 
TAB E

OF THE APPENDIX
66

- LETI'ERS TESTAMENJ:ARY 

\ 

c::::::::::::=:=::=-<<:>>--C::::=::::::> 

No. 14,054 

THE STATE OF TEXAS 

County of Hlilolgo } IN COUNTY COURT. AT LAW 

of Hidalgo County, Tesa~~ 

I, Santo• StJldal'l4, Clerk of the County Coure __ A:~T_LAW ____ _ 

of Hidalgo County, Te%tu, do hereby certify tlud on t1ae ___ 3_r_d ___ _ 

day of JUNE , A.. D. ~9~ MIL@RED F. PURSLEY 

HAROLD 'W. PURSLEY -.J___ _,~ 

----------------------------------------------------· ~al~ 

and th.m...:Lhe__quollfied aa. __ IND __ EP_.END __ ENT __ EXE_c_u_TRIX ____________ _ 

of •aid ~tate on the 4t:h day of. __ _....n.,.m~E.,.· _________ __;..· A.. D. 1~ so 

as the law requires mul that so:ld appointment U. still in full force and ef/ed. 

Git:~en under my hand mul seal of office at Edinburg, Te:cas the 

_4_t_h __ ..... d ... ay of. ___ J_UN_E ______ A. D. 19~ 

Santos Saldalfo, Clerk, 

(Seal) AT LAW County Court -------~Hidalgo County, T~ 

By. _____________________________________ Dep~. 

ROSIE MEDELLIN 

EXHIBIT 

I £ 
TAB F

OF THE APPENDIX
67

.. 

,···· --·-· ·-:-· -· ·-··---~ 

....__: ... ---:~ ·~ 

ESTATE OF 

!)[). 14,054 

s IN 'IHE o::IJNlY a:uRl' Nr I.J1&Y 

HAR:XD W. FtJRSI.m:', SR. 

Da::;EASID 

s 

s 

OF 

HIDAI.CD COJNIY. 

IN\IEN'IORY, APPRAISB.ENI', AN:> Lisr OF CLAIMS 

Date of Death: May 10, 1980 

TEXASFILED 

FEB 10 1981 

&a •• u.:. ~ .. !it liLfRK 

The following is a full, true and complete Inventory and 

~~~= Appraisement of all personal property and of all real property situated in the 

State of Texas, together ~th a List of ClaUn5 due and owing to this 

Estate as of the date of death, which have cane to the posesston or 

knowledge of the undersigned. 

INV.ENTORY A!ID APPRAISEMENI' 

Real Property (See Schedule A) 

Stocks and Bonds (See Schedule B) 

Accounts Receivable & Cash (See Schedule C) 

Insurance Payable to Estate ( Schedule D) 

Jointly OWned Property (Nb Schedule E) 

N.tlscellaneous Property (See Schedule F) 

'Ibtal 

Lisr OF CLAIMS 

/ 

203,280.00 

10,302.50 

60,210.50 

11,215.50 

l\OifE 

.246, 767 .oo 

531,775.50 

'!here are no claims due or owing to the Estate other than those 

shown on the foregoing Inventory and Appraisement. 

'Ihe foregoing Inventory, Appraisement and List of Claims should be 

approved and ordered entered of record. 

Respectfully submitted, 

~s2'9JL~ DENNIS E. HEl'DRIX 

Attorney for the Estate 

P.O. Box 1016 

Edinburg, Texas 78539 

EXHIBIT 

1[: 
68

··--· --- --· ,! - -·· ..•• - ...... - .. V!J,t,. 31 P P1 /.3 7 

--·----------- -- --·· 

SCHEDULE A 

ESTATE OF HAROLD W • .PURSLEY 

Real Estate 

SEPARATE .P.RJPERIY: 

c::o.MJNI'IY P.OOPERIY: 

House and 1 acre, Block 246, Lot 5, 

Texas Mexican Railway Ccmpany 

Survey, Hidalgo County, Texas 

House and 1 acre, Block 246, Lot 5, 

Texas Mexican Railway Ccmpany 

Survey, Hidalgo Cbunty, Texas 

Equipnent Yard 

BloCk 246, Lot 5, (5 acres) 

Texas Mexican Railway Survey, 

Soil Pit 

Block 246, Lot 5, (16.1 Acres), 

Texas Mexican Railway Survey, 

Hidalgo Cbunty, Texas 

Farm Land 

Block 246, Lot 5, (8.72 Acres) 

Texas Mexican Railway Survey 

Hidalgo County, Texas 

Farm Land 

Block 246, Lot 3, (23.45 acres) 

Texas Mexican Railway Survey 

Hidalgo County, Texas 

Farm Land 

Block 246, Lot 13, (8.65 Acres) 

Texas Mexican Railway Survey 

Hidalgo County, Texas 

Farm Land 

Block 248, Lot 11, (38.80 Acres) 

Block 248, Lot 14, (19.19 Acres) 

Texas Mexican Railway Survey 

Hidalgo County, Texas 

'!OrAL .REAL ESTA'IE 

DECEDENT'S 1/2 INI'EREST 

Fair Market Value 

91,015.00 

11,814.00 

32,500.00 

1,611.00 

23,545.00 

104,300.00 

25,950.00 

115,825.00 

406,560.00 

203,280.00 

, 
69

------·- ... _ --· .. --... 

' .. . . ·--------- -- -· --·--

SCHEDULE B 

ESTATE OF HAROLD W. PURSLEY 

STOCKS AND BONDS 

SEPARATE .FR:>PERIY: 

a::MVNI'IY PKlP.ERIY: 

Harold W. Pursley, Sr., Inc. 

1000 shares No-Par Value COmmon Stock 

Edinburg, Texas 15.60 per share 

Federal Land Bank of Houston 

Houston, Texas 

Edinburg, co-op Gin 

8% Perferred Stock at Par Value 

'Ibtal Stocks and Bonds 

DEC.fDENI''S 1/2 INIEREST 

Fair Market Value 

15,600.00 

4,905.00 

100.00 

20,605.00 

10,302.50 
70

·.·· . . . . . ··· 

.:•:- -··. . ; __ ,._ 

•.•• .•Ji- 'n 

:· .. ····· ' ' 

'• •} o I '• 

. ·•: .. ·' . 

. · . 

. . . . . · .... 

... : 

.... 

··-· . ..: -

: .... ' .. .· 

· .. ·- -~ 

:•·•.._ (:: I!'' 

~ !•7 ••• .,,:.:"'i 

. . . . , •. 

'!.!··--=· .••• 

j, •I ... "':- • ; ''If.:.. 

-...". .·· : . . 

'·· 
71

{ - • • --a• • ••- - o •. "" - - - •-• 

I • j ~ . I 

--- ·------··-----.) 

SEPARA'lE P.RCPERIY: 

SCHEDULE C 

ESTATE OF HA.ROLD W. PURSLEY" 

MORTGAGES, NOTES AND CASH 

~.t. 31 g ,o, /.:3 r . . . . 

CXMLINI'IY PROPERlY: Fair M!rket Value 

First State Bank & Trust Co •• Edinburg, Texas 

Harold Pursley 

Checking Account Nb. 09-1489-4 

First State Bank & Trust Co •• Edinburg, Texas 

Mildred 0. Pursley 

Checking Account Nb. 00-6705-9 

First National Bank of Edinburg. Edinburg. TExas 

Harold PUrsley 

Checking Account Nb. 010-450-7 

Federal Land Bank Association. Edinburg, Texas 

First State Bank & Trust Q)., Edinburg. Texas 

Savings Account Nb. 01-1219-4 

Payroll Checks, Harold W. Pursley, Sr., Inc. 

Nbte Receivable 

].D. Reavis, Dated March 22. 1979, in the 

original amount of $120,000.00, payable 

annually $10,000.00 plus 9% interest. 

Total M:>rtgages, Notes and Cash 

DEDEDENI' 1S 1/2 Il'll'EREST 

338.00 

1,337.00 

6.00 

6,459.00 

72.00 

880.00 

111,329.00 

120,421.00 

60,210.50 
72

SCHEDULED 

EST ATE OF HAROLD W. PURSLEY 

INSURANCE PAYABLE TO ESTATE 

SEPARA'IE ProPERlY: 

Great Southern Life Insurance COmpany 

Policy No. 531552 

Death Claim Benefit 

Dividend Accumulations 

Total Paid 

cn.M.JNI'IY ProPERlY: 

American National Insurance COmpany 

Policy No. 05280083 

Death Claim Benefit 

Dividend Accumulations 

Total Paid 

GUlf Life Insurance COmpany 

Credit Life Policy No. 11810-734066 

Total Carm.mi ty Insurance 

Decedent 1 s 1/2 Ccrmnm1 ty 

1,423.70 

423.70 

5,000.00 

18.00 

5,018.00 

14,565.00 

19,583.00 

· ....... __ ·-· 

1,423.70 

9,791.50 

11,215.50 

-·"···-· .. ·. . ! 

. -- i ...... _ .... 
73

SCHEDULE F 

EST ATE OF HAROLD W. PURSLEY 

OTHER MISCELLANEOUS PROPERTY 

VOL 

SEPARATE ProPERlY: N:111E 

318PAoe141 

cx::M.UNI'IY P.R:P.ERIY: Fair Market Value 

Household fUrniture 3,500.00 

Cattle, 7 Cows and 3 Calves 3,766.00 

Federal Income~ Withheld for 1980 2,341.00 

Edinburg Coop Gin, Book Credits 357.00 

Southwestern Life Insurance Cbmpany 

Life Insurance Policy Nb. 6778823 

Mildred 0. Pursley 820.00 

DRILLIN:; MACHINERY AN:> EQUIFMENI' 

MOdel 1500 Failing Drilling Rig, Serial 

Nb. ~738Vl24200 on 1978 Olevrolet Truck 75,000.00 

Mbdel 1500 Failing Drilling Rig, Serial 

No. 903703, on GC Diesel Truck 30,000.00 

MOdel 1500 Failing Drilling Rig, 

Serial No. 903224 8,000.00 

MOdel 1500 Failing Drilling ~g. Serial 

No. 902072, o~ 1955 Mack Diesel Truck 2,000.00 

Mbdel 120 G Caterpillar Mbtor Grader with Ripper 

and Power Shaft, Serial Nb. 87V2699 55,000.00 

MOdel 1150BCase Crawler Tractor with Winch, ~Vide Tracks, Serial Nb. 7302728 15,000.00 

MOdel llSOBCase Crawler Tractor with Winch, 

Serial N0.7304731 26,000.00 

MOdel M-100 Allis Olalmers Mbtorgrader wl th Ripper, 

Serial No. 1510 8,000.00 

Mbdel 12G Allis Chalmers Loader with 35 yard Bucket, 

Serial No. 221 25,000.00 

Mbdel D6C Caterpillar Tractor with Tilt Blade, 

Winch and Power Shaft, Serial NO. 10Kl3634 60,000.00 

Mbdel 5800 Case Backhoe, Serial No. 8953660 16,000.00 

HUeber Steel Wheel Roller 1.000.00 

Fiat-Allis liB Crawler Tractor with Power Shaft, 

Serial No. 25Ll8772 35,000.00 

Fiat-Allis llBCrawler Tractor with Winch and 

Tilt Blade, Serial No.25Ll91.56 50,000.00 
74

VOL "318PAGE 142 

SCHEDULE F .1 

ESTATE OF HAROLD W. PURSLEY 

OTHER MISCELLANEOUS PROPERTY 

David Brown Tractor 

1 Diesel Engine 

Mbdel 471 Diesel Engine 

Mbdel 671 Diesel Engine 

Air O:::npressor 

Lincoln Gas welder 

TRANSR:RrATIQ\1 B;UIFMENI' 

1971 Olevrolet Truck and 38" Float, 

Serial No.SCI631P24963 

1977 Olevrolet 1-Ton 4-Wheel Drive 4-Door 

Crew-Cab Truck, Serial No. CKL3472189520 

1978 Olevrolet !-Ton 4-Wheel ·Drive Guston-cab 

Pickup Truck, Serial No. CKL348Bll2644 

1974 Dodge Pickup Truck 

1976 Dodge Pickup Truck 

1976 Dodge Pickup Truck - 4 \~eel Drive 

1976 Dodge D-200 Pickup Truck 

1977 Dodge 3/4 Ton Pickup Truck 

1977 Dodge Club-cab Pickup Truck 

1973 Fork Pickup Truck 

1978 Fork F-250 3/4 Ton 4~eel Drive Supercab 

Pickup Truck, Serial No. X265KBCK598 

1977 Fork F-250 3/4 Ton $-Wheel Drive GUston Cab, 

Pickup Truck, Serial No. F26HNY47069 

1969 GMC Diesel 5-Ton Truck Tractor 

1971 GMC Diesel Truck 

1965 International Truck and Lowboy Trailer, Serial 

No. T53742 

1974 International Truck Tractor, Serial 

No. 10682 OiA53132 and Aluminum 18 Yard Dump Trailer, 

Serial No. ALF223030 

3,500.00 

4,500.00 

3,000.00 

4,000.00 

1,200.00 

450.00 

4,000.00 

4,000.00 

4,200.00 

225.00 

225.00 

3,000.00 

1,000.00 

3,000.00 

800.00 

500.00 

4,200.00 

2,000.00 

3,500.00 

2,000.00 

6,500.00 

6,500.00 
75

SCHEDULE F.2 

ESTATE OF HAROLD W. PURSLEY 

OTHER MISCELLANEOUS PROPERTY 

1975 Pl~uth Fury 4~or, Serial 

No. PH43KSK182806 

1976 Oldsmobile 98 Regency 4-Door, Serial 

No. 3X39'lt;Ml 07 321 

1 Fiberglass Gamper 

1 Amerigo Carrper on DfM:O Trailer 

1974 General Flatbed Trailer, Serial No. 3SGLB74285 

1 GOoseneck 30 1 Metal Cattle Trailer 

1 D.EM:X> 20 I Trailer, Serial 110. 244 

1 DEMX> 28' Trailer, 3-Axle, Serial No. 3255 

1 DFM:O 20 1 Trailer, 2-Axle, Serial No. 5038 

1 D.EM:O 16' Trailer, 1-Axle, Serial No. 4152 

1 DEM:O 20 1 Trailer, 2-Ax1e, Serial No. 4158 

OFFICE EQ.JIPMENI' 

Total Nascellaneous Property 

D.EX.:;fDENr 1 S 1/2 INIEREST 

VOL 318.PAGE 1'43 

1,300.00 

1,800.00 

1,000.00 

1,000.00 

1,250.00 

2,500.00 

1,000.00 

1,000.00 

1,000.00 

1,000.00 

1,000.00 

600.00 

493,534.00 

246,767.00 
76

VOl 

'1HE BrATE OF "'EXAS 

a:JJNI.Y OF HIDIWD 

s 

s 

s 

KN:JN ALL MEN ~ THESE .PRESfNIS 'lHAT: 

I, MILORED F. PURS~, having been duly sworn, hereby state on oath 

that the foregoing Inventory and List of Claims is a true and catplete 

statement of all the property and clairm of the Estate that have cane to 

my knowledge. 

MILDRID F. PtiRSLE¥, IND~ .. ooit5unux 

&v..tlRN '10 .Al-D SUBSCRIBED BER:RE ME by the said MilDRED F. PURSLEY, on this the lOth day of February, 1981, to certify v.hich witness my hand 

and seal of office. 

taPUbiiCill an for Hidalgo J 

County, Texas 

'Ihe foregoing Inventory, Appraisement and List of Clairm of the 

above Estate having been filed and presented and the O>urt having 

considered and examined the same and being satisfied that 1t should be 

approved and there havings been no objections made thereto, it is in all 

respects APPROVED and ORDERED entered of record. 

SIGNED AN) .ENI'ERED on the J..£!f. day of ~ 1981. 

/L E./·~ ~p~.,~ 

FILED 

FEB 1 t. 1981 
TAB G

OF THE APPENDIX
77

mast Will UlJ~ Westurp.ent q- 3'-1 ,8C?\ - ~ - \ ll - 0 

Mildred F. Pursley ! .'·::'J..~~--D· · :. t · · ·: ~ < 

: 

;, rcn i) Q 7fl',') ~ L,., 'v c:: .... v."" 

I, Mildred F. Pursley, of the County ofHidalgo and the State ofTJ~~~&@.~~~:-~~~;K of sound and disposing mind and memo.ry, do make and declare this i~trfiW~n~~~-~~~ ~t Wi~.DEPU1Y 

and Testament, hereby expressly revokmg all former Wills and CodJcilsil:iiiCfebyme arany-tmie\)'·-----

heretofore, and intending hereby to dispose of all the property of whatever kind and wherever 

situated which I own, or in which I have any kind of interest at the time of my death. 

I. 

IDENTITY OF THE FAMILY 

At the time of the execution of this Will, I am not married and I have three children, namely, 

Harold Wayne Pursley, Jr., Rocky Joe Pursley and Rolland Hugh Pursley. 

II. 

PAYMENT OF EXPENSES 

I direct that all the expenses of my last illness, my funeral expenses, and my just personal 

debts, including any inheritance taxes, transfer taxes, and estate taxes which may be levied by the 

United States Government or by any state by reason of my death, shall be paid by my Independent 

Executor out of the residue of my estate as soon as conveniently may be done; provided that my 

Independent Executor, in such Executor's sole discretion, may distribute from time to time any real 

or personal property in my estate which at my death is subject to a lien securing an indebtedness 

upon it without discharging said indebtedness, if in my Independent Executor's judgment, the 

condition of my estate so requires. The distributee shall then be considered as having received my 

estate's equity in the property. 

III. 

DISPOSITION OF ESTATE 

A. I give, devise and bequeath to my son, Rocky Joe Pursley t.'le following property ifhe 

shall survive me; however if he does not survive me, the whole thereof to Rolland Hugh Pursley: 

I. 27.0 acres gross (23.45net acres) out of Lot 3, Section 246, Tex-Mex Subdivision, 

Hidalgo County, Texas. 

2. 8.65 acres net out of Lot 13-E 10/W 13.55, Section 243, Tex-Mex Subdivision, 

Hidalgo County, Texas. 

3. One-half(l/2)ofmy oil, gas and mineral rights to all ofLot 11, Block 248, Tex-Mex 

Subdivision, Hidalgo County, Texas. 40 gross acres (38.80 net acres) 

?A. I? 

ptJt'l-' 

e/ ;ct 

EXHIBIT ;.h/,,. 

J __,{;,...__ 11· 3-d 

·' 
78

4. One-half(l/2) of my oil, gas and mineral rights toE 112 of Lot 14, Block 248, TexMex Subdivision, Hidalgo County, Texas. 20 gross acres (19.19 net acres) 

5. One half(l/2) of my oil, gas and mineral rights in Frio County, Texas describedasJ. 

Poitevent Survey No. 1, Abstract No. 552. 

6. One half(l/2) of my stock in Ebony Hills Golf Course, Hidalgo County, Texas. 

7. Two (2) cemetery lots in Charlotte, Atascosa County, Texas. 

B. I give, devise and bequeath to my son, Rolland Hugh Pursley the following property 

if he shall survive me; however if he does not survive me, the whole thereof to Rocky Joe Pursley: 

I. 31.82 gross acres (30.82 net acres) out of Lot 5, Block 246, Texas-Mex Survey, Hidalgo 

County, Texas, (Save and except one (I) acre which is the homestead property). 

2. One (I) acre out of Lot 5, Block 246, Tex-Mex Survey, Hidalgo County, Texas. (Homestead 

property). 

3. One half (l/2) of my oil, gas and mineral rights to all of Lot 1 1, Block 248, Tex-Mex Survey, 

Hidalgo County, Texas consisting of 40 gross acres (38.80 net acres). 

4. One half(l/2)ofmyoil,gas and mineral rights to all ofE ~of Lot 14, Block248, Tex-Mex 

Survey, Hidalgo County, Texas consisting of20 gross acres (19.19 net acres). 

5. One half (1/2) of my oil, gas and mineral rights in Frio County, Texas described as J. 

Poitevent Survey No. I, Abstract No. 552. 

6. One half(l/2) of my stock in Ebony Hills Golf Course, Hidalgo County, Texas. 

7. Two (2) cemetery lots in Charlotte, Atascosa County, Texas. 

C. I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest of my estate to my children, Rocky Joe 

Pursley and Rolland Hugh Pursley, in equal shares. 

D. I have deliberately made no provision for my son, Harold Wayne Pursley, Jr. because I 

feel that he has ample property of his own. 

IV. 

DEFINITION OF SURVIVAL 

Any legatee, devisee, donee, person or beneficiary with respect to all or any part of my estate 

who shall not survive until ninety (90) days after the date of my death, or until this Will is probated, 

whichever occurs earlier, shall be deemed to have predeceased me, and shall be treated for all 

purposes herein as though such person had predeceased me. 

v. 

APPOINTMENT OF EXECUTOR 

A. I hereby nominate, constitute and appoint my son, Rocky Joe Pursley, as Independent 

Executor of my estate. In the event that my son, Rocky Joe Pursley, shall predecease me or fail or 

refuse to qualifY, or die, resign, or become unable to serve during the administration of my estate, I 

hereby nominate, constitute and appoint my son, Rolland Hugh Pursley, as Independent Executor, 

2 

?Jt./! 
79

_; ;-

and all the powers, duties and responsibilities granted and imposed upon Rocky Joe Pursley shall 

devolve upon and be exercised by Rolland Hugh Pursley. 

B. If any individual Independent Executor or Executrix becomes unable to discharge his 

or her duties under this Will because of accident, physical or mental illness or deterioration, or other 

cause and does not resign, then upon certification in a fonn sufficient for the recording of a deed in 

the State of Texas by two medical doctors (neither of whom is a beneficiary under this Will) 

affirming that each has examined the Independent Executor or Executrix and that each has 

concluded, based on such examination, that the Independent Executor or Executrix is unable to 

discharge his or her duties under this Will, the Independent Executor or Executrix shall cease to 

serve, as if he or she had resigned, effective the date of the certification. 

C. It is my will and desire and I hereby direct that in the administration of my estate, my 

Independent Executor or any successor shall not be required to furnish any bond of any kind and that 

no action shall be had in any court in the administration of my estate other than the probating of this, 

my Last Will and Testament, and the filing of any Inventory, Appraisement and List of Claims of my 

estate that may be required. 

VI. 

POWERS OF EXECUTOR 

The estate created or arising by virtue of my death and this instrument, my Last Will and 

Testament, shall be governed by and administered in accordance with the following provisions: 

A. I hereby grant unto my Independent Executor or any successor named above, full 

power and authority over any and all of my estate and they are hereby authorized to sell, manage, and 

dispose of the same or any part thereof, and in connection with any such sale or transaction, make, 

execute and deliver proper deeds, assignments and other written instruments and to do any and all 

things proper or necessary in the orderly handling and management of my estate. 

B. My Independent Executor or any successor named above, shall have full power and 

authority to compromise, settle and adjust any and all debts, claims and taxes which may be due from 

or owing by my estate. 

C. My Independent Executor or any successor named above, shall have full power and 

authority to deal with any person, firm, or corporation. 

D. My Independent Executor or any successor named above, shall have full power to 

borrow money at any time and in any amount from time to time for the benefit of my estate, from any 

person, firm, or corporation or from any bank or trust company and to secure the loan or loans by 

pledge, deed of trust, mortgage or other encumbrances on the assets of the estate and from time to 

time to renew such loans and give additional security. 

3 
80

... .. 

·/·--. .. { . 

E. As compensation for his services hereunder, my Independent Executor or any 

successor named above shall be entitled to charge the same fees customarily charged for similar 

services in other estates at the time the services are rendered. 

VII. 

SPENDTHRIFI' PROVISION 

No interest of any beneficiary in the corpus or income of my estate shall be subject to 

assignment, alienation, pledge, attachment, or claims of creditors of such beneficiary and may not 

otherwise be alienated or encumbered by such beneficiary, except as may be otherwise expressly 

provided herein. 

VIII. 

IN TERROREM CLAUSE 

If any beneficiary under this Will shall in any manner contest or attack this Will or any of its 

provisions, any share or interest in my estate given to such contesting beneficiary under this Will is 

hereby revoked and shall be disposed of as part ofthe residue of my estate. 

IX. 

DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS 

For purposes of interpretation of this, my Last Will and Testament, and the administration of 

the estate established herein, the following provisions shall apply: 

A. The words "child, children, descendants, issue," and similar terms shall be deemed 

only to include children born to, or adopted (on or before eighteen years of age) by me or my 

descendants. 

B. When a distribution is directed to be made to any person's descendants "per stirpes," 

the division into stirpes shalJ begin at the generation nearest to such person that has a living member. 

C. The use of the masculine, feminine or neuter genders shall be interpreted to include 

the other genders, and the use of either the singular or the plural number shall be interpreted to 

include the other number, unless such an interpretation in a particular case is inconsistent with the 

general tenor of this instrument. Any references herein relating to my Independent Executor shall 

include his successors regardless of the gender of the successors. 

D. This Will shall be probated in accordance with the laws of Texas, and should any 

provisions of the same be held unenforceable or invalid for any reason, the unenforceability or 

invalidity of said provision shall not affect the enforceability or validity of any other part of this Will. 

4 
81

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I, Mildred F. Pursley, hereby sign my name to this, my last 

Will, on each page of which I have placed my initials, on this E_ day of ~; L 

2007, at Edinburg, Texas. 

1JwA&.teUST~ Mildred F. Pursley, Testatrix 

ATTESTATION 

The foregoing instrument was signed in our presence by Mildred F. Pursley and declared by 

her to be her last Will. We, at the request and in the presence of Mildred F. Pursley and in the 

~~f each other, have subscribed our names below as witnesses on this~ day of 

_r--2007. 

~~ik=~ 

City and State 

Wim~~a-~ 

Street Address -r Pha.r r, , X 7 f511 

City and State 

SELF-PROVING AFFIDAVIT 

STATEOFTEXAS § 

§ 

COUNTY OF HIDALGO § 

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared Mildred F. 

Pursley, Phyllis Hendrix and Rebecca Gonzalez , 

known to me to be the Testatrix and the witnesses, respectively, whose names are subscribed to the 

annexed or foregoing instrument in their respective capacities, and all of said persons being by me 

duly sworn, the said Mildred F. Pursley, Testatrix, declared to me and to the said witnesses in my 

presence that said instrument is her Last Will and Testament and that she had willingly made and 

5 /Ja./). 
82

. ···-. . r . 

.. . . 

executed it as her free act and deed; and the said witnesses, each on their oath stated to me, in the 

presence and hearing of the said Testatrix, that the said Testatrix had declared to them that said 

instrument is her Last Will and Testament, and that she executed same as such and wanted each of 

them to sign it as a witness; and upon their oaths each witness stated further that they did sign the 

same as witnesses in the presence of the said Testatrix and at her request; that said Testatrix was at 

that time eighteen years of age or over (or being under such age, was or had been lawfully married, 

or was then a member of the armed forces of the United States or of an auxiliary thereof or of the 

Maritime Service) and was of sound mind; and that each of said witnesses was then at least fourteen 

years of age. 

Mildred F. Pursley, Testatrix 

Witnes 

Witness ~»~ 

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME by the said Mildred F. Pursley, Testatrix, 

and by the said Phyllis Hendrix and Rebecca Gonzalez , Witnesses, 

this 13th day of April , 2007. 

PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF: 

Law Office of Dennis E. Hendrix 

200 N. 12th Street, Ste. 202 

Edinburg, TX 78541 

6 
TAB H

OF THE APPENDIX
83

FIRST CODICIL 

OF THE 

JJJa.at Will anil (!Testament 

OF 

MILDRED F. P"QRSLEY ~ 

l 

~ FEB022012 I 

i 

I, Mildred F. Pursley, being of sound mind and disposing memo~~~~~~~~i;·¥:~~" t ?-!",.-· • ")!:O"'!"f. 

and publish this instrument as and to be the FIRST CODICIL to my.~: ·~i~;·~~d ·~e:fi';~~··' .. ' 

executed by me on Aprill3, 2007 in the presence ofPhyllis Hendrix and Rebecca Gonzalez. 

I revoke and annul the following portion of said Will: Section Ill. A., and hereby substintte in 

lieu thereofthe following: 

A. I give, devise and bequeath to my son, Rocky Joe Pursley the following property ifhe 

shall survive me; however if he does not survive me, the whole thereof to Rolland Hugh Pursley: 

1. 27.0 acres gross (23.45net acres) out of Lot 3, Section 246, Tex-Mex Subdivision, 

Hidalgo County, Texas. 

2. 8.65 acres net out of Lot 13-E 10/W 13.55, Section 243, Tex-Mex Subdivision, 

Hidalgo County, Texas. 

3. One-half{l/2) of my oil, gas and mineral rights to all ofLot 11, Block 248, Tex-Mex 

Subdivision, Hidalgo County, Texas. 40 gross acres (38.80 net acres) 

4. One-half(l/2) of my oil, gas and mineral rights toE~ of Lot 14, Block 248, TexMex Subdivision, Hidalgo County, Texas. 20 gross acres (19.19 net acres) 

5. One half ( 1/2) of my oil, gas and mineral rights in Frio County, Texas described as J. 

Poitevent Survey No. 1, Abstract No. 552. 

6. One half (1/2) of my stock in Ebony Hills Golf Course, Hidalgo County, Texas. 

7. Two (2) cemetery lots in Charlotte, Atascosa County, Texas. 

8. 31.82 gross acres (30.82 net acres) out of Lot 5, Block 246, Texas-Mex Survey, 

Hidalgo County, Texas, (Save and except one (1) acre which is the homestead property). 

9. One (1) acre out of LotS, Block 246, Tex-Mex Survey, Hidalgo County, Texas. 

(Homestead property). 

1/!.4 

/pt. 

c 14~ 

.,l h/1:2. 

El~IT 

I ____n_ 

1/. 3$"'1 
84

I revoke and annul the following portion of said Will: Section m.B., and hereby substitute in 

lieu thereofthe following: 

B. I give, devise and bequeath to my son, Rolland Hugh Pursley the following property if 

he shall survive me; however if he does not survive me, the whole thereof to Rocky Joe Pursley: 

1. One half ( 1/2) of my oil, gas and mineral rights to all of Lot 11, Block 248, Tex-Mex Survey, 

Hidalgo County, Texas consisting of 40 gross acres (38.80 net acres). 

2. One half(l/2) ofmyoil,gasand mineral rights to all ofE YzofLot 14, Block248, Tex-Mex 

Survey, Hidalgo County, Texas consisting of20 gross acres (19.19 net acres). 

3. One half (1/2) of my oil, gas and mineral rights in Frio County, Texas described as J. 

Poitevent Survey No. I, Abstract No. 552. 

4. One half (1/2) of my stock in Ebony Hills Golf Course, Hidalgo County, Texas. 

5. Two (2) cemetery lots in Charlotte, Atascosa County, Texas. 

In all other respects I ratify and confirm all of the provisions of my said will dated April 13, 

2007. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I, Mildred F. Pursley, hereby sign my name to this, my FIRST 

CODICIL of my last Will, on each page I have placed my initials, on this ./.l.. day of ~- (/ 

2010, at Edinburg, Texas. 

Mildred F. Pursley 

Testatrix 
85

... 

ATTESTATION 

The foregoing instrument was signed in our presence by Mildred F. Pursley and declared by 

her to be her FIRST CODICIL to her last Will. We, at the request and in the presence of Mildred F. 

Pursley and in the presence of each other, have subscribed our names below as witnesses on this _ 

__ l_Jt_h __ day of Jan_ua_r_Y _____ _, 2010. 

CITY AND STATE 
86

I 

e ••• .... ·-~. 

STATE OF TEXAS 

COUNTY OF IDDALGO 

SELF-PROVING AFFIDAVIT 

§ 

§ 

§ 

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared Mildred F. 

Pursley, Phyllis Hendrix and Mary Catherine Hendrix , 

known to me to be the Testatrix and the witnesses, respectively, whose names are subscribed to the 

annexed or foregoing instrument in their respective capacities, and all of said persons being by me 

duly sworn, the said Mildred F. Pursley, Testatrix, declared to me and to the said witnesses in my 

presence that said instrument is her FIRST CODICIL to her Last Will and Testament and that she 

had willingly made and executed it as her free act and deed; and the said witnesses, each on her oath 

stated to me, in the presence and hearing of the said Testatrix, that the said Testatrix had declared to 

them that said instrument is her FIRST CODICIL to her Last Will and Testament, and that she 

executed same as such and wanted each of them to sign it as a witness; and upon their oaths each 

witness stated further that they did sign the same as witnesses in the presence of the said Testatrix 

and at her request; that said Testatrix was at that time eighteen years of age or over (or being under 

such age, was or had been lawfully married, or was then a member of the armed forces of the United 

States or of an auxiliary thereof or of the Maritime Service) and was of sound mind; and that each of 

said witnesses was then at least fourteen years of age. 

Mildred F. Pursley, Testatrix 

~~'ikzAy 

Witness 

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME by the said Mildred F. Pursley. Testatrix, 

and by the said Phyllis Hendrix and Mary Catherine Hendrix 

Witnesses, this 13th day of January 2010. 
TAB I

OF THE APPENDIX
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2 

3 

4 

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6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

REPORTER'S RECORD 

VOLUME 1 OF 1 VOLUMES 

TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. P-34,801 

- - - - X 

IN THE ESTATE OF 

MILDRED OZELLA FAVOR 

PURSLEY, AKA 

MILDRED F. PURSLEY, 

DECEASED 

- - - - - - - - X 

IN THE PROBATE COURT 

OF 

HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS 

PRE-TRIAL HEARING 

On the 20th day of August, 2014, the following 

1 

16 proceedings came on to be heard in the above-entitled 

17 and numbered cause before the Honorable Homero Garza, 

18 Judge Presiding, held in Edinburg, Hidalgo County, 

19 Texas. 

20 Proceedings reported by computerized stenotype 

21 machine. 

22 

23 

24 

25 

ROLAND P. QUINTANILLA, CSR 

EXHIBIT 

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AUGUST 20, 2014 

VOLUME 1 

CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX 

PAGE 

Appearances . ............................... 2 

Announcements . ............................. 3 

Court's ruling . ............................ 3 

End of proceedings ......................... 4 

Reporter's Certificate ..................... 5 

ROLAND P. QUINTANILLA, CSR 

VOL 

1 

1 

1 

1 

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1 A P P E A R A N C E S 

2 APPEARING FOR THE MOVANTS: 

3 HON. EDMUNDO 0. RAMIREZ 

State Bar No. 16501420 

4 

5 

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Ellis, Koeneke & Ramirez, LLP 

1101 Chicago 

McAllen, Texas 78501 

Phone No. 956-682-2440 

Fax No. 956-682-0820 

eor@ekrattorneys.com 

APPEARING FOR THE RESPONDENT: 

HON. CHARLES C. MURRAY 

State Bar No. 14719700 

Atlas, Hall & Rodriguez, LLP 

818 Pecan Boulevard 

McAllen, Texas 78501 

Phone No. 956-682-5501 

Fax No. 956-686-6109 

ROLAND P. QUINTANILLA, CSR 

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3 

1 THE COURT: The next case is P-34,801, 

2 this is in the estate of Mildred Ozella Favor -- I 

3 hope I didn't mispronounce that. Pretrial hearing. 

4 Ozella Favor Pursley, also known as Mildred F. 

5 Pursley. 

6 

7 

8 

9 

clicked. 

MR. MURRAY: 

THE COURT: 

MR. MURRAY: 

10 Rocky Pursley, Your Honor. 

11 

12 

13 

14 

pretrial? 

movants, 

THE COURT: 

MR. RAMIREZ: 

Your Honor. We've 

34,801, Your Honor? 

Yeah, Pursley is what 

Yes. Charles Murray for 

All right. It's for 

Edmundo Ramirez for the 

got a pretrial, Your 

15 Honor, and we have dueling summary judgments, for 

16 lack of a better term. We've argued them, and we've 

17 briefed them, and both parties agree that the only 

18 issue is a matter of law, and so we urge the Court to 

19 rule. 

20 THE COURT: I guess we got these jury 

21 trial settings before we realized there was going to 

22 be a pending motion for summary judgment. 

23 MR. RAMIREZ: Right, right, we've 

24 

25 

refined it down to summary judgments. 

THE COURT: I have that case on my 

ROLAND P. QUINTANILLA, CSR 
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Accepted by: Alejandra Zapata

254

1 desk, and I'm going on vacation next week, so by 

2 Friday I'll have a ruling for the parties. 

3 

4 

5 

MR. RAMIREZ: Thank you. 

MR. MURRAY: Thank, Your Honor. 

MR. RAMIREZ: We've submitted 

6 electronic orders. 

MR. MURRAY: And so have we. 

4 

7 

8 

9 

MR. RAMIREZ: And if you want to, I'll 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

send a paper 

I leave. 

one. 

THE COURT: No, that's fine. 

MR. RAMIREZ: Thank you, Your Honor. 

MR. MURRAY: Thank you, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: I'll dispose of it before 

MR. MURRAY: Thank you. 

MR. RAMIREZ: Thank you. 

THE COURT: You all have a good day. 

(End of proceedings.) 

ROLAND P. QUINTANILLA, CSR 
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5 

1 STATE OF TEXAS: 

COUNTY OF HIDALGO: 

2 CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 

3 I, ROLAND P. QUINTANILLA, Official Court 

4 Reporter in and for the Probate Court of Hidalgo 

5 County, State of Texas, do hereby certify that the 

6 above and foregoing contains a true and correct 

7 transcription of all portions of evidence and other 

8 proceedings requested by Edmundo 0. Ramirez, counsel 

9 for Movants to be included in this volume of the 

10 Reporter's Record, in the above-entitled and numbered 

11 cause, all of which occurred in open court or in 

12 chambers and were reported by me. 

13 I further certify that this Reporter's Record of 

14 the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the 

15 exhibits, if any, admitted by the respective parties. 

16 I further certify that the total cost for the 

17 preparation of this Reporter's Record is $75.00, and 

18 was paid by counsel for Movants, Edmundo 0. Ramirez. 

19 WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND on this the 22nd day of 

20 October, 2014. 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

ROLAND P. QUINTANILLA, CSR 

Official Court Reporter 

Hidalgo County Probate Court 

100 N. C1osner, 3rd Floor 

Edinburg, TX 78539/956-318-2385 

CSR No. 900, Expires 12/31/14 

ROLAND P. QUINTANILLA, CSR 
TAB J

OF THE APPENDIX
208

,-----------------------

J ' 

Cause No. P-34.801 J 

IN THE ESTATE OF ! 

IN THE PROBA:TE 

tJJr.! ,... 2 .. o-~. 

COURT -:.7 ~ t 1" 

MILDRED OZELLA FAVOR PURSLEY 

AKA MILDRED F. PURSLEY 

OF 

DECEASED, HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS 

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the Z~y of OJ.,r,.,r- , 20!1, the 

Court considered the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Harold 

Wayne Pursley, Jr. and Rolland Hugh Pursley and the Motion for 

Summary Judgment filed by Rocky Joe Pursley. 

The Court, having examined the pleadings on file and the 

summary judgment evidence, finds: 

1, The will executed by Harold W. Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley 

on April 29, 1975 is a contractual will. The language in 

paragraph IV. "any child or children of this marriagen 

provided for the remainder of the estate to be conveyed as a 

class gift and therefore, mandates the distribution to all 

persons identified in that class, those being all the 

children. 

2. The court concludes (reading the 1975 will as a whole 

instrument) that it was the intent of Harold W. Pursley when 

he executed the 1975 will with his wife, that at his passing 

(if he died first) and at the subsequent passing of his wife, 

any estate left over was to go and vest in his beloved 

children, Harold Wayne Pursley, Jr., Rolland Hugh Pursley and 

Rocky Joe Pursley, share and share alike. 

3. The preferred will executed by Mildred F. Pursley dated April 

13, 2007 is a breach of the 1975 contractual will. The 
209

preferred First Codicil executed by Mildred F. Pursley dated 

January 13, 2010 is a breach of the 1975 contractual will. 

4. Harold Wayne Pursley, Jr. and Rolland Hugh Pursley are 

entitled to summary judgment; 

5. Rocky Joe Pursley is not entitled to summary judgment; 

It is therefore, 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Motion for Summary 

Judgment filed by Harold Wayne Pursley, Jr. and Rolland Hugh 

Pursley, is hereby granted. 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Motion for Summary 

Judgment filed by Rocky Joe Pursley, is hereby denied. 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 2007 Will and the 2010 

Codicil preferred by Rocky Joe Pursley not be admitted to probate. 

SIGNED on this the 

xc. Edmundo 0. Ramirez 

Attorney at Law 

1101 Chicago 

McAllen, Texas 78501 

Charles Murray 

Attorney at Law 

818 W. Pecan Blvd. 

McAllen, Texas 78502 

2-%.-.( day of ~ ,J- , 20 IF-. 

cc).r 

JUDGE PRESIDING 
TAB K

OF THE APPENDIX
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270

CAUSE NO. P-34,801-A 

IN THE ESTATE OF 

MILDRED OZELLA FAVOR 

PURSLEY 

AKA MILDRED F. PURSLEY 

DECEASED 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

IN THE PROBATE COURT 

OF 

HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS 

FINAL JUDGMENT 

.. The .Court hereby_enters .this_Fjnal. Judgment ...in _accordance_with _the_Qtd.er_exe.c.ute_d_Qll_ _______ _ 

August 22, 2014, in which the Court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Harold 

Wayne Pursley, Jr. and Rolland Hugh Pursley and denied the Motions for Summary Judgment 

filed by Rocky Joe Pursley. 

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the will executed by Harold W. 

Pursley and Mildred F. Pursley on April 29, 1975 is a contractual will. The language in 

paragraph IV. "any child or children of this marriage" provided for the remainder of the estate to 

be conveyed as a class gift and therefore, mandates the distribution to all persons identified in 

that class, those being all the children. 

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the court concludes (reading the 

1975 will as a whole instrument) that it was the intent of Harold W. Pursley when he executed 

the 1975 will with his wife, that at his passing (if he died first) and at the subsequent passing of 

his wife, any estate left over was to go and vest in his beloved children, Harold Wayne Pursley, 

Jr., Rolland Hugh Pursley and Rocky Joe Pursley, share and share alike. 
Electronically Filed

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Hidalgo County Clerks Office

Accepted by: Alejandra Zapata

20TH NOVEMBER

271