1On January 1, 2005, the name of the Illinois Industrial Commission was

changed to the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission. See 820 ILCS

305/1(c) (West 2004).

Docket No. 102723.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

DONALD D. ROBERSON, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL

 COMMISSION (P.I. & I. Motor Express, Inc., Appellant).

Opinion filed March 22, 2007.

JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the judgment of the court,

with opinion.

Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Garman,

Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

Donald Roberson filed a claim for benefits under the Workers’

Compensation Act (see 820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2004)) after he

was injured while delivering a load of steel coils for P.I. & I. Motor

Express, Inc. (P.I. & I.). An arbitrator denied this claim, and the

Illinois Industrial Commission1 reversed the arbitrator’s decision,

finding an employment relationship between Roberson and P.I. & I.,

as well as a causal relationship between Roberson’s injury and his

work. The circuit court of Montgomery County reversed the

Commission’s decision, and the appellate court reversed the trial
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court’s decision (No. 5–05–0279WC (unpublished order under

SupremeCourt Rule 23)), concluding that the Commission’s decision

was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Roberson worked for P.I. & I. as an employee truck driver from

March to May 2000, when he bought his own truck. On May 15,

2000, Roberson signed an “INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

CONTRACT” with P.I. & I. Under the contract, Roberson would

receive 78% of the gross revenue received by P.I. & I. for each load

in exchange for the services of a driver and the equipment listed in

Appendix A to the contract–namely, his truck. Appendix A provided:

“P.I. & I. MOTOR EXPRESS, INC. hereby receipts for the

equipment hereinafter described, this receipt being executed

pursuant to [federal regulations] and to the extent as therein

specified and directed P.I. & I. MOTOR EXPRESS, INC.

shall during the duration of this receipt have the exclusive

possession, control and use of the equipment and to the extent

required by the Motor Carrier Act, P.I. & I. MOTOR

EXPRESS, INC. shall be deemed to have assumed complete

responsibility for the operation of the equipment in the

transportation of the commodities; provided however, that

this receipt shall not affect the legal relations between P.I. &

I. MOTOR EXPRESS, INC. and the Contractor, his agents or

employees as set forth in this Independent Contractor

Contract to which this receipt is an appendix ***.”

Roberson was responsible for all costs and expenses associated

with operating his truck, including fuel, tolls, license plates, and

taxes. The contract permitted Roberson to have employees, and he

was required to have worker’s compensation insurance coverage for

himself and any employees. The contract contained an option to

obtain such coverage through P.I. & I. Roberson also was required to

have liability insurance coverage. The contract provided that

Roberson must maintain and operate the equipment in compliance

with all applicable laws and regulations, notify P.I. & I. of any

accidents, and cooperate with P.I. & I. in investigating any accidents.
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At its discretion, P.I. & I. could advance monies to Roberson or

pay for items which were his responsibility; such monies would then

be deducted from Roberson’s weekly settlements. Upon “reasonable

request,” P.I. & I. could agree to “trip lease,” or broker, Roberson’s

truck to another motor carrier, in accordance with federal regulations

and on three conditions: (1) the other motor carrier appeared on P.I.

& I.’s approved list; (2) Roberson obtained a release number from P.I.

& I. before the trip; and (3) P.I. & I. had no freight available to load.

If these conditions were not met, P.I. & I. would not agree to trip

lease the truck.

The contract specifically provided that it was “not intended to

create an employee/employer relationship” betweenRoberson andP.I.

& I., and further that P.I. & I. “shall have no direction or control” of

Roberson “except in the results to be obtained.” The parties agreed

that the contract should be “interpreted in accordance with this

expressed intent.” Either party could terminate the contract at any

time upon written notice.

Appendix C to the contract was an “EQUIPMENT AND

SERVICES TO INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR CONTRACT”

under which Roberson leased a trailer from P.I. & I. Roberson was

required to pay as rent 10% of the revenue received by P.I. & I. for

each load. He was further required to operate the trailer in compliance

with all applicable laws and regulations, and to notify P.I. & I. of any

accidents. Roberson was responsible for all expenses associated with

the trailer, except for “normal scheduled preventative maintenance,”

and he agreed to follow P.I. & I.’s maintenance schedules. This

contract provided that any service and repair of the trailer must be

performed according to P.I. & I.’s instructions, by P.I. & I. or at its

designated facility.

On January 5, 2001, Roberson left home for P.I. & I.’s Granite

City terminal to pick up a load. He then drove to Bethlehem Steel in

northwest Indiana, unloaded the vehicle, and reloaded it with two

large steel coils. The coils were covered with a tarp and secured with

chains and ratchet binders. Instead of delivering these coils to Red

Bud, Illinois, Roberson returned home because he was experiencing

mechanical problems with his truck. Roberson advised P.I. & I. of the

delay, and P.I. & I. instructed him to deliver the load as soon as

possible. On January 11, he left home to deliver the load. In Red Bud,
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Roberson removed the tarp and chains from the steel coils, and began

to unfasten the ratchet binders. As he was pushing on a ratchet, it

gave way. Roberson tumbled forward, fell into the side of one of the

coils, and landed on his back. Roberson felt pain, but continued to

work, believing that it would go away. Though he intended to sleep

in his truck at P.I. & I.’s terminal and pick up a new load the next

day, Roberson’s pain increased, and he again returned home. The next

morning, he visited an emergency room, complaining of pain in his

lower back, shoulder, and neck, and numbness in his right leg.

Emergency room records indicate that Roberson injured his back

while unloading his truck. According to the initial nurse evaluation

form, as Roberson was removing a load with a ratchet binder, the

binder “let go,” and Roberson twisted his body. He felt a “pull and

pop” in his lower back, and pain went up his back to his neck. As

time passed, the pain got worse. Roberson told the nurse, “It feels like

I had the crap beat out of me.” His back was tender, and he could not

lay down on it. An X ray of his back revealed no abnormalities, and

the initial diagnosis of the emergency room doctor was “acute back

and neck strain with spasm.” Roberson was given pain medication,

including Vicodin and Flexeril, advised to see his own physician, and

instructed to stay off work until January 15.

On January 12, Roberson visited Dr. Assa Mayersdorf, a

neurologist with whom he had made an appointment before the

accident to discuss nonconvulsive seizure episodes. Dr. Mayersdorf’s

office notes indicated that “[i]n the last two days,” Roberson had

taken Vicodin and Flexeril “because of low back pain which

happened when he slept [sic] in the truck.”

On January 15, Roberson visited his physician, Dr. Jose Villegas.

In his evidence deposition, Dr. Villegas stated that Roberson claimed

he injured his shoulder and back four days earlier while ratcheting a

load of steel. Roberson had stiffness and generalized pain in the lower

back area, as well as numbness in his right leg. Dr. Villegas’ initial

diagnosis was lumbosacral spine and cervical neck strain. Dr.

Villegas again examined Roberson on January 29, 2001. Roberson

stated that his pain had continued and had become more localized. He

had trouble sleeping and experienced tingling and numbness in his

legs. Dr. Villegas ordered physical therapy and a CT scan. According

to Dr. Villegas, the CT scan showed that Roberson had a herniated
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disc in his lower back, which was consistent with his symptoms. Dr.

Villegas reexamined Roberson on February 9 and 28, 2001. On

February 9, Roberson showed improvement, and on February 28, he

had no back pain and was ready to resume work. Dr. Villegas opined

that there was a causal relationship between Roberson’s accident at

work and his back pain: “I haven’t seen Mr. Roberson for any prior

history of back problems. *** And because of the symptoms and

physical findings and the CT can, it seems to correlate well to his

back injury.”

Roberson filed a worker’s compensation claim on February 8,

2001. At the arbitration hearing, Roberson testified regarding his

relationship with P.I. & I. According to Roberson, he would

telephone P.I. & I. each morning to see if any loads were available.

Before Roberson began hauling a load, P.I. & I. required him to

perform pretrip inspections, and to keep and turn in a logbook bearing

P.I. & I.’s name and logo. Roberson asserted that on several occasions

P.I. & I. had given him a “hot load” to deliver and return back as

quickly as he could.

Roberson acknowledged that he could choose his routes and

where to obtain fuel or repairs. P.I. & I. provided him a debit card that

he could use at any truck stop to buy fuel, pay for repairs, or obtain

cash advances, and these expenses were later deducted from his

weekly settlements. According to Roberson, P.I. & I. helped him

secure “bobtail and dead head” liability insurance coverage, and the

premiums were also deducted from his settlements. Additionally,

before the accident P.I. & I. deducted workers’ compensation

insurance coverage premiums from his settlements. Roberson stated

that P.I. & I. stopped withholding taxes from his settlements after he

entered the independent contractor contract. P.I. & I. provided a

camera with which to photograph an accident scene or a damaged

load.

Roberson further stated that once he started driving for P.I. & I.,

he did not make deliveries for other trucking companies. He

explained that he could have obtained authorization to haul loads for

other companies, but that “[t]here was just so much paperwork ***

you just didn’t do it.” On direct examination, Roberson stated that he

worked for three other trucking companies in 2000 before he became

a P.I. & I. employee. On cross-examination, Roberson stated he
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actually worked for two of those companies–Castle Trucking, Inc.,

and AMS, LLC–after he entered the independent contractor contract

with P.I. & I. Roberson also acknowledged that in 1992 he filed a

worker’s compensation claim for a lower back injury sustained while

working for another trucking company. Roberson’s application

asserted that his lower back and left leg were injured while lifting and

mounting a truck tire, resulting in a “probable ruptured disc with

radiculopathy.” That claim was denied.

P.I. & I. performed an annual review of Roberson’s work. A

September 17, 2001, letter from P.I. & I. Safety Director Patty

Caldwell congratulated Roberson on his professionalism and quality

effort. A copy of this letter was placed in Roberson’s “personnel file

for future reference.” A December 3, 2001, letter from Cardwell

informed Roberson that his independent contractor’s contract had

been cancelled by P.I. & I. effective November 30, 2001.

P.I. & I. presented the evidence deposition of its president, Joseph

Kerola. Kerola explained:

“Independent contractors in our industry are gentlemen who

own their own tractors or tractors and trailers. We pay them

a percentage of the revenue they generate to provide the

tractor, the trailer.

They’re also responsible, they purchase their own license

plates, pay their own fuel taxes, buy their own fuel, their own

tires, tarps, maintenance. The money we pay them, which is

on a 1099, is very simply their percentage, and they pay all

their own bills for that out of the money we pay them. As an

independent contractor, that is a *** long-term lease to us,

they primarily, then, work for us. There’s nothing in there that

prohibits them from working for other people as long as they

let us know, and that’s done because the Department of

Transportation requires a motor carrier, a licensed motor

carrier to keep certain records as far as driver’s licenses,

random drug or alcohol tests and some other things like that,

so they need to be leased to a motor carrier primarily. ***

Also, the work we have, if they choose not to work for a

week or so, then they can choose not to do that. They are

totally their own boss.”
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Kerola stated that when Roberson worked as an employee driver, P.I.

& I. had “100-percent control” over his work. But as an independent

contractor, Roberson was an “independent businessman,” making his

own decisions.

Kerola agreed that employee drivers are a major expense. P.I. &

I. has very few employee drivers–“one or two at the most”–and 150

independent contractors. P.I. & I. also has very few trucks, preferring

instead to lease them from independent contractors. Kerola stated that

P.I. & I. requires only that its independent contractors comply with

Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, though P.I. & I.

does ask its drivers “to call in daily to report their status.”

According to Kerola, P.I. & I. does not require independent

contractors to wear uniforms, and they may fuel and repair their

trucks at their discretion. Their routes are also left to their discretion,

as long as they deliver loads in a timely manner and keep P.I. & I.’s

customers happy. Kerola added that when drivers are given a load,

they are also given “the parameters with which that load needs

hauled.” The drivers may then accept or reject the load. “But if they

accept it,” stated Kerola, “we expect them to follow standard

procedures.” On this point, Kerola distinguished employees from

independent contractors. P.I. & I. takes some control over the routes

that employee or company drivers take; to a degree, these drivers

would be “directed on what routes are acceptable and unacceptable

because of the relationship with them and them driving a truck [for

which] we are buying the fuel, paying the tolls, paying the

maintenance. We want to make sure it runs in the lanes and routes

that we feel are the most economical.” Independent contractors do not

receive such suggestions. Some independent contractors would take

the same routes; some would not.

Kerola stated that independent contractors do not need written

permission for trip leases. Because P.I. & I. is the “primary lease” and

keeps records of its drivers, independent contractors must notify P.I.

& I. that they wish to work for another company. P.I. & I. then sends

a form to that company stating that the driver’s records are in its

possession and in order. Kerola further stated that drivers primarily

leased to P.I. & I., like Roberson, are required by the DOT to keep a

logbook, so the DOT can determine whether they are complying with

regulations regarding “hours of service.” P.I. & I. tries to ensure that
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its drivers–both employees and independent contractors–satisfy these

regulations. “If not,” stated Kerola, “we do what we need to do to get

them in compliance.”

P.I. & I. does not withhold taxes for independent contractors.

According to Kerola, P.I. & I. offers independent contractors the

opportunity to participate in certain programs to save them money.

Independent contractorsmay purchase occupational hazard insurance

coverage, as well as equipment insurance coverage, through P.I. & I.

Kerola described these as “pass-through” programs; the insurer

covers the independent contractors directly; P.I. & I. simply groups

them together to obtain more affordable coverage for them.

P.I. & I. also presented the evidence deposition of its regional

manager, Charles Butts. Butts stated that when Roberson was an

employee driver, he was required to report to work between 8 and 10

o’clock each morning. When he became an independent contractor,

he was not required to report to work. Employees can refuse one load;

independent contractors can refuse any load. Employees are

instructed where to obtain fuel; independent contractors are not

because they buy their own fuel. According to Butts, once employees

deliver their loads, they must report back to the P.I. & I. terminal.

Independent contractors are not required to do so. Butts stated that

P.I. & I. specifies routes for its employees, but not for its independent

contractors.

According to Butts, Roberson was primarily leased to P.I. & I.

That is, Roberson’s primary business was with P.I. & I. Butts insisted

that P.I. & I. does not require pretrip inspections, but the DOT

does–for any drivers, both employees and independent contractors.

The DOT also requires independent contractors to post logos of the

company for which they are driving on their trucks. Like Kerola,

Butts insisted that P.I. & I. did not enforce the contract provision

requiring written permission for trip leases. Roberson was “required

to or asked to call in and just tell us that he was going to” trip lease.

Butts stated that the annual review was required by P.I. & I.’s

liability insurer to determine whether its drivers had valid licenses

and any unreported tickets or accidents. P.I. & I. was required by the

DOT to insure any truck, whether owned by the company or an

independent contractor. Other insurance–cargo or worker’s
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compensation–would be the responsibility of the independent

contractor.

The arbitrator found that Roberson was not P.I. & I.’s employee

and that his injury was not work-related. The Industrial Commission

reversed. Relying on Ware v. Industrial Comm’n, 318 Ill. App. 3d

1117 (2000), the Commission found that P.I. & I. “both had and

exercised a right to control [Roberson’s] work activities.” Appendix

A of the independent contractor contract provided P.I. & I. with

exclusive possession, control and use of Roberson’s equipment, as

required by federal regulations. Roberson was required to report any

accidents to P.I. & I. and to maintain the trailer he leased according

to P.I. & I.’s instructions.

The Commission added that the record contained “other indicia

of control.” The Commission first addressed the provision in the

parties’ contract stating that P.I. & I. shall have no direction or control

over the contractor “except in the results to be obtained.” The

Commission characterized this as “a significant exception” because

it could be interpreted to mean that an employer could dictate to a

contractor the terms of delivery, and Roberson testified that he

received all of his delivery instructions from P.I. & I. The

Commission also noted that, while Roberson could “trip lease” with

P.I. & I.’s consent, he opted to drive exclusively for P.I. & I. because

its trip lease requirements were so onerous. Roberson, thus, was

primarily leased to P.I. & I.

The Commission further highlighted the fact that Roberson was

required to display P.I. & I. logos on his equipment and to perform

pretrip inspections. The Commission acknowledged that these

requirements were imposed by DOT regulations, but P.I. & I.’s

compliance with these regulations did not diminish its control over

Roberson’s work. The Commission also found that the services

Roberson provided for P.I. & I. constituted a regular part of its

business: “It is not as if [Roberson] was an outside contractor brought

in to perform a special service.” The Commission finally likened the

parties’ relationship to employment at-will because the contract could

be terminated upon written notice alone, absent any allegation of its

breach.

Additionally, the Commission found that Roberson suffered a

work-related injury. Roberson provided “a very detailed account of
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his accident,” which was consistent with the history he gave at the

emergency room. The Commission stated that the “puzzling

inconsistency” about whether Roberson’s back pain was caused by

sleeping in his truck was insufficient to defeat the entire claim. The

Commission awarded Roberson 7 3/7 weeks of temporary total

disability and $5,708 in medical expenses, and further found 10%

permanent disability.

P.I. & I. sought judicial review. The trial court found that the

Commission’s decision was against the manifest weight of the

evidence, and reinstated the arbitrator’s decision. Roberson appealed,

and the appellate court reversed. Regarding the issue of whether

Roberson was P.I. & I.’s employee, the appellate court initially noted

that this determination is fact specific. The appellate court stated that

here

“[t]he parties’ relationship contained elements of both

independent contractor and employment status. Factors such

as the manner in which claimant was paid; the parties’

labeling of their relationship; claimant providing his own

tractor and trailer; claimant paying for his own expenses, such

as insurance and fuel; and the fact that claimant could refuse

loads and choose his own routes indicate an independent

contractor status.

On the other hand, there were significant elements of

control present here. Most importantly, the contract gave

employer exclusive possession, use, and control of the

equipment. Although the contract contained a caveat that such

exclusive possession did not affect the parties’ legal

relationship, the caveat is merely a labeling provision, which

is a factor of lesser weight. The fact of exclusivity and control

remained.” No. 5–05–0279WC (unpublished order under

Supreme Court Rule 23).

The appellate court further noted that P.I. & I. controlled many

aspects of Roberson’s work. He was required to display P.I. & I.

logos, to communicate with P.I. & I. regularly, and to meet P.I. & I.’s

pick-up and delivery schedule. According to the appellate court,

Roberson did not work for other companies because it was too much

trouble: “The parties contract allowed [Roberson] to trip lease, but

placed restrictions on his ability to do so. Notably, one condition of
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trip leasing was that no freight of employer was available to load.”

The appellate court concluded that this case was close, but the

Commission’s finding of an employment relationship was not against

the manifest weight of the evidence.

Regarding the issue of whether Roberson’s injury was workrelated, the appellate court again concluded that the Commission’s

finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

According to the appellate court, the Commission found that, despite

some inconsistencies in Roberson’s version of the events leading to

his injuries, he essentially gave a plausible account of the accident.

On denial of rehearing, all five justices of the appellate panel filed

a statement that the case involves a substantial question warranting

consideration by this court. We allowed P.I. & I.’s petition for leave

to appeal. See 210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS

In worker’s compensation cases the Industrial Commission is the

ultimate decisionmaker. Cushing v. Industrial Comm’n, 50 Ill. 2d

179, 181-82 (1971). The Commission must weigh the evidence

presented at the arbitration hearing and determine where the

preponderance of that evidence lies. See Steiner v. Industrial

Comm’n, 101 Ill. 2d 257, 260 (1984); Wagner Castings Co. v.

Industrial Comm’n, 241 Ill. App. 3d 584, 594 (1993) (“it is solely

within the province of the Commission” to weigh the evidence

(emphasis in original)). A reviewing court will not set aside the

Commission’s decision unless its analysis is contrary to law (see

Butler Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 85 Ill. 2d 213, 216

(1981)) or its fact determinations are against the manifest weight of

the evidence (see Shockley v. Industrial Comm’n, 75 Ill. 2d 189, 193

(1979)). Fact determinations are against the manifest weight of the

evidence only when no rational trier of fact could have agreed with

the agency. See D.J. Masonry Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 295 Ill. App.

3d 924, 930 (1998).

This case, as framed in the appellate court, presents two issues:

(1) whether the Commission’s determination that an employment

relationship existed between Roberson and P.I. & I. was against the

manifest weight of the evidence, and (2) whether the Commission’s
 

2P.I. & I. elected to proceed on the argument presented in its petition and

did not file a separate appellant’s brief.

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determination that Roberson’s injury arose out of and in the course of

his employment was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

In its petition,2 P.I. & I. attempts to recast the first issue.

According to P.I. & I., the appellate court’s employment-relationship

analysis conflicts with that of Earley v. Industrial Comm’n, 197 Ill.

App. 3d 309 (1990), in several respects, including the effect of federal

regulations on the relationship between P.I. & I. and Roberson. P.I.

& I. asserts that on these questions of law our review should proceed

de novo. Roberson responds that the appellate court’s analysis was

consistent with Earley, and the primary question is still whether he

was an employee of P.I. & I. Roberson asserts that on that fact issue

our review should be deferential. Because the Commission’s decision

was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, argues Roberson,

this court should affirm.

An employment relationship is a prerequisite for an award of

benefits under the Act, and the question of whether a person is an

employee remains “one of the most vexatious *** in the law of

compensation.” O’Brien v. Industrial Comm’n, 48 Ill. 2d 304, 307

(1971). The difficulty arises not from the complexity of the applicable

legal rules, but from the fact-specific nature of the inquiry. No rule

has been, or could be, adopted to govern all cases in this area. Henry

v. Industrial Comm’n, 412 Ill. 279, 282 (1952). Instead, we have

listed various factors that help determine when a person is an

employee: whether the employer may control the manner in which the

person performs the work; whether the employer dictates the person’s

schedule; whether the employer pays the person hourly; whether the

employer withholds income and social security taxes from the

person’s compensation; whether the employer may discharge the

person at will; and whether the employer supplies the person with

materials and equipment. See Wenholdt v. Industrial Comm’n, 95 Ill.

2d 76, 81 (1983), quoting Morgan Cab Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 60

Ill. 2d 92, 97 (1975). Additionally, we have also considered whether

the employer’s general business encompasses the person’s work:
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“[B]ecause the theory of [worker’s] compensation legislation

is that the cost of industrial accidents should be borne by the

consumer as part of the cost of the product, this court has held

that a worker whose services form a regular part of the cost of

the product, and whose work does not constitute a separate

business which allows a distinct channel through which the

cost of an accident may flow, is presumptively within the area

of intended protection of the compensation act.” Ragler

Motor Sales v. Industrial Comm’n, 93 Ill. 2d 66, 71 (1982).

No single factor is determinative, and the significance of these factors

will change depending on the work involved. Luby v. Industrial

Comm’n, 82 Ill. 2d 353, 358-59 (1980). The determination rests on

the totality of the circumstances.

The right to control the manner of the work is often called the

most important consideration. SeeBauer v.Industrial Comm’n, 51 Ill.

2d 169, 172 (1972); Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 212 Ill. 2d 1, 13

(2004) (“An independent contractor is defined by the level of control

over the manner of work performance”), citing Hartley v. Red Ball

Transit Co., 344 Ill. 534, 539 (1931). Discussing Ware, the appellate

court here noted that contract language required by federal regulations

may indicate such control.

More than 50 years ago, interstate motor carriers shielded

themselves from liability for their drivers’ negligence by leasing

trucks from independent contractors. Morris v. JTM Materials, Inc.,

78 S.W.3d 28, 37 (Tex. Ct. App.–Fort Worth 2002). Such

arrangements invariably led to abuses that threatened public safety,

as unscrupulous motor carriers leased inexpensive, and unsafe,

equipment from shallow-pocket drivers. Harris v. Mitchell, 358 N.J.

Super. 504, 507-08, 818 A.2d 443, 445 (2003). In 1956, Congress

amended the Interstate Commerce Act and authorized the Interstate

Commerce Commission (ICC) to prescribe regulations governing

leased equipment. See Pub. L. No. 84–957, reprinted in 1956

U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163. In 1995, Congress abolished the ICC; its

functions were transferred to the DOT and the Surface Transportation

Board, and many sections of the Interstate Commerce Act were

recodified. See Harris, 358 N.J. Super. at 508, 818 A.2d at 445.

Section 14102(a)(4) of that Act currently provides:
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“The Secretary [of Transportation] may require a motor

carrier providing [interstate] transportation *** that uses

motor vehicles not owned by it to transport property under an

arrangement with another party to *** have control of and be

responsible for operating those motor vehicles in compliance

with requirements prescribed by the Secretary on safety of

operations and equipment, and with other applicable law as if

the motor vehicles were owned by the motor carrier.” 49

U.S.C. §14102(a)(4) (2000).

See Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. v. Brada Miller Freight

Systems, Inc., 423 U.S. 28, 39, 46 L. Ed. 2d 169, 178, 96 S. Ct. 229,

235 (1975).

The DOT requires a motor vehicle lease to provide that “the

authorized carrier lessee shall have exclusive possession, control, and

use of the equipment for the duration of the lease. The lease shall

further provide that the authorized carrier lessee shall assume

complete responsibility for the operation of the equipment for the

duration of the lease.” 49 C.F.R. §376.12(c)(1) (2005). This

regulation, like its precursors, prevents motor carriers from escaping

liability to injured persons by claiming that their drivers were

independent contractors, rather than employees. See St. Paul Fire &

Marine Insurance Co. v. Frankart, 69 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (1977);

Schedler v. Rowley Interstate Transportation Co., 68 Ill. 2d 7, 13

(1977); Hershberger v. Home Transport Co., 103 Ill. App. 3d 348,

352 (1982); Stonerock v. Miller Brothers Paving, Inc., 72 Ohio App.

3d 123, 128, 594 N.E.2d 94, 97 (1991) (“These regulations, and the

statute pursuant to which they were promulgated, were created in

order to correct widespread abuses by authorized interstate carries

who would immunize themselves from liability to the public by

leasing trucks from third parties”), citing American Trucking

Associations v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 303, 97 L. Ed. 337, 352,

73 S. Ct. 307, 311 (1953).

Pursuant to this regulation, some courts have characterized

independent contractor lessors as “statutory employees” of motor

carrier lessees. See, e.g., Harris, 358 N.J. Super. at 509, 818 A.2d at

446, quoting Cox v. Bond Transportation, Inc., 53 N.J. 186, 201, 249

A.2d 579, 587 (1969); Tamez v. Southwestern Motor Transport, Inc.,

155 S.W.3d 564, 573 (Tex. Ct. App.–San Antonio 2004) (“an
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interstate carrier is vicariously liable as a matter of law under the

[regulations] for the negligence of its statutory employee drivers”).

This is a legislative fiction, of course, intended to shift responsibility

for the safe use of leased equipment to the motor carrier in order to

protect the public. Harris, 358 N.J. Super. at 510, 818 A.2d at 446.

The statutory scheme created by Congress plainly accepts a

distinction between employees and independent contractors. See

Pouliot v. Paul Arpin Van Lines, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 374, 383 (D.

Conn. 2003) (“the existence of a lease under regulations that impose

liability between the carrier-lessee and the public does not have any

impact on the type of relationship that exists between the carrierlessee and the contractor-lessor”). Indeed, as P.I. & I. observes, 49

C.F.R. §376.12(c)(4) (2005) provides:

“Nothing in the provisions required by paragraph (c)(1) of

this section is intended to affect whether the lessor or driver

provided by the lessor is an independent contractor or an

employee of the authorized carrier lessee. An independent

contractorrelationship may exist when a carrier complies with

49 U.S.C. 14102 and the attendant administrative

requirements.”

In short, the regulation requiring a motor carrier to have exclusive

possession, control, and use of leased equipment does not mandate

that the driver is an employee for all purposes. “While a lessee cannot

free itself of its federally imposed duties when protection of the

public is at stake, the federal requirements are not so radically

intrusive as to absolve lessors *** of otherwise existing obligations

under applicable state tort law doctrines or under contracts allocating

financial risk among private parties.” (Emphasis added.) Carolina

Casualty Insurance Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 595 F.2d

128, 138 (3d Cir. 1979). Freedom of contract requires that parties

may structure their relationship as they see fit, provided they do not

neglect the requirements of federal law. See Riddle v. Trans-Cold

Express, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 186, 189-90 (S.D. Ill. 1982) (“the lessor

and lessee of equipment operated under an I.C.C. certificate are free

to agree, by contract, as to rights affecting their relationship, so long

as their duty to the general public is not diminished”). Compliance

with federal regulations is merely a factor that may be considered in

a common law analysis of whether a driver is an employee of a
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trucking company. Universal Am-Can, Ltd. v. Worker’s

Compensation Appeal Board, 563 Pa. 480, 489, 762 A.2d 328, 332

(2000); Toomer v. United Resin Adhesives, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 219,

229 (N.D. Ill. 1986).

Ware and Earley are consistent on this point. Both cases state that

contract language required by federal regulations is a consideration

in determining whether the trucking company had the right to control

the driver’s work. See Ware, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1123; Earley, 197 Ill.

App. 3d at 314. These cases, however, reach different results on

different facts. P.I. & I.’s argument thus reduces to simply this: the

Commission relied upon Ware, when it should have followed Earley.

In Ware, a truck driver was injured while making delivery for a

trucking company. At the time of the accident, the driver and the

company were operating under an “Equipment Lease Agreement

Between Independent Contractor and Carrier.” The agreement

provided that the driver would lease his truck to the company in

return for a percentage of the gross revenue that the company received

for each load. Under the agreement, the company would have

“exclusive possession, control, and use” of the truck “for the limited

purpose of complying with state and federal transportation law.”

The driver was required to shave and occasionally to wear a

uniform, and the company arranged for his work. The company would

issue a travel order, instructing the driver what load he would be

hauling, when to pick it up, and when and where to deliver it. The

travel order included route information, which the driver was not

required to follow unless he was hauling hazardous materials. The

company dictated how the driver should operate and maintain his

truck, particularly in cold weather. The driver was responsible for

inspecting the truck and its trailer, and he was required to notify the

company if he had an accident. The company’s logo was displayed on

the side of the driver’s truck, and it was registered in the company’s

name, as required by federal regulations. The driver was forbidden to

drive more hours than allowed by those regulations.

The driver shouldered all the costs associated with operating the

truck. The company did not withhold income or social security taxes

for the driver. The company paid for liability insurance on the truck

while it was in its service and for “bobtail” insurance on the truck

while it was not in its service; the cost of the bobtail insurance was
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charged to the driver. Under the lease, the driver was required to

procure worker’s compensation insurance, and he was allowed to

enroll in an occupational accident plan through the company. The

lease allowed the driver to hire employees and to use his truck for

other firms, subject to the company’s approval. The lease could be

terminated by either party upon written notice.

An arbitrator determined that the driver was an employee of the

company, and the Commission reversed. The trial court confirmed

this decision, but the appellate court found that it was against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Ware, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1127. The

appellate court concluded that the evidence indicated that the

company both had and exercised a right to control the driver’s work.

Ware, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1123. The court recognized that the

company exercised this control to ensure it complied with federal

regulations or customer demands, but held that the motivation for its

actions was “irrelevant.” Ware, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1123. The court

stated that a showing of control may arise “ ‘by introducing detailed

regulations *** and proving that the employer was personally

responsible for their observance.’ “ Ware, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1123,

quoting 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, Worker’s Compensation Law

§61.05(3), at 61–9 (2000).

The appellate court further stated that the driver’s work was

“intimately related” to the company’s business. Ware, 318 Ill. App.

3d at 1124-25. The driver “had no customers of his own. He worked

exclusively for [the company], served customers designated by [the

company], and was paid a percentage of what [the company] received

from these customers.” Ware, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1124-25. The

company’s business was hauling freightfor its customers; the driver’s

work, likewise, was hauling freight for the company’s customers.

Ware, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1125. The driver was engaged in a long,

continuous, and exclusive relationship with the company, and he did

not trip lease. Ware, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1126. The relationship was

akin to at will employment and could be terminated absent a breach

by either party. Ware, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1126. Additionally, the

appellate court stated that the company provided a trailer for the

driver, and he sometimes wore a uniform. Ware, 318 Ill. App. 3d at

1125-26.
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The appellate court declined to give much weight to the facts that

the contract designated the driver an independent contractor and that

the company did not withhold taxes. Ware, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1127.

Considering the factors in their totality, the court stated that “strong

evidence exists that [the driver] was an employee,” and the

Commission’s decision to the contrary was against the manifest

weight of that evidence. Ware, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1126. See also

Peesel v. Industrial Comm’n, 224 Ill. App. 3d 711 (1992) (holding

that the Commission’s decision that a driver was not an employee

was against the manifest weight of the evidence).

In Earley, a truck driver was injured while making a delivery for

a trucking company. The driver and the company were parties to a

one-year equipment lease. Under the lease, the driver would provide

the truck, the trailer, and a driver, in return for a percentage of the

gross revenue for each load that he hauled. From these payments, the

company deducted the driver’s workers’ compensation insurance

premiums and any cash advances, but it did not withhold income or

social security taxes for the driver. The driver bore all the costs

associated with operating the equipment. The driver even paid for the

truck’s licenses, but they were in both his name and the company’s

name.

The driver could hire employees, but they had to be approved by

the company before they could haul any loads. Either the company

would call the driver with work, or the driver would call the company

for work. The company told the driver where and when to pick up and

deliver loads, but the driver chose his route. The driver was instructed

to notify the company if he had an accident. He primarily worked for

the company, but he was permitted to trip lease. Trip leases were

arranged through the company.

The arbitrator determined that the driver was not an employee of

the company, and the Commission affirmed. The trial court

confirmed the Commission’s decision, and the appellate court

affirmed. The appellate court initially noted that the driver contended

the Commission’s decision was erroneous as a matter of law, citing

federal regulations. Earley, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 314. The court stated:

“The ICC’s rules *** require a lease agreement, such as the

one here, to include a provision that the authorized carrier has

exclusive possession, control, and use of the leased equipment
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for the duration of the lease. Therefore, because Federal law

requires [the company] to have the exclusive possession and

control provisions in the lease, [the driver] argues that this

confers upon [the company] the right to control the work ***,

thereby creating an employee status *** as a matter of law.

While the ICC rules and regulations are a factor to consider

in determining a claimant’s employment status,these rules are

not conclusive ***.” Earley, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 314.

The appellate court then stated that some facts indicated that the

driver was an employee, while others indicated that he was an

independent contractor. Earley, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 315. The company

could direct the driver when and where to pick up and deliver loads,

but the driver chose his own route. Earley, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 315. He

worked solely for the company, and even his trip leases were arranged

by the company. Earley, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 315. The court observed,

however, that the driver was paid for trip leases as he was paid for

other loads; he received a flat percentage of the revenue generated by

his work. Earley, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 315. According to the court, the

company “was only interested in the end result, i.e., that the

shipments be transported within a given time to a customer, and that

the details of how this was accomplished were left to [the driver].”

Earley, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 317. The driver paid his own income and

social security taxes, as well as the costs of operating his equipment.

Earley, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 316.

The court then considered the nexus between the driver’s work

and the company’s business: “In trucking cases such as this, this is a

close consideration.” Earley, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 316. The driver and

the company were in the same business: transporting shipments for

profit. Earley, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 316. Regarding the right to

discharge, the appellate court noted that the lease could be terminated

by either party for any reason. Earley, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 316.

The lease labeled the driver as an independent contractor, but

according to the court, this factor was controversial: “It has been held

that the label given by the parties in a written agreement will not be

dispositive of the employment status, but that the facts of the case

must be considered to determine what the individual’s employment

status is. [Citation.] Further, although a contractual agreement is a

factor to consider, it does not, as a matter of law, determine an
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individual’s employment status. [Citation.]” Earley, 197 Ill. App. 3d

at 317-18. In a close case, however, the contract’s designation of a

person as an independent contractor may tip the balance by

establishing the parties’ intent. Earley, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 318,

quoting 1C A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation §46.30, at 8–263-

8–264 (1986). In this case, the court found that calling the driver an

independent contractor was not “a sham label,” and the lease

indicated the parties’ intent. Earley, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 318.

Given the competing inferences arising from the facts, it was the

Commission’s province to determine the driver’s employment status.

Earley, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 318. The court concluded that the

Commission’s decision was not against the manifest weight of the

evidence. Earley, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 318.

Certainly, the case before us is similar in some respects to Earley,

just as it is similar in some respects to Ware. But the question before

us is not whether the Commission’s decision tracked one case when

it should have tracked another. The question is whether the

Commission’s decision was against the manifest weight of the

evidence. We turn to that evidence.

The contract between Roberson and P.I. & I. provided that the

parties did not intend to create an employment relationship, and both

parties could terminate the contract at any time upon written notice.

Appendix A of the lease gave P.I. & I. the exclusive possession,

control, and use of Roberson’s truck, but the contract stated that P.I.

& I. had no control over Roberson, “except in the results to be

obtained.” That is, P.I. & I. did not dictate Roberson’s routes, as long

as, according to Kerola, “he delivers [loads] in a timely manner that

keeps our customers happy.” The contract required Roberson to

operate his truck in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

Roberson testified that he was required to perform pretrip inspections

and to post P.I. & I. logos on his truck, but Butts testified that these

were DOT requirements for any of its drivers. Kerola testified that

independent contractors are required by the DOT to keep a logbook,

so the DOT can determine whether they are complying with

regulations regarding hours of service. P.I. & I. ensures its drivers

comply with these regulations. Tellingly, Kerola stated that if its

drivers stray from these regulations, P.I. & I. does what it needs to do

to get them in compliance. P.I. & I. even keeps personnel files and
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performs annual reviews of its drivers as required by its insurer.

Roberson was required to notify P.I. & I. if he had an accident, and

P.I. & I. provided him with a camera to photograph any damage.

The contract stated that P.I. & I. could allow trip leases if it

preapproved the other motor carrier, issued a release to Roberson, and

had no freight available for Roberson to haul. Butts testified that P.I.

& I. does not enforce the contract requirement of written permission,

and Kerola testified that P.I. & I. does not require written permission

for trip leases. But Kerola added that independent contractors must

notify P.I. & I. that they wish to work for another motor carrier. P.I.

& I., as the “primary lease” of these drivers, then must send a form to

the other carrier stating that the drivers’ records are in order.

Roberson testified that he did not drive for other companies because

he found the authorization process too burdensome. The record is

unclear whether Roberson actually had trip leases with two other

companies while he was primarily leased to P.I. & I.

Butts testified that Roberson was not required to report to work

each morning, but Kerola testified that P.I. & I. asks its drivers “to

call in daily to report their status.” Roberson confirmed this, stating

that he telephoned P.I. & I. each morning to see if any loads were

available. Roberson also testified that P.I. & I. occasionally gave him

a “hot load” to deliver quickly. According to Kerola, drivers are given

parameters in which loads must be hauled. If drivers accept such

parameters, P.I. & I. expects them to follow “standard procedures.”

Roberson was paid a percentage of the gross revenue that P.I. &

I. received for the loads he delivered. From his weekly settlements

Roberson paid the costs and expenses of operating his truck, as well

as his own taxes. Additionally, he paid for his own worker’s

compensation and liability insurance coverage, though he obtained

such coverage through P.I. & I. P.I. & I. provides such services only

to drivers primarily doing business with the company. P.I. & I. also

provided Roberson with a debit card, which he could use to purchase

fuel, pay for repairs, or obtain cash advances, which were later

deducted from his settlements.

Roberson had his own truck, but he leased a trailer from P.I. & I.

He not only paid rent on the trailer–10% of the gross revenue for each

load, or approximately one-eighth of his compensation–he also

maintained it to P.I. & I.’s specifications. See 3 A. Larson & L.
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Larson, Worker’s Compensation Law §61.07(3), at 61–19 (2006)

(“control may be realistically inferred even when the employer owns

only a part of the equipment, if that part is of considerable size and

value”). Finally, Roberson’s work fell entirely within the scope of P.I.

& I.’s business. P.I. & I., for economic reasons, used independent

contractor drivers almost exclusively, and Roberson was primarily

leased to P.I. & I. for nearly eight months before his accident. See 3

A. Larson & L. Larson, Worker’s Compensation Law §61.07(5), at

61–21 (2006) (“there is a growing tendency to classify owner-drivers

of trucks as employees when they perform continuous service which

is an integral part of the employer’s business”).

This is a close case. The same reasoning employed in Earley to

uphold the Commission’s decision leads us to do the same. The

evidence here was well balanced; it was the Industrial Commission’s

province to weigh it and decide among competing inferences. See

Earley, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 318. The Commission found Roberson to

be an employee of P.I. & I. We cannot say that decision was against

the manifest weight of the evidence.

With respect to the second issue, P.I. & I. argues that the appellate

court erred in concluding that the Commission’s decision on

causation was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

According to P.I. & I., the record does not support Roberson’s

testimony regarding his work and injury. P.I. & I. points to various

discrepancies between Roberson’s testimony and the record.

Roberson predictably responds that the appellate court did not err.

As the appellate court correctly observed, Roberson’s testimony

provided a detailed account of this accident, consistent with the

history he gave at the emergency room on the morning after the

accident, and to Dr. Villegas four days later. Roberson testified that

he notified P.I. & I. of this accident, and Kerola and Butts did not

dispute his testimony. The Commission noted a “puzzling

inconsistency” in Dr. Mayersdorf’s records, but the statement in Dr.

Mayersdorf’s records that Roberson hurt his back sleeping in his

truck is neither puzzling nor inconsistent. The emergency room

records indicate that Roberson was prescribed Vicodin and Flexeril

after he slipped in his truck. Dr. Mayersdorf’s records indicate that

Roberson was prescribed those same painkillers after he “slept” in his

truck two days earlier. Dr. Villegas testified that it was unlikely that
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Roberson could herniate a disc, as shown by the MRI test, in his

sleep. Absent any evidence that Roberson slept in his truck on the day

of the accident, it seems likely that “slept” is a typographical or

transcription error for “slipped.” The findings of fact made by the

Commission were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons that we have stated, we affirm.

Affirmed.