Filed 10/3/24 P. v. Walker CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

WALTER EARL WALKER,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B334454

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. TA033786)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Allen Joseph Webster, Jr., Judge. Reversed. 

Sydney Banach, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________
2

In 1996, a jury convicted Walter Earl Walker of murder 

and assault. When sentencing Walker, the trial court imposed 

and stayed two Penal Code1 section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior 

prison term enhancements. The Legislature subsequently 

deemed invalid enhancements “imposed” pursuant to section 

667.5, subdivision (b) unless imposed for a sexually violent 

offense. Section 1172.75 creates a procedure for resentencing 

persons sentenced to the now invalid enhancements. 

This appeal is from the trial court’s order denying Walker a 

resentencing hearing because the section 667.5, subdivision (b) 

enhancements were imposed and stayed, as opposed to imposed 

and executed. On appeal, the parties dispute whether 

section 1172.75 applies to enhancements that were imposed but

stayed. Recognizing this issue is currently before our high court,2

we follow the weight of appellate authority holding a defendant 

whose sentence includes a section 667.5, subdivision (b) 

enhancement that has been imposed and stayed is entitled to a 

full resentencing hearing. Accordingly, we reverse the order 

denying Walker a resentencing hearing. 

BACKGROUND3

By information filed September 8, 1995, the People charged 

Walker with the murder of Miguel Galarza and an assault with a 

firearm on E. Macedo. The People alleged Walker personally 

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code. 

2 See Discussion, post.

3 Although our record does not include a transcript of the 

trial, the facts underlying Walker’s offenses are irrelevant to the 

legal issue before us. 
3

used a firearm. The People alleged two section 667.5, 

subdivision (b) enhancements.

The jury convicted Walker of murder and assault and found 

true the personal use of a firearm as to both convictions. The 

court also found true the two 667.5, subdivision (b) 

enhancements.

In 1996, the court sentenced Walker to a total term of 

37 years 4 months to life. The court imposed and stayed a 

one-year term for each 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement.

In 2023, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(CDCR) notified the Superior Court that Walker was possibly 

eligible for resentencing based on the section 667.5, 

subdivision (b) enhancements. The resentencing trial court found 

Walker was not eligible for resentencing because the trial court 

had stayed sentence on the section 667.5, subdivision (b)

enhancements. Walker did not file a timely notice of appeal, but 

we court granted him relief to file a belated notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

A sentence enhancement is an “ ‘ “additional term of 

imprisonment added to the base term.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1124.) Before January 1, 2020, 

section 667.5, subdivision (b) required that trial courts impose a 

one-year sentence enhancement for each prior prison or county 

jail term the defendant served if the defendant had not remained 

free of custody for the preceding five years. (§ 667.5, former 

subd. (b); People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664, 681 

(Jennings).) 

Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 

Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 136) amended section 667.5, 

subdivision (b), by limiting the enhancement to prior prison 
4

terms for sexually violent offenses. (§ 667.5, subd. (b); Jennings, 

supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 681.) “By eliminating section 667.5, 

subdivision (b) enhancements for all prior prison terms except 

those for sexually violent offenses, the Legislature clearly 

expressed its intent in Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) 

to reduce or mitigate the punishment for prior prison terms for 

offenses other than sexually violent offenses.” (Jennings, supra, 

at p. 682.) In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483 

(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 483), which made Senate 

Bill No. 136’s changes to the law retroactive (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, 

§ 1), and added former section 1171.1, now section 1172.75, to the 

Penal Code. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.) 

Section 1172.75 provides in relevant part: 

“(a) Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to 

January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, 

except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a 

sexually violent offense . . . is legally invalid. 

“(b) The Secretary of the Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation and the county correctional administrator of each 

county shall identify those persons in their custody currently 

serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement 

described in subdivision (a) and shall provide the name of each 

person, along with the person’s date of birth and the relevant 

case number or docket number, to the sentencing court that

imposed the enhancement. . . .

[¶] . . . [¶]

“(c) Upon receiving the information described in subdivision 

(b), the court shall review the judgment and verify that the 

current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described 

in subdivision (a). If the court determines that the current 
5

judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), 

the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the 

defendant. . . . 

[¶] . . . [¶]

“(d)(1) Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in 

a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of 

the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court 

finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser 

sentence would endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant 

to this section shall not result in a longer sentence than the one 

originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75, italics added.) 

The parties dispute whether the term “imposed” in 

subdivision (a) includes enhancements that were imposed and 

stayed or instead, applies only to enhancements that are imposed 

and executed. Appellate courts have disagreed on this issue, 

which is pending before our Supreme Court. (See, e.g., People v. 

Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188 (Espino) [holding inter alia 

§ 1172.75 applicable to sentence enhancements regardless of 

whether the original trial court stayed the enhancement];

4 People 

v. Mayberry (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 665, 672 [same], review 

granted Aug. 14, 2024, S285853; People v. Saldana (2023) 

97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1276 [same], review granted Mar. 12, 2024, 

S283547; People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, 309 

(Christianson) [same], review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189; 

4 The majority in Espino also held that section 1172.75 

applies to a section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement that the 

original trial court had stricken. (Espino, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 194, petn. for review pending, petn. filed Sept. 19, 2024, 

S286987 [324 Cal.Rptr.3d 377, 382–383].) We express no opinion 

on whether that holding is correct. 
6

People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38 [holding § 1172.75 

applies only to executed sentence enhancements], review granted 

Feb. 21, 2024, S283169.) 

We agree with those appellate courts interpreting

section 1172.75 to include sentences for prison prior 

enhancements that have been imposed and stayed, particularly 

Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 300, review granted. 

Christianson explained that under section 1172.75, 

subdivision (b), the CDCR is required to identify all inmates for 

whom the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements were 

included in the abstract of judgment regardless of whether the 

enhancements were stayed. (Christianson, supra, at p. 312.) 

“Had the Legislature intended for the language in subdivision (b) 

to limit the identification to those inmates that would necessarily 

be required to serve an additional term based on the 

enhancement, it certainly could have done so.” (Ibid.) “It does 

not follow logic or reason to read these two subdivisions together 

in a manner that would require the CDCR to identify a larger 

class of inmates—all those serving time on a judgment that 

include a now invalid enhancement—only for the trial courts to 

then look at the same abstracts of judgment available to the 

CDCR to determine whether the previous court imposed 

additional time for, or stayed, the relevant enhancements.” 

(Ibid.) 

Christianson further explained that the Legislature 

intended to “provide broad relief to all defendants impacted by 

the now invalid section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements.” 

(Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 314, review granted.) 

Because “the Legislature chose to mandate a full resentencing for 

those individuals impacted by a now invalid section 667.5, 
7

subdivision (b) enhancement,” Christianson discerned “no reason 

to differentiate between defendants serving an additional term 

based specifically on a now invalid enhancements and those for 

whom the enhancement was imposed but stayed. In both 

instances, the presence of the enhancement was one component 

considered by the sentencing court in pronouncing the overall 

sentence.” (Christianson, supra, at p. 315.) 

Respondent argues Christianson was wrongly decided 

because it relied on People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142 and 

People v. Brewer (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 98 “to conclude the 

Legislature was aware of a trial court’s authority to stay 

section 667.5(b) enhancements and, by not providing a ‘carveout’ 

for such stayed enhancements, intended for section 1172.75 to 

apply to both executed and stayed enhancements.” According to 

respondent, Jones and Brewer considered “other provisions of 

law” and did not consider the “Legislature’s use of ‘imposed’ in 

section 667.5(b).” 

We agree with respondent insofar as respondent argues 

neither Jones nor Brewer considered the meaning of the term 

“imposed” in section 1172.75, subdivision (a), the resentencing 

statute at issue before us. We, however, do not agree that 

Christianson’s reliance on those cases undermines Christianson’s 

holding that section 1172.75 includes section 667.5, 

subdivision (b) enhancements that were imposed and stayed. 

First, Christianson relied on Brewer to reject respondent’s 

argument that a stayed enhancement never results in additional 

punishment. (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312, 

review granted.) Citing Brewer, Christianson explained that a 

trial court “retains the ability to lift the stay and impose the term 

under certain circumstance, such as if an alternately imposed 
8

term is invalidated.” (Ibid.) Respondent does not dispute that a 

trial court retains the ability to impose a stayed term under 

certain circumstances. 

Second, Christianson referred to Brewer and Jones in 

discussing whether the trial court in that case erred in 

administratively striking the section 667.5, subdivision (b) 

enhancement rather than resentencing the defendant. 

(Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 315–316, review 

granted.) The trial court in Christianson reasoned it should 

strike the enhancement because “the general rule that ‘once the 

prison prior is found true, it must be imposed or stricken, not 

stayed’ . . . .” (Id. at p. 315.) In other words, staying the 

enhancement was unauthorized. In response, the appellate court 

observed there are statutory exceptions to the general rule. 

(Ibid.) Christianson cited Jones and Brewer as “authority 

suggesting that section 667 allows for a stay in cases in which 

there is both a section 667 serious felony prior enhancement and 

a section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement based on the same 

underlying conviction.” (Christianson, supra, at pp. 315–316.) 

Christianson then held the trial court erred in administratively 

striking the section 667.5, subdivision (b) priors rather than 

resentencing the defendant. (Christianson, at p. 316.) Again, 

these references to Brewer and Jones do not undermine our 

reliance on Christianson where the trial court here did not strike 

the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements.

Respondent also contends our high court has interpreted 

the term “imposed” in People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1125–

1130 to mean “imposed and executed.” The Gonzalez court, 

however, interpreted the term “imposed” as it appears in a 

completely different statute, there section 12022.53, 
9

subdivision (f). Gonzalez recognized that “imposed” could 

encompass an enhancement that was imposed and executed as 

well as an enhancement that was imposed and then stayed, but 

reasoned, “ ‘as a practical matter, the word “impose” is often 

employed as shorthand to refer to the first situation, while the 

word “stay” often refers to the latter.’ [Citation.]” (Gonzalez, 

supra, at p. 1125.) Construing the term in the context of the

statutory scheme before it, Gonzalez held that “impose” in 

section 12022.53, subdivision (f) means imposed and executed 

and not imposed and stayed. (Gonzalez, at p. 1126.)

As Christianson recognized, Gonzalez was interpreting a 

statute whose purpose was diametrically opposed to section 

1172.75’s purpose to reduce sentences. As Gonzalez observed 

regarding section 12022.53, subdivision (f), “the Legislature’s 

stated intent was to ensure that “ ‘ “substantially longer prison 

sentences must be imposed on felons who use firearms in the 

commission of their crimes, in order to protect our citizens and to 

deter violent crime.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Christianson, 

supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 313, review granted, italics added.) 

In contrast, Senate Bill Nos. 136 and 483 were “expressly aimed 

at reducing sentences by retroactively eliminating a sentencing 

enhancement described as exacerbating ‘existing racial and socioeconomic disparities in our criminal justice system.’ (Sen. Rules 

Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as 

amended Sept. 3, 2019, p. 5; see also Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1 [‘in 

order to ensure equal justice and address systemic racial bias in 

sentencing, it is the intent of the Legislature to retroactively 

apply . . . Senate Bill [No.] 136 . . . to all persons currently 

serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for these repealed 
10

sentence enhancements’].)” (Christianson, at p. 314.) 

Interpreting “imposed” broadly advances this goal. (See ibid.) 

DISPOSITION

The order finding Walker ineligible for resentencing is 

reversed. The case is remanded for a full resentencing hearing 

pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75, as to the section 667, 

subdivision (b) enhancements that were imposed but stayed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

WEINGART, J.

KLINE, J.*

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First

Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.