IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-40171

Summary Calendar

JARRIOD SCOTT,

Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

WEBER AIRCRAFT,

Defendant–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:11-CV-728

Before SMITH, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Following his termination by Weber Aircraft (Weber), Jarriod Scott 

brought this lawsuit alleging racial discrimination, retaliation, hostile work 

environment, negligence, defamation, and breach of contract. The district 

court granted summary judgment to Weber and Scott appealed. We hold that

the district court correctly granted summary judgment for Weber on each of 

Scott’s claims. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

* Pursuant to Fifth Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Fifth 

Cir. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 17, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 14-40171

I.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. 

Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is 

appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 56(a). All facts and inferences are construed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Dillon, 596 F.3d at 266.

II.

The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation provides a full 

account of the facts. The district court adopted the findings and conclusions of 

the magistrate judge as the findings and conclusions of the district court. Scott 

was employed as an assembler by Weber, an aircraft seat manufacturer, from 

2005 until he was terminated in 2011. His employment and eventual 

termination were subject to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) 

negotiated between Weber and the General Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 

767 (Union). 

According to Scott, who is African-American, in 2006 he observed a white 

noose constructed of towels hanging on the end of one of the assembly-line 

machines. After three days, Scott brought the noose to the attention of his 

supervisor and it was taken down. In 2010, Scott became aware of a thirdparty publication on Weber property containing the “n-word.” Scott reported 

this and met with his Union representative and the Human Resources (HR) 

Manager, Elizabeth Hutchon, that same day. Following this meeting, Hutchon

e-mailed all Weber supervisors, reiterating the policy that no third-party 

materials were permitted to be distributed on Weber property without prior 

approval by Weber. Scott alleges that after this report, members of 

management and key Weber employees began conducting surveillance of Scott. 

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Scott contends that in March 2011, a car was driven at him in the Weber 

parking lot and “grazed” him as he extended his hands to push away from the 

vehicle. Scott did not know the driver. Scott reported this incident to HR

personnel at Weber, who then called the police. Scott provided Hutchon with 

the license plate of the vehicle and Hutchon provided Scott with the identity of 

the employee who owned the vehicle so that Scott could file an insurance claim. 

Scott also filed a worker’s compensation claim arising from injuries from this 

incident. That claim was denied based on a lack of evidence of the incident and 

a lack of evidence of any injury. 

Scott also alleges that a white Weber employee videotaped or 

photographed Scott in the parking lot. According to Scott, other employees 

began driving in front of and behind him in the parking lot, and at one point a

different unidentified Weber employee pointed his finger at Scott “like he was 

fixing to pull a trigger.” 

In August 2010, a female employee reported that Scott had been staring 

at her and had touched her backside. In March 2011, another female employee 

reported that Scott had been harassing her for the past year by pulling up to 

her vehicle in the parking lot and staring at her. In April 2011, a female 

employee reported to HR that Scott had inquired with her about “that b---h,” 

in reference to another female employee. Around the same time, a male 

employee reported that Scott had stared at him on multiple occasions and 

another male employee reported that Scott had stared at him while the 

employee was using the restroom. 

The following day, Scott was issued a formal warning for intimidating 

and improper conduct. Scott acknowledged that he received the warning. 

Several days later, Scott again reported that he had almost been struck by a 

car in the parking lot. During the subsequent meeting with HR, Scott shouted 

and looked directly at Hutchon when using the word “b---h.” The following day, 

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two female employees reported that Scott asked them for their names in a way 

that made them feel targeted. The next day, Scott was fired. 

Scott filed a grievance and a meeting was held. Scott contends that at 

that meeting, a Weber employee, Dane Coker, stated that there was a video of 

the 2011 incident in the parking lot that showed that Scott was not hit by a 

vehicle. In May 2011, Scott filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC. 

The EEOC found insufficient evidence of a Title VII violation to sustain Scott’s 

claim. Scott then filed this lawsuit for race-based employment discrimination, 

retaliation, hostile work environment, defamation, negligence, and breach of 

contract. The magistrate judge recommended in favor of granting summary

judgment for Weber on all claims. The district court adopted the magistrate 

judge’s report and recommendation and granted summary judgment for 

Weber. Scott appealed the judgment as to all claims.

III.

On appeal, Scott raises a number of arguments, but his claims sound 

most clearly in retaliation. Because Scott appeals pro se, and for thoroughness, 

we, as the magistrate judge did, analyze Scott’s allegations for a variety of 

claims. Scott argues that Weber was not entitled to summary judgment on his 

race discrimination claim. To prove a claim of intentional discrimination Scott 

must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for 

the position at issue; (3) he was the subject of an adverse employment action; 

and (4) he was treated less favorably because of his membership in that 

protected class than were other similarly situated employees who were not 

members of the protected class, under nearly identical circumstances. Lee v. 

Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing McDonnell 

Douglass Corp. v. Green 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). 

To meet this standard, Scott must first make a prima facie case of racial 

discrimination. Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 317 (5th 

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Cir. 2004). Weber may then articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason 

for Scott’s termination. Id. Scott must then “offer sufficient evidence to create 

a genuine issue of material fact either (1) that [Weber’s] reason is not true, but 

is instead a pretext for discrimination (pretext alternative); or (2) that 

[Weber’s] reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and 

another ‘motivating factor’ is [Scott’s] protected characteristic (mixed-motives 

alternative).” Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).

As explained in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, Scott 

failed to make out a prima facie case. Scott did not identify any similarly 

situated employees—employees against whom complaints were made—who 

were treated differently than he was treated, nor did Scott allege that he was 

replaced by someone outside of the protected class. Moreover, even if Scott 

could demonstrate a prima facie case, Weber has articulated a valid nondiscriminatory reason for his termination—Scott’s staring and “intimidating” 

conduct toward other employees. 

Scott appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on his 

hostile work environment claims. To establish a claim of hostile work 

environment, Scott must prove that he (1) belongs to a protected class; (2) was 

subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on his race; 

(4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and

(5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question 

and failed to take prompt remedial action. Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 

268 (5th Cir. 2002). As explained in the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation, Scott did not meet this standard. The presence of the noose, 

and later the presence of the offensive publication, were isolated incidents. 

More importantly, Weber immediately addressed both of these incidents as 

soon as Weber supervisors became aware of the situations. Scott offered no 

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evidence that any of his other allegations, including the 2011 incident in the 

parking lot, were based on his race. 

Scott appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on his 

retaliation claims. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title 

VII, Scott must show that (1) he engaged in activity protected by the statute;

(2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) a causal link exists 

between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Evans v. 

City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 352 (5th Cir. 2001). As explained in the 

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, Scott failed to establish a 

prima facie case of retaliation because he did not show a causal link between 

protected activity and his termination. The only events that might qualify as 

“protected activity” are Scott’s reports regarding the noose and the offensive

publication. The first report occurred five years prior to Scott’s termination 

and the second report occurred over one year prior to Scott’s termination. In 

addition to the protected activity being temporally distant from Scott’s 

termination, Scott developed multiple disciplinary problems and incurred an 

official warning between his reports and his termination. Furthermore, even 

if Scott had established a prima facie case, he did not show that Weber’s stated

reasons for his termination are pretext. 

Scott appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Weber 

on Scott’s defamation claim. The basis of Scott’s defamation claim is that

during a meeting with Weber personnel, Coker, a Weber manager, stated that 

Coker had a video that showed that Scott was not hit by a vehicle in the 

parking lot, as Scott alleged. To establish a cause of action for defamation,

Scott, as a private individual, must show that Weber: (1) published a 

statement; (2) that was defamatory; (3) while acting with negligence regarding 

the truth of the statement. WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W. 2d 568, 571 

(Tex. 1998). To qualify as defamatory, a statement should be derogatory, 

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degrading, somewhat shocking, and contain elements of disgrace. Means v. 

ABCABCO, Inc., 315 S.W.3d 209, 214 (Tex. App.– Austin 2010, no pet.)

(internal citations omitted). As explained in the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation, Scott did not show that the statement was defamatory. The 

statement that a video disproves Scott’s claims does not have any of the 

characteristics of a defamatory statement. 

Scott’s appeal as to his negligence and breach of contract claims likewise 

fails. In support of his negligence claim, Scott did not show how Weber was 

negligent regarding his safety in the parking lot. In support of his breach of 

contract claim, Scott did not present any evidence that he had a written 

contract with Weber or that Weber violated any of the terms of the CBA, which 

governed Scott’s employment. The district court correctly granted summary 

judgment in favor of Weber. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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