STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A24-0171

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: T. M. A. and M. J. R., Parents. 

Filed September 9, 2024

Affirmed

Ede, Judge

Itasca County District Court

File No. 31-JV-23-1873

Jennifer L. Thompson, JLT Law & Mediation, Litchfield, Minnesota (for appellant-father 

T.M.A.)

Jacob P. Fauchald, Itasca County Attorney, Michael J. Haig, Chief Assistant County 

Attorney, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent Itasca County Health and Human 

Services)

Rachel Hughes, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Schmidt, Judge. 

SYLLABUS

An order transferring permanent legal and physical custody of a child under 

Minnesota Statutes section 260C.517 (2022) does not violate a parent’s substantive dueprocess rights to freedom of contract.

OPINION

EDE, Judge

In this appeal from an order transferring permanent legal and physical custody of 

appellant’s child, appellant argues (1) that the district court abused its discretion in issuing 

the transfer-of-custody order and (2) that the order violates appellant’s procedural and 

substantive due-process rights. We affirm.
2

FACTS

Prior to January 2024, appellant T.M.A. (father) had sole legal and physical custody 

of his son (the child), who was born in 2007 and has type 1 diabetes.

Child in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS) Proceedings

In July 2022, Itasca County Social Services Agency (the agency) filed a CHIPS 

petition. A district court ruled that the petition alleged a prima facie case of endangerment 

and that there was factual support to order removal of the child from father’s custody on 

an ex parte emergency basis. The allegations included information that medical providers 

at a hospital found the child to be malnourished and exhibiting symptoms consistent with 

high blood sugar levels. Several months later, the district court granted the agency’s motion 

to dismiss the petition.

On November 7, 2022, the agency filed another CHIPS petition. The same day, the 

district court in that matter held an emergency protective-care hearing. Neither parent 

appeared. The district court again ruled that the agency had made a prima facie showing

that the child was in need of protection or services. In addition, the district court determined 

that it was contrary to the welfare of the child to be returned home and that placement 

outside the home was in the child’s best interests.

The district court held a pretrial conference in December 2022. Again, neither parent 

appeared. Through default proceedings held in father’s absence,1 the district court 

adjudicated the child to be in need of protection or services under Minnesota Statutes 

1 See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 18.01, .02 (addressing a party’s failure to appear in a juvenileprotection matter and default orders).
3

section 260C.007, subdivisions 6(3), (8), and (9) (2022). The district court approved an 

out-of-home-placement plan (case plan) and directed the agency to implement it. The case 

plan set forth several tasks for father to complete. Father was to remain sober, submit to 

random drug testing, complete a chemical-health evaluation, permit announced and 

unannounced visits, participate in mental-health services, contact his social worker weekly, 

and ensure that the child was attending school.

In May 2023, the district court held a permanency progress review hearing. 

Following that hearing, the district court filed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an 

order in which it found that father had made no progress on the tasks outlined in the case 

plan. Father had failed to submit to random drug tests, complete a chemical-health 

evaluation and follow any resulting recommendations, permit visits to his home, and 

maintain safe, stable, and chemically free permanent housing for himself and the child. The 

district court determined that it was appropriate for the agency to file a permanency 

petition.

Permanency Proceedings

In July 2023, the agency petitioned to terminate father’s parental rights. After an 

admit/deny hearing, the district court ruled that the agency had made a prima facie showing 

that, following the child’s placement outside the home, reasonable efforts, under the 

direction of the court, had failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement. 

In August 2023, the agency filed an amended petition requesting that—rather than 

terminate father’s parental rights—the district court transfer permanent legal and physical 

custody of the child to proposed custodians, who are the child’s relatives and with whom 
4

the child was placed after the child’s court-ordered removal from father’s custody. The 

agency also filed a social worker’s affidavit that outlined the factual basis for the agency’s 

request, which we summarize as follows.

The social worker asserted that the best interests of the child would be served by a 

transfer of custody for these reasons: the child needed a caregiver who could meet his needs 

on a consistent basis; the child had medical, chemical-health, and mental-health needs that 

required consistent follow-up appointments; and the child needed a caregiver who was able 

to demonstrate safe and stable behaviors, as well as provide constant guidance and 

oversight for the child’s diabetic care. The social worker detailed concerns that father 

lacked knowledge about diabetes and that father did not understand how to ensure that the 

child’s diabetic needs were met.

The social worker noted that, after the district court placed the child outside the 

home, father was unwilling to engage in reunification planning or compliance with the case 

plan to remedy the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement. The social worker 

also described offering services to father several times, which father declined based on his 

belief that he did not need additional support. And the social worker said that father was 

unresponsive to calls or text messages throughout the case and was unwilling to work with 

the agency to assess what steps he could take to reunify with the child.

In addition, the social worker discussed her meetings with the child throughout 

2023. According to the affidavit, the child stated during each meeting that he supported his 

placement outside the home and would like to stay with his proposed custodians. The child 

also said that he felt well cared for by the custodians and that “his diabetes was managed
5

better than it had ever been[.]” And although the child was hospitalized because of 

diabetes-related complications in May 2023, the affidavit asserted that one of the child’s 

custodians immediately responded to the child’s needs, attended all doctor appointments, 

and participated in diabetic-education meetings.

The permanency matter proceeded to trial in September 2023. On the first day of 

trial, father moved the district court for a continuance because he had “insufficient time to 

review documents.” The district court denied father’s request.

The agency presented testimony from the prospective custodians, a school-based 

therapist, the social worker, and the child’s mother. Father presented testimony from the 

child’s step-grandfather, the child’s paternal grandfather, the child’s paternal grandmother, 

and father’s lifelong friend. The district court also heard testimony from father, the child, 

and the child’s guardian ad litem.

Father testified that, under the Constitution, he has “the right to not contract with an 

agency that is in direct violation of [his] rights.” Father claimed that “the agency’s contract 

offer”—referring to a chemical-health component of the case plan—“was unreasonable.” 

He also admitted that he was unwilling to communicate with the social worker about the 

case plan.

In October 2023, the district court filed an order transferring permanent legal and 

physical custody of the child to the proposed custodians. But the district court deferred 

finalization of the order to determine eligibility of the proposed custodians for Northstar 

kinship assistance, which “provides medical coverage and reimbursement of nonrecurring 

expenses associated with obtaining permanent legal and physical custody of a child . . . .” 
6

In re Welfare of Child of T.M.A., 2 N.W.3d 328, 329 n.1 (Minn. App. 2024). The district 

court explained that it would later hold a hearing to review the status of the Northstar 

kinship assistance determinations. Id. at 329.

In the transfer-of-custody order, the district court explained its decision that 

transferring custody was in the best interests of the child. The district court made specific 

findings supporting its best-interests determination, including that the child’s “current 

functioning and behaviors [had] improved since residing in the foster home” and that the 

“foster parents [had] worked to gain the specialized knowledge necessary to best support 

the child’s ongoing diabetic condition.” The district court also made specific factual 

findings about the steps that the agency took to reunify the child with father, determining 

that the agency’s “continued efforts to engage [f]ather in working the [case plan] 

constituted ‘reasonable efforts’ pursuant to [Minnesota Statutes section 260C.517, 

subdivision (a)(2) (2022),] where [f]ather repeatedly refused to participate or offer any 

evidence that the allegations raised by the CHIPS petition had been remedied within the 

home.” Moreover, the district court found that the agency “continued to try and engage 

[f]ather in the [case plan] throughout the life of the case” and that the agency “did all that 

it could do to involve [f]ather in reunification efforts.” And the district court determined 

that there “was no evidence [that] any of the conditions which led to the out-of-home 

placement were corrected . . . so that the child [could] safely return home.”

Before the district court finalized its order, and while its determination of eligibility 

for Northstar kinship assistance remained pending, father appealed. Id. at 329-30. We 

dismissed that appeal in a special term opinion, concluding that father had appealed from 
7

an order that was neither final nor appealable. Id. at 330-31. In January 2024, following 

our dismissal of father’s first appeal, the district court vacated the deferment it had ordered 

and deemed its October 2023 order final.

Father again appeals.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court abuse its discretion in ordering the transfer of permanent legal 

and physical custody?

II. Did the transfer-of-custody order violate father’s procedural and substantive dueprocess rights?

ANALYSIS

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the transfer of 

permanent legal and physical custody. 

Father contends that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the transferof-custody order. As explained below, father’s arguments do not persuade us to reverse. 

On appeal from an order transferring permanent legal and physical custody of a 

child, this court “review[s] the [district] court’s factual findings for clear error and its 

finding of a statutory basis for the order for abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Child of 

D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015). When 

reviewing factual findings for clear error, appellate courts view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the findings, do not find their own facts, do not reweigh the evidence, do 

not reconcile conflicting evidence, and “need not go into an extended discussion of the 

evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the [district] court.” In 

re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted); 
8 

see also In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601 n.6 (Minn. App. 2021) 

(applying Kenney to a review of a juvenile-protection order), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 

2021). In conducting clear-error review, “an appellate court’s duty is fully performed after 

it has fairly considered all the evidence and has determined that the evidence reasonably 

supports the decision.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (quotation omitted). A district court 

abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact that lack evidentiary support, misapplies 

the law, or resolves discretionary matters in a manner contrary to logic and the facts on 

record. Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022); see also D.L.D., 865 

N.W.2d at 322 (“A district court abuses its discretion if it improperly applies the law.” 

(quotation omitted)).

“In a permanency proceeding under sections 260C.503 to 260C.521 of the 

Minnesota Statutes, a district court may order any one of six dispositions.” In re Welfare 

of Child of J.C.L., 958 N.W.2d 653, 655 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. May 12, 

2021). “One of the possible dispositions is a transfer of permanent legal and physical 

custody ‘to a fit and willing relative.’” Id. (quoting Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4 (2020)) 

(other citation omitted). A transfer-of-custody order must include detailed findings about: 

(1) how the child’s best interests are served by the order; 

(2) the nature and extent of the responsible social services 

agency’s reasonable efforts . . . to reunify the child with the 

parent . . . where reasonable efforts are required; 

(3) the parent’s . . . efforts and ability to use services to correct 

the conditions which led to the out-of-home placement; and 

(4) that the conditions which led to the out-of-home placement 

have not been corrected so that the child can safely return 

home. 
9 

Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(1)-(4) (2022). “Each of these four statutory requirements must 

be proved by clear and convincing evidence.” J.C.L., 958 N.W.2d at 656; see also Minn. 

R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 1 (providing that “[i]n a permanency matter other than a 

termination of parental rights matter, the standard of proof is clear and convincing 

evidence”). 

Below, we address each of father’s challenges to the district court’s findings about 

the above statutory requirements and the court’s determination that clear and convincing 

evidence supports its transfer-of-custody order. 

A. Best Interests 

Father challenges the district court’s determination that placement with the 

proposed custodians is in the child’s best interests. He asserts that the district court clearly 

erred in finding that “the home of the proposed custodians was a safer, more stable 

environment than” his home and that the court abused its discretion by relying on those 

facts in support of its best-interests ruling. In particular, father questions the district court’s 

determinations because “the child had been in intensive care due to severe symptoms of 

his type 1 diabetes . . . while in the care of the proposed custodians” and “the child was 

continuing to smoke cannabis, use a vape pen, and drink alcohol while in the home of the 

proposed custodians.” 

“The paramount consideration in all proceedings for permanent placement of the 

child under sections 260C.503 to 260C.521 . . . is the best interests of the child.” Minn. 

Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 3 (2022). “The ‘best interests of the child’ means all relevant 
10 

factors to be considered and evaluated.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(a) (2022). “In making a 

permanency disposition order . . . the court must be governed by the best interests of the 

child, including a review of the relationship between the child and relatives and the child 

and other important persons with whom the child has resided or had significant contact.” 

Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(b) (2022). Here, the record evidence supports the district court’s 

finding that the proposed custodians’ residence was more stable than father’s home and its 

resulting ruling that it is in the child’s best interests “to be placed in the permanent care, 

custody, and control” of the proposed custodians. 

Before filing the underlying transfer-of-custody petition, the agency had filed a 

CHIPS petition in July 2022. Although a district court ultimately dismissed that CHIPS

petition, it first ruled that the petition made a prima facie showing that endangerment 

existed because the child had presented at a hospital as malnourished and with high blood 

sugar levels. 

In November 2022, father reported the child as a runaway. After the child was 

located, the agency met with the child, and the child reported that he had been out of the 

home for about a month and that father did not check on him during that time. The child 

also reported that “there [was] not much food in” father’s home. The agency filed the 

second CHIPS petition and the district court ultimately determined that the agency had 

established that a juvenile-protection matter existed. In later meetings with the agency, the 

child consistently expressed a desire to continue to live with the proposed custodians. The 

child also reported that his diabetes was being managed and that he felt well cared for by 

the custodians. 
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During the permanency trial, the social worker testified that the child had struggled 

with “sporadic use” of marijuana. But the social worker nonetheless stated that the 

proposed custodians were “addressing the concerns as they [arose] and as they’re made 

aware of it[.]” According to the social worker, the proposed custodians had “stepped up” 

and were “willing to do whatever [was] necessary to follow any sort of recommendations 

for [the child],” as well as do “whatever it takes to make sure they’re fully educated in [the 

child’s] needs.” The social worker said that, since being placed with the custodians, the 

child’s school attendance had improved and the child had been working with a recovery 

specialist to address his substance use. And the social worker testified that the child’s need 

for a safe and stable environment would not be met if the child reunified with father.

Despite the child’s ongoing issues with substance use, father himself testified that 

the custodians had the child’s best interests at heart and that they had done a good job in 

caring for the child. Father also stated that the child had been doing better recently and that 

the custodians properly managed the child’s medical issues. Father’s testimony aligns with 

record evidence that, at the time the child was hospitalized in May 2023 because of 

diabetes-related complications, one of the proposed custodians had responded immediately 

to the child’s needs, brought the child to the emergency room, and notified the social 

worker, their supervisor, and the guardian ad litem. The record likewise reflects that the 

proposed custodian attended all medical appointments and diabetic-education meetings

during the child’s three-day hospital stay.

Finally, the child testified that, although he would “love” to be reunited with father, 

he felt that he would “fall behind again in everything” if he and father were reunified. The 
12 

child also said that the proposed custodians have done “an awesome job” helping him with 

his diabetic condition, that he would like to stay with the proposed custodians, and that he 

thinks that remaining with the proposed custodians would be the best thing for him. See 

Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b) (2022) (providing that “the factors the agency shall 

consider in determining the current and future needs of the child” include “the reasonable 

preference of the child, if the court, or the child-placing agency in the case of a voluntary 

placement, deems the child to be of sufficient age to express preferences”). 

Based on our careful review of the record, we conclude that the district court did 

not clearly err in finding that the proposed custodians’ home provided a more stable 

environment for the child. We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in ruling—based on its reasonably supported factual findings—that transferring 

permanent legal and physical custody from father to the proposed custodians is in the best 

interests of the child. 

B. Reasonable Efforts 

Father argues that the district court abused its discretion in ruling that the agency 

made reasonable efforts to reunify father and the child. Father contends that the social 

worker’s efforts were “perfunctory and not aimed toward any true reunification” of father 

with the child. 

Under Minnesota Statutes section 260.012(a) (2022), reasonable efforts “for 

rehabilitation and reunification are always required” except under circumstances not 

applicable here. As noted above, in an order permanently placing the child out of the home, 

a district court must make “detailed findings” about “the nature and extent of the 
13

responsible social services agency’s reasonable efforts . . . to reunify the child with the 

parent or guardian where reasonable efforts are required[.]” Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(2). 

Here, in determining that the agency’s efforts were reasonable, the district court 

found that the agency drafted the case plan, attempted to work with father to implement it, 

and continued to engage father in the case plan throughout the length of the case. The 

district court also found that, “[u]nder the circumstances, the [a]gency did all that it could 

to involve [f]ather in reunification efforts. Unfortunately, [f]ather chose not to cooperate 

or comply with those efforts.” The district court’s findings are reasonably supported by the 

record.

In the affidavit accompanying the transfer-of-custody petition, the social worker 

stated that father was “offered a case plan on multiple occasions and refuse[d] to sign or 

follow through with supports or regular communication with the agency.” The social 

worker noted that father had been “unreachable,” and she detailed the many occasions in 

which she had tried to contact father. And the social worker explained that father was 

“unwilling to work with the agency to assess the conditions” of reunification and that he 

rejected the agency’s services.

At trial, the social worker testified that the agency sought to engage father in 

preparing the case plan, but father was unwilling to discuss the matter. According to the 

social worker, father failed to follow through regarding the items outlined in the case plan 

after the district court adopted it. To the social worker’s knowledge, father had not followed 

through with the court-ordered mental- and chemical-health tasks, chemical testing, 

parenting skills, visitation, and maintaining consistent contact with the social worker. The 
14 

social worker could not determine whether the conditions were corrected because “there 

was no level of communication or cooperation” from father. 

In his own testimony, father conceded that he was unwilling to communicate with 

the social worker despite the worker’s efforts to contact him throughout the case. Father 

also expressed his belief that he did not “have to jump through [the agency’s] hoops” or 

comply with components of the case plan. 

Given this record, we conclude that the district court’s factual findings underlying 

its statutory determination that the agency made reasonable efforts to reunify father with 

the child were reasonably supported by the evidence. And we conclude that the district 

court’s reasonable-efforts ruling was not an abuse of discretion. 

C. Failure to Correct Conditions that Led to Out-of-Home Placement 

Father disputes the district court’s ruling that placement with the proposed 

custodians was warranted based on his failure to correct the conditions that led to the 

child’s out-of-home placement and his decision not to cooperate with the case plan. 

“[A] case plan that has been approved by the district court is presumptively 

reasonable.” In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 388 (Minn. 2008). And 

“[a] parent’s failure to comply with a reasonable case plan results in a presumption that the 

parent has failed to correct the conditions leading to out-of-home placement.” In re Welfare 

of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012). 

In support of its ruling that father failed to correct the conditions that led to the 

child’s out-of-home placement, the district court made the following factual findings: that 

“none of the requirements of the [case plan had] been met by [f]ather”; that “[t]here was 
15

no evidence [that] any of the conditions which led to the out-of-home placement were 

corrected”; that father acknowledged that he made the choice not to follow the case plan; 

that father was familiar with mental- and chemical-health assessments but decided not to 

participate in either for this case; that father “refused to communicate about his lifestyle, 

home environment and relationship with the child”; that there was no way to verify father’s 

compliance with the case plan because of his refusal to cooperate; and that the social 

worker testified that she had no knowledge whether father completed “any of the items on 

the [case plan].” These findings are supported by the record.

At a December 2022 hearing, the district court approved the case plan, thereby 

raising the presumption that the case plan was reasonable. See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 388. 

And father’s undisputed failure to comply with that presumptively reasonable case plan in 

turn “results in a presumption that [father] . . . failed to correct the conditions leading to 

[the child’s] out-of-home placement.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 87. 

Presumptions aside, the social worker testified at the permanency trial that father 

failed to follow through with the tasks outlined in the case plan. The social worker also 

noted that father told her he would not “contract” with her, meaning that father was 

“unwilling to sign or participate in any services or supports that” the agency offered him.

Consistent with the social worker’s testimony, father stated that he did not have to 

comply with the case plan. Father explained that he did not want to submit to drug testing 

because “that would be contracting in a deal that [he did not] want to sign” and it was his 

right “to not incriminate [himself].” This did not stem from father’s inability “to use 

services to correct the conditions which led to the out-of-home placement[.]” Minn. Stat. 
16

§ 260C.517(a)(3). Indeed, father admitted that, in a previous CHIPS case, he had submitted 

to drug testing to dispel allegations about his failure to maintain sobriety even though the 

district court had not ordered that he do so. Father similarly acknowledged that the case 

plan required that he participate in mental-health services, but he did not do so despite his 

familiarity with the process. Father admitted that he was unwilling to communicate with 

the social worker and that he felt that he did not “have to jump through [the agency’s] 

hoops[.]” On this record, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in ruling

that father did not correct the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement.

Father also suggests that the district court should not have relied on his lack of 

cooperation in deciding to issue the transfer-of-custody order. But the district court did not 

transfer custody of the child solely or even primarily based on father’s failure to provide 

information to the agency. Instead, the district court transferred custody because the trial 

evidence supported its statutory findings: (1) that the child’s best interests are served by 

the transfer-of-custody order; (2) that the agency made reasonable efforts to reunify the 

child with father; (3) that—despite his ability to do so—father made no efforts to use 

services to correct the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement; and (4) that 

the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement had not been corrected so that the 

child could safely return home. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(1)-(4). In addition, the 

district court issued the transfer-of-custody order because it found that the proposed 

custodians were fit, willing, and suitable to provide for the child’s needs. See Minn. Stat. 

§ 260C.515, subd. 4 (2022).
17

In sum, father has not shown that the district court misapplied the law in issuing the 

transfer-of-custody order. Additionally, even considering the clear-and-convincing 

standard of proof required in juvenile-protection matters, reasonable evidence supports the 

district court’s findings of fact, and we are not otherwise left with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake occurred. Thus, the district court’s findings of fact are not clearly 

erroneous. See D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d at 322. Further, because those findings of fact support 

the district court’s order transferring of permanent legal and physical custody of the child, 

the order is not contrary to logic and the facts on record. See Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506; 

see also J.C.L., 958 N.W.2d at 656. Thus, we conclude that the district court’s decision to 

issue the transfer-of-custody order did not result from an abuse of discretion. See D.L.D., 

865 N.W.2d at 322.

II. The transfer-of-custody order did not violate father’s procedural and 

substantive due-process rights.2

Father asserts that the order transferring permanent legal and physical custody of 

the child violated his procedural due-process rights for three reasons: (A) the district court 

in the separate CHIPS matter did not provide him with notice of the emergency protectivecare hearing, the 72-hour hold, or the CHIPS petition, as required by Minnesota Rule of 

Juvenile Protection Procedure 40.04; (B) the district court in the permanency case 

2 “Procedural due process analyzes whether fair procedures were used in depriving an 

individual of life, liberty, or property.” In re Welfare of Child of F.F.N.M., 999 N.W.2d 

525, 537 n.4 (Minn. App. 2023) (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990)), rev. 

denied (Minn. Jan. 5, 2024). “Substantive due process bars ‘certain arbitrary, wrongful 

government actions, regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’” 

Id. (quoting Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 1999)).
18

underlying this appeal denied father’s motion for a continuance of the trial on the transferof-custody petition; and (C) the delay in the finalization of the permanency order 

“substantially affected” father’s “right to bring a timely appeal.” Father also maintains that

the order (D) violates his substantive due-process rights to freedom of contract. Father’s 

arguments lack merit.

We begin by addressing the standard of review that applies to father’s procedural 

due-process claims, which we discuss below in sections II.A through II.C.3 “Whether a 

parent’s due-process rights have been violated in a [permanency] proceeding is a question 

of law, which [appellate courts] review de novo.” In re Welfare of Child of D.F., 752 

N.W.2d 88, 97 (Minn. 2008). “The parent-child relationship is among the fundamental 

rights protected by the constitutional guarantees of due process.” Id. “Due process requires 

reasonable notice, a timely opportunity for a hearing, the right to counsel, the opportunity 

to present evidence, the right to an impartial decision-maker, and the right to a reasonable 

decision based solely on the record.” Id. “Although the amount of process due in a 

particular case varies with the unique circumstances of that case, prejudice as a result of 

the alleged violation is an essential component of the due process analysis.” Id. (quotation 

omitted).

We analyze each of father’s procedural and substantive due-process arguments in 

turn.

3 We set forth the applicable standard of review that governs father’s substantive dueprocess claim below, in section II.D.
19

A. Notice in Separate CHIPS Matter

First, father contends that his rights to procedural due process were violated because 

he was not given notice of the emergency protective-care hearing, the 72-hour hold, and 

the CHIPS petition.

This argument challenges the underlying juvenile-protection proceedings, in which 

the district court determined that the child was in need of protection or services. Father 

could have appealed that decision. See, e.g., In re Welfare of D.N., 523 N.W.2d 11, 12

(Minn. App. 1994) (appeal from default CHIPS adjudication), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 29, 

1994). But—as conceded by father’s appellate counsel at oral argument and as shown by

the lack of any appellate proceeding challenging the CHIPS determination—father did not. 

Because father did not appeal the district court’s CHIPS adjudication, we decline to 

consider his procedural due-process challenge to the district court’s provision of notice in 

that case. See Dieseth v. Calder Mfg. Co., 147 N.W.2d 100, 103 (“Even though the decision 

of the trial court in the first order may have been wrong, if it is an appealable order it is 

still final after the time for appeal has expired.”); see also In re Welfare of Child of B.G., 

No. A16-1512, 2017 WL 958476, at *4 (Minn. App. Mar. 13, 2017) (applying this aspect 

of Dieseth in a permanency appeal).4

B. Continuance of Permanency Trial

Second, father maintains that the district court violated his rights to procedural due 

process by denying his motion for a continuance of the trial on the agency’s petition to 

4 We cite nonprecedential opinions herein as persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 

136.01, subd. 1(c).
20

transfer permanent legal and physical custody. Father explains that he moved for a 

continuance on the grounds that he had been served with additional disclosures, an 

amended permanency petition, and motions in limine, and he asserts that the district court

improperly denied his motion merely because all parties were present and ready to proceed 

with trial. Father contends that his continuance motion was reasonable and that the district 

court should have granted it based on the close timing of the amended petition and the 

exhibit disclosures to the commencement of trial.

Appellate courts “generally review a district court’s refusal to continue or 

reschedule a hearing for a future date for abuse of discretion[.]” In re Welfare of Child. of 

G.A.H., 998 N.W.2d 222, 236 (Minn. 2023). But there “is a point when a denial of a 

continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process.” Id. (quotation omitted). “In assessing 

whether that line has been crossed in a particular case, [appellate courts] look at the reasons 

offered by the party seeking a continuance when the request for more time [was] made.” 

Id.

On September 13, 2023—the first day of the permanency trial—the child’s attorney 

explained that he had intended to file six motions in limine on September 6, all relating to 

how the child would testify, but he did not file them until the day before trial or the day of 

trial. The child’s attorney had, however, discussed the motions with the district court at the 

pretrial hearing and had provided father with copies of the motions a few minutes before 

trial commenced. Father requested a continuance, claiming that he had “insufficient time 

to review the documents” and explaining that he had been served with papers both the day 

before trial and on the day of trial. The district court clarified that father was provided the 
21

child’s motions the first morning of trial and that father was served with the court’s pretrial 

order the day before trial. Father also alleged that he received exhibits the day before trial. 

But the agency’s counsel informed the district court that those exhibits had been served on 

father by mail on August 29.

The district court denied father’s continuance request, reasoning that father had been 

upset that the trial could not be held sooner at almost all previous hearings. The September 

permanency trial date was the first and only time that the district court had available, and 

that date fell within the required timelines set forth in the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile 

Protection Procedure. Although the agency had filed an amended petition at a previous 

hearing, the district court had asked father if he still wished to proceed with the trial date, 

and father confirmed that he did. At that hearing, the agency had maintained that the same 

factual basis and the same exhibits would be offered at trial. The district court therefore 

determined that its decision to deny father’s requested continuance would not prejudice 

father. The district court denied father’s continuance request for those same reasons and 

because the parties were ready to proceed.

Based on this record, we conclude that the district court did not violate father’s 

procedural due-process rights. See G.A.H., 998 N.W.2d at 236. Although father argued that 

he received paperwork the day before trial, the agency’s counsel told the district court that 

it had sent those documents to father two weeks before trial. And although father did not 

receive the child’s motions relating to testimony until the day of trial, the child’s attorney 

had discussed those motions at a previous hearing, such that father was aware of them. The 

district court also made sure to issue its pretrial order on a date that would allow father 
22

sufficient time to review it before the commencement of trial. In addition, on multiple 

occasions, father requested that the district court set trial for an earlier date. 

Even if we were to assume that the district court’s decision to deny the continuance 

violated father’s procedural due-process rights, father has not shown prejudice. The 

Minnesota Supreme Court has held that “a party challenging on constitutional or other 

grounds a district court’s refusal to continue or reschedule a hearing must establish that the 

party was prejudiced in the preparation or presentation of their case so as to materially 

affect the outcome of the trial.” G.A.H., 998 N.W.2d at 238 (quotation omitted). Denial of 

a continuance amounts to a procedural due-process violation when “the [party] has been in 

some manner embarrassed or prejudiced in preparing his defense so as to materially affect 

the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 238-39 (quoting State v. Huber, 148 N.W.2d 137, 142 

(Minn. 1967)). Because father has not shown that he has been embarrassed or prejudiced 

in preparing his defense before the district court, we conclude that his procedural dueprocess challenge to the district court’s decision denying his continuance request fails. 

C. Delay in Finalization of Order Transferring Permanent Legal and 

Physical Custody

Third, father insists that the district court’s delay in determining eligibility for 

Northstar funding after it deferred finalization of the transfer-of-custody order 

“substantially affected [his] right to bring a timely appeal and his potential for restoring 

custody of his child.”

Father, however, timely filed the appeal now before us. Moreover, Minnesota 

Statutes section 260C.515, subdivision 4(8), authorizes district courts to “defer finalization 
23

of an order transferring permanent legal and physical custody to a relative when deferring 

finalization is necessary to determine eligibility for Northstar kinship assistance under 

chapter 256N.” T.M.A., 2 N.W.3d at 330 (quotation omitted). The statute does not require 

that finalization after such deferment occur within a specific timeframe. But see id. at 331 

(“caution[ing] . . . that the district court should proceed with all deliberate speed to reach a 

final determination”). 

Given the specific circumstances of this case, we conclude that the district court 

proceeded with all deliberate speed and that the less-than-three-month delay between the 

October 2023 transfer-of-custody order and the January 2024 order vacating the deferment 

and deeming the October order final did not amount to a prejudicial violation of father’s 

procedural due-process rights. See D.F., 752 N.W.2d at 97. We therefore reject father’s 

argument that the district court’s decision to defer finalization of the transfer-of-custody 

order violated his rights to procedural due process. 

D. Freedom of Contract

Fourth, father maintains that “the management of his child’s education and medical 

needs between himself and certain providers constitutes a contract, and that the agency’s 

interference with that contract is a violation of his constitutional rights as a parent.” 

According to father, “overreaching child protection involvement . . . violates a parent’s 

well-established right to direct the upbringing of children—unless the parent has a truly 

enforceable right to decline the offered ‘services’ by invoking freedom of contract.” 

Whether an order transferring permanent legal and physical custody of a child under 
24

Minnesota Statutes section 260C.517 violates a parent’s substantive due-process rights to 

freedom of contract presents a novel constitutional issue of first impression.

Father first cites the contract clause of the United States Constitution, which 

provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of 

Contracts[.]”5 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. While father suggests that the contract clause 

could have established a general right to freedom of contract, the Minnesota Supreme Court 

has explained that “[t]he concept of freedom of contract, which has been dealt with by the 

courts as an aspect of due process, is to be distinguished from the contract clause, U.S. 

Const. art. I, § 10, which prohibits the impairment of the obligation of contract.” State v. 

Int’l Harvester Co., 63 N.W.2d 547, 551-52 (Minn. 1954). Because the balance of father’s 

argument appears grounded in his rights to freedom of contract as protected by the state 

and federal due-process clauses, we turn to an analysis of his contentions under that 

framework.6

5 Although father does not cite it, the Minnesota Constitution similarly provides that “[n]o 

. . . law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.” Minn. Const. art. I, § 11. 

6 Even if we were to consider father’s freedom-of-contract claim as arising from the federal 

and state contract clauses, we would still reject his argument. “The contracts clauses [of 

the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution] prevent retroactive 

impairment of contracts[,]” but “[w]hen the statute was in force and effect at the time the 

contract was made, there is no impairment, because existing statutes are read into future 

contracts and enter into the contract terms by implication.” Gretsch v. Vantium Cap., Inc., 

846 N.W.2d 424, 435 (Minn. 2014). Both before the district court and on appeal, father has 

failed to identify legislation that retroactively impairs any specific and existing contracts 

relating to his management of the child’s educational and medical needs. But even 

assuming father had done so, “the federal constitutional prohibition against contract 

impairment, U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 1, has been construed to mean that the state reserves 

some power to modify contract terms when the public interest requires.” Hertz Corp. v. 

State Farm Mut. Ins., 573 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted). Thus, “[t]he 
25

“[T]he principle of freedom of contract” is “considered implicit in the guaranty of 

due process of law in the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal, and art. 1, § 7, of the state, 

constitution.” McElhone v. Geror, 292 N.W. 414, 416 (Minn. 1940). But “[n]either under 

the due process guaranty nor otherwise is the right to freedom of contract absolute.” Id.

Instead, “[a]s with most other individual rights, it is qualified and limited by similar rights 

of others and those of government.” Id. Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court has explained 

that “[i]ndividual liberty must yield to the conflicting interest of society, acting through 

sovereign government[,]” and “[i]ndividual will must give way to that of government when 

the latter is expressed in declared policy, enforced by constitutional means.” Id.

“To challenge successfully an interference with the liberty of contract protected by 

the state and federal due process clauses, one must demonstrate that the action is not 

rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate governmental purpose.” Metro. Sports 

Facilities Comm’n v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 470 N.W.2d 118, 125 (Minn. 1991); see also State 

by Humphrey v. Ri-Mel, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 102, 106 (Minn. App. 1987) (observing that, “in 

Essling v. Markman, 335 N.W.2d 237 (Minn. 1983)[,] the supreme court explained that 

freedom of contract has not been recognized as a fundamental right sufficient to invoke 

strict judicial scrutiny, and thus minimum judicial scrutiny is appropriate”), rev. denied 

legislature . . . can alter contract terms by enacting statutes as long as the legislation is 

necessary to meet a broad and pressing social or economic need, if the legislation is 

reasonably adopted for the solution of the problem involved, and if it is not over broad or 

over harsh.” Id. (quotation omitted). We note that “[t]he government . . . has a compelling 

interest in identifying and protecting abused children . . . and in safeguarding the physical 

and psychological well-being of children . . . .” In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 

N.W.2d 127, 134 (Minn. 2014) (quotations omitted).
26

(Minn. Feb. 17, 1988). “Under the ‘rational[] basis’ test an Act should be upheld as 

constitutional if the record shows the Act is rationally related to achievement of a legitimate 

government purpose.” Ri-Mel, 417 N.W.2d at 106 (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf 

Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981); Guilliams v. Comm’r of Revenue, 299 N.W.2d 

138, 142 (Minn. 1980)). “There is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of 

legislation and a party challenging constitutionality has the burden of demonstrating 

beyond a reasonable doubt a statute violates a provision of the constitution.” Id. (citing 

McGuire v. C & L Rest., Inc., 346 N.W.2d 605, 611 (Minn. 1984)).

The purpose of the laws relating to permanency . . . is to ensure 

that:

(1) when required and appropriate, reasonable efforts 

have been made by the social services agency to reunite the 

child with the child’s parents in a home that is safe and 

permanent; [and]

(2) if placement with the parents is not reasonably 

foreseeable, to secure for the child a safe and permanent 

placement according to the requirements of section 260C.212, 

subdivision 2, preferably with a relative through . . . a transfer 

of permanent legal and physical custody . . . [.]

. . . .

The paramount consideration in all proceedings for 

permanent placement of the child under sections 260C.503 to 

260C.521 . . . is the best interests of the child. . . .

Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 3; see also R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 134 (explaining the state’s 

compelling interest in protecting children).

We conclude that the district court did not violate father’s substantive due-process 

rights to freedom of contract by issuing the transfer-of-custody order under the juvenile-
27

protection provisions of the Juvenile Court Act, which include the laws relating to 

permanency. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subds. 1(a), 3 (2022). The statutory prerequisites 

for the order transferring permanent legal and physical custody of the child under

Minnesota Statutes section 260C.517 are rationally related to achievement of a legitimate 

governmental purpose—the protection of a child adjudicated to be in need of protection or 

services, and the safeguarding of that child’s physical and psychological well-being. See 

R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 134; see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 3. 

Section 260C.517 requires that the agency prove the following by clear and 

convincing evidence: (1) that the transfer-of-custody order serves the child’s best interests; 

(2) that the agency made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with father; (3) that father 

failed to make efforts to use services to correct the conditions that led to the out-of-home 

placement despite his ability to do so; and (4) that the conditions that led to the out-ofhome placement had not been corrected so that the child could safely return home. See 

J.C.L., 958 N.W.2d at 655-56. We are therefore satisfied that the statute is rationally related 

to a legitimate state purpose. See Essling, 335 N.W.2d at 239. 

Strict scrutiny is a higher, more exacting standard of review than the rational-basis 

test that applies to father’s freedom-of-contract argument. See Ri-Mel, 417 N.W.2d at 106; 

see also Fletcher Props., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 947 N.W.2d 1, 10 n.5 (Minn. 2020) 

(discussing the application of the “higher hurdle” of strict scrutiny “[w]hen fundamental 

rights are at stake” and explaining that, if “no fundamental rights are at stake[,] . . . the less 

demanding rational basis standard applies”). We consider it persuasive that the Minnesota 

Supreme Court has held that other provisions of the Juvenile Court Act survive the more 
28

restrictive strict-scrutiny test. See, e.g., R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 133-38 (holding that

Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4) (2012), which provides that 

parents who previously have had their parental rights to children involuntarily terminated 

are presumed to be palpably unfit to parent other children, is narrowly tailored to serve the 

state’s compelling interest in protecting children and therefore survives strict scrutiny); 

SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 821-24 (Minn. 2007) (holding that Minnesota 

Statutes section 257C.08, subdivision 4 (2006), which allowed district courts to grant 

reasonable visitation to a person with whom the child has resided for at least two years, 

survives strict scrutiny because it is narrowly drawn to the state’s compelling interest in 

protecting the general welfare of children by preserving the relationships of recognized 

family units).

Lastly, although father seems to argue that his due-process rights to freedom of 

contract entitle him to decline to participate in the court-ordered case plan altogether, the 

Minnesota Supreme Court has held that, “once a case plan has been approved by the court, 

the appropriate action for a parent who believes some aspect of the case plan to be 

unreasonable is to ask the court to change it, rather than to simply ignore it.” S.E.P., 744 

N.W.2d at 388.

We therefore hold that an order transferring permanent legal and physical custody 

of a child under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.517 does not violate a parent’s 

substantive due-process rights to freedom of contract.7

7 We acknowledge that “‘the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects 

the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
29

DECISION

The district court did not abuse its discretion in its transfer-of-custody order. The 

order did not violate father’s procedural due-process rights, and an order transferring 

permanent legal and physical custody of a child under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.517 

does not violate a parent’s substantive due-process rights to freedom of contract.

Affirmed.

control of their children.’” In re Child of M.E.P., 4 N.W.3d 152, 162 (Minn. App. 2024) 

(quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 25, 2024); 

see also SooHoo, 731 N.W.2d at 820 (“A parent’s right to make decisions concerning the 

care, custody, and control of his or her children is a protected fundamental right.”). 

Although father alludes to his fundamental right as a parent by asserting that “the public 

safety and police powers of the government have no place interfering in a parent’s 

reasonable and prudent choices in raising his child,” he cites no authority in support of this 

contention. When an appellant “fails to provide legal argument or to cite legal authority in 

support of [a] proposition[,] . . . [t]he issue is not adequately briefed, and we therefore deem 

it waived.” In re Welfare of the Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 545 n.2 (Minn. App. 

2009). Although we do not reach the issue, we are mindful that the Minnesota Supreme 

Court has explained that the fundamental right of parents “is not absolute[,]” observing that 

“[t]he Supreme Court has long recognized that states may intrude on parental rights in order 

to protect the ‘general interest in the youth’s well being.’” SooHoo, 731 N.W.2d at 822 

(quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). Indeed, in construing Troxel, 

the Minnesota Supreme Court has said that the Supreme Court “recognized that there may 

be instances when the state may constitutionally intrude upon a fit parent’s right to the care, 

custody, and control of the parent’s child . . . .” Id. at 821.