Appellant Peter Renzo contends that the district court erred in 

declaring that his facility, which houses and exhibits several large 

wildcats, was not a public zoo and thus exempted from the permit 

requirements. He also asserts that the Code's definition of public zoo, 

insofar as it requires AZA accreditation, fails to pass a rational basis 

review. We review the district court's legal determinations de novo but 

give deference to the district court's factual determinations. Edelstein v. 

Bank of New York Mellon, 128 Nev. „ 286 P.3d 249, 260 (2012); 

County of Clark v. Upchurch, 114 Nev. 749, 961 P.2d 754 (1998) (applying 

both standards of review in a declaratory relief action). 

The district court found that, while Renzo holds a USDA class 

C exhibitor's license,' his facility did not meet the definition of public zoo 

because his tigers are "only a 'token collection," not an exhibit of a 

permanent cultural institution. The record indicates that Renzo resided 

at several different locations and owned various exotic animals throughout 

the ten years preceding the district court action; at the pertinent time, he 

had six tigers and a leopard. Nothing in the record explains what the 

primary purpose of Renzo's business is or demonstrates that Renzo 

exhibits the animals to the public on a regularly scheduled basis, although 

he now asserts that he meets these factors. Further, Renzo admittedly is 

not accredited by the AZA. Therefore, Renzo failed to demonstrate that he 

'Under 9 C.F.R. § 1.1, a class C license is for exhibitors who are in 

the business of showing or displaying animals to the public for 

compensation. The term "exhibitor" covers a wide variety of activities, 

including "carnivals, circuses, animal acts, zoos, and educational exhibits." 

9 C.F.R. § 1.1. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

2 

(0) 194Th e 
falls under the public zoo exemption, and the district court's finding is 

supported by substantial evidence. 

As for the latter factor, Renzo argues that the AZA 

accreditation requirement for exemption is arbitrary and capricious in 

that there is no rational reason for it. In order to withstand scrutiny 

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution, the Code provisions must bear a rational 

relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. See Wilkins v. Daniels, 

913 F. Supp. 2d 517, 536 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (concluding that exotic animal 

ownership implicates a limited property interest such that no fundamental 

constitutional right is at stake and a rational basis review applies), aff'd, 

744 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2014). Certainly, the Code itself meets this 

standard as a law designed "to protect the health and safety of the public 

and to promote the welfare of these animals." Lyon Cnty. Code § 7.07.01. 

See Wilkins, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 538. 

Moreover, the Code does not require accreditation by the AZA; 

instead, it exempts from its permit requirements public zoos that are 

accredited by the AZA. The exemption provision neither interferes with 

any right to own exotic animals nor lacks a rational basis—it is not 

unreasonable for Lyon County to conclude that a facility meeting AZA 

accreditation requirements need not also meet the Lyon County 

requirements. See generally Wilkins, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 534 (explaining 

that, for freedom of association purposes, the government does not compel 

the owner of regulated animals into qualifying for a wild animal act 

exemption through accreditation merely by providing exemptions for 

accredited owners). As a result, even if Renzo otherwise met the Code's 

definition of public zoo, he cannot overcome the AZA accreditation 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

3 

(0) I947A 
J. 

J. 

requirement. And although Renzo suggests that his alleged "USZA" 

accreditation should be accepted in lieu of AZA accreditation, nothing in 

the record indicates that he made this argument before the district court 

below, or before Lyon County officials in contesting his citation. See Old 

Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (noting 

that this court does not consider arguments raised for the first time on 

appeal). For these reasons, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

Gibbons 

cc: Hon. John Schlegelmilch, District Judge 

Peter Renzo 

Lyon County District Attorney 

Third District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

4 

(0) 1947A ea.