alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(June 10, 1991)

#### Scott P. Abuso, Appellant, v Mack Trucks, Inc., et al., Defendants, and Joseph Russo et al., Respondents. (And Third-Party Actions.)

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Hentel, J.), dated January 2, 1990, which granted the motion of the defendants Joseph Russo and Peter Toscano, John Toscano, and Thomas Toscano, individually, and doing business as Mr. T. Carting, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them on the ground that the Workers’ Compensation Law precludes recovery.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff Scott P. Abuso was injured when he fell from and was hit by a garbage truck owned by the defendant Thomas Toscano, a partner in a business called Mr. T Carting. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was the sole employee of Tee’s Recycling, a recycling business formed by Mr. T Carting in order to sell the recyclable materials it collected. According to the plaintiff, the accident occurred when, in the course of collecting refuse, he touched a hot exhaust pipe and fell under the truck. After accepting Workers’ Compensation benefits through Tee’s Recycling, the plaintiff commenced this action, *inter alia,*against Joseph Russo, the driver of the truck and an employee of Mr. T Carting, and Thomas Toscano, John Toscano and Peter Toscano, individually, and doing business as Mr. T Carting, to recover damages for the injuries. These defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them on the ground that the plaintiff was barred from such recovery by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (6). The Supreme Court granted this motion, reasoning that a special employment relationship existed between the plaintiff and Mr. T Carting.

We agree. The evidence demonstrates the existence of a special employment relationship between the plaintiff and Mr. T Carting *(see, Thompson v Grumman Aerospace Corp.,*166 *591AD2d 578; *Cameli v Pace Univ.,*131 AD2d 419). The plaintiff worked under the direction and control of the partners of Mr. T Carting, and was assigned to assist its employee, Russo. While the question of whether a special employment relationship exists is generally one of fact *(see, Thompson v Grumman Aerospace Corp., supra; Matter of Abramson v Long Beach Mem. Hosp.,*103 AD2d 866), the indicia of special employment in this case are so strong that, in the absence of a triable issue, the court properly determined it as a matter of law *(see, Richiusa v Kahn Lbr. & Millwork Co.,*148 AD2d 690; *Cameli v Pace Univ., supra; Doboshinski v Fuji Bank,*78 AD2d 537). In light of this determination, we decline to address the parties’ remaining contentions *(see, Heritage v Van Patten,*59 NY2d 1017). Mangano, P. J., Kooper, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.
**For fastest processing, please attach this form and a PDF shipping label in an email to DairySanitaryCerts@ams.usda.gov.

DA-240 (01/2013)

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of race, color, national origin, age, disability, and where applicable, sex, marital status, familial status, parental status, religion, sexual orientation, genetic information, political beliefs, reprisal, or because all or part of an individual’s income is derived from any public assistance program.  (Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Persons with disabilities who require alternative means for communication of program information (Braille, large print, audiotape, etc.) should contact USDA’s TARGET Center at (202) 720-2600 (voice and TDD).

To file a complaint of discrimination, write to USDA, Director, Office of Civil Rights, 1400 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20250-9410, or call (800) 795-3272 (voice) or (202) 720-6382 (TDD). USDA is an equal opportunity provider and employer.
OFFICIAL NOTICE FROM COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS oF Texas FILE COPY
P.O. BOX 12308, CAPITOL STATION, AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711

4/17/2015
BENNETT, CHAD RAY

The appellant’s pro se petition for discretion
and filed.

COA No. 06-14-00050-CR
3 PD-0421-15
Aeview has this day been received

Abel Acosta, Clerk

6TH COURT OF APPEALS CLERK
DEBBIE AUTREY

100 N. STATE LINE AVE.
_TEXARKANA, TX 75501-5666

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

390 

KA 09-01812 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, AND SCONIERS, JJ.

 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JAMES A. RIOS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

PETER J. DIGIORGIO, JR., UTICA, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

SCOTT D. MCNAMARA, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, UTICA (STEVEN G. COX OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Oneida County Court (Barry M.

Donalty, J.), rendered April 17, 2009. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of burglary in the third degree

and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him

upon his plea of guilty of burglary in the third degree (Penal Law §

140.20) and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§

265.03 [2]). We reject defendant’s contention that he did not

knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive his right to appeal. 

Taking into account “the nature and terms of the [plea] agreement and

the age, experience and background of [defendant]” (People v Seaberg,

74 NY2d 1, 11), we conclude that the record of the plea colloquy

“establish[es] that the defendant understood that the right to appeal

is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited

upon a plea of guilty” (People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256; cf. People v

Moyett, 7 NY3d 892, 893). Defendant’s further contention that his

plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered is actually a challenge

to the factual sufficiency of the plea allocution. That challenge “is

encompassed by the valid waiver of the right to appeal and is

unpreserved for our review inasmuch as [defendant] did not move to

withdraw the plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction on that

ground” (People v Bryant, 87 AD3d 1270, 1271, lv denied 18 NY3d 881). 

In addition, “the waiver by defendant of the right to appeal

encompasses his contention that the sentence is unduly harsh and

severe” (People v Ruffins, 78 AD3d 1627, 1628).

Entered: March 23, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
Exhibit 32.1



Certification Pursuant to Rule 18 U.S.C. § 1350

(Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)



BNSF Railway Company



In connection with the Annual Report of BNSF Railway Company (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the Report), the undersigned, Matthew K. Rose, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Thomas N. Hund, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies that, to his
knowledge on the date hereof:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Dated: February 16, 2007

|                                                |  |  |  |                                                     
|----------------------------------------------- |  |  |  | ----------------------------------------------------
|                                                |  | 
|/s/ Matthew K. Rose                             |  |  |  | /s/ Thomas N. Hund                                  
|Matthew K. Rose                                 |  |  |  | Thomas N. Hund                                      
|Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer |  |  |  | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to BNSF Railway Company and will be retained by BNSF Railway Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in

the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12

- 405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer

generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of Appeals.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A
- 1
- CA
- 41483 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plainti ff

- Appellee,

v. ENRIQUE VILLAR,
Defendant

- Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY Mary Marlowe Sommer, District Court Judge Raúl Torrez, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Van Snow, Acting Deputy Solicitor General Albuquerque, NM for Appell ee Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant
MEMORANDUM OPINION BOGARDUS, Judge. {1} Summary reversal was proposed for the reasons stated in the notice of proposed summary disposition. Appellee has filed a notice with this Court informing us that they will not be filing a memorandum in opposition. No memorandum opposing the proposed dispos ition has been filed, and the time for doing so has expired. Accordingly, we rely on the reasoning contained in our notice of proposed disposition. REVERSED

.{2} IT IS SO ORDERED.

KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge
WE CONCUR: JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Chief Judge

JANE B. YOHAEM, Judge
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

**PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Randall K. Gausman, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of Tut Systems Inc.,on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2004 fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934, as amended, and that information contained in such Quarterly Report onForm 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial conditionand results of operations of Tut Systems, Inc.

 

 
|                | By:    | /s/ Randall K. Gausman                                                             |   |
|---------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                |   | Randall K. Gausman                                                                 |   |
|                |   | Vice President, Finance and Administration,  Chief Financial Officer and Secretary |   |
| Date: July 28, 2004 |   |                                                                               |   |

 

----
#### William J. Zetko et al., Appellants, v McDonald’s Corporation et al., Respondents.

—Order unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs, in accordance with the following Memorandum: By the terms of a previous order, plaintiffs were directed to provide defendants, within 20 days, "medical information showing the alleged injuries of the plaintiff, William J. Zetko and the names of the doctors, dates of treatment and treatment provided by each doctor and hospital in accordance with the demand for the Bill of Particulars.” In response to the order, plaintiffs’ attorney sent to defendants’ attorney portions of a hospital record containing progress notes, results of various chemistry tests and doctors’ orders. Deeming the response defective and insufficient, defendants’ attorney moved for summary judgment contending that plaintiffs failed to comply with the court’s order and "failed to provide any evidence of *1057an injury * * * attributable to defendants”. The court granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint in an order reciting that plaintiffs "failed to produce any medical proof that the plaintiff was injured as a result of any negligence of defendants.”

The court erred in granting summary judgment. The exclusive remedy for a defective or insufficient bill of particulars is provided by CPLR 3042 (d) by way of a motion for preclusion or to direct the service of a further bill *(see,*Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3042:6; *Lutza v Bollacker,*36 AD2d 789; *Golowaty v Mach-nick Constr. Co.,*26 AD2d 718). At the time the court granted summary judgment, plaintiffs were not precluded from submitting medical evidence because no preclusion order had been granted; thus, it was improper to grant summary judgment unless defendants sustained their burden by submitting evidence in admissible form that plaintiffs’ cause of action has no merit (CPLR 3212 [b]). Defendants failed to meet that burden and they may not rely upon plaintiffs’ failure to show that their cause of action has merit. "A defendant moving for summary judgment must first present evidence establishing that the plaintiff has no cause of action before the plaintiff is called upon to present evidence raising a question of fact” *(Hayes v Riccardi,*97 AD2d 954).

Although the court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiffs failed to comply with the court’s previous order. Thus, we deem defendants’ motion to be one for preclusion and we modify the order to provide that plaintiffs are precluded from giving testimony concerning the matters referred to in the previous order unless they properly comply with that order within 20 days from the date of service of the order entered herein. (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Oneida County, Tenney, J.—Summary Judgment.) Present—Denman, J. P., Boomer, Pine, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Richard Baker, Appellant.

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: From our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) (a). Because the People announced their readiness for trial on July 5, 1989, which was within six months of the Court of Appeals’ denial of the People’s motion for leave to appeal our reversal of defendant’s prior conviction, it was timely (CPL 30.30 [4]). Defendant’s CPL 30.30 motion asserted that the period during which the *1020prosecution had to announce its readiness began to run from November 15, 1988, the date of our reversal of defendant’s prior conviction, and reversal was mandated because the People did not announce their readiness by May 15, 1989. On appeal, defendant abandons that contention and asserts an entirely new basis for dismissal pursuant to CPL 30.30. Given those circumstances, the People are not bound by their failure to contest at trial the basis for defendant’s theory.

We further find no error in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a missing witness charge concerning the two child witnesses who were allegedly present when defendant sodomized and sexually abused complainant. The People, in response to defendant’s missing witness motion, adequately demonstrated that these witnesses refused to cooperate with the prosecution. They were not under the control of the prosecution because there was no relationship, in legal status or on the facts, to cause the prosecution naturally to expect the witnesses to testify in its favor *(see, People v Gonzalez,*68 NY2d 424; *People v Archie,*167 AD2d 925).

We have reviewed defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. (Appeal from Judgment of Monroe County Court, Maloy, J.—Sexual Abuse, 1st Degree.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Balio, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
**Exhibit 32**

 

**Certification of Chief Executive Officer andChief Financial OfficerPursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350***

 

In connection with the annual report ofCascade Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the period endedJanuary 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission onthe date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, that:

 

(i)                                     The Report fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(ii)                                  The information contained in the Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ Robert  C. Warren, Jr.               |   |
|------------------------------------------|--------|
| Robert C. Warren, Jr.                    |   |
| *President and  Chief Executive Officer* |   |
| April 7, 2004                            |   |

 
| /s/ RICHARD S. ANDERSON    |   |
|----------------------------|--------|
| Richard S. Anderson        |
| *Chief Financial  Officer* |
| April 7, 2004              |

 

----

*A signed original of this written statementrequired by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided toCascade Corporation and will be retained by Cascade Corporation and furnishedto the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

1

----
A-A-20121A

 NOTICE 1

 June 26, 2020

COMMERCIAL ITEM DESCRIPTION (CID)

CRANBERRY JUICE COCKTAIL (SINGLE STRENGTH AND CONCENTRATE)

This cancellation was approved by the

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).

CID A-A-20121A, Cranberry Juice Cocktail (Single Strength and Concentrate), dated September 

20, 2001, is hereby canceled due to the contents being incorporated into CID A-A-20327A, 

Cranberry Juice Products (Juice, Blends, Drinks, and Cocktails), Shelf Stable, dated June 4, 

2020.

CIVIL AGENCY COORDINATING ACTIVITIES:

DOJ - BOP

HHS - FDA, NIH

USDA - SCI

VA - OSS

PREPARING ACTIVITY:

USDA - SCI

FSC 8915

 NOTICE OF 

CANCELLATION

METRIC
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1463 

To limit the use of Federal funds for the use of the travel expenses of 

senior Federal officials in contravention of certain regulations, and for 

other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 28, 2019 

Mr. O’HALLERAN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Oversight and Reform 

A BILL 

To limit the use of Federal funds for the use of the travel 

expenses of senior Federal officials in contravention of 

certain regulations, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Taxpayers Don’t Incur 

5 Meaningless Expenses Act of 2019’’ or the ‘‘Taxpayers 

6 DIME Act of 2019’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•HR 1463 IH

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN FED2 ERAL EMPLOYEE TRAVEL IN CONTRAVEN3 TION OF CERTAIN REGULATIONS. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Beginning on the date of enact5 ment of this Act, no Federal funds appropriated or other6 wise made available in any fiscal year may be used for 

7 the travel expenses of any senior Federal official in con8 travention of sections 301–10.260 through 301–10.266 of 

9 title 41, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor 

10 regulation. 

11 (b) QUARTERLY REPORT ON TRAVEL.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

13 the date of enactment of this Act and every 90 days 

14 thereafter, the head of each Federal agency shall 

15 submit a report to the Committee on Oversight and 

16 Reform of the House of Representatives and the 

17 Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

18 Affairs of the Senate detailing travel on Government 

19 aircraft by any senior Federal official employed at 

20 the applicable agency. 

21 (2) APPLICATION.—Any report required under 

22 paragraph (1) shall not include any classified travel, 

23 and nothing in this Act shall be construed to super24 sede, alter, or otherwise affect the application of sec25 tion 101–37.408 of title 41, Code of Federal Regula26 tions, or any successor regulation. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
3 

•HR 1463 IH

1 (c) TRAVEL REGULATION REPORT.—Not later than 

2 one year after enactment of this Act, the Director of the 

3 Office of Government Ethics shall submit a report to Con4 gress detailing suggestions on strengthening Federal trav5 el regulations. On the date such report is so submitted, 

6 the Director shall publish such report on the Office’s pub7 lic website. 

8 (d) DEFINITION OF SENIOR FEDERAL OFFICIAL.— 

9 In this Act, the term ‘‘senior Federal official’’ has the 

10 meaning given that term in section 101–37.100 of title 

11 41, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on the date 

12 of enactment of this Act, and includes any senior executive 

13 branch official (as that term is defined in such section). 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 April 30, 2019

t0422

Order 

Clerk

April 30, 2019

158219

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 158219

COA: 342532

Ottawa CC: 12-036826-FC

WILLIAM ALAN NICHOLSON,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_____________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 10, 2018 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded 

that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
# C_2012326EN.01004701.xml

| 26.10.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 326/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 326/1

---

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

PART THREE

UNION POLICIES AND INTERNAL ACTIONS

UNION POLICIES AND INTERNAL ACTIONS

TITLE III

AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES

AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES

Article 38

(ex Article 32 TEC)

(ex Article 32 TEC)

1.   The Union shall define and implement a common agriculture and fisheries policy.

The internal market shall extend to agriculture, fisheries and trade in agricultural products. ‘Agricultural products’ means the products of the soil, of stockfarming and of fisheries and products of first-stage processing directly related to these products. References to the common agricultural policy or to agriculture, and the use of the term ‘agricultural’, shall be understood as also referring to fisheries, having regard to the specific characteristics of this sector.

2.   Save as otherwise provided in Articles 39 to 44, the rules laid down for the establishment and functioning of the internal market shall apply to agricultural products.

3.   The products subject to the provisions of Articles 39 to 44 are listed in Annex I.

4.   The operation and development of the internal market for agricultural products must be accompanied by the establishment of a common agricultural policy.

---