COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00145-CV 

IMTIAZ HUSSAIN PIRZADA APPELLANT

V.

LATANYA NICOLE RICE APPELLEE

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FROM THE 233RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 233-489884-11

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant Imtiaz Hussain Pirzada appeals from the trial court’s final decree 

of divorce and specifically challenges the trial court’s child-support and attorneyfees determinations. We affirm.

 1

See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

I. BACKGROUND

Pirzada and appellee LaTanya Nicole Rice married in 1999 and had two 

children, J. and Z.2

 On January 4, 2011, Pirzada filed a divorce petition, seeking 

sole managing conservatorship of J. and Z. (the SAPCR). See Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 6.406 (West 2006). On September 14, 2011, the trial court entered 

temporary orders, appointing Pirzada and Rice as temporary joint managing 

conservators of J. and Z. Rice then filed a counterpetition for divorce on 

September 21, 2011, and asked to be named sole managing conservator of J. 

and Z. On August 27, 2012, Rice filed a motion to modify the temporary orders, 

alleging parental alienation by Pirzada: “Since entry of the Temporary Orders 

[Pirzada] has engaged in parental alienation of the children against [Rice] to the 

extent of causing severe emotional danger to the children.” Rice requested to be 

appointed J. and Z.’s temporary sole managing conservator. 

The trial court called the case for trial on the merits on October 2, 2012. 

The trial court called Susan Goldstein Reddig, a caseworker for Family Court 

Services, as a witness to testify regarding the social study she had prepared. 

She testified that J. and Z. were in “emotional danger” from Pirzada and that they 

refused to see their mother because they were angry with her after she had 

 2

We use aliases for the names of the children. See Tex. R. App. P. 

9.9(a)(3) (requiring privacy protection for sensitive data in civil cases, including 

names of minors). 
3

another baby3 and because they believed Rice wanted to kill them. Reddig 

stated that J. and Z. began reacting aggressively toward Rice after spending time 

with Pirzada. After this testimony, the trial court recessed the trial, ordered the 

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) to take immediate 

possession of J. and Z., and appointed DFPS J. and Z.’s temporary sole 

managing conservator pending a full adversary hearing. See generally id.

§§ 152.204, 262.102, 262.104 (West 2014) (providing for emergency possession 

of child). The trial court also stopped all visitation with Pirzada “until the 

children’s counselor says otherwise,” and ordered Rice’s possession to be 

supervised. 

The next day, DFPS filed a petition in the SAPCR, requesting a temporary

order for the protection of J. and Z. and appointment as J. and Z.’s temporary 

managing conservator (the DFPS suit). See id. §§ 102.003(a)(5), 262.105 (West 

2014). Finally, DFPS requested termination of Pirzada’s and Rice’s parental 

rights to J. and Z. only if reunification with Pirzada or Rice could not be achieved. 

On October 16, 2012, after the required hearing, the trial court ordered Pirzada 

and Rice to pay child support to DFPS and allowed Rice to begin supervised 

visits—“limited access”—with J. and Z. See id. § 262.201 (West 2014). Pirzada 

was given no visitation rights at this time. Because of this child-support order, 

 3

It appears that the father of this baby was Rice’s boyfriend and not 

Pirzada. 
4

the Texas Attorney General became an interested party in the SAPCR. See id.

§§ 102.007, 231.101 (West 2014).

On January 23, 2013 after having had no contact with J. and Z. for four 

months, Pirzada filed a motion seeking “reasonable visitation periods” with J. and 

Z., which the trial court granted, allowing Pirzada to visit J. and Z., supervised by 

DFPS, for thirty minutes twice a month. On April 12, 2013, DFPS moved to 

suspend Pirzada’s visitation because J. and Z. continued to be “very negative 

towards” Rice and appeared to have been emotionally abused by Pirzada. The 

trial court declined to modify Pirzada’s visitation. After a hearing on 

August 12, 2013, however, the trial court entered an order suspending all 

visitation with Pirzada but allowing Rice and Z. to have unsupervised visits “on 

Saturdays from 9:00 am to 6:00 pm.” See id. § 263.304 (West 2014). The trial 

court set October 7, 2013 as the dismissal date. See id. §§ 263.306(a)(12), 

263.401(a) (West 2014).

On September 17, 2013, DFPS filed two motions for the monitored return 

of J. to Pirzada and Z. to Rice, which the trial court granted. See id. § 263.403

(West 2014). The trial court extended the dismissal date and set both the 

SAPCR and the DFPS suit for trial on January 23, 2014. See id. § 263.401(b). 

On December 16, 2013, the trial court removed DFPS as J. and Z.’s temporary 

sole managing conservator pursuant to DFPS’s motion, appointed Pirzada as J.’s 

temporary managing conservator, and appointed Rice as Z.’s temporary 
5

managing conservator. This ended DFPS’s involvement in the SAPCR. Indeed, 

DFPS did not enter an appearance at the SAPCR trial.

The trial of the SAPCR began on January 23, 2014. Pirzada, Rice, and 

the attorney general appeared. At its conclusion, the trial court granted the 

divorce, divided the marital estate, appointed Rice as sole managing conservator 

of J. and Z., and appointed Pirzada as possessory conservator with supervised 

visitation. The trial court further set Pirzada’s child-support obligation at $1,130 

per month, which was the amount requested by the attorney general. The final 

divorce decree was signed on February 24, 2014. 

Pirzada timely filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the trial court erred 

by failing to allow J. to testify at Pirzada’s request and by ordering supervised 

visitation for Pirzada in the absence of sufficient evidence. Pirzada did not 

request findings of fact or conclusions of law. See id. § 6.711 (West 2006),

§ 154.130 (West 2014); Tex. R. Civ. P. 296. The motion was overruled by 

operation of law, and Pirzada filed a notice of appeal from the final divorce 

decree. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(c). Pirzada argues in three issues that he was 

denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial, there was no evidence to 

support the trial court’s net-resources finding, and the trial court’s attorneys-fee 

award must be remanded if the trial court’s judgment is reversed. 

II. ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

In his first issue, Pirzada argues his trial counsel was constitutionally 

ineffective for failing to call two witnesses to “directly challenge the claims of 
6

alienation,” resulting in the trial court’s unfavorable custody rulings. The right to 

effective assistance of counsel arises under the Sixth Amendment and has been 

extended only to certain civil proceedings in Texas. U.S. Const. amend. VI; 

see, e.g., In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544–45 (Tex. 2003) (extending Sixth 

Amendment to parental-rights termination cases based on statutory right to 

appointed counsel applicable to termination proceedings); In re Protection of 

H.W., 85 S.W.3d 348, 355–56 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.) (noting right 

applies to involuntary civil-commitment cases). This constitutional right has not 

been extended to divorce proceedings or to disputes regarding conservatorship 

or its modification. See In re A.J.M., No. 05-10-00920-CV, 2011 WL 2207103, at 

*1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 8, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re M.J., No. 09-09-

00355-CV, 2010 WL 3042438, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 5, 2010, 

no pet.) (mem. op.); Chrisman v. Chrisman, 296 S.W.3d 706, 707 (Tex. App.—El 

Paso 2009, no pet.); In re V.N.S., No. 13-07-00046-CV, 2008 WL 2744659, at *5 

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 3, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

Pirzada argues that this right should be extended to the SAPCR trial 

because the DFPS suit sought termination of his parental rights and because he 

“actually lost his rights to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 

control of his children.” We conclude the constitutional right to effective 

assistance of counsel is not extended to this case. Although DFPS sought 

termination in its suit as an alternative to reunification, that suit was concluded 

when the trial court removed DFPS as J. and Z.’s temporary sole managing 
7

conservator, appointed Rice as Z.’s temporary managing conservator, and 

appointed Pirzada as J.’s temporary managing conservator. DFPS did not 

appear at the trial and, of course, introduced no evidence relevant to termination.

Both Rice and Pirzada were represented by retained counsel at the SAPCR trial. 

The factor that compelled the supreme court to extend the Sixth Amendment to 

parental-rights termination cases—an indigent parent’s statutory right to 

appointed counsel in such cases—is not present in this case. We decline to 

extend the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel under 

these circumstances and overrule Pirzada’s first issue.4

III. CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION

In his second issue, Pirzada argues that the trial court abused its discretion 

by determining his monthly net resources and ordering him to pay $1,130 per 

month based on that amount. We review a trial court’s determination of child 

support for an abuse of discretion. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 

(Tex. 1990). An abuse of discretion occurs if a trial court acts without reference 

to any guiding principles. Id. If some probative evidence supports the trial 

 4

Even if the right to effective counsel extended to Pirzada’s retained trial 

counsel, we would conclude Pirzada failed to show counsel was ineffective. See 

Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (holding prejudice 

prong of ineffective-assistance test cannot be met for failure to call a witness 

absent showing that witness was available and appellant would have benefitted 

from testimony); Lair v. State, 265 S.W.3d 580, 594 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d) (holding decision whether to call certain witness is 

strategic decision that will not be second-guessed by appellate court in the 

absence of any explanation). 
8

court’s decision, no abuse of discretion occurs. In re A.A.G., 303 S.W.3d 739, 

740 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.). Because Pirzada did not request findings 

or conclusions, we imply “that the trial court made all the findings necessary to 

support its judgment.” Worford, 801 S.W.2d at 109. In determining whether 

some evidence supports the trial court’s decision based on these implied findings 

of fact, we are to consider only that evidence most favorable to the issue and 

entirely disregard opposing or contradictory evidence. Id.

Under the statutory guidelines, Pirzada was subject to a presumption that 

he should pay 25% of his monthly net resources for J. and Z.’s support. 

See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.125(b) (West 2014). Net resources for a childsupport obligation include “100 percent of all wage and salary income” and “selfemployment income.” Id. § 154.062(b)(1), (3) (West 2014). Self-employment 

income, in turn, is subject to the trial court’s discretion. See Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 154.065(b) (West 2014). Pirzada asserts that the evidence he submitted 

of his monthly net worth showed an average monthly amount of $6,903.83, which 

then must be reduced by 50%—to $3,451.92 per month—to account for 

Pirzada’s business partner. 

Pirzada testified that he owned a limousine service equally with a partner, 

Mohammad Ismael, who received 50% of the business’s gross income. Pirzada 

introduced into evidence the business’s bank statements for five months in 2013, 

showing the business grossed an average of $6,903.83 per month, and his 2011 

tax return, which showed his adjusted gross income was $16,745. Pirzada did 
9

not produce his personal bank statements or the required financial-information 

statement. See Tarrant Cnty. (Tex.) Fam. Cts. Loc. R. 4.05(2); see also Tex. 

Fam. Code Ann. § 154.063 (West 2014). Pirzada testified that he had business 

expenses—car payments, gas, maintenance fees, car insurance—that were 

deducted from his gross business income. Rice testified that Pirzada had never 

before claimed to have a business partner and pointed out that the web site for 

the business only provided Pirzada’s contact information. 

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining

the amount of Pirzada’s child-support obligation. Although Pirzada testified that 

he had a business partner who was entitled to 50% of the amount reflected in the 

bank statements, thereby reducing the amount subject to any child-support 

obligation, the trial court could have discounted that testimony based on Rice’s

statements that Pirzada never had a business partner. See In re N.T., 

335 S.W.3d 660, 666 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.). Pirzada also testified 

as to business expenses, which would reduce the $6,903.83 gross monthly 

income from his business. This evidence taken as a whole supported the trial 

court’s order that Pirzada pay $1,130 per month in child support, as requested by 

the attorney general. See In re B.J.M., No. 04-14-00300-CV, 2015 WL 1244804, 

at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 18, 2015, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); In re 

H.D.C., No. 14-13-00976-CV, 2014 WL 6464331, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] Nov. 18, 2014, no pet.); Baxley v. Baxley, No. 01-10-00570-CV, 

2011 WL 2504216, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 23, 2011, no pet.) 
10

(mem. op.). Therefore, Pirzada has failed to show that the trial court abused its 

discretion. See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, No. 01-13-00182-CV, 2014 WL 2538555, 

at *8–9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 5, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); 

N.T., 335 SW.3d at 666–67. We overrule issue two.

IV. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the SAPCR was not a proceeding to which the 

guarantees of the Sixth Amendment applied and that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion by determining Pirzada’s monthly net income in setting his childsupport obligation. Because Pirzada’s third issue was conditional on a finding of 

trial court error, we need not address it. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. Accordingly, 

we affirm the trial court’s final divorce decree. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a). 

/s/ Lee Gabriel

LEE GABRIEL

JUSTICE

PANEL: GARDNER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DELIVERED: April 16, 2015