NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING 

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED 

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL 

OF FLORIDA 

SECOND DISTRICT 

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ) 

o/b/o Loretta Sermon, Cherral Smith, ) 

and Yata Frichelle Canty, ) 

 ) 

 Appellant, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case Nos. 2D14-823 

 ) 2D14-825 

GEORGE BAKER, ) 2D14-867 

 ) 

 Appellee. ) CONSOLIDATED 

 ) 

Opinion filed April 17, 2015. 

Appeals from the Circuit Court for Pasco 

County; Susan Gardner, Judge. 

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and 

William H. Branch, Assistant Attorney 

General, Tallahassee, for Appellant. 

No appearance for Appellee. 

VILLANTI, Chief Judge. 

 The Department of Revenue seeks review of a court order that reduced 

the amount of George Baker's monthly child support obligations. Because the trial court 

impermissibly altered the substance of a prior court's ruling, we reverse. 
- 2 -

 Baker is father to several children and makes regular child support 

payments to Loretta Sermon,1 Cherral Smith,2 and Yata Frichelle Canty,3 all 

represented by the Department of Revenue. Baker's total payments made up a 

significant portion of his monthly income. At a status hearing held in the context of an 

enforcement proceeding, the hearing officer assigned to the case opined that Baker's 

payments might be exceeding the amount legally allowable. After the hearing, the 

hearing officer then reviewed the specifics of each case and filed a recommendation 

suggesting a reduction of payments to be made and amounts owed on arrearages. The 

trial court adopted the hearing officer's recommendations and entered an order reducing 

Baker's payments and arrearage. But, no opportunity to object was given nor was a 

hearing held before the court unilaterally lowered Baker's payments. As justification, the 

court noted in its order that, pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(a), it 

could correct a "clerical error" in the previous order by its own initiative. 

 The facts of this case are very similar to those found in this court's recent 

decision in Department of Revenue ex rel. Williams v. Annis, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D565 

(Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 13, 2015). In Annis, the trial court claimed to correct a "clerical error" 

in a previous court order when it changed the imputation of the father's income from the 

median wage level to the minimum wage level. The trial court maintained that rule 

 1Baker's support obligations to Sermon began in 1991 and terminated in 

2004, with a balance of $12,219.05 due in arrearages at the time of the order on appeal. 

2Baker's support obligations to Smith began in 1991 and were modified in 

2006 upon the birth of their second child. At the time of the order on appeal, Baker 

owed $11,619.40 in arrearages. 

3Baker's support obligation to Canty began in 2004, with a balance of 

$2377.08 due in arrearages at the time of the order on appeal. 
- 3 -

1.540(a) gave it authority to make this correction at any time and on its own initiative. In 

reversing the trial court's order, this court noted that "a change in the amount of child 

support is considered a substantive change," and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction 

under rule 1.540(a) to make substantive changes to a prior judgment. Id. at D565; see 

also Malone v. Percival, 875 So. 2d 1286, 1288 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Byers v. Callahan, 

848 So. 2d 1180, 1184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Dep't of Revenue ex rel. Thomas v. 

Thomas, 675 So. 2d 1024, 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Instead, any mistake in the 

amounts owed should have been corrected either within ten days of entry of the 

judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530 or by appeal. See Annis, 40 

Fla. L. Weekly at D565; Levy v. Levy, 900 So. 2d 737, 746 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). In this 

circumstance, the concept of not utilizing a corrective order to make these substantive 

changes clearly applied. 

 Here, the trial court's concern would have been better handled if Baker 

were simply informed of his right to seek modification or if the Department had agreed 

to a reduction. Instead, the trial court unilaterally and substantively altered a prior court 

order without notice or a hearing. This was a substantive change for which the trial 

court lacked authority to address on its own initiative and not simply the correction of a 

clerical error. Accordingly, the trial court fundamentally erred when it entered the 

modification of Baker's child support payments without notice or without holding a 

hearing. 

 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 

NORTHCUTT and BLACK, JJ., Concur.