alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### George O. SMITH, Deceased, and Lila J. Smith, widow, Plaintiffs, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of the State of Utah et al., Defendants.

No. 14275.

Supreme Court of Utah.

April 28, 1976.

*449Robert M. McRae, of Hatch, McRae & Richardson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.

Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Frank V. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants.

HENRIOD, Chief Justice:

Review of the adequacy of a Commission award. Affirmed with no costs.

This was a very protracted case, where an award was made on June 13, 1975, seven years after the injury of the applicant’s husband, in the course of his employment, on May 7, 1968, when he fell from a ladder, injured his head against a pipe and died on May 25, 1972.

The petitioner urges one point on review: That the Commission did not award her, a wholly dependent widow, sufficient entitlement under Section 35 — 1— 68, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The benefits were definable as to maximum time for payment and amount, were governed by the wording of the section on date of injury,1 and it appears the award fully complied with or exceeded such provisions. (Laws Utah 1967, Ch. 65, Sec. 1.) Any additional benefits would not be awardable by amendment thereafter, and subsection 4, paragraphs 5 and 6 so amended in 1973 2 that *did*enlarge such benefits would have no application here.

Petitioner did not join in defendants’ petition for review, was not par-ticeps thereto, and anyway, the issue raised by them are not those raised by her here. Besides, she did not ask for a review within 15 days after the award, as' interdicted by Title 35-1-82.55, all of which has precluded her from asserting any claim further.

ELLETT, CROCKETT, TUCKETT and MAUGHAN, JJ., concur.

1

. *Utah Road Comm. v. Industrial Comm.,*109 Utah 553, 168 P.2d 319 (1946).

2

. Laws of Utah, 1973, Ch. 67, See. 5.
Page 1 of 5
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. (S) 1350



(ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002)



In connection with the periodic report of Dynegy Inc. (the Company) on Form
10-Q/A for the period ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Holli C. Nichols, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify as
of the date hereof, solely for the purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code, that to the best of my knowledge:



|(1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods
indicated.
|--- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                  |  |     |  |                                                                      
|----------------- |  | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: May 1, 2006 |  | By: |  | /s/ HOLLI C. NICHOLS                                                 
|                  |  |     |  | Holli C. Nichols Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
```

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 231 (Friday, November 30, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Page 71474]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-28993]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

Seventeenth Meeting: RTCA Special Committee 224, Airport Security 
Access Control Systems

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Meeting Notice of RTCA Special Committee 224, Airport Security 
Access Control Systems.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA is issuing this notice to advise the public of the 
seventeenth meeting of the RTCA Special Committee 224, Airport Security 
Access Control Systems.

DATES: The meeting will be held December 13, 2012 from 9:00 a.m.-4:00 
p.m.

ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held at RTCA, 1150 18th Street NW., 
Suite 910, Washington, DC, 20036.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The RTCA Secretariat, 1150 18th Street 
NW., Suite 910, Washington, DC 20036, or by telephone at (202) 833-
9339, fax at (202) 833-9434, or Web site at http://www.rtca.org.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to section 10(a)(2) of the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, 5 U.S.C., App.), notice is 
hereby given for a meeting of Special Committee 224. The agenda will 
include the following:

December 13, 2012

 Welcome/Introductions/Administrative Remarks
 Review/Approve Summary of Sixteenth Meeting
 Updates from TSA (as required)
 Section Reports
 Times and Place of Next Meeting
 Other Business
 Adjourn

    Attendance is open to the interested public but limited to space 
availability. With the approval of the chairman, members of the public 
may present oral statements at the meeting. Persons wishing to present 
statements or obtain information should contact the person listed in 
the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. Members of the public may 
present a written statement to the committee at any time.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on November 15, 2012.
Richard F. Gonzalez,
Management Analyst, Business Operations Group, ANG-A12, Federal 
Aviation Administration.
[FR Doc. 2012-28993 Filed 11-29-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
```
#### The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edward Thomas SWAIN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 14036.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Sept. 30, 1975.

Gary H. Weight, of Aldrich & Nelson, Provo, for defendant and appellant.

Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Earl F. Dorius, William Barrett, Asst. Attys., Gen., Salt Lake City, Noall T. Wootton, Utah County Atty., Provo, for plaintiff and respondent.

TUCKETT, Justice:

The defendant appeals from an order of the district court denying his motion for a new trial.

The defendant was found guilty of the crime of distributing a controlled substance (amphetamine) for value. After his conviction the defendant filed a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. In support of his motion defendant filed an affidavit of one Darrel W. Lyon, which stated in effect that he (Lyon) at the time and place mentioned in the information sold one hundred amphetamine tablets to Robert Murray after the defendant and Murray had come to the Lyon home. The chief testimony supporting the State’s case against the defendant came from Robert Murray who was an under cover agent for the Narcotics Task Force. However, Murray testified that he purchased five hundred amphetamine tablets from the defendant at Lyon’s home.

Lyon was not produced at the trial and the defendant claims here that he was unaware of the fact that Lyon had sold amphetamine to Murray, and that he was unaware of the fact that he (Lyon) would testify that he did in fact make the sale. The defendant contends that his motion and the supporting affidavit meet the requirements of Section 77-38-3(7), U.C.A. 1953, and that the trial court should have granted his motion.

*6The defendant is entitled to have the order of the trial court reversed only if it appears the trial court abused its discretion.1 In view of the discrepancies in the testimony of the State’s witness and the statements made by Lyon in his affidavit there is nothing to show that the jury would have found differently even though Lyon had testified at trial to the statements made in his affidavit. It is doubtful that the out of court confession by Lyon would be admissible in a new trial of this case.2 In view of all the circumstances we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

The decision of the court below is affirmed.

HENRIOD, C. J., and CROCKETT, ELLETT and MAUGHAN, JJ„ concur.

1

*. State v. Montgomery,*37 Utah 515, 109 P. 815; *State v. Jiron,*27 Utah 2d 21, 492 P.2d 983.

2

. *Donnelly v. United States,*228 U.S. 243, 273, 33 S.Ct. 449, 57 L.Ed. 820.
ex10-1



 




EXHIBIT 10.1


CONCORD EFS, INC.

1993 INCENTIVE STOCK OPTION PLAN

(Second 1999 Restatement)


2000 Amendment


         Pursuant to the provisions of Section 20 of the Concord EFS, Inc. 1993
Incentive Stock Option Plan, the Compensation Committee of the Board of
Directors of Concord EFS, Inc. hereby causes Section 11(b) of said Plan to be
amended, effective November 16, 2000, to read as follows:



                  (b)  Terms of Formula Options. Each Formula Option granted to an Optionee
under this Section 18 shall (i) have an exercise price equal to 100% of the
Fair Market Value of the Stock on the applicable Formula Grant Date, and (ii)
become exercisable as to one-half of the shares covered thereby on the date of
the next succeeding annual stockholders meeting and as to the remaining
one-half on the date of the second succeeding stockholders meeting, but only if
the Optionee remains a director of the Company on each such date. No Formula
Option granted pursuant to this Section 11 is intended to qualify as an
incentive stock option within the meaning of Section 422 of the Code. The
Formula Grants shall be evidenced by Option Agreements. Option Agreements
shall contain provisions consistent with this Section 11 and shall contain
identical terms and conditions, except as otherwise required by this Section
11.



         In witness whereof, the Committee has caused this 2000 Amendment to be
executed and delivered on November 16, 2000.



          


	 	 	 
	 	 	
/s/ Douglas C. Altenbern



Douglas C. Altenbern
	 
	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	
/s/ Jerry D. Mooney



Jerry D. Mooney
	 
	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	
/s/ Paul L. Whittington



Paul L. Whittington
"A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of 

an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or 

station or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion." 

Williams v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 45, 262 

P.3d 360, 364 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); NRS 

34.160. "A district court's decision to grant or deny a writ petition is 

reviewed by this court under an abuse of discretion standard." DR 

Partners v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Clark County, 116 Nev. 616, 621, 6 

P.3d 465, 468 (2000). 

Morrow claims that various statutes within NRS chapter 179A 

(Records of Criminal History and Information Relating to Public Safety) 

and chapter 239 (Public Records) support his request and mandate 

disclosure of his parole file. However, Morrow's reliance on these statutes 

is misplaced as NRS 213.1075 specifically controls the disclosure of 

information obtained by the Board in the discharge of its official duty and 

the more specific provision• controls. See Nevada Power Co. v. Haggerty, 

115 Nev. 353, 364, 989 P.2d 870, 877 (1999). 

NRS 213.1075 states: 

Except as otherwise provided by specific statute, 

all information obtained in the discharge of official 

duty by an employee of the Division or the Board 

is privileged and may not be disclosed directly or 

indirectly to anyone other than the Board, the 

judge, district attorney or others entitled to 

receive such information, unless otherwise ordered 

by the Board or judge or necessary to perform the 

duties of the Division. 

Morrow argues that the Board's information is merely 

privileged, not confidential, that the information can be released by the 

judge, and that he is an "other[ ] entitled to receive such information" 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 1947A 4WD 
J. 

because he is the subject of the parole file. Morrow fails to demonstrate 

that disclosure of his parole file was a duty required by law; therefore, he 

fails to demonstrate that he was entitled to extraordinary relief. 

Having reviewed the record on appeal, and for the reasons set 

forth above, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

( J. 

Gibbons 

cc: Hon. Michael Montero, District Judge 

Richard David Morrow 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Pershing County Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 3 

(0) 1947A
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Rodney Brown, Appellant.

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Meyerson, J.), rendered December 19, 1989, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We reject the defendant’s contention that the hearing court should have suppressed tangible evidence. Issues of credibility are primarily for the suppression court which has the peculiar advantage of having seen and heard the witness, and its determination is entitled to great weight on appeal *(see, People v Prochilo,*41 NY2d 759; *People v Garafolo,*44 AD2d 86). Moreover, we find nothing "manifestly untrue, physically impossible, contrary to experience, or self-contradictory” in the experienced police officer’s hearing testimony that he saw the defendant holding a couple of vials containing a white substance in a well lit lobby from a distance of approximately three feet *(see, People v Garafolo, supra,*at 88).

We also find no reason to reverse the defendant’s judgment of conviction because of the trial court’s charge regarding the defendant’s failure to testify. While the court’s charge could have been better, in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt there is no reasonable possibility that any error in the court’s charge affected the verdict *(see, People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230, 241-242; *People v Baker,*153 AD2d 865). Rosenblatt, J. P., Miller, O’Brien and Ritter, JJ., concur.
An equal opportunity employer

1220 L Street, Northwest Russell White

Washington, DC 20005-4070 Health Sciences Manager

Tel 202-682-8344

Fax 202-682-8270

whiter@api.org

November 15, 2012

Byron J. Bunker,

Division Director

Compliance Division

Office of Transportation and Air Quality US Environmental Protection Agency 

2000 Traverwood Drive 

Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105

RE: CAA Section 211(b) Fuels and Fuel Additives Health Effects Testing Regulation: 

Final Report for Gasoline DIPE Vapor Condensate: Embryo-Fetal Toxicity Study in Rats by 

Inhalation Exposure (Study No. 05-4287) 

Dear Mr. Bunker:

The American Petroleum Institute (API), on behalf of the Section 211(b) Research Group (RG), 

is submitting the following information to EPA as partial fulfillment of the CAA Section 211(b) 

Alternative Tier 2 requirements of the testing regulation:

 Final Report for Gasoline DIPE Vapor Condensate: Embryo-Fetal Toxicity Study in 

Rats by Inhalation Exposure (Study No. 05-4287) 

If you require further information or have any questions regarding this submission, please 

contact me.

Regards,

Russell D. White

Enclosures on CD: 1) Final Report for Gasoline DIPE Vapor Condensate: Embryo-Fetal 

Toxicity Study in Rats by Inhalation Exposure (Study No. 05-4287) 

Cc: Joe Sopata, EPA (via email)
# C_2016202EN.01006001.xml

| 7.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 202/60 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 202/60

---

Article 29

(ex Article 24 TEC)

(ex Article 24 TEC)

Products coming from a third country shall be considered to be in free circulation in a Member State if the import formalities have been complied with and any customs duties or charges having equivalent effect which are payable have been levied in that Member State, and if they have not benefited from a total or partial drawback of such duties or charges.

---
Exhibit 32.2

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Wireless Telecom Group, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Periodic Report”), I, Paul Genova, President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Periodic Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

|   |   |   |                               |
|--------|--------|--------|------------------------------------|
|   |   |   | /s/ Paul Genova                    |
|   |   |   |                                    |
|   |   |   | Paul Genova                        |
|   |   |   | President, Chief Financial Officer |
|   |   |   | August 12, 2008                    |

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.

 

----
#### John Woloch et al., Respondents, v Olthof Funeral Home, Inc., et al., Appellants. (And a Third-Party Action.)

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Rose, J.), entered January 4, 1991 in Tioga County, which, *inter alia,*denied defendants’ motion for a change of venue.

In rejecting defendants’ contention that their motion for a change of venue from Tioga County to Broome County should have been granted, we note initially that defendants have failed to support their claim that an impartial trial cannot be had in Tioga County *(see, Krupka v County of Westchester,*160 AD2d 681). Furthermore, Tioga County is the place of residence of plaintiffs, it is the county in which the claim arose and the convenience of the witnesses will be served by a trial there *(see, Risoli v Long Is. Light. Co.,*138 AD2d 316). Under the circumstances, we cannot say that Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying defendants’ motion *(see, Filler v Cornell Univ.,*147 AD2d 610). We have considered defendants’ remaining contentions and have found them to be lacking in merit.

Mikoll, J. P., Yesawich Jr., Mercure, Crew III and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
**PROGRESS
      ENERGY, INC.**




**AMENDED
      AND RESTATED**




**MANAGEMENT
      DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN**









Amendment,
      effective April 1, 2005



















Section
      1.40 was amended to read as follows:




1.40  Retirement
      Date




The
      date
      a Participant retires from the Company on or after attaining (i) age 65 with
      5
      years of service, (ii) age 55 with 15 years of service, (iii) 35 years
      of (iv)
      eligibility for retirement under the SSERP if covered under such plan, or (v)
      age 50 with 5 years of service as of March 31, 2005, and where the Participant
      elects during the period beginning March 15, 2005, and ending April 15, 2005,
      to
      retire no later than December 1, 2005, pursuant to the terms of the Voluntary
      Enhanced Retirement Program (a “VERP Participant”). Notwithstanding any other
      provision of the Plan to the contrary, a VERP Participant may elect on or before
      December 31, 2005, to (a) commence payment of the Plan Year Accounts as of
      (i)
      April 1, 2006, (ii) April 1, 2007, or (iii) April 1, 2011 (each a
“Payment Commencement Date”) and (b) provide for the payment of such Plan Year
      Accounts in the form of (i) a lump sum or (ii) annual installments over a period
      extending from two years to ten years following the Payment Commencement Date.
      In the event no other payment election is made by the VERP Participant prior
      to
      January 1, 2006, the VERP Participant shall be deemed to have elected for
      payment of the Plan Year Accounts to be made in accordance with the Enrollment
      Form submitted by the VERP Participant; provided, that if the VERP Participant
      is a “key employee” as defined in Section 416(i) of the Code (but determined
      without regard to the 50 employee limit on the number of officers treated as
      key
      employees), the Payment Commencement Date shall not be earlier than six months
      after the date of Retirement of the VERP Participant (or, if earlier, the date
      of death of the Participant). A VERP Participant may not make any election
      with
      respect to the payment of the Plan Year Accounts after December 31,
      2005.
# C_2012326EN.01004701.xml

| 26.10.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 326/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 326/1

---

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

PART SIX

INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

TITLE I

INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER 1

THE INSTITUTIONS

SECTION 1

SECTION 1

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Article 225

(ex Article 192, second subparagraph, TEC)

(ex Article 192, second subparagraph, TEC)

The European Parliament may, acting by a majority of its component Members, request the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters on which it considers that a Union act is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties. If the Commission does not submit a proposal, it shall inform the European Parliament of the reasons.

---
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 00-7550

ANTHONY JOSEPH TURNER, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus K. L. OSBORNE, Warden; DOCTOR ANGLIKER; DOCTOR RAYNAUD, Defendants - Appellees.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, District Judge. (CA-95-1106-7) Submitted: May 17, 2001 Decided: May 22, 2001 Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Anthony Joseph Turner, Appellant Pro Se. Martha Murphey Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia; Jim Harold Guynn, Jr., GUYNN & DILLON, Roanoke, Virginia; Larry Benson Kirksey, Bristol, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Anthony Joseph Turner appeals the district court’s order denying his requests to restructure the court-arranged disbursement schedule of his settlement award. Our review of the record and thedistrict court’s opinion discloses no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Turner v. Osborne , No. CA-95-1106-7 (W.D. Va. Sept. 29, 2000). We deny Turner’s motions for appointment of counsel and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED