J-A02034-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

GLENN GRATZ

Appellee No. 2376 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Order July 22, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0003930-2011

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and WECHT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED APRIL 17, 2015

Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from the order 

granting suppression of all evidence seized at the residence of Appellee, 

Glenn Gratz.1 The Commonwealth contends that the trial court erred in its 

application of the totality of the circumstances standard for reviewing the 

sufficiency of the affidavit of probable cause. We agree and, therefore,

reverse the order and remand for further proceedings.

After searching his residence, the Commonwealth charged Gratz with 

three counts of possession of narcotics with intent to deliver (“PWID”), three 

____________________________________________

1 This appeal properly invokes the jurisdiction of this Court as an 

interlocutory appeal from an order that terminates or substantially handicaps 

the prosecution. The Commonwealth has certified in good faith that the 

Order substantially handicaps the instant prosecution. See Pa.R.A.P., Rule 

311(d).
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counts of possession of narcotics, and four counts of possession of drug 

paraphernalia. Prior to trial, Gratz filed a motion to suppress the evidence 

discovered during the search of his residence, arguing that the affidavit of 

probable cause was insufficient to justify the search of his residence. After a 

hearing, the trial court granted suppression of all the evidence discovered at 

Grant’s residence, and the Commonwealth filed this timely appeal.

On appeal, the Commonwealth contends that the trial court erred in 

granting the suppression motion. We review a challenge to an order 

granting suppression according to the following principles.

The suppression court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court if 

the record supports those findings. The suppression court’s 

conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate 

court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court 

properly applied the law to the facts. 

Commonwealth v. Dukeman, 917 A.2d 338, 341 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(citations omitted). 

Here, the Commonwealth has not challenged any of the factual 

findings of the trial court. Furthermore, the factual record developed at the 

suppression hearing consists of only the affidavits of probable cause.2 We 

therefore focus our attention upon the legal conclusions set forth by the trial 

court in support of its order.

____________________________________________

2 One affidavit was for the home, the other for Gratz’s vehicle. The two 

affidavits are substantially similar; any distinctions are irrelevant for 

purposes of this appeal.
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The trial court found that the affidavit did not support a finding of 

probable cause to search Gratz’s residence. Specifically, the trial court 

concluded that the affidavit did not provide sufficient reliable allegations to 

support a finding that evidence of criminal activity could be found at Gratz’s 

residence. When reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit of probable cause, 

we follow well established standards. 

In Commonwealth v. Gray our Supreme Court adopted the 

“totality of the circumstances” standard, announced in Illinois 

v. Gates, for evaluating whether probable cause exists for the 

issuance of a search warrant based upon information received 

from a confidential informant. In Gray, our Supreme Court 

stated:

The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a 

practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 

circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, 

including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of 

persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair 

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 

found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing 

court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 

‘substantial basis for ··· conclud[ing] that probable cause 

existed.’

This determination must be based on facts described within the 

four corners of the supporting affidavit. Furthermore, we stress 

that probable cause exists where there is a probability of 

criminal activity, not a prima facie showing of such activity. 

 

When information essential to a finding of probable cause is 

garnered from the use of confidential informants, the issuing 

authority determines the reliability of the informant’s information 

from the facts supplied by the police official. The determination 

of reliability does not hinge on disclosed records “regarding the 

track record of the informant.” Furthermore, the affidavit need 

not “contain the names, dates, or other information concerning 

prior arrests or convictions.” The affidavit must, however, at the 

very least, contain an averment stating the “customary” phrase 
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that the informant has provided information which “‘has in the 

past resulted in’ arrests or convictions.”

Dukeman, 917 A.2d at 341.

In the instant case, the affidavit of probable cause alleged that 

experienced narcotics officers interviewed a confidential informant, (“CI #1”) 

who informed them that Gratz’s wife, Diane Barnes, was dealing 

methamphetamine from her residence in Plymouth Township. CI #1 

indicated that this knowledge was gleaned from face-to-face and telephonic 

communications with Barnes and her supplier, the last of which occurred 

approximately a month before the interview. The affidavit indicated that CI 

#1 had provided information to officers in the past that led to the arrest of 

drug traffickers and the seizure of narcotics.

The affidavit further indicated that officers had also received an 

anonymous complaint about Barnes and Gratz dealing methamphetamine 

from their residence at 3 Colton Drive, Plymouth Township.

The affidavit also described independent investigation performed by 

the officers. Slightly more than a month after the interview with CI #1, 

officers followed Gratz after he left his home and traveled to a nearby 

shopping center. After parking at the center, Gratz left his vehicle and 

walked to a nearby car, occupied by Barnes. The two interacted for a short 

time, and then Gratz returned to his vehicle, while Barnes drove away. 

After Barnes had left, Gratz walked to another nearby vehicle, 

occupied by Kimberly Friedberg. Officers observed Gratz hand Friedberg a 
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small bag in exchange for currency. Gratz then returned to his vehicle and 

drove away. 

Friedberg departed the parking lot in the opposite direction and was 

stopped by officers shortly thereafter. Friedberg denied the existence of any 

narcotics transaction, but told officers that she knew Gratz used 

methamphetamines and that Barnes dealt methamphetamines.

The affidavit also described an interview with another confidential 

informant (“CI #2”). CI #2 informed officers that Gratz dealt 

methamphetamines. CI #2 also informed officers that this knowledge was 

derived from an instance where CI #2 observed Gratz preparing for the 

purchase of a large amount of methamphetamine while in his house. CI #2 

further indicated that Gratz had intended to purchase a pound of 

methamphetamine that had been seized by other officers in an unrelated 

operation.

The trial court found that these allegations were insufficient. However, 

this Court has previously held that

[w]hen two independent informants both supply the same 

information about a particular crime to the police, each source 

tends inherently to bolster the reliability of the other. Although 

the information supplied by one questionable source may be 

insufficient, the probability is extremely small that a second 

independent source would supply identical information if it were 

not probably accurate. Such corroboration by independent 

sources produces the necessary reliability to establish probable 

cause.
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Dukeman, 917 A.2d at 342. Here, four separate informants, CI #1, an 

anonymous complaint, Friedman, and CI #2 all indicated that either Gratz or 

his wife Barnes were involved in the distribution of methamphetamines in 

Plymouth Township. Furthermore, officers independently observed Gratz 

leave his residence and engage in what appeared to be a narcotics 

transaction with Friedman. When viewed in a common sense fashion, these 

allegations are more than sufficient to allow a reasonable person to conclude 

that evidence of methamphetamine trafficking would be found in the 

residence at 3 Colton Drive and in Gratz’s vehicle. We therefore conclude 

that the trial court erred in granting suppression of the evidence and reverse 

the order.

Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/17/2015