J-S15017-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ANGELA M. BOTZ IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOHN P. BOTZ III

Appellant No. 1604 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered on September 8, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County

Civil Division at No.: 2011-20769

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED APRIL 17, 2015

John P. Botz III (“Husband”) appeals the September 8, 2014 order 

that denied his motion to enforce a marriage settlement agreement (“MSA”). 

We affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

Angela M. Botz [“Wife”] and Husband were married on August 

29, 2007. Wife filed for Divorce on October 19, 2011. On 

[October 9, 20111], the parties entered into a [MSA]. On June 

21, 2013, Wife filed a Petition to Enforce the Marriage 

Settlement Agreement. A Hearing was scheduled for August 6, 

2013. On July 22, 2013, a Motion to Withdraw the Petition was 

granted by the [trial c]ourt as the parties had reached a 

resolution prior to the scheduled hearing.

____________________________________________

1 The parties executed the MSA on October 9, 2011. It was docketed on 

February 21, 2012 and incorporated, but not merged, into the February 22, 

2012 divorce decree.
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On May 12, 2014, Husband filed a Petition to Enforce the 

Marriage Settlement Agreement. Specifically, Husband 

claim[ed] that according to the terms of the [MSA], Wife agreed 

that the proceeds from the sale of a marital property were to [be 

used to] pay off a line of credit. The [MSA] was originally 

drafted by Husband’s attorney. The parties negotiated through 

their respective attorneys and came to a final agreement. The 

final draft of the [MSA] contained the following provision:

HUSBAND and WIFE agree to sell the Mifflin County real 

estate for the best price obtainable and, after payment of 

any sales and transfer costs, and payment of any 

outstanding liens, the remaining proceeds shall be applied 

to the line of credit owed to Northwest Bank. If there are 

any remaining proceeds after payment of the line of credit, 

the proceeds shall be divided equally between HUSBAND 

and WIFE.

Marital Settlement Agreement, dated October 9, 2011, 

paragraph 9.

On September 22, 2011, prior to the parties signing the [MSA], 

Husband’s parents had paid off in full the line of credit specified 

in the [MSA]. At the time, Husband was aware that his parents 

were paying off the line of credit owed to Northwest Bank, but 

Wife claim[ed] that she was not aware of this fact. The [MSA] is 

dated October 9, 2011 and was signed by both parties. 

Husband’s mother signed as witness for Husband.

In his Petition to Enforce, Husband avers that he and Wife are 

equally responsible for reimbursing his parents for this payment 

under the terms of the [MSA]. The Mifflin County real estate 

was sold on October 25, 2013 for $45,000.00. The proceeds of 

the same in the amount of $43,339.50 were placed in escrow by 

agreement of the parties pending resolution of Husband’s 

Petition to Enforce the Marriage Settlement Agreement. A 

hearing was held before [the trial c]ourt on June 24, 2014.

Trial Court Memorandum and Order (“T.C.M.”), 9/8/2014, at 2-3.

On September 8, 2014, the trial court denied Husband’s motion. On 

September 24, 2014, Husband filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court 
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ordered, and Husband timely filed, a concise statement of errors complained 

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Husband raises one issue on appeal: “Did the lower court err and/or 

abuse its discretion in denying [Husband’s] Petition to Enforce Marital 

Settlement Agreement by failing to properly consider the intention of the 

parties, thereby resulting in an unintended windfall to [Wife?]” Husband’s 

Brief at 4.

Our standard of review is well settled:

When interpreting a marital settlement agreement, “the trial 

court is the sole determiner of facts and absent an abuse of 

discretion, we will not usurp the trial court’s fact-finding 

function.” Chen v. Chen, 840 A.2d 355, 360 (Pa. Super. 2003), 

appeal granted in part, 853 A.2d 1011 (Pa. 2004). On appeal 

from an order interpreting a marital settlement agreement, we 

must decide whether the trial court committed an error of law or 

abused its discretion. 

“[J]udicial discretion” requires action in conformity with 

law on facts and circumstances before the trial court after 

hearing and due consideration. Such discretion is not 

absolute, but must constitute the exercises of sound 

discretion. This is especially so where, as here, there is 

law to apply. On appeal, a trial court’s decision will 

generally not be reversed unless there appears to have 

been an abuse of discretion or a fundamental error in 

applying correct principles of law. An “abuse of discretion” 

or failure to exercise sound discretion is not merely an 

error of judgment. But if, in reaching a conclusion, law is 

overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is 

manifestly unreasonable or lacking in reason, discretion 

must be held to have been abused.

In re Deed of Trust of Rose Hill Cemetery Ass'n Dated Jan. 

14, 1960, 590 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. 1991) (internal citations omitted). 

“Because contract interpretation is a question of law, this Court 

is not bound by the trial court’s interpretation.” Chen, supra at 
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360. “Our standard of review over questions of law is de novo

and to the extent necessary, the scope of our review is plenary 

as [the appellate] court may review the entire record in making 

its decision.” Kripp v. Kripp, 849 A.2d 1159, 1164 n.5 (Pa. 

2004). However, we are bound by the trial court’s credibility 

determinations. Wade v. Huston, 877 A.2d 464 (Pa. Super.

2005).

Stamerro v. Stamerro, 889 A.2d 1251, 1257-58 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(footnote and some citations omitted; citations modified). 

We also note that:

In Pennsylvania, we enforce property settlement agreements 

between husband and wife in accordance with the same rules 

applying to contract interpretation. . . .

It is well-established that the paramount goal of contract 

interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the parties’

intent. When the trier of fact has determined the intent of the 

parties to a contract, an appellate court will defer to that 

determination if it is supported by the evidence. 

When construing agreements involving clear and unambiguous 

terms, this Court need only examine the writing itself to give 

effect to the parties[’] understanding. The court must construe 

the contract only as written and may not modify the plain 

meaning of the words under the guise of interpretation. When 

the terms of a written contract are clear, this Court will not 

rewrite it or give it a construction in conflict with the accepted 

and plain meaning of the language used. Conversely, when the 

language is ambiguous and the intentions of the parties cannot 

be reasonably ascertained from the language of the writing 

alone, the parol evidence rule does not apply to the admission of 

oral testimony to show both the intent of the parties and the 

circumstances attending the execution of the contract. 

Lang v. Meske, 850 A.2d 737, 739-40 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quoting Osial v. 

Cook, 803 A.2d 209, 213-14 (Pa. Super. 2002)) (citations omitted).
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Husband asserts that the MSA is not ambiguous. Instead, Husband 

argues that the parties intended to sell the Mifflin property, satisfy the line of 

credit, and then split the remaining proceeds of the sale. Husband contends 

that the trial court disregarded the intent of the parties in deciding that 

Husband and Wife did not need to reimburse Husband’s parents after they 

paid off the line of credit. Therefore, Wife would receive an unintended

windfall. Husband’s Brief at 9-11.

Wife agrees that the MSA was not ambiguous. Wife argues that the

MSA is clear that the Mifflin property would be sold and then costs of sale, 

liens, and the Northwest Bank line of credit would be paid before the parties 

split the remainder. Wife asserts that she was unaware that Husband’s 

parents paid off the line of credit before the MSA was signed and that 

Husband signed the MSA knowing that the line of credit had been paid off 

without telling her. Wife argues that the MSA only contemplates paying the 

Northwest Bank line of credit and does not speak to paying a personal loan 

or reimbursement to Husband’s parents. Because the MSA is not 

ambiguous, Wife contends that the court cannot re-write the contract to 

include a clause for reimbursement to Husband’s parents. Wife’s Brief at 

6-9.

The trial court found that the MSA was unambiguous. The trial court 

determined that the MSA contemplated paying costs and fees of sale, 

outstanding liens, and the Northwest Bank line of credit prior to the 

distribution of the proceeds. T.C.M. at 4. The trial court reasoned that the 
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line of credit no longer existed and that the MSA contained no provision for 

repaying Husband’s parents. The trial court found that Husband knew the 

line of credit was retired prior to finalizing the MSA. Id. The trial court 

found, and the record supports, that Wife was unaware that the line of credit 

was paid prior to signing the MSA. Id.; Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 

6/24/2014, at 8. Husband’s counsel prepared the MSA. Id. at 16, 24.

Neither party argues that the MSA is ambiguous. We agree and 

therefore, are bound by the plain language of the MSA. Lang, supra. The 

MSA clearly delineates the debts that are to be paid from the proceeds of the 

Mifflin property. Those debts do not include any personal liability or 

reimbursement to Husband’s family. Further, Husband was the only party to 

the MSA who was in a position to know that the line of credit listed in the 

provision no longer existed. Husband’s attorney drafted the MSA. Husband 

could have requested that his attorney update the MSA to reflect a loan from 

Husband’s parents. He chose not to do so. Because the language of the

MSA is unambiguous, we may not look beyond the document to examine 

Husband’s intention. We cannot re-write the MSA or “modify the plain 

meaning of the words under the guise of interpretation.” Lang, 850 A.2d at 

740. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Husband’s motion.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/17/2015