J-A07016-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

DIANE FREEMAN-RHODES, AND CRAIG 

RHODES, HER HUSBAND

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellants

v.

AMANDA SWANGER, AN ADULT 

INDIVIDUAL

Appellee No. 1173 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Dated June 17, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Civil Division at No(s): GD 13-017355

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and MUNDY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED APRIL 17, 2015

Appellants, Diane Freeman-Rhodes and Craig Rhodes, appeal from the 

June 17, 2014 order, which granted the motion for judgment on the 

pleadings filed by Appellee, Amanda Swanger. After careful review, we 

affirm.

On February 13, 2012, Craig Rhodes was driving a vehicle in which 

Diane Freeman-Rhodes was a passenger. Appellants’ Complaint, 9/20/13, at 

¶ 4. While driving on East Pittsburgh-McKeesport Boulevard in Allegheny 

County, Appellants collided with a vehicle driven by Swanger. Id. The trial 

court provided the following procedural background of the case.

On February 15, 2013, [Appellants] filed a[n] 

[] arbitration action at AR13-000658 against Amanda 

Swanger as a result of an automobile accident on 
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February 13, 2012, which automobile accident is also 

the subject of the instant civil action. In Count I of 

the arbitration complaint filed at AR13-000658, Craig 

Rhodes claimed personal injuries. In Count II of the 

arbitration complaint, Diane Freeman-Rhodes 

claimed loss of consortium. On April 16, 2013, an 

Allegheny County arbitration panel awarded Craig 

Rhodes $2,500.00 for his personal injury claim and 

$500.00 to Diane Freeman-Rhodes for her 

consortium claim. The arbitration award was not 

appealed. On May 23, 2013, [Appellants] entered 

judgment on the award. [Swanger] asserts that 

both Craig Rhodes and Diane Freeman-Rhodes were 

paid on their arbitration award. On May 24, 2013, 

[Appellants] marked the docket at AR-13000658 as 

“satisfied[.]”

The instant civil action was filed by [c]omplaint 

on September 20, 2013. The allegations of 

[Appellants’] [c]omplaint arise out of the identical 

automobile accident for which [Appellants] sued 

Amanda Swanger in the arbitration matter at AR13-

000658. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the instant 

[c]omplaint assert personal injuries and damages on 

behalf of Diane Freeman-Rhodes. Count II of the 

instant [c]omplaint asserts a loss of consortium 

claim on behalf of Craig Rhodes. 

Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/14, a 1-2.1

____________________________________________

1 The reproduced record contains the trial court opinion of July 30, 2014, as 

corrected on August 18, 2014. We rely on the July 30, 2014 trial court 

opinion because the subsequent opinion was not included in the certified 

record. See Brandon v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 34 A.3d 104, 106 n.1 

(Pa. Super. 2011) (recognizing an appellate court may not consider 

documents that are not made part of the record). However, we note the 

portions of the July 30, 2014 opinion cited to in this memorandum are 

identical to the subsequent corrected opinion of August 18, 2014, attached 

to Appellants’ brief. 
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On January 31, 2014, Swanger filed a response to Appellants’ 

complaint and asserted that both Appellants’ claims are barred by res 

judicata and that Appellants impermissibly split their causes of action. 

Swanger’s Answer to Appellants’ Complaint and New Matter, 1/31/14, at ¶¶ 

28-31. On February 28, 2014, Appellants filed a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings. Appellants’ motion averred that an arbitration panel previously 

found Swanger solely liable for the collision and awarded Appellants 

damages. Appellants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 2/28/14, at ¶ 

3. Appellants observed that judgment was entered on the award on May 23, 

2013, and Swanger did not appeal the arbitration award. Id. Therefore, 

Appellants sought a ruling that Swanger was solely liable for the collision. 

Id. at ¶ 4. Swanger also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on 

May 2, 2014. In her motion, Swanger contended that Appellants have 

impermissibly split their causes of action and the instant civil action is barred 

by res judicata. Swanger’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 5/2/14, at 

¶¶ 14-17. Swanger further asserted that Appellants’ claims have been 

litigated in the previous arbitration action and sought dismissal of the civil 

action against her. Id. at ¶ 18. 

The trial court held argument on the motions on June 16, 2014. On 

June 17, 2014, the trial court, by separate orders, granted Appellants’ 

motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Swanger’s liability and granted 

Swanger’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing both of 
J-A07016-15

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Appellants’ claims. Swanger did not appeal the order granting Appellants’ 

motion for judgment on the pleadings.2 Appellants filed a motion for 

reconsideration on July 11, 2014, asking the trial court to vacate its prior 

order, which dismissed Appellants’ claims. Appellants’ Motion for 

Reconsideration, 7/11/14, at 3 (unnumbered). The trial court did not rule 

on Appellants’ motion for reconsideration. On July 15, 2014, Appellants 

timely appealed.3

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review. 

I. Whether the court below committed [an] error of 

law in its [o]rder of June 1[7], 2014 which granted 

____________________________________________

2 On August 22, 2014, Appellants filed a motion to quash/vacate the order 

on appeal with this Court because Swanger failed to appeal the order finding 

her liable for the collision. Appellants’ Motion to Quash/Vacate, 8/22/14, at 

¶ 8. Therefore, Appellants argue, Swanger cannot argue that the order 

subject to the instant appeal should be affirmed without challenging the 

validity of the order which found her liable for the collision. Id. However, “a 

party adversely affected by earlier rulings in a case is not required to file a 

protective cross-appeal if that same party ultimately wins a judgment in its 

favor; the winner is not an ‘aggrieved party.’” Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 

973 A.2d 417, 421 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted, italics in original). 

Accordingly, we deny Appellants’ motion. 

3 We observe that the filing of a motion to reconsider does not toll the period 

of time in which Appellants were required to file their appeal. See M.O. v. 

J.T.R., 85 A.3d 1058, 1060 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2014) (noting, “if the trial court 

does not grant the motion for reconsideration before the expiration of the 

thirty days in which the litigant can file a notice of appeal, the litigant will 

lose the right to appeal[]”). 

Appellants and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925. 
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[Swanger’s] [m]otion for [j]udgment [o]n [t]he 

pleadings on grounds that both []Appellants had 

violated the rule against splitting causes of action 

embodied in Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d) because it adopted 

an unreasonable construction of the phrase “cause of 

action” in the context of Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d) and failed 

to recognize that the derivative loss of consortium 

claims arose from the marital relationship of 

[]Appellants and not out of the accident in which 

they and [Swanger] were involved[?]

II. Whether the court below committed [an] error of 

law in its [o]rder of June 1[7], 2014 which granted 

[Swanger’s] [m]otion for [j]udgment on the 

[p]leadings on the grounds that both []Appellants 

had violated the rule against splitting causes of 

action embodied in Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d) because it 

failed to reconcile the language of Pa.R.C.P. 2228(a), 

which required that the derivative loss of consortium 

claim of Diane Freeman-Rhodes had to be joined in 

the prior action or be forfeited under Pa.R.C.P. 

2232(a) and the provisions of Local Rule 1301 of 

Allegheny County that Craig Rhodes claims had to be 

heard before a [b]oard of [a]rbitrators, with the 

provisions of Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d)[?] 

Appellants’ Brief at 2. 

When considering the grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, 

we adhere to the following standard of review.

Entry of judgment on the pleadings is permitted 

under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1034, 

which provides that “after the pleadings are closed, 

but within such time as not to unreasonably delay 

trial, any party may move for judgment on the 

pleadings.” Pa.R.C.P. 1034(a). A motion for 

judgment on the pleadings is similar to a demurrer. 

It may be entered when there is no disputed issues 

of fact[,] and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. 
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Appellate review of an order granting a motion for 

judgment on the pleadings is plenary. The appellate 

court will apply the same standard employed by the 

trial court. A trial court must confine its 

consideration to the pleadings and relevant 

documents. The court must accept as true all well 

pleaded statements of fact, admissions, and any 

documents properly attached to the pleadings 

presented by the party against whom the motion is 

filed, considering only those facts which were 

specifically admitted.

We will affirm the grant of such a motion only when 

the moving party’s right to succeed is certain and the 

case is so free from doubt that the trial would clearly 

be a fruitless exercise.

Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Forest Res., LLC., 83 A.3d 177, 185 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 96 A.3d 1029 (Pa. 2014).

In their first issue, Appellants claim the trial court failed to “grasp [] 

what the phrase ‘cause of action’ means in the context of Pa.R.C.P. 1020 ....” 

Appellants’ Brief at 8. Therefore, Appellants argue, “the [trial] court ... 

erroneous[ly] determin[ed] that the cause of action of Diane FreemanRhodes for personal injuries in this case against [] Swanger was barred by 

operation of ... Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d) ... and that [Rhodes’] cause of action for 

loss of consortium in this case was likewise barred ....” Id. Specifically, 

Appellants argue, “the claims of a husband and wife are separate and 

distinct” and “[] the derivative consortium claims did not arise from the 

accident at issue but rather from their marital relationship.” Id. at 10-11. 
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For the following reasons, we conclude Appellants are not entitled to relief 

on this issue.4 

Rule 1020(d) provides as follows.

Rule 1020. Pleading More Than One Cause of 

Action. Alternative Pleading. Failure to Join. 

Bar

...

(d) If a transaction or occurrence gives rise to more 

than one cause of action heretofore asserted in 

assumpsit and trespass, against the same person, 

including causes of action in the alternative against 

any such person. Failure to join a cause of action as 

required by this subdivision shall be deemed a 

waiver of that cause of action as against all parties 

to the action.

Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d). In interpreting Rule 1020(d), we note that it should “be 

liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination 

of every action or proceeding to which it is applicable.” Hineline v. 

Stroudsburg Elec. Supply Co., Inc., 586 A.2d 455, 456 (Pa. Super. 

1991). Further, “[t]he purpose of Rule 1020(d) is to avoid a multiplicity of 

____________________________________________

4 We observe that Appellants’ argument rests heavily on Gulak v. Yu, 295 

F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Pa. 1969), and Appellants urge this Court to adopt its 

reasoning. However, “federal court decisions do not control the 

determinations of the Superior Court. Our law clearly states that, absent a 

United States Supreme Court pronouncement, the decisions of federal courts 

are not binding on Pennsylvania state courts[.]” NASDAQ OMX PHLX, Inc. 

v. PennMont Sec., 52 A.3d 296, 303 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). 

Moreover, the Gulak Court specifically commented that the disposition of 

the case was “a by-product of the dual system of state and federal courts[.]” 

Gulak, supra at 1328. Therefore, Gulak is inapposite to the case before 

this Court. 
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suits, thereby ensuring the prompt disposition of all rights and liabilities in a 

single action.” Id. Rule 1020(d) is also intended to “prevent the imposition 

of a heavy burden on defendants and the judicial system to defend multiple 

suits arising from the same occurrence.” Id. at 459.

In its opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a), the trial court observed “[t]he 

allegations of [Appellants’] [c]omplaint arise out of the identical automobile 

accident for which [Appellants] sued Amanda Swanger in the arbitration 

matter at AR13-000658.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/14, at 2 (emphasis 

added). Permitting Appellants to pursue additional damages, based on the 

occurrence for which they were both awarded compensation in the 

arbitration matter, would impose a heavy burden on Swanger and the

judicial system to defend multiple suits arising from the same occurrence. 

See Hineline, supra at 456. Thus, we conclude the trial court’s ruling was 

consistent with the interpretation of Rule 1020(d) and ensured the prompt 

disposition of all rights and liabilities in a single action. See id. 

In their second issue, Appellants present a related, yet distinct, 

argument. Appellants contend that Rule 1020(d) does not bar the instant 

case because Appellants were required to bring the claims based on Craig

Rhodes’ injuries and Diane Rhodes’ loss of consortium to a board of 

arbitrators pursuant to Local Rule 1301 of Allegheny County and Pa.R.C.P. 

2228(a). Id. at 13. Allegheny Local Rule provides, in relevant part, as 

follows.
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Rule 1301. Scope

(1) The following civil actions shall first be submitted 

to and heard by a Board of Arbitrators:

(a) Civil actions, proceedings and appeals or issues 

therein where the demand is for $35,000 or less 

(exclusive of interest and costs);

...

Allegheny Cty.Civ.Fam.R. 1301(1)(a). Rule 2228(a) provides as follows.

Rule 2228. Joinder of Related Plaintiffs

(a) If an injury, not resulting in death, is inflicted

upon the person of a husband or a wife, and causes 

of action therefor accrue to both, they shall be 

enforced in one action brought by the husband and 

the wife.

...

Pa.R.C.P. 2228(a). 

There is no dispute that Rule 2228 requires that the spouse of an 

injured party bring his or her claim for loss of consortium in the same action 

as the claim brought by the injured spouse. See Appellants’ Brief at 13; 

Swanger’s Brief at 8; accord Pa.R.C.P. 2228(a). Further, by local rule, 

parties to claims of less than $35,000.00 must submit their claims to 

arbitration. Allegheny Cty.Civ.Fam.R. 1301(1)(a). Appellants acknowledge 

they were required to join Freeman-Rhodes’ claim of loss of consortium with 

Rhodes’ claim of injury pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 2228(a), and because the 

combined claims were less than $35,000, Allegheny Local Rule 1301 

required this action be decided by a board of arbitrators. Appellants’ Brief at 
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15. Appellants contend, however, that because Freeman-Rhodes’ claim for 

her own, personal injuries was in excess of $35,000, they could not enforce 

this claim in arbitration, and they should not be prohibited from bringing this 

claim to the trial court. Id. For the following reasons, we conclude 

Appellants are not entitled to relief.

 “Res judicata, which is also known as claim preclusion, holds that a final 

judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction will bar any 

future action on the same cause of action between the parties and their 

privies.” Rearick v. Elderton State Bank, 97 A.3d 374, 380 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (citation omitted). In applying the doctrine of res judicata, “the 

essential inquiry is whether the ultimate and controlling issues have been 

decided in a prior proceeding in which the parties had an opportunity to 

appear and assert their rights.” Clark v. Pfizer Inc., 990 A.2d 17, 31 (Pa. 

Super. 2010) (citation omitted, emphasis added), appeal denied, 13 A.3d 

473 (Pa. 2010). “Res judicata bars not only the claims that were disposed 

of via the original judgment, but also those claims that were based upon the 

same set of facts and could have been asserted in the original 

proceedings.” Id. (citation omitted, italics and emphasis added). We 

highlight, “[t]he courts of this Commonwealth have long adhered to the 

generally accepted view disfavoring the splitting of claims.” Id. (citation 

omitted). 

The trial court addressed Appellants’ argument as follows.
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[Appellants] first observe Pa.R.C.P. 2228(a) requires 

compulsory joinder of any derivative consortium 

claim with the claim of an injured spouse. This is an 

accurate statement. However, Pa.R.C.P. 2228(a) in 

no way prohibited Diane Freeman-Rhodes from 

bringing her own personal injury claims within the 

prior arbitration action. [Appellants] appear to 

contend that because Diane Freeman-Rhodes claim[] 

is in excess of the compulsory arbitration limits in 

Allegheny County, she was not able to do so. Of 

course, had she asserted her claim then, that would 

have simply caused the removal of the entire prior 

matter from the arbitration realm and into the 

[c]ourt of [c]ommon [p]leas. In short, there was no 

prohibition preventing Diane Freeman-Rhodes from 

asserting a personal injury claim at the same time 

she asserted her loss of consortium claim arising out 

of the same automobile accident.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/14, at 3. 

We agree with the trial court’s analysis. While Appellants correctly 

summarize what Rule 2228(a) requires in terms of joining a claim for loss of 

consortium with a spouse’s claim of injury, they misconstrue it to mean that 

Freeman-Rhodes was somehow prohibited from bringing her injury claim at 

the same time as Rhodes’ injury claim. See Appellants’ Brief at 15. 

Moreover, permitting Freeman-Rhodes’ claim to proceed would promote a 

multiplicity of suits regarding the same occurrence, violating the spirit of 

Rule 1020(d). See Hineline, supra. 

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court correctly considered and 

applied Rules 1020(d) and 2228(a) in finding that our rules of procedure 

required Appellants to bring all their claims arising from this occurrence at 

one time. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/14, at 3-4; Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d); 
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Pa.R.C.P. 2228(a). Freeman-Rhodes had the opportunity to appear and 

assert her claim for personal injury at the same time she brought her loss of 

consortium claim resulting from Rhodes’ personal injury claim. A final 

judgment was rendered on Rhodes’ claim and Freeman-Rhodes’ loss of 

consortium claim, which found Swanger liable for the accident and resultant 

injuries. Because Freeman-Rhodes elected not to bring her personal injury 

claim, that was based on the same set of facts as the claims settled by 

arbitration, when she had opportunity to present it, res judicata bars her 

claim in the instant action as well as Rhodes’ derivative claim for loss of 

consortium. See Rearick, supra; Clark, supra. 

Based on the foregoing discussion, we conclude the trial court correctly 

entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of Swanger, as she is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. See Sw. Energy Prod. Co., supra. 

Accordingly, we affirm the June 17, 2014 order.

Motion to quash/vacate denied. Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/17/2015