* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 27, 2009*

Decided August 28, 2009

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐2150

GLORIA DICKERSON,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

WALGREEN CO.,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of

Indiana, New Albany Division.

No. 07‐cv‐44

Sarah Evans Barker,

Judge.

O R D E R

Gloria Dickerson, an African‐American woman, suedWalgreen forfiring her, claiming

that the firing violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., because it was

racially discriminatory and unlawfully retaliatory. Walgreen explained that it had fired

Dickerson, a store manager, for violating company policy when she authorized the use of

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 09‐2150 Page 2

coupons and cash that had been found in the store to cover shortages of money in cash

drawers. The district court granted summary judgment for Walgreen, and Dickerson appeals.

Dickerson’s pro se appellate brief is deficient in an unusual way: Dickerson has reused,

verbatim, 19 pages from the 21‐page brief her former counsel filed in opposition to summary

judgmentin thedistrict court.Aside from beingdeficient,the briefill servesDickerson because

it does not engage the district court’s comprehensive opinion. Nevertheless, the brief is

sufficient to give notice of the issues that Dickerson wishes to raise on appeal—that may be

why Walgreen has not complained—and so we consider those issues.

The district court granted summary judgment on Dickerson’s discrimination claim

because the only Walgreen employee she accused of discrimination was a former supervisor

who was not involved in the decision to terminate her. Of the nineteen examples of this

supervisor’s conduct that the district court considered, only one even comes close to

suggesting discrimination: the supervisor apparently stated that he had pushed Dickerson

harder than he had pushed other managers. To survive summary judgment under the direct

method, Dickerson had to present evidence that “allows a jury to infer intentional

discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 779‐80 (7th Cir.

2006). Dickerson’s evidence was insufficient because, at most, it showed discrimination only

by someone who was not the decisionmaker.

The district court did not explicitly consider the indirect method of proving

discrimination, but our consideration of it does not aid Dickerson. Underthe indirect method,

if Dickerson were to present a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden would shift to

Walgreen to offer a nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. Once it did so, the burden

would shift back to Dickerson to submit evidence showing that the nondiscriminatory reason

was a pretext for discrimination. See Fane v. Locke Reynolds, LLP, 480 F.3d 534, 538 (7th Cir.

2007). Even assuming that Dickerson put enough evidence in the recordto support a prima facie

case of discrimination, her evidence did notrebut Walgreen’s nondiscriminatory explanation,

because she did not dispute that, in violation of company policy, she authorized her

subordinates to use money that a customer had found to cover a shortage in a cash drawer.

This concession ends her discrimination case. See Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 697

(7th Cir. 2006) (where plaintiff was fired for violating company policy admitted the violation,

she could not rebut employer’s nondiscriminatory reason for the firing).

Next, we affirm the district court’s ruling on Dickerson’s retaliation claim under both

the direct and indirect methods of proof. Under the direct method, Dickerson’s evidence fails

to show a causal connection between any protected conduct and her termination. The only

potentially protected activities were Dickerson’s complaints about the conduct by her former

supervisor that she took to be discriminatory. But those complaints came more than one year
No. 09‐2150 Page 3

before Walgreen fired Dickerson. The district court correctly ruled that no jury could

reasonably find that these year‐old events supported a direct case of retaliation. See

Andonissamy v. Hewlett‐Packard Co., 547 F.3d 841, 851 (7th Cir. 2008).

The district court also found that Dickerson did not present enough evidence underthe

indirect method of proving retaliation. To establish a prima facie case under the indirect

method, Dickerson had to present evidence showing, among other things, that a similarly

situatedemployee whodidnot engage inprotectedactivity receivedmore favorable treatment.

See id. at 850. The district court was correct that Dickerson supplied no evidence of such a

person. First, the subordinates whom she identified were not similarly situated to her. See

Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002). Dickerson also pointed to

a white store manager who was fired afterthreatening to kill her supervisor but who received

some benefits after termination that Walgreen did not also give to Dickerson. That evidence

might help Dickerson if her claim were about being denied benefits after termination, but

Dickerson’s claim was about the termination itself. In any event, the district court correctly

found that Dickerson and this store manager were not similarly situated. In addition to

threatening to kill her supervisor, the other store manager had threatened to kill herself, and

so Walgreen wanted to help her receive mental health treatment. Dickerson, in contrast, has

never claimed that she suffered from any mental illness. SeeCassimy v.Board ofEduc. ofRockford

Public Schools, Dist. No. 205, 461 F.3d 932, 938 (7th Cir. 2006) (plaintiff and employee with more

severe illness not similarly situated). Dickerson and this other manager were also not similarly

situated because different decisionmakers were involved in their terminations. See Ellis v.

United Parcel Service, Inc., 523 F.3d 823, 826 (7th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the district court

correctly granted summary judgment on this claim as well.

AFFIRMED.