J-S35005-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: E.B.I., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 397 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered January 11, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-1090-2017

IN THE INTEREST OF: B.I., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 398 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered January 11, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000975-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.I., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 399 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered January 11, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000974-2016
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IN THE INTEREST OF: J.B.I., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 400 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered January 11, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-1091-2017

IN THE INTEREST OF: C.B.I., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 401 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered January 11, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-1089-2017

IN THE INTEREST OF: C.I., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 402 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered January 11, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000950-2016
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BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 16, 2019

In these consolidated appeals, A.B. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on January 11, 

2019, voluntarily relinquishing Mother’s parental rights to her three children,

C.I., a/k/a C.B.I., (“Child 1”) (a male, born in October of 2008), J.I., a/k/a 

J.B.I. (“Child 2”) (a male, born in April of 2006), and E.I. a/k/a B.I. (“Child 

3”) (a female, born in October of 2008) (collectively, “the Children”), 

confirming her consent to adoption, pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2504, and changing the permanency goals for the Children to adoption 

pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351.1 We affirm.

In its opinion, the trial court set forth the following factual and 

procedural background:

[Philadelphia] Department of Human Services (“DHS”) [or (the 

“Agency”)] became involved with this family on May 5, 2015, after 

DHS received a General Protective Services (“GPS”) report 

alleging that [the] family was active with the Delaware County 

Children and Youth Department (“CYD”); in May 2014, Child 1 had 

been found unsupervised in a hotel in Montgomery County, 

Pennsylvania; police contacted Mother, who was believed to be 

intoxicated; Mother failed to retrieve Child 1[,] and Child 1 had 

been placed in foster care; Child 1 was scheduled to be reunified 

with Mother that day; Child 1 was diagnosed on the autism 

____________________________________________

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 On January 11, 2019, J.I. (“Father”) voluntarily relinquished his parental 

rights to the Children. Father is not a party to this appeal, nor has he filed a 

separate appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/27/19, at 3 n.2.
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spectrum and was nonverbal, although he was able to 

communicate his wants and needs; Child [1] received care from 

Behavioral Health Rehabilitation Services (“BHRS”) through 

Devereaux; Mother had a history of drug use; in December 2014, 

Mother tested positive for benzodiazepines; Mother had stated 

that she had a prescription for the drug but failed to provide 

documentation; Mother recently obtained housing; Mother was 

employed; [and] Mother gave a negative drug screen on January 

5, 2015. This GPS report was substantiated[,] and DHS 

implemented Family Empowerment Services [(“FES”)].

On April 18, 2016, DHS received a GPS report alleging that on 

April 15, 2016, Child 1’s teacher observed that Child 1 had 

bruising on both of his thighs; Child 1 was examined by the school 

nurse, who stated that Child 1 had bruising on his lower body, 

legs, and buttocks; it appeared that Child 1 had been hit and that 

the injuries were not self-inflicted; Child 1 was on the autism 

spectrum and was nonverbal; Child 1 exhibited impulsive 

behavior; [and] it was unknown as to how Child 1 was injured. 

This report was indicated. On April 19, 2016, DHS visited Mother’s 

home to investigate the allegations of the GPS report, but no one 

was home[.] DHS left a notification letter advising Mother to 

contact DHS. On April 20, 2016, DHS visited Child 1’s school to 

speak with staff and examine photographs of Child 1’s injuries, 

which DHS found to be substantial. School staff indicated to DHS 

that Child 1 had come to school with a black eye [in] March []

2016. On that same day, DHS obtained an Order of Protective 

Custody (“OPC”) for Child 1 and transported him to DHS.

On April 20, 2016, [the] Children’s maternal grandmother 

(“Maternal Grandmother”) contacted DHS and stated that she was 

willing and able to care for [the] Children. Maternal Grandmother 

was determined to be an appropriate caregiver for [the] Children. 

On that same day, DHS transported Child 1 to Maternal 

Grandmother’s home. DHS developed a safety plan for [the] 

Children in which Maternal Grandmother would ensure that [the] 

Children attended school, [Maternal Grandmother would meet 

the] Children’s basic daily needs, and Mother would not have any 

unsupervised contact[] with [the] Children. Mother stated that 

Child 1 sustained his injuries when he fell down the stairs and 

[she] did not seek medical attention because she did not believe 

his injuries were serious. Mother also indicated that Father was 

an indicated perpetrator of sexual abuse against [the] Children.1 

Later that day, DHS transported Child 1 to St. Christopher’s 
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Hospital for Children (“Children’s Hospital”) for a medical 

evaluation and treatment. Hospital staff indicated that Child 1’s 

injuries were not consistent with Mother’s explanation.

On April 22, 2016, a shelter care hearing was held for Child 1. The 

trial court lifted the OPC and ordered Child 1’s temporary 

commitment to DHS to stand. DHS was also ordered to obtain an 

OPC for Child 2 and Child 3 forthwith. Mother was ordered to 

attend supervised, line-of-sight visits with Child 1 prior to the 

adjudicatory hearing[,] and Mother was prohibited from visiting 

Child 1 in Maternal Grandmother’s home. On that same day, DHS 

obtained an OPC for Child 2 and Child 3. [The] Children remained 

in the care of Maternal Grandmother. On April 25, 2016, a shelter 

care hearing was held for Child 2 and Child 3. The trial court lifted 

the OPC and ordered the temporary DHS commitment to stand. 

On May 2, 2016, an adjudicatory hearing was held for [the] 

Children. Mother was present for this hearing. The trial court 

deferred the adjudication and ordered that the temporary 

commitment to DHS stand. The trial court ordered that all 

services for [the] Children continue[,] and that the Community 

Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) follow up with any services for [the] 

Children. The trial court granted the joint request of counsel for 

a continuance for further investigation[,] and ordered that the 

prior visitation order stand.

On May 14, 2016, a Single Case Plan (“SCP”) meeting was held 

for [the] Children. Mother was present for this meeting. Mother’s 

parental objectives were to continue to cooperate with CUA 

services; follow up with the Achieving Reunification Center 

(“ARC”) for appropriate services; comply with all court orders and 

maintain visitation as allowed; follow up with the Autism Center 

to secure all available services for Child 1; follow the Clinical 

Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) recommendations; comply with three 

random drug screens and participate in a dual diagnosis 

assessment as well as monitoring; and attend a Parenting 

Capacity Evaluation (“PCE”).

On June 6, 2016, [the] Children were adjudicated dependent and 

fully committed to DHS. The trial court ordered that Mother be 

referred to the CEU for a forthwith drug screen, three random drug 

screens, a dual diagnosis assessment, and monitoring. The trial 

court also ordered that Mother was prohibited from visiting [the] 
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Children at the home of Maternal Grandmother[,] and that Mother 

be referred for a PCE.

Between September 2016 and November 2017, six permanency 

review hearings were held for [the] Children. Mother was present 

for almost all [of the] permanency review hearings. On December 

5, 2016, the trial court determined that Mother was in contempt 

of court after violating the court order prohibiting contact with 

[the] Children outside of supervised visitation. The trial court 

ordered that Mother be detained for 30 days and that she was not 

to be discharged until the case returned to court. The trial court 

issued a stay-away order against Mother as to [the] Children. 

Mother was released from incarceration on January 13, 2017.2 

Mother’s visits with [the] Children have remained suspended since 

December 5, 2016.

[The] Children have been in DHS care since April 18, 2016. 

Mother [] failed to consistently comply with her objectives and 

comply with court orders throughout the life of the case. Mother 

continues to struggle with her addiction. DHS filed a petition to 

involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights and change [the] 

Children’s permanency goal to adoption on November 7, 2017.

On November 9, 2017, a permanency review hearing was held for 

[the] Children. Mother was present for this hearing. The trial 

court determined that the stay[-]away order as to Mother was to 

stand[,] and that Mother’s visitation remained suspended. On 

December 11, 2017, Mother appealed the November 9, 2017 

[order]. On September 7, 2018, [the] Superior Court of 

Pennsylvania dismissed Mother’s appeal after [Attorney Mario 

D’Adamo, III, former counsel for Mother (“Former Counsel”)]

failed to file a brief.

In 2018, five permanency review hearings were held for [the] 

Children. Mother was present for most of these hearings. At these 

hearings, the trial court ordered that visitation between Mother 

and [the] Children [was] only to occur at the recommendation of 

[the] Children’s therapists. At the November 13, 2018,

[termination of parental rights] hearing Mother indicated that she 

was interest[ed] in voluntarily relinquishing her parental rights to 

[the] Children. On that same day, Mother signed the voluntary 

relinquishment of her parental rights (“VOLS”) [and consents to 

adoption], and the trial court, nevertheless, heard evidence as to 

the termination and goal change petitions. . . . The trial court 
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entered continuance orders in the termination and goal change

matters, holding in abeyance its decisions as to termination [and 

on the goal change petitions.] DHS filed [Mother’s] Petition for 

VOLS [and consents to adoption] on November 21, 2018. On 

December 18, 2018, Mother notified Former Counsel that she 

wished to revoke her voluntary relinquishment[s and consents]. 

N.T. 01/11/19, at 13.

On January 11, 2019, the trial court, presided [over] by Judge 

Joseph Fernandes, held the hearing to confirm the consent[s to 

adoption] signed by Mother on November 13, 2018. The trial 

court concluded that Mother knowingly and voluntarily signed the 

voluntary relinquishments of her parental rights to [the] Children 

[and consents to adoption] on November 13, 2018, and did not 

revoke her signature within the 30 days, as prescribed by 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c)(1)(ii). [On January 11, 2019, the trial court 

entered the decrees confirming Mother’s consents to adoption, 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children, and 

withdrawing the petitions for involuntary termination (which 

erroneously said voluntary termination); see N.T., 1/11/19, at 31. 

On that same date, the trial court also entered the permanency 

review orders changing the Children’s permanency goals to 

adoption.] 

___________________________________________________

1 On September 6, 2013, Father was arrested and charged with 

two counts each of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a 

child, unlawful contact with a minor - sexual offenses, sexual 

assault, indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age,

corruption of minors, and aggravated indecent assault of a child, 

where Child 2 and Child 3 were the complainants. On October 27, 

2014, the court granted a [m]otion for [n]olle [p]rosequi as to all

of the charges against Father[.]

2 From May 2, 2016 to March 19, 2018, the trial judge assigned 

to these matters was the Honorable Lyris Younge. After June 22, 

2018, these matters were assigned to the Honorable Joseph 

Fernandes. Judge Fernandes presided over the proceedings 

currently at issue.
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Trial Court Opinion, 3/27/19, at 1-5 (footnotes in original).2 On February 6, 

2019, Mother timely filed separate notices of appeal, along with concise 

statements raising six issues for each of the Children.

3

 

In her counseled brief on appeal, Mother raises the six issues that follow:

A. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by changing the [Children’s]

goal to adoption and terminating [the] parental rights of 

Appellant Mother, under 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(1) and (2), 

(5), and (8)[?]

____________________________________________

2 The trial court appears to use the terms “voluntary relinquishment” and 

“VOLS” interchangeably with consents to adoption. However, in this matter

as discussed at length below, DHS proceeded on the consents for adoption 

that Mother executed, and not the voluntary relinquishments that she signed. 

See N.T., 1/11/2019, at 28-31.

3 On February 6, 2019, Former Counsel filed a timely notice of appeal with a 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b) (“concise statement”) for each of the Children. Former 

Counsel also filed a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel. On February 7, 

2019, Former Counsel filed amended concise statements. On February 13, 

2019, the trial court granted Former Counsel’s motion to withdraw, and 

appointed Attorney Athena Dooley as counsel for Mother for appeal purposes, 

only. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/27/19, at 1. On June 10, 2019, Attorney 

Dooley filed a motion to withdraw as Mother’s counsel with this Court, citing 

a conflict with Mother as to Mother’s desire to file a pro se reply brief to the 

brief of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”). Attorney 

Dooley also filed a motion for extension of time for Mother to file a pro se reply 

brief. On June 24, 2019, this Court denied both motions. Mother did not 

challenge our June 24, 2019 denial order; however, Mother retained Attorney 

Mark R. Ashton who subsequently filed a reply brief on behalf of Mother, which 

this Court, by order filed on July 22, 2019, deemed filed as of July 17, 2019. 

In the same July 22, 2019 order, this Court denied Mother’s request for oral 

argument on her counseled reply brief. Although we initially denied Attorney 

Dooley’s motion to withdraw, by our order accepting Attorney Ashton’s reply 

brief on behalf of Mother, we have effectively permitted Attorney Dooley to 

withdraw and allowed the appearance of Attorney Ashton on behalf of Mother. 
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B. Whether the [t]rial court erred in terminating [Mother’s]

parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(2), the 

evidence having been insufficient to establish Mother caused 

[the Children] to be without essential parental care, nor could 

that not have been remedied[?]

C. Whether the [t]rial Court erred by finding, under 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

[§] 2511(b), that termination of [Mother’s] rights best serves 

the Child[ren]’s developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare[?]

D. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by disallowing [Mot]her the 

opportunity to voluntarily relinquish Appellant’s parental 

rights[?]

E. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by denying [Mother’s]

constitutional right to voluntarily give up [Mother’s] parental 

rights under a substantive due process analysis[?]

F. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by not accepting [Mother’s] 

revocation of [her] voluntary relinquishment of parental 

rights[?4]

Mother’s Brief, at 3. 

Before we examine the merits of this case, it is necessary to explain the 

confusing legal procedural framework surrounding this case. In this case, as 

previously noted, Mother signed voluntary relinquishments of her parental 

rights at the same time that she executed consents for adoption for all of the 

Children. Pertinent to this appeal, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711 governs consents 

necessary to adoption. Section 2711 provides in pertinent part as follows: 

§ 2711. Consents necessary to adoption

____________________________________________

4

 As will be explained below, although Mother frames this issue as one 

involving the revocation of her voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, 

the argument presented deals with Mother’s efforts to revoke her consent to 

adoption. Because this issue is dispositive, we will address it first. 
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(a) General rule.—Except as otherwise provided in this 

part, consent to an adoption shall be required of the 

following:

* * *

(3) The parents or surviving parent of an adoptee who 

has not reached the age of 18 years.

* * *

(c) Validity of consent.—No consent shall be valid if it 

was executed prior to or within 72 hours after the birth of 

the Child. A putative father may execute a consent at any 

time after receiving notice of the expected or actual birth of 

the Child. Any consent given outside this Commonwealth 

shall be valid for purposes of this section if it was given in 

accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction where it was 

executed. A consent to an adoption may only be 

revoked as set forth in this subsection. The revocation 

of a consent shall be in writing and shall be served upon 

the agency or adult to whom the Child was relinquished. 

The following apply:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (3):

* * *

(ii) For a consent to an adoption executed by a 

birth-mother, the consent is irrevocable more 

than 30 days after the execution of the 

consent.

(2) An individual may not waive the revocation period 

under paragraph (1).

(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the following 

apply:

(i) An individual who executed a consent to an 

adoption may challenge the validity of the 

consent only by filing a petition alleging fraud 

or duress within the earlier of the following time 

frames:
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(A) Sixty days after the birth of the Child

or the execution of the consent, whichever 

occurs later.

* * *

(ii) A consent to an adoption may be invalidated 

only if the alleged fraud or duress under 

subparagraph (i) is proven by:

(A) a preponderance of the evidence in the 

case of consent by a person 21 years of age 

or younger; or

(B) clear and convincing evidence in all 

other cases.

(d) Contents of consent.—

(1) The consent of a parent of an adoptee under 18 

years of age shall set forth the name, age and marital 

status of the parent, the relationship of the consenter to 

the Child, the name of the other parent or parents of the 

Child and the following:

I hereby voluntarily and unconditionally consent to the 

adoption of the above named Child.

I understand that by signing this consent I indicate my 

intent to permanently give up all rights to this Child.

I understand such Child will be placed for adoption.

I understand I may revoke this consent to permanently 

give up all rights to this Child by placing the revocation 

in writing and serving it upon the agency or adult to 

whom the Child was relinquished.

* * *

If I am the Birth-mother of the Child, I understand that 

this consent to an adoption is irrevocable unless I revoke 

it within 30 days after executing it by delivering a written 

revocation to (insert the name and address of the agency 

coordinating the adoption) or (insert the name and 

address of an attorney who represents the individual 

relinquishing parental rights or prospective adoptive 

parent of the Child) or (insert the court of the county in 
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which the voluntary relinquishment form was or will be 

filed).

I have read and understand the above and I am signing 

it as a free and voluntary act.

(2) The consent shall include the date and place of its 

execution and names and addresses and signatures of at 

least two persons who witnessed its execution and their 

relationship to the consenter.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711 (internal emphasis added). 

“Section 2711 of the Adoption Act prescribes the requirements for 

consent and the procedure and timeframes for the revocation of a voluntary 

consent to adoption.” In re J.W.B., 2019 WL 3059772, at *4 (Pa. Super. 

filed July 12, 2019), citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(a), (c), (d).

We have previously determined:

A party seeking to disturb a termination decree entered after a 

consent to relinquishment must show that the consent given to 

terminate parental rights was not intelligent, voluntary and 

deliberate. Section 2504 provides an alternative procedure for 

relinquishment as follows:

§ 2504. Alternative procedure for relinquishment

(a) Petition to confirm consent to adoption.—If the parent 

or parents of the child have executed consents to an 

adoption, upon petition by the intermediary or, where there 

is no intermediary, by the adoptive parent, the court shall 

hold a hearing for the purpose of confirming a consent to an 

adoption upon expiration of the time period under section 

2711 (relating to consents necessary to adoption). The 

original consent or consents to the adoption shall be 

attached to the petition.

(b) Hearing.—Upon presentation of a petition filed pursuant 

to this section, the court shall fix a time for a hearing which 

shall not be less than ten days after filing of the petition. 

Notice of the hearing shall be by personal service or by 

registered mail ... Notice of the hearing shall be given to the 
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other parent or parents ... and to the parents or guardian of 

a consenting parent who has not reached 18 years of age. 

The notice shall state that the consenting parent's ... rights 

may be terminated as a result of the hearing. After hearing, 

which shall be private, the court may enter a decree of

termination of parental rights in the case of a relinquishment 

to an adult or a decree of termination of parental rights and 

duties, including the obligation of support, in the case of a 

relinquishment to an agency.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(a)-(b).

* * *

Section 2711(c) unequivocally states that a consent to an 

adoption may only be revoked as set forth in this subsection, and 

the revocation of a consent shall be in writing and shall be served 

upon the agency or adult to whom the child was relinquished. 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c). 

* * *

An individual may not waive the revocation period. 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2711(c)(2). Moreover, the statute precludes a challenge to the 

validity of the consent to adoption after 60 days following the birth 

of the child or the execution of the consent, whichever occurs 

later, and only upon a petition alleging fraud or duress. 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c)(3)(i)(A)-(B).

This Court has held that Section 2711 renders a consent to 

adoption irrevocable more than thirty (30) days after execution, 

and the unambiguous language of the statute requires a trial court 

to consider the timeliness of a petition to revoke consent before it 

considers the merits. If the revocation is untimely, the court may 

not consider the merits of the revocation. The language of the 

statute plainly provides for time constraints to revoke and/or 

challenge the validity of a consent to adoption, and its purpose is 

to afford finality to the adoption process.

Id. at *3–4 (internal quotations, case citations, and original brackets 

omitted).

Here, the trial court determined:
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A parent may voluntarily relinquish their parental rights, and[,] 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504, a parent may execute their 

consent to an adoption. If a parent wishes to voluntarily provide 

consent to the adoption of a child, the consent must be valid, 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c). For a consent to an adoption 

executed by a birth mother, the consent is valid and irrevocable if 

revoked more than 30 days after the execution of the consent. 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c)(1)(ii). Mother may not waive the revocation 

period. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c)(2). The revocation must be 

timely, in writing, and served upon appropriate parties. Id. The 

language of this statute has been deemed to be unambiguous. In 

re Adoption of J.A.S., 939 A.2d 403, 408-409 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

If a revocation is determined to be untimely, the trial court is 

unable to consider the merits of the revocation. In re R.L., 172 

A.3d 665, 667 (Pa. Super. 2017).

On November 13, 2018, Mother properly signed VOLS and the 

petition to confirm the consent for adoption of [the] Children. N.T. 

01/11/19, at 12-24. Mother subsequently attempted to revoke 

the voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights to [the] 

Children on December 18, 2018, by informing Former Counsel. 

Former Counsel subsequently informed all counsel, via email, of 

Mother’s attempted revocation on December 21, 2018. N.T. 

01/11/19, at 12-13. The CUA case worker [sic] indicated that 

when Mother signed VOLS, Mother was explicitly informed that 

she had 30 days from the date of her signature to change her 

mind and that the decision would have to be made in writing to 

either the CUA case worker [sic] or to Former Counsel. N.T. 

01/11/19, at 21. At the time that Mother signed the VOLS, 

Former Counsel was present and colloquied Mother as to 

her understanding and whether she was under duress. 

Mother’s answer was that she understood the meaning of 

VOLS and she was not under duress. N.T. 01/11/19, at 17-21. 

Mother never attempted to make contact, either in writing or 

verbally, with the CUA case worker at any time to indicate her 

intention of revoking her VOLS. N.T. 01/11/19, at 25. The DHS 

witness[’s] testimony was credible. Mother’s communication with 

Former Counsel indicating her intent to revoke her voluntary 

relinquishment of her parental rights to [the] Children was 

untimely[,] as the communication occurred more than 30 days 

after Mother signed VOLS and the petitions to confirm the consent 

for adoption of [the] Children. Mother provided notice to Former 

Counsel of her attempt to revoke 35 days after her signature. 

Since Mother’s revocation was untimely, the trial court did not err 
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or abuse its discretion by determining that Mother’s revocation 

was untimely and that Mother knowingly and voluntarily 

relinquished her rights to [the] Children on November 13, 2018. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/27/2019, at 5-6 (emphasis added).5

In Mother’s sixth issue as presented (issue F above),

6 she asserts that 

under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711, she properly and timely gave notice of her 

revocation of consent to adoption of the Children by contacting Former 

Counsel who, in turn, notified DHS, the CUA, and the trial court. Mother’s 

Brief at 5. Mother states that Former Counsel told Mother that he would 

convey her revocation decision and that he followed up with an e-mail 

____________________________________________

5

 Again, we recognize that the trial court appears to use the terms “voluntary 

relinquishment” and “VOLS” interchangeably with consents to adoption. See

N.T., 1/11/2019, at 28-31.

6

 We note that similar to the trial court, Mother seemingly conflates voluntary 

relinquishment of parental rights with consents to adoption. As noted above, 

while Mother claims in her questions presented section of her appellate brief 

that she is challenging the revocation of her voluntary relinquishment of 

parental rights, as discussed, she is actually relying upon her purported 

revocation of her consents to adoption for the Children. See Mother’s Brief at 

3.

Further, we note that neither the parties nor the trial court cites to a provision 

of the Adoption Act that governs a set procedure for the revocation of 

voluntary relinquishment of parental rights. Our independent research has 

not revealed any statutorily mandated procedure for doing so. However, there 

is no dispute that Section 2711 is applicable herein, because: (1) Mother 

executed both voluntary relinquishments and consents for adoption for all 

three Children at the same time; (2) Mother does not challenge the trial court’s 

reliance upon Section 2711 in rendering its decision; and (3) as set forth 

above, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504, provides an “alternative procedure for 

relinquishment” of parental rights, by confirming a consent to adoption under 

Section 2711. 
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notifying the court, DHS, and the CUA of Mother’s desire to revoke her 

consents. Mother also claims that the trial court prevented her from filing a 

timely petition to challenge the validity of her consents pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c)(3)(i)(A), because the trial court did not appoint new 

counsel, Attorney Dooley, until more than sixty days after Mother executed 

her consents. Mother’s Brief at 5. Mother claims that she felt under duress 

to execute her consents to adoption because the trial court denied her request 

for a continuance of the November 13, 2018 hearing and denied her request 

to enter the appearance of new, private counsel, who was present at that 

hearing. Id. Mother also asserts that she felt under duress because of her 

inability to effectively communicate with her court-appointed counsel and/or 

to properly and effectively prepare for the November 13, 2018 hearing. Id. 

We review the trial court’s determination for an abuse of discretion or 

legal error. In re Adoption of K.G.M., 845 A.2d 861, 863 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

When reviewing a decree entered by the Orphans’ Court, this 

Court must determine whether the record is free from legal error 

and the court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence. 

Because the Orphans’ Court sits as the fact-finder, it determines 

the credibility of the witnesses, and on review, we will not reverse 

its credibility determinations absent an abuse of that discretion.

Id., quoting In re A.J.B., 797 A.2d 264, 266 (Pa. Super. 2002).

Herein, the trial court correctly analyzed the alleged revocation under 

the controlling statutes, particularly Section 2711(c)(1)(ii) and Section 

2711(c)(3)(i)(A), and controlling case law. The record supports the trial 

court’s determination that Mother’s efforts to revoke her consents to adoption 
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were untimely under the 30-day provision pursuant to Section 2711(c). Here, 

there is no dispute that Mother executed consents for adoption for the Children 

on November 13, 2018. As such, she had 30 days from that date, or until 

December 13, 2018, to provide written revocation to either her attorney-ofrecord or the Agency. There is no evidence suggesting, and Mother does not 

argue, that she contacted the Agency to revoke her consents to adoption. See

N.T., 1/11/2019 at 24. However, Mother maintains that “[o]n November 30, 

2018, [she] wrote to her counsel requesting copies of the documents she had 

signed on November 13, 2018, as well as any [o]rder entered by the [t]rial 

[j]udge that occurred during that month [and s]he renewed that request on 

December 11, 2018.” Mother’s Reply Brief at 6. Mother attached to her 

appellate reply brief e-mail correspondence from herself to Former Counsel 

dated November 30, 2018 and December 11, 2018 in support of her 

argument. While not a part of the certified record, upon our review of these 

documents, it is clear that Mother never requested revocation of her prior 

consents. Instead, Mother asked for copies of documents and transcripts from 

prior proceedings. She did not explicitly revoke her consents to adoption in 

her e-mails to Former Counsel. 

Thereafter, the only additional record evidence of Mother’s attempt to 

revoke her consents to adoption is a letter from Former Counsel to counsel for 

the Agency, dated December 21, 2018, wherein Former Counsel states that 

Mother sent him correspondence “on December 18, 2018” that “she wished to 
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revoke her voluntary relinquishment of parent[al] rights[.]” N.T., 1/11/2019,

at 25-26; Agency Exhibit 1. Both Mother’s request and Former Counsel’s 

subsequent letter are plainly outside of the 30-day revocation period under 

Section 2711 and, therefore, the trial court was precluded from examining the 

merits of Mother’s request for revocation of her consents to adoption. Thus, 

we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in denying Mother’s 

revocation of consent to adoption for the Children because she did not properly 

revoke her consent within the strictly construed requirements of Section 

2711.

7

 

____________________________________________

7

 Furthermore, Mother does not complain that she did not understand the 

procedure for revocation. DHS presented the testimony of the CUA 

caseworker, Precious Randall, who witnessed Mother’s execution of the 

consents and voluntary relinquishments. Ms. Randall testified concerning 

Mother’s execution of the consents and voluntary relinquishments, and 

whether Mother appeared to be under duress. N.T., 1/11/2019, at 14-24. 

Ms. Randall testified that Mother could read, write, and understand English, 

which is Mother’s first language, and that Mother has a high school education. 

Id. at 17-18. Mother did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol, 

drugs, or any substance on November 13, 2018. Id. at 18. Ms. Randall did 

not observe anything that led her to believe that Mother experienced difficulty 

in understanding what she was doing on November 13, 2018. Id. at 19. Ms. 

Randall testified that she reviewed the petitions to confirm consent and to 

relinquish parental rights to the Children with Mother. Id. Ms. Randall stated 

that Former Counsel was present to assist Mother and explain the

documentation. Id. at 19-20. Ms. Randall testified that Former Counsel asked 

Mother if she was under the influence of drugs or alcohol or if she was being 

paid to sign or receiving anything for signing the documents. Id. at 20. 

Mother responded in the negative to these questions. Id. at 20. Ms. Randall 

further stated that it was explained to Mother that her signature on the 

documents, if allowed to be presented in court, would result in the termination 

of her parental rights to the Children. Id. at 20-21. It also was explained to 

Mother that, if she wished to change her mind, she had 30 days from the date 
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Moreover, despite the untimeliness of Mother’s request, the trial court 

permitted Mother to explain the basis for her untimely revocation at a January 

11, 2019 hearing.

8 Mother unmistakably testified that she “changed her mind” 

and “still want[ed] to fight for [her] children” because she believed that she 

complied with all of DHS’s directives for her reunification with the Children. 

N.T., 1/11/2019, at 28. Mother did not testify, however, that she wished to 

revoke her consents because she executed them under fraud or duress. 

Therefore, within 60 days of Mother’s execution of the consents, the trial court 

____________________________________________

of her signature to do so. Id. at 21. Further, it was explained to Mother that 

she would need to make a decision in writing, and provide it to either Ms. 

Randall or to Former Counsel. Id. Mother was not provided any promise or 

any threat from CUA or from counsel to obtain her signature on the 

documents, and she signed them on November 13, 2018. Id. at 21-23. Ms. 

Randall witnessed Mother’s signature. Id. at 21. When she signed the 

documents, Mother had a pleasant demeanor. Id. at 23. After signing the 

documents, Mother, Former Counsel, and the witnesses, returned to the 

courtroom. Id. at 23. Based on the foregoing, we reject Mother’s claim that 

she could not revoke her consent to adoption because the trial court prevented 

her from filing a timely petition to challenge the validity of her consents 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c)(3)(i)(A) as the trial court did not appoint 

new counsel until more than sixty days after Mother executed her consents. 

As Section 2711 makes unequivocally clear, it was Mother’s responsibility to 

revoke her consent, in writing, with either her attorney-of-record or the 

Agency. 

8 We observe that the January 11, 2019 hearing took place on the 59th day 

following Mother’s execution of the consents to adoption on November 13, 

2018. The hearing was held to confirm the consents to the voluntary 

relinquishments signed by both Mother and Father. At that time, Mother 

expressed her desire to revoke her voluntary consent to relinquish her 

parental rights to the Children. We note, however, that upon review of the 

certified record, Mother did not file a petition pursuant to Section 2711(c)(3)(i) 

alleging fraud or duress. 
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heard testimony regarding the basis for her revocation. Mother did not claim 

that she signed the consents to adoption under fraud or duress.

9 For all of 

the foregoing reasons, we find no merit to Mother’s sixth issue.10

In sum, Mother had two established statutory procedures available to 

her to achieve her goal of negating her voluntary relinquishment of her 

parental rights. She could revoke her consents in writing to the Agency or 

counsel within 30 days. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c)(1)(ii). She failed, 

____________________________________________

9

 We note that Mother alleges that she was under duress for the first time on 

appeal to this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower 

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”) 

10

 Because the trial court properly confirmed Mother’s consents to adoption 

as an alternative procedure for the relinquishment of her parental rights, we 

need not address Mother’s other issues as presented on appeal. Further, we 

note that Mother raises additional issues in her counseled reply brief that were 

not raised in her concise statement of errors complained of on appeal under 

Rule 1925(b). She challenges a prior judge’s decision to remove the Children 

from kinship care and to incarcerate Mother for retrieving one of her sick 

children from school despite having only supervised visitation. See Mother’s 

Reply Brief at 8. Mother also challenges the trial court’s decision to continue 

to hear testimony regarding the involuntary termination of her parental rights 

while she left the courtroom to execute voluntary termination and 

consent-to-adoption forms. Id. at 8-12. In her reply brief, Mother also argues 

that “[t]he consent she did sign does not identify the adopting parents nor a 

waiver of the right to know their identity [pursuant to] 23 Pa.C.S.[A. §] 

2712[.]” Id. at 14. Mother further contends that the trial court erred by 

failing to hold a hearing to confirm her consents within 10 days of signing 

them. Id. at 15. These issues were not raised before the trial court and we 

may not address them for the first time on appeal. See Lineberger v. 

Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141, 148 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“An appellant's failure to 

include an issue in [her Rule] 1925(b) statement waives that issue for 

purposes of appellate review.”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised 

in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on 

appeal.”)
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however, to timely invoke this procedure. Mother could also petition the court 

alleging fraud or duress within 60 days of executing her consents. See 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c)(3). Mother never filed a petition and never alleged fraud 

or duress before the trial court as grounds for challenging her prior consents. 

She simply stated that she changed her mind at a subsequent hearing. 

Because Mother did not comply with either of the statutorily mandated 

procedures for withdrawing her consents to adoption, we are constrained to 

affirm the trial court’s decision confirming Mother’s voluntary relinquishment 

of parental rights to the Children.11 Accordingly, we affirm the decrees and 

orders with respect to each of the Children. 

Decrees and orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/16/19

____________________________________________

11 Finally, we recognize that there were irregularities regarding the termination 

procedure and note our dissatisfaction with the confusing way the trial court 

handled this case. However, as explained in detail above, the trial court did 

not err as a matter of law by denying Mother’s request to revoke her consents 

to adoption.