# FILED
October 8, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT KNOXVILLE MARCH 1999 SESS ION

STATE OF TENN ESSEE , * C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9809-CC-00318 Appellee, * BLOUNT COUNTY
v. * Hon. D. Kelly Thom as, Jr., Judge RONALD D. CORRELL , * (Aggravated Assaul t,Vandalism, Leaving the Scene of an Accident) Appellant. *

For Appellant : For Appellee : F.D. Gibson Paul G. Summers 116 E. Harper St. Attorney General and Repor ter Maryville, TN 37804 450 James Robertson Parkwa y Nashville, TN 37243-0493 Ellen Pollack Assistant Attorney Gener al Criminal Justice Div

ision 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243 Lisa McKenzie Assistant District Attorney General 363 Court St. Maryville, TN 37804 OPINION FILED: ____________________

AFFIRMED

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE1 The appellant does not appealhis convi ction for drivi ng on a suspended li cense. 2 OPINION On May 7, 19 98, the a ppellan t, Ronald D. Correll, was convict ed by a jury in the Blount Count y Circuit Court of aggravated assault, v andalism, leaving the scene of an accident, and driv ing on a suspended license. 1 The trial court imposed an effective sentence of four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, suspending all but six months of the appel lant’s sentence and placing him on supervised probation for the remainder.

In this appeal as of right, the appellant presents the follow ing issues for our re view:

(I) Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the appellant’s

convicti ons of aggra

vated assau lt, vandal ism, and leaving the scene of an ac cident; (II) With respect to the appellant’s co nviction for leaving the scene of an accident, whether the trial court erred b

y instructing the jury

on the definition of accident; (III) With respect to the appellant’s c onviction of aggravated assault, whether the trial cour t erred by failing to charge the jury with the lesser included offense of assault; (IV) Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt; and (V) Whether the appellant’s multiple conv ictions for aggravated assault, vandalism, and leaving the scene of an accident violate pri nciples of double jeopardy or due process. Following a rev

iew of the record and the par ties’ briefs, we affirm the j udgment of the trial court.

I. Factual Background3 The present offenses occurred follow ing an altercation betw een the appellant and his ex-w ife, Rhonda Correll. The rec ord reflects that, at the time of these of fenses , the app ellant an d Ms. Corre ll had bee n divorced for more than two years and maintained separate residences. They had tw o sons who visited the appellant every other weekend. Ms. Correll recounted at the appellant’s trial that, in the morning hours of Friday, September 6, 1996, she went to the ap pellant’s residence to finalize ar rangements for the children’ s visitation that w eekend. The appellant informed Ms. Correl l that he would be unable to c are for the children because he had a d ate that

evenin g. Fol lowing

a heated

argument, Ms. C

orrell left the residence.

Later that morning, Ms. Correll returned to the appellant’s residence when the appellant was absent from home. Ms. Correll had a key to the residence, because the appellant had asked her to do his laund ry. Accordingly, she was able to retrieve a television set she had loaned to the appellant for their children’s use during visitation.Before departing, she left a note and the house keys for the appellant.
Ultimately, the appellant ’s aunt agreed to care for th e children that weekend. Therefore, in the late afternoon , Ms. Correll left the children at the aunt’s home, completed several err ands, and drove to her boy friend’s home. Her boyfriend had not yet returned from work, and Ms. Correll decided to await his return in his drive way. Wh ile she was waiting, th e appella nt drove in to the dri veway, jumped from his truck, and began “ screaming” about the telev ision and their earlier argument concerning v isitation. Ms. Corr

ell closed the door of her car and attempted to roll up her wi ndow. However, the appellant forced his arm thr ough the open window, preventing Ms. Correll from closing the window. He then struck Ms.4 Correll in the jaw, opened the car door, and pushed her “down between the seats.” Ms. Correll was

only able to extract

herself from the appellant’s gr asp by kicking the appellant and again closing the car door.
At this point, in order to convince the appellant to leave in his truck, Ms. Correll told the appellant that she would foll ow him to another location.The appellant returned to his tr uck and began to leave but dr ove back into the driv

eway when Ms. Correll failed to follow him. The appellant again jumped from his truck, this time brandishing a k nife. While screaming obscenities, he punc tured both front tires of Ms. Correll’s car. The appellant then threatened, “I’ve got a gun in the truck and I’m going to blow

your brains out.” N evertheless, at Ms. C orrell’s entreaty, he again returned to his tr uck and allowed her to l eave.
Ms. Correll left her boy friend’s driveway

and drove onto the road. In an effort to attract attention and obtai n assistance, Ms. Corr ell began honking her car horn. The appellant then began ramming the back of her car with his truck, pushing her car off the road into a ditch. When a couple stopped to offer assistance, the appellant immedi ately fled.

Because her car was sti ll operational and because the appellant had departed, Ms. Correll declined the couple’s assi stance and decided to return to her boyfriend’s residence. H owever, as she began to turn her car around, the appe llant reappeared in his truck. He screamed, “Watch this” and rammed the side of her car, before again fleeing the scene. Ms. Correll t estified that, when the appell ant reappeared and screamed at her, s he became “scared.”

Additionally, Ms. Correll testified that, at the time of these of fenses,5 she was driving

a white Chevette. She stated that she had bought the car from her sister, but had never r

egistered her owners hip. Following the se offenses and the consequent damage to the Chev ette, she purchased a new v ehicle.
The State also presented the testimony of Charles W ard. Mr. Ward stated that, on September 6, 1996, he was at hom e in his front yard when he heard a noise and observed a white truck pushing a small white car across two driveways, including his own. Mr. Ward noted that the left front of the truck w as pushing into the driver’s side of the car. At trial, Mr. Ward identified the appellant as the driver of the truck and also testified th at, when he approached the truc k, the appellant claimed that the driver of the car had damaged his truck first. Mr. Ward noticed that there was a dent next to the door on the driver’s side of the truck.

Officer Robert Schafer, an officer employ ed by the Blount County Sheriff’s Department, testified on behal f of the State. He recounted that, on September 6, 1996, he was dispatched to Six Mile Road in Blount County. Upon his arrival, Officer Schafer observed a white Chevette “turned sideways in a ditch.” Ms. Correll was standi ng beside the vehicle an d “had a few cuts on her face, g lass in her hair, [and] was vis ibly shaken and upset.” Ms. Correll informed Officer Schafer that a white truck had stru ck her vehicle. Officer Schafer noticed extensiv e damage on the left side of Ms. Correll ’s vehicle. He testified that he observed no damage to the front of Ms. Correll’s vehicle or any other evidence that Ms. Correll had herself rammed another vehicle w ith the Chevette.
The appellant presented evidence at trial, including a certified copy of a certificate of title and reg istration obtained from the Blount County Clerk. The document reflects that the white Chevette involved in the incident was registered in6 1996 to Sonya Bell, Ms. Correll’s sister.

The appellant also presented the tes timony of Charles Henry Ward, the son of the State’s witness , Charles Ward. He testified that he knew the appellant and that he observed the appellant’s truck on the morning of September 6, 1996, prior to the instant offenses. He stated that, at that time, the appellant’s truck was not damaged in any w ay. Later that morning, he arrived at the scene of the appellant’s offenses as the appellant was leaving. H e approached Ms. Correll ’s car and linger

ed at the scen e while Offi cer Schafer i nterview ed Ms. Corr

ell. At some point, at Ms. Correll ’s request, he removed a cooler containing unopened c ans or bottles of beer from her car. He testified at trial that Ms . Correll “smelled l ike she had been drinking, but, you know, I couldn’t tell that, because you know, I really didn’t - - I just got

the cooler out of the back of the car.”
Additionally, Anna Ward, Charles Hen ry Ward’s wife, testified on behalf of the appellant. She stated that, on September 6, 1996, she lived on Six Mile Road and approached Ms.Correll immediately after the incident in order t o provide her access to a telephone. Ms. Ward no ticed that Ms. Correll “smelled like beer” and that there was a cooler in the trunk of her car. Ms. Ward further testified that, two or three day

s after the incident, Ms. Co rrell confessed to her that s he had rammed the appellant’s truck w ith her car first.
Finally, the appellant presented the testimony of his w ife, Edwina Correll. She testified that she observed the appellant’s truck three days bef ore these offenses and could not recall any damage to the body of the truck. However, approximately one w

eek after the offenses, she noticed damage on the driver’s side of the truck. In contrast, the front of the appellant’s truck di d not appear damaged.7 II. Analy sis A. Sufficiency

of the Evidence The appellant contends that the record conta ins insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for aggravated as sault, vandalism, and leav ing the scene of an accident. In Tennessee, appellate courts accord considerabl e weight to the verdict of a jury i n a criminal trial. In essence, a jury conv

iction removes the presumption of the defendant’s innocence and replaces it with one of g uilt, so that the appellant carries the burden of demonstrat ing to this court why the evidence will not support the jury’s findings. State v. Tuggle , 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). The appellant must establish that “no reasonable trier of fact” coul d have found the essential elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); T enn R. App. P. 13(e).

Accordingly, on appeal , the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences w hich may be drawn there from. State v. Williams , 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). In other words, questions concerning the credibil ity of witnesses and the weight and value to

be given the evidence, as well as

factual issues raised by the evidence, are resol ved by the trier of fact, and not the appellate courts. State v. Pruett , 788 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990).
With respect to the appellant’s convic tion of aggravated assaul t, the applicable statute provides:

(a) A person commits agg ravated assault who: (1) Intentionally or knowingly commits an assault as defined in § 39-13-101 and: (B) Uses or displays a deadly weapon; . . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102 (1995 Supp.) . Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-101(a)( 2)8 (1997) provides that a person commits assault who intentionally or knowingly causes another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury. In this case, the jury convicted the appellant of ag gravated assault purs uant to an indictment chargi ng the appellant with “unlaw

fully and knowingly

by the use of a deadly w eapon, to wit: A motor vehicle, caus[ing ] Rhonda Correll to reas onably fear imminent bodily injury by striking her vehi cle while she was inside . . . .”
We conclude that the State adduced ample evidence to convict the appellant of aggravated assault as charged in the indictment. In reaching this conclusion, we note that a truck can be a deadly w eapon within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102. State v. Tate , 912 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Moreover, as previously noted, M s. Correll testified at trial that the appellant deliberately an d on two occasions used hi s truck to ram her car w hile she was driving the

car, thereby forcing her car off the road. Ms. Corr ell further testified that, on the second occasion, she became “scared” of the appellant. Charles Ward corroborated her testimony concerning the second occa sion, stating that he witnessed the appellant’s truck pushing Ms. Correll’s car across two driveways.

With respect to the appellant’s convic tion of vandalism, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-408 (1991) provides:

(a) Any person who knowingly causes damage to or the destruction of any real or personal property of another

. . . knowing that the person does not have the owner’s effective consent is guilty of an offense unde r this section. The statute further provides at section (c)(1) that “[a]cts of vandalism are to be valued accord ing to the prov

isions of § 39-1 1-106(a

)(36) a nd punis hed as th eft under § 39-14-105.” Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-14-408. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11- 106(a)(36)(A)(I) ( 1997) defines “value” as “[t]he fair market value of the pr operty . . .2 The appellant was originally indicted for vandalism of property over one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) . However, f ollowi ng a hearing out side the j ury’s p resence and due to t he State’ s lack of evidence, the trial

court dir

ected the j ury to f ix the val ue of the vandal ized proper ty ei ther at l ess than five hundred dollars ($500) or at more than five hund red dollars ($500). 9 at the time and place of the offense . . . .” Under Tenn. Code. Ann. § 39-14-105 (1997), the value of any v andalized property w

ill determine the grade of the offense.
In this case, the jury convicted the appellant of v andalism of property worth less than five hundred dollars ($500.00). 2 Again, Ms. Correl l testified at trial that, prior to these offenses, she had purchased the white Chev ette from her sister. She also testified that the appell ant did not have her consent t o damage the car. Moreover, the record reflects that the appellant sla shed the Chevette’s front ti res with a knife and rammed the side of the Chevette with his truck, denting the side of the car and breaking a car window. Due to the appellant’s actions, Ms. Correll was forced to purchase a new v ehicle.
The app ellant ar gues that , becaus e the car wa s registere d in Sonya Bell’s name, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable do ubt that Ms. Correll was the owner of the car and, therefore, that the appellant did not have the owner’s consent to damage the car. How ever, for purposes of the van dalism statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-401(3) (1997) defines an “owner” as “ a person in lawful possession of property, whether the possession is actual or constructive.” See also State v. Katz , No. 03C01-9704-CC-00 150, 1998 WL 334378, at *3 (Tenn. Cr

im. App. at Knoxville, J une 25, 1998), perm to appeal denied (Ten n. 19 99 ). We conclude that the evidence s upports the jury’s findi ng that Ms. Correll was the “owner” of the white Chevette at the time of these offenses.

The appellant also argues that the State failed to establish the v alue of the white Chevette or the cost of replacing the vehicle, because the State merely10 relied upon Ms. Correl l’s testimony concerni ng the damage to the white Chevette and several photographs of the Chevette following these offenses. We disagree. Our supreme court has held that a trier of fact may, from all th e evidence presented at trial, determine the fair mar ket value of stolen property

. State v. Hamm , 611 S.W.2d 826, 828-29 (Tenn. 1981). Similarly, based upon the evidence adduced in this case, a rational jur or could have found beyond a r easonable doubt that the value of the Chevette was less than five hundred dollars. The record before th is court supports the appellant’ s conviction of vandali sm worth less than fiv e hundred dollars ($500.00).

With respect to the appellant’s convic tion of leaving the scene of an accident, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-102(a) (1998) provides:

The driver of any vehi cle involved in an a ccident resulting only in damage to a vehi cle which is driv en or attended by any person shall i mmediately stop such vehi cle at the scene of such accident . . . , but shall forthwith retur

n to and in every event shall remain at the scene of such accident until that person has fulfilled the requirements of § 55-10-103. Tenn. Code. Ann. § 55-10-103 (1998) sets forth the duty of any suc h driver to provide information and render aid to other individual s involved in the ac cident.
The appellant essentially a rgues that the State failed to es tablish at trial that any “acci dent” occurred on September 6, 1996, because an “accident” within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-102(a) and an intentional or knowing aggravated assault cannot occur simultaneously. However, the appellant’s argument depends upon a more limit ed definition of “accident” than w arranted by the applicable statute. We discuss the appro priate definition of “accident” in the succeeding section. In l ight of this discussion, we conclude that the evi dence at trial was sufficient to support the appellant’s conviction of leaving the scene of an11 accident. This issue is w ithout merit.
B. Jury Instructions

i. Leaving the Scene of An Accident - The D efinition of Accident The appellant argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the definition of “accident” for p urposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-102( a), the statute setting forth the offense of leav ing the scene of an accident. I n this case, the jury submitted a wr

itten question to the tri al court, inquiring about the definition of “accident” under Tennessee law. In response to this question, the trial court consulted Black’s Law Dictionary 31 (Revised 4th ed. 1968) , and provided the followin g definit ion to the jury:

The word “accident,” r

equiring operator of v

ehicle to stop immediately in case of accid ent, contemplates any situation occurring on the highway wherein he so operates his automobile as to c ause injury to the proper ty or person of anot her using t he same h ighway. The appellant contends that, to the ex tent this definition encompasses i ntentional conduct, it does not provide the normal, ordinary meaning of “accident.” Moreover, the appellant contends that the tr ial court erred by onl

y instructing the j ury on a portion of the Black’s Law Dictionary definition.
Generally, a charge will constitute prejudicial error if “it fails to fairly submit the legal issues or if it misleads the jury as to the applicable law.” State v. Hodges , 944 S.W.2d 346, 352 (Tenn.), cert. denied , __U.S. __, 118 S.Ct. 567 (1997). Thus, in instructing the jury on the applicable law, the trial court must describe and define the essential elements of each charged offense. State v. Cravens , 764 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tenn. 1989). However,trial courts are not r equired to define or explain wor ds or terms in common use w hich are understood by persons of ordinary intel ligence. State v. Summers , 692 S.W.2d 439, 445 (Tenn.12 Crim. App. 1985). Never theless, trial courts may provide supplemental instructions in response to questions by the jury. State v. Forbes , 918 S.W.2d 431, 451 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Applying these general principles and in light of our prior decision in State v. Bowman , No. 1315, 1991 WL 108755 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knox ville, June 24, 1991), we conclude that the trial court’s instr uction to the jury on the d efinition of “accident” was corr

ect. In Bowman , this court rejected a defendant’s identical contention that the word “ accident,” contained in the l eaving the scene of an accident statute, did not encompass intentional conduct. Id. at *4. This court observed that, in making it a crime to leave the scene of an accident, the legislature intended “to assist those w ho are victims of damage or injury from the operation of automobiles by others.” Id. Furthermore, this court concluded that the defend ant’s contention w

ould defeat thi s legisla

tive purpo

se and procee

ded to adopt th e same Black’s Law Dictionary

definition of accident used in thi s case. Id. This issue is without merit.
ii. Aggrav ated Assault -

The Lesser Offense of Assault With respect to his conviction of agg ravated assault, the appell ant challenges the trial c

ourt’s refusal, in response to his request, to inst ruct the jury on the lesser offense of assault. A tri al judge has a duty to c harge the jury as to all the law of each offense included in the i ndictment. State v. Cleveland , 959 S.W.2d 548, 553 (Tenn. 1997); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-18- 110(a) (1997). Moreov er, a defendant has a right to have ev

ery issue of fact raised by the evidence and material t o his or her defense submitted to the jury on proper instructions. State v. Robinette , No. 03C01-9611-CR-00430, 1997 WL 671889, at * 3 (Tenn. C rim. App. at Knoxvil le, October 29, 1997). Thus, a defendant has a right to a jury i nstruction on all lesser13 included offenses and lesser gr ades or classes of the charg ed offenses if the facts are susceptible to an inference of guilt of any of those offenses. State v. Trusty , 919 S.W.2d 305, 310 (Tenn. 1996); State v. Cutshaw , 967 S.W.2d 332, 341-342 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-18-110; Tenn. R. Crim. P. 31(c). An offense is necessarily included in another if the eleme nts of the greater offense include, but are not congr uent with, all the elements of the lesser offense. Trusty , 919 S.W.2d at 310. See also State v. Miller , N o. 01 C0 1- 97 03 -C C- 00 08 7, 19 98 WL 601241, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. at N ashville, September 11, 1998) . Furthermore, an offense is a lesser grade of another offense if both offenses are located in the same section of the statute. Trusty , 919 S.W.2d at 310.

Assault is both a lesser included offense and a lesser gr ade offense of aggravated assault. Trusty , 919 S.W.2d at 310-11; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-101; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102. How ever, the indictment in th is case charged, and the evidence at trial es tablished, that the appellant either assaulted Ms. Corr ell with his truck or he did not as sault her at all. A tri al court may refuse to inst ruct a lesser offense if the evidence shows that the defendant is either guilt y of the greater offense or not guilty of any offense. Howard , 926 S.W.2d 579, 585 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)(cit ing State v. Stephenson , 878 S.W.2d 530, 550 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Boyd , 797 S.W.2d 589, 593 (Tenn. 1990); State v. Dulsworth , 781 S.W.2d 277, 287 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989)). This issue is without meri

t.
iii. Jury Instruction on Reasonable Doubt The appellant contends that the tri al court’s instructi on to the jury on reasonable doubt impermissibl y shifted the burden of proof to the appel lant, thereby violating his ri ght to due process of law.The trial court provi ded the following instruct ion to the jury:3 The S tate incorre ctly asserts that the jury ins truction in this c ase is en tirely identical to T.P .I. Crim . No. 2.03 (a). 14

A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in this case and an inability after such investigation to let the m ind rest easily as to the certainty of guilt. It is not necessary that

the defendant’s guilt be prov ed beyond all possible doubt, as absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to co nvict of any criminal charge. A reasonable doubt is just that -- a doubt that is reasonable after an examination of all the f acts of this case. If you find the state has not prov en every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, then y ou should find the defendant not guilty. (Emphasis added). The appellant s pecifically challeng es the trial court’s i nclusion, without qualification, of language concerning an “inability . . . to let the mind rest easily . . . .”

Initiall y, we note th at, with th e exceptio n of the “let the m ind rest e asily” phrase, the trial court’ s reasonable doubt instructi on in this case is identi cal to Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction (T.P.I) Crim. No. 2.03(a) (4th ed. 199 5). 3 This court has held that T.P.I. Cri m. No. 2.03(a) is consist ent with principles of due process. State v. Saulsberry , No. 02C01-9710-CR-00406, 1998 WL 892281, at **13-14 (Tenn. Crim. App. at J ackson, December 21, 1998); State v. White , No. 02C01-9710-CR-00384, 1998 W L 376352, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson), perm to appeal denied , ( Tenn. 1998); State v. Henning , No. 02C01-9703-CC00126, 1997 WL 661455, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jacks on, October 24, 1997). Accordingly, w

e must determine whether the “let the mind rest easily ” phrase, by itself, rendered the reasonable doubt jury instructi on invalid.15 The trial court apparently borrowed the disputed phr ase from the “traditional” reasonabl e doubt jury instructi on. T.P.I. Crim. No. 2.03 (4th ed. 1995). Tennessee courts have repeatedl y upheld the constitutional ity of the traditional instruction. See State v. Hall , 976 S.W.2d 121, 159 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied , __U.S. __, 119 S.Ct. 1501 (1999); State v. Bush , 942 S.W.2d 489, 52 0-21 (Tenn.), cert. denied , __U.S.__, 118 S.Ct. 376 (1997) ; State v. Nichols , 877 S.W.2d 722, 734 (Tenn. 1994). See also Coe v. Bell , 161 F.3d 320, 329 (6th Cir. 1998); Austin v. Bell , 126 F.3d 843, 847 (6th Cir. 1997), cert denied , __U.S.__, 118 S.Ct. 1526 (1998). Nevertheless, the appellant attempts to distinguish those cases f rom his own, arguing that the jury instructions in those cases qualified the “let the mind rest easily” phrase by requiring “moral certainty” of a defendant’s g uilt.

In determining whether a jury instruction s atisfies the requirements of due process, we must ex amine the instructions as a w hole, without consideri ng particular phrases out of cont ext. Victor v. Nebraska , 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1243 (1994). "[S]o long as th e court instructs the jur y on the necessity that

the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the C onstitution does not require that any particular form of words be used i n advising the jury of the government's burden of proof." Id. (citations omitted). We conclude that the trial court properly instructed the jury on the definition of reasonable dou bt. This issue is without merit.

C. Do uble Jeop ardy

The appellant next asserts that his convictions for a ggravated assault, vandalism, and leaving the scene of an accident violate principles of double jeopardy. Initially, we note that the double jeopar dy clauses of the United Stat es and Tennessee constitutions guar d against three evils : (1) a second prosecution16 following an acquitt

al; (2) a second prosecuti on following a convi ction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Denton , 938 S.W.2d 373, 378 (Tenn. 1996) (citations omitted). The instant case po tentially involves the third category, multiple puni shments for the same offense.

In Denton , 938 S.W.2d at 379, our supreme court noted that the “multiple punishments” area of double jeopardy law “has presented courts with the greatest challenge.” Accordingly, the c ourt established a four-prong test to be applied in resolving

double jeopardy challenges in this area: (1) A reviewi ng court should conduct an anal ysis under Blockburger v. Uni

ted States , 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182 (1932): [W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisi ons, the test to be applied to deter mine whet her there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. (2) A court should also undertake an analysis of the evidence used to prove the offenses, guided by the princi ples of Duchac v. State , 505 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tenn. 1973): One test of identity of offenses is w hether the same evidence is required to prove them. If the same evidence is not required, then the fact that both charges r elate to, and grow out of, one transac tion, does not make a single offense where two are defined by the statutes. (3) A court should determine whether there were multiple victims or discrete acts. (4) A court should compare the purposes of the respective statutes. Id. at 379-81. The court noted that the key issue in multiple punishm ent cases is legislative intent

. Id. at 379. However, the court also emphasized that n o one step in the Denton analysis is determina tive and that “the results of each must be17 weighed and considered in relation to each other.” Id. at 381.

Applying the Denton analysis in this ca se, we first conclude that the relevant statutory p rovisions satisfy the Blockburger test. As noted earlier, a person commits aggra vated a ssault when he

intenti onally

or know ingly and by u se of a deadly weapon causes another to reasonably fear imminent bodi ly injury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-101, 102. In cont rast, a person commits van dalism when he knowingly damages

or destroys the personal property of another. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-408. Finally, a person commits the offense of leaving the scene of an accident when he is involved in an accident causing damage to another person’s vehicle and fails to stop hi s vehicle in order t o provide the requisi

te information and assistance. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 10-102. All three offenses contain u nique elements.
Additionally, the State relied upon different evidence to prove each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Fi rst, in proving th e charge of aggravated assault, the State adduced testimony that the appellant rammed Ms. C orrell’s car with his truck; the appellant then fled but later reappea red, shouting “Watch this!” and causing Ms. Corre l to fear another collision.Second, in order to prov e the charge of vandalism, the Stat e adduced testimony that the appel lant in fact collided with Ms. Correll ’s car a second time; Ms.Correll owned the car and did not consent to the appellant’s conduct; and the appellant’s con duct inflicted considerable damage to Ms. Correll’s car. Third, in order t o establish the appellant’s guilt of leaving the scene of an acci dent, the State not only prese nted proof that there was an accident, but also that the appel lant left the scene of the accident w ithout providing the requisite information or assistance. Thus, an analysis of the evidence used to p rove th e offenses , guided by the princi ples of Duchac , 505 S.W.2d at 239,18 weigh again st a find ing of do uble jeop ardy.

Similarly, an exami nation of the remaining factors r equires an affirmance of the appellant’s convic tions. Although there w as only one victim of the appellant’s offenses, there wer e multiple discrete acts a s delineated above. Moreover, each of the applic able statutes serves a di stinct purpose. The aggravated assault statute is intended to both deter and punish threa tening conduct against another person, inc luding the use of a deadly w eapon, which inspires fear of bodily injury. The vandalism statute is ins tead intended to both deter and punish the destruction of property. Finally, as noted earlier, the statute setting forth the o ffense of leaving the scene of an accident is clearly intended to “assist those who are victims of damage or injury from the operation of automo biles by others.” Bowman , No. 1315, 1991 WL 108755, at *4. More specificall y, the statute is intended t o encourage those involv ed in automobile accidents to s top and render assistance to other affected motorists and to prov ide information for the purpose of facili tating any investigation of the acci dent.

Having weighed and considered the various Denton factors , we conclude that the appellant’s c onvictions for aggr

avated assault, vandali sm, and leaving the scene of an accident do not violate principles of double jeop ardy. This issue is without meri

t.

D. Due Process

The appellant also argues that his multiple convicti ons for aggravated assault, vandalism, and leaving the scene of an accident violate due process pursuant to State v. Anthony , 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991). In Anthony , our supreme court held that the due pr ocess clause of the Tennessee Consti tution19 prohibits convictions

for both kidnapping and another felon y when the kidnapping was essentially i ncidental to the accompanying felony. 817 S.W.2d at 306-307. Moreover, in Anthony , the court indicated that a due process review necessarily includes an analysis of l egislative intent. 817 S.W.2d at 306.

We conclude that the due process concerns addre ssed in Anthony

are not implicated in this case . Unlike the robbery and kidnapping offenses in Anthony , proving the offense of aggravated assault does not inherently prove the statuto ry elements of the other offenses. The damage to Ms . Correll’s car cau sed by the appellant was not necessar y or incidental for the c ommission of the aggravated assault. Likewise, the appellant’s departure from the s cene of the accident was not necessary or incidental for the commission of the aggr avated assault. We conclude that the legislature int

ended independent prosecutions for the conduct underlying each of the appellant’s convic tions. This issue without merit.
Accordingly, the j udgment of the trial court is affirmed.

__________________________________ Norma McGee Ogle, Judge CONCUR:

______________________________ Gary R. Wad e, Presiding Judge

_______________________________ Cornelia A. Clark, Special Judge