[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-10590

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-20509-KMM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

DANIEL JEAN CHARLES, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(April 17, 2015)

Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Daniel Jean Charles appeals his 57-month sentence, imposed after he 

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pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit access device fraud, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1029(b)(2), and one count of aggravated identify theft, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). 

On appeal, Charles argues that the district court committed clear error when it 

denied a joint recommendation for a reduction to Charles’s offense level for his 

allegedly minor role in the offense under United States Sentencing Guideline

§ 3B1.2. Specifically, Charles alleges that the district court failed to properly 

analyze his role in the offense under the test provided in United States v. 

Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (De Varon). He 

also argues that the district court failed to consider his co-conspirator’s more 

significant role in the larger criminal scheme. After careful consideration, we 

affirm.

“[A] district court’s determination of whether a defendant qualifies for a 

minor role adjustment under the Guidelines is a finding of fact that will be 

reviewed only for clear error.” Id. at 934. The defendant “bears the burden at all 

times of establishing her role in the offense by a preponderance of the evidence.” 

Id. A defendant warrants a two-level reduction for playing a minor role in the 

offense if he is “less culpable than most other participants, but [his] role could not 

be described as minimal.” USSG § 3B1.2 comment. n.5. A district court is not 

required to find a participant’s role is minor merely because the government 

recommends such a finding. See United States v. Erves, 880 F.2d 376, 381 (11th 

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Cir. 1989). 

 Under De Varon, a district court conducts a two-pronged analysis of the 

defendant’s conduct to determine whether a minor-role reduction applies. 175 

F.3d at 940. First, “the district court must assess whether the defendant is a minor 

or minimal participant in relation to the relevant conduct attributed to [him] in 

calculating [his] base offense level.” Id. The first prong does not evaluate whether 

he played a minor role in a larger conspiracy. Id. at 944. Second, the district court 

may assess a defendant’s relative culpability compared to any other participants in 

the relevant conduct. Id. Under this prong, the court is limited to considering only 

those participants who were involved in the particular conduct for which the 

defendant was convicted. Id. The court does not take into account the role of any 

participants in any larger criminal conspiracy. Id. Furthermore, “[t]he fact that a 

defendant’s role may be less than that of other participants engaged in the relevant 

conduct may not be dispositive of role in the offense, since it is possible that none 

are minor or minimal participants.” Id. 

Here, the district court did not clearly err in denying a minor-role 

adjustment. Although the district court made no factual findings as to the first De 

Varon prong, “the sentencing judge has no duty to make any specific subsidiary 

factual findings.” Id. at 939. “So long as the district court’s decision is supported 

by the record and the court clearly resolves any disputed factual issues, a simple 

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statement of the district court’s conclusion is sufficient.” Id. The facts set forth in 

the factual proffer signed by Charles provide sufficient support for denying the 

adjustment. According to the proffer, Charles “agreed to help Wesly Compere use 

debit cards numbers and social security card numbers to obtain fraudulent income 

tax refunds and social security Retirement Income Benefits (RIB) payments.” 

Charles allowed Compere to use addresses under his control in furtherance of this 

scheme and forwarded any payments and correspondence in exchange for part of 

the proceeds. Charles also sent text messages notifying Compere and other coconspirators of the arrival of such correspondence and passing along personal 

identification information like social security numbers and dates of birth. Charles 

was involved with fraudulent returns totaling $239,433.90. In short, the record 

supports the district court’s finding that Charles did not play a minor role in the 

offense.

Neither did the district court err when it considered Charles’s culpability in 

the conduct for which he was convicted in comparison to that of Compere, his coconspirator. Charles asks this Court to consider Charles’s role in Compere’s larger 

criminal scheme. But under De Varon, “the district court may consider only those 

participants who were involved in the relevant conduct attributed to the 

defendant.” 175 F.3d at 944 (emphasis added). The district court properly 

compared the financial loss and roles of Charles and Compere in the conduct for 

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which Charles was convicted. We affirm the sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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