alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 23.1**
**INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ CONSENT**
The Board of Directors and StockholdersBowne and Co., Inc.:
     We consent to the incorporation by reference inthe registration statements (Form S-8 No. 333-102046,333-64836, 333-79409, 333-81639, 2-96887, 33-48831, 33-35810 and333-57045 and Form S-3 No. 333-109810, 333-25861,333-25849 and 333-18629) of Bowne & Co., Inc. of ourreports dated February 11, 2004 with respect to theconsolidated balance sheets of Bowne & Co., Inc. andsubsidiaries as of December 31, 2003 and 2002 and therelated consolidated statements of operations,stockholders’ equity, and cash flows for each of the yearsin the three-year period ended December 31, 2003 and withrespect to the related financial statement schedule, whichreports appear in the December 31, 2003 annual report onForm 10-K of Bowne & Co., Inc. Our reports referto the adoption of the provisions of Statement of FinancialAccounting Standards No. 142, “*Goodwill and OtherIntangible Assets*,” in the year ended December 31,2002, and the adoption of the provisions of Statement ofFinancial Accounting Standards No. 146, “*Accountingfor Costs Associated with Exit or Disposal Activities*,”in the fourth quarter of the year ended December 31, 2002.
/s/ KPMG LLP     
New York, New YorkMarch 12, 2004
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Hawks
Industries, Inc. 1996 10K and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
10K.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000015678
<NAME> HAWKS INDUSTRIES, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                          48,000
<SECURITIES>                                   571,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                  320,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     51,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,042,000
<PP&E>                                       4,325,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,059,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,765,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,083,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       268,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,969,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,765,000
<SALES>                                      2,140,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,146,000
<CGS>                                        2,349,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,869,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               520,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              65,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (742,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (742,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                (13,000)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (755,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.03)
        

</TABLE>
#### Lorraine Phillipe, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated, Appellant, v American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc., Respondent.

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (C. Beauchamp Ciparick, J.), entered February 5, 1991, which granted defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) and dismissed the amended complaint, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of denying the motion to dismiss the first cause of action and reinstating that cause of action and, as so modified, the order is otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff, against whom defendant obtained a default judgment for $9,470.53 in charges billed to her American Express card, brings this class action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, who, it is alleged, had default judgments entered against them on the basis of so-called "sewer service” and false affidavits of non-military service.

In dismissing the first cause of action for abuse of process, the IAS court concluded that plaintiff failed to allege any facts sufficient to demonstrate that defendant acted with intent to cause harm without excuse or justification and found that, albeit defective, the use of process here was not improper or perverted, inasmuch as the action was to collect an apparently valid debt.

However, construing the complaint liberally and accepting plaintiffs allegations as true at this stage, as we must, the allegations of a large scale pattern of "sewer service” are sufficient, if proven, to establish a cause of action for abuse of process.

We have considered plaintiffs other contentions and find them without merit. Concur—Carro, J. P., Milonas, Wallach and Kupferman, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This Schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Capstead
Securities Corporation IV's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended
March 31, 1998 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial
statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                           1,380
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 421,099
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                               43
<BONDS>                                        411,942
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             1
<OTHER-SE>                                       9,113
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   421,099
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                11,323
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   338
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               9,365
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,620
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,620
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,620
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
```

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of
Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code), the undersigned officer of
Finlay Enterprises, Inc., (the "Company") does hereby certify with respect to
the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the period ended October
28, 2006 (the "Report") that:

     1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

Date: December 7, 2006

                                          /s/ Bruce E. Zurlnick
                                          --------------------------------------
                                          Bruce E. Zurlnick
                                          Senior Vice President, Treasurer and
                                          Chief Financial Officer

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the
United States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a
separate disclosure document.
```
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-13-0000221

16-APR-2015

09:40 AM
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Wireless Telecom Group, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending March 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the Periodic Report), I, Paul Genova, President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Periodic Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

/s/ Paul GenovaPaul GenovaPresident, Chief Financial OfficerMay 14, 2009


The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.

---
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U. S.
C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Report of MSGI Security Solutions, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-KSB for the period ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Richard J. Mitchell
III, as Chief Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:





1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





Dated:
      October 13, 2009
                  By:
                  /s/ Richard J. Mitchell
  IIIRichard
      J. Mitchell IIIChief
      Accounting Officer
                    (Principal
      Financial
Officer)





This
certification accompanies this Report on Form 10-K pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by
such Act, be deemed filed by the small business issuer for purposes of Section
18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
Exhibit 32.1
 CERTIFICATION BY CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as amended; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 November 7, 2008
    /s/ John R. Eckel, Jr.John R. Eckel, Jr.Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William Cook, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Albert Williams, J.), rendered March 30, 1990, convicting defendant, after jury trial, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, and sentencing him, as a predicate felon, to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 4 Vi to 9 years, 4 Vi to 9 years, and 2 to 4 years, respectively, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s conviction arises out of his arrest for acting in concert with two others in a street sale of three (3) vials of crack-cocaine to an undercover officer in New York County on September 18, 1989.

*312We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in invoking the provisions of CPL 270.35 to discharge a sitting juror and substitute an alternate after ascertaining that the sitting juror was experiencing classic flu symptoms and did not feel well enough to continue service *(see, People v Page,*72 NY2d 69).

We find also that the trial court’s jury charge on accessorial liability included the proper concept of intent, and, as a whole, accurately conveyed the appropriate standards *(see, e.g., People v Adams,*69 NY2d 805). Additionally, there is no merit to defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in rereading its accessorial liability charge when requested to do so by the deliberating jury, and defendant has shown no prejudice resulting from the jury’s apparent choice not to heed the court’s suggestion that they clarify their facially unclear written request for additional instruction regarding an aspect of that charge *(see, People v Malloy,*55 NY2d 296, *cert denied*459 US 847).

Finally, defendant has failed to preserve his claim of error in the trial court’s jury charge explaining circumstantial evidence, by appropriate objection (CPL 470.05 [2]; *see also, e.g., People v Ford,*66 NY2d 428).

In any event, as the People primarily offered direct evidence at trial, the court’s jury instruction explaining that circumstantial evidence is evidence of facts, "which are inferred, or deduced, or which flow from direct evidence;” that "the inferences or conclusions that are to be drawn must flow naturally;” and that "if the inference is inconsistent with guilt, you must not draw the inference of guilt, but that of innocence,” was proper, adequately conveying both the essence of the circumstantial evidence theory and the appropriate burden of proof *(see, People v Barnes,*50 NY2d 375). Concur— Murphy, P. J., Carro, Kupferman, Asch and Rubin, JJ.
#### Jackie R. MATTHEWS, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of the State of Colorado, Acme Delivery Service, Inc., and Western Surety Company, Respondents.

No. 79CA0975.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division II.

March 27, 1980.

Fogel, Keating & Wagner, P. C., James M. Robinson, Denver, for petitioner.

J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., William Levis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondent Industrial Commission.

Glasman, Jaynes & Carpenter, James L. Carpenter, Denver, for respondent Acme Western Cas.

BERMAN, Judge.

This matter comes before the Court upon the Industrial Commission’s motion to dismiss the petition for failure “to name the Director of the Colorado Division of Labor as an indispensable party in accordance with § 8-53-107 and 108, C.R.S.1973.”

The concept that the Director of the Colorado Division of Labor is an indispensable party to an action to review an Industrial Commission order is erroneous. The only indispensable party is the Industrial Commission. It is the Commission that makes the final determination of claims. The Director, referee, or deputy who hears the claim in its initial phases makes recommendations and findings which the Commission is free to overrule and set aside, § 8-74-104(1), C.R.S.1973 (1979 Cum. Supp.), without any need to take additional evidence. *See McGinn v. Industrial Commission,*31 Colo.App. 6, 496 P.2d 1080 (1972); *In re Claim of Allmendinger v. Industrial Commission,*40 Colo.App. 210, 571 P.2d 741 (1977).

The Director may be made a party or not, at the discretion of the petitioner, *1128and the failure to make the Director a party is not a jurisdictional defect which would require the dismissal of the appeal. Section 8-53-108, C.R.S.1973 (1979 Cum. Supp.). Only where the appeal concerns a question involving a statutory duty of the Director which concerns a mandatory exercise of discretion, *see K. Davis, Administrative Law*§ 24.03 (1958), must he be named as an indispensable party. *E. g.,*§§ 8-1-103(1) and 107(2), C.R.S.1973. However, as a matter of law, the Director’s statutory obligation under § 8-40-102, C.R.S.1973 (1979 Cum.Supp.), “to enforce and administer the provisions of Articles 40 to 54” is purely ministerial in character. It is a cardinal principle that a public officer will carry out his official duties, such as enforcement of an order of the court, *see Town of Frisco v. Brower,*171 Colo. 441, 467 P.2d 801 (1970), and therefore, the fulfillment of this statutory obligation does not make the Director an indispensable party.

Motion denied.

PIERCE and VAN CISE, JJ., concur.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-15-00106-CV

Nell RAMEY,

Appellant

v.

Jessica A. POLLET,

Appellee

From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013-CI-04119

Honorable Martha B. Tanner, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Jason Pulliam, Justice

Delivered and Filed: April 8, 2015

DISMISSED

When Nell Ramey filed this appeal, she was required to pay a $195.00 filing fee. See

TEXAS SUPREME COURT ORDER REGARDING FEES CHARGED IN CIVIL CASES IN THE SUPREME 

COURT AND THE COURTS OF APPEALS AND BEFORE THE JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT 

LITIGATION (Misc. Docket No. 13-9127, Aug. 16, 2013). Ramey did not pay the required filing 

fee; accordingly, the clerk of this court notified her by letter on February 26, 2015, that her notice 

of appeal was conditionally filed and the filing fee was due within ten days. On March 13, 2015, 

when the fee remained unpaid, this court ordered that Ramey must, not later than March 23, 2015, 
04-15-00106-CV

either (1) pay the applicable filing fee or (2) provide written proof to this court that she is indigent 

or otherwise excused by statute or the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure from paying the fee.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 5 (“A party who is not excused by statute or these rules from paying costs must 

pay—at the time an item is presented for filing—whatever fees are required by statute or Supreme 

Court order. The appellate court may enforce this rule by any order that is just.”). The court 

advised Ramey that if she failed to respond satisfactorily within the time ordered, the appeal would 

be dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3.

The filing fee has not been paid, and Ramey has not otherwise responded to our March 13, 

2015 order. We therefore dismiss this appeal for want of prosecution. 

PER CURIAM

- 2 -
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markm an Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_________________________________________ Clerk September 24, 2012

h0917 

# Order

September 24, 2012

145476

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 145476

COA: 307821

Ingham CC: 89

- 060011

- FC

MICHAEL SWEET,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 8, 2012 order of

the Court of Appeals is con sidered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to

meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Order entered April 13, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-01131-CR

No. 05-14-01132-CR

No. 05-14-01133-CR

JERROD DEMOUN PRESTON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 2

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. F13-72559-I, F14-56011-I, & F14-70597-I

ORDER

Appeal Nos. 05-14-01131-CR, 05-14-01132-CR, and 05-14-01133-CR are set for 

submission on April 14, 2015 without oral argument. The Court has before it appellee the State 

of Texas’s April 13, 2015 First Motion for Extension of Time to File State’s Response Brief. 

Appellee tendered its brief with its motion. We GRANT appellee’s motion to extend time for 

filing its brief in these appeals and direct the Clerk to file appellee’s brief effective the date of 

this order.

/s/ ROBERT M. FILLMORE 

PRESIDING JUSTICE
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Nuclear Regulatory Commission

          - [Docket No. 55-23694-SP; ASLBP No. 13-925-01-SP-BD01]

                    Pursuant to delegation by the Commission,                     *see*37 FR 28,710 (Dec. 29, 1972), and the Commission's regulations,                     *see*                     10 CFR §§ 2.103(b), 2.300, 2.309, 2.313(a), 2.318, and 2.321, notice is hereby given that an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) is being established to preside over the following proceeding:                

Charlissa C. Smith, (Denial of Senior Reactor Operator License).

This proceeding concerns a hearing request from Charlissa C. Smith, dated December 5, 2012, challenging a denial letter from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) dated November 15, 2012 notifying her that, following an administrative review, the NRC is in agreement with Region II's decision of May 11, 2012 not to issue her a Senior Reactor Operator License for the Vogtle Power Station.

The Board is comprised of the following administrative judges:

Alan S. Rosenthal, Chair, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

Ronald M. Spritzer, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

Brian K. Hajek, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

As provided in 10 CFR 2.302, all correspondence, documents, and other materials shall be filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule, which the NRC promulgated in August 2007 (72 FR 49,139).

Issued at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of January 2013.

E. Roy Hawkens,

Chief Administrative Judge, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel.

[FR Doc. 2013-00328 Filed 1-9-13; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P