### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te m be r 21, 200 5

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . JO E SHE LTO N BERRY

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty

No. 2001-C- 1682 Steve D ozier , Judge

No. M2004- 03052-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Septem ber 27, 2005

The de fenda nt, J oe Sh el t o n Be rry , pled no contest to one c ount of rape . The trial c ourt sentenc ed the def endant to ei gh t y ear s at 100%, but suspended se rvice of the sente nce and place d him on

su pe rv ise d p ro ba tio n. Th e re a ft e r, the tr ia l cou rt re vo ke d th e de fe nd a nt’ s p ro batio n a ndpla c e d h is

e nti re se nte nc e int o e ff

e c t. O n a pp e a l, the de fe nd a nt c ha lle ng e s th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s revo cat ion of his probation. F ollowing our revie w, we a ffirm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

J.C. M C L IN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

E m m a R a e T e n n e n t( o n ap p e a l ) a n d A m y H ar w e l l , ( a ttr i a l ) f o r t h e ap p e l l a n t , J o e S h e l t o n B e rr y.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; Re ne e W. T urne r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Victor S. J ohnson, I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; and Be rnar d McEvoy , Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

BACK GR OUND

On December 5, 2002, the defendant entered a negotiated no c ontest plea to ra pe. He was sentenc ed to eig ht y ear s at 100%, suspended on supe rvised probation. As part of the c onditions of his probation, the def

endant wa s require d t o complete a sexual offende rs treatment prog ram a nd provide a DNA submission.

On J uly 1 8 , 2003, a probation violation warrant wa s filed, alleg ing that the defe ndant had violated the terms of his probation by : (1) fa i l i n g t o ca rr y out instructions given by the Probation Of fi c e r o n a t le a st t wo oc c a sio ns ; ( 2) faili ng to ve ri fy DN A s ub mis sio n; and(3 ) f a ili ng to c omp ly-2-

wi th s e x off

e nd e r t re a tme nt d ir e c ti ves , th e re by be ing dis c ha

rg e d f ro m tr e a tme nt o n th re e se pa rate
oc c a sio ns

.
T h e t ri al co u rt h el d a p ro b at i o n re v o ca t i o n h ea ri n g o n J u l y 1 8 , 2 0 0 3

. Fo l l o wi n g t h e h ea ri n g, the t ri a l c ou rt

re vo ke d th e de fe nd a nt’ s p ro batio n a ndpla c e d th e de fe nd a nt’ s se nte nc e int o e ff e c t. Howeve r, the c ourt ag ree d t o conduct a hearing to c onsider suspension of the r emainder of the defe ndant’s sente nce a fter 120 day s.

At the Novembe r 25, 2003 hea ring , the def

endant c laimed that he wa s in bad hea lth a nd that his condition ha d worsene d since be ing inc arc erated. The de fenda nt also reque sted that he be place d wi th a no the r c ou ns e lor . T he tr ia l c ou rt fo un d th a t th e de fe nd a nt h a d “ be e n le ss tha n tr uth fu l w ith the Court[,] ” but base d on his ag e and health, orde red split confine ment of seve n months from the date he was take n into custody , then re instatement of probation. The trial court further imposed an additional condition of probation that the defe ndant not have c ontact with any children a nd re- enter the se x off

e nd e r t re a tme nt p ro g ra m.

On Octobe r 28, 2004, anothe r probation violation warrant wa s issued alleg ing that the defe ndant was aga i n d i s char g ed fr om the sex offender treatment prog ram on Aug ust 11, 2004. There afte r, the trial c ourt held a second probation revoc ation hearing. A t the hearing, John Brog don, the direc tor of the se x offe nder tre atment prog ram, testified the defe ndant was punc tual and attende d

every class , b u t n onetheless, he made little prog ress in the prog ram a nd was ve ry dece ptive about his conviction and conta ct with the childre n in his family . As Mr. B rog don explained, the defe ndant would “almost [t ell] the truth but the n ref use to.” He would vag uely acknow led ge h i s criminal actions but then later

deny them. Acc ording to Mr. Br og don, t h e def endant would sa y , “She [the tw e lve -y e ar o ld g ra nd daug hte r] c a me on to me , a nd I pr ob ably pu t my thi ng in h e r. B ut s he c a me on to me.” Mr

. B r o g d o n t e s t i f

i e d t h a t h e f

o u n d t h e d e f

e n d a n t t o b e u n r e l i ab l e a n d l a c k a d a i s i c a l wi th
reg ard to the c ourt-orde red tre atment. Mr. Brog don stated t hat defendant was discharg ed fr om the treatment prog ram be cause he did not fully participa te in the prog ra m an d was holding the re st of the group back. Yolanda J ohnson, the defendant’s probation office r, also testi fied. She stated that she wa s conce rned a

bout the close prox imity the defendant li ved to his g randc hildren and that he had

c a nc e lle d, a ndno t r e sc he du le d, his la st p oly g ra ph te st. The de fenda nt testified that he attende d the sex offende r treatment c lass every wee k as he w as require d. He also testified t hat he lived in his house for forty -two y ear s, but that his daughte r lived in the house next to his house

. The de fenda nt stated that he would be willing to re schedule and take the pol y gra p h test if the test would help him. On examination by the court, the defe ndant denied telling the c ourt at t he pre vious hearing that his gr anddaug hter c ame on to him and “tried to insert [hi s] penis i nto her va g ina.”

Def ense c ounsel arg ued in closing rema rks that the def

endant ha d met the conditions of pr ob a tio n b y

a tte nd ing tr e a tme nt andthat he sh ou ld n ot b e requ ir ed to adm it that he ra pe d h is-3-

g randdaug hter beca

use such admission wa s not a condition of the plea ag ree ment. The trial c ourt stated that the de fendant was require d to attend and complete trea tment and Mr. B rog don was in the best position to determine what one must do to complete trea t ment. The c ourt found that the de fe nd a nt “ fl ip- fl op s” be tw e e n th re e ve rs ion s o f w hat di d or did no t ha pp e n a ndbe c a us e of

his ong oing, de ceptive activity could not complete the sex offe nder treatment progr am. Therefor e, the court re voked probation and placed the defe ndant’s sentence into eff ect. The defenda nt appea led.

AN AL YSI S
On appe al, the def

endant a rg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in r ev o k i n g his probation. Specifica lly , he ar g ues that the trial c ourt err ed in re voking his probatio n b as ed o n alleg ations of

un sa tis fa c tory

pr og re ss a ndthe su bs e qu e nt dis c ha rg e fr om the se xua l of

fe nd e r t re a tme nt p ro g ra m.

I nitially , we note that the decision to revoke probation l ies in the s ound discretion of the trial court. S tate v. L eac h, 914 S.W .2d 104, 106 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). The trial court may revoke probatio n u p o n f

in d in g b y a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f th e e v id e n c e th a t th e d e f e n d a n t h a s v io late d the conditions of his or her pr obation. See Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35- 310,-311(e ); State v. Har kins, 811 S.W .2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991) . Revocation of probation is subject to an abuse of discre tion standard of re view, rather than a de novo standard. I d. I f the tria l judge has exercise d “consc ientious judgme nt in making the de cision rather than ac ting a

rbitrarily ,” then ther e is no abuse of discre tion. L eac h, 914 S.W .2d at 107. Discre tion is abused only if the re cord c ontains no substantial evidence to s up po rt the tr ia l c ou rt ’s c on c lus ion that a violatio n ha s occ ur re d. Ha rkins , 811 S.W. 2d a t 82 ; State v. Gre g ory , 946 S.W .2d 829, 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)

. As previously

stated, we do not de cide the matter as if we wer e the trial court. I nstead, we revie w the re cord to de termine whether the trial court abused its discretion by revoking probation. Upon re view, the r ecor d ref lects that after the defe ndant vi olated his probation the fir st tim e, he w as g iven a se cond cha nce at probation. At the s econd probation revoc ation hearing, Mr . Br og don, the defe ndant’s tre atment provider, testified that the def endant wa s evasive, not f

ully forthcoming , and ho ldi ng the g ro up ba c k. Mr . B ro g do n, a se x off e nd e r t re a tme nt p ro vid e r f

or ov e r t we nty -s e ve n y e ars , de te rm in e d t h a tt h e d e f

e n d a n tc o u l d n o tb e a s s e s s e d f o r f u tu r e r i s k g i v e n t h e f

a i l e d m u l t i p le opportunities for tre atment. Mr. Brog don rec alled that the defendant did not fully participate when the foc us was on him and that he dis play ed a c asual disre g ard towa rd his trea tment. Mr. Br og don te sti fi e d th a t he dis c ha

rg e d th e de fe nd a nt f

ro m th e pr og ram a ndwo uldno t a c c e pt h im b a c k b e c a us e he re fu se d to be ho ne st a ndtr y to w or k o ut h is p ro ble ms.

After hearing the testi m o n y , the trial court found that the def endant violated his probation

w h e n h e w a s d i s c h ar g e d f r o m t h e s e x o f

f e n d e r tr e a t m e n t c l a s s , f

o r o n g o i n g d e c e p t i v e a c t i v i t y, wh e re by he c ou ld n ot c omp le te the tr e a tme nt p ro g ram or be a sse sse d for fu tur e ri sk

. I n ma kin g thi s finding , the trial court a

ppare ntly acc redited Mr . Br og don’s testimony . L ooking a t the rec ord, we

c on c lud e the tr ia l c ou rt

e xer cisedc on sc ie nti ou s ju dg me nt i n f ind ing the de fe nd a nt v iol a te d h is pr ob a tio n w he n h e wa s d isc ha rg e d f ro m th e se x off

e nd e r t re a tme nt p ro g ram.-4-

We al s o note that this holding does not contr adict our de cision in St ate v. William A. Marsha ll, No. M2001-02954-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31370461, at *8-9 (T enn. C ri m

. App., at Nashville, Oc t. 14, 2002), wher e we held that a de fenda nt could fulfill the objective standards of a treatment prog ram without being “cur ed.” A lthough the de fenda nt was punctua l and attende d every session, he did not have othe rwise posit i v e participation as did the defe ndant in Marsha ll. The defe ndant did not fulfill the objective st an d ards of his treatment prog ram by his lack of c andor, la ckada isi c a l a tti tud e , a ndina de qu a te pa rt ic ipatio n. Th e re is s uf

fi c ie nt e vid e nc e in the re c or d to support that the defendant failed t o meet the objec tive standards of the treatment prog ram, whic h was the b a s i s o f t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n

. A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e tr i a l c o u r t d i d n o t ab u s e i t s d i s c r e t ion in revoking the def

endant’ s probation.

CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the for eg oing a uthorities and re asoning , we aff irm the trial court’s revoc ation of the def endant’ s probation and r einstatement of his orig inal sentenc e.

___________________________________ J .C. McL I N, J UDGE