United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 6, 2015 Decided April 17, 2015

No. 14-7014

LOUIS P. CANNON, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:12-cv-00133)

Matthew A. LeFande argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellants.

Richard S. Love, Senior Assistant Attorney General, 

Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, 

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the briefs were 

Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney General, at the time the brief was 

filed, Office of the Attorney General for the District of 

Columbia, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Loren L. 

AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General.

Before: KAVANAUGH, MILLETT, and WILKINS, Circuit 

Judges.
2

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH.

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: Plaintiffs are retired 

officers of D.C.’s Metropolitan Police Department. After 

retiring, they were subsequently re-hired by the D.C.

Protective Services Division, which protects government 

buildings and D.C.-owned property. 

Plaintiffs received pension benefits from their service 

with the Metropolitan Police Department and salaries for their 

jobs with the Protective Services Division. But Section 5-

723(e) of the D.C. Code requires the D.C. Government to 

reduce plaintiffs’ salaries by the amount of their pensions. 

The goal of that statute is to prevent so-called double-dipping

by D.C. government employees who retire and then are rehired back into another D.C. government job.

Pursuant to that statutory provision, D.C. reduced 

plaintiffs’ salaries by the amount of their pensions. In 

response to their salary reduction, plaintiffs sued D.C. under a 

variety of theories. In an earlier round in this Court, we 

considered plaintiffs’ claims under the federal Fair Labor 

Standards Act, the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, 

and the Equal Protection Clause. We ruled in favor of the 

plaintiffs on the Fair Labor Standards Act claim, ruled in 

favor of D.C. on the remaining constitutional claims, and 

remanded for further proceedings. See Cannon v. District of 

Columbia, 717 F.3d 200 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 

Plaintiffs’ victory on the FLSA claim gave them only 

partial relief and did not fully restore their salaries. On 

remand, still seeking to fully restore their salaries, plaintiffs

therefore filed an amended complaint that asserted a new 

federal claim: that D.C.’s salary reduction provision violates 
3

the federal Public Salary Tax Act of 1939. See Pub. L. No. 

76-32, § 4, 53 Stat. 574, 575 (1939) (codified as amended at 4 

U.S.C. § 111(a)). The District Court rejected that argument, 

and so do we.

1

As relevant here, the Public Salary Tax Act allows States 

and D.C. to impose “taxation” on compensation paid to 

employees of the Federal Government, but only so long as the 

taxation does not discriminate against Federal employees as 

compared to state and local government employees, for 

example. 4 U.S.C. § 111(a).

2

 Plaintiffs’ theory here is as 

follows: They say that their pensions from the D.C. 

Metropolitan Police Department are actually federal

compensation (due to the complex interaction of the Federal 

and D.C. Governments in funding those pensions). And they 

say that D.C., by means of this salary reduction provision, is 

in effect taxing plaintiffs’ federal pensions in a discriminatory 

manner in violation of the Public Salary Tax Act.

Plaintiffs’ argument under the Public Salary Tax Act has 

a plethora of potential problems. One initial (and in this case 

dispositive) problem with plaintiffs’ novel theory is that the

 

1

Some of the plaintiffs no longer work with the Protective 

Services Division, but plaintiffs are suing for damages as well as 

forward-looking injunctive relief. 

2 The full text of the relevant provision reads: “The United 

States consents to the taxation of pay or compensation for personal 

service as an officer or employee of the United States, a territory or 

possession or political subdivision thereof, the government of the 

District of Columbia, or an agency or instrumentality of one or 

more of the foregoing, by a duly constituted taxing authority having 

jurisdiction, if the taxation does not discriminate against the officer 

or employee because of the source of the pay or compensation.” 4 

U.S.C. § 111(a).
4

Act applies only to “taxation.” And the D.C. salary reduction

provision at issue here is not “taxation” of plaintiffs’ 

pensions. 

As a general matter, taxes are a “charge,” usually

“monetary, imposed by the government on persons, entities, 

transactions, or property to yield public revenue.” Black’s 

Law Dictionary 1685 (10th ed. 2014). That basic definition is 

longstanding. The edition of Black’s Law Dictionary in effect 

when the Act was passed in 1939 defined “taxation” as an 

exaction imposed by the government “for the purpose of 

providing revenue for the maintenance and expenses of 

government.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1707 (3d ed. 1933). A

contemporaneous edition of Webster’s concurred, defining 

“taxation” as “the raising of revenue by the imposition of 

compulsory contributions; also, a system of so raising 

revenue.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 2587 (2d 

ed. 1934). As far back as McCulloch v. Maryland, the 

Supreme Court has understood the power to tax as the power

“of raising revenue, and applying it to national purposes.” 

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 409 (1819). One of the 

few Supreme Court cases interpreting the Public Salary Tax 

Act similarly indicates that revenue raising is a hallmark of 

“taxation” under the Act. In Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 

U.S. 423 (1999), the Supreme Court concluded that a license 

fee imposed on judges was “revenue-raising” and constituted 

taxation for purposes of the Public Salary Tax Act. Id. at 440-

42. 

Here, D.C.’s salary reduction provision is not a tax. It 

does not raise revenue. Rather, it operates on the opposite 

side of D.C.’s financial ledger. It reduces D.C.’s total 

expenditures on salaries. In particular, it decreases

employees’ salaries by the amount of their pensions from

prior service in the D.C. government. Moreover, the
5

reduction takes effect when the employee’s salary is initially 

computed by the Protective Services Division. The salary 

reduction is thus not collected “through the normal means of 

taxation,” which is yet another indication that this is not 

taxation for purposes of this Act. National Federation of 

Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2596, slip 

op. at 36 (2012). 

The salary reduction statute, in short, is nothing more 

than a way for D.C. to prevent so-called double-dipping and 

thereby reduce its expenditures on employee salaries. It is not 

a tax on plaintiffs’ pensions. We therefore reject plaintiffs’ 

novel Public Salary Tax Act argument.

3

In this second appeal, plaintiffs also renew the due 

process and takings claims that we found unavailing on their 

last trip to this Court. The law of the case doctrine bars us 

from reconsidering those holdings. See PNC Financial 

Services Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of IRS, 503 F.3d 119, 

126 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 

Finally, plaintiffs contend that the District Court erred by 

declining to exercise jurisdiction over their separate D.C. law 

claims. (Plaintiffs’ complaint tacked on several D.C. law 

claims to their numerous federal claims.) Plaintiffs primarily 

argue that D.C. Code § 1-815.02 gives federal courts 

“exclusive jurisdiction” over claims related to the payment of 

their pensions. But the salary reduction provision does not 

affect the amount or payment of plaintiffs’ pensions. It 

affects only the amount of their salaries. See D.C. Code § 5-

723(e) (“the salary of any annuitant . . . shall be reduced by” 

 

3 To be clear, we do not here purport to say what constitutes a 

tax under any other statute. 
6

the amount “of such annuitant’s annuity”) (emphasis added). 

Alternatively, plaintiffs contend that the District Court abused 

its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ D.C. law claims. Federal district 

courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if, 

among other things, “the claim raises a novel or complex

issue of State law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). Plaintiffs’ D.C. 

law claims appear to be novel. Our review of the District 

Court’s declination of supplemental jurisdiction is deferential. 

We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over plaintiffs’ D.C. law claims.

4

 

* * *

We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

So ordered.

 

4 The District Court transferred the remaining D.C. law claims 

to the Superior Court. D.C. did not cross-appeal to argue that those 

claims should have been dismissed rather than transferred. 

Therefore, we do not consider the propriety of the transfer.