15-167 

Maliqi v. Lynch 

BIA 

Loprest, IJ 

A201 105 870

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

14th 4 day of December, two thousand sixteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

8 ROBERT D. SACK, 

9 GERARD E. LYNCH,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 LIRIDON MALIQI, 

14 Petitioner, 

15 

16 v. 15-167 

17 NAC 

18 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

20 Respondent. 

21 _____________________________________ 

22 

23 FOR PETITIONER: Sokol Braha, New York, New York; 

24 Adrian Spirollari, Brooklyn, New 

25 York. 

26 

27 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

28 Assistant Attorney General; Cindy S. 

29 Ferrier, Assistant Director; 

30 Jessica E. Burns, Trial Attorney, 

31 Office of Immigration Litigation, 

32 United States Department of Justice, 

33 Washington, D.C. 
2 

1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

4 DENIED. 

5 Petitioner Liridon Maliqi, a native and citizen of Kosovo, 

6 seeks review of a December 23, 2014, decision of the BIA 

7 affirming a February 11, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge 

8 (“IJ”) denying him asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 

9 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Liridon 

10 Maliqi, No. A201 105 870 (B.I.A. Dec. 23, 2014), aff’g No. A201 

11 105 870 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Feb. 11, 2013). We assume the 

12 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural 

13 history in this case. 

14 We have reviewed the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the 

15 sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

16 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of 

17 review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see 

18 also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). 

19 The agency did not err in finding that Maliqi failed to 

20 establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of 

21 persecution in Kosovo. Maliqi asserted that a family in Kosovo 

22 had threatened his life because they blamed his father for the 
3 

1 Serbian military’s killing of one of their relatives during the 

2 Kosovo war. 

3 A valid past persecution claim can be based on harm other 

4 than threats to life or freedom, including non-life-threatening 

5 violence and physical abuse, Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 

6 226 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006), but the harm must be sufficiently severe, 

7 rising above “mere harassment,” Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of 

8 Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006). In evaluating a past 

9 persecution claim, the agency must consider the harm suffered 

10 in the aggregate. Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 79-80 

11 (2d Cir. 2005). 

12 The agency did not err in finding that Maliqi’s experiences 

13 in Kosovo did not constitute persecution. Maliqi’s claim of 

14 past persecution rested on unfulfilled threats directed at him 

15 and his brothers, and an incident after he left Kosovo, in which 

16 two unidentified men grabbed and threatened his sister in the 

17 family’s home. These incidents, even considered cumulatively, 

18 did not constitute persecution against Maliqi. See Ci Pan v. 

19 U.S. Att’y General, 449 F.3d 408, 412-13 (2d Cir. 2006) 

20 (recognizing that unfulfilled threats do not amount to 

21 persecution); Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 

22 2007) (providing that an asylum applicant cannot establish 

23 persecution based on harm to a family member unless the 
4 

1 applicant was “within the zone of risk when the family member 

2 was harmed, and suffered some continuing hardship after the 

3 incident.”). 

4 Absent past persecution, an alien may establish 

5 eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of 

6 future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2). To establish 

7 a well-founded fear of persecution, an applicant must show that 

8 he subjectively fears persecution and that his fear is 

9 objectively reasonable. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 

10 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). 

11 The agency reasonably determined that Maliqi’s fear of 

12 persecution in Kosovo was not objectively reasonable. Maliqi 

13 and his younger brothers remained unharmed in Kosovo from 2001, 

14 when the family who sought revenge first threatened them, until 

15 the end of 2010, when Maliqi left Kosovo for the United States. 

16 During that time, Maliqi and his brothers lived in the family’s 

17 home, walked to school daily, and otherwise lived openly without 

18 taking any safety precautions other than avoiding the family 

19 who sought revenge against them. As Maliqi was able to avoid 

20 harm for almost a decade without altering his daily life, the 

21 agency did not err in finding that his fear of persecution was 

22 not objectively reasonable. See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 

23 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid 
5 

1 support in the record . . . , [an applicant’s] fear is 

2 speculative at best”). 

3 Maliqi argues that the IJ misconstrued the record when he 

4 found that Maliqi and his brothers were last threatened in 2005 

5 and that the IJ ignored the assault on his sister in finding 

6 that his fear was not objectively reasonable. There is no 

7 indication that the IJ ignored this evidence. The IJ correctly 

8 noted that the last direct threat to Maliqi (as opposed to word 

9 of mouth through his cousin) occurred in 2005. And the IJ 

10 acknowledged the assault on Maliqi’s sister in 2011, during 

11 which two unidentified men accosted her in the family home 

12 before fleeing without harming her when her parents returned 

13 home. The IJ did not err in concluding that, despite this 

14 incident, Maliqi’s ability to live unharmed in Kosovo for six 

15 years after the last direct threat to him was dispositive of 

16 his claim of an objectively reasonable fear of persecution. 

17 See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where 

18 there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 

19 factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly 

20 erroneous.”); see also Melgar de Torres, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d 

21 Cir. 1999). 

22 Alternatively, the IJ reasonably concluded that Maliqi 

23 failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution 
6 

1 because he did not establish that the government of Kosovo was 

2 unable or unwilling to protect him. See Pan v. Holder, 777 F.3d 

3 540, 543 (2d Cir. 2015). Although police were unable to act 

4 on the threats Maliqi’s family reported in the early 2000s, 

5 Maliqi did not demonstrate that the same conditions prevailed 

6 at the time of his hearing in 2012. He did not know whether 

7 his family reported the assault on his sister in 2011, and the 

8 2010 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report on Kosovo stated 

9 that the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo had 

10 deployed police and other resources to assist the government, 

11 the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo investigated civilian 

12 complaints against the police, and domestic and international 

13 human rights groups operated freely in the country. The report 

14 gave no indication that police are unable or unwilling to 

15 protect citizens in circumstances such as Maliqi’s. 

16 Because Maliqi failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear 

17 of persecution, the agency did not err in denying him asylum, 

18 withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three claims 

19 were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 

20 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the Court 

21 need not consider the agency’s alternative determination that 

22 Maliqi failed to demonstrate that the harm he fears is on account 

23 of a protected ground. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 
7 

1 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required 

2 to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary 

3 to the results they reach.”). 

4 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

5 DENIED. Petitioner’s request for oral argument is DENIED in 

6 accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), 

7 and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). 

8 

9 FOR THE COURT: 

10 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk