MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 2 3 ME 28 Docket: Kno

- 22

- 276 S ubmitted

On	B riefs : January	25,	2023 Decided: May	9,	2023 Panel: MEAD, JABAR , HORTON , CONNORS ,	and	LAWRENCE , JJ. PAT	DOE

v. THOMAS LINDAHL
MEAD ,	J. [¶1] Thomas	 Lindahl	appeals from	a	judgment entered	in the	District
Court (Rockland, Raimondi,	J .) grant ing his	wife,	 Pat	Doe, 1 a protection	 from abuse order against	 hi m . Lindahl contends that the	 court’s	 finding	 that	 he abused	Doe	within	the	meaning	of	19

- A	M.R.S.	§	4002(1)(B)	( 2022) 2 is clearly

erroneous. For	the	reasons	noted	below,	we vacate	the	judgment.

1 “ Pursuant	 to	 federal	law,	we	do	not	identify	 the	plaintiff	because	of a protection	 from	abuse order	between	the	parties , and we limit	our	description	of	events	and	locations	to	avoid	revealing	the identity	 or	 location	 of	 the	 party	 protected	 under	 a	 protection	 order	 as	 required	 by	 18	 U.S.C.S. § 2265(d)(3)	(LEXIS	through	Pub.	L.	No.	117

- 214). ” Doe	v.	Hewson ,	2022	ME	60,	¶	1	n.1, 28 8 A.3d 382 ( alterations	and quotation	marks omitted)

. Doe	did	not	file	a	brief	and	did	not	participate	in	the appeal.

2 The	 Legislature	 recodified	 the	 protection	 from	 abuse	 statutes	 effective	 January	 1,	 2023. P.L. 2021,	ch.	697,	§§	A

- 2,	A

- 3	(effective	Jan.	1,	2023)(codified	at	19

- A	M.R.S.	§§	4101

- 4116	(2023) )

. The	 recodification	 is	 not	 relevant	 to	 the	 analysis	 in	 this	 o pinion. “The	 bill	 does	 not	 make	 any substantive	changes	to	existing	law	and	is	intended	solely	as	reorganization	of	the	existing	statutes.” L.D.	1696,	Summary	at	19	(130th	Legis.	2022).2 I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] Doe and Lindahl have	 been married since	 2012

. S hortly	 after Lindahl filed	 for	divorce	in	 January	2022,	Doe	 filed her first	protection	 from abuse	 (PFA)	 complaint	 alleging	 abuse by	 Lindahl .	 	 In the complaint	 filed	 on February	 28,	 2022,	 Doe asserted many	 allegations	 of	 abuse,	 including	 that Lindahl had th reatened	to	“throw	[her]	in	a	woodchipper.” A temporary	order of	protection was	granted the	same	day.		A t	a hearing	held	on	April 6 ,	2022,	the court	 ( Martin, J .) denied the	 complaint	 because	 Doe	 failed	 to	 prove	 her allegations,	stating:	“The	Court	finds	[Doe’s]	testimony	incredible.” [¶ 3 ] On	April 22 ,	2022,	sixteen days after	the	first	PFA	case	was denied , Doe	filed	the	PFA	complaint at	issue	in	this	case .		In	th is second	PFA complaint,
Doe allege d that Lindahl had c o me o nto	 the	 marital	 property that	 morning “freaking	out	.	.	.	demanding	[to	be]	let	in”	and	 that she	had	 to	call	911.		The complaint	also	alleged	that “ [Lindahl] said	he’s	going	to	throw	me	out	back	in

t he	woodchipper , ” without	linking	the	threat	to	a	particular	date.		Attached	to the	 complaint	 was	 a	 statement	 dated	 April 14,	 2022 , that	 Doe	 said	 she	 had submitted	to	the	police. The	statement	asserted	that	Lindahl “ has	threat[en]ed me	many	times that	if	I	leave	him	he	will ‘ ruin	me	and	bury	me, ’ that ‘ I ’ m	going in	 the	wood	 chipper	 out	 back, ’ ‘ put	me	in	 the	 bottom	 of	 his	lobster	 trap, ’ or3

‘ throw	me	in	jail. ’ ” A	temporary	order	of	protection	was	granted	( Martin,	J .)	the same	day , barring Lindahl from	entering	 the	marital	residence	or	going	onto the	 property.	 	On	May	 13, 2022, the	 court	 amended	 the	 temporary	 order	 to allow Lindahl access	 to	 the residence during	 specific	 days	and	 times	 so	 that Lindahl could retrieve	certain	items related to his	commercial	fishing	business. [¶ 4 ] The final	hearing	on	the second complaint	was	held	on	July	12 ,	2022

. Doe	and	her	daughter	both	testified	that	Lindahl	had	made	a	threat	of	violence against	Doe	in	April	2022. Doe	testified	that	a	few	days	before	April	22,	she	and Lindahl	 had	 a “ big	 fight ” during	 which	 he	 threatened	 to	 throw	 her	 into	 a woodchipper ; her	daughter	testified	that, at	some	point	during April 2022,	she heard	Lindahl,	while	he	was	in	the	kitchen	of	the home,	threaten	to	throw	Doe into	 a	 woodchipper	 or	 a	lobster	 trap.	 	 During	 his	 testimony,	 Lindahl	 denied being	in	the	house or speaking	to	Doe	during	April	2022. [¶ 5 ] O n	 July	 22 , 2022, the	 court ( Raimondi,	 J .)	 granted the PFA	 for

one year,	finding that there	was	a	basis	to	Doe’s	complaint “under 19

- A	M.R.S. § 4002	(1)(B) ,	which	defines	abuse	as:	Attempting	to	place	or	placing	another in	 fear	 of	 bodily	injury,	 regardless	 of	intent,	 through	 any	 course	 of	 conduct, including	 threatening,	 harassing	 or	 t ormenting	 behavior.” Concluding	 that Lindahl	 felt	 emboldened	 and	 empowered	 by	 the	 dismissal	 of	 the	 first	 PFA4 complaint,	t he court	noted	what	it	stated was	a	credible threat Lindahl	made	on an	unspecified	date	to	throw	Doe	into	a	woodchipper. In	a clear	reference	to
Doe ’ s	daughter ’ s	testimony,	t he	court	found	that	Doe ’ s	daughter	had	witnessed the	 threat and	 had	 said that she	 would	 hang	 herself	 from	 the	 front	 porch	if anything	happened	to	her	mother

. Although	both	Doe	and	her	daughter	had testified that	 Lindahl	 had	 made	 the	 threat	 during	 April	 2022,	 the	 court expressed uncertainty	as	to	when	the	threat	was	made ,	but commented, “ Even if	the	event	occurred	prior	to	the	dismissal	of	the	first	Complaint	for	Protection from	 Abuse,	 the	 court	 is	 entitled	 to consider	 background	 and	 history	 in assessing	this	current	complaint. ” [¶ 6 ] The	 court	also	 found that, on	May	 13 ,	 2022, Lindahl entered	 the marital residence while	Doe	was	cutting	a	client’s	hair	in	her	salon and	while waving	his	arms	addressed	Doe	in	a	raised	voice	saying,	“I	need	to	get	my	stuff; remember	what	I	said , ” and	left,	slamming	the	door. Lindahl	also	removed	four four

- wheelers	from	the	property,	which	the	court	found	was	done	in	violation of	the	te mporary	order. [¶ 7 ]		The	court ’ s	finding	of	abuse	was	based	on	its	finding	that	Lindahl

“ has	been	engaging	in	threatening,	harassing,	and	tormenting	behavior,	in	an attempt	to	intimidate	or	create	fear	in ” Doe. The	court	did	not	indicate	whether5 its	findi ng	of “ threatening	.	.	.	behavior ” was	based	on	the	woodchipper	threat that	the	court	found Lindahl had	made	on	some	indeterminate	date	before	or after	Doe ’ s	first	PFA	complaint. [¶ 8 ] Lindahl moved	 for	 further	 findings of	 fact and	 conclusions	 of law and	 for reconsideration of	 the	 court’s	 order. See M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 52(b) ; M.R. Civ. P. 59(e)

. The	court	summarily	denied	both	motions

. Lindahl timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION [¶ 9 ] Lindahl	challenges	 the	sufficiency	of	 the evidence	supporting	 the court’s	 finding of	abuse

. “We	review	a	 trial	court’s	 finding	of	abuse	 for	clear error.” Walton	v.	Ireland ,	2014	ME	130,	¶	22 ,	104	A.3d	883

. “Clear	error	exists and	requires	reversal	of	a	finding	if	(1)	there	is	no	competent	evidence	in	the record	to	support	it,	or	(2)	it	is	based	on	a	clear	misapprehension	by	the	trial court	of	the	meaning	of	the	evidence,	or	(3)	the	force	and	effect	of	the evidence, taken	as	a	total	entity,	rationally	persuades	to	a	certainty	that	the	finding	is	so against	 the	 great	 preponderance	 of	 the	 believable	 evidence	 that	 it	 does	 not represent	the	truth	and	right	of	the	case.” Remick	v.	Martin ,	2014	ME	120,	¶	7,
103	A .3d	552	(quotation	marks	omitted).6 [¶1 0 ] “When	a	party’s	motion	for	further	findings,	M.R.	Civ.	P.	52(b),	has been	 denied, we cannot	 infer	 findings	 from	 the	 evidence	 in	 the	 record.” Sulikowski	v.	Sulikowski ,	2019	ME	143,	¶	11,	216	A.3d	893. “Instead,	th e	court’s judgment	 must	 be	 supported	 by	 express	 factual	 findings	 that	 are	 based	 on record	evidence,	are	sufficient	to	support	the	result,	and	are	sufficient	to	inform the	parties	and	any	reviewing	court	of	the	basis	for	the	decision.” Klein	v.	Klein , 2019 ME	 85,	 ¶	 6, 208	 A.3d	 802 (alterations	 and	 quotation	 marks	 omitted)

. Because	Lindahl’s	motion	for	further	findings	was	denied,	we	limit	our	review to	the	express	findings	contained	in	the	court’s	findings	and	conclusions issued in	conjunction	with	the	PFA order

. A
. The	Woodchipper	Statement [¶1 1 ] Doe	testified	that	it was the incident	on	April	22 , 2022, along	with the	woodchipper	threat	that she	testified Lindahl	had	made	a	few	days	before April	22, that	precipitated	her	filing	of	the	second	PFA	complaint. The	April	22 incident involv ed Lindahl	entering	onto	the	property	in	an	angry	state , waving his	arms , and	demanding	to	be	let	into	the	garage. She	 testified	 that	Lindahl addressed her in	a	raised	voice	saying,	“I	need	to	get	my	stuff;	remember	what I	said, ” and	left,	slamming	the	door

. Doe	believed

— incorrectly

— that	Lindahl was	prohibited	from	being	on	the property that	day

.7 [¶ 12 ] Although Doe	 a sserted	 in	 her	 April	 22 c omplaint	 for PFA that Lindahl said “.	 .	 . he’s	 going	 to	 throw	me	 out	 back	in	 the	 woodchipper, ” her testimony	at	trial clarified that	his actual words on	April	22 were,	“Remember what	 I	 said,”	 which	 she understood	 to refer	 to	 prior	 statements that she attributed	to	him	regarding	the	woodchipper

. [¶1 3 ] The	court	erroneously	identifie d Lindahl’s entry	into	the	home as happening on	May	 13 ,	 2022

— a	 date occurring after the	 temporary	 order	 of protection on	 the	 second	 PFA	 complaint was	 entered

— and therefore	 found that Lindahl had	entered the	residence	in	violation	of that order. Th e	record does	not	contain	any	evidence suggesting that the	events	of April	22	occurred while	a protecti on order	was	in effect

. [¶1 4 ] The	court heard	Doe’s testimony and	Doe ’ s	daughter ’ s	testimony regarding Lindahl ’ s	 alleged	 statement sometime	 during	 April	 2022 that he would	 “throw	 [Doe]	in	 a	 woodchipper , ” but	 did	 not	ma ke any	 finding	 about when	the	statement	was	made , and	left	open	the	possibility	that	it	was	made before	Doe	 filed	the	 first	PFA	complaint. The issu e	o f	whether Lindahl	made such	a statement was	part and	parcel of	the first	PFA,	which	was denied by that

court upon	 a	 finding	 that	 Doe	 was	 not	 credible .	 	 The	 court	 here	 did	 not determine whether	the threat	described	in	its	findings	was	made before	or after8 the	dismissal	of	the	first	PFA	complaint. Only	if	the threat that	the court	found Lindahl	had	made	was	not	the	same	threat	as	the	threat	alleged	in	Doe ’ s	first PFA	complaint could	that	finding	support	the	court ’ s	finding	of	abuse. [¶1 5 ] Based	on that	uncertainty	in	the	court ’ s	findings, Lindahl invokes the	doctrine	of	issue	preclusion	and asserts	that	the	court’s	consideration	of	a statement	attributed	to	him	and	litigated	in	the	first	PFA	action	(and	apparently rejected	by	the	court	in	that	actio n)	constituted	error. See Fiduciary	Tr.	Co.	v. Wheeler ,	2016	ME	26,	¶	10,	132	A.3d	1178	(quotation	marks	omitted)	(“Issue preclusion	.	.	.	prevents	the	relitigation	of	factual	issues	already	decided	if	the identical	 issue	 was	 determined	 by	 a	 prior	 final	 j udgment,	 and	 .	 .	 .	 the	 party estopped	 had	a	 fair	 opportunity	and	incentive to	litigate	 the	issue	in	a	 prior proceeding.”). We	do	not	agree. [¶1 6 ] Although	the	court ’ s	limited	findings	regarding	the	threat	left	open the	possibility	that	it	had occurred	before	Doe ’ s	first	PFA	complaint,	the court ’ s specific findings	that	both	Doe	and	her	daughter	had	heard	the	threat,	and that the	 daughter had said that she	 would hang	 herself from	 the	 front	 porch if anything	happened	to	her	mother,	leave	no	doubt that	the	 findings	refer	to	a threat	 that	Doe	and	 her	 daughter	 both	 testified	 Lindahl	made	at	 some	 point during	Apri l 20 22.		Accordingly,	contrary	to	Lindahl ’ s	argument, the	evidence9 was	sufficient	to	allow	the	court	to consider a	“woodchipper” threat occu rring during	 the	month	 of	April	after	 the	 dismissal	 of	 the	 previous	 PFA	 complaint along	with	other	evidence 3 for	purposes	of its analysis	and finding	that Lindahl had	committed	abuse	by	engaging	in	threatening	behavior toward	Doe

. B
. Existence	of	Protective	Order	on	April	22 [¶1 7 ] The	court	erroneously	identified Lindahl ’ s	entry	to	the	home on April 22 as	having	occurred on May	13

— a	date	occurring after the	temporary order	of protection	on	the	second	PFA	complaint	was	entered. 4 The	record	does not	 contain	 any	 evidence suggesting that	 the	 events described	 by	 Doe	 as occurring	on April 22	occurred	while	a	protection	order	was	in	eff ect. Because the	court’s	assumption	that	th ose events	occurred	while	a	protection	order	was in	effect	loomed large 5 in	its conclusion that an	act	of	abuse	occurred, 6 we	must vacate	and	remand	for	reconsideration	by	the	trial	court

.

3 See Sections	B	and	C	below.

4 The	 court’s	 conflation	 of	 the	 two dates	 is	 understandable	 given	 the trial testimony	 that fluctuated	between	the	events	of	those	days.

5 The	court	characterized	Lindahl’s	violation	of	the	order	as	being	“blatant.”

6 The	court’s	findings	do	not	indicate	whether	Lindahl’s	other	acts	(the	woodchipper	statement and	the	removal	of	the	three	four

- wheelers)	in	the	absence	of	a	violation	of	a	p rotection	order	were sufficient	in	its	view	to	constitute	abuse	as	defined	in	19

- A	M.R.S.	§	4002(1)(B). Further,	t he	court expressed	 some	 concern	 in	 its	 decision	 over	 whether	 Doe	 had	 actually	 been	 placed	 in	 fear	 by Lindahl’s	actions.10 C
. Removal	of	the	Four
- Wheeler	Vehicles on	May	13 [¶1 8 ] On	May	13, 2022, Lindahl	arrived	at	the	premises	for	the	purposes of	 removing	 items	 related	 to	 his	 fishing	 occupation	 as	 allowed	 by the amendment	to	the	temporary	order. He	removed	four	all

- terrain	vehicles	from the	premises. Although	a	single	four

- wheeler	may	have	arguably	been	part	of his	fishing	business,	the	rema in ing	three	were	not,	and	he	does	not	challenge that conclusion. Accordingly, as	the	court	correctly	found, his removal	of	three of	the	vehicles	constituted	a	violation	of	the amended temporary	PFA	order.
III. CONCLUSION [¶1 9 ] B ecause	 the	 court’s	 finding of	 abuse	 relied	 upon	 an erroneous assumption	that	the	events	that	Doe	described	as	happening	on	April 22 ,	2022, occurred	 on	May 1 3 ,	 2022 in	 violation	 of	a n	amended	 temporary protection order,	we	vacate	and	remand	for	clarification	of	whether	the	court	concludes that	those	events,	which	occ urred	at	a	time	when	no	protection	order	was	in effect, when	considered	independently	or	in	conjunction	with	Lindahl’s	other
acts, constituted	abuse	pursuant	to 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	4002(1)(B )

. The	entry	is: Judgment	vacated.		Remanded	for	further proceedings	consistent	with	this	opinion.11 Laura	 P.	 Shaw,	 Esq.,	 Dirigo	 Law	 Group	 LLP,	 Camden,	 for	 appellant	 Thomas Lindahl Appellee Pat	Doe	did	not	file a brief

Rockland	District	Court	docket	number	PA

- 2022

- 50 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY