PRESENT: Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, McClanahan, and 

Powell, JJ., and Koontz, S.J. 

IN RE: ROBERT FLOYD BROWN, JR. 

 OPINION BY 

Record No. 141130 CHIEF JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 

 April 16, 2015 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE GEORGE COUNTY 

Nathan C. Lee, Judge 

 In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court abused 

its discretion in denying an application for a name change 

filed under Code § 8.01-217 by Robert Floyd Brown, Jr. 

("Brown"). While Brown's appeal to this Court was pending, the 

Court granted an appeal in a similar case from a decision of 

the same trial judge. That case was styled: In Re: Steven Roy 

Arnold (Rec. No. 131447). Pro bono counsel accepted 

appointment to represent Arnold and the Attorney General filed 

an amicus brief in support of Arnold. Oral argument in 

Arnold's case was heard on January 5, 2015. Brown's appeal was 

originally considered together with Arnold's appeal. However, 

the day before the Court was to render its opinion in Arnold's 

case as a combined opinion with Brown's appeal, the Court was 

notified that Arnold had committed suicide while incarcerated 

in federal prison. Arnold's appeal has been rendered moot. 

Brown's appeal remains to be decided, which we do in this 

opinion. 
2

I. Facts and Proceedings 

 On February 8, 2013, Brown filed an application in the 

Circuit Court of Prince George County ("trial court") to change 

her1 name to Alicia Jade Brown. Brown has been diagnosed with 

Gender Identity Disorder ("GID") and is transitioning from the 

male gender to the female gender. Brown is an inmate in a 

federal prison located in Petersburg. Attached to Brown's 

application was a medical record from the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons confirming her diagnosis of GID. The trial court 

refused to grant the application, finding no good cause 

existed. Brown appealed to this Court, and we granted her 

petition for appeal. 

 We issued an order on December 12, 2013, holding that 

there was error in the trial court's order denying Brown's 

application. We reversed the judgment of the trial court and 

remanded the case to the trial court with direction to enter 

judgment in accordance with our holding in Stephens v. 

Commonwealth, 274 Va. 157, 645 S.E.2d 276 (2007). Despite the 

direction from this Court, the trial court issued an order on 

March 26, 2014, in which the trial court again declined to 

accept Brown's application, finding that good cause did not 

exist because Brown's "stated reasons for the name change do 

 1

 Brown refers to herself using the feminine pronoun. This 

opinion will therefore also adopt usage of the feminine pronoun 

when referring to Brown. 
3

not outweigh the potential negative impact on the community. 

Given that the name change reflects a shift in gender identity 

of a federal prisoner, the court declines to accept the 

application pursuant to Section 8.01-217(A)." Brown appeals 

that decision to this Court. Brown's assignment of error to 

this Court states: 

1. For the second time, upon remand from this Court, the 

circuit court erred in denying the application for a 

change of name where appellant provided ample evidence of 

"good cause" for the application, and the record contained 

no evidence of fraudulent purpose within the meaning of 

Virginia Code § 8.01-217. 

II. Analysis 

A. Standard of Review 

 We apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a 

trial court's denial of an application for name change. See

Stephens, 274 Va. at 162, 645 S.E.2d at 278; In re Strikwerda, 

216 Va. 470, 473, 220 S.E.2d 245, 247 (1975). We review issues 

of statutory interpretation de novo. Warrington v. 

Commonwealth, 280 Va. 365, 370, 699 S.E.2d 233, 235 (2010). 

B. Code § 8.01-217 

 Code § 8.01-217 governs how the name of a person may be 

changed. The General Assembly amended this statute in 2014, 

and the amendments went into effect on July 1, 2014. See 2014 

Acts ch. 232; Code § 1-214(A). Brown submitted an application 

for change of name in 2013, and the trial court denied the 
4

application for lack of good cause in 2013, before the 

amendments went into effect. However, because the trial court 

never accepted Brown's application on the merits, the question 

arises regarding which version of Code § 8.01-217 should govern 

Brown's application. 

Code § 1-239 states: 

No new act of the General Assembly shall be 

construed to repeal a former law, as to any 

offense committed against the former law, 

or as to any act done, any penalty, 

forfeiture, or punishment incurred, or any 

right accrued, or claim arising under the 

former law, or in any way whatever to 

affect any such offense or act so committed 

or done, or any penalty, forfeiture, or 

punishment so incurred, or any right 

accrued, or claim arising before the new 

act of the General Assembly takes effect; 

except that the proceedings thereafter held 

shall conform, so far as practicable, to 

the laws in force at the time of such 

proceedings; and if any penalty, 

forfeiture, or punishment be mitigated by 

any provision of the new act of the General 

Assembly, such provision may, with the 

consent of the party affected, be applied 

to any judgment pronounced after the new 

act of the General Assembly takes effect. 

We have held that Code § 1-239 applies to accrued rights 

categorized as "substantive" or "vested." City of Norfolk v. 

Kohler, 234 Va. 341, 345, 362 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1987). 

"'[S]ubstantive' rights, as well as 'vested' rights, are 

included within those interests protected from retroactive 

application of statutes." Shiflet v. Eller, 228 Va. 115, 120, 
5

319 S.E.2d 750, 753 (1984). "Substantive rights, which are not 

necessarily synonymous with vested rights, are included within 

that part of the law dealing with creation of duties, rights, 

and obligations, as opposed to procedural or remedial law, 

which prescribes methods of obtaining redress or enforcement of 

rights." Id. at 120, 319 S.E.2d at 754. 

Under the version of Code § 8.01-217 that was in effect in 

2013, applications for name changes from probationers and 

incarcerated persons could only be accepted if the trial court 

found that good cause existed for such an application. Former 

Code § 8.01-217(A)(Repl. Vol. 2007)(stating that 

"[a]pplications of probationers and incarcerated persons may be 

accepted if the court finds that good cause exists for such 

application"). However, once a trial court made a 

determination that good cause existed for the application, the 

trial court was required to order the requested change of name 

"unless the evidence show[ed] that the change of name [wa]s 

sought for a fraudulent purpose or would otherwise infringe 

upon the rights of others." Former Code § 8.01-217(C)(Repl. 

Vol. 2007). 

The amended version of Code § 8.01-217, effective July 1, 

2014, still requires a trial court to make an initial 

determination whether good cause exists before accepting an 

application for a name change from an incarcerated person. 
6

Code § 8.01-217(D). An applicant must still demonstrate that 

the change of name is not sought for a fraudulent purpose and 

that it would not otherwise infringe upon the rights of others. 

However, under the amended version of the statute, now an 

applicant must also demonstrate that the change of name "would 

not frustrate a legitimate law-enforcement purpose." Id. 

We hold that requiring an applicant to prove a new 

element, that the name change "would not frustrate a legitimate 

law-enforcement purpose," is a substantive change to the 

statute. This additional burden of proof affects the duties, 

rights, and obligations of a petitioner seeking a name change 

who has already established that good cause exists for the name 

change. Therefore, retroactive application of the amended 

statute is not permitted. Accordingly, Brown's appeal and 

application must be decided under the version of Code § 8.01-

217 that was in effect in 2013.2

 Code § 8.01-217(A) does not define what constitutes good 

cause for an application for a name change. However, Code § 

32.1-269(E) permits a person whose sex has been changed by 

medical procedure to request that the State Registrar amend 

such person's birth certificate to show a change of sex and 

change of name. Code § 32.1-269(E) demonstrates a recognition 

 2

 Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent references to Code 

§ 8.01-217 in this opinion refer to the version of that statute 

in effect prior to July 1, 2014. 
7

by the General Assembly that being transgender and undergoing a 

gender and sex change is a valid basis for changing one's name 

and amending a person's vital records. Accordingly, the fact 

that an applicant is transgender and is changing their name to 

reflect a change in their gender identity cannot be the sole 

basis for a finding by a trial court that such an application 

is frivolous and lacks good cause. 

 We have already reversed the trial court's finding of no 

good cause as to Brown's application on one occasion. Despite 

our reversal and direction to the trial court to enter judgment 

in accordance with our holding in Stephens, the trial court 

again held that good cause did not exist and refused to accept 

the application. The trial court found that "the petitioner's 

stated reasons for the name change do not outweigh the 

potential negative impact on the community. Given that the 

name change reflects a shift in the gender identity of a 

federal prisoner, the court declines to accept the application 

pursuant to Section 8.01-217(A)." 

 As discussed above, by enacting Code § 32.1-269(E), the 

General Assembly has already recognized that a shift in a 

person's gender is a valid reason to change one's name and to 

amend that person's vital records. There is nothing in the 

record to indicate that Brown's name change was sought with 
8

frivolous intentions, and the trial court abused its discretion 

in holding good cause did not exist. 

 There is also no evidence in this record that would 

support the trial court's holding that this name change would 

have any negative impact on the community. The fact that Brown 

is a federal prisoner is also not a reason to deny the name 

change application under Code § 8.01-217(C). The statute makes 

clear that once good cause has been established, the only thing 

left for the trial court to consider is whether the evidence 

shows that the name change is sought for a fraudulent purpose 

or would otherwise infringe upon the rights of others. As 

there is no evidence in the record of a fraudulent purpose or 

that this name change would infringe upon the rights of others, 

the trial court was required to order the change of name. 

III. Conclusion 

 For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgment of 

the trial court and direct the trial court to order the change 

of name as requested in Brown's application. 

Reversed and remanded. 

JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, dissenting. 

 In my view, the Court's judgment directing the trial court 

to order the change of name requested in Brown's application 
9

cannot be reconciled with our decision in Stephens v. 

Commonwealth, 274 Va. 157, 645 S.E.2d 276 (2007). 

 In Stephens, this Court ruled that the trial court abused 

its discretion in refusing to accept the application for a name 

change by an incarcerated person because the trial court's 

finding of lack of good cause for the application was not 

supported by the evidence in the record. Since we found there 

was no basis for the denial of the application for lack of good 

cause and the trial court did not consider the application 

under former Code § 8.01-217(C), we remanded the case for 

further proceedings in accordance with the requirements of that 

statute. Id. at 162-63, 645 S.E.2d at 278 (trial court's 

denial was an abuse of discretion "requiring reversal and 

remand" for the court to "resume its review and consideration 

of the petition in accord with the requirements of Code § 8.01-

217(C)"). 

Our holding in Stephens dictates the same disposition of 

this appeal. As in Stephens, the majority holds that the trial 

court abused its discretion in refusing to accept Brown's 

application, concluding the trial court's finding of lack of 

good cause for the application was not supported by the 

evidence in the record. Although the trial court did not 

consider the application under former Code § 8.01-217(C), the 

majority directs the trial court to order the change of name as 
10

requested in the application.1 Pursuant to our decision in 

Stephens, this case should be remanded to the trial court with 

directions that the trial court resume its review and 

consideration of the application. 

Additionally, such review and consideration by the trial 

court should be governed by the version of Code § 8.01-217 now 

in effect. Pursuant to Code § 8.01-1, "all provisions of 

[Title 8.01] shall apply to causes of action which arose prior 

to the effective date of any such provisions." This general 

rule applies unless such a provision "may materially change the 

substantive rights of a party (as distinguished from the 

procedural aspects of the remedy)." Code § 8.01-1.2 Likewise, 

Code § 1-239 provides that proceedings held after a new act of 

the General Assembly takes effect "shall conform, so far as 

practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such 

proceedings." Therefore, "procedural provisions of the statute 

 1

 In Stephens, the Court refused to grant the very relief 

that it grants here. Stephens asserted that because the record 

contained no evidence that his change of name was sought for a 

fraudulent purpose or would infringe on the rights of others as 

specified in former Code § 8.01-217(C), the proper disposition 

of his appeal was a remand directing the trial court to grant 

his petition. Stephens, 274 Va. at 161, 645 S.E.2d at 277-78. 

Since the trial court had not considered the application under 

Code § 8.01-217(C), however, the Court rejected Stephens' 

position and directed the trial court to resume its review. Id. 

at 162-63, 645 S.E.2d at 278. 

2

 The general rule also does not apply if such provision 

"may cause the miscarriage of justice." Code § 8.01-1. 
11

in effect on the date of trial control the conduct of trial 

insofar as practicable." Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 

476, 248 S.E.2d 135, 148 (1978) (applying predecessor statute, 

former Code § 1-16). The revisions made to Code § 8.01-217 in 

2014, see 2014 Acts ch. 232, do not affect any substantive 

rights of Brown but set forth the procedure to be undertaken by 

the trial court in considering Brown's application.3 See Harris 

v. Dimattina, 250 Va. 306, 312, 462 S.E.2d 338, 340 (1995) 

(statutory provisions that control only the method of obtaining 

redress or enforcement of rights are procedural in nature).4 

Procedural remedies "may be altered, curtailed, or repealed at 

 3

 The procedure for applications filed by persons who 

are incarcerated is now contained in Code § 8.01-217(D). 

Under that section, if a court accepts the application of 

an incarcerated person upon finding good cause, it shall 

mail or deliver a copy of the application to the attorney 

for the Commonwealth for the jurisdiction where the 

application was filed and the attorney for the 

Commonwealth for any jurisdiction in the Commonwealth 

where a conviction occurred that resulted in the 

applicant's probation, registration with the Sex Offender 

and Crimes Against Minors Registry pursuant to Chapter 9 

(Code § 9.1-900 et seq.) of Title 9.1, or incarceration. 

The attorney for the Commonwealth where the application 

was filed is entitled to respond and represent the 

interests of the Commonwealth at the hearing conducted by 

the trial court to consider the application. 

4

 Although the statute now requires the court to determine 

that an incarcerated person's change of name "would not 

frustrate a legitimate law-enforcement purpose" when 

considering the application, evidentiary burdens are matters of 

procedure. Wyatt v. Virginia Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 11 Va. App. 

225, 229, 397 S.E.2d 412, 414 (1990) (statutory burdens of 

proof are procedural provisions that do not affect substantive 

rights). 
12

the will of the legislature." Morency v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 

569, 576, 649 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2007) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). Thus, the current version of Code § 

8.01-217 would govern the proceedings upon remand. 

For these reasons, I dissent from the Court's judgment.