alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2012326EN.01004701.xml

| 26.10.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 326/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 326/1

---

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

PART ONE

PRINCIPLES

PRINCIPLES

TITLE II

PROVISIONS HAVING GENERAL APPLICATION

PROVISIONS HAVING GENERAL APPLICATION

Article 13

In formulating and implementing the Union's agriculture, fisheries, transport, internal market, research and technological development and space policies, the Union and the Member States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the Member States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM BOTH
THE DECEMBER 31, 1996 BALANCE SHEET AND STATEMENT OF INCOME AND EXPENSES
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000017294
<NAME> CAPITAL RESOURCES REAL ESTATE PARTNERSHIP II
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                         996,979
<DEPRECIATION>                                 404,574
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 721,463
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<BONDS>                                      1,317,678
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   (957,656)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   721,463
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               419,977
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               445,357
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             108,254
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<NET-INCOME>                                 (108,688)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (20.63)
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</TABLE>
FILE COPY

SHARON KELLER

PRESIDING JUDGE

LAWRENCE E. MEYERS

CHERYL JOHNSON

MIKE KEASLER

BARBARA P. HERVEY

ELSA ALCALA

BERT RICHARDSON

KEVIN P. YE.ARY

DAVID NEWELL

JUDGES

Court of Criminal Appeals ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK

(SI2)4*3-KWfP0- B°*Ti23^!r°^ATI0P!LED IN COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711

District Attorney Anderson County

Doug Lowe

500 North Church Street

Palestine, TX 75801

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

Re: PRIDGEN, ROBERT LYNN

CCA No. PD-0186-15

Trial Court Case No. 29956

April 14,2015

.. ~l f* _i J •> SIAN SCHILHAB 12th COUrt C? "generalcounsei (512)463-1597

AFK 1 5 2015

TYLER TEXAS

CATHY S. L'JSK, CLERK

James Wesley Volberding

100 East Ferguson, Suite 500

Tyler, TX 75702-7370

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

COANo. 12-13-00136-CR

Dear District Attorney Anderson County:

This letter is to serve notice, pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.10(c), that

the Court has identified sensitive data or items that have been determined should be sealed in the

above referenced case. The items are listed in the Court's order which is enclosed herewith.

order.

Comments or objections to the Court's order are due within 10 days of the date of the

Sincerely,

Abel Acosta, Clerk

cc: 12th Court Of Appeals Clerk (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL)

Supreme Court Building, 201 West 14th Street, Room 106, Austin, Texas 78701

w ebs1te www.txcourts.oov/cca.aspx
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

Per curiam.

NO. PD-0186-15

FILED IN COURT OF APPEALS

12th Court of Appeals District

ROBERT LYNN PRIDGEN, Appellant

CAT

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ORDER PURSUANT TO TEXAS RULES OF

APPELLATE PROCEDURE RULE 9.10

ORDER

This cause is before this Court on petition for discretionary review from court of

appeals case number 12-13-00136-CR, trial court case number 29956 in the 3rd District

Court of Anderson County.

The Clerk of this Court has discovered sensitive data in the record, namely:

sexually explicit photographs. TEX. R. APP. P. Rule 9.10(a). Pursuant to Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 9.10, the Clerk sought a ruling from the Court and thereafter notified

the parties. The Court now orders the Clerk of this Court to seal the discovered sensitive
Rule 9.10 Order-2

data from the records identified and listed below. The Court further orders the trial court

clerk, the clerk of the court of appeals, or any entity or individual possessing the

following documents to redact or seal the documents pursuant to this order:

1. Appellant's Petition for Discretionary Review

2. Appellant's Amended Petition for Discretionary Review

Filed: April 14,2015

Do not publish
Printed on 100% recycled/recyclable paper with 100% post-consumer fiber and process chlorine free.

Customer Service Hotline: 1-800-438-2474

7/22/14

The Honorable Randy C. Huffman, Secretary

Executive Office

West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection

601 57th Street, SE

Charleston, West Virginia 25304

Dear Secretary Huffman:

On July 2, 2014, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) received a revision to the 

West Virginia State Implementation Plan (SIP) from the West Virginia Department of Environmental 

Protection (WVDEP). The SIP revision pertains to amendments to West Virginia’s Legislative Rule 

45CSR8 – Ambient Air Quality Standards. Revisions to the rule provide for a change in the effective 

date for the incorporation by reference of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards and the associated 

ambient air monitoring reference methods and equivalent methods as promulgated by EPA in 40 CFR 

50 and 40 CFR 53, respectively. EPA has determined that the submittal is administratively and 

technically complete, and is reviewing it to prepare a Direct Final Rulemaking (DFR) action.

If members of your staff have any questions, they may direct them to Ms. Ellen Schmitt, Office 

of Air Program Planning, at (215) 814-5787, or schmitt.ellen@epa.gov. She is the principal contact for 

this rulemaking. 

Sincerely, 

/s/

Diana Esher, Director

Air Protection Division 

cc: William F. Durham, Director

 Division of Air Quality, WVDEP
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Calvin Morrison, Appellant.

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Counsel’s application to withdraw granted *(see, People v Crawford,*71 AD2d 38). (Appeal from Judgment of Monroe County Court, Connell, J.—Robbery, 2nd Degree.) Present— Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Lawton, Lowery and Davis, JJ.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-77,627-02

IN RE ETHAN WAYNE HORTON, Relator

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

CAUSE NO. 1087158-B IN THE 179TH DISTRICT COURT

FROM HARRIS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Relator has filed a motion for leave to file a writ of mandamus pursuant to the original

jurisdiction of this Court. In it, he contends that he filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus

in the 179th District Court of Harris County, that more than 35 days have elapsed, and that the

application has not yet been forwarded to this Court.

In these circumstances, additional facts are needed. Respondent, the District Clerk of Harris

County, is ordered to file a response, which may be made by submitting the record on such habeas

corpus application, submitting a copy of a timely filed order which designates issues to be

investigated (see McCree v. Hampton, 824 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)), or stating that
-2-

Relator has not filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in Harris County. Should the response

include an order designating issues, proof of the date the district attorney’s office was served with

the habeas application shall also be submitted with the response. This application for leave to file

a writ of mandamus shall be held in abeyance until Respondent has submitted the appropriate

response. Such response shall be submitted within 30 days of the date of this order.

Filed: April 8, 2015

Do not publish
## COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 14

- 00304

- CR

MICHAEL A. SMITH APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM THE 371ST DISTR ICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY TRIAL COURT NO. 0788 049R

----------


### MEMORANDUM OPIN ION 1

---------- Appellant Michael A. Smith appeals from the trial court’s order denying his

motion for judgment nunc pro tunc. In August 2014 , we informed Appellant by

letter of our concern that we do not have jurisdiction over his appeal because the

orde r denying his motion does not appear to be an appealable order, and we

stated that his appeal could be dismissed unless he or any party filed a response

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2 showing grounds for continuing the appeal. While Appellant sent us a nother

motion for judgment nunc pr o tunc apparently intended for the trial court, he did

not file anything responsive to our letter.

Because an order denying a motion for judgment nunc pro tunc is not

appealable, 2 we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. 3

PER CURIAM

PANEL: DAUPH INOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: October 2, 2014

2 See Ex parte Ybarra , 149 S.W.3d 147, 148

– 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (providing that appropriate remedy for denial of motion for j udgment nunc pro tunc is to file petition for writ of mandamus in court of appeals); Everett v. State

, 82 S.W.3d 735, 735 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2002, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.)

.

3 See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).
#### Interglobal Realty Corp. et al., Appellants, v American Standard Inc., Respondent.

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Harold Tompkins, J.), entered June 15, 1990, which, *inter alia,*granted the motion by defendant American Standard Inc. for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs. The appeal from the order of the same court and same Justice, entered on or about October 2, 1990, denying reargument, is dismissed as non-appealable, without costs.

Plaintiffs, licensed New York real estate brokers, neither of which is licensed to act as a broker in New Jersey, seek to collect a commission allegedly earned with respect to brokerage services rendered, in part, in the State of New Jersey, in procuring a potential buyer for an office building condominium owned by defendant American Standard Inc., in Piscataway, New Jersey.

Upon examination of the record, we find, as did the IAS Court, that plaintiffs’ complaint was properly dismissed inasmuch as under New Jersey’s licensing statute (NJ Stat Annot §§ 45:15-1, 45:15-3), brokers unlicensed in the State of New Jersey may not recover a commission on a transaction any part of which occurred in that State. *(Tanenbaum, v Sylvan Bldrs.,*29 NJ 63, 148 A2d 176.)

New Jersey’s licensing provisions are triggered when a real estate broker performs a single act within New Jersey in connection with the rendering of brokerage services. *(Tanenbaum v Sylvan Bldrs.,*148 A2d, *supra,*at 181.) We find that the New Jersey licensing statute, prohibiting commission suits by unlicensed brokers, therefore clearly applied to the underlying transaction since it is undisputed that plaintiff Berman escorted a potential buyer on an inspection tour of the New Jersey property.

Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions, New Jersey Statutes Annotated § 45:15-3.1 does not authorize a broker licensed in a foreign jurisdiction, but unlicensed in New Jersey, to maintain an action for a commission against the broker’s customer if the broker has engaged a licensed New Jersey broker. Rather, by its own clear language, the statute only authorizes out-of-State brokers to accept a referral commission from New Jersey brokers and to enter into enforceable fee-splitting agreements. The only legal action authorized by that statute is an action by the licensed out-of-State broker against the New Jersey broker.

*437Finally, plaintiffs may not circumvent the New Jersey licensing statute by merely filing suit in another jurisdiction, such as New York, since "[t]he bar of the [New] Jersey statute requiring licensed actors in land brokerage transactions does not merely serve to 'close the doors’ of the [New] Jersey courts (so that a suit in a separate jurisdiction such as New York could be maintained); rather it operates to extinguish the commission claim of the unlicensed plaintiff so that he cannot pursue his action anywhere” *(Collins Tuttle & Co. v Colgate-Palmolive Co.,*114 Misc 2d 728, 729).

We have reviewed the plaintiffs’ remaining contentions, and find them to be without merit. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Carro, Rosenberger, Asch and Kassal, JJ.
#### Ivory C. SLATER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 20327.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 19, 1963.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 27, 1963.

King C. Haynie, Houston, Tex., for appellant.

Morton L. Susman, Asst. U. S. Atty., Woodrow Seals, U. S. Atty., Houston, Tex., for appellee.

Before HUTCHESON and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and SIMPSON, District J udge.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a conviction for offering a bribe to a juror in violation of Title 18, See. 206. It is quite clear, we think, that there is nothing of substance in the appeal.

The first and second specifications of error are that the court erred in not directing a verdict on the ground that the evidence was insufficient. A reading of the record shows that there is absolutely no substance in this point. There was direct and positive evidence to support the conviction, indeed it was overwhelming. The third and fourth specifications undertake to charge plain error, — the third that “It was plain error for counsel for the government, while cross-examining appellant, to accuse him of getting some people to commit a crime, where there was no evidence to support it”; the fourth that “It was plain error for counsel for the government, in his argument to the jury, to give unsworn testimony bolstering and sustaining the witnesses for the government by telling the jury that he vouched for the testimony of said witnesses”.

 Of the first and second specification of error, it is sufficient to say that the proof of guilt was overwhelming and that the court did not err in denying defendant’s motions; while of the third *495and fourth, it is enough to say that the defendant’s counsel made no motion for mistrial or objection of any kind below, choosing not to call any attention to the matter but rather to take his chances on the verdict and rely on the claims of error as an ace in the hole, and that the action complained of, if error at all, which we think it was not, was not plain error and was waived by the defendant when he did not object to it. In effect, what the appellant is trying to do is to get his case tried over on grounds which are frivolous. The judgment must, therefore, be affirmed.
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1333 

To amend the Mineral Leasing Act to create a buffer in between oil and 

gas drilling operations and homes, businesses, schools, and other buildings that require special protection, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 25, 2019 

Ms. BARRAGA ́N introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To amend the Mineral Leasing Act to create a buffer in 

between oil and gas drilling operations and homes, businesses, schools, and other buildings that require special 

protection, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘No Drilling in Our 

5 Backyards Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•HR 1333 IH

1 SEC. 2. BUFFER FROM OIL AND GAS DRILLING OPER2 ATIONS. 

3 The Mineral Leasing Act (30 U.S.C. 181 et seq.) is 

4 amended by— 

5 (1) redesignating section 44 as section 45; and 

6 (2) inserting after section 44 the following: 

7 ‘‘SEC. 45. BUFFER FROM OIL AND GAS DRILLING OPER8 ATIONS. 

9 ‘‘The Secretary of the Interior may not issue a permit 

10 for any oil and gas drilling operation that is located within 

11 1,500 feet from a home, business, school, or other building 

12 that requires special protection, as determined by the Sec13 retary.’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
CAUSE NUMBER 14—15—00038—CR 

VICTOR JENKINS IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

 

V. FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

 

STATE OF TEXAS STATE OF TEXAS

APPELLANT’S SECOND MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR

FILING OF APPELLANT’S BRIEF

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

COMES NOW THE APPELLANT, by and through his appointed 

attorney of record, Paul M. Evans, in the above entitled and numbered 

cause, and moves this Court, to grant the Appellant’s Second Motion to 

Extend Time for Filing Appellant’s Brief, and, in support thereof, would 

show the Court as follows: 

 I.

Appellant’s Brief was due before this Court on April 14, 2015. A 

previous Motion to Extend Time was filed on April 6, 2015. The prior 

motion was granted on April 8, 2015. 

 II. 

The undersigned counsel had previously represented in good faith to 

this Court that he anticipated filing an Anders brief in the instant cause. 

However, Counsel has determined that the record does in fact contain a 

ACCEPTED

14-15-00038-CR

FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

4/15/2015 11:20:54 AM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 14th COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 4/15/2015 11:20:54 AM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
potentially meritorious, non-frivolous issue that deserves to be brought to 

this Court’s attention. Accordingly, the present Draft of the Appellant’s 

Brief—essentially, a brief written according to Anders procedure—will 

need substantial revision. 

 III. 

Counsel would very respectfully request that the deadline for the 

Appellant’s brief be extended to May 1, 2015, in order that the undersigned 

counsel may have adequate time and opportunity to revise the present draft 

of the Appellant’s Brief and complete the necessary research and drafting to

present the issue described above. 

 IV. 

This Motion is not made for purposes of delay, but so that justice 

might be served. 

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Defendant respectfully 

prays that this Court, upon good cause shown, grant the Appellant’s Second 

Motion to Extend Time for Filing Appellant’s Brief.
 Respectfully submitted,

 Law Office of Paul M. Evans

 811 Nueces Street

 Austin, Texas 78701

 (512) 569-1418

 (512) 692-8002 FAX

 _/s/ Paul M. Evans________ 

 PAUL M. EVANS

 SBN 24038885

 Attorney for Defendant

 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 

was delivered by facsimile unto the office of the prosecuting attorney for the

State of Texas—mailing address P.O. Box 1748, Austin, Texas 78767, 

physical address 509 W. 11th Street, Austin, Texas 78701—on this the 15th

day of April, 2015. 

 

 _/s/ Paul M. Evans________ 

 PAUL M. EVANS

 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

 I hereby certify that the present document contains 407 words, all 

contents included. 

 _/s/ Paul M. Evans________ 

 PAUL M. EVANS
1019.52
#### Board of Education of the Katonah-Lewisboro School District, Appellant, v Board of Education of the Carmel Central School District, Respondent.

—In an action for reimbursement of tuition pursuant to Education Law § 3202, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nastasi, J.), entered November 14, 1989, which granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

*705We agree with the Supreme Court that the action is one to "vindicate a public interest” and thus the plaintiff was not required to file a notice of claim within three months of the accrual of the action pursuant to Education Law § 3813 (1) *(see, Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v City School Dist.,*59 NY2d 262; *Union Free School Dist. No. 6 v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd.,*35 NY2d 371; *Valhalla Union Free School Dist. v Somers Cent. School Dist.,*98 Misc 2d 365).

However, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the public interest exception does not permit the commencement of actions against a school district after the expiration of the one-year period of limitation of Education Law § 3813 (2-b). The instant action was commenced more than one year after the period of limitation had expired. Therefore, the action was properly dismissed as time-barred. Thompson, J. P., Kunzeman, Eiber, Rosenblatt and Ritter, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 10.02

                                                                  March 28, 2002
John Wong
Hybrid Networks, Inc.
6409 Guadalupe Mines Road
San Jose, CA  95120

Dear John,

This Letter  Agreement will confirm that in connection with and in consideration
of your continued  employment with Hybrid Networks,  Inc.  ("Hybrid") Hybrid and
you agree as follows:

1. At Hybrid's  request you will remain  employed by Hybrid for up to sixty (60)
days  following  the date  hereof,  or, until such time that Hybrid is no longer
able to pay you your regular base salary (the "Retention  Period") provided that
Hybrid continues to pay your current base salary at its regular periodic payroll
dates;

2. You will receive a Severance Payment of $6,750.00, (the "Severance Payment"),
which is equal to two weeks of your regular base salary;

3. You will receive a Retention  Bonus of $13,500.00,  (the  "Retention  Bonus")
which is equal to four  weeks of your  regular  salary,  payable  upon  Hybrid's
receipt  of a  signed  copy of a  release  and a  signed  copy  of  this  Letter
Agreement.  The  Retention  Bonus will be  returned by you to the Company if you
voluntarily  terminate your employment with the Company before the expiration of
the Retention Period; and

Please acknowledge your acceptance of this Letter Agreement by signing below and
returning this letter to me as soon as possible.

If you  have  any  questions  concerning  this  offer,  please  call me at (408)
323-6291.

Sincerely,


Michael D. Greenbaum
President and CEO


I have reviewed the above Letter Agreement and understand and agree to the terms
under which I will continue to be employed with Hybrid Networks, Inc.


------------------------            --------------------------------
Date                                [name]