J-S10030-15

2015 PA Super 80

ADOPTION OF: C.J.P., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.B.P., MOTHER No. 2650 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree entered July 22, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, 

Orphans’ Court, at No: 0036-2013

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., STABILE, and PLATT,* JJ.

OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED APRIL 15, 2015

J.B.P. (Mother) appeals from the decree entered July 22, 2014, in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, which involuntarily terminated 

her parental rights to her minor son, C.J.P. (Child), born in May of 2011. We 

affirm.1

On July 19, 2011, protective custody of Child was awarded to Children 

and Youth Services of Delaware County (CYS), as a result of Mother’s 

homelessness and mental instability. Child has remained in foster care since 

that time. On April 9, 2013, CYS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to Child, and a termination hearing was held on July 

18, 2014.

At the beginning of the termination hearing, Mother’s court-appointed 

trial counsel stipulated to the admission of CYS Exhibit 1 into evidence. 

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The orphans’ court entered a decree terminating the parental rights of 

Child’s unknown father that same day. Child’s father is not a party to the 

instant appeal.
J-S10030-15

- 2 -

N.T., 7/18/14, at 4-5. CYS Exhibit 1 consisted of, inter alia, a court 

summary prepared by CYS, therapy progress notes, a series of mental 

health evaluations, various parenting and visitation progress reports, and a 

number of documents related to a criminal charge against Mother.2 

Additionally, Mother’s counsel stipulated that the evidence presented at 

Mother’s June 12, 2013 goal change hearing would be incorporated by 

reference.3 Id. at 4-5. CYS did not present any live testimony at the July 

18, 2014 hearing. Mother testified on her own behalf, and neither counsel 

for CYS nor Child’s guardian ad litem cross-examined Mother. 

On July 22, 2014, the orphans’ court entered its decree involuntarily 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child. On July 29, 2014, Mother’s 

trial counsel filed a petition to withdraw his representation. By order 

entered August 5, 2014, the court vacated the appointment of Mother’s trial 

counsel and appointed Mother’s current counsel. Mother timely filed a notice 

of appeal on August 15, 2014. However, Mother did not concomitantly file a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, as required by 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). On September 25, 2014, this Court ordered Mother 

 

2 These documents, which are contained in the certified record, are labeled 

as individual exhibits. However, they were admitted simultaneously as one 

exhibit with eight “attachments.” N.T., 7/18/14, at 4-5. 

3 At the conclusion of the June 12, 2013 goal change hearing, the court 

denied the requested goal change to adoption to give Mother one final 

chance to change her ways. N.T., 6/12/13, at 72. 
J-S10030-15

- 3 -

to file a concise statement by October 6, 2014. Mother complied by filing a 

concise statement with the orphans’ court on that date.4

Mother now raises the following issues for our review. 

I. The [orphans’ c]ourt erred in ordering termination of parental 

rights of [M]other there being the lack of clear and convincing 

evidence to support the [orphans’ c]ourt’s conclusion thereof. 

II. CYS failed to extend reasonable good faith services to 

[M]other to promote family stability and preserve family unity to 

warrant termination of parental rights. 

III. [Mother] challenges the constitutionality and fairness of 23 

Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(b) in violation of the equal protection clause 

and due process clauses of the United States and Pa. 

Constitution. 

Mother’s Brief at 5.

We consider Mother’s claims mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

 

4 Neither CYS nor Child’s guardian ad litem has objected or claimed any 

prejudice as a result of Mother’s failure to file a concise statement until 

ordered to do so by this Court. Thus, we have accepted Mother’s statement 

in reliance on our decision in In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 748 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (holding that a mother’s failure to comply strictly with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) did not warrant waiver of her claims, as there was no 

prejudice to any party). Cf. J.M.R. v. J.M., 1 A.3d 902, 906-07 (Pa. Super. 

2010) (holding that a father had waived his claims on appeal after this Court 

ordered him to file a concise statement, and the father’s statement was 

untimely).
J-S10030-15

- 4 -

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). We need only agree 

with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well 

as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). 
J-S10030-15

- 5 -

Here, we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under Sections 

2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows.

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 

an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date 

of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child. 

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a) ... (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b). 

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) 

The child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or 

more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.
J-S10030-15

- 6 -

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

“Notably, termination under Section 2511(a)(8), does not require an 

evaluation of [a parent’s] willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that 

led to placement of her children.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 

511 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted).

Instantly, the orphans’ court concluded that Mother’s parental rights 

should be terminated because of her unwillingness or inability to address her 

mental health issues. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/18/14, at 8-9, 12-15 

(unpaginated). The court also emphasized Mother’s lack of stable housing, 

her resentment and hostility towards others, and her “refusal to cooperate 

(or even communicate) with CYS . . . .” Id. at 9, 14.

In response, Mother presents a wide variety of arguments. Mother 

contends that the orphans’ court abused its discretion by relying solely on a 

psychiatric evaluation produced by Dr. Stephen Mechanick in January and 

February of 2013, which recommended that Child’s permanency goal should 

be changed to adoption, and by disregarding a psychological evaluation 

produced by Dr. Karen Dybner-Madero in May of 2012, which was less 

critical of Mother, but which did not directly address whether Child’s goal 

should be changed. Mother’s Brief at 8. Mother then blames her CYS 

caseworker for not being sufficiently supportive and accepting of her, 

contends that it was the caseworker’s lack of support that resulted in 

Mother’s lack of contact with CYS, and asserts that CYS should have 
J-S10030-15

- 7 -

assigned her a new caseworker. Id. at 9. Mother argues that she did well 

during her visits with Child, and that she improved her parenting skills. Id.

at 9-10, 12. Mother also states that she is seeking employment, and that 

she has made, and continues to make, progress toward improving her 

mental health and other aspects of her life. Id. at 10-12. Finally, Mother 

argues that the court failed to consider her individual circumstances, such as 

her history of being sexually abused, and placed a “sole and undue emphasis 

on her mental health issues to the exclusion of all else and without relating it 

to her true ability to parent which was positively documented in other areas 

by other service providers.” Id. at 13-14.

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that 

the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating 

Mother’s parental rights to Child. During the June 12, 2013 goal change 

hearing, CYS caseworker, LaKisha Smith, testified that she had been 

working on Mother’s case since August of 2011. N.T., 6/12/13, at 4. Ms. 

Smith noted that Child was adjudicated dependent as a result of Mother’s 

mental health issues and unstable housing. Id. at 5. Ms. Smith conceded 

that Mother visited regularly with Child since that time, and that Mother had 

obtained housing. Id. at 7. However, Ms. Smith testified that Mother was 

discharged from therapy at Northwestern Human Services and placed on a 

waiting list in March of 2013. Id. at 8. According to Ms. Smith, this was 

because Mother was volatile and engaged in “angry outbursts” during 
J-S10030-15

- 8 -

therapy, and “many therapists have refused to continue to work with 

[Mother].” Id. Ms. Smith also noted that Mother “refuses to have contact 

with me.”5 Id. at 11.

Dr. Steven Mechanick testified that he is a physician specializing in the 

practice of psychiatry, and that he prepared a psychiatric evaluation of 

Mother. Id. at 15-16. Dr. Mechanick explained that he diagnosed Mother 

with “a depressive disorder not otherwise specified[,]” as well as “a 

personality disorder not otherwise specified with paranoid and borderline 

features.” Id. at 19. Dr. Mechanick opined that Mother’s depressive 

disorder would have little impact on her ability to act as a parent, and that 

Mother “might improve.” Id. at 20, 23. However, Dr. Mechanick expressed 

greater concern with respect to Mother’s personality disorder. Id. Dr. 

Mechanick testified that Mother’s personality issues “are pervasive” and have 

limited her ability to “take care of herself in some of the normal, broader 

functional areas of life[,]” and “to function in the world.” Id. at 20-22. Dr. 

Mechanick further explained that individuals with similar personality 

disorders typically need “quite a number of years” before they are able to 

improve, if they ever improve at all. Id. at 23, 33. Dr. Mechanick noted 

that Mother is “not particularly insightful or motivated to change her own 

 

5

In the court summary submitted at the July 18, 2014 termination hearing, 

Ms. Smith opined that Child is “extremely bonded” to his foster parents, that 

removing Child from his current foster placement would be “extremely 

detrimental” to him, and that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated. 

CYS Exhibit 1, at 17-18.
J-S10030-15

- 9 -

sort of world view or patterns of behavior,” and that this “would worsen her 

prognosis.” Id. at 23. Dr. Mechanick acknowledged that Mother likely 

experiences heightened stress as a result of her interactions with CYS, but 

opined that this stress was not the primary cause of her mental condition.6 

Id. at 26-27.

Clinical visitation worker Kenya Cobb testified that she had been 

conducting biweekly supervised visits with Mother since 2012, and that 

Mother began receiving unsupervised visits at her home in April of 2013. 

Id. at 37. Ms. Cobb testified that Mother had been doing well during visits, 

but that “I just had mainly concerns with mom when she becomes upset. 

We’ve had to . . . talk her down through a few of the visits.” Id. at 38. Ms. 

Cobb further explained that Mother “has done okay caring for [Child] with 

short periods of time,” but that she was concerned that Mother would be 

unable to care for Child full-time, as a result of her mental health issues. 

Id. at 39. 

Finally, Mother testified that she did not want to have any contact with 

CYS because “they’re really negative. They keep just being mean to me 

about my mental health, [and] my past history.” Id. at 49-50. Mother 

stated that she asked for a different caseworker, but that CYS declined to 

 

6

In Dr. Mechanick’s evaluation, which was admitted into evidence at the 

July 18, 2014 termination hearing, he concluded that “[i]t may take many 

years for [Mother] to reach a level of emotional stability and improved 

functioning so that she could adequately care for [Child,]” and that a goal 

change to adoption “is reasonable and appropriate.” CYS Exhibit 5, at 10. 
J-S10030-15

- 10 -

provide her one. Id. at 50. Mother refused to go back to therapy and 

explained that “I just can’t” attend therapy, because “I can’t talk about my 

past.” Id. at 53-54, 59. Mother also testified that she had been living in an 

apartment since March 1, 2013. Id. at 60. However, Mother admitted that 

this was the third location where she had been residing since January of 

2013. Id. at 60-62.

During the termination hearing on July 18, 2014, Mother further 

testified concerning her efforts at reunification following the June 12, 2013 

goal change hearing. Mother explained that she was incarcerated shortly 

after the goal change hearing, and lost her apartment. N.T., 7/18/14, at 15, 

19. Mother stated that she was released on “August 26 or 27 of 2013,” and 

that she is currently on parole. Id. at 19-20. Mother indicated that she was 

homeless at the time of her release, but that she would be moving into a 

new residence on September 1, 2014. Id. at 21, 27-28. Mother claimed 

that she attends counseling and sees a doctor for psychiatric medication. 

Id. at 29-32. Mother also claimed that she was trying to comply with CYS 

“little-by-little” but that she could not do everything that had been asked of 

her. Id. at 40. For example, Mother admitted that she was not meeting 

regularly with CYS and keeping them advised of her location. Id.

Concerning her relationship with Child, Mother testified that she was 

initially unable to visit with him after her release from incarceration because 

she lacked transportation. Id. at 22-23. Mother stated that she was again 
J-S10030-15

- 11 -

able to visit with Child at the hospital “in the middle of October/November” 

of 2013. Id. at 23. Mother stated that she met with Child’s foster mother 

at the hospital, and that she also had telephone conversations with the 

foster mother about Child. Id. at 23-24. Mother acknowledged that Child is 

“attached” to his foster mother, and that, when she visited with Child in the 

hospital, “he didn’t really want to be near me because he ain’t seen me in a 

while,” and “it took him a while in the hospital to be attached to me.” Id. at 

24. Mother noted that she now visits with Child once every two weeks. Id.

at 41. Mother testified that her visits with Child go well, and that they talk 

and play together. Id. at 44. Mother explained that she did not want to 

remove Child from the care of his foster mother, who was taking good care 

of Child. Id. at 26. However, Mother stated that she would not give up her 

rights to Child voluntarily, and that she wanted Child back. Id. at 25. 

Mother reported that Child had stated to her that he “wants to be with [his 

foster mother] and he wants to be with me.” Id. at 45. 

Accordingly, the record confirms that Child had been out of Mother’s 

care for a period in excess of 12 months at the time CYS filed its termination 

petition on April 9, 2013, and that the conditions that led to Child’s 

placement continued to exist, as Mother had failed to remedy her mental 

health issues and find stable housing. Most critically, the evidence 

establishes that Mother was discharged unsuccessfully from therapy in March 

of 2013 and that, at the time of the goal change hearing, she had no 
J-S10030-15

- 12 -

intention of returning. While Mother testified during the termination hearing 

that she is now attending counseling and is making more of an effort to 

comply with CYS, these remedial efforts took place after CYS filed its petition 

to terminate her parental rights. Mother does not dispute that she received 

notice of the termination petition at the time it was filed in April of 2013 and, 

therefore, the orphans’ court was not permitted to consider these efforts. 

See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) (“With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the 

parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated 

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.”). Moreover, 

while Mother contends that the court placed undue emphasis on Dr. 

Mechanick’s psychiatric evaluation, we observe that the orphans’ court was 

free to weigh the evidence presented during the termination proceedings as 

it saw fit. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.

Additionally, the record confirms that terminating Mother’s parental 

rights would best serve the needs and welfare of Child. At the termination 

hearing, Mother acknowledged that Child is “attached” to his foster mother, 

and that the foster mother has been taking good care of Child. In contrast, 

Mother has not cared for Child since July of 2011, when he was about two 

months old. At the time of her termination hearing, Mother had failed for a 

period of nearly three years to remedy her problems, and the evidence 

suggests that Mother is unlikely to achieve recovery anytime soon. It would 
J-S10030-15

- 13 -

not serve Child’s needs and welfare to place his life on hold any longer. See 

M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1276 (“A child’s life simply cannot be put on hold in the 

hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of 

parenting.”). No relief is due.7

Next, we consider whether termination was proper under Section 

2511(b). Section 2511(b) “focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs 

and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. 

Super. 2010). As this Court has explained, “Section 2511(b) does not 

explicitly require a bonding analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the 

Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional 

bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered” as part 

of our analysis. In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

“While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect of 

the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of 

many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the 

best interest of the child.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(citing K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d at 533-36). 

 

7

In her brief, Mother also asserts that the orphans’ court erroneously 

considered certain irrelevant evidence. Mother’s Brief at 13. We observe 

that Mother did not include this claim in her concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. Thus, it is waived. See Krebs v. United 

Refining Co. of Pa., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“[A]ny issue not 

raised in a statement of matters complained of on appeal is deemed 

waived.”) (citations omitted).
J-S10030-15

- 14 -

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally 

emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also 

consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and 

stability the child might have with the foster parent. 

Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should consider 

the importance of continuity of relationships and whether any 

existing parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.

Id. (quoting In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010)); see also In 

re T.D., 949 A.2d 910, 920-23 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal denied, 970 A.2d 

1148 (Pa. 2009) (affirming the termination of parental rights where “obvious 

emotional ties exist between T.D. and Parents, but Parents are either 

unwilling or unable to satisfy the irreducible minimum requirements of 

parenthood,” and where preserving Parents’ rights would prevent T.D. from 

being adopted and attaining permanency).

Here, the orphans’ court found that Child was bonded with his foster 

mother, and that removing Child from his current placement would be 

detrimental to him. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/18/14, at 15, 17. In 

contrast, the court concluded that Child has “only a very modest connection” 

with Mother, and that it would be in Child’s best interest for Mother’s 

parental rights to be terminated. Id. at 17. Mother argues that the 

orphans’ court failed to conduct an adequate analysis of Mother’s bond with 

Child, that her bond with Child is “significant,” and that the court lacked 

sufficient evidence from which to conclude that termination was in Child’s 

best interest. Mother’s Brief at 14. Mother emphasizes that she visited 

regularly with Child, that she did well during her visits, and that visitation 
J-S10030-15

- 15 -

progress reports contained in CYS Exhibit 1 confirm that she and Child are 

bonded. Id. at 14-15. 

Again, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion. 

As noted during our discussion of Section 2511(a)(8), it is undisputed that 

Child is bonded with his foster mother, and that foster mother has raised 

Child and cared for him for years while Mother failed to take the steps 

necessary to achieve reunification. Admittedly, there also is significant 

evidence in the record indicating that Mother and Child are bonded. For 

example, a majority of Mother’s visitation progress reports from September 

of 2012 through May of 2013 indicate that Mother and Child “seem to have a 

strong bond.” CYS Exhibit 7, at 6, 9, 12, 19, 22, 32, 38 (unpaginated). 

However, Mother admitted that Child “didn’t really want to be near me” 

when she visited him in the hospital in November of 2013. N.T., 7/18/14, at 

24. Even if Mother and Child still are bonded, that bond is outweighed in the 

instant matter by Mother’s inability to remedy the causes of Child’s 

placement, and by Child’s need for permanence and stability. See T.D., 949 

A.2d at 920-23; J.M., 991 A.2d at 325 (quoting In re Adoption of R.J.S.,

901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“‘The court cannot and will not 

subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a 
J-S10030-15

- 16 -

parent's claims of progress and hope for the future.’”)). Mother is not 

entitled to relief.8

Mother’s second issue is that her parental rights should not have been 

terminated because CYS failed to provide reasonable reunification services. 

Mother’s Brief at 16. Mother contends that CYS was obligated to continue 

providing her services, but “gave up on her much too early.” Id.

Mother’s issue fails, as it is clear that CYS provided her reasonable 

reunification services. During the June 12, 2013 goal change hearing, Ms. 

Smith explained that CYS, inter alia, referred Mother to a visitation program, 

to parenting classes, and for both a psychological and psychiatric evaluation. 

N.T., 6/12/14, at 6. After Mother was discharged unsuccessfully from 

therapy at Northwestern Human Services, CYS referred Mother for therapy 

at two new locations. Id. at 75-76; CYS Exhibit 1, at 14. In addition, while 

Mother’s visits with Child stopped as result of her failure to contact CYS 

following her release from incarceration, Mother was permitted to resume 

visitation at CYS in February of 2014. CYS Exhibit 1, at 16; CYS Exhibit 7, at 

1 (unpaginated).

 

8

In connection with her other arguments, Mother also emphasizes the 

portion of Section 2511(b) indicating that “[t]he rights of a parent shall not 

be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found 

to be beyond the control of the parent.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b); Mother’s 

Brief at 12. We note that this provision does not apply to the instant matter, 

as Mother’s parental rights were terminated due to a combination of factors, 

including her mental instability and unwillingness to work with CYS, and not 

“solely on the basis of environmental factors” like Mother’s unstable housing. 
J-S10030-15

- 17 -

Even if CYS had failed to provide reasonable services, Mother still 

would not be entitled to relief. In In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662 (Pa. 2014), 

our Supreme Court analyzed the language of Section 2511(a)(2) of the 

Adoption Act, as well as Section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6351. The Court reasoned that, while “reasonable efforts may be relevant 

to a court’s consideration of both the grounds for termination and the best 

interests of the child,” neither of these provisions, when read together or 

individually, requires reasonable efforts. Id. at 671-75 (citation omitted). 

The Court also concluded that reasonable efforts were not required to 

protect a parent’s constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of his 

or her child. Id. at 676-77. While the Supreme Court in D.C.D. focused its 

analysis on Section 2511(a)(2), we find the Supreme Court’s reasoning 

equally applicable to Section 2511(a)(8). Like Section 2511(a)(2), nothing 

in the language of Section 2511(a)(8) suggests that reasonable reunification 

services are necessary to support the termination of parental rights. 

In her third issue, Mother challenges the constitutionality of Section 

2511(b) of the Adoption Act. Mother’s Brief at 17-18. Mother focuses her 

challenge on the third sentence of Section 2511(b), which provides that, 

“With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), 

the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving 

of notice of the filing of the petition.” Id.; 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). 
J-S10030-15

- 18 -

According to Mother, this provision provided CYS an unfair advantage during 

her termination hearing, as it prohibited Mother from presenting witnesses 

who would testify concerning her remedial actions taken after the filing of 

the termination petition, while permitting CYS to present its own evidence of 

Mother’s ongoing parental incompetence. Mother’s Brief at 17. Mother 

suggests that this unfair advantage is a violation of her due process and 

equal protection rights under the United States and Pennsylvania 

Constitutions. Id. at 17-18.9 Specifically, Mother emphasizes the lengthy 

delay between the filing of the petition to terminate her parental rights and 

her termination hearing, and argues that there is no compelling state 

interest in preventing the court from considering current information 

concerning her abilities as a parent. Id. at 17. Mother also suggests that 

CYS should not have been permitted to present its own post-filing evidence, 

“under fairness and equity doctrines[.]” Id. at 17-18. 

Again, we conclude that Mother is not entitled to relief. In D.C.D., our 

Supreme Court rejected the suggestion that Section 2511 violates due 

process principles. The Supreme Court offered the following discussion.

 

9 To the extent Mother argues that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides 

her with greater protection under these circumstances than the United 

States Constitution, she cites no authority in support of this proposition, and 

we decline to consider this argument. See In re F.C. III, 2 A.3d 1201, 

1212 (Pa. 2010) (concluding that the appellant’s due process rights were 

equal under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, where the 

appellant failed to cite to the Pennsylvania Constitution or offer any 

argument to the contrary).
J-S10030-15

- 19 -

As we have previously held, the right to make decisions 

concerning the care, custody, and control of one’s children is one 

of the oldest fundamental rights protected by the Due Process 

Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution]. Accordingly, any infringement of that right by the 

state must be reviewed by this Court pursuant to a strict 

scrutiny analysis, determining whether the infringement is 

narrowly tailored to effectuate a compelling state interest.

Obviously, termination of parental rights is the most 

extreme infringement of parental rights. Additionally, it is 

beyond cavil that the protection of children, and in 

particular the need to provide permanency for dependent 

children, is a compelling state interest. In balancing these 

interests, the General Assembly has created a detailed system 

setting forth the limited situations which would result in removal 

of children from their parents and termination of parental rights. 

Moreover, the statutory construct requires specific 

determinations by the trial court regarding the proper placement 

and permanency goals of the children at each step of the 

process. Ultimately, the grounds of termination must be 

demonstrated by the state by clear and convincing evidence. 

We conclude that this system is sufficiently narrowly tailored to 

protect a parent’s fundamental right while also ensuring the 

safety and permanency needs of dependent children.

In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d at 676-77 (quotation marks and citations omitted) 

(emphasis added). 

Further, we disagree with Mother’s contention that the relevant portion 

of Section 2511(b) does not serve a compelling state interest. The subject 

provision furthers the compelling state interest of providing dependent 

children with permanency, as it prevents unwilling or incapable parents, like 

Mother, from continuing to delay the adoption of their children with lastminute attempts at reunification.
J-S10030-15

- 20 -

Mother’s claim that Section 2511(b) violates her right to equal 

protection also fails. “‘The essence of the constitutional principle of equal 

protection under the law is that like persons in like circumstances will be 

treated similarly.’” Markovsky v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 107 A.3d 749, 

766 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 267 (Pa. 

1995)). Here, in the context of a termination of parental rights proceeding, 

Mother and CYS clearly are not “like persons in like circumstances.” Thus, 

Mother’s argument with respect to Section 2511(b) fails to implicate equal 

protection principles.

Finally, Mother contends in connection with her other constitutional 

arguments that she did not receive the benefit of a “full” termination 

hearing, because CYS did not present any live testimony and instead relied 

solely on documentary evidence. Mother’s Brief at 18. Mother concedes 

that her trial counsel stipulated to the admission of the CYS documentary 

evidence, and that counsel indicated during the hearing that Mother also was 

in agreement with this arrangement, but notes that the court did not 

colloquy Mother and suggests that “it is not clear from the record that 

[M]other agreed to this voluntarily, knowingly[,] and intelligently.” Id. 

Mother states that her fragile mental health prevented her from challenging 

her trial counsel’s stipulations, and the orphans’ court “should have 

mandated a full hearing to better protect her interests and the clear due 
J-S10030-15

- 21 -

process that should have been afforded in such an important termination 

proceeding.” Id. 

Tellingly, Mother does not direct our attention to any authority 

indicating that the orphans’ court had a duty to colloquy Mother, or to sua 

sponte refuse to accept her trial counsel’s stipulations, based on Mother’s 

questionable mental health. We see no basis on which to reverse the 

orphans’ court’s decree. 

Accordingly, because we conclude that none of Mother’s arguments 

entitles her to relief, we affirm the decree of the orphans’ court.

Decree affirmed.

Judge Platt joins the opinion. 

President Judge Gantman concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/15/2015