IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-30132

LITO MARTINEZ ASIGNACION, 

 Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.

RICKMERS GENOA SCHIFFAHRTSGESELLSCHAFT MBH & CIE KG, 

 Defendant–Appellant.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

RICKMERS GENOA SCHIFFAHRTSGESELLSCHAFT MBH & CIE KG, 

 Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

LITO MARTINEZ ASIGNACION,

 Defendant–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and BENAVIDES and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PRISCILLA R. OWEN, Circuit Judge:

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 16, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Rickmers Genoa Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Cie KG (Rickmers) 

sought to enforce a Philippine arbitral award given to Lito Martinez 

Asignacion for maritime injuries. The district court refused to enforce the 

award pursuant to the public-policy defense found in the Convention on the 

Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the Convention)1

and the prospective-waiver doctrine. Rickmers appeals. We reverse and 

remand for the district court to enforce the award.

I

Asignacion, a citizen and resident of the Philippines, signed a contract 

to work aboard the vessel M/V RICKMERS DAILAN. Rickmers, a German 

corporation, owned the vessel, which sailed under the flag of the Marshall 

Islands.

 Philippine law mandates that foreign employers hire Filipino workers 

through the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), an arm 

of the Philippine government. POEA requires Filipino seamen’s contracts to 

include the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of 

Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean Going Vessels (Standard Terms). 

Asignacion’s contract incorporated the Standard Terms.

The Standard Terms include several provisions related to dispute 

resolution. Section 29, in part, provides:

In cases of claims and disputes arising from this employment, the 

parties covered by a collective bargaining agreement shall submit 

the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the 

voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. If the parties are not 

covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the parties may at 

their option submit the claim or dispute to either the original and 

exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission 

(NLRC), pursuant to Republic Act of 1995 or to the original and 

1 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 

10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.

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exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of 

arbitrators. 

Section 31 provides:

Any unresolved dispute, claim or grievance arising out of or in 

connection with this Contract, including the annexes thereof, shall 

be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, 

international conventions, treaties and covenants where the 

Philippines is a signatory.

Section 20(B) provides that when a seaman suffers work-related injuries, the 

employer must provide the full cost of medical treatment until the seaman is 

declared fit to work or his level of disability is declared after repatriation to the 

Philippines. If the seaman is permanently disabled, he is entitled to scheduled 

disability benefits. Section 20(G) provides that the contract covers “all claims 

arising from or in the course of the seafarer’s employment, including but not 

limited to damages arising from the contract, tort, fault or negligence under 

the laws of the Philippines or any other country.”

While the M/V RICKMERS DAILAN was docked in the Port of New 

Orleans, Asignacion suffered burns when a cascade tank aboard the vessel 

overflowed. After receiving treatment at a burn unit in Baton Rouge for nearly 

a month, Asignacion was repatriated to the Philippines, where he continued to 

receive medical attention. The court below found that Asignacion sustained 

severe burns to 35% of his body, suffered problems with his body-heat control 

mechanism, and experienced skin ulcerations and sexual dysfunction. The 

record and the district court’s opinion do not address Asignacion’s current 

condition.

Asignacion sued Rickmers in Louisiana state court to recover for his 

injuries. Rickmers filed an exception seeking to enforce the arbitration clause 

of Asignacion’s contract. The state court granted the exception, stayed 

litigation, and ordered arbitration in the Philippines.

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Arbitration commenced before a Philippine panel, which convened under 

the auspices of the Philippine Department of Labor and Employment. The 

panel refused to apply, or even consider applying, United States or Marshall 

Islands law, finding that Section 31 of the Standard Terms prevented the panel 

from applying any law besides Philippine law. The arbitrators accepted 

Rickmers’s physician’s finding that Asignacion had a Grade 14 disability—the 

lowest grade of compensable disability under the Standard Terms—which 

entitled Asignacion to a lump sum of $1,870.

Asignacion then filed a motion in the Louisiana state court asking that 

Rickmers show cause as to why the Philippine arbitral award should not be set 

aside for violating United States public policy. Rickmers removed the suit to 

federal court and brought a second action in the district court seeking to 

enforce the award.

The district court determined that the Convention provided the legal 

framework for analyzing the award and that the only defense Asignacion 

invoked was Article V(2)(b) of the Convention. Article V(2)(b) allows a 

signatory country to refuse enforcement if “recognition or enforcement of the 

award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.”2

The district court proceeded to apply the traditional choice-of-law 

analysis for maritime injury cases, the Lauritzen3–Rhoditis4 test, and 

concluded that the law of the vessel’s flag—the Marshall Islands—should apply 

absent a valid choice-of-law clause. The court also found that the Marshall 

Islands adopts the general maritime law of the United States. The court then 

held that enforcing the arbitral award would violate the United States public 

2 Convention art. V(2)(b).

3 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).

4 Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970).

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policy protecting seamen. The public-policy violation arose not from the 

arbitrator’s failure to apply United States law but rather because applying 

Philippine law effectively denied Asignacion the “opportunity to pursue the 

remedies to which he was entitled as a seaman,” i.e., maintenance and cure, 

negligence, and unseaworthiness. The court additionally held that the 

prospective-waiver doctrine, which invalidates certain combined choice-of-law 

and choice-of-forum provisions, applied to Asignacion’s contract. Thus, the 

court entered an order refusing to enforce the Philippine arbitral award. 

Rickmers now appeals.

II

We review the district court’s decision refusing to enforce the Philippine 

arbitral award under the same standard as any other district court decision.5 

We accept findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous and review questions 

of law de novo.6

III

The Convention applies when an arbitral award has been made in one 

signatory state and recognition or enforcement is sought in another signatory 

state.7 Both forums in this case, the United States and the Philippines, are 

signatories to the Convention.8 An award’s enforcement is governed by the 

Convention, as implemented at 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., if the award arises out 

5 See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 

364 F.3d 274, 287 (5th Cir. 2004) (reviewing a district court judgment enforcing a foreign 

arbitral award).

6 Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 2001).

7 Convention, 21 U.S.T. at 2566 (“The United States of America will apply the 

Convention, on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and enforcement of only those 

awards made in the territory of another Contracting State.”); see also id. art. I(3).

8 See, e.g., Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 900-01 (5th Cir. 

2005).

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of a commercial dispute and at least one party is not a United States citizen.9 

The award issued as a result of arbitration between Asignacion, a Filipino 

seaman, and Rickmers, a German corporation, is governed by the Convention.

A party to an award governed by the Convention may bring an action to 

enforce the award in a United States court that has jurisdiction.10 The court 

“shall confirm” the award unless a ground to refuse enforcement or recognition 

specified in the Convention applies.11 The Convention permits a signatory to 

refuse to recognize or enforce an award if “recognition or enforcement of the 

award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.”12

Arbitral awards falling under the Convention are enforced under the 

Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).13 An “emphatic federal policy” favors arbitral 

dispute resolution.14 The Supreme Court has noted that this policy “applies 

with special force in the field of international commerce.”15 The FAA permits 

courts to “vacate an arbitrator’s decision ‘only in very unusual 

circumstances.’”16 A district court’s review of an award is “extraordinarily 

narrow.”17 Similarly, a court reviewing an award under the Convention cannot 

9 See 9 U.S.C. § 202 (providing that commercial arbitral awards fall under the 

Convention except for certain awards entirely between United States citizens).

10 9 U.S.C. § 207.

11 Id.

12 Convention art. V(2)(b).

13 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 

(1985); see also 9 U.S.C. § 201 (“The [Convention] shall be enforced in United States courts 

in accordance with this chapter.”).

14 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 631 (1985).

15 Id.

16 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013) (quoting First 

Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995)).

17 Kergosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346, 352 (5th Cir. 2004), abrogated on 

other grounds by Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).

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refuse to enforce the award solely on the ground that the arbitrator may have 

made a mistake of law or fact.18 The party opposing enforcement of the award 

on one of the grounds specified in the Convention has the burden of proof.19

We have held that the Convention’s “public policy defense is to be 

‘construed narrowly to be applied only where enforcement would violate the 

forum state's most basic notions of morality and justice.’”20 In the context of 

domestic arbitral awards, the Supreme Court has recognized a public-policy

defense only when an arbitrator’s contract interpretation violates “‘some 

explicit public policy’ that is ‘well defined and dominant, and is to be 

ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general 

considerations of supposed public interests.’”21 The Eleventh Circuit has held 

that the “explicit public policy” requirement applies with the same force to 

international awards falling under the Convention.22 We see no reason to 

depart from that standard here.23

The parties do not dispute these standards. Rather, they disagree 

whether Asignacion’s case provides the narrow circumstances that would 

18 Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 

364 F.3d 274, 288 (5th Cir. 2004).

19 Id. (citing Imperial Ethiopian Gov’t v. Baruch-Foster Corp., 535 F.2d 334, 336 (5th 

Cir. 1976)).

20 Id. at 306 (quoting M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., KG, 87 F.3d 844, 851 

n.2 (6th Cir. 1996)).

21 United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987) 

(quoting W.R. Grace & Co v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum

and Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)) (some internal quotation marks 

omitted).

22 Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1445 

(11th Cir. 1998).

23 Cf. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 

(1985) (noting that the federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution “applies with 

special force in the field of international commerce”).

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render the arbitral award unenforceable under the Convention because it 

violates United States public policy.

A

Asignacion’s public-policy defense primarily turns on the adequacy of 

remedies under Philippine law. But at oral argument, Asignacion’s counsel 

also urged that United States public policy requires that foreign arbitral panels 

give seamen an adequate choice-of-law determination; he argued that the 

arbitrators’ exclusive reliance on the choice-of-law provision in Asignacion’s 

contract did not constitute a choice-of-law determination, let alone a fair one.

To the extent that Asignacion’s defense turns on the Philippine 

arbitrators’ exclusive reliance on the contract’s choice-of-law provision, courts 

are unable to correct this sort of unexceptional legal error (if one was in fact 

made) when reviewing an arbitral award.24 Applying Philippine law to a 

Filipino seaman in Philippine arbitration, by itself, is not cause for setting 

aside the award, even if American choice-of-law principles would lead to the 

application of another nation’s law.

B

Asignacion has the burden of proving that the Convention’s public-policy 

defense applies.25 The Philippine arbitrators awarded Asignacion $1,870. 

Were he to prevail in a suit under United States general maritime law, we have 

little doubt his recovery would be greater.

As detailed above, the United States has a public policy strongly favoring 

arbitration, which “applies with special force in the field of international 

24 See Karaha Bodas, 364 F.3d at 288 (“The court may not refuse to enforce an arbitral 

award solely on the ground that the arbitrator may have made a mistake of law or fact.”); id. 

at 290 & n.27 (“Under the New York Convention, the rulings of the [arbitrators] interpreting 

the parties' contract are entitled to deference.”).

25 See id. at 288 (citing Imperial Ethiopian Gov’t v. Baruch-Foster Corp., 535 F.2d 334, 

336 (5th Cir. 1976)).

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commerce.”26 On the other hand, the United States has an “explicit public 

policy that is well defined and dominant”27 with respect to seamen: maritime 

law provides “special solicitude to seamen.”28 Seamen have long been treated 

as “wards of admiralty,”29 and the causes of action and the remedies available 

to seamen reflect this special status.30 In addition to the foundational policies 

favoring arbitration and protecting seamen, other policies concerning 

international dispute resolution weigh in our decision.

The Supreme Court has rejected the “concept that all disputes must be 

resolved under our laws and in our courts,”31 even when remedies under 

foreign law do not comport with American standards of justice. The Supreme 

Court has stated: “To determine that American standards of fairness . . . must 

[apply] demeans the standards of justice elsewhere in the world, and 

unnecessarily exalts the primacy of United States law over the laws of other 

countries.”32 Similarly, in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 

which addressed the application of choice-of-law principles to a seaman’s claim, 

the Court stated:

To impose on ships the duty of shifting from one standard of 

compensation to another as the vessel passes the boundaries of 

26 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 631 (1985).

27 United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

28 Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 987 (5th Cir. 1989).

29 U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 355 (1971).

30 See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960) (noting that 

unseaworthiness liability is not tied to negligence); Boudreaux v. Transocean Deepwater, Inc., 

721 F.3d 723, 725-26 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that the right to maintenance and cure cannot 

be “contracted away by the seaman, does not depend on the fault of the employer, and is not 

reduced for the seaman's contributory negligence” (footnotes omitted)).

31 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).

32 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 n.11 (1974) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also Haynsworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 966 (5th 

Cir. 1997).

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territorial waters would be not only an onerous but also an unduly 

speculative burden, disruptive of international commerce and 

without basis in the expressed policies of this country. The amount 

and type of recovery which a foreign seaman may receive from his 

foreign employer while sailing on a foreign ship should not depend 

on the wholly fortuitous circumstance of the place of injury.33

Therefore, even with regard to foreign seamen, United States public policy does 

not necessarily disfavor lesser or different remedies under foreign law. 

The importance of the POEA Standard Terms to the Philippine economy 

also weighs in favor of enforcement. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, 

“[a]rbitration of all claims by Filipino overseas seafarers is an integral part of 

the POEA's mandate to promote and monitor the overseas employment of 

Filipinos and safeguard their interests.”34 Asignacion points out, correctly, 

that the Convention directs a court to consider the public policy of the country 

in which it sits,35 not the public policy of the arbitral forum. But, while 

Philippine public policy does not apply of its own force, our analysis of a foreign 

arbitral award is colored by “concerns of international comity, respect for the 

capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of 

the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of 

disputes . . . even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a 

domestic context.”36 

33 358 U.S. 354, 384 (1989) (emphasis added).

34 Balen v. Holland America Line, Inc., 583 F.3d 647, 651 (9th Cir. 2009); see also 

Marinechance Shipping, Ltd. v. Sebastian, 143 F.3d 216, 221 n.25 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The effect 

of POEA intervention in employment contracts is to shift the balance of power slightly in 

favor of the employee in much the same way that a labor union or legislative enactment of 

minimum work standards increases the level of protection for employees in the United 

States.”).

35 Convention art. V(2)(b).

36 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985).

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Asignacion maintains that in particularly egregious circumstances, a 

United States court may apply our choice-of-law and forum-selection laws as a 

means of implementing the Convention’s public-policy defense and refusing to 

enforce an award. 

The seminal maritime-injuries choice-of-law case is Lauritzen v. 

Larsen.37 In Lauritzen, a Danish seaman injured in Cuba aboard a Danishowned and flagged ship brought suit in the United States.38 The seaman’s 

contract provided that Danish law applied.39 Unlike United States law, 

Danish law fixed maintenance and cure to a twelve-week period and provided 

a no-fault compensation scheme “similar to [American] workmen’s 

compensation.”40 The Court enumerated a seven-factor test to determine 

choice of law41 but also commented that “[e]xcept as forbidden by some public 

policy, the tendency of the law is to apply in contract matters the law which 

the parties intended to apply.”42 The Court then cautioned that “a different 

result would follow if the contract attempted to avoid applicable law,” such as 

applying foreign law to a United States flagged ship.43 The Court thus had 

little hesitation applying the contracted-for Danish law, as the law of the ship’s 

flag.44

37 345 U.S. 571 (1953).

38 Id. at 573.

39 Id.

40 Id. at 575-76.

41 See id. at 583-92 ((1) place of injury; (2) the vessel’s flag; (3) plaintiff’s domicile or 

allegiance; (4) shipowner’s allegiance; (5) place of contract; (6) inaccessibility of a foreign 

forum; and (7) law of the forum); see also Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 309 

(1970) (noting the Lauritzen factors are not exhaustive and considered the shipowner’s base 

of operations).

42 Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 588-89.

43 Id. at 589.

44 Id. at 588-89.

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Lauritzen’s rule—that contractual choice-of-law provisions for foreign 

seamen are generally enforceable—favors Rickmers. However, the reach of the 

exception—which condemns a choice-of-law provision that attempts to “avoid 

applicable law”—is less clear. On one hand, Rickmers did little, if anything, to 

avoid applicable law through its contract with Asignacion. Rickmers had no 

say in the choice-of-law provision; POEA’s Standard Terms mandated 

Philippine law. On the other hand, the Philippine government has arguably 

attempted to avoid the application of foreign law to its seamen. But it is far 

from certain that the Lauritzen Court condemned such choice-of-law clauses 

mandated by a foreign sovereign rather than a party to the contract.

Several cases from our court have ordered that a Filipino seamen’s 

claims be resolved in Philippine arbitration or under Philippine law. Rickmers 

argues that these cases establish that applying Philippine law to Asignacion’s 

claims does not violate public policy. Many of these cases simply weigh the 

Lauritzen–Rhoditis factors without addressing any public-policy concerns.45 

The decisions that reach public-policy considerations address policies 

irrelevant to the remedies at issue in the present case.46

Our decision in Calix-Chacon v. Global International Marine, Inc.47

addressed the question of reduced remedies in foreign law. In Calix-Chacon, a 

45 See Quintero v. Klaveness Ship Lines, 914 F.2d 717, 722-23 (5th Cir. 1990); Cuevas 

v. Reading & Bates Corp., 770 F.2d 1371, 1378-79 (5th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds 

by In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).

46 See Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 900, 906 (5th Cir. 

2005) (rejecting a public-policy challenge to Philippine arbitration based on Louisiana’s policy 

disfavoring forum-selection clauses in employment litigation); Marinechance Shipping Ltd. 

v. Sebastian, 143 F.3d 216, 219-21 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 

499 U.S. 585 (1991)) (rejecting a challenge to contracts containing the POEA Standard Terms 

because individual Filipino seamen lacked bargaining power); cf. Francisco v. STOLT 

ACHIEVEMENT MT, 293 F.3d 270, 277-78 (5th Cir. 2002) (upholding an order to arbitrate 

in the Philippines and finding that the suspension of a Philippine law that would have 

otherwise limited remedies did not compel against arbitration).

47 493 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 2007).

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Honduran seaman signed a contract providing that Honduran law would apply

and specifying a Honduran forum.48 He brought a claim in an American court 

for maintenance and cure, and the district court held the forum-selection 

clause unenforceable on public-policy grounds because both general maritime 

law and the Shipowner’s Liability Convention of 1936 (Shipowner’s 

Convention) “express[ed] a strong public policy” against abridging 

maintenance and cure liability in contract.49 On appeal, we concluded that 

under our precedents, the Shipowner’s Convention did not require us to 

invalidate a foreign forum-selection clause when foreign law imposed a lower 

standard of care.50 We vacated the district court’s decision because it relied on 

the Shipowner’s Convention and remanded for further analysis of the publicpolicy question under the general maritime law.51 

In Calix-Chacon, we expressly refrained from addressing the general 

maritime law’s weight in the public-policy analysis. Nonetheless, our 

conclusion that the Shipowner’s Convention did not, as a matter of policy, 

prevail over a reduced standard of care in Honduran law, suggests we should 

be reluctant to conclude that lesser remedies make an award unenforceable on 

policy grounds. 

In Aggarao v. MOL Ship Management Co.,52 the District of Maryland, 

relying on the district court’s decision in the present case, refused to enforce a

Filipino seaman’s arbitral award. The Philippine arbitrators determined that 

Aggarao had a Grade 1 disability—the highest grade under the POEA 

contract—and awarded him $89,100 in disability benefits, sick pay, and 

48 Id. at 509.

49 Id. at 510.

50 Id. at 514 (citing In re McClelland Eng’rs, Inc. 742 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1984)).

51 Id.

52 Civ. No. CCB–09–3106, 2014 WL 3894079 (D. Md. Aug. 7, 2014).

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attorney’s fees.53 The district court found that Aggarao had over $700,000 in 

unpaid medical debts, had to forgo necessary treatments, and would require 

lifetime care.54 The Maryland district court found that Aggarao’s limited 

remedies under the POEA contract violated public policy and refused to enforce 

the arbitral award.55

Asignacion contends that Aggarao is on all fours with his claims. We 

disagree. Unlike in Aggarao, the arbitrators found that Asignacion had a 

Grade 14 disability—the lowest compensable grade—and the district court 

made no findings related to the adequacy of the award vis-à-vis Asignacion’s 

lasting injuries or unmet medical expenses. Rather, the district court only 

determined that the arbitration and award “effective[ly] deni[ed]” Asignacion 

the right to pursue his general maritime remedies. But that finding is 

insufficient to support the conclusion that the public policy of the United States 

requires refusing to enforce the award.

Asignacion’s arbitral award does not represent the sum total of 

Rickmers’s obligation to Asignacion under the POEA Standard Terms contract. 

Section 20(B) required Rickmers to pay Asignacion’s medical costs until he was 

repatriated to the Philippines and his disability level was established. There 

is no dispute that Rickmers met its obligations under Section 20(B). At oral 

argument, Asignacion’s counsel represents that he has incurred medical 

expenses after Rickmers’s Section 20(B) obligation terminated. But our careful 

review of the record has found no evidence that the Philippine arbitral award 

was inadequate relative to Asignacion’s unmet medical needs, let alone so 

inadequate as to violate this nation’s “most basic notions of morality and 

53 Id. at *6-7.

54 Id. at *5.

55 Id. at *14.

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justice.”56 We conclude that the district court erred in determining that 

Asignacion’s award violated the public policy of the United States.

C

Finally, Rickmers contends that the district court erred by also relying 

on the prospective-waiver doctrine to refuse to recognize the Philippine 

arbitral award. We agree.

In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the 

Supreme Court addressed a district court’s enforcement of an agreement to 

arbitrate, which forced an auto dealer to arbitrate its antitrust claims under 

the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., in Japan.57 The Court commented, in 

dictum, that “in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses 

operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue 

statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in 

condemning the agreement as against public policy.”58 Similarly, in Vimar 

Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, the Court, again in dictum,

suggested that Mitsubishi’s prospective-waiver doctrine might apply to 

contracts under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1300 et 

seq.59 In both cases, the Court declined to apply the doctrine, in part, because 

it would be premature to do so; each case addressed the enforceability of an 

agreement to arbitrate, as opposed to awards in which the arbitrators actually 

failed to address causes of action under American statutes.60

56 Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 

364 F.3d 274, 288 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., KG, 87 

F.3d 844, 851 n.2 (6th Cir. 1996)).

57 473 U.S. 614, 619-21 (1985).

58 Id. at 637 n.19.

59 515 U.S. 528, 540-41 (1995).

60 See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19; Vimar, 515 U.S. at 540.

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The present case is at the award-enforcement stage, unlike Mitsubishi

and Vimar, and the district court applied the prospective-waiver doctrine. The 

district court noted that the antitrust laws in Mitsubishi and COGSA in Vimar

applied to “business disputes between sophisticated parties.” Because seamen 

are afforded special protections under United States law, unlike sophisticated 

parties, the district court concluded that the prospective-waiver doctrine 

prevented the enforcement of the Philippine arbitral award.

However, the prospective-waiver doctrine is limited to statutory rights 

and remedies. From Mitsubishi onwards, the Supreme Court has referred only 

to “statutory” rights and remedies when discussing the doctrine.61 The Court

recently continued that phrasing in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 

Restaurant, where the Court refused to apply the doctrine to a waiver of class 

arbitration.62 The Supreme Court has not extended the prospective-waiver 

doctrine beyond statutory rights and remedies. The district court therefore 

erred when it relied on the doctrine to afford Asignacion an opportunity to 

pursue his claims under the general maritime law. Additionally, to apply that 

doctrine in every case in which a seaman agreed to a choice-of-law provision 

that would result in lesser remedies than those available under laws of the 

United States would be at odds with the rationale of the Supreme Court’s 

61 See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 (“so long as the prospective litigant effectively may 

vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum”); id. at 637 n.19 (“take cognizance 

of the statutory cause of action”); id. (“right to pursue statutory remedies”); see also Vimar, 

515 U.S. at 540 (“right to pursue statutory remedies” (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 

n.19)).

62 See 133 S. Ct. at 2310 (2013) (“agreement forbidding the assertion of certain 

statutory rights”); id. at 2311 (“it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory 

remedy”); id. (“[i]t no more eliminates those parties’ right to pursue their statutory remedy”); 

see also id. at 2319 (KAGAN, J., dissenting) (arguing that the doctrine should apply but noting 

that the doctrine “asks about the world today, not the world as it might have looked when 

Congress passed a given statute”).

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No. 14-30132

reasoning in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,63 discussed 

above.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the order of the district court 

and REMAND for the district court to enforce the arbitral award.

63 358 U.S. 354, 384 (1989).

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 Case: 14-30132 Document: 00513007448 Page: 17 Date Filed: 04/16/2015