FILED

May 3, 1996

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

HAYDEN D. WILSON, JR., )

)

Plaintiff/Appellee, )

) Sequatchie Circuit

) No. 6368

VS. )

) Appeal No.

) 01-A-01-9506-CV-00235

KATHRYN ANN MOORE, )

)

Defendant/Appellant. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR SEQUATCHIE COUNTY

AT DUNLAP, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE BUDDY D. PERRY, JUDGE

For the Plaintiff/Appellee: For the Defendant/Appellant:

Stephen T. Greer Jacqueline E. Schulten

Dunlap, Tennessee Chattanooga, Tennessee

MODIFIED AND REMANDED

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
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O P I N I O N

This appeal involves a marriage that failed in less than three years. The

husband filed suit in the Circuit Court for Sequatchie County seeking a divorce

and the enforcement of the parties’ prenuptial agreement. The wife also requested

a divorce and challenged the validity of the prenuptial agreement. Following a

bench trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced pursuant to Tenn. Code

Ann. § 36-4-129(b) (1991) and upheld the prenuptial agreement. Accordingly, the

trial court awarded the parties their personal property and directed the husband to

assume certain credit card indebtedness and to provide the wife medical insurance

for up to thirty-six months. Both parties take issue with various portions of the

final divorce decree on this appeal. We have determined that the trial court erred

by failing to consider the husband’s income earned during the marriage as marital

property. Accordingly, we modify the division of marital property and the award

of spousal support.

I.

Hayden Wilson, Jr. and Kathryn M. Wilson (now Kathryn Ann Moore) first

met when they were both employed by the Sequatchie County Board of Education.

Mr. Wilson, who was in his mid-forties at the time, had a doctorate degree in

educational psychology and guidance and was a special education instructor. Ms.

Moore worked at the same school as an aide. She was eight years younger than

Mr. Wilson and was a recent divorcée with custody of two minor children. They

began dating shortly after Mr. Wilson’s divorce in February 1990. 

Mr. Wilson proposed to Ms. Moore in March 1991. Two months later, Ms.

Moore received her undergraduate degree and was employed at a local pharmacy.

Mr. Wilson requested Ms. Moore to sign a prenuptial agreement because he

desired to preserve his separate assets for his children. Ms. Moore was generally

ambivalent about signing the agreement. On the only occasion she questioned the

need for the agreement, Mr. Wilson informed her that he would not pay her to

marry him. Thereafter, Mr. Wilson requested the lawyer who had represented Ms.

Moore in her divorce from her first husband to prepare the agreement. They
1Mr. Wilson and his first wife had three children. Their oldest daughter was an adult

when they were divorced, and Mr. Wilson and his first wife agreed to a joint custody

arrangement with regard to their two minor sons. The boys lived alternately with their mother

and father.

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signed the agreement on July 18, 1991 and were married ten days later on July 28,

1991. Ms. Moore and her two children moved in with Mr. Wilson and his two

minor children.1

Ms. Moore suffered a work-related injury and stopped working at the

pharmacy shortly after the wedding. The parties’ relationship developed serious

problems later in the year, and by December 1991, Ms. Moore declared that she

wanted a divorce. Mr. Wilson also consulted a lawyer about a divorce. An uneasy

stalemate developed, and the parties began living essentially separate lives in June

1992 when Ms. Moore enrolled at Chattanooga State Technical Community

College to study radiological technology. She spent most of the time during the

week at school, and she studied most of the time when she was at home.

The parties separated in November 1993, and Mr. Wilson filed suit for

divorce on November 8, 1993. Ms. Moore counterclaimed for divorce. Following

a trial in May 1994, the trial court entered a final decree declaring the parties

divorced and finding that their prenuptial agreement was valid. The trial court

also found that Mr. Wilson’s contributions to his retirement accounts during the

marriage were marital property and awarded Ms. Moore one-half of these funds.

The court also directed Mr. Wilson to be responsible for $1,500 in credit card debt

and to provide Ms. Moore with health insurance coverage for up to thirty-six

months or until she found employment.

Mr. Wilson filed a post-trial motion taking issue with the portion of the

decision awarding Ms. Moore one-half of the contributions to his retirement

accounts made during the marriage. The trial court altered its original decision

after determining that the prenuptial agreement prevented Ms. Moore from

receiving a share of Mr. Wilson’s retirement contributions. This appeal followed.

II.

THE VALIDITY OF THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT
2

See, e.g., Lightman v. Magid, 54 Tenn. App. 701, 710, 394 S.W.2d 151, 156 (1965) (the

husband and wife were seventy-one and fifty-eight years old respectively, and the husband had

children from a previous marriage); Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn. App. 220, 226, 142 S.W.2d 737,

741 (1940) (the husband and wife were sixty years old, and both had children from their previous

marriages).

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Ms. Moore disputes the validity of the prenuptial agreement on the ground

that Mr. Wilson did not disclose his financial holdings with sufficient precision

before she executed the agreement. We disagree. Mr. Wilson’s explanation of his

financial holdings was sufficient to enable Ms. Moore to make a knowledgeable

decision with regard to executing the agreement.

A.

Prenuptial agreements are favored by public policy in Tennessee.

Perkinson v. Perkinson, 802 S.W.2d 600, 601 (Tenn. 1990); Hoyt v. Hoyt, 213

Tenn. 117, 125, 372 S.W.2d 300, 303 (1963); Key v. Collins, 145 Tenn. 106, 109,

236 S.W. 3, 4 (1921). They benefit the parties by defining their marital rights in

property which tend to be among the most frequent causes of family discord.

Sanders v. Sanders, 40 Tenn. App. 20, 30, 288 S.W.2d 473, 477 (1955). They

also enhance the opportunities for middle-aged persons to re-marry by protecting

their separate assets for the children of previous marriages. Pajak v. Pajak, 385

S.E.2d 384, 388 (W. Va. 1989).2

 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-501 (1991) requires the courts to give effect to

prenuptial agreements as long as they satisfy certain requirements. To be

enforceable, the agreement must “have been entered into by such spouses freely,

knowledgeably and in good faith without exertion of duress or undue influence on

either spouse.” This record contains no evidence of duress, undue influence, or

bad faith on Mr. Wilson’s part. Thus, the principal focus of this aspect of the

appeal is on the requirement that the spouse enter into the prenuptial agreement

knowledgeably.

An engagement to marry establishes a confidential relationship between the

parties. Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn. App. 220, 223, 142 S.W.2d 737, 745 (1940); see

also 1 Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States,

§ 1.9, at 44 (2d ed. 1987); 3 Alexander Lindley & Louis I. Parley, Lindley on
3Williams v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d at 619; Hartz v. Hartz, 234 A.2d 865, 870 (Md. 1966);

Fick v. Fick, 851 P.2d 445, 450 (Nev. 1993); Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 167 (Pa. 1990).

4This formulation of the standard is used by the twenty-one states which have adopted

either the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, § 6(a)(2)(I), 9B U.L.A. 369, 376 (1983) or the

Uniform Marital Property Act, § 10(g)(2)(ii), 9A U.L.A. 103, 122 (1983).

5Herget v. Herget, 550 A.2d 382, 385 (Md. App. 1988),rev'd on other grounds, 573 A.2d

798 (Md. 1990); Panossian v. Panossian, 569 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (App. Div. 1991); In re Estate

of Beesley (Beesley v. Harris), 883 P.2d 1343, 1348 (Utah 1994).

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Separation Agreements and Antenuptual Contracts, § 90.03 (MB) (1995).

Accordingly, engaged persons who plan to execute a prenuptial agreement must

make “a full disclosure of the nature, extent and value” of their property in order

to enable their prospective spouse to make a knowledgeable decision about

entering into the agreement. Williams v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 616, 619 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 1992). The required disclosure may be accomplished through a formal,

explicit process, such as exchanging lists of holdings, or it can be made more

informally over the course of the relationship. Kahn v. Kahn, 756 S.W.2d 685,

695 (Tenn. 1988).

The adequacy of a particular disclosure depends upon the context in which

it was made. Therefore, the lengths to which a person must go in revealing his or

her financial interests can only be determined by the circumstances of each

particular case. Rather than formulating precise tests, many courts have required

that the disclosure be “full and fair”3 or “fair and reasonable”4 or some other

similar formulation. All these standards, in essence, require that the disclosure be

essentially fair under all the circumstances.

While some state courts have resolved the issue differently, most courts

have not construed the full and fair disclosure requirement to mandate detailed

disclosures such as financial statements, appraisals, balance sheets, or the like. In

re Estate of Lopata, 641 P.2d 952, 955 (Colo. 1982); In re Thies (Thies v. Lowe),

903 P.2d 186, 189 (Mont. 1995); In re Estate of Geyer, 533 A.2d 423, 427 (Pa.

1987); Hartz v. Hartz, 234 A.2d 865, 871 n.4 (Md. 1967); In re Estate of Hill, 335

N.W.2d 750, 753 (Neb. 1983); see also, 2 John Tingley & Nicholas P. Svalina,

Marital Property Law, § 28.05 (rev. 2d ed. 1995). Thus, in the absence of fraud

or overreaching, the inadvertent failure to disclose an asset5

 or the unintentional
6Farver v. Hilty, No. S-91-3, 1991 WL 254224, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1991).

7Mr. Wilson testified later that the value of the zero coupon bonds at maturity was

$31,000 but that their market value in 1991 prior to the marriage was $18,232.

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undervaluation of an asset6

 will not invalidate a prenuptial agreement as long as

the disclosure that was made provides an essentially accurate understanding of the

party’s financial holdings. The disclosure will be deemed adequate if it imparts

an accurate understanding of the nature and extent of a person’s property interests.

Nanini v. Nanini, 802 P.2d 438, 441 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).

B.

Mr. Wilson’s financial holdings immediately prior to his marriage to Ms.

Moore consisted of (1) a 360-acre farm partially owned with his parents, (2) a

furnished farm house, (3) farm equipment and vehicles, (4) approximately seventy

head of livestock, (5) a boat, and (6) twelve other accounts or assets worth

between $130,000 and $160,000. While he did not provide Ms. Moore with a

detailed list of these assets and their value prior the execution of the prenuptial

agreement, he attempted as best he could to familiarize her with his holdings.

Ms. Moore was familiar with Mr. Wilson’s farm and was even privy to his

negotiations in 1991 to sell a portion of the farm to Charles Green. She was also

familiar with the farm house and its contents because she had visited there often

while the parties were dating. Sometime after the engagement, Mr. Wilson

removed each of his financial files from a filing cabinet in his bedroom, described

each one of his accounts to Ms. Moore, and even gave her an estimate of the

current value of the assets. Mr. Wilson unintentionally overlooked a $5,000

certificate of deposit and 250 shares of stock in First Pikeville Bank because he

did not have folders for these assets. He also overvalued his Sherson Lehman

account by approximately $13,000 because he mistook the maturity value of the

bonds in the account for their current market value.7

Ms. Moore seemed generally disinterested in the information about Mr.

Wilson’s holdings. She asked no questions while Mr. Wilson was describing his

property and never asked for additional information about these accounts. She
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reviewed and signed the prenuptial agreement ten days before the wedding

without comment or question. The agreement, which was drafted by Ms. Moore’s

former lawyer at Mr. Wilson’s request, specifically recited that both parties were

“fully acquainted with the business and resources of the other,” that both parties

“understood the assets and possessions of the other,” that both parties had

“answered all questions the other has asked about income and assets,” and that

both parties “had access to any and all financial information of the other party.”

Under all the circumstances of this case, Mr. Wilson made a full and fair

disclosure of his financial holdings to Ms. Moore. His inadvertent omission of

two assets whose value comprised ten to fifteen percent of the total value of his

holdings was not material or significant enough to prevent the enforcement of the

prenuptial agreement. This omission was also partially off-set by Mr. Wilson’s

mistaken overvaluation of one of his other assets. Accordingly, we concur with

the trial court’s conclusion that Mr. Wilson’s disclosure of his holdings was

sufficient to enable Ms. Moore to execute the prenuptial agreement

knowledgeably as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-501.

III.

THE DIVISION OF THE MARITAL PROPERTY

Ms. Moore also takes issue with the trial court’s decision to classify the

increase in value of several of Mr. Wilson’s accounts during the marriage as his

separate property. Since Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a) (1991) vests trial courts

with wide discretion with regard to classifying and dividing property, Fisher v.

Fisher, 648 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tenn. 1983), these decisions are entitled to great

weight on appeal. Edwards v. Edwards, 501 S.W.2d 283, 288 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1973). They will be presumed to be correct unless the evidence preponderates

otherwise, Hardin v. Hardin, 689 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), or

unless they are based on an error of law. Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 775 S.W.2d 618,

622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). 

A.

MR. WILSON’S RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS
8The $2,646 difference between the total increase in the value of these accounts and Mr.

Wilson’s contributions represents the investment income of these two accounts.

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Mr. Wilson participated in the Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System

and in the state-sponsored 403(b) deferred compensation program during the

marriage. He arranged for his retirement contributions and his monthly $350

contributions to his 403(b) plan to be deducted automatically from his paycheck.

From September 1991 through March 1994, Mr. Wilson contributed $4,099 to his

retirement plan and approximately $11,850 in his 403(b) plan. As a result of the

earnings on these investments, the combined value of both accounts increased by

approximately $18,594.978 during the marriage.

The trial court first determined that the increase in the value of Mr.

Wilson’s retirement accounts during the marriage was marital property and

awarded Ms. Moore one-half of the total increase. The trial court later reversed

itself. We have determined that the trial court’s first decision was correct. These

contributions were marital property.

The prenuptial agreement contains two provisions relevant to the

classification of Mr. Wilson’s retirement contributions. One on hand, it states:

The parties hereto shall retain the title to and

shall manage and control the estate which they now

own, or which they may inherit or receive by gift,

whether it be realty, personalty or mixed, together with

all increase or addition thereto, as though such party

had remained single and unmarried, and entirely free

and unmolested by the other party, as well as the right

to encumber, sell, dispose of or give away, by will or

otherwise, all of said estate so separately owned and

possessed. Should the marriage between the parties be

terminated by annulment or divorce . . . no claim for

property distribution alimony, [or] support . . . shall be

made by either of the parties hereto against the other

party or the estate or inheritance or gifts of the other

party.

On the other hand, it also states:

Both parties acknowledge that they may accumulate

certain other property during their marriage by virtue of

their joint efforts. Such property acquired jointly shall
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not be deemed part of the separate property of the

parties discussed herein.

Thus, the parties agreed that increases in the value of their separate property

would be considered separate property but that they could also accumulate marital

property during the marriage.

Prenuptial agreements should be construed with reference to the statutes

governing the distribution of marital property. They should also be construed

using the rules of construction applicable to contracts in general. In re Estate of

Wiseman, 889 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); Gilley v. Gilley, 778

S.W.2d 862, 863 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Sanders v. Sanders, 40 Tenn. App. 20,

30, 288 S.W.2d 473, 477 (1955). Thus, the courts’ role is to ascertain and to give

effect to the contracting parties’ intent. Bob Pearsall Motors, Inc. v. Regal

Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc., 521 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tenn. 1975); Winfree v. Educators

Credit Union, 900 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

Contracting parties’ intent is embodied in their written agreements. Gredig

v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 891 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

Accordingly, the courts must examine the text of the contract in the context of the

entire agreement. Cocke County Bd. of Highway Comm’rs v. Newport Utils. Bd.,

690 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Tenn. 1985); Cookeville Gynecology & Obstetrics, P.C. v.

Southeastern Data Sys., Inc., 884 S.W.2d 458, 462 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

Contractual terms should be given their ordinary meaning, Breeding v.

Shackelford, 888 S.W.2d 770, 775 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); Jaffe v. Bolton, 817

S.W.2d 19, 25 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), and should be construed harmoniously to

give effect to all provisions and to avoid creating internal conflicts. Rainey v.

Stansell, 836 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Park Place Ctr. Enters.,

Inc. v. Park Place Mall Assocs., L.P., 836 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Ambiguities in contract language should be construed against the party

responsible for drafting the contract. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Haney, 221 Tenn. 148,

153-54, 425 S.W.2d 590, 592-93 (1968); Grand Valley Lakes Property Owners

Ass’n v. Cary, 897 S.W.2d 262, 267 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
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Mr. Wilson asserts that the contributions to his retirement accounts during

the marriage should not be subject to division as marital property because they

were “increases” or “additions” to accounts he owned prior to the marriage. Ms.

Moore, on the other hand, contends that these contributions were marital property

because they came from salary Mr. Wilson earned during the marriage. Ms.

Moore has the better argument.

The provision on which Mr. Wilson relies was intended to counteract Tenn.

Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B) (1991) which states that increases in the value of

separate property during the marriage should be treated as marital property if each

party contributed substantially to the preservation and appreciation of the separate

property. Its evident purpose was to make sure that all appreciation in the value

of the property that each party owned prior to the marriage would remain separate

property notwithstanding any “contributions” the other party might make. We do

not construe the provision to enable one spouse to place property that would

otherwise be marital property beyond the reach of the other spouse simply by

depositing it into an account that existed prior to the marriage.

Mr. Wilson’s contributions to his retirement accounts came directly from

the salary he earned during the marriage. His salary was not separate property

under either the prenuptial agreement or state law. It was not covered by the

agreement because it was not part of Mr. Wilson’s premarital estate and because

he did not receive it by inheritance or gift. Likewise, it did not fit within the

definition of separate property in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2) (1991) but

rather was marital property for the purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-

121(b)(1)(A) (1991). Since Mr. Wilson’s salary earned during the marriage was

marital property, Mr. Wilson could not place it beyond Ms. Moore’s reach simply

by directing that it be deposited into his separate accounts.

We have determined that the $15,949 in contributions thatMr. Wilson made

to his retirement accounts during the marriage were marital property subject to

division. Since the abridged record does not enable us to determine how much of

the investment income should properly be attributed to these contributions, we

have determined that the $2,646 earned during the marriage should be treated as
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Mr. Wilson’s separate property in accordance with the prenuptial agreement.

Accordingly, we have determined that Mr. Wilson should have been awarded his

retirement accounts but also that he should have been ordered to pay Ms. Moore

$7,974.50 in full and complete settlement for her interest in this property.

B.

MR. WILSON’S OTHER ACCOUNTS

Ms. Moore also insists that she was entitled to a portion of three other

financial accounts. She claims that the funds in these accounts are marital

property because Mr. Wilson opened the accounts during the marriage. We do not

agree that the funds in these accounts are marital property solely because the

accounts were opened during the marriage.

Mr. Wilson testified without contradiction that the funds for the three

accounts in question came from his farming activities, either from the installment

sale of a portion of the farm property, from the proceeds of the sale of cattle, or

from renting portions of the farm land to others. There is no dispute that Mr.

Wilson owned the farm prior to the marriage, and thus that the funds in these

accounts were proceeds from this separate asset. Both the prenuptial agreement

and the statute governing the distribution of marital property provide that property

acquired in exchange for separate property and income from separate property

remains separate property. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(B), -121(b)(2)(C)

(1991). Since the record contains no evidence that Mr. Wilson intended to treat

these assets as marital property, we concur with the trial court’s conclusion that

these accounts should be classified as Mr. Wilson’s separate property.

IV.

THE SPOUSAL SUPPORT AWARD

Both parties take issue with the trial court’s decision to award Ms. Moore

rehabilitative alimony by directing Mr. Wilson to provide her medical insurance

for three years or until she remarried or became employed. Ms. Moore asserts that

she was entitled to more spousal support; while Mr. Wilson predicably insists that
9Our courts have traditionally invalidated provisions in prenuptial agreements that affect

a spouse’s right to spousal support. Kahn v. Kahn, 756 S.W.2d at 694; Duncan v. Duncan, 652

S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983);Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 604, 385 S.W.2d

288, 293 (1964). Most other jurisdictions now honor agreements affecting spousal support. See,

e.g., Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941, 943-46 (Ky. 1990); Frey v. Frey, 471 A.2d 705,

710 (Md. 1984); see also 1 John Tingley & Nicholas B. Svalina, Marital Property Law §§ 25:01

- 25:05 (rev. 2d ed. 1995).

In 1989, a panel of the Western Section of this Court declined to follow the traditional rule

and predicted that the Tennessee Supreme Court would uphold spousal support restrictions in

otherwise valid prenuptial agreements when squarely presented with the issue. Gross v. Gross,

C.A. No. 257, slip op. at 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 1989) (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application

filed). Recently, another Western Section panel declined to follow the Gross decision and

declined to give effect to a prenuptial agreement’s spousal support restriction. Cary v. Cary,

App. No. 02-A-01-9401-CV-0003, slip op. at 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1995), perm. app.

granted (Tenn. May 1, 1995). The Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision to review Cary v. Cary

provides strong support for the Gross court’s prediction of the demise of the traditional rule.

It is not necessary for us to address the question of the enforceability of the prenuptial

agreement’s spousal support restriction because Mr. Wilson has explicitly waived his reliance

on this provision.

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Ms. Moore was entitled to no support at all. We have determined that Ms.

Moore’s spousal support should be reduced.

The trial court ignored the provision in the prenuptial agreement in which

both parties waived their right to request spousal support if they were divorced.

Rather than relying on the prenuptial agreement,9 Mr. Wilson asserts that Ms.

Moore is not entitled to spousal support under the facts of this case using the

criteria in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) (Supp. 1995). For her part, Ms.

Moore asserts that she should have received spousal support more commensurate

with the temporary support she was receiving prior to the divorce.

Trial courts exercise broad discretion in determining whether to award

spousal support as well as the amount and duration of support if it is warranted.

Hawkins v. Hawkins, 883 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); Loyd v. Loyd,

860 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993); Luna v. Luna, 718 S.W.2d 673, 675

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). These decisions are guided by the factors in Tenn. Code

Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) and are entitled to great weight on appeal. Batson v.

Batson, 769 S.W.2d 849, 859 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). Accordingly, the appellate

courts are disinclined to second-guess these decisions unless they are not

supported by the evidence or are contrary to the public policies reflected in the

statutes governing spousal support. 
10During the marriage, Mr. Wilson earned $75,898, while Ms. Moore earned $1,587.

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The current statutes governing spousal support reflect a preference for

temporary rehabilitative support as opposed to long-term support. Tenn. Code

Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) (economically disadvantaged spouses should be

rehabilitated whenever possible). The facts of this case support the trial court’s

decision to provide Ms. Moore with some rehabilitative support, but they also

militate against the length of support awarded by the trial court.

This marriage was of relatively short duration. Ms. Moore precipitated the

divorce. She contributed comparatively little to the parties’ finances10 and

apparently made little other non-financial contributions to the marriage. During

the marriage, Mr. Wilson paid for many of Ms. Moore’s non-marital expenses

such as a note Ms. Moore executed before the marriage and expenses relating to

a home that Ms. Moore owned with her first husband. He also paid for Ms.

Moore’s education expenses at Chattanooga State Technical Community College

and for a portion of the expenses Ms. Moore incurred to support her children by

her first marriage. 

We have determined that requiring Mr. Wilson to provide Ms. Moore with

medical insurance was a proper form of rehabilitative support. In light of Ms.

Moore’s contributions to the marriage, the financial benefits she received during

the marriage, the amount of her separate property, and the funds she received in

the division of the marital property, we have determined that Mr. Wilson should

be required to provide Ms. Moore with medical insurance for two years from the

date of the entry to the final decree or until she remarries or becomes employed.

V.

We affirm the portions of the judgment declaring the parties divorced and

upholding the validity of their prenuptial agreement. In accordance with this

opinion, we remand the case with directions to enter an order directing Mr. Wilson

to pay Ms. Moore $7,974.50 for her interest in the marital estate and to reduce the

duration of Mr. Wilson’s spousal support obligation from three to two years. We
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also tax the costs of this appeal in equal proportions to Hayden D. Wilson, Jr. and

to Kathryn Ann Moore and her surety, for which execution, if necessary, may

issue.

__________________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

CONCUR:

__________________________________

HENRY F. TODD, P.J., M.S.

__________________________________

SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE