### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A ugus t 11
, 200 4

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. JOHN WHAT LEY

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Maury County

No. 13006 Stella Hargrove , Judge

No. M2003- 01773-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Dece m ber 22, 2004

The a ppellant, J ohn Whatley , was c onvicted by a jury in the Maury

County Circuit Court of ag g ravated sexual battery . The trial c ourt sentenc ed the a ppellant to twelve y ear s in the Tenne ssee De pa rt me nt of Cor

re c tio n. On app e a l, the app e lla nt c ha lle ng e s th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s a c tio ns a s th ir te e nth juror, the specific ity of the indictment, the trial court’s instructions r eg arding l esser -included of fe ns e s, the tr ia l c ou rt ’s e vid e nti ary ru lin g s, se nte nc ing
, a nd the de nia l of his mot ion fo r n e w t ri a l. Up on ou r r e vie w o f the re c or d a ndthe pa rt ie s’ br ie fs , w e a ffi rm th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt ; howeve r, in light of B lakely v. Washington, __ U .S. __, 124 S. C t. 2531 (2004), we modify the appellant’ s sentence to eleven y ear s.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court is Aff irm ed as M odi fie d.

N ORM A M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

Michae l A. Colavecc hio, Nashville, Tenne ssee ( o n appea l), and L . Samuel Patterson, Columbia, T e n n e s s e e ( a tt r i a l )
, f

o r t h e ap p e l l a n t , J o h n W h a t l e y.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; El iza be th T

. Ry a n, Se nio r Cou ns e l; M ark F ulk s, Assistant A tt o rn e y

G e n e r a l; M ike B o tt o ms , D istric t Attorney Gene ral; and Joey

Penrod and Christine Thompson, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

On Ma rc h 2 2, 20 02 , th e app e lla nt w a s ind ic te d fo r ra pe of a c hil d. Th e pr oo f a dd uc e d a t tria l, taken in the lig ht most favorable to the State, reve aled that at the end of Februa ry or the be g inning of Mar ch 1996, the appellant lived in a mobile home at 207 L ewis Street in Woodland Trailer Park in Colum bia. Sever al fa m i l y m em bers a lso lived in the mobil e home, including L isa Fr azier, theIt i s t he p o l i cy o f t his co urt no t t o rev ea l t he na m es o f ch i l d victi m s o r wit ne sses i n sex ua l l y rel ated crim es. 1

W e wi l l a ddr es s t h es e i s s u es i n a di f fer en t or der t h an t h at i n w h i ch t h ey w er e r ai s ed. 2

-2- appellant’ s g irlfriend a nd the victim’s mother, and the then three -y ear -old victim, the child of F razier and the appellant. Whil e living at the mobile home, the victim shared a bedroom with his brother, 1 AF. T he victim, who was ten y ear s old at t he ti me of trial, testified t hat he and AF wer e not allowed

ou t of the ro om t o e a t or

us e the ba thr oo m. Th e re wa s n o to ile t in the be dr oo m; the re fo re , th e vic tim

an d AF urinated and de fec ated on “ [a] ny thing that we could.” Additionally , the bedr oom had a window, but the victim c ould not se e out of the w indow beca use it was cove red w ith duct tape. The victim stated that he did not know t he color of t he mobi le hom e “be cause I never seen the outside until Imoved out.”

Du ri ng a we e kd a y wh e n it wa s lig ht ou tsi de
, the app e lla nt c a me to the be dr oo m th e vic tim

a ndAF sh ared

. Th e app e lla nt p ic ke d u p th e vic tim a ndc arrie d h im t o th e ba thr oo m. T he vic tim

rec alled that the ba throom had “kind of like sunf lower wallpaper ” and “ some kind of fur on the toi le t.” On c e in the ba thr oo m, the app e lla nt loc ke d the do or , p ull e d d ow n h is p a nts , a ndpu t hi s p e nis in the victim’s m o u t h

. The victim described the appe llant’s penis as being “very hard a nd it had hair.” After

the offe nse, the a

ppellant orde red the victim not to t ell any one what had happene d. The victim reca lled that the offense oc curr ed “[a]t least a fe w months” befor e Nove mber 1996 whe n he

w a s r e m o v e d f

r o mt h e ap p e l l a n t ’ s c u s t o d y.

On No ve mbe r 2 7, 19 96 , G loria Ke lly , a ne mp l o y e e of

the De pa rt me nt o f C hil dr e n’ s Se rv ic e s, visited the appellant’ s mobile home in Maury County

. She found all re sidents except the victim and AF in the liv ing ro om of the ho me

. She wa s inf or me d that the tw o b oy s w e re in the be dr oo m. K e lly enter ed the be droom wher e she f ound the victim and AF

. Kelly noticed that the room contained no beds, and it was extremely dark be cause aluminum foil covere d the windows. The vic tim and AF

wer e sca ntilydresse d an d ap p eared malnourishe d and hung ry . Bits of torn diape r we re sc attere d around the room, and the room was “saturated with urine” and had a “strong fec es smell.” The four children w ere remove d from the a ppellant’s home.

At the c on c lus ion of the pr oo f, the jury fo un d th e app e lla nt n ot g uil ty of the c ha rg e d o ff e ns e of ra pe of a child. Howeve r, the appellant was c onvicted of the lesser- included off ense of ag g ravated sexual ba ttery and was sentenc ed to twe lve y ear s in the Tennesse e De partment of Corr ection. On

app e a l, the app e lla nt ra ise s the fo llo wi ng iss ue s: (1 ) wh e the r the tr ia l c ou rt fa ile d to a c t a s th ir te e nth juror; (2) w hether

the indictment failed to state with specificity when the of

fense was a lleg ed to have

occur red; (3) whether

the t rial court failed to prope rly instruct the jury

on all lesser- included offe nses; (4) whe ther the tria l c ourt err ed in “[a]l lowing the jury to hear about the living c onditions in the ho me in wh ic h the a lle g a tio ns we re a lle g e d to hav e oc c ur re d, a s irr e le va nt to the c ha rg e s in this case” ; (5) whe ther the tria l court incorr ectly applied enha nceme nt fac tors to the appellant’ s sentenc e; and ( 6) whe ther the tria l court err ed in de ny ing the appellant’ s motion for new tria l based upon a conf

lict of interest with a me mber of the District Attorney Gene ral’s of

fice

. 2-3- II. Ana lys is

A. I ndictment

As his first issue, the appe llant challeng es the indictment cha rg ing him with the off

ense of rape of a c hild. Under both the fe dera l and state c onstitut ions, a criminal ac cused is entitled “to be informed of

the nature and ca

use of the a ccusation” ag ainst him. S ee U .S. Const. Amend. VI ; see also Tenn. Const. Art. I , § 9. This require ment is m et wh en an i ndictment char g ing a n acc used “provide s sufficient information (1) to ena ble the ac cused to know the acc usation to which answe r is r e qu ir e d, (2 ) t o f

ur nis h th e c ou rt

a de qu a te ba sis fo r the e ntry of a pr op e r jud gment , and(3 ) t o protec t the acc used fr om double jeopar dy .” State v. Hill, 954 S.W .2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997)

.

I n the instant case , the indictment char ged t h at the appe llant “on or a bout the __ day

of F e br ua ry , 1 996, in M a ury

Cou nty , T e nn e sse e a ndbe fo re the fi nd ing of the ind ic tme nt, did

un la wf ull y a ndint e nti on a lly , kno wi ng ly or re c kle ssl y se xua lly pe ne tr a te [the vic tim ], a

pe rs on le ss than thirteen ( 13) y ear s of age
, in violation of Tennesse e Code Annota ted 39-13-522, a ll of which is ag ainst the pea ce a nd dignity of the State of T ennesse e.” T he appe llant contends that the
specific ity

of that date in the indictm ent should not require the Appellant to pre pare a def ense tha t this even m ay h av e instead

occur red in January , 1996, nor in Marc h, 1996. T h e Appellant prepa red to de fend himself in this case by providing uncontrove rted proof that he never lived in a trailer home with a bathroom de corated wi th s un fl ow e r w a llp ape r a nda fu r- c ov e re d to ile t. .

. . Th e Sta te place d befor e the jury

and the tria l court e x tensive proof that the trailer home from which the victim wa s remove d by D.H.S. worke rs in November

1996 was the tra iler hom e i n wh ich the alleg ed eve nt

occur red.

Ba sed upon the for ego ing a rg ument, it appear s that the appe llant’s true c omplaints concern the sp e c if ic ity of the ind ic tme nt a nd a

po ssi ble va

ri a nc e be tw e e n th e ind ic tme nt a ndthe pr oo f. We w ill

a dd re ss b othof

the app e lla nt’ s c omp la int s.

We note that an “indictment m u s t state the fa cts constituting the of fense in ordinary

and concise lang uag e, without prolix ity or repetition, in such a manner as to ena ble a pe rson of c ommon understandi n g t o know what is intended, a nd with that deg ree of ce rtainty which will enable the court, on c onviction, to pronounce the proper judgme nt.” T en n

. Code Ann. § 40-13- 202 (2003). Howeve r, “[t] he time at which the offe nse was committed need not be st ated in the indictment, but the offe nse may

be alleg ed to have been c ommit t ed o n anyday befor e the f

inding ther eof, or g ener ally befor e the f

inding of the indictment, unless the time is a materia l ingr edient in the off ense.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 13-207 (2003) ; see a lso St ate v. B yrd, 820 S

. W .2d 739, 740 (Tenn. 1991)

. We conclude that the indictment char g ing the appellant is suffic iently specific to alert the a

ppellant of the ne ed t o d ef

en d ag ainst the cha

rg e of r ape of

a child and to pr event f

urther c harg es which-4-

wo uldvio la te do ub le je op ard y . Se e Rog e r L e e Wils on v. Sta te , N o. E2 00 3- 01 37 8- CCA -R 3- PC, 20 04 W L 15 33 83 0, a t *8 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. a t K no xvill e , July 8, 20 04 ), app lic a tio n f

or pe rm . to appea l filed, (Sept. 8, 2004).

More o v er , we n ote that any complaints reg arding a variance betwee n the proof a nd the indictment a

re likewise without merit. “A varia nce betwee n an indictment or a subsequent bill of particula rs and the evidenc e pre sented a t trial is not fatal unless it is both m aterial and pre judicial.” State v. Shropshire, 45 S.W .3d 64, 71 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000); see also State v. Moss, 662 S .W.2d 590, 592 (Tenn. 1984) . A variance is not material when substantial c orre spondence exis ts betwee n the proof a nd the indictment. See Shropshire, 45 S.W.3d 7 1

. T h e ap pellant’s main complaint appea rs to be that the State f

ailed to unequivoca lly

prove tha t the offe nse occur red in F ebrua

ry 1996. Howeve r, as we ear lier stated, the indictment pr ovides that the offe nse occur red “on or about the __ da y of F e br ua ry , 1 99 6. ” Th e pr oo f r e ve a le d that the vic tim wa s take n fr om the app e lla nt’ s ho me in November

1996. The victim testified t hat t he offense occurr ed “[ a]t least a few months” be fore he

was re moved from the a

ppellant’s custody , substantially corr esponding with the date alleg ed in the indictment.

Further, in the instant ca se, there was no que s t i o n t h at t he victim was unde r the a g e of thi rt e e n a t th e tim e of th e off ens e . A dd iti on a lly , th e vic tim a sse rt e d o nly

a sin g le se xua l a c t. Moreove r, as the a

ppellant contends on a

ppeal, the a

ppellant’s entire defe nse was that he had neve r lived in a mobile home with a bathroom such as that described by the victim. The def

ense w as not that he had not lived in such a mobile home only during Fe bruary

1996. Notably , it is i mmaterial wh e the r the of

fe ns e oc c ur

re d in F e br

ua ry 19 96 or a s late a s Nov e mbe r 199 6, wh e n all of the po ssi ble da te s w e re pr ior

to the fi lin g of

the ind ic tme nt. Se e Sta te v. Vi c ke rs , 985 S.W. 2d 1, 9 (T e nn . Crim. A p p

. 1 9 9 7 ) ; s e e a ls o St a te v

. A n d r e w N e a l D a v is
, N o

. M 2 0 0 2

- 02375-CCA- R3

- CD
, 2 0 0 4 WL 1562544, at *18 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, July9, 2004), perm. to appeal de nied, (Te nn. 2004). Furthermore , this court has l ong been “sensitive t o the fact that y oung children w ho are victims of child abuse ma y

not be able t o t es t i fy that abuse oc curr ed on a spe cific date, or provide extensive de ta ils in this re g ard .” Sta te v. B ro wn , 99 2 S. W.2 d 3 89 , 3 91 (T e nn . 1 99 9) . A c c or din g ly , th e re is

no ind ic a tio n th a t th e app e lla nt’ s def e ns e wa s hampe re d by a va ri a nc e in the pr oo f r e g ard ing the tim e f r a me f o r th e o f f e n s e

. Se e St a te v

. M ic h a e l T h o ma s o n , N o

. W1 9 9 9

- 0 2 0 0 0

- CC A

- R3

- CD
, 2 0 0 0 WL 298695, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Mar. 7, 2000) ; see a lso St ate v. Philip Charles Saindon, J r., No. M2001-01860-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 354508, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Fe b. 14, 2003).

B. A dmission of Evidence
Next, the appellant contends tha t the trial court erre d in allowing the State to present e vidence reg arding the conditions in which the victim was living in November 1996. The a

ppellant ar g ues that th e te sti mon y wa s ina dmi ssi ble un de r Rul e 40 4( b) of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f E vid e nc e be c a us e “the e vidence should have be en excluded as it wa s much more pr ejudicial than pr obative.”

Te nn . R. Ev id. 40 4 p ro vid e s:-5- (b ) Othe r Cr ime s, Wro ng s, or Ac ts. - Ev ide nc e of ot her c ri me s,
wr on g s, or

a c ts i s n ot a dmi ssi ble to p ro ve the c ha ra c te r o f a pe rs on in

o r d e r t o s h o w a c t i o n i n c o n f

o r m i t y w i t h t h e c h a r a c t e r t r a i t

. It m a y, howev e r , b e a d mi s s ib le f o r o th e r p u rp o s e s

. T h e c o n d it io n s w h ic h

mus t be sa tis fi e d b e fo re a llo wi ng su c h e vid e nc e are :
(1) The court upon re quest must hold a hea ri n g outside the jury ’s pr e se nc e ;
(2) The court must determin e t h at a material issue exists other than

c on du c t con fo rm ing wi th a c ha ra c te r t ra it a ndmus t up on re qu e st s ta te on the re cord the materia l issue, the ruling , and the r easons f or admitting the e vidence ; and

(3 ) T he c ou rt mu st exc lud e the e vid e nc e if its pr ob a tiv e va lue is outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice.

Se e a lso State v. Parton
, 694 S.W .2d 299, 302 (Tenn. 1985) . A trial court’s decision re g arding the admission of Rule 404(b) evide nce will be reviewe d under a n abuse of discretion standa

rd; howeve r, “the de cision of the trial c ourt should be af forde d no d ef

er en ce unless there has bee n substantial compliance with the proce dural re quirements of the R ule.” State v. DuB ose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn. 1997)

.
Gene rally , “[o] nly

in an exceptional ca se will another c rime, wrong , or bad a ct be r eleva nt to a n is su e oth e r t

ha n th e a c c us e d’ s c ha

ra c te r. Suc h e xce pti on a l c a se s include ide nti ty , in te nt, motive, opportunity , or re buttal of mistake o r ac ci d en t .” State v. L uellen
, 867 S.W .2d 736, 740 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). I n making its de cision reg arding the admissibilit y of the testimony , the trial court must first deter mine if the offe red te stimonyis releva nt to prove something other than the

app e lla nt’ s c ha

ra c te r. I f the e vid e nc e is r e le va nt, the n, up on re qu e st, the c ou rt wi ll p ro c e e d to a

Rul e 4 0 4 (b ) h ea ri n g.

Th e da y be fo re tr ia l, the tr ia l c ou rt he ld a he ari ng on a mot ion in l imi ne fi le d b y the app e lla nt,

a sk ing that th e tr ia l cou rt pr oh ibi t evi de nc e re g ard ing the liv ing c on dit ion s o f the app e lla nt’ s h ome while the victim lived with him, such as the pre sence of human wa ste in the victim’s bedroom. The trial court, acting out of an abundanc e of caution, instructed the State not to revea l the conditions of the home unless the c onditions became r eleva nt during the course of trial. At trial, the conditions of the ho me we re no t r e ve a le d d ur ing the Sta te ’s ini tia l di re c t e xami na tio n o f the vic tim

. On c ro sse xami natio n, the app e lla nt e lic ite d te sti mon y that th e vic tim

ha d li ve d in mor e th an on e mob ile home, sug g esting that the victim wa s confuse d as to the mobile home whe re the offe nse occ urre d.

As a result of the appe llant’s cross-e x amination of the victim, cha lleng ing the location of the sexual abus e, t h e S t at e re quested the tria l court’s pe rmission to present evidenc e re g arding the-6-

conditions of the appellant’s mobile home at the t ime the vi ctim lived with him. The trial court, afte r conducting a jury -out hea ring in compliance w ith Rul e 40 4(b), noted that the appellant r aised the issue that the victim ha d lived in mor e than one mobile home

. There fore
, the trial court found that the pr ob a tiv e va lue of

the inf or ma tio n o utw e ig he d th e po te nti a l pr e jud ic e the inf

or ma tio n c ou ld

e ng e nd e r. Th us , th e vic tim wa s a llo we d to br ie fl y te sti fy to the c on dit ion s of the app e lla nt’ s mo bil e home.
Additionally , the State re quested the tria l court’s pe rmission to have Gloria Ke lly testify as to the conditions of the appe llant’s mobile home prior to the re moval of the c hildren. The trial court allowed Ke lly ’s testimony to corrobor ate the vic tim’s testim ony beca use “the d ef

ense ha s opened the door for

that, with their cross ex amination of [ the victim] .” Howe ver, the trial court limited the testimonyreg arding the conditions of the mobile home, allowing only the conditions of the victim’s bedroom to be revea led t o the j ury . Testimony describing other

poor conditions that exis ted in the home was not a llowed.

As we note d ear lier, the appellant asserts tha t the trial court err ed in a llowing the testimony describing the co n d i t i o n s the victim endure d while living with the a ppellant. Specific ally , the appellant c omplains about testimonyfrom the victim and Kelly conce rning the pre sence of urine a nd fec es, torn diape r bits, and a da rkene d window in the bedroom the vic tim shared with his brother. Fr o m o u r re v i ew o f t h e re co rd
, we q u es t i o n wh et h ert h e l i v i n g co n d i t i o n s q u al i fyas a “ cr i m e, wr o n g, or bad a ct” suc h as conte mplated by Rule 404(b). Reg ardle ss, upon the appe llant’s objection, the trial court de termined during jury -out hea ring s that the appellant opened the door for such testimony by elicitin g t es t i m o n y fr o m the victim that he had lived in more tha n one mobile home. The trial court pointed out t hat during cr oss-examination, the appellant implied that the victim was conf used

as to th e s p e c if

ic mo b il e h o me in w h ic h th e e v e n t o c c u rr e d

. T h e tria l c o u r t f o u n d tha t it was

“ app ro pr ia te to j us t le t th e jury kn ow that [th e vic tim ] wa s r e mov e d a ndtake n to a n a pp ro ve d s ta te foster home [t hat would not approve of such c onditions] .” The ref ore, the trial court c oncluded that the living conditions w ere highly rele vant and probative of the issue of identity and lack of mistake. We ag ree with the trial court that the a ppell an t ’s q u estioning of the victim opened the door to the te sti mon y of wh ic h h e c omp la ins . T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

C. Thirteenth Juror/Sufficiency of the Evidenc e

Th e app e lla nt ph ra se s his ne xt i ssu e a s a c ha lle ng e to the tr ia l c ou rt ’s act io n as th ir te e nth juror; howeve r, the bulk of the a ppellant’s ar g ument rela tes to the sufficie ncy of the e vidence supporting his c onviction. We beg in our ana ly sis by not i n g t hat Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Pr oc e du re 33 (f

) pr ov ide s that “ [t]he tr ia l c ou rt ma y g ra nt a ne w tr ia l fo llo wi ng a ve rd ic t of g uil ty if it d isa g re e s w ith the jury abo ut the we ig ht o f the e viden ce.” Whe n a tr ia l c ou rt

make s a determination followin g R u l e 33(f ), the c ourt is acting as thirteenth juror . See State v. Gillon, 15 S.W .3d 4 9 2
, 5 0 0 (T en n. Crim. App. 1997). This court has obse rved tha t once the trial court ha s approve d the ver dict as the thirtee nth juror, our appellate revie w i s then l imited to determining the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence

. See State v. Bur lison, 868 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). I n th e ins ta nt c a se , th e tr ia l c ou rt , s pe c if ic a lly a c ting as th ir tee nthjur or , f ou nd“ that th e ve rd ic t is-7-

overw helmingly

supported by

the evidenc e in thi s two-day trial.” The ref

ore, w e will addre ss the appellant’ s complaint as a c halleng e to the suff iciency of the e vidence

. On appe al, a jury

conviction re mov es t h e p resumpti on of the a ppellant’s innoce nce a nd repla ces it with one of g uilt, so that the appellant car ries the burden of demonstrating to this court why the evidenc e will not support the jury ’s finding s. See S t at e v . Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). The a

ppellant must establish that no “rea sonable trier of fa ct” c ould have f

ound the essential ele ments of the offense bey ond a reasonable doubt. See J ackson v. V irg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct . 2781, 2789 (1979); Te nn. R. App. P. 13(e).

Acc ording ly , on appea l, the State is entitled to the stronge st leg itimate view of the e vidence and all re asonable infere nces w hich may be draw n there from. See State v. Wil liams, 657 S.W .2d 405, 410 ( T e n n

. 1 9 8 3 )

. I n o th e r w o r d s , q u e s ti o n s c o n c e r n in g th e c r e d ib il it y o f w it n e s s e s a nd the weig ht and value to be g iven t he evide nce, a s well as all fa ctual issues ra ised by the evidenc e, ar e resolved by

the trier of

fac t, and not the appe llate courts. See State v. Pruett, 788 S.W .2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990)

.

I n the i nstant case , the appellant was convicted of ag g ravated s exual battery . “Ag g ravated

se xua l batte ry is un la wf

ul se xua l c on ta c t wi th a vic tim by the de fe nd a nt or the de fe nd a nt by a vic tim ” when the “victim is le ss than thirteen (13) y ear s of ag e.” T enn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-504(a )(4) (2003).

“ ‘S e xua l c on ta c t’ inc lud e s the int e nti on a l touc hin g of the vic tim ’s [or ] the de fe nd a nt’ s .

. . int imate parts, . . . if that intentional touching can be rea sonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual

arousa l or g ratification.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-501(6) (2003).

At trial, the victim testified that when he was thre e y ear s old, the appellant picked him up and

c arrie d h im t o th e ba thr oo m. O nc e in the ba thr oo m, the app e lla nt loc ke d the do or , pu lle d do wn his pa nts , a ndins e rt e d h is p e nis int o th e vic tim ’s mou th. Th e vic tim te sti fi e d th a t th e app e lla nt’ s p e nis was “ hard” and “ha d hair on it.” The appellant a lso warne d the v i ct i m not to tell any one what ha pp e ne d. I t w a s p e rm iss ibl e fo r the jury to “ use the ir

c omm on kn ow le dg e a nde xpe ri e nc e in

makin g re a so na

ble inf e re nc e s f ro m e vid e nc e .” Sta te v. Me e ks , 876 S.W. 2d 12 1, 13 1 ( Te nn . Crim. App

. 1 9 9 3 )

. A s s u c h
, th e ju r y c o u ldh a v e d r a w n u p o n th e ir c o mm o n k n o w le d g e to in f e r th a t the appellant f

orce d fellatio for the purpose of sex ual arousal or g ratification. See State v. J ack War ren Emert, Jr., No. 03C01-9802-CC-0 0 0 7 4
, 1 999 WL 512029, at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, J uly 21, 1999). We co n cl u d e t h at the jury could re asonably

have de termined fr om the fore g oing evidenc e that the a

ppellant committed ag g ravated sexual battery

.

D. L esser -I ncluded Of

fense I nstructions
Next, the appellant alleg es that the trial court e rre d in not inst ructing the jury on the lesser

included off

ense of child abuse. The state conte nds that the appe lla n t h as waived this issue. Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 18 -1 10 (2 00 3) pr ov ide s:-8- (a) When reque sted by a p arty in writing prior to the trial judg e’s instructions to the jury

in a criminal case , the trial judg e shall instruct the ju r y a s to th e la w o f e a c h o f f e n s e s p e c if

ic a ll y id e n ti f

ie d in the reque st that is a lesser included off ense of the offe nse cha

rg ed in the indictment or prese ntment. Howeve r, t he trial judge sha ll not ins truct the jury as to any such off ense unle s s the judg e dete rmines that the

rec ord conta ins any

evidenc e which r easona

ble minds could acc ept as to the l esser included off

ense. In making this determination, the trial jud g e sh a ll vie w the e vid e nc e lib e ra lly in the lig ht m os t f a vo ra ble to th e e xis te n c e o f th e le s s e r in c lu d e d o f f e n s e w ith o u t ma

k in g any jud g me nt o n th e cre dib ili ty of su c h e vid e nc e . T he tr ia l ju dg e sh a ll

a lso de te rm ine wh e th er the e vid e nc e , v ie we d in thi s li g ht, is l e g a lly sufficie nt to support a conviction for the lesser inc luded offe nse.
(b ) In th e abs e nc e of a wri tt en r e qu e st f ro m a pa rt y sp e c if ic a lly identify ing the particula

r lesser included offe nse or offe nses on which a jury instruction is sought, the trial judge may char g e the jury on any le sse r i nc lud e d o ff

e ns e or of fe ns e s, bu t no pa

rt y sh all be ent itl e d to any such cha rg e.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contra ry , when the def endant f ail s t o re q uest the instruction of a le sser include d offe nse as required by

this section, such instruction is waived. Absent a w ritten reque st, the failure of a trial judge to instruc t the jury on any lesser included offe nse m ay not be presented as a g round for

re lie f e ith e r i n a

mot ion fo r a

ne w t ri a l or on app e a l.

I n the instant ca s e, t h e appellant did not request an instruc tion on child abuse. I n fac t, the

re c o r d r e f l e c t s t h a tt h e ap p e l l a n ts p e c i f i c a l l y i n f o r m e d t h e t r i a l c o u r tt h a th e w a s c h o o s i n g n o tto reque st an instruction on child abuse. Thus, the State c ontend s t h at b as ed upon Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 40-18-110( a) a nd (b), the a ppellant has wa ived his complaint on appea l.

I nitially , we note that a pane l of t his court has rec ently opined t hat “the waiver provision of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-18-110 is an unconstitu t i o n al abr og ation of a c riminal defe ndant’s rig ht to have the jury char g ed on all off

enses include d within the indicte d offe nse and

su pp orte d by the pr oo f ad du c e d at tri a l.” Sta te v. Rob e rt Pa g e , N o. W20 03 -0 13 42 -C CA -R 3- CD , s lip op. at 15-16 (T enn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Aug . 26, 2004), application for perm. to appeal f iled, (O c t. 2 5, 20 04 ). Ho we ve r, we ne e d n ot a dd re ss tha t is su e be c a us e the app e lla nt wa s not en tit le d to the lesser -included of

fense instruction he see ks in the instant case.

A t ri a l c ou rt ’s de c isi on re g ar d i n g wh e the r t o c ha rg e a jury re g ard ing a

le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e is a mix ed que s t i o n o f l aw and fa ct, which de cision this court will review de novo with no presumption of cor

rec tness. See State v. B owles, 52 S.W .3d 69, 74 (Tenn. 2001) . “I n apply ing the-9-

les s e r

- in c lu d e d o f

f e n s e d o c trin e , th r e e q u e s ti o n s ar is e : ( 1 ) w h e th e r a n o f f e n s e is a le s s e r

- in cluded offe nse; (2) whether the evidenc e supports a lesser-included offense instruction; and (3) whe ther a n ins truc tio na l e rr or is ha

rm le ss. ” Sta te v. Al le n, 69 S.W. 3d18 1, 18 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) . A tr ia l c ou rt is not require d to char g e an of fense s i mply

beca use it is a lesser- included off ense of the cha rg ed offe nse. “Whether

or not a pa

rticular le sser-inc luded offe nse should be cha rg ed to the jury

depends on whether

proof in the r ecor d would support the lesser char g e.” State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 468 (Tenn. 1999) . I f the instruction is war rante d by the evidenc e, the trial court must instruct the jury on all lesser- included off

enses r eg ardle ss of any theory proposed by either the def ense or the State. See State v. Richmond, 90 S.W .3d 648, 660 (Tenn. 2002)

. I n determining whe ther the le sserinc lud e d o ff

e ns e sh ou ld be c ha

rg e d, “ the tr ia l c ou rt

mus t vi e w the e vid e nc e lib e ra lly in the lig ht m os t favor able to the e x istence of the lesser -included of

fense wi t h o u t m aking any judgme nts on the

cre dibilit y

of such e vidence .” B urns, 6 S.W.3d at 469.

The c urre nt test for determining whether an offense is a le sser-inc luded offe nse wa s outlined by our supre me court in Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 466-67. I n addition to an en u m er at ed t est , the B urns court noted that an offense may be considered lesser-include d if so desig nated by the leg islature. I d.

a t 46 7 n .1 2. Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d se c tio n 3 9- 15 -4 01 (d ) ( 20 03 ) s pe c if ic a lly de sig na te s c hil d abuse a s a lesser -included offense “of any kind of .

. . sexual offense if the victim is a child.” See State v. Elkins, 83 S.W .3d 706, 711 (Tenn. 2002) . Acc ording ly , child abuse is a le sser-inc luded offe nse of r ape of

a child.

Howeve r, the proof

in the instant case did not support an instruction on child abuse. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec t i o n 39-15-1- 401(a) (2003) pr ovides that child abuse oc curs whe n “[a]nyperson who know ingly other than by acc idental means, trea ts a child under eig hteen ( 18) y ear s of ag e in such a

manner as to inf lict injury .” The off

ense a s to a child under e ighte en is consider ed

a Cla ss A mis de me a no r; ho we ve r, if the vic tim

is u nd e r s ix y e ars of

a g e , the of

fe ns e is a Cla ss D fe l o n y

. I d

. T e n n e s s e e C o d e A n n o t a t e d s e c t i o n 3 9

- 1 1

- 1 0 6 ( a ) ( 2 ) d e f i n e s “ b o d i l y

i n j u r y ” a s “ a

c ut, abra sion, bruise, burn or disfig ureme nt; phy sical pain or te mporar y i l l ness or impairment of the function of a

bodily member, or g an, or me ntal fac ulty .”

There was no proof

prese nted at trial that the vic t i m suffe red a ny injury as a r esult of the appe llant’s conduct. Ac cording ly , even in the lig ht most favorable to the exis tence of the lesse rincluded off

ense, the evidenc e did not support an instruction on child a b use. Thus, the trial c ourt did not err in fa iling to cha rg e the jury

on the lesser -included of fense of child abuse

. E. Sentencing
Appellate r eview of

the leng th, r an ge o r manner of ser vice of

a sente nce is de novo. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d) (2003). I n conducting its de novo revie w, this court consider s the following fac tors: (1) the e vidence , if any , rec eived at the trial and the se nt en ci ng hearing; ( 2) the pr e se nte nc e re po rt ; (3) the pr inc ipl e s of se nte nc ing a ndarg ume nts a s to se nte nc ing a lte rn a tiv e s; (4) the nature a nd char ac teristics of the c riminal conduct involved; (5) evidenc e and inf ormation of fe re d b y the pa rt ie s o n e nh a nc e me nt a ndmit ig a tin g fa c tor s; ( 6) a ny state me nt b y

the app e lla nt i n-10-

his own behalf; and (7) the potential for r ehabilitation or treatment. See Tenn. Code A nn. §§ 40-35- 10 2, -1 03 , - 21 0 ( 20 03 ); se e a lso Sta te v. As hb y , 8 23 S.W. 2d16 6, 16 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 1) . T he bu rd e n is

on the appellant to demonstrate the impropriety of hi s sentenc e. S ee T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401, Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts . M or e ov e r, if the re c or d r e ve a ls tha t the tr ia l c ou rt a de qu a te ly considere d sentenc ing principles and all rele vant facts and circumstance s, this court will acc ord the trial court’ s determinations a pr esumption of corr ectne ss. I d. at (d); Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

The a ppellant was c onvicted of a ggravated sexual battery , a Class B f elony . To beg in a sentenc ing de termination reg ardi n g a Class B f elony , a court should beg in at the pre sumptive min imu m, the n “ e nh a nc e the se nte nc e wi thi n the ra ng e a s a pp ro pr ia te fo r the e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s, and then r educe the s entenc e as appropriate for the m itigating fac tors.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(e) . The p re s u m p t i v e sentence f or a Class B felony

is the minim um sentence within the appropriate ra ng e. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( c). The a ppellant was se ntence d as a standa rd Rang e I o ff

ender . Acc ording ly , the pre sumptive sentence for the a ppellant’s Class B f

elony conviction was e ight y ear s. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112( a)( 1)-( 3) (1997)

.
The trial c ourt found the e x istence of two enhanc ement fa ctors: (5) t h e v i ctim was particula rly vulnera ble bec ause of

ag e or phy sical or menta l disabilit y , and (16) the appellant a bused a position of private tru s t

. S ee T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(5) and (16) (2003). On a ppeal, the appellant c halleng es on l y t h e trial court’s application of enhanc ement fa ctor (5) reg arding the victim’s vulnerability

. We note that the particularly vulnera ble enha nceme nt fac tor may b e u s ed i n child sexual abuse case s beca

use the fac tor “re lates more to the natura l phy sical and mental limit atio n s o f t he victim than merely

to the victim’s ag e.” State v. A dams, 864 S.W .2d 31, 35 (Tenn. 1993) . I n other words, “[t]he factor c an be use d in an [child sex ual abuse ] case if the c ircumstance s show that the victim, because of his ag e or phy sical or menta l condition, was in fac t ‘ particula rly vulnera

ble,’ i.e., incapa ble of resisting
, summoning help, or testify ing ag ainst the per petrator.” I d. I n the instant case
, the trial court found that the three -y ear -old victim was kept in isolation in the mobile home in which he lived with the ap p el l an t and was preve nted from summoning help. The f acts a dduced at trial support this finding.

Howeve r, we are compelled to note that the Supreme Court r elea sed Blakely v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. C t. 2531 (2004), af ter the trial in this case

. This c ourt has rec ently rec og nized that Blakely “ca lls int o question the continuing validity of our c urre nt s en t encing scheme .” State v. J ulius E. Sm ith, No. E2003-01059 -C C A- R 3 -CD, 2004 WL 1606998, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, J uly

19, 2004); see a lso St ate v. Micha el Way ne Poe, No. E2003-00417-CCA-R3-CD, 20 04 WL 16 07 00 2, a t *9 (Te nn . Crim . App . at Kn oxvil le , J uly 19 , 200 4) , a pp lic a tio n f

or pe rm . to appea l filed, (Sept. 21, 2004).

I n B lake ly , th e Sup re me Cou rt he ld tha tA s we earl i er not ed
, t he ap p el l ant did no t co m p l ai n regardi ng t he t ri al co urt ’ s ap p l i cat i o n of enhancem ent 3

fac to r (1 6 ). O u r re v ie w o f the re c o rd re v e a ls tha t the a p p e llan t te stif ie d a t t ria l t h a t t h e vic tim w a s h is so n , an d the vic tim l i ved wi t h hi m at t he t i m e o f t he o f fense. T herefo re, w e co ncl ud e t hat e ven gi ven t he d i ct at es of B l akel y , t he t ri al co urt d id no t er r in fi n d ing e n h a n c e m e n t f a c to r (1 6 ) a p p lica b le to the a p p e llan t.

-11- the “statutory

maxi mum” for Appr endi[v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 1 2 0 S

. C t

. 2 3 4 8 (2 0 0 0 )] p u rp o s e s i s t h e m ax i m u ms en t en ce a j u d ge may impose so le ly on the ba sis of t he fac ts re

fle c ted in th e jur

y verdic t or admitted by the defendant. I n o t h er words, the r eleva nt “statut o ry m axim um” is not the max imum sentence a judge may impose after

finding additional fac ts, but th e maxi mum he may i m pose without

a n y a d d i t i o n a l f

i n d i n g s

. W h e n a

j u d g e i n f

l i c ts punishment that the j ury ’s ver dict alone doe s not allow, the jury has not found all the fa cts “whic h th e l aw make s essential to the p u n i s h m e n t , ” a n d t h e j u d g e e x c e e d s h i s p r o p e r a u t h o r i t y.

B lake ly
, _ _ U .S. a t __, 124 S. Ct. at 2 53 7. Es se nti a lly , B lake ly do e s n ot d isp ute the app ro pr ia te ne ss of a tria l court’s a

pplication of enha nceme nt fac tor (2), w hich is based on the ex i s t en ce of a defe ndant’s prior criminal history ; y et, the constitutionalit y of the a pplication of the re mainder of our statutory enhanc ement factors without such facts being found by a jury or admitted by

an appe llant

rema ins to be seen. Thus, as the ex istence of enhanc ement fa ctor (5) was not found by a jury , nor was it admitted by

the appellant, the application of this enha nceme nt fac tor is inappropriate under B l ak e l y. 3

The trial court specifica lly enhanc ed the appellant’ s sentenc e by two y ear s for e ach of the two

e nh a ncemen t fact or s it

fo un d a pp lic able , g ivi ng the app e lla nt a se nte nc e of

tw e lve y e ars

. Ac c o r d in g ly
, h a v in g f

o u n d th a t th e ap p li c a ti o n o f e n h a n c e me n t f a c to r ( 5 ) w a s e rr o r , we a re compelled to re duce the appellant’ s sentence by two y ear s.

Howeve r, our analy sis of the appellant’ s sentenc e is not y et complete. Fr om our revie w of the appe llant’s p resentence report, we notice that the appellant ha s a history of numerous misdemeanor c onvictions. Base d upon this documented hi story of criminal convictions, we conclude that enhanc eme n t fac tor (2), tha t the appellant ha s a pre vious historyof criminal convictions in addition to those necessa ry to establish the appropriate ra ng e, is applica ble to the appellant. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(2) . As such, we conclude that the appe llant’s sentenc e sh ou ld b e e nh a nc e d b y

on e y e ar. Th e re fo re , the app e lla nt’ s tot a l e ff e c tiv e se nte nc e is e le ve n y e ars

.

F . Co nf lic t of I nte re st
As his final issue, the appe llant questions whether the t ri al court erre d in “denying the Ap pe lla nt’ s ‘ Mo tio n f

or Ne w T ri a l’ ba se d o n the fa c t th e pr os e c uto r f or the Sta te

. . . h a d p re vio us ly worke d for the O ffice of the Public Def ender , who re prese nted the g irlfriend of the Appellant in her-12-

c a se , a ndwa s p re se nt w he n s he wa s inte rv ie we d co nc e rn ing the c a se , whi c h wa s bas e d on th e sa me fac ts alleg ed ag ainst the Appellant in this case .”

I nitially , we note tha t the appellant f iled a mo t i o n fo r n ew trial on May 21, 2003, which motion did not include the conflict issue. A hearing on the motion was conduc ted, and, on June 17, 2003, the trial court entere d a written order de ny ing the motion. Subsequently
, on J uly 16, 2003, the appellant simultaneously

filed an amende d motion for new tria l and a notice of appe al. The a mended motion for new tria l raised the issue of a conf lict. Wi thout ruling on the timeliness of the a mended motion, the trial court hea rd ar g uments and denie d the motion.

Rul e 33 (b ) o f the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ri min a l P ro c e du re pr ov ide s th a t a tr ia l c ou rt

“ sh a ll upon motion allow amendments liberally until the day of the he aring of the motion for ne w trial.” Further, “ this rule does not preve nt a judg e fr om allowing, at hi s or her discretion, an a mendment to a mot ionfo r n e w t

ri a l a t a ny tim e du ri ng wh ic h th e tr ia l ju dg e ha s ju ri sd ic tio n o f the c a se .” Sta te v. Shawn Rafa el Boug h,

__ S.W .3d
__, No. E2002-00717-SC-R11-CD, 2004 WL 2481367, at *6 (Tenn. at Knox ville, Nov. 1, 2004). As we noted ear lier, the trial court denied the motion for new tr ia l prior to the app e lla nt fi lin g his a me nd e d mot ion fo r ne w tr ia l. Mo re ov e r, the app e lla nt f ile d h is notice of appea l on the s ame day that he filed his amende d motion for ne w trial. The f iling of the

no tic e of app e a l r e mov e d th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s jurisd ic tio n o ve r the c a se , p la c ing jurisd ict ion wi th this court. I d. at **6-7. Ac cording ly , t h e trial court wa s without jurisdi ction to hear the appe llant’s amende d motion for new tria l. There fore , beca use the appellant did not raise the issue in his origina l motion or in an amende d motion before the trial court lost its jurisdiction over the case , this iss ue has bee n waived. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e)

.
III. Conclusi on

Ba sed upon the for eg oing, w e af firm the judg ment o f t he trial c ourt, but reduc e the appellant’ s sentence to eleven y ear s.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE