UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ AARON MICHAEL STEVENSON, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. KVC BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE, INC.; JASON HOOPER, Chief Executive Officer of KVC; MEGAN NELSON, KVC Case Manager; BRITTANY SMITH, KVC Case Manager, Defendants - Appellees. No. 18-3005 (D.C. No. 5:17- CV-03027-SAC) (D. Kan.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before PHILLIPS , McKAY , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ In November 2014, Franklin County Di strict Court in Kansas adjudicated Plaintiff Aaron Michael Stevenson’s child, C.S ., to be a “Child in Need of Care.” Two years later, Frank lin County District C ourt terminated the pare ntal rights to C.S. of both Plaintiff and C.S.’s mother. De fendant KVC Behavioral Healthcare, Inc. (“KVC”), a private non-profit organization, placed C.S. in a fo ster home and began providing family support servic es between Plaintiff and C.S. Plaintiff appealed the termination of his parental rights. In Febr uary 2017, while his appeal in state court

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judica ta, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consiste nt with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 15, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 was still pending, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ag ainst KVC and KVC employees in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas. This complaint alleged KVC and its employees violated hi s constitutional rights by forcing a case plan upon him before his paternity was established, prohib iting him from attending the same church as his child , and discriminating against hi m because of his criminal history. Defendants moved to dismiss the complain t. Plaintiff did not file a timely response. The district cour t entered an order to show cause why Defendants’ motion should not be granted. After Plaintiff still did not respond, the district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss for three reasons. First, the court held the Younger abstention doctrine, set forth in Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37 (1 971), barred the court from interfering with the ongoing st ate court proceedings. Second, the court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on the dom estic relations exception to federal jurisdiction recognized in Ankenbrandt v. Richards , 504 U.S. 689 (1992). Third, the court held Plaintiff failed to state a claim under § 1983 because neither KVC nor its employees are state actors and Plai ntiff failed to allege sufficient facts to establish they acted under the color of state law. On appeal, Plaintiff fails to address these holdings of the district court’s Memorandum and Order. Instead, he repeats the same arguments he made before the district court: (1) KVC unconstitutionally for ced a case plan on him before paternity was established; and (2) KVC unconstituti onally caused him to miss church because his son attended that church. As the distri ct court ably explained in its Memorandum3 and Order, these claims fail because the Younger abstention doctrine denies the district court the ability to exercise its jurisd iction. ROA, 44–45; see also Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs , 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999). Where the district court accurately analyzes an issue, we see no useful purpose in writing at length. Because the Younger abstention is sufficient to justify the district court’s grant of the motion to dismiss, we need not address the other two independent grounds on which the di strict court relied. Plaintiff only raises one new issue that he did not raise before the district court and, thus, the district court did not address. Plaintiff ar gues he was unable to contest Defendants’ motion to dismiss because he never received a copy of the motion. Defendants were required to mail the moti on to Plaintiff’s last known address. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C). According to Defendants’ certificate of service attached to their motion to dismiss, th ey did indeed mail the motion to the most recent address on record for Plaintiff. At th is point, service was complete. See id. Five days after Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, Pl aintiff entered a noti ce of a change of address. The record shows that same day, the clerk of the District of Kansas forwarded the motion to dismiss to this new address. In short, the record indicates Plaintiff was appropriately served the mo tion to dismiss. In any event, nothing Plaintiff might have argued in a response to Defendants ’ motion to dismiss would change the fact that, under the Younger abstention doctrine, the district court could4 not exercise jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court,

Bobby R. Baldock United States Circuit Judge