UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4562

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RAUF ABDUL SALAM, a/k/a Pierre Demaro Banks, a/k/a Radio,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Glen E. Conrad, Chief 

District Judge. (7:12-cr-00073-GEC-2)

Submitted: March 30, 2015 Decided: April 15, 2015

Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Paul G. Beers, GLENN, FELDMANN, DARBY & GOODLATTE, Roanoke, 

Virginia, for Appellant. Anthony P. Giorno, Acting United 

States Attorney, R. Andrew Bassford, Daniel P. Bubar, Assistant 

United States Attorneys, Franklin Sacha, OFFICE OF THE UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Following a jury trial, the district court sentenced Rauf 

Salam to 292 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute 

and possess with intent to distribute 1000 grams or more of 

heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 

846 (2012). Salam raises several challenges to his conviction 

and sentence. We affirm. 

Salam asserts that the district court erred in admitting 

testimony by a drug trafficking expert in light of the 

Government’s insufficient disclosure under Rule 16(a)(1)(G) of 

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, testimony by several 

coconspirators, and testimony regarding allegedly unrelated drug 

activities. We review the district court’s admission of 

evidence for abuse of discretion, and we “will only overturn [a] 

ruling that is arbitrary and irrational.” United States v. 

Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 130 (4th Cir.) (alteration in original) 

(internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 157 

(2014). Our careful review of the record on appeal leaves us 

without doubt that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting the challenged testimony. 

Next, Salam challenges the district court’s refusal to give 

a jury instruction regarding multiple conspiracies. “We review

the district court’s decision to give or refuse to give a jury 

instruction for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Sarwari, 
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669 F.3d 401, 410-11 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). A multiple conspiracy instruction “is not required 

unless the proof at trial demonstrates that [the defendant]

[was] involved only in [a] separate conspiracy[y] unrelated to 

the overall conspiracy charged in the indictment.” United 

States v. Stockton, 349 F.3d 755, 762 (4th Cir. 2003)

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Because there was no evidence that Salam was involved in a 

conspiracy separate from that for which he was indicted, we 

conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

refusing to give a multiple-conspiracy instruction.

Salam also argues that the district court erred by refusing 

to grant a mistrial based on comments made by the Government 

during closing arguments. We review the “denial of a motion for 

a mistrial for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Johnson, 

587 F.3d 625, 631 (4th Cir. 2009). The defendant must show that 

the comments were improper and prejudicial. See United States 

v. Powell, 680 F.3d 350, 358 (4th Cir. 2012). In making the 

prejudice determination, we consider four factors:

(1) the degree to which the prosecutor’s remarks have 

a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the 

accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or 

extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of 

competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of 

the accused; and (4) whether the comments were 

deliberately placed before the jury to divert 

attention to extraneous matters. 
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United States v. Woods, 710 F.3d 195, 203 (4th Cir. 2013) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Applying these standards to 

the facts before us and assuming -- without deciding -- that the 

challenged comments were improper, we conclude that Salam 

suffered no prejudice and that the district court therefore did 

not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial.

Finally, Salam contends that the district court erred in 

applying the leadership role enhancement. To qualify for this

enhancement, a defendant must have been “an organizer or leader 

of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants 

or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) (2013); see 

also id. § 3B1.1 cmt. nn.2 & 4. Because application of this 

enhancement involves a factual determination, we review for 

clear error. See United States v. Steffen, 741 F.3d 411, 415 

(4th Cir. 2013). After our review of the record on appeal, we 

conclude that the district court did not clearly err by applying 

the enhancement. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED