FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TULALIP TRIBES OF WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF WASHINGTON;

WASHINGTON STATE GAMBLING

COMMISSION; DAVID TRUJILLO,

Director of the Washington State

Gambling Commission, in his

official capacity; JAY INSLEE,

Governor of the State of

Washington, in his official capacity,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-35464

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-00688-

RAJ

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 11, 2014—Seattle, Washington

Filed April 17, 2015

Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Richard C. Tallman,

and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown
2 TULALIP TRIBES V. STATE OF WASHINGTON

SUMMARY*

Tribal-State Gaming Compacts

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment in an

action seeking amendment of a tribal-state gaming compact

to enable the Tulalip Tribes of Washington to acquire

additional licenses to video player terminals for Class III

gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.

The panel held that the district court did not err in its

consideration of the parties’ simultaneous cross-motions for

summary judgment.

Distinguishing Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465

F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2006), the panel held that a “most-favored

tribe” clause in the compact did not require the State of

Washington to adopt Tulalip’s amendment, which did not

mirror the restrictions set forth in another tribe’s compact. 

COUNSEL

Lisa M. Koop (argued), Office of the Reservation Attorney,

Tulalip Tribes of Washington, Wulalip, Washington; Phillip

E. Katzen, Kanji & Katzen, PLLC, Seattle, Washington;

Riyaz A. Kanji, David Giampetroni, and Philip H. Tinker,

Kanji & Katzen, PLLC, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for PlaintiffAppellant.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
TULALIP TRIBES V. STATE OF WASHINGTON 3

Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General, and Callie M.

Castillo (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Olympia,

Washington, for Defendants-Appellees.

Craig J. Dorsay and Lea Ann Easton, Dorsay & Easton LLP,

Portland, Oregon, for Amicus Curiae Samish Indian Nation.

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to interpret a tribal–state gaming

compact between the Tulalip Tribes of Washington

(“Tulalip”) and the State of Washington. More specifically,

at issue are electronic scratch ticket and online lottery games

that use video player terminals. Tulalip asks us to force the

State to amend the compact so that Tulalip can acquire

additional licenses to these terminals. Citing the “mostfavored tribe” clause in its compact, Tulalip argues that it is

entitled to what it characterizes as the “more favorable terms”

available to the Spokane Tribe through a mechanism known

as the Inter-Tribal Fund. We disagree. We conclude that the

terms of the compact do not require the State to adopt

Tulalip’s amendment.

BACKGROUND

I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF TRIBAL GAMING

This dispute occurs against the backdrop of manyiterative

changes to tribal–state gaming compacts, so we begin with

the basics of tribal gaming. The Indian Gaming Regulatory

Act (“IGRA”), which was passed by Congress in 1988,
4 TULALIP TRIBES V. STATE OF WASHINGTON

provides a framework for “the operation of gaming by Indian

tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development,

self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.” 25 U.S.C.

§ 2702(1). IGRA “provide[s] a statutory basis for the

regulation of gaming by an Indian tribe adequate to shield it

from organized crime and other corrupting influences, to

ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the

gaming operation, and to assure that gaming is conducted

fairly and honestly by both the operator and players.” Id.

§ 2702(2).

Under IGRA, lawful gaming is divided into three classes,

each of which is subject to different regulations. We have

previously summarized the classes:

Class I gaming covers “social games solely

for prizes of minimal value or traditional

forms of Indian gaming engaged in by

individuals as part of, or in connection with,

tribal ceremonies or celebrations.” 25 U.S.C.

§ 2703(6). Class II gaming includes bingo

and card games that are explicitly authorized

by a state or “not explicitly prohibited by

the laws of the State and are [legally] played

at any location in the State.” Id.

§ 2703(7)(A)(ii). Class II gaming specifically

excludes banked card games and slot

machines.

Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712,

715 (9th Cir. 2003). Class III gaming, the subject of this

appeal, includes “all forms of gaming that are not class I

gaming or class II gaming,” 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8), such as slot

machines and other “high-stakes games usually associated
TULALIP TRIBES V. STATE OF WASHINGTON 5

with casino-style gambling,” Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand

Casino, 353 F.3d at 715.

For class III gaming to be lawfully conducted on tribal

lands, three conditions must be satisfied: “(1) authorization

by an ordinance or resolution of the governing body of the

Indian tribe and the Chair of the National Indian Gaming

Commission . . . ; (2) location in a state that permits such

gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or

entity; and (3) the existence of a Tribal–State compact

approved by the Secretary of the Interior.” Id. at 715–16

(footnote omitted) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)).

In Washington, the process for entering into tribal gaming

compacts is governed by both federal and state law—IGRA

and the Revised Code of Washington § 9.46.360. The

process begins when a tribe asks the state to enter into

negotiations for a gaming compact. 25 U.S.C.

§ 2710(d)(3)(A); Wash. Rev. Code § 9.46.360. The

Executive Director of the Washington State Gambling

Commission is authorized to negotiate on behalf of the state. 

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.46.360(2). Following approval by the

Commission, the proposed compact is sent to the Governor

for review and execution. Id. § 9.46.360(3), (6). Once the

Governor and the tribe execute a compact, or an amendment

to a compact, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior reviews it and

it takes effect after the Secretary’s approval has been

published in the Federal Register. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B).

II. THE TULALIP COMPACT

In 1991, Tulalip and the State of Washington signed a

tribal–state gaming compact (the “Tulalip Compact”), an

agreement that has since been amended numerous times.
6 TULALIP TRIBES V. STATE OF WASHINGTON

A 1998 amendment to the Tulalip Compact authorized

Tulalip to operate a Tribal Lottery System, which authorizes

tribes to operate electronic scratch ticket and online lottery

games that use video player terminals. According to Tulalip,

“the terminals resemble video slot machines.” The terms of

the Tribal Lottery System were collectively negotiated

between the State and twelve tribes, including Tulalip, and

resulted in amendments to their gaming compacts. Tulalip’s

amendment became effective on January 28, 1999. See

Notice of Amendment to Approved Tribal–State Compact,

64 Fed. Reg. 4,460-04 (Jan. 28, 1999).

The Tribal Lottery System rules are laid out in “Appendix

X” to the Tulalip Compact. Section 12 of Appendix X

prescribes how terminals are allocated to tribes. Each tribe

receives a base allocation of the right to operate 675 terminals

after one year. A tribe may increase the number of authorized

terminals, up to an overall limit of 1500, by acquiring unused

allocation rights from any “[e]ligible tribe,” that is, a

compacting tribe with gaming rights consistent with

Appendix X. Any such acquisition or transfer of unused

allocation rights “shall be made only pursuant to a plan

approved by no less than a majority” of eligible tribes. 

Appendix X § 12.4.1. Such a terminal allocation plan exists

among the tribes.

Some aspects of the Tribal Lottery System changed

through a 2007 amendment to the Tulalip Compact. The new

terms were also collectively negotiated, this time between the

State and the twenty-seven Washington tribes with gaming

compacts, including Tulalip. The negotiations concluded in

February 2007, and Tulalip and the State executed the

amendment in March 2007. The amendment became

effective on May 31, 2007. See Notice of Amendment to
TULALIP TRIBES V. STATE OF WASHINGTON 7

Approved Tribal–State Compact, 72 Fed. Reg. 30,392-01

(May 31, 2007).

The updated terms for the Tribal Lottery System are

found in another appendix—this one entitled “Appendix X2.” 

Appendix X2 raised the base allocation to 975 terminals and

also raised the overall limits on terminals. Most tribes have

a new overall limit of 3000 terminals. Three tribes—Tulalip,

the Muckleshoot Tribe, and the Puyallup Tribe—have a

higher overall limit of 4000 terminals. As under Appendix X,

a tribe that seeks to acquire the right to operate terminals in

addition to its base allocation may do so through a plan

approved by a majority of eligible tribes. This terminal

allocation plan is the only mechanism specified in Appendix

X2 for a tribe to obtain rights in excess of its base allocation.

Both Appendices X and X2 contain a “most-favored tribe

clause” that entitles Tulalip to different, more favorable terms

under certain circumstances. The substantive portion of each

clause is the same:

[I]n the event the State agrees (or is required

by law or a court ruling to agree) to permit an

allocation of Player Terminals to a tribe which

is greater, or is on terms which are more

favorable, than as set forth herein, the Tribe

shall be entitled to such greater Allocation or

more favorable terms.

Appendix X § 12.5; Appendix X2 § 12.4.

At the time of the 2007 amendment, the State and the

tribes involved in the collective negotiations also agreed to a

moratorium on amendments. Specifically, Appendix X2
8 TULALIP TRIBES V. STATE OF WASHINGTON

contains a moratorium on compact amendments before

June 30, 2009, unless the amendment would involve a

technical change or would be by mutual agreement. After

June 30, 2009, the tribe may seek an amendment under four

specific circumstances: (1) federal or state law is amended to

authorize gambling devices that were previously not

permitted, (2) a court interpreting Washington law permits

use of a gambling device not previously permitted,

(3) another tribe or entity is allowed to use a type or number

of class III gambling devices that is materially different or

greater in quantity per location than authorized by Appendix

X2, or (4) another tribe offers higher maximum wagers or the

extension of credit.

III. THE SPOKANE COMPACT

The Spokane Tribe is one of two Washington tribes that

did not participate in the collective negotiation process that

led to the Tulalip Compact. In 2005, the Spokane Tribe and

the State arrived at terms of an initial proposed compact, but

the proposal was returned for further negotiations that

proceeded concurrently with the collective negotiation of the

terms of Appendix X2 to the Tulalip Compact, discussed

above. The Spokane Tribe and the State eventually executed

a compact (the “Spokane Compact”) that became effective on

April 30, 2007. See Notice of Amendment to Approved

Tribal–State Compact, 72 Fed. Reg. 21,284-03 (Apr. 30,

2007).

The Spokane Compact also includes multiple appendices. 

The three at issue here are “Spokane Appendix X,”

“Appendix Spokane,” and “Spokane Appendix X2.” Spokane

Appendix X, which mirrors part of the Tulalip Compact,
TULALIP TRIBES V. STATE OF WASHINGTON 9

authorizes operation of lottery games similar to those

described in Tulalip’s Appendix X.

Appendix Spokane, in turn, sets a base allocation of the

right to operate 900 player terminals and an overall limit of

4700 terminals. Appendix Spokane permits the Spokane

Tribe to acquire additional terminal allocation rights over the

base allocation from other authorized Washington tribes. It

departs, however, from the terms of the Tulalip Compact by

establishing the Inter-Tribal Fund as an alternative way to

acquire terminal allocation rights. This option was intended

to address, in part, the fact that few terminal licenses were

available to be leased under the Tribal Lottery System.

To acquire rights via the Inter-Tribal Fund, the Spokane

Tribe would pay into a fund that would be distributed among

eligible tribes. This mechanism would be available only if

certain conditions were met: the Spokane Tribe must make

and report reasonable efforts to obtain rights from other tribes

and must commit to negotiating a revised statewide tribal

gaming framework after three years. Using the Inter-Tribal

Fund would also trigger limits—the Spokane Tribe’s overall

terminal limit would decrease from 4700 to 3000 during

renegotiation.

About 18 months after the Spokane Compact took effect,

the State and the Spokane Tribe agreed to another

amendment, the terms of which are contained in Spokane

Appendix X2. Like Appendix X2 to the Tulalip Compact,

Spokane Appendix X2 raises the base terminal allocation and

allows the tribe to increase the number of terminals that it is

entitled to operate by way of a terminal allocation plan, so

long as the plan has been approved by a majority of eligible

tribes. Spokane Appendix X2 also conditions the Spokane
10 TULALIP TRIBES V. STATE OF WASHINGTON

Tribe’s right to lease terminals to other tribes upon its

decision not to invoke the Inter-Tribal Fund. Use of the InterTribal Fund by the Spokane Tribe would terminate any

terminal allocation transfer agreements executed by the tribe

pursuant to the terminal allocation plan. The Spokane

Appendix X2 amendment became effective on October 24,

2008. See Notice of Approved Tribal–State Gaming

Compact Amendment, 73 Fed. Reg. 63,503-02 (Oct. 24,

2008).

IV. THIS DISPUTE

Tulalip requested negotiations with the State to amend its

compact in 2010. Citing the most-favored tribe clause,

Tulalip wanted to amend its compact to include a mechanism

similar to the Inter-Tribal Fund set forth in Appendix

Spokane. The State disagreed with Tulalip’s interpretation of

both the most-favored tribe clause and Appendix Spokane. 

During negotiations, the State expressed concern that the

Tribe’s proposed amendments did not incorporate the

conditions and limitations contained in Appendix Spokane. 

Negotiations continued into 2012, ending when the Tribe did

not respond to the State’s counterproposal to negotiate an

appendix with an Inter-Tribal Fund, provided that the

amendment included limitations similar to those contained in

Appendix Spokane.

After negotiations broke down, in April 2012, Tulalip

initiated suit in the district court, seeking “a declaration that

the State is in breach of the Compact and an injunction

requiring the State to comply with the Compact.” The Tribe

asserted that the most-favored tribe clause in the Tulalip

Compact entitled it to an Inter-Tribal Fund mechanism. 

Framing the mechanism as an “alternative viable method”
TULALIP TRIBES V. STATE OF WASHINGTON 11

available to the Spokane Tribe but unavailable to Tulalip—

and thus a more favorable term—Tulalip demanded that the

State be forced to execute the proposed compact amendment. 

Tulalip’s proposed amendment does not include the

conditions or limitations that would have been triggered by

using the Inter-Tribal Fund set forth in Appendix Spokane.

The Tribe moved for summary judgment. The State

responded with a cross-motion for summary judgment and

motion to dismiss for failure to join other tribes pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. In a single order, the

district court decided all of the motions and granted summary

judgment to the State.

The court noted that Appendix Spokane became effective

before Appendix X2, perhaps suggesting that the mostfavored tribe clause in Appendix X2 could not be used to

obtain terms found in Appendix Spokane. The court went on

to reason that even if the clause applied, Tulalip’s argument

failed on its merits. On appeal, Tulalip argues both that the

court failed to separately consider its motion for summary

judgment and that the court erred by entering judgment for

the State.

ANALYSIS

I. CONSIDERATION OF THE CROSS-MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

We first consider Tulalip’s argument that reversal is

warranted because the district court failed to separately

consider Tulalip’s motion for summary judgment. “[W]hen

simultaneous cross-motions for summary judgment on the

same claim are before the court, the court must consider the
12 TULALIP TRIBES V. STATE OF WASHINGTON

appropriate evidentiary material identified and submitted in

support of both motions, and in opposition to both motions,

before ruling on each of them.” Fair Hous. Council of

Riverside Cnty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1134

(9th Cir. 2001).

We are perplexed by Tulalip’s challenge because the

district court did exactly what was required by Fair Housing

Council. The court separately reviewed and decided

Tulalip’s motion. The court summarized Tulalip’s

arguments, cited authority referenced by Tulalip, and cited

exhibits to a declaration submitted by Tulalip. It is not

surprising that the court did not organize its discussion of the

cross-motions into separate sections: briefing on the motions

was combined in response to an agreed upon motion by the

parties and the central legal issue was the same. We have no

concern, as we did in Fair Housing Council, that a procedural

technicality rendered the losing motion moot. We are

satisfied that the court “rule[d] on each party’s motion on an

individual and separate basis, determining, for each side,

whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the

Rule 56 standard.” 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.

Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 2720 (3d ed. 1998).

II. INTERPRETATION OF THE COMPACTS

Tulalip’s success here hinges on what is guaranteed by

the most-favored tribe clause, which states that “in the event

the State agrees . . . to permit an allocation of Player

Terminals to a tribe which is . . . on terms which are more

favorable, than as set forth herein, the Tribe shall be entitled

to such . . . more favorable terms.” Appendix X § 12.5;
TULALIP TRIBES V. STATE OF WASHINGTON 13

Appendix X2 § 12.4.1 Tulalip’s effort to benefit from this

clause is unsuccessful because its proposed terms do not even

track the terms of the Spokane Compact.

Our departure point is whether this clause applies in

relation to the Spokane Compact terms that Tulalip claims are

“more favorable.” Tulalip seeks what it calls the “combined”

terminal allocation plan and Inter-Tribal Fund procedures

authorized in the Spokane Compact. Although the initial

Spokane Compact took effect in April 2007, the last

amendment to it became effective on October 24, 2008—

more than a year after Appendix X2 to the Tulalip Compact

took effect on May 31, 2007. In light of this timing, we give

Tulalip the benefit of the doubt and assume that the Spokane

Compact as it was last amended is an acceptable reference

point for potentially more favorable terms. Thus, we do not

adopt the district court’s suggestion that the timing of the two

compacts deprives Tulalip of the benefit of the most-favored

tribe clause.

We next consider the two compacts, which begin on

similar ground. Appendix X2 and Spokane Appendix X2

entitle Tulalip and the Spokane Tribe, respectively, to the

same base allocation of terminals and the right to acquire

additional terminal allocation rights from other eligible tribes

1 We agree with the parties that Washington contract law, which

comports with federal common law, governs the interpretation of the

compacts. See Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d 1095, 1098

(9th Cir. 2006) (noting that IGRA compacts are governed by federal

common law and accepting state law where there is no material

difference). Under Washington law, we “attempt to determine the parties’

intent by focusing on the objective manifestations of the agreement . . . .” 

Hearst Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co., 115 P.3d 262, 267 (Wash.

2005).
14 TULALIP TRIBES V. STATE OF WASHINGTON

via bilateral negotiations pursuant to a terminal allocation

plan.

Should these negotiations fail, however, the compacts

diverge as to the available options. The Tulalip Compact

provides no alternative mechanism by which Tulalip may

obtain more terminal rights if negotiations under the terminal

allocation plan fail. The Spokane Compact offers, by

contrast, an alternative mechanism to obtain more terminal

rights: the Inter-Tribal Fund. Section 6 of Appendix Spokane

provides that if the Spokane Tribe is unable to acquire

allocation rights for terminals in excess of its base allotment

“after making reasonable efforts to do so,” it may obtain such

rights by paying into the Inter-Tribal Fund. Section 7 then

sets forth the mechanics of the Inter-Tribal Fund.

Like Appendix Spokane, Tulalip’s proposed amendment

would authorize Tulalip to use an Inter-Tribal Fund. The

trigger for using the Inter-Tribal Fund would be similar to

part of Section 6 of Appendix Spokane: if Tulalip is unable

to acquire allocation rights for terminals in excess of its base

allotment “after making reasonable efforts,” it would be

permitted to pay into the Inter-Tribal Fund. The Inter-Tribal

Fund would work essentially as described in Section 7 of

Appendix Spokane.

What distinguishes Tulalip’s proposed amendment and

Appendix Spokane are the consequences of using the InterTribal Fund. Unlike Appendix Spokane, Tulalip’s proposed

use of the Inter-Tribal Fund would not require it to accept a

lower overall ceiling on the permitted number of terminals. 

Section 6 of Appendix Spokane, by contrast, establishes clear

consequences for using the Fund—a lower overall limit on

terminals (initially, using the Fund would lower the ceiling on
TULALIP TRIBES V. STATE OF WASHINGTON 15

the Spokane Tribe to 3000 from 4700). Nor would Tulalip’s

proposed amendment require the tribe to participate in

renegotiating a revised statewide tribal gaming framework, as

does Appendix Spokane. Finally, Tulalip’s proposal leaves

out other consequences contained in Spokane Appendix

X2—namely, that the right to lease terminals to other tribes

is dependent on not using the Inter-Tribal Fund and that any

use of the Inter-Tribal Fund would terminate any agreements

executed pursuant to a terminal allocation plan.

In these differences lies the heart of this dispute. The

district court was correct that Tulalip is “cherry-picking” the

terms of its proposed amendment and that the State “never

agreed to the allocation terms [Tulalip] seeks.” Because

Tulalip would have us impose some, but not all, of the

interdependent “terms” that govern the Inter-Tribal Fund in

the Spokane Compact, the proposed amendment can hardly

be described as reflecting “such” “more favorable terms” to

which the State has “agreed”—to echo the language of the

most-favored tribe clause. Tulalip’s proposed amendment is

a sui generis package of terms; the State has not agreed to

them at all. We thus need not reach the question of whether

the terms of the Spokane Compact are actually “more

favorable.”

Tulalip is mistaken that it only seeks the terms of

Section 7 of Appendix Spokane and that these terms are

divisible from the rest of Appendix Spokane. The plain text

of Tulalip’s proposed amendment acknowledges the

importance of Section 6 of Appendix Spokane. Mirroring

Section 6.A, the proposed amendment establishes that the

tribe would only be eligible to use the Inter-Tribal Fund “after

making reasonable efforts” to use the terminal allocation

plan. The interdependency between these provisions
16 TULALIP TRIBES V. STATE OF WASHINGTON

undermines Tulalip’s position that the “more favorable”

terms are contained entirely within Section 7.

Our prior gaming compact case involving a most-favored

tribe clause, Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d

1095 (9th Cir. 2006), does not dictate a different result. The

provision in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes stated, “In the event

any other Indian tribe is permitted by compact or final court

decision to conduct any Class III games in Idaho in addition

to those games permitted by this Compact, this Compact shall

be amended to permit the Tribes to conduct those same

additional games.” Id. at 1098. The plaintiff tribes sought an

amendment to get the “one thing” guaranteed by that

provision: “the operation of the same games conducted by

other tribes under their compacts.” Id. at 1099. They pointed

to a state statute that allowed tribes “to conduct gaming using

tribal video gaming machines pursuant to state–tribal gaming

compacts which specifically permit their use.” Idaho Code

§ 67-429B(1). Citing three tribes that had amended their

compacts to allow for the operation of video gaming

machines, they simply wanted the same thing. Our inquiry

thus centered on the comparatively simple question: were the

tribes entitled to operate those games? Our answer was yes.

Tulalip points to the fact that we simultaneously rejected

the argument that the tribes should be required to accept

limitations on the number of gaming terminals that were also

included in those other tribes’ compacts. Shoshone-Bannock

Tribes, 465 F.3d at 1100. Our reasoning on that point was

grounded in the language of the most-favored tribe clause in

the compact: “[t]he plain meaning of ‘same additional games’

refers to the games themselves and not the number of

machines.” Id.
TULALIP TRIBES V. STATE OF WASHINGTON 17

The question before us here is different. We are

addressing a much broader phrase—the Tulalip Compact’s

promise of such “terms which are more favorable.” Given

the interdependent, conditional nature of the terms that

govern the Spokane Compact’sInter-Tribal Fund mechanism,

Tulalip does not get beyond the threshold question of whether

the State agreed to the terms in its proposed amendment. 

They are not equivalent to the terms of Appendix Spokane.

Our conclusion is consonant with our instruction in

Shoshone-Bannock Tribesthat courts should hold compacting

parties to the ordinary meaning of terms in their agreements. 

Id. at 1098–100. The plain language of the Spokane Compact

shows that the Inter-Tribal Fund mechanism available to the

Spokane Tribe carries with it interdependent conditions and

consequences. Tulalip’s amendment would not match those

terms. We take no view on whether the terms of Appendix

Spokane are in fact more favorable than those included in the

Tulalip Compact. We hold simply that Tulalip is not entitled

as a matter of law to the more selective set of terms in its

proposed amendment.2 The most-favored tribe clause does

not allow a “pick and choose” arrangement. The district

court correctly entered judgment for the State. Simply put,

Tulalip’s proposal does not mirror the restrictions of

Appendix Spokane, and those are the terms to which the State

agreed.

AFFIRMED.

2 Because we affirm the district court on this ground, it is unnecessary

to reach the other issues presented in this appeal.