U.S. Department 

of Transportation 

Federal Aviation 

Administration 

MAY 2 6 2016 

Wayne R. Messinger 

P.O. Box 1710 

Friendswood, TX 77549 

James F. Parker, III 

Office of Airport Compliance and 

Management Analysis 

Lloyd, Gosselink, Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. 

816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900 

Austin, TX 78701 

Dear Messrs. Messinger and Parker: 

800 Independence Ave., S.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

Re: Wayne R. Messinger v. Clover Acquisition Corporation (dba) Pearland Regional Airport, 

Texas, FAADocketNo.16-15-01 

Enclosed is a copy of the determination of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) with respect 

to the above-referenced matter finding the Pearland Regional Airport, Texas, not in violation of its 

Federal obligations with respect to this complaint. The reasons for the finding of compliance are set 

forth in the enclosed Director's Determination. 

The Director's Determination does not constitute a Final Agency Decision and order subject to 

judicial review. [14 CFR § 16.247(b)(2)] A party adversely affected by the Director's 

Determination once issued may appeal the initial determination to the FAA Associate Administrator 

for Airports pursuant to 14 CFR § 16.33(c) within 30 days after the service of the Director's 

Determination. 

Sincerely 

_.-·-;-7 I 1.- j/ /t/? jc_ j/U·n/-

Robin K. Hunt 

Acting Director, Office of Airport Compliance 

And Management Analysis 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 26, 2016, I caused to be placed in the United States mail 

(first class mail, postage paid) a true copy of the FAA's Request for Additional Information and 

Notice of Extension of Time, addressed to: 

For Complainant 

Wayne R. Messinger 

P.O. Box 1710 

Friendswood, TX 77549 

For Respondent 

James F. Parker, III 

Llyod, Gosselink, Rochelle & Townsend, P.C. 

816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900 

Austin, TX 7870 I 

Copy to: 

FAA Part 16 Airport Proceedings Docket 

FAA Airport Compliance and Management Analysis, AC0-100 

c 

0 ce of Airport Compliance and 

Management Analysis 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Wayne R. Messinger, 

Complainant. 

v. 

Clover Acquisition Corporation (dba) Pearland 

Regional Airport, Texas 

Respondent. FAA Docket No. 16-15-01 

DIRECTOR'S DETERMINATION 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Mr. Wayne R. Messinger (Complainant) brings this complaint pnrsnant to 14 CFR Part 16 against the Clover 

Acquisition Corporation d/b/a Pearland Regional Airport (Airport/CAC/Respondent), owner and sponsor of 

Pearland Regional Airport (LVJ), in Pearland, Texas. [FAA Exhibit I, Item 1]. 

The Complainant alleges that the sponsor has banned him from a certain aviation facility at LVJ, namely an 

otherwise public building known as the Fixed-Base Operator (FBO) Building. Complainant alleges that this ban 

violates FAA Grant Assurance 22, Economic Nondiscrimination. The Complainant alleges the Airport's actions 

are in retaliation for him having filed a safety complaint against the Airport. [FAA Exhibit 1, Item 1, page 1 

(Overview)]. 

Complainant alleges that these retaliatory actions have prevented him from using important amenities that the 

airport offers others and are unreasonable and unjustly discriminatory under Grant Assurance 22. As part of the 

Complaint, Complainant also makes reference to Grant Assurance 30, Civil Rights. [FAA Exhibit 1, Item 1, 

page 2]. 

In response to the Complaint, the Airport admits that it prevented Complainant from accessing the FBO building 

at LV J, but argues that the facility in question (FBO building) is not subject to the grant assurances. The Airport 

further responds that even if the grant assurances were applicable, its actions do not violate the grant assurances. 

As a result, the Airport requests that this matter be dismissed or a summary judgment be granted by FAA. [FAA 

Exhibit 1, Item 3, pages 1-6]. 

Upon consideration of the record and the arguments of the parties, the FAA finds that the Airport is not in 

violation of Grant Assurance 22 or 30. 

The administrative record in this proceeding is attached as Exhibit 1. 

Page 1 
Wayne R. Messinger v. Pearland Regional Airport, Texas (FAA Docket No, 16: 15~01)-

II. PARTIES 

A. Airport 

Pearland Regional Airport (L VJ) is a public-use, privately-owned reliever airport owned by Clover 

Acquisition Corporation (AirportJRespondent/CAC). Texas Aviation Partners (TAP) manages tbe Airport's 

operations under contract to CAC. 1 L VJ consists of 565 acres and is located three miles outside Pearland, 

Texas, and approximately seventeen miles south of Houston's city center. As of2013, there were !52 based 

aircraft and 87,250 annual operations. [FAA Exhibit I, Item 8, page 2]. 

The development of the Airport was financed, in part, with Airport Improvement Program (AlP) funding. 

Consistent with the provisions of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, as amended, 49 United 

States Code (U.S.C.) §47101, et seq. and its grant agreement, the Airport is obligated to comply with the 

FAA sponsor grant assurances and related Federal law. Since 2000, tbe Airport has accepted AlP grants 

from the FAA totaling over $15 million. [FAA Exhibit I, Item 9, page 3]. 

B. Complainant 

Wayne Messinger is a private pilot, aircraft owner, and current Airport tenant (through a hangar sublease) at 

LVJ. [FAA Exhibit I, Item I, page 2]. Until September 27,2013, Mr. Messinger held the Operations 

Manager position at LVJ. [FAA Exhibit 1, Item 2, page 1]. 

Ill. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On June 23,2014, Complainant filed an informal14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 13.1 

Complaint with FAA's Texas Airports District Office (AD0) 2 That same day, the ADO forwarded the Part 

13 Complaint to the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) asking for consideration and a 

response. 

3 [FAA Exhibit 1, Item 2, Exhibit 5]. 

On Jnly 7, 2014, the TxDOT wrote to Complainant and dismissed Complainant's allegations. [FAA Exhibit 

I, Item 2, Exhibit I]. 

On January 7, 2015, the Complainant filed this complaint under 14 CFR Part 16. [FAA Exhibit 1, Item 1]. 

On March 3, 2015, the FAA issued a Notice of Docketing. [FAA Exhibit 1, Item 1A]. On March 4, 2015, 

tbe Respondent filed an Agreed Motion to Extend Answer Deadline (Motion for an Extension of Time). 

[FAA Exhibit 1, Item 14]. This motion was granted by the FAA on March 6, 2015. [FAA Exhibit I, Item 

IC]. 

On April 8, 2015, the Respondent filed a Consolidated Original Answer and Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Answer). [FAA Exhibit 1, Item 3]. On April13, 2015, the Complainant filed Complainant's Rebuttal 

(Rebuttal). [FAA Exhibit I, Item 4]. 

On August 14, 2015, the FAA issued a Notice of Extension of Time until November 21, 2015, extending the 

due date oftbe Director's Determination to November 21, 2015. [FAA Exhibit I, Item 13]. 

On December 16,2015, the FAA extended the due date of the Director's Determination to on or before 

January 29,2016. [FAA Exhibit 1, Item 13A]. On February 3, 2016, tbe FAA again extended the due date 

oftbe Director's Determination to on or before April2, 2016. [FAA Exhibit 1, Item 13C]. 

1 For simplicity and clarity, and within context (when pertinent), references to Respondent CAC, TAP, and airport employees, 

were replaced by the word "Airport." In this case, TAP is managing the entire Airport on behalf of CAC, the Airport owner 

and sponsor. 2 The allegations raised in the Part 13 complaint are substantially similar to those made here. 3 Because Texas is a Block Grant Staie, the TxDOT acts as a representative of the FAA on certain matters, including informal 

compliance resolution. 

Page2 
Wayne R. Messinger v. Pearland Regional Airport, Texas (FAA Docket No. 16-15-01) 

IV. CHRONOLOGICAl BACKGROUND 

In March 2004, the Complainant was hired by the owner of the Airport, Clover Acquisition Corporation 

(CAC), as LVJ's Airport Operations Manager. This position required him to supervise office personnel, 

which at one point, included Ms. Leah Langford. [FAA Exhibit I, Item 3, page 8]. 

In 2013, Texas Aviation Partners (TAP) was hired to take over management ofLVJ on behalf ofCAC. As 

part of this process, several incumbent employees were interviewed by TAP, including Complainant and 

Ms. Langford. The Airport states that during these interviews "[it]leamed that [Complainant] had taken up 

residence in his office at the FBO," and that Complainant "had engaged in a pattern of harassing conduct 

toward [Ms. Langford], including inappropriate e-mails and taking surreptitious photographs of her." The 

declaration of Stephen Alexandre, a partner in TAP, states that: 

"As part of TAP's management duties of the Airport and following up on Langford's complaints, I 

conducted an investigation of Massinger' s conduct. During that investigation, I downloaded the 

contents ofMassinger's office computer hard drive. Reviewing the files on Massinger's computer, l 

found evidence to corroborate Langford's complaints, including inappropriate emails and photographs 

of women at the Airport, including Langford, some of which appeared to have been taken 

surreptitiously. Investigating further, I performed a criminal background check of Messinger and 

ascertained that he was convicted of attempted murder with a firearm in 1986. Based on my 

investigation, I determined that Massinger's conduct, coupled with his criminal background, and 

caused Langford reasonably to become fearful for her physical safety." [FAA Exhibit I, Item 3, 

Exhibit I, page 2 and FAA Exhibit I, Item 3, Exhibit I, Exhibit B, pages 329-334]. 

Based on these concerns, TAP made the decision to retain Ms. Langford and not retain the Complainant. 

[FAA Exhibit I, Item 3, Exhibit I, page 2]. 

On September 27,2013, the Complainant's employment was terminated. [FAA Exhibit I, Item 3, Exhibit 

3, page 155]. Despite the termination, TAP alleges that the Complainant "continued his pattern of harassing 

behavior toward Langford." Consequentially, "after [Ms.] Langford complained, TAP instructed [Ms. 

Langford] to inform [Complainant] that he was prohibited from entering the FBO." [FAA Exhibit I, Item 3, 

Exhibit I, pages 2-3]. 

On October 18, 2013, the Complainant sent an e-mail to Ms. Langford, who by this time had become the 

new Airport Operations Manager. In that email, Complainant congratulated Ms. Langford on her new 

position and seems to suggest that weeks before his actual termination, TAP had made plans to fire him and 

place her in his position. In the email, the Complainant also requested that Ms. Langford write a colunm for 

the Bay Area Aero Club (BAA C) newsletter, which had been his fmmer practice. Complainant also stated 

to Ms. Langford that he "would do anything to help her." Specifically, in an e-mail to Ms. Langford, 

Complainant wrote: 

"Leah, It was good to see you today ... I'm thrilled for you that you are full time at the airport. (The 

TAP folks finally did something right.) Did they put you on salary? What title did they give you? 

Hope its AIRPORT MANAGER. The thing that has depressed me the most is that you wouldn't see 

me and wouldn't answer my emails. You were probably told that they were dumping me for you 

several weeks back. I'm sure that would put you in an uncomfortable position. I now know that you 

have a full-time at the airport and you know that I'm unemployed. It is what it is. I told you before 

that I would do anything I could to help you. That offer still stands. So, let's get back to talking ... 

REMEMBER: True friends are those who stand by you through good times and bad times -no matter 

what. Thanks for your smile today. I saw the rainbow on the way home. Wayne." [FAA Exhibit I, 

Item 3, Exhibit 3, page 175]. 

On October 22, 2013, Ms. Langford e-mailed Complainant and stated that she had "been instructed to keep 

[Complainant] out of FBO ... I think it's best to just respect the wishes ofT AP especially when they have 

Page 3 
Wayne R. Messinger v. Pearland Regional Airport, Texas (FAA Docket No. 16·15-01) 

requested specifically that the FBO is offlimits [to Complainant]. Let's just keep it that way ... " In his e· 

mail, Complainant wrote: 

" Leah ... the tone of your e-mail tells me that you do not want to see me and that you do not want to 

hear from me ... When I recommended you for a full-time management position I said I would help 

you learn to management [sic] the airport. I'm still to offer you any help you need [sic]. .. For me, 

the airport is my life. It is who I am. And I did nothing to cause me to lose my [job] when the FBO 

reopens, I want to be back there working. Since you are now the boss, I was hoping to get your 

support for that. But your apparent hostility toward me indicates that is not the case. I want to alert 

you to something. People on the airport are upset about the FBO being closed and ... there is a small 

group working up the airport people against you, trying to see you fail as a manager .. .I want you to 

do well and that is why I've offered to help you. And I have some sway with people on the airport. 

But you want me to leave you alone and let you learn to manage the airport your way, I respect 

your wishes. I not with those who are against you [sic] ... My hand of help and friendship remain 

extended to you ... Wayne." [FAA Exhibit I, Item 3, Exhibit I, Exhibit B, page 178]. 

On November 8, 2013, Complainant wrote to Ms. Langford and presented a hypothetical aircraft incident 

situation at the Airport. In the e-mail, Complainant added, "you have to quickly get it right the first time 

and react like a trained Airport Manager. The whole airport will be watching. So if you have no idea what 

to do, no one will take you seriously as the manager. This is must have information for you, the Operations 

Manager. It's not a question of 'if' a gear-up will happen, but "when" it will happen. Your job will be so 

much easier if you let the old manager [Complainant] pass on necessary information to you before you need 

[it]. This is strictly airport business, not personal." [FAA Exhibit I, Item 3, Exhibit I, Exhibit B, page 172 

(e-mail)]. 

On May 15,2014, the Complainant claimed he struck a tree growing in the general proximity of Taxiway 

Delta with the wing of his aircraft. The Complainant claims he reported the obstruction to Ms. Langford, 

the Operations Manager. Complainant states that initially, the Airport did not cut down the tree. After 

Complainant notified the TxDOT on June 9, 2015 that the tree was a safety issue under Grant Assurance 19 

Operation and Maintenance,' the Airport cut down the tree on June 13. [FAA Exhibit I, Item 3, page 6]. 

On June 15,2014, the Airport reportedly observed the Complainant entering the FBO building. 

Complainant was advised that he was prohibited from entering this building since he was tenninated from 

his position the previous year. [FAA Exhibit I, Iten13, Exhibit I, Exhibit A, page 193]. The following day, 

Ms. Langford sent the Complainant an e-mail message prohibiting him from entering the FBO, without 

conditions for reinstatement of this privilege. Specifically, the e-mail stated "you are not allowed to enter 

the building at any time," and that this "e-mail serves as notice to again inform you that you are not under 

any circumstance to enter the FBO at Pearland Regional Airport. Legal action via law enforcement will be 

taken should you choose to again disregard this notice." [FAA Exhibit I, Item I, Exhibit 1]. 

On June 23, 2014, Complainant filed an inforrnall4 CFR Part 13.1 Complaint with FAA's Texas ADO. 

[FAA Exhibit 1, Item 2]. In his complaint to FAA, Complainant stated that he and his airplane were 

ordered off the Airport, that he "was ordered to stay out of the FBO" and that this is a violation of the 

Airpmi's federal grant assurances." [FAA Exhibit I, Item 2, page 1]. That same day, the ADO forwarded 

the 14 CFR Part 13 Complaintto TxDOT for disposition. [FAA Exhibit I, Item 2, Exhibit 5]. 

On July 7, 2014, TxDOT issued a fmding and found that the Airport was in compliance with the Grant 

Assurances. TxDOT stated the Airport was within its rights to deny access to the FBO, since it was a 

private business and federal grant money was never spent on this facility, leaving it unencnmbered by the 

assurances. Specifically, TxDOT concluded "The airport land for the FBO pad site has not received public 

4 Grant Assurance 19, Operation and Maintenance provides, in pertinent part, that the sponsor of a federally obligated 

airport will operate the airport and all facilities necessary to serve the aeronautical users in a safe and serviceable condition 

at an times. 

Page4 
Wayne R. Messinger v. Pearland Regional Airport, Texas (FAA Docket No. 16-15-01) 

funds for improvement and is privately owned ... " and thus "the owners and management have a reasonable 

right to deny you access to this private property." [Exhibit I, Item 2, Exhibit I]. 

On August 2, 2014, the Bay Area Aero Club (BAAC) sent an e-mail message to the Complainant, who, at 

the time, was serving as Secretary of the BAAC. BAAC stated that it has an "excellent relationship with 

the airport staff and management" and ask Complainant "to stop writing inflammatory columns about the 

[Airport] staff and the management company." [FAA Exhibit 1, Item 3, Exhibit l, Exhibit B, page 173]. 

On December 5, 2014, the Airport published LVJ's Minimum Standards. This document states one of its 

primary purposes is to "ensure that all commercial operators, tenants, users, and Clover Acquisition 

Corporation are not exposed to illegal, unsafe, or irresponsible practices." [FAA Exhibit I, Item 6]. On 

January 2, 2015, BAAC's Board of Directors met in a special closed session to consider three complaints 

brought against BAAC members. BAAC's Newsletter outlined the three complaints as follows: 

"(1) member Wayne Messinger against Leah Langford, member, seeking her termination from the 

club. The Board found no merit or cause and dismissed the complaint; (2) member Wayne Messinger 

against Aaron Huguet, member (and Chairman of the Board), seeking his removal from the Board. 

The Board found no merit or cause and dismissed the complaint; and (3) member Aaron Huguet 

against Wayne Messinger, member seeking his termination from the club. The Board found merit and 

cause, and voted to impose sanctions and conditions for Mr. Messinger. " [FAA Exhibit I, Item 15]. 

On .Ta.tmru·y 7, 2015, the Complainant filed a Part 16 Complaint with the FAA. [FAA Exhibit I, Item I]. 

On February 6, 2015, the Airport published LVJ's Airport Rules and Regulations. This document includes 

a new provision claiming the Airport management has the authority to deny access to the FBO "for any 

lawful reason." [FAA Exhibit 1, Item 5, Section 4.2 I]. 

On February 24,2015, the Complainant filed a suit against Leah Langford and the BAAC with the 149"' 

District Court of Brazoria County, Texas. The Complainant alleged, among other claims, the defendants in 

the case defruned his character and conducted "tortious interference with a business relationship." [FAA 

Exhibit 1, Item 3, Exhibit B, pages 158-171]. 

V. ISSUE 

Upon review of the allegations and circumstances summarized above, the FAA has determined the 

following issue requires analysis to provide a complete review of the Airport's compliance with applicable 

Federal law and policy: 

Whether the actions taken by the Airport with respect to Complainant's access to the I<'BO 

facilities at LVJ are in violation of Grant Assurance 22, Economic Nondiscrimination; 

VI. APPLICABLE FEDERAL LAW AND POLICY 

The Federal role in civil aviation is augmented by various legislative actions that authorize programs for 

providing Federal funds and other assistance to local communities for the development of airport 

facilities. In each such program, the airport sponsor assumes certain obligations, either by contract or by 

restrictive covenants in property deeds and conveyance instruments, to maintain and operate its airport 

facilities safely and efficiently and in accordance with specified conditions. Commitments assumed by 

airport sponsors in property conveyance or grant agreements are important factors in maintaining a high 

degree of safety and efficiency in airport design, construction, operation and maintenance, as well as 

ensuring the public fair and reasonable access to the airport. 

Page 5 
Wayne R. Messinger v. Pearland Regional Airport, Texas (FAA Docket No. 16-15-01) 

A. The Airport Improvement Program (AlP) 

Title 49 U.S.C., § 4 7101, et seq., provides for Federal airport financial assistance for the development of 

public-use airports under AlP established by the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, (AAIA) as 

amended. Title 49 U.S.C., § 47107, et seq., sets forth certain assurances to which an airport sponsor must 

agree to as a condition of receiving Federal financial assistance. Upon acceptance of an AlP grant, these 

statutory assurances, and others contained in the grant agreement, become a binding contractual obligation 

between the airport sponsor and the Federal Government. The assurances made by airport sponsors in A1P 

grant agreements are important factors in maintaining a viable national airport system. 

B. Airport Sponsor Assurances 

As a condition precedent to providing airport development assistance under AlP, 49 U.S.C. § 47107, et seq., 

the Secretary of Transportation and, by extension, the FAA must receive certain assurances from the airport 

sponsor. Title 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a) sets forth certain sponsorship requirements to which an airport sponsor 

receiving Federal financial assistance must agree. The FAA has a statutory mandate to ensure that airport 

owners comply with these sponsor assurances. FAA Order 5190.68, FAA Airport Compliance Manual 

(Order), issued on September 30,2009, provides the policies and procedures to be followed by the FAA in 

carrying out its compliance program. The FAA grant assurances relevant to the allegations set forth in this 

Complaint are Grant Assurances 22, Economic Nondiscrimination, and Grant Assurance 30 Civil Rights. 

1 . Grant Assurance 22, Economic Nondiscrimination 

Grant Assurance 22 provides, in part, that the sponsor will assure that: 

"a. It will make the airport available as an airport for public use on reasonable terms and witl10ut unjust 

discrimination to all types, kinds, and classes of aeronautical activities, including commercial 

aeronautical activities offering services to the public at the airport. 

b. In any agreement, contract, lease or other arrangement under which a right or privilege at the airport is 

granted to any person, firm, or corporation to conduct or engage in any aeronautical activity for 

furnishing services to the public at the airport, the sponsor will insert and enforce provisions requiring 

the contractor to: 

1. ... furnish said services on a reasonable, and not unjustly discriminatory, basis to all users ... and 

2 .... charge reasonable, and not unjustly discriminatory, prices for each unit or service, provided that 

the contractor may be allowed to make reasonable and nondiscriminatory discounts, rebates, or 

other similar types of price reductions to volume purchases ... 

h. The sponsor may establish such reasonable, and not unjustly discriminatory, conditions to be met by all 

users of the airport as may be necessary for the safe and efficient operation of the airport ... 

1. The sponsor may prohibit or limit any given type, kind or class of aeronautical use of the airport if such 

action is necessary for the safe operation of the airport or necessary to serve the civil aviation needs of 

the public." 

2. Grant Assurance 30, Civil Rights 

Grant Assurance 30, Civil Rights states, in part that the airport sponsor " ... will promptly take any measures 

necessruy to ensure that no person in the United States shall, on the grounds ofrace, creed, color, national 

origin, sex, age, or disability be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise 

subjected to discrimination in any activity conducted with, or benefiting from, funds received from this 

grant ... the sponsor will facilitate all progrruns, operate all facilities, or conduct all progrruns in compliance 

with all non-discrimination requirements imposed by, or pursuant to these assurru1ces." 

Page 6 
Wayne R. Messinger v. Pearland Regional Airport, Texas (FAA Docket No.l6-15-0l) 

C. The FAA Airport Compliance Program 

The FAA discharges its responsibilities for ensuring airport owners' compliance with their Federal 

obligations through its Airport Compliance Program. The FAA's airport compliance efforts are based on 

the statutory and contractual obligations an airpmi owner accepts when receiving Federal grant funds or 

when accepting Federal property for airport purposes. These obligations are incorporated in grant 

agreements and instruments of conveyance in order to protect the publics' interest in civil aviation and to 

ensure compliance with Federallaws5 The goal is to ensure the availability of a national system of safe and 

properly maintained public-use airports, operated in a mmmer consistent with the airport owners' Federal 

obligations and the public's investment in civil aviation.' FAA Order 5190.6B sets forth policies and 

procedures for the FAA Airport Compliance Program.' The Order establishes the policies and procedures to 

be followed by FAA personnel in carrying out the FAA's responsibilities for ensuring airport compliance' 

FAA Order 5190.6B also analyzes the various obligations set forth in the standard airport sponsor 

assurm1ces, addresses the nature of those assurances, addresses the application of those assurances in the 

operation of public-use airports, a!ld facilitates interpretation of the assurances by FAA personne1.9 In 

addressing allegations of noncompliance, the FAA will make a detennination as to whether an airport 

sponsor is cuiTently in compliance with the applicable Federal obligations. The FAA will consider a 

successful action by the airport to cure allY alleged or potential past violation of applicable Federal 

obligation to be grounds for dismissal of such allegations. 

D. FAA Enforcement Responsibilities 

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 40101, et seq., assigns the FAA Administrator 

broad responsibilities for the regulation of air commerce in the interests of safety, security, and development 

of civil aeronautics. Commitments assumed by airport owners or sponsors in property conveyance or grant 

agreements are important factors in maintaining a high degree of safety and efficiency in airport design, 

construction, operation and maintenance, as well as ensuring the public reasonable access to the airport. 

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 47122, the FAA has a statutory ma!ldate to ensure that airport owners comply with 

their Federal grant assurances. 

E. The Complaint Process 

Pursuant to 14 CFR § 16.23, a person directly and substm1tially affected by any alleged noncompliance may 

file a complaint with the FAA. The complainant shall provide a concise but complete statement of the facts 

relied upon to substantiate each allegation. The complaint shall also describe how the complainant was 

directly and substantially affected by the things done or omitted by the respondents. 10 If, based on the 

pleadings, there appears to be a reasonable basis for further investigation, the FAA will investigate the subject 

matter of the complaint. In rendering its initial determination, the FAA may rely entirely on the complaint and 

the responsive pleadings provided. Each party shall file documents it considers sufficient to present all 

relevant facts and argnments necessary for the FAA to determine whether the sponsor is in complia!lce.11 

s The Airport Compliance Program is administered by FAA's A CO-l, Airport Compliance and Management Analysis Division. The 

Airport Compliance Division oversees the Airport Compliance Program (AC0-100). A CO-l 00 holds primary responsibility for 

interpreting, recommending, and developing policies and resolving matters that involve 1he Federal obligations of airport 

sponsors. !t also adjudicates formal complaints and FAA-initiated investigations under 14 CFR Part 16. 

6The Airport Compliance Program does not control or direct the operation of airports. Rather, it monitors the administration of the 

valuable rights pledged by airport sponsors to the people of the United States in exchange for monetary grants and donations of 

Federal property to ensure that the public interest is being served. 7 See http://www .faa.gov /airports/resources/publications/orders/compliance_5190_6/. 

Blt provides basic guidance for FAA personnel in interpreting and administering the various continuing commitments made to the 

United States by airport owners as a condition of receivlng a grant of Federal funds or the conveyance of Federal property for 

airport purposes. 

9 The FAA Compliance Program is designed to achieve voluntary compliance with Federal obligaflons accepted by owners 

and/or operators of public-use airports developed with FAA-administered assistance. 

w 14 CFR § 16.23{b) (3, 4). 

n 14 CFR § 16.29. 

Page 7 
Wayne R. Messinger >':Pearland Regional Airport, Texas (FAA Docket No. 16-15-01) 

TI1e proponent of a motion, request, or order has the burden of proof. Title 14 CPR§ 16.3l(b-d) provides, in 

part, that "the Director's determination will set forth a concise explanation of the factual and legal basis ... on 

each claim made by the complainant." 

In accordance with J 4 CPR§ 16.33(b) and (e), upon issuance of a Director's determination, "a party 

adversely affected by the Director's determination may file an appeal with the Associate Administrator for 

Airports within 30 days after the date of service of the initial determination;" however, "if no appeal is filed 

within the time period specified in paragraph (b) of this section, the Director's Determination becomes the 

final decision and order of the P AA without further action." A Director's Determination that becomes final 

because there is no administrative appeal is not judicially reviewable. Title 14 CPR§ 16.247(a) provides for 

judicial review of the Associate Administrator for Airports' final decision and order. 

VI. ANALYSIS 

A. Preliminary Matters 

1. Airport's Motion to Dismiss and Request for Summary Judgment 

In its Answer to the Complaint, and pursuant to 14 CPR Part 16.26(b ), the Airport asks that the Complaint 

be dismissed because, "it does not state a claim that warrants an investigation or further action by the 

FAA." [FAA Exhibit 1, Item 3, page 1, and pages 7-8]. The Airport also requests summary judgment 

under 14 CFR § 16.26( c) because "there is no genuine issue of material fact for adjudication and ... the 

complaint, when viewed in the light most favorable to the complainant, should be summarily adjudicated in 

favor of the respondent as a matter of law." The Airport asks that the Complaint be dismissed with 

prejudice on summary judgment because "[Complainant] has not been the victim of unreasonable or 

unjustly discriminatory conditions." 12 [P AA Exhibit 1, Item 3, page 9]. 

Title 14 CPR §16.26(b) states that a motion to dismiss shall be accompanied by a concise statement of the 

reasons for seeking dismissal and that a respondent must show that the complaint should be dismissed, with 

prejudice, if (i) it appears to be outside the jnrisdiction of the Administrator under the Acts listed in§ 16.1, 

or (ii) it does not state a claim that warrants an investigation or further action. 13 

In describing how he was directly and substantially affected by alleged actions of the Airport, Complainant 

alleges certain facts and makes legal arguments that fall under tile FAA's Part J 6 jurisdiction. 14 The 

Complainant sufficiently argues that he is a person directly and substantially affected as a result of being 

denied access to the PBO. This case deals with a right to access aeronautical services and tl1e limitations 

imposed upon that right, an issue appropriately before us. The pleadings raise a reasonable question as to 

whether there is a violation of Grant Assurance 22 and this case is not appropriate for dismissal or sunrmary 

judgment. The motions for dismissal and summary judgment are denied. 

2. Allegations Referencing Grant Assurance 30. Civil Rights 

Grant Assurance 30, Civil Rights, requires sponsors to comply with rules promulgated to assure that no 

person shall, on the grounds of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, age, or handicap be excluded from 

participating in any activity conducted with or benefiting from funds received from Federal grants.15 

In his Complaint, Complainant makes reference to Grant Assnrance 30, Civil Rights. Specifically, 

Complainant argues the PBO facility is on airport property funded by federal grant funding and is therefore 

12 The Airport also cites Meyer v. City of Cincinnati, FAA Docket No. 16-12-14, 25, (Sept. 12, 2014) and notes that "abundance 

of argumentative opinion and criticism do not equate to substantial and credible evidence." 

"See 14 CFR Part 16.26 {bl {I) {i) and {ii). 

14 14 CFR 16.23 states, in part, that "a person directly and substantially affected by any alleged noncompliance ... may file a 

complaint .. .," and to "describe how [it] was directly and substantially affected by the things done or omitted ... by the 

respondents." 

15 See Grant Assurance 30. 

Page 8 
Wayne R. Messinger v. PeorlondRegionol Airport, Texas (FAA Docket No. 16-15-01) 

subject to the protections provided under this grant assurance (Grant Assurance 30). [FAA Exhibit I, Item 

I, page 2]. 

In response, the Airport argues that Complainant failed to make a specific allegation or claim under Grant 

Assurance 30, and "nowhere in his Complaint does Complainant allege that [the Airport] discriminated 

against him on the basis of his race, creed, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability. [FAA Exhibit 1, 

Item 3, page 5]. 

We a~>ree with the Airport that the Complainant has not presented facts to support this claim. Based on the 

record before us we find no violation of Grant Assurance 30. 

3. 14 CFR Part 13 Complaint and Grant Assurance Applicability to LV J's FBO Facilities 

On July 7, 2014 TxDOT issued a decision on the allegations and issues submitted in the Complainant's 

informal Part 13 complaint dated June 23,2014. [FAA Exhibit I, Item2]. TxDOT detennined that the 

Airport was within its rights to deny Complainant access to the FBO, because "the FBO building is privately 

owned and is not obligated under the grant assurances." Specifically, TxDOT concluded "the airport land 

for the FBO ... site has not received public funds for improvement and is privately owned ... the owners ... have 

a reasonable right to deny you access to this private property." [Exhibit I, Item 2, Exhibit 1]. 

In addition, TxDOT found that the threats alleged by the Complainant were unsubstantiated. [FAA Exhibit 

I, Item 2, Exhibit 2]. The Airport takes a similar position and argues that "the Grant Assurances apply only 

to the facilities developed or equipment acquired for an airport development. .. project." The Airport adds 

that the FBO "is a private construction sitting on private land that was not acquired with federal funds," and 

therefore, "is not subject to the provisions of Assurance 22." [FAA Exhibit 1, Item 3, pages 2 and 4]. 

We disagree with TxDOT's preliminary detennination. The grant assurance obligations apply to all areas of 

the Airport which are owned by the sponsor and desi~•nated on the Airport Layout Plan (ALP) for 

aeronautical use. FAA Order 5l90.6B states that "any property, when described as part of an airport in an 

agreement with the United States or defined by an airport layout plan (ALP) or listed in the Exhibit A 

property map, is considered to be dedicated or obligated properly for airport purposes by the terms of the 

agreement."16 

When an airport receives AlP grants, the entire airport becomes obligated. Title 49 U.S. Code§ 47102 

defines the airport as: (I) an area ... used or intended to be used for the landing and taking off of aircraft; (2) 

an appurtenant area ... to be used for airport buildings or other airport facilities ... and (3) airport buildings and 

facilities located in any of those areas. A review of the ALP for L VJ indicates that the FBO building is 

clearly an obligated properly. [See FAA Exhibit 1, Item 12]. 

In determining whether the FBO facility is obligated, it does not matter that it "was constructed with private 

fnnds and is sited on a private pad," that the Airport "has not accepted any public funds subject to the Grant 

Assurances to construct the FBO building," or that the Airport did not "acquire the land that the FBO occupies." 

[FAA Exhibit 1, Item 3, pages 3-4]. Therefore, the Director rejects the argument that that the sponsor's 

activities in or related to the FBO building are not subject to the Grant Assurances. 

B. Issue 1 - Complainant's Access lo the FBO and Related Services 

Having established above that actions related to the FBO facility are not exempt from the Grant Assurances, 

the issue now is to determine whether the justification provided by the Airport in restricting Complainant 

from using the FBO and related services, is consistent with Grant Assurance 22 Economic 

Nondiscrimination, both in terms of reasonableness and unjust discrimination. 

"FAA Order 5190.6B, page 22-1. 

Page 9 
Wayne R. Messinger v. Pearland Regional Airport, Texas (FAA Docket No. 16-15-01) 

a. The FBO as an Aeronautical Service to Airport Users 

The FBO building at L VJ is the location of the FAA weather equipment and it is used for flight planning. It 

is also the location of specific services and amenities, such as the federally-funded National Weather 

Service (NWS) computer tenninal (weather services), pilot lounge, briefing rooms, telephone services (e.g., 

flight plan filing), and restroom facilities. As such they are other services to support airport nsers, who also 

use them to conduct operations, including pre-flight and post-flight activities. FAA encourages airports to 

provide these ancillary services and they are typically provided for in minimum standards. 17 

b. Requirements Under Grant Assurance 22 

Grant Assurance 22 deals with both the reasonableness of airport access and the prohibition of adopting 

unjustly discriminatory conditions. As stated in FAA Order 5190.6B, airport sponsors have the obligation to 

treat in a uniform manner those users making the same or similar use of the airport and to make all airport 

facilities and services available on reasonable terms without unjust discrimination18 As such, it is the 

Airport's responsibility to ensure that aeronautical services, including FBO services, are offered in a 

reasonable and just mrumer to all airport users. An exclusion of these services, without good cause, is a 

violation of Grant Assurance 22. Although making and enforcing prohibitions or limitations are within the 

sponsor's proprietary power, this authority is limited to actions that are consistent with its obligations under 

the grants. 19 

c. Complainant's Arguments 

Complainant claims that he was not given a reason "why [he] was not permitted into the FBO building," 

and argnes that Grant Assurance 22 "requires that aviation facilities must be provided on fair and 

reasonable terms, and without unjust discrimination." Complainant also asserts that the Airport prevented 

him from accessing the FBO facility as "retaliation" for reporting a safety deficiency at the Airport, namely 

a tree with which he collided while taxiing. Complainant requests that he be "allowed to enter the [FBO] 

building to access the weather and flight planning facilities, use the only public restrooms available on the 

airport, and to get out of the heat of the day on the hot Texas ramp," and asks that he "be treated the same as 

any other customer on the airport." [FAA Exhibit I, Item l, page I and 3]. 

Complainant states that, "if protecting Leah Langford was [the] intent, then the need for that ban is now 

moot. Complainant states that Ms. Langford terminated her employment at the airport on April 9th, 2015. 

She no longer works at the airport and continuing the ban against Complainant no longer serves a legitimate 

purpose. Therefore, [the Airport] should rescind the letter banning Complainant from the FBO ru1d allow 

Complainant access to the FBO the same as any other customer." [FAA Exhibit 1, Item 4, page 5]. 

Upon review of the record, the Director fmds that there is no evidence to substantiate this retaliation 

allegation by Complainant. Although the Director would agree that with the Complainant that restricting 

him from using the FBO based on retaliation for reporting a safety issue would likely be a prohibited 

restriction under Grant Assurance 22, Complainant has not substantiated such a claim. 

Other than a mere assertion, Complainant has presented no evidence, circun1stantial or direct, to support the 

proposition that his exclusion from the FBO is a consequence of his reporting a safety issue. Without 

considerably more, the FAA is not willing to accept such an allegation. Moreover, based on the facts 

presented, there are other plausible reasons why the sponsor has barred the Complainant from the FBO. 

Whether or not these reasons are justified under the assurances is considered further below. 

17 As example, see FAA Order 5l90.6B, Appendix C, page 38 and Appendix 0, page 193. Also see Skydive Monroe. Inc. v. 

Cify of Monroe. Georgia FAA Docket No. 16-06-02, March 30, 2007, page 10. 

"FAA Order 5190.68 at Chapter9. 

"See FAA Order 5190.68, paragraph 14.3. 

Page 10 
Wayne R. Messinger v. Pearland Regional Airport, Texas (FAA Docket No. 16-15-01) 

d. Airport's Position 

The Airport admits that it has barred Complainant from the FBO Building. But the Airport argues that the 

"facts demonstrate that [Complainant] was excluded from the FBO for legitimate business reasons-i.e., the 

maintenance of a workplace safe from harassment and the efficient operation of the airport by competent 

employees- that have been consistently applied." The Airport also notes that Complainant can use the 

Airport's taxiways and runways, rents a hangar at the Airport, and is allowed to purchase fuel, still has 

"unfettered access to the rest of the airport's facilities and amenities,"but is excluded from the FBO because 

of his "behavior toward Langford." [FAA Exhibit I, Item 3, pages 7, 13]. 

The Airport also adds that there has been, "no other airport user who has engaged in a pattern of harassing 

conduct aimed at an airport employee. No other airport user has taken unwanted photo1,rraphs of airport 

employees, made unwanted advances toward airport employees, and behaved in a threatening and 

provocative manner toward an airport employee." [FAA Exhibit I, Item 3, Exhibit I, page 3]. As a result, 

the Airport takes the position that Complainant "has not been the victim of unreasonable or unjustly 

discriminatory conditions." [FAA Exhibit I, Item 3, page 9]. 

e. Airport's Rules and Regulations and Minimum Standards 

A relevant issue the Director considered in this case is the role of the Airport's rules and regulations and 

minimum standards. On December 5, 2014, the Airport published LVJ's Minimum Standards. 20 [FAA 

Exhibit l, Item 6]. And includes language to "ensure that all commercial operators, tenants, users ... are not 

exposed to illegal, unsafe, or irresponsible practices." [FAA Exhibit 1, Item 6]. On February 6, 2015, the 

Airport published L VJ' s Airport Rules and Regulations. This document includes a new provision stating 

that the Airport has the authority to deny access to the FBO "for any lawful reason." [FAA Exhibit 1, Item 

6, Section 4.21]. These types of documents represent guidance commonly used by airport sponsors in 

managing their facilities; they are encouraged by the FAA and are presumptively valid when consistent with 

the Grant Assurances and other federal obligations, including the requirements of Grant Assurance 22. A 

review of the documents in this case does uot indicate that, as written, either document is in violation of the 

Airport's federal obligations. 

f. Previous Part l6s Involving Harassment or Behavior-Related Allegations 

The Airport cites Ashton v. FAA (04-1124, U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C., 2006) in its Answer and uotes that 

in the cited case, the Airport "terminated a user's permit to use an airport hangar after he repeatedly 

'photographed, bothered, and harassed other tenants at the airport." [FAA Exhibit I, Item 3, page 11]. 

Ashton v. FAA has pertinent characteristics to the present case in that both cases involve, amongst others, 

(1) a single private (non-commercial) airport user; (2) partial denial of access to airport property; (3) 

allegations of harassing behavior, albeit of differing types; and ( 4) court action filed by the complainant 

against the airport. In Ashton, unlike the subject case, the Complainant admitted to many of the alleged 

behaviors found to be inappropriate by the sponsor; he was arrested and his threats were clearly 

documented. Nevertheless, differences in factual circumstances aside, Ashton establishes the principle that 

inappropriate actions by an individual can be sufficieut grounds to limit his or her access to otherwise 

public airport facilities. 

2o The Director notes for clarification purposes that the minimum standards at LV J are relevant only to the extent that they 

guide, in part, aeronautical services being provided, and not how an individual user {not a commercial business) behaves or 

not, at the Airport. In other words, actions taken against Complainant, as an individual user, should not be based upon a 

violation of the minimum standards, and if it were, it would likely found to be misplaced. As a result, any reference to 

minimum standards here is informational only, while references to rules and regulaHons, are more in line with the rights and 

responsibilities expected from an airport sponsor when dealing with a user rather than a commercial service provider. 

Page 11 
Wayne R. Messinger v. Pearland Regional Airport, Texas (FAA Docket No. 16-15-01) 

The Airport also cites Aero Ways, Inc. v. Delaware River and Bay Authority [16-09-12, August 30, 2010] and 

points out that "an airport sponsor acts as a proprietor with regard to managing its airport to certain reasonable 

levels of service, personal decorum, business professionalism and financial responsibility ... allows a sponsor to 

apply a standard for reasonable security, personal behavior, and rules of tenancy." [FAA Exhibit I, Item 3, page 

12]. This is a principle that we affirm. In Aero Ways, however, the employee damaged a card reader on an 

entry gate to the airpmi and left physical evidence. Additionally, the incident was confirmed by the 

Complainant and the details were immediately documented by the airport. Also, a police report was filed 

regarding the incident. In both Aero Ways and Ashton, the evidence of wrongdoing was clearer than that 

presented here. 

g. Discussion 

The Director must determine whether the arguments, facts, and evidence permit a determination that the 

Airport's actions towards Complainant are in violation of Grant Assurance 22. 

First, it is not the role of the FAA to adjudicate employment disputes or claims of harassment, and we 

decline to do that here. Both sides have presented their sides of the dispute, but the FAA is not in a 

position to ultimately determine if a wrongdoing has occurred with regard to Complainant's relationship 

with either the Airport or its employees. 

Second, the Director recognizes that the Airport has the right to protect its employees when confronted with 

work place harassment. As stated in SeaSauds Air Transp., Inc. v. Huntsville-Madison County Airport 

Auth., Docket No. 16-05-17, the Director noted that "Grant Assurance 22 ... allows a sponsor to apply a 

standard for reasonable security, personal behavior, and rules oftenancy."21 

Certainly, the Director is not going to adjudicate a case which hinges on personal relationships or 

employment matters. It is also not for the FAA to adjudicate a case where the reasons for employment 

termination are argued under the cover of grant assurance compliance. The arguments made by both sides, 

and hence resolution of the dispute in this case are squarely matters for local or state jurisdictions, not the 

FAA. These actions are covered through other state and local labor and harassment laws, and are largely 

outside the purview of the FAA. In fact, the record shows that both sides recognized the local and state legal 

venues applicable in this case.

22 [FAA Exhibit I, Item I, Exhibit 1]. 

Third, a review of the record also indicates that the Airport restricted Complainant from using the FBO 

facilities, in part because he was interacting with one ofthe Airport's employees in a way that the Airport 

considered inappropriate. [FAA Exhibit I, Item 3, Exhibit 3, pages 175 and 178, 340-343, and 347-367]. 

We note that this concern was great enough to trigger the Airport's hiring of a private investigation finn to 

investigate Complainant. 23 [FAA Exhibit I, Item 3, Exhibit I, Exhibit B, pages 329-334]. Moreover, as we 

noted above, the Complainant's argument conceming retaliation is tmsubstantiated. Additionally, we 

camwt say that the Airport's actions are without any basis. The Airport management was clearly having 

problems with the Complainant, and such problems can be a ground to limit a person's access. 

Fourth, the FAA does not question or review an Airport sponsor's hiring or termination decisions, including 

employment standards, protecting its employees, or otherwise taking reasonable action to address a real or 

perceived harassment situation at the Airport, by a tenant. 

Fifth, the reference to reasonable action in this case is also considered based on the fact it is relevant that the 

Airport did not restrict Complainant's access to the runways and taxiways, fuel services, or hangar services. 

In that respect, the Airport tailored its action toward Complainant "to prevent him from contacting and 

21 SeaSands AirTranso. Inc. v. Huntsville-Madison County Airport Auth., Docket No. 16-05-17 (2006) at 15. 22 The record shows that there was a legal case in a Texas Court where Complainant sued Ms. Langford for defamation. 

Case No. 80476-CV, 149th Judicial District of Brazoria County, Texas. See FAA Exhibit l, Item 3, Exhibit 1, Exhibit B, pages 158-

171. The record also shows that the Airport's communications with Complainant included warnings of a legal nature such as 

"legal action via law enforcement will be taken should you choose to again disregard this notice." 

23 See investigation report 

Page12 
Wayne R. Messinger v. Pearland Regional Airport, Texas (FAA Docket No. 16c 15-01) 

harassing Langford, while still permitting him fully to use the Airport for legitimate aeronautical functions." 

[FAA Exhibit I, Item 3, Exhibit I, page 3]. 

Sixth, the record contained no evidence that the Airport treated Complainant in an unjustly discriminatory 

manner, that is, that other similarly situated airport users (e.g., affected by harassment claims) were 

restricted from using the FBO and its facilities. 

In conclusion, FAA is not in a position to mediate personal or employment disputes. In the context of our 

assurances, sponsors have significant latitude to run their own businesses. Although the evidence presented 

by the Airport regarding Complainant's conduct, is not as strong as in other cases that we cited to above, we 

believe the Airport has presented sufficient evidence to show that there was a reasonable basis for the 

actions that it took. 

This evidence primarily focuses on unwanted communications with the Airp01t's employees and behavior 

that, in the opinion of the Airport, constituted a form of harassment. We are not in a position to secondguess the sponsor's judgment in a case such as this one that involves claims of personal disputes, 

harassment and employment issues. Against this hackground, the Director does not find that the Airpmt 

has violated Grant Assurance 22. 

VII. FINDINGS AND CONClUSION 

Upon consideration ofthe submissions of the parties, and the entire record herein, and the applicable law 

and policy and for the reasons stated above, the Director finds and concludes that the Airport is not in 

violation of Grant Assurance 22 Economic Nondiscrimination. 

ORDER 

All Motions not expressly granted in this Detennination are denied. 

RIGHT TO APPEAL 

This Director's Determination, FAA Docket No. 16-15-01, is an initial agency determination and does not 

constitute a final agency decision and order subject to judicial review. [14 CFR § 16.24 7(b )(2)]. A party to 

this proceeding adversely affected by the Director's Determination may appeal the initial determination 

pursuant to 14 CFR § I 6.33( c) within thirty (30) days after service of the Director's Determination. 

Robin K. Hunt 

Director, Airport Compliance and Management Analysis (Acting) 

Federal Aviation Administration 

1 Date 

Page13 
Wayne R. Messinger v. Pearland Regional Airport, Texas (FAA Docket No. 16-15-0 I) 

INDEX OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 

The following items constitute the administrative record in this proceeding: 

fAA Exhibit 1 

Item 1 

Part 16 Complaint from Wayne Messinger, December 18,2014. 

Exhibit 1 

E-mail message from LVJ Operations Manager, Leah Langford, to Complainant, June 16,2014. 

Exhibit 2 

Item lA 

Photograph 1 ofLVJ's FBO (overhead). 

Exhibit 3 

Photograph 2 ofLVJ's FBO (side view). 

FAA Notice of Docketing, March 3, 2015. 

Item 1B 

Respondent's Agreed Motion to Extend Answer Deadline (Motion for an Extension of Time), March 4, 2015. 

Item lC 

FAA Oder granting Agreed Motion to Extend Answer Deadline, March 6, 2015. 

Item2 

Patt 13 Complaint, June 23,2014. 

Exhibit 1 

TxDOT decision on informal Part 13 complaint, July 7, 2014. 

Exhibit 2 

Part 13 compliant, the original letter sent to Texas ADO, June 23, 2014. 

Exhibit 3 

E-mail message from LVJ Operations Manager, Leah Langford to Complainant, June 16, 2014. 

Exhibit 4 

Aerial image of Pearland Regional Airport and FBO building. 

Pagel4 
Wayne R. Messinger v. Pearland Regional Airport. Texas (FAA Docket No. 16-15-01) 

Exhibit 5 

E-mail response from FAA's Texas Airports District Office (ADO) to Complainant, June 23,2014. 

Item 3 

Respondent's Consolidated Original Answer and Motion for Summary Judgment, April 8, 2015. 

Exhibit 1 

Declaration of Stephen Alexander, Partner at Texas Aviation Partners (TAP), April 7, 2015. 

Exhibit A 

116 photographs recovered from Complainant's computer. 

Exhibit B 

214 e-mails between the Complainant and Leah Langford. Includes related documents and some 

photography. 

Exhibit C 

Complainant Wayne Messinger's Resume. 

Exhibit 2 

Declaration of Leah Langford, April 7, 2015. 

Exhibit 3 

Public Recordfrom the Texas Department of Corrections, November 29,2014. 

Item 4 

Complainant's Rebuttal, April13, 2015. 

Item 5 

Pearland Regional Airport Rules and Regulations, February, 6, 2015. 

Item6 

Pearland Regional Airport Minimum Standards, December 5, 2014. 

Item 7 

Pearland Regional Airport website content, January 21,2015. 

Item 8 

Airnav.com airport information about LVJ, November 19,2015. 

Item 9 

FAA Grant History Report, 2015. 

PagelS 
Wayne R. Messinger v. Pearland Regional Airport, Texas (FAA Docket No. 16-15-01) 

Item 10 

N/A. 

Item11 

Phone record of call between FAA and TxDOT discussing the Complainant's informal Part 13 filing and the subsequent 

review, August 3, 2015. 

Item 12 

LVJ Airport Layout Plan (ALP), July 9, 2010. 

Item 13 

FAA Notice of Extension of Time, August 14, 2015. 

Uem 13A 

FAA Notice of Extension ofTime, December 16,2015. 

Item 13C 

FAA Notice of Extension ofTime, February 3, 2016. 

Item 14 

Agreed Motion to Extend Answer Deadline, March 4, 2015. 

Item 15 

BAAC Newsletter, February 2015. 

Page 16