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does not resolve that issue, it does not affect a substantial 

right of Charter West and therefore is not a final order under 

§ 25-1902.

We note that it may have been more expedient for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and defer any 

ruling on the motion to compel arbitration until the parties 

had an opportunity to present evidence on the issue of whether 

the real estate transaction involved interstate commerce. But 

the dismissal of the motion to compel arbitration without 

prejudice achieved essentially the same result, which was to 

defer a final determination of the arbitrability of the dispute. 

On this record, that determination has not yet been made, and 

therefore, there is no final, appealable order capable of appellate review.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the order from which this appeal was taken, 

and we dismiss the appeal.

Appeal dismissed

Cargill Meat Solutions Corpora

appellee, v. Colfax County B

of Equalization, appella

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed April 17, 2015. No. S-14-701.

1. Taxation: Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews decisions 

rendered by the Tax Equalization and Review Commission for errors appearing 

on the record.

2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the decision conforms 

to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is not arbitrary, capricious, 

or unreasonable.

3. Taxation: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews questions of law arising during appellate review of decisions by the Tax Equalization and Review 

Commission de novo on the record.
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4. Statutes. Statutory interpretation is a question of law.

5. Taxation: Equity. The assessment, levy, and collection of taxes are not equitable 

proceedings; they necessarily have to be governed by rules, and the taxing power 

and the taxpayers must comply with these rules.

6. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain 

the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.

7. Statutes. It is not within the province of the courts to read a meaning into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of a statute.

8. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. Components of a series or collection of statutes 

pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari materia and should be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the intent of the Legislature, so that 

different provisions are consistent, harmonious, and sensible.

9. Taxation: Jurisdiction. County boards of equalization can exercise only such 

powers as are expressly granted to them by statute, and statutes conferring power 

and authority upon a county board of equalization are strictly construed.

10. ____: ____. Where a county board of equalization’s actions are void, the Tax 

Equalization and Review Commission lacks jurisdiction over the merits of 

the appeal.

Appeal from the Tax Equalization and Review Commission. 

Affirmed.

Edmond E. Talbot III, Special Colfax County Attorney, for 

appellant.

Timothy L. Moll and Christopher C. Cassiday, of Rembolt 

Ludtke, L.L.P., for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, M

Miller-Lerman, and Cassel,

Cassel, J

I. INTRODUCTION

A taxpayer timely filed a 2010 personal property tax 

return properly listing the taxable property, but the property was not placed on the tax rolls. The primary issue in 

this appeal is whether in 2013, the Colfax County Board of 

Equalization (Board) had statutory authority to add the property to the 2010 tax rolls. The Tax Equalization and Review 

Commission (TERC) considered and rejected two statutory 
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sources of authority, but the Board assigns error only as to 

one statute.1

Because § 77-1507(1) applies only to real estate and not 

to personal property, it did not authorize the Board’s action. 

Without supporting statutory authority, the action was void. We 

therefore affirm TERC’s decision reversing and vacating the 

Board’s decision.

II. BACKGROUND

1. Taxation of Personal Pro

Under Nebraska law, the owner of personal property must 

compile a list of all its tangible personal property having a tax 

situs in Nebraska.2 The list must be on the forms prescribed by 

the Department of Revenue’s Tax Commissioner and must be 

filed as a personal property tax return on or before May 1 of 

each year.3 A party seeking a personal property exemption shall 

file a claim on the form and supporting schedules prescribed by 

the Tax Commissioner.4

The county assessor reviews the personal property tax 

returns and changes the reported valuation of any item of taxable tangible personal property to conform the valuation to net 

book value.5 The assessor also lists any item of taxable tangible personal property omitted from a personal property return 

and values the item at net book value.6

2. 2010 Personal Prope

Tax Ret

Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation (Cargill) timely filed a 

personal property tax return for the 2010 tax year. As part of 

that return, Cargill submitted personal property schedules to 

the Colfax County assessor’s office identifying numerous items 

1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1507(1) (Cum. Supp. 2014).

2 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1201 (Reissue 2009).

3 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1229(1) (Reissue 2009); Kaapa Ethanol v. Board of 

Supervisors, 285 Neb. 112, 825 N.W.2d 761 (2013).

4 See § 77-1229(2) and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-4105(2) (Reissue 2009).

5 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1233.04(1) (Cum. Supp. 2014).

6 Id.
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of personal property. One of the schedules showed the assessed 

value of the property to be $18,382,151. The assessor accepted 

the return.

However, the personal property was not placed on the tax 

rolls in 2010, and no tax was assessed or paid. Because of an 

evidentiary ruling by TERC excluding an exhibit, the record 

sheds little light on the procedures followed or overlooked 

in 2010.

3. Action by Bo

In October 2013, the Board sent a letter to Cargill stating that it was placing the personal property identified by 

Cargill in 2010 “back on the tax rolls.” The Board’s letter 

asserted that the assessor had “held the personal property 

schedule . . . pending an approval of the exemption,” that no 

exemption had been authorized, and that the property had not 

been “placed back” on the tax rolls in 2010 due to a “clerical error.” The letter “[gave] notice” that “[p]ursuant to . . . 

§ 77-1507(1),” the property would be “placed back on the tax 

rolls for collection.”

Cargill filed a protest of the Board’s action, but the 

Board denied the protest. Cargill then appealed. Pursuant to 

§ 77-1507(3), the appeal from the Board’s denial of the protest 

was taken to TERC.

4. TERC’s Hearing and

Pursuant to the rules of practice and procedure for hearings 

before TERC, the chairperson issued an order to show cause 

and notice of hearing which directed the parties to participate 

in a hearing and show cause regarding jurisdiction.7 The order 

stated in part: “[TERC] does not have jurisdiction to hear an 

appeals [sic] if: [TERC] does not have the power or authority 

to hear the appeal [if] the Board of Equalization does not have 

the authority to act.”

During the show cause hearing before TERC, the Board 

sought to introduce into evidence an order of the Department 

of Revenue’s Tax Commissioner concerning Cargill’s 2011 

7 See 442 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 5, § 029 (2011).
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730 290 NEBRASKA REPORTS

tax return. TERC sustained Cargill’s objection to the exhibit, 

noting that it had not been exchanged in advance of the 

hearing. The Board’s third assignment of error pertains to 

this exhibit.

At the time of the Board’s attempt to offer this exhibit, 

Cargill’s attorney explained that “from 2011, there’s a personal property tax appeal pending that has to do with whether 

Cargill qualified for LB775 credits.” He also explained that 

the Department of Revenue “sent a letter to Colfax County 

that said, ‘Based on the results of 2011, we think you 

should include 2010 personal property tax back on the tax 

rolls . . . .’”

TERC entered a decision and order vacating and reversing 

the Board’s decision. TERC first rejected the Board’s claim 

that § 77-1507(1) authorized the Board’s action of adding 

items of omitted personal property to the tax rolls. TERC 

reasoned that § 77-1507(1) applied to real property only. 

Thus, TERC stated that the Board’s action, if performed under 

§ 77-1507(1), was void and that both the Board and TERC 

lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal in the absence of a statute authorizing the Board to place omitted personal property 

on the tax rolls.

TERC next stated that the letter sent by the Board to Cargill 

was void because it did not meet several requirements of Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 77-1233.06 (Reissue 2009). TERC reasoned that 

the Board did not have the authority to make an initial change 

or to send notice under the statute and that without such 

authority, the Board’s actions were void.

TERC also rejected the Board’s claim that §§ 77-1233.04 

and 77-1233.06 provided a process for correction based on 

clerical errors. TERC noted that the definition of omitted property “specifically excludes listing errors by the county assessor 

and clerical errors.” TERC reasoned that the Board’s action 

was void if it was relying on § 77-1233.04.

TERC ultimately determined that the Board’s action was 

void. It recited that “[w]here the actions of an administrative 

agency are void, appellate administrative agencies lack subject 

matter jurisdiction.” TERC concluded that the Board did not 

have authority to place the items of personal property on the 
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tax rolls and that, thus, TERC did not have jurisdiction over 

the appeal.

The Board timely appealed, and we moved the case to our 

docket under our statutory authority to regulate the caseloads 

of the appellate courts of this state.8

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The Board assigns that TERC erred in (1) interpreting 

§ 77-1507 to apply to omitted real property only, (2) failing to determine whether mistakenly entering taxable tangible 

personal property as exempt was a clerical error, (3) failing 

to receive as an exhibit an order from the Tax Commissioner 

which directed county officials to place Cargill’s taxable tangible personal property on the tax rolls, and (4) failing to 

consider whether Cargill was entitled to an exemption of its 

taxable tangible personal property.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1,2] An appellate court reviews decisions rendered by 

TERC for errors appearing on the record.9 When reviewing 

a judgment for errors appearing on the record, an appellate 

court’s inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is 

supported by competent evidence, and is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.10

[3,4] An appellate court reviews questions of law arising 

during appellate review of decisions by TERC de novo on the 

record.11 Statutory interpretation is a question of law.12

V. ANALYSIS

1. Statutory Histo

Before addressing the Board’s specific arguments, we briefly 

discuss the history of valuation of personal property in Nebraska 

and how the statutory language of § 77-1507 evolved over the 

8 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2008).

9 Conroy v. Keith Cty. Bd. of Equal., 288 Neb. 196, 846 N.W.2d 634 (2014).

10 Id.

11 Id.

12 First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Davey, 285 Neb. 835, 830 N.W.2d 63 (2013).
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years. We note that § 77-1507 is included under the statutes in 

chapter 77, article 15, of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, which 

relate to “Equalization by County Board.”

(a) Valuation of 

Personal Property

Prior to 1992, personal property, like real property, was 

valued at its actual value.13 A series of federal and state court 

decisions prompted changes to Nebraska’s framework for taxation of personal property.14

In 1992, voters approved an amendment to portions of Neb. 

Const. art. VIII, §§ 1 and 2.15 As amended, article VIII, § 1, 

provided that “tangible personal property, as defined by the 

Legislature, not exempted by this Constitution or by legislation, shall all be taxed at depreciated cost using the same 

depreciation method with reasonable class lives, as determined by the Legislature, or shall all be taxed by valuation 

uniformly and proportionately.” And, as amended, article VIII, 

§ 2, provided that “the Legislature may exempt inventory 

from taxation” and that “the Legislature may define and classify personal property in such manner as it sees fit, whether 

by type, use, user, or owner, and may exempt any such class 

or classes of property from taxation if such exemption is 

reasonable or may exempt all personal property from taxation.” By means of special sessions, the Nebraska Legislature 

adopted the legislation necessary to implement these constitutional changes.16

Effective January 1, 1992, personal property, unless expressly 

exempt from taxation, was to be valued at its net book value.17

The county board of equalization and the State Board of 

Equalization and Assessment—TERC’s predecessor—were 

13 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-201(1) (Supp. 1991).

14 See, generally, MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equal., 238 Neb. 

565, 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991).

15 See 1992 Neb. Laws, L.R. 219CA.

16 See 1992 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1, 2d Spec. Sess. (Aug. 12, 1992) and 4th Spec. 

Sess. (Nov. 12, 1992).

17 See § 77-201(3) (Reissue 1996).
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no longer required to equalize the values of personal property, but their obligation to equalize the values of real property remained.18

(b) Evolution of § 77-1507

Under a precursor to § 77-1507, the county board of equalization had the duty to “[f]airly and impartially equalize the 

valuation of the personal property of the county” and, upon 

complaint, to “review the assessment and correct the same 

as shall appear to be just.”19 The same statute authorized 

the county board of equalization to equalize the valuation of 

real property and provided that “in cases of evident error of 

assessment or of apparent gross injustice in overvaluation or 

undervaluation of real property, the county board of equalization may at its annual meetings consider and correct the 

same by raising . . . or by lowering the assessed valuation 

of such real property.”20 The statute further empowered the 

county board of equalization to “add to the assessment rolls 

any taxable property not included therein, assessing the same 

in the name of the owners thereof as the assessor should 

have done, but no personal property shall be so added unless 

the owner thereof is previously notified, if he be found in 

the county.”21

By 1943, § 77-1507 had been condensed considerably. The 

statute, in its entirety, stated:

The county board of equalization shall also add to 

the assessment rolls any taxable property not included 

therein, assessing the same in the name of the owners thereof as the assessor should have done, but no 

personal property shall be so added unless the owner 

thereof is previously notified, if he be found in the 

county.22

18 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 77-505 (Reissue 1996) and 77-1504 (Cum. Supp. 

1992).

19 Rev. Stat. § 6437 (1913).

20 Id.

21 Id.

22 § 77-1507 (1943).
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But like its predecessor statutes,23 § 77-1507 pertained to both 

real property and personal property. The same continued to 

be true after a 1987 amendment.24 The statute then provided 

in part:

The county board of equalization may meet at any 

time upon the call of the chairperson or any three members of the board for the purpose of determining and 

equalizing the assessments of any omitted or undervalued real or personal property. The board shall add to 

the assessment rolls any taxable property not included 

therein, assessing the same in the name of the owners 

thereof. Omitted or undervalued personal property shall 

be added only after the owner or agent of the owner 

thereof is notified.25

As we noted above, the statutory framework for personal 

property tax in Nebraska changed dramatically beginning in 

1992. But the above-quoted portion of the statute remained 

unchanged following a 1995 amendment.26

However, in 1997, the Legislature changed § 77-1507 significantly in connection with an overhaul of the taxation statutes.27 As a result, the statute no longer contained any mention 

of personal property. Instead, it provided that the county board 

of equalization could “meet at any time for the purpose of 

assessing any omitted real property which was not reported 

to the county assessor pursuant to section 77-1318.01.”28

The statute further provided that “[n]o omitted real property 

which was properly reported to the county assessor pursuant to section 77-1318.01 shall be added to the assessment 

roll after July 25 of the year or years in which the property 

was omitted.”29

23 See § 6437 and Comp. Stat. §§ 5972 (1922) and 77-1702 (1929).

24 See 1987 Neb. Laws, L.B. 508, § 48.

25 § 77-1507 (Cum. Supp. 1988).

26 See § 77-1507 (Reissue 1996) and 1995 Neb. Laws, L.B. 490, § 150.

27 See 1997 Neb. Laws, L.B. 270, § 89.

28 § 77-1507(1) (Cum. Supp. 1998).

29 § 77-1507(4).
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A 1999 amendment30 added the provision on which the 

Board relies. This change allowed the county board of equalization to meet “for clerical errors as defined in section 77-128 

that result in a change of valuation.”31 Although the Board 

contends that this language applies to personal property, the 

word “personal” does not appear in the statute as amended 

in 1999.

The statute was later amended several more times,32 but no 

reference to personal property was ever reinserted. Thus, for 

purposes of our inquiry, the statute has not changed in any significant way since 1999.

Currently, § 77-1507(1) (Cum. Supp. 2014) states in part:

The county board of equalization may meet at any time 

for the purpose of assessing any omitted real property 

that was not reported to the county assessor pursuant to 

section 77-1318.01 and for correction of clerical errors 

as defined in section 77-128 that result in a change of 

assessed value. The county board of equalization shall 

give notice of the assessed value of the real property 

to the record owner or agent at his or her last-known 

address. For real property which has been omitted in the 

current year, the county board of equalization shall not 

send notice pursuant to this section on or before June 1.

Protests of the assessed value proposed for omitted real 

property pursuant to this section or a correction for clerical errors shall be filed with the county board of equalization within thirty days after the mailing of the notice. 

All provisions of section 77-1502 except dates for filing 

a protest, the period for hearing protests, and the date 

for mailing notice of the county board of equalization’s 

decision are applicable to any protest filed pursuant to 

this section.

With that history in place, we turn to the issues on appeal.

30 See 1999 Neb. Laws, L.B. 194, § 27.

31 § 77-1507 (Reissue 2003).

32 See 2005 Neb. Laws, L.B. 263, § 14, and L.B. 283, § 5; 2006 Neb. Laws, 

L.B. 808, § 39; 2010 Neb. Laws, L.B. 877, § 5; and 2011 Neb. Laws, 

L.B. 384, § 17.
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2. Applicability of § 77-150

[5] The chief issue is whether in 2013, § 77-1507(1) empowered the Board to add the specified personal property to the 

2010 tax rolls. As this court explained over 100 years ago, 

the assessment, levy, and collection of taxes are not equitable 

proceedings; they necessarily have to be governed by rules, 

and the taxing power and the taxpayers must comply with 

these rules.33 At various times, the Board has relied on either 

§ 77-1507(1) or § 77-1233.04. TERC concluded that neither 

statute authorized the Board to place the personal property on 

the tax rolls for 2010. On appeal, the Board does not assign 

error to TERC’s finding that § 77-1233.04 did not apply. Thus, 

we consider only whether § 77-1507(1) was applicable under 

the circumstances of this case.

The Board argues that TERC erred in interpreting 

§ 77-1507(1) to apply to omitted real property only. The 

Board also contends that the statute allows for correction of 

clerical errors concerning personal property. We disagree that 

§ 77-1507(1) applies to personal property.

The plain language of § 77-1507(1), its reading in the context of other statutes, and the Nebraska Administrative Code 

support our conclusion that § 77-1507(1) applies only to real 

property. Each reason requires elucidation.

[6] We primarily rely on the plain language of the statute, 

both generally and specifically. Statutory language is to be 

given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court 

will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of 

statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.34

The general language of the statute refers only to real property. The evolution of § 77-1507, which we have set forth 

above, shows deliberate action by the Legislature to change 

the statute from applying to both real and personal property to 

applying solely to real property. Subsequent amendments to the 

statute were made, but none of them restored personal property 

to the section’s scope.

33 See Darr v. Dawson County, 93 Neb. 93, 139 N.W. 852 (1913).

34 Dean v. State, 288 Neb. 530, 849 N.W.2d 138 (2014).
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The specific language of the statute also demonstrates that 

it applies only to real property. The statute explicitly mentions 

real property four times, while never referring to personal 

property. The Board observes that although § 77-1507(1) specifically refers to “omitted real property,” no property type is 

specified with respect to the correction of clerical errors. It follows, they argue, that the latter phrase was intended to apply to 

all “property,” whether real or personal.

But that sentence must be read in context. The key language 

appears in the first two sentences. The first sentence states, 

“The county board of equalization may meet at any time for 

the purpose of assessing any omitted real property . . . and 

for correction of clerical errors . . . .” The second sentence 

states, “The county board of equalization shall give notice of 

the assessed value of the real property to the record owner or 

agent . . . .”35 In essence, the Board is trying to insert the words 

“or personal” into the latter sentence. Without those words, 

the first sentence would supposedly allow the board to change 

the value of personal property, but the second sentence would 

require notice only to owners of real property. That makes 

no sense.

[7] And we cannot read those words into the statute. It is 

not within the province of the courts to read a meaning into a 

statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out 

of a statute.36 If the Legislature had intended to allow a county 

board of equalization to correct a clerical error concerning 

personal property, it surely would have changed the second 

sentence of § 77-1507(1) to require notice to owners of “real 

or personal property.”

[8] Reading § 77-1507 in the context of other statutes within 

the chapter on revenue and taxation also persuades us that it 

applies to real property only. Components of a series or collection of statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter are in pari 

materia and should be conjunctively considered and construed 

to determine the intent of the Legislature, so that different 

35 § 77-1507(1).

36 Johnson v. City of Fremont, 287 Neb. 960, 845 N.W.2d 279 (2014).
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provisions are consistent, harmonious, and sensible.37 Statutes 

mentioning § 77-1507 do so in the context of real property.38

And, as Cargill highlights, the overall tax scheme addresses 

personal property and real property separately for purposes 

of omitted property and correction of errors. Section 77-1507 

pertains to real property, while § 77-1233.04 addresses the procedure for personal property.

The regulations in the Nebraska Administrative Code also 

demonstrate that § 77-1507(1) is limited to the correction of 

clerical errors for real property only. The chapter concerning 

real property contains several regulations concerning clerical 

errors,39 while the chapter addressing personal property contains no regulation mentioning clerical errors.40 Because we 

conclude that § 77-1507 applies to correction of clerical error 

concerning real property only, we need not decide whether a 

clerical error occurred in this case.

[9] We conclude that § 77-1507(1) does not apply to personal property and, thus, did not give the Board authority 

to place Cargill’s personal property on the tax rolls. County 

boards of equalization can exercise only such powers as are 

expressly granted to them by statute, and statutes conferring 

power and authority upon a county board of equalization are 

strictly construed.41 Because the Board lacked statutory authority under § 77-1507(1) to place Cargill’s personal property on 

the tax rolls, its action was void.42

37 Professional Mgmt. Midwest v. Lund Co., 284 Neb. 777, 826 N.W.2d 225 

(2012).

38 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 77-202.03(4) and 77-1317 (Cum. Supp. 2014) and 

77-1345(3) and 77-1345.01(4) (Reissue 2009). Compare Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 77-5017(2) (Cum. Supp. 2014).

39 See 350 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 10, §§ 002.06, 003.02B(2), 003.02G, 

003.04C, 003.06H, and 003.07 (2014).

40 See 350 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 20 (2009).

41 John Day Co. v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal., 243 Neb. 24, 497 N.W.2d 65 

(1993).

42 See, generally, Wetovick v. County of Nance, 279 Neb. 773, 782 N.W.2d 

298 (2010); Big John’s Billiards v. Balka, 254 Neb. 528, 577 N.W.2d 294 

(1998).
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3. Remaining Assig

of Erro

[10] We need not address the Board’s remaining assignments of error. Because the Board did not have statutory 

authority to add Cargill’s personal property to the tax rolls 

under § 77-1507(1) and because the Board does not challenge 

TERC’s finding that § 77-1233.04 did not provide such authority, the Board’s action was void. Where a county board of 

equalization’s actions are void, TERC lacks jurisdiction over 

the merits of the appeal.43

VI. CONCLUSION

Our conclusion is driven by the very narrow way in which 

the issue was presented to us. We confront both a limited 

record and the Board’s reliance on § 77-1507(1) to the exclusion of any other potential avenue of addressing the problem. 

We were not asked to review whether § 77-1233.04 would 

allow the county assessor to make this change, and we therefore express no opinion on that question. We are also constrained by the language used by the Legislature in its 1999 

amendment to § 77-1507(1), which did not make the statute 

applicable to personal property. We conclude that the Board’s 

action in placing Cargill’s personal property on the tax rolls 

for 2010 was void, because it lacked statutory authority to do 

so under § 77-1507(1). TERC reached the same conclusion 

and correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the 

appeal. We affirm.

Affirmed

43 See Darnall Ranch v. Banner Cty. Bd. of Equal., 280 Neb. 655, 789 

N.W.2d 26 (2010).