NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

KIMBERLY H., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, S.B., C.B., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 14-0192

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD21231

The Honorable Linda H. Miles, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Denise L. Carroll, Scottsdale

By Denise L. Carroll

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Dawn R. Williams

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
KIMBERLY H. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Kimberly H. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

severing her parental rights to S.B. and C.B. (collectively, “the children”).

Because reasonable evidence supports severance based on cumulative outof-home placement for fifteen months or more pursuant to court order, we 

affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 S.B. was born in July 2010, and C.B. in July 2011. In March 

2011, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”)

1 began receiving reports 

about the family, primarily concerning allegations Mother and the 

children’s alleged biological father (“Father”)2 were neglecting S.B. and 

engaging in domestic violence. After police responded to a domestic 

violence incident in August 2011, Mother left Father and resided briefly 

with her mother until being asked to leave. She subsequently resided with 

friends, but eventually relocated to a shelter. After further reports of 

neglect, DCS removed the children in December 2011. At the time of 

removal, both children appeared emaciated, ill, and developmentally 

delayed, with ongoing medical conditions. S.B. had a severe rash and open 

wounds from eczema, and C.B. had rotovirus and recurring ear infections. 

 

1 At the outset of this proceeding, the children were taken into care by 

Child Protective Services (“CPS”), formerly a division of the Arizona 

Department of Economic Security (“ADES”), and ADES filed the initial 

dependency petition. In May 2014, CPS was removed as an entity within 

ADES and replaced by DCS, an entity outside of ADES. See 2014 Ariz. Sess. 

Laws, ch. 1, §§ 6, 20, 54 (2d Spec. Sess.). Accordingly, DCS has been 

substituted for ADES in this matter. See ARCAP 27. References to DCS 

encompass both ADES and the former CPS.

2 On June 20, 2013, the juvenile court terminated Father’s parental 

rights, as well as those of “John Doe” or any other person claiming 

paternity. Father is not part of this appeal.
KIMBERLY H. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

Mother appeared indifferent to concerns about the children and her lack of 

care for them. At the first visit between Mother and the children after their 

removal, it was apparent she had trouble supervising both children at the 

same time.

¶3 On December 29, 2011, DCS petitioned the juvenile court to 

declare S.B. and C.B. dependent as to both parents. As to Mother, DCS 

alleged the children were dependent due to abuse and/or neglect. 

Specifically, DCS alleged (1) Mother had failed to provide the children with 

the basic necessities of life, including their medical needs, as exhibited by 

Mother’s failure to care for S.B.’s eczema and failure to obtain 

immunizations for the children, and (2) Mother and Father had domestic 

violence issues. On April 30, 2012, the juvenile court adjudicated the 

children dependent, and ordered a case plan of family reunification 

concurrent with severance and adoption.

¶4 To work toward reunification, Mother was expected to 

demonstrate an ability to (1) ”recognize and seek medical attention for her 

children when needed,” (2) “empathize with her children, recognizing their 

cues and appropriately respond[ing] to their needs,” and (3) “financially 

provide a safe stable home.” To help Mother achieve those goals, DCS 

provided her with transportation and arranged for her to complete a 

substance abuse assessment, urinalysis testing, and a psychological 

evaluation, and DCS offered other services, including parent aide assistance

and individual counseling to address Mother’s anger and domestic violence

issues. DCS also completed assessments on the children and offered speech 

and othertherapy for S.B. and occupational therapy for C.B. to address their 

developmental delays. DCS also offered day care, play therapy, and foster 

care services.

¶5 Despite the assistance DCS offered, Mother continued to 

struggle. She was unable to maintain stable housing or employment, and

appeared to lack the motivation to participate in services to address the 

safety threats to the children. She also lacked insight into her involvement 

with DCS and the reasons the children remained in out-of-home placement. 

Mother minimized the allegations, lacked insight into normal child 

development, and indicated she wished to reunite with Father, despite their 

history of domestic violence. Mother was also inconsistent both in her drug 

testing - missing several required tests, testing positive twice for opiates in 
KIMBERLY H. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

July 2012,

3 and testing positive once for alcohol – and in her participation 

with parent aide services, missing several scheduled visits and resisting

instruction from parent aides. During visits, she failed to appropriately 

supervise the children, used inappropriate language, argued with the 

parent aide, and refused to accept redirection in her parenting skills. She 

also demonstrated an inability to understand the importance of following 

the children’s dietary restrictions, even after learning about S.B.’s extreme 

food allergies.

¶6 On October 22, 2012, DCS moved to terminate the parents’ 

parental rights to the children. As to Mother, DCS sought to terminate her

parental rights pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes section 8-533(B)(8)(b)

(West 2015)4 (six months’ time-in-care), alleging she had substantially 

neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances causing the 

children to be in an out-of-home placement. DCS noted Mother had not 

been fully compliant with drug testing, individual counseling, domestic 

violence counseling, or visitation. At the conclusion of the trial on May 9, 

2013, the juvenile court severed Father’s parental rights; however, the court 

found DCS had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the 

grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights, and ordered the case plan 

changed to family reunification concurrent with severance and adoption.

¶7 DCS thereafter continued to offer reunification services to 

Mother, although DCS discontinued parent aide services and offered only 

case aide services for approximately one year. Mother remained 

inconsistent in her drug testing, missing numerous tests. Further, although 

Mother’s parenting skills improved slightly between 2013 and 2014 and she 

was eventually able to verbalize some good parenting techniques, case 

aides continued to express concerns about Mother’s ability to parent, and 

noted Mother consistently demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to 

learn and apply appropriate parenting skills. Mother sporadically missed 

visits and failed to adequately supervise both children, which resulted in 

safety concerns for the children. Despite one-on-one, hands-on parenting

instruction from the case aides, Mother continued to put the children at risk 

by giving them food without ensuring it would not cause an allergic 

 

3 Mother later provided a prescription to explain her positive tests for 

opiates.

4 We cite the current version of the applicable statutes because no 

changes material to our decision have occurred since the time of the 

severance.
KIMBERLY H. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

reaction; allowed them to hurt themselves and each other without 

redirection; let S.B. cover himself in feces; and became upset with the 

children and case aides when the children would not listen to her. Mother 

also continued to minimize and deny the allegations and issues causing the 

children to be in out-of-home placement. Her housing and employment 

continued to be unstable, and she regularly missed individual counseling 

sessions.5

¶8 On October 9, 2013, DCS again moved to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights to the children, on the grounds of six, nine, and fifteen 

months’ time-in-care. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a)-(c). DCS further alleged 

that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest.

¶9 Pending trial on the severance motion, Mother gave birth to a 

third child, A.H. Although Mother became more compliant with visitation 

and the services offered her, she continued to lack the necessary skills to 

safely parent, denied any parenting issues, and refused to accept direction 

with respect to her care of A.H. Accordingly, DCS removed A.H. from 

Mother’s care as well. In January 2014, DCS filed a dependency petition 

regarding A.H.

6

¶10 On February 12 and March 17, 2014, Mother completed a 

psychological evaluation offered by DCS and conducted by James Thal, 

Ph.D.7 Dr. Thal diagnosed Mother with an unspecified personality disorder 

with borderline traits, and noted “she has a strong inclination to project

blame onto others.” Dr. Thal indicated his review of DCS reports supported 

his “genuine concern that [Mother] would quickly be overwhelmed by the 

demands of parenting three active children, all under the age of four.” At 

the time of the evaluation, Mother was temporarily living in the apartment 

of two friends, but planned to move again in the near future, and had only 

recently secured a part-time job cleaning houses. Nevertheless, she asserted

she could support herself and her three children, and she denied that her 

 

5 Mother did, however, successfully complete of a counseling session 

in November 2013.

6 The juvenile court later adjudicated A.H. dependent as to Mother, 

but he is not subject to the termination order from which Mother appeals.

7 Mother was scheduled for her evaluation on February 12, but she 

arrived forty minutes early and indicated she would have to leave before 

the assessment could be completed. She missed the rescheduled March 3 

appointment, then arrived late for the rescheduled March 17 appointment.
KIMBERLY H. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

6

personal shortcomings had led to the children’s out-of-home placement. 

Dr. Thal opined that Mother’s general distrust of others and the absence of 

meaningful support from others would likely continue to hamper her. 

These traits were intertwined with her personality disorder, leading Dr. 

Thal to offer an uncertain prognosis regarding whether Mother would be 

“able to demonstrate minimally adequate parenting skills in the foreseeable 

future, even with existing or proposed interventions.” Further, her inability 

to gain appropriate parenting skills in the time since the children’s removal 

indicated her condition would continue “for a prolonged, indeterminate 

period of time,” and a child in her care was at risk of neglect.

¶11 In April and June 2014, the juvenile court held a four-day 

contested severance hearing. At the beginning of the hearing, DCS

withdrew the six-month and nine-month out-of-home placement grounds, 

and proceeded on the fifteen-month ground.

¶12 At the hearing, Dr. Thal opined that Mother would not be able 

to safely parent the children for at least “a couple of years,” and that she 

would only be able to do so if she completed the “arduous” work necessary 

to address her own immaturity and personality disorder. He further noted 

that, “what’s really difficult and really troubling is why she was never able 

to consistently implement what she learned” given the “hours and hours 

and hours of coaching” she received. He opined that reunification with S.B.

and C.B. was “a lost cause,” and Mother and DCS should focus their efforts 

on her new infant, A.H.

¶13 Similarly, Mother’s DCS case manager, Ashley ShaubBetcher, opined that Mother “has not been able to make significant behavior 

changes in two and a half years of [DCS] involvement,” and therefore

recommended discontinuing reunification services for S.B. and C.B.

8 When 

Ms. Shaub-Betcher supervised visits between Mother and the children

following A.H.’s birth, she noted Mother continued to struggle to parent 

both S.B. and C.B., did not fully understand S.B.’s severe allergies, and 

required intervention because of safety concerns when she failed to 

adequately supervise the children. Moreover, Mother still had not 

demonstrated an ability to maintain a stable home or income and relied on 

DCS to meet her transportation needs. Her instability was particularly 

concerning, given the number of appointments and services the children

needed on a regular basis. Because, unlike S.B. and C.B., A.H. had no 

 

8 Ms. Shaub-Betcher conceded, however, that sometime in the fall of 

2013, Mother started submitting to drug testing more consistently and 

appeared to have remedied her substance abuse problem.
KIMBERLY H. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

7

apparent special needs, Ms. Shaub-Betcher recommended Mother 

concentrate on obtaining the parenting skills necessary to parent him.

¶14 At the conclusion of the trial, the juvenile court terminated the 

parent-child relationship between Mother and the children. We have 

jurisdiction over Appellant’s timely appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 

12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

ANALYSIS

 I. Fifteen Months’ Out-of-Home Placement

¶15 Mother argues the juvenile court erred in finding there was 

clear and convincing evidence that she failed to remedy the circumstances 

that caused the children to be in out-of-home placement. We disagree.

¶16 Although the right to custody of one’s children is 

fundamental, it is not absolute. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 

Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11–12, 995 P.2d 682, 684 (2000). The juvenile court may 

sever a parental relationship based on clear and convincing evidence of at 

least one statutory ground enumerated in A.R.S. § 8–533(B). Id. at 249, ¶ 12, 

995 P.2d at 685. In addition, the court must find by a preponderance of the 

evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child. See id.; Kent K. 

v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22, 110 P.3d 1013, 1018 (2005).

¶17 Because “the juvenile court [i]s in the best position to weigh 

the evidence, judge the credibility of the parties, observe the parties, and 

make appropriate factual findings,” Pima Cnty. Dependency Action No. 

93511, 154 Ariz. 543, 546, 744 P.2d 455, 458 (App. 1987), this court will not 

reweigh the evidence but will look only to determine if there is evidence to 

sustain the court’s ruling. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JV–132905, 186 

Ariz. 607, 609, 925 P.2d 748, 750 (App. 1996). “We will not disturb the 

juvenile court’s disposition absent an abuse of discretion or unless the 

court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous, i.e., there is no reasonable 

evidence to support them.” Id. (citations omitted); accord Minh T. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 76, 78–79, ¶ 9, 41 P.3d 614, 616–17 (App. 2001).

¶18 Although DCS must provide parents with the time and 

opportunity to participate in programs designed to improve their ability to 

care for their child, Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 

192, ¶ 37, 971 P.2d 1046, 1053 (App. 1999), DCS is not required to provide 

every conceivable service or to ensure parents participate in each service 

offered. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS–501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353, 884 

P.2d 234, 239 (App. 1994). Nor is DCS required to offer futile services. See 
KIMBERLY H. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

8

Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 18, 83 P.3d 43, 50 

(App. 2004).

A. Mother’s Inability to Remedy the Circumstances

¶19 Mother argues “the State failed to prove that she was unable 

to remedy the circumstances that had caused the removal of her children” 

because she addressed her substance abuse and domestic violence issues, 

consistently visited the children, improved her parenting skills, and 

purportedly learned to use an EpiPen to treat S.B.’s allergies. Mother’s 

argument, however, amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence, which 

we will not do. See JV–132905, 186 Ariz. at 609, 925 P.2d at 750. Mother’s

claim fails because, despite her efforts, she was unable to remedy the 

circumstances that caused the children’s out-of-home placement.

¶20 Under A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(8)(c), the juvenile court had 

discretion to terminate Mother’s parental rights after finding that (1) DCS

made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services; (2) the 

children were in an out-of-home placement for fifteen months or longer; (3) 

Mother was unable to remedy the circumstances causing the out-of-home

placement; (4) a “substantial likelihood” existed Mother would “not be 

capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the 

near future”; and (5) severance was in the children’s best interest.9 Unlike 

the nine-month ground under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a), the fifteen-month 

ground under subsection (c) does not require that the juvenile court find 

the parent substantially neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the 

circumstances causing the out-of-home placement. Rather, it requires only 

that the juvenile court find the parent was unable to remedy the 

circumstances causing the out-of-home placement, regardless of her efforts.

See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c).

¶21 In this case, ample evidence supported the juvenile court’s 

finding that Mother had been unable to remedy the circumstances that 

caused the children’s out-of-home placement. Dr. Thal testified he 

diagnosed Mother with a personality disorder characterized by “selfdefeating behaviors” and a pattern of making decisions that were not in her 

or her children’s best interest. He opined that a personality disorder like 

Mother’s would interfere with productivity and relationships (including 

the parent-child relationship) and would cause distorted thinking, 

 

9 Mother has not challenged the juvenile court’s findings that DCS

made diligent reunification efforts and the children had been in an out-ofhome placement for at least fifteen months.
KIMBERLY H. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

9

difficulty accepting reality, and a tendency to blame others. Dr. Thal 

recognized Mother had made gains and had some favorable traits: she was

young and potentially able to learn better habits, she was intelligent, and 

she had stopped using drugs. Nevertheless, he opined that overcoming her 

deficits would be “an arduous task[,] to say the least,” and she would need 

“a considerable amount of time to catch up” with her own development 

before she would be able to parent. Dr. Thal’s review of the records 

supported his opinion that Mother had made some progress, yet continued 

to display the same issues and deficits throughout the case and was not 

currently able to effectively parent.

¶22 Ms. Shaub-Betcher supported Dr. Thal’s opinion. Following 

A.H.’s birth in January 2014, Ms. Shaub-Betcher opined Mother was not 

able to care for him because Mother “consistently demonstrates an 

unwillingness or inability to learn appropriate parenting skills, which 

would put her young infant at risk of abuse or neglect.” She noted Mother 

“has been offered numerous services to remedy [her history of unsafe and 

limited parenting skills] in the past three years and she has not been able to 

consistently demonstrate good parenting skills.” In fact, as recently as two 

months before trial, Mother still did not understand S.B.’s severe allergies. 

Ms. Shaub-Betcher noted that, in addition to Mother’s deficient parenting 

skills, she still lacked stable income, housing, and transportation – all major 

concerns for her ability to safely care for the children. Ms. Shaub-Betcher 

opined that, as of June 2014, Mother was not able to parent any of her three 

children in a minimally adequate manner.

¶23 Mother’s parent aides confirmed Mother struggled with 

caring for the children at visits, did not understand the children’s 

developmental levels, was unable to understand and properly respond to 

the children’s emotional cues, and was unable to consistently implement 

successful parenting skills. Further, Mother did not seem to understand the 

scope and implications of S.B.’s many allergies, bringing him snacks that 

could or did harm him, and Mother was incapable of adequately 

supervising both children at the same time, putting them at risk.

¶24 Thus, despite over two years of reunification services, 

including multiple referrals for various forms of parenting instruction, 

Mother remained unable to understand and address the children’s special 

needs, could not safely parent them together, was unable to appropriately 

discipline them, and was unlikely to be able to overcome her challenges 

without years of arduous and ongoing work. Reasonable evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s finding that Mother had been unable to 
KIMBERLY H. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

10

remedy the circumstances that caused the children’s fifteen-month out-ofhome placement.

B. Mother’s Inability to Exercise Proper and Effective Parental 

Care and Control in the Near Future

¶25 Mother also claims DCS did not prove there was a substantial 

likelihood she would be unable to parent the children in the near future 

because “she is at the least, a minimally adequate parent pursuant to the 

statutes.” She requests that this court reweigh the fact that she “currently 

has stable housing” and employment and “had actively engaged in 

services” against DCS’s evidence that her immaturity and inability to 

consistently practice safe parenting rendered her unable to parent in the 

near future. As we have noted, we do not reweigh the evidence. See JV–

132905, 186 Ariz. at 609, 925 P.2d at 750. Further, because reasonable 

evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Mother would be unable 

to parent the children in the near future, her claim fails.

¶26 In 1986, the Arizona Legislature amended A.R.S. § 8-533 to 

include out-of-home placement as a ground for severance to expedite the 

adoption of children in foster care and to promote a stable and long-term 

family environment for these children. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS6520, 157 Ariz. 238, 243, 756 P.2d 335, 340 (App. 1988) (citation omitted).

Termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) requires a showing that a parent

is unable to properly and effectively parent a child “in the near future.”

Although the legislature did not define the phrase “near future,” we 

construe undefined phrases contained in statutes according to their 

ordinary meaning. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 377, 

¶ 16, 231 P.3d 377, 381 (App. 2010) (citation omitted). “Near” is defined in 

part as “at, within, or to a short distance or time” or “not far distant in time.” 

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 775 (10th ed. 1993). Ultimately, 

the statute reinforces the concept that children should not be forced to wait 

inordinately for a parent to develop necessary parenting skills. Raymond F., 

224 Ariz. at 378, ¶ 25, 231 P.3d at 382.

¶27 As detailed above, Mother’s defensive and resistant posture 

rendered her unable to parent the children in the foreseeable future. Dr. 

Thal referenced Mother’s decision to have a third child with yet another 

unsupportive and inappropriate man during the dependency, her view that 

she was a “great mom” despite the service providers’ ongoing concerns, her 

inadequate income, and her immaturity for her age as reasons why it would 

take at least “a couple of years” before the children could be safely returned 

to her care. Supporting Dr. Thal’s opinion, Mother’s parent aide testified 
KIMBERLY H. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

11

Mother had failed to make adequate, consistent progress in demonstrating 

safe parenting techniques. Likewise, Ms. Shaub-Betcher testified Mother 

would not be able to safely parent the children in the near future because, 

despite over two years of services, Mother continued to display the same 

unsafe behaviors and had not demonstrated meaningful change. Ms. 

Shaub-Betcher testified that, based on her education and training in 

behavioral health, it was reasonable to conclude that, if Mother had failed 

to learn adequate parenting skills after more than a year of services, she 

likely would not do so. Reasonable evidence therefore supports the 

juvenile court’s finding that there was a substantial likelihood Mother

would be unable to exercise proper and effective parental care and control 

in the near future.

II. Best Interest of the Children

¶28 Mother additionally challenges the juvenile court’s finding 

that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest.

Mother claims the court erred when it found severance was in the children’s 

best interest because “she is bonded to her children, and has made great 

strides in maintaining her relationship with them,” and the lack of an 

adoptive placement “proves that [there] would be no detriment to allowing 

Mother the opportunity to parent her children in the future.” Because 

reasonable evidence supports the court’s best interest finding, Mother’s 

claim fails.

¶29 To effectuate severance, the court must find, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, termination of the parent-child relationship 

is in a child’s best interest. A.R.S. § 8–533(B); Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 22, 

110 P.3d at 1018. To support a best interest finding, the petitioner must 

prove that the child will affirmatively benefit from the termination.

Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS–500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 6, 804 P.2d 730, 735 

(1990). This means that “a determination of the child’s best interest must 

include a finding as to how the child would benefit from a severance or be 

harmed by the continuation of the relationship.” Id. at 5, 804 P.2d at 734.

The best interest requirement may be met if, for example, the petitioner 

proves a current adoptive plan exists for the child, id. at 6, 804 P.2d at 735, 

or even that the child is adoptable. See JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 352, 884 P.2d 

at 238. The juvenile court may also consider evidence that an existing 

placement is meeting the needs of the child in determining severance is in 

the child’s best interest. Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 

377, ¶ 5, 982 P.2d 1290, 1291 (App. 1998).
KIMBERLY H. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

12

¶30 In this case, the record supports the juvenile court’s finding 

that severance was in the children’s best interest. Ms. Shaub-Betcher 

testified that terminating Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best 

interest because Mother cannot safely parent them. Ms. Shaub-Betcher 

stated DCS was looking for an adoptive placement that would take the 

children together, but S.B.’s foster mother was willing to adopt him if DCS 

was unable to find a home that could take both children. She opined that 

the children were adoptable and noted they had, in fact, been together in a 

two-parent potentially adoptive home in the past, but those adoptive

parents had moved out of the state. Accordingly, although the children 

were not currently in a home that could adopt them together, the children 

are adoptable, and DCS has a plan to find the children a two-parent 

adoptive home that could meet their special needs. Reasonable evidence 

therefore supports the juvenile court’s finding that terminating Mother’s 

parental rights was in the children’s best interest.

CONCLUSION

¶31 The juvenile court’s order severing Mother’s parental rights 

to S.B. and C.B. is affirmed.