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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 15-442 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(March 22, 2017) 

Plaintiff Clifton Stanley Diaz filed suit against Defendant Washington Metropolitan Area 

Transit Authority (“WMATA”) alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 

after he was terminated from his employment as a probationary officer with WMATA’s Metro 

Transit Police Department (“MTPD”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against him 

on the basis of his national origin and sexual orientation. Presently before the Court is Defendant’s 

[21] Motion for Summary Judgment. Upon consideration of the pleadings,1 the relevant legal 

authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court shall GRANT Defendant’s Motion. Plaintiff has 

not presented evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to find that Defendant’s asserted nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff was not Defendant’s actual reason for doing so. 

 

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 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents and their attachments 

and/or exhibits: Def.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment, ECF No. [21] (“Def.’s Mot.”); Pl.’s Resp. 

to Def.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment, ECF No. [22] (“Pl.’s Resp.”); and Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s 

Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment, ECF No. [23] (“Def.’s Reply”). In an exercise of 

its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in this action would not be of assistance 

in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).

CLIFTON STANLEY DIAZ, JR., 

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA 

TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

 Defendant. 
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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Clifton Stanley Diaz was employed as a probationary recruit police officer with 

the MTPD until his termination in 2013. Def.’s Stmt. of Material Facts Not in Dispute, ECF No. 

[21-1] (“Def.’s Stmt.”), ¶¶ 1, 7. In 2013, MTPD conducted an investigation into allegations that 

Plaintiff had abandoned his Field Training Officer (“FTO”) during a service call, returned to the 

police station without said FTO, failed to submit his paperwork for review by a supervising 

official, and failed to check off with the official on duty before ending his shift. Id. ¶ 4; see also

Def.’s Stmt., Exs. 1, 2 (May 7, 2013 and May 27, 2013 MTPD Investigative Reports outlining 

Plaintiff’s alleged misconduct). As a result of the investigation, MTPD charged Plaintiff with a 

violation of its Ethical Standards of Conduct and Financial Interest, General Order # 217, section 

III.A, number 3, which states that “Members will respond promptly and truthfully to all inquiries 

initiated by an official” and “will not knowingly make false statements in any written or verbal 

reports.” Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 5. The MTPD subsequently terminated Plaintiff, effective June 1, 2013. 

Id. ¶ 7. According to Defendant, Plaintiff was terminated as a result of this investigation and due 

to his failure to satisfactorily complete his field training program. Id. ¶ 6; see also Def.’s Stmt., 

Ex. 3 (May 31, 2013 MTPD Field Training Failure Notice summarizing “performance 

deficiencies exhibited by Recruit Officer Clifton Diaz during his Field Training”). 

 Plaintiff has not presented evidence that rebuts the facts laid out above, but claims that he 

was in fact discharged either because he is Hispanic2

 or because his superiors at WMATA 

“perceived [him] to be gay.” Def.’s Stmt., Ex. 5 (Deposition of Clifton Stanley Diaz) at 18:6-12. 

Plaintiff expounded on the basis for his claims at his deposition. At that deposition, Plaintiff 

 

2 Plaintiff refused at his deposition to provide additional detail as to his national origin beyond 

asserting that he is Hispanic. Def.’s Stmt., Ex. 5 at 16:9-15. 
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stated that he “was the only Hispanic in [his] training group.” Id. at 16:2-3. He further stated

that “[t]he Deputy Police Chief, Jeffrey Delinski, asked me if I had girlfriends. When I 

responded no, he laughed and chuckled, then discharged me.” Id. at 16:21-17:1. Additionally, 

Plaintiff—who has repeatedly indicated that he is a heterosexual—claims that he overheard two 

unidentified peers at WMATA refer to him using a derogatory term for homosexuals. Id. at 

17:12-13, 19:3-4, 22:6-23:4. Finally, Plaintiff stated that he was required to wear pants that did 

not fit him. Id. at 17:13-20. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

 Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a). The mere existence of some factual dispute is insufficient on its own to bar 

summary judgment; the dispute must pertain to a “material” fact. Id. Accordingly, “[o]nly 

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will 

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986). Nor may summary judgment be avoided based on just any disagreement as to 

the relevant facts; the dispute must be “genuine,” meaning that there must be sufficient 

admissible evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to find for the non-movant. Id.

 In order to establish that a fact is or cannot be genuinely disputed, a party must (a) cite to 

specific parts of the record—including deposition testimony, documentary evidence, affidavits or 

declarations, or other competent evidence—in support of its position, or (b) demonstrate that the 

materials relied upon by the opposing party do not actually establish the absence or presence of a 

genuine dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Conclusory assertions offered without any factual 

basis in the record cannot create a genuine dispute sufficient to survive summary judgment. See 
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Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Transp., 564 F.3d 462, 465-66 (D.C. Cir. 

2009). Moreover, where “a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly 

address another party's assertion of fact,” the district court may “consider the fact undisputed for 

purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

When faced with a motion for summary judgment, the district court may not make 

credibility determinations or weigh the evidence; instead, the evidence must be analyzed in the 

light most favorable to the non-movant, with all justifiable inferences drawn in his favor. Liberty 

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. If material facts are genuinely in dispute, or undisputed facts are 

susceptible to divergent yet justifiable inferences, summary judgment is inappropriate. Moore v. 

Hartman, 571 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In the end, the district court’s task is to determine 

“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or 

whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Liberty Lobby, 477 

U.S. at 251-52. In this regard, the non-movant must “do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); “[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not 

significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50 

(internal citations omitted).

 In recognition of the difficulty in uncovering clear evidence of discriminatory or 

retaliatory intent, the district court should approach summary judgment in an action for 

employment discrimination or retaliation with “special caution.” Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 116 

F.3d 876, 879-80 (D.C. Cir. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 

(en banc). Be that as it may, the plaintiff is not relieved of his burden to support his allegations 

with competent evidence. Brown v. Mills, 674 F. Supp. 2d 182, 188 (D.D.C. 2009). As in any 
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context, where the plaintiff would bear the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial, then at 

the summary judgment stage he bears the burden of production to designate specific facts 

showing that there exists a genuine dispute requiring trial. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 

(2009). Otherwise, the plaintiff could effectively defeat the “central purpose” of the summary 

judgment device—namely, “to weed out those cases insufficiently meritorious to warrant . . . 

trial”—simply by way of offering conclusory allegations, speculation, and argument. Greene v. 

Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 

III. DISCUSSION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful for any employer to “fail or refuse to 

hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). To 

establish a prima facie case under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that he “is a member of a 

protected class,” that he “suffered an adverse employment action,” and that “the unfavorable 

action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Youssef v. F.B.I., 687 F.3d 397, 401 (D.C. 

Cir. 2012) (quoting Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 

Plaintiff represents himself pro se in this matter and his pleadings are not a model of 

clarity. Accordingly, two preliminary points must be made. First, Plaintiff appears to allege in 

his Amended Complaint that he was discriminated against based on his sexual orientation. Am. 

Compl., ECF No. [20], at 5. However, “Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on 

sexual orientation or sexual preference.” Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 208 (D.D.C. 

2006). Accordingly, Plaintiff has not established an actionable claim for discrimination based on 
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his sexual orientation.3

 That being said, it is unclear from his pleadings whether Plaintiff 

intended to additionally assert claims for gender or sex-stereotyping, which could be actionable. 

Assuming that Plaintiff did intend to plead such claims, the Court explains further below why 

they would not survive summary judgment. 

Second, although Plaintiff’s pleadings include references to various other conduct, the 

only actionable “adverse employment action” Plaintiff has alleged in this case is his termination. 

“[N]ot everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.” Russell v. 

Principi, 257 F.3d 815, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2001). An adverse action must be “‘a significant change 

in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly 

different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits.’” Taylor v. Small, 

350 F.3d 1286, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 

761 (1998)). In this case, other than Plaintiff’s termination, the acts complained of in Plaintiff’s 

pleadings—including comments by Plaintiff’s peers and supervisors and issues with Plaintiff’s 

uniform—do not rise to the level of adverse employment actions that could form the basis of a 

Title VII claim on their own. 

Having resolved these preliminary issues, the Court moves on to consider the record as to 

Plaintiff’s allegedly discriminatory termination. Defendant has proffered a non-discriminatory

rationale for this employment action, for which it has provided supporting evidence: Defendant 

claims that Plaintiff was terminated as a result of the investigation into Plaintiff’s alleged 

misconduct relating to his abandoning of his FTO, which he was determined to have been 

untruthful about when questioned, as well as Plaintiff’s poor evaluations. Because Defendant 

 

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 Moreover, although Plaintiff appears to suggest that he was mistreated because he was 

perceived to be a homosexual, Plaintiff has repeatedly indicated that he is in fact a heterosexual. 
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has proffered such a rationale, it “is no longer relevant” if Plaintiff has established a prima facie 

case. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983). In fact, the Court 

of Appeals has dictated that this Court “need not—and should not—decide” whether the Plaintiff 

has made out a prima facie case at this stage. Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 

494 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). Instead, this Court need only determine whether 

Plaintiff has “produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the [Defendant’s] 

asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that [Defendant] intentionally 

discriminated against [Plaintiff] on the basis of” a protected status. Id. A plaintiff may make this

showing by relying on “(1) evidence establishing the plaintiff’s prima facie case; (2) evidence 

the plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its actions; and (3) any 

further evidence of discrimination that may be available to the plaintiff, such as independent 

evidence of discriminatory statements or attitudes on the part of the employer.” Holcomb v. 

Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 897 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

In this case, Plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to rebut Defendant’s proffered 

non-discriminatory reason for terminating him. With respect to Plaintiff’s national origin 

discrimination claim, the only “evidence” the Court can discern from the record is that Plaintiff 

claims to have been the only Hispanic person in his training group. This is clearly insufficient 

evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant’s non-discriminatory reason for 

terminating Plaintiff—based on a fully-documented investigation into Plaintiff’s alleged 

wrongdoing and poor evaluations—was false and that Plaintiff was actually terminated due to his 

national origin. In fact, the Court does not find that this “evidence” supports that conclusion at 

all.
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Moreover, even if Plaintiff’s allegations related to his sexual orientation were construed 

as actionable gender or sex-stereotype discrimination claims under Title VII, the Court similarly 

finds that there is not sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that such discrimination 

was the true purpose of Plaintiff’s termination either. Plaintiff claims that he was required to 

wear a uniform with ill-fitting pants, was asked if he had “girlfriends,” and that he overheard two 

of his peers—who had no supervisory role over Plaintiff and no apparent involvement with his 

termination—refer to him by a derogatory term for homosexuals. Plaintiff’s concerns regarding 

his uniform and the derogatory comments attributed to his peers have no apparent connection to 

his termination. Similarly, the comment regarding Plaintiff’s “girlfriends,” without any context, 

also provides little if any evidence as to the intent of Defendant in terminating Plaintiff. The 

Court of course by no means sanctions any of this alleged conduct. However, it does conclude 

that these assertions are not sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable juror could base a 

conclusion that Defendant’s non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff was not its

“actual reason.” Brady, 520 F.3d at 494. Because Plaintiff failed to produce such evidence, 

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment in its favor. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court shall GRANT Defendant’s [21] Motion for 

Summary Judgment and DISMISS this case. An appropriate Order accompanies this 

Memorandum Opinion. 

 /s/ 

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

United States District Judge