J-A32011-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ESTATE OF SHEILA CURRY SAYER 

A/K/A SHEILA C. SAYER, AND

SHEILA SAYER, DECEASED

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

APPEAL OF MICHAEL CURRY BLOOM, IN 

HIS OWN RIGHT, AND HANNAH CURRY 

WITTMAN AND MALLORY CLAY 

WITTMAN, BY THEIR NATURAL PARENT 

AND GUARDIAN, SUZANNE BLOOM 

WITTMAN AND SUZANNE BLOOM 

WITTMAN, IN HER OWN RIGHT

Appellants No. 3160 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Decree November 12, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 89-2012

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and FITZGERALD, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED APRIL 13, 2015

The children and grandchildren of Decedent Sheila Sayer (Testator) 

appeal the decree entered by the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, 

Orphan’s Court division, granting summary judgment to Elizabeth Hazel 

Murphy Campbell, the sole beneficiary under Testator’s will, and Joseph 

Siedlarz, Esq., the scrivener and executor of the will (collectively Appellees). 

____________________________________________



Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. Mr. Siedlarz, 

as Testator’s estate attorney, prepared several wills over the years for 

Testator, including the will executed on August 18, 2011, which is at issue 

here. The August 18, 2011 will contains the following sentence: “I make no 

provisions in this will for my children and grandchildren, not because of any 

lack of affection for them, but because they are already well provided for.” 

Last Will and Testament of Sheila C. Sayer, dated August 18, 2011, at 2, 

Reproduced Record (“R.R.”) at 705a. In addition, the August 18, 2011 will 

appointed Mr. Siedlarz as the sole executor, as opposed to his prior 

designation as co-executor, of the estate. Ms. Campbell, Testator’s close 

friend for over 20 years, is the sole beneficiary. The execution of the August 

18, 2011 will was witnessed by Mr. Siedlarz and Kathyrn Razzi.1

Testator died on September 28, 2011. On November 9, 2011, the 

August 18, 2011 will was admitted to probate as the last will and testament 

of Testator. On December 5, 2011, Testator’s children, Appellants Michael C. 

Bloom and Suzanne Wittman, filed a formal caveat and request for 

certification objecting to the admission of the August 18, 2011 will and 

requesting that no letters testamentary or letters of administration be 

issued. The Register of Wills held a hearing on November 9, 2011, after 

____________________________________________

1 The August 18, 2011 will has the same distribution scheme as Testator’s 

prior will, which was executed on November 13, 2010. Under both wills, Ms. 

Campbell is named as the sole beneficiary of the estate. The estate at issue 

is worth approximately $700,000.
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which it dismissed the caveat, admitted the August 18, 2011 will to probate, 

and granted Letters Testamentary to Mr. Seidlarz. 

On July 2, 2012, Appellants filed a petition for citation sur appeal, 

which was later amended, alleging that Testator lacked testamentary 

capacity when she executed the August 18, 2011 will and, alternatively, that 

the will was the product of fraud, forgery, and undue influence. Ms. 

Campbell filed preliminary objections, which were overruled on November 

20, 2012. Appellants then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings 

seeking to vacate the probate of the will, again alleging fraud, forgery, and 

undue influence. In May 2013, the court denied the motion; set a discovery 

schedule, which was amended on June 27, 2013, ordering that discovery be 

completed by July 31, 2013; and scheduled trial for October 2013.

On August 19, 2013, Appellants filed a “Petition for Sanctions Under 

Pa.R.C.P. 4019(c)(1); to Complete Answers to Interrogatories and Document 

Request; to Compel Respondent Joseph Siedlarz, III to Submit to 

Deposition; and for Amendment of the Scheduling Order.” On September 4, 

2013, Ms. Campbell filed a motion for summary judgment joined by Mr. 

Siedlarz. On September 16, 2013, after a hearing on the motion for 

sanctions and to compel discovery, the trial court entered a decree ordering 

Mr. Siedlarz to present himself for deposition on Monday, October 7, 2013. 

On October 3, 2013, Appellants filed an answer to the motion for summary 

judgment. Oral arguments were held on October 16, 2013, and the trial
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court granted the summary judgment motion by order entered November 

12, 2013. Appellants filed a timely appeal to this Court.2 

Our review of a grant of a motion for summary judgment is wellsettled. An appellate court may disturb the order of the trial court only 

where it is established that the court committed an error of law or abused its 

discretion. As with all questions of law, our review is plenary.

In evaluating the trial court's decision to enter summary 

judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the 

summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. The rule states that 

where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment 

may be entered. Where the non-moving party bears the burden 

of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or 

answers in order to survive summary judgment. Failure of a 

non-moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue 

essential to his case and on which it bears the burden of proof ... 

establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a 

matter of law. Lastly, we will view the record in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved 

against the moving party.

Murphy v. Duquesne University of the Holy Ghost, 777 A.2d 418, 429 

(Pa. 2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

The proponent of the will has the burden to present evidence of the 

formalities of probate. See In Re Clark’s Estate, 334 A.2d 628, 631 (Pa. 

1975). Once those formalities have been proven and the will has been 

admitted to probate, its validity is presumed and the contestant bears the 

____________________________________________

2 Appellants have withdrawn Issue “D” as a basis for their appeal. See

Appellants’ Brief at 33. 
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burden of proving that “the testator lacked mental capacity, or [that] the will 

was obtained by forgery, fraud, or undue influence, or was the product of an 

insane delusion.” In Re Estate of Nalaschi, 90 A.3d 8, 11-12 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (citation omitted).

Appellants first argue that the Register of Wills violated 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3132 by admitting the August 18, 2011 will to probate because, allegedly, 

only one of the two subscribing witnesses appeared before the Register of 

Wills at the probate hearing.3 This issue is waived. Appellants did not raise 

this issue before the Register of Wills or before the trial court in their petition 

for citation sur appeal. Moreover, Appellants did not raise this issue in any 

of the over four hearings on various issues that were held prior to the entry 

of the trial court’s order granting summary judgment. Contrary to the 

statement in their docketing statement filed with this Court, that their issues 

were preserved by “pre-trial motion,” there is no pre-trial motion in the 

certified record raising an issue regarding the Register of Wills’ compliance 

with § 3132. In fact, this is the first time they have raised this issue. 

Because it was not raised below, the issue is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) 

____________________________________________

3 Section 3132, entitled “Manner of probate,” provides in relevant part that 

“[a]ll wills shall be proved by the oaths or affirmations of two competent 

witnesses.”
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(“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for 

the first time on appeal.”).4 

Although not stated in their question presented, Appellants also argue 

as a sub-issue of this first issue that the will should not have been admitted 

to probate and summary judgment should not have been granted because 

questions of material fact existed regarding (1) Testator’s testamentary 

capacity, and (2) whether the will was the product of undue influence.

Testamentary capacity exists when a testator is aware of the 

natural objects of his bounty, the composition of his estate and 

what he wants done with it, even if his memory is impaired by 

disease. The testator need not have the ability to conduct 

business affairs. Courts evaluate testamentary capacity on the 

date of the execution of the contested will. “Evidence of such 

state of mind may be received for a reasonable time before and 

after execution as reflective of decedent's testamentary capacity. 

This information can be supplied by lay witnesses as well as 

experts.” In re Agostini's Estate, 457 A.2d 861, 867 (Pa. 

Super. 1983).

In re Estate of Nalaschi, 90 A.3d at 12-13 (some internal citations and 

quotations marks omitted).

In the instant case, the trial court observed:

____________________________________________

4 We note that the certified record contains no transcript of the proceedings 

that occurred before the Register of Wills prior to the admission of the will to 

probate on November 9, 2011. On December 20, 2011, at the hearing held 

on Appellants’ Caveat, the Register of Wills stated that the will “appears to 

be duly executed.” Notes of Testimony, 12/20/11, at 40. Appellants did not 

object at that time, and made no attempt at any other time to rebut the 

presumption, created after the will was admitted to probate, that the will 

was executed with adherence to proper execution procedures. See In re 

Estate of Nalaschi.
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[P]roper execution of the August 18, 2011 will ha[d] been 

proven so there is a presumption of testamentary capacity. The 

Petitioners have failed to produce any evidence that the Testator 

lacked testamentary capacity. The facts of this case suggest just 

the opposite. The Testator was a strong-willed, independent 

woman [who] lived alone, managed her own affairs, held a job 

and called her bank nearly daily to check her statements. That 

does not suggest a woman who does not know the objects of her 

bounty and what she wants done with them. 

Trial Court Opinion, dated 12/20/13, at 8-9.

Discovery in this case was extensive. Appellants obtained hundreds of 

pages of medical and bank records, none of which showed that Testator was 

in any way incapacitated in the days leading up to, or on the date of, her 

signing of the will. Moreover, Appellants pointed to no evidence which 

suggested that Testator did not have an understanding of her “bounty.” 

Appellants Wittman and Bloom each testified as to their mother’s 

independent and stubborn nature; and, in fact, Wittman testified that 

Testator called the bank nearly every day regarding the balances of her 

accounts. Although Appellants attempt to support their contention of 

incapacity with their own testimony about Testator’s status as a recovering 

alcoholic, they did not present any evidence that on the day the will was 

executed, Testator was anything other than sober and fully aware of the 

substance of her estate. In fact, the evidence showed that Testator had had 

a full physical examination by Dr. Pamela Nagy on August 18, 2011, the day 

she executed the will—and Dr. Nagy had noted that Testator appeared to be 
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healthy. Dr. Nagy expressed no concerns about Testator’s mental capacity. 

Appellants produced no evidence that met their burden of proving 

testamentary incapacity. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law in concluding that there 

was no genuine issue of material fact regarding Testator’s testamentary 

capacity. 

In arguing that the will was the product of undue influence, Appellants 

conclude that “both Siedlarz and Campbell had confidential relationships with 

Decedent, [Testator’s] psychological, physical and alcoholism combined with 

prescription abuse [sic] weakened her intellect relative to the intellects of 

Appellees’, and the interest each Appellee had in the estate could be 

established on the record in this case.” Appellants’ Brief at 24. Appellants 

also allege that Mr. Siedlarz would directly benefit from the execution of the 

will naming Ms. Campbell as beneficiary because he was to receive a referral 

fee from a lawyer representing Ms. Campbell in an unrelated case. 

The contestants of a will bear the burden of proving undue influence 

with clear and convincing evidence that “(1) the testator suffered from a 

weakened intellect at the time the will was executed; (2) there was a person 

in a confidential relationship with the testator; and (3) the person in the 

confidential relationship received a substantial benefit under the challenged 

will.” In re Estate of Nalaschi, 90 A.3d at 14 (citation omitted). Once 

each of these three elements are established by the contestant, the burden 
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shifts back to the proponent to prove the absence of undue influence by 

clear and convincing evidence. See In re Bosley, 26 A.3d 1104, 1108 (Pa. 

Super. 2011). The burden of clear and convincing evidence means that 

“mere suspicions, opinions or beliefs not founded on established facts are 

insufficient to support” a charge of undue influence. In re Paul’s Estate, 

180 A.2d 254, 257 (Pa. 1962) (citations omitted).

A confidential relationship exists “when the circumstances make it 

certain that the parties do not deal on equal terms, with one side exercising 

an over-mastering influence over the other[.]” In re King’s Estate, 87 

A.2d 469, 472 (Pa. 1952) (citations omitted). With respect to “weakened 

intellect,” this Court has observed:

Although our cases have not established a bright-line test by 

which weakened intellect can be identified to a legal certainty, 

they have recognized that it is typically accompanied by 

persistent confusion, forgetfulness and disorientation. In a case 

of undue influence, a trial court has greater latitude to consider 

medical testimony describing a decedent's condition at a time 

remote from the date that the contested will was executed. 

However, if the court's decision rests upon legally competent and 

sufficient evidence, we will not revisit its conclusions. Our review 

of the court's factual findings is limited to considering whether 

those findings have support in the record. 

In re Estate of Fritts, 906 A.2d 601, 607 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted).

In the instant case, the trial court stated:
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Elizabeth Hazel Murphy Campbell was a close friend of the 

Testator for approximately twenty years after having met her at 

Alcoholics Anonymous.[5] Some of the estate documents which 

Mr. Siedlarz prepared for the Testator mention Ms. Campbell. Mr. 

Siedlarz prepared a document which indicated that the Testator 

considered naming Ms. Campbell her general power of attorney 

but it was never delivered. The Testator also executed a 

subsequent power of attorney which did not name Ms. Campbell 

and revoked all prior power of attorneys. Mr. Siedlarz also 

prepared a document which gave Ms. Campbell medical power of 

attorney. However, that too was not delivered. Mr. Siedlarz 

also referred Ms. Campbell to Stephen Carroll, Esquire, to 

represent her in a legal matter in Montgomery County for which 

Mr. Siedlarz was to receive a referral fee.

Occasionally, the Testator would have Ms. Campbell sign her 

checks because she was no longer able due to tremors in her 

hand (Tr. S. Wittman 48:14-17; Exhibit D to Motion for 

Summary Judgment). However, Petitioner Suzanne Wittman 

explained that Ms. Campbell signed the checks at the direction of 

the Testator (Id. 49:11-13). Ms. Wittman also testified that the 

Testator called her bank every day to check her balance and that 

the Decedent was very independent that way. (Id. 52: 12-16).

As a close friend, Ms. Campbell occasionally took the Testator to 

the hospital and to rehab. (Id. 46: 14-47: 4). The Testator 

struggled with alcohol addiction but, nevertheless, was an 

independent woman who managed her own household, finances, 

and health and safety. In fact, Petitioner Wittman testified that 

the Testator was very independent, headstrong and stubborn. 

(Id. 16: 2-9; 52: 12-16). [Testator] also volunteered to help 

others who struggled with alcohol abuse and worked at a local 

thrift store where she dealt with the public on a daily basis.

The Testator did not have much of a relationship with her 

children or grandchildren. Petitioner Wittman wrote in an email 

that the Testator had no relationship with her grandchildren, Ms. 

Wittman's daughters. (Email Chain; Exhibit 1 to Answer to 

Motion for Summary Judgment). Ms. Wittman also wrote that 

the Testator could do more for her children and grandchildren 

____________________________________________

5 Testator was Ms. Campbell’s sponsor at AA.
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but does not and that the Testator has completely cut herself off 

from Ms. Wittman. (Id.). In addition, Ms. Wittman testified that 

she did not expect the Testator to leave anything to Michael 

Bloom, the Co-Petitioner. (Tr. S. Wittman 21:22-22:3).

The Testator was prescribed several different medications and 

her cause of death was multiple drug intoxication. (Medical 

Examiner Report; Exhibit A to the Amended Petition). Dr. Steven 

Weinstein, a board certified psychiatrist and neurologist, testified 

that, even in combination and taken at a higher than 

recommended dosage, those medications would not 

detrimentally effect the Testator’s mental functioning. (Tr. 

Steven Weinstein, M.D. 13: 21-14: 22; 36: 1-11).

Trial Court Opinion, dated 12/20/13, at 2-3.

Although the trial court recognized that Ms. Campbell was to receive 

the bulk of the estate, it concluded:

[Appellants] have produced no evidence that either Mr. Siedlarz 

or Ms. Campbell was in a confidential relationship with the 

Testator. The strongest evidence that [Appellants] produced to 

support this element are the power of attorneys and drafts of 

power of attorneys drawn up by Mr. Siedlarz at the direction of 

the Testator. Mr. Siedlarz prepared a document which indicated 

that the Testator considered naming Ms. Campbell her general 

power of attorney but it was never delivered. The Testator also 

executed a subsequent power of attorney which did not name 

Ms. Campbell and revoked all prior power of attorneys. Mr. 

Siedlarz also prepared a document which gave Ms. Campbell 

medical power of attorney. However, that too was not delivered. 

Ms. Campbell was never given these power of attorneys [sic] 

and [Appellants] have produced no evidence that she even knew 

of their existence. Therefore, these documents cannot be 

considered a clear indication of a confidential relationship.

While the facts of this case demonstrate that the Testator and 

Ms. Campbell were close friends for about 20 years, friendship 

alone is insufficient to create a confidential relationship. The 

facts demonstrate that Ms. Campbell occasionally signed the 

Testator’s checks for her later in life due to a hand tremor, that 

she lived with her for a short time after the Testator came home 

from the hospital, and that she would take her to rehab and 
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doctors’ appointments. ... [T]he facts here show that the 

Testator’s mind was clear. The Testator was consistently 

described as an independent woman who managed her own 

affairs. She also maintained a job at a local thrift store until 

shortly before she died where she dealt with the public on a daily 

basis. In addition, the facts show that the Testator was 

independent, headstrong and stubborn. Someone with those 

characteristics is unlikely to be subject to an over-mastering 

influence by another and the [Appellants] have failed to produce 

facts which would suggest otherwise. Therefore, [Appellants] 

have failed to produce any evidence that there was a confidential 

relationship between the Testator and Ms. Campbell.

As for Mr. Siedlarz, there are no facts to support the allegation 

that he exerted an over-mastering influence on the Testator. As 

the case law above states, the [Appellants] cannot sustain their 

burden by offering mere suspicions that are not founded on 

established facts. If anything, the facts show a standard 

attorney[-]client relationship where Mr. Siedlarz altered estate 

documents according to the Testator’s directions and sought 

clarification and advice when something was ambiguous. 

Therefore, [Appellants] have failed to produce any facts to 

support the element of a confidential relationship between the 

Testator and Mr. Siedlarz.

Id., at 6-7 (emphasis added).

Our review indicates that the trial court’s factual findings and legal 

conclusions are fully supported by the record and case law. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to 

Appellees. 

Appellants next aver that the trial court should have dismissed the 

probate of the will because Appellee Siedlarz had “unclean hands.” 

Appellants’ Brief at 25. In support, they cite to Mr. Siedlarz’s referral of Ms. 

Campbell to another law firm on an unrelated matter for which he would 

receive a referral fee. Appellants then reiterate their unsubstantiated 
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argument about the failure of the second witness to testify before the 

Register of Wills, and provide a reframed variation of their argument that 

Mr. Siedlarz exerted undue influence over Testator. See Appellants’ Brief at 

26–27.

Appellants did not raise the doctrine of “unclean hands” below, and 

this issue is thus waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Moreover, even if we had 

addressed it on the merits we would have found that it is without merit.

Under the doctrine of unclean hands, a

court may deprive a party of equitable relief where, to the 

detriment of the other party, the party applying for such relief is 

guilty of bad conduct relating to the matter at issue. The 

doctrine of unclean hands requires that one seeking equity act 

fairly and without fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue. 

Terraciano v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver 

Licensing, 753 A.2d 233, 237–38 (Pa. 2000) (citations omitted). 

In the instant case, Mr. Siedlarz is not a beneficiary under the will; he 

is merely the executor. Moreover, there is no record evidence to support 

Appellants’ claims that Mr. Siedlarz will directly or indirectly benefit from Ms. 

Campbell being named the beneficiary of the will. In response to Appellants’ 

argument of fraud below, the trial court stated:

[Appellants] alleged that Mr. Siedlarz and Ms. Campbell 

misrepresented to the Testator that her children and 

grandchildren were well provided for with the intention of 

causing the Testator to leave her estate to Ms. Campbell. 

However, [Appellants] have failed in their response to the 

motion for summary judgment to put forth any material facts 

after extensive discovery to support their allegations. Instead, 

[Appellant] Bloom testified that he was unaware of any 
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documents that reflect upon fraud practiced by either Ms. 

Campbell or Mr. Siedlarz and [Appellant] Wittman testified that 

she did not think that there was any sort of conspiracy between 

Ms. Campbell and Mr. Siedlarz. Those two statements support 

the fact that there was no misrepresentation to the Testator that 

the children and grandchildren were well-provided for. In 

addition, the facts demonstrate that the Testator was an 

independent woman who managed her own affairs[.]

Trial Court Opinion, dated 12/20/13, at 4-5.

Our independent review of the record indicates that there is no 

evidence that Mr. Siedlarz acted unfairly, fraudulently, or deceitfully in this 

matter. Appellants’ contention of unclean hands is, thus, without merit. 

Accordingly, even if this issue were not waived, we would not grant relief.

Lastly, Appellants aver that the trial court erred or abused its 

discretion when it denied their request for sanctions under Pa.R.C.P. 

4019(c)(1) on September 16, 2013. In support, Appellants provide a nearly 

incoherent argument averring that Appellees obstructed their efforts to 

obtain discovery, before concluding that they were prevented from 

responding to the summary judgment motion. 

Contrary to their contention, Appellants did respond to the summary 

judgment motion by filing a response to the motion for summary judgment 

and a “Brief in Support of Response” to the motion for summary judgment. 

In addition, Appellants’ counsel provided a vigorous argument against 

summary judgment during the hearing held on October 16, 2013. 

In their brief, Appellants do not indicate exactly what sanction they 

were seeking or allege exactly how the trial court erred. They do not cite to 
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the transcript of the September 16, 2013 hearing that actually occurred on 

their motion for sanctions. Moreover, Appellants do not discuss Rule 

4019(c)(1) or provide citation to relevant case law or other authority 

pertaining to discovery sanctions. They have essentially failed to comport 

with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 2119. Because Appellants have not 

provided a coherent, developed argument supported by relevant authority, 

we conclude that this issue is waived. See, e.g., Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 

A.3d 1080, 1088-89 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 403 WAL 2014 (Pa. 

filed Dec. 10, 2014) (observing that Pa.R.A.P. 2119 requires that argument 

be developed for each issue raised with citation to authority in support of 

each contention, and appellate arguments which fail to adhere to Rule 2119 

may be considered waived). 

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/13/2015
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