Interim Decision #3023 

MA1 ihR OF ATEMBE 

In Visa Petition Proceedings 

A-28369181 

Decided by Board December 29, 1988 

Notwithstanding the fact that an illegitimate child may qualify 

for immigration purposes as the "child" of his or her natural 

father following the amendment on November 6, 1986, of section 

101(b)(1)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 

111.11(b)(1X.0) (19S2), provided paternity is established and the 

father "has or had a bona fide parent-child relationship" with the 

child, a visa petition filed prior to the effective date of the amendment may not be used to obtain preference status for the beneficiary under section 203(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.O. § 1153(a) (1982), because approval of the visa petition would give the beneficiary a priority date to which he or she was not entitled at the time the visa 

petition was filed. Matter of Drigo, 18 I&N Dec. 228 (BIA 1982); and 

Matter of Bardouille, 18 I&N Dec. 114 (BIA 1981), followed. 

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: 

Emiliano T. Deguzaaan, Esquire Steven R. Abrams 

299 Broadway, Suite 1215 District Counsel 

New York, New York 10007 

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Dunne, Morris, Vacca, and Heilman, Board Members 

In a decision dated August 22, 1986, the Immigration and Naturalization Service Regional Adjudications Center ("RAC") director 

denied the visa petition filed by the petitioner to accord the beneficiary preference status as his unmarried son pursuant to section 

208(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1153(a)(2) (1982). The petitioner has appealed from that decision. 

The appeal will be dismissed. 

The petitioner is a native of Cameroon and lawful permanent 

resident of the United States. The record reflects that the beneficiit9.7 
Interim Decision #3023 

ary was born in Cameroon of a relationship between the petitioner 

and a woman who was not then, and never became, his wife. 

To qualify as a "son" under the provisions of section 203(a)(2) of 

the Act, the beneficiary must qualify, or once have qualified, as the 

petitioner's "child" as that term is defined by section 101(b)(1) of 

the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (1982). Section 101(b)(1) provides in 

part: 

The term "child" means an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age 

who is— 

(A) a legitimate child; or 

(C) a child legitimated under the law of the child's residence or domicile, or 

under the law of the father's residence or domicile, whether in or outside the 

United States, if such legitimation takes place before the child reaches the age 

of eighteen years and the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating parent 

or parents at the time of such legitimation. 

The term "legitimate" applies only to children born in wedlock 

or to children born out of wedlock within jurisdictions that have 

eliminated all distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy. ,See 

generally Matter of Reyes, 17 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA 1980), and the 

cases cited therein. The term "legitimated" refers to the act of putting, by legal means, an illegitimate child in the position or state of 

a legitimate child in the eyes of the law. Where less than equality 

of status results, an act of legitimation is not deemed to have occurred. Id. 

The RAC director found that the petitioner had failed to establish that the beneficiary was legitimate at birth or that he had 

been legitimated under the law of Cameroon or the law of New 

York, the petitioner's and beneficiary's present place of residence. 

We agree with the RAC director's findings. 

The petitioner does not claim that the beneficiary qualifies as his 

"legitimate" son and there has been no showing that compliance 

with the provision of Cameroon law relied upon by the petitioner 

accords a child born out of wedlock the full legal status of a legitimate child so that the child may be considered to have been "legitimated" for purposes of the immigration laws. Under the law of 

New York, legitimation can only be effected by the marriage of the 

child's natural parents. See Matter of Hernandez, 19 I&N Dec_ 14 

(BIA 1983). 

On November 6, 1986, subsequent to the RAC director's decision 

in the instant case, the lumnigi ation Reform and Control Act of 

IPart V, Chapter 1, Article 44 of the Official Gazette of the United Republic of 

Cameroon. 

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1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, was signed into law. That 

legislation amended section 101(b)(1)(D) of the Act to recognize for 

immigration purposes the relationship of an illegitimate child to 

his or her natural father, as well as to his or her mother, 2provided 

paternity is established and the father "has or had a bona fide 

parent-child relationship" with the child. 

Although the beneficiary may presently be entitled to classification as the child of the petitioner by reason of section 101(b)(1)(D) of 

the Act, as amended, the petitioner may not use the visa petition 

presently under consideration to obtain a benefit under the new 

provision. This Board has held that in order to be eligible for preference status under section 203(a) of the Act, the beneficiary must 

be fully qualified for such classification at the time the visa petition is filed to avoid giving the beneficiary a priority date to which 

he or she was not entitled at the time of filing. See Matter of Drigo, 

18 I&N Dec. 223 (BIA 1982); Matter of Bardouille, 18 I&N Dec. 114 

(BIA 1081). The petitioner may, of course, file a new visa petition 

on the beneficiary's behalf accompanied by proof of paternity and 

the existence of a "bona fide parent-child relationship." The appeal 

will be dismissed. 

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 

2 Prior to its amendment, section 101(bX1XD) of the Act included within the definition of the term "child" 

an illegitimate child, by, through whom, or on whose behalf a status, privilege, or 

benefit is sought by virtue of the relationship of the child to its natural mother.