UNITED STATES NAVY-MARINE CORPS 

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Before

F.D. MITCHELL, K.J. BRUBAKER, M.C. HOLIFIELD 

Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DENNIS L. JOHNSON II

AIRMAN APPRENTICE (E-2), U.S. NAVY

NMCCA 201400431

GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL

Sentence Adjudged: 14 August 2014.

Military Judge: CDR Michael J. Luken, JAGC, USN.

Convening Authority: Commander, Navy Region Mid-Atlantic, 

Norfolk, VA.

Staff Judge Advocate's Recommendation: CDR S.J. Gawronski, 

JAGC, USN.

For Appellant: CDR Suzanne M. Lachelier, JAGC, USN.

For Appellee: CDR R.D. Evans, Jr., JAGC, USN.

14 April 2015

---------------------------------------------------

OPINION OF THE COURT 

---------------------------------------------------

THIS OPINION DOES NOT SERVE AS BINDING PRECEDENT, BUT MAY BE CITED AS 

PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY UNDER NMCCA RULE OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 18.2. 

PER CURIAM:

A military judge, sitting as a general court-martial, 

convicted the appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of two 

specifications of sexual assault of a child, in violation of 

Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. 

§ 920b. The military judge sentenced the appellant to 

confinement for 15 months, reduction to pay grade E-1, 

forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a bad-conduct 
2

discharge. The convening authority (CA) approved only so much 

of the sentence as provides for the reduction to pay grade E-1, 

confinement for 15 months, and a bad-conduct discharge. 

Suspending all confinement in excess of 12 months pursuant to a 

pretrial agreement, the CA ordered the sentence, except for the 

bad-conduct discharge, executed. 

On appeal, the appellant claims that a sentence including a 

bad-conduct discharge is inappropriately severe. 

After carefully considering the record of trial and the 

submissions of the parties, we conclude that the findings and 

sentence are correct in law and fact and that no error 

materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the 

appellant was committed. Arts. 59(a) and 66(c), UCMJ. 

Background

The nineteen-year-old appellant befriended a young female, 

RH, through social media. After communicating electronically 

for two weeks, during which the appellant became aware that RH 

was only 14, they arranged to meet. The appellant picked up RH 

from her aunt and uncle’s home with the aim of delivering her to 

school. Once in the appellant’s car, RH indicated she did not 

wish to go to school. The pair instead went to the mall and a 

movie. When RH later voiced a desire not to go home, the 

appellant took her to a friend’s apartment where they spent the 

night. Over the next several days, the appellant and RH engaged 

in oral sodomy and sexual intercourse.

During this time, RH’s aunt and uncle, who had custody of 

her, were desperately trying to locate RH. They were able to 

identify the appellant after reviewing RH’s phone and tablet 

computer. When the uncle texted the appellant, the latter said 

he had only spoken with her once and had never met her. The 

uncle asked the appellant, were he to see RH, to let her know 

her family was looking for her and was very concerned. The 

uncle feared his niece was either raped or dead. The appellant 

did not contact RH’s family after this initial exchange of 

texts. RH was located after further analysis of her recent 

contacts on social media indicated the appellant, a Sailor, was 

the person with whom she likely was staying. Additional facts 

necessary to address the assignment of error will be provided 

below. 
3

Sentence Appropriateness 

The appellant argues that a bad-conduct discharge was 

excessive and inappropriate given the facts of his case. We 

disagree. In accordance with Article 66(c), UCMJ, a Court of 

Criminal Appeals “may affirm only such findings of guilty and 

the sentence or such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds 

correct in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the 

entire record, should be approved.” Sentence appropriateness 

involves the judicial function of assuring that justice is done 

and that the accused gets the punishment he deserves. United 

States v. Healy, 26 M.J. 394, 395 (C.M.A. 1988). This requires 

“‘individualized consideration’ of the particular accused ‘on 

the basis of the nature and seriousness of the offense and 

character of the offender.’” United States v. Snelling, 14 M.J. 

267, 268 (C.M.A. 1982) (quoting United States v. Mamaluy, 27 

C.M.R. 176, 180-81 (C.M.A. 1959)). While this court has a great 

deal of discretion in determining whether a particular sentence 

is appropriate, we are not authorized to engage in exercises of 

clemency. United States v. Lacy, 50 M.J. 286, 288 (C.A.A.F. 

1999). 

The maximum sentence applicable to the offenses to which 

the appellant pleaded guilty was confinement for 60 years, 

forfeiture of all pay and allowances, reduction to pay grade 

E-1, and a dishonorable discharge. The appellant knew RH was 

14. Despite this, he aided her in her efforts to skip school 

and remain away from her home, and engaged in sexual activity 

with her on two occasions. We find his actions were squarely 

within the conduct proscribed by the statute, and reject any 

claim that his misconduct was any less serious than the range of 

permissible punishments indicates. 

The appellant urges this court to focus on his personal 

circumstances. At the time of the charged offenses, he was only 

nine months removed from high school, and had been in the Navy 

for a short time. Several of the appellant’s family members and 

a supervisor testified to his relative immaturity, portraying 

him as “a good kid [but] young for his age”1 and “19 . . . going 

on about 15 or 16 . . . from a maturity aspect.”2 In addition to 

the present court-martial, he also now has a civilian conviction 

for a related offense of contributing to the delinquency of a 

minor. He will be required to register as a sex offender when 

he returns to his home of record. The appellant argues that 

 

1 Record at 76. 

2 Id. at 82.
4

these facts, combined with the remainder of his approved 

sentence, make a punitive discharge inappropriately severe in 

his case. We disagree. To the extent these facts may militate 

towards a sentence at the lower end of the range of permissible 

punishments, we find they are sufficiently acknowledged in the 

relatively lenient sentence the CA approved.

After review of the entire record, we find that the 

sentence is appropriate for this offender and his offenses. To 

grant sentence relief at this point would be to engage in 

clemency, a prerogative reserved for the convening authority. 

Healy, 26 M.J. at 394. 

Conclusion 

The findings and the sentence as approved by the CA are 

affirmed. 

For the Court

 

 

 

R.H. TROIDL

Clerk of Court