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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 13-CV-83

JOHN DOE NO. 1, APPELLANT

v.

SUSAN L. BURKE, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia

(CAB-7525-12)

(Hon. Maurice A. Ross, Trial Judge)

(Argued January 29, 2014 Decided May 29, 2014)

Christopher J. Hajec, with whom Michael E. Rosman was on the brief, for 

appellant.

William T. O’Neil for appellee.

James A. McLaughlin for amicus curiae Reporters Committee for Freedom 

of the Press, the American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation‟s Capital, American 

Society of News Editors, Digital Media Law Project, Gannett Co., Inc., the 

McClatchy Co., National Press Photographers Association, and the Washington 

Post. Bruce D. Brown and Gregg P. Leslie were on the brief for amicus curiae. 

Before EASTERLY, Associate Judge, and SCHWELB and FARRELL, Senior 

Judges.
2

EASTERLY, Associate Judge: A “strategic lawsuit against public 

participation” or “SLAPP” is a lawsuit “filed by one side of a political or public 

policy debate aimed to punish or prevent the expression of opposing points of 

view.” D.C. Council, Comm. on Pub. Safety and the Judiciary, Report on Bill 18-

893 (“Comm. Report”) at 1 (Nov. 18, 2010). SLAPPs “masquerade as ordinary 

lawsuits,” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation 

marks omitted), but a SLAPP plaintiff‟s true objective is to use litigation as a 

weapon to chill or silence speech. The District recently enacted the D.C. AntiSLAPP Act to protect the targets of such suits. D.C. Code § 16-5501 to -5505

(2012 Repl.). Invoking this statute, anonymous speaker John Doe No. 1 filed a 

special motion to quash a subpoena issued by Susan L. Burke seeking his 

identifying information. See D.C. Code § 16-5503. The trial court denied the 

motion and John Doe No. 1 now seeks interlocutory review. Addressing the AntiSLAPP statute for the first time, we begin by assessing whether the denial of a 

special motion to quash under the statute may be immediately appealed to this 

court. We answer that question in the affirmative and then consider whether the 

trial court correctly denied the special motion to quash. We determine that it did 

not. Accordingly, we reverse. 
3

I. Facts1

Appellee Susan L. Burke is an attorney based in the District of Columbia 

who litigates in state and federal courts across the country. She founded her own 

law firm to pursue her interest in human rights litigation and a focus of her practice 

is advocacy for those allegedly harmed by the misconduct of U.S. military 

personnel and government contractors. For example, Ms. Burke represented a 

group of former detainees held at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in their suit against 

federal government contractors working at that site. In 2007, Ms. Burke filed a 

civil lawsuit seeking to vindicate the rights of Iraqi civilians and their families who 

were victims of the 2007 civilian shootings in Baghdad by individuals who worked 

for the company then known as Blackwater (now Academi). See Abtan v. 

Blackwater Lodge & Training Ctr., 611 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009). That lawsuit 

was settled in 2010. 

In October 2011, an individual known only as RetroLady64 created a 

webpage for Ms. Burke on Wikipedia. Wikipedia is a “collaboratively edited, 

 

1

 Because of the procedural posture of this case, the trial court has not yet 

made factual findings. But the relevant facts, as alleged by the parties in their trial 

court filings, are not in dispute.
4

multilingual, free-access, free content Internet encyclopedia” and any visitor to the 

website has the ability to add, edit, or remove content.2 The Wikipedia entry for 

Ms. Burke discussed, among other things, her civil suit against Blackwater: 

Burke represented plaintiffs . . . in a lawsuit against Blackwater. The 

lawsuit stemmed from the firefight in Niso[u]r Square in Baghdad.

The lawsuit alleged Blackwater violated the federal Alien Tort Statute 

in committing extrajudicial killing and war crimes, and that the 

company was liable for assault and battery, wrongful death, 

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 

negligent hiring, training and supervision. The lawsuit was dismissed 

in 2010.

Three months later, in January 2012, appellant John Doe No. 1, whose 

Wikipedia user name is “Zujua,” added information in the section of Ms. Burke‟s 

page that addressed the Abtan litigation. This information had nothing to do with 

Ms. Burke or the Abtan civil suit; instead it related to the troubled federal criminal 

prosecution of the Blackwater contractors arising from the same incident in Nisour 

Square.

3

 As modified by Zujua, the section of Ms. Burke‟s page that addressed the 

Abtan litigation read (Zujua‟s additions are italicized):

 

2

 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia (last visited May 27, 

2014). 

3

 As the source for this information, Zujua cited to a December 2009 article 

in the New York Times: See Charlie Savage, Judge Drops Charges from 

(continued...)
5

Burke represented plaintiffs . . . in a lawsuit against Blackwater. The 

lawsuit stemmed from the firefight in Niso[u]r Square in Baghdad. 

The lawsuit alleged Blackwater violated the federal Alien Tort Statute 

in committing extrajudicial killing and war crimes, and that the 

company was liable for assault and battery, wrongful death, 

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 

negligent hiring, training and supervision. Judge Urbina threw out 

the suit in December 2009, saying that "the court declines to excuse 

the government's reckless violation of the defendants' constitutional 

rights as harmless error," after they attempted to use as evidence the 

defendants’ compelled statements taken under threat of the 1oss of 

their jobs. Judge Urbina went on to criticize prosecutors for 

withholding "substantial exculpatory evidence" from the grand jury, 

and presenting "distorted versions" of witness' testimony. The lawsuit 

was dismissed in 2010.

Ms. Burke saw and removed this information about one month after it was 

posted. Zujua is not alleged to have taken any further action. A second 

anonymous user (“CapBasics359”), however, later posted similar language about 

the 2009 dismissal of the federal government‟s criminal case to Ms. Burke‟s

Wikipedia page. Ms. Burke again removed the offending statements herself; this 

time, she also contacted CapBasics359 through Wikipedia to inform him that the 

information he added did not apply to her case. CapBasics359 then restored the 

statements about the government prosecution, however, and he and Ms. Burke 

 

(...continued)

Blackwater Deaths in Iraq, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2009, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/us/01blackwater.html.
6

went back and forth several times, with CapBasics359 adding and Ms. Burke 

deleting this same information.

Suspecting that incorrect additions to her Wikipedia page were the product 

of a scheme by Blackwater to discredit her, Ms. Burke filed suit in D.C. Superior 

Court alleging defamation, tortious interference in prospective business advantage, 

and false light invasion of privacy. She named several anonymous defendants who 

she asserted had colluded to defame her: Zujua (John Doe No. 1), CapBasics359 

(John Doe No. 2), and eight alleged Blackwater employees or agents (John Does 3-

10). As Ms. Burke did not know the real names of the Wikipedia users, she was 

unable to serve them. She therefore issued a subpoena to obtain Wikipedia‟s user 

data so that she could obtain the anonymous posters‟ identifying information.

Zujua, represented by the Center for Individual Rights, moved to quash the 

subpoena pursuant to the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act‟s “special motion to quash” 

provision, D.C. Code § 16-5503.4 In the alternative, he sought a protective order 

preventing the discovery of his identity. On January 30, 2013, the trial court

denied Zujua‟s motion in a one-page order. The court ruled that Zujua was not 

 

4

 CapBasics359, the other anonymous Wikipedia editor, is not a participant 

in the current appeal. 
7

entitled to the protection of the Anti-SLAPP statute because he had not established 

that he had spoken about “an issue of public interest” within the meaning of the 

statute. Without further explanation, the court stated that Zujua had both failed to 

make an affirmative showing that Ms. Burke was a general- or limited-purpose 

public figure and failed to disprove that his speech was commercially motivated. 

In addition, the trial court ruled, also without explanation in its order, that even if 

Zujua‟s speech was about an issue of public interest, he was not entitled to quash 

the subpoena because Ms. Burke had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the 

merits of her defamation claim. Finally, the court denied Zujua‟s request for a 

protective order noting that Zujua had provided no authority for such a request. 

This appeal followed.5

II. The D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act

In 2010, the Council of the District of Columbia enacted the D.C. AntiSLAPP Act to protect the targets of SLAPPs and encourage “engag[ement] in 

political or public policy debates.” Comm. Report at 4. Following the lead of a 

 

5 Because we determine that the denial of Zujua‟s motion to quash the 

subpoena seeking his identifying information is appealable and that his motion 

should have been granted, we decline to address his claim that he is separately 

entitled to a protective order preventing the discovery of his identity.
8

number of other jurisdictions, the statute creates a “special motion to dismiss,” a 

procedural mechanism that allows a named defendant to quickly and equitably end 

a meritless suit. D.C. Code § 16-5502. The D.C. statute goes further than the

other jurisdictions, however, in its additional protection for anonymous speech. 

Given that “SLAPP plaintiffs frequently include unspecified individuals as 

defendants,” Comm. Report at 4, and recognizing the importance of anonymous 

speech on matters of public interest, the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act also allows “a 

person whose personal identifying information is sought” to safeguard his identity 

by filing a “special motion to quash” a subpoena. D.C. Code § 16-5503 (a). An 

anonymous would-be defendant who is able to protect her identity in this manner 

can thus avoid being named in a suit and served with a complaint. 

To establish the grounds for either of the two procedural protections the 

Anti-SLAPP statute affords—dismissal of the suit or quashing of a subpoena—the 

moving party must show that his speech is of the sort that the statute is designed to 

protect. Specifically, the moving party must “make[] a prima facie showing that 

the underlying claim arises from an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on 

issues of public interest.” D.C. Code § 16-5502 (b); see also D.C. Code § 16-5503 

(b). Upon such a showing, the motion will be granted unless the opposing party 
9

demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits of his or her underlying claim. 

Id. 

III. Appealability of a Special Motion to Quash 

Before we may consider the merits of the trial court‟s order denying Zujua‟s 

special motion to quash, we must determine whether such an order can be 

immediately appealed to this court.6See McNair Builders, Inc. v. Taylor, 3 A.3d 

1132, 1135 (D.C. 2010) (“Before we may decide [the merits of the appeal], we 

must first determine whether this court has jurisdiction.”)

 

6

 We do not address the related but separate question of whether an order 

denying a special motion to dismiss under the Anti-SLAPP Act is immediately 

appealable. We note that this was an issue in a different case before this court, 

Mann v. Nat’l Review, Inc., et al., 13-CV-1043, but the appeal in that case was 

dismissed before an opinion was issued. Two days before oral argument for this 

case, the District of Columbia delivered to the court the amicus brief it filed in 

Mann. It is not clear what the District, which is not a party to this case, sought to 

accomplish, procedurally or substantively, with this submission. While the District

is not required to ask permission to be amicus in this court, see D.C. App. R. 29

(a), it still must follow other rules pertaining to amicus filings, see, e.g., D.C. App. 

R. 29 (c)-(e). Moreover, if it meant to participate in this case as amicus by 

resubmitting its Mann amicus brief, that brief provides little guidance regarding the 

issue before us. In a footnote, the District in Mann took the position that whether 

the denial of a special motion to dismiss is immediately appealable is “related, but 

quite distinct” from whether the denial of a special motion to quash is appealable, 

and it never said whether the appealability of these distinct motions should be 

resolved similarly or differently. We see no reason to address the appealability of 

the special motion to dismiss in this case.
10

The appellate jurisdiction of this court is defined by statute. Specifically, 

D.C. Code § 11-721 (2012 Repl.) gives this court jurisdiction over “all final orders 

and judgments” of the Superior Court, as well as certain categories of interlocutory 

orders. D.C. Code § 11-721 (a)(1), (a)(2). Superior Court orders that do not 

finally resolve pending cases are therefore not ordinarily appealable pursuant to 

our “general policy against piecemeal review.” Umana v. Swidler & Berlin,

Chartered, 669 A.2d 717, 722 (D.C. 1995). Furthermore, we have specifically 

held that “[a] pretrial order granting or denying discovery from a non-party witness 

is not ordinarily final for purposes of appeal unless, in the case of an order granting 

discovery, the subject of the order refuses to comply and is adjudicated in 

contempt.” Crane v. Crane, 657 A.2d 312, 315 (D.C. 1995) (emphasis omitted). 

With that said, this court also has jurisdiction to hear certain non-final orders

not specifically enumerated in our jurisdictional statute. This court has recognized 

that the collateral order doctrine, first articulated by the Supreme Court in Cohen v. 

Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) and applied to the 

jurisdictional statute for the federal courts of appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 1291-92 (2012), 
11

likewise applies to D.C. Code § 11-721.7See Stein v. United States, 532 A.2d 641, 

643 (D.C. 1987); see also, e.g., McNair Builders, 3 A.3d at 1135-36. The 

collateral order doctrine “is best understood not as an exception to the final 

decision rule” codified in this court‟s jurisdictional statute “but as a practical 

construction of it.” Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). This doctrine permits appellate courts to assert jurisdiction over a 

“small class” of otherwise non-final orders, Stein, 532 A.2d at 643 (quoting Cohen, 

337 U.S. at 546), which “finally determine claims of right separable from, and 

collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and 

too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be 

deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. 

This court, like the Supreme Court, recognizes that “[p]ermitting piecemeal, 

prejudgment appeals . . . undermines efficient judicial administration and 

encroaches on the prerogatives of [trial] court judges who play a special role in 

managing ongoing litigation.” Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 

(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we have likewise 

emphasized that the reach of the collateral order doctrine is “modest” and the test 

 

7

 D.C. Code § 11-721 is modeled after and “virtually identical” to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291-92 (2012). See Brandon v. Hines, 439 A.2d 496, 509 (D.C. 1981). 
12

for applying it is “stringent.” McNair Builders, 3 A.3d at 1136 (quoting Will, 546 

U.S. at 349-50). Three criteria must be satisfied; the subject order: (1) “must 

conclusively determine a disputed question of law,” (2) “must resolve an important 

issue that is separate from the merits of the case,” and (3) “must be effectively 

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” McNair Builders, 3 A.3d at 1135 

(quoting Finkelstein, Thompson & Loughran v. Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc., 774 

A.2d 332, 339-40 (D.C. 2001) (overruled on other grounds)). Despite this 

“stringent” test, we conclude that an order denying a special motion to quash under 

the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act satisfies the requisite criteria and is immediately 

appealable to this court.8 See id. at 1140 n.9 (explaining that a determination that 

an order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine is “not directed at the 

individual case, but to the entire category to which a claim belongs” (quoting 

Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 101) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

First, the order denying the special motion to quash conclusively determines 

a disputed question of law. The trial court concluded that “[d]efendant fail[ed] to 

 

8

 Because we rely on the collateral order doctrine to resolve the 

jurisdictional issue, we do not address Zujua‟s alternative argument that the order 

denying the special motion to quash amounts to the denial of injunctive relief 

which is appealable under D.C. Code § 11-721 (a)(2)(A) (identifying as appealable 

orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving or refusing to 

dissolve or modify injunctions”).
13

present a prima faci[e] case that the writings at issue are protected under the D.C. 

Anti-[SLAPP] statute.” With this order, the court made a determination that 

Zujua‟s speech was not of the sort that the Anti-SLAPP statute intends to protect. 

See supra part II. Federal appellate courts that have examined similar state AntiSLAPP statutes have likewise found the conclusivity element satisfied when a trial 

court has determined the movant is ineligible for protection under the statute. See

Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2010) (“the order conclusively 

decides that relief under Maine‟s [Anti-SLAPP statute] is unavailable to the 

individual defendants”); Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, 566 F.3d 164, 174 (5th 

Cir. 2009) (“an order denying a[] . . . motion [under Louisiana‟s Anti-SLAPP 

statute] satisfies any concerns regarding conclusivity”).9

Next, the order denying the special motion to quash resolves an important 

issue separate from the merits of the lawsuit. On its face, whether Zujua‟s 

anonymous speech qualifies for protection under the statute is a separate question 

from whether Zujua may be held liable for defamation. Ms. Burke argues that our 

 

9

 We note that Godin and Henry apply the collateral order doctrine to 

special motions to dismiss. But just as in the statutory schemes reviewed in Godin

and Henry, an anonymous speaker seeking to quash a subpoena in the District 

carries the burden to present prima facie evidence that his speech is eligible for the 

Anti-SLAPP statute‟s protections. See supra part II. 
14

analysis cannot stop here, however, and that we must also consider that, upon the 

presentation of a prima facie case that the movant has engaged in protected 

activity, the plaintiff may defeat the special motion to quash by showing a

likelihood of success on the merits. See D.C. Code § 16-5503 (b). This latter 

inquiry, Ms. Burke asserts, is not sufficiently separate from a merits inquiry. We

disagree. Although a plaintiff may defeat a special motion to quash by showing a 

likelihood of success on the merits, the purpose of this inquiry is still “to determine 

whether the defendant is being forced to defend against a meritless claim, not to 

determine whether the defendant actually committed the relevant tort.” Henry, 566 

F.3d at 175 (internal quotation mark omitted); see also id. (discussing numerous 

applications of the collateral order doctrine and concluding that “an order does not 

have to be separate from the entirety of the underlying dispute to satisfy Cohen”).10 

Put another way, the “[d]enial of an anti-SLAPP motion resolves a question 

 

10

 In Henry, the court explained that the separability requirement is meant to 

promote the collateral order doctrine‟s goal of encouraging “efficient 

adjudication. . . . by preventing appeals on issues that will be definitively decided 

later in the case. In this way, one might characterize separability as a way of 

ensuring that a movant is not attempting to have an appellate court preemptively 

resolve a disputed issue still pending in the district court.” 566 F.3d at 175-76. 

But, the court further explained, “issues of immunity [like those considered in 

evaluating a motion under an Anti-SLAPP statute] are decided prior to trial and 

then not normally revisited.” Id. at 176. Because of the nature of the court‟s 

inquiry, therefore, the concerns that drive the separability requirement are not 

relevant here. 
15

separate from the merits in that it merely finds that such merits may exist, without 

evaluating whether the plaintiff‟s claim will succeed.” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 

1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Finkelstein, Thompson & Loughran, 774 A.2d

at 340 (concluding that “the issue of immunity from having to defend against . . . 

[a] defamation claim is separate from the merits of that claim”). 

The final requirement to qualify for review under the collateral order 

doctrine is that the subject order be “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a 

final judgment.” McNair Builders, 3 A.3d at 1135. “We have said that the denial 

of a motion that asserts an immunity from being sued is the kind of ruling that is 

commonly found to meet the requirements of the collateral order doctrine and thus 

to be immediately appealable.” Id. at 1136 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here we consider the denial of a special motion to quash, not the denial of a special 

motion to dismiss, which explicitly protects the right not to stand trial. But we 

conclude that the former also confers an immunity of a sort from suit. See supra p. 

7-8. An anonymous speaker who can preserve his anonymity can avoid service and 

thereby avoid ever becoming a named party to a suit.

We have explained, however, that it is not enough that the unreviewable 

interest be in the “mere avoidance of a trial.” McNair Builders, 3 A.3d at 1136 
16

(quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 353). Rather, before we exercise our appellate 

jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine we must confirm what is at stake is

the “avoidance of a trial that would impair a „substantial public interest.‟” Id. at 

1137.

The right the Council sought to protect with the special motion to quash is 

the right to engage in anonymous speech, Comm. Report at 4, which is grounded in 

the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 

941, 950-51 (D.C. 2009).11 In drafting the District‟s Anti-SLAPP statute, the 

Council took into account the experiences of states with similar statutes and 

determined that, in this respect, the District could do better in offering protection to 

the intended targets of SLAPP actions. We find it significant in our assessment of 

the public interest in the right at stake that the constitutional right of anonymous 

speech is specially protected in the District‟s Anti-SLAPP statute.12

 

11

 While Ms. Burke correctly notes that anonymous defamation is not 

entitled to constitutional protection, see Solers, 977 A.2d at 951, the Council made 

a legislative judgment in choosing to broadly protect anonymous speech. If truly 

defamatory, a plaintiff may defeat the motion to quash if she can establish a 

likelihood of success on the merits. See infra part IV.

12

 Citing Englert v. MacDonell, 551 F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009), Ms. 

Burke argues that because the District‟s Anti-SLAPP statute does not explicitly 

provide for the immediate appeal of the denial of a special motion to quash, the 

(continued...)
17

The exercise of the statutorily protected right to anonymous speech would be 

substantially chilled if the denial of a special motion to quash were not 

immediately appealable. See McNair Builders, 3 A.3d at 1140 (“the crucial 

question . . . is not whether an interest is important in the abstract; it is whether 

deferring review until final judgment so imperils the interest as to justify the cost 

of allowing immediate appeal of the entire class of relevant orders.”). Deferring 

review of the denial of a special motion to quash would result in the irreversible 

loss of the anonymity that the Anti-SLAPP Act specifically seeks to protect. As a 

result, those who would speak out anonymously might choose not to speak at all. 

This is precisely the sort of injury to an important public interest that this court has 

 

(...continued)

Council must not have believed that anonymity was an important value worthy of 

such protection. But because of the limitations placed on the D.C. Council under 

the Home Rule Act, we conclude that the D.C. Council‟s failure to codify an 

immediate appeal provision for the denial of a special motion to quash cannot 

reasonably be analogized to the Oregon legislature‟s failure to create an immediate 

appeal in Englert. Congress created the current District of Columbia Courts 

system, defined the jurisdiction of the District‟s courts, and prohibited the Council 

from legislating to expand (or contract) their jurisdiction. Although what 

constitutes an improper expansion of jurisdiction has been the subject of some 

dispute in this court, it is clear that this court possesses the sole power to interpret 

D.C. Code § 11-721, our jurisdiction-conferring statute. It was for these reasons 

that the Council, which originally sought to create a right of immediate appeal for 

special motions to dismiss, see Comm. Report at 7, deleted this provision. We 

therefore read little into the absence of a provision that the Council may not have 

been empowered to include in the first place. 
18

acknowledged that the collateral order doctrine is meant to protect. See McNair

Builders, 3 A.3d at 1138 (observing that the public interest in protecting the “valid 

exercise of the constitutional right[] of freedom of speech” and “encourag[ing]

continued participation in matters of public significance” would be a “public 

interest worthy of protection on interlocutory appeal.” (quoting Henry, 566 F.3d at 

169, 180)). 

Because each of the criteria of the collateral order doctrine is satisfied, we 

hold that an order denying a special motion to quash under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP 

statute will be immediately appealable to this court. 

IV. Assessing the Motion to Quash

Having determined that we have jurisdiction to reach the merits in the

instant appeal, we turn to the parties‟ arguments with regard to the trial court‟s 

order denying the special motion to quash. Our review of this issue, a question of 

statutory interpretation, is de novo. See Hernandez v. Banks, 84 A.3d 543, 552 

(D.C. 2014). 
19

A. Prima Facie Case

As noted above, to prevail on a special motion to quash, the moving party 

must first demonstrate that “the underlying claim arises from an act in furtherance 

of the right of advocacy13 on issues of public interest.” D.C. Code § 16-5503 (b). 

An “issue of public interest” is defined positively and negatively in the AntiSLAPP statute. The statute positively defines it to “mean[] an issue related to 

health or safety; environmental, economic, or community well-being; the District 

government; a public figure; or a good, product, or service in the market place”; 

the statute then provides that it “shall not be construed to include private interests, 

 

13

 The statute defines “[a]ct in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues 

of public interest” as: 

(A) Any written or oral statement made:

(i) In connection with an issue under consideration or 

review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or 

any other official proceeding authorized by law; or

(ii) In a place open to the public or a public forum in 

connection with an issue of public interest; or

(B) Any other expression or expressive conduct that involves 

petitioning the government or communicating views to 

members of the public in connection with an issue of public 

interest.

D.C. Code § 16-5501 (1). The Superior Court made no specific finding on whether 

Zujua‟s Wikipedia edit was “an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy” but 

found that regardless of the “act” element, Zujua‟s speech was not on an “issue of 

public interest.” On appeal, Zujua asserts that his Wikipedia edit satisfied this 

criterion and Ms. Burke makes no argument disputing that assertion. 
20

such as statements directed primarily toward protecting the speaker‟s commercial 

interests rather than toward commenting on or sharing information about a matter 

of public significance.” D.C. Code § 16-5501 (3). Here, the trial court found that 

Zujua failed to establish a prima facie case that his speech met this statutory 

definition both because (1) he did not establish that Ms. Burke was a public figure, 

and (2) he did not “provide[] prima faci[e] evidence that his comments were not 

commercially motivated.”

To establish that his speech fell within the definition of “issue of public 

interest” Zujua argued at trial and reiterates on appeal that his Wikipedia edit was 

on an “issue related to . . . a public figure.”14 D.C. Code § 16-5501 (3). Although 

the statute does not define “public figure,” we presume that the use of this term 

imports the definition of “public figure” used throughout defamation law. See

1618 Twenty-First St. Tenants’ Ass’n, Inc. v. The Phillips Collection, 829 A.2d 

201, 203 (D.C. 2003) (explaining that as a general rule, we presume that where a 

 

14

 Zujua additionally argues that his Wikipedia edit related to an “issue of 

public interest” because it pertained to Ms. Burke‟s performance as an attorney and 

was thus “related to . . . a service in the market place.” D.C. Code § 16-5501 (3). 

The trial court did not address this argument, perhaps because it was raised only in 

Zujua‟s reply in support of his motion. We likewise do not address this argument 

as we find that Ms. Burke is a public figure.
21

legislature adopts a term of art, it “knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were 

attached to each borrowed word”).

15

 

Like the Supreme Court, this court has recognized two types of public 

figures in the context of defamation claims: general and limited purpose public 

figures. “[G]eneral purpose public figures . . . because of their „position of such 

pervasive power and influence . . . [,] are deemed public figures for all purposes.‟” 

Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1030 (D.C. 1990) (quoting Gertz v. Robert 

Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)). “[L]imited-purpose public figures,” that 

is, individuals “who assume roles „in the forefront of particular public 

controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved,‟ . . . are 

deemed public figures only for purposes of the controversy in which they are 

influential.” Id. (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345). “[T]he touchstone remains 

whether the individual has assumed a role of special prominence in the affairs of 

society . . . that invites attention and comment.” Id. (quoting Tavoulareas v. Piro, 

817 F.2d 762, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). While it is clear that Ms. Burke is not a 

 

15

 Federal courts that have examined the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act have done 

the same. See, e.g., Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, No. 12-1565, 2013 WL 

5410410, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2013); Boley v. Atl. Monthly Grp., 950 F. Supp. 

2d 249, 260-62 (D.D.C. 2013). 
22

general purpose public figure, such as a politician or celebrity, both Zujua and the 

amici argue that she is a limited-purpose public figure. 

The task of determining whether a defamation plaintiff is a limited-purpose 

public figure is a difficult one, requiring a highly fact-intensive inquiry that one 

court has described as “trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall.” Moss, 580 A.2d at 

1030 (quoting Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 

1976), aff’d, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978)). To facilitate this determination, this

court in Moss adopted a three-part inquiry articulated by the D.C. Circuit in 

Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, 627 F.2d 1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court 

must begin by determining “whether the controversy to which the defamation 

relates was the subject of public discussion prior to the defamation.” Moss, 580 

A.2d at 1030. Next, the court must determine “whether „a reasonable person 

would have expected persons beyond the immediate participants in the dispute to 

feel the impact of its resolution.‟” Id. (quoting Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297). 

After identifying the existence and scope of the public controversy, the court will 

find that a defamation plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure with respect to 

that controversy if “[t]he plaintiff . . . achieved a special prominence in the debate, 

and either „must have been purposely trying to influence the outcome or could 

realistically have been expected, because of [her] position in the controversy, to 
23

have an impact on its resolution.‟” Id. at 1031 (quoting Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 

1297). 

Applying the Waldbaum framework, we hold that Ms. Burke is a public 

figure. First, the speech at issue here pertains to an obviously public controversy 

that existed before Ms. Burke‟s involvement. The 2007 Nisour Square shooting 

was a significant international event which implicated United States foreign policy 

and which raised questions about the appropriate use of private contractors in Iraq. 

Ms. Burke attempts to define the controversy narrowly by asserting that only the 

private interests of individual clients were at play. But every public controversy 

involves individuals when examined at some level of granularity, and Ms. Burke‟s

narrow view of the controversy is not reflected in her own descriptions of the high 

stakes of this litigation in press releases and interviews, where Ms. Burke has said, 

for example, that the “litigation [would] prove that Blackwater‟s interests are 

contrary to the interests of the U.S. military, the State Department, and the nation 

of Iraq.” Press Release, Burke O‟Neil LLC, Blackwater Faces New Death and 

Injury Claims and Drug Allegations (Nov. 27, 2007), available at

http://burkepllc.com/category/press-releases. Furthermore, it cannot reasonably be 

disputed that the public “or some segment of it” would “feel the impact” of the 
24

resolution of the controversy about Blackwater‟s presence in Iraq and its actions in 

Nisour Square. 

Finally, we are asked to examine in-depth Ms. Burke‟s role in this 

controversy to determine whether she “achieved a special prominence” such that 

she was “purposefully trying to influence” an outcome of the controversy. Ms. 

Burke warns against determining that an attorney is a public figure simply because 

of her performance of her job duties, namely, zealous advocacy for her clients. 

Courts in other jurisdictions have taken on the difficult task of determining when 

an attorney will become a public figure in her representation of clients, with many 

finding that attorneys whose cases address large-scale public issues or who 

represent prominent clients and seek extensive media attention will become 

limited-purpose public figures. See, e.g., Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l Magazine for 

Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1083-84 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that an attorney was a 

limited-purpose public figure where he “actively participate[d] in the public issue 

in a manner intended to obtain attention”); Partington v. Bugliosi, 825 F. Supp. 

906, 917-18 (D. Haw. 1993) (explaining that an attorney who “voluntarily engaged 

in a course of action with respect to [his representation of his client] that was 

bound to invite attention and comment” was a limited-purpose public figure); 

Ratner v. Young, 465 F. Supp. 386, 400 (D.V.I. 1979) (noting that attorneys were 
25

limited-purpose public figures where they “voluntarily thrust themselves into the 

vortex of [a] case that had far-reaching and serious effect[s] on many people not 

connected with it.”). But see, e.g., Littlefield v. Fort Dodge Messenger, 614 F.2d 

581, 584 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding that an attorney was not a limited-purpose public 

figure due simply to his practice of law in violation of bar discipline); Marchiondo 

v. Brown, 649 P.2d 462, 467-68 (N.M. 1982) (holding that an attorney was not a 

limited-purpose public figure despite being “well known” in the community). 

We agree that “[l]egal representation of a client, by itself, does not establish 

an individual as a public figure,” Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1085. In her litigation of 

high-profile cases like Abtan, however, Ms. Burke went above and beyond simple 

legal representation in court pleadings and appearances. She sought substantial 

publicity for this case by putting out press releases and giving interviews. (We 

note that her actions prompted the company formerly known as Blackwater to seek 

a gag order against her.) By no means do we seek to criticize or challenge her farreaching and assertive advocacy. We comment on her conduct only to explain 

how she “assumed the risk that in the course of reporting and commenting on a 

well known person or public controversy,” that public speakers, like Zujua, might

“inadvertently make erroneous statements about” her. See Marcone, 754 F.2d at 

1081. 
26

Thus, Ms. Burke satisfies all three criteria from Waldbaum, and we are 

confident that she has “thrust [herself] to the forefront of . . . [this] public 

controvers[y],” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, and can be considered a limited-purpose 

public figure. The trial court‟s determination to the contrary was erroneous.

We additionally find error in the trial court finding on Zujua‟s commercial 

motivation. It appears to have been the trial court‟s understanding that in order to

establish “an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public 

interest,” the anonymous speaker must also disprove commercial motivation, even 

where such motivation is not apparent from the content of the speech. This 

apparent presumption of commercial interest has no foundation in the statute which 

merely states what an issue of public interest is and is not. Moreover, such a 

presumption is inappropriate in the context of a prima facie showing, for which we 

have held the burden of proof is “not onerous.” Little v. United States, 613 A.2d 

880, 885 (D.C. 1992). We understand Ms. Burke suspected that Zujua was

affiliated with Blackwater and thus had a commercial interest in defaming her.

16

 

 

16

 Amici emphasize—and both parties agree—that the fact that a speaker 

receives compensation for his speech, e.g. he is a paid journalist, does not mean 

that his statements are “directed primarily toward protecting the speaker‟s 

(continued...)
27

But her unsubstantiated suspicion did not increase Zujua‟s initial burden. Indeed, 

it would turn the statute on its head if a party seeking a special motion to quash had 

to reveal his professional affiliation or other identifying information to disprove a 

disqualifying commercial motivation not apparent from his speech alone. We 

conclude, then, that Zujua established a prima facie case that his speech was 

worthy of protection under the statute. 

B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 

We next consider whether Ms. Burke is able to show that her “underlying

claim” of defamation is likely to succeed on the merits such that the special motion 

to quash should nonetheless be denied. Without any discussion, the trial court 

determined that Ms. Burke could make such a showing. We conclude otherwise.

17

 

(...continued)

commercial interests.” Ms. Burke‟s argument on this point, however, is that Zujua 

was affiliated with Blackwater and thus shared its commercial interests. 

17

 In her complaint, Ms. Burke raised two additional claims: (1) Tortious 

Interference with Prospective Business Advantage, and (2) False Light Invasion of 

Privacy. In opposing Zujua‟s special motion to quash, however, Ms. Burke only 

argued that her defamation claim was likely to succeed on the merits, and she 

similarly does not address her other two tort claims in her argument before this 

court. Thus, she has waived any argument that she is likely to succeed on either of 

these two claims.
28

To establish liability for defamation, a plaintiff must show: 

(1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement 

concerning the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant published the statement 

without privilege to a third party; (3) that the defendant's fault in 

publishing the statement amounted to at least negligence; and (4) 

either that the statement was actionable as a matter of law irrespective 

of special harm or that its publication caused the plaintiff special 

harm.

Rosen v. Am. Israel Pub. Affairs Comm., Inc., 41 A.3d 1250, 1256 (D.C. 2012) 

(quoting Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 76 (D.C. 2005)). If the plaintiff is a 

public figure, however, the fault component embodied in the third defamation 

element is heightened; the plaintiff must then show by clear and convincing 

evidence that the defendant‟s defamatory statement was published with actual 

malice, i.e. either subjective knowledge of the statement‟s falsity or a reckless 

disregard for whether or not the statement was false. Moss, 580 A.2d at 1029. 

Zujua argues that the malice standard should apply here, and that Ms. Burke 

is unlikely to succeed on the merits of her defamation claim because Zujua did not 

publish his statements with malice. Zujua does not contest any of the other 

elements of the defamation claim, and in particular makes no argument that the 

Wikipedia edit is not a “false and defamatory statement.” 
29

As a preliminary matter, it seems far from clear that Zujua‟s revisions to Ms. 

Burke‟s Wikipedia page even constitute a defamatory statement. We note that 

Zujua‟s edit introduced internal inconsistencies and, to anyone with a basic 

understanding of the distinction between a civil suit and a criminal prosecution,

appears barely coherent. Thus, we query whether the edit amounts to a statement 

of fact capable of defamatory meaning, i.e. that “it tends to injure the plaintiff in 

[her] trade, profession or community standing, or lower [her] in the estimation of 

the community.” Moss, 580 A.2d at 1023. Without argument to the contrary from 

Zujua, however, we assume without deciding that this first element of defamation 

has been satisfied.18 

Having already determined that Ms. Burke is a limited purpose public figure, 

see supra part IV. A., we agree with Zujua that she is required to show malice on 

Zujua‟s part in order to succeed on her defamation claim. We conclude that she is 

unlikely to be able to do so here. Although we have assumed that Zujua‟s edits 

would constitute a false and defamatory statement of fact, the lack of clarity of his 

 

18

 At oral argument, counsel for Zujua asserted that it had not conceded the 

information posted by his client was actually defamatory, but this court generally 

“decline[s] to consider contentions raised for the first time in oral argument, at 

least absent compelling reasons not apparent here.” Wagner v. Georgetown Univ. 

Med. Ctr., 768 A.2d 546, 554 n.8 (D.C. 2001). 
30

revisions provides good evidence of Zujua‟s state of mind. Zujua‟s edits do not 

suggest knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for whether or not the statement 

was false. If anything, the edits seem to suggest confusion or honest mistake on 

Zujua‟s part. Again, the edited paragraph is internally contradictory and implies 

that Zujua probably did not understand that the private civil action in Abtan and the 

federal prosecution of the contractors arising out of the same incident were 

separate legal actions. Moreover, in contrast to the allegations Ms. Burke makes 

against John Doe No. 2 (CapBasics359), who apparently re-published similar 

information after she informed him that it was false, Ms. Burke admits that after 

she apprised Zujua of the problems with the paragraph, he apparently accepted the 

correction and did not seek to re-publish the information. This too demonstrates a 

lack of malice. Zujua‟s failure to inquire further and learn more about the subject 

and the federal case before he posted his edit might be evidence of negligence, but 

we do not believe it demonstrates clear and convincing evidence of the “intentional 

or reckless disregard for [the statement‟s] falsity.” Moss, 580 A.2d at 1029. 

To be sure, the task of demonstrating malice is difficult for a plaintiff who 

does not know the identity of the defamatory speaker and cannot argue malice 

based on the identity and motivations of her alleged defamer. It is not impossible, 

however, and the circumstances of the alleged defamation may well demonstrate 
31

malice. Furthermore, the D.C. Council articulated a clear policy in favor of 

anonymous speech when it enacted the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act and created the 

special motion to quash. We will neither question this policy judgment nor the 

Supreme Court case law it builds upon. Like any public figure, Ms. Burke has 

exposed herself to comment and criticism by virtue of the prominent role she has 

assumed in this controversy. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. While that does not mean 

that she may be defamed freely, see id., it does mean that she must satisfy the test 

imposed by the Supreme Court in order to protect the “breathing space” of the 

constitutional freedom of expression. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.

254, 272 (1964). Because she cannot do so, she is unlikely to succeed on the 

merits of her defamation claim. 

V. Conclusion

Having determined that this court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal and 

further holding that Zujua has established a prima facie case under the D.C. AntiSLAPP statute that was not rebutted by a showing of likelihood of success on the 

underlying claims, we reverse the Superior Court‟s January 30, 2013 order and 
32

remand with instructions to enter an order granting Zujua‟s special motion to quash 

Ms. Burke‟s subpoena.19

So ordered. 

 

19

 Although Zujua argues on appeal that he was entitled to attorney fees 

pursuant to D.C. Code § 16-5504 (a), the trial court never addressed this motion 

because Zujua did not prevail below. In the absence of a ruling from the trial 

court, we do not address this argument on appeal. Zujua may renew his claim for 

attorney fees once the trial court enters its order quashing the subpoena.