Filed 3/8/18

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

MICHAEL CHANEY,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LEANNE NETTERSTROM,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Civil No.B282120

(Super. Ct. No. 15FL-0528)

(San Luis Obispo County)

After three years of dating and cohabitation, appellant 

Leanne Netterstrom and respondent Michael Chaney applied for 

a confidential marriage license and exchanged vows at a 

solemnization ceremony. After the ceremony, the officiant gave

the signed license to the parties, who promised to file it with the 

county. For personal and financial reasons, the parties did not 

return the license to the county. Four years later, Chaney 

petitioned for dissolution of marriage. Netterstrom moved to 

quash on the ground that she and Chaney are not married. The 

trial court denied the motion to quash. 

Rule 1: “[A] marriage shall be licensed, solemnized and 

authenticated, and the authenticated marriage license shall be 

returned to the county recorder of the county where the marriage 
2

license was issued . . . . Noncompliance with this part by a 

nonparty to the marriage does not invalidate the marriage.”1 

Rule 2: “The person solemnizing the marriage shall return 

the marriage license . . . to the county recorder . . . within 10 days 

after the ceremony.”2 

The law requires an officiant to return the license to the 

county; however, noncompliance by a nonparty does not 

necessarily invalidate an otherwise lawful marriage. (§ 306.) 

Nor was the marriage invalidated by the parties’ conduct in 

keeping the license or claiming “single” status to tax authorities 

and a bank. Once they secured a license from the county,

exchanged vows at a solemnization ceremony and the license was 

authenticated, the parties were married. We affirm the trial 

court’s validation of the marriage. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties began dating in 2008 and cohabiting in 2011. 

In the fall of 2011, Netterstrom agreed to what was, in her mind, 

a “commitment ceremony.” She had reasons to avoid marriage: 

she had been married twice before; “I never wanted to get 

married again;” she did not want to lose her Social Security 

widow’s benefits by remarrying; and Chaney gambled and was 

financially unstable. In Chaney’s view, he proposed marriage to 

Netterstrom and she accepted. 

The parties obtained a confidential marriage license from

the county clerk.3 Netterstrom claimed at trial that this was a 

 

1 Family Code, section 306. Unlabeled statutory references 

in this opinion are to the Family Code. 

2 Section 423.

3 The parties must personally appear before the county 

clerk to obtain a confidential marriage license. (§ 501.)
3

ruse: the parties only wanted to appease relatives who 

disapproved of unwedded cohabitation. The trial court 

discredited Netterstrom’s testimony, noting that the parties could

have held a ceremony without a license, and her relatives would 

be none the wiser.

It is undisputed that the parties participated in a 

solemnization ceremony in Cambria on November 11, 2011. The 

officiant signed the marriage license and gave it to the parties

with the understanding that they would file it. The trial court 

found that in doing so, the officiant did not perform his duty to 

return the license. It concluded, however, that this dereliction 

did not invalidate the marriage. 

Chaney admittedly allowed the time for returning the 

license to lapse. Netterstrom asked him not to file it because she 

did not want to lose her Social Security benefits. Chaney told 

Netterstrom “it was her decision as to whether or not the 

marriage license would be returned to the county recorder’s 

office”; she advised him that “she decided she didn’t want to mail 

the certificate in.” It is undisputed that neither of the parties 

returned the signed marriage license to the county. Instead, it 

remained in Chaney’s desk, where Netterstrom found it in July 

2015. 

After exchanging vows, Netterstrom occasionally called

herself Leanne Chaney, and the couple openly referred to each 

other as husband and wife. Despite telling friends and family

that they were married, the parties pretended to be unmarried 

when it suited their financial interests. They filed tax returns as 

“single” people. They refinanced Chaney’s home in 2013, stating 

on the loan application that they are unmarried. The deed of 
4

trust securing repayment of the loan is in the names of Chaney 

and Netterstrom as “unmarried” individuals. 

In a change of ownership document for the house, Chaney

notified the assessor’s office of a transfer between “domestic 

partners,” not between husband and wife. Title was taken in the 

name of “Michael Chaney, an unmarried man, and Leanne 

Netterstrom, an unmarried woman, as joint tenants.” 

In 2015, Chaney petitioned for dissolution of marriage. In 

response to the petition, Netterstrom declared that she and 

Chaney are not married. She asked the trial court to quash the 

summons and petition on the ground that there is no marriage, 

and to dismiss the action. 

The trial court ruled that the parties are married. The 

statement of decision recites that the parties participated in a 

ceremony, then wittingly kept the completed marriage license

instead of returning it to the county. Family members toasted 

the marriage at a party after the ceremony. Netterstrom 

announced the marriage on Facebook and thereafter referred to 

Chaney as her “husband.” When the relationship ended, 

Netterstrom lamented the end of the “marriage.” 

The trial court acknowledged that the parties filed as 

“single” taxpayers throughout their marriage, to suit their 

financial interests. Nonetheless, it found that the parties 

consented to marriage by not calling off the ceremony before the 

exchange of vows. Though the parties agreed to retain the 

marriage license, the court deemed this “unconvincing” evidence 

that consent was lacking. The court wrote that the wedding 

officiant failed to perform his duty to return the license, but this 

did not invalidate the marriage. 
5

DISCUSSION

If either party denies a marriage, the other party may seek 

to have the validity of the marriage judicially determined and 

declared. (§ 309; Health & Saf. Code, § 103450, subd. (a) [a party 

may petition to judicially establish the fact of an unregistered

marriage].) “[T]he Legislature has enacted a comprehensive 

scheme regulating marriage in California . . . setting forth in 

detail the procedures to be followed.” (Lockyer v. City and County 

of San Francisco (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1055, 1079.) Our analysis 

requires us to review and interpret the statutes governing 

marriage, to determine whether the requirements for a valid 

marriage have been met. This presents a question of law. (Ceja 

v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1113, 1119.) 

“Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil 

contract between two persons, to which the consent of the parties 

capable of making that contract is necessary. Consent alone does 

not constitute marriage. Consent must be followed by the 

issuance of a license and solemnization.” (§ 300, subd. (a).) To 

solemnize the marriage, “the parties shall declare, in the physical 

presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and necessary 

witnesses, that they take each other as spouses.” (§ 420, subd. 

(a).) 

Following solemnization, the marriage license “shall be 

returned” to the county. (§ 306.) “Returned” means presented in 

person or postmarked before the statutory deadline. (§ 359, subd. 

(f).) A confidential marriage document “is a marriage license 

until it is registered with the county clerk, at which time the 

license becomes a marriage certificate.” (§ 500.5.)4

 

4 Once registered, the certificate becomes part of the state’s 

vital statistics. (Health & Saf. Code, § 102100 [“[e]ach . . . 
6

The statutory scheme does not contemplate what happens 

if the wedded couple retains the signed license. The Legislature 

did not address this eventuality because it has placed the burden

of returning the license to the county for registration squarely 

upon the wedding officiant. 

The law on this point is clear. It states that a confidential 

marriage license “shall be returned by the person solemnizing the 

marriage to the office of the county clerk in the county in which 

the license was issued within 10 days after the ceremony.” 

(§ 506, subd. (c), italics added; § 423 [“The person solemnizing the 

marriage shall return the marriage license . . . to the county 

recorder . . . within 10 days of the ceremony.” Italics added]; 

Health & Saf. Code, § 103150 [A marriage “shall be registered by 

the person performing the ceremony.” Italics added].) The word 

“shall” means that the act is mandatory. (§ 12.) 

Applying the statutes addressing the creation of marriage, 

we conclude that the parties in this case are married. They 

applied in person for a confidential marriage license at the office 

of the county clerk. They exchanged vows declaring each other 

spouses at a solemnization ceremony. After the ceremony, the 

officiant authenticated the marriage license; he was not told that 

the wedding was a ruse. At that point, the parties were married. 

The officiant had a legal duty to return the license to the county. 

His failure to perform that duty “does not invalidate the 

marriage.” (§ 306.) 

 

marriage that occurs in the state shall be registered . . . on the 

prescribed certificate forms”]; § 511, subd. (d) [the county clerk 

must transmit a copy of the original confidential marriage 

certificate to the State Registrar of Vital Statistics].) 
7

Netterstrom relies on Estate of DePasse (2002) 97 

Cal.App.4th 92 (overruled in part in Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten,

supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1126). DePasse is factually inapposite. In 

DePasse, the parties did not obtain a marriage license before 

their “marriage ceremony”; therefore, there was no license to 

return for registration. The burden of obtaining a marriage 

license was on the parties, who had to prove their identity,

capacity to marry, and lack of intoxication at the time of 

application. (Id. at pp. 98-100.) The absence of a license was 

fatal to the claim of a valid marriage in DePasse. (Id. at p. 95.) 

In our case, by contrast, the parties indisputably secured a valid 

license and solemnized their vows. The burden was then on the 

officiant, not the parties, to return the license. 

The case of In re Marriage of Cantarella (2011) 191 

Cal.App.4th 916 (Cantarella) disposes of Netterstrom’s claim that 

no marriage was formed because the parties did not return the 

license. As here, the question in Cantarella was “whether a 

party’s failure to register a certificate is fatal to the marriage’s 

validity.” (Id. at p. 924, fn. 8.) Cantarella holds that failure to 

return the license does not invalidate the marriage “regardless of 

who bore the responsibility for the nonregistration (whether a 

party or nonparty).” (Id. at p. 925.)

In Cantarella, the parties had a marriage ceremony before 

a judge in 1991; the certificate was rejected for registration due to 

a technical error on the document. “After the second rejection, 

the parties decided not to submit the certificate for registration, 

possibly to avoid the tax consequences of marriage.” (Cantarella, 

supra 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 919.) A decade later, they had a 

second wedding ceremony. At dissolution, in 2008, the husband 
8

claimed that the marriage was not of long duration because the 

unregistered 1991 marriage was invalid. (Id. at pp. 919-921.) 

The appeal required the court “to determine whether the 

parties’ failure to register a marriage certificate invalidated the 

1991 marriage.” (Cantarella, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 921.) 

The court emphasized that a marriage is not invalidated if the 

officiant fails to comply with the statutory mandate to return the 

license to the county. The court declined to infer that a party’s

noncompliance with the same registration requirement 

necessarily invalidates a marriage. (Id. at p. 922, fn. 6.)5

The court in Cantarella reasoned that the validity of a 

marriage is determined by the parties’ consent to it: “a marriage 

was actually or potentially invalid if a party did not consent to it 

or lacked the ability to consent.” (Cantarella, supra, 191 

Cal.App.4th at p. 923.) “Most importantly, a marriage ceremony 

culminated in the parties’ declaration that they accepted each 

other as husband and wife. Common sense and tradition tells us 

this is the moment at which the parties’ valid consent creates a 

marriage. Indeed, once solemnized, a marriage is presumed valid

 

5 Cantarella applied prior law, stating that a marriage 

“‘must be licensed, solemnized, authenticated, and the certificate 

of registry of marriage filed . . .; but noncompliance with its 

provisions by others than a party to a marriage does not 

invalidate it.’” (Cantarella, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at pp. 921-

922, citing former Civ. Code § 4200.) The Family Code 

superseded the Family Law Act without substantive change. (Id. 

at p. 919, fn. 1.) Wording changes in a statute from “shall” to 

“must” (or vice versa) without substantive changes means that 

the former and current versions are “identical, and are to be 

considered as having the same effect.” (Davis v. Superior Court 

(1921) 184 Cal. 691, 693.)
9

(Evid. Code, § 663) and a person disputing its validity bears the 

burden of proving it void.” (Id. at p. 924.) 

The registration of the certificate does not bear on the issue 

of consent, and serves only a recordkeeping function “after the 

parties had solemnly consented to marriage in a ceremony and 

after the county clerk and the officiant had satisfied themselves 

the parties’ consent was knowing, voluntary, and valid. 

Additionally, registration was the duty of an officiant . . . , i.e., of 

a nonparty whose noncompliance with statutory requirements did 

not void a marriage . . . .” (Cantarella, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 924.)

Nodding to the societal importance of recognizing the 

validity of marriages—given the significant property and 

inheritance rights marriage confers, with concurrent fiduciary 

and legal duties—the court concluded that the Legislature did 

not intend that a marriage be invalidated by the parties’ failure 

to register the license. (Cantarella, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at pp. 

924-925.) The court recognized that its holding “could allow a 

party to conceal a marriage for tax reasons, but later claim it for 

purposes of spousal support” but determined that “[t]he tax 

consequences of our decision, if any, are not before us.” (Id. at 

p. 926, fn. 12.)

CONCLUSION

Here we conclude that the parties’ retention of the license 

does not invalidate the marriage after the solemnization 

ceremony has taken place. The “necessary step of solemnizing”

the marriage makes the union valid. (Burnham v. Public 

Employees’ Retirement System (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1576, 

1584-1585 [contrasting domestic partnerships, in which filing the 

declaration of partnership is the necessary step to validate the 
10

union].) The exchange of vows to take each other as spouses 

“symbolize[s] the irrevocable decision to go through with the 

union. In the case of solemnization, once the parties say ‘I do,’

they cannot take the statement back. . . . [I]t is the point in the 

process at which the parties can no longer change their minds 

about their decision to form a union.” (Id. at p. 1585.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to 

recover his costs on appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.
11

Commissioner Patrick J. Perry, Judge Pro Tem

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Banick Hodges Law Corporation and John F. Hodges for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.

Ogden & Fricks, Roy E. Ogden and Sue N. Carrasco for 

Defendant and Appellant.