UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4532

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CURTIS EUGENE ELLIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior 

District Judge. (5:12-cr-00395-BR-1)

Submitted: March 30, 2015 Decided: April 14, 2015

Before WILKINSON and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, 

Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Robert E. Waters, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer 

P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Curtis Eugene Ellis appeals the sentence imposed by the 

district court following his guilty plea to aiding and abetting 

two Hobbs Act robberies and an attempted Hobbs Act robbery, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951(a) (2012), and to aiding and 

abetting the using, carrying, possessing, and brandishing of a 

firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A) (2012). The district court 

sentenced Ellis to concurrent 144-month terms of imprisonment on 

the robbery counts and a consecutive 84 months’ imprisonment on 

the firearm count. The district court ordered that the federal

sentence be served consecutively to Ellis’s previously imposed 

state sentences. Ellis argues that the district court 

inadequately explained its decision to make his federal robbery 

sentence run consecutively to his state sentences. We affirm.

In explaining a sentence, the district court is not 

required to “robotically tick through . . . every subsection [of 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)].” United States v. Powell, 650 F.3d 

388, 395 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

However, the court “must make an individualized assessment based 

on the facts presented” that is “tailored to the particular case 

at hand and adequate to permit meaningful appellate review.” 

United States v. Lymas, __ F.3d __, __, 2015 WL 1219553, at *3

(4th Cir. Mar. 18, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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A district court has discretion to make a defendant’s 

federal sentence run consecutively to or concurrently with an 

undischarged sentence previously imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) 

(2012); Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1468 (2012). 

The Guidelines also provide factors a court should consider in 

exercising its discretion to impose a consecutive or concurrent 

sentence: 

(i) the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3584[(b)] 

(referencing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a));

(ii) the type (e.g., determinate, 

indeterminate/parolable) and length of the prior 

undischarged sentence;

(iii) the time served on the undischarged sentence and 

the time likely to be served before release; 

(iv) the fact that the prior undischarged sentence 

may have been imposed in state court rather than 

federal court . . . ; and

(v) any other circumstance relevant to the 

determination of an appropriate sentence for the 

instant offense.

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.3 cmt. n.3(A) (2013). 

In this case, although the district court did not expressly 

discuss its reasons for making the federal robbery sentence run 

consecutively to Ellis’s prior state sentence, the district 

court indicated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors, 

the fact that Ellis was currently subject to a state sentence 

with a release date of May 4, 2016, and the nature and 

background of these offenses. We note that the district court 
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did not expressly consider the type of the prior sentence, but 

its consideration of Ellis’s expected release date adequately 

addressed this issue. Thus, we are satisfied that the district 

court adequately explained its reasons for the sentence as a 

whole.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED