### IN THE UNI TED STATES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCUIT

No. 11-11181

JACK BELL, Plaintiff–Appellant
v. DALLAS COUNTY, Defendant–Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

(08-CV-1834)

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and DeMOSS and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Plaintiff–Appellant Jack Bell s u e d Dallas County for retaliation and interfering with h i s rights pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2006). On March 25, 2010, the district court denied Bell’s motion for summary judgment and granted the County’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the County had not interfered with Bell’s rights pursuant to the FMLA and had not retaliated against him. U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Novembe r 15, 20 12 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Pursua nt to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court hasd ete rm inedthat this op inion s houldnot * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t forth in 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 11-11181 Document: 00512054024 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/15/2012This civil action has previously been before this court. Bell v. Dallas Co. ,

4 3 2 F. App’x 330 (5th Cir. 2011). On the first appeal, we affirmed the distri c t

c o u rt ’ s rejection of Bell’s retaliation claim but remanded for further consideration of his FMLA interference claim. On remand, the distri c t c ourt revisited Bell’s interference claim. It filed its memorandum op inion and order

on August 30, 2011, concluding that: (1) Bell had n o t p l e aded an FMLA interference claim, and (2) even if Bell had pleaded such a c l ai m , it failed as a

m a t t e r of law because there was no evidence that the County had denied h i m benefits to which he was entitled pursuant to the FMLA. Again, Bell appealed, restating his argument for his FMLA interference claim and also claiming that the district court erred in denying his motion for leave to amend his complaint after it issued its August 30, 2011 memorandum opinion and order. We have reviewed the record on appeal and have considered the law and facts as reflected therein and in the briefs of the parties. We are satisfied with the district court’s reasoning in its August 30, 2011 memorandum opinion and order, and therefore affirm. We briefly address Bell’s claim that the district court erred in denying his motion for leave to amend his complaint, which he asserted as part of his Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. “The court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Nevertheless, this generous standard is “tempered by the necessary power of a district court to manage a case.” Schiller v. Alpert Grp. , 342 F. 3 d 563, 566 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). We review the district court’s denial of Bell’s Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of discretion, in light of the limited discretion of Rule 15(a). Id. (citation omitted). In deciding whether to grant l e av e t o amend, the district court may consider a variety of factors in exercising its discretion, including undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failures to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing

2 Case: 11-11181 Document: 00512054024 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/15/2012party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, and futility of the amendment.

Id. Here, the prominent factor s a r e undue delay and the futility of any amendment. The County f irst raised the issue of the deficiency in Bell’s complaint on June 1, 2009—nine months after B e l l had filed his original complaint. Bell simply disagreed, and did not amend his complaint. On October 8, 2009, the County filed its reply in support of its motion for summary judgment, and raised the deficiency issue again. Over two years passed between the time the County first highlighted the complaint’s deficiency and the point at which Bell requested leave to amend, with two decisions i s sued by the district court and one iss u e d b y this court in between. “[A]t some point, a court must decide that a p l ai ntif

f has had fair opportunity to make his case; if, after that time, a cause of action has not been established, the court should finally dismiss the suit.” Schiller , 342 F.3d at 567 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, even if the district court had grante d B ell’ s m otio n to a m end, the amendment would have been futile for the reasons elaborated in the district court’s August 30, 2011 memorandum opinion and order. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bell’s post-judgment motion for leave to amend. AFFIRMED.

3 Case: 11-11181 Document: 00512054024 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/15/2012