UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-4102

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

KRISTOPHER SETH DAVIS, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, 

at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, Senior District Judge. (1:15-cr-00033-IMK-MJA-1) 

Submitted: August 23, 2018 Decided: September 5, 2018

Before NIEMEYER and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC 

DEFENDER, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Powell, United States 

Attorney, Zelda E. Wesley, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
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PER CURIAM: 

Kristopher Seth Davis appeals from the judgment revoking his supervised release 

and imposing a 24-month prison term. Davis argues that this term is plainly 

unreasonable. We affirm. 

“We will not disturb a district court’s revocation sentence unless it falls outside 

the statutory maximum or is otherwise plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Padgett, 

788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing 

whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must first determine whether it 

is unreasonable at all.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). 

In making such a determination, “we strike a more deferential appellate posture than we 

do when reviewing original sentences.” Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “Nonetheless, the same procedural and substantive considerations that 

guide our review of original sentences inform our review of revocation sentences as 

well.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 

A supervised release revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district 

court has considered the Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter Seven advisory policy statement 

range and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors it is permitted to consider in a 

supervised release revocation case, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012); Padgett, 788 F.3d at 

373, and has adequately explained the sentence chosen, although it need not explain the 

sentence in as much detail as when imposing an original sentence. Thompson, 595 F.3d 

at 547. “Where the defendant . . . presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different 

sentence than that set forth in the advisory Guidelines, a district judge should address the 
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party’s arguments and explain why [it] has rejected those arguments.” United States v. 

Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and alteration 

omitted). 

A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court sufficiently 

states a proper basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence imposed. 

Id. Only if we find a revocation sentence unreasonable must we decide whether it is 

“plainly” so. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007). A sentence is 

plainly unreasonable if it is clearly or obviously unreasonable. Id. 

Davis argues that the 24-month sentence is plainly unreasonable because the 

district court failed to explain why a sentence within the advisory policy statement range 

of 3 to 9 months’ imprisonment was unwarranted and relied on an improper basis—the 

need for the sentence imposed to provide just punishment—in concluding he should 

receive that term. Davis also argues that the district court’s rationale for imposing the 

24-month term was not “persuasive,” and that a less severe prison term with a term of 

supervised release to follow was the appropriate sentence to impose. 

In rejecting Davis’ request for a prison term within the policy statement range 

followed by a term of supervised release, the district court made explicit its reasons for 

imposing the 24-month term. These reasons included Davis’ repeated decisions not to 

comply with the terms of his supervision, his demonstrated lack of will to live within the 

boundaries of the terms of his supervision, and the danger to the community posed by its 

exposure to a recidivist and non-compliant supervisee. These reasons are easily matched 

to factors appropriate for consideration, namely, the nature and circumstances of Davis’ 
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violative conduct, his history and characteristics, the need for the sentence to protect the 

public, and the sanctioning of Davis’ breaches of trust while on release, see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(C); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 

3(b) (“[A]t revocation the [district] court should sanction primarily the defendant’s 

breach of trust.”), and were tied to Davis’ particular situation. The district court 

adequately explained its rationale for imposing the 24-month term, see Moulden, 

478 F.3d at 657 (addressing touchstones of a sufficient explanation for a revocation 

sentence), and relied on proper considerations in doing so. Contrary to Davis’ 

suggestion, the district court did not improperly rely on the need for the sentence imposed 

to provide just punishment, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), in imposing the 24-month 

term. 

Davis’ remaining arguments essentially ask this court to substitute its judgment for 

that of the district court. While this court may have weighed relevant § 3553(a) factors 

differently had it imposed the revocation sentence, we defer to the district court’s 

decision that a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment achieved the purposes of sentencing 

in Davis’ case. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (explaining that 

appellate courts “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the 

§ 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify” the sentence imposed). In light of the “extremely 

broad” discretion afforded to a district court in determining the weight to be given each 

of the § 3553(a) factors in imposing sentence, see United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 

679 (4th Cir. 2011), and the deferential posture we take in reviewing the imposition of a 

revocation sentence, Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373, Davis fails to establish that his 24-month 
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sentence is unreasonable. Therefore, we conclude that his sentence is not plainly 

unreasonable. 

Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED