NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

MARIA J., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, R.R., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 14-0300

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County

No. S1400JD20140281

The Honorable Kathryn Stocking-Tate, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Law Offices of Kelly A. Smith, Yuma

By Kelly A. Smith

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Erika Z. Alfred

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
MARIA J. v. DCS, R. R.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Maria J. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

adjudicating her child, R.R., dependent as to her.

1 For the reasons stated 

below, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

¶2 Mother, a Guatemalan national, is an undocumented 

immigrant living in southern California. In December 1997, while living in 

Oregon, Mother gave birth to R.R. In 1998, Mother and R.R. moved to 

Guatemala, where Mother gave birth to another child, V.J., in December 

1999.

3

¶3 In 2003, Mother returned to the United States, leaving the 

children in the care of their maternal grandparents in Guatemala. Over the 

next eleven years, Mother did not visit the children or bring them to visit 

her in the United States, although she sent them some money. Meanwhile, 

 

1 The juvenile court also adjudicated R.R. dependent as to her 

biological father, Remigio R. (“Father”), who has not been located and is 

believed to be deceased. Father is not a party to this appeal.

2 In reviewing an adjudication of dependency, we view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court’s findings. Willie 

G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 231, 235, ¶ 21, 119 P.3d 1034, 1038

(App. 2005).

3 We refer to R.R. and V.J. collectively as “the children.”
MARIA J. v. DCS, R. R.

Decision of the Court

3

when R.R. was ten years old, she dropped out of school and began cleaning 

homes to support V.J., her grandparents, and herself.4

¶4 The children’s grandmother died in December 2013, and their 

grandfather died a few weeks later, in January 2014. The children began 

living with an uncle, but were unable to continue doing so.

¶5 In June 2014, the children boarded a bus in Guatemala and 

began a four-to-five day journey to the United States border.5 Along the 

way, they were assaulted by Mexican law enforcement officers, who took 

most of their money. When the children reached the port of entry in San 

Luis, Arizona, they were detained by federal authorities. No adult met the 

children at the border, and R.R., who possessed only twenty dollars and the 

clothes on her back, had no way to get to Mother’s apartment in California.

¶6 The Arizona Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took R.R.

into temporary custody.6 A DCS investigator called Mother to come and 

get R.R., but Mother refused, ostensibly because she did not want to risk 

 

4 At the dependency hearing, Mother testified that, while the children 

were living in Guatemala, she sent them “400 or $500 per month,” and R.R. 

“never worked.” The juvenile court, however, found Mother’s testimony

was not credible. See Hamilton v. Municipal Court, 163 Ariz. 374, 377, 788 

P.2d 107, 110 (App. 1989) (“The trial court is not bound to accept as true the 

uncontroverted testimony of an interested party.” (citation omitted)).

5 Mother testified she “made arrangements” for the children to travel 

from Guatemala to the United States, but had not sent money for the 

journey because the children already had “the money that I usually sent to 

them.” She further testified the children traveled with a twenty-year-old 

sibling, who was taken into custody at the United States border by federal 

officials because “she doesn’t have papers.” No other evidence supported 

Mother’s claim, and as previously noted, the juvenile court found she was 

not credible.

6 Because V.J. is not a United States citizen, federal officials took him 

into custody and later released him. According to Mother, V.J. is currently 

in her custody. Even if true, however, we do not consider this information 

dispositive. Mother has provided no evidence or argument that the federal 

government is in any way subject to or regularly follows the Interstate 

Compact on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”), much less that it did so in 

V.J.’s case.
MARIA J. v. DCS, R. R.

Decision of the Court

4

the possibility of being apprehended at a Border Patrol checkpoint while 

traveling to Yuma, Arizona. Mother suggested her “significant other”

might be able to pick up R.R., but DCS determined that would not be 

appropriate because he had a criminal history and had never met R.R.

Mother refused to provide further contact information.

¶7 On June 18, 2014, DCS filed a petition alleging R.R. was 

dependent because Mother had neglected and abandoned her. In part, DCS 

maintained Mother was unable or unwilling to provide R.R. with the basic 

necessities of life, including medical care, proper supervision, and 

education; had left R.R. with relatives in Guatemala, where she did not 

attend school or receive medical care; had failed to pick up R.R. after she 

travelled through Mexico to the United States; and had refused to allow for 

inspection of Mother’s residence to ensure R.R.’s safety.

¶8 A guardian ad litem was appointed for R.R., and counsel was 

appointed for Mother. On June 20, 2014, the juvenile court held a 

preliminary protective hearing, and an initial dependency hearing was held 

on July 7, 2014.

¶9 Sometime after DCS filed the dependency petition, Mother 

provided the DCS investigator with contact information for a maternal aunt 

(“Aunt”) who might be able to pick up R.R. and transport her to California.

Aunt, however, was unable to drive and stated she would have to rely on 

her husband (“Uncle”) to get R.R. Uncle, however, had a criminal history, 

including charges of domestic violence. Mother eventually gave Aunt a 

power of attorney authorizing her to take custody of R.R., ostensibly for the 

purpose of transporting R.R. to Mother, but because Aunt and Uncle were 

not Arizona residents, DCS officials concluded DCS was required under the 

ICPC to assess them in terms of placement before placing R.R. in their 

custody.7 However, DCS was unable to gather the necessary information 

to conduct an ICPC investigation for Aunt and Uncle.

¶10 While awaiting the dependency hearing, DCS placed R.R. 

with a foster family, who ensured she was attending school. R.R. was also 

given medical attention, receiving her first immunization shots. 

 

7 See generally Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 8-548; see also Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec. v. Leonardo, 200 Ariz. 74, 77-78, ¶¶ 8-9, 22 P.3d 513, 516-17 (App. 

2001) (discussing Arizona’s adoption of the ICPC, and its purpose and 

policy in facilitating cooperation between states in the protection, 

placement, and monitoring of dependent children).
MARIA J. v. DCS, R. R.

Decision of the Court

5

Additionally, a visit to the dentist disclosed she had fifteen cavities, all of 

which ultimately required fillings.

¶11 DCS sent a referral for parenting classes and counseling to 

Mother in California, and started an ICPC process for Mother. DCS also 

offered Mother supervised visits and telephone contact with R.R., and 

Mother participated in telephonic visits with her approximately two or 

three times per week. However, Mother continued to refuse to come to 

Arizona to visit or get R.R. Further, DCS was unable to verify Mother’s 

claim that she was living in a one-bedroom apartment with V.J., or 

otherwise assess the current living situation, and was unable to verify 

Mother’s claim that she was currently employed or whether Mother had 

the financial means to care for R.R.

¶12 On September 3, 2014, the juvenile court held a contested 

dependency hearing. DCS presented testimony from the DCS investigator 

and the DCS caseworker assigned to the case. At the close of the State’s 

case, Mother moved for judgment as a matter of law as to both alleged 

grounds for dependency. The juvenile court denied Mother’s motion on 

the neglect ground, but granted the motion on the abandonment ground.

¶13 Mother, who was appearing telephonically and spoke 

through an interpreter, then testified she lives in an apartment with V.J., 

who was placed with her by the federal government.8 She claimed she is 

employed by a small company during the week, cleans houses on 

weekends, has a weekly income of $580, and has the financial means to care 

for the children, including providing medical care, which she believes could 

be obtained through Medicaid. Mother further testified that V.J. is 

attending school, and she has looked into placing R.R. in a school. She 

stated she could not provide proof of her income, however, because she 

receives most of her income in the form of cash, and only a small amount 

through checks. She also stated she would not run the risk of coming to 

pick up R.R. due to her “legal status,” but Aunt and Uncle had come to 

Yuma and were present the day of the hearing.

¶14 At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court 

adjudicated R.R. dependent after concluding DCS had proved by a 

 

8 Mother testified the apartment is leased by her “brother-in-law,” and 

although she is also listed as a tenant on the lease, V.J. is not. (Although the 

record is not clear, it appears the “brother-in-law” is Mother’s boyfriend’s 

brother.) She also testified the lease contains no condition limiting the 

number of people living in the apartment.
MARIA J. v. DCS, R. R.

Decision of the Court

6

preponderance of the evidence that Mother was unable to parent R.R. and 

Mother’s inability to parent caused an unreasonable risk of harm to R.R. In 

part, the court found Mother’s testimony was not credible, no parent 

willing and able to care for R.R. was physically present, Mother had failed 

to show proof of her housing arrangements or income, and Mother had 

neglected R.R. by failing to make appropriate plans for her care after her 

grandparents had died and allowing R.R. to assume the risk of traveling 

from Guatemala to the United States on a bus unsupervised, while Mother 

refused to even risk traveling to the border to get her. A case plan of family 

reunification was set, with a current target date of June 14, 2015.9

¶15 We have jurisdiction over Mother’s timely appeal pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 8–235(A).

ANALYSIS

¶16 Mother argues the juvenile court erred in denying her motion 

for judgment as a matter of law as to the allegation of neglect and abused 

its discretion in finding R.R. dependent as to her.

10 In effect, Mother’s 

 

9 DCS is currently offering the following services as part of its 

permanency plan: allowances and subsidies, case management services, 

medical and dental services, parent locate services, placement services, 

visitation services, and young adult services. The juvenile court has held 

periodic report and review hearings, and has found that DCS has made 

reasonable efforts to identify and assess placement with a member of the 

child’s extended family or persons with a significant relationship with the 

child, but no family members or persons with a significant relationship 

have yet been identified as an appropriate placement. 

10 DCS argues that, by failing to provide the standard of review or 

applicable case law, Mother has waived her argument regarding the denial 

of her motion for judgment as a matter of law. See ARCAP 13(a)(6) 

(requiring that, for each contention, “the proper standard of review on 

appeal shall be identified, with citations to relevant authority”); City of 

Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 218 Ariz. 172, 195, ¶ 88, 181 P.3d 219, 

242 (App. 2008) (concluding that a party’s failure to adequately develop its 

argument resulted in waiver). In light of the significant interests in dispute, 

however, we address the merits of Mother’s argument.
MARIA J. v. DCS, R. R.

Decision of the Court

7

argument is that substantial and reasonable evidence does not support the 

court’s finding of dependency.

¶17 We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as a 

matter of law. Warne Invs., Ltd. v. Higgins, 219 Ariz. 186, 194, ¶ 33, 195 P.3d 

645, 653 (App. 2008); Tobias v. Dailey, 196 Ariz. 418, 420, ¶¶ 6-7, 998 P.2d 

1091, 1093 (App. 2000). In our analysis, however, we view the evidence and 

all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Warne Invs., 219 Ariz. at 194, ¶ 33, 195 P.3d at 653; Tobias, 

196 Ariz. at 420, ¶ 7, 998 P.2d at 1093; Monaco v. HealthPartners of S. Ariz., 

196 Ariz. 299, 302, ¶ 6, 995 P.2d 735, 738 (App. 1999). A trial court should 

only grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law “if the facts produced 

in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the 

quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with 

the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme 

Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309, 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990). We will affirm 

if substantial evidence exists that could lead reasonable persons to find the 

ultimate facts to support the verdict.

11 Goodman v. Physical Res. Eng’g, Inc., 

229 Ariz. 25, 28, ¶ 6, 270 P.3d 852, 855 (App. 2011) (citations omitted); Acuna 

v. Kroack, 212 Ariz. 104, 111, ¶ 24, 128 P.3d 221, 228 (App. 2006).

¶18 Additionally, we review a juvenile court’s ultimate ruling in 

a contested dependency hearing for an abuse of discretion. See Willie G., 

211 Ariz. at 235, ¶ 21, 119 P.3d at 1038. We will not disturb a dependency 

adjudication unless the findings on which it is based are clearly erroneous; 

that is, unless no reasonable evidence supports them. See id.; Pima Cnty. 

Juv. Dependency Action No. 118537, 185 Ariz. 77, 79, 912 P.2d 1306, 1308 (App. 

1994).

 

11 Judgment as a matter of law during a trial without a jury is permitted 

if “a party has been fully heard on an issue and the court after determining 

the facts finds against the party on that issue.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 52(c); see also 

S.S. v. Superior Court, 178 Ariz. 423, 424, 874 P.2d 980, 981 (App. 1994) 

(recognizing that this court may resort to the civil rules “where the juvenile 

rules are silent and where the civil rules are readily adaptable and necessary 

to the dependency proceedings”). If no findings of fact are requested or 

made, this court must presume the trial court found the necessary facts 

upon which to predicate its judgment, provided evidence exists in the 

record to support the presumption. Upton v. East-West Realty Co., 81 Ariz. 

58, 60, 299 P.2d 646, 647 (1956); see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 52(a), (c) (explaining 

findings of fact and conclusions of law are only necessary if requested).
MARIA J. v. DCS, R. R.

Decision of the Court

8

¶19 The juvenile court, as the trier of fact in a dependency 

proceeding, is “in the best position to weigh the evidence, judge the 

credibility of the parties, observe the parties, and make appropriate factual 

findings.” Pima Cnty. Dependency Action No. 93511, 154 Ariz. 543, 546, 744 

P.2d 455, 458 (App. 1987). Thus, the resolution of conflicting evidence is 

within the unique province of the juvenile court, and we will not reweigh 

the evidence. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8, 83 

P.3d 43, 47 (App. 2004); Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 

282, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d 203, 207 (App. 2002).

¶20 Under A.R.S. § 8-201(14)(a)(i), a dependent child is one who 

is “[i]n need of proper and effective parental care and control and . . . who 

has no parent or guardian willing to exercise or capable of exercising such 

care and control.” A child may also be dependent if the child’s “home is 

unfit by reason of abuse, neglect,[12] cruelty or depravity by a parent, a 

guardian or any other person having custody or care of the child.” A.R.S. 

§ 8-201(14)(a)(iii). However, the focus of the dependency statutes is “not on 

the conduct of the parents but rather the status of the child.” Santa Cruz 

Cnty. Juv. Dependency Action Nos. JD-89-006 & JD-89-007, 167 Ariz. 98, 102, 

804 P.2d 827, 831 (App. 1990).

¶21 To an extent, Mother’s arguments ask us to reweigh the 

evidence, which, as we have recognized, we will not do. See Mary Lou C., 

207 Ariz. at 47, ¶ 8, 83 P.3d at 47. Moreover, although Mother asserts the 

juvenile court erroneously shifted the burden of proof to her on the issues 

of her employment and housing, and otherwise characterizes several of the 

court’s findings as mere speculation, we conclude the underlying findings 

necessary for the court’s adjudication of dependency are supported by 

substantial, reasonable evidence, independent of any employment and 

housing issues.

¶22 In this case, Mother’s actions throughout have exhibited 

ongoing neglect supporting the conclusion that R.R. is dependent as to her. 

From the time Mother left R.R. in 2003, Mother never visited her, and 

 

12 Under A.R.S. § 8-201(24)(a), “neglect” is defined in pertinent part as:

The inability or unwillingness of a parent, guardian or 

custodian of a child to provide that child with supervision, 

food, clothing, shelter or medical care if that inability or 

unwillingness causes unreasonable risk of harm to the child’s 

health or welfare . . . .
MARIA J. v. DCS, R. R.

Decision of the Court

9

although Mother asserts she sent money for the children, it was clearly 

insufficient because R.R. had to drop out of school at a very young age and 

work to support her family, and she never received any medical or dental 

care. After R.R.’s grandparents died, Mother made no appropriate plans to 

get the children or bring them to live with her. Instead, five months later, 

Mother’s only “arrangements” consisted of a long, dangerous, and 

unsupervised bus trip through a foreign country with no additional funds 

made available to the children.13 Further, when the children reached the 

border, no adult met them, and with only twenty dollars, R.R. had no way 

to get to Mother’s home in California. Only after R.R. was in DCS’s 

protective custody did Mother suggest her “significant other” — who had 

a criminal history and had never met R.R. — could pick up R.R., and only 

after the dependency petition was filed did Mother suggest Aunt and Uncle

could pick her up. DCS was unable to assess them in terms of placement, 

however, and Uncle had a criminal history. Many of these events are 

recent, and no evidence was presented that Mother’s ongoing inability or 

unwillingness to exercise proper judgment or provide proper parental 

supervision has changed. Accordingly, substantial, reasonable evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s conclusions that Mother “put the children in 

unreasonable risk of harm” and neglected the children because “she should 

have been making plans [when the grandparents died] to either go back to 

Guatemala and parent her children or . . . get the children up to the U.S,” 

and because she allowed the children to assume the risk of traveling 

through Mexico by themselves.

¶23 Moreover, after taking R.R. into temporary protective 

custody, DCS gave Mother an opportunity to come get her, but Mother 

refused to do so, and later testified she was unwilling to risk crossing the 

California border because she was undocumented. By the time of the 

dependency hearing, Mother still had not come to Arizona to see or get R.R., 

and she continued to refuse to do so. Substantial, reasonable evidence 

therefore supported the juvenile court’s determination that R.R. was 

dependent because there was no parent “able or willing to take custody of 

[her]” at the time of trial.

14

 

13 Even Mother admitted the children could have come into harm 

traveling unsupervised through Mexico, and in fact, they were assaulted 

and robbed.

14 Mother asserts she was willing and able to parent R.R. because she 

“sent someone with a legal valid power of attorney to pick her child up.” 
MARIA J. v. DCS, R. R.

Decision of the Court

10

¶24 Because substantial, reasonable evidence otherwise supports 

the juvenile court’s finding of dependency, we need not consider Mother’s 

assertion that the juvenile court shifted the burden of proof on the issues of 

her employment and housing. See Oscar F. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 235 Ariz. 

266, 269 n.5, ¶ 11, 330 P.3d 1023, 1026 n.5 (App. 2014) (holding that this court 

need not consider one reason for a dependency if sufficient evidence 

supports another). In any case, it appears the juvenile court was merely 

unpersuaded by the evidence Mother presented to counter DCS’s evidence 

that R.R. was dependent. Moreover, the uncertainty of Mother’s (and 

Aunt’s) living situation was relevant to the need for an ICPC home study 

for a child who was otherwise dependent.

¶25 As we have noted, Mother maintains the juvenile court 

should have allowed Aunt to transport R.R. to her based on the power of 

attorney Mother signed allowing Aunt to take custody of R.R. But given 

R.R.’s status as a child in the temporary protective custody of DCS, the 

ICPC prohibited the juvenile court from simply placing her with Aunt or 

enabling Aunt to take her to Mother in California. See A.R.S. § 8-548, art. 

III(a)-(b), (d); Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Stanford, 234 Ariz. 477, 480-81, 

¶¶ 17-18, 323 P.3d 760, 763-64 (App. 2014). When a parent’s rights have 

been diminished by a court order — as compared to a parent who has full 

legal rights prior to placing a child — “no inference of fitness for placement 

may be made.” Leonardo, 200 Ariz. at 81, ¶ 20, 22 P.3d at 520 (concluding 

that the ICPC applies to the out-of-state placement of children made 

temporary wards of the juvenile court). Instead, the parent “must be 

investigated to ensure that the child would be safe if placed with that parent 

and, thereafter, provided any necessary services.” Id. When a parent lives 

in another state, the ICPC requires the other state to “investigate and 

monitor the placement.” Id. This is because “the primary purpose of the 

ICPC is to protect children by making certain they are placed in a safe 

environment.” Id. at 82, ¶ 22, 22 P.3d at 521.

¶26 Further, the ICPC prohibits the juvenile court from sending a 

child into a receiving state without complying with the ICPC’s 

requirements or regulations. See Stanford, 234 Ariz. at 480-82, ¶¶ 17-23, 323 

P.3d at 763-65; A.R.S. § 8-548. A violation of the ICPC not only endangers 

 

However, when a parent executes a power of attorney, “the juvenile court 

d[oes] not err in refusing to give preclusive effect to the mother’s delegation 

of parental authority in relation to the dependency proceeding.” Maricopa 

Cnty. Juv. Action No. JD-05401, 173 Ariz. 634, 639-40, 845 P.2d 1129, 1134-35

(App. 1993). The juvenile court therefore did not err in finding the power 

of attorney alone was insufficient.
MARIA J. v. DCS, R. R.

Decision of the Court

11

a child sent into another state without supervision, but also jeopardizes 

Arizona’s future ability to place children in the other state. See A.R.S. § 8-

548, art. IV (providing that any “violation of the laws respecting placement 

of children . . . shall constitute full and sufficient grounds for the suspension 

or revocation of any license, permit, or other legal authorization held by the 

sending agency which empowers or allows it to place, or care for children”).

¶27 Neither Aunt nor Mother lives in Arizona. Mother provided 

mostly non-verifiable information at the dependency hearing, and 

continued to insist R.R. be released into Aunt’s care. As the DCS case 

manager testified, however, to place R.R. with Aunt or allow her to take 

custody of R.R., Aunt and Uncle would have had to comply with the 

requirements of the ICPC to ensure R.R. was in a safe environment. DCS 

was unable to gather the necessary information to conduct an ICPC 

investigation for Aunt and Uncle, however, and even without an 

investigation done through the ICPC, DCS discovered Aunt was unable to 

drive, Aunt relied on Uncle for transportation, and Uncle had a criminal 

conviction for domestic violence. Releasing a child into such a situation 

would thus be inappropriate under the ICPC. Further, sending R.R. to 

Mother in another state by any means would have violated the ICPC unless 

the juvenile court determined R.R. was not dependent. The ICPC 

prohibited the juvenile court from placing R.R. with Aunt or enabling Aunt 

to take her to Mother in California. Accordingly, substantial evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s denial of Mother’s motion for judgment as a 

matter of law, and reasonable evidence supports the court’s order finding 

R.R. dependent under A.R.S. § 8-201(14).

CONCLUSION

¶28 Because substantial, reasonable evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s order of dependency, we affirm.