## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District o f Texas at Fort Worth

___________________________ No

. 02

- 19

- 00165

- CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 78th Di strict Court Wichita County, Texas Trial Court No. 60,089

- B Before Kerr, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Ju stice Kerr 

### C ASEY 

### J OE 

### C OCHNAUER 

### , Appellant
V


### . T HE 

### S TATE OF 

### T EXAS2 MEMORANDUM OPINION Casey Joe Cochnaue r appeals his conviction for two counts of indecency with a child

. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(1), (a)(2)(A). In two issues , Cochnauer

— who represented himself with the assi st ance of standby counsel at trial

— argues that the tr ial court deprived him of two S ixth Amendment rights : right to counsel and right t o a speedy trial. We will overrule Cochnauer’s issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment

. I. Backgro un d In early 2016, two brothers made an outcry about indecencies that Cochnauer had committed against them in early 2011 when they were thi rteen and ten years old , respectively

. 1 A Wichita County magistr ate issued arrest warrants in Feb ruary 2016 for C ochnauer , who had be en incarc erated since 2012 at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ’s Kyle Facility on unrelated char ges. The warrant s were served on C o chnau er in May 2018 at that facilit y . Cochnauer was tried and convicted of the in decency charges in April 2019 , and t he trial court sentenced Cochnauer in accordance w ith the jury ’s punishment assessments. C ochnauer timely appealed . W e will address his two Sixt h Amendment issues in reverse order

.

1 B ecause evidentiary s ufficiency is not an issue , we provide only th e fa cts needed to dispose o f this ap peal

.3 II. Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial In his second issue, Cochnauer contends that the three

- year delay between the February 2016 issuance of the arres t warrants an d his April 2019 trial violated his Sixth Amendm ent r ight to a speedy trial. See U.S. Const. amend VI. He argues that under the four

- factor balancing test set out in Barker v. Wingo , h e is entitled to a dismissal of the charges against him. Se e 407 U.S. 51 4, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972); Gonzales v. Stat e , 435 S.W.3d 801, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). To as sist in evaluating Cochnauer’s speedy

- t rial claim, we will set out a detailed t imeline below. A. Speedy
- Trial Facts

• Early 2011, Cochn auer commits indec en cy with a child.

• April 20, 20 1 2, C ochna uer beg ins serving an eight

- year sentence for felonies unrelated to this case

.

• Earl y 2016, the two complainants mak e their outcries.

• February 2 6, 2016, a magistrate issue s two warrants for Cochnauer’s

arr est .

• February 29, 2016, t h e Kyle Facility receive s the warrants

.

• May 6, 2018, the State receive s a prosecution report for the 2011 offe nses .

• May 7, 2018, the arrest warrants are executed on Cochnauer

.4 • May 8, 2018, the magistr at e conducts a probable

- cause hearing, issues warning s to Cochnauer, and orders bond.

• May 10, 2018, the trial court appoints Michael Valverde as Cochnauer’s counsel

.

• June 7, 2018, a grand jury indicts Cochnauer on two counts of in de cency with a child

. Cochnauer is served wi th a copy of the indictment.

• June 12, 2018, the State announces “ready” for trial.

• June 1 5, 2018, Valverde waives pretrial arraignment , and Co chnaue r
enters a “not guilty ” plea.

• September 19, 2018, V alverde moves for the appointment of an investigato r.

• October 1 9, 2018, Valverde announce s “not ready” at docket call.

• November 16, 2018 , Valverde announces “ready” at docket call.

• January 11, 2019, Valver de files a motion in limi ne .

• February 1, 2019, Cochnauer begins filing pro se motions.

• Feb ruary 11, 2019, Cochnauer files his pro se “Motion to Dismi ss Due to Violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers A ct” ( the “ IADA motion ” )

.

• Fe bruary 25, 2019, C ochnauer files his pro se Sixth Amendment speedy

tr ial motion

.5 • Marc h 1, 2019, Valverde moves to withdraw as counsel.

• M arch 7, 2019, after a hearing , the trial court denies Valverd e’s motion to withdraw.

• March 1 1, 2019, after a hearing , the trial court gran ts Valv erde’s motion to withdraw, g rants Cochnauer’s pro se Sixth Amendment speedy

- trial motio n , and orders a special setting for trial on April 22, 2019

.

• March 21, 2019, Cochnauer amen ds his IADA motion to add a complaint under the (federal) 1974 Speedy T rial Act.

• April 12, 2019, after a hearing, the trial court d enies Cochnauer’s amended IADA motion and moves the trial to April 23, 2019

.

• April 23, 2019, Coachnauer’s tri al begins

. B. Error Preservatio n Speedy

- trial complaints are subject to error

- preservat ion requirements. See Henson v. State , 407 S.W.3d 764, 768

– 69 (T ex. Crim. App. 2013). To preserve a complaint for our review, a p ar ty must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection , or motion stating the specific grounds, if not apparen t f rom the context, for the desired ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (a)(1); Thomas v. State , 505 S.W.3d 916, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 201 6) . Further, the party must obtain an express or impl icit adverse trial

- court ruling or object to the trial court’s refusal to rul e. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Everitt v. State , 407 S.W.3d 2 59, 262

– 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).6 Here, Cochnauer raised speedy

- t rial complaints in two pro se motions. Cochnauer’s first motion

— filed on February 25, 2019, and heard on March 11, 2019

— raised a Sixth Amendment speedy

- trial complaint. In that m otion, Cochnauer requested alternate forms of relief: “trial set fo r a date on or before the 8th of May 2019, or , if a trial is not set on or before said date, Cause No. 60089

- B*1

- 2

. . . be dism issed on the ground that the defendant has been denied the Co nstitutional Right to a Speedy Trial.” [Emphasis added.] Th e trial court granted Cochnauer’s motion and set th e trial for April 22, 2019. 2 Because the trial court gra nted Cochnauer one form of his request ed relief

— a trial setti ng on or before May 8

— there is no error for us to review. See Hil l v. State , 213 S.W.3d 533, 53 8 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2007, no pet.); Cl ine v. State , 685 S.W.2d 760, 761

– 62 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1s t Dist.] 1985, no pet.)

. Cochnauer’s s econd speedy

- trial moti on
— the amended IADA motion

— asked the trial court to dismiss the c as e based on the “Speedy Trial Act of 1974” and the I ADA , n either of which applies to this case . The Speedy Trial Act is a federal statute that does not govern state

- co urt prosecu tions

. See 18 U.S.C. A. §§ 31 6 1

– 74. The IADA is inapplicable because Cochnauer ’ s case does not involve an interstate detainer. See Tex. Cod e Crim. Proc. Ann. a rt. 51.1 4

. Regardless, presenting a st atutory speedy

- trial claim to the trial court doe s not preser ve error on a claim that the State violated an appellant’s constitutional right to a

2 The trial court later moved the trial’s start date to April 23, but regardless, the trial court s till granted Cochnauer’s reques ted relief: trial on or before May 8, 2019.7 speedy trial. See Du nn v. State , 819 S.W.2d 510, 52 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 199 1); C hec k v. State , 543 S.W.3d 883, 8 87 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) ; see also C

lark v. State , 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“ The point of error on appeal must comport wit h the objection made at trial.” ). Cochnauer ’s second speedy

trial motion thus did not pres erve his Sixth Amendment speedy

- trial complaint f or our revie w. But even if Cochanuer had preserved his Sixth Amendment speedy

- trial complaint, application of the Bar ke r factors shows no speedy

- tri al violation

. C. Barker Factors To determin e when a Sixth Am endment speedy

- trial violation occurs, appellate

c ourts apply a balancing test using the Barker factors

. See 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192; Gonzales , 435 S .W.3d at 808 ( re citing the Bark er factors). Appellate courts weigh : (1) the length of dela y, (2) reasons for the delay, (3) the defendan t’s asse rtion o f his speedy

- trial right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant because of the delay. Barker , 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. The conduct of the Sta te and defendant are weighed

un der each factor, thoug h no single factor alone is necessary or s u ffic ient to establish a speedy

- trial violation. Hurdsma n v. State , No. 02

- 17

- 00319

- CR, 2018 WL 5832116, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Nov. 8, 2018, pet. ref’d) (m em . op., not designated for pub lication). The first f actor

— l ength of delay

— is , to an exten t, a t rigg ering mechanism for the remaining factors. Santalla n v. State , 922 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth8 1996, pet. ref’d). The “speedy

- trial clock ” starts on ly when a formal indictment, information, or actual arrest occurs. Id. (citing U nited States v . M a rion , 404 U.S. 307, 320 , 92 S. Ct. 455, 463 (1971) ). When , as her e, there is no prearre st indictment, the calculation does n ot include the period before arrest. See i d. ( excluding four years between issuance and execution of arrest warrants from delay calc ulation). Here , although a magist ra te issued the arrest warrants for Cochnauer in Febru ary 2016, his actual arrest did not o ccur until May 7, 2018. T he trial began less than a year later on April 23, 2019. T h e almost year

- long delay between Cochnauer’s

arr est and th e start of his trial does weig h slightly against the State and is enough to trigger an an alysis of the remaining Barker fact ors. See Dragoo v. State , 96 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“In general, courts deem delay approaching one ye ar t o be ‘ un re asonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry. ’ ” (quo ting Doggett v. United States , 505 U. S. 647 , 652 n. 1, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2691 n.1 ( 1992) ) ). W hen asse ssing the second factor

— reason s for delay

— different weight is given to different reasons. Gonz ales , 435 S. W.3d at 809

. For instance, deliberate delays to h amper the defense will weigh more he avily against the State than more neutral reasons such as negl igence or overcrowded dockets, which will still weigh against the State but less heavily

. Id. Coc hnauer d oes not argue that the delay was the result of delib erate conduct; instead, he complains that the State failed to explain t he more than two

- year delay between the February 2016 arrest warrants and his May 2018 arrest. But as we have9 explain ed , the “speedy

- trial clock” di d not start to run unti l Cochnauer’s arrest. In addition, t he State announced “ready” in June 2018 , the mont h after Cochn auer’s
arrest. This factor does n o t weigh against the State. The third factor

— assertion of the s peedy

- trial righ t

— concerns wh ether and how a defenda nt assert s the right. Id. at 810. De lay in asserting a speedy

- trial right weighs against a defe nda nt, as does requesting dismissal rather than trial. See Dragoo , 96 S.W.3d at 314

– 15 ; see also Murphy v. State , 28 0 S.W .3d 445, 454 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2009, pet. r ef’d) (filing for dismissal weakens a speedy

- trial claim because it shows a desire for no trial in stead of a speedy trial). Here , Cochnauer wait ed until nine months after his arrest to assert his speedy

- t rial righ t. And only after th e trial court had grant ed his request for a speedy trial an d specially set his case for trial two months later did Coc hna uer s eek dismissal , which un dermin e s his claim of a speedy

- trial violation. Th is factor thus weighs against C oc hnau er. T he final Ba rker factor

— prejudice

— is assessed in light of what the speedy

- trial right is designed to prevent: o ppressive pretrial inca rceration, a defendant’s anxiety and concern, o r impairment of a defense. Dragoo , 96 S.W.3d at 315. Impairment of a de fense is the mos t serious , as an inability to adequa tely prepare for trial skews the fairness of the justice syste m. Id. (citing Barker , 40 7 U.S. at 532 , 92 S. Ct. at 2193 ). Actual prejudice is not required, but the def en dant must show some prejudice c ause d by the delay. M cCarty v. State , 498 S.W.2d 212, 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (citing Harris v. State , 489 S.W.2d 30 3 , 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) ).10 Here, Cochnauer claims prejudice in the form of testimon ial inconsistencies,

an xi ety and concern due to a “d e tainer,” and necessary w itnesses ’ being “gone.” 3 To show prejudice based on unavailable witnesses, Cochnaue r must show their unavailability at t rial , that their testimony may be material and relevant to his case, an d that he exercised due dil igence in atte mpting to p roduce them for trial. See i d. The

rec ord shows that Cochnauer ’s trial subpoenas were returned or un served because witnesses changed jobs or Cochnauer withdrew the subpoena. Yet this does no t establish that the witnesse s were unavailable at tri a l because of the delay between Co chnauer’s arrest and trial. Nor does it establish the relevanc e and materiality of those witnesses’ testimonies to Cochnauer’s case. Cochnauer cannot satisfy his burden

o f prejudice in this case.

3 Regarding Cochnauer ’s an xiety, he was alr ead y incarc erated on unrel ated charge s . E vidence of general anxiety is relevant but not sufficient proof of prejudice under Barker , especially whe n the anxiety is no greater than what is normally associate d with a criminal investigation. See T hames v. Stat e , No. 02

- 17

- 00 295

- CR , 2019 WL 237556, at *10 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Jan

. 17, 2019 , no pet. ) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

. Moreover, ther e is no evidence that Cochnauer’s anxiety, if any, resulted from the delay in this case as op posed to his inc arceration f or the unrelate d charges

. See i d. Cochnauer also complains that the delay caused inconsistencies in the complaining witnesses’ stories. But t he se inconsistencies could have damaged the State’s c ase too , as well as providing a ba sis for Cochn aue r to challen ge the witnesse s’ credibil ity at trial

— which he did. Cf

. Rivera v. State , 990 S.W.2d 882, 892 (Tex. App.

— Austin 1999, pet . ref’d) (“Time can damage either side’s case, and it is of ten impossible to determine whic h side has been prejudiced mo r e severely.”)

.11 Balancing the Barker fa ct or s (even if necessary to do), we conclude that Cochnauer’s speedy

- trial right was not violated. We overrule Cochnauer’s second issue

. III. Sixth Amen dment Right to Counsel In his first issue, Cochna ue r argues that the trial cour t deprived him of his Si xth Amendment right to counsel. H e claims that the trial court unconstitutionally “d ragooned ” and “commandeered” him into representing himself at trial because (1) he did not clearly and un eq uivocally assert his right t o defend himself and (2) he did not c ompe tently, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to counsel. We disagree

. A. Applicable Law While the Sixth Amendment guarantee s the right to c ounsel , it also impli es a right of self

- representat ion. Faretta v. Californ ia , 422 U.S. 806, 819 , 95 S. Ct. 25 25, 2533 (1975). That right must be timely , clearly , and unequ ivocally asserted

. Id. at 835 , 95 S. Ct. at 2541 ; Blankenship v. State , 673 S.W.2d 578, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (assert in g self

- representation right be fore a jury is empanel ed is timely ). W hen the plain, ordina ry, and generally accepted meaning of an accused’s statements signify a desire to proceed pro se, the right is clearly and unequivocally asserted. See Lathem v. State , 5 14 S.W.3d 796, 808 (Tex. App.

— Fo rt Worth 2017, no pet. ) (holdi ng t hat “I’ll name myself as counsel” is a clear and unequivocal assertion of self

- represen tation right). If the self

- representation right is clearly and unequivocally asserte d, the trial12 court sh ould inform the accused about the dangers and disadv antages of s elf

representation so tha t the record will reflect t hat t he accused “knows what he is d oing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Faretta , 422 U.S. at 835 , 95 S. Ct. at 2541 (quoting Adams v. U nited States ex rel. McCann , 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S. Ct. 236 , 242 (1942))

. Exercising th e self

- representation right nece ssarily means volunta rily, knowingly, and intelligently wai ving the opposite right to counsel. Lathem , 514 S.W.3d at 802

– 03

. Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of the right. Williams v. State , 252 S .W .3d 353, 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). To assess an

e ffective waiver, courts consider the t otality of the circumstances. Id. Faretta does not mandate qu e stioning on the accused’s age, education, background, or previous me ntal history, but the record must c on tain proper admonishm ents abou t pro se representati on . Blankenship , 673 S.W.2d at 583

. Faretta admonishments are no t required whe n stand by counsel is appointed and u tilized

. Alexander v. State , No. 02

- 15

- 00033

- CR, 2016 WL 2 586602, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth May 5, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for pu blication) ; Dolph v. State , 440 S.W.3d 898, 907 (Tex. Ap p.
— Texarkana 2013 , pet. ref ’ d

) ; Rainwater v. State , 634 S.W.2d 67, 68 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1 9 82, no pe t.) ; see also Clark v. State , 7 17 S.W.2d 910, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ( stating that Faret t a admonishments are not required for hybrid representation)

.13 B. Analys is On May 10, 2018, the trial court appointed Valverd e to represent Cochnauer. Over the next eig ht months, Valverde filed s everal motions on Cochnauer’s behalf. Cochnauer began filing his own motions in February 2019. I n early March 2019, Valverde move d to withdraw, explaining that (1) Cochnauer had expressed dissatisfaction with Valverde ’s servic es; (2) Cochnauer had filed motions against Val verde’s advice; and (3) Valverde could no longer effectivel y communicate with C ochnauer. At the March 7, 2019 hearing on his motio n, Valverde explained that he had met with Cochnauer multiple times, had review ed evidence with him, and had advised Cochnauer to let him review any further pro se motions. Cochnaue r had agreed but continued to fil e various motions. 4 Valver de then asked permission to withdraw as he was unable to “aggr essively and zealously” represent Co chnauer. Cochnauer stated that he did not ob ject to Valverde’s w it hdrawal. The trial court twice lauded Valverde’s qualifications as a defense attorney before asking Cochnauer if he wanted to represent himself. Cochnauer replied, “No, sir, not at this
t ime .” [Emphasis added. ] T he trial court lam ente d how long the case had been pending

4 Cochnauer fil ed a grievance against Valverde because he refused to file more motions on Cochnauer’s behalf. Valverde revealed this to the trial court, bu t the court still denied the wit hd rawal motion. Personality conflicts and disagreement s a bout trial strategy are typ ically not valid grounds for withdrawal. King v. State , 29 S.W.3d 5 56, 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).14 and expressed conc ern that granting a withdrawal motion “at this late date on th e eve of trial” might cause further delay , ultimately denying Valverde’s withdrawal

. A t a mo tio ns he aring four days la ter on March 11, 2019 , Cochnauer told Valverde that he want ed to represent himself. Valverde relayed this to the trial court , which then addressed Cochnauer: THE COURT: Mr. Cochnauer, we can do one of two things. Either Mr

. Valver de can repre sent you or you can represent you rs elf.

. . . Which do you want to do? Mr. Cochnauer: Sir, at this moment I f eel like I’m going to have to represent myself

. [Emphasis added.] After Cochnauer expressed t his desire , the tr ial court question ed Coc hna uer about his education, his familiarity wit h Texa s’s evidence laws, and his work experience. Cochn au er explained that he had a high

- school education with some college courses, that he had a 120 IQ, that he was fam il iar with the Texas Rules of Evidence, an d that he ha d worked in construction and as a tradesman. The trial court then twice ad monished Cochnauer that he would “get no help from the Court or anyone else” if he represented himself, and that he w ould be “standing on [his] own knowledge and [his] o w n objections to evidence .” After every quest ion and warning, Cochnauer repli ed, “Yes, sir.” When the trial court asked if Cochnauer had ever represented himself in a legal matter , Cochnauer replied, “No, sir, but for the last two ye ars and two months, I ’ve spent two hours a day, three days a week in side the law15 librar y in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice preparing for this moment .” [Emphasis added.] 5 The colloquy end ed with the trial co urt ’s advising Cochnauer that proc eeding pro se was ill

- adv is ed because if he did not make the proper pleadi ngs, potentia l defenses might be waived. Cochnauer again replied, “Yes, sir.” The trial court again advised Co chnauer not to rep resent himself, cautioned him that he would be prone to

err ors, and warned him th at his decision to represent himself was final: “ If we get to April 20th and you tell the Court that you now want to be represented by somebody, you’ve alr ea dy waived that rig ht today.” 6 [Emphasis added.] Cochnauer replied t hat he had made his decision. Th e t rial court then a ppointed Mark Barber as Coc hnauer’s standby counsel. Cochnauer stated he had only four spec if ic questions for s tandby counsel but “ [ o ] utside of tha t, I am prepared. I was prepared for tomorrow .” [Emphasis added.]

5 Cochnauer stated two othe r t imes during questioning that he “fought for three years to get to where we are,” and that “I feel the only way that I’m going to get a proper defense is

-- As I said, I’ve prepared for this for three years, Your Honor.”

6 The trial court mad e this final admonishment after an off

- the

- record conversation with Coc h nauer about tria l delays. The admonishment co uld be read as a misstateme nt about withdrawing a waiver of counsel if read lite rally as Cochnauer urges. But read contextuall y and in light of the trial cour t’ s concern about further tria l delays, the admonishmen t was correct about a trial court’s exer cis ing discretion in denying a withdrawal waiver if withdrawal would c ause unnecessary trial delays. See Robles v. State , 577 S.W.2d 699 , 704 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979) ( demanding dif ferent counsel or dismissal of counsel on the day of trial would be m anipulating the right to couns el to obstr uct the orderly procedure of courts and fair administration of justice.).16 Here , Coc hnauer clearly , t imely, and unequivocally asserted his right of self

representation . At the March 11, 2019 hearing, C ochnauer stated , “ I feel like I’m going to have to rep resent myself ,” after V alverde asked the court to take up his pro se argument. 7 From there, Cochnau er proceeded to file more pro se motions, atten d additional pretrial hearings, participate in voir dire, and re present himself throughout the entir e trial. Moreover, the t rial court appointed

— and Cochnauer utilized

— standby counsel

. 8 Faretta admonishments w ere not required in this case because Cochnauer received and utilized standby counsel

. 9 See Dolph , 4 40 S.W.3d at 907 ;

7 Cochnauer argue s on appeal that he did not un equivocally maintain his right of self

- representation. The record must reflect a defendant’s w a iver of self

representation af ter the ri ght is asserted. Funderburg v. State , 717 S.W.2d 637, 642 ( Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ( “A waiver m ay be found if it reasonably appears to the court tha t [ the ] defendant has abandoned his initial request to represent hims e lf.”) ( quoting Brown v. Wainwri ght , 665 F.2 d 607, 611 ( 5th Cir. 1982) ). Cochnauer’s cited record refer ences do not reflect Cochnauer ’s a bandoning his initial reques t to represent himself. At most, the references show Cochnauer’s brief confusion and the tr i al court ’s and the State’s atte mpting to patiently assist Coc hn auer in proper court procedure

. 8 Before and during trial, Co chnauer asked questions a nd conferred with his standby counsel, allowed his standby counsel to challenge during voir dire , and reque s te d assistance issuing subpoena s and drafting legal forms

. 9 Yet ev en if we held that more specific inquiries were required in this case, the court’s colloquy properly informed Cochnauer of the dangers of pro se representation and yield ed evidence that Coc h nauer knowi ng ly, intelligently, and volun tarily waived his right t o counsel. The trial court’s questioning revealed: (1) Cochnauer completed high school and had taken some coll ege courses; (2) Cochnauer stated affirmatively t hat he was familiar with Texas e vi dence laws and was knowledge able enough to make prope r objections to evidence; (3) Cochnauer worked in construction and as a tradesman; (4) Cochnauer spent the last two years and two months spending two hours a day, three days a we ek in the TDCJ law li b rary pre paring for this moment.17 Rainwater , 634 S.W.2d at 68 ; see also Clark , 717 S.W.2d at 918

. We thu s overrule Cochnauer’s first issue. IV. Conclusion Having overruled Coc hnauer’s two i ssues , we affirm the trial court’s judgment

. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice Do Not Publish T ex . R. App. P. 47.2( b) Delivered : September 2, 2021

Additionally , the trial court asked Cochnauer at a previous pretrial hearing if he wanted to represent him self , and he said “no.” Cochnauer then had fou r days to contemplate the idea o f pro se representation before assertin g his right to s elf

representatio n for the first time at the March 11, 2019 pretrial hearing. Furthermore, the court warned Cochnauer, twice, that proceeding pro se is ill

- adv ised and that Cochnauer might wa iv e potential defenses. These admonishme nts were en ough to put Cochnauer on notice of the challenges and dangers of pro se representation and to give the trial court a chance to assess Cochnauer’s competency b efore allowing him to waive his ri ght to counsel.