United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 7, 2015*

Decided April 7, 2015

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 14‐1929

OBBIE WARD, JR.,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

BRADLEY KELLY,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of

Wisconsin.

No. 10‐CV‐00862

Lynn Adelman,

Judge.

O R D E R

This case involves the timeliness of a notice of appeal. Obbie Ward, Jr., a former

Wisconsin inmate whose civil‐rights suit against his probation officer ended in

summary judgment, filed his notice of appeal two days late. We dismiss the appeal for

lack of jurisdiction.

In 2010, Ward sued several Wisconsin officials and the Wisconsin Department of

Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging state‐law negligence (in connection with

damages to his wheelchair while he was in prison) and retaliation against his probation

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(A).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 14‐1929    Page 2

officer, Bradley Kelly, who changed his conditions of supervision. A magistrate judge

screened the complaint and allowed Ward to proceed only on his retaliation claim.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The district judge then concluded that Ward presented no

evidence that he had been injured by Kelly, and on March 24, 2014, granted Kelly’s

motion for summary judgment.

Ward, however, did not file his notice of appeal until April 25, two days beyond

the permitted thirty days. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Because of his untimeliness, we

ordered Ward to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction. He responded in May by filing a cursory motion in the district court for

more time, asserting that he had mailed the notice “early enough” and that the court

had to accommodate him under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court

denied the motion, finding that Ward had demonstrated neither good cause nor

excusable neglect for his late filing. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii). The court

acknowledged that the two‐day delay in filing was “minimal” and did not prejudice

Kelly, but concluded that Ward did not justify the delay.

In June, Ward sought reconsideration on the basis that he “didn’t receive the

[summary judgment] decision in time” and that he was suffering from a foot injury. The

district court promptly denied this motion, noting that Ward’s proposed ground for

relief was new and, in any event, he had dated and signed his notice of appeal on

March 29, 2014,“plenty of time” in which to deliver the notice to the clerk’s office by the

April 23, 2014 deadline.   

We ordered the parties to brief the issue of the appeal’s timeliness and

specifically whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Ward’s motion to

extend time. Ward then sent the district court a one‐line submission saying that he

failed to file on time because he “read the due date wrong.”

Without an extension of time from the district court, Ward’s notice of appeal is

untimely. See Thomas v. Butts, 745 F.3d 309, 311 (7th Cir. 2014). And the district court

acted within its discretion in denying the motion for more time because Ward provided

insufficient explanation for his failure to file a timely notice of appeal. We therefore lack

jurisdiction over this appeal. Further, Ward’s perfunctory brief makes no argument of

any kind; although we construe pro se filings liberally, pro se litigants must give some

reason to disturb the district court’s decision. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); Anderson v.

Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2001).

DISMISSED.