Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 06A01-1411-MI-508 | April 14, 2015 Page 1 of 14

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Christopher B. Serak

Jacob Hammerle & Johnson

Zionsville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Brian Reitz

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Leona Rae Hawk,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

April 14, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

06A01-1411-MI-508

Appeal from the Boone Superior 

Court.

The Honorable Rebecca McClure, 

Judge.

Cause No. 06D02-1410-MI-131

Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Leona Rae Hawk (Hawk), appeals the Order of the trial 

court holding her in indirect criminal contempt of court.

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Hawk raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:

(1) Whether Hawk was deprived of due process amounting to fundamental 

error because the charging instrument failed to set forth an adequate description 

of the facts establishing contempt; and

(2) Whether the trial court’s imposition of the maximum sanction for contempt 

is unreasonable.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] At approximately 3:00 a.m. on October 13, 2014, Whitestown Metropolitan 

Police Officer Ryan Batts (Officer Batts) observed a female—later identified as 

Hawk—driving a vehicle with a license plate that was obscured by a tinted 

cover. Officer Batts began following the vehicle at a close enough distance to

read the license plate number. While waiting for the results of the license plate 

check, Officer Batts continued to follow Hawk and observed that she 

committed several additional traffic infractions. When he learned that the 

vehicle was registered to a man with a suspended driver’s license, Officer Batts 

initiated a traffic stop.
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[5] Officer Batts approached the vehicle and asked for Hawk’s information, and he 

noticed that her speech was slurred and her movements were slow. Officer 

Batts ran a check on Hawk’s driver’s license, which was suspended indefinitely. 

Officer Jacob King (Officer King) arrived on the scene to assist and asked Hawk 

to exit her vehicle. As Hawk staggered to the rear of her vehicle, Officer Batts 

observed that her pupils were constricted, but Hawk denied that she had been 

drinking alcohol. At that point, Officer Batts arrested Hawk for driving while 

suspended and to further investigate a possible charge of operating while 

intoxicated.

[6] Officer Batts secured Hawk in handcuffs, and when he commenced a pat-down 

search, Hawk became agitated. She demanded proof that her license was 

suspended, argued that it was a civil rights violation to deny her request to have 

a female officer conduct the pat-down, and told Officer Batts that “she was 

gonna have [his] job.” (Tr. p. 13). Officer Batts placed Hawk in the front seat 

of his vehicle. Hawk continued to demand proof that her driver’s license was 

suspended, so Officer Batts displayed the information for her on his computer, 

but Hawk insisted that the results were inaccurate. En route to the jail, Hawk 

fell asleep in the squad car. Officer King, who had remained at the scene to 

wait for the tow truck, radioed to Officer Batts that the inventory search of 

Hawk’s vehicle had yielded a glass pipe, three spoons, and several syringe caps.

[7] At the Boone County Jail, Officer Batts administered three field sobriety tests, 

of which Hawk passed one and failed two. A portable breathalyzer test 

indicated that Hawk had not consumed any alcohol. Based on Hawk’s 
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unsteadiness, droopy eyelids, and staggering, Officer Batts determined that 

chemical tests were necessary to verify whether Hawk was under the influence 

of alcohol or a controlled substance. Officer Batts read Indiana’s implied 

consent law to Hawk, which provides that when a police officer has probable 

cause to believe that a person has been operating while intoxicated, that person 

“impliedly consents” to “submit to each chemical test offered” by the officer “as 

a condition of operating a vehicle in Indiana.” Ind. Code §§ 9-30-6-1; -2. Hawk 

stated that “she wasn’t doing anything” until Officer Batts “proved that [her 

license] was suspended.” (Tr. pp. 8-9). Interpreting her response as a refusal to 

voluntarily comply, Officer Batts applied for and, at 4:27 a.m., was granted a 

search warrant “to use reasonable force to obtain” a sample of Hawk’s blood or 

other bodily fluid. (Appellant’s App. p. 32).

[8] Officer Batts transported Hawk to the Witham-Anson emergency room in 

Zionsville, Indiana, explaining to her that he had a search warrant to procure 

blood and/or urine samples. When Hawk indicated that she would refuse, 

Officer Batts informed her that the procedure was not optional because it was 

ordered by a judge and that she could be held in contempt for refusing to 

submit. Hawk stated that “she didn’t care what the [j]udge said, [and] she 

didn’t care what the [w]arrant said.” (Tr. p. 13). While waiting for the lab 

technician, Officer Batts read the search warrant to Hawk and allowed her to 

review it, but Hawk was belligerent—screaming that she wanted her attorney, 

Officer Batts’ superior officer, a female police officer, and a doctor present

because Officer Batts was violating her civil rights.
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[9] As the lab technician, Patricia Clinkenbeard (Technician Clinkenbeard), 

prepared her equipment, she asked Hawk to stop screaming in order to avoid 

scaring the children in the emergency room, but Hawk simply yelled, “I have 

rights[,]” and continued with her tirade. (Tr. p. 23). When Technician 

Clinkenbeard approached with her needle, Hawk pulled away and started 

bouncing around on the hospital bed. Officer Batts and Officer King attempted 

to restrain her, but Hawk squirmed, kicked, and screamed that she was being 

subjected to police brutality. Because of the officers’ proximity to the struggling 

Hawk, Technician Clinkenbeard was concerned that the vein might spray and 

contaminate the officers. Realizing that it could not be safely accomplished, the 

officers decided to forego the blood draw. Officer Batts instructed Hawk to 

stand so they could leave, but Hawk refused. The officers removed her from 

the bed, and because Hawk refused to walk, they had to pull her out of the 

hospital. Hawk did not cease screaming until after she had been removed from 

the building.

[10] On October 16, 2014, the State filed a petition for rule to show cause and an 

Information, charging Hawk with indirect criminal contempt of court based on 

her failure to comply with the search warrant. On October 30, 2014, the trial 

court conducted a hearing and, at the close of the evidence, issued its Order 

finding Hawk in indirect contempt of court. As a sanction, the trial court 

ordered Hawk to serve 180 days in the Boone County Jail.

[11] Hawk now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
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DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Adequacy of Charging Instrument

[12] In this case, the trial court found Hawk to be in indirect criminal contempt of 

court for refusing to comply with the search warrant. Indirect contempt is the 

willful disobedience, resistance, or hindrance of any process or other lawfully 

issued order of a court. I.C. §§ 34-47-3-1; -2. “A criminal contempt can be any 

act which manifests a disrespect for and defiance of a court.” In re Perrello, 291 

N.E.2d 698, 700 (Ind. 1973). Hawk now claims that the finding of contempt 

should be reversed because the Information “does not describe the charge with 

the requisite specificity under prevailing law to apprise [her] of the nature of the 

prohibited conduct underlying the charge.” (Appellant’s Br. pp. 5-6).

[13] At the outset, we note that Hawk relies on Indiana’s criminal charging statute, 

which requires that a charging information “allege the commission of an 

offense by . . . setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged in 

plain and concise language without unnecessary repetition.” I.C. § 35-34-1-

2(a)(4). The purpose of a charging information is to protect a defendant’s due 

process rights by providing him “with notice of the crime of which he is charged 

so that he is able to prepare a defense.” Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 

271 (Ind. 2000), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1164 (2002). However, it is 

well established that an action for contempt is a “sui generis proceeding neither 

civil nor criminal in nature, although both of those labels are used to describe 

certain categories of contempt” depending on “the nature and purpose of the 

sanction imposed.” Wilson v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1211, 1218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) 
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(quoting State v. Heltzel, 552 N.E.2d 31, 33 (Ind. 1990)). Accordingly, we look 

to Indiana Code chapter 34-47-3—which specifically governs all cases of 

indirect contempt—rather than the general criminal code.

[14] Indirect contempt involves actions that do not occur in the presence of the trial 

court; thus, an indirect contempt proceeding “requires an array of due process 

protections, including notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Ind. Bureau of 

Motor Vehicles v. Charles, 919 N.E.2d 114, 118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). These due 

process safeguards are codified at Indiana Code section 34-47-3-5(a), which

stipulates that an individual charged with indirect contempt must “be served 

with a rule of the court against which the contempt was alleged to have been 

committed.” In particular, the rule to show cause is required to

(1) clearly and distinctly set forth the facts that are alleged to constitute 

the contempt;

(2) specify the time and place of the facts with reasonable certainty, as 

to inform the defendant of the nature and circumstances of the charge 

against the defendant; and

(3) specify a time and place at which the defendant is required to show 

cause, in the court, why the defendant should not be attached and 

punished for such contempt.

I.C. § 34-47-3-5(b). Before the trial court may issue a rule to show cause, an 

information verified by oath or affirmation must be filed to apprise the court of

“the facts alleged to constitute the contempt.” I.C. § 34-47-3-5(d)(1).

[15] Hawk concedes that she did not move to dismiss or otherwise object to the 

adequacy of the rule to show cause or the Information, thereby waiving her

claim for appeal. See Holler v. State, 106 N.E. 364, 364 (Ind. 1914) (“The proper 
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mode of testing an information for indirect contempt is by a motion to 

discharge the rule to show cause.”). Nevertheless, she contends that the 

Information “contains fundamental errors that have important implications on 

[her] basic constitutional rights.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 5).

[16] The fundamental error doctrine is a narrow exception to the waiver rule, under 

which our court may consider the merits of an otherwise forfeited claim if there 

are “blatant violations of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is 

substantial, and the resulting error denied the defendant fundamental due 

process.” Ben-Yisrayl, 738 N.E.2d at 270. “To qualify as fundamental error, ‘an 

error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial 

impossible.’” Absher v. State, 866 N.E.2d 350, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting 

Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind. 2002)). On review, we are mindful of 

the fact that the fundamental error exception is only applicable in the most 

“egregious circumstances.” Id. Simply arguing “that a constitutional right is 

implicated” is insufficient to invoke the fundamental error doctrine. Id.

[17] In the present case, the Information charged that

on or about October 13, 2014 in Boone County, State of Indiana, 

Leona Rae Hawk did willfully disobey a Search Warrant Order issued 

under 06D02-1410-MC-543 by the Boone County Superior Court II 

under the authority of law, after it had been served upon her, contrary 

to the form of the statutes in such cases made and provided by [the 

Indiana Code] and against the peace and dignity of the State of 

Indiana.
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(Appellant’s App. p. 18). The State’s petition for rule to show cause 

accompanied the Information and set forth the following factual details serving 

as the basis for contempt:

Hawk informed Officer Batts that she didn’t care what the [j]udge said 

and that Officer Batts wasn’t touching her until she spoke to her 

attorney. Officer Batts informed [Hawk] that she would be held in 

contempt of court for refusing and she said she didn’t care and that she 

wanted to speak to her attorney. Upon arriving at Witham HospitalAnson and when [Technician Clinkenbeard] arrived in the room, 

[Hawk] continued to scream and yell and said we weren’t taking her 

blood or anything else until she spoke to her attorney. [Technician] 

Clinkenbeard prepared the needle and tubes and [Officer King] and 

[Officer Batts] took Hawk[’s] sweatshirt off down to her handcuffs and 

she continued to yell and scream. [Hawk] started to resist by pulling 

away and bouncing around on the hospital bed. [Officer King] and 

[Officer Batts] attempted to hold [Hawk] down to get a blood sample 

and she started kicking, kneeing, and screaming police brutality.

(Appellant’s App. p. 20).1

[18] Hawk argues that “[t]he charge of ‘willful disobedience’ . . . is . . . a ‘generic 

term’ that ‘encompasses a large realm’ of potentially prohibited conduct, and is 

inadequate to properly apprise her of the nature of the prohibited conduct 

charged.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 7) (quoting Gebhard v. State, 459 N.E.2d 58, 61 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1984)). We disagree.

 

1

 Because the trial court’s rule to show cause specifically references the State’s petition for rule to show 

cause, we will consider the documents together to determine whether Hawk received adequate notice of the 

charge. See Smith v. Ind. State Bd. of Health, 303 N.E.2d 50, 58 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 

419 U.S. 836 (1974).
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[19] First, we find that the Information tracks the “willful disobedience’ language of 

the indirect contempt statute. I.C. § 34-47-3-2. The dictionary defines “willful” 

as “done deliberately” or “intentional,” and the ordinary definition of 

“disobey” is “to not do what someone or something with authority tells you to 

do” or “to refuse or fail to obey rules, laws, etc.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). 

Furthermore, our courts have long held that “[t]he acts constituting the criminal 

contempt ‘must be characterized by a deliberate intent to defy the authority of 

the court.’” Allison v. State ex rel. Allison, 187 N.E.2d 565, 568 (Ind. 1963) 

(quoting Denny v. State ex Inf. Brady, 182 N.E. 313, 321 (Ind. 1932)). Thus, “the 

language is clear, explicit, and susceptible of but one meaning”—that is, that 

Hawk intentionally refused to comply with the search warrant. Kilgallen v. 

State, 132 N.E. 682, 686 (Ind. 1921), reh’g overruled.

[20] Second, the petition for rule to show cause sets forth a clear “statement of the 

facts constituting the contempt.” In re Perrello, 291 N.E.2d at 701. Despite 

being informed of the consequences of non-compliance, Hawk repeatedly stated 

that she would not consent to a blood draw, and she specifically expressed her 

disrespect for the court’s authority. When the officers attempted to use the 

“reasonable force” permitted by the warrant to obtain the samples, Hawk 

physically resisted—squirming, kicking, and screaming—making it unsafe for 

Technician Clinkenbeard to complete the draw. (Appellant’s App. p. 32). 

Accordingly, we find that Hawk received “clear notice” of the facts alleged to 
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constitute the contempt. In re Paternity of C.N.S., 901 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2009).

[21] Nevertheless, although Hawk does not assert that she was unable to defend 

herself in the contempt action based upon the facts set forth in the petition for 

rule to show cause and the Information, she argues that she will be unable to 

defend herself against double jeopardy in any future prosecution arising from the 

same incident. Particularly, she avers that the Information does not specify 

“which aspects of her conduct” were relied upon to establish willful 

disobedience. (Appellant’s Br. p. 7). According to Hawk, the risk that she will 

be “put in jeopardy for the same offense twice is not merely speculative but an 

imminent reality” because she “has in fact been charged with [r]esisting [l]aw 

[e]nforcement and [d]isorderly [c]onduct based on the same events of October 

14, 2014 as formed the basis for the contempt action.” (Appellant’s Br. pp. 8-9).

[22] With the exception of Officer Batts’ incident report, which lists six offenses 

supporting Hawk’s arrest, we find nothing in the record establishing that she

has officially been charged with resisting law enforcement, disorderly conduct, 

or any other offense.

2

 There is no question that Hawk’s sanction was intended 

to be punitive rather than remedial or coercive because the time for compliance 

 

2

 Hawk explains that the charges of resisting law enforcement and disorderly conduct “are currently pending 

under Cause No. 06D02-1410-CM-542, which case is reference[d] in rhetorical paragraph 5 of the Petition for 

Rule to Show Cause Hearing filed in this contempt action.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 6). We note that “rhetorical 

paragraph 5” specifically refers to Officer Batts’ affidavit for probable cause, which does not include any 

information about specific charges or the status of the case. (Appellant’s Br. p. 6).
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with the search warrant had long lapsed. See D.W. v. State, 673 N.E.2d 509, 

511-12 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. As such, the contempt sanction may 

very well constitute “the first jeopardy” for purposes of a double jeopardy 

analysis in the event that other charges have been or will be filed. Hunter v. 

State, 802 N.E.2d 480, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. However, 

whether any subsequent prosecution would actually violate the rule against 

double jeopardy would depend upon the statutory elements of the charged 

offenses and the factual bases upon which those new charges are predicated. 

Ellis v. State, 634 N.E.2d 771, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). We have already 

determined that Hawk was made aware of the facts giving rise to the charge of 

contempt. Absent any information of additional charges that rely on the same 

facts, we decline to engage in a purely speculative double jeopardy analysis. If 

and when Hawk’s double jeopardy rights are implicated, it will be up to her to 

make the relevant objections before the trial court. In this regard, we conclude 

that the rule to show cause and the Information for contempt satisfied the due 

process requirements of Indiana Code section 34-47-3-5(b), and we therefore 

find no error, let alone fundamental error.

II. Reasonableness of Sanction

[23] Hawk claims that the trial court’s imposition of a 180-day jail sentence is an 

inappropriate sanction. In general, a punishment for contempt is a matter 

reserved to the sound discretion of the trial court. Hopping v. State, 637 N.E.2d 

1294, 1298 (Ind.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1017 (1994). The trial court’s power to 

punish contempt is limited only by reasonableness. Jones v. State, 847 N.E.2d 
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190, 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), reh’g denied, trans. denied. However, a trial court 

may impose a maximum sentence of six months “for criminal contempt[]

without guilt or innocence being determined by a jury.” Holly v. State, 681 

N.E.2d 1176, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).

[24] Here, Hawk received the maximum sanction permitted in the absence of a jury 

trial. In determining a proper sanction, the trial court explained to Hawk that it 

“heard testimony today that has convinced the [c]ourt that you took actions 

clearly calculated to prevent hospital personnel from drawing your blood.” (Tr. 

p. 41). Moreover, the trial court found Hawk to be “the most resistant of any 

person [that it has] heard testimony about in a [c]ourt on a[n] indirect contempt 

hearing.” (Tr. p. 44).

[25] “[A] criminal contempt sanction is punitive in nature because its purpose is to 

vindicate the authority of the court.” Jones, 847 N.E.2d at 199. In addition, a 

punishment for criminal contempt is meant to “act as a deterrent for [the 

defendant] and all others who might harbor the thought of defying an order of 

[the court].” In re Perrello, 291 N.E.2d at 701. We find that Hawk’s 180-day 

sentence effectuates both of these purposes. Hawk unequivocally announced 

her disregard for the authority of the court and proceeded to verbally and 

physically resist all efforts to execute the mandate of the search warrant. By her 

actions, Hawk put herself, the officers, and Technician Clinkenbeard at risk of 

injury or blood contamination. Moreover, by screaming, kicking, and flailing, 

Hawk successfully thwarted the blood draw, thereby preventing Officer Batts 

from collecting the necessary evidence to support a charge of operating while 
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intoxicated. It would undermine the authority of all courts and render search 

warrants meaningless if an individual subject to a warrant could forcibly resist 

without fear of reprisal. As our supreme court has stated, “Open defiance of 

the orders of [a court] will not be countenanced.” Id. Accordingly, we find that 

Hawk’s sentence is reasonable in light of the given circumstances.

CONCLUSION

[26] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Hawk was provided with adequate 

notice of the charge against her, and the trial court imposed a reasonable

sanction of incarceration for 180 days.

[27] Affirmed.

[28] Bailey, J. and Barnes, J. concur