Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 01A02-1402-JT-113 | April 16, 2015 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Special Assistant to the State Public 

Defender

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Plainfield, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorney General

David Dickmeyer

Graduate Law Clerk

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of L.P., Mother, and L.H., Child,

L.P,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

April 16, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

01A02-1402-JT-113

Appeal from the 

Adams Circuit Court

The Honorable Patrick R. Miller, 

Special Judge

Cause No. 01C01-1306-JT-2

Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] L.P. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental 

rights to her child, L.H. (“Child”). She raises the following restated issue on 

appeal: whether sufficient evidence was presented to support the termination of 

Mother’s parental rights. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Child was born on August 5, 2008 to Mother and T.H. (“Father”), who were 

unmarried, but lived together in Berne, Indiana.

1

 On April 16, 2012, Family 

Case Manager (“FCM”) Julie Foster and Berne Police Department Officer Earl 

Hough (“Officer Hough”) conducted an unannounced home visit and 

assessment at Mother’s home. FCM Foster took law enforcement with her on 

the visit because Mother had made threats against FCM Foster at previous 

assessments with the family. Mother, Father, and Child were all in the home at 

the time of the visit. Mother was very upset and belligerent during the 

assessment. FCM Foster made this visit due to allegations that Mother was 

making comments about Casey Anthony and had stated that, if Mother was

Casey Anthony, she could get away with harming her own child. Tr. at 9. 

[4] The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) discovered through statements by 

Mother and further research that Mother had two children previously removed 

 

1 T.H. voluntarily relinquished his parental rights.
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from her care based on threats that Mother made against their lives. In total, 

Mother had her parental rights terminated as to three of her children in 

Kentucky in 2005 and 2008 and as to one other child in Ohio in 2002. DCS 

had also had two prior assessments with Mother and Child, one when Child 

was about nine months old, and one when Child was approximately two years 

old. These prior assessments concerned allegations of Mother’s mental health, 

her lack of treatment for her mental illness, and incidents outside her apartment 

where Mother was overheard and observed being “belligerent” with Child and 

making statements “threatening harm to [Child].” Id. at 13. 

[5] DCS removed Child on April 17, 2012, the day after the initial assessment. 

When Child was removed, Father was very upset. Mother, however, stayed in 

bed during the removal and “was very calm.” Id. at 18. Mother did get out of 

bed to get clothing for Child and say goodbye, which appeared to FCM Foster 

as “a forever goodbye.” Id. On April 19, 2012, DCS filed a Child in Need of 

Services (“CHINS”) petition. Within a few days of removal, DCS spoke to 

Mother about services and placement for Child. At that time, Mother admitted 

that she took more of her medications than was prescribed. Therefore, DCS 

requested that Mother participate in medication management and have an 

assessment to determine if she was taking the correct medications. DCS also 

requested Mother complete a psychological evaluation and begin visitations. 

Mother had services until approximately June 2012 when services were 

suspended due to Mother’s behavior. Before the services were suspended, the 
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DCS caseworker really had to encourage Mother to participate in services 

because Mother thought the services were not needed. 

[6] In May 2012, Mother had home-based therapy to work on mental health 

instability and refraining from acting out in hostile or threatening ways. 

Mother explained that she took more medication than the prescribed amount 

because it was not effective in the prescribed dosage, and she needed to take 

more to calm herself down. During this therapy, Mother did not progress 

toward medication management and mental stability, and instead, she declined. 

She also “continued to escalate” as to her hostility and “ruminating thoughts.” 

Id. at 100. 

[7] After Child was removed, DCS referred Mother for home-based services with 

Janelle Coates (“Coates”), a caseworker with the Youth Service Bureau of Jay 

County, who was to assist Mother with community resources, transportation, 

finding housing, and getting prescription assistance and resources for mental 

health stability. Coates was not able to accomplish any of her goals with 

Mother. Coates also worked with Mother on supervised visitation with Child. 

During one of these visits, Mother informed Coates that she did not take her 

medication, and Mother proceeded to yell at other children to stay away from 

Child on the playground and hover over Child, extending her arms so that other 

children would not talk to Child. This visit was terminated early, and when 

Child started crying, Mother yelled at Child and told her it was Coates’s fault

they were leaving early and to blame Coates. On another occasion, Coates 

transported Mother and Father to a psychological evaluation, and after the 
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evaluation, Mother spent twenty minutes in the bathroom alone and could be 

heard talking, although it was unclear who she was talking to since she had no 

minutes on her phone. After storming out of the bathroom, Mother became 

agitated on the way home and stated that “all social workers are gonna . . . have 

their heads fucking blown off” and that they “work for the devil.” Id. at 154. 

Coates contacted someone from DCS, who called the police. Mother exited the 

vehicle and stated she was going to walk home, but another driver picked her

up. 

[8] DCS concluded that it could not ensure the safety of its workers, so due to the 

volatile nature of the circumstances, on May 24, 2012, visitation and homebased services were indefinitely suspended. After a hearing in July 2012, 

supervised visitation was to occur at a neutral location, and DCS tried to set up 

visitation with Mother. Mother only wanted to schedule one visit around the 

time of Child’s birthday and told FCM Foster that it would be the “last time” 

she would see Child. Id. at 34. 

[9] A factfinding hearing for the CHINS petition was set for October 31, 2012, but 

after a meeting prior to the hearing with Mother and Father, attorneys, and 

DCS, an agreement was reached, in which Mother and Father agreed to admit 

that Child was a CHINS, and the parties proceeded to a disposition hearing. In 

the disposition order, Mother was, in pertinent part, ordered to participate in: 

home-based therapy; home-maker services; supervised visitation twice a month; 

and medication review and to follow all recommendation of such review. 

Mother was also ordered to maintain stable and suitable housing. On January 
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23, 2013, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. On 

October 30 and 31, 2013, the juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing on the 

petition.

[10] During the hearing dates, the following testimony and evidence was presented. 

After undergoing a psychological evaluation, Mother was diagnosed with 

posttraumatic stress disorder, chronic; parent-child relational problem;

schizophrenia, paranoid type; and paranoid personality disorder. DCS learned 

that Mother tended to stay up to the early morning hours and did not have a 

regular sleep pattern, which had affected Child when she was in Mother’s care 

because Mother was keeping Child up and preventing her from functioning as a 

normal child. At the time of her assessment, Mother reported she had been up 

for three days and had not showered or bathed in that time, and she stated there 

was no need to take care of herself because she no longer had Child. Evidence 

was presented that Mother was not taking her medications and acted very 

aggressive and hostile toward service providers. When Mother did not take her 

medications, she talked very fast, spit when she talked, had a white foam 

around her mouth, spoke incoherently and illogically, and would be 

argumentative and angry. Other times, Mother took more medications than

prescribed, and one time, she called a doctor’s office multiple times a day, 

yelling and wanting more pain medication. Mother recognized that she did not 

get along well with people and needed to learn to control her anger; however, 

she felt she was not treated fairly in the community because of her belief she 

was the “only black person that lives in Adams County.” Id. at 37. 
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[11] From October 2012 until May 2013, Mother was provided services, including a 

home-based caseworker, a home-based homemaker, and home-based therapy 

services. Initially, after the CHINS disposition hearing, Mother was 

cooperative with the service providers, and they were able to come to Mother’s 

home for services. However, not long after, Mother would tell the service 

providers they could come to her home, but that she was “not going to do 

anything for them,” which resulted in little progress toward the DCS goals and 

work on services. Id. at 29. FCM Foster stated that Mother went through the 

motions, but did not implement the information given to her. 

[12] Home-based therapy sessions were ended at a certain point in time due in part 

to the fact that Mother was receiving services on her own through Park Center. 

Because of these duplicate services, progress was very slow with the DCS 

providers because Mother did not feel the DCS services were necessary. FCM 

Foster attempted to schedule child and family team meetings with Mother, but 

Mother cancelled two of these meetings and failed to show up for a third. 

There were also times that Mother would state she was willing to work with the 

service providers, but when they arrived at her home, she would not answer the 

door even though the service providers could hear her inside. At the time of the 

termination hearing, Mother was on her sixth therapist; she also refused to sign 

anything DCS sent her. 

[13] By the time the termination petition was filed, FCM Foster stated that Mother 

was at the same point she was at when Child was removed. Even though 

Mother sought her own services, she was not compliant with those service 
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providers either. According to one of her service providers at Park Center, 

Mother was, at times, very upset, yelling, cussing, and screaming for no reason, 

and Mother felt she did not need to work on anger management skills. Mother 

had switched to Park Center from Meridian Services because her therapist there 

told her she was mentally ill and would be better treated in a mental hospital. 

This upset Mother because she thought there was “nothing wrong with her.” 

Id. at 33. Because of Mother’s lack of improvement and history, among other 

issues with Child, DCS requested an order for no reasonable efforts, which is an 

order stating that DCS no longer had to work with Mother toward 

reunification.

[14] From July 2012 until May 2013, Mother had visitation with Child twice per 

month at a neutral location. The visitations were very stressful to Child, and 

she had a lot of anxiety before and after the visits. Specifically: (1) Child did 

not want to attend the visits; (2) afterwards, Child would ask DCS why they 

made her visit with her “mean mommy,” id. at 39; (3) Child consistently stated 

she did not want to visit with Mother; (4) Child was not able to identify 

anything positive with Mother, only negative interactions and events; and (5) 

Child stated she did not want to visit with Mother because of things that 

happened before she was removed. At one visitation, Mother told Child that if 

she could not have Child back, she was going to send Child to California to live 

with a relative, which statement has a negative effect on Child. 

[15] Before and after visits, foster mother observed a lot of regression from Child, 

including reverting back to asking for a bottle. Child would put food in her 
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pocket because she was afraid she would not have more, and Child would not 

sleep the night before visitations and acted out more. Foster mother had to 

reassure Child that she would be reunited with foster parents after the visits, 

which was a big concern of Child. It usually took a few day for Child to stop 

being anxious after visitations with Mother, but it would sometimes take up to 

two weeks. At a certain point in time, DCS implemented home-based therapy 

for Child work on coping skills and work through Child’s anxiety. Child began 

to have nightmares and night terrors, involving her biological parents. In 

February 2013, DCS recommended that visitation end between Child and 

Mother. At the time of the termination hearing, Child was still in therapy, but 

had made significant progress.

[16] At the time Child was removed, she was three years old, but was not potty 

trained, spoke a lot of baby talk, still used a sippy cup, was more like a toddler 

than a preschooler in development, had no sleep pattern and would stay up all 

night, and was hesitant toward affection. Child was placed in foster care and 

remained in the same home since removal. After a short time in foster care, 

Child was potty trained, adjusted to a normal sleep pattern, and began talking 

and communicating with foster parents. Child was five years old at the time of 

the termination hearing and was very bright, participated in ice skating, tested 

above her grade level, and was very friendly and able to make friends easily. 

The plan for Child was adoption by foster parents. On January 10, 2014, the 

juvenile court issued its findings, conclusions, and judgment terminating 

Mother’s parental rights. Mother now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision

[17] We begin our review by acknowledging that this court has long had a highly 

deferential standard of review in cases concerning the termination of parental 

rights. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. When 

reviewing a termination of parental rights case, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 

265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence 

and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. 

Moreover, in deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the 

evidence, we will set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-child 

relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d at 14. 

[18] Here, in terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child, the juvenile court 

entered specific findings and conclusions. When a trial court’s judgment 

contains specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered 

standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 

143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the 

findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. 

Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to 

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 

102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s 

decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 

1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. 
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[19] The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In 

re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 923 (Ind. 2011). These parental interests, however, are 

not absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s interests when determining 

the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. In re J.C., 994 

N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In addition, although the right to raise 

one’s own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home 

available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is 

unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. 

[20] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State is 

required to allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the 

child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services; 

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the 

child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State’s burden of proof for establishing these 

allegations in termination cases “is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In 

re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2). 
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Moreover, if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 

4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. 

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added). 

[21] Mother argues that DCS failed to prove the required elements for termination 

by sufficient evidence. Specifically, Mother contends that DCS failed to present 

sufficient evidence that the conditions that resulted in Child being removed 

would not be remedied. She asserts that no evidence was presented that she 

could not need Child’s basic needs, that there were any concerns with the 

condition of her home, or to support her inability to complete services because 

she actively participated in services and even sought out her own services. 

Mother also claims that, as to her mental health, she had made significant 

improvement with developing interpersonal relationship skills and her anger 

management. Mother further alleges that DCS failed to present sufficient 

evidence that termination is in the best interest of Child. She argues that, 

although Child exhibited anxiety about visits with Mother, there was no 

evidence that this was due to Mother and not to the condition under which the 

visitations occurred. 

[22] In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

led to a child’s removal and continued placement outside the home would be 

remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 

989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, “we must ascertain what conditions 

led to their placement and retention in foster care.” Id. Second, “we 

‘determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will 
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not be remedied.’” Id. (citing In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1132, 1134 (Ind. 2010)

(citing In re A.A.C., 682 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997))). In the second 

step, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness at the time of the termination 

proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and 

balancing a parent’s recent improvements against “‘habitual pattern[s] of 

conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect 

or deprivation.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 

N.E.2d at 1231). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has 

discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily than efforts made only 

shortly before termination.” Id. Although trial courts are required to give due 

regard to changed conditions, this does not preclude them from finding that 

parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior. Id.

[23] Here, the evidence showed that Child was removed from Mother’s home on the 

basis of allegations of Mother making threatening statement about harming 

Child and due to Mother’s mental health issues. Mother had two other 

children removed from her care due to threats made against their lives, and her 

parental rights had previously been terminated to three of her children. In the 

prior cases from other states, the cases noted that Mother’s mental health issues 

indicated an increased risk of harming the children. Additionally, in prior DCS 

involvement in Adams County, Mother was overheard threatening harm to 

Child. These circumstances did not change over several years and several 

different cases. 
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[24] In the present case, Mother’s mental health and medication issues were 

consistent problems in the underlying case. When Mother had her initial 

psychological evaluation, she admitted to taking more than her prescribed 

dosage of her medications. Even after being referred to medication 

management, Mother continued to have problems taking her medication 

properly, at times, not taking it at all and other times, taking more than 

prescribed. Mother’s behavior also caused concern throughout the case. At 

times, she was cooperative, but detached, and other times, she was combative 

and hostile. At the initial assessment, FCM Foster had the police escort her 

due to prior threats by Mother that she would harm DCS caseworkers if they 

returned. Mother often treated the service providers with hostility and would 

threaten them, which caused DCS to temporarily suspend services for Mother. 

[25] Throughout the case, Mother did not realistically address her mental health

issues. After being psychologically evaluated, Mother was diagnosed with 

posttraumatic stress disorder, chronic; parent-child relational problem;

schizophrenia, paranoid type; and paranoid personality disorder. However, she 

denied being schizophrenic and insisted that nothing was wrong with her. For 

the most part, throughout the underlying case, Mother failed to acknowledge 

the need to change and, therefore, did not demonstrate any change toward 

medication management and mental stability. 

[26] The evidence clearly showed that Mother did not make any progress with the 

service providers. She consistently told them they could come to her house, but 

that she would not do anything for them. She just went through the motions 
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and did not implement any of the instruction given to her. Mother was 

uncooperative, did not show the ability to apply what she learned, and did not 

benefit from the services provided to her. Based on the evidence presented, we 

conclude that the juvenile court did not err in finding that there was a 

reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the removal and the 

reasons for continued placement of Child outside Mother’s home would not be 

remedied.

[27] Mother next argues that insufficient evidence was presented to prove that 

termination is in the best interest of Child. In determining what is in the best 

interests of the child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the 

evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing In re 

D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 267), trans. dismissed. In doing so, the trial court must 

subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child involved. Id.

Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child’s emotional 

and physical development is threatened. Id. (citing In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 

930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). The trial court need not wait until the 

child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social 

development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child 

relationship. Id. Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is an important 

consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of 

the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child’s 

best interests. Id. (citing McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798 

N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). 
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[28] In the present case, the evidence presented showed that Child experienced 

severe anxiety both before and after visitations with Mother. Child did not 

want to go to the visits, and after the visits, she would ask DCS why she was 

made to visit with her “mean mommy.” Tr. at 39. Child consistently stated 

she did not want to visit with Mother, was unable to identify anything positive 

about her biological parents, could remember only negative interactions and 

events, and did not want to visit with Mother due to things that happened prior 

to removal. Child would exhibit a lot of regression after visits with Mother and 

would not sleep the night before visitations. It would generally take several 

days for Child to settle down after a visit. However, when the visitations were 

stopped, Child’s behavior improved. Based on the above, we conclude that 

sufficient evidence was presented to prove that termination was in the best 

interest of Child. 

[29] We will reverse a termination of parental rights “only upon a showing of ‘clear 

error’--that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been made.” In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) 

(quoting In re Egly, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). Based on the record 

before us, we cannot say that the juvenile court’s termination of Mother’s 

parental rights to Child was clearly erroneous. Further, Mother’s arguments 

are merely a request for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of 

the witnesses, which we cannot do on appeal. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265. 

We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s judgment. 

[30] Affirmed.
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Friedlander, J., and Crone, J., concur.