UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 

MARGARETT L. HARMONDAWKINS,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

CH-0752-14-0250-I-1

DATE: April 15, 2015

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Oliver Sanders, Ecorse, Michigan, for the appellant.

Wayne A. Hales, Detroit, Michigan, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed the appeal as settled. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one 

only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the 

initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or 

 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add 

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, 

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not 

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a 

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board 

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
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the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings 

during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent 

with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting 

error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal 

argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not 

available when the record closed. See Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 

section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this 

appeal, and based on the following points and authorities, we conclude that the 

petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the 

petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM 

the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.113(b). 

¶2 The agency removed the appellant from the GS-9 position of Social Worker 

for failure to maintain the requirements of her position, specifically, failure to 

obtain certification at the independent master’s level within 3 years of her 

appointment. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8, Subtabs 4b-4c, 4f. The appellant 

appealed the agency’s action, IAF, Tab 1, and, during proceedings before the 

administrative judge, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, IAF, 

Tab 27. The agreement provided that the appellant would withdraw her appeal 

with prejudice in return for the agency’s rescinding the removal, accepting the 

appellant’s resignation for medical reasons, and agreeing to assist, support and 

provide relevant documentation in its possession concerning the appellant with 

respect to her applications for disability retirement and the State of Michigan 

unemployment benefits. Id. The administrative judge found that the agreement 

was entered into freely by the parties and was lawful on its face. IAF, Tab 28, 

Initial Decision (ID). The administrative judge entered the settlement agreement 

into the record for enforcement and dismissed the appeal with prejudice. ID at 2.

¶3 In her petition for review, the appellant alleges that on the day after she 

signed the settlement agreement, she learned that, prior to the parties’ entering 
3

into the agreement, the agency had attempted to block her receipt of 

unemployment benefits. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. She states that 

she notified the administrative judge and asked him to rescind the agreement. Id. 

She asserts that the administrative judge’s dismissing the appeal as settled after 

she contacted him asking to rescind the agreement constitutes bias on his part. 

Id. The agency has responded in opposition to the petition. PFR File, Tab 3. 

The appellant has not replied to the agency’s response.

¶4 A party may challenge the validity of a settlement agreement if the party 

believes that the agreement is unlawful, involuntary, or the result of fraud or 

mutual mistake. Wade v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 61 M.S.P.R. 580, 583 

(1994). Here, there is no assertion that the agreement was unlawful or 

involuntary. The settlement agreement was signed by both the appellant and her

representative. IAF, Tab 27; see, e.g., Swidecki v. U.S. Postal 

Service, 101 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 18 (2006). Further, the appellant has not asserted 

that she was mentally impaired or unable to either understand the agreement or to 

assist her representative. Thus, the appellant has not shown that she involuntarily 

entered into the agreement. See, e.g., Swidecki, 101 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶¶ 17-19. 

Therefore, it appears that the appellant is seeking to set aside the agreement on 

the basis of fraud or mutual mistake. A party seeking to set aside a settlement 

agreement on the basis that it was tainted by fraud or mutual mistake bears a

heavy burden. See Cassidy v. U.S. Postal Service, 65 M.S.P.R. 86, 90 (1994). 

¶5 In this case, the settlement agreement changed the basis of the appellant’s 

separation from removal for failure to meet a condition of her employment to 

voluntary resignation. The agency agreed, in effect, to change its posture 

regarding the appellant’s unemployment benefits claim to reflect the basis of her 

separation provided in the settlement. The appellant has not asserted that the 

agency failed to comply with the provision of the agreement that it would assist 

her to obtain unemployment benefits on the basis of her resignation. Indeed, the 

record shows that, after she filed her petition for review, the State of Michigan 
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awarded the appellant unemployment benefits. PFR File, Tab 3, Subtab E. The 

appellant’s assertions on review fail to establish that the agency acted

fraudulently or in bad faith concerning her claim to unemployment benefits 

before the basis of her separation became a resignation. See Hoffman v. 

Department of the Navy, 71 M.S.P.R. 484, 486 (1996). 

¶6 Likewise, the appellant’s discontent with the administrative judge’s alleged 

action of issuing the initial decision after she had contacted him about wanting to 

rescind the settlement does not provide a basis for disturbing the initial decision 

or setting aside the agreement. The administrative judge properly found that the 

agreement was entered into freely by the parties and was lawful on its face and 

thus properly entered the agreement into the record and dismissed the appeal as 

settled. See Futrell-Rawls v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 115 M.S.P.R. 322, 

¶ 8 (2010) (before dismissing an appeal as settled, an administrative judge must 

document for the record that the parties reached a settlement agreement, 

understood its terms, and agreed whether it was to be enforceable by the Board); 

see also Mahoney v. U.S. Postal Service, 37 M.S.P.R. 146, 148-49 (1988) (same). 

To the extent that the appellant claims that the administrative judge was biased, 

the appellant’s conclusory claims of bias, none of which involve extrajudicial 

conduct, do not overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that 

accompanies a hearing officer. See Wadley v. Department of the 

Army, 90 M.S.P.R. 148, ¶ 6 (2001).

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 2 On review, the appellant also contends that, since she entered into the agreement, the 

agency has refused to help her with “disability assistance.” Id. In its response to the 

petition, the agency states that it remains ready, willing, and able to assist the appellant 

with her application for disability benefits. PFR File, Tab 3. Further, attached to the 

agency’s response, is a copy of an email sent on January 9, 2015, after the appellant 

filed her petition for review, in which an agency official indicates that he sent the 

appellant by certified mail documents that the agency had prepared for her to submit 

with her application for disability retirement. Id. We find that, under these 

circumstances, it is appropriate not to treat this action as a petition for enforcement 

based on the appellant’s bare assertion, made before the date of the email, that the 

agency failed to comply with the provision of the settlement to assist her in applying for 
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NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request further review of this final decision.

Discrimination Claims: Administrative Review

You may request review of this final decision on your discrimination 

claims by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See Title 5 

of the United States Code, section 7702(b)(1) (5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1)). If you 

submit your request by regular U.S. mail, the address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit your request via commercial delivery or by a method requiring a 

signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, NE

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

You should send your request to EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after 

your receipt of this order. If you have a representative in this case, and your 

representative receives this order before you do, then you must file with EEOC no 

later than 30 calendar days after receipt by your representative. If you choose to 

file, be very careful to file on time.

Discrimination and Other Claims: Judicial Action

If you do not request EEOC to review this final decision on your 

discrimination claims, you may file a civil action against the agency on both your 

 

disability retirement. Cf. Secrist v. U.S. Postal Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 199, ¶ 9 (2010)

(the Board forwards an appellant’s allegations of noncompliance with a settlement 

agreement, made in a petition for review, to the regional office for processing as a 

petition for enforcement).
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discrimination claims and your other claims in an appropriate United States 

district court. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2). You must file your civil action with 

the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your receipt of this order. If 

you have a representative in this case, and your representative receives this order 

before you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar 

days after receipt by your representative. If you choose to file, be very careful to 

file on time. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on race, color, 

religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be entitled to 

representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any requirement of 

prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) 

and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

FOR THE BOARD:

Washington, D.C.

______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board