Filed 4/13/15 Miranda v. Super. Ct. CA4/3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION THREE 

FRANK PAUL MIRANDA, 

 Petitioner, 

 v. 

THE APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE 

SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE 

COUNTY 

 Respondent; 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Real Party in Interest. 

 G050870 

 (Super. Ct. No. 30-2014-00746722) 

 O P I N I O N 

 Original proceedings; petition for a writ of mandate to challenge an order of 

the Appellate Division of the Orange County Superior Court, Deborah C. Servino, Glenn 

R. Salter, and Richard Y. Lee, Judges. Petition granted. 

 Chad R. Maddox for Petitioner. 

 No appearance for Respondent. 
2

 Tony Rackauckas, District Attorney and John R. Maxfield, Deputy District 

Attorney, for Real Party in Interest. 

 * * * 

THE COURT:* 

 Petitioner, Frank Paul Miranda, filed a motion to dismiss a misdemeanor 

complaint on the basis that he was denied his state and federal constitutional right to a 

speedy trial. When the trial court denied his motion, Miranda sought relief by filing a 

petition for writ of mandate in the Appellate Division of the Orange County Superior 

Court. When his writ petition was denied by the Appellate Division, Miranda sought 

relief in this court. The petition has merit and relief is granted. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 At the motion, the parties agreed on the following facts: On December 11, 

2012, Frank Paul Miranda was arrested for driving under the influence. At the time of his 

arrest, Miranda gave the officer his correct address where he has resided throughout this 

case. Miranda was released on bail with a court appearance scheduled for January 8, 

2013. On January 8, Miranda appeared in court, but was told at the clerk’s window that 

nothing had been filed. On the same day, Miranda checked-in at the Orange County 

District Attorney’s Office and he was given an information sheet indicating nothing had 

been filed. 

 On May 6, 2013, a misdemeanor complaint was filed alleging two counts of 

driving under the influence based on Miranda’s arrest on December 11, 2012. An 

“Arraignment Letter” was sent to Miranda’s address advising him that his arraignment 

was scheduled for June 3, 2013. When Miranda failed to appear on June 3, an arrest 

warrant was issued by the trial court on June 13, 2013. 

 

* Before O’Leary, P. J., Rylaarsdam J., and Ikola, J. 
3

 On April 18, 2014, the trial court recalled the bench warrant and Miranda 

was arraigned on the misdemeanor complaint. Because over 16 months had passed from 

his arrest to his arraignment on the complaint, he filed a speedy trial motion pursuant to 

both the California and U.S. Constitutions. 

 At the hearing on the motion, the People acknowledged there was no proof 

of service for the arraignment letter, and the Sheriff’s Department did not serve the 

warrant after the warrant issued. The People also acknowledged that Miranda was 

unaware the driving under the influence case had been filed and the case was pending 

until he applied for an independent contractor job on March 21, 2014, and he was told his 

proposal could not be considered because of his unresolved court case from his arrest in 

2012. 

 At the conclusion of the motion, the trial court announced its tentative 

opinion and said, “I’m finding that the time for the speedy trial motion starts to run in this 

case on the date of the arrest; and I’m finding that on the day of the arrest he was – the 

defendant gave the right address and that he appeared as the citation required him to 

appear; and that there was no filing and no complaint; and that he did, in fact, check with 

the district attorney’s office and found out that there had, in fact, not been any filing.” 

 The trial court continued and said, “And I’m using the state’s standard, not 

the federal standard, for – so – but the over-the-year delay does cause, I think, a burden to 

be placed on the People. And implying those – and in using the factors that you folks are 

referring to, even though there’s no proof of actual service of the warrant or the delivery 

of the mail, the fact is that the prosecution has a backup system, which is that notice goes 

out to the governmental agencies, which apparently is the way he finds out that there is a 

complaint out there – is sufficient for the Court to find that the defense, or the accused, 

has a burden to show actual prejudice. [¶] And looking at the declarations, I don’t see 

the actual prejudice . . . .” 
4

 In response to the trial court’s explanation that it was using the state 

standard, counsel said, “I understand the Court said that it’s using the state’s standard, but 

we’re specifically making the motion alleging a violation of the federal speedy trial 

right.” When counsel said, “I don’t know how we get to using the state standard,” the 

following exchange took place: “[The Court]: Because you’re in California. You’ve 

heard of Calhoun, haven’t you? Well, this is a political thought. Remember a gentleman 

– a philosopher named Calhoun? [¶] [Counsel]: No. [¶] [The Court]: Oh, my gosh. 

Okay. So he’s a – before the Civil War – big proponent of state rights; okay? So that’s a 

continuing dialogue that’s going on. [¶] But for the purpose of my ruling here, I’m 

expressly not applying the federal rule. I’m applying the state rule, which is not that far 

away from yours in view of the Court’s finding. A – I’m using the date of the arrest, 

which is beneficial to the accused. From the date of the arrest to the time he’s actually 

arraigned is over a year; and I’m finding on behalf of the accused that, what, the process 

that’s in place by the district attorney on straightforward misdemeanors, DUI, is 

somewhat de minimis in that they can’t show actual service of the warrant that was 

issued or that they actually served a letter to him. [¶] . . . The only way we get to him is 

they have a system of notifying the governmental agencies, and that’s why he doesn’t get 

his job. He finds out what’s going on. [¶] So there’s a time lapse between the time of 

the arrest and the time he’s arraigned. And so those are the factors the Court’s 

considering; that when you fill in those four or five factors that come – that the Court’s 

balanced that. The State had some responsibility to show due diligence, and I’m finding 

that they did. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . They barely had enough. So then I go to you, after I tell 

you that, and tell you, you need to show some actual prejudice in addition to the delay in 

time.” 

 When the trial court denied the motion, Miranda unsuccessfully sought 

relief in the Appellate Division of the Orange County Superior Court. After this court 

issued an order to show cause, the People filed a return and Miranda filed a traverse. 
5

DISCUSSION 

 Miranda filed a motion to dismiss the misdemeanor complaint in this case 

on the basis that he had been denied his state and federal right to a speedy trial. Although 

Miranda’s speedy trial motion clearly states the motion is based on both the state and 

U.S. constitutions, the trial court’s decision to “expressly not apply[ ] the federal rule,” is 

problematic because there are significant differences between the state and Sixth 

Amendment right to a speedy trial, (Scherling v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 493, 

504; People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 754) and “we are bound by decisions of 

the United States Supreme Court interpreting the federal Constitution” (People v. Bradley

(1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 86.) 

 Under the state standard, the defendant has the initial burden to 

affirmatively demonstrate prejudice as a result of the delay. (People v. Lowe (2007) 40 

Cal.4th 937, 942.) In contrast, the federal standard, as explained in Barker v Wingo

(1972) 407 U.S. 514, 529 (Barker), employs a more amorphous test, in which prejudice is 

but one of four factors, none of which “is ‘either a necessary or sufficient condition to the 

finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and 

must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, 

these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and 

sensitive balancing process.’” (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 233.) 

“‘Simply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval 

between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 

“presumptively prejudicial” delay . . . .’” (Id. at p. 234, citing Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at 

pp. 530-531.) 

 Once a defendant triggers the federal speedy trial analysis, “some of the 

factors” courts should assess in determining whether he or she has been deprived of 

speedy trial rights include “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s 

assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” (Barker v Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. 
6

at p. 530.) Barker explains, “The approach we accept is a balancing test, in which the 

conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed.” (Ibid.) “[B]ecause of 

the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an 

inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. To take but 

one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably 

less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.” (Id. at pp. 530-531.) 

 Rather than weighing the Barker factors, as the federal standard requires, 

the trial court in this case mistakenly concluded that Miranda needed to “show some 

actual prejudice in addition to the delay in time.” The trial court’s refusal to apply the 

correct legal standard to Miranda’s federal speedy trial claim represents an error of law 

and therefore the appellate division abused its discretion when it denied Miranda’s 

petition for writ of mandate to compel the trial court to conduct a hearing at which the 

court considers the Barker factors. (See also Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 

239, 264.) 

 Initially, this court issued an order to show cause (OSC) and set a schedule 

for briefing and oral argument. After reviewing the parties’ briefs and the record below, 

we conclude that Miranda’s entitlement to a new hearing under both the state and federal 

speedy trial standards is “so obvious that no purpose could reasonably be served by 

plenary consideration of the issue . . . .” (Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 

1232, 1241.) Having received full briefing on the subject, we discharge the OSC as 

having been improvidently granted, and grant the petition for writ of mandate in the first 

instance, without the necessity of oral argument. Because of the societal interests in a 

speedy trial, there also “‘“is an unusual urgency requiring acceleration of the normal 

process . . . .” [Citation.]’” (Ibid.; see also Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Superior 

Court (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 828.) 
7

DISPOSITION 

 The OSC is discharged as improvidently granted. Let a peremptory writ of 

mandate in the first instance issue directing the Appellate Division of the Orange County 

Superior Court to vacate its order denying the petition for writ of mandate. The 

Appellate Division is directed to grant the petition for writ of mandate and compel the 

trial court to vacate its order denying petitioner’s speedy trial motion and conduct a new 

hearing at which the trial court follows Barker, supra, 407 U.S. 514, in considering 

petitioner’s speedy trial motion based on the Sixth Amendment. 

 This decision shall be final as to this court 15 days after its filing. (Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)