alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 99-6822

JAMES A. BIGGINS, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus MARYLAND DISTRICT COURT #2-3 D.C.; WICOMICO COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (CA99-476-PJM) Submitted: September 9, 1999 Decided: September 15, 1999 Before ERVIN, WILKINS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James A. Biggins, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).1 Although the district court’s order is marked as “filed” on March 4, 1999, the district court’s records show that the order was entered on the docket sheet on March 5, 1999. Pursuant to Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date that the order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the effective date of the district court’s decision. See Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1243-35 (4th Cir. 1986). 2 Under Houston v. Lack , 487 U.S. 266 (1988), the notice is considered filed as of the date Appellant delivered it to prison officials for forwarding to the court. 2 PER CURIAM:James Biggins seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1999) claim. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Biggins’ notice of appeal was not timely filed.Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). The district court’s order was entered on the docket on March 5, 1999. 1 Biggins’ notice of appeal was filed on May 28, 1999. 2 Because Biggins failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss3 the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 5 (Tuesday, January 8, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Page 1197]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-00156]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Foreign-Trade Zones Board

[Order No. 1875]


Reorganization/Expansion of Foreign-Trade Zone 8 Under 
Alternative Site Framework; Toledo, OH

    Pursuant to its authority under the Foreign-Trade Zones Act of 
June 18, 1934, as amended (19 U.S.C. 81a-81u), the Foreign-Trade 
Zones Board (the Board) adopts the following Order:

    Whereas, the Board adopted the alternative site framework (ASF) (15 
CFR Sec. 400.2(c)) as an option for the establishment or reorganization 
of zones;
    Whereas, the Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority, grantee of 
Foreign-Trade Zone 8, submitted an application to the Board (FTZ Docket 
B-49-2012, docketed 7/12/2012) for authority to reorganize and expand 
the zone under the ASF with a service area of Sandusky, Henry, Wood, 
Lucas and Defiance Counties, Ohio, in and adjacent to the Toledo-
Sandusky Customs and Border Protection port of entry, FTZ 8's existing 
Sites 1, 2, 4 and 5 would be categorized as magnet sites and Sites 7 
and 8 as usage-driven sites, Site 3 would be removed from the zone and 
the grantee proposes an additional subzone (Subzone 8I) under the ASF;
    Whereas, notice inviting public comment was given in the Federal 
Register (77 FR 43048, 7/23/2012) and the application has been 
processed pursuant to the FTZ Act and the Board's regulations; and,
    Whereas, the Board adopts the findings and recommendations of the 
examiner's report, and finds that the requirements of the FTZ Act and 
the Board's regulations are satisfied, and that the proposal is in the 
public interest;
    Now, therefore, the Board hereby orders:
    The application to reorganize and expand FTZ 8 under the 
alternative site framework is approved, subject to the FTZ Act and the 
Board's regulations, including Section 400.13, to the Board's standard 
2,000-acre activation limit for the zone, to a five-year ASF sunset 
provision for magnet sites that would terminate authority for Sites 2, 
4 and 5 if not activated by December 31, 2017, and to three-year ASF 
sunset provisions for subzone/usage-driven sites that would terminate 
authority for Sites 7 and 8 as well as each site of Subzone 8I if no 
foreign-status merchandise is admitted for a bona fide customs purpose 
by December 31, 2015.

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 20th day of December 2012.
Paul Piquado,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration, Alternate 
Chairman, Foreign-Trade Zones Board.

ATTEST:----------------------------------------------------------------

Andrew McGilvray,
 Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2013-00156 Filed 1-7-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
* The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 05-2501

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the District v. * of Nebraska. * Daniel Villalobos-Delgado, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: April 18, 2006 Filed: April 19, 2006

___________ Before MELLOY, FAGG, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Daniel Villalobos-Delgado appeals the 120-month prison sentence the district court * imposed after Villalobos-Delgado pleadedguilty to a drug-conspiracy charge. On appeal, counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a br ief under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which counsel ra ises a challenge to the sentence imposed.-2- The sentencing challenge fails, because in his plea agreement VillalobosDelgado specifically agreed to receive a sentence of 120 months imprisonment. See United States v. Nguyen , 46 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1995) (defendant who explicitly and voluntarily exposes himself to specific sentence may not challenge that punishment on appeal). We have carefully reviewed the reco rd in accordance with Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous i ssues. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment, and we grant counsel leave to withdraw.

______________________________
NUMBER 13-15-00115-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

___________________________________________________________

JULIE CHAU, Appellant,

v.

PRIME HEALTHCARE SERVICES D/B/A 

HARLINGEN MEDICAL CENTER, Appellee. 

____________________________________________________________

On appeal from the 445th District Court 

of Cameron County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Garza, Benavides, and Perkes

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam

Appellant, Julie Chau, attempted to perfect an appeal from a judgment entered by 

the 445th District Court of Cameron County, Texas, in cause number 2012-DCL-921-I. 

Judgment in this cause was signed on January 27, 2015. 
2

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 provides that an appeal is perfected when 

notice of appeal is filed within thirty days after the judgment is signed, unless a motion for 

new trial is timely filed. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a)(1). A motion for extension of time is 

necessarily implied when an appellant, acting in good faith, files a notice of appeal beyond 

the time allowed by rule 26.1, but within the fifteen-day grace period provided by Rule 

26.3 for filing a motion for extension of time. See Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 

617-18, 619 (1997) (construing the predecessor to Rule 26). However, appellant must 

provide a reasonable explanation for the late filing: it is not enough to simply file a notice 

of appeal. Id.; Woodard v. Higgins, 140 S.W.3d 462, 462 (Tex. App.BAmarillo 2004, no 

pet.); In re B.G., 104 S.W.3d 565, 567 (Tex. App.BWaco 2002, no pet.).

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, appellant=s notice of appeal 

was due on February 26, 2015, but was not filed until March 4, 2015. On March 11, 

2015, the Clerk of this Court notified appellant of this defect so that steps could be taken 

to correct the defect, if it could be done. Appellant was advised that, if the defect was 

not corrected within ten days from the date of receipt of this Court=s letter, the appeal 

would be dismissed. To date, no response has been received from appellant providing 

a reasonable explanation for the late filing of the notice of appeal.

The Court, having examined and fully considered the documents on file, 

appellant=s failure to timely perfect his appeal, and appellant=s failure to respond to this 

Court=s notice, is of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed for want of 

jurisdiction. Accordingly, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED FOR WANT OF 

JURISDICTION. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a)(c).
3

PER CURIAM

Delivered and filed the

16th day of April, 2015.
July 23 , 2013



### JUDGMENT 

## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

CONNOR R. BLAND , Appellant

NO. 14

- 12

- 01057

- CV V.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY , Appellee

________________________________ This cause, an appeal from the judgment in favor of appellee, Texas Depa rtment of Public Safety, signed September 24, 2012, was heard on the transcript of the record. We have inspected the record and find no error in the j udgment. We order the judgment of the court below AFFIRMED

. We order appellant Connor R. Bland to pay all costs incurred in this appeal. We further order this decision certified below for observance.
Identification of Nonhaza

Identification of Nonhaza

Secondary Materials that a

Secondary Materials that a

Wastes

George Faison

EPA ORCR

Scrap Tire Reuse and Recy

Webinar 

February 23, 2009
TOPICS

• Background on the Rulemaking• ANPRM• Schedule 
BACKGROUND BACKGROUND

• Scrap tires, used oil, biomass and coal re

examples of materials assessed in the ru

• Units combusting the material include bo

kilns, process heaters

• Estimate 136,000 units in all
BACKGROUND BACKGROUND

• Materials determined to be solid was

in combustion units are subject to CArequirements

• Materials determined not to be a soli

be subject to CAA 112 requirements

• Solid waste definition to be determin

Administrator according to RCRA
BACKGROUND BACKGROUND

• CAA 129 thought to be more stringent

– Limits for 9 specific pollutants– Management requirements

• Stigma attached to being solid waste inci• Effort is a result of June 2007 DC Court o

vacating and remanding Commercial and Waste Incineration Definition Rule and BRule 
ANPRM

• Published January 2, 2009• Identifies 2 key factors for solid was

determination

– Whether material has been discarded– If discarded, has it been processed to 

legitimate fuel 

• Lays out criteria for legitimacy
ANPRM

• Categories of materials in ANPRM 

considered to be a solid waste inclutraditional fuels; secondary materialegitimate fuels not previously discadiscarded secondary materials proclegitimate fuel

• Whole tires from tire piles fed to co

units would be a solid waste under 
STATE COMMEN

STATE COMMEN

• States need to be concerned with m

of materials before arrival at combu

• Want to promote beneficial use• Regulating whole tires as solid was

burned as fuel could disrupt recycli
IN CONCLUSIO

IN CONCLUSIO

• Rulemaking applies to application of CAA 

only; should not impact other Subtitle D aland filling, composting

• Do not want to undercut state solid waste 

authority, beneficial use programs

• Schedule – to be signed by April 15 toget

MACT and CISWI rulemakings 

• http://www.epa.gov/waste/nonhaz/definiti
P.O. BOX 12308, CAPITOL STATION

AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711

s>c©

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Q.U.

PKOVATE USE

RE: WR-82,802-01

.DEQUINNCY TYSON

02 1R » ©@

0006557458 MAR 24 

MAILED FROM2IPCODE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

WESTERN DISTRICT 

JAMES HAMMONDS, 

 Petitioner 

 v. 

HON. ANTHONY MARIANI, 

 Respondent 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 16 WM 2015 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 8th day of April, 2015, the Application for Extraordinary Relief is 

DENIED, and the Prothonotary is DIRECTED to strike the name of the jurist from the 

caption.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1

Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I, Allan L. Bridgford, Chairman of the Board of Bridgford Foods Corporation
(the Company), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:



| | (1) |  | the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the fiscal year
ended October 31, 2003 (the Report) fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 780(d)); and
| | --- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| | (2) |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.                                                                                        

|                        |  |                              
|----------------------- |  | -----------------------------
|Dated: January 23, 2004 |  |                              
|                        |  |                              
|                        |  | /s/   ALLAN L. BRIDGFORD     
|                        |  | Allan L. Bridgford,          
|                        |  | Chairman of the Board        
|                        |  | (Principal Executive Officer)
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 22, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-50475

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOSE ANTONIO AGUIRRE-NOYOLA, also known

as Jose Antonio Aguirre-Nojola, also known

as Jose Antonio Aguirre Noyola,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. DR-02-CR-609-ALL-WWJ

--------------------

Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 Jose Antonio Aguirre-Noyola appeals the sentence imposed

following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United

States after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

Aguirre-Noyola contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b) define separate offenses. He argues that the prior

conviction that resulted in his increased sentence is an element

of a separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that should have
No. 03-50475

-2-

been alleged in his indictment. Aguirre-Noyola maintains that he

pleaded guilty to an indictment which charged only simple reentry

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues that his sentence exceeds

the two-year maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed

for that offense.

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235

(1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of

separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing

provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. 

Aguirre-Noyola acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres, but asserts that the decision has been cast

into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 

He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. 

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres

“unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule

it.” Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED. 

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
News Media Contact(s): 

(202) 586-4940

For Immediate Release

July 22, 2009

Energy Secretary Chu, Agriculture Secretary Vilsack Announce 

$6.3 million for Biofuels Research

Washington, DC – U.S. Department of Energy Secretary Steven Chu and U.S. Department of 

Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack announced today the joint selection of awards of up to $6.3 million 

towards fundamental genomics-enabled research leading to the improved use of plant feedstocks for 

biofuel production. The seven projects announced today follow the green jobs and renewable energy 

Rural Tour event hosted last weekend by the two cabinet Secretaries in Virginia. These investments will 

further the Obama Administration’s efforts to broaden the nation’s energy portfolio while decreasing our 

dependence on foreign oil. 

"Part of the solution to the energy problem will be home-grown energy crops," Secretary Chu said. 

"These projects will help us unlock the true potential of advanced biofuels, decrease our dependence on 

foreign oil, and create new jobs and a thriving biofuels industry in America.” 

”Helping expand and diversify production of biofuels is an example of the Obama Administration’s 

commitment to developing a sustainable domestic biofuels industry that can help strengthen rural 

America while decreasing our dependence on foreign oil,” said Secretary Vilsack. 

These grants will be awarded under a joint DOE-USDA program begun in 2006 that is committed to 

fundamental research in biomass genomics, providing the scientific foundation to facilitate use of 

lignocellulosic materials for bioenergy and biofuels. Since lignocellulosic crop plants are less intensive 

to produce and can grow on poorer quality land, competition with crops grown for food production is 

avoided. 

DOE will provide $4 million in funding for four projects, while USDA will award $2.3 million to fund 

three projects. Initial funding will support research projects for up to three years. 

Awards have been selected for: 

z USDA-ARS Northern Plains Area (Lincoln, NE), $1,182,000 

z USDA-ARS Western Regional Research Center (Albany, CA), $1,300,000 

z University of Georgia (Athens, GA), $1,200,000 

z University of Georgia (Athens, GA), $705,000 

z Michigan Technological University (Houghton, MI), $900,000 

z University of Florida (Gainesville, FL), $643,000 

z University of Nebraska (Lincoln, NE), $390,000 

Secretary Chu recently posted a video on his Facebook page and on his YouTube channel discussing the 

U.S. Department of Energy Page 1 of 2

http://www.energy.gov/news2009/print2009/7683.htm 1/22/2010
great potential of next generation biofuels.

Read more information on the individual projects and the DOE-USDA biomass genomics research 

program. 

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.

U.S. Department of Energy Page 2 of 2

http://www.energy.gov/news2009/print2009/7683.htm 1/22/2010
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kevin Doddy, Appellant.

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: We reject defendant’s contention that the suppression court erred in concluding that defendant was not in custody when he admitted shooting Kenneth Hughes. In determining whether an individual is in custody, "[t]he standard to be applied is whether a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have felt free to leave” *(People v Harris,*48 NY2d 208, 215). Here, defendant willingly accompanied the police to the Walton Street bridge to help them locate the shotgun he had thrown into the creek. At the bridge, defendant showed the officers where he had thrown the shotgun and, while the officers searched the creek, defendant sat in the back seat of the police car with the car door open and his feet on the curb, awaiting a ride home. While defendant was in the car the officers intermittently questioned defendant and he admitted accidentally shooting Hughes. There is no suggestion of threats, intimidation or any physical restraint of defendant by the officers. Given those circumstances, we find no basis to disturb the suppression court’s determination that defendant was not in custody when he made that statement to the police *(see, People v Johnson,*91 AD2d 327, 330-331, *affd*61 NY2d 932). (Appeal from Judgment of Onondaga County Court, Mulroy, J.—Murder, 2nd Degree.) Present—Callahan, J. P., Denman, Balio, Lawton and Lowery, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                                5
<MULTIPLIER>                             1

<S>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                       12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>              APR-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                   APR-30-1999
<CASH>                             164,923
<SECURITIES>                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                      520,220
<ALLOWANCES>                        68,886
<INVENTORY>                      1,617,807
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                 3,359,920
<PP&E>                           2,492,346
<DEPRECIATION>                   1,217,201
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  11,414,751
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>            2,760,057
<BONDS>                          2,755,596
<COMMON>                           153,871
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                    0
<PREFERRED>                          3,465
<OTHER-SE>                       4,972,443
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    11,414,751
<SALES>                          6,631,355
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<CGS>                            5,107,934
<TOTAL-COSTS>                    7,942,100
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                  (116,726)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                  35,201
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 (1,462,672)
<INCOME-TAX>                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                (50,270)
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</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of American Bar Association Members/State Street Collective
Trust (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert E. Fullam, as Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to and for purposes of 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ Robert E. FullamRobert E. FullamChief Financial OfficerNovember 14, 2008