J-A01017-15 

2015 PA Super 81 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

SAMANTHA FLEET, 

 Appellant No. 29 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered November 15, 2013, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008782-2013 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOT, P.J.E., DONOHUE, and ALLEN, JJ. 

DISSENTING OPINION BY ALLEN, J.: FILED APRIL 16, 2015 

I agree with the Majority that persons subject to involuntary civil 

commitments are entitled to the constitutional protections provided by the 

Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8, as these protections apply to all 

citizens, regardless of their status, when police or other government entities 

are involved. Majority at 6. However, where the Majority concludes that the 

warrant for Appellant’s involuntary commitment for an emergency mental 

health examination was invalid and the evidence should therefore have been 

suppressed, I would hold that the § 7302 warrant was properly issued, and 

that the subsequent seizure of Appellant and search incident thereto, were 

constitutionally valid. 

 Preliminarily, I would conclude that the warrant for Appellant’s 

emergency commitment under § 7302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act 

(“MHPA”) was validly issued. As we explained in Commonwealth v. 
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Jackson, 62 A.3d 433, 439 (Pa. Super. 2013) “our Supreme Court [has] 

held... that the standard for evaluating the validity of [§ 7302 warrants] is 

whether reasonable grounds exist to believe that a person is severely 

mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment.” See 50 P.S. § 

7301(a) (“[a] person is severely mentally disabled when, as a result of 

mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion 

in the conduct of his affairs and social relations or to care for his own 

personal needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of 

harm to others or to himself”). In evaluating the validity of a § 7302 

warrant, “t]he guiding inquiry is whether, when viewing the surrounding 

facts and circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of the applicant 

for a section 7302 warrant could have concluded that an individual was 

severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment.” Jackson, 

62 A.3d at 439 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

Here, Officer Newcomer testified that on December 14, 2012, 

Appellant’s mother appeared at the police station and reported that 

Appellant was suffering from depression and had made statements about 

“wanting to end things.” N.T., 11/15/13, at 5-6; Affidavit of Probable Cause, 

12/31/12. Appellant’s mother then showed Officer Newcomer text messages 

from Appellant in which Appellant stated: “I’m going to kill myself.” N.T., 

11/15/13, at 5, 14; Affidavit of Probable Cause 12/31/12. Although the date 

and time of the text messages was not specified at the suppression hearing, 

Officer Newcomer testified that she personally viewed the text messages, 
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that in them, Appellant unequivocally expressed a desire to kill herself, that 

Appellant’s mother related to her that Appellant suffered from depression 

and had made previous suicidal statements, and that the officer’s 

understanding was that Appellant was indicating an intent to commit suicide. 

N.T., 11/15/13, at 5-6, 14. I would conclude, in light of the foregoing, that 

a person in Officer Newcomer’s position could have reasonably believed that 

Appellant was severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate 

treatment, and that in the interest of protecting human life, a temporary 

emergency examination by a physician was warranted. 

A section 7302 commitment is an initial emergency examination period 

under which the individual must be examined by a physician within two 

hours of arrival at the hospital in order to determine if the person is actually 

severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment. 50 P.S. 

7302(b). If a physician then determines that the person is in fact severely 

mentally disabled and in need of emergency treatment, treatment shall 

begin immediately, and cannot exceed 120 hours. § 7302(b) and (d). If the 

physician does not so find, or if at any time it appears there is no longer a 

need for immediate treatment, the person shall be discharged and returned 

to such place as he may reasonably direct. Id. 

Thus, within two hours of arrival at the hospital, the statute requires a

physician to determine whether the individual is severely mentally disabled 

and in need of treatment; that determination is not made at the time of 

issuance of the warrant. Rather, at the time of issuance of the warrant, the 
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applicant need only demonstrate “reasonable grounds” to believe that the 

person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment. 

See In Re J.M., 726 A.2d 1041, 1074 (Pa. 1999) (explaining that a § 7302 

warrant is “a warrant to take [the individual] to the doctor, not to take [the 

individual] to jail”, and only allows the individual to be taken into custody 

and kept in custody for a maximum of two hours for the purpose of 

performing an emergency mental health examination for therapeutic 

purposes). I would conclude that such reasonable grounds existed here. 

Moreover, in the event a physician does ultimately determine that the 

individual is severely mentally disabled, even then, the individual cannot be 

committed in excess of 120 hours without the Commonwealth satisfying the 

rigorous involuntary commitment requirements set forth in § 7303 of the 

MHPA, which require a hearing where the Commonwealth must justify the 

need for involuntary commitment by clear and convicting evidence. See In 

re Ryan, 784 A.2d 803, 806 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“Under section 7303, when 

a facility deems a patient to be in need of additional care beyond the 120 

hours of emergency care authorized by section 7302, an application to 

extend treatment may be filed in the trial court and an informal hearing held 

within 24 hours of the filing of the application [and] after the hearing, if the 

judge or mental health review officer certifies the patient as severely 

mentally disabled, he may authorize up to an additional twenty days of 

treatment.”); J.M, 726 A.2d 1041, 1047, n.9 (“Pennsylvania jurisprudence 

has consistently noted that the legislature intended the MHPA to create a 
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treatment scheme under which a patient's procedural protections expand 

progressively as the deprivation of liberty gradually increases.”). In light of 

the foregoing, I would conclude that Officer Newcomer acted reasonably in 

her belief that Appellant was in need of emergency medical examination, 

and that the § 7302 warrant was validly issued. 

In Jackson, on which the Majority relies, the appellant alleged that 

evidence obtained during the execution of a § 7302 warrant should have 

been suppressed because the application was legally insufficient. Jackson, 

62 A.3d at 458. Specifically, the appellant in Jackson asserted that the 

application contained no allegations that he was a threat to himself, or that 

he inflicted serious bodily injury. Id. at 439. We determined in Jackson

that the application satisfied the requirements for the issuance of a valid § 

7302 warrant, and that the contraband obtained during execution of that 

warrant was admissible. I would conclude that the evidence in this case was 

far more compelling than that in Jackson, where the appellant threatened 

to hurt the applicant, and hit her car with a baton. Here, Officer Newcomer 

viewed text messages from Appellant in which she articulated the clear and 

immediate intent to kill herself. Under these circumstances, and as in 

Jackson, I would conclude that Officer Newcomer had reasonable grounds 

to believe that Appellant was severely mentally disabled and in need of 

immediate treatment, to satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid § 

7302 warrant. 
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Moreover, even if the warrant was technically defective pursuant to 

the procedural prerequisites of the MHPA, I do not believe that such defects 

would necessarily entitle Appellant to suppression of the evidence. 

Suppression is a remedy for violation of the Fourth Amendment guaranty.1 

See e.g. Commonwealth v. Mason, 490 A.2d 421, 425 (Pa. 1985) 

(explaining that “technical violations of the Rules regarding the issuance and 

execution of a search warrant do not ordinarily render the search 

unreasonable nor require the exclusion of evidence, whereas violations of 

the Rules which assume constitutional dimensions and/or substantially 

prejudice the accused may require the exclusion of evidence so seized”). 

Neither Jackson nor the MHPA require suppression as an automatic remedy 

where a warrant application fails to comply with the statutory requirements. 

____________________________________________ 

1 See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426-27, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285 

(2011)(citations and internal quotations omitted): 

The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be 

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Amendment says 

nothing about suppressing evidence obtained in violation of this 

command. That rule—the exclusionary rule—is a prudential 

doctrine, created by this Court to compel respect for the 

constitutional guaranty. Exclusion is not a personal 

constitutional right, nor is it designed to redress the injury 

occasioned by an unconstitutional search. The rule’s sole 

purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth 

Amendment violations. Our cases have thus limited the rule’s 

operation to situations in which this purpose is thought most 

efficaciously served. Where suppression fails to yield 

appreciable deterrence, exclusion is clearly ... unwarranted. 
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In addressing Appellant’s claim that the police “violated her rights 

under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 

§ 8 of the Pennsylvania constitution,” we are required to examine whether 

Appellant’s constitutional rights were infringed upon when she was seized 

and subsequently searched by Officer Newcomer. Appellant’s Brief at 13-17. 

Because I believe the evidence (heroin and a syringe) was not obtained in 

the course of an illegal search or seizure, I would conclude that Appellant is 

not entitled to suppression. 

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which 

protects from unreasonable searches and seizures, “applies to seizures in 

civil, as well as criminal, proceedings”, and courts have generally recognized 

that the Fourth Amendment protections extend to civil involuntary 

commitment proceedings. Doby v. DeCrescenzo, 171 F.3d 858, 871 (3d 

Cir. 1999) citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714–15, 107 S.Ct. 

1492, 1496, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987). Under the Fourth Amendment, “the 

established remedy for illegal seizures and searches in criminal cases is 

exclusion of the fruits of the illegal police conduct.” Commonwealth v. 

Johnson 86 A.3d 182, 187 (Pa. 2014). 

Because the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and 

seizures, but only ‘unreasonable’ ones, “the central question in any litigation 

challenging a particular search or seizure is whether that search or seizure 

was constitutionally ‘reasonable.’” Commonwealth v. Beaman, 880 A.2d 

578, 582-583 (Pa. 2005) citing Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 
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496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990). “[T]he 

reasonableness of a search is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the 

degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy, and on the other, 

the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate 

governmental interests.” United States. v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 112-

13, 122 S. Ct. 587, 588, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001) (citations omitted). 

Here, balancing the deprivation of liberty caused by the involuntary 

commitment against the government’s legitimate interest in providing for 

the emergency examination of dangerous and mentally ill individuals, I 

would conclude that the seizure of Appellant, who expressed an intent to kill 

herself, was reasonable. See Doby v. DeCrescenzo, 171 F.3d 858, 871

(3d Cir. 1999), (finding § 7302 seizures “reasonable” under the Fourth 

Amendment, after balancing the deprivation of liberty caused by the 

involuntary commitment against the government’s legitimate interest in 

providing for the involuntary examination of dangerous individuals). 

Accordingly, I would hold that Appellant was not subjected to a violation of 

her Fourth Amendment rights. 

While “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, 

not individualized suspicion,” the United States Supreme Court has 

nevertheless generally preferred some quantum of individualized suspicion 

(probable cause or reasonable suspicion) as a prerequisite to a constitutional 

search or seizure. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 67 A.3d 736, 748 (Pa. 

2013) quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855, n.4., 126 S.Ct. 
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2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969, 

186 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2013). In this case, I would conclude that probable cause 

existed for the seizure. 

In criminal cases, the probable cause standard is described as follows: 

Probable cause is made out when the facts and circumstances 

which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the 

arrest, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, 

are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 

belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. 

The question we ask is not whether the officer's belief was 

correct or more likely true than false. Rather, we require only a

probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity. 

In determining whether probable cause exists, we apply a 

totality of the circumstances test. 

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa. 2009) (emphasis in 

original; citations and quotation marks omitted). Applying this probable 

cause analysis in the context of involuntary commitments under the MHPA, 

the inquiry is not whether an individual has committed or is committing a 

crime; rather, § 7302 permits a peace officer to take an individual to an 

involuntary treatment facility if there are “reasonable grounds to believe a 

person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment.” 

50 P.S. § 7302(a); In re J.M., 726 A.2d at 1046; In re F.C. III, 2 A.3d 

1201, 1207, n.4. (Pa. 2010) (“As defined in Section 7301(a), the term 
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‘severely mentally disabled’ essentially means the person, as a result of 

mental illness, poses a clear and present danger to himself or others”).2

In assessing whether probable cause has been established, “[t]he 

question we ask is not whether the officer’s belief was correct or more likely 

true than false[;] [r]ather, we require only a probability, and not a prima 

facie showing.” Thompson, supra. “Probable cause ... is not a high bar: 

It requires only the kind of fair probability on which reasonable and prudent 

people ... act.” Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1103, 188 L. Ed. 

2d 46 (2014) (citations omitted); see also Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 

1050, 1056, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61 (2013) (explaining that probable cause “is a 

fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual 

contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules”) 

(citations and internal quotations omitted). 

Here, where Officer Newcomer testified that Appellant’s mother 

appeared at the police station, showed her text messages from Appellant in 

which Appellant stated: “I’m going to kill myself”, and reported that 

Appellant was suffering from depression and had made statements about 

“wanting to end things”, I would conclude that probable cause existed for 

____________________________________________ 

2

 While our Supreme Court in J.M. held that “the ‘reasonable grounds’ 

standard set forth in section 7302 was not meant to approximate the 

standards employed in the criminal warrant context” and that the reasonable 

grounds standard is less exacting than the probable cause standard, the 

Court in J.M. was not conducting a Fourth Amendment analysis to determine 

whether an unconstitutional search and seizure had occurred. J.M., 726 

A.2d at 1047-1048. 
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the belief that Appellant was severely mentally disabled. N.T., 11/15/13, at 

5-6, 14; Affidavit of Probable Cause 12/31/12. Therefore, in my view, 

Appellant was not subjected to an illegal seizure in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment which would warrant suppression. 

Moreover, I would uphold Officer Newcomer’s search of Appellant (in 

which heroin and a syringe were recovered) as a valid search incident to a 

civil commitment, for safety purposes, analogous to a search incident to 

arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 

685 (a police officer may conduct a warrantless search incident to arrest 

limited to the area within the arrestee’s immediate control, where it is 

justified by the interests in officer safety or to prevent evidence destruction). 

I would conclude that when effecting an involuntary commitment, police 

officers are permitted to conduct an accompanying search of the person 

detained and the immediate area which the person occupies, for safety 

purposes, akin to a search incident to arrest. See also Commonwealth v. 

Shiflet, 670 A.2d 128, 132 (Pa. 1995) (recognizing the search incident to 

arrest exception as a “reasonable intrusion for the protection of police 

officers [who may conduct] a search of the person arrested and the 

immediate area which the person occupies during his or her custody”); 

Commonwealth v. Henkel, 452 A.2d 759, 764 (Pa. Super. 1982) (in a 

search incident to arrest, arresting officers may search the person and area 

within reach of the suspect, in the interest of preserving the safety of those 

making the arrest). Accordingly, I would conclude that Officer Newcomer’s 
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recovery of heroin and a syringe from Appellant occurred during a lawful 

search incident to Appellant’s commitment, for the safety and well-being of 

Appellant, Officer Newcomer, and others.3

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 

____________________________________________ 

3

 There is a question as to whether a different result could be reached under 

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which affords greater 

individual privacy protections than the Fourth Amendment. See 

Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991). However, in 

Commonwealth v. Perez, 97 A.3d 747 (Pa. Super. 2014), we explained: 

It is axiomatic that when presenting a claim for higher 

protections under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Appellant 

must discuss the following four factors: 1) text of the 

Pennsylvania constitutional provision; 2) history of the provision, 

including Pennsylvania case-law; 3) related case-law from other 

states; 4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state 

and local concern, and applicability within modern Pennsylvania 

jurisprudence. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 

A.2d 887, 895 (1991). 

Appellant’s brief does not include the required Edmunds analysis for us to 

consider whether she is entitled to greater protections under the 

Pennsylvania constitution, and Appellant does not argue that the 

Pennsylvania Constitution offers greater protection than the United States 

Constitution. Therefore, I do not engage in a separate state constitutional 

analysis.