SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4630-17T1

SHASHI CUKKEMANE and

SHYAM CUKKEMANE, her

husband,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

THE PORT AUTHORITY OF

NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY,

Defendant-Respondent,

and

AMPCO SYSTEM PARKING, an ABM

Industries Incorporated Company, 

Defendant-Appellant,

and

ABM INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Defendant.

________________________________

Submitted March 11, 2019 – Decided March 29, 2019

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-4630-17T1

Before Judges Messano and Fasciale.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-9142-13.

Gallo Vitucci & Klar, LLP, attorneys for appellant 

(Yolanda L. Ayala, on the briefs).

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, attorneys for 

respondent The Port Authority of New York and New 

Jersey (Peter B. Van Deventer, Jr., of counsel; Douglas 

H. Amster, of counsel and on the brief; Gene K. 

Kaskiw, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Shashi Cukkemane, an employee of United Airlines, parked her 

vehicle in an employee parking lot at Newark Liberty International Airport, 

which is leased and operated by defendant, The Port Authority of New York and 

New Jersey (the PA). Cukkemane slipped and fell on ice, allegedly causing 

serious injury. She sued the PA and Ampco Systems Parking (Ampco).1

Ampco was the assignee of a contract between the PA and another 

contractor, whereby Ampco became responsible for supervising the parking lots 

at the airport. The agreement required that "the [Ampco] . . . indemnify and 

hold harmless the [PA], . . . against all claims and demands . . . arising out of or 

 

1 Ampco is a subsidiary of ABM Industries Incorporated. For ease of reference, 

we use Ampco when referring to both throughout the opinion. Plaintiffs' claims 

against other defendants were dismissed.
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in any way connected" with the agreement, and to procure and maintain 

commercial general liability insurance in favor of the PA. An endorsement to 

the policy provided: "Insurance provided by this policy shall be primary 

insurance and no other insurance or self[-]insured retention carried or held by 

the [PA] shall be called upon to contribute to a loss covered by insurance for 

[Ampco]."

Ampco and the PA filed answers to plaintiff's complaint that included 

cross-claims for contribution and indemnification. The PA tendered its defense, 

and Ampco accepted, subject to a reservation of rights. The PA subsequently 

rejected the offer to defend subject to the reservation and defended plaintiff's 

suit itself. It eventually moved for and was granted summary judgment, 

dismissing plaintiff's complaint and all cross-claims against the PA.2 The PA 

immediately moved for reimbursement of litigation costs and fees, submitting a 

certification from counsel along with billing statements. Counsel stated that the 

PA's legal expenses had been paid by Global Aerospace, Incorporated (Global), 

described as the PA's "insurer."3 The PA requested oral argument on the motion.

 

2 Ampco has not appealed from this order. Ampco settled with plaintiff in the 

underlying suit.

3 Global apparently insured plaintiff's employer, United Airlines, which, in turn, 

apparently agreed to defend and indemnify the PA.
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A-4630-17T1

Ampco opposed the motion on four grounds. It argued the PA lacked 

standing, because Global already paid its legal fees and expenses. Ampco also 

argued the fees were unreasonable and that any award should be "split on an 

equal basis with Global." Lastly, Ampco contended the PA was not entitled to 

pre- or post-judgment interest. Ampco also requested oral argument.

Without conducting oral argument, the judge granted the motion and 

ordered Ampco to pay the entire amount sought by the PA, $159,895 in fees and 

costs, as well as pre-judgement interest in the amount $17,548.48, and postjudgment interest from the date she granted the PA summary judgment. The 

judge placed no oral decision on the record and filed no written statement of 

reasons. Ampco filed this appeal.

Ampco essentially reiterates the arguments made before the motion judge, 

but we choose not to reach their merits. We reverse because the judge failed to 

carry out her responsibilities, thereby denying both the parties and this court the 

ability to conduct any meaningful review. 

Despite both parties requesting oral argument, the judge decided the 

motion without it. Except for motions involving pre-trial discovery or the 

calendaring of a case, a request for oral argument "shall be granted as of right." 

R. 1:6-2(d) (emphasis added). The failure to grant a request for oral argument 
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on a substantive motion such as this, without any explanation, provides grounds 

for reversal. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc. v. Checchio, 335 N.J. Super. 

495, 497-98 (App. Div. 2000). However, "[w]e need not consider whether the 

denial of oral argument in itself warrants reversal, given that we find a reversal 

is required on other grounds." LVNV Funding, LLC v. Colvell, 421 N.J. Super. 

1, 5-6 (App. Div. 2011) (citing Spina Asphalt Paving Excavating Contractors, 

Inc. v. Borough of Fairview, 304 N.J. Super. 425, 427 n.1 (App. Div. 1997)). 

Rule 1:7-4(a) provides that "[t]he court shall, by an opinion or 

memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its 

conclusions of law thereon . . . on every motion decided by a written order that 

is appealable as of right . . . ." (emphasis added). The failure to do so impedes 

our ability to consider the parties' arguments, even when we apply a de novo 

standard of review. See Estate of Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super. 298, 

302 (App. Div. 2018) ("[O]ur function as an appellate court is to review the 

decision of the trial court, not to decide the motion tabula rasa."). 

Regarding the amount of the counsel fee award and the award of 

prejudgment interest, the shortcoming is perhaps more acute, because we review 

the award of counsel fees and pre-judgment interest for a mistaken exercise of 

discretion. Occhifinto v. Olivo Constr. Co., LLC, 221 N.J. 443, 453 (2015); 
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A-4630-17T1

Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 390 (2009). That requires 

us to consider whether "the decision was 'made without a rational explication, 

inexplicably departed from established practices, or rested on an impermissible 

basis.'" Estate of Kotsovska v. Liebman, 221 N.J. 568, 588 (2015) (quoting 

Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)). We are unable to

decide because the judge gave no reasons for her decision. 

"Because it is fundamental to the fairness of the proceedings and serves 

as a necessary predicate to meaningful review, . . . 'a trial court must analyze the 

[relevant] factors in determining an award of reasonable counsel fees and then 

must state its reasons on the record for awarding a particular fee.'" R.M. v. Sup.

Ct. of N.J., 190 N.J. 1, 12 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Furst v. 

Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 21 (2004)). The judge failed to do that in 

this case.

Because the judge failed to explain why she rejected Ampco's arguments 

opposing the PA's motion, and why she granted the full amount of fees requested 

as well as pre-judgment interest, we reverse.4

 

4 Ampco contends it was error to award post-judgment interest pursuant to Rule

4:42-11(a) because the Rule applies only to tort actions. The argument lacks 

sufficient merit to warrant any discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Without 

limitation, "[p]ost-judgment interest is generally available pursuant to Rule
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The matter is remanded to the motion court for further proceedings. The 

judge shall grant oral argument if either party requests it.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

 

4:42-11(a)." United Consumer Fin. Servs. Co. v. Carbo, 410 N.J. Super. 280, 

313 (App. Div. 2009) (citing Bd. of Educ. of Newark v. Levitt, 197 N.J. Super. 

239, 244-45 (App. Div. 1984)). On remand, the judge need not reconsider or 

explain her decision to award post-judgment interest.