1 

14-1362-cv 

Snowden v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY 

FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST 

CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION 

“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON 

ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New 

York, on the 16th day of April, two thousand fifteen. 

 

PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 

GUIDO CALABRESI, 

REENA RAGGI, 

 Circuit Judges. 

---------------------------------------------------------------------- 

EMMA SNOWDEN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. No. 14-1362-cv 

 

THE TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

---------------------------------------------------------------------- 

APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: LOCKSLEY O. WADE, Law Office of 

Locksley O. Wade, LLC, New York, New York. 

APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: MICHAEL T. MCGRATH, Putney, Twombly, 

Hall & Hirson LLP, New York, New York. 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District 

of New York (George B. Daniels, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 
2 

AND DECREED that the judgment entered on March 28, 2014, is AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiff Emma Snowden, a former Columbia University employee, appeals from an 

award of summary judgment in favor of defendant on her claims of discrimination under 

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; the New York 

State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq.; and the New York 

City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq.1 We review 

an award of summary judgment de novo, and we will affirm only if the record, viewed in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals no genuine issue of material fact. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 842–43 (2d Cir. 

2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, 

which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. 

1. ADA Claims 

Snowden argues that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that 

she failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of disability discrimination in her claim that 

Columbia failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. We evaluate this claim under 

the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See 

McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying McDonnell 

Douglas framework to ADA claim based on failure to accommodate); see also McBride v. 

BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that, at first step of 

 

1

 Snowden does not appeal from the judgment in favor of Columbia on her discrimination 

claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., nor the 

dismissal of her ADA retaliation claim. Accordingly, we do not review those parts of the 

judgment here. 
3 

McDonnell Douglas analysis, plaintiff “must establish a prima facie case” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff 

must cite evidence showing that (1) her employer is subject to the ADA; (2) she was 

disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) she was otherwise qualified to perform the 

essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) she 

suffered adverse employment action because of her disability. McMillan v. City of New 

York, 711 F.3d at 125. The district court determined that Snowden failed to carry her 

prima facie burden because (1) there was “no genuine dispute that Plaintiff could not 

perform the essential sorting, filing, bending, reaching, and stooping functions of her job”; 

and (2) Snowden “made no evidentiary showing that there was a reasonable 

accommodation available to Defendant at the time . . . her employment . . . was 

terminated.” Snowden v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., No. 12 Civ. 3095 (GBD), 2014 

WL 1274514, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2014). 

In urging otherwise, Snowden argues that material disputes regarding the essential 

functions of her position preclude an award of summary judgment. Determining the 

essential functions of a position requires “a fact-specific inquiry into both the employer’s 

description of a job and how the job is actually performed in practice.” McMillan v. City 

of New York, 711 F.3d at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted). Relevant factors 

include, among other things, “the employer’s judgment, written job descriptions, the 

amount of time spent on the job performing the function, the mention of the function in a 

collective bargaining agreement, the work experience of past employees in the position, 
4 

and the work experience of current employees in similar positions.” Id. (citing Stone v. 

City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1997)); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) 

(defining “essential functions” and listing factors relevant to determination). 

Snowden asserts that the essential functions of her position were vigorously 

contested in the district court—especially whether lifting heavy boxes was an essential job 

function—and that, as a result, the district court erred in resolving this issue on summary 

judgment. We disagree. The district court expressly stated that it “[did] not find the 

heavy lifting issue to be determinative of Plaintiff’s ADA discrimination claim, as there 

were other essential functions . . . that Plaintiff was not able to perform and for which she 

requested accommodation.” Snowden v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 2014 WL 1274514, 

at *4 n.5. Indeed, the district court explained that “sorting, filing, bending, reaching, and 

stooping” were also essential functions of Snowden’s position—which Snowden did not 

dispute—and noted that she had requested accommodation based on her difficulty 

executing these functions. Id. at *4; see id. at *4 n.6 (citing Snowden’s deposition 

testimony and Local Rule 56.1 Statement as “identifying ‘sorting and filing’ as primary 

functions of mail clerk job”); id. at *4 n.9 (citing Snowden’s requested accommodation for 

“‘gradual return to daily activity, such as lifting, bending, and reaching’ in the form of 

‘help with lifting and carrying things, help with filing things that are [too] high or [too] 

low’”); see also J.A. 626–27 (stating, in Local Rule 56.1 Statement, that “[t]o perform her 

filing duties, Plaintiff was required to bend and stoop to file in the lower drawers and to 

reach out and up to file in the upper drawers”). Because Snowden did not dispute that 
5 

these were essential functions of her position, and because the undisputed facts support the 

district court’s ruling on this issue, we identify no error in the district court’s determination 

that there were essential functions of Snowden’s job that she could not perform. 

Snowden further contends that Columbia was not entitled to summary judgment 

because it failed to engage in a good-faith interactive process to determine whether any 

reasonable accommodations existed. “[A]n employer’s failure to engage in a sufficient 

interactive process does not form the basis of a claim under the ADA,” however, and 

evidence of such failure “does not allow a plaintiff to avoid summary judgment unless she 

also establishes that, at least with the aid of some identified accommodation, she was 

qualified for the position at issue.” McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 

at 101. Here, the district court concluded that (1) Snowden “made no specific showing 

that a reasonable accommodation was available to her employer, given her limited abilities 

to bend, reach, and lift”; and (2) to the extent Snowden sought “help” from other 

employees in executing these actions and performing her job functions, “such an 

accommodation constitutes an elimination of an essential function of [her] job and . . . is 

unreasonable under the law.” Snowden v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 2014 WL 

1274514, at *5 (citing Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 644 (2d Cir. 1991), and Shannon v. 

N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2003)); see McMillan v. City of New 

York, 711 F.3d at 127 (“[A] reasonable accommodation can never involve the elimination 

of an essential function of a job.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Borkowski v. Valley 

Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1995) (observing that employer not required to 
6 

accommodate individual with disability by eliminating essential job functions, and that 

“having someone else do part of a job may sometimes mean eliminating the essential 

functions of the job”). Snowden does not challenge these rulings on appeal, and we 

identify no error in the district court’s conclusion that Snowden failed to demonstrate the 

existence of a reasonable accommodation that would allow her to perform the essential 

functions of her job. 

2. NYCHRL Claims 

Snowden argues that the district court erred in dismissing her NYCHRL claims 

because it failed to conduct the independent analysis required under the NYCHRL. See 

Velazco v. Columbus Citizens Found., 778 F.3d 409, 410–11 (2d Cir. 2015). We 

disagree. The district court expressly stated that, “[a]pplying [the] separate analysis with 

a focus on the ‘uniquely broad and remedial aspects’ of the NYCHRL,” Snowden failed to 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the NYCHRL. Snowden v. Trustees 

of Columbia Univ., 2014 WL 1274514, at *9 (quoting Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 61 

A.D.3d 62, 66–68, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 31–33 (1st Dep’t 2009)). Snowden contends that the 

district court nevertheless failed to conduct a “meaningful” analysis or to construe her 

claim “broadly in her favor.” Appellant’s Br. 18. To be sure, it would have been 

preferable for the district court to have stated its reasoning in more detail. Snowden, 

however, does not explain how a more detailed analysis would have altered the conclusion 

that—even with the burden resting on the employer, as it does under the NYCHRL—she 

could not perform the essential functions of her position, with or without a reasonable 
7 

accommodation. Cf. Jacobsen v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 N.Y.3d 824, 840 & 

n.3, 988 N.Y.S.2d 86, 97–98 & n.3 (2014) (holding that evidence created triable issue of 

fact on whether plaintiff “could have reasonably performed his essential job duties” upon 

transfer to another office, and emphasizing that, “in seeking a transfer, plaintiff was not 

improperly attempting to compel [his employer] to establish a new light-duty position or a 

permanent light-duty position” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, the record 

does not compel a contrary conclusion as a matter of law. Accordingly, on de novo 

review, we conclude that Snowden’s NYCHRL claims were properly dismissed. 

3. Conclusion 

We have considered Snowden’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are 

without merit. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

FOR THE COURT: 

CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, Clerk of Court