### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT S eptember14 , 2 004 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 02- 1334 8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 98-00109 -CV -6 TR ACYMIL LE R, Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant, UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Intervenor, ve rs us RONALD KING, De fendant-Appellee, WAYNE GA RNER, THE STAT E OF GEORGIA, TH E G EO RGI A D EP ART MEN T O F CORRE CT IO NS , JO HN

NYSIKES , D ef en dants .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (S ep te m be r 14, 200 4) Be fo re CA RN E S, H U L L and H IL L , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. HU LL , C ircuit Judg e:2

Pl ai nti ff T ra cy Mi lle r (“ Mi lle r” ), apara ple gic state pr iso ne r, appe al s th e gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t onhis E igh th- A m en dm en t c la im s br ough t un de r 28 U . S. C. § 19 83 and h is d isa bil ity -d isc ri m inatio n c la im s br ough t un de r T itl e II of th e Am eri can s wi th Dis ab il it ie s Act , 42 U.S.C. §§ 12 13 1- 12 16 5 (“ ADA”). A ft er r ev ie wand o ra l arg um en t, w e re ve rs e as to Mi lle r’ s: ( 1) E igh thA m en dm en t c la im s un de r § 19 83 f or m one tary

dam ag es a ga ins t de fe ndant S ike s in his ind ivi dua l c ap ac ity ; ( 2) E igh th- A m en dm en t c la im s un de r § 19 83 f or inj unc tiv e re lie f ag ai nst

de fe ndant S ike s inhis of fi ci al c ap ac ity ; and ( 3) A D Ac la im s f or inj unc tiv e re lie f ag ai nst

de fe ndant S ike s inhis of fi ci al c ap ac ity . W e af

fi rm a s to Miller’ s AD A c laim s for m onetary dam ages as to all defendants and as to all other cl ai m s a ga ins t a ll de fe ndants . I. BACKG ROUND Mi lle r is a

para ple gic , w he el ch ai r- boun d in m at e at G eo rg iaS ta te P ri son (“ G SP ”) in Re ids vil le , G eo rg ia . Mi lle r suf fe rs f ro m c om ple te para ly sis in his r igh t leg, partial paraly sis in h is left leg, and a neurogenic bladder conditi on that causes ur in ary in co nt in en ce. At GSP , Mil le r is ho us edin di sc ip li na ry is ol at io n i n t he “ KBu il di ng ,” whi ch is de si gn at eda “ hi gh m ax im um ” se cu rit y

sec ti on of t he pri so n. A s ar es ult

of m or e than 18 0 di sc ipl inary r ep orts, Mi lle r ha s be enhe ld i n is olatio n in the K-B uildi ng sin ce at le ast 1998 , and is du e to rem ain in isol ation for a totalThe de fenda nts dispute Mil ler’s a lleg ation that the K-B uilding is not whee lchair- 1 acc essible. Howe ver, in re viewinga grant of summar y judgme nt, we must view all evide nce a nd all fac tual infere nces the ref rom in the light most favor able to the non- moving pa rty . Bur ton v. City of B elle Glade , 178 F.3d 1175, 1186- 87 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, we outline Miller’ s version of the c on dit ion s and

e ve nts at G SP. 3 of m ore than eight y ears. Able-bodied in m ates in discipli nary isolation are housed in les s s tri ng en t u ni ts th an th e “ hi gh m ax im um ” se cu rit y

K-Bu il di ng . Becau se KBu ild ing c el ls are so s m al l and n ot a cc om m odate d f

or the w he el ch ai r- boun d, pr iso n po lic y

c al ls f or be ds t o be r em ove d da ily so tha t the w he el ch ai r- boun d inm at es have som e m ini m al are a w ith in whic h to m ove aro und the ir c el ls. 1 A. Com plaint Mi lle r or igi na lly

f ile d th is a ct ionund er

42 U . S. C. § 19 83 a ga ins t R ona ld K ing , the H eari ng O ff

ic er f or the O ff ic e of I nm at e D isc ipl ine a t G SP , and W ay ne G ar ne r, Co m m iss ion er of the G eo rg iaD ep ar

tm en t of Co rr ec tio ns ( “ G D O C” ), in the ir of fi ci al and i ndi vid

ua l c ap ac iti es . T he or igi na l c om pla int a lle ge d th at

the de fe ndants ha d de pr ive d M ill er of vari ous due -p ro ce ss r igh ts unde r the F ourte en th Am en dm en t, i nc lu di ng th e ri gh t t o p res en t wi tn es se s i n h is di sc ip li na ry he ari ng s. Mi lle r al so a lle ge d th at

the de fe ndants ha d pl ac ed him in iso la tio n be ca

use he is dis ab le d and i n r et al ia tio n f or his f ili ng s uit s. Mi lle r subs eque ntl y

a m en de d hi s c om

pla int to ad d a s de fe ndants the S ta te of G eo rg ia , the G D O C, and G SP W ar de n Jo hnny S ike s, in his of

fi ci al and4

indiv idual capacities. Miller also added disabili ty -discrim ination claim s under T itl e II of the A D A , r et al ia tio n c la im s un de r the F ir st Am en dm en t, and c ru el -andunus ual-punis hm ent claim s under the Eighth Am endm ent. Miller ’ s com plaint (as am ended, the “ Com

plaint”) soug ht m onetary and injunctive relief

. Re gard ing his E igh th- A m en dm en t and A D Ac la im s, Mi lle r’ s C om pla int es se nti al ly

m ak es the f

oll ow ing c la im s a ga ins t the de fe ndants : ( 1) that the re is no ro om in his sm al l c el l f

or him to m an euve r his w he el ch ai r, m ak ing him im m obi le an d r es tr ai ne d f

or e xte nde d pe ri ods of

ti m e an d th at

thi s pr obl em

is ex ac er ba te d by GS P staff ’ s failure to re m ove his bedfrom his cell daily , a s prison p olicy requires fo r w he el ch ai r- boun d in m at es ; ( 2) that the sho w er s and t oil et s inthe K -B uil din g ar e not w he el ch ai r- ac ce ssi ble , that he ha s be ende nie d th e oppo rt uni ty to ba the re gul ar ly and t o ob ta in b as ic hy gie ne , and tha t G SP sta ff have not pr ovi de d hi m ne ce ssary ur ine c athe te rs or

a ssi stanc e in u sin g po rt ab le toi le ts, r es ult ing in Miller’ s urination and defecation o n him self; and (3) that G SP off icials and staff have ignored his m edical com plaints, failed to provide him with rudim entary m ed ic al de vic es r equir ed f or his para ple gic c ondi tio n, inc lud ing le g br ac es , orthoped ic shoes, a wheelchair-a ccessible van, and wheelchair repairs, and failed t o p r o v i d e h i m wi th r e qu i r e dmed i c a l c ar e , i n c l u d i n g p h ys i c a l th e r ap y, oc cu pa tio na l the ra

py , and m ed ic al e va luatio n f or his spi na l c ondi tio n, r es ult ing inWhil e Mil le r m ake s v olumin ou s c la ims , ma ny of wh ic h a re un int e lli g ibl e or

no ns e ns ic a l, 2 we f ocus on the c laims by

Miller that are intelligible and a ppear potentially

viable. 5 bed sores, ser ious atroph y , and deterioration of his s pinal cond ition . As additional A D Ac la im s, Mi lle r as se rt s th at he ha s be ende nie d ba sic pr ivi le ge s pr ovi de d to able-bodied inm ates in isolatio n, including rem oval from isolation for one day a f t e r e a c h th i rty- d ay i s o l a t i o np e r i o d , an dp art i c i p a t i o ni n“ yar dc a l l ” an d“ g ym c a l l ” du r i n g e a c h s u c h r e mo v a l d ay. 2 Miller alleges that G SP off icials and staff, includin g W arden Sikes pe rs ona lly , w er e aw ar e of his para ple gic c ondi tio n, the inhum an e co ndi tio ns o f his co nf ine m en t and h is s er iou s m ed ic al ne ed s, and w er e de lib er at el y ind if fe re nt t o tho se c ondi tio ns and n ee ds. O n th es e ba se s, Mi lle r se ek s m one tary dam ag es and in jun ct iv e rel ie f un de r § 1 98 3 a ndTit le II o f th e ADA. B. Pr elim inary Injun ction He aring Mi lle r fi le d num er ous m oti ons fo r em er ge nc y pr el im inary

inj unc tio ns. T he m ag istrate j udge c ondu ct ed ahe ar ing a t whic h M ill er , se ve ra l i nm at es , and p ri son of fi ci al s te sti fi ed . W e re vie wthat e vid en ce be ca use Mi lle r re lie s onit

in thi s ap pe al . Dur in g t he he ari ng , Cla ren ce Do wns , a GSP p ris on er h ou se d i n t he KBu ild ing w ithMi lle r, te sti fi ed that he ha d ob se rv ed

c or re ct ion al of

fi ce rs usi ng6

ex ce s s i v e f

o rc e a g ai n s tMi l l er , t h ato ff i ce rs att i m es s h u to ff

th e w at ert o Mi l l er ’s cell for day s at a tim e, that Miller’ s cell w as not large enough to m aneuver a w he el ch ai r, and tha t pr iso n st af f did not r em ove be ds f

ro m c el ls d ur ing the day

to m ak e the c el ls whe el ch ai r- ac ce ssi ble . T he m ag istrate j udge a dm itt ed int o evidence a letter

from J. P hilip Fer

raro, GD OC Assistant Dire ctor of L egal Se rv ic es , ac opy

of w hic h w as pr ovi de d to W ar de n S ike s, statin g th at “ the be ds f

or disabled priso ners in restricted quarter s are r em oved du ring the day to ensure they have e noug h r oom

to m an euve r the ir

w he el ch ai rs in the ir

c el ls. ” D ur ing the hearing, Miller

em phasized that his bed was not rem oved from his cell daily

as re qui re d by

G D O C p oli ci es . Dr . C aroly

n Mailloux , the G SP m edical director, testified that Miller w as ab le to stand o n hi s own and m an euve r fo r shor t pe ri ods of

ti m e, and tha t whil e Mi lle r w oul d no t ne ce ssari ly r equir e a “ w he el ch ai r w ithle gs, ” it w oul d be be ne fi ci al to him . A lth oughD r. Ma ill oux re que ste d vari ous m ed ic al c onsu ltatio ns an d tr eatm en ts f

or Mi lle r, Mi lle r ne ve r re ce ive d th e pr es cr ibe d c onsu ltatio ns o r tr eatm en ts b ec au se e ac h ti m e ei the r Mi lle r re fu se d or G SP U til iz at ion Managem ent did no t approve the visit s. D r. Mailloux ackno wledged that Miller had experienced som e m

uscle atrophy . How ever, Dr . Ma illou x testified that m edical staff

exam ined Miller shortly

before or after he w as placed in disciplin ary7

isolatio n, that Miller’ s cell w as whee lchair-ac cessible, that she w as not awar e that the prison st aff had ever re fused Miller m edical treatm ent, and that Miller’ s life w as not in im m ine nt d an ge r due to la ck of m ed ic al tr eatm en t at the pr iso n. S he further testified that Miller had not received phy sical therapy because he r efused to go to a prer equisite cons ultation , and that Miller could travel in a regular van wit ho utan y

sp eci al acco m

m od at io ns . While able-bodied in m ates in isolatio n are housed elsewher e, W arden Sikes te sti fi ed that M ill er

w as hou se d inthe K -B uil din g be ca use of it s whe el ch ai r ac ce ssi bil ity

to the sho w er

and the y ar d. S ike s te sti fi ed that M ill er

w as m ove d to the K -B uil din g f

ro m the inf irm ar y be ca use he pr ove d ac ont inu al dis tr ac tio n to both st af f an d in m at es in the inf

irm ar y , and tha t the K -B uil din g’ s a cc om m odatio ns we re r easonable under thos e circ um stances. A ccording to W arden Sikes, there w as no o the r pla ce w he re oth er iso la tio n in m at es w er e hous ed that w oul d be wheelc hair-ac cessible for Miller. W ith regard to Miller’ s isolatio n tim e, W arden Si ke s a cknow le dge d th at

Mi lle r on o ne oc ca sio n ha d no t be enr em ove d a ft er thi rty day s of isolation , but testified that the failure to r em ove Miller w as due to an ove rs igh t onthat si ngl e oc ca sio n. Re gin al d F or d, ac or

re ct ion al of

fi ce r at G SP , te sti fi ed

that onone oc ca sio n he r es pond ed

to Mi lle r’ s c om

pla int of aba ck inj ur y , but the m ed ic al sta ff

did not8

respond imm ediately . GS P staff phy sician Dr. Thom as L owry testified that he had on on e occasion attem

pted to treat Miller for

back pain, but Miller re fused. D r. L ow ry te sti fi ed that M ill er

m et the c ri te ri a fo r ana ssi ste d- liv ing f ac ili ty a t Augus t St at e Me dic al P ri son, but that, to his kno w le dge , Mi lle r ha d r ec ei ve d r ea sona ble m ed ic al care at GSP . N ex t, V iso l S m ith , ac or

re ct ion al uni t m an ag er

a t G SP , te sti fi ed

that the m ed ic al st aff h adev al ua te d M il le r aft er h e co m pl ai ne d abo uthi s b ackin jury. A cc or din g to S m ith , pr iso n st af f cl eane d M ill er ’ s c el l and b ro ught f ood tr ay s to his be d, an d b ecau se th e st aff was ab le to acco m m od at e Mi ll er’s d is ab il it y , th e KBu ild ing w as appr opr ia te hou sin g f or Mi lle r. S m ithdid

te sti fy , how ev er , that the be d w as not

r em ove d f

ro m Mi lle r’ s c el l onada ily

ba sis to al lowMi lle r m or e ro om fo r hi s wh eel ch ai r, al th ou gh th ere wer e p la ns to be gi n d oi ng so . Finally , def

endant King, the G SP hearing officer, testified that m ost inm ates ar e re sto re d pr ivi le ge s and r et ur ne d to the dor

m s whe n th ey

are take n ou t of iso la tio n st at

us. Mi lle r, on the oth er

hand, c ont inu ed

to liv e in the K -B uil din g up on rem ov al fro m

is ol at io n s ta tu s due to hi s p oo r be ha vi or . C . D en ialof

P re lim in ar y In

ju nc ti on Af ter the hear ing, the m agistrate j udge iss ued a report re com m ending that the dis tr ic t c ourt de ny

Mi lle r’ s m oti on f

or apr el im inary

inj unc tio n. T hePart of the f actua l dispute in thi s case appea rs to be whe ther a

whee lchair- acc essible van 3 is nece ssary

to transport Miller or whe ther he can be transporte d safe ly by strappinghim into a regular pa sseng er se at in a van. 9 m ag istrate j udge c onc lud ed that M ill er

arg uably de m onstrate d ali ke lih ood of success on the m erits of his Eighth-Am endm ent claim s that GD OC staff

“ knowingl y

failed to rem ove [Miller’ s] bed from his cell each day

as re co m m en de d by

the L eg al D ivi sio n of

the G D O C and f

ai le d to c hange his status to a llo wf or c om ple te ge ne ra l po pul at ionpr ivi le ge s f or one day f oll ow ing thi rty day s of disciplin ary

isolation .” T he m agistrate j udge foun d, howe ver, that Miller fai le d t o e st ab li sh irr ep arab le ha rm , as re qu ire d fo r a p rel im in ary in jun ct io n. W ithr eg ar d to Mi lle r’ s E igh th- A m en dm en t c la im s, the m ag istrate j udge co nc lud ed , on the ba sis of D r. Ma ill oux’ s te sti m ony , that M ill er f ai le d to de m onstrate that the de fe ndants w er e de lib er at el y ind if fe re nt t o hi s se ri ous m ed ic al ne ed s. S pe ci fi ca lly , the m ag istrate j udge ’ s r ep ort st at ed : Mailloux test ifie d tha

t P l a intiff has been provided adequ ate m edical car e an d th at the re are no ser iou s m ed ic al ne ed s of P la int if f w hic h have not been accom

m odated. A ddit i o n al l y, Dr. Ma i l l o u x ex p l ai n edth atPl ai n t i ff ha s r ef use d m ed ic al c ar e on s ev er al oc ca sio ns. So m e of the se inc ide nts inc lud e Pl ai nti ff

r ef usi ng t o go to c onsu ltativ e ap poi ntm en ts at Augus ta Me dic al S ta te P ri son be ca use he w oul d not

be tr an spor

te d inave hic le which w as whee lch ai r ac cessible. D r. Mailloux expl ained that Pl ai nti ff ’ s m ed ic al c ondi tio n is suc h th at he doe s no t ne ed to be tr an spor te d inaw he el ch ai r ac ce ssi ble van. 310

N ex t, the m ag ist

rate j udge f

ound that: (1 ) the pr iso n’ s a ct ion s innot pe rm itt ing Mi lle r to r ee nte r the ge ne ra l po pul at ionw er e re as ona ble due to Mi lle r’ s a ggr es siv e be havio r an d hi s de fe nse le ssn es s to a tta ck s f ro m oth er inm at es ; ( 2) Mi lle r fa ile d to de m onstrate ali ke lih ood of suc ce ss o n th e m er its of

his due -p ro ce ss c la im ; and ( 3) any harm that M ill er

m igh t su ff

er in the f uture w as not

im m ine nt. T he m ag istrate j udge refused to recom

m end that Miller be transfer red to another fac ility , such as Augusta State Me dical Prison. O ver Miller’ s objections, the district court adopted the m agistrate j udge’s r eport and denied Miller’ s m otion for a prelim inary in jun ct io n. D. Sum m ary Judgm ent for Garne r and S ik es Su bse que ntl y , a ll de fe ndants j oin tly m ove d f or sum m ar y j udgm en t, and subm itted the affidavits of King, S ikes, and D r. Mailloux. In his affidavit, W arden Sikes stated that he was not m edically trained, that “ sick call requests” w ere routed dir ec tly to G SP m ed ic al sta ff

, and tha t he w as ne ve r inv olv ed in any de ci sio n re gard ing Mi lle r’ s di ag nosi s or c ar e. Mo re ove r, W ar de n S ike s st at ed that he did not dis cr im inate a ga ins t M ill er due to any

dis ab ili ty , and tha t M ill er w as m ove d to discipli nary

housi ng because he “ virtually destroy ed his hos pital cell.” In her affidavit, Dr . Ma illou x stated that the m edical car e re ceived by Miller w as co nsi ste nt w ithc ont em

por ar y m ed ic al standard s, and tha t M ill er ’ s ho usi ng11

as sig nm en t w as not

c ontrary to his m ed ic al c ondi tio n or ne ed s. D r. Ma ill oux furthe r state d: Whil e inm at e Mi lle r doe s have m ed ic al li m itatio ns, his co ndi tio n is n ot suc h th at he appe ar s to be dis ab le d inam aj or li fe a ct ivi ty . Whil e he use s aw he el ch ai r at

ti m es , he a lso ha s be enobs er ved st an din g and I have se enr ep orts of oc ca sio ns wh en he ha s cause d c onsi de ra ble dam ag e to h is cell , a ll of

whic h c oul d no t have be enphy sic al ly pos sib le if

he were i nd eedun ab le to am bu la te as h e so m et im es co nt en ds . In oppos ition to the defendants’ m otion for sum m ary j udgm ent, Miller subm itt ed tw o br ie fs , his own a ff

idavit , a s w el l a s th e af

fi davit s of

inm at es D w igh t Benton and Tony

Goodm an. Miller also filed his own m otion for sum m ary jud gm en t. In hi s af fid av it , Ben to n, a d is ab le d i nm at e atGSP, at te st edth atth e KBu ild ing c el ls w er e not

w he el ch ai r- ac ce ssi ble . B en tona ve rr ed that he is a paraly zed inm ate at G SP, that he is also hou sed in the K-Building, that Miller has no a cc es s to oc cu

pa tio na l the ra

py , phy sic al the ra

py , sho w er s, or

the li br ar y , and that M ill er ’ s c el l i s no t a cc om m odate d and l ac ks “ w he el ch ai r spa ce . ” A cc or din g to B en ton , Mi lle r w as hara sse d onada ily ba sis and n ev er

le av es his c el l. B en ton ne ve r obse rv ed

Mi lle r standi ng w ith out

the use of

his “ de vic es . ” I n hi s a ff idavit , G oodm an , anothe r dis ab le d in m at e at G SP , a lso state d th at

the c el l bl oc k whe re he an d M ill er

are hou se d is not

w he el ch ai r- ac ce ssi ble . A cc or din g to G oodm an ,In connec tion with an ear lier motion, Mill er pr esente d the af fidavit of Erne st Howard, 4 another disabled inmate in the K- Building , who stated that the c ells are too small to m aneuve r a whee lchair a

nd that the shower s are not safe f or disabled inmates. Dr. Mailloux also st ated in the letter that on many

occa sions Mil ler, a fter r equesting 5 medical e valuation, either ref used it outright or

ref used to be ha

ndcuff ed and tr ansported f

or evaluation. 12 Mi lle r ha s no w ay

to show er , and n o a cc es s to r ec re at ion , phy sic al the ra py , or o c c up a t i o n a l th e r ap y. 4 Inhis a ff idavit , Mi lle r atte ste d th at he is para ly ze d c om

ple te ly in his r igh t le g and p ar

tia lly in his le ft

le g du e to g unsh ot w ound s. Mi lle r fi le d ale tte r fr om Dr . Ma illou x in which she acknowledged that Miller is a “partially paralyzed inm at e. ” Mi lle r te sti fi ed that he is de nie d a cc es s to the gym , kit ch enc al l, 5 re qui re d m ed ic al tr eatm en t, phy sic al the ra py , oc cu pa tio na l the ra

py , and uri ne cathe te rs . A cc or din g to Mi lle r’ s a ff idavit , his be d is ne ve r re m ove d f ro m his c el l, he is denied wheelchair repairs and ortho pedic shoes, his legs swell, and his back hurts. Mi lle r as ks f

or a be d th at “ w orks” so tha t he c an

e le va te his f

ee t and l eg s to prevent continu ous “ dropfoot, swelling.” T he m ag istrate j udge ’ s r ep ort r ec om m en de d ( 1) that sum

m ar y j udgm en t be granted to defendants Garner and Sikes but no t the other defendants, and (2) that all of Miller’ s m otion s be denied. O ver Miller’ s objections, the district court ad opt ed the m ag istrate j udge ’ s r ep ort and g rante d sum m ar y j udgm en t t o S ike s andAlthough the mag istrate judg e grante d summary judgme nt on all ADA cla ims ag ainst the 6 State of Ge or g ia and GD OC , th e ma g istra

te jud g e ’s or de r a dd

re sse d o nly

Mil le r’ s A DAc la ims for moneta

ry damag es and not his ADA c laims for injunctive re lief. 13 G ar ne r, but oth er w ise de nie d sum

m ar y j udgm en t a s to de fe ndants K ing , the S ta te of G eo rg ia , and the G D O C. T he part ie s th enc onse nte d to the j ur isd ic tio n of the m agistrate j udge. E . S u mma r y J u d g me n t o n AD ACl a i ms Su bse que ntl y , de fe ndants K ing , the S ta te of G eo rg ia , and the G D O C f ile d a supp le m en ta l m oti on f

or part ia l sum

m ar y j udgm en t, w hic h th e m ag istrate j udge gr an te d. O ve r Mi lle r’ s ob j ec tio ns, the m ag istrate j udge c onc lud ed that: (1 ) Miller’ s AD A c laim s against the State of G eorgia and the GD OC we re pre cluded by the Ele venth Am endm ent; (2) public officials, such as King, in their individu al 6 ca pa ci tie s are not

sub j ec t t o A D Ali ab ili ty ; and ( 3) Mi lle r’ s on ly c la im s r em ai nin g fo r tr ia l w er e ag ai nst

K ing f or r et al ia tio n and d

ue -p ro ce ss v iol at ion s inpr iso n di sc ip li na ry

he ari ng s. F. Jury Trial on D ue-P rocess and R etaliation Claim s Against King T he m ag istrate j udge the n he ld a j ur y tr ia l onMi lle r’ s du e- pr oc es s and retaliation claim s against defendant King as the GSP hearing officer . The j ury re tur ne d ave rd ic t i n f

av or of K ing . T he m ag istrate j udge de nie d M ill er ’ s m oti ons fo r a n ew tr ia l an d ju dg m en t as a m at te r of law.On appe al, Miller also conte nds that he is entitled to proce ed under § 504 of the 7 Re ha bil itatio n A c t of

19 73 , 2 9 U .S. C. § 79 4( a ). Th is c la im w a s n e ve r r a ise d in the dis tr ic t c ourt , and thus we do not c onsider it for the f irst time on appeal. See Dra per v. Rey

nolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1274 n.5 (11th Cir. 2004). 14 G. A pp ea l O n a ppe al Mi lle r ar gue s th at : ( 1) the j ur y ’ s ve rd ic t onhis due -p ro ce ss and re ta liatio n c la im s w as not sup porte d by

sub stanti al e vid en ce ; ( 2) the m ag istrate j udge im pr ope rl y c ondu ct ed

voi r dir e an d la ck ed

j ur isd ic tio n; ( 3) the m ag istrate j udge and di strict court im properly denied Miller’ s m otion s for prelim inary inj unc tio ns; and ( 4) the m ag istrate j udge and d istri ct c ourt e rr ed

in gr an tin g summ ary j udgm ent to the defendants on his Eighth-Am endm ent claim s under § 19 83 and h is A D Ac la im s un de r T itl e II . E xc ep t f or the E igh th- A m en dm en t and ADA cl ai m s , t h es e a rg u m en t s l ac km er i tan dwa rr an tn o fu rt h erd i s cu s s i o n . We 7 thu s turnto the gr an t of

sum m ar y j udgm en t t o a ll de fe ndants on M ill er ’ s E igh thA m en dm en t and A D Ac la im s. II. ST AN DA RD OF RE VIEW

“ W e re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r uli ngs on m oti ons fo r sum m ar y j udgm en t de novo , appl y ing the sam e le ga l st an dard s th at bound the dis tr ic t c ourt. ” Ja ck son v. Be llS outh T el ec om

m . , 372 F . 3d 1 250, 127 9 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) . T his Co urt, li ke the tr ia l c ourt, m

ust vie wa ll ev ide nc e an d a ll fa ct ua l i nf er en ce s th er ef

ro m in the li ght15

m ost f av or ab le to the non -m ovi ng p ar ty . B urtonv. Ci ty

of Be lle G la de , 178 F . 3d 1175 , 118 7 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) . “ Is sue s of c re dib ili ty

and the w ei ght

a ff or de d to ce rt ai n e vid en ce are de te rm inatio ns a ppr opr ia te ly

m ad e by af ind er of f ac t and n ot a co urt de ci din g sum

m ar y j udgm en t. ” Mc Co rm ic k v. Ci ty of F ort L au de rd al e, 333 F.3 d 1 23 4, 1 24 0 n .7 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 3) . Sum m ar y j udgm en t i s a

ppr opr ia te w he n “ the ple ad ing s, de posi tio ns, an sw er s to int er

ro ga tor ie s, and a dm iss ion s onf ile , tog ethe r w iththe a ff

idavit s, if any , sho wthat the re is no g enuin e iss ue a s to any m at er ia l f

ac t and tha t the m ovi ng party is en tit le d to aj udgm en t a s am atte r of law . ” Ja ck son, 372 F . 3d at 12 79- 80 (quotin g Fed. R. Civ. P . 56(c) ). T here is no genuine iss ue for tria l if “ the record take n a s aw hol e co uld

not le ad ar at ion al tr ie r of

f ac t t o f ind f or the non -m ovi ng party . ” Matsu shi taE le c. I ndus . Co . v. Z en ithRa dio Co rp . , 475 U . S. 574 , 587 , 106 S. Ct . 13 48 , 13 56 (19 86 )) (ci ta ti on om it te d) ; J ack so n, 3 72 F.3dat 1 97 9- 80 . III. D ISCU SSION Mi lle r ch al le nge s th e gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t t o a ll de fe ndants on h is E igh th- A m en dm en t and A D Ac la im s. S pe ci fi ca lly , Mi lle r ar gue s, int er a lia , that: (1 ) ge nui ne iss ue s of

m at er ia l f

ac t pr ec lud e sum

m ar y j udgm en t onhis E igh thA m en dm en t c la im s a ga ins t W ar de n S ike s un de r § 19 83; ( 2) he is en tit le d to pr ospe ct ive inj unc tiv e re lie f unde r the A D A ; ( 3) Co ngr es s va lid ly abr ogate d th eMil le r w ants to p ur su e his Ei g hth -Ame ndme nt a nd AD A c la ims a g a ins t de fe nd ants 8 Ga rn e r a nd Ki nga s w e ll, but w e c on c lud e that hi s e vid e nc e do e s n ot c re ate fa c tua l is su e s to s ur v i v e s um m ar

y j u d g m e n ta s a g a i n s tG ar n e r an d K i n g . M i l l e r ’ s C o mp l a i n t , r e a d l i b e r a l l y, attempts to state an equa l-protec tion claim under the F ourtee nth Amendment, but Miller has pr od uc e d in su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e to c re ate a dis pute of

mate ri a l f

a c t on thi s c la im a s w e ll. 16 Eleventh A m endm ent in Title II of the A DA , a llowing him to recover m onetary dam ag es f

ro m the S ta te of

G eo rg iaand the G D O C f or A D Avio la tio ns; and ( 4) the A D Apr ovi de s f

or sui ts a ga ins t S ta te of

fi ci al s inthe ir

ind ivi dua l c ap ac iti es , al lo win g h is ADA clai m s ag ai ns t t he in di vi du al de fen da nt s t o g o fo rward . W e af fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of the defendants except for Miller’ s: (1) § 1983 Eighth -A m endm ent claim s for m onetary dam ag es a ga ins t de fe ndant S ike s in div idu al ly ; ( 2) § 19 83 E igh th- A m en dm en t claim s for inj unctive relief against defendant Sikes in his official capac ity as W ar de n of

G SP ; and ( 3) A D Ac la im s f or inj unc tiv e re lie f ag ai nst

S ike s inhis of fi ci al c ap ac ity

a s W ar de n of

G SP . W e expla in why

the se c la im s surv ive 8 su m m ary jud gm en t an d wh y

ag ai ns t o nl y

de fen da ntSik es . A . Ei gh th -A m en dm en t C lai m s U nd er § 19 83 1. Pr ope r D ef

en dants U nde r § 19 83 When filing a suitunder 42 U. S. C. § 198 3, a prisoner is lim ited with respect to whom he or she m ay sue . Apla int if

f m ay not br ing a§ 19 83 a ct ionf

or m one tary dam ag es a ga ins t the S ta te of G eo rg ia , the G D O C, or

state of fi ci al s inIn E dw ard s, we e xpla ine d th at “ [a] s tate , a state a g e nc y , a

nd a state of fi c ia l su e d in

his 9 officia l capa city

are not ‘persons’ within the meaningof § 1983, thus damag es ar e unava ilable; but a state off

icial sued in his officia l capa city is a person f

or purpose s of § 1983 when pr os pe c tiv e re lie f, inc lud inginj un c tiv e re lie f, is s ou g ht. ” 49 F .3 d at 15 24 (c iti ngWill, 49 1 U .S. at 71, n.10, 109 S. Ct. at 2312, n.10). 17 the ir of fi ci al c ap ac iti es . W ill v. Mi ch . D ep ’ t of S ta te P oli ce , 491 U . S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct . 230 4, 231 2 ( 1989 ); E dw ar ds v . W al la ce Co m m uni ty Co lle ge , 49 F . 3d 1 517, 1 5 2 4 (1 1 th Ci r. 1 9 9 5 ). Fu rt h er , t h e E l ev en th Am en d m en tb ar s a p ri s o n er ’s 9 § 198 3 action against th e State of G eorgia and the GD OC for both m onetary dam ages and injunctive relief . Stevens v. G ay , 864 F. 2d 11 3, 114-15 (11th Cir. 1989 ). A cc or din gly , w e af fi rm the gr an t of

sum m ar y j udgm en t t o th e St at e of G eo rg iaand the G D O C o n M ill er ’ s § 1 983 cl ai m s. Apr iso ne r, how ev er , m ay br ing a§ 19 83 a ct iona ga ins t st at e of fi ci al s in their official c apacities, but on ly for prospective, injunctive relief . W ill, 491 U. S. at 71 n . 10, 109 S . Ct . a t 23 12 n . 10 ( ci tin g K en tuc ky v. G raham , 473 U . S. 159 , 167 n. 14, 105 S . Ct . 309 9, 310 6 n. 14 ( 1985 )) ; E x part e Y oung , 209 U . S. 123 , 159 -6 0, 28 S . Ct . 441 , 453 -5 4 ( 1908 ); se e E dw ar ds, 49 F . 3d at 15 24. F urthe r, “ the E le ve nthA m en dm en t do es not pr ohi bit apla int if f fr om sui ng s ta te of

fi ci al s in their official c apacities for prospective inj unctive relief. ” Ste vens, 864 F.2d at 1 1 5 . Th u s , War d en Si k es i nh i s o ff i ci al cap ac i ty i s a s u ab l e d ef en d an ti nMi l l er ’s § 1 98 3 c la im s fo r in

jun ct iv e rel ie f.18

In addition, a prisoner m ay sue state officials in their individu al capac ities unde r § 19 83 and r ec ove r m one tary dam ag es , but

onl y if suc h pe rs ons ar e not en tit le d to qua lif

ie d im m uni ty . S ee D ’ A guanno v. G al la ghe r, 50 F . 3d 8 77, 879 (1 1thCi r. 199 5) . T hus, W ar de n S ike s inhis ind ivi dua l c ap ac ity is a sua ble de fen da ntin Mi ll er’s § 19 83 cla im s fo r m on et ary da m ag es . T he m or e dif

fi cu lt que sti on i s whe the r Mi lle r’ s e vid en ce w as suf fi ci en t t o cr eate f ac tua l i ssu es r eg ar din g hi s a lle ge d E igh th- A m en dm en t vi olatio ns a ga ins t W ar de n S ike s. W e dis cu ss o ur E igh th- A m en dm en t j ur isp ru de nc e an d th enappl y it to Mi ll er’s cl ai m s. 2. U nne ce ssary

and W an tonI nf

lic tio n of P ai n

“ A lth oughthe U nit ed

S ta te s C onst itutio n do es not r equir e co m fo rt ab le pr iso ns, ne ith er

doe s it pe rm it inhum an e one s. ” F ar ro wv. W es t, 320 F . 3d 1 235, 1242 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) ( ci tin g F ar m er v. Br ennan, 511 U . S. 825 , 832 , 114 S . Ct . 1970 , 197 6 ( 1994 )) . T he tr eatm en t a pr iso ne r re ce ive s inpr iso n, a lon g w iththe co ndi tio ns unde r w hic h th e pr iso ne r is c onf ine d, is gove rn ed

by the E igh th A m en dm en t, w hic h pr ohi bit s c ru el and unusu al pun ish m en t. I d. ( ci tin g H el lin g v. McKi nn ey , 50 9 U.S. 2 5, 3 1, 1 13 S. Ct. 2 47 5, 2 48 0 (1 99 3) ). The E ighth Am endm ent, howe ver, “ does not authorize j udicial re co nsi de ratio n of

‘ ev er y gov er nm en ta l a ct iona ff

ec tin g th e int er es ts o r w el l- be ing19

of apr iso ne r. ’ ” Cam

pbe ll v. S ike s, 169 F . 3d 1 353, 136 2 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) ( quot ing Whit le y v. A lbe rs , 475 U . S. 312 , 319 , 109 S . Ct . 107 8, 108 4 ( 1988 )) . “ If pr iso n conditi ons are m erely

‘ restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty

that cr im ina l of

fe nde rs pay

f or the ir of fe nse s a ga ins t so ci ety . ’ ” Ch an dle r v. Cr osby (1 1thCi r. Augus t 6, 200 4) ( Sl ip O p. a t 33 68) ( quot ing Rh ode s v. Ch ap m an , 452 U. S. 337, 347, 101 S. Ct. 2392 , 2399 (1981)). P rison cond ition s rise to the level of an E igh th- A m en dm en t vi olatio n on ly w he n th ey

inv olv e the w an tonand unne ce ssary

inf lic tio n of pa in. I d. ; H ope v. P el ze r, 536 U . S. 730 , 737 , 122 S . Ct . 25 08 , 25 14 (20 02 ); F arro w, 32 0 F .3dat 1 24 2; Cam pb el l, 1 69 F.3dat 1 36 2. To es ta bli sh “unne ce ssary

and w an toninf

lic tio n of pa in, ” a pla int if

f is r equir ed

to sh ow “ th atoff

ic ia ls act edwit h s pe ci fic in te nt .” Cam pb el l, 1 69 F.3dat 1 36 2.

“ [T ] he exact nature of

the specific intent required depends on th e ty pe of claim

at iss ue . ” I d. a t 13 63. To show an Eighth-Am endm ent violatio n, a prisoner m ust satisfy

both an obj ec tiv e an d asub

j ec tiv e inquir

y . C handl er , S lip O p. a t 33 69; F ar ro w , 320 F . 3d at 124 3. U nde r the obj ec tiv e co m pone nt, apr iso ne r m

ust pr ove the c ondi tio n he co m pla ins of is suf fi ci en tly se ri ous to v iol at e the E igh th A m en dm en t. H udso n v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1, 8, 112 S. Ct. 995, 999 (199 2). Specifica lly , a prisoner m ust prov e “ a serious m edical need” or the denial of “ the m inim al civilized20

m easure of life’ s necessities.” C handler, S lip Op. at 3369 ; Farr ow, 320 F.3d at 1243 ; R hode s, 452 U . S. a t 34 7, 101 S . Ct . a t 23 99. “ T he c ha lle nge d pr iso n co ndi tio n m

ust be ‘ ex tr em e’ ” an d m

ust pos e “ anunr ea sona

ble r isk of se ri ous dam ag e to h is f

uture he al th. ” Ch an dle r, S lip O p. a t 33 69 ( quot ing H udso n, 503 U.S. at 9 , 11 2 S . Ct. at10 00 ) (o th er ci ta ti on om it te d) . U nde r the sub

j ec tiv e co m

pone nt, the pr iso ne r m

ust pr ove that the pr iso n of fi ci al a ct ed

w ith“ de lib er at e ind if

fe re nc e. ” F ar

m er , 511 U . S. a t 8 37, 114 S . Ct . at 197 9 ( statin g th at

an in div idu al m ay

be he ld l ia

ble und er the E igh th A m en dm en t onl y if “ the of fi ci al kno w s of

and d isr eg ar ds an e xc es siv e ri sk t o in m at e he al th o r sa fe ty ; the of

fi ci al m ust both be aw ar e of

f ac ts f ro m w hic h th e inf

er en ce c oul d be dr awn th at

asub stanti al r isk

of se ri ous harm

e xis ts, and h e m

ust a lso dr awthe inference ”); H udso n, 503 U. S. at 8, 112 S. Ct. at 999; W ilson v. S eiter, 501 U.S . 294, 303 , 111 S . Ct . 232 1, 232 7 ( 1991 ). T o pr ove de lib er at e ind if fe re nc e, the pr iso ne r m

ust sho wthat the de fe ndant p ri son of fi ci al “ ‘ ac te d w ithasuf

fi ci en tly cu lpa ble state of

m ind ’ ” w ithr eg ar d to the se ri ous pr iso n c ondi tio n or se ri ous m ed ic al ne ed

in iss ue . C handl er , S lip O p. a t 33 69 ( quot ing H udso n, 503 U . S. a t 8, 112 S. Ct . a t 99 9) . N eg lig en ce or e ve n gr oss ne gli ge nc e doe s no t satis fy thi s standard. I d.; Cottrell v. Caldwe ll, 85 F. 3d 14 80, 1490 (11t h Cir. 1996 ).21

It is al so “ w el l e sta

bli she d inthi s C ir cu it that su pe rv iso ry of fi ci al s are not lia ble und er § 19 83 f or the unc onst itutio na l a ct s of the ir sub or din at es on the ba sis of r es pond eat su

pe ri or or vic ar iou s li ab ili ty . ” Co tto ne v. Je nne , 326 F . 3d 1 352, 1360 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) . S upe rv iso ry li ab ili ty und er § 19 83 o cc ur s on ly

w he n “ the superviso r personally

participates in the alleged unconst itutio nal conduct or when the re is a ca

usa l c onne ct ionbe tw ee n th e ac tio ns o f a supe rv isi ng o ff ic ia l and the al le ge d c onst itutio na l de pr ivatio n. ” I d. Ac au sa l c onne ct ionm ay be e sta bli she d: (1) when “ a history

of w idespread abuse puts the responsib le supervisor on n otice of the ne ed to co rr ec t the a lle ge d de pr ivatio n, and h e [o r she ] f ai ls t o do so” ; ( 2) w he n “ a supe rv iso r’ s c ust om or pol ic y r es ult s inde lib er at e ind if fe re nc e to co nst itutio na l r igh ts” ; or

( 3) w he n “ fa ct s su

ppor t an in fe re nc e that the sup er vis or dir ec te d th e subo rd inate s to a ct unl aw fu lly

or kne wthat the sub or din at es w oul d ac t un law fu lly

and f ai le d to sto p th em

f ro m doi ng s o. ” I d. ( int er

na l punc tuatio n, quot at ionm ar

ks, and c itatio ns o m itt ed ). W e nowtur n to Mi lle r’ s c la im s a ga ins t W ar de n S ike s. 3 . M i l l e r ’s C l a i ms W e conclude that Miller’ s evidence cre ates genuine issu es of m aterial f act regarding his Eighth-Am endm ent claim s for m onetary dam ages against W ardenWe rec og nize that Dr. Mailloux say s that Miller is only partially para ly zed in one leg 10 and ca n ambulate somewhat. Howe ver, Miller’ s evidenc e is that he c annot, cr eatingfac tual issues. In any

event, e ven ac ceptingDr. Mailloux’s st atements a s true, Miller still has serious medical ne eds and is at lea st substantially confine d to a whee lchair. 22 Si ke s inhis ind ivi dua l c ap ac ity and f or inj unc tiv e re lie f ag ai nst

W ar de n S ike s in hi s o ffi ci al cap aci ty. A s aw he el ch ai r- boun d para ple gic w ho s uf

fe rs f ro m c om ple te para ly sis in his rightleg, par

tial paraly sis in h is left leg, and a bladder conditio n that causes urinary incontin ence, Miller unquestio nably has serious m edical needs. See Br ow n v. H ughe s, 894 F . 2d 1 533, 153 8 ( 11th C ir . 199 0) ( im m obi le br oke n f

oot constitu ted serious m edical need); Mandel v. D oe, 888 F. 2d 78 3, 788 (11th Cir. 1989 ) (d et er ior at ing le g c onst itute d se ri ous m ed ic al ne ed ); se e al so S im m ons v. Co ok, 154 F . 3d 8 05, 808 ( 8thCi r. 199 8) ( co nc lud ing that whe el ch ai r- boun d para ple gic ha d se ri ous m ed ic al ne ed s) ; W ee ks v . Ch ab oudy , 984 F . 2d 1 85, 187 -8 8 (6 th C ir . 199 3) ( sam e) ; L aF au t v. S m ith , 834 F . 2d 3 89, 393 -9 4 ( 4thCi r. 198 7) (sam e); Mac lin v. Fre ake, 650 F.2d 885 , 889 (7th Cir. 1981 ) (sam e). Miller has 10 presented evidence that he wa s denied certain of those needs. A s discuss ed previousl y , Miller

presented testim ony

and affidavits stating th at he has been denied wheelchair repairs, phy sical therapy , m edical consultatio ns, and m edical devices such as leg braces and orthopedic sho es, e ffec tively rendering MillerThe district cour t adopted the mag istrate judg e’s r eport re commendingdenial of 11 Mil le r’ s p re lim ina

ry inj un c tio n mo tio n f

or fa ilure to s ho w i rr e pa

ra ble inj ur y . In th at r e po rt , howeve r, the mag istrate judg e found that Mill er a rguably demonstrated a

likelihood of succe ss on his Eighth-Amendment claim that GSP prison officials, such a s Warden Sikes, knowing ly failed to have his bed r emoved f rom his cell ea ch day , as re commended by the L eg al Division of the GD OC . 23 im m obi le and c au sin g hi s m usc le s to a tr ophy . A cc or din g to Mi lle r, thi s pr obl em is ex ac er ba te d by the und isp ute d f

ai lur e of G SP of fi ci al s to r em ove his be d da ily fr om his c el l t o a llo whim

to m an euve r his w he el ch ai r, a s r equir ed by pr iso n pol ic y . Mi lle r’ s e vid en ce f urthe r sugg es ts tha t G SP ’ s f ai lur e to p ro vid e him

w ith 11 req ui redm ed ic al care ha s ca us edhi s s pi na l co nd it io n t o d et eri or at e. Ina ddi tio n, Mi lle r ha s pr es en te d a ff idavit s st at ing that the K -B uil din g in w hic h he is hous ed

doe s no t c ont ai n whe el ch ai r- ac ce ssi ble sho w er s and t oil et s, that he is de nie d th e oppo rt uni ty to ba the , and tha t he is de nie d ur ine c athe te rs and sta ff a ssi stanc e in u sin g to ile ts. Whil e the de fe ndants hot ly dis put e the se assertions, Miller’ s evidence cre ates genuine issu es of m aterial f act as to whether he , as apa rap le gi c, ha s b een affo rd edth e b as ic lev el s o f hu m an e car e an d h y gi en e. A ssum ing the tr

uthof the a ff idavit s pr es en te d by

Mi lle r – th at

Mi lle r is w he el ch ai r- boun d and v irtua lly im m obi le or tr ap pe d inhis sm al l, uns an itary c el l fo r ex te nde d pe ri ods, f

or ce d to r em ai n inhis own ur ine and e xc re m en t w ithno ability to m ove and no p hy sical therapy , a s his bo dy deteriorates – Miller

has sa ti sf ie d t he ob jecti ve pro ng of t he de li be rat e in di ffer en ce i nq ui ry .Se e , e .g ., Simm on s, 15 4 F .3 d at 80 8 ( c on c lud ingthat pr iso n o ff ic ia ls w e re de lib e rate ly 12 indiffer ent to needs of

para pleg ic, wher e whe elcha ir could not pass through the ce ll doors and mane uv e r a

ro un d th e c e ll b unk to re a c h th e fo od tr ay slo t and the toi le t ha d n o h and

ra ils ); Wee ks , 98 4 F .2 d at 18 7 ( do c tor ’s kn ow le dg e that pa ra ple g ic pr iso ne r c ou ld n ot h ave wh e e lc ha ir in cellblock a

nd ref usal to admit prisoner to the infirmar y , wher e he c ould use a whe elcha ir, established deliber ate indiffe renc e); L aF aut, 834 F.2d a t 393-94 (deliber ate indiffe renc e whe re para pleg ic inmate wa s not provided conve nient whee lchair- acc essible toilet and was not provide d adequate re habilitation therapy duringincar cer ation); Maclin, 650 F .2d at 889 (c oncludingthat para pleg ic inmate esta

blished colorable deliberate-indiffe renc e cla im where he re ceive d no phy sical thera

py duringeleve n months of incarc eration). 24 Re gard ing the sub

j ec tiv e inquir

y , S ike s a cknow le dge d r ec ei vin g num er ous verbal and wr itten com

plaints from

Miller and even visited his cell. Sikes noted that M ill er ’ s c om

pla int s have be en“ voi ce d c ount le ss t im es . ” A cc or din g to Mi lle r’ s e vid en ce , S ike s w as aw ar e of Mi lle r’ s se ri ous m ed ic al ne ed s, the conditi ons of his confinem ent, and that GSP staf f w ere not correcting the alleged deprivation s and thus we re a cting un lawf ully . Ye t, a ccording to Miller’ s evidence, Si ke s ne ve rthe le ss d id n ot e xe rc ise his auth or ity a s W ar de n to pr ovi de Mi lle r w ith the required m edical attention and basic liv ing cond ition s to which he is entitled unde r the E igh th A m en dm en t. 12 A s no te d e ar lie r, sup er

vis or s, suc h a s W ar de n S ike s, are not vic ar iou sly li ab le forth e in act io n o f pr is on m ed ic al st aff, g ua rd s, o r ot he r pr is on off ic ia ls . Wha t M ill er

c la im s, how ev er , is that W ar de n S ike s kn ewG SP sta ff w er e ac tin g unlawfully

and that Sikes failed to stop th em . To som e extent, M iller’ s evidence also im plicates W arden Sikes in not personallyhaving follo we d the prison policyB e c a us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

fo un d n o c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n und e r t he Ei g hth 13 Am e ndme nt, the dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a dd re ss whe the r d e fe nd ant S ike s in div idu a lly is e nti tle d to qualified immunity

on any of Miller’s § 1983 c laims for monetar y damag es. See F arr ow, 320 F . 3 d at 1 2 4 9 n . 2 2 . O na

p p e a l, th e d e f

e n d an ts a ls o h av e n o t a d dr e s s e d qu a li f ie d immu n it y . We believe that this i ssue is best addre ssed by the district court in the fir st instance. In addition, we note that Miller br oug ht another § 1983 la wsuit for Eig hth-Amendment violations in Mi ller v. Wetherington, case no. 99-00083-CV-JEG-6 (S.D. Ga .), af f’d, No. 02- 15471 (11th Cir. Oct. 31, 2003). On a ppeal, the de fenda

nts do not contend that any of Miller’s Eig hth-Amendment c laims in thi s case was a lrea dy decide d in his other case . Thus, Miller may proce ed on his Eig hth-Amendment c laims in thi s § 1983 suit. In addition, “[b] eca

use injunctions regulate future conduct, a party has standingto seek 14 inj un c tiv e re lie f o nly

if the pa rt y a lle g e s . . . a

re a l and imm e diate – a s o pp os e d to a me re ly c on je c tur a l or

hy po the tic a l – t

hr e at of futur e inj ur

y .” Sho tz v. Cate s, 25 6 F .3 d 1 07 7, 10 81 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 1) (q

uo tin gWoo de n v . B d. of

Re g e nts of

Un iv. Sy s. of

Ga ., 24 7 F .3 d 1 26 2, 12 84 (1 1th Cir. 2001)). In ADA c ases, this Court has held that a pla intiff lacks standingto seek injunctive re lie f u nle ss h e a lle g e s f

a c ts g ivi ngri se to a

n in fe re nc e that he wi ll s uf fe r f utu re dis a bil ity 25 re g ar d i n g re m o v al o f M i l l er ’s b edfr o m h i s ce l l . Wh i l e w e r ec o g n i ze th atSi k es ’s version of events differs totally from Miller’ s, the evidence pre sented by Miller cr eate s ge nui ne iss ue s of

m at er ia l f

ac t a s to w he the r Si ke s w as de lib er at el y ind if fe re nt t o M ill er ’ s se ri ous m ed ic al ne ed s and t o th e inhum an e co ndi tio ns i n w hic h M ill er

is hous ed , in vio la tio n of the E igh th A m en dm en t. A cc or din gly , the d i s tri ctco u rterre di ng ra n t i n g s u m m ary ju d g m en tt o d ef

en d an tSi k es o nMi l l er ’s E igh th- A m en dm en t c la im s un de r § 19 83. 13 B. AD A Inj unct ive Relief W e al so a gr ee w ithMi lle r that he is en tit le d to sue de fe ndant S ike s inhis of fi ci al c ap ac ity

f or inj unc tiv e re lie f unde r the A D A , and tha t the E le ve nth A m en dm en t do es not

bar suc h su its . 14discrimination by the def endant. I d. Miller is servinga life se ntence for murde r. Given that Miller will remain inca

rce rate d for some time, he has met this standing r equire ment for injunctive relief

. 26 T itl e II of the A D Age ne ra lly

pr ohi bit s di sa

bil ity dis cr im inatio n by

a“publ ic entity ” in the adm inistration of its services, program s, or a ctivities. 42 U. S. C. § 12 132. T he A D Ae xte nds to d isa bil ity dis cr im inatio n a ga ins t st at e pr iso n inm ates. Pennsy lvania Dep’ t of Corr. v. Y eskey , 524 U. S. 206, 212, 213, 118 S. Ct . 195 2, 195 6 ( 1998 ) (s ta tin g th at the “ A D Aunam

big uous ly e xte nds to s ta te pr iso n in m at es , ” but

de cl ini ng t o de te rm ine w he the r that a ppl ic at ionis a co nst itutio na l e xe rc ise of c ongr es sio na l po w er ); se e al so O nis he a v. H oppe r, 171 F.3 d 1 28 9, 1 29 6 n .11 (11 th Cir . 19 99 ) (en ba nc ) (s ta ti ng “ The Supr em e Co ur t . . . de ci de d th at

the A m er ic an s w ithD isa bil iti es A ct

appl ie s to pr iso ns” ) (c iti ng Y es ke y , 524 U . S. 206 , 118 S . Ct . 195 2) . T hus, the pr inc ipa l r em ai nin g is sue ra ise d he re a s to Mi lle r’ s A D Ac la im f or inj unc tiv e re lie f is whe the r it is b ar re d by th e Ele ve nt h Am en dm en t. Whil e the E le ve nthA m en dm en t ge ne ra lly bars sui ts a ga ins t no n- co nse nti ng St at es , “ [u ]nde r th e d oc tri ne of Ex pa rte You ng , 20 9 U.S. 1 23 , 28 S. Ct. 4 41 , 52 L. E d. 714 ( 1908 ), the re is a lon g and w el l- re co gni ze d e xc ep tio n to thi s r ule f or sui ts ag ai nst state of fi ce rs se ek ing pr ospe ct ive e qui ta ble r el ie f to e nd c ont inu ing vio la tio ns o f fe de ra l l aw . ” F la . A ss’ n. of Re hab. F ac ili tie s v. F la . D ep t. of H ea lthIn Gar rett, the Supreme Court expressly declined to a ddress whe ther moneta ry damag es 15 under Title I Iof the AD A ar e re cover able f rom the States. 531 U.S. at 360, n.1, 121 S. Ct. at 27 and Rehab. S ervs., 225 F.3d 1208 , 1219 (11th Cir. 2000) (addressing a suit un der th e Me di cai d Act ). T his E x part e Y oung e xc ep tio n w as r ec ogni ze d inthe A D Ac ont ex t i n Bo ar d of T ru ste es of

U niv er sity

of A la bam a v. G ar

re tt, 531 U . S. 356 , 374 n. 9, 121 S. Ct. 955, 968 n.9 (2001 ). T he Suprem e Court in Garrett f irst concluded th at St at es are e nti tle d to sov er ei gn i m m uni ty und er the E le ve nthA m en dm en t f or sui ts fo r m one tary

dam ag es und er

T itl e I of the A D A . I n af

ootnot e, how ev er , the Su pr em e Co urt r ea ff

irm ed the E x part e Y oung e xc ep tio n, not ing that i ts h old ing ab out m one tary

dam ag es did

not pr ec lud e sui ts unde r T itl e I of the A D Aa ga ins t state of fi ci al s inthe ir

of fi ci al c ap ac iti es f

or inj unc tiv e re lie f, a s f

oll ow s: O ur hol din g he re that C ongr es s di d no t va lid ly abr ogate the S ta te s’ sovereign imm

unityfrom

suit by private individ uals for m oney dam ages under Title I does not m ean that persons with disabili ties have no federal recourse a gainst di scrim ination . Title I of the A DAstill prescribes standard s a

ppl ic ab le to the St at es . T hose standard s c anbe e nf or ce d by the U nit ed

S ta te s ina ct ion s f

or m one y dam ag es , a s w el l a s by

pr ivate ind ivi dua ls i n a ct ion s f

or inj unc tiv e re lie f unde r E x part e Y ou ng , 209 U.S. 12 3, 2 8 S . Ct. 4 41 , 52 L. Ed. 71 4 (1 90 8) . . . . Id . , n. 9 ( em

pha sis a dde d) . A lth oughthe above f ootnot e w as in the c ont ex t of T itl e I rathe r than T itl e II of

the A D A , and a lth oughthe S upr em e Co urt i n G ar re tt em pha siz ed it w as r uli ng o nly

on T itl e I, w e se e no r ea son (and the S ta te

15960, n.1 (“We a re not disposed to dec ide the constitutional issue whether Title I I , which has somewhat diff

ere nt remedia l provisions from Title I , is appropriate leg islation under § 5 of the Four teenth Amendme nt when the pa rties have not favore d us with briefingon the statutory question.”). As discussed in g reater de tail later in this opinion, ADA Title I I ’s terms do not 16 authorize a suit ag ainst an individual; rather , they subject only

a “public e ntity ” to liability . 42 U. S.C. § 1 21 32 . H ow e ve r, in a n o ff ic ia l- c a pa c ity su it f or inj un c tiv e re lie f, the re a l pa rt y in int e re st i s th e g ov e rnme nt e nti ty . T hu s, a su it a g a ins t a

state of fi c ia l in his or he r o ff ic ia l c a pa c ity is in effe ct ag ainst a “public e ntity ” and is a uthorized by

§ 12132. See He nrietta D. v. Bloomber g , 331 F.3d 261, 288 ( 2d Cir. 2003). 28 de fe ndants of

fe r none ) that c la im s un de r T itl e II sho uld be tr eate d di ff

er en tly w ith regard to inj unctive relief. 16 T he re fo re , w e j oinour

sis te r ci rc uit s inhol din g th at the E le ve nth Am endm ent does no t bar A DAsuits u nder Title II f or prospective injunctive relief ag ai nst state of fi ci al s inthe ir

of fi ci al c ap ac iti es . Mc Carthy v. H awkin s, — F . 3d — ( 2004 W L 178 9945 a t * 7) ( 5thCi r. Augus t 11 , 200 4) ; C ha ff in v . K an sa s S ta te Fa ir Bd . , 348 F . 3d 8 50, 866 -6 7 ( 10th C ir . 200 3) ; H enri ettaD . v. Bl oom be rg , 331 F. 3d 2 61, 288 ( 2d C ir . 200 3) ( “ T his f ootnot e, a lbe it dic taand a lth oughspe ci fi ca lly ad dr es sin g T itl e I, r ef

le ct s th at the E x part e Y oung e xc ep tio n to the E le ve nth Am endm ent bar to suit is vi able under the AD A. ”); Br uggem an ex rel. Bruggem an v. Bl ag oj ev ic h, 324 F . 3d 9 06, 913 ( 7thCi r. 200 3) ( not ing that the re is “ no r el ev an t differe nce betwe en Title I and Title I I, which governs acce ss to services, so far as the appl ic ab ili ty

of E x part e Y oung is co nc er ne d” ); Mi randaB. v. K itz habe r, 328 F. 3d 1 181, 118 7 ( 9thCi r. 200 3) ; C ar te n v. K en t S ta te U niv . , 282 F . 3d 3 91, 396A “public e ntity ” is define d as “a ny depar tment, ag ency , specia l purpose district, or 17 other instrumentality

of a State or

States or local g overnme nt.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). Thompson, Randolph, and L ove ar e ca ses involving prisoner suits under Title I Iof the 18 A D A . Ine a c hc a s e , o ur

s is te r c ir c u it s a p p li e d th e s ame te s t a s th is Co urt a p p li e d in Sh o tz . 29 (6 th C ir . 200 2) ( hol din g th at “ anof fi ci al w ho v iol at es T itl e II of the A D Adoe s no t re pr es en t ‘ the state ’ f

or pur pose s of the E le ve nthA m en dm en t, y et he or she nevertheless m ay

be held responsib le in an official c apacity for violating Title II, w hic h by it s te rm s a

ppl ie s on ly

to ‘ publ ic e nti t[ ie s] ’ ”) ; R an dol ph v . Ro ge rs , 253 F.3 d 3 42 , 34 8 (8 th Cir . 20 01 ). W e nowtur

n to w ha t M ill er

m ust pr ove to obt ai n in

j unc tiv e re lie f in h is A D Ac la im s. T o pr ove ac la im und er T itl e II of

the A D A , apla int if

f m ust establish: (1) that he is a qualified individu al w ith a disabili ty ; (2) that he w as ex cl ude d f

ro m the part ic ipatio n inor

de nie d th e be ne fi ts o f the se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, or activities of a public entity or otherwise subjected to discrim ination by such en tity ; ( 3) by

r ea son of suc h di sa bil ity . S hot z v. Cate s, 256 F . 3d 1 077, 107 9 ( 11th Ci r. 200 1) ( ci tin g 42 U . S. C. § 12 132) . Whil e the pub lic e nti ty in Sh otz w as a 17 co unty c ourtho use , thi s st an dard is equa lly

appl ic ab le w he n th e publ ic e nti ty or agency is a state prison. S ee T hom pson v. D avis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002 ); Randol ph, 170 F . 3d at 85 8; L ove v. W es tvi lle Co rr . Ctr. , 103 F . 3d 5 58, 560 (7 Cir. 1996 ). t h 18Se c tio n 1 21 31 (2 ) s tate s, a s f oll ow s: 19 Th e t e r m “ qu a lif ie d in div idu a l w itha

dis a bil ity” me ans an in div idu a l w itha dis a bil ity who, with or without rea sonable modifications to rules, policies, o r practices, the remova l of arc hitectura l, communication, or transpor tation barrie rs, or the provision of auxili ary

aids and ser

vices, mee ts the essential elig ibilit y requirem en t s for the re c e ipt of se rv ic e s or the pa

rt ic ipatio n in pro g ra

ms or a c tiv iti e s pro vid e d by a pu bli c e n t i ty. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). Acc ordingto the EEOC reg ulations interpretingthe ADA, 20 Th e te rm su bs tanti a lly

lim its me ans : (i) Una ble to perf

orm a majo r l i fe ac t ivity that the ave rag e per son in the g ener al population can pe rfor

m; or (ii) Signific antly

restr i cted as to the condition, manner or duration under

which an 30 In ord er t o e st ab li sh th e fi rs t el em en t o f a cl ai m un de r Tit le II o f th e ADA, the plaintiff m

ust sh ow that he is disabled and “ that he ‘ m eets the essential el igi bil ity r equir em en ts’ f

or part ic ipatin g inthe pr ogr am , w ithor w ith out reasonable acc omm odation s.” Love, 103 F.3d at 560 (quot ing 42 U. S. C. § 12 131( 2) ). T he A D Ade fi ne s “ dis ab ili ty ” as :

19 (A ) a phy sical or m ental im pairm ent that subs tantially lim its one or m ore of the m aj or

li fe a ct ivi tie s of

suc h in div idu al ; (B ) a re co rd

of suc h an im

pa irm en t; or (C ) be ing r eg ar de d a s havin g su chan im pa irm en t. 42 U . S. C. § 12 102( 2) . I n turn , “ m aj or li fe a ct ivi tie s” are de fi ne d a s in cl udi ng

“ ‘ func tio ns s uc h a s c ar ing f or one se lf , pe rf orm ing m anua l t as ks, w al kin g, se ei ng, he ar ing , spe ak ing , br eathi ng, le ar nin g, and w orkin g. ’ ” Ch en ow eth v. Hil ls bo ro ug h C ou nt y , 25 0 F .3d13 28 , 13 29 (11 th Cir . 20 01 ) (quo ti ng ADA regulations in 29 C.F .R. § 1630 .2(i) ). 20individual can perform a particula r major life activity

as compa red to the c ondition, manner , or duration und er wh i ch t he ave rag e per son in the g ener al population can p e r f o r mth ats am e m a

j o r l i f e a c t i v i ty. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) . 31 Inthi s c as e Mi lle r, apara ple gic , is dis ab le d un de r the A D Abe ca use he is subs tanti al ly

li m ite d inthe m aj or

li fe a ct ivi ty

of w al kin g. S ee 29 C . F. R. P t. 163 0, App. § 163 0.2(j ) (2004) (“ [A ] n indi vidu al w hose legs are para ly zed” or who “ can onl y w al k f or ve ry br ie f pe ri ods of

ti m e” is subs tanti al ly

li m ite d inthe a ct ivi ty

of wa lking ). In the prison cont ext, the diffic ult qu estion is what c onsti tutes a “ qualified ind ivi dua l” und er

the A D A . Adis ab le d pr iso ne r m ay not be “ qua lif

ie d” und er

the A D Ato part ic ipate in vari ous se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, or a ct ivi tie s be ca

use of discipli nary

rea sons , hea lth reasons, or other, valid penal justifications. Se e L ove, 103 F. 3d at 56 1 ( “N owhe re doe s W es tvi lle [ pr iso n] arg ue that so m e oth er r ea son m oti va te d it s a ct ion s, suc h a s th e ne ed to co nf ine L ove f

or dis ci pli nary

r ea sons , or fo r fe ar that othe r inm at es w oul d be inf ec te d, or be ca use L ove w as oth er

w ise unqu al if ie d to part ic ipate . ”) ; se e al so O nis he a, 171 F . 3d at 12 96- 1301 . T hus, whether a particular disabled priso ner is “ qualified” to participate in the service, pr ogr am or a ct ivi ty a t i ssu e m

ust be de ci de d c as e by

c as e ba se d onnum er ous32

fa ct or s, inc lud ing but

not li m ite d to va lid

pe na l j ust if

ic at ion s f or e xc lud ing a p art i c u l ar i n d i v i du a l p r i s o n e r

f r o m a s e rv i c e , p r o g r a m, o r a c t i v i ty. If apr iso ne r is b othdis ab le d and an “ oth er w ise qua lif

ie d in div idu al , ” a state prison m ay

not denyservices, program s, or a ctivities m erely because the prisoner has a disability . In Shotz, this Court noted that AD A r egulation s required that

“ ‘ no qu alified individ ual with a disability shall, beca

use a public entity ’ s facilities ar e ina cc es sib le to or

unu sa ble by ind ivi dua ls w ithdis ab ili tie s, be e xc lud ed f ro m part ic ipatio n in , or

be de nie d th e be ne fi ts o f the se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, or a ct ivi tie s of a public entity , or be subjecte d to dis crim ination by any publi c entity .’ ” Shotz, 256 F. 3d at 10 79- 80 ( quot ing 28 C . F. R. § 35 . 149) . R athe r, “ a publ ic e nti ty m ust m ake its services, program s, or a ctivities readily acce ssibl e to disabled ind ivi dua ls. ” I d. ( int er

na l qu otatio ns and c itatio ns o m itt ed ); se e Randol ph, 170 F. 3d at 85 8 ( T he A D A“ re qui re [s ] that othe rw ise qua lif ie d in div idu al s r ec ei ve m eanin gf ul a cc es s to pr ogr am s and a ct ivi tie s. ” (quot at ionm ar ks and c itatio ns om itted)); 28 C.F .R. § 35.150(a) (2004) (“ A public entity shall operate eac h service, program , or activity so that the service, program , or activity , when viewed in its entirety , is r eadily

acce ssibl e to and usable by indiv iduals with dis abilities.”). N one the le ss, e ve n if

an in m at e is a

“ qua lif ie d” ind ivi dua l and e nti tle d to reas on ab le acco m

m od at io ns , we m

us t em ph as iz e th at“ te rm s l ik e ‘reaso nabl e’ . . .33

ar e re la tiv e to c ir cum stanc es , and the c ir cum stanc es of apr iso n are dif

fe re nt f ro m tho se of asc hool , an of

fi ce , or af ac tor y . . . . ” Cr aw fo rd

v. I ndi an a D ep ’ t of Co rr s. , 115 F . 3d 4 81, 487 ( 7thCi r. 199 7) , abr ogate d onoth er gr ound s, E ri ck son v. Bd . of G ove rn or s of

S ta te Co lls . & U niv s. f

or N orthe as te rnI ll. U niv . , 207 F . 3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000 ). Consequently , c ourts m ust be m indful of the necessary balance betw een the A DA ’ s worthy goal of integration and a priso n’ s uniq ue need for security , saf

ety , and oth er penological concerns. S ee Randol ph, 170 F.3d at 859 (“ T he de fe ndants pr es en te d su bst an tia l e vid en ce that R an dol ph’ s r eque st f or [a sig nin g] int er

pr et er c re at ed sa fe ty and s ec ur ity

iss ue s, a s w el l a s pl ac ed

a fi nanc ia l burd enon the pr iso n. T he D ep ar tm en t of Co rr ec tio ns i s e nti tle d to have its e vid en ce c onsi de re d by the f ac t- fi nde r in this c as e. ”) ; L ove , 103 F . 3d at 56 1 (“ Se curi ty

c onc er ns, sa fe ty c onc er ns, and a dm ini str at ive e xig en ci es w oul d a ll be im portant c onsi de ratio ns t o take int o a cc ount . ”) ; C raw fo rd , 115 F . 3d at 48 7 ( “ T he se curi ty c onc er ns tha t the de fe ndant r igh tly e m pha siz es in ur gin g us to ex cl ude pr iso ne rs f

ro m the pr ote ct ion s of

the A ct are hig hly

r el ev an t t o de te rm ini ng the fe as ibi lity of the a cc om

m odatio ns tha t di sa

ble d pr iso ne rs ne ed

in or de r to h av e acce ss to desired prog ram s and services.” ). Finally , prisoner a ccess to program s need not be un iversal because “ [a] publ ic entity

need not ‘ m ake structural changes in existing fac ilities where otherNothing in this opinion should be rea d as cr eatinga “r ight of transfe r” to a

particula r 21 pr iso n und e r t

he AD A. Rathe r, pr iso n a uth or iti e s st ill ma int a in a

g re at de a l of

dis c re tio n in runningtheir pena l insti tutions, and such discretion norma lly outweig hs any

interest that any individual prisoner may

have in r emaininghoused in a pa rticular pr ison. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245, 103 S. Ct. 1741, 1745 (1983) (prisoner s have no r ight to be incar cer ated in any

particula r prison within a state) ; Ellard v. Alabama B d. of Pardons a nd Paroles, 824 F .2d 937, 941-42 (11th Cir. 1987). How ever , in the context of the ADA, a pr iso ne r’ s tr ans fe r f

ro m or to a pa rt ic ula r p ri so n ma

y be c ome re le va

nt whe n p ri so n o ff

ic ia ls attempt to determine what constitutes a “r easona ble” a ccommodation. 34 m ethods are e ff

ec tiv e in a ch ie vin g c om

pli an ce w iththi s se ct ion . ’ ” Sh otz , 256 F . 3d at 1080 (qu oting 28 C.F .R. § 35.150(b)(1)). Rather , “ if one fac ility is inaccessible, a [p ri son] m ay

c om ply w ithT itl e II by

m ak ing it s se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, and ac tiv iti es a va ila

ble a t anothe r fa ci lity

that i s a cc es sib le . ” S hot z, 256 F . 3d at 10 80 (citing Parker

v. Universidad de Puerto Rico, 225 F. 3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000 )). 21 Whil e w e co nc lud e that M ill er ha s adis ab ili ty

und er the A D A , the m ag istrate j udge did

not a ddr es s M ill er ’ s A D Ac la im s f or inj unc tiv e re lie f an d w he the r Mi lle r w as a“ qua lif ie d in div idu al ” unde r the A D A , or w he the r his dis ci pli nary

pr obl em s m ad e him

unqua lif ie d to part ic ipate in ce rt ai n se rv ic es , p r o g r a ms , o r

a c t i v i t i e s . I f

M i l l e r i s aqu a l i f

i e di n d i v i du a l f

o r a tl e a s ts o me services, program s, or a ctivities, the m agistrate j udge also d id notaddress what ac co m m odatio ns are r ea sona

ble und er the A D Ain Mi lle r’ s part ic ular ca se . T hus, we rem and all of Miller’ s AD A c laim s for inj unctive relief against defendant Sikes35

in h is o ff ic ia l c ap ac ity

f or the dis tr ic t c ourt t o de te rm ine the se iss ue s inthe f ir st in st an ce. C . A D AM on et ar y D am age s C lai m s O n a ppe al , Mi lle r al so arg ue s th at the m ag istrate j udge e rr ed in gr an tin g su m m ary jud gm en t fo r de fen da nt s o n M il le r’s ADA clai m s fo r m on et ary da m ag es . A s e xpl ai ne d a

bove , the A D Aappl ie s to state pr iso ns, and M ill er is en tit le d to pr ove his A D Ac la im s f

or inj unc tiv e re lie f ag ai nst

de fe ndant W ar de n S ike s inhis of fi ci al c ap ac ity . R eg ar din g M ill er ’ s A D Ac la im s f or m one tary

dam ag es , how ev er , thi s c as e pr es en ts the f orm ida ble le ga l qu es tio n of

w he the r Co ngr es s co nst itutio na lly

abr ogate d th e E le ve nthA m en dm en t i n T itl e II of the A D A– a qu es ti on th atha s at tra ct edsi gn ifi can t an d wel l-f ou nd edde ba te in th e co ur ts . To ai d our an al y sis , w e de sc ri be the int er play be tw ee n th e A D Aand the E le ve nth A m en dm en t, and the e vol vin g j ur isp ru de nc e in this are a, c ulm inatin g inthe Supr em e Co ur t’s re cen t d eci si on in Tenn es se e v . Lane , 12 4 S . Ct. 1 97 8 (2 00 4) . 1. AD A O verview The purpose of the A DAis “ to provid e a c lear and com prehensive nation al m an da te f

or the e lim inatio n of

dis cr im inatio n a ga ins t i ndi vid ua ls w ith dis ab ili tie s. ” 42 U . S. C. §§ 1 2101 (b )( 1) . T o th at e nd, the A D Ainv oke s “ the sw ee p of c ongr es sio na l auth or ity , inc lud ing the pow er to en fo rc e the f

ourte en th36

am en dm en t and t o r eg ulate c om m er ce , ” 42 U . S. C. §§ 1 2101 (b )( 4) , and g en er al ly pr ohi bit s di sc ri m inatio n a ga ins t i ndi vid ua ls w ithdis ab ili tie s inthe are as of em plo ym en t ( T itl e I) ; pu

bli c se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, and a ct ivi tie s ( T itl e II ); and pu bl ic acco m

m od at io ns (Tit le III). See Lane , 12 4 S . Ct. at19 84 . Specifica lly , T itle II of the AD A – the title at issue here – prescribes that

“ no qua lif

ie d in div idu al w ithadis ab ili ty sha ll, by r ea son of suc h di sa bil ity , be ex cl ude d f

ro m part ic ipatio n inor

be de nie d th e be ne fi ts o f the se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, or activities of a public entity , or be subjecte d to dis crim ination by any such en tity . ” 42 U . S. C. § 12 132 (e m pha sis a dde d) . T itl e II thu s purp orts t o r eg ulate dis cr im inatio n inthe pr ovi sio n of pub lic se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, or a ct ivi tie s by

pub lic en tit ie s. T he S upr em e Co urt ha s in str uc te d th at the A D Ae xte nds to discrim ination against state prison in m ates. Ye skey , 524 U. S. at 211-12, 118 S. Ct. at 1955-56 . Ne ither the Suprem e Court nor this Court, however , has y et addressed the precise issue in this case: whether S tates can be sued for m onetary da m ag es forvi ol at io ns of Ti tl e II o f th e ADA, as ap pl ie d i n t he pri so n c on te xt . 2. E le ve nth -A m en dm en t A na ly sisThe Eleve nth Amendment provides: “T he Judi cial powe r of the United States shall not 22 be construe d to ext end to any suit in l aw or

equity , commence d or prose cuted a g ainst one of the Un ite d St ate s b y

Citi zen s o f a

no the r S tate , o r b y

Citi zen s o r S ub

je c ts o f a ny F or e ig n St ate .” U. S. Const. amend. XI . 37 A s age ne ra l r

ule , the E le ve nthA m en dm en t gr an ts S ta te s im m uni ty to sui ts brough t by

private citizens in feder al court. T he Suprem e Court has rec ogni zed 22 that C ongr es s c anabr ogate that so ve re ignim m uni ty w he re ( 1) Co ngr es s

“ une qui voc al ly

e xpr es se d it s in te nt t o a

br ogate ” the S ta te s’ sov er ei gn i m m uni ty in the statut e at

iss ue , and ( 2) “ Co ngr es s a ct ed pur suant t o ava lid

gr an t of constitu tional auth ority .” K im el v. F lorida Bd. of R egents, 528 U. S. 62, 73, 120 S. Ct . 631 , 640 ( 2000 ). T he A D Apla inl y state s th at

“ [a ] S ta te sha ll not

be im m une under the eleventh am endm ent to the Const itutio n of the United States f rom an action in Federal or S tate Court . . . f or a violation of” the AD A. 42 U. S. C. § 12 202. A cc or din gly , the f ir st r equir em en t – a cl ear int en tio n to abr ogate E le ve nth -A m en dm en t i m m uni ty – i s satis fi ed . S ee L an e, 124 S . Ct . a t 19 85. A s to th e s e c o n dr e qu i r e men t , th e AD Ai n v o k e s “ th e s w e e p o f c o n g r e s s i o n a l au th o r i ty, inc lud ing the pow er

to en fo rc e the f

ourte en th am en dm en t and t o r eg ulate com m erce . . . .” 42 U. S. C. §§ 12 101(b)(4). H owever , the S uprem e Court has cl ar if ie d th at Co ngr es s m ay

not abr ogate the S ta te s’ E le ve nth -A m en dm en t imm un it y form on et ary-dam ag es su it s b as edon it s Art ic le I co m m erce po wer.In the district court, the de fenda nts’ supplemental brief

in support of their summary 23 jud g me nt m oti on

argue d th at th e Comme rc e Cla us e a lso do e s n ot a

uth or ize Con g re ss t o r e gulate state prisons throug h Title I Iof the AD A. The district c ourt’s orde r did not addre ss this i ssue. Al tho ugh w e a dd

re ss i n th is s e c tio n whe the r T itl e I Iis v a lid § 5 le g isl atio n, we do no t a dd re ss whether Title I Iwas va lidly

enac ted under

Congr ess’s Ar

ticle I commerc e powe r for

purposes of injunctive relief

ag ainst States. Be cause the par ties have not brie fed this Commerce -Clauseinj un c tiv e -r e lie f i ssu e on

a pp e a l, w e le ave it t o th e dis tr ic t c ourt to a dd re ss t he iss ue in t

he fi rs t instance if it is raise d by

the par ties on remand.

38 Garrett, 531 U.S . at 364, 121 S. Ct. at 962; Kim el, 528 U.S . at 79, 120 S. C t. at 643. T he param ount

que sti on, the n, is w he the r Co ngr es s’ s in te nde d a br ogatio n of the S ta te s’ E le ve nth -A m en dm en t i m m uni ty in T itl e II of

the A D Aw as ava lid ex er ci se of

it s r em ed ia l po w er s un de r § 5 o f the F ourte en th A m en dm en t. 23 Se ct ion5 of

the F ourte en th A m en dm en t pr ovi de s: “ T he Co ngr es s sh al l have power to enfor ce, by

appropriate legislation, the provisi ons of thi s article. ” U .S . Const. am end. X IV , § 5. T he Suprem e Court has concluded that § 5 auth orizes Co ngr es s to “ re m edy

and t o de te r vio la tio n of

r igh ts g uarante ed

[ by the F ourte en th Am endm ent] by

prohibit ing a som ew hat broader sw ath of conduct, includin g that w hic h is not

it se lf f or bid de n by

the A m en dm en t’ s te xt. ” K im el , 528 U . S. a t 81 , 120 S. Ct . 644 . “ L eg isl at ionw hic h de te rs or r em ed ie s c onst itutio na l vi olatio ns can f al l w ith in the sw ee p of

Co ngr es s’ e nf

or ce m en t po w er

e ve n if in the pr oc es s it pr ohi bit s c ondu ct

w hic h is not

it se lf unc onst itutio na l and i ntr ude s in to ‘ le gis la tiv e sphe re s of

auto nom y pr ev iou sly

r es er ve d to the S ta te s. ’ ” Ci ty

of Bo er ne v. F lor es , 52 1 U.S. 5 07 , 51 8, 1 17 S. Ct. 2 15 7, 2 16 3 (1 99 7) (ci ta ti on om it te d) .39

O n th e oth er

hand, the S upr em e Co urt ha s de ci de d th at the r em ed ia l and preventive m easures “ m ay not work a ‘ subs tantive change in the go verning law. ’ ” Lan e, 12 4 S . Ct. at19 86 (qu ot in g B oe rn e, 52 1 U.S. at51 9, 1 17 S. Ct. at 21 64 ). Regarding Congress’ s § 5 autho rity , the S uprem e Court has acknowledged that

“ the li ne be tw ee n m ea sur es that r em edy or pr ev en t un co nst itutio na l a ct ion s and m ea sur es that m ak e a subs tanti ve c hange in the gov er nin g lawis not

e as y to dis ce rn , and C ongr es s m

ust have w ide latit

ude in de te rm ini ng whe re it li es , ” but has stressed that “ the distin ction exists and m ust be obs erved. ” Boer

ne, 521 U. S. at51 9- 20 , 11 7 S . Ct. at21 64 . In determ ining whether

Congress has acted w ithin the scope of its § 5 po we r to abrogate States’ sovereign imm unity , the S uprem e Court applies the three-par t

“ co ngr ue nc e an d pr opor

tio na lity ” te st f

ir st e sta bli she d inBo er

ne . 521 U . S. a t 52 0, 117 S. Ct . a t 21 64. I n a

ppl y ing the Bo er

ne te st, ac ourt m

ust : ( 1) ide nti fy

“ w ith som e pr ec isi on the sc ope of the c onst itutio na l r igh t at i ssu e, ” Bd . of T rs . of U niv . of A la . v. G ar

re tt, 531 U . S. 356 , 365 , 121 S . Ct . 955 , 963 ( 2001 ); ( 2) de te rm ine w he the r Co ngr es s id en tif ie d ahis tor

y and p atte rnof

unc onst itutio na l c ondu ct by the S ta te s, and ( 3) if

so, ana ly ze w he the r the statut e is an a ppr opr ia te , c ongr

ue nt an d p ro po rti on al res po ns e to th athi st ory an d p at te rn of u nc on st itut io na l t reat m en t.See supra note 15. 24 40 G ar re tt, 531 U . S. a t 37 4, 121 S . Ct . a t 96 8; s ee Bo er ne , 521 U . S. a t 52 0, 117 S . Ct . at21 64 . InG ar re tt, 531 U . S. a t 37 4, 121 S . Ct . a t 96 8, the S upr em e Co urt a ppl ie d th e Bo er ne te st t o T itl e I of

the A D Aand h el d th at

Co ngr es s di d no t va lid ly abr ogate the States’ Ele venth-Am endm ent im m unityto suits for m onetary dam ages under Ti t l e I , wh i ch re l at es t o empl o ym en td i s cr i m i n at i o n . Th e S up re m e C o u rt ’s de ci sio n inG ar

re tt w as dr ive n by

it s c onc lus ionthat C ongr es s’ s e xe rc ise of prophy lactic power s under § 5 was unsupp orted by a re levant histo ry

and pattern of c onst itutio na l vi olatio ns. 531 U . S. a t 36 8, 374 , 121 S . Ct . a t 96 5, 967 -6 8. I n so hol din g, the m aj or ity

opi nio n inG ar

re tt state d th at

the “ ove rwhe lm ing m aj or ity ” of the e vid en ce be fo re Co ngr es s r el at ing to dis ab ili ty dis cr im inatio n r el at ed

to “ the provisi on of pub lic services and public accom m odation s, which areas are ad dr es se d inT itl es I I an d I II , ” rathe r than T itl e I. I d. a t 37 1, n. 7, 121 S . Ct . a t 96 6 n.7. Thus, in Gar

rett, the Suprem e Court left unanswe red the question raised here of w he the r Co ngr es s va lid ly abr ogate d th e E le ve nthA m en dm en t i n T itl e II of the ADA. 24 In T ennessee v. L ane, the Suprem e Court re visited th e question o f whether C o n g r e s s v a l i d l y ab r o g at e dth e E l e v e n th A me n d me n ti nth e A D A , th i s t i me41

ex am in in g Ti tl e II i n t he co nt ex t o f acc es s o f di sabl edpe rs on s t o t he co ur ts . A lth oughthe pla int if

fs in L an e w er e not

pr iso ne rs , L an e expla ins the ana ly sis re qui re d to de te rm ine w he the r T itl e II of the A D Apr ope rl y

abr ogate s th e E le ve nth Am en dm en t i n t he pri so n c on te xtin th is cas e. Thu s, we re vi ew Lan e in de ta il . 3. T enne sse e v. L an e InL an e, the pla int if

fs a sse rt ed

A D Ac la im s r el at ing to the a cc es s of dis ab le d pe rs ons to c ourts. A ft er sum m ar ily a cknow le dgi ng tha t C ongr es s c le ar ly i n t e n d e dt o ab r o g a t e E l e v e n th - A me n d me n ti mmu n i ty i nT i t l e I I , th e S up r e me C o u rtr e a f

f i rmedth e ap p l i c a t i o no f

th e B o e rn e “ c o n g r

u e n c e an dp r o p o rt i o n a l i ty” te st. L an e, 124 S . Ct . a t 19 86. Appl y ing the f ir st s te p of

the Bo er ne ana ly sis , the Su pr em e Co urt no te d th at

T itl e II , li ke T itl e I, se ek s to e nf or ce the F ourte en th Am en dm en t’s “ pr oh ib it io n o n i rrat io na l d is ab il it y di sc riminat io n.” Id. at19 88 . But, the S uprem e Court concluded, “ it also seeks to enforce a var iety of other basic constitu tional gu arantee s, infringem ents of which ar e subjec t to m ore searching j udicial review, ” including rights relating to access to courts protected by the D ue -P ro ce ss C lause of the F ourte en th A m en dm en t and the Co nf ro ntatio n Cl au se of the S ixth A m en dm en t ( ap pli ed to the S ta te s vi a the F ourte en th Am en dm en t). Id .42

InL an e, the S upr em e Co urt the n pr oc ee de d to the se co nd s te p, in w hic h it ad dr es se d th e his tor

y and p atte rnof

vio la tio ns o f the se c onst itutio na l r igh ts b y St at es a ga ins t the dis ab le d. A ft er not ing that the “ ap pr opr ia te ne ss o f the r em edy de pe nds on the gr av ity

of the harm it se ek s to pr ev en t, ” the S upr em e Co urt st at ed :

“ It i s n otdi ffi cu ltto pe rcei ve th e h arm th atTit le II is de si gn edto ad dr es s. Co ngr es s e na ct ed

T itl e II a ga ins t a

ba ck dr op o f pe rv as ive une qua l tre atm en t i n th e adm ini str at ionof

state se rv ic es and p ro gr am s, inc lud ing sy ste m at ic de pr ivatio ns o f fundam ental rights.” I d. at 1988-89. T he Suprem e Court cata logu ed m any such deprivation s in the areas of voting, m arry ing, serving as jur ors, unj ustified co m m itm en t, abuse and n eg le ct in m en ta l he al th h ospi ta ls, and z oni ng d ec isi ons, an d th ene xpl ai ne d th at

the de ci sio ns o f oth er

c ourts “ doc um en t a

pa tte rnof une qua l tre atm en t i n th e adm ini str at ionof aw ide r an ge of

pub lic se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, and a ct ivi tie s, inc lud ing the pe na l sy ste m , pub lic e duc at ion , and v o t i n g . ” I d . a t1 9 8 9 ( f

o o tn o t e s o mi t t e d ) ( e mp h a s i s a d d e d ) . I nL an e , th e S up r e me Co urt c onc lud ed

that “ [t ] his pa tte rnof

dis ab ili ty

dis cr im inatio n pe rs ist ed

de spi te se ve ra l f ed er al and s ta te le gis la tiv e ef fo rt s to a ddr es s it , ” an d th at in the de lib er at ion s pr ec ed ing the A D A ’ s e na ctm en t, “ Co ngr es s id en tif ie d im portant shor tc om ing s ine xis tin g law s th at r en de re d th em

‘ ina de quate to ad dr es s th eIn a fo otn ote in L ane , th e Sup re me Court lis te d o nly

on e dis tr ic t c ourt

and tw o c ir c uit 25 court de cisions reg ardingdeprivation of rig hts in the penal sy stem. The footnote state d: E. g ., L a F a

ut v . Sm ith , 8 34 F .2 d 3 89 , 3 94 (C .A .4 19 87 ) (pa ra ple g ic inm ate un a

ble to a c c e ss t oil e t f

a c ili tie s) ; Sc hmi dt v . O de ll, 64 F .Su pp .2 d 1 01 4 ( D. Ka

n. 19 99 ) ( do ub le amputee f orce d to cra

wl around the floor of jail). See a lso, e.g ., Key v. Gra y son, 179 F.3d 996 ( C.A.6 1999) (de af inmate denied acc ess to sex offender thera py prog ram alleg edly require d as pre condition for par ole). L ane, 124 S. Ct. at 1989 n.11. We note that two of these decisions wer e re ndere d afte r the AD A was enac ted but wer e used by the Supreme C o u rt as ev i d ence of past discrimination addr essed by the AD A. Whil e it s e e ms to us that the re wa s little do c ume ntatio n o f a his tor y and patte rn of dis a bil ity 43 pe rv as ive pr obl em s of

dis cr im inatio n th at

pe opl e w ithdis ab ili tie s are f ac ing . ’ ” I d. at 1990 (qu oting S. Rep. No. 101-116 , at 18). The S uprem e Court com

pleted its step-two analy sis with the conclusio n that T itl e II w as e na ct ed

in re spon se to a his tor

y and p atte rnof

dis ab ili ty di sc riminat io n i n t he “pr ov is io n o f pu bl ic servi ces an d a cces s t o p ub li c fac il it ie s,” as f oll ow s: The c o n cl u sion th at Congress drewfrom this bo dy

of evidence is set fo rth in the te xt of the A D A its el f: “ D isc ri m inatio n a ga ins t i ndi vid ua ls w ithdis ab il it ie s pe rs ist s insuc h c ri tic al are as a s . . . e duc at ion , tr an spor ta tio n, c om

m uni catio n, r ec re at ion , insti tut ion al iz at ion , he al th se rv ic es , vot ing , and ac ce ss to publi c se rv ic es . ” 42 U . S. C. § 12 101( a) (3 ) (e m pha sis a dde d) . Th is f

ind ing , tog ethe r w iththe e xte nsi ve r ec or d of dis ab ili ty dis cr im inatio n th at

und er lie s it , m ak es c le ar be y ond pe ra dve nture that ina de quate pr ovi sio n of publ ic se rv ic es and a cc es s to publ ic f ac ili tie s w as an a

ppr opr ia te sub

j ec t f or pr ophy la ct ic le gis la tio n. Id. at 1992 (em

phasis add ed). T he Suprem e Court in Lane concluded that Title II of the AD A w as enacted in re spon se to a history and pattern of constitut ional v i o l a t i o n s b y th e S t a t e s , th e r e b y s a t i s f yi n g B o e rn e ’s s t e p - tw o i n qu i ry. 25discrimination in prisons recited in L ane, se e note 30 infr a, the Supreme Court in L ane in e ffe ct has

decide d the step-two inquiry as to Title I I , and we must follow the Supreme Court’s lea d. Th is “ a s- a

pp lie d” a pp ro a c h w a s h e avil y

c ri tic ize d in

the dis se nt o f Jus tic e Re hn qu ist , in 26 which Just ices Ke nnedy

and Thomas joined. L ane, 124 S. Ct. at 2004-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The eff

ect [of the as- applied ana ly tical appr oach] is to rig the congruenc e-andproportionality

test by artificia lly

constrictingthe scope of the statute to close ly mirror a rec og nized constitut ional rig ht.”). B eca use the majority

opinion, however , follows an as- applied approa ch, we also must do so in t his case. 44 The third and final query in the Eleventh-A m endm ent analy sis is whether the legislation at issue is a congruent, proportional respon se to that hist ory . In Lane, the S uprem e Court declined to decide whether Title I I as a whole satisfies Bo er ne ’ s st ep -thr ee c ongr

ue nc e- an d- pr opor

tio na lity r equir em en t. I nst ea d, the Suprem e Court adopted an “ as-applied” test, stating that “ noth ing in our case law requires us to consid er T itle II, with its wide var iety of applications, as an undi ff er en tiate d whol e. . . . B ec au se w e fi nd tha t T itl e II unque sti ona bly is va lid § 5 l eg isl at iona s it

appl ie s to the c la ss o f ca se s im pli catin g th e ac ce ssi bil ity of j udicial services, w e need go no further.” Id. at 1992-93 (em phasis add ed). 26 N oti ng the lon g hi sto ry

and i ntr ac ta

bil ity of the S ta te s’ dis ab ili ty discrim ination in the area of acc ess to courts, and m ore genera lly the unequal treatm ent in the adm inistration of public services, and the “ considerable evidence of the shortcom ings o f previous legislativ e re spon ses,” the Suprem e Court concluded th at Congress was j ustified in enacting prophy lactic m easures in T itle II45

fo r ac ce ss t o j udi ci al se rv ic es . I d. a t 19 93. T he S upr em e Co urt c hara ct er iz ed T itl e II’ s rem edy

in the area

of acc ess to courts as “ lim ited” in that it do es not require

“ St at es to em

plo y any and a ll m eans t o m ak e j udi ci al se rv ic es a cc es sib le to pe rs ons w ithdis ab ili tie s, and i t do es not r eq uir e St at es to co m

pr om ise the ir es se nti al e lig ibi lity

c ri te ri a fo r publ ic pr ogr am s. ” I d. R athe r, T itl e II r equir es onl y

“ reas on ab le m od ifi cat io ns .” Id . Mor eo ve r, in L an e the S upr em e Co urt e m pha siz ed the tr ad iti ona l br ea dthof the States’ due-process responsibi lity to afford individu als acce ss to courts. In lightof the lim ited nature of the A DA ’ s rem edy and the States’ expansive du epr oc es s r es pons ibi lit ie s, the Co urt c onc lud ed : “ T his duty to ac co m m odate is pe rf ec tly c onsi ste nt w iththe w el l- es ta bli she d du e pr oc es s pr inc ipl e that, ‘ w ith in the li m its of

pr ac tic ab ili ty , aS ta te m

ust a ff or d a ll ind ivi dua ls a

m eanin gf

ul oppo rt uni ty to be he ar d’ in its c ourts. ” I d. a t 19 94 ( quot ing Bo ddi e v. Co nn ect ic ut , 40 1 U.S. 3 71 , 37 9, 9 1 S . Ct. 7 80 , 78 6- 87 (19 71 )) (em ph as is ad de d) . T he S upr em e Co urt thus co nc lud ed that T itl e II ’ s ob lig at ionto ac co m m odate pe rs ons w ithdis ab ili tie s inthe a dm ini str at ionof j ust ic e “ cannot

be sa id t o be ‘ so out of pr opor tio n to asup pose d r em ed ia l or pr ev en tiv e obj ec t tha t i t c annot be u n d er s t o o das re s p o n s i v e t o , o r d es i g n edt o p re v en t , u n co n s t i tu t i o n al b eh av i o r. ’” Id .W e c anl o c at e n o p o s t - Lan e c i r c u i tc o urtd e c i s i o nd e c i d i n gw h e th e r C o n g r e s s i nT i t l e II 27 of the AD A validly

abrog ated the States’ immunit y for moneta

ry damag es outside the ac cess- tothe-c ourts context. Befor e L ane, the circ uits were split on this issue. Compare Wessel v. Glendening , 306 F.3d 203 ( 4th Cir. 2002) (no valid abr og ation); Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020 ( 10th Cir. 2001) (same) ; Reickenba cker v. Foster , 274 F.3d 974 ( 5th Cir. 2001) (same) ; Alsbrook v. City

of Maumelle, 184 F .3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999) (same ) with Hason v. Medica l Bd. of Ca lifornia, 279 F .3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2002) (a brog ation valid); Popovich v. Cuyaho g a County Ct. of Common Ple a s, 27 6 F .3 d 8 08 (6 th C ir . 2 00 2) (e n b anc ) ( El e ve nth Amendment validly

abrog ated in conte x t of fundame ntal, due-pr ocess- based c laims, but not equal- protec tion-based c laims); Garc ia v. S.U.N.Y. He alth Science s Center of B rookly n, 280 F.3d 98 ( 2d Cir. 2001) (abr og ation valid only as to ca ses wher e Title I Iviolation was motivated by discriminatory

animus or ill will due to dis ability). In th is c a se , th e Un ite d St ate s ( a s inte rv e no r o n a pp e a l) argue s th at Mi lle r’ s c a se 28 implicates a pa

noply of prisoner

rig hts, but the parties do not. Acc ording ly , we ne ed not consider the host of rig hts identified by the United States, and w e limit our opinion t o the Eig hthAmendment right to be fre e fr om crue l and unusual punishment. 46 W e nowappl y

the Bo er ne /L an e te st t o M ill er ’ s A D Ac la im s inthe pr iso n se tti ng. 27 4. Appl ic at ionof

Bo er ne /L an e to this c as e Inthe f ir st s te p of

the Bo er ne /L an e an al y sis , w e ide nti fy the sc ope of

the co nst itutio na l r igh t at i ssu e. B othMi lle r an d th e de fe ndants a gr ee that the onl y right at issue in th is particular ca se is Miller’ s Eighth-Am endm ent right to be free fr om c ru el and unusu al pun ish m en t. 28 T he se co nd s te p r equir es us t o de te rm ine w he the r T itl e II w as e na ct ed in res po ns e to a hi st ory

an d p at te rn of c on st itut io na l v io la ti on s b y th e St at es . A lth oughthe de fe ndants arg ue the re is ins uf fi ci en t e vid en ce of

dis ab ili ty47

discrim ination in prison s, w e conclude that this st ep-two inquiry under Title I I al re ady ha s be ende ci de d by

the S upr em e Co urt i n L an e. A s pr ev iou sly dis cu sse d, in a ppl y ing the se co nd s te p of the Bo er ne te st, the S upr em e Co urt i n L an e co nsi de re d e vid en ce of

dis ab ili ty

dis cr im inatio n inthe a dm ini str at ionof pub lic se rv ic es and p ro gr am s ge ne ra lly , r athe r than f oc usi ng o nly

on d isc ri m inatio n inthe context of access to the courts, and conclud ed that Title I I in its entirety satisfies Bo er ne ’ s st ep -tw o r equir em en t tha t i t be e na ct ed in re spon se to a his tor

y and pattern of States’ constitu tional vi olation s. I d. at 1992. W e ar e boundby that co nc lu si on as t o s te p t wo. W e n ow p ro ceedto th e th irdan d fi na l s te p o f th e Bo ern e/ Lan e in qu iry. T his Co urt m

ust de ci de if T itl e II of

the A D A , a s a

ppl ie d to c la im s r oot ed

in the Eighth Am endm ent, is an appropriate § 5 re spon se to the above-described histo ry and pattern of unconst itutio nal treatm ent. L ane, 124 S. Ct. at 1992. G iven Lane, w e ac ce pte d a t st ep tw o th at T itl e II w as e na ct ed

in re spon se to a his tor

y and pa tte rnof dis ab ili ty

dis cr im inatio n inthe a dm ini str at ionof pub lic se rv ic es and pr ogr am s ge ne ra lly . T o gi ve m eanin g to the S upr em e Co urt’ s c ont ex t- by -c ont ex t an al ytic al appr oa ch , how ev er , w e m ust c onsi de r, in ste p th re e, the his tor y of dis cr im inatio n no t ge ne ra lly but spe ci fi ca lly

in the pr iso n c ont ex t, and the sc ope of the E igh th- A m en dm en t c onst itutio na l r igh t, and d et er m ine w he the r the r em edy48

af fo rd ed by T itl e II is co ngr

ue nt and p ro portio na l t o it s hi sto ri ca l ba ck dr op and t o the obj ec t of

e nf or ci ng the E igh th- A m en dm ent r igh t t o be f re e fr om c ru el and unus ua l punis hm en t. L an e, 124 S . Ct . a t 19 93. T o m ee t this c ongr ue nc e- an dpr opor tio na lity te st, le gis la tio n m

ust be ta ilo re d to r em edy

or pr ev en t the dem onstrated uncon stitut ional conduct. F lorida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. E xpe nse Bd . v. Co lle ge S av . Bank, 527 U . S. 627 , 639 , 119 S . Ct . 219 9, 220 7 (1999). W e re co gni ze that § 5 auth or iz es Co ngr es s to de te r E igh th- A m en dm en t violatio ns byprohibit ing “ a som ew hat broader sw ath of conduct” than that prohibi ted by

the Eighth Am endm ent and by proscribing “ facia lly

constitu tional conduct[] in order to prevent and deter unconstitu tional cond uct.” Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1985 (internal quo tation m arks and citations om itted). C ongress’s r em edial an d pr ev en tiv e m ea sur es , how ev er , m ay not go s o f ar a s to w ork asub stanti ve ch an ge in the gov er

nin g E igh th- A m en dm en t l aw . L an e, 124 S . Ct . a t 19 86 ( statin g that C ongr es s’ s r em ed ia l and p re ve nti ve m ea sur es “ m ay not w ork a‘ subs tanti ve change in the gov erning law’ ” (quoting Boerne, 521 U. S. at 519, 117 S. C t. at 2164 )) . I n othe r w or ds, § 5 doe s no t pl ac e in the hands of Co ngr es s atoo l t o re w ri te the Bi ll of

Ri ght s. I nst ea d, w he n C ongr es s e na ct s § 5 pr ophy la ct ic le gis la tio n, the re m

ust be “pr opor

tio na lity or c ongr ue nc e be tw ee n th e m eansSpecifica lly , they point to: evidence be fore Congr ess that “jailer s rational[iz ed] taking 29 awa y [di sabled inmates’ ] wheelcha irs as a f orm of punishment,” Staff of the House Comm. On Educ. And L abor, 101 Cong., 2d Sess., L eg islative History of Pub. L . No. 101-336: The st Americ ans with Disabilities Act, Volume 2, at p. 1190 (Comm. Print 1990); and evidenc e pr e se nte d to the Ho us e and Se nate Sub c omm itt e e s th at c a lle d atte nti on to t he “ [i]na de qu ate treatment and re habilitation prog rams [affor ded the disable d] i n penal a nd juvenile fa cilities,” and the “ [i]na de qu ate a

bil ity to d e a l w ithphy sic a lly

ha nd ic a pp e d a c c us e d p e rs on s a

nd c onvic ts (e.g ., acc essible jail cells and toilet fa cilities),” U.S. Comm’n on Civi l Rights, Acc ommodating the Spectrum of I

ndividual Abiliti es, Sept. 1983, App. A at 168. The United States also notes that a c on g re ssi on a lly -d e signate d ta sk fo rc e su bmi tte d to Con g re ss s e ve ra l th ou sa nd do c ume nts evidenc ing disc rimination and segreg ation in the provision of public servic es, includingthe tr e atme nt o f p e rs on s w ithdis a bil iti e s in pr iso ns and

ja ils , s e e Ga

rr e tt, 53 1 U .S. at 39 3, 12 1 S. Ct. at 978 (Appe ndix to J ustice B reyer’ s dissent), and cites a necdota l evidence of discrimination from a r eport of the California Attorne y Gene ral, see Calif. Att’y

Gen., Commission on Disability : Final Report 103 ( Dec . 1989). Miller and the United States also cite se vera l court decisions, includingthose noted in L ane, r elatingto discrimination ag ainst prisoners. See supra note 25. In L ane , th e Sup re me Court de vo te d a

sin g le pa ra g ra phto t he his tor y of dis a bil ity 30 discrimination in the specific a rea at issue in L ane – a cce ss to courts. L ane, 124 S. Ct. at 1991. But see id. at 2000 (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting) (“The Court’s attempt to disguise the la ck of c on g re ssi on a l do c ume ntatio n w itha fe w c itatio ns to j ud ic ia l de c isi on s c ann ot r e tr oa c tiv e ly

49 adopted and th e legitim ate end to be achieved. ” Boer ne, 521 U. S. at 533, 117 S. Ct . a t 21 71. Miller and the United States, a s intervenor, ar gue that a history and pattern of disabilit y

discrim ination in prison s existed and also form ed part of the historical ba ck dr op a ga ins t whic h C ongr es s e na ct ed T itl e II of

the A D A . Whil e the

29 de fe ndants c ont en d th at

the e vid en ce of

ahis tor y and p atte rnof

une qua l tre atm en t in p ri sons is sc an t, Mi lle r ar gue s th at the e vid en ce a s to pr iso ns i s no t su bst an tia lly le ss m eanin gf

ul than th e ev ide nc e uponw hic h th e Su pr em e Co urt r el ie d inL an e in the c ont ex t of

a cc es s to c ourts. E ve n if adoc um en te d hi sto ry

of dis ab ili ty 30provide support for Title I I , and in any

event, f ails on its own terms.”). 50 d i s c r i mi n a t i o ns p e c i f

i c a l l y i nth e p r i s o nc o n t e x tj u s t i f i e s ap p l i c a t i o no f

s o me co ngr es sio na l pr ophy la ct ic le gis la tio n to state pr iso ns, w ha t m ak es thi s c as e radically differ ent from

Lane is the lim ited nature of the constitut ional right at iss ue and h owT itl e II , a s a ppl ie d to pr iso ns, w oul d su bst an tiv el y

and m at er ia lly re w ri te the E igh th A m en dm en t. I n th is c as e, w e fo cu s onthe li m ite d natur e of the Eighth-Am endm ent right because in Lane, the Suprem e Court’ s conclusio n that T itl e II ’ s r em edy

is co ngr ue nt and p ro portio na l i n th e ac ce ss- to- co urts c ont ex t re lie d he av ily

upo n th e na tur e of

the c onst itutio na l r igh t i n is sue and the S ta te s’ ex pa ns iv e due -p ro ces s o bl ig at io n t o p ro vi de in di vi du al s wi th acce ss to th e co ur ts . It w as on that basis th at the Suprem e Court concluded that the Title II -im posed duty to ac co m m odate is “pe rf

ec tly c onsi ste nt w iththe w el l- es ta bli she d du e pr oc es s pr inc ipl e that, w ith in the li m its of pr ac tic ab ili ty , aS ta te m

ust a ff or d to a ll indiv iduals a m eaningful op portuni ty to be heard in its courts.” L ane, 124 S. Ct. at 19 94 (in te rn al qu ot at io n m ark s an d c it at io n o m it te d) . T his r obus t, pos iti ve due -p ro ce ss o bli ga tio n of the S ta te s to pr ovi de m eanin gf ul and e xpansi ve c ourt a cc es s is in stark c ontra st w iththe S ta te s’ E igh thAm en dm en t, n eg at iv e o bl ig at io n t o abs ta in fro m “ cru el an d u nu su al pu ni sh m en t,”Indeed, “ [i ]tis difficult to imagine an ac tivity in which a State ha s a strong er inter est, or 31 one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, re gulations, and proce dures, than the administration of its prisons.” L ewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 386, 116 S. C t. 2174, 2197 (1996) (quotingPreiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92, 93 S. Ct . 1827, 1837 (1973)) . 51 a m ar ke dly narr owr es tr ic tio n onpr iso n a dm ini str at ive c ondu ct . I n th e pr iso n co nte xt, the S ta te s hi sto ri ca lly have w ie lde d f

ar -r ea ch ing dis cr et ionin the ir tr eatm en t of

inm at es , c onf

ine d on ly by the li m ite d E igh th- A m en dm en t re qui re m en t tha t su chtr eatm en t no t be “ cr ue l and unusu al pun ish m en t. ” T he 31 E igh th A m en dm en t ha s no e ff ec t onm ost

pr iso n se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, and a ct ivi tie s, suc h a s e duc at ion al , r ec re at ion al , and j ob- tr ai nin g pr ogr am s. R athe r, the E igh th Am en dm en t i s l im it edto pu ni sh m en t, an d “ cru el an d u nu su al ” p un is hm en t atth at . Inoth er w or ds, the E igh th A m en dm en t i m pose s anarr owr es tr ic tio n – “ cr ue l and unus ua l” – ononl y

ali m ite d sp he re of

pr iso n a dm ini str at ive c ondu ct –

“puni shm ent.” As e xplained abo ve, e ven as to that pu nishm ent sphere, negligence or gr oss ne gli ge nc e doe s no t satis fy the E igh th- A m en dm en t st an dard . C ottre ll, 85 F. 3d at 14 90. I nst ea d, apr iso ne r al le gin g an E igh th- A m en dm en t vi olatio n co nf ro nts an e xa ct ing bur de n of sho w ing that the pr iso n of fi ci al w an ton ly

and w ill fu lly inf lic te d pa in o n th e inm at e. C handl er , S lip O p. a t 33 68- 69. T he E igh th A m en dm en t r eg ulate s on ly asm al l sl ic e of

pr iso n a dm ini str at ive c ondu ct .52

T itl e II of the A D A , on the oth er

hand, pur

ports t o pr osc ri be the e xc lus ion of a“ qua lif ie d, ” dis ab le d pr iso ne r fr om part ic ipatio n inany

“ se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, or a ct ivi tie s” of

apub lic e nti ty . T itl e II is not ta ilo re d to pr ovi de pr ophy la ct ic protection of the Eighth-Am endm ent right; ins tead, it applies to anyservice, pr ogr am , or

a ct ivi ty pr ovi de d by

the pr iso n, w he the r ed

uc at ion al , r ec re at ion al , j obtr ai nin g, w ork inpr iso n in dustri es , dr ug and a lc ohol c ouns el ing , or am yri ad of oth er pr iso n se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, and a ct ivi tie s no t a ff ec te d by the E igh th A m en dm en t. A lth oughw e re co gni ze Co ngr es s’ s po w er to pr osc ri be f

ac ia lly constitu tional cond uct, T itle II does not m erely proscribe a “ som ew hat broader sw ath of c ondu ct ” than th e E igh th A m en dm en t, but pr ohi bit s adif

fe re nt s w ath of co nduc t tha t i s f

ar br oa de r an d e ve n to ta lly unr el at ed

to the E igh th A m en dm en t i n m any ins tanc es . I n sh ort, T itl e II pr ohi bit s f ar m or e state c ondu ct

and i n m any m or e ar ea s of

pr iso n a dm ini str at ionthan c onc ei vably ne ce ssary

to en fo rc e the Eighth Am endm ent’ s ban on cruel and unu sual pun ishm ent. I ndeed, T itle II ad dr es se s a ll pr iso n se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, and a ct ivi tie s – and g oe s w el l be y ond the basic, hum ane necessities guaranteed by the Eighth Am endm ent – to dis abled pr is on ers . A cc or din gly , w e co nc lud e that T itl e II ’ s a ff irm at ive duty

to ac co m m odate qua lif ie d, dis ab le d pr iso ne rs is m ar ke dly dif fe re nt than, and c annot

be sa id t o beThis case share s more in common with Title Iaddre ssed in Gar rett, the Patent Remedy 32 Act in Flor ida Prepa id, the Ag e Discr imination in Employ ment Act in Kimel, and the Re ligious F re e do m Re sto ratio n A c t in B oe rn e , a ll o f whic h th e Sup re me Court inv a lid ate d a s atte mpt s to substantively

rede fine the F ourtee nth Amendment. In L ane, the Supreme Court re ache d a dif fe re nt c on c lus ion

on ly be c a us e it d e c ide d th at th e AD A d uty to a c c omm od ate wa s “ pe rf e c tly c on sis te nt w ith ” the du e -p ro c e ss p ri nc ipl e in i ssu e in t he a c c e ss- to- the -c ourt s c onte xt. As previously

noted, the ADA ’s application is “lim ited” somewhat in that it requires 33 only “re asonable modifications in policies, prac tices, and pr ocedur es,” where doing so doe s not “funda mentally alter the nature of the ser vice, pr og ram, or a ctivity .” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b) (7) (2004). How ever , Title I Icre ates in state pr isoners newfede ral rights to participate in a br oad arr ay of ser vices, programs, and a ctivities that prisons are not re quired to provide a nd that are remote f rom the re alm of the Eighth Amendment, and plac es upon the state pr isons the onus of justifying a

ny exclusion of a qualified, disabled pr isoner fr om its services, programs, or activities. Thus, while Title I Idoes not fundame ntally alter the nature of a pa

rticular pr ison 53 “pe rf ec tly c onsi ste nt w ith , ” tr ad iti ona l pr ote ct ion s a ff or de d by the E igh th A m en dm en t. Ar equir em en t of r ea sona ble a cc om

m odatio ns f

or aqua lif ie d, dis ab le d pr iso ne r in the pr iso n’ s e duc at ion al , r ec re at ion al , and j ob- tr ai nin g pr ogr am s, f

or e xam ple , be ar s no pe rm iss ibl e pr ophy la ct ic r el at ion shi p to de te rr ing or r em edy ing vio la tio ns o f dis ab le d pr iso ne rs ’ r igh t t o be f re e fr om c ru el and unus ua l punis hm en t. R athe r, T itl e II of the A D A , a s a

ppl ie d inthe E igh thA m en dm en t c ont ex t t o st at e pr iso ns, f ai ls t o m ee t the r equir em en t of proportio nality

and congruence. 32 Mi lle r str es se s th at

T itl e II is lim ite d inthat i t do es not r equir e state pr iso ns to c om pr om ise the ir

e sse nti al e lig ibi lity

c ri te ri a fo r the ir

se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, and ac tiv iti es , and tha t i t do es not r equir e St at es to fundam en ta lly a lte r the na tur e of tho se se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, or a ct ivi tie s. Wha t M ill er ign or es , how ev er , is that the 33se rv ic e , p ro g ra m, o r a c tiv ity , it

do e s f un dame nta lly

e xpand and a lte r t he natur e of

the State s’ obligations to qualified, disabled prisoners a nd substantively

rewrites the Eig hth-Amendment law. 54 E igh th A m en dm en t ha s no e ff ec t onm ost

pr iso n se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, and a ct ivi tie s. Fu rth er, wh il e Mi ll er’s el ig ib il it y an d t he ex te ntof t he st at e p ris on ’s ADA obl igatio ns unde r T itl e II m ay be m uc h m or e lim ite d du e to h is d isc ipl inary status in i sol at ionin a m ax im

um -s ec ur ity

bui ldi ng, the § 5 iss ue m ust be e xam ine d inthe state -p ri son co nte xt a s aw hol e an d th e St at es ’ A D Aobl igatio ns unde r T itl e II to dis ab le d pr iso ne rs ge ne ra lly , m ost of w hom are not in dis ci pli nary

iso la tio n ina m ax im um -s ec ur ity

bui ldi ng. A s no te d e ar lie r, A D Ar eg ulatio ns r equir e that “ ‘ no qualified indi vidu al w ith a disabili ty shall, beca

use a public entity ’ s facilities are ina cc es sib le to or

unu sa ble by ind ivi dua ls w ithdis ab ili tie s, be e xc lud ed f ro m part ic ipatio n in , or

be de nie d th e be ne fi ts o f the se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, or a ct ivi tie s of a public entity , or be subjecte d to dis crim ination by any publi c entity .’ ” Shotz, 256 F. 3d at 10 79- 80 ( quot ing 28 C . F. R. § 35 . 149) . Whil e a pr iso n’ s un iqu e ne ed s m ay im pact what is r easonable, it is still clear that the A DAaff ects far m ore statepr iso n c ondu ct

and f ar m or e pr iso n se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, and a ct ivi tie s th anthe E igh th A m en dm en t. S im ply put , to upho ld T itl e II ’ s a ppl ic at ionto state pr iso ns w oul d a llo wCo ngr es s to “ re w ri te ” the E igh th- A m en dm en t l aw . S ee G ar re tt, 531 U . S. a t 37 4, 121 S . Ct . a t 96 8. T he re fo re , T itl e II of the A D A , a s a

ppl ie d inthi sI f Title I Ias a whole fa ils the cong ruenc e-a nd-propor tionality test in the Eighth- 34 Amendment conte x t (as we conclude here ), Miller alter natively invites us to adopt an as-a pplied approa ch under

which Title I Iof the AD A is narr owly enfor ced a g ainst States only wher e the alleg ed ADAviolations also actually violate the constitutional rig ht at issue – in this case, the Ei g hth -Ame ndme nt rig ht t o b e fr e e fr om c ru e l and unus ua l pu

nis hme nt. I f T itl e I Ia

pp lie s o nly

to actua l constituti onal violations, the argument become s that it is not“so out of propor tion to a supposed re medial or pre ventive objec t that it cannot be under stood as responsive to, or de signe d to preve nt, unconstituti onal beha vior.” B oerne , 521 U.S. at 532, 117 S. Ct . 2170. This approa ch was e mbrac ed pre -L ane by the Second Circuit in the equa l-protec tion context . Gar cia, 280 F .3d at 111-12 (E leventh Amendme nt validly abrog ated with re spect to Title I Iclaims based on a ctual violations of the Four

teenth Amendme nt). In Kiman v. New

Hampshire D epar

tment of Correc tions, 301 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2002), the Fi rs tC i rc u i tad o p t edth i s as -ap p l i edap p ro ac hi nth e E i gh th -A m en dm en tco n t ex t , al l o wi n g a former state prisoner

to proce ed with his monetary -dama g es cla ims ag ainst state entities under Title I I of the AD A bec ause the plaintiff had a lleg ed violations of the Eighth Amendment. The F ir st C ir c uit

c on c lud e d, “ we ho ld t

hat K ima n ma y pr oc e e d w ithhis su it a g a ins t th e De pa rtme nt, be c a us e Ti tle I Iof

the AD A a s a

pp lie d to the fa c ts o f t

his c a se pr op e rl y

e nf or c e s th e Ei g hth Amendment (a s incorporated ag ainst the states by the Four teenth) a nd abrog ates Ne w Hampshire’ s immuni ty

from private suit.” 301 F.3d at 25. Howeve r, that dec ision was vacated and the c ase r ehea

rd by the Fir st Circuit en banc, a nd the en ba

nc cour t affir med the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’ s ADA c omplaints. Kiman v. New Ha mpshire Dep’ t of Corrs., 332 F.3d 29 ( 1st Cir. 2003) (en ba nc). O n petition for ce rtiorar i, the Supreme Court vac ated the First Circuit’s en ba

nc judg ment and re manded the c ase to the F irst Circuit for furthe r consideration in li g ht of L ane. Kiman v. New H ampshire De p’t of Corrs., 124 S. Ct. 2387 (2004). In the post-L ane w orld, we de cline Miller’s invitation to follow his sugg ested a s-applied ana ly sis be c a

us e it i s in c on sis te nt w ithL ane . In L ane , th e Sup re me Court a do pte d a

dif fe re nt a sa p p li e d a p p r o a c hin

w h ic hth e c o n s ti tuti o n a li ty o f T it le I Iis c o n s id e r e d

c o n te xt b y

c o n te xt wi tho ut a ny me nti on of the AD A v iol atio ns be ingc ir c ums c ri be d b y or lim ite d to wh at w ou ld otherwise c onstitut e an a ctual constitutional violation. I nstead, L ane r eaf firmed ( 1) that Congr ess’s § 5 author ity

includes the a

uthority to prohibit “a somewhat broade r swath of conduct,” including that which is not forbidden by the Four teenth Amendme nt, and (2) that “Cong ress may

enac t so-called pr ophylactic leg islation that proscribes fa cially constitutional conduct, in orde r to preve nt and deter unconstitutional conduct.” L ane, 124 S. Ct. at 1985 (citations omitted). Ther efor e, under L ane, c onduct does not nee d to be unconstitutional to be validly proscr ibed by

Congr ess. Fur

ther, Miller’s a

pproac h would eff

ectively impose a sec ond 55 pr iso n c as e, doe s no t va lid ly abr ogate the S ta te s’ sov er ei gn i m m uni ty and c annot be enforce d against the State of G eorgia or the G DO C in a suit for m onetary dam ag es . 34lay er to the te st announce d in L ane, a llowing Miller to proc eed on A DA cla ims in t he prison

context but onl y

to the extent that the ADA claims constitute valid Eig hth-Amendment c laims. 56 D . A D AC lai m s A gai ns t In di vid ua ls Finally , Miller

argues that the m agistrate j udge erred in granting summ ary j udgm en t t o de fe ndant K ing on M ill er ’ s A D Ac la im s a ga ins t K ing in his indiv idual capacity . W e disagree bec ause the m agistrate j udge prop erly concluded that i ndi vid

ua ls a re not sub j ec t t o pe rs ona l l ia

bil ity und er § 12 132 fo r vio la tio ns o f Tit le II o f th e ADA. A s st at ed above , § 12 132 state s th at “ no qua lif

ie d in div idu al w itha dis ab ili ty sha ll, by r ea son of suc h di sa bil ity , be e xc lud ed

f ro m part ic ipatio n inor be de nie d th e be ne fi ts o f the se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, or a ct ivi tie s of

apub lic e nti ty , or be sub j ec te d to dis cr im inatio n by any suc h e nti ty . ” 42 U . S. C. § 12 132 (e m pha sis ad de d) . T hus, the pla in l an gua ge of the statut e ap pli es onl y

to publ ic e nti tie s, and no t t o i nd iv idua ls . M i l l e r , o nth e o th e r

h an d , ar g u e s th a tth e p h r a s e “b y an y s u c h e n t i ty” m odifies onl y

the final clause of the sentence: “be subjecte d to dis crim ination .” Miller thus contend s that the first part of the sentence, which provides that an indiv idual with a disability“ shall not be excluded from participation in or denied the be ne fi ts o f the se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, or a ct ivi tie s of

apub lic e nti ty , ” ap pli es notTh is C ou rt ha s h e ld t

hat § 1 22 03 e sta

bli sh e s in div idu a l li a

bil ity fo r a vio latio n o f i ts 35 pr oh ibi tio ns , whe re the “ a c t or pr a c tic e ” op po se d is on e ma de un lawf ul b y Ti tle I I . Sh otz v . Ci ty of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). In so holding, this Court noted that § 12203, unlike § 12132 (the statute at issue in this case ), extends liabilit y to any person. Specifica lly , the Court stated: In fac t, § 12203 is the only anti-discrimination pro v i sion in the ADA that uses the

57 onlyto pub lic entities but also to indi vidu al officials, while the f inal

“ di sc riminat io n” cla us e ap pl ie s o nl y to act io ns of p ub li c en ti ti es . Mi lle r’ s arg um en t f

ai ls f or tw o r ea sons . F ir st, und er Mi lle r’ s in te rp re ta tio n, Congress specified the parties that could be liable for discrim ination , y et ine xpl ic ab ly

f ai le d to spe ci fy

w ho c oul d be li ab le f

or de nia l of be ne fi ts o f se rv ic es , pr ogr am s, or

a ct ivi tie s, im

pli ci tly a llo w ing abr oa de r range of de fe ndants to be lia ble f or tho se vio la tio ns. I n th e ab se nc e of any r ea son fo r suc h adis tin ct ion , Mi lle r’ s in te rp re ta tio n is non se nsi ca l. Se co nd, ha d C ongr es s in te nde d to c re at e lia bil ity f or ind ivi dua ls unde r T itl e II of the A D A , it

e as ily c oul d have pr ovi de d f

or suc h li ab ili ty . I n f

ac t, Co ngr es s did pr ovi de f or suc h li ab ili ty

f or r et al ia tio n c la im s. S pe ci fi ca lly , § 12 203 provides, in relevant part: “ No person shall discrim inate against any indiv idual be ca use suc h in div idu al ha s op pose d any a ct or pr ac tic e m ad e unl aw fu l by thi s ch ap te r or

be ca use suc h in div idu al m ad e a ch ar ge , te sti fi ed , a ssi ste d, or part ic ipate d inany

m anne r in an in ve sti ga tio n, pr oc ee din g, or he ar ing und er

thi s chapter. ” 42 U. S. C. § 122 03(a) (e m phasis add ed). Congress clear ly prohibit ed 35unqualified term “per son” to de fine the regulated entity . Compare . . . 42 U.S.C. §

12132 (“public e ntity ”) . . . . I d. at 11 68 . T he Sho tz Co ur t th e n n ote d th at “ [w]he re Con g re ss i nc lud e s p art ic ula r l angua g e in one sec tion of a statute but omits itin another se ction of the same Act, it is ge nera lly presumed that Congr ess ac ts intentionally and purpose ly

in the disparate inclusion or exclusion,” and that “ Con g re ss k

no ws ho w t o u se sp e c if

ic langua g e to i de nti fy

wh ic h p art ic ula

r e nti tie s it

se e ks to regulate.” I d. The Court conc luded that the ter m “per son” includes individuals, id., and, ultimately

conclude d that liability

for violations of § 12203 extends to indivi duals. I d. at 1183.

58 A D Avio la tio ns b y

pe rs ons in § 122 03, and w e m ust a ssum e that i ts f

ai lur e to d o so in § 1 2132 wa s purpos eful. Ac cordingly , the natura l m eaning of § 121 32 is th at liabilityextends on ly

to pub lic entities and not to persons in their individ ual cap aci ti es . W e thu s c onc lud e that § 1213 2 do es not pr ovi de f or c la im s a ga ins t indiv iduals in their individ ual capacities, and that the m agistrate j udge didnot err in g ranti ng d ef

en dant K ing sum

m ar y j udgm en t onthat ba sis . T his c onc lus ionis in acco rdwit h t ho se of o ursi st er ci rcu it s t ha t h av e d eci de d t he is su e. See, e.g ., Garcia v. S. U. N. Y. He alth Sciences. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001 ) (“ Insofar as G arcia is suin g the indi vidu al defendants in their indiv idual capacities, neither T itle II of the AD A nor § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides fo r ind ivi dua l c ap ac ity

sui ts a ga ins t st at e of

fi ci al s. ”) ; W al ke r v. S ny de r, 213 F . 3d 344, 346 (7th Cir. 2000 ), abrogated on oth er grounds, as re cognized in Bruggem an ex r el . Br ugge m anv. Bl ag oj ev ic h, 324 F . 3d 9 06, 912 -1 3 ( 7thCi r. 200 3) ; V ins on v. T hom as, 288 F. 3d 11 45, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002 ); A lsbrookv. City of Maum elle,59

184 F.3d 999 , 1005 n. 8 (8th Cir. 1999 ) (“ [W ] e agre e . . . that the c omm issio ners m ay not be sue d inthe ir

ind ivi dua l c ap ac iti es dir ec tly und er the pr ovi sio ns o f T itl e II . T itl e II pr ovi de s di sa

ble d in div idu al s r edre ss f or dis cr im inatio n by

a‘ publ ic en tity . ’ T ha t t er

m , a s it is de fi ne d w ith in the statut e, doe s no t i nc lud e in di vi du al s.”) . IV. C ONC LUS ION Fo r al l the above r ea sons , w e re ve rs e the gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t t o de fe ndant S ike s ( 1) ind ivi dua lly on M ill er ’ s E igh th- A m en dm en t c la im s f or m one tary dam ag es und er

§ 19 83, ( 2) in his of

fi ci al c ap ac ity

on M ill er ’ s E igh thAmen d m en tcl ai m s fo r i n ju n ct i v e r el i ef

, a n d(3 ) i nh i s o ff

i ci al cap ac i ty o nMi l l er ’s AD A c laim s for inj unctive relief. W e otherw ise aff irm the grant of sum

m ary jud gm en t i n fa vo r of

all de fen da nt s o n a ll rem ai ni ng cla im s. AFFIRMED I N PART; REVERSED I N PART; and REMANDED.