alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit
32.1




Certification
Pursuant to Rule 18 U.S.C. § 1350






(Section 906 of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)






BNSF
Railway Company




In
connection with the Annual Report of BNSF Railway Company (the “Company”) on
Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Matthew
K. Rose, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and
Thomas N. Hund, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, each hereby certifies that, to his knowledge on the date
hereof:




1.The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and




2.The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.









Dated:
February 14, 2008





/s/
      Matthew K. Rose
            
            /s/
      Thomas N. HundMatthew
      K. Rose
            
            Thomas
      N. HundChairman,
      President and Chief Executive Officer
            
            Executive
      Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer









A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
BNSF Railway Company and will be retained by BNSF Railway Company and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
## IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL A PPE ALS
OF TEXAS

N O

. P D

- 1 3 3 7

- 1 5

T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

v
.

R O G E R A N T H O N Y M A R T I N E Z , A p p e l l e e

O N P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W
F R O M T H E T H I R T E E N T H C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

V I C T O R I A C O U N T Y

P e r C u r i a m
.

O R D E R

T h e C o u r t g r a n t s r e v i e w o n i t s o w n m o t i o n o f t h e f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n :

D i d t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s e r r i n i t s a s s e s s m e n t o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e f o r a

w a r r a n t l e s s a r r e s t p u r s u a n t t o T e x a s C o d e o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e a r t i c l e 1 4

. 0 1 ?

T h e C l e r k o f

t h i s C o u r t w i l l s e n d c o p i e s o f t h i s o r d e r t o t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s f o r t h e

T h i r t e e n t h D i s t r i c t
, t h e S t a t e P r o s e c u t i n g A t t o r n e y , t h e D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y f o r V i c t o r i a C o u n t y,MARTI NEZ - 2

a n d A p p e l l e e

.

E n t e r e d F e b r u a r y 2 4

, 2 0 1 6
D o N o t P u b l i s h
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DEREK MURCHISON,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 156 EAL 2023

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 20th day of March, 2024, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

GRANTED. The issue, rephrased for clarity, is:

Whether the Superior Court applied the correct standard for an 

after-discovered evidence claim based upon post-conviction DNA testing 

received pursuant to Section 9543.1 of the PCRA and what value the 

jurisprudence related to a standard of actual innocence provides to that 

analysis. 

Additionally, the Prothonotary is DIRECTED to serve this order on the 

Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, who is INVITED to participate as amicus.

Justice McCaffery did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
EXHIBIT 21.1

SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT

TOM BROWN, INC.
Subsidiaries of Registrant
December 31, 2002

|Name of Subsidiary       |  | Jurisdiction of
Incorporation/Organization |  | Percent
Of Ownership
|------------------------ |  | ------------------------------------------ |  | --------------------
|Retex Inc.               |  | Wyoming                                    |  | 100%                
|Rocno Corporation        |  | Texas                                      |  | 100%                
|Sauer Drilling Company   |  | Delaware                                   |  | 100%                
|TBI West Virginia, Inc.  |  | Delaware                                   |  | 100%                
|TBI Pipeline Company     |  | Delaware                                   |  | 100%                
|Tom Brown Resources Ltd. |  | Alberta                                    |  | 100%                
|TCP Gathering Co.        |  | Colorado                                   |  | 100%                



QuickLinks
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11**  **- 7349** 

THOMAS LOWERY , Petitioner

- Appellant ,
v. SC DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION PAROLE AND PARDON SERVICES; CECILIA REYNOLDS, Warden Ker
. CI , Respondents

- Appellees
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Columbia
. Terry L. Wooten , District Judge. ( 3:10

- cv - 03011

- TLW )

Submitted : January 9, 2012 Decided: January 11, 2012

Before WILKINSON and SHEDD , Circuit Jud ges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Thomas Lowery , Appellant Pro Se. Tommy Evans, Jr. , SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION, PAROLE & PARDON SERVICE S , Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Thomas Lowery , a state prisoner, seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and deny ing relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 224 1 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (A) (200 6 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of th e denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S .C. § 2253(c)(2)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitut ional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Lowery has not made the requisite showing. Acc ordingly, we deny Lowery’s motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials3 before the court and argument would not aid the d ecisional
process. DISMISSED
THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

Post Office Box 12248

Austin, Texas 78711

FILE COPY

(512)463-1312

Monday, April 13,2015

Mr. Brett Brewer

The Norman Law Firm

215 E. Commerce, 2nd Floor

Jacksonville, TX 75766

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

Mr. Jeffrey R. Pruitt

Garza & Pruitt

402 Peoples Street, Suite 2F

Corpus Christi,TX 78401

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

RE: Case Number: 14-0645

Court of Appeals Number: 12-13-00262-CV

Trial Court Number: 2011-05-0389

Style: WASSON INTERESTS, LTD.

v.

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, TEXAS

Dear Counsel:

Today the Supreme Court of Texas granted the Motion for Extension of Time to File

Respondent's Brief on the Merits in the above-referenced case. Respondent's brief on the merits

is due to be filed in this office May 11, 2015. Petitioner's reply brief is due no later than May

26, 2015 FURTHER REQUESTS FOR EXTENSIONS OF TIME FOR THIS FILING

WILL BE DISFAVORED.

PLEASE NOTE pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 9.2(c)(2) all documents (except documents

submitted under seal) must be e-filed through eFileTexas.gov. You may file up to midnight on

the due date.

Persons not represented by an attorney may e-file documents, but e-filing is not required.

If you are not an attorney you may file using the traditional paper filing method. An original and

one copy are required for all paper filings with the Texas Supreme Court. The original is

required to be bound; the copy may be unbound so that it may be scanned by the Court. The

paper copy must comply with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9. For more details, see the

Court's Order Requiring Electronic Documents in the Supreme Court of Texas at

http:/7www.txcourts.gov/All_Archived Documcnts/SupremcCourt/AdministrativeOrdcrs/miscdo

ckct/13/13916500.pdf.

FILED IN COURT OF APPEALS

12th Court of Appeals District

TEXA:

CATHY S. LUSK,
THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

Post Office Box 12248

Austin, Texas 78711

FILE COPY

(512)463-1312

Please note all notices or communication about this case will be sent by email in lieu of

mailing paper documents. (See Tex. R. App. P. 9.2(c)(7)).

Sincerely,

Blake A. Hawthorne, Clerk

by Justin Chavez, Deputy Clerk

cc: Ms. Cathy S. Lusk (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL)

Ms. Janet Gates
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of American Bar Association Members/State Street Collective Trust (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the
period ending June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Beth M. Halberstadt, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to and for purposes of 18 U.S.C. ss.
1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.



/s/    BETH M. HALBERSTADTBeth M. HalberstadtChief Financial OfficerAugust 6, 2004
## THE STATE OF TEXAS MANDATE

TO THE 366TH DISTRIC T COURT OF COLLIN CO UNTY, GREETINGS: Before the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Court of Appeals District of Texas, on the 17th day of June, A.D. 2016, the cause upon appeal to revise or reverse your Judgment was determined;
and therein our said Court made its order in these words:

John Turner Gray, Appellant

v. The State of Texas, Appellee No. 06

- 16

- 00004

- CR

Trial Court No. 366

- 81875

- 2014

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court
below

. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. We note that the appellant, John Turner Gray, has adequately indicated his inability to pay costs of appeal. Th erefore, we waive payment of costs. WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court in this behalf, and in all things to have it duly recognized, obeyed, and executed. WITNESS, the Hon. Josh R. Morriss, III, Chief Justice of our said Court of Appeals, with the seal thereof annexed, at the City of Texarkana, this the 12th day of October , A.D. 2016

.

DEBRA K. AUTREY , Clerk
DISMISS and Opinion Filed December 13, 2021 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-21-00821-CV 

FREDERICK ALTYMAN BROWN (JR.), Appellant 

V. 

JOE JORDAN TRUCKS, INC., Appellee 

On Appeal from the 191st Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-19-20105 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Reichek, Nowell, and Carlyle 

Opinion by Justice Reichek 

The deadline for filing this appeal, from the trial court’s March 25, 2021 

summary judgment, was June 23, 2021 or, with an extension motion, July 8, 2021. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a)(1). The notice of appeal was not filed, however, until 

September 21, 2021. 

Because the timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, we questioned 

our jurisdiction over the appeal and directed appellant to file a letter brief addressing 

our concern. See Brashear v. Victoria Gardens of McKinney, L.L.C., 302 S.W.3d 

542, 545 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (op. on reh’g). Appellant complied, 

seemingly relying, in relevant part, on the tolling of deadlines in the Texas Supreme 
 –2– 

Court’s emergency Covid-19 orders.1

 As appellee notes in response, however, 

appellant did not separately request an extension of time to file the notice of appeal. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3. And, while an extension request can be implied when the 

notice of appeal is filed within the extension period, we cannot imply an extension 

request when, as here, the notice of appeal is filed outside the extension period. See 

Naaman v. Grider, 126 S.W.3d 73, 74 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); Verburgt v. Dorner, 

959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997). Accordingly, on the record before us, we dismiss 

the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a). 

210821F.P05 

 

1

 Although appellant’s letter brief appears to address only the merits of his appeal, the letter states it is 

in response to our request for jurisdictional briefing. Accordingly, we have liberally construed the brief as 

also addressing the timeliness of the appeal. 

/Amanda L. Reichek/

AMANDA L. REICHEK 

JUSTICE 
 –3– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

FREDERICK ALTYMAN BROWN 

(JR.), Appellant 

No. 05-21-00821-CV V. 

JOE JORDAN TRUCKS, INC., 

Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 191st Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-19-20105. 

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Reichek, Justices Nowell and Carlyle 

participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS the appeal. 

 We ORDER that appellee Joe Jordan Trucks, Inc. recover its costs, if any, of 

this appeal from appellant Frederick Altyman Brown (Jr.). 

Judgment entered December 13, 2021.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1235 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1235

  To provide that the term of office of certain members of the Merit 
 Systems Protection Board shall be extended by a period of 1 year, to 
   limit such members from concurrently holding positions within the 
              Federal Government, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 14, 2019

 Mr. Cummings (for himself and Mr. Connolly) introduced the following 
   bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To provide that the term of office of certain members of the Merit 
 Systems Protection Board shall be extended by a period of 1 year, to 
   limit such members from concurrently holding positions within the 
              Federal Government, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``MSPB Temporary Term Extension Act''.

SEC. 2. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD MEMBERS: TERM EXTENSION AND 
              LIMITATION ON SERVICE.

    (a) Extension of Term.--The term of office of any member of the 
Merit Systems Protection Board appointed under section 1202 of title 5, 
United States Code, serving as such a member on the date of enactment 
of this Act shall be extended for a period of one year beyond the date 
the member's service would otherwise end under subsection (c) of such 
section.
    (b) Limitation on Holding Federal Positions Concurrently.--
Notwithstanding section 1201 of title 5, United States Code, any member 
of the Merit Systems Protection Board whose term is extended by 
subsection (a) may not, while serving as such a member, concurrently 
hold another office or position in the Government of the United States.
                                 <all>
```
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 43172

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ALEJANDRO DESIDERIO-OCAMPO,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 733

Filed: November 30, 2015

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Patrick H. Owen, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of fifteen years, with a minimum 

period of confinement of five years, for lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, 

affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Elizabeth Ann Allred, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before MELANSON, Chief Judge; GRATTON, Judge;

and HUSKEY, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM

Alejandro Desiderio-Ocampo pled guilty to lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. 

Idaho Code § 18-1508. The district court sentenced Desiderio-Ocampo to a unified term of 

fifteen years with five years determinate. Desiderio-Ocampo appeals asserting that the district 

court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and 

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-
2

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Desiderio-Ocampo’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
#### Kenny Wong, Appellant, v City of New York et al., Respondents.

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Edward H. Lehner, J.), entered on or about November 30, 1990, permitting the Corporation Counsel to withdraw as counsel for defendant Bouknight, unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts and in the exercise of discretion, and the motion to withdraw is denied, without prejudice to a further application for such relief after the completion of pretrial disclosure, without costs.

The issue of whether a City employee was acting within the scope of his employment and is thus entitled to representation by the Corporation Counsel and indemnification by the City is to be determined in the first instance by the Corporation *487Counsel (General Municipal Law § 50-k [2]) and his determination may be set aside only if it lacks a factual basis, and in that sense, is arbitrary and capricious. *(Matter of Williams v City of New York,*64 NY2d 800, 802.)

However, where the Corporation Counsel has undertaken the defense of the City’s employee, Bouknight, in this personal injury action based upon his alleged assault of plaintiff, by answering on his behalf and representing him for more than three years, it was improper to relieve him in the absence of a showing that the employee failed to or refused to cooperate in the formation or presentation of his defense *(see,*General Municipal Law § 50-k [4]).

The Corporation Counsel’s conclusory assertion that the employee failed to request that he provide for his defense by not delivering a copy of the summons and complaint served upon him, as required by section 50-k (4), is belied by his actual assumption of such defense. There is also an insufficient basis in this record to warrant the conclusion, urged by the Corporation Counsel, that his service of an amended answer on behalf of Mr. Bouknight was erroneous in light of his written statement, dated March 31, 1987, that he was on his lunch break at the time of the incident. Moreover, the question of whether the employee’s acts were committed within the scope of his employment is heavily dependent on factual considerations *(see, Riviello v Waldron,*47 NY2d 297, 303) and a motion to withdraw as counsel is a poor vehicle to test an insurer’s or, in this case, a self insurer’s right to disclaim liability or deny coverage or representation *(see, Brothers v Burt,*27 NY2d 905). Concur—Rosenberger, J. P., Kupferman, Ross, Asch and Kassal, JJ.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 17, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

05IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-40883

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ELMER IVAN GARTH DAVINSON-CANALES,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:04-CR-207-ALL

--------------------

Before BENAVIDES, CLEMENT, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Elmer Ivan Davinson-Canales appeals his sentence imposed

following his guilty plea conviction for illegal reentry

following deportation. He argues that, if Almendarez-Torres v.

United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) is overruled, his sentence

imposed under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) would be unconstitutional and he

would be entitled to be resentenced to the penalty for a lesser

included offense. Davinson correctly acknowledges that

Almendarez-Torres has not been overruled and that this argument
No. 04-40883

-2-

is foreclosed, but he seeks to preserve the issue for possible

Supreme Court review. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 247

(1998); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489-90 (2000);

United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000).

Davinson next asserts that he should be resentenced in light

of United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) because he was

sentenced under the mandatory guideline system. He concedes that

his argument is subject to plain error review, but contends that

he is not required to show prejudice because the error was

structural and insusceptible of harmless error analysis. 

This court has rejected Davinson’s argument that a Booker

error or the application of the then mandatory guidelines is a

structural error or is presumptively prejudicial. See United

States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir. 2005), petition for

cert. filed (Mar. 31, 2005) (No. 04-9517); see also United States

v. Malveaux, 411 F.3d 560-61 n.9 (5th Cir. 2005), petition for

cert. filed (July 11, 2005) (No. 05-5297). We review for plain

error. United States v. Valenzuela-Quevedo, 407 F.3d 728, 732-33

(5th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed (July 25, 2005) (No.

05-5556). The “application of the Guidelines in their mandatory

form constitutes error that is plain.” Id. at 733. To

demonstrate an effect on his substantial rights, Davinson bears

the burden of showing that the plain error he has identified

“‘affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’” Id.

(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 724, 734 (1993)).
No. 04-40883

-3-

Davinson has not pointed to anything in the record

indicating that the district court would have imposed a lesser

sentence under an advisory scheme. See Mares, 402 F.3d at 521.

He has thus failed to demonstrate that his substantial rights

were affected, and his sentence is AFFIRMED.