[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-12746

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 6:06-cr-00197-JA-KRS-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SHAWNTAVIS GREEN, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(June 20, 2019)

Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Shawntavis Green appeals his 46-month sentence, imposed at the low end of 

his guideline range, following the revocation of his supervised release. Green 

admitted that he violated the terms of his supervised release when he was charged 

with a domestic-violence offense under Florida law and tested positive for 

methamphetamine. He now argues that the district court procedurally erred by 

focusing too heavily on the specific facts of the domestic-violence offense 

underlying his violation, rather than making the “breach of trust” of the supervised 

release system its primary inquiry. After review,1 we affirm.

Applicable policy statements in the Sentencing Guidelines indicate that the

primary focus of a revocation sentence is the defendant’s breach of trust, though 

the district court can account, to a limited degree, for the seriousness of the 

underlying violation. U.S.S.G. § Ch. 7, Pt. A, intro. comment 3(b). Specifically, 

the court may consider the conduct leading to the revocation in measuring the 

extent of the defendant’s breach of trust, but the overall goal of the sentence is to 

sanction the defendant for failing to abide by the conditions of his supervision. Id.

 1 The parties dispute the standard of review—the Government asserts plain-error review 

applies because Green failed to object in the district court after the sentence was imposed, while 

Green maintains this Court should review the reasonableness of his sentence under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. While Green did not raise any objections following the district court’s 

pronouncement of its sentence, he did argue, throughout the revocation proceeding, that the 

district court should focus primarily on the “violation of trust” that occurred when he violated the 

terms of his supervised release, and should only focus on the underlying offense “in a limited 

fashion.” We need not definitively resolve whether this was sufficient to preserve the error for 

appeal, as Green’s 46-month revocation sentence is reasonable under the higher abuse-ofdiscretion standard. See United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1273 n.25 (11th Cir. 2008) 

(“We review both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence under an abuseof-discretion standard.”).

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According to Green, the district court here went too far in considering his 

underlying conduct, rendering his sentence procedurally unreasonable.

Green’s claim of procedural error fails for several reasons. The policy 

statements are not binding on the district court; the court must simply consider 

them, which the record indicates it did. See United States v. Brown, 224 F.3d 

1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000). Second, although the district court discussed Green’s 

underlying conduct, it expressly indicated his domestic violence offense was a 

“breach of the trust” it had placed in him. Thus, the record shows the court’s 

discussion of Green’s underlying conduct was focused on measuring the extent of 

his breach of trust. 

Third, contrary to Green’s arguments, the district court specifically stated 

that it was not sentencing Green as a state judge. Green points to the district 

court’s statement that, were it a state court presiding over criminal charges 

stemming from the domestic-violence incident, it would have imposed the 

maximum sentence. Green argues this statement “clearly reflects that the conduct 

underlying [his] violation was, in the court’s mind, the end all be all of the 

sentencing determination.” However, a closer examination of the record reflects 

the court did not offer its opinion on the seriousness of the underlying conduct 

unprompted. Rather, it made this statement in response to Green’s argument that, 

if he was convicted and sentenced on the underlying state charge, he would likely 

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face a sentence of only a year and a half to two years. The statement therefore is 

not as reflective of what was “in the court’s mind” at sentencing as Green suggests.

Finally, the district court stated that it was basing the sentence on the 

considerations already mentioned, along with the remaining 18 U.S.C. § 3553 

factors, and its pronouncement provided enough reasoning to show that it 

considered the arguments and had a reasoned basis for the sentence. See United 

States v. Agbai, 497 F.3d 1226, 1230 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he sentencing judge 

should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the 

parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal 

decisionmaking authority.” ).

In sum, the district court did not procedurally err in imposing Green’s 

sentence. Accordingly, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED. 

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