Kay's defense and convicted him of all but the possession of stolen 

property counts. 

Almost two years after the verdict, Kay filed a motion for a 

new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The alleged new evidence 

was obtained as a result of document production related to Frates' civil 

suit against Twin-Vest and consisted of: a May 1, 2008, invoice from Kay 

for work done at the Nipton pit; a bill of sale in which Coast to Coast sold 

equipment to Twin-Vest in lieu of being in default on the promissory note; 

depositions from Janet Bivens (a former employee of Twin-Vest), Philip 

Boeckle, and Frates; and a letter from Frates written to the family court 

on behalf of Kay. Kay asserted that this evidence entirely discredited the 

Boeckleses' trial testimony that they did not hire or authorize him to 

recover equipment from the Nipton site and were not aware that he had 

taken the equipment, and demonstrated that the Boeckles were intimately 

involved in the seizure of the equipment from the Nipton site. Kay further 

asserted that this evidence would have established that he acted in good 

faith when seizing the equipment and changed the outcome of the trial. 

The district court summarily denied the motion and this appeal followed. 

Kay claims that the district court erred by denying his motion 

for a new trial.' We disagree. Kay failed to demonstrate that all of the 

'Kay failed to adequately cite to the record in his briefs and provide 

this court with a copy of the trial transcripts and the transcript of the 

hearing on the motion for a new trial See NRAP 3C(e)(1)(C); NRAP 

30(b)(1). The trial transcripts are essential for resolving this claim. We 

are able to reach the merits of this claim only because the State provided 

copies of the trial transcripts in its appendix. We remind Kay's counsel 

that it is appellant's responsibility to provide this court with all 

transcripts and documents necessary for this court's review of the issue 

raised on appeal. NRAP 30(b)(1)-(3). 

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evidence was "newly discovered" or "that even with the exercise of 

reasonable diligence it could not have been discovered and produced for 

trial." Sanborn v. State, 107 Nev. 399, 406, 812 P.2d 1279, 1284 (1991). 

Further, much of the evidence is cumulative to other evidence presented 

at trial, and Kay failed to demonstrate that presentation of this evidence 

would "render a different result probable upon retrial." Id. Finally, the 

primary purpose of the alleged new evidence was to impeach the 

Boeckleses' trial testimony. Although the Boeckleses' testimony was 

important, Kay presented other testimony at trial aimed at discrediting 

the Boeckleses' testimony, and their testimony was not so important that 

further discrediting of their testimony would make a different result at 

trial reasonably probable. Id. We therefore conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a new trial, see 

id.; NRS 176.515, and we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

cc: Hon. Michelle Leavitt, District Judge 

Cremen Law Offices 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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