J-A01017-15 

2015 PA Super 81 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee :

:

 v. :

:

SAMANTHA FLEET, :

:

 Appellant : No. 29 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 15, 2013, 

Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, 

Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0008782-2013 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DONOHUE and ALLEN, JJ. 

OPINION BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED APRIL 16, 2015 

 Samantha Fleet (“Fleet”) appeals from the November 15, 2013 

judgment of sentence entered by the Allegheny County Court of Common 

Pleas following her conviction of possession of a controlled substance.1 

Specifically, Fleet challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion to 

suppress, as the fruit of an unlawful search, the heroin and needle found 

during the execution by police of a warrant for emergency mental health 

treatment (“302 warrant”). Upon review, we conclude that because the 

Commonwealth failed to satisfy its burden of proof regarding the propriety of 

the issuance of the 302 warrant, the trial court erred by denying 

suppression. As Fleet’s conviction was based solely upon the evidence 

 

1

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16). 
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obtained during the execution of the 302 warrant, we vacate the judgment 

of sentence. 

 The trial court aptly summarized the facts and procedural history of 

this case as follows: 

On December 14, 2012, Crafton Borough Police 

Officer Stephanie Newcomer was on duty between 

3:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. (T.T.) at 4. On that day, 

Jennifer Fleet, [Fleet]’s mother, entered the Crafton 

Borough Police station regarding text messages 

[Fleet] sent stating that [Fleet] wanted to kill herself. 

(T.T.) at 5. Jennifer Fleet showed the text messages 

to Officer Newcomer. (T.T.) at 5. Jennifer Fleet also 

told Officer Newcomer that she had conversations 

with [Fleet] wherein [Fleet] stated that she was 

depressed and wanted to end things. (T.T.) at 5-6. 

Upon hearing this information, Officer Newcomer 

telephoned Rita Agostinelli at the Allegheny County

Mental Health Department (the “ACMHD”) and 

advised her of the situation. (T.T.) at 6, 11. 

Telephoning the ACMHD is an established 

procedure in the Crafton Borough Police Department 

and one with which Officer Newcomer was familiar. 

(T.T.) at 18. Officer Newcomer had encountered 

warrants and involuntary commitments under the 

Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”), 50 P.S. § 

7302[,] before this incident. (T.T.) at 18. Jennifer 

Fleet stated that she would sign a [302] warrant to

commit [Fleet]. (T.T.) at 6. Jennifer Fleet read the 

text messages to Ms. Agostinelli and went into more

detail on the telephone. (T.T.) at 16. Ms. Agostinelli 

instructed Officer Newcomer to tell Jennifer Fleet to 

follow [Fleet] to the hospital to conclude the 

paperwork. (T.T.) at 17. At this point, Ms. Agostinelli 

gave Officer Newcomer verbal authorization over the

phone that the [302] warrant would be filed. (T.T.)

at 6. Ms. Agostinelli advised Officer Newcomer that

as long as Jennifer Fleet followed the ambulance that 

would be taking [Fleet] to the hospital, she would 
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sign the paperwork that would complete the warrant 

and commitment. (T.T.) at 7. It is not the Crafton 

Police Department’s policy to require a paper 

warrant; a verbal warrant such as the one in this 

matter is sufficient. (T.T.) at 10-11. Officer 

Newcomer understood that the ACMHD would fax the 

[302] warrant to the hospital, and that the hospital 

filled out and finalized the requisite paperwork. 

(T.T.) at 11-12. 

Jennifer Fleet followed Officer Newcomer and the 

ambulance to [Fleet]’s brother’s house wherein 

[Fleet] was located. (T.T.) at 7-8, 17. [Fleet] was

asked to come outside of her brother’s home, and 

was advised of the [302] warrant. (T.T.) at 8, 19. 

Officer Newcomer asked [Fleet] if she wanted to step 

inside, because a search was required prior to 

transportation pursuant to a warrant. (T.T.) at 8, 19. 

Per Officer Newcomer, a search of the person is 

required pursuant to a warrant in such a situation for 

the safety of the police and the ambulance crew. 

(T.T.) at 9. They went inside and Officer Newcomer 

asked [Fleet] if she had anything on her. (T.T.) at 8, 

19. [Fleet] informed Officer Newcomer that she had 

heroin on her, and handed the officer a capped 

syringe and five “stamp bags.” (T.T.) at 9. A stamp

bag is a small square white bag with suspected 

heroin in it. (T.T.) at 9. [Fleet] had four empty stamp 

bags and one stamp bag had 0.1 grams of heroin in 

it. (T.T.) at 17-18. Laboratory results confirmed that 

the substance inside the stamp bag was heroin. 

(T.T.) at 40. 

On November 14, 2013, this [c]ourt held a 

suppression hearing on two issues prior to [Fleet]’s 

non-jury trial, also before this [c]ourt. [Fleet] argued 

that the search was illegal; that the search, if legal, 

exceeded the scope of permissible searches; and 

that the Commonwealth has a burden to show that 

they’ve complied with all the procedural safeguards

pertaining to searches. (T.T.) at 25. This [c]ourt 

denied [Fleet]’s suppression motion. (T.T.) at 35. 
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Following that denial, this [c]ourt proceeded to a 

stipulated non-jury trial incorporating the testimony 

from the suppression hearing. (T.T.) at 37. The 

parties stipulated to the laboratory results and that 

Officer Newcomer would testify that, based on her 

training and experience, she perceived the needle to 

be drug paraphernalia used for the ingestion of 

heroin. (T.T.) at 40. In consideration of the 

testimony and stipulated evidence, this [c]ourt found 

[Fleet] guilty of the possession charge at [c]ount 

[o]ne and not guilty of the paraphernalia charge at

[c]ount [t]wo. At [c]ount [o]ne, this [c]ourt 

sentenced [Fleet] to six months of non-reporting 

probation and a [d]rug and [a]lcohol [e]valuation. 

(T.T.) at 45. 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/14, at 4-6. 

 On November 25, 2013, Fleet filed a timely post-sentence motion 

seeking reconsideration of the trial court’s denial of her suppression motion. 

The trial court denied this request on December 4, 2013. On January 2, 

2014, Fleet filed her notice of appeal and now presents the following 

arguments before this Court: 

I. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in failing to grant 

Ms. Fleet’s Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion to Suppress 

Evidence when the Commonwealth failed to establish 

that the procedural safeguards and requirements of 

involuntary civil commitment were satisfied? 

II. Assuming, arguendo, the Commonwealth established 

that the procedural safeguards and requirements of 

involuntary civil commitment were satisfied, whether 

the [t]rial [c]ourt nonetheless erred in failing to

grant Ms. Fleet’s Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion to 

Suppress Evidence when the search of Ms. Fleet’s 

person was not supported by a search warrant, and 

no specifically established, well-delineated exception 

to the warrant requirement existed? 
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III. Assuming, arguendo, the police may conduct a 

warrantless search of a person incident to a lawful

involuntary civil commitment, whether the [t]rial 

[c]ourt still erred in failing to grant Ms. Fleet’s

Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion to Suppress Evidence when 

the police exceeded the permissible scope of such a

search? 

Fleet’s Brief at 4.2

We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress to determine 

whether the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and whether it 

reached its legal conclusions in error. Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 

843, 845 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 85 A.3d 482 (Pa. 2014). “If the 

record supports the trial court’s findings of fact, we will reverse only if the 

trial court’s legal conclusions are incorrect.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions protect citizens 

from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; PA.

CONST. art. I, § 8. The trial court states, however, that because police 

obtained the contraband while executing a 302 warrant, “the proper inquiry 

is not under the criminal standards of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution and Article [I], Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/14, at 7. Rather, according to the trial court, the 

Commonwealth need only “establish that the procedural safeguards and 

 

2

 Since we conclude that the Commonwealth failed to satisfy its burden of 

proof with regard to the propriety of the issuance of the 302 warrant, we do 

not address the remaining issues Fleet raises on appeal. 
J-A01017-15 

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requirements of involuntary civil commitment were satisfied” under the 

MHPA. Id. at 7, 11. As the trial court found that the Commonwealth 

satisfied its burden of proving that the issuance of the 302 warrant was 

proper pursuant to the MHPA, it found that the evidence was not subject to 

suppression. Id. at 8-10. 

Fleet asserts that the trial court’s conclusions in both respects are 

erroneous. First, Fleet disagrees with the trial court’s conclusion that 

involuntary civil commitments are not subject to the protections of the 

Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8. Fleet’s Brief at 14-18. Fleet 

further argues that the Commonwealth did not present sufficient evidence to 

support a finding that the issuance of a 302 warrant was proper, as it failed 

to present evidence to show that Fleet was a “clear and present danger” 

under the MHPA or demonstrate compliance with the MHPA’s warrant 

requirement. Id. at 21-23. 

At the outset, we find no support for the trial court’s notion that 

persons subjected to involuntary civil commitments are not entitled to the 

constitutional protections provided by the Fourth Amendment and Article I, 

Section 8. The trial court is correct that civil commitment proceedings are 

not “to be based on criminal standards and procedures.” In re J.M., 726 

A.2d 1041, 1046 (Pa. 1999); see Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/14, at 7. This 

relates solely to the burden of proof required at an involuntary civil 

commitment proceeding, and does not mean that simply because the person 
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is subject to a 302 warrant he or she therefore is not afforded constitutional 

protection against unreasonable searches and seizures by police. These 

protections apply to all citizens, regardless of their status, when police or 

other government entities are involved. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The 

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 

and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 

persons or things to be seized.”); PA. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The people shall 

be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from 

unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or 

to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly 

as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation 

subscribed to by the affiant.”) (emphasis added); see also Soldal v. Cook 

Cnty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 67 (1992) (“the [Fourth] Amendment’s protection 

applies in the civil context as well [as the criminal context]”). 

It is an intrusion by the government, not the status of the citizen, that 

triggers protection and inquiry into the reasonableness of the intrusion. 

“The Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 8 have long been interpreted to 

protect the people from unreasonable government intrusions into their 

privacy. The reasonableness of a governmental intrusion varies with the 

degree of privacy legitimately expected and the nature of the governmental 
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intrusion.” Commonwealth. v. McCree, 924 A.2d 621, 626 (Pa. 2007) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Once a defendant files a motion to suppress, the Commonwealth has 

the burden of proving that the evidence in question was lawfully obtained 

without violating the defendant’s rights. Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H). Pursuant to 

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, there are three categories of interactions 

between police and a citizen: 

The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or 

request for information) which need not be 

supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no

official compulsion to stop or to respond. The 

second, an “investigative detention” must be 

supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a 

suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does 

not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute 

the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an

arrest or “custodial detention” must be supported by 

probable cause. 

Commonwealth v. Downey, 39 A.3d 401, 405 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal 

denied, 50 A.3d 124 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). To find an interaction 

with police elevated above a mere encounter, we must determine whether 

the individual was “seized” by police. Commonwealth v. Au, 42 A.3d 

1002, 1004 (Pa. 2012). 

To guide the crucial inquiry as to whether or not a

seizure has been effected, the United States 

Supreme Court has devised an objective test 

entailing a determination of whether, in view of all 

surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person 

would have believed that he was free to leave. In 

evaluating the circumstances, the focus is directed
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toward whether, by means of physical force or show 

of authority, the citizen-subject’s movement has in

some way been restrained. In making this 

determination, courts must apply the totality-of-thecircumstances approach, with no single factor 

dictating the ultimate conclusion as to whether a 

seizure has occurred. 

Downey, 39 A.3d at 405 (citation omitted). 

The record in the case at bar reflects that Officer Newcomer obtained 

the evidence from Fleet after the officer “advised [Fleet] of the situation with 

the 302 warrant.” N.T., 11/15/13, at 8. Officer Newcomer informed Fleet 

that she was going to be searched and “asked her if she had anything on 

her,” at which point Fleet handed the officer the heroin and syringe. Id. at 

8-9. It is clear that no reasonable person would have felt free to leave, and 

that Fleet was therefore “seized” as defined above.3 See Downey, 39 A.3d 

at 405. 

Fleet’s seizure occurred as a result of Officer Newcomer’s execution of 

a 302 warrant and Fleet challenged the propriety of the issuance of the 302 

warrant. Therefore, the determination of whether that seizure was lawful 

depends on whether the Commonwealth satisfied its burden of proving at 

the suppression hearing that the procedural requirements for the issuance of 

a 302 warrant pursuant to the MHPA were met. See Commonwealth v. 

 

3

 Our conclusion that Fleet was seized prior to Officer Newcomer obtaining 

the contraband in question is important because if this had been a mere 

encounter, Fleet would not be entitled to any redress, as she voluntarily 

provided the contraband to Officer Newcomer upon being asked “if she had 

anything on her.” 
J-A01017-15 

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Jackson, 62 A.3d 433, 438 (Pa. Super. 2013) (indicating that where 

evidence is obtained during the execution of a 302 warrant and the 

defendant challenges the factual basis for the issuance of the 302 warrant, it 

is the Commonwealth’s burden to prove that the 302 warrant was properly 

issued); see also Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/14, at 7 (recognizing that it 

“must determine if the Commonwealth complied with the requirements of a 

civil involuntary confinement”). 

[T]he standard for evaluating the validity of [302]

warrants is whether reasonable grounds exist to 

believe that a person is severely mentally disabled

and in need of immediate treatment. ... Whether 

evidence is sufficient to constitute reasonable 

grounds for purposes of a [302] warrant can only be

determined on a case by case basis. ... [T]he guiding

inquiry must be whether, when viewing the 

surrounding facts and circumstances, a reasonable 

person in the position of the applicant for a [302]

warrant could have concluded that an individual was

severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate

treatment. 

In re J.M., 726 A.2d at 1049; see also Jackson, 62 A.3d at 439. 

Section 7301(a) of the MHPA, governing who may be subject to 

involuntary emergency examination and treatment, provides: 

Whenever a person is severely mentally disabled 

and in need of immediate treatment, he may be 

made subject to involuntary emergency examination 

and treatment. A person is severely mentally 

disabled when, as a result of mental illness, his 

capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and 

discretion in the conduct of his affairs and 

social relations or to care for his own personal 
J-A01017-15 

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needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and 

present danger of harm to others or to himself. 

50 P.S. § 7301(a) (emphasis added). Clear and present danger of harm to 

oneself requires proof that “within the past 30 days,” one of the following 

occurred: 

(i) the person has acted in such manner as to 

evidence that he would be unable, without care, 

supervision and the continued assistance of others,

to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or 

medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety, 

and that there is a reasonable probability that death, 

serious bodily injury or serious physical debilitation 

would ensue within 30 days unless adequate 

treatment were afforded under this act; or 

(ii) the person has attempted suicide and that 

there is the reasonable probability of suicide 

unless adequate treatment is afforded under 

this act. For the purposes of this subsection, a 

clear and present danger may be demonstrated 

by the proof that the person has made threats 

to commit suicide and has committed acts 

which are in furtherance of the threat to 

commit suicide; or 

(iii) the person has substantially mutilated himself or 

attempted to mutilate himself substantially and that 

there is the reasonable probability of mutilation 

unless adequate treatment is afforded under this act. 

For the purposes of this subsection, a clear and 

present danger shall be established by proof that the 

person has made threats to commit mutilation and 

has committed acts which are in furtherance of the 

threat to commit mutilation. 

50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2) (emphasis added). 

 Only a “severely mentally disabled” person, as defined above, may be 

emergently examined by a physician “upon the certification of a physician 
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stating the need for such examination; or upon a warrant issued by the 

county administrator authorizing such examination; or without a warrant 

upon application by a physician or other authorized person who has 

personally observed conduct showing the need for such examination.” 

50 P.S. § 7302(a). 

The record reflects that Officer Newcomer was the only witness to 

testify at the suppression hearing. Although she stated that Fleet’s mother 

came to the police station and indicated that Fleet had threatened to kill 

herself, the officer provided no indication of when the threats of suicide 

allegedly occurred. See generally N.T., 11/15/13, at 5-7. There was also 

no testimony that Fleet had previously attempted suicide or testimony that 

in addition to threatening suicide, Fleet took any actions in furtherance of 

her suicidal ideations. To the contrary, the record reveals no evidence that 

in the thirty days prior to Fleet’s mother coming to the police station, Fleet 

engaged in any of the behaviors set forth in section 7301(b)(2) such that 

she would meet the definition of a person posing a clear and present danger 

to herself and thus, “severely mentally disabled.” See 50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2). 

As stated above, “severely mentally disabled” is a defined term of art 

in section 7301(a) of the MHPA. The only evidence of Fleet’s mental state 

presented by the Commonwealth was that at some unknown time, Fleet 

allegedly sent text messages to her mother indicating that she was 

contemplating suicide and that she had a conversation with her mother, 
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again at a time unknown, “about being depressed and wanting to end 

things.” N.T., 11/15/13, at 5-6, 14. The Commonwealth presented no 

evidence to support a finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe 

that Fleet was a clear and present danger to herself, and thus “severely 

mentally disabled,” as defined by the MHPA. See J.M., 726 A.2d at 1049; 

50 P.S. §§ 7301(a), 7302(a). As such, the Commonwealth failed to satisfy 

its burden of proving that the 302 warrant was properly issued. 

Contrary to the statement by the learned Dissent, the evidence 

presented in the case at bar in support of the propriety of the issuance of 

the 302 warrant was not “more compelling” than the testimony in Jackson, 

wherein this Court decided the same issue as is presented in the case at bar 

and found the 302 warrant was properly issued. Diss. at 5. In Jackson, 

police executed a written 302 warrant issued for Jackson at his house. 

Jackson, 62 A.3d at 435. While there, the police observed drug 

paraphernalia and “an active marijuana growing operation.” Id. Thereafter, 

police obtained a warrant to further search the residence and seize the 

contraband found. Id. 

Jackson filed a motion to suppress, asserting, inter alia, that the 

seizure “was derivative of an invalid mental health warrant which the police 

used to gain entry to his home.” Id. The trial court held a suppression 

hearing, at which the following relevant testimony was provided: 
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Tracy Semow, a mental health supervisor for 

Westmoreland Case Management and Supports, 

testified that in addition to her caseload supervision 

responsibilities, she assists individuals who have a 

family member or friend who is a threat to himself or 

others. On April 5, 2011, she met with [Jackson’s 

father] and his wife and Ms. Bates[, Jackson’s 

paramour], and all three expressed concerns about 

[Jackson]’s and Ms. Bates’[] safety. Since Ms. Bates 

was the primary witness to [Jackson]’s conduct and 

felt personally threatened, she was the designated 

applicant. Ms. Semow assisted Ms. Bates in 

completing an application for the warrant that 

subjected [Jackson] to an involuntary emergency 

examination and treatment. 

Ms. Bates averred in the application that she 

believed [Jackson] to be severely mentally disabled

and a clear and present danger to others. She 

checked the box on the form providing: 

Clear and present danger to others shall be 

shown by establishing that within the past 30 

days the person has inflicted or attempted to 

inflict serious bodily harm on another and that 

there is reasonable probability that such 

conduct will be repeated. A clear and present 

danger of harm to others may be 

demonstrated by proof that the person has 

made threats of harm and has committed acts 

in furtherance of the threat to commit 

harm[.][4]

Application for Involuntary Emergency Examination 

and Treatment, Commonwealth Exhibit 1, at 2. 

Ms. Bates handwrote the behavior exhibited by 

[Jackson] within the past thirty days that supported 

her belief. Ms. Bates recounted that on March 21, 

2011, she and [Jackson] had an explosive argument 

over trash bags that culminated in [Jackson] 

 

4

 See 50 P.S. § 7301(b)(1) (defining clear and present danger to others). 
J-A01017-15 

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threatening “to smash [her] face in with those f–––in 

keys.” Ms. Bates also described an incident that 

occurred on April 4, 2011, the day before the 

warrant issued. Ms. Bates insisted on driving home 

from the dentist after [Jackson] had received 

novocaine. Their two children were in the rear seat

of the vehicle. [Jackson] repeatedly yelled at her 

about her driving and started kicking the dashboard

and punching the window to convince her that he 

should drive. When Ms. Bates declined to relinquish

control of the car, [Jackson] told her “No you are 

going to f–––ing pull over now and let me drive!” 

When Ms. Bates refused, [Jackson] pushed his feet 

against the dashboard, which had the effect of 

pushing his seat into the infant seat located behind 

him. When Ms. Bates pointed out that the child could 

be hurt, [Jackson] put his hand on the keys in the 

ignition, threatening to remove them. 

When Ms. Bates continued to refuse to allow 

[Jackson] to drive, he began punching the window 

on the passenger side of the vehicle. He again 

insisted that she turn over the wheel, and when she

declined, he threatened, “I will beat your face in with 

a baton until there is a big gaping hole in your 

head!” 

At that point, Ms. Bates directed the car away 

from their home, intending to go directly to the 

police station. [Jackson] noticed and became more 

violent. As Ms. Bates was entering a turn, [Jackson] 

grabbed the keys in the ignition and turned off the

car, blocking traffic in all directions. He then jumped 

from the car and ordered her to exit the car. Ms. 

Bates restarted the car and attempted to drive it. 

[Jackson] stood in front of the car, took his baton, 

and smashed it against the passenger side window. 

At that point, Ms. Bates proceeded to the local police 

department where she filed a report of the incident. 

Ms. Semow read the application in its entirety 

over the phone to Dawn Hixon, a Westmoreland 

County mental health delegate. Based on Ms. Bates’ 
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account, Ms. Hixon approved the warrant that 

permitted the police to apprehend [Jackson] and 

take him to the nearest emergency room for 

evaluation. Ms. Semow then signed the warrant. At 

the suppression hearing, Ms. Semow verified her 

signature on the 302 warrant and confirmed that the

information contained therein was the information 

Ms. Bates transcribed in Ms. Semow’s presence. 

Id. at 435-37 (footnote added; some record citations omitted). The trial 

court denied suppression. 

Following his convictions of drug-related charges, Jackson appealed to 

this Court. On appeal, this Court evaluated the evidence presented by the 

Commonwealth at the suppression hearing and determined that it supported 

the trial court’s finding that Jackson was “severely mentally disabled,” as he 

was a clear and present danger to others as defined by section 7301, and 

that the 302 warrant was properly issued. Id. at 440. We thus concluded 

that the police were lawfully present in Jackson’s home by virtue of the 

properly procured 302 warrant; police viewed the contraband in plain view; 

and the resulting issuance of a search warrant and the seizure of the drugs 

and paraphernalia by police were permissible. Id. 

In Jackson, the Commonwealth provided testimony to establish that 

Jackson was engaging in behaviors during the preceding thirty days that 

made him a clear and present danger to others, and therefore “severely 

mentally disabled” as defined by the MHPA. In the case before us, on the 

other hand, the Commonwealth did not present any evidence to support a 
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finding that the 302 warrant was properly procured. Although the Dissent 

states, “Officer Newcomer viewed text messages from [Fleet] in which she 

articulated a clear and immediate intent to kill herself,” Diss. at 5 

(emphasis added), there is no support in the record for such a conclusion. 

As stated hereinabove, the Commonwealth presented no evidence regarding 

when Fleet allegedly sent the text messages or any specificity as to the 

content of the messages. Officer Newcomer only testified that Fleet’s 

mother came to the police station and showed her text messages, allegedly 

sent by Fleet at some unknown time, indicating that Fleet was contemplating 

suicide and that Fleet’s mother had a conversation with Fleet, again at a 

time unknown, “about being depressed and wanting to end things.” N.T., 

11/15/13, at 5-6, 14. 

The Dissent’s alternative argument – that Officer Newcomer’s seizure 

of Fleet was “reasonable” “even if the warrant was technically defective 

pursuant to the procedural prerequisites of the MHPA” – is also erroneous. 

See Diss. at 6-11. This was not a mere technical defect in the 302 warrant 

as the Dissent suggests; this was a wholesale failure to establish that Fleet 

was the proper subject of an emergency examination under the MHPA. See

50 P.S. § 7302(a) (permitting transportation of a person to a treatment 

facility for emergency examination only if there are “reasonable grounds to 

believe a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate 

treatment,” either as provided in a warrant for emergency examination or 
J-A01017-15 

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upon personal observation of the person’s conduct) (emphasis added). As 

stated above, Officer Newman’s testimony did not establish that Fleet was 

“severely mentally disabled” as defined by the MHPA or in need of immediate 

treatment. As such, the Dissent’s conclusion that the Commonwealth 

established “that probable cause existed for the belief that [Fleet] was 

severely mentally disabled” is unsupportable under the law.5 Diss. at 10-11. 

We agree with the Dissent that the Commonwealth need not prove 

that Fleet was, in fact, “severely mentally disabled” to establish that the 302 

warrant was properly issued. See Diss. at 3-4. Rather, as stated supra, the 

Commonwealth had the burden of proving that there were reasonable 

grounds to believe that Fleet was “severely mentally disabled” as defined by 

the MHPA and in need of immediate treatment. See J.M., 726 A.2d at 

1049; 50 P.S. §§ 7301(a), 7302(a). In finding that the Commonwealth 

satisfied its burden in this regard, the Dissent wholly ignores the definition 

under the MHPA of who is subject to a 302 warrant and the paucity of 

evidence produced by the Commonwealth at the suppression hearing. The 

Commonwealth failed to produce the text messages Fleet allegedly sent; 

 

5

 We note that it is entirely possible that Fleet was the proper subject of a 

302 warrant and lawfully committed pursuant thereto. Our decision here 

does not address that question. Rather, our inquiry is simply whether the 

Commonwealth satisfied its burden of proving that it lawfully obtained the 

contraband in question. As the Commonwealth obtained the contraband 

during the execution of a 302 warrant, and Fleet challenged the validity of 

the 302 warrant in a suppression motion, pursuant to Jackson, the 

Commonwealth in the case at bar had the burden of proving that the 302 

warrant was properly issued. See Jackson, 62 A.3d at 438. 
J-A01017-15 

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failed to call any witnesses to testify regarding the content of those 

messages or the information contained in the application for the 302 

warrant; and failed to produce any evidence pertaining to when Fleet 

allegedly sent the messages or when the conversation with her mother 

“about being depressed and wanting to end things” occurred. Stated 

otherwise, the Commonwealth failed to establish that the requirements for 

obtaining a 302 warrant were met. As such, the Commonwealth failed to 

satisfy its burden of proof on this predicate issue and we have no basis from 

the record to conclude that Fleet was lawfully detained prior to the search. 

Where a court finds that a person was illegally 

seized before he allegedly consented to a search, 

any evidence obtained as a result of the search must 

be excluded from the evidence against the accused 

as fruit of the poisonous tree, i.e., the unlawful 

seizure, unless the prosecution can establish that the 

alleged consent was not a result of the illegal 

seizure. 

Commonwealth v. Reid, 811 A.2d 530, 544-45 (Pa. 2002) (citation 

omitted). 

We therefore conclude that the trial court erred by denying Fleet’s 

motion to suppress the heroin and syringe recovered from her person by 

Officer Newcomer and reverse that decision. As Fleet’s conviction of 

possession of a controlled substance was based entirely upon the nowsuppressed evidence, we vacate the judgment of sentence. 
J-A01017-15 

- 20 - 

 Order denying suppression reversed. Judgment of sentence vacated. 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

 Ford Elliott, P.J.E. joins the Opinion. 

 Allen, J. files a Dissenting Opinion. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 4/16/2015