alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                EXHIBIT (10)(b)

                        OPINION AND CONSENT OF ACTUARY
<PAGE>

               [Transamerica Life Insurance Company Letterhead]

April 10, 2002

Transamerica Life Insurance Company
4333 Edgewood Road NE
Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52499-0001

Re: Premier Asset Builder Variable Annuity
    Separate Account VA F
    Registration on Form N-4

Dear Sir/Madam:

With regard to the above registration statement, I have examined such documents
and made such inquiries as I have deemed necessary and appropriate, and on the
basis of such examination, have the following opinions:

Fees and charges deducted under the Premier Asset Builder Variable Annuity
policies are those deemed necessary to appropriately reflect:

(1)    the expenses incurred in the acquisition and distribution of the
       policies,

(2)    the expenses associated with the development and servicing of the
       policies,

(3)    the assumption of certain risks arising from the operation and management
       of the policies and/or riders to the policy and that provides for a
       reasonable margin of profit.

Fees and charges assessed against the policy values in the variable account
include:

(i)    Service Charge and Administrative Charge

(ii)   Mortality and Expense Risk Fee (M&E)

(iii)  Taxes (including premium and other taxes if applicable)

(iv)   Surrender Charges

(v)    Any applicable rider fees or charges
<PAGE>

Transamerica Life Insurance Company
April 10, 2002
Page 2

The magnitude of each of the individual charges listed above in (i) through (v)
is established in the pricing of the Premier Asset Builder Variable Annuity, to
achieve a reasonable Return on Investment (ROI), which is within the range of
industry practice with respect to comparable variable annuity products.

Except by coincidence, it is not expected that actual charges assessed in a
given year would exactly offset actual expenses incurred.  Acquisition expenses
(as well as major product and/or systems development expenses) are incurred "up
front" and recovered, with a reasonable profit margin, through future years'
charges.  In addition, the company cannot increase certain charges under the
policies in the pricing process.

Therefore, in my opinion, the fees and charges deducted under the policies, in
the aggregate, are reasonable in relation to the services rendered, the expenses
expected to be incurred, and the risks assumed by the company.

I hereby consent to the use of this opinion, which is included as an Exhibit to
the registration statement.

    /s/ R. Gene Hauser
---------------------------------
R. Gene Hauser
Associate Actuary
Transamerica Life Insurance Company
M A N D A T E

TO THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO 3 of NUECES COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before our Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas, on the 29th day of

January, 2015, the cause upon appeal to revise or reverse your judgment between

TEXAS REAL ESTATE

COMMISSION, Appellant,

v.

CHARLOTTE A. HANSEN AND

JAMES LARRY HANSEN, Appellees.

CAUSE NO. 13-12-00757-CV (Tr.Ct.No. 04-60394-3)

was determined; and therein our said Court made its order in these words:

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on

appeal, concludes the appeal should be DISMISSED. The Court orders the appeal

DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion. Costs of the appeal are adjudged against

appellant.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

      

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court of Appeals

for the Thirteenth District of Texas, in this behalf, and in all things have it duly

recognized, obeyed and executed.

WITNESS, the Hon. Rogelio Valdez, Chief Justice of our Court of Appeals, with the seal

thereof affixed, at the City of Edinburg, Texas this 16th day of April, 2015.

Dorian E. Ramirez, CLERK

FILE COPY
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 123 

To authorize a pilot program under section 258 of the National Housing 

Act to establish an automated process for providing additional credit 

rating information for mortgagors and prospective mortgagors under 

certain mortgages. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 3, 2019 

Mr. GREEN of Texas introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To authorize a pilot program under section 258 of the National Housing Act to establish an automated process 

for providing additional credit rating information for 

mortgagors and prospective mortgagors under certain 

mortgages. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘FHA Additional Credit 

5 Pilot Program Reauthorization Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•HR 123 IH

1 SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION OF PILOT PROGRAM. 

2 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of Housing 

3 and Urban Development shall establish and carry out the 

4 pilot program under section 258 of the National Housing 

5 Act (12 U.S.C. 1715z–24), as amended by subsection (b) 

6 of this section. 

7 (b) SUNSET.—Subsection (d) of section 258 of the 

8 National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1715z–24(d)) is amend9 ed by striking ‘‘5-year period beginning on the date of the 

10 enactment of the Building American Homeownership Act 

11 of 2008’’ and inserting ‘‘14-year period beginning on the 

12 date of the enactment of the FHA Additional Credit Pilot 

13 Program Reauthorization Act’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
EXHIBIT 32


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of American Medical Security
Group, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2003 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Samuel V. Miller, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and I,
John R. Lombardi, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

/S/ SAMUEL V. MILLER                            /S/ JOHN R. LOMBARDI
Samuel V. Miller                                John R. Lombardi
Chief Executive Officer                         Chief Financial Officer

August 13, 2003                                 August 13, 2003

This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained
by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL  INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FINLAY
ENTERPRISES,  INC.  FORM 10-Q AND IS  QUALIFIED  IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JAN-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 FEB-02-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   AUG-02-1997
<CASH>                                         3,453
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  29,884
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    221,393
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               264,040
<PP&E>                                         81,235
<DEPRECIATION>                                 25,141
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 425,395
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          196,450
<BONDS>                                        216,084
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       76
<OTHER-SE>                                     12,278
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   425,395
<SALES>                                        282,652
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               282,652
<CGS>                                          137,834
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  137,834
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               137,283
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             16,148
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (8,613)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (3,009)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (5,604)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (5,604)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.75)
        

</TABLE>
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Thomas C. Kuehn, Appellant. American Television & Communications Corporation, Respondent; Thomas F. Hartnett, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

—Casey, J. P.

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed August 18, 1989, as amended by decision filed October 10, 1990, which ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because his employment was terminated due to misconduct.

Claimant worked for the employer from March 2, 1987 to October 3, 1988 as an advertising account executive. Up to four or five months before his discharge, claimant was a steady, competent and satisfactory employee. At that time, his job performance took a downward turn. He missed' appointments, lost deals and misplaced important material. He was warned about his deteriorating performance and told the employer it was due to "personal problems at home”. When the employer lost money and prestige due to claimant’s mishandling and neglect of certain incidents involving clients, the *777employer set up an appointment for a serious talk and written warning with claimant. Claimant missed the appointment and was discharged.

Claimant now admits that he began experimenting with cocaine at the time his work began to deteriorate, that he went from a recreational user to "becoming hooked”, and went from "snorting” to "free basing”, but never told his employer. Six weeks after his discharge from employment claimant admitted himself to a detoxification unit and at the time of his unemployment insurance hearing claimed he was drug free and firmly committed to rehabilitation.

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board adopted the findings of the Administrative Law Judge and decided that claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits due to his misconduct. Since claimant misled his employer as to the reason for his poor job performance by claiming "personal problems” instead of "substance abuse”, we find that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision.

Weiss, Mikoll, Levine and Crew III, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
Exhibit 31.2

I, Ross G. Landsbaum, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q
of ReachLocal, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash
flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I
are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) [paragraph omitted in accordance with Exchange Act Rule 13a-14(a)];

c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions
about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants
fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants
ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that
involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ Ross G. Landsbaum  
|Ross G. Landsbaum      
|Chief Financial Officer
|Date: May 16, 2011
**THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS**

**Post Office Box 12248**

**Austin, Texas 78711**

**(512) 463-1312**

February 27, 2009

Mr. Michael D. Conner

Hirsch & Westheimer, P.C.

700 Louisiana, Suite 2550

Houston, TX 77002

Mr. Jay L. Gueck

Olson Nicoud & Gueck, L.L.P.

1201 Main Street, Suite 2470

Dallas, TX 75202

Honorable David L. Evans

Judge, 48th District Court

401 West Belknap 8th Floor

Fort Worth, TX 76102

RE:Case Number:  07-0901

Court of Appeals Number:  02-05-00397-CV

Trial Court Number:  048-204713-04

Style:IN RE  BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.

Dear Counsel:

Today the Supreme Court of Texas delivered the enclosed per curiam opinion in the above-referenced cause.  (Justice Johnson not sitting)

Sincerely,

Blake A. Hawthorne, Clerk

by Claudia Jenks, Chief Deputy Clerk

Enclosures

**Case No. 07-0901Page 1**
#### City of Canandaigua, Appellant-Respondent, v Canandaigua Police Officers Association, by its President, Joseph D. Starr and Another, Respondent-Appellant.

—Order and judgment unanimously reversed on the law without costs, petition granted and award vacated. Memorandum: Petitioner *1049appeals from an order and judgment denying its motion to vacate an arbitrator’s award. The arbitrator found that petitioner had violated the collective bargaining agreement by imposing discipline without following the procedure provided by Civil Service Law §75. The court rejected petitioner’s argument that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. Although the agreement was silent with respect to discipline, and the arbitrator found that he had no jurisdiction to consider the merits of the discipline imposed, he also found that the action taken contravened article IV, paragraph 4 of the collective bargaining agreement. He reasoned that that paragraph referred to "fair working conditions” and that, by virtue of past practice, such conditions included compliance with Civil Service Law § 75 in imposing discipline.

The paragraph relied on is a statement of purpose and does not by itself impose substantive obligations. We agree with petitioner that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and that his award therefore must be vacated pursuant to CPLR 7511 (b) (1) (iii), because the agreement contained neither an express provision allowing consideration of past practice nor an express provision on discipline *(see, County of Ontario v Civil Serv. Employees Assn.,*76 Misc 2d 365, *affd*46 AD2d 738). (Appeals from Order and Judgment of Supreme Court, Ontario County, Curran, J.—Arbitration.) Present—Doerr, J. P., Green, Pine, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
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PACKAGED SYSTEM CENTRAL AIR CONDITIONERS: COST AND EFFICIENCY DATA - Reverse Engineering

Total Total

% Over Manufacturer's Cost Multiplier Manuf. Equip. Install. Installed Annual Annual Compr. 

Level Description Baseline ARI mean Reverse Engr Cost Price Price Price Repair Maint. SEER Mfg. Cost 

SEER Split Packaged Split Packaged (1998$) (1998$) (1998$) (1998$) (1998$) (1998$) (Btu/Whr) (1998$) 

0 Baseline (SEER=10) 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% $511 $1,240 $1,367 $2,607 $34 $36 10 $122 1 10% Impr. (SEER=11) 10% 116% 119% 112% 109% $557 $1,329 $1,367 $2,696 $34 $36 11 $152 2 20% Impr. (SEER=12) 20% 136% 130% 128% 116% $593 $1,398 $1,367 $2,765 $34 $36 12 $153 3 30% Impr. (SEER=13) 30% 163% 163% 144% 143% $731 $1,665 $1,367 $3,032 $35 $36 13 $167 4 40% Impr. (SEER=14) 40% 203% 187% 182% 174% $889 $1,971 $1,367 $3,338 $54 $36 14 $167 5 50% Impr. (SEER=15) 50% 240% 223% 199% 187% $956 $2,099 $1,367 $3,466 $57 $36 15 $221 6 80% Impr. (SEER=18) 80% 240% 223% 199% 187% $956 $2,099 $1,367 $3,466 $57 $36 18 $221 

Split Packaged

Baseline Mfg Cost $394 $511

Installation Price $1,279 $1,367

Distributior Markup 

Marginal Markups Cumulative 

New Retrofit Wt.Avg / Baseline Markup Probability 

34% 66% Sampled Markup 1.027 1% 

Manufacturer Markup 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.056 10% 

Distributor Markup 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.37 1.069 20% 

Dealer Markup 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.077 30% 

Builder Markup 1.26 1.00 1.09 1.09 Sales Tax Distribution for Retrofit 1.084 40% 

10% 30% 38% 22% 1.091 50% 

Sales Tax 1.00 1.07 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.098 60% 

1.105 70% 

Service Cost $36 1.114 80% 

1.126 90% 

New/Retrofit Group 1 1=New, 2=Retrofit 1.155 99%
#### Estate of Marjorie Whitehall et al., Respondents, v State of New York, Appellant.

(Claim No. 75541.)

—In a condemnation proceeding, the State of New York appeals from *708a judgment of the Court of Claims (Silverman, J.), entered July 13, 1989, which is in favor of claimants and against it in the principal amount of $40,000,

Ordered that the matter is remitted to the Court of Claims for a more detailed explanation of the methodology it utilized in calculating the values it assigned to the subject property both before and after the appropriation, and the appeal is held in abeyance in the interim. The Court of Claims is to file its report with all convenient speed.

The State claims that it was improper for the Court of Claims to have valued the subject property utilizing an income approach to determine the before-taking value of the property and a market/sales approach to determine the after-taking value. We cannot discern from the court’s decision which method it utilized. Nor are we able to determine how the. court arrived at its conclusion that $7,000 should be reduced from the after-taking value of the subject property. Accordingly, the matter is remitted to the court for a more detailed explanation by it as to the methods it utilized in arriving at the damage award. Thompson, J. P., Kunzeman, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We consent to the reference to our firm under the caption "Financial Statements"
and to the use of our reports pertaining to Western-Southern Life Assurance
Company (statutory-basis) and Western-Southern Life Assurance Company Separate
Account 2 dated April 4, 2002 and March 25, 2002, respectively, in
Post-Effective Amendment No. 12 (Form N-4 No. 033-79906) and Post-Effective
Amendment No. 13 (Form N-4 No. 811-08550) to the Registration Statement and
related Statement of Additional Information of Western-Southern Life Assurance
Company Separate Account 2 dated May 1, 2002.


                                                      /s/ Ernst & Young, LLP

Cincinnati, Ohio
April 24, 2002
#### Gordon WEAR, Appellant, v. FARMERS AND MERCHANTS BANK OF LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO, Appellee.

No. 3850.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Feb. 29, 1980.

*1279Millard Ingraham, Rice, Hoppner, Hed-land, Fleischer & Ingraham, Fairbanks, for appellant.

Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Fairbanks, for ap-pellee.

Before CONNOR, BURKE and MATTHEWS, JJ., and DIMOND, Senior Justice.

PER CURIAM.

The Bank has petitioned for a rehearing. The petition is granted.

In its petition for rehearing, the Bank argues that in our determining that the Bank was not a holder in due course of Wear’s promissory note, we overlooked a controlling decision. The decision the Bank refers to is *First Nat’l Bank v. Bell,*88 S.W.2d 119 (Tex.Civ.App. — -Fort Worth 1935). The *Bell*decision was criticized as not being a sound construction of the Negotiable Instruments Law by another panel of the Texas Civil Court of Appeals in *Estrada v. River Oaks Bank & Trust Co.,*550 S.W.2d 719, 726 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston [14th District] 1977). Thus, in the absence of a decision by the Texas Supreme Court on this question, the *Bell*decision cannot be considered as a “controlling decision,” as the Bank asserts.

In reaching our decision that the Bank was not a holder in due course of Wear’s note in 1968, we applied the Uniform Commercial Code, which was adopted by the State of Texas in 1966. A holding that the Bank did become a holder in due course would be inconsistent, in our opinion, with Texas statutory law in 1968. We will presume that the *Estrada*view in 1977, and not that in the *Bell*case in 1935, regarding the question of written contracts to assignments as endorsements of notes, would be the view that the Supreme Court of Texas would have adopted in 1968 if the matter had been presented to it.

The Bank also reiterates its argument that Wear forfeited his right to commissions by “twisting,” i. e., by inducing Century policyholders to cancel their Century policies and insure instead with another insurance company represented by Wear so that he could get the higher first-year commissions. As we held in the original opinion in this case, that argument is untenable and without merit.

We adhere to our original decision which reverses the judgment of the superior court.

RABINOWITZ, C. J., and BOOCHEVER, J., not participating.