ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

No. PD-0186-15

In the Court of Criminal Appeals

Austin, Texas

 

ROBERT LYNN PRIDGEN,

Petitioner / Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Respondent / Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 369th District Court, no. 29956,

Anderson County, Texas, and the Tyler Court of 

Appeals, No. 12-13-00136-CR

 

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

 

James W. Volberding

SBN: 00786313

First Place (903) 597-6622

100 E. Ferguson Street (866) 398-6883 (fax)

Suite 500 e-mail: james@jamesvolberding.com

Tyler, Texas 75702

Attorney for the Petitioner, Robert Lynn Pridgen 
ii

No. PD-0186-15

In the Court of Criminal Appeals

Austin, Texas

 

ROBERT LYNN PRIDGEN,

Petitioner / Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Respondent / Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 369th District Court, no. 29956,

Anderson County, Texas, and the Tyler Court of 

Appeals, No. 12-13-00136-CR

 

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

 

 

To the Honorable Court of Criminal Appeals:

Mr. Robert Lynn Pridgen, Petitioner, asks the Court to grant 

discretionary review, then acquittal or retrial of his murder conviction.
iii

THE PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL

The following is a list of all parties to the trial court’s judgment 

and the names and addresses of all trial and appellate counsel:

Petitioner Petitioner’s Counsel

Mr. Robert Lynn Pridgen Mr. James W. Volberding

First Place

100 E. Ferguson Street

Suite 500

Tyler, TX 75702

(903) 597-6622

Petitioner’s Trial Counsel

Mr. Jeff Haas

100 E. Ferguson, Suite 908

Tyler, TX 75702

State of Texas State’s Appellate Counsel

Ms. Allyson Mitchell 

Anderson County District 

 Attorney

500 N. Church Street, Room 38

Palestine, TX 75801

State’s Trial Counsel

Mr. Douglas Lowe

Mr. Stanley Sokolowski

Mr. Scott Holden

Anderson Co. Asst. District

 Attorneys
iv

(Parties, cont.)

Judges Hon. Deborah Oakes Evans,

369th District Court, Anderson 

County

Hon. Bascom W. Bentley, III,

369th District Court, Anderson

County

Justices Hon. Chief Justice James T.

 Worthen

Hon. Justice Sam Griffith

Hon. Justice Brian Hoyle 

/s/ James W. Volberding

_______________________________

James W. Volberding
v

CONTENTS

The Parties and Their Counsel ................................................................ iii

Authorities................................................................................................ vii

Statement Regarding Oral Argument ................................................... viii

Statement of Jurisdiction ....................................................................... viii

Statement of the Case............................................................................. viii

Statement of Procedural History ..............................................................ix

Grounds For Review ...................................................................................1

Statement of Facts ......................................................................................1

Argument.....................................................................................................8

Ground I. Albeit stating the proper standard, the appellate court 

erred by actually applying a constitutionally deficient and 

discredited standard of sufficiency review. .........................................8

A. The court of appeals’ favored items of proof did not come 

close to eliminating reasonable doubt. ........................... 10

B. The appellate court’s analysis ignored undisputed facts 

inconsistent with murder.............................................. 15

Ground II. In assessing the case for self-defense, the appellate court 

erred by applying an unconstitutional hindsight viewpoint as to 

whether deadly force was necessary. ..................................................18

Ground III. The appellate court erred in holding that the decedent’s 

photos of simulated sexual violence were inadmissible. ....................20
vi

(Contents, cont.)

A. The photos are material to Pridgen’s statutorily authorized 

defense...................................................................... 21

B. The photos are probative of self-defense.......................... 22

C. The photographs speak loudly for themselves and 12 citizen 

jurors should be permitted to listen................................ 23

D. The appellate court undertook its own impermissible factweighing and credibility assessment...............................24

Conclusion .................................................................................................25

Relief Sought.............................................................................................26

Certificate of Compliance .........................................................................27

Certificate of Service.................................................................................27

Appendix....................................................................................................28

Tyler Court of appeals opinion

 Pridgen v. State, 2014 Tex. App. 

 LEXIS 12915 (Tex. App. --- Tyler 

 Dec. 3, 2014, pet. filed)......................................................... A-1

Denied sexually explicit photographs by Rohne ........................ A-2
vii

AUTHORITIES

CASES

Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)............17, 24, 25

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) .........................................25

Cooper v. State, 95 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. App.---Houston [1st Dist.] 

2002, no pet.) .........................................................................................22

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) ........................................................23

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) ..................................................25

Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) .....................................25

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) .........................................................17

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) ....................................14, 17, 18

Miller v. State, 36 S.W.3d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)............ 20, 22, 25

STATUTE

Tex. Penal Code § 9.32 (2011) ............................................................ 18-19

RULES

Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 401.............................................................................20

Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 402.............................................................................20
viii

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

The Court will benefit from oral argument. This fact-intensive

murder/self-defense case pivots on two concepts. First, the case 

delineates the difference between the constitutionally mandated 

beyond-reasonable-doubt review standard of Jackson v. Virginia and 

the lower, forbidden civil-sufficiency standard. The court of appeals 

clearly applied the latter standard. But it never understood it was doing 

so, a mistake subject to repetition. Second, the case explores the legal 

framework for admitting pre-incident photos of simulated sexual 

violence. The jury was explicitly charged to consider evidence of the 

decedent’s sexual assault on defendant Pridgen. The photos would have 

corroborated Pridgen’s protest that the decedent carried a knife and 

intended sexual assault. When they were excluded, Pridgen was denied 

the ability to prove self-defense. 

The decision in this case will affect scores of similar murder/selfdefense appeals. This appears to be the first case addressing whether 

admission of intended rape evidence requires proof that the rapist was 

of the same gender.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court possesses jurisdiction under Texas Constitution Art. V, 

§§ 1, 5 and Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.201, et seq. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the case Prosecution for murder, under Texas Penal 

Code section 19.02, and the lesser-included 

offense of manslaughter, under section 

19.04.

District court Hon. Deborah Oakes Evans, 369th District 

Court, Anderson County
ix

(Case, cont.)

Course and disposition Mr. Pridgen pled not guilty. RR11:8-9.

of proceedings After the court denied his motion for 

directed verdict, a jury convicted Pridgen of 

murder, RR15:65; CR166, and sentenced 

him to 20 years incarceration, RR15:128; 

CR163, 164. The court denied Pridgen’s 

motion for new trial, by operation of law. 

RR13:137; CR170, 174 (presented). 

Properly certified, CR157, Pridgen timely 

appealed. CR177.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in a written

unpublished opinion. 

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Date of court of appeals opinion December 3, 2014

 Pridgen v. State, 2014 Tex. App. 

 LEXIS 12915 (Tex. App. --- Tyler 

 Dec. 3, 2014, pet. filed)

Date motion for rehearing filed January 20, 2015

(extension granted)

Date rehearing motion overruled January 30, 2015
1

GROUNDS FOR REVIEW

I. Albeit stating the proper standard, the appellate court erred by 

actually applying a constitutionally deficient and discredited 

standard of sufficiency review. (Presented: Pridgen’s Jan. 20, 

2015, motion for rehearing at 1; Opening Brf. at 8-24; Directed 

verdict, RR15:65, MNT, RR13:137; CR170-174).

II. In assessing the case for self-defense, the appellate court erred by

applying an unconstitutional hindsight viewpoint as to whether 

deadly force was necessary. (Presented: Pridgen’s motion for 

rehearing at 11; Opening Brf. at 8-24, 25-28; Directed verdict, 

RR15:65, MNT, RR13:137; CR170-174). 

III. The appellate court erred in holding that the decedent’s photos of 

simulated sexual violence were inadmissible. (Presented: 

Pridgen’s motion for rehearing at 13; Opening Brf. at 28-49; 

Directed verdict, RR15:65, MNT, RR13:137; CR170-174).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Robert “Lynn” Pridgen shot and killed his friend, Paul Rohne, in 

Pridgen’s home late at night.

In response to Pridgen’s 911 call, police drove to Pridgen’s 

Montalba home in which Rohne, recently divorced, rented a room. 

RR14:9. They found Rohne slumped on the love seat, dead. RR12:59, 60-

62, 88-93, 121-22.
2

Both men were drunk. RR12:95-96, 106-07; 14:35. Alcohol bottles 

lay throughout the kitchen. RR12:179-80. Rohne’s post-mortem bloodalcohol content -- 0.33 -- was four times the legal limit. RR12:222. On a

911 call, sounding drunk, Pridgen acted nonchalantly with the operator, 

explaining that there was a dead man on his couch. RR12:33-39, 47; 

SX1 (recording).

Nothing was knocked over; there was no sign of any struggle. 

RR12:139, 181-82; RR14:38, 116-17.When arrested, Pridgen cooperated 

completely. RR12:100.

At trial Pridgen, 55, a retired TDC prison guard, explained what 

happened. When his friend Paul Rohne, 40, divorced, Rohne and his exwife persuaded Pridgen to rent Rohne a room in Pridgen’s Montalba 

house because of Rohne’s heavy drinking. RR14:12-13, 53-55. 

Otherwise, they feared, Rohne was “going to kill somebody [with his 

drunk driving] ‘[i]f he keeps living up there in Tyler.’” RR14:12, 47-48.

Pridgen retained the master bedroom and the right to come and go. 

RR14:13.
3

Seven months passed without incident. RR14:13-14, 55, 124-25. 

Pridgen, intending to stay for a couple of days, RR14:14-15, arrived at 

the Montalba house with some personal items, a case of beer, and an 

unfinished vodka bottle. RR14:15-16, 59-60, 75, 77. He also brought a 

12-gauge shotgun loaded with birdshot, which he used to frighten away 

feral hogs, and the .45 pistol he regularly carried. RR14:15-16, 59.

Pridgen and Rohne, who often drank together, RR14:16-17, 47-49, 

52-53, 57, did so this time. Rohne had his own beer and vodka. 

RR14:17-18; 71-74; SX82, 23 (photos). They drank and smoked until 

late, watching TV and discussing fishing, hunting, women, politics and 

the war. RR14:19, 61-64.

Talk turned to sex. A week earlier, Rohne told Pridgen that he 

hired a couple of Dallas prostitutes to chain him with leg-irons and 

hand-cuffs to a bed. RR14:20-21, 66-67, 125. This time, Pridgen asked 

Rohne to tell details. RR14:21-22, 66-67:

I asked Paul, . . . “Tell me what those whores did to you.”

And he said, “Oh, no, I'm not going to.” Probably 20 minutes 

later, I said, “Come on, Paul, tell me what they did to you.” 

And he said, “Oh, you would be surprised.” And a short time 
4

after that, he said to me, “Lynn, you seem to be showing an 

awful lot of interest in that. You ought to try it some time.” 

And I said, “You've got to be fucked up.” And that was the 

end of the conversation regarding any of that.

RR14:22, 26, 68-70 (Grammatical marks inserted for clarity. 

First paragraph outside jury, but before jury on page 68).

Discussion turned to other subjects. RR14:39-40, 70-71.

Pridgen fell asleep around 11 p.m., upright on the love seat. 

RR14:30-32, 35, 65, 83-84.

Near 1:25 a.m., he awoke to find the much larger Rohne (Rohne 

was 6’, 4-1/4” and weighed 270 pounds; Pridgen is 5’, 8” and ninety 

pounds lighter, RR14:38, 50) in unfastened shorts, pressed against 

Pridgen, with his left hand rubbing Pridgen’s genitals. RR14:30-32, 34, 

85-86, 120 (see photos SX9, 54). (Rohne had recently shaved his pubic 

hair (RR12:234-35; SX63 (autopsy report, p. 3).) Rohne cooed, “Don’t get 

up. Just relax and enjoy the pleasure.” RR14:30-32, 87, 114. 

Frightened, Pridgen leapt up and ran the several steps to the 

sliding glass door, locked. RR14:31-21, 62-63, 88, 90-92. When he 

turned, he saw Rohne with a knife in his right hand rising from the love 

seat, eyes toward him. RR14:33, 92-94, 116, 121, 123. Surmising he was 
5

about to be killed (or as he surmised after shooting, handcuffed to a bed 

and raped), and reacting to his prison-guard training, Pridgen

instinctively grabbed the shotgun that was propped by the door, turned,

and shot Rohne once center mass. Rohne slumped back onto the love 

seat, where he died. RR14:35, 39, 40, 46, 94-96, 97-99, 102-03, 113-15, 

118, 125, 130.

For some minutes Pridgen, very drunk and dazed, stared at 

Rohne. RR14:36, 99-101. In retrospect, he was suffering shock. 

RR14:36, 99, 103, 105. He touched nothing. RR14:37. He called 911. 

RR14:36, 101.

He had never before seen Rohne’s knife. RR14:37. He certainly did 

not plant it. RR14:37, 116. 

Throughout trial, the State argued—incredulously—that Pridgen 

had killed Rohne as a means to evict him, and then—in the midst of his 

deep, drunken stupor somehow managed to fabricate self-defense by: 

• planting a knife without leaving any trace of his DNA or 

prints;

• reading a self-defense article from a gun magazine;

• delaying calling 911;

• calling his brother to concoct self-defense;
6

• falsely claiming attack in the 911 call; and

• falsely claiming that Rohne stood from the love seat when 

his feet were crossed.

See supra and RR15:19-33, 54-64. The State argued that Pridgen made 

up the account of Rohne’s sexual advances. According to the State, 

Rohne was just a good ‘ol boy, like so many of the jurors, and Pridgen’s 

contrary testimony was unbelievable.

To counter these arguments and prove self-defense, Pridgen 

sought to corroborate his testimony about Rohne’s homosexual attack. 

He offered photographs taken by Rohne himself and found in Rohne’s 

room. The photos cataloged Rohne’s (1) practice of simulated sexual 

violence, (2) use of sexual-fantasy toys, and (3) wearing of sexual roleplay clothing—including a “French maid” outfit, suggesting a 

transsexual lifestyle. (See Appendix A-2.) The trial court barred the 

proof’s admission, finding it irrelevant—even under the minimal 

threshold of Evidence Rule 402—and further finding it outside the 

allowance, in Rule 404, for proving a victim’s character or nature or 

intent or motive.
7

Unaware of this critical contextual proof, the jury bought the 

State’s argument and convicted Pridgen, who had no previously 

criminal history, of murder, rejecting the lesser manslaughter, RR15:65, 

and sudden passion, and assigned 20 years incarceration, RR15:128; 

CR163, 164.
8

ARGUMENT

Respectfully, the court of appeals’ analysis falls short in three 

critical respects:

• It applies a constitutionally deficient standard of review.

• It misapplies the substantive elements of self-defense.

• And it gets the admission-of-evidence analysis entirely wrong.

I. Albeit stating the proper standard, the appellate court 

erred by actually applying a constitutionally deficient and 

discredited standard of sufficiency review. (Presented: 

Pridgen’s Jan. 20, 2015, motion for rehearing at 1; Opening Brf. at 

8-24; Directed verdict, RR15:65, MNT, RR13:137; CR170-174).

While saying that murder must be proved and self-defense 

rejected beyond all reasonable doubt – i.e., to a near-certainty – the 

court of appeals actually applied a constitutionally prohibited “no 

evidence” standard. The court searched only for a scintilla or mere 

modicum of allegedly incriminating evidence and, on finding such proof, 

called it a day. 

This is no mere technicality. When examined under the correct 

standard of review, the proof here misses the required mark (guilt 
9

beyond reasonable doubt) widely—so widely, in fact, that we can negate 

the State’s burden via a single undisputed fact: Rohne was found 

clutching a knife, with no evidence it was planted. 

The scientific proof about the knife – the only probative evidence 

respecting how it came to be in Rohne’s hand – was that it was at least 

equally probable that Rohne wielded the knife as that he didn’t. See

RR12:224 (Pathologist “I wouldn’t even speculate.”). The responding 

officers’ comments (about a so-called death grip, etc.) were pure 

surmise, categorized as non-probative nonsense by the pathologist. 

RR12:224. This is critical because if Rohne held a knife, the case for 

murder crumbles, regardless how the Court might analyze any other 

fact. 

The State has not even suggested that a murder conviction could 

be sustained if Rohne wielded the knife. And it cannot. The remaining 

items of the State’s “evidence” (such as the absence of a struggle) either 

are so flimsy as to be utterly incapable of sustaining any inference at all 

of murder, or they are so weakly suggestive of it that the unresolvable 

uncertainty surrounding the knife simply swamps whatever slight 
10

effect they otherwise could have. That is, the equal probability that 

Rohne held the knife defeats the case for murder. Given the abject 

uncertainty about Rohne’s use of the knife, the case for murder is no 

more probable than the case for self-defense. No rational jury, apprised 

by the pathologist of the probabilities respecting Rohne’s use of the 

knife, could find murder beyond all reasonable doubt.

A. The court of appeals’ favored items of proof did not 

come close to eliminating reasonable doubt.

The reasonable doubt that Rohne’s knife established was not 

defeated by any other proof. For its contrary holding, the appellate 

court listed nine items of evidence that it says “permit[ed] a rational 

jury to conclude that deadly force was not immediately necessary,” slip 

op. at 8:

1. Bruises on Rohne 

2. Lack of signs of struggle

3. Rohne and Pridgen were intoxicated

4. 911 call 

5. Absence of prior confrontations

6. Rohne’s mellow demeanor 

7. Weapon discharged at elevated position

8. Rohne’s position on loveseat with ankles crossed

9. Pridgen’s testimony he thought only of Rohne and the knife
11

Most of these items just are not probative and thus are incapable 

of sustaining any inference of murder. And not one of these nine items 

rationally contradicts self-defense. 

Evidence Supposition Rational Test

Bruises on 

Rohne

That Pridgen 

assaulted him

! The pathologist, who rejected the 

bruises as proof of an assault by 

Pridgen, RR12:216, said the bruises 

could have existed for hours before the 

shooting. RR12:215-16.

! Rohne was tall, heavy, and .33 

drunk. It is more logical that he 

stumbled and hit the floor or a 

cabinet.

! Pridgen had no bruises himself. It is 

implausible that the smaller, weaker, 

sicker man inflicted bruises on the 

larger, stronger, younger man, but 

sustained no bruising himself.

Lack of signs 

of struggle

That Pridgen 

assaulted him

! The far more logical conclusion is 

that Pridgen did not strike Rohne, 

there was no struggle and Rohne 

attempted to seduce Pridgen.

! The officer testified that a man 

with a knife could stab a victim 

quickly unless the victim acted fast. 

RR13:50-51.
12

Evidence Supposition Rational Test

Rohne and 

Pridgen were 

intoxicated

In a stupor, 

Pridgen 

decided to 

murder his 

friend 

! Why would Pridgen, in his own 

home, shoot a long time friend paying 

him rent, drunk or not?

! The logical conclusion is that 

something unexpected occurred, like 

attempted seduction, increasing the 

vital need for Rohne’s photos to prove 

it was so.

911 Call Pridgen’s 

callousness 

shows lack of 

remorse 

! The 911 call is at worst a neutral 

event. Pridgen was drunk and in 

shock.

! That he called 911 and remained at 

the scene supports self-defense.

Absence of 

prior 

confrontations

That Rohne did 

not pull knife

! Proof that something astonishing 

must have occurred to justify a 

shooting.
13

Evidence Supposition Rational Test

Rohne’s 

position on 

loveseat with 

ankles 

crossed

That Rohne 

was sitting 

when shot

! As the pathologist confirmed, if 

Rohne was attempting to stand with a 

knife, and was shot by a shorter man, 

gravity and the blast could have 

pushed Rohne back down into the 

seat, RR12:239-40, precisely what 

Pridgen said occurred, RR14:95-96, 

119, 121-22.

! Police officer agreed. RR12:189.

! Pathologist explained alcohol’s 

destruction of fine motor skills and the 

ability to walk. RR12:223; also officer: 

12:180-81. That Rohne stumbled, 

tripped or crossed his feet is 

predictable.

Pridgen’s 

testimony he 

thought only 

of Rohne and 

the knife, not 

rape

That Pridgen 

shot Rohne 

only because he 

had a large 

knife, not for 

fear of rape

! The knife alone was sufficient cause 

to shoot Rohne. 

Weapon 

discharged at 

elevated 

position

That Pridgen 

was standing 

while Rohne 

was sitting

! Pridgen admitted standing, and

never contended that Rohne was fully 

standing. Rohne was rising with the

knife, consistent with self-defense. 

! The knife is the reason for selfdefense.

Rohne’s 

mellow 

demeanor

That Rohne did 

not pull the

knife on 

Pridgen

! Again, the appellate court ignored 

the knife. What is this mellow man 

doing with a 16-ounce knife? Mellow 

people kill every day.
14

Even if these items, taken in hindsight, could establish a modicum 

of proof that deadly force was not necessary, there is nothing 

approaching proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Pridgen did not in 

fact reasonably believe such force was necessary when he pulled the 

trigger. 

While the appellate court was entitled to presume the jury 

resolvedy conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution, Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979), this did not authorize the jury to 

speculate its way into a criminal conviction, any more than it 

authorized the appellate court to speculate its way to affirmance. And 

yet that is exactly what has happened. The appellate court has parlayed 

what is at best a “mere modicum” of proof into the basis for a murder 

conviction. Constitutional due process forbids this. “[I]t could not be 

argued that such a “modicum” of evidence could by itself 

rationally support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320 (emphasis added).

Any attempt to rationalize a murder verdict in this case hinges on 

speculation that the knife was planted – by the same drunk who made 
15

the bizarre 911 call the appellate court quotes. Pridgen’s reasonable 

belief that force was necessary can’t be disproved beyond all reasonable 

doubt if there was a knife. The only credible evidence respecting the 

knife (and thus the only proof the jury could credit in its deliberation) 

shows the presence of a knife was equally probable with its absence. So 

no rational fact-finder could conclude that murder was proved beyond 

all reasonable doubt.

B. The appellate court’s analysis ignored undisputed 

facts inconsistent with murder.

The appellate court ignored seven items of incontestable fact: 

Evidence Proof of Self-Defense

The knife ! Officers testified the one-pound knife is a deadly 

weapon. RR13:42. 

! Only two equally probable possibilities exist: (1) 

Pridgen planted the knife, for which no proof exists, 

or (2) Rohne had the knife, and Pridgen had the 

right to shoot him.

Pridgen’s home ! The shooting was not in a honky-tonk. It was 

inside Pridgen’s home, where he had every 

entitlement to self-protection.

! It is implausible Pridgen would plot murder in his 

home, without any motive, but highly likely he 

would defend himself given a knife threat.
16

Evidence Proof of Self-Defense

The difference in 

size, age and 

condition of the 

two men

! Rohne was 15 years younger, 8 inches taller, and 

90 lbs heavier than Pridgen, who suffered from 

chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, RR14:38; 

SX53, 63; RR14:38, 50.

! It is impossible that the much smaller Pridgen 

inflicted bruises on Rohne while receiving none, 

without disturbing the room. But it does explain 

why Rohne selected Pridgen as a victim.

Pridgen’s prison

guard training

! Police verified that officers are trained to fire 

center of the chest of a knife attacker within 21 feet 

(now 27-feet) because an attacker at close range can 

stab faster than officer can fire. RR13:43-44, 46-47, 

50-51;12:191-92. Pridgen, a former prison guard, is 

similarly trained. His instinctive reaction to fire 

tends to support that he faced a real threat.

Officer’s 

testimony that 

shooting in 

response to knife 

wielder within 21 

feet is 

appropriate selfdefense

! The police officer, testifying as the State’s expert, 

confirmed that shooting under these circumstances is 

self-defense. RR13:46-47; 50-51. No reasonable juror 

can set aside that testimony without a valid basis, 

and none exists.

Rohne changed to 

shorts which he 

unfastened

! This is unrebutted proof of Rohne’s intent.

The government’s 

weak attempt at 

motive – to expel 

a renter

! No rational person could reasonably believe a 

homeowner killed a renter to expel him when the 

renter was a month-to-month tenant.
17

A reviewing court must consider these facts if it is going to 

conduct a sufficiency review consistent with the Jackson beyond-areasonable-doubt standard. The appellate court’s refusal to do so proves 

it applied a “scintilla” or “mere modicum” test: having found 9 items it 

believes supply a modicum of guilt evidence, the court saw no point in 

examining any other record facts, no matter how strongly they might 

point away from murder. Such analysis is constitutionally wrong. “[I]t 

could not be argued that such a “modicum” of evidence could by 

itself rationally support a conviction beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320 (citation omitted) (emphasis added); 

accord Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 916 & n.20 (Tex. 2010) 

(Cochran, J., concurring).

The appellate court’s review of cherry-picked evidence—the kind 

of ‘no-evidence’ review afforded in civil cases—is precisely barred in this 

criminal case. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (“[A] person 

accused of a crime . . . would be at a severe disadvantage, a 

disadvantage amounting to a lack of fundamental fairness, if he could 
18

be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the same 

evidence as would suffice in a civil case.”) (citation omitted).

II. In assessing the case for self-defense, the appellate court 

erred by applying an unconstitutional hindsight viewpoint 

as to whether deadly force was necessary. (Presented: 

Pridgen’s motion for rehearing at 11; Opening Brf. at 8-24, 25-28; 

Directed verdict, RR15:65, MNT, RR13:137; CR170-174). 

When it comes to self-defense, the appellate court did not even get

the substantive elements right. The nub of the court’s analysis, on page 

eight of its slip opinion, is that certain cherry-picked proof “permit[ted] 

a rational jury to conclude that deadly force was not immediately 

necessary ....” Slip op. at 8. But the question is not whether a jury could 

in hindsight conclude that deadly force was unnecessary. It is whether a 

jury rationally could conclude to a near certainty that Pridgen – clearly 

drunk and reacting in real time – could not have formed a reasonable 

belief that deadly force was necessary, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32, 

and, further, could conclude that this conclusion was established so 

soundly as to exist beyond any reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (“[B]y impressing upon the factfinder the need 
19

to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused, 

the standard symbolizes the significance that our society attaches to the 

criminal sanction”).

The question, as respects self defense under Penal Code Section 

9.32, is what Pridgen himself, in the critical instant and faced with the 

particular circumstances, might reasonably have believed when he 

pulled the trigger. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §9.32(a) (imposing a 

subjective standard under which deadly force is justified “when and to 

the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately 

necessary ... to prevent the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful 

deadly force” or “to prevent the other’s imminent commission of ... 

murder, sexual assault, [or] aggravated sexual assault ...”). Under this 

statute, the appellate court’s analysis—which asks whether a detached 

observer, in the calm and clarity of hindsight, could “conclude that 

deadly force [in fact] was not immediately necessary,” slip op. at 8—is 

beside the point. 
20

III. The appellate court erred in holding that the decedent’s 

photos of simulated sexual violence were inadmissible. 

(Presented: Pridgen’s motion for rehearing at 13; Opening Brf. at 

28-49; Directed verdict, RR15:65, MNT, RR13:137; CR170-174).

Evidence in a criminal trial is “relevant” if it has “any tendency to 

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 

would be without the evidence.” TEX. R. CR. EVID. 401; Miller, 36 S.W.3d 

at 507. The photos of Rohne (attached to this petition) clearly meet this 

test and thus are admissible under Evidence Rule 402. TEX. R. CR. EVID.

402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided 

by ... these rules .... Evidence which is not relevant is inadmissible.”).

“A defendant has a fundamental right to present evidence of a 

defense as long as the evidence is relevant and is not excluded by 

an established evidentiary rule.”

Miller v. State, 36 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)
21

A. The photos are clearly relevant to Pridgen’s statutorily 

authorized defense.

The photos—which depict Rohne role-playing bizarre, violent

sexual fantasies—directly addressed the statutory defense jurors were 

charged to decide: “[a] person is justified in using deadly force ... to 

prevent the other’s imminent ... sexual assault or aggravated sexual 

assault.” Jury Charge, CR152-53. The government conceded this 

indirectly at trial, stating that the photos included “images of sexual 

violence” and “bondage.” RR2:11-12. The photos counter the 

government’s contention that Pridgen fired to evict a tenant. They go a 

long way to answering the prosecutor’s rhetorical question: “And who 

knows what went on that night?” RR15:62-63. And, of course, the 

photos are vitally necessary to rebut the government’s cries that 

“The photographs, I’ll concede, there are some images of sexual 

violence. We are dealing with bondage and S&M nature, where 

people are in a superior position and an inferior position, where 

someone was being sometimes violently abused, and someone was

receiving that violent abuse.”

Prosecutor, RR2:11-12.
22

Pridgen planted the knife. If the photos were not admissible already, 

the government arguments would make them admissible. See Cooper v. 

State, 95 S.W.3d 488, 491 (Tex. App.---Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.)

(The State’s counter arguments alone can make evidence Rule 401 

relevant).

B. The photos are highly probative of self-defense.

To be probative, “the proffered evidence must tend to make the 

existence of the fact ‘more or less probable than it would be without the 

evidence.’” Miller, 36 S.W.3d at 507. So what facts are made more or 

less probable by the photos?

• That Rohne was capable of sexual assault.

• That Rohne had a knife.

• That Rohne grabbed Pridgen’s genitals.

• That Rohne whispered ““Don’t get up. Just relax and 

enjoy the pleasure.”

• That Rohne’s bruises may have been self-inflicted when 

using his sex toys (see his chains and clamps, App. A-2).

• That Rohne and Pridgen’s lack of prior confrontation is 

consistent and explained with the secret and threatening 

activities Rohne knew of but Pridgen did not.
Jurors&

Rule&402&Relevance&Threshold&

Self&Defense&&

TPC&Art&9.31&

Rule&404(b)&

(MoCve,&

Plan,&Intent)&

Rule&404(a)&

(Character&

Trait)&

Rohne’s&Photos,&

Toys&and&

Equipment&
23

C. The photographs speak loudly for themselves and 12 

citizen jurors should be permitted to listen.

Remarkably, the appellate court erected an artificial barrier to 

sexual assault evidence: the evidence must be of a homosexual nature 

when the victim and perpetrator are of the same gender. See slip op. at 

10 (“There are no images contained in Defense exhibits 1 through 27 

that show Rohne acting as an aggressor or engaging in homosexual 

conduct.”) This is not only wrong—at least one photo (see App. A-2) 

showed the giant Rohne cross-dressing in a maid costume—but is a 

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

Whether Rohne is homosexual is beside the point. Who is to say 

that Rohne did not see this encounter with Pridgen as a fresh 

opportunity to branch out from female prostitutes to male participants? 

What rational distinction can (or should) be made between simulated 

violence against women and men, censuring the one, and sanctioning 

the other?

Further, as the government conceded, RR12:11-12, the photos do 

show Rohne as an aggressor:
24

• 7 of the photos (see App. A-2) show Rohne inflicted pain on 

himself with a genital clamp (proof his bruises may be selfinflicted);

• 3 photos show that Rohne used restraint devices to simulate 

bondage and pain. 

• And other photos (DX7 and DX12) (see App. A-2) display 

rope, penis clamps, handcuffs and chains --- designed to 

inflict pain and recognized as deadly weapons. See Hill v. 

State, 913 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (chain is 

deadly weapon); Castro v. State, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 704, 

7 (Tex. App. --- Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 26, 2006, no pet.) 

(rope is deadly weapon); Smith v. State, 186 N.C. App. 57 

(N.C. App. 2007) (handcuffs as deadly weapon).

D. The appellate court undertook its own impermissible 

fact-weighing and credibility assessment.

The appellate court wrote, “Appellant testified that he shot Rohne 

because he ‘was in fear of his life and thought Rohne was going to kill 

him.’ But as the sole judge of witness credibility and the weight to be 

given their testimony, the jury was free to disbelieve Appellant’s 

contention that he feared for his life.” Slip op. at 8. But the court 

withheld an entire class of evidence relevant to whether Pridgen in fact 

feared for his life. The photos were unique and would have been critical 

to the “witness credibility” and “weight” determinations on which the 
25

appellate court hangs its decision. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 911

(appellate court cannot sit as 13th juror). 

The exclusion of the photos was more than error; it denied critical 

constitutional rights. “[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal 

defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” 

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). As this Court explained in 

Miller, exclusions of evidence under Rules 401 and 402 implicate the 

Due Process and Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. See Miller, 36 S.W.3d at 506. By dismissing the 

photographs of Rohne on mere relevance grounds and refusing retrial, 

the court of appeals violated Pridgen’s right to present a complete 

defense, in contravention of Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 

(2006), and the Due Process and Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 

485 (1984). 

CONCLUSION

A former prison official with no criminal record, standing in his 

own home, shot a transsexual who pulled a knife and grabbed his 
26

genitals with plans for simulated or actual rape. Every rational Texan 

would say this is fair reason for self-defense. When jurors see the photos 

that corroborate Pridgen’s explanation and Rohne’s misconduct, they 

will acquit Pridgen. The court of appeals should not stand in the way of 

the most important right we have, to have accusations decided by a jury 

of peers with full presentation of evidence. The Court should grant 

review.

RELIEF SOUGHT

Pridgen seeks discretionary review followed by acquittal or new 

trial. Respectfully submitted this 6 day of April 2015,

By: /s/ James W. Volberding

___________________________________

JAMES W. VOLBERDING

SBN: 00786313

First Place

100 E. Ferguson Street 

Suite 500

Tyler, Texas 75702

(903) 597-6622

(866) 398-6883 (fax)

e-mail: james@jamesvolberding.com

Attorney for Appellant, 

Mr. Robert Lynn Pridgen
27

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this document is written in 14-point font and 

contains 4,238 words, as measured from the Statement of Facts through 

the Relief Sought, plus about 200 words in pages containing exhibits.

 /s/ James W. Volberding

____________________________

James W. Volberding

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this pleading has 

been delivered this 6 day of April 2015 to:

Anderson County District Attorney

500 N. Church Street, Room 38

Palestine, TX 75801

State Prosecuting Attorney

P. O. Box 13046 

Austin, Texas 78711-3046

by the following means:

_____ By U.S. Postal Service Certified Mail, R.R.R.

_X___ By First Class U.S. Mail

_____ By Special Courier _______________________

_____ By Hand Delivery 

_____ By Fax before 5 p.m.

_____ By Fax after 5 p.m.

_____ By email.

 /s/ James W. Volberding

____________________________

James W. Volberding
28

APPENDIX

Tyler Court of appeals opinion

 Pridgen v. State, 2014 Tex. App. 

 LEXIS 12915 (Tex. App. --- Tyler 

 Dec. 3, 2014, pet. filed) .......................................................... A-1

Denied photographs of Rohne ................................................... A-2
A-1

Opinion of the Court of Appeals
NO. 12-13-00136-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

ROBERT LYNN PRIDGEN,

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

§

§

§

APPEAL FROM THE 3RD

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

ANDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Robert Lynn Pridgen appeals his conviction for murder. He raises three issues on appeal. 

We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

An Anderson County grand jury indicted Appellant for the murder of Paul Rohne alleged 

to have occurred on or about January 27, 2009. It is undisputed that Appellant fired the shot that 

led to Rohne’s death, but he contends that he was acting in self-defense.

Appellant pleaded “not guilty,” and his first trial resulted in a hung jury. In his second 

trial, the jury rejected Appellant’s claim of self-defense, found him guilty, and assessed 

punishment at twenty years of imprisonment. This appeal followed.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

In his first two issues, Appellant contends that the evidence is legally and factually 

sufficient to support his “affirmative defense of self-defense.” Appellant contends that he is 

entitled to an acquittal because the evidence established his “affirmative claim of self-defense . . . 

as a matter of law.” 
2

Standard of Review 

Appellant contends that the standard of review in this case is governed by the holding in 

Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), but his reliance on Matlock is 

misplaced. In Matlock, the court of criminal appeals reaffirmed that the civil standards of 

review apply when an appellant raises a legal or factual sufficiency challenge to a jury’s adverse 

finding on his affirmative defense. See Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 668–70 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2013). This is because, in a criminal case, a defendant must prove an affirmative defense 

by a preponderance of the evidence—the civil burden. See id.

Under Matlock, the standard for reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting an adverse finding on an affirmative defense is as follows:

When an appellant asserts that there is no evidence to support an adverse finding on which [he]

had the burden of proof, we construe the issue as an assertion that the contrary was established as 

a matter of law. We first search the record for evidence favorable to the finding, disregarding all 

contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact[]finder could not. If we find no evidence supporting 

the finding, we then determine whether the contrary was established as a matter of law.

See id. at 669 (citations omitted). When examining whether an appellant established his factual 

sufficiency claim, the appellate court views the entirety of the evidence in a neutral light, and 

may sustain a factual sufficiency challenge on appeal

only if, after setting out the relevant evidence and explaining precisely how the contrary evidence 

greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the verdict, the court clearly states why the verdict is so 

much against the great weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, conscience-shocking, or 

clearly biased.

See id. at 671 (citing Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc)). 

However, the standards set forth in Matlock do not apply to the current case because self-defense 

is a defense rather than an affirmative defense. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2003). 

The issue of self-defense is a fact issue to be determined by the jury, and a jury’s verdict 

of guilt is an implicit finding that it rejected a defendant’s self-defense theory. Saxton v. State, 

804 S.W.2d 910, 913-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc). In reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the jury’s rejection of self-defense, we examine all of the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have 
3

found the essential elements of the offense and also could have found against the defendant on 

the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 914 (stating “we look not to whether 

the [s]tate presented evidence which refuted appellant’s self-defense”); Sutton v. State, No. 

12-04-00150-CR, 2005 WL 3725087, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication). Under this standard, we do not conduct a separate factual 

sufficiency review. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 

Accordingly, we address Appellant’s second issue (legal sufficiency) but not his first (factual 

sufficiency). See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

Applicable Law

The use of deadly force is justified as self-defense under certain circumstances. Morales 

v. State, 357 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). An actor is justified in using deadly force 

against another if (1) the actor would be justified in using force under Section 9.31 of the penal 

code, and (2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes that deadly force is 

immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful 

deadly force, or to prevent the other’s imminent commission of murder, sexual assault, or 

aggravated sexual assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a) (West 2011). 

Self-defense is an issue to be determined by the jury. Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913. 

“Defensive evidence which is merely consistent with the physical evidence at the scene of the 

alleged offense will not render the State’s evidence insufficient since the credibility 

determination of such evidence is solely within the jury’s province and the jury is free to accept 

or reject the defensive evidence.” Id. at 914.

When a defendant raises self-defense, he bears the burden of producing some evidence to 

support his defense. See Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594 (citing Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913); see also 

McCurdy v. State, No. 06-12-00206-CR, 2013 WL 5433478, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 

26, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Once the defendant produces 

some evidence supporting his defense, the state then bears the burden of persuasion to “disprove 

the raised defense.” Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594; see also Tidmore v. State, 976 S.W.2d 724, 729 

(Tex. App.—Tyler 1998, pet. ref’d) (state does not have burden of producing evidence to 

affirmatively refute self-defense). The burden of persuasion does not require the production of 

evidence; it requires only that the state prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuliani, 97 

S.W.3d at 594.
4

The Evidence

It is undisputed that Appellant shot and killed Paul Rohne. Appellant called 911 at 

approximately 1:25 a.m. on January 27, 2009. The following discourse took place between 

Appellant and the 911 dispatcher:

Dispatch: Anderson County 911.

Appellant: Yeah, how you doin’ tonight?

Dispatcher: Sir, do you have an emergency?

Appellant: Yeah I do, I got a dead man on my couch. Um.

Dispatcher: You have a dead man on your couch?

Appellant: Yeah, I just shot him.

Dispatcher: You shot him?

Appellant: Yes I did.

Dispatcher: What’s your name sir?

Appellant: Lynn Pridgen.

Dispatcher: And who is the man you shot?

Appellant: Uh, Paul Rohne.

Dispatcher: And why did you shoot him?

Appellant: Uh, because he was attacking me. But, you know, all this stuff needs to be hashed out 

in court. But I’m telling you I got a dead man on my couch and I’d like a[n] ambulance or 

something to come get him.

Dispatcher: Okay, hold on for me just a second sir, okay?

Appellant: Yeah.

At approximately 1:30 a.m., law enforcement arrived at the residence. By that time, Appellant’s 

911 call had ended. The 911 dispatcher called Appellant back and informed him that law 

enforcement was requesting that he exit his residence. In concluding this phone call with the 

dispatcher, Appellant said, “Cool deal[.] You’re doin’ good girl. Bye.” 

Sergeant Ronnie Foster was among the first officers to enter the residence. He testified 

that there did not appear to be any signs of struggle, that the temperature inside the residence was 
5

68 degrees, and that Rohne was deceased. Rohne was sitting on a loveseat, slumped over, with 

his ankles crossed. He had a “tight” grip on the side of his glasses with his left hand and “no grip 

at all” on a knife that was in his right hand.

Deputy Michael Mitchell arrived at Appellant’s residence at the same time as Sergeant 

Foster. When they arrived, they handcuffed Appellant, and placed him in Mitchell’s patrol car. 

Mitchell testified that Appellant had difficulty standing, his speech was slurred, and he smelled 

heavily of alcohol. He testified that Appellant was intoxicated, which Appellant confirmed when 

he testified that he was “drunk” the night of the shooting. 

Paramedic Matthew Corbin arrived at Appellant’s residence at approximately 1:50 a.m. 

Corbin confirmed that Rohne was dead and testified that he was cool to the touch, and his skin 

was pale and mottled.1 Corbin testified that a large amount of blood was “all over the place,” and 

that blood was “already coagulating” when he arrived. 

The officers collected various items from the scene, including the knife in Rohne’s right 

hand and a shotgun that they believed was used in the shooting. They swabbed the knife and 

shotgun for forensic testing. The trigger of the shotgun contained Appellant’s DNA, but no 

DNA profiles could be extracted from the knife. No usable fingerprints were obtained from the 

gun or the knife. 

Cause and Time of Rohne’s Death

Dr. Delbert Van Deusen, a forensic pathologist, performed an autopsy and determined 

that Rohne’s cause of death was a shotgun wound to the chest. He testified that Rohne had a 

blood alcohol concentration of .33, “a rather obvious bruise on the . . . right side of his face[,] 

multiple bruises on his arms, a pretibial area on his legs[, and] of course, the shotgun wound to 

the chest.” The bruising occurred prior to Rohne’s death, Dr. Van Deusen explained, because 

bruising requires blood pressure. When Rohne was shot, he instantly lost blood pressure because 

the gunshot went through his heart. Dr. Van Deusen described the bruising on Rohne’s arms as 

“defense wounds” because their pattern indicated that they were incurred from a person 

attempting to protect his face or body. He agreed that an equally consistent explanation for the 

cause of Rohne’s bruising was falling. 

Dr. Van Deusen testified that Rohne’s gunshot wound was front to back, downward, and 

slightly left to right. He described the wound as “more of a distant gunshot wound.” He 

 1 Corbin explained that “mottled” meant Rohne’s skin appeared, pale, white, and blotchy.
6

explained that the firearm was discharged approximately eight to ten feet away and was 

positioned higher than Rohne when it was discharged. Dr. Van Deusen did not know how long 

Rohne had been dead when the photographs of Rohne (specifically State’s exhibits 10, 48, and 

51) were taken. Hypothetically, he estimated that if there was some mottling of the skin, the 

body was cool to the touch, and there was coagulation of blood, a person could have been dead 

for “two or three hours.”2

Dr. Van Deusen explained the differences between liver mortis and rigor mortis because 

the testimony had shown that some of the officers believed Rohne’s loose grip on the knife was 

due to the fact that the knife was staged. Sergeant Foster testified that he expected Rohne to 

have a “death grip” on the knife. Investigator Larry Warrick testified that he thought the 

positioning of the knife was odd because Rohne’s hand was “cupping” the knife instead of 

holding it, and the knife fell out of Rohne’s hand after Warrick barely touched it. 

Dr. Van Deusen testified that there was not anything significant about Rohne’s left hand 

having a stronger grip on his glasses and his right hand being more loose and open around the 

knife. He was asked, “You can’t say whether [Appellant’s fingers were] like that and opened up, 

or whether it was closed, or whether it was never closed, or—I mean, either hand?” Dr. Van 

Deusen replied, “I wouldn’t even speculate.”

Appellant’s Testimony

Appellant is a retired, fifty-nine-year-old man. He is five feet, eight inches tall, weighs 

180 pounds, and has chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). He has worked as a 

security officer, and as a sergeant and maintenance employee for the Texas prison system. 

Appellant met Rohne sometime before 2001, and Appellant began renting part of his house to 

Rohne approximately seven months before the shooting.

3

 

Appellant testified that he originally did not want to rent his house, but after several 

months of being “begged” by Rohne and Rohne’s ex-wife, he finally agreed. Appellant testified, 

“[B]oth he [(Rohne)] and Carla [(Rohne’s ex-wife)] stated [‘]If I keep living up here,[’] – or, 

Carla would say [‘]If he keeps living up there in Tyler, he’s going to kill somebody.[’]” Because 

Appellant occasionally needed the use of his Bois D’ Arc house, his agreement with Rohne was 

 2 State’s exhibits 10, 48, and 51 are photographs of Rhone from different angles as he was found at 

Appellant’s residence. The record is silent as to the time the photographs were taken.

3 Appellant’s primary residence is in Neches, Texas. The house where the shooting occurred is located in 

Bois D’Arc, a community near Montalba.
7

that he would continue to have use of the master bedroom and bathroom, he could stay at the 

house whenever he desired, and Rohne was to have use of the rest of the house.

Appellant described Rohne as a much younger, very large man—over six feet tall and 

weighing about 270 pounds. Rohne was one of Appellant’s “drinking buddies.” Appellant 

testified that Rohne generally had a mellow demeanor when he was drinking but sometimes 

became depressed and talked about killing himself. Rohne and Appellant never had any

disagreements, fights, or arguments prior to January 26, 2009. 

Appellant and Rohne talked on the phone almost every night. Appellant testified that he 

was sure he and Rohne had talked about their “escapades of the past a couple of weeks” before 

the shooting. But it was not until the week before the shooting that Rohne told Appellant that he 

hired prostitutes in Dallas to handcuff and leg iron him to a bed. 

On January 26, 2009, at approximately 4:00 p.m., Appellant arrived at his Bois D’ Arc 

house. Once he arrived, he and Rohne began drinking alcohol. During the night, Appellant 

inquired about Rohne’s experience with the Dallas prostitutes. Because Rohne had not 

responded to his previous questions, Appellant continued to prod Rohne for details and stated, 

“Come on, Paul, tell me what those whores did to you.” Rohne responded, “Oh, you’d be 

surprised.” Later that night, Rohne commented on Appellant’s interest about the Dallas 

prostitutes and said, “Lynn, you seem to show a lot of interest in that. You ought to try it 

sometime.” 

Sometime after 10:00 p.m., Appellant fell asleep on the loveseat and was awakened by 

Rohne “rubbing my genitals” with his left hand. Rohne told Appellant, “Don’t get up. Just relax 

and enjoy the pleasure.” Approximately one second after Rohne’s statement, Appellant “jumped 

up,” and ran to the sliding glass door, but the door was locked. When Appellant turned and 

looked back at Rohne, he saw that Rohne had a knife in his hand and “was getting up, and 

coming towards me.” When he saw Rohne standing with the knife, Appellant “thought 

something bad was fixing to happen” to him. Appellant explained that he felt that he had been 

sexually assaulted, and the thought running through his mind was that Rohne “was going to rape 

me, handcuff me up to a bed. He was just running fast.” Appellant shot Rohne as he was “in the 

process of standing up,” and testified that he shot Rohne because “I was in fear of my life. I 

thought he was going to kill me.” Appellant testified that one of the photographs of Rohne 
8

showed that his shorts were unbuttoned, but he did not state whether he was aware of this when 

he shot Rohne.

On cross examination, Appellant demonstrated how Rohne was positioned on the love 

seat when he woke up. Appellant confirmed that when he was awakened by Rohne’s touching, 

he did not see a knife and had no fear of a knife. But he confirmed that when he shot Rohne, he 

was thinking only about Rohne and the knife. Appellant testified that “[t]he knife was the 

immediate danger.” Appellant did not know how Rohne received the bruises on his face and 

arms, and maintained that he had not fought with Rohne that evening. 

Discussion

To accept Appellant’s claim of self-defense, the jury had to find that Appellant was 

justified under Section 9.31 of the penal code in using deadly force against Rhone, and that 

Appellant reasonably believed the deadly force was immediately necessary to protect him against 

Rhone’s use or attempted use of deadly force, or to prevent Rhone’s imminent commission of 

sexual assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a). 

Appellant testified that he shot Rohne because he “was in fear of his life and thought 

Rhone was going to kill him.” But as the sole judge of witness credibility and the weight to be 

given their testimony, the jury was free to disbelieve Appellant’s contention that he feared for his 

life. See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914. Although Rohne had bruising on his face and arms, the 

living room showed no signs of struggle, and Rohne’s gunshot wound showed that the weapon 

was discharged from an elevated position. This evidence, when viewed in light of Appellant’s 

and Rhone’s intoxication, Appellant’s 911 phone calls, Rohne’s mellow demeanor, the absence 

of prior confrontations between Rohne and Appellant, and Rohne’s position on the loveseat with 

his ankles crossed, permits a rational jury to conclude that deadly force was not immediately 

necessary to protect Appellant from Rohne’s alleged use or attempted use of unlawful deadly 

force. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a)(2)(A); Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914.

Appellant testified further that Rhone had rubbed his genitals and he thought Rhone “was 

going to rape” him. But Appellant contradicted his prior testimony on cross examination when 

he testified that he was thinking only about Rohne and the knife when he shot Rohne. This 

evidence permits a rational jury to conclude that it was not reasonable for Appellant to believe 

that deadly force was immediately necessary to prevent the imminent commission of a sexual 

assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a)(2)(B),(b)(10(c); Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914.
9

After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a 

rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense and also found against 

Appellant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914. 

Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s implicit rejection of Appellant’s 

self-defense claim. See id. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue. 

EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE

In his third issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by 

excluding evidence that would have corroborated his testimony. He contends that the excluded 

evidence proves “Rohne was an aggressive bisexual hungry to role play bizarre sexual 

encounters including rape, bondage, and torture.” 

Standard of Review

A trial court has considerable discretion in determining whether to exclude or admit 

evidence. See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc) 

(op. on reh’g); State v. Dudley, 223 S.W.3d 717, 724 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, no pet.). Absent 

an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence on 

appeal. Dudley, 223 S.W.3d at 724 (citing Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2005)). Under this standard, we will uphold a trial court’s evidentiary ruling as long as the 

ruling is within the “zone of reasonable disagreement.” Id.

Applicable Law

Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 401. Evidence that is not relevant is inadmissible. TEX. R.

EVID. 402. 

In determining whether evidence is relevant, it is important that courts examine the 

purpose for which the evidence is being introduced. Layton v. State, 280 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2009) (citations omitted). It is critical that there is a direct or logical connection 

between the actual evidence and the proposition sought to be proved. Id.

An alleged victim’s prior specific acts of violence are admissible “only to the extent that 

they are relevant for a purpose other than character conformity.” Torres v. State, 71 S.W.3d 758, 

760 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In the context of proving the deceased was the first aggressor, 
10

violent acts are relevant apart from showing character conformity by demonstrating the 

deceased’s intent, motive, or state of mind. Id. Before a specific, violent act is introduced, there 

must be some evidence of a violent or aggressive act by the deceased that tends to raise the issue 

of self-defense that the specific act may explain. Id. at 761. Prior specific acts of violence 

relevant to the ultimate confrontation may be offered to show a deceased’s state of mind, intent, 

or motive, and the specific violent acts need not be directed at the defendant to be admissible. 

Id. “As long as the proffered violent acts explain the outward aggressive conduct of the 

deceased at the time of the killing, and in a manner other than demonstrating character 

conformity only, prior specific acts of violence may be admitted. . . .” Id. at 762.

Discussion

The only contested issue at trial was whether Appellant shot Rohne in self-defense. 

Appellant testified that Rohne was the first aggressor because Rohne rubbed Appellant’s 

genitals, told him to relax and enjoy the pleasure, and then began to stand up from the loveseat 

holding a knife in his hand. The trial court excluded twenty-seven exhibits that Appellant argues 

would have increased the probability that Rohne (1) was an aggressive transvestite, (2) who 

fondled Appellant’s genitals, (3) told Appellant to relax and enjoy the pleasure, and (4) whose 

next steps “apparently were to force or role play [Appellant’s] rape with a knife (or perhaps 

[Appellant’s] involuntary, forced rape of Rohne).”

Defense exhibits 2 through 27 are photographs of items found inside Rohne’s room. The 

items include women’s shoes, women’s undergarments and other clothing, and various “sex 

toys.” Defense exhibit 1 is a disc containing the results of a forensic search of Rohne’s laptop. 

The disc contains several different files that include links to websites which purport to contain

sexually explicit material, pornographic images of male genitalia, pornographic images of 

women, and pornographic images of Rohne. The pornographic images of Rohne showed him 

wearing women’s clothing, being subjected to sexual acts with women in which he was in a 

submissive position, or wearing other items with his genitals exposed. There are no images 

contained in Defense exhibits 1 through 27 that show Rohne acting as an aggressor or engaging 

in homosexual conduct.

In order for Defense exhibits 1 through 27 to be admissible, they must explain the 

outward aggressive conduct of Rohne at the time he was shot. Id. at 762. The evidence at trial 

does not show that Rohne was wearing any of the items depicted in the proffered photographs, or 
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that Rohne was attempting to use any of the items on Appellant. No knives are shown to have 

been found in Rohne’s room, and none of the images of Rohne show him engaging in

homosexual activity or other activity in which a knife is being used. Accordingly, there is no 

direct or logical connection between these exhibits and Appellant’s contention that he shot 

Rohne in self-defense. See Layton, 280 S.W.3d at 240. 

Although the items found in Rohne’s bedroom and laptop show that Rohne engaged in 

unorthodox sexual practices, they do not make more or less probable the fact that Appellant was 

in fear for his life when he shot Rohne or that he believed Rohne was going to rape him. See id.

Moreover, Defense exhibits 1 through 27 do not demonstrate Rohne’s state of mind, intent, or 

motive on the night of the shooting. See Torres, 71 S.W.3d at 760–62. Thus, the exhibits are 

not relevant apart from showing character conformity. See TEX. R. EVID. 401; Torres, 71 S.W.3d 

at 760. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Defense exhibits 1 through 27. 

See TEX. R. EVID. 402; Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s 

third issue. 

DISPOSITION

Having overruled Appellant’s second and third issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court.

JAMES T. WORTHEN

Chief Justice

Opinion delivered December 3, 2014.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

DECEMBER 3, 2014

NO. 12-13-00136-CR

ROBERT LYNN PRIDGEN,

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

Appeal from the 3rd District Court 

of Anderson County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 29956)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed 

herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the 

judgment.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of 

the court below be in all things affirmed, and that the decision be certified to the court below 

for observance.

James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.