IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-10219

AUTUMN K. BROWN, 

 Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

LIBERTY MUTUAL GROUP, INCORPORATED, 

 Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:12-CV-1196

Before DENNIS, PRADO, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff–Appellant Autumn Brown (“Brown”) filed this suit alleging 

employment discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and 

interference with leave benefits after she resigned from her position as a lead 

sales representative for Defendant–Appellee Liberty Mutual Group (“Liberty 

Mutual”). The district court determined that Brown had offered insufficient 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 10, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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evidence to support her claims and granted summary judgment for Liberty 

Mutual. We agree and will AFFIRM the district court’s decision.

I.

The pertinent facts are largely undisputed, but where they differ we 

construe the facts and inferences in the record on appeal in the light most 

favorable to Brown. See Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010). 

Brown began working as a sales representative for Liberty Mutual on October 

18, 2004. She performed very well and was promoted to lead sales 

representative. As lead sales representative, Brown received the assistance of 

a sales associate, although this benefit was contingent upon Brown meeting 

certain sales goals.

When Brown notified her supervisor, Lynn Peters (“Peters”), of her 

pregnancy on January 11, 2011, Peters told Brown that she had never had a 

pregnant person in her office before and that it would be a new experience for 

her. Shortly thereafter, Peters began to question Brown’s sales performance 

and admonished Brown that she risked losing the assistance of a sales

associate if Brown failed to meet her sales expectations. After Brown missed 

work due to a pregnancy-related health issue, Peters suggested that Brown 

take leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Brown, 

however, declined to take leave at that time.

During the first week of January 2011, Brown was selected for an audit 

of her insurance sales by an auditor who was unaware of Brown’s pregnancy. 

Peters was not involved in the decision to audit Brown. The auditor discovered 

a number of insurance policies in which the information that Brown had 

entered did not match the information provided by the policyholders. The 

auditor thereafter asked Peters to look into the discrepancies. On February 

14, 2011, Peters told Brown to come to a meeting, which Brown expected to be 

a routine discussion between her and Peters about an insurance policy that 

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Brown had sold. When she arrived in the conference room, however, Brown 

found Peters, Peters’s supervisor, and an HR representative, who asked Brown 

a series of questions regarding her sales practices. Brown became 

overwhelmed and left the meeting before it was complete. The meeting 

resumed the next day, and Brown received no disciplinary action as a result of 

the audit. 

From February 18 through 27, 2011, Brown went on a previously 

scheduled vacation to South Africa. She did not return to work on February 

28, 2011, however, because she was not feeling well due to stress. On 

recommendations from her therapist and doctor, she requested and received 

short-term disability and medical leave under the FMLA. On April 15, 2011, 

before the end of her medical leave, Brown resigned from her position with 

Liberty Mutual.

Approximately one year after resigning, Brown filed the instant suit, 

alleging that Liberty Mutual had subjected her to pregnancy-based 

discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 

et seq. Additionally, she alleged that Liberty Mutual had interfered with her 

leave rights in violation of the FMLA. Brown claimed that she had been 

constructively discharged from her position when she resigned. 

Thereafter, Liberty Mutual filed a motion for summary judgment on all 

of Brown’s claims. The district court granted Liberty Mutual’s motion, holding

that Brown had failed to support prima facie cases for any of her claims 

because she did not suffer an adverse employment decision, the “harassment” 

she alleged was not severe or pervasive, and there was no evidence that Liberty 

Mutual interfered with her FMLA benefits. This timely appeal followed. 

Brown’s evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to her, cannot

establish that she suffered an adverse employment action nor that Liberty 

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Mutual interfered with her FMLA leave. Accordingly, as a matter of law, she 

is unable to make out a prima facie case for discrimination, harassment, 

interference with FMLA benefits, or retaliation. Thus, we AFFIRM summary 

judgment on all claims.

II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same 

standard as the district court. Richard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 559 F.3d 341, 

344 (5th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is appropriate where, taking the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no 

genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Vuncannon v. United States, 711 F.3d 

536, 538 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 

III.

A.

To establish a prima facie case for discrimination based on pregnancy

under Title VII, the plaintiff must show, inter alia, that she was the subject of 

an adverse employment action. See Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 

204, 206 (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Young v. United Parcel 

Serv., Inc., No. 12-1226, 2015 WL 1310745 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2015). Although 

Brown voluntarily resigned, a resignation may still constitute an adverse 

employment action “if the resignation qualifies as a constructive discharge.” 

Brown v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 2001). “To prove a 

constructive discharge, a plaintiff must establish that working conditions were 

so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.” Id. 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court found that Brown has failed to create a genuine 

dispute of material fact as to whether she was constructively discharged. We 

agree. Brown argues that Peters’s exhortations to improve her sales 

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performance and threats to take away her sales associate constituted a 

constructive discharge by forcing Brown to resign. However, informal 

criticisms of an employee’s work rarely suffice to support a finding of 

constructive termination. See, e.g., Haley v. Alliance Compressor LLC, 391 

F.3d 644, 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that plaintiff was not constructively 

discharged in spite of her employer “fabricating deficiencies in [her] work 

performance and setting an overly strict performance plan for her; threatening 

to fire her if she did not meet her teamwork goals; micromanaging her; 

excluding her from HR Department meetings; and ridiculing her in front of her 

coworkers”). Because having the assistance of a sales associate was contingent 

upon Brown’s sales performance, the threat of taking the sales associate away 

due to Brown’s lack of sales was simply a reminder of the policy to which Brown 

had agreed. Despite this reprimand, Brown was never formally disciplined, 

and no supervisor at Liberty Mutual threatened to terminate her employment. 

Thus, because the uncontested facts indicate that Brown was not

constructively discharged, the district court did not err in granting summary 

judgment to Liberty Mutual on Brown’s pregnancy discrimination claim.

B.

To establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff 

must prove that the harassment complained of was “sufficiently severe or 

pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an 

abusive working environment.” Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th 

Cir. 2002) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). In the 

instant case, Brown argues that she was harassed by comments about her sales 

numbers, threats of penalties if Brown did not meet her sales goals, and the 

meeting with her supervisor and other managers following the audit. Brown’s 

counsel acknowledged at oral argument that neither Peters nor any other 

employees made any derogatory comments regarding Brown’s pregnancy, 

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other than Peters’s initial observation that she had not had a pregnant 

employee before Brown. The types of job-related criticisms Brown complains 

of are unlikely to support a hostile work environment claim. See Kang v. Bd. 

of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 75 F. App’x 974, 976-77 (5th Cir. 2003) (per 

curiam) (holding that receiving a poor performance evaluation, being unjustly 

criticized in front of peers, and being written up were not enough to make out 

a prima facie case of hostile work environment). More importantly, the 

treatment Brown experienced was not so severe as to create an abusive 

working environment. See Hockman v. Westward Commc’ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 

317, 326-29 (5th Cir. 2004) (concluding that male coworker’s conduct did not 

affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment where, inter alia, he 

brushed against plaintiff’s breasts and behind, once slapped her behind with a 

newspaper, and once attempted to kiss plaintiff); Shepherd v. Comptroller of 

Pub. Accounts of State of Tex., 168 F.3d 871, 872, 875 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding 

that employee’s work environment was not rendered objectively hostile by coworker remarking that plaintiff’s “elbows are the same color as [her] nipples,” 

repeatedly attempting to look down plaintiff’s clothing, rubbing one of his 

hands from plaintiff’s shoulder down to her wrist, and patting his lap and 

remarking “here’s your seat” at meetings). Brown has not created a fact 

dispute regarding whether she was subjected to severe or pervasive 

harassment because of her pregnancy. Thus, Brown cannot establish a prima 

facie case of hostile work environment, and the district court did not err in 

granting summary judgment to Liberty Mutual on this claim.

C.

As with a discrimination claim, a Title VII retaliation claim requires an 

adverse employment decision. See Ackel v. Nat’l Commc’ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 

385 (5th Cir. 2003). Retaliation claims may be proven by a wider range of 

adverse actions than discrimination claims. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 

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Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006). To support a claim for retaliation, “a 

plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the 

challenged action materially adverse, which . . . means [the adverse action] 

well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a 

charge of discrimination.” Id. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Brown’s supervisors’ actions do not meet the standard for retaliation; their

allegedly retaliatory behavior was limited to counseling Brown to improve her 

performance, reminding Brown of the consequences of poor performance, and

conducting a meeting to ask questions raised by Brown’s audit. Mere workrelated reprimands are generally insufficient to rise to the level of being 

“materially adverse.” See Mendoza v. Bell Helicopter, 548 F. App’x 127, 130 

(5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that employee did not suffer an adverse 

employment action where he was verbally counseled at least three times for 

taking too long on assignments and once for riding an electric buggy at work); 

Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir. 2009) (same 

where employee was, among other things, chastised by superiors for 

performance issues). The district court properly granted summary judgment 

on this claim.

D.

Lastly, to present an interference claim under the FMLA, a plaintiff 

must show, inter alia, that the defendant denied or interfered with benefits to 

which she was entitled under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); Ragsdale v. 

Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002). Brown argues that by 

constructively discharging her, Liberty Mutual interfered with her ability to 

take additional FMLA leave once her child was born. As discussed supra, 

Brown has not offered sufficient summary-judgment evidence to support a 

finding of constructive discharge, and therefore her interference claim fails as 

a matter of law.

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IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment in full. 

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