J-S47017-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOSE LUIS TORRES

Appellant No. 2117 EDA 2013

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 21, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0000282-2012

CP-39-CR-0000289-2012

CP-39-CR-0002821-2011

CP-39-CR-0002822-2011

CP-39-CR-0002828-2011

CP-39-CR-0003824-2012

BEFORE: MUNDY, OLSON and WECHT, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED OCTOBER 31, 2014

Appellant, Jose Luis Torres, appeals, pro se, from an order entered on 

June 21, 2013 that denied his petition filed pursuant to the Post conviction 

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm. 

Between June 2010 and May 2011, Appellant committed a series of 

ten burglaries in Lehigh County and neighboring jurisdictions. Thereafter, on 

June 3, 2011, officers with the Allentown and Upper Saucon Police 

Departments, acting on information from confidential sources and pursuant 

to an arrest warrant on unrelated charges, stopped a vehicle operated by 

Appellant. A struggle ensued but the officers were eventually able to subdue 
J-S47017-14

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Appellant. During a subsequent inventory search, the officers discovered a 

9mm semi-automatic handgun on the front passenger floorboard of the 

vehicle. Further investigation also revealed that 1) the 9mm handgun had 

been reported stolen, 2) Appellant had a prior felony conviction that 

prohibited him from possessing a firearm, and 3) Appellant did not have a 

license to carry a firearm on the date of his apprehension.

On July 28, 2011, the Commonwealth filed three criminal informations 

that charged Appellant with the following offenses:1

CP-39-CR-2821-2011

Count 1 – Persons not to possess firearms, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6105(a)(1).

CP-39-CR-2822-2011

Count 1 – Receiving stolen property, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3925(a).

Count 2 - Persons not to possess firearms, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6105(a)(1).

Count 3 – Firearms not to be carried without a license, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1).

CP-39-CR-2828-2011

Count 1 – Aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.s.a. § 2702(a)(3).

Count 2 – Recklessly endangering another person, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.

____________________________________________

1 Hereafter, we shall collectively refer to the charges filed on July 28, 2011 

as the “2011 cases.”
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Count 3 – Resisting arrest, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104.

On February 14, 2012, the Commonwealth filed three additional 

criminal informations against Appellant that charged as follows:2

CP-39-CR-282-2012

Count 1 – Burglary, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a).

Count 2 – Criminal trespass, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(ii).

Count 3 – Theft by unlawful taking, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).

Count 4 – Receiving stolen property, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3925(a).

Count 5 – Criminal mischief, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(5).

CP-39-CR-289-2012

Counts 1, 7, 13, 19, 25, 33, 39 – Burglary, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3502(a).

Counts 2, 8, 14, 20, 26, 34, 40 – Criminal trespass, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(ii).

Counts 3, 9, 15, 21, 27, 35, 41 – Theft by unlawful taking, 

18 Pa.C.S.a. § 3921(a).

Counts 4, 10, 16, 22, 28, 36, 42 – Receiving stolen 

property, 18 Pa.C.s.a. § 3925(a).

Counts 5, 11, 17, 23, 29, 37, 43 – Criminal mischief, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(2).

____________________________________________

2 Hereafter, we shall collectively refer to the charges filed on February 14, 

2012 as the “2012 cases.”
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Counts 6, 12, 18, 24, 30, 38, 54 – Conspiracy to commit 

burglary, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a), 3502(a).

Counts 31, 32, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53 –

Persons not to possess, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).

CP-39-CR-3824-2012

Counts 1 and 2 – Burglary, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a).

On February 27, 2012, Appellant resolved the 2011 cases by entering 

a negotiated plea agreement with the Commonwealth. See generally N.T., 

2/27/12, at 2-16. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Appellant pled 

guilty to persons not to possess in case no. 2822/2011 and entered a nolo

contendere plea to resisting arrest in case no. 2828/2011. In exchange for 

Appellant’s pleas, the Commonwealth agreed to nolle pros case no. 

2821/2011 and further agreed not to pursue the other charges alleged in 

case nos. 2822/2011 and 2828/2011. Additionally, pursuant to the parties’ 

plea agreement, the court imposed a sentence of five to ten years’ 

incarceration for Appellant’s persons not to possess conviction at case no. 

2822/2011, together with a concurrent sentence of one to two years of 

imprisonment for the resisting arrest charge in case no. 2828/2011.

On June 28, 2012, Appellant moved pro se to discontinue trial 

counsel’s representation. The trial court convened a hearing on Appellant’s 

motion on July 9, 2012. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court relieved 

trial counsel of her duty to represent Appellant, but directed her to remain 

attached to Appellant’s cases as stand-by counsel. 
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Appellant resolved the 2012 cases by entering a separate negotiated 

plea agreement with the Commonwealth on September 10, 2012. See 

generally N.T., 9/10/12, at 2-27. At the September 10, 2012 plea hearing, 

Appellant pled guilty to ten counts of burglary3and one count of criminal 

conspiracy to commit burglary. In exchange for Appellant’s guilty pleas, the 

Commonwealth withdrew the remaining charges at case nos. 282/2012 and 

289/2012. In addition, pursuant to the parties’ plea agreement, the court 

sentenced Appellant to serve seven and one-half to 15 years on each of the 

burglary and conspiracy charges. The court also directed that these 

sentences were to run concurrent to each other but consecutive to the 

sentence imposed on February 27, 2012. Thus, the aggregate sentence for 

Appellant’s 2011 and 2012 cases was 121⁄2 to 25 years in prison.

Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition on February 19, 2013. 

Appellant’s petition alleged that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 

in advising him to enter into pleas that violated 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110. 

Appellant also claimed that his sentence was illegal and that the 

Commonwealth breached the parties’ plea agreement when the sentences on 

the 2011 and 2012 cases were run consecutively to each other instead of 

concurrently. On February 26, 2013, the PCRA court appointed counsel to 

____________________________________________

3 As indicated above, one count of burglary was charged at case no. 

282/2012, seven were charged at case no. 289/2012, and two were charged 

at case no. 3824/2012.
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represent Appellant. After reviewing the record, PCRA counsel concluded 

that the issues raised in Appellant’s petition lacked merit. Accordingly, 

counsel forwarded Appellant a “no-merit” letter pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) and moved to withdraw as 

counsel on March 21, 2013. The trial court convened an evidentiary hearing 

to address Appellant’s petition for collateral relief on May 29, 2013. At the 

commencement of this hearing, the court permitted PCRA counsel to 

withdraw. See N.T., 5/29/13, at 6. Appellant proceeded pro se throughout 

the proceedings. Following the close of testimony, the PCRA court took the 

matter under advisement. On June 24, 2013, the PCRA court issued an 

opinion and order denying Appellant’s petition. This timely appeal followed.4

Appellant’s brief raises the following questions for our review:

WHETHER PCRA COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO 

RAISE THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF TRIAL COUNSEL, WHERE 

TRIAL COUNSEL: (A) ADVISED THE APPELLANT TO ENTER 

GUILTY PLEAS ON FEBRUARY 27, 2012, WHEN THERE EXISTED 

OTHER DUPLICATE AND RELATED CHARGES, AND/OR CHARGES 

WHICH WERE PART OF THE SAME CRIMINAL EPISODE, IN A 

SEPARATELY FILED MATTER; AND (B) FAILED TO FILE A TIMELY 

OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION TO DISMISS THE CRIMINAL 

INFORMATION AT CP-39-CR-0000289-2012, ON DOUBLE 

JEOPARDY GROUNDS?

WHETHER THE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON 9/10/12, 

FOR BURGLARY, IS ILLEGAL, WHERE: (A) IT VIOLATES THE 

____________________________________________

4 The requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c) have been satisfied in this case.
J-S47017-14

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CONCURRENT TERMS OF THE FORMER 2/27/12 PLEA 

AGREEMENT, INVOLVING THAT SAME THEFT BY RECEIVING 

STOLEN PROPERTY; OR (B) WHERE THE COMMONWEALTH 

DISMISSED THAT “THEFT” AS PART OF THE FORMER 

AGREEMENT; AND/OR (C) WHERE THE FIREARM’S CHARGE THE 

BURGLARY RAN CONSECUTIVE TO WAS ACTUALLY DISMISSED, 

AS PART OF THE TERMS OF THE SECOND AGREEMENT, IN 

EXCHANGE FOR THE PLEAS BEING ENTERED?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

Appellant challenges an order that denied his petition for relief under 

the PCRA. Our standard of review for an order denying collateral relief is 

well settled. We have said:

This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a 

petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the 

PCRA court is supported by evidence of record and is free of 

legal error. In evaluating a PCRA court’s decision, our scope of 

review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the 

evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party at the trial level. We may affirm a PCRA court’s 

decision on any grounds if it is supported by the record.

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted).

Appellant’s first claim asserts that trial counsel5 was ineffective in 

advising him to enter guilty pleas on February 27, 2012 where there 

____________________________________________

5

In both the argument section of his brief and in his statement of questions 

involved, Appellant asserts a layered claim relating to PCRA counsel’s failure 

to raise a claim based upon trial counsel’s deficient stewardship. Appellant, 

however, never raised a claim pertaining to PCRA counsel’s alleged 

ineffectiveness before the PCRA court. Hence, we deem this aspect of 

Appellant’s contentions waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see also 

Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1085 (Pa. Super. 2014) (PCRA 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S47017-14

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remained outstanding duplicate and related charges arising from the same 

criminal episode relating to the 2011 cases. Appellant also claims that, in 

view of the duplicate and related charges alleged in the 2011 cases, trial 

counsel should have filed a pretrial motion to dismiss case no. 289/2012 

under the compulsory joinder rule.6 Appellant maintains that trial counsel’s 

lack of familiarity with the compulsory joinder rules caused her to advise him 

to accept the Commonwealth’s plea offer on February 27, 2012. Appellant 

also asserts that counsel’s recommendations were not the result of any 

reasonable, strategic or tactical decision and that her advice subjected him 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

petitioner can preserve claims challenging PCRA counsel’s effectiveness after 

counsel files a Turner/Finley letter by seeking leave from the trial court to 

amend his petition, by including such claims in response to the court’s notice 

of intent to dismiss, or by otherwise raising such issues while the PCRA court 

retains jurisdiction). We shall therefore address only Appellant’s complaints 

about the performance of trial counsel.

6 Throughout his brief, Appellant refers interchangeably to “double jeopardy” 

and to the compulsory joinder statute found at 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110. 

Appellant’s references to double jeopardy, however, are not separately 

developed through citations to pertinent authority. This Court has found 

waiver where claims have not been developed through citation to pertinent 

authorities. Pa.R.A.P. 2119; see also Commonwealth v. Cox, 72 A.3d 

719, 721 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2013). We have also said that, “Consideration of 

the constitutional protections contained in the double jeopardy clauses [of 

the federal and state constitutions] is necessary where the statutory 

provisions relating to subsequent prosecutions are not applicable.” 

Commonwealth v. Keenan, 530 A.2d 90, 93 (Pa. Super. 1987). Section 

110 of the compulsory joinder statute addresses situations where a former 

prosecution for a different offense is alleged to compel joinder. Id. at 92. 

That is precisely the claim that Appellant raises in this appeal. For each of 

these reasons, we shall confine our analysis to an examination of section 

110 and its application to the circumstances in this case.
J-S47017-14

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to successive trials and consecutive punishments. For the following reasons, 

we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief.

To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, the petitioner must plead and 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence 

resulted from “one or more” of the seven, specifically enumerated 

circumstances listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). One of these statutorily 

enumerated circumstances is the “[i]neffectiveness of counsel which, in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining 

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken 

place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).

Counsel is, however, presumed to be effective and “the burden of 

demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on [A]ppellant.” Commonwealth v. 

Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010). To satisfy this burden, 

Appellant must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular 

course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some 

reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; and, (3) 

but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of the challenged proceedings 

would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Fulton, 830 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. 2003). “A failure to 

satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the 

claim.” Id. “[C]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a 

meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Tharp, 2014 WL 474578, *5 (Pa. 

2014).
J-S47017-14

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As stated supra at footnote six, section 110 of the compulsory joinder 

statute applies to situations where it is alleged that a former prosecution for 

a different offense compels joinder. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110. We are guided 

by the following principles in our review of claims that invoke section 110.

The compulsory joinder statute is a legislative mandate that a 

subsequent prosecution for a violation of a provision of a statute 

that is different from a former prosecution, or is based on 

different facts, will be barred in certain circumstances. 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 110. As amended in 2002, Section 110 states in 

relevant part:

§ 110. When prosecution barred by former prosecution for 

different offense

Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision 

of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different 

facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following 

circumstances:

(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a 

conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to when 

prosecution barred by former prosecution for same offense) and 

the subsequent prosecution is for:

(i) any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted 

on the first prosecution;

(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the 

same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the 

appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the 

commencement of the first trial and occurred within the same 

judicial district as the former prosecution unless the court 

ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense; or

Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66, 71-72 (Pa. 2008).

By the plain terms of section 110, a former prosecution precludes a 

subsequent prosecution only when the former prosecution results in an 
J-S47017-14

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acquittal or a conviction. Appellant cites his February 27, 2012 pleas as the 

former prosecution that triggered the Commonwealth’s obligation to 

prosecute the burglary charges alleged in case no. 289/2012 in the same 

proceeding. As we stated above, Appellant, on February 27, 2012, pled 

guilty to persons not to possess in case no. 2822/20117and entered a nolo

contendere plea to resisting arrest in case no. 2828/2011. In exchange for 

Appellant’s pleas, the Commonwealth agreed to nolle pros case no. 

2821/20118and further agreed not to pursue the other charges alleged in 

case nos. 2822/2011 and 2828/2011. Under the particular circumstances of 

this case, then, we must first identify the precise offenses within the former 

prosecution that are capable of barring a subsequent prosecution under 

section 110. 

Here, Appellant makes no claim that his conviction for resisting arrest 

compelled the joinder of the burglary charges alleged at case no. 289/2012. 

Moreover, pursuant to Appellant’s February 27, 2012 plea deal, the 

Commonwealth agreed to nolle pros case no. 2821/2011 and further agreed 

not to pursue the other charges alleged in case nos. 2822/2011 and 

____________________________________________

7 The persons not to possess charge in case no. 2822/2011 related to the 

recovery of the 9mm handgun found in Appellant’s vehicle at the time of his 

arrest.

8 The sole charge alleged at case no. 2821/2011 involved the offense of 

persons not to possess. This charge arose from the recovery of a Glock 

handgun that officers recovered from a garage that they searched after 

Appellant’s June 3, 2011 arrest.
J-S47017-14

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2828/2011. Black’s Law Dictionary defines nolle prosequi as “[a] legal 

notice that a lawsuit or prosecution has been abandoned.” Black’s Law 

Dictionary, Eighth Edition at 1074. That source goes on to state that, 

[n]olle prosequi is a formal entry on the record by the 

prosecuting officer by which he declares that he will not 

prosecute the case further, either as to some of the counts of 

the indictment, or as to part of a divisible count, or as to some of 

the persons accused, or altogether. It is a judicial determination 

in favor of [an] accused and against his conviction, but it is not 

an acquittal, nor is it equivalent to a pardon.

Id. (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Ahearn, 670 A.2d 133, 135-136 

(Pa. 1996) (“Since a nolle prosequi acts neither as an acquittal nor a 

conviction, double jeopardy does not attach to the original criminal bill or 

information.”).9 As such, neither the charge alleged at case no. 2821/2011, 

nor the offenses withdrawn at case nos. 2822/2011 and 2828/2011, are 

capable of preclusive effect under the express terms of section 110. Only 

Appellant’s guilty plea to persons not to possess at case no. 2822/2011 

(arising from the seizure of the 9mm handgun found in Appellant’s vehicle) 

____________________________________________

9 We note Ahearn is legally distinguishable from the present case. In 

Ahearn, our Supreme Court confronted the question of whether the 

Commonwealth improperly reinstituted the exact same charges that had 

previously been nolle prossed when the defendant entered a guilty plea to 

unrelated charges. By contrast, in the present case, the Commonwealth 

withdrew a receiving stolen property charge which arose from the fact that 

Appellant had been apprehended with a 9mm firearm that had been 

reported stolen and later filed burglary charges accusing Appellant of 

entering the residence of another without authority for the purpose of 

committing a crime therein.
J-S47017-14

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qualifies as a potentially preclusive offense under section 110. We therefore 

review the facts underlying Appellant’s guilty plea to that offense.

The Commonwealth described the factual basis for Appellant’s plea at 

the hearing conducted on February 27, 2012. During that proceeding, the 

district attorney entered the following recitation on the record:

On June the 3rd, 2011 at approximately 4:19 p.m. members of 

the Allentown Police Department stopped a burgundy over gold 

in color Chevrolet Tahoe bearing Pennsylvania registration HND 

2110 in the 800 block of Hickory Street in Allentown.

It was being operated by [Appellant], who was wanted by police 

on unrelated charges.

[A co-defendant] was seated in the front passenger [seat]. 

During an inventory of the vehicle’s contents a Smith & Wesson 

model 659, 9mm semi-automatic pistol, bearing a serial number 

TBF 2165 was located on the passenger front floorboard of the 

vehicle.

Upon checking the handgun for ownership, [an officer], learned 

that the handgun had been reported stolen to Pennsylvania 

State Police, Hamburg during a burglary and had subsequently 

been entered into NCIC Clean as such.

It was later learned [] that the handgun was owned by [an 

individual], as he had registered the firearm, Smith & Wesson 

659, manufactured serial number TBF 2165.

[The officer] did a check and it was determined that [Appellant] 

did not have a license.

In addition, [the officer] obtained a copy of [Appellant’s] criminal 

history and in 1997 [Appellant] pled guilty to burglary, a felony 

of the first degree, which makes him a person prohibited from 

possessing, using, manufacturing, controlling or selling a firearm 

under Subsection of 6105.
J-S47017-14

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N.T., 2/27/12, at 6-8. Appellant agreed to the Commonwealth’s recitation of 

the facts without hesitation. Id. at 8 (indicating Appellant’s acceptance of 

“full responsibility” for the firearm despite the presence of an accomplice).

With these facts in mind, we now address Appellant’s claims that his 

firearms conviction barred prosecution of the burglary offenses alleged at 

case no. 289/2012. Initially, appellant raises a claim under 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 110(1)(i). Section 110(1)(i) provides that a prior conviction bars 

subsequent prosecution of “any offense of which the defendant could have 

been convicted on the first prosecution.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110(1)(i). 

Appellant cites four factors supporting his contention that his guilty plea 

precluded later prosecution of burglary charges under section 110(1)(i). 

First, Appellant notes that the Commonwealth, on October 5, 2011, filed a 

single complaint in case no. 289/2012 that encompassed both burglary and 

firearms related offenses. See Appellant’s Brief at 16-18. Second, 

Appellant claims that the two prosecutions could have been consolidated 

because offenses charged in both cases (i.e. firearms possession charges) 

constituted a single continuous possession. See id. at 18-22. Third, 

Appellant alleges that the two prosecutions could have been consolidated 

because the receiving stolen property charge in the first prosecution was a 

lesser-included offense of the burglary charges leveled in the second 

prosecution. See id. at 22-23. Fourth, Appellant asserts that he could have 

been convicted of both prosecutions on February 27, 2012 because the 
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Commonwealth filed notice, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 582, of its intent to try 

all of Appellant’s offenses (i.e. the 2011 cases and the 2012 cases) in a 

single proceeding in which Appellant and his accomplices were named as 

defendants. See id. at 23-25. Notwithstanding Appellant’s contentions, 

even a cursory review of the admitted factual basis of Appellant’s guilty plea 

reveals that it could not support a conviction for burglary. Hence, 

Appellant’s claim under section 110(1)(i) lacks merit and trial counsel cannot 

be deemed ineffective for failing to consider or take action under this 

provision.

Appellant next asserts that the burglary offenses charged in case no. 

2012 should have been joined in the prior prosecution under section 

110(1)(ii).

As has been summarized by our [Supreme] Court, Section 

110(1)(ii) . . . contains four requirements which, if met, preclude 

a subsequent prosecution due to a former prosecution for a 

different offense:

(1) the former prosecution must have resulted in an acquittal or 

conviction;

(2) the current prosecution is based upon the same criminal 

conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the former 

prosecution;

(3) the prosecutor was aware of the instant charges before the 

commencement of the trial on the former charges; and

(4) the current offense occurred within the same judicial district 

as the former prosecution.

See [Commonwealth v.] Nolan, 855 A.2d [834, 839 (Pa. 

2004)]; Commonwealth v. Hockenbury, 701 A.2d 1334, 1337 
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([Pa.] 1997). Each prong of this test must be met for 

compulsory joinder to apply.

Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66, 71-72 (Pa. 2008) (parallel 

citation omitted).

In this case, we focus our attention upon the second requirement 

listed above, as we find it dispositive of Appellant’s contentions. In deciding 

whether the current prosecution is based upon the same criminal conduct or 

arose from the same criminal episode as the former prosecution,10 our 

Supreme Court has said that, “courts considering the logical relationship 

prong [must look to] the temporal and logical relationship between the 

charges to determine whether they arose from a single criminal episode.” 

Commonwealth v. Reid, 77 A.3d 579, 582 (Pa. 2013). “Generally, 

charges against a defendant are clearly related in time and require little 

analysis to determine that a single criminal episode exists.” 

Commonwealth v. Hude, 458 A.2d 177, 181 (Pa. 1983). With respect to 

whether a logical relationship exists, the Supreme Court has explained:

In ascertaining whether a number of statutory offenses are 

logically related to one another, the court should initially inquire 

as to whether there is a substantial duplication of factual, and/or 

legal issues presented by the offenses. If there is duplication, 

then the offenses are logically related and must be prosecuted at 

one trial. The mere fact that the additional statutory offenses 

involve additional issues of law or fact is not sufficient to create 

____________________________________________

10 This factor is commonly referred to as the “logical relationship” prong. 

See Commonwealth v. Reid, 77 A.3d 579, 582 (Pa. 2013).
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a separate criminal episode since the logical relationship test 

does not require an absolute identity of factual backgrounds.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial duplication of issues of 

law and fact is a prerequisite, as de minimis duplication is insufficient to 

establish a logical relationship between offenses. Commonwealth v. 

Bracalielly, 658 A.2d 755, 761 (Pa. 1995). Where different evidence is 

required to establish the defendant’s involvement in criminal activity, 

substantial duplication is not demonstrated.11 See id. at 761–62.

Appellant argues that there are common issues of law and fact that 

run between the two prosecutions. To establish the requisite logical and 

factual relationship, Appellant claims that the burglaries, his firearms 

conviction, and the offenses that were nolle prossed or withdrawn following 

the entry of his pleas on February 27, 2012 (e.g. receiving stolen property) 

all arose from a single criminal episode. For example, Appellant argues that 

____________________________________________

11 In considering the temporal and logical relationship between criminal acts, 

we are guided by the policy considerations that § 110 was designed to 

serve:

(1) to protect a person accused of crimes from governmental 

harassment of being forced to undergo successive trials for 

offenses stemming from the same criminal episode; and (2) as a 

matter of judicial administration and economy, to assure finality 

without unduly burdening the judicial process by repetitious 

litigation.

Commonwealth v. Anthony, 717 A.2d 1015, 1018–1019 (Pa. 1998) 

(citation omitted).
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when he burglarized the residence of one of his victims on May 28, 2011 and 

stole firearms that were located within the home, he simultaneously 

committed burglary, receiving stolen property, and persons not to possess 

firearms. See Appellant’s Brief at 31. Appellant then argues that the two 

prosecutions involve factual duplication since the victims of his offenses 

would be called upon to prove the theft charges in the first prosecution as 

well as the burglary offenses in the second prosecution. See id. at 34. 

Appellant seems to suggest that, given the logical relationship between the 

first and second prosecutions, it was improper for the Commonwealth to 

institute burglary charges after it withdrew the receiving stolen property 

charge on February 27, 2012 since the withdrawal of the theft charge led 

Appellant to believe that no further prosecution would be forthcoming. See 

id. at 33 (noting that the receiving stolen property charge substantially 

duplicates the burglary charges and that the withdrawal of the receiving 

charge was part of the quid pro quo of the February 27, 2011 plea 

agreement); see also Ahearn, 670 A.2d at 136 (to substantiate claim that 

Commonwealth was barred from reinstating nolle prossed charges following 

entry of guilty plea, appellant was required to show an actual representation 

by the Commonwealth or a commitment by the Commonwealth which led 

appellant to reasonably believe that guilty plea obligated the Commonwealth 

to withdraw the charges as part of the plea agreement). 

The record refutes Appellant’s understanding and firmly establishes 

that there is no logical relationship between Appellant’s firearms conviction 
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and the subsequent burglary prosecution. At the February 27, 2012 plea 

hearing, the trial court stated on the record that, notwithstanding Appellant’s 

pleas to persons not to possess and resisting arrest, Appellant still had open 

cases. N.T., 2/27/12, at 3. Appellant nodded his head in agreement with 

the trial court. Id. Then, after the trial court accepted Appellant’s pleas, 

the following exchange between the court, trial counsel, and Appellant took 

place on the record:

[Trial Counsel]: Your Honor, he does have other charges, 

obviously, that he needs to resolve here in Lehigh County. This 

is a – and elsewhere, as you heard. So this is a maximum 

penalty. It’s within the standard range. Other than that, there 

really is nothing more to say.

The Court: Anything that you want to say?

[Appellant]: No.

Id. at 15.

The record contains no evidence of an agreement by the 

Commonwealth to forgo Appellant’s burglary charges as part of the plea 

agreement entered by the parties on February 27, 2012. The guilty plea 

colloquy does not establish an interrelationship between the pleas entered 

on February 27, 2012 and the subsequent burglary charges. In exchange 

for Appellant’s pleas to resisting arrest and persons not to possess, the 

Commonwealth agreed to nolle pros case no. 2821/2011 and further agreed 

not to pursue the other charges alleged in case nos. 2822/2011 and 

2828/2011. The facts placed on the record at Appellant’s first plea hearing 
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related exclusively to resisting arrest and a discreet firearms possession 

charge relating to the date of Appellant’s apprehension. Moreover, the 

written plea colloquy signed by Appellant states that he received no other 

promises (apart from the plea agreement) that induced his entry of a plea. 

The PCRA court found that Appellant understood the terms and 

consequences of his guilty pleas. Thus, Appellant has not established that 

the withdrawal of any charges on February 27, 2012 led him to believe that 

he would not face prosecution for the burglaries that he committed.

Turning to the logical relationship between Appellant’s possessory 

firearms conviction and the subsequent burglary charges, we find no error in 

the PCRA court’s conclusion that this claim lacked merit. In rejecting 

Appellant’s claim, the court stated:

[The PCRA court] recognizes that [s]ection 110 of the Criminal 

Code requires that the Commonwealth proceed with all charges 

arising out of the same criminal episode by prosecuting them 

together. However, [Appellant’s] possessory crime that occurred 

in the City of Allentown, Lehigh County, on June 3, 2011, is a 

totally separate criminal episode from the burglary that occurred 

on May 28, 2011, in Hamburg, Pennsylvania. [The PCRA court] 

notes that [Appellant] did not enter a guilty plea to the theft of 

the subject firearm on February 27, 2012. Instead, [Appellant 

pled guilty to [p]ersons [n]ot to [p]ossess a [f]irearm. This 

offense has nothing to do with how the firearm was acquired, 

but addresses the fact that the firearm was in [Appellant’s] 

possession in contravention of the law. Therefore, [Appellant’s] 

guilty plea to [p]ersons [n]ot to [p]ossess a [f]irearm that was 

entered on February 27, 2012, does not prohibit the later 

prosecution for the [b]urglary in which the firearm was taken. 

Based on the foregoing, [trial counsel] cannot be deemed 

ineffective for advising [Appellant] that there were no viable or 

recognizable legal issues with regard to [Appellant’s contentions 

under section 110].
J-S47017-14

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PCRA Court Opinion, 6/24/13, at 5-6 (emphasis in original). For the reasons 

expressed by the PCRA court, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to 

relief under section 110(1)(ii).

In his final claim, Appellant alleges that the consecutive sentence 

imposed on September 10, 2012 for his burglary conviction is illegal. 

Appellant advances three reasons in support of his contention. First, 

Appellant claims that his burglary conviction should have merged with the 

receiving stolen property charge that was withdrawn by the Commonwealth 

as part of Appellant’s February 27, 2012 plea agreement. Second, Appellant 

asserts that the withdrawal of the persons not to possess charge alleged at 

case no. 289 retroactively voided Appellant’s prior conviction for that offense 

at case no. 2822/2011. Third, Appellant claims that a consecutive sentence 

in this case violates a promise he received to the effect that all of his theft 

and firearms related offenses would be imposed concurrently. These claims 

merit no relief.

This Court has held that:

The phrase ‘illegal sentence’ is a term of art in Pennsylvania 

Courts that is applied to three narrow categories of cases. Those 

categories are: (1) claims that the sentence fell outside of the 

legal parameters prescribed by the applicable statute; (2) claims 

involving merger/double jeopardy; and (3) claims implicating the 

rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

Commonwealth v. Munday, 78 A.3d 661, 664 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal 

citations and parallel citations omitted).
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In this case, Appellant does not allege that his sentence fell outside 

the legal parameters prescribed by the applicable statute or that his 

punishment ran afoul of Apprendi. In addition, for reasons largely related 

to our prior analysis, we conclude that Appellant has failed to advance a 

viable claim involving merger, double jeopardy, or compulsory joinder. 

Thus, Appellant’s final claim does not challenge the legality of his sentence. 

Rather, Appellant objects to the trial court’s exercise of its discretion to 

impose consecutive sentences.12 This Court has previously held that 

undeveloped challenges to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are not 

cognizable under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Evans, 866 A.2d 442, 

444-445 (Pa. Super. 2005). For these reasons, we conclude the Appellant’s 

sentencing claim merits no relief.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/31/2014

____________________________________________

12 Appellant’s sentencing challenge is not set forth under the rubric of an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim.