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MARK J. HORTON, ) 

 ) 

 Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

vs. ) No. SD33329 

 ) 

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) Filed: April 13, 2015

 ) 

 Respondent-Respondent. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NEWTON COUNTY 

Honorable Timothy W. Perigo, Circuit Judge 

AFFIRMED

 Mark J. Horton (“Petitioner”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for the 

removal of his name from Missouri’s sex offender registry. We affirm the trial court’s 

judgment because Petitioner “has been . . . required” to register under the federal Sex 

Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”)

1

 and, as a result, is required to 

register under Missouri’s Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”)2 even though he may 

no longer be required to register under SORNA. 

 

1

 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901, et seq. (effective July 27, 2006). 

2

 Section 589.400, et seq., RSMo Cum.Supp. 2008. 
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Facts and Procedural History

 As the appellant, Petitioner had the responsibility to prepare a record on appeal 

that is sufficient to permit us to resolve his claim in this appeal. Rule 81.12(c)-(e);3 Hall 

v. Hall, 345 S.W.3d 291, 292 n.1 (Mo.App. S.D. 2011). Petitioner has failed to do so. 

The legal file contains only a docket sheet, a one-page petition, and a one-page judgment. 

Only a single transcript was filed with us, and that transcript reflects a hearing at which 

no evidence was tendered or admitted, and the trial court’s only substantive action at the 

hearing was to take judicial notice of state and federal statutes. No exhibits were 

deposited with us. We present the facts that are accepted as true by both Petitioner and 

the State.4

 These “agreed” facts are the following. In January 1996, Petitioner entered an 

Alford plea of guilty to the class A misdemeanor of sexual abuse in the second degree for 

conduct that occurred in 1993 in Newton County in violation of section 566.110, RSMo 

Cum.Supp. 1990.5 At the time of the offense, Petitioner was older than twenty and 

Petitioner’s victim was thirteen. Petitioner’s misdemeanor offense caused him to be “a 

tier I sex offender” under SORNA. 

 In addition, the record shows that, on December 11, 2013, in Newton County, 

Petitioner filed a petition to remove his name from the “sexual offender registry.” 

 

3

 All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2015). 

4

See Riggins v. Director of Revenue, No. SD33368, 2015 WL 452440, at *1 n.2 (Mo.App. S.D. January 

27, 2015) (discussing rules for determining facts on appeal when the record is incomplete). 

5 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). In a plea pursuant to the principles announced in Alford, a 

defendant affirmatively claims he is innocent of the crime to which he is pleading guilty, but “intelligently 

concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong 

evidence of actual guilt.” Id. at 37. “An Alford plea . . . ‘stands on equal footing with one in which an 

accused specifically admits the commission of the particular act charged.’” Wilson v. State, 813 S.W.2d 

833, 843 (Mo. banc 1991) (quoting Jenkins v. State, 788 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Mo.App. S.D. 1990)). 
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Among other facts alleged in the petition are that Petitioner “has duly registered” and 

“[u]nder Section 16915(a)(1) of SORNA (42 U.S.C. § 16915), [Petitioner] no longer has 

a duty to register.” The trial court held a hearing on February 14, 2014. At the hearing, 

the trial court expressed the view that “[i]t’s a legal issue, not factual,” and counsel for 

Petitioner responded “[a]ll right. That sounds good.” No evidence was tendered or 

admitted at the hearing, and the trial court’s only substantive action at the hearing was to 

take judicial notice of state and federal statutes. The trial court denied Petitioner’s 

petition on April 2, 2014. 

Analysis

 In his sole point relied on, Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in denying 

his petition to remove his name from Missouri’s sex offender registry because Missouri’s 

Sex Offender Registration Act does not apply to Petitioner’s pre-2000 plea to a 

misdemeanor, and because Petitioner is a “federal tier I sex offender” and “may be 

removed from the registry 15 years after” his plea. We deny Petitioner’s point because it 

ignores well-established Missouri law. 

 In reviewing a court-tried case, we will: 

affirm the trial court’s judgment unless it is not supported by substantial 

evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, it erroneously declares 

the law, or it erroneously applies the law. [Murphy v. Carron, 536 

S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976)]. The interpretation and application of a 

statute to a given set of facts is a question of law we review de novo, 

giving no deference to the trial court’s conclusions. See Otte v. Edwards, 

370 S.W.3d 898, 900 (Mo.App. E.D.2012). 

Solomon v. St. Charles County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, 409 S.W.3d 487, 489 

(Mo.App. E.D. 2013). 
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 Petitioner is correct that SORA does not require him to register as a sex offender 

based solely on his pre-2000 plea to a misdemeanor because (1) SORA did not require 

registration for a misdemeanor until August 28, 2000, and (2) Missouri’s constitutional 

prohibition on laws enacted by the state being “retrospective in [their] operation” 

prevents SORA from applying retroactively to Petitioner’s pre-2000, misdemeanor plea. 

Doe v. Keathley, 290 S.W.3d 719, 20 (Mo. banc 2009) (“On August 28, 2000, [SORA] 

was amended to require registration for misdemeanor offenses under chapter 566.”); Doe 

v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 849-53 (Mo. banc 2006) (SORA cannot be applied to “those 

persons who were convicted or pled guilty prior to” SORA’s effective date because of 

Missouri’s constitutional prohibition of “laws [that are] retrospective in their operation”); 

Doe v. Blunt, 225 S.W.3d 421 (Mo. banc 2007) (applied Phillips to an amendment of 

SORA that added an offense to those offenses requiring registration). 

 However, SORA also requires a person to register as a sex offender who “has 

been or is required to register under . . . federal . . . law.” Section 589.400.1(7), RSMo 

Cum.Supp. 2008; Doe v. Toelke, 389 S.W.3d 165, 167 (Mo. banc 2012). The federal Sex 

Offender Registration and Notification Act (effective July 27, 2006) imposes an 

independent, federally mandated registration requirement that is not subject to Missouri’s 

constitutional ban on state laws that operate retrospectively. Doe v. Keathley, 290 

S.W.3d at 720; Roe v. Replogle, 408 S.W.3d 759, 767-69 (Mo. banc 2013). Further,

SORNA has applied to persons who pled guilty before its enactment since at least August 

1, 2008, following the United States Attorney General’s issuance of final guidelines. 

Vaughan v. Missouri Department of Corrections, 385 S.W.3d 465, 468 (Mo.App. W.D. 

2012); United States v. Whitlow, 714 F.3d 41 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 287 
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(2013); see also Doe v. Keathley, 290 S.W.3d at 720 (“SORNA applies to individuals 

who committed a sex offense prior to July 2[7], 2006. 42 U.S.C. section 16913(d); 28 

C.F.R., section 72.3.”); Roe v. Replogle, 408 S.W.3d at 768 (“SORNA’s registration 

requirement applies to all individuals convicted of a sex offense. Sections 16911(1), 

16913. Accordingly, an offender who completed his involvement with the criminal 

justice system before the enactment of SORNA, such as Mr. Roe, still may be required to 

register. Doe v. Keathley, 344 S.W.3d [759,] 770 [(Mo.App. W.D. 2011)].”). 

 As a tier I sex offender under SORNA, Petitioner was required to “keep his 

registration current for” fifteen years “unless . . . allowed a reduction.” 42 U.S.C. 

§16915(a)(1). If allowed, the reduction for a tier I sex offender is five years. 42 U.S.C. 

§16915(b)(3)(A). The record does not contain any evidence that Petitioner ever sought or 

was “allowed” a reduction. As a result, at a minimum, Petitioner was required to register 

as a sex offender under SORNA from at least August 1, 2008 to January 2011, when his 

fifteen year registration period expired. Inasmuch as Petitioner “has been” required to 

register under federal law, he now is required to register in Missouri under SORA even 

though he may no longer be required to register under federal law. Toelke, 389 S.W.3d 

at 167. As the Eastern District recently summarized in the context of a defendant’s guilty 

plea to a misdemeanor in April 1996: 

 In their first point on appeal, Defendants contend the trial court 

erred in finding Solomon met his federal registration obligation and, 

therefore, did not have to register under Missouri law. Defendants argue 

that a sex offender who has been or is required to register under federal 

law is required to register under Missouri law, even if the federal 

requirement has lapsed. We agree. 

 The interplay between the federal registration requirements 

pursuant to SORNA and Missouri’s registration requirements pursuant to 

SORA has been well-documented. See Doe v. Toelke, 389 S.W.3d 165, 

166–67 (Mo. banc 2012); Doe v. Keathley, 290 S.W.3d 719, 720–21 (Mo. 
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banc 2009). SORA requires a Missouri resident to register as a sex 

offender if he or she “has been or is required to register under ... federal ... 

law....” Section 589.400.1(7). SORNA provides “a sex offender shall 

register ... in each jurisdiction where the offender resides.” 43 U.S.C. 

Section 16913(a). 

. . . . 

 Solomon’s requirement to register as a sex offender pursuant to 

SORNA triggered an independent obligation for him to register as a sex 

offender pursuant to SORA. As such, Solomon’s contention that his 

federal registration requirement cannot serve as the sole basis to require 

registration under Missouri law is belied by the controlling precedents. In 

Toelke and Keathley, the Missouri Supreme Court held that a Missouri 

resident deemed a sex offender pursuant to the terms of SORNA has an 

“independent, federally mandated registration requirement” that triggers 

the individual’s duty to register in Missouri. Toelke, 389 S.W.3d at 167; 

Keathley, 290 S.W.3d at 720. The court found that the State’s registration 

requirements in Section 589.400.1(7) of SORA are based on the person’s 

present status as a sex offender who “has been or is required” to register 

pursuant to SORNA. Toelke, 389 S.W.3d at 167. Therefore, if an 

individual has been required to register pursuant to SORNA, he or she is 

presently required to register pursuant to SORA. Id.

 Solomon concedes that he was required to register as a sex 

offender pursuant to SORNA. That registration requirement triggered an 

independent obligation for him to register pursuant to Section 

589.400.1(7) of SORA. The registration requirements of SORA are 

lifetime registration requirements, unless . . . narrow criteria are met[.] 

Solomon, 409 S.W.3d at 489-90; see also Doe v. Replogle, 445 S.W.3d 573, 575-76 

(Mo.App. S.D. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2853 (2014) (similar summary of the law in 

the context of a tier III sex offender). Petitioner does not claim that he meets any of the 

“narrow criteria” that permit a reduced registration period under SORA. Petitioner now 

is required to register under SORA because he “has been” required to register under 

federal law (i.e., SORNA) from at least August 1, 2008 until January 2011. 

 In the argument portions of his briefs, Petitioner raises two claims that were not 

pled, or presented to, or decided by the trial court, and were not included in his point 

relied on in this appeal. We decline to review either of these claims because we will not 
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convict a trial court of error on an issue not presented to the trial court for decision. 

Vaughan, 385 S.W.3d at 468; see also Brown v. Brown, 423 S.W.3d 784, 788 (Mo. banc 

2014) (“‘An issue that was never presented to or decided by the trial court is not 

preserved for appellate review.’” (quoting State ex rel. Nixon v. American Tobacco Co., 

Inc., 34 S.W.3d 122, 129 (Mo. banc 2000)); Doe v. Keathley, 344 S.W.3d 759, 770 

(Mo.App. W.D. 2011) (“Doe’s petition only sought relief on the basis that he had not 

been ‘convicted’ of a sex offense within the meaning of the statute. He did not allege that 

he should be exempted from SORNA’s registration requirements because he had 

completed his involvement in Missouri’s criminal justice system at the time the statute 

became effective. Doe is not entitled to relief on a ground he did not assert in the circuit 

court.”). In addition, an argument not included in an appellant’s point relied on is not 

preserved for our review. Rule 84.04(e) (“The argument shall be limited to those errors 

included in the ‘Points Relied On.’”); State v. Guinn, No. SD33028, 2014 WL 6845559, 

*3 n.4 (Mo.App. S.D. Dec. 4, 2014). 

 Petitioner’s point is denied, and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 

Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer, J. - Opinion Author 

Mary W. Sheffield, P.J. - Concurs 

Don E. Burrell, J. - Concurs