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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: C.H.M., 

A MINOR

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: M.M., FATHER : No. 3433 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 5, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Juvenile Division at No. CP-51-AP-0000599-2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: C.H.M., 

A MINOR

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: M.M., FATHER : No. 3434 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered November 5, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Juvenile Division at No. CP-51-DP-0000715-2018

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McCAFFERY, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 22, 2020

In this consolidated appeal, M.M. (“Father”) appeals from the 

November 5, 2019 decree granting the petition of the Philadelphia 

Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to involuntarily terminate his parental 

rights to his minor female child, C.H.M. (“Child”) (born March 2018), pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and the order changing
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Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption.1 After careful review, 

we affirm.

The juvenile court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history 

of this case as follows:

This family became known to DHS on March 14, 2018, 

after receiving a General Protective Services (“GPS”) 

report alleging that there were concerns regarding 

Child’s safety in the care of Mother due to Mother’s 

heroin addiction; Child was born [in March 2018], with 

drugs in her system and Child experienced 

withdrawal; Mother stated that Father sold 

prescription medication; Father’s home lacked heat 

and hot water; there was drug paraphernalia in 

Father’s home; Father used marijuana and abused 

alcohol; there was a history of domestic violence 

between Mother and Father; while Mother was 

homeless, Father convinced Mother to return to his 

home by offering her heroin; Father has a criminal 

history; Father had an active warrant for his arrest for 

harassment; and Father did not have the supplies to 

care for Child and Child was expected to be discharged

from Thomas Jefferson Hospital (“Hospital”) with 

Mother [two days after her birth]. This report was

determined to be valid. On that same day, DHS 

visited Child at Hospital. Mother indicated to DHS that 

she was unable to care for Child and wanted Father to 

care for her. Hospital staff confirmed to DHS that 

Child tested positive for opioids, was being monitored

for withdrawal, and that Child’s discharge date was 

unknown. Maternal Grandmother later contacted DHS 

via telephone on the same date and stated that Father 

was unfit to care for Child. Maternal Grandmother 

indicated that Father perpetuated Mother’s drug use 

and provided Mother with drugs.

On March 15, 2018, DHS received supplemental 

information that stated Child was born addicted to 

 

1 The record reflects that the juvenile court also terminated Mother’s parental 

rights to Child on November 5, 2019. Mother is not a party to this appeal.
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opiates and was experiencing withdrawal, Father was 

employed, and Father purchased drugs for Mother. 

On March 16, 2018, DHS visited Father at his home. 

Father denied any drug use or history of mental 

illness. Father indicated that Mother did not reside in 

his home, but she did have keys to the home and he 

would allow her to stay there if she needed to rest. 

DHS expressed concern to Father regarding Mother’s 

access to the home if Child were placed in his care. 

Father stated that he was determined to be Child’s 

primary caregiver. DHS conducted a home 

assessment of Father’s home and found that his home 

lacked hot water. On that same date, DHS received 

additional information that Child was born at 40 weeks 

gestation and weighed six pounds and seven ounces

at birth; Child was in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit 

and was receiving morphine for her withdrawal 

symptoms; and that Father was abusive to Mother.

On March 29, 2018, Hospital contacted DHS and 

informed them that Child was ready for discharge. On 

that same date, DHS obtained an Order of Protective 

Custody (“OPC”) for Child and placed her in foster 

care.

On March 30, 2018, a shelter care hearing was held 

for Child. Father was not present for this hearing. The 

[juvenile] court lifted the OPC and ordered the 

temporary commitment of Child to stand. Father was 

granted supervised visits with Child between 

March 30, 2018, and the upcoming adjudicatory 

hearing for Child. DHS filed a dependency petition for 

Child on April 5, 2018.

On April 10, 2018, an adjudicatory hearing was held 

for Child. Father was present for this hearing. Child 

was adjudicated dependent based on present inability 

of the parents to provide proper parental care, 

control, and supervision. The [juvenile] court 

discharged the temporary commitment to DHS and 

fully committed Child to the custody of DHS. Father 

was referred to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) for 

a forthwith drug and alcohol screen, dual diagnosis 

assessment, monitoring, and three random drug 
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screens. Father was also referred to the Genetic 

Testing Unit for a paternity test. Father was also 

ordered to attend supervised visits at [DHS] with Child

with 24 hours[’] confirmation. At Father’s forthwith 

drug and alcohol screen, Father tested positive for 

alcohol.

On April 25, 2018, the Community Umbrella Agency 

(“CUA”) created an initial single case plan (“SCP”). 

Father’s objectives were to attend visits as scheduled; 

ensure the paternity test is completed; attend the 

Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) and 

participate in recommended services; and to 

participate in domestic violence counseling when 

scheduled.

On June 25, 2018, a permanency review hearing was 

held for Child. Father was present for this hearing. 

The [juvenile] court found that Child’s placement 

continued to be necessary and appropriate, and 

ordered the commitment to DHS to stand. Father was 

ordered to provide proof of employment and that 

New Jersey Children and Youth Services conducted a 

home assessment of Father’s home in New Jersey.[

2]

Father was also referred to the CEU for a forthwith 

drug and alcohol screen. Father was ordered to 

attend twice weekly supervised visits with Child at 

[DHS] and the visits may be modified by agreement 

of the parties prior to the next court date.

On September 25, 2018, a permanency review 

hearing was held for Child. Father was present for

this hearing. The [juvenile] court determined that 

Father was minimally compliant with the permanency

plan and that Father was employed. The [juvenile]

court also determined that Child’s placement

continued to be necessary and appropriate, and 

ordered her commitment to DHS to stand. Father was 

re-referred to ARC for appropriate services and to 

Behavioral Health Services (“BHS”) for consultation, 

evaluation, and monitoring. Father was ordered to 

complete healthy relationships, a housing workshop, 

 

2 The record is unclear as to the exact date Father returned to Pennsylvania.
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and parenting. Father’s visitation with Child was not 

modified.

On December 11, 2018, a permanency review hearing 

was held for Child. Father was not present for this 

hearing. The [juvenile] court determined that Father 

was minimally compliant with the permanency plan, 

Father is employed and has provided CUA with proof 

of employment, and Father declined ARC services due 

to his work schedule. The [juvenile] court found that 

Child’s placement continued to be necessary and 

appropriate, and ordered her commitment to DHS to

stand. The [juvenile] court re-referred Father to BHS 

for a consultation and evaluation and to ARC for

appropriate services.

On March 5, 2019, a permanency review hearing was 

held for Child. Father was not present for this hearing. 

The [juvenile] court determined that Father was 

non-compliant with the permanency plan; Father was 

referred to ARC for services but was discharged from 

ARC due to lack of participation; Father did not comply 

with the BHS evaluation; and Father had not attended 

supervised visits since December 2018. The 

[juvenile] court also determined that Child’s 

placement continued to be necessary and appropriate, 

and ordered her commitment to DHS to stand. The 

[juvenile] court referred Father to BHS for a 

consultation and evaluation, once he availed himself, 

and to ARC for parenting, housing, employment, and 

healthy relationships. Father was ordered to comply 

with all SCP objectives and recommendations. 

Father’s visits were decreased to biweekly supervised 

visits at the agency.

On May 28, 2019, a permanency review hearing was 

held for Child. Father was present for this hearing. 

The [juvenile] court determined that Father was 

non-compliant with the permanency plan; Father was 

residing with Paternal Grandfather; Father was 

employed; and Father had not attended a visit with 

Child since March 5, 2019. The [juvenile] court also 

determined that Child’s placement continued to be 

necessary and appropriate, and ordered her 
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commitment to DHS to stand. The [juvenile] court 

referred Father to BHS for a consultation and 

evaluation. The [juvenile] court also ordered Father

to provide CUA with proof of employment.

On July 26, 2019, the SCP was revised. Father’s 

objectives were to attend visits, as scheduled; attend 

ARC and participate in recommended services; and to 

participate in healthy relationships counseling, as 

scheduled.

Juvenile court opinion, 1/9/20 at 1-4 (footnotes omitted).

On August 9, 2019, DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate 

Father’s parental rights to Child and change the permanency goal from 

reunification to adoption. Thereafter, on November 5, 2019, the juvenile court 

conducted a termination hearing; Father was present for this hearing and was 

represented by counsel. Following the hearing, the juvenile court entered a 

decree involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 

Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and an order changing the

permanency goal from reunification to adoption. (See notes of testimony, 

11/5/19 at 70-71.) On December 4, 2019, Father filed two separate, timely 

notices of appeal for each docket number, in compliance with 

Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), and its progeny. 

Contemporaneously with these notices of appeal, Father filed two concise 

statements of errors complained of on appeal, in accordance with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(2)(i). On January 9, 2020, the juvenile court filed its 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. This court sua sponte consolidated Father’s 

appeals by per curiam order on January 29, 2020.
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Father raises the following issues for our review: 

1. Did the [juvenile c]ourt err in terminating 

[Father’s] parental rights under [23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§] 2511 (a)(1)[,] (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8)?

2. Did the [juvenile c]ourt err in finding that 

termination of [Father’s] parental rights best 

served [Child’s] developmental, physical and 

emotional needs under [23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§] 2511(b)?

3. Did the [juvenile] court err in changing [Child’s]

goal to adoption?

Father’s brief at 4. 

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental 

rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record. If the 

factual findings are supported, appellate courts review 

to determine if the trial court made an error of law or 

abused its discretion. [A] decision may be reversed 

for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of 

manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, 

or ill-will. The trial court’s decision, however, should 

not be reversed merely because the record would 

support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings. 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). 
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The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis 

of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, 

the court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to 

terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus is on 

the conduct of the parent. The party seeking 

termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in 

Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the 

parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her 

parental rights does the court engage in the second 

part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child 

under the standard of best interests of the child. One 

major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond 

between parent and child, with close attention paid to 

the effect on the child of permanently severing any 

such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have 

defined “clear and convincing evidence” as that which is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted).

In this case, the juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), which provide as 

follows:
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§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard 

to a child may be terminated after a petition 

filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing 

for a period of at least six months 

immediately preceding the filing of 

the petition either has evidenced a 

settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform parental 

duties.

(2) The repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental 

care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not 

be remedied by the parent.

. . . .

(5) The child has been removed from 

the care of the parent by the court 

or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency for a period of at 

least six months, the conditions 

which led to the removal or 

placement of the child continue to 

exist, the parent cannot or will not 

remedy those conditions within a 

reasonable period of time, the 

services or assistance reasonably 

available to the parent are not likely 

to remedy the conditions which led 

to the removal or placement of the 

child within a reasonable period of 

time and termination of the parental 
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rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child.

. . . .

(8) The child has been removed from 

the care of the parent by the court 

or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more 

have elapsed from the date of 

removal or placement, the 

conditions which led to the removal 

or placement of the child continue 

to exist and termination of parental 

rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child.

. . . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give 

primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of environmental 

factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect 

to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first 

initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of 

the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b). We need only agree with the 

juvenile court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), in addition to 

Section 2511(b), to affirm a decree terminating parental rights. In re M.M., 

106 A.3d 114, 117 (Pa.Super. 2014).
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Instantly, we analyze the juvenile court’s decision to terminate Father’s 

parental rights to Child under Section 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three 

elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the 

child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted).

“The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot be 

remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” Id. “Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the 

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A] parent’s 

vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the 

necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or 

disingenuous.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa.Super. 2002) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted).

Upon review, we find that there was clear and convincing evidence to 

support the juvenile court’s termination of Father’s parental rights to Child, 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). The record establishes that “incapacity” 

under Section 2511(a)(2) exists given that Father has demonstrated a 
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repeated and continual inability to fully satisfy his SCP objectives. As noted, 

DHS became involved in this matter in March 2018 after Child tested positive 

for opioids at birth. (Notes of testimony, 11/5/19 at 11-12.) At the time of 

the November 5, 2019 termination hearing, Child was approximately 

19 months old and had been in a pre-adoptive foster home for nearly 

11 months. (Id. at 18.) Tyesha Grasty, the CUA case manager assigned to 

this matter, testified that Father’s SCP objectives for reunification with Child 

included the following: (1) attend housing, parenting, healthy relationships, 

and anger management counseling at ARC; (2) provide proof of employment; 

(3) participate in bi-weekly evaluations at BHS; (4) attend medical 

appointments for Child; (5) participate in supervised visitation with Child; and 

(6) attend the CEU for forthwith and random drug screening evaluation. (Id.

at 20.) 

Grasty’s testimony during the termination hearing reveals that Father

has failed, in large part, to satisfy the majority of his SCP objectives. 

Specifically, Grasty testified that as of the date of the termination hearing, 

Father had yet to complete the housing program at ARC. (Id. at 23.) Father 

acknowledged during the termination hearing that he has failed to acquire 

stable housing, and the record reflects that Father only began to search for 

appropriate housing after the August 9, 2019 termination petition was filed. 

(Id. at 22, 45-46, 51.) Grasty also testified that at the time of the termination 

hearing, Father had yet to participate in anger management counseling. (Id.
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at 22.) Father testified that he was scheduled to begin the anger management 

program on November 6, 2019, the day after the termination hearing, due to 

being placed on a wait list, but could not recall the date he first attempted to 

enroll in the program. (Id. at 22, 45.) Grasty further testified that Father 

only began attending healthy relationships counseling in October 2019, a 

month before the termination hearing, but has yet to complete the program. 

(Id. at 21-23.) Likewise, Grasty noted that Father only completed the 

parenting program at ARC on October 30, 2019, less than a week before the 

termination hearing. (Id. at 21, 41.) Additionally, Grasty testified that 

although Father has previously provided proof of employment and testified 

that he works for Uber and ServPro disaster restoration, he has failed to 

update CUA since the last hearing. (Id. at 22-23, 44, 54.) 

The record further reflects that the juvenile court ordered Father to 

attend BHS for an evaluation on July 11, 2018, March 5, 2019, and May 28,

2019, but Father elected to disregard the juvenile court’s orders, and his BHS 

evaluation was not completed until June 14, 2019. (Id. at 32, 67-68.) 

Additionally, although Father did complete a drug and alcohol screen at CEU, 

the record reflects that Father failed to attend two of five random drug screens 

within the required 24 hours. (Id. at 39-41.) A number of these tests came 

back positive, but Father denied taking drugs and claims he has a prescription 

for Adderall. (Id. at 48.) 
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The record also reveals that Father’s visitation with Child has been 

inconsistent. Father was initially granted weekly-supervised visitation with 

Child, but by the March 5, 2019 permanency review hearing, Father’s 

visitation had been reduced to biweekly due to his failure to visit Child from 

December 2018 to April 2019. (Id. at 24.) During the termination hearing, 

Grasty expressed concern over Father’s failure to consistently appear on time 

and act appropriately during his visits with Child. (Id. at 24-25.) Specifically, 

Grasty testified that although Father began to visit Child again in April 2019, 

he developed a pattern of arriving approximately 15 to 20 minutes late to 

each scheduled visit. (Id. at 25.) Grasty further noted that during Child’s 

hospitalization in April 2019, Father did not attempt to visit Child. (Id. at 36.) 

Additionally, Grasty testified that she personally supervised some of Father’s 

visits with Child and became concerned that Father was not cleaning Child 

properly and had to be instructed to change Child’s diaper before the visitation 

concluded. (Id at 25, 36.) 

Father, in turn, testified on his own behalf at the termination hearing 

and opined that he was fully compliant with the SCP objectives and just lacked

appropriate housing, a claim that is clearly belied by the record. (Id. at 57.)

Based on the foregoing, we agree with the juvenile court that there 

exists clear and convincing evidence of record to terminate Father’s parental 

rights to Child pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). See In re Adoption of 

C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1216.
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Next, we consider Father’s contention that the termination of his 

parental rights was improper under Section 2511(b) because it was not in 

Child’s best interests. (See Father’s brief at 16.) In support of this 

contention, Father avers that he shares a bond with Child and “[i]t is clear 

that Father and [Child] having a loving relationship which benefits [Child].” 

(Id. at 17.)

With regard to Section 2511(b), our supreme court has stated as 

follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) 

are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The 

emotional needs and welfare of the child have been 

properly interpreted to include [i]ntangibles such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability. . . . [T]his Court 

held that the determination of the child’s “needs and 

welfare” requires consideration of the emotional 

bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost 

attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on 

the child of permanently severing the parental bond. 

However, as discussed below, evaluation of a child’s 

bonds is not always an easy task.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (internal case citations omitted). 

“[I]n cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and 

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. Accordingly, the extent of 

the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the 

particular case.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 

2010) (citations omitted). Additionally, when evaluating a parental bond, “the 

court is not required to use expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers 
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can offer evaluations as well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require 

a formal bonding evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 

2010) (citations omitted). This court has long recognized that,

[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child 

is a major aspect of the Section 2511(b) best-interest 

analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to 

be considered by the court when determining what is 

in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the 

trial court can equally emphasize the 

safety needs of the child, and should also 

consider the intangibles, such as the love,

comfort, security, and stability the child 

might have with the foster parent. . . .

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219 (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Upon review, we find that the record supports the juvenile court’s 

determination that the termination of Father’s parental rights was clearly in 

the best interests of Child, pursuant to Section 2511(b). At the termination 

hearing, Grasty testified that Child shares a “primary parental relationship” 

with her foster mother and paternal aunt, R.M. (“Aunt”), with whom Child has 

resided with in the pre-adoptive home since January 2019. (Notes of 

testimony, 11/5/19 at 5, 18-19.) Grasty testified that Child requires 

specialized medical care and that Aunt provides for her medical, emotional, 

and daily needs. (Id. at 18-19, 29.) Grasty further testified that the 

interaction between Child and Aunt “goes very well[]” and that Child “looks to 

[Aunt] as her caregiver.” (Id. at 18-19.) In contrast, Grasty testified that 
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she does not believe that Child shares a relationship with Father based on her 

young age and Father’s failure to consistently meet his SCP objectives 

“throughout the life of the case.” (Id. at 27.) Grasty testified that she does 

not believe that Child is bonded with Father. (Id. at 28.) Grasty further

opined that Child would not suffer any irreparable harm if Father’s parental 

rights were terminated and that adoption is clearly in Child’s best interests. 

(Id. at 27.) The juvenile court found Grasty’s testimony credible. (Juvenile 

court opinion, 1/9/20 at 23.)

Our standard of review requires us to accept the juvenile court’s findings 

of fact and credibility determinations where, as here, they are supported by 

the record. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Accordingly, Father’s 

contention that termination of his parental rights was improper under 

Section 2511(b) must fail.

In his final claim, Father contends that “the [juvenile] court err[ed] in 

changing [Child’s] goal to adoption[.]” (Father’s brief at 4.) 

We review the court’s goal change order determination for an abuse of

discretion. Interest of A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088 (Pa.Super. 2011). The 

Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301-6375, governs proceedings to change a 

child’s permanent placement goal and juvenile courts must apply the following 

analysis:

Pursuant to [42 Pa.C.S.A.] § 6351(f) of the Juvenile 

Act, when considering a petition for a goal change for 

a dependent child, the juvenile court is to consider, 

inter alia: (1) the continuing necessity for and 
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appropriateness of the placement; (2) the extent of 

compliance with the family service plan; (3) the 

extent of progress made towards alleviating the 

circumstances which necessitated the original 

placement; (4) the appropriateness and feasibility of 

the current placement goal for the children; (5) a

likely date by which the goal for the child might be 

achieved; (6) the child’s safety; and (7) whether the 

child has been in placement for at least fifteen of the 

last twenty-two months. The best interests of the 

child, and not the interests of the parent, must guide 

the trial court. As this Court has held, a child’s life 

simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the 

parent will summon the ability to handle the 

responsibilities of parenting.

Interest of A.B., 19 A.3d at 1088-1089 (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted).

Additionally, Section 6351(f.1) requires the juvenile court to make a

determination regarding the child’s placement goal:

(f.1) Additional determination.—Based upon the

determinations made under subsection (f) and 

all relevant evidence presented at the hearing, 

the court shall determine one of the following:

. . . . 

(2) If and when the child will be placed 

for adoption, and the county agency 

will file for termination of parental 

rights in cases where return to the 

child’s parent, guardian or

custodian is not best suited to the 

safety, protection and physical, 

mental and moral welfare of the 

child.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f.1)(2).
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Here, our review reveals that Father has waived this claim by failing to 

raise it in the argument section of his appellate brief. (See Father’s brief at 

9-17.) “It is well-settled that this Court will not review a claim unless it is 

developed in the argument section of an appellant’s brief, and supported by 

citations to relevant authority.” In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465 

(Pa.Super. 2017).

Even accepting for the sake of argument that Father did not waive this 

claim, we would find that the record fully supports the juvenile court’s 

conclusion that it was in Child’s best interests to change the permanency goal

from reunification to adoption. (See juvenile court opinion, 1/9/20 at 20-23.)

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court did not 

abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to 

Child pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), and changing Child’s 

permanency goal from reunification to adoption. Accordingly, we affirm the 

juvenile court’s November 5, 2019 decree and order.

Decree affirmed. Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/22/20