[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-14521

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 0:13-cv-61317-WPD

RAYMOND PARDON, a.k.a. Peter Pardon,

 Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

 Respondent-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(April 10, 2015)

Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Petitioner Raymond Pardon, a Florida state prisoner, appeals the district 

court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. We agree with the 

district court that habeas relief is not warranted, and thus affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

The crime underlying this habeas petition occurred in September, 2003. 

Petitioner was living with his girlfriend Michelle Madden, and the two had been 

using drugs for days when they ran out of money. See Pardon v. State, 930 So. 2d 

700, 701 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). While driving around, Petitioner and Madden 

spotted an elderly couple at a bus stop. Id. Madden testified that Petitioner 

stopped and covered his car tag, then pulled up close to the couple and told her to 

get out and grab the woman’s purse. Id. Madden got out of the car, carrying a 

knife that belonged to Petitioner. Id. She tried but was unable to grab the purse, 

and she slashed at both the woman and her husband as they fought to maintain 

possession of it. Id. At some point, Petitioner backed the car up, helped Madden 

get back in, and fled the scene. Pardon, 930 So. 2d at 701. 

Petitioner was arrested on September 19, 2003. When he was first detained, 

Petitioner asked one of the officers who picked him up if he could talk to an 

attorney. The officer responded that Petitioner would have to “worry about that 

later.” Petitioner acknowledges that the officer did not interrogate him, and that 

“there was no questioning going on” when he asked about an attorney. 

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About three hours after he was detained, Petitioner was interviewed by 

Detective Lance Moore. At the beginning of the interview, Moore required 

Petitioner to read a statement of his Miranda rights out loud. While reading, 

Petitioner made it clear that he understood he had a right to have an attorney 

present during the interview. Petitioner told Moore that he had previously asked

about an attorney but disavowed any desire to speak to an attorney at that time, 

stating:

Petitioner: [Reading rights card] And in regards to this investigation, 

have you previously asked a police officer to allow you to speak to 

any attorney? Yeah, I did that. No, I’m going to put no.

Moore: Well, I mean, tell me. I mean, I don’t know.

Petitioner: Well, downstairs I just briefly said to one of the fellows, 

you know, you know can I talk to my attorney. And—

Moore: Okay. Well, let me ask you: Did you talk to me?

Petitioner: No 

Moore: Okay. Well, let me ask you: Did—do you want to talk to an 

attorney or do you want to talk to me? It’s your decision.

Petitioner: I want to talk to you.

Moore: Are you sure?

Petitioner: Yes.

Moore asked several more questions to ensure that Petitioner knew and 

understood his rights, and that he did not want to contact an attorney. Petitioner 

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confirmed his decision to speak to Moore without an attorney. Moore then 

completed the interview, during which Petitioner made incriminating statements 

about his participation in the crime. The interview was recorded. 

Petitioner subsequently was charged with one count of attempted robbery, 

two counts of aggravated battery on a person sixty-five years or older, and one 

count of aggravated assault. Prior to trial, Petitioner moved to suppress his 

interview with Moore. Petitioner argued that he had asked to speak with an 

attorney and that Moore had interviewed him without honoring his request, in 

violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and its progeny. There is no 

written order in the record ruling on the motion to suppress, but the trial judge

allowed the recording of Petitioner’s interview to be played for the jury. The jury 

convicted Petitioner on all four counts as charged. After applying a habitual 

violent felony enhancement, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to life 

imprisonment. 

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. 

Pardon, 930 So. 2d at 704. Addressing Petitioner’s Miranda claim, the Florida 

appellate court held that Petitioner’s rights were not violated because he was not 

undergoing interrogation, and interrogation was not imminent, when he asked if he 

could talk to an attorney. Id. at 703. Petitioner sought state post-conviction relief 

under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which was denied. See Pardon v. 

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State, 88 So. 3d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Petitioner then filed the instant federal 

habeas petition under § 2254 asserting numerous grounds for relief. The district 

court denied relief on all grounds. This Court granted a certificate of appealability 

on the Miranda issue. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Standard

We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions, and we review the 

district court’s findings of fact for clear error. Terrell v. GDCP Warden, 744 F.3d

1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a highly deferential standard for reviewing the 

Florida court’s decision on the merits of Petitioner’s Miranda claim. See id. The 

AEDPA only authorizes federal habeas relief if the decision was “contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or if it was “based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.” Id. 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)) (quotation marks omitted). 

A decision is “contrary to” federal law if it conflicts with the governing rule

set forth by the United States Supreme Court, or arrives at a different result than

the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts. Id. (citing 

Kimbrough v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 565 F.3d 796, 799 (11th Cir. 2009)). “An 

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‘unreasonable application’ of clearly established federal law occurs when the state 

court correctly identifies the governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies 

it to the facts of the particular case.” Id. (quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 

(2002)) (quotation marks omitted). This Court has emphasized the difference 

between an “unreasonable” and an “incorrect” application of federal law. Terrell, 

744 F.3d at 1261. As we explained in Terrell, even a “strong case for relief” does 

not necessarily mean that the state court’s contrary conclusion was “unreasonable.” 

Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)) (quotation marks 

omitted). See also Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1220 (11th Cir. 2011)

(habeas relief is not available if fairminded jurists could agree with the state court’s 

decision). 

Likewise, a state court’s factual findings are not “unreasonable” just because 

the federal habeas court would have viewed the facts differently if it had 

considered them in the first instance. Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 

1230 (11th Cir. 2014). Rather, a state court’s factual findings are only 

unreasonable if “no fairminded jurist could agree” with them. Holsey v. Warden, 

Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 694 F.3d 1230, 1257 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Harrington, 

562 U.S. at 102) (quotation marks omitted). See also Landers v. Warden, Att’y 

Gen. of Ala., 776 F.3d 1288, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The Supreme Court has 

found state factual findings unreasonable under § 2254(d)(2) when the direction of 

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the evidence, viewed cumulatively, was too powerful to conclude anything but [the 

petitioner’s factual claim]”) (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 265 

(2005)) (quotation marks omitted). 

B. Petitioner’s Miranda Claim

Petitioner contends that, when he asked one of the officers who arrested him 

if he could talk to his attorney, he invoked his Miranda right to have counsel

present during any subsequent questioning. The recorded interview reflects that 

Petitioner advised Moore of his previous request for an attorney. Rather than 

concluding the interview, Moore sought a Miranda waiver and resumed his 

questioning. Petitioner argues that Moore thereby violated Miranda and the 

Supreme Court’s subsequent admonition that an accused who invokes his right to 

have counsel present during questioning “is not subject to further interrogation by 

the authorities until counsel has been made available to him.” Edwards v. Arizona, 

451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). According to Petitioner, the Florida appellate court’s 

adverse ruling was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law, and was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. We 

disagree.

1. The state court properly identified the governing legal principles.

The Florida appellate court’s decision clearly was not “contrary to” federal 

law. Beginning with Miranda itself, the Florida court cited and accurately

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described the holdings of the most relevant Supreme Court cases. Pardon, 930 So. 

2d at 701-703. The Florida court noted that Miranda “require[s] the police to 

unequivocally honor an arrestee’s request not to speak to the police without 

counsel.” Id. at 702. Quoting extensively from Edwards, the court further 

recognized that an accused, “having expressed his desire to deal with the police 

only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until 

counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further 

communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Id. (quoting 

Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85). This is a correct statement of the legal principles 

that govern Petitioner’s claim. 

2. The state court’s decision was not an “unreasonable application” of 

the above authorities.

Although the Florida court acknowledged that the police must scrupulously 

comply with the Miranda-Edwards rule, it held that the rule was not implicated 

here because Petitioner was not subject to interrogation or imminent interrogation 

when he inquired about an attorney. Id. In support of its holding, the court cited 

Supreme Court authority indicating that (1) Miranda safeguards only apply when a 

defendant is subject to “custodial interrogation” and (2) “custodial interrogation” 

must involve something more than merely being in custody. Id. (citing Rhode 

Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980) (“the special procedural safeguards 

outlined in Miranda are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, 

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but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation”). Specifically, 

the Supreme Court has explained that “interrogation” in the Miranda context refers 

either to “express questioning” or other “words or actions on the part of the police 

(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)” that are likely to elicit 

an incriminating response. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Based on the evidence 

presented, the Florida court concluded that although Petitioner was in custody, he 

was not subject to questioning or other “words or actions” likely to elicit 

incriminating information when he inquired about an attorney. Pardon, 930 So. 2d 

at 702. 

Furthermore, the Florida court rejected the idea that Petitioner could have 

“anticipatorily invoked” his Miranda right to counsel before interrogation was 

imminent. Id. According to the court, “requiring the invocation [of the right to 

counsel] to occur either during custodial interrogation or when it is imminent 

strikes [the healthiest] balance between the protection of the individual from police 

coercion on the one hand and the State’s need to conduct criminal investigations on 

the other.” Id. (quoting Ault v. State, 866 So. 2d 674, 686 (Fla. 2003)) (quotation 

marks omitted). Petitioner conceded that he was fully apprised of his Miranda 

rights and that he did not invoke, and in fact repeatedly disavowed, his right to 

counsel just prior to his interview with Moore, when his interrogation did become 

imminent. Id. at 701. The Florida court thus held that Petitioner’s interview did 

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not violate the Miranda-Edwards rule, and that the interview was properly 

admitted into evidence. Id. at 702-04. 

The Florida court’s decision was not unreasonable. Supreme Court authority 

supports its conclusion that the Miranda-Edwards safeguards only apply when a 

defendant is undergoing or imminently subject to interrogation and not when the 

defendant is merely in custody. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 (“‘Interrogation,’ as 

conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion 

above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.”) and McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 

U.S. 171, 177-78 (1991) (noting that the Miranda-Edwards guarantee “relates only 

to custodial interrogation”). The evidence in this case suggests that although 

Petitioner was in custody when he inquired about an attorney, he was not 

undergoing or imminently subject to “interrogation.” See Pardon, 930 So. 2d at 

701. Moreover, the Supreme Court has never held that a defendant can invoke his 

Miranda rights anticipatorily. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n. 3. See also Bobby v. 

Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 29 (2011) (quoting McNeil for the proposition that “this 

Court has never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in 

a context other than ‘custodial interrogation’”) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, 

the Florida court’s holding that Petitioner’s interrogation did not violate the 

Miranda-Edwards rule was a reasonable application of the governing Supreme 

Court precedents. 

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3. The state court’s decision was not based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence in the record.

Finally, Petitioner’s argument that the Florida court’s decision was based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts consists of little more than a conclusory 

assertion. Petitioner does not support the assertion with any more detailed

argument or even identify the factual determinations that he claims to be 

unreasonable. Based on his arguments below, we assume Petitioner’s position to 

be that the Florida court unreasonably determined that interrogation was not 

“imminent” when Petitioner asked about an attorney. Petitioner argued in the 

district court that there were no facts in the record to support this conclusion.

Again, we disagree.

Indeed, there is plenty of evidence in the record to support the Florida 

court’s finding. Petitioner acknowledged during the interview that “there was no 

questioning going on” when he inquired about an attorney. There is no evidence 

that Petitioner, at the time of the inquiry, was otherwise subjected to any “words or 

actions on the part of the police” that were likely to elicit incriminating 

information. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. About three hours after the inquiry, and just 

prior to his interview, Petitioner equivocated when asked whether he had 

previously invoked his right to an attorney, stating “Yeah, I did that. No, I’m 

going to put no.” He then clarified that he had no desire to talk to an attorney, and 

wanted to waive his Miranda right to have an attorney present during questioning. 

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Based on this evidence, the Florida appellate court’s factual finding was not 

unreasonable. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the denial of Petitioner’s § 2254 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

AFFIRMED.

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