DISMISS and Opinion Filed April 15, 2020 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-19-01190-CV 

JAMES MCCOLLUM AND FRANK D. MCCOLLUM, III, Appellants 

V. 

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS LEGAL TITLE TRUSTEE 

FOR TRUMAN 2016 SC6 TITLE TRUST, Appellee 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-03726-C 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Whitehill, and Justice Nowell 

Opinion by Chief Justice Burns 

Appellants James McCollum and Frank D. McCollum, III (Frank) appeal 

from the trial court’s judgment in a forcible detainer action awarding possession of 

the property to appellee.1

 After appellee notified the Court that the property had 

been destroyed by fire hours before the writ of possession was to be executed and 

was no longer habitable, we instructed the parties to file letter briefs addressing 

 1

 James McCollum participated at trial and filed a timely notice of appeal. Frank, who did not 

participate at trial or file a timely post-judgment motion, filed a timely notice of restricted appeal. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 30.
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whether the appeal is now moot. See Olley v. HVM, LLC, 449 S.W.3d 572, 575 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (appellate courts lack 

jurisdiction over moot controversies). 

 A forcible detainer action is intended as a speedy and inexpensive way to 

obtain immediate possession of property. See Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of San 

Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006). A judgment of possession in such an 

action is not a final determination as to whether the eviction is wrongful, but merely 

a determination of the right to immediate possession. Id. When a party is no longer 

in possession of the property and cannot demonstrate a meritorious claim of right to 

current, actual possession, the case is moot and the reviewing court must vacate the 

judgment and dismiss the appeal. See id. at 788. Any challenges to the validity of 

the underlying substitute trustee’s deed and the foreclosure sale, even if meritorious, 

cannot be resolved in a forcible-detainer action and cannot form the basis of a 

potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession. See Schlichting 

v. Lehman Bros. Bank FSB, 346 S.W.3d 196, 199 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. 

dism’d); Snowden v. Quach, No. 05-18-01040-CV, 2019 WL 5119273, at *2 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas Oct. 7, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

The record before this Court demonstrates that the property was sold at a 

foreclosure sale. At that time, appellants became tenants at sufferance. Appellee 

subsequently acquired the property. In his letter brief, Frank asserts the appealed 

judgment is void because in rendering the judgment, the county court necessarily 
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determined title to the property. We disagree. Following the foreclosure sale, Frank 

filed a wrongful foreclosure lawsuit. The trial court granted summary judgment in 

favor of the bank. Frank appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s 

judgment. See McCollum v. The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., 481 S.W.3d 

352, 363 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.). Thus, title to the property has been 

determined and Frank’s argument that the appealed judgment is void lacks merit. 

Frank also asserts this appeal is not moot because the collateral consequences 

exception to the mootness doctrine applies. In order to invoke the collateral 

consequences exception, Frank must show both that a concrete disadvantage resulted 

from the judgment and that the disadvantage will persist even if the judgment is 

vacated and the case dismissed as moot. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 789. 

Although Frank’s argument is difficult to decipher, he appears to argue the 

disadvantages that will persist in the future are financial ruin caused by the 

destruction of the house by the fire, damage to his personal reputation and credit, 

and that a judgment from this Court will impede his efforts to pursue tort claims for 

alleged wrongs. We disagree. The property loss was suffered by appellee, not 

Frank. Furthermore, one purpose of vacating the underlying judgment if a case 

becomes moot during an appeal is to prevent prejudice to the rights of the parties 

when appellate review of the judgment on its merits is precluded. See Marshall, 198 

S.W.3d at 788; see also Reule v. RLZ Investments, 411 S.W.3d 31, 33 (Tex. App. – 

Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (declining to apply collateral consequences 
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exception when party complained that the judgment hurts reputation and credit but 

failed to explain why consequences would persist once judgment vacated). 

 Appellants are no longer in possession of the property. Because appellants 

have shown neither a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual 

possession of the property nor that the collateral consequences exception to 

mootness doctrine applies, we conclude this appeal is moot, vacate the trial court’s 

judgment, and dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a). 

191190F.P05 

 

/Robert D. Burns, III/ 

ROBERT D. BURNS, III 

CHIEF JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

JAMES MCCOLLUM AND 

FRANK D. MCCOLLUM, III, 

Appellants 

No. 05-19-01190-CV V. 

U.S. BANK NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION AS LEGAL TITLE 

TRUSTEE FOR TRUMAN 2016 

SC6 TITLE TRUST, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the County Court at 

Law No. 3, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 

CC-19-03726-C. 

Opinion delivered by Chief Justice 

Burns. Justices Whitehill and Nowell 

participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is 

DISMISSED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS 

LEGAL TITLE TRUSTEE FOR TRUMAN 2016 SC6 TITLE TRUST recover its

costs of this appeal from appellants JAMES MCCOLLUM AND FRANK D. 

MCCOLLUM, III. 

Judgment entered April 15, 2020.