J-S62044-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

ADERONKE OYETAYO

Appellee No. 358 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Dated December 18, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0006576-2013

BEFORE: ALLEN, J., OLSON, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED APRIL 15, 2015

The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered on December 18, 

2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, dismissing the 

charges against Aderonke Oyetayo because of a violation of the statute of 

limitations. In this timely appeal, the Commonwealth argues the trial court 

incorrectly applied 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933. After a thorough review of the 

submissions by the parties, relevant law, and the certified record, we 

reverse and remand for further proceedings.

On September 10, 2013, the Office of the Inspector General filed a 

criminal complaint against Oyetayo, claiming she had, in violation of 62 P.S. 

§ 481(a), willfully misrepresented material facts to obtain $14,996.31 in 

subsidized child care benefits. These benefits were paid between October 

15, 2007 and October 29, 2008. Specifically, it was alleged she failed to 
J-S62044-14

- 2 -

inform the Delaware County Child Services Office that her husband was 

employed by Montgomery County and had earned in excess of $42,000.00 

during that period.

Relevant to this appeal, 62 P.S. § 481 provides:

(a) Any person who, either prior to, or at the time of, or 

subsequent to the application for assistance, by means of a 

wilfully false statement or misrepresentation, or by 

impersonation or by wilfully failing to disclose a material fact 

regarding eligibility or other fraudulent means, secures, or 

attempts to secure, or aids or abets or attempts to aid or abet 

any person in securing assistance, or Federal food stamps, 

commits a crime which shall be graded as provided in subsection 

(b).

62 P.S. § 481(a).

At the December 17, 2013, pre-trial conference, counsel for Oyetayo 

moved for dismissal of charges based upon a violation of the statute of 

limitations. Section 481(d) provides: “There shall be a four-year statute of 

limitations on all crimes enumerated in subsection (a).” The September 10, 

2013 filing of charges based upon a violation of Section 481(a) was more 

than four years later than the last date charged, that being October 29, 

2008. Accordingly, Oyetayo sought dismissal of the charges.

The Commonwealth countered by claiming the actual statute of 

limitations was found at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(b)(4), which states in relevant 

part,

(b) Major offenses.--A prosecution for any of the following 

offenses must be commenced within five years after it is 

committed:
J-S62044-14

- 3 -

(4) Under the act of June 13, 1967 (P.L. 31, No. 21), 

known as the Public Welfare Code.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(b)(4). It is undisputed that 62 P.S. § 481 is part of the 

Public Welfare Code.

Counsel for Oyetayo argued that when there is an irreconcilable 

conflict between statutory provisions, the specific takes precedence over the 

general. The trial court agreed with Oyetayo’s argument based upon 1 

Pa.C.S. § 19331and dismissed the charges, although it did not specifically 

reference this statute. 

In this timely appeal, the Commonwealth argues the trial court failed 

to correctly apply the specific/general rule. The Commonwealth asserts 

application of Section 1933 results in the use of the five-year statute of 

limitations. Section 1933 states, in toto:

Whenever a general provision in a statute shall be in conflict with

a special provision in the same or another statute, the two shall 

be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both. If 

the conflict between the two provisions is irreconcilable, the 

special provisions shall prevail and shall be construed as an 

exception to the general provision, unless the general provision 

shall be enacted later and it shall be the manifest intention of 

the General Assembly that such general provision shall prevail.

1 Pa.C.S. § 1933.

Oyetayo’s argument before the trial court sought the application of the 

provision’s mandate that “the special provisions shall prevail and shall be 

____________________________________________

1 This provision is part of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-

1991.
J-S62044-14

- 4 -

construed as an exception to the general provision.” Id. The Commonwealth 

argues that the trial court failed to recognize the exception set forth in 

Section 1933,2that, “unless the general provision shall be enacted later and 

it shall be the manifest intention of the General Assembly that such general 

provision shall prevail.” Id.

Relevant to the Commonwealth’s argument, the legislative history of 

Section 481 demonstrates it was enacted, “1967, June 13, P.L. 31, No. 21, 

art 4, § 481.” 62 Pa.C.S. § 481. The legislative history of Section 5552 

shows it was enacted, “1976, July 9, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2, effective June 

27, 1978.” Section 5552 was clearly enacted later than Section 481, and 

the language of Section 5552(4) also clearly indicates the five-year statute 

of limitations will apply to any violation of the Public Welfare Code. We 

believe this later enactment demonstrates the manifest intention of the 

General Assembly that the general provision shall prevail. Therefore, we 

agree with the Commonwealth that a proper application of 1 Pa.C.S § 1933 

results in the determination that the five-year statute of limitations is 

applicable to the instant offense. 

Notwithstanding the above analysis, we are compelled to address 

Oyetayo’s claim the Commonwealth has overlooked the fact that in 1996, 

____________________________________________

2 Although the Commonwealth did not make this specific argument before 

the trial court on December 17, 2013, the argument was raised in the 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. 

Accordingly, the argument has not been waived.
J-S62044-14

- 5 -

twenty years after the enactment of Section 5552, the General Legislature 

amended Section 481. The text of the amended bill included subsection (d), 

the four-year statute of limitations. See Act of May 16, 1996, P.L. 175, No. 

35. § 17. Oyetayo argues the fact that the 1996 amendment included the 

currently disputed Section 481(d) statute of limitations proves the 

legislature intended the four-year statute of limitations to prevail. Had the 

legislature intended for the five-year general statute of limitations to apply, 

the legislature could have deleted subsection (d) from the amended bill. 

Rather, subsection (d) is included in the text of the amended bill in regular 

font. Oyetayo notes that, relevant to the instant appeal, additions to the law 

were shown in bold typeface, while those portions of the bill that were 

intended to remain unchanged and in effect are in regular typeface. 

While this is an interesting argument, it is also incomplete. Accepting, 

if only for the sake of argument, Oyetayo’s position regarding the effect of 

the inclusion of subsection (d) in the text of the amended bill, we are also 

required to examine the text of subsequent amendments to Section 5552. 

Subsequent to the May 16, 1996 amendment of Section 481, Section 5552 

has been amended eight times.3 We have located the text of the amended 

____________________________________________

3 1998, Dec. 21, P.L. 1086, No. 405; 2000 Dec. 20, P.L. 976, No. 136; 2001, 

Nov. 21, P.L. 844, No. 86.; 2002, June 28, P.L. 518, No. 86; 2004, Nov. 30, 

P.L. 1428, No. 185; 2006, July 7, P.L. 378, No. 81; 2006, Nov. 29, P.L. 

1581, No. 179; and 2008, Oct. 17, P.L. 1628, No. 131.
J-S62044-14

- 6 -

bills, similar to that which Oyetayo directed us to regarding Section 481. 

Both the 2000 and 2001 amended bills included the five-year statute of 

limitations found at subsection (b)(4). The five-year statute of limitations is 

also included in the latest publication of Section 5552. See Purdon’s 

Pennsylvania Statues and Consolidated Statutes Annotated, 42 Pa.C.S. § 

5552, 2014 Cumulative Annual Pocket Part. Pursuant to Oyetayo’s own 

logic, the subsequent inclusion in 2000 and 2001 of the five-year statute of 

limitations in the text of the amended bills, as well as the current inclusion of 

the five-year statute of limitations in the latest publication of the act, 

demonstrates the legislature’s reassertion of its intent to have the five-year 

statute of limitations prevail.4 

The last date of a violation of Section 481 charged in the Complaint 

was October 29, 2008. The Complaint was filed on September 10, 2013, 

within five years of the last date charged. We have determined that the 

____________________________________________

4 We question Oyetayo’s argument regarding the effect of the text of 

amended bills. First, none of the amendments cited herein changed the 

relevant statute of limitations. It is possible that the relevant subsections 

were included in the text of the amended bills only to provide context. 

However, if inclusion of the relevant language indicated the intent to reaffirm 

the four-year statute of limitations, then in 1967 the statute of limitations 

for a violation of Section 481 was four years. In 1978, the effective date of 

Section 5552, the statute of limitations became five years. In 1996, with 

the amendment of Section 481, the statute of limitation returned to four 

years. Finally, in 2000, with the amendment of Section 5552, the statute of 

limitations once more became five years. We are not convinced the 

legislature intended the statute of limitations to fluctuate in such a manner. 

In either event, our analysis leads to the conclusion that the five-year 

statute of limitations prevails.
J-S62044-14

- 7 -

five-year statute of limitations applies to violations of 62 P.S. § 481. 

Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the charges against Oyetayo. 

Order reversed. Charges are reinstated. This matter is remanded for 

further action consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/15/2015