Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 14, 2015.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-14-00337-CR

JOHN HUGHES HILL, JR., Appellant 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 212th District Court 

Galveston County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 13CR0095 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

Appellant John Hughes Hill, Jr. appeals his conviction for aggravated assault 

with a deadly weapon. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2) (West 2011). In a 

single issue he claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

After being admonished by the trial court appellant entered a guilty plea to 

the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court accepted 
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appellant’s plea and ordered a presentence investigation (PSI) report prepared. 

The complainant, Corey Sonnier, testified during the punishment hearing. 

Prior to explaining what occurred on the date of the offense, the complainant 

admitted having previously been convicted of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, 

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, manufacture and delivery of a controlled 

substance, possession of a controlled substance, evading arrest, assault causing 

bodily injury to a family member, and felony criminal mischief. On the night of the 

offense, the complainant stopped at a convenience store to get a snack. While he 

was in the store, appellant walked in and greeted the complainant. When the 

complainant was attempting to drive away he put his car in reverse and hit another 

vehicle in the parking lot. The occupants of the car were appellant’s mother and 

brother. The complainant argued with the occupants of the vehicle over who was at 

fault, and asked them whether they wanted to call the police about the accident, but 

they declined. The complainant determined that the damage was minimal, and 

turned to get back in his car to leave. As he walked back to his car, he heard four 

shots fired, felt one hit him in the back, and another shot hit him in the arm. 

Appellant’s mother, Angela Owens, testified that she was driving the vehicle 

involved in the accident with the complainant. She did not want to call the police 

because she did not have insurance and she had been drinking prior to the accident. 

She testified that the complainant cursed at her, but agreed the damage was 

minimal. Prior to walking back to his vehicle, the complainant told appellant and 

his mother, “Hold on, I’ve got something for you, m***r f***s.” Owens 

considered the complainant’s statement a threat, and thought he was going to his 

vehicle to retrieve a weapon. Owens did not see appellant fire the gun, but heard 

the shots. 

A video of appellant’s statement was played at the hearing. In the video, 
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appellant admitted he was the person who shot the complainant. Appellant stated 

he was afraid he would be incarcerated for trying to defend himself. On the night 

of the offense appellant was driving his wife’s car, and picked up his sister from 

the Texas City Jail. Appellant and his sister subsequently picked up Diane, his 

sister’s mother-in-law, who wanted to go to the store. Appellant went into the 

store, purchased a beer, and walked out to the parking lot. Appellant’s mother 

drove into the parking lot, and appellant’s sister got out of his car to go to her 

mother’s car. Appellant described the argument that occurred after the complainant 

backed into appellant’s mother’s car. Appellant heard the complainant say, “I’ve 

got something for y’all’s ass.” At that time appellant said he grabbed his wife’s 

gun from the car. Appellant shot the gun three times pointing toward the ground. 

When they heard the complainant say he had been hit, appellant’s sister and her 

mother-in-law encouraged appellant to drive away from the store and “get off the 

street.” Appellant did not see the complainant with a gun, but claimed he had heard 

the complainant had a reputation for violence. Appellant admitted he did not know 

what the complainant planned to retrieve from his car. 

While taking appellant’s statement, officers reviewed the store’s parking lot 

surveillance video with appellant. The surveillance video revealed that the 

complainant was getting out of his car at almost the same time appellant reached 

for the gun in his wife’s car. The only time the complainant walked back to the 

driver’s side of his truck was after he had been shot. The surveillance video did not 

show a confrontation between the complainant and appellant’s mother prior to 

appellant retrieving the gun from his wife’s car. Appellant admitted that he was 

mistaken about the time he retrieved the gun from his wife’s car. After questioning, 

appellant also admitted he did not hear of the complainant’s reputation for violence 

until after he shot the complainant. 
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Appellant’s mother and wife testified at the punishment hearing. His mother 

stated that appellant was not justified in shooting the complainant, she never saw 

the complainant with a weapon, but that she wanted the court to give appellant 

probation because he has a family. Appellant’s wife also stated she wanted 

appellant to receive probation and appellant was sorry the incident happened. 

Appellant also testified at the punishment hearing. He stated that the 

complainant appeared angry after the vehicle accident in the parking lot. Appellant 

testified that the complainant was angry and that he shot the complainant because 

of the way the complainant treated his mother. However, appellant also said that 

when he fired the gun he was not trying to shoot the complainant; he intended to 

fire a warning shot. 

At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court sentenced appellant to 

confinement for twelve years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department 

of Criminal Justice. 

INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE-OF-COUNSEL CLAIM

In his sole issue, appellant contends that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel because his trial counsel did not assert a claim of self-defense or defense 

of a third person on appellant’s behalf. Both the United States and Texas 

Constitutions guarantee an accused the right to assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. 

amend. VI; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.051 

(West Supp. 2014). This right necessarily includes the right to reasonably effective 

assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To 

prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, the appellant must show that (1) 

counsel’s performance was deficient by falling below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, and (2) there is a probability, sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
5

would have been different. Cannon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 342, 348–49 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2008). 

We indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s actions fell within the wide 

range of reasonable professional behavior and were motivated by sound trial 

strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1999). To overcome this presumption, an appellant’s claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel must be firmly demonstrated in the record. 

Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814. In most cases, direct appeal is an inadequate vehicle 

for raising such a claim because the record is generally undeveloped and cannot 

adequately reflect the motives behind trial counsel’s actions. Rylander v. State, 101 

S.W.3d 107, 110–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813–14. 

When the record is silent regarding trial counsel’s strategy, we will not find 

deficient performance unless the challenged conduct was “so outrageous that no 

competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 

390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 

The right to reasonably effective assistance of counsel applies to the 

defendant’s entry of a guilty plea. Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530, 536 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1997). When a defendant enters a plea and later challenges the 

voluntariness of that plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

voluntariness of the plea depends on (1) whether counsel’s advice was within the 

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases and, if not, (2) 

whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the defendant 

would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Id. 

Due process requires that each defendant who pleads guilty does so with a 

full understanding of the charges against him and the consequences of his plea. 

Basham v. State, 608 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). A record that 
6

indicates the defendant was duly admonished before entering a guilty plea presents 

a prima facie showing the plea was both knowing and voluntary. Martinez v. State, 

981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 

Misinformation concerning a matter about which a defendant is not 

constitutionally or statutorily entitled to be informed, may render a guilty plea 

involuntary if the defendant shows that his guilty plea was actually induced by the 

misinformation. Brown v. State, 943 S.W.2d 35, 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 

However, “a defendant’s claim he was misinformed by counsel, standing alone, is 

not enough for us to hold his plea was involuntary.” Fimberg v. State, 922 S.W.2d 

205, 208 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d). A claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel must be affirmatively supported by the record. See Jackson v. 

State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Therefore, in determining the 

voluntariness of a guilty plea, the court should examine the record as a whole. See 

Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The review 

should focus specifically on the conduct of trial counsel. See Kemp v. State, 892 

S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994 pet. ref’d). The record is 

best developed in the context of an evidentiary hearing on application for writ of 

habeas corpus or motion for new trial. Tabora v. State, 14 S.W.3d 332, 336 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). 

Appellant acknowledges that he signed the trial court’s admonishments that 

he understood the charge against him and the appropriate range of punishment for 

the charged offense was two to twenty years’ confinement and a possible fine not 

to exceed $10,000. Appellant also signed the plea form, stating “I give up all right 

to a jury in this case under Art. 1.13 C.C.P., and I give up my right to appearance, 

confrontation and cross examination of witnesses as to guilt under Art. 1.15 

C.C.P., and as to punishment.” 
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Appellant contends, however, that the record reflects his trial counsel 

“waived his right to have a judge or jury consider the issue of guilt or innocence, 

which the transcript shows was a real issue given Appellant’s claims that he acted 

in defense of himself and his family[.]” At the plea hearing, the following 

exchange between the trial court and appellant occurred: 

THE COURT: You’ve had plenty of time to discuss this with your 

attorney, you’re satisfied with your attorney’s representations to you 

and y’all’s discussions about the possible outcomes in this case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Do you want to ask him about that?

MS. OTT [prosecutor]: Mr. Hill, have you had an opportunity to look 

over [the plea agreement] and discuss it with your attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

MS. OTT: Is this your signature on the second page indicating a guilty 

plea?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

MS. OTT: Did you sign it freely and voluntarily?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

MS. OTT: You haven’t been threatened or coerced in any way to sign 

this document? 

THE DEFENDANT: No. 

MS. OTT: Offer this document. 

THE COURT: Any objection? 

MR. LAVALLE [defense counsel]: No, Your Honor, no objection. 

THE COURT: Mr. Hughes [sic], at the bottom of this document, the 

admonishments and waivers, it says, “Open plea, the court to decide 

punishment at a later date,” and that’s what you want to do? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I would. 

MR. LAVALLE: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: And to get to that point, you want to waive your right 

to trial by jury; is that right? 
8

THE DEFENDANT: Right. 

THE COURT: And you want to waive your right to cross-examine the 

witnesses against you; is that correct? 

THE DEFENDANT: Correct. 

THE COURT: You’ve discussed all of these issues, your 

constitutional rights and waiver of those with your attorney? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

The plea papers in the record also reflect that the trial court admonished 

appellant, among other things, that he had been accused of aggravated assault with 

a deadly weapon; he was pleading guilty to that offense, and the range of 

punishment was two to twenty years’ confinement and a fine of up to $10,000. We 

presume that recitals in court documents are correct unless the record affirmatively 

shows otherwise. Breazeale v. State, 683 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). 

Appellant argues that his guilty plea was involuntary because his counsel did 

not advise him of the right to assert self-defense and defense of a third person in a 

jury trial. Appellant contends that had counsel properly advised him while he was 

considering his plea he would have chosen to have either the judge or a jury decide 

whether his shooting of the complainant was committed in the reasonable belief 

that it was necessary to defend himself or his family members. Appellant argues 

that the complainant was aggressive and that he had heard of the complainant’s 

violent reputation, which was evidenced at the hearing by the complainant’s 

extensive criminal record. Appellant did not make this complaint in a motion for 

new trial, nor has he filed a habeas corpus petition. 

The record is silent as to the reasoning and strategy behind counsel’s action 

or inaction; accordingly, appellant has not rebutted the strong presumption that 

counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 

814. On this record, appellant has failed to prove that his trial counsel failed to 
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render effective assistance. See Rodriguez v. State, 425 S.W.3d 655, 668–69 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (court cannot speculate when record is 

silent as to discussions appellant and his attorney had regarding appellant’s choice 

to plead guilty). We overrule appellant’s sole issue. 

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

 

 /s/ Sharon McCally

 Justice 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and McCally. 

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).