alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Michigan Supreme 

Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

April 14, 2015

Order 

April 14, 2015

150725(191)(194)

MARKELL VANSLEMBROUCK, Minor, by and

through ERIC BRAVERMAN, Conservator,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

and

KIMBERLY A. VANSLEMBROUCK,

Plaintiff,

v

ANDREW JAY HALPERIN, M.D., and WILLIAM 

BEAUMONT HOSPITAL,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

MICHIGAN INSTITUTE OF GYNECOLOGY

AND OBSTETRICS, P.C.,

Defendant.

SC: 150725

COA: 309680

Oakland CC: 2006-074585-NH

________________________________________/

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendants-appellants to exceed the 

page limit restriction for their reply brief is GRANTED. The 25-page reply brief 

submitted on April 1, 2015, is accepted for filing. On further order of the Chief Justice, 

the motion of plaintiff-appellee to strike the reply brief and to recover the costs associated 

with filing the motion are DENIED.
Specimen Stock Certificate

     Incorporated Under the Laws of the State of Nevada




 CYBERSIA CAPITAL CORP.

     Total Authorized Issue
     25,000,000 Shares Par Value $.001 Each
     Common Stock

This is to certify that _______________ is the owner of _________________ fully
paid and non-assessable shares of the above corporation transferable only on the
books of the Corporation by the holder hereof in person or by duly authorized
Attorney upon surrender of the Certificate properly endorse. Witness, the seal
of the Corporation and the signatures of its duly authorized officers. Dated


Secretary                President








<PAGE>
# C_2012326EN.01004701.xml

| 26.10.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 326/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 326/1

---

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

PART ONE

PRINCIPLES

PRINCIPLES

TITLE I

CATEGORIES AND AREAS OF UNION COMPETENCE

CATEGORIES AND AREAS OF UNION COMPETENCE

Article 4

1.   The Union shall share competence with the Member States where the Treaties confer on it a competence which does not relate to the areas referred to in Articles 3 and 6.

2.   Shared competence between the Union and the Member States applies in the following principal areas:

| (a) | internal market; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

internal market;

| (b) | social policy, for the aspects defined in this Treaty; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

social policy, for the aspects defined in this Treaty;

| (c) | economic, social and territorial cohesion; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

economic, social and territorial cohesion;

| (d) | agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources;

| (e) | environment; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

environment;

| (f) | consumer protection; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

consumer protection;

| (g) | transport; |
| --- | --- |

(g)

transport;

| (h) | trans-European networks; |
| --- | --- |

(h)

trans-European networks;

| (i) | energy; |
| --- | --- |

(i)

energy;

| (j) | area of freedom, security and justice; |
| --- | --- |

(j)

area of freedom, security and justice;

| (k) | common safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined in this Treaty. |
| --- | --- |

(k)

common safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined in this Treaty.

3.   In the areas of research, technological development and space, the Union shall have competence to carry out activities, in particular to define and implement programmes; however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs.

4.   In the areas of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, the Union shall have competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy; however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs.

---
Exhibit 32.2

 

Certification of the Chief Financial Officer

 

Pursuant to 18 US.C. Section, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

 

 

I, Michael S. Sarner, Chief Financial Officer of Capital Southwest Corporation, certify that, to my knowledge:

 

|  | 1. |  | The Form 10-K for the year ended March 31, 2017, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on June  1, 2017 (“accompanied report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--|----|--|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

|  | 2. |  | The information contained in the accompanied report fairly presents, in all material respects, the consolidated financial condition and results of operations of Capital Southwest Corporation. |
|--|----|--|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

|                     |   |                                       |
|--------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------|
| Date:  June 1, 2017 | By:    | /s/ Michael S. Sarner                      |
|                     |   | Michael S. Sarner

Chief Financial Officer |

 

 

----
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2833

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Paula Jean Pudil

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of North Dakota - Fargo

____________

 Submitted: March 12, 2015

 Filed: April 16, 2015

[Unpublished] 

____________

Before WOLLMAN and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges, and WHITE, District 1

Judge.

____________

PER CURIAM.

The Honorable Ronnie L. White, United States District Judge for the Eastern 1

District of Missouri, sitting by designation.
Paula Jean Pudil appeals from the sentence imposed by the district court at 2

resentencing following a successful motion to vacate her sentence under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255. For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss the appeal.

Pudil pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and

distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A). 

In her written plea agreement, Pudil waived her right to challenge her sentence,

unlessthe district court imposed a sentence greater than the maximum recommended

by the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (Guidelines). In exchange, the

government agreed to move under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) for a downward departure

from the 240-month mandatory minimum sentence required by statute. Pudil’s

advisory Guidelines sentence was 240 months—the statutory mandatory

minimum—and the district court imposed a 138-month sentence.

Pudil’s attorney did not file a notice of appeal. Pudil later moved to vacate her

sentence under § 2255 for ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming that she had

asked her attorney to file an appeal. The district court granted Pudil’s motion,

vacated her sentence, and resentenced Pudil to 138 months’ imprisonment, stating

that it had “no legal authority to impose any sentence other than the sentence that [it]

previously imposed.”

Pudil appeals, arguing that she was entitled to de novo resentencing. Pudil’s

appeal, however, falls within the scope of the plea waiver because it constitutes a

challenge to the below-Guidelines sentence imposed by the district court. Pudil does

not argue that she failed to knowingly and voluntarily enter into the appeal waiver,

and we conclude that enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of

justice. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890-92, 894 (8th Cir. 2003) (en

The Honorable Ralph R. Erickson, Chief Judge, United States District Court

2

for the District of North Dakota.

-2-
banc) (holding appeal waiver enforceable when the defendant did “not claim that he

failed to enter into an appeal waiver knowingly and voluntarily” and enforcing waiver

would not result in miscarriage of justice).

The appeal is dismissed.

______________________________

-3-
IIB 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 1375 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 9, 2020 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

AN ACT 

To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide 

for transparency of Medicare secondary payer reporting 

information, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 1375 RFS

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Provide Accurate In3 formation Directly Act’’ or ‘‘PAID Act’’. 

4 SEC. 2. TRANSPARENCY OF MEDICARE SECONDARY PAYER 

5 REPORTING INFORMATION. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1862(b)(8)(G) of the So7 cial Security Act (42 U.S.C. 395y(b)(8)(G)) is amended— 

8 (1) by striking ‘‘INFORMATION.—The Sec9 retary’’ and inserting ‘‘INFORMATION.— 

10 ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary’’; 

11 and 

12 (2) by adding at the end the following new 

13 clause: 

14 ‘‘(ii) SPECIFIED INFORMATION.—In 

15 responding to any query from an applica16 ble plan related to a determination de17 scribed in subparagraph (A)(i), the Sec18 retary, notwithstanding any other provision 

19 of law, shall provide to such applicable 

20 plan— 

21 ‘‘(I) whether a claimant subject 

22 to the query is, or during the pre23 ceding 3-year period has been, entitled 

24 to benefits under the program under 

25 this title on any basis; and 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
3 

HR 1375 RFS

1 ‘‘(II) to the extent applicable, the 

2 plan name and address of any Medi3 care Advantage plan under part C 

4 and any prescription drug plan under 

5 part D in which the claimant is en6 rolled or has been enrolled during 

7 such period.’’. 

8 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

9 subsection (a) shall apply with respect to queries from 

10 plans made on or after the date that is one year after 

11 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

12 SEC. 3. DEPOSIT OF SAVINGS INTO MEDICARE IMPROVE13 MENT FUND. 

14 Section 1898(b)(1) of the Social Security Act (42 

15 U.S.C. 1395iii(b)(1)) is amended by striking ‘‘$0’’ and in16 serting ‘‘$30,000,000’’. 

17 SEC. 4. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS. 

18 The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of 

19 complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, 

20 shall be determined by reference to the latest statement 

21 titled ‘‘Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation’’ for this 

22 Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional Record 

23 by the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, proVerDate Sep 11 2014 07:36 Dec 10, 2020 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1375.RFS H1375

pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
4 

HR 1375 RFS

1 vided that such statement has been submitted prior to the 

2 vote on passage. 

Passed the House of Representatives December 8, 

2020. 

Attest: CHERYL L. JOHNSON, 

Clerk. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 _________________________________________

 Clerk

June 25, 2012

s0618

Order 

June 25, 2012

144766

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 144766

COA: 307417

Monroe CC: 08-037378-FC

CHRISTOPHER A. FLOWERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 12, 2012 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
No. _____________

In the

Court of Criminal Appeals

At Austin 



No. 01-14-00165-CR

In the

Court of Appeals

for the

First District of Texas

at Houston



No. 1344756 

In the 338th District Court

Harris County, Texas



LOUIS MARKEITH WILLAIMS

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

Appellee



APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

WITHIN WHICH TO FILE 

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW



TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

APPELLANT, pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2(c) moves for an 

extension of time within which to file its petition for discretionary review. In 

support of its motion, appellant submits the following: 

1. Appellant was charged with the felony offense of theft. 

PD-0413-15

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 4/13/2015 8:47:05 PM

Accepted 4/15/2015 5:13:26 PM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK
2. A jury convicted appellant of the charged offense and sentenced

him to 32 years confinement in the Institutional Division of the

Texas Department of Criminal Justice on February 5, 2014. 

3. A unanimous panel of the First Court of Appeals rendered

judgment in an unpublished opinion on March 12, 2015, affirming

appellant’s conviction and sentence. 

5. Appellant’s petition for discretionary review is due April 13, 2015. 

6. Appellant seeks an extension, in accordance with TEX. R. APP.

P. 68.2(c), until May 13, 2015, to file its petition for discretionary

review. This is appellant’s first request for an extension. 

9. The following facts are relied upon to show good cause for the

requested extension:

a. Counsel has been working on the appellate briefs in Dorsey v.

State, No. 01-14-00685-CR., Hayes v. State, 04-14-00878-CR.

and 04-14-00879-CR., and Ross v. State, 01-14-00902-CR.

b. Counsel has filed a writ of certiorari in the United States

Supreme Court in Masterson v. Stephens.

c. Appellant’s petition is not for purposes of delay, but so that

justice may be done.

WHEREFORE, the Appellant prays that this Court will grant the

requested extension until May 13, 2015. 

Respectfully submitted,

/s/MANDY MILLER

 Attorney for appellant

2910 Commercial Center Blvd., Ste. 103-201

Katy, TX 77494

SBN 24055561

PHONE (832) 900-9884

FAX (877) 904-6846

mandy@mandymillerlegal.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 9.5, this certifies that on April 13, 2015, a

copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following addresses:

Alan Curry

Harris County District Attorney’s Office

Curry_Alan@dao.hctx.net

Lisa McMinn

State Prosecuting Attorney

lisa.mcminn@spa.state.tx.us

/S/MANDY MILLER
# C_2012326EN.01004701.xml

| 26.10.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 326/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 326/1

---

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

PART SIX

INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

TITLE I

INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER 1

THE INSTITUTIONS

SECTION 5

SECTION 5

THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Article 272

(ex Article 238 TEC)

(ex Article 238 TEC)

The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to give judgment pursuant to any arbitration clause contained in a contract concluded by or on behalf of the Union, whether that contract be governed by public or private law.

---
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1378 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1378

 To provide that the authority to grant clemency for offenses against 
  the District of Columbia shall be exercised in accordance with law 
                  enacted by the District of Columbia.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 26, 2019

  Ms. Norton introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                   Committee on Oversight and Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To provide that the authority to grant clemency for offenses against 
  the District of Columbia shall be exercised in accordance with law 
                  enacted by the District of Columbia.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``District of Columbia Clemency Home 
Rule Act''.

SEC. 2. AUTHORITY TO GRANT CLEMENCY IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISTRICT OF 
              COLUMBIA LAW FOR OFFENSES AGAINST DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

    (a) Authority Described.--The authority to grant clemency for 
offenses against the District of Columbia shall be exercised by such 
person or persons, and under such terms and conditions, as may be 
provided under law enacted by the District of Columbia.
    (b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act may be construed to 
affect any authority exercised by the President or the Mayor of the 
District of Columbia prior to the effective date of any law enacted by 
the District of Columbia pursuant to this Act with respect to the 
authority to grant clemency for offenses against the District of 
Columbia.
    (c) Clemency Defined.--In this Act, the term ``clemency'' means a 
pardon, reprieve, or commutation of sentence, or a remission of a fine 
or other financial penalty.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                                   5
<MULTIPLIER>                                         1,000
       
<S>                                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                               3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           JAN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                              FEB-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                MAY-02-1998
<CASH>                                                 319
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                          413
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                          7,701
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    10,193
<PP&E>                                              11,244
<DEPRECIATION>                                       3,404
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                      19,504
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                3,251
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                            22,337
<OTHER-SE>                                               0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                        19,504
<SALES>                                              9,041
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     9,041
<CGS>                                                4,585
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       10,099
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                     192
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     (1,250)
<INCOME-TAX>                                            12
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 (1,262)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                        (1,262)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                           (0.12)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                           (0.12)
        



</TABLE>
AFS-08-262-E Sep 23 2010

Exemption No. 10139 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2008-0421

Mr. R. Mike Rawson Director of Operations Coastal Helicopters, Inc.

8995 Yandukin Drive Juneau, AK 99801

Dear Mr. Rawson:

This letter is to inform you that we have denied your petition for exemption. It transmits our decision and explains its basis.

The Basis for Our Decision

By letter dated March 28, 2008, you petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on behalf of Coastal Helicopters, Inc. (Coastal), for an exemption from §§ 136.9(a) and 136.11(c)(2) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). That exemption, if granted, would allow Coastal to operate its helicopters over bodies of water and beyond shorelines crossed during commercial air tour flights with a life preserver for each occupant but without each occupant wearing a life preserver and without its helicopters being float equipped.

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for not publishing a summary of the petition in the Federal Register because the requested exemption would not set a precedent.

The FAA issued a denial of exemption in circumstances similar in all material respects to those presented in your petition. In Denial of Exemption No. 9934 (copy enclosed), the FAA concluded that the proposed operations, during which passengers would not be wearing life preservers and the aircraft would not be equippe d with floats, could not be conducted with an equivalent level of safety to the rule because the operations would be conducted at altitudes equivalent to or exceeding the power-off gliding distance from the shoreline of the certificate holder’s assigned helicopters.2

Having reviewed your reasons for requesting an exemption, I find that—

 they do not differ materially from those presented by the petitioner in the enclosed denial of exemption;

 the reasons stated by the FAA for denying the enclosed exemption also apply to the situation you present; and

 a grant of exemption would not be in the public interest.

Our Decision

Under the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. §§ 40113 and 44701, which the FAA Administrator has delegated to me, I hereby deny the petition of Coastal Helicopter, Inc., for an exemption from 14 CFR §§ 136.9(a) and 136.11(c)(2).

Sincerely,

/s/ Raymond Towles Acting Director, Acting Director, Flight Standards

Enclosure