J-A04035-15 

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

2015 PA Super 76 

IN RE: T.B. 

 

APPEAL OF: T.B. 

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:

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 1059 WDA 2014 

 

Appeal from the Order Entered June 2, 2014 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

Orphans’ Court, at No(s): CC 140037 

BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED APRIL 14, 2015 

 T.B. appeals from the order of June 2, 2014, which denied his petition 

for expungement of mental health records and restoration of rights. We 

affirm. 

 The facts of this case can be summarized as follows. On November 

26, 2008, T.B. cut his face in several places after returning to his parents’ 

house following a night of consuming alcohol and celebrating his twenty-first 

birthday. T.B.’s father saw blood on T.B.’s face after he got out of the 

shower, decided to check on him early in the morning, and discovered the 

cuts were still bleeding. An ambulance was called, and T.B. went to 

Jefferson Regional Medical Center (Jefferson) to get the cuts on his face 

treated. T.B. arrived at the hospital at 9:15 a.m. T.B.’s mother arrived 

shortly thereafter, and she voiced concern that T.B. was suicidal. She then 

worked with Jefferson to have T.B. committed for psychiatric treatment 

involuntarily pursuant to 50 P.S. § 7302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act 
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(MHPA).1 She completed the application required under section 7302(a), 

and a warrant pursuant to section 7302(a)(1) was issued at 1:21 p.m. A 

physician examined T.B. at 1:30 p.m. and determined that T.B. had selfmutilated and was a danger to himself. Thus, T.B. was committed 

involuntarily for the statutory 120-hour period,2 and was released from 

Jefferson on November 30, 2008. 

On January 30, 2014, T.B. filed a petition to “vacate and/or expunge 

involuntary civil commitment.” Petition, 1/30/2014. Specifically, T.B. 

argued, inter alia, that his involuntary commitment was void ab initio

because he was not examined by a physician within two hours of his arrival 

at Jefferson pursuant to 50 P.S. § 7302(b) (“A person taken to a facility shall 

be examined by a physician within two hours of arrival....”). T.B. asserted 

that his involuntary commitment “has caused him to suffer a loss of liberty 

and reputation.” Id. at 2 (unnumbered). Further, T.B. contended that he 

“suffers from permanent deprivation of fundamental state and federal 

constitutional rights as a direct result of his involuntary commitment[.]” Id.

3

 

 

1

 This procedure is known colloquially as a 302 procedure or involuntary 

commitment. 

2

 50 P.S. § 7302(d)(1). 

3

 T.B. also asserted that, because of this involuntary commitment, the 

Pennsylvania State Police would not grant him permission to possess a 

firearm pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(c)(4) of the Uniform Firearms Act, 

which sets forth a prohibition against those who have been involuntarily 

committed under the MHPA from possessing a firearm. Moreover, T.B. 
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A hearing was held on April 29, 2014. After the hearing, the orphans’ 

court concluded “that when a patient voluntarily receives treatment at a 

hospital and a subsequent 302 is completed, the requirement that a 

physician examine the patient within two hours, under 50 P.S. § 7302(b), 

begins when the 302 is authorized.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/8/2014, at 3. 

Accordingly, the orphans’ court held that because the warrant was 

authorized at 1:21 p.m., and T.B. was examined by a physician at 1:30 

p.m., well within the two-hour period, T.B.’s involuntary commitment was 

valid and legal. Therefore, the orphans’ court denied T.B.’s petition for 

expungement. 

T.B. timely filed a notice of appeal, and both T.B. and the orphans’ 

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal, T.B. sets forth the following 

question for our review: “Is a mental health commitment invalid and illegal 

where the Application for Involuntary Civil Commitment demonstrates, on its 

face, that the statutory mandates have not been followed.” T.B.’s Brief at 3. 

 In considering T.B.’s arguments, we bear in mind that 

a person who has been unlawfully committed to a state mental 

facility has a constitutional right to the destruction of hospital 

records created as a result of the illegal commitment. Wolfe v. 

Beal, 477 Pa. 477, 384 A.2d 1187 (1978). Wolfe’s rationale has 

been extended to require that court records also be expunged 

when an illegal commitment occurs; to-wit: 

 

argued that his rights under the Second Amendment of the United States 

Constitution were being violated. However, T.B. does not present on appeal 

any argument with respect to the Second Amendment or a potential denial 

of the right to possess a firearm. 
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To be sure, the question of expungement of court 

records arising from an illegal commitment was not 

at issue in Wolfe simply because the lower court’s 

decision to order such relief was not challenged. 

However[,] we think it clear that the Court’s 

reasoning regarding destruction of the hospital 

records is equally applicable to the issue sub judice. 

Be they hospital records or court records, the 

dispositive fact is that they originated as a result of 

an illegal proceeding subsequently declared null and 

void; and, in either case, their “continued existence 

[...] pose a threat to [A]ppellant’s reputation.” Under 

such circumstances, and in the absence of any 

compelling reason to the contrary offered by the 

Commonwealth, justice demands that [A]ppellant be 

returned to a position as near as possible as that 

which [she] enjoyed prior to the illegal commitment; 

namely, an unsullied record. 

In re R.F., 914 A.2d 907, 908-09 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. J.T., 420 A.2d 1064, 1065 (Pa. Super. 1980) (citations 

omitted)). 

Instantly, T.B. contends that his involuntary commitment began at 

9:15 a.m., when he arrived at Jefferson, even though no application 

pursuant to section 7302(a) had been completed. Thus, he argues that he 

arrived at Jefferson at 9:15 a.m. “against his will, [and was held] for over 

four (4) hours, before being examined by a physician” at 1:30 p.m. T.B.’s 

Brief at 19. 

Allegheny County and the Pennsylvania State Police contend that “[i]f 

a person comes voluntarily to the hospital then the arrival time would be 

when the 302 is subsequently authorized.” Allegheny County’s Brief at 8. 
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Thus, Allegheny County argues that because the warrant was authorized at 

1:21 p.m. and the examination by a physician occurred at 1:30, well within 

the two-hour period contemplated by the statute, the involuntary 

commitment was valid. 

The process for authorizing an involuntary commitment is outlined by 

statute; thus, we bear in mind the rules of statutory construction. “An issue 

of statutory construction presents a pure question of law and our standard of 

review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Spahn v. Zoning Bd. 

of Adjustment, 977 A.2d 1132, 1142 (Pa. 2009). “The object of all 

interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the 

intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). “When the words 

of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be 

disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Id. at (b). However, 

[w]hen the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of 

the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, 

among other matters: 

(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute. 

(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted. 

(3) The mischief to be remedied. 

(4) The object to be attained. 

(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the 

same or similar subjects. 

(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation. 
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(7) The contemporaneous legislative history. 

(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute. 

Id. at (c). Moreover, “[i]n ascertaining the intention of the General 

Assembly in the enactment of a statute the following presumptions, among 

others, may be used ... (1) [t]hat the General Assembly does not intend a 

result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable[, and] (2) 

[t]hat the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and 

certain.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922. 

 Section 7302 provides the following procedure for obtaining a warrant 

and transporting an individual to a facility. “Upon written application by a 

physician or other responsible party setting forth facts constituting 

reasonable grounds to believe a person is severely mentally disabled and in 

need of immediate treatment, the county administrator may issue a warrant 

requiring a person authorized by him, or any peace officer, to take such 

person to the facility specified in the warrant.” 50 P.S. § 7302(a)(1). 

Pursuant to 50 P.S. § 7302(b)(1), “[a] person taken to a facility shall be 

examined by a physician within two hours of arrival in order to determine if 

the person is severely mentally disabled within the meaning of section 301 

and in need of immediate treatment[.]” 

 Thus, the words of the statute are explicit as to the situation where an 

individual is not at a hospital or other facility at the time it is recognized that 

an involuntary commitment may be necessary. Someone may obtain a 
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warrant permitting the transportation of the individual involuntarily to a 

facility for mental health treatment. Once that individual arrives at the 

facility, the statute requires that the individual be examined by a physician 

within two hours. However, the statute is silent about this time period if an 

individual is already at a facility when someone recognizes that a 302 may 

be necessary. 

That is the situation we encounter in this case, where the orphans’ 

court found that T.B. went voluntarily to Jefferson. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

9/8/2014, at 4 (stating T.B. “voluntarily went to the hospital for the purpose 

of getting his facial lacerations treated[.]”).4 Accordingly, the orphans’ court 

had to determine when T.B. “arrived at the facility” for the purposes of a 

possible involuntary commitment, therefore implicating the two hour 

protection provision. The orphans’ court concluded that the time of arrival 

under these circumstances “begins when the 302 [warrant] is authorized.” 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/8/2014, at 3. We agree that is the appropriate 

interpretation of the statute where T.B. was already at Jefferson for medical 

reasons prior to the application for an involuntary commitment was made. 

“[I]t is axiomatic that in determining legislative intent, all sections of 

a statute must be read together and in conjunction with each other, 

 

4

 This finding is supported by the record. T.B. testified that the ambulance 

“took [him] to the hospital saying that they’re just going to clean [him] up” 

because his “face was bleeding.” N.T., 4/29/2014, at 6. He testified that 

“nobody said anything about a 302 the whole time.” Id. 
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and construed with reference to the entire statute.” Allstate Life Ins. Co. 

v. Com., 52 A.3d 1077, 1080 (Pa. 2012) (emphasis added). Instantly, 

T.B.’s argument that the protections of section 7302(b) were triggered 

before the application was filed pursuant to section 7302(a) creates an 

absurd result. T.B. attempts to pick and choose which portions of the 

statute applied without reading the statute as a whole.

5

 

 Accordingly, we hold the orphans’ court interpreted the statute 

properly and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the involuntary 

commitment of T.B. was valid. T.B. has presented no other argument on 

appeal as to why his records should be expunged; therefore, we affirm the 

order of the orphans’ court denying T.B.’s petition for expungement. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

 

5

 This interpretation is consistent with other aspects of the statute. Where 

an individual is not at a facility at the time the warrant is authorized, the 

statute does not count the time it takes to find the individual and transport 

him to the facility as part of the two-hour window for physician examination. 
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Date: 4/14/2015