NO. 04-14-00916-CR

IN THE 

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

OF TEXAS

AT SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

EBERTO A. MENDEZ, 

Appellant

VS.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

Appellee

Trial Court No. 2009CR2760

Appeal from the 175th District Court 

of Bexar County, Texas

Hon. Mary D. Roman, Presiding

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW

 RICHARD B. DULANY, JR.

 Texas Bar No. 06196400

 Assistant Public Defender

 Bexar County Public Defender’s Office

 101 W. Nueva St., Suite 310 

 San Antonio, Texas 78205 

ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED (210) 335-0701

 FAX (210) 335-0707

richard.dulany@bexar.org

 

 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ACCEPTED

04-14-00916-CR

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

4/13/2015 1:28:13 PM

KEITH HOTTLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 4th COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 4/13/2015 1:28:13 PM KEITH E. HOTTLE Clerk
ii

Identity of Parties and Counsel

Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(a), the parties are:

APPELLANT

EBERTO A. MENDEZ

TDCJ# 01965661

Dominguez State Jail

6535 Cagnon Road

San Antonio, TX 78252-2202

APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY

AT THE REVOCATION HEARING:

John Garcia (State Bar No. 50511937)

615 East Houston Street

San Antonio, TX 78298

ON APPEAL:

Richard B. Dulany, Jr. (State Bar No. 06196400)

Assistant Public Defender

Bexar County Public Defender’s Office

101 W. Nueva St., Ste. 310

San Antonio, TX 78205

STATE’S ATTORNEY’S

AT THE REVOCATION HEARING:

Sade Mitchell (State Bar No. 24076564)

Assistant District Attorney

Paul Elizondo Tower

101 W. Nueva, Fourth Floor

San Antonio, TX 78205

ON APPEAL:

Nicolas A. LaHood, Bexar County District Attorney

(or his appellate section)

Bexar County District Attorney’s Office

Appellate Division

101 W. Nueva St., Ste. 710

San Antonio, TX 78205
iii

TRIAL COURT:

AT THE REVOCATION HEARING:

Hon. Mary D. Roman, Judge Presiding

175th District Court

Cadena-Reeves Justice Center

300 Dolorosa St., Fourth Floor

San Antonio, TX 78205
iv

Table of Contents

Page

Identity of Parties and Counsel.............................................................................ii-iii

Table of Contents......................................................................................................iv

Table of Authorities.............................................................................................. v-vi

A Note on Record References................................................................................. vii

Certificate of Compliance ....................................................................................... vii

Statement of the Case............................................................................................. 1-2

No Meritorious Issues Presented for Review ............................................................3

Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and High v. 

State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), counsel for Appellant 

has diligently searched the record and upon researching all applicable 

law has determined that this appeal is without merit and frivolous.

Summary of Facts.................................................................................................. 3-5

Summary of the Argument.........................................................................................5

Summary of the Facts Pertinent to Anders v. California...........................................5

Argument and Authorities.................................................................................... 6-11

Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 11-12

Prayer .......................................................................................................................13

Certificate of Service ...............................................................................................14

Appendix..................................................................................................................15
v

Table of Authorities

Cases

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)...................................................... passim

Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) .............................................8

Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)...........................................6

Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)............................................6

Duncan v. State, 321 S.W.3d 53 (Tex.App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d).6, 

7

Ex parte Beck, 922 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)........................................11

Ex parte Raborn, 658 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)..................................7, 8

Ex parte Wilson, 724 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).........................................8

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991)...10

Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).......................................10

Hays v. State, 933 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1996, no pet.) ................6

Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)....................................7

Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)..................................8

High v. State, 537 S.W.2d 807 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978).................................. iv, 3, 12

Johnson v. United States, 360 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1966).......................................11

Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).........................................12

Lugaro v. State, 904 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1995, no pet.) .........7
vi

McMahon v. State, 528 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).................................12

Mercado v. State, 718 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).....................................9

Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001)..................................................7

Puga v. State, 916 S.W.2d 547 (Tex.App. – San Antonio 1996, no pet.) .................9

Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).....................................9

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).7,

10

Wilkerson v. State, 726 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ...................................8

Yabrra v. State, 890 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1994, pet. ref’d) ...........7

Statutes

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 4.05 (West 2005)...............................................11

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.02 (West 2009).............................................11

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 21(d) (West 2015).................................7

TEX. CONST. art. I § 13.............................................................................................10

TEX. CONST. art. V § 16 ...........................................................................................11

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.139(b) (West 2009)...................................................11

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.268 (West 2009) .......................................................11

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.34 (West 2015) ...........................................................9

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(f) (West 2015) .......................................................9

U.S. CONST. art. VIII................................................................................................10
vii

A Note on Record References

The reporter’s record in this case consists of one volume, from the hearing 

on the motion to adjudicate guilt and revoke probation. Reference to the reporter’s 

record will be: (RR at ___). A reference to the clerk’s record will be: (CR at ___).

A reference to the supplemental clerk’s record will be: (SCR at ___).

Certificate of Compliance

Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1) & (i)(2)(B), the word count, from the 

beginning of the Summary of Facts until, but excluding, the signature block, is: 

2,283. The total word count is 3,937.
1

TO THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS:

The undersigned attorney submits this brief in support of his motion to 

withdraw. This is an appeal from a judgment adjudicating Appellant guilty of 

intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to a child, after revoking his 

community supervision (probation), upon his plea of true.

1

Statement of the Case

The Appellant, Eberto A. Mendez, was charged by indictment with

intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to a child. (CR at 5). The 

indictment alleged that the offense was committed on or about May 9, 2008. (CR 

at 5). The indictment was filed on March 25, 2009. (CR at 5). 

On March 30, 2010, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to the 

charged offense. (CR at 13). The trial court, the Honorable Mary Roman presiding,

followed the terms of the plea agreement, deferred adjudication of guilt, and placed

Appellant on community supervision for three years with a $1,500 fine. (CR at 15, 

28). The term of community supervision began on May 3, 2010. (CR at 30). The 

term of community supervision was later extended by two years, from May 2, 2013 

until May 3, 2015. (CR at 39).

On October 17, 2014, the State filed a “Motion to Enter Adjudication of 

Guilt And Revoke Community Supervision (Adult Probation).” (CR at 42). The 

 1 In this brief, the terms “community supervision” and “probation” are used interchangeably.
2

motion alleged that Appellant violated several of the conditions of community 

supervision, including Condition No. 5, which asserted that he failed to report to 

the Supervision Officer for the months of June, July, August or September 2014. 

(CR at 42). 

On November 5, 2014, the trial court, the Honorable Mary Roman presiding,

held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to revoke. (RR at 1). The trial court 

adjudicated Appellant guilty of the charged offense and revoked his probation 

upon his plea of “true” to the allegation that he failed to report to the Supervising 

Officer, in violation of Condition No. 5 of his community supervision agreement. 

(RR at 4-5). The State waived the remaining allegations in the motion to 

adjudicate. (RR at 4-5). The trial court sentenced Appellant to imprisonment in the 

Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for five years, 

with no fine. (RR at 5)(CR at 49). The sentence runs concurrently with the fiveyear sentence imposed in cause number 2011-CR-5500. (RR at 6)(CR at 49).

On December 12, 2014, Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal.

2

(CR at 63). The trial court certified that Appellant has a limited right of appeal the 

adjudication of guilt following a deferred adjudication. (SCR at 6). On December 

29, 2014, the trial court appointed the Bexar County Public Defender’s Office to 

represent Appellant on appeal. (CR at 76). This appeal follows.

 2 The notice of appeal was mailed to the trial court clerk on December 4, 2014. (CR at 68). 
3

No Meritorious Issues Present for Review

In compliance with the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967) and High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), the 

undersigned, court-appointed attorney states that he has diligently reviewed the 

entire record in this cause and the law applicable thereto, and, in his opinion, has 

determined that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit in that the record 

reflects no reversible error, and no issues for review upon which an appeal may be 

predicated.

Summary of Facts

Eberto A. Mendez, the Appellant, was charged by indictment with the felony 

offense of intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to a child. (CR at 5). 

The indictment alleged that the offense was committed on or about May 9, 2008. 

(CR at 5). On March 30, 2010, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to the 

charged offense. (CR at 13, 15). The trial court, the Honorable Mary Roman

presiding, deferred adjudication of guilt and placed Appellant on probation for 

three years, with a $1,500.00 fine. (CR at 28-29). The term of Appellant’s 

probation began on May 3, 2010. (CR at 30). The term of probation was extended 

by two years, from May 2, 2013 until May 3, 2015. (CR at 39).

On October 17, 2014, the State filed a “Motion to Enter Adjudication of 

Guilt And Revoke Community Supervision (Adult Probation).” (CR at 42-43). The 
4

motion alleged inter alia that Appellant violated Condition No. 5 by failing to 

report to the Supervision Officer for the months of June, July, August or 

September 2014. (CR at 42). 

A revocation hearing was held in the trial court on November 5, 2014, the 

Hon. Mary Roman, presiding. (RR at 1). Appellant was represented by counsel. 

(RR at 2). The attorney for the State proceeded on the allegation that Appellant 

violated Condition No. 5 by failing to report to the Supervision Officer. (RR at 4). 

The trial court asked Appellant how he pled to the allegation, “true or not true?”

(RR at 4-5). Appellant replied, “True, Your Honor.” (RR at 5). The State did not 

proceed on the remaining allegations. (RR at 4).

In exchange for his plea of “true,” Appellant and the State agreed that the 

State would recommend that Appellant be sentenced to five years of imprisonment

in this cause, and in cause number 2011-CR-5500, to run concurrently. (RR at 5). 

The trial court found the allegation that Appellant violated a condition of his 

probation to be true. (RR at 5). The trial court revoked Appellant’s probation, 

adjudicated him guilty of the charged offense, and sentenced him to five years of 

imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. (RR at 5-6)(CR at 49-

50). 

The trial court certified that Appellant has a limited right to appeal the order 

revoking probation only. (SCR at 6). On December 12, 2014, Appellant timely 
5

filed a pro se notice of appeal. (CR at 63). On December 29, 2014, the trial court 

appointed the Bexar County Public Defender’s Office to represent Appellant on 

appeal. (CR at 76). This appeal follows.

Summary of the Argument

In the professional opinion of the undersigned counsel for Appellant, after a 

diligent search of the record and of the applicable law, there is no reversible error 

reflected in the record. Therefore, this appeal is without merit and frivolous.

Summary of Facts Pertinent to Anders v. California

The record in this case clearly reflects that the trial court had before it 

Appellant’s plea of true to the allegation that he violated Condition No. 5 of his 

probation by failing to report to the Supervision Officer as directed. Appellant’s 

plea of true to that allegation, standing alone, was sufficient to support the trial 

court’s decision to adjudicate him guilty of the charged offense and revoke his 

probation.

Moreover, the record does not indicate that Appellant received ineffective 

assistance of counsel, and does not indicate that there are any jurisdictional defects. 

The record reflects that Appellant’s plea of true was voluntary. The sentence 

imposed was also within statutory range of punishment. In short, undersigned 

counsel can find no meritorious issues for review to raise on Appellant’s behalf. As 

such, this appeal is frivolous and without merit.
6

Argument and Authorities

In a probation revocation hearing, the State must prove by a preponderance 

of the evidence that the probationer violated a condition of his or her probation. 

Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The evidence meets 

this standard when the greater weight of the credible evidence creates a reasonable 

belief that a defendant has violated a condition of his community supervision. 

Duncan v. State, 321 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. App. ––Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. 

ref’d). To support the trial court's order to adjudicate guilt, the State need only 

establish one sufficient ground for revocation. Id.

A plea of true to a violation, standing alone, is sufficient to support the trial 

court’s order revoking Appellant’s probation and adjudicating him guilty. Cole v. 

State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Hays v. State, 933 S.W.2d 

659, 661 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1996, no pet.); Duncan, 321 S.W.3d at 58. 

There is no reason for a trial court to disregard a plea of true, even if defensive 

issues are later presented. Id.

Here, Appellant pleaded true to allegations that he violated Condition No. 5

of his probation by failing to report to the Supervision Officer. (RR at 22). His plea 

of true, standing alone, provides sufficient evidence to support revocation. Cole, 

578 S.W.2d 129. So, unless Appellant can show either that counsel was ineffective 
7

at the revocation hearing, or that there is a jurisdictional defect,3 he has no 

appealable issues. 

The record does not indicate ineffective assistance of counsel. 

A defendant in a revocation proceeding is entitled to effective assistance of 

counsel, unless counsel is waived. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 21(d) 

(West 2015); see Lugaro v. State, 904 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. App. – Corpus 

Christi 1995, no pet.). In a claim that a defendant received ineffective assistance of 

counsel, the defendant bears the burden of establishing ineffective assistance by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Yabrra v. State, 890 S.W.2d 98, 112 (Tex. App. –

San Antonio 1994, pet. ref’d). The test for ineffective assistance of counsel is 

derived from the Supreme Court case Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 

S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by the Texas Court of Criminal 

Appeals in Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). In 

order for counsel to be deemed ineffective, it must be shown that counsel’s 

representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and there is the 

probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result would have 

been different. Id. at 55. The test is applied to the “totality of the representation” 

rather than to isolated acts or omissions of trial counsel, Ex parte Raborn, 658 

 3 Jurisdictional defects which render a judgment void may be raised in the context of an appeal 

of a probation revocation. Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Duncan, 

321 S.W.3d at 57.
8

S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), and is applied at the time of the 

proceeding, not through hindsight. Wilkerson v. State, 726 S.W.2d 542, 548 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1986). It is rare for the record in a direct appeal to contain sufficient 

information to permit an appellate court to evaluate the merits of a claim of 

ineffective assistance. Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

The Strickland test requires an accused to show that his or her counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the 

deficient performance prejudiced the defense. In meeting the second prong, that 

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Ex 

parte Wilson, 724 S.W.2d 72, 74 n. 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Thus, the defendant 

must show that he was prejudiced as a result of deficient attorney performance. 

Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

The undersigned counsel has searched the record, and has not found any 

facts that suggest that reversible error occurred in the revocation proceeding. 

Appellant may argue that trial counsel should not have allowed him to plead true, 

since that plea standing alone gave the trial court authority to adjudicate him guilty 

and revoke his probation. However, that argument would not be meritorious. The 

appellate court will not second-guess trial counsel’s strategy, nor is the court privy 

to the reasons counsel may have advised Appellant to plead true. Judicial scrutiny 
9

of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential, and a reviewing court “must 

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance[.]” Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Thus, “the defendant must overcome the presumption 

that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound 

trial strategy.’” Id.

With regard to any challenge to the propriety of the sentence, trial counsel 

failed to preserve error by failing to object or file a motion for new trial. Mercado 

v. State, 718 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). However, when the 

punishment assessed by the court is within the statutory range for the underlying 

offense, “it is not within the province of an appellate court to pass upon the 

propriety of the sentence.” Puga v. State, 916 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tex.App. – San 

Antonio 1996, no pet.). 

Appellant was convicted of intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury 

to a child, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(f) (West 

2015). The punishment range for that offense is imprisonment in the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice for any term of not more than 10 years or less than 

2 years, with a possible fine not to exceed $10,000. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 

12.34 (West 2015). The sentence actually imposed—5 years of imprisonment, with 

no fine—was well within the statutory range. (RR at 6)(CR at 49). Moreover, the 
10

trial court gave Appellant credit for the time he had already served. (RR at 7)(CR 

at 49). 

The punishment is within the range established by the Legislature, and, as 

such, does not violate the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual 

punishment under either U.S. CONST. art. VIII or TEX. CONST. art. I § 13; Harris v. 

State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Nor does the undersigned 

attorney discern anything in the record to suggest that the punishment assessed is 

grossly disproportionate to the crime. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 

111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991). Additionally, no objection was made to 

the punishment assessed at the revocation hearing. (RR at 6-7).

The facts in the present case do not support an assertion that Appellant 

received ineffective assistance from his revocation counsel. The totality of the 

representation appears to be sound. Appellant’s plea of true was entered as part of 

an agreement that revocation counsel negotiated with the attorney for the State. 

(RR at 5). In addition, revocation counsel made sure that the sentence imposed in 

this cause ran concurrently with the sentence imposed in cause number 2011-CR5500, and made sure that Appellant was given credit for his “back time.” (RR at 6-

7). For these reasons, the record does not support a finding that defense counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under Strickland. 

Therefore, it is unnecessary to reach the second prong of the analysis. 
11

There are no jurisdictional defects.

A defect which renders a sentence void may be raised at any time. Ex parte 

Beck, 922 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). But the sentence in this case is 

not void on any ground and there are no jurisdictional defects apparent from the 

record. The 175th District Court of Bexar County, Texas, has jurisdiction over 

felony cases, such as this one. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 4.05 (West 2005); 

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 24.139, 24.268 (West 2009). The indictment was in 

proper form, pursuant to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.02 (West 2009), and 

correctly alleged the offense of intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to 

a child. (CR at 5). The indictment conferred jurisdiction on the trial court by virtue 

of TEX. CONST. art. V § 16.

Conclusion

After a thorough review of the record, the undersigned attorney is unable to 

identify any potentially meritorious points on appeal. It is the professional opinion 

of the undersigned counsel that the appeal is frivolous and without merit.4 See 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

Counsel has executed an attached Certificate of Service certifying that he is 

sending Appellant a copy of his Motion to Withdraw, and a copy of this Brief, with 

 4

See Johnson v. United States, 360 F.2d 844, 846 n. 2 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J. concurring): 

“An attorney owes his first duty to the court . . . His oath requires him to be absolutely honest 

even though his client’s interests may seem to require a contrary course.” 
12

an explanation of Appellant’s further rights regarding this appeal. High v. State, 

537 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Pursuant to the requirements of Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. at 744-45, and High v. State, 573 S.W.2d at 813, counsel has

documented that he has furnished Appellant with a copy of this brief. He has 

notified Appellant of his right to obtain and review the record, and to file any brief 

that he deems appropriate. 

He has also provided Appellant with a motion for pro se access to the 

appellate record to file with this Court if Appellant decides that he does wish to 

review the record and file a pro se brief. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318-

19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Counsel for Appellant has attached documentation of 

the letter advising Appellant of his rights and remedies, with instructions for filing 

the motion for pro se access to the appellate record. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; 

McMahon v. State, 528 S.W.2d 771, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Kelly, 436 

S.W.3d at 318-19.
13

Prayer

Counsel respectfully requests that he be allowed to withdraw from 

representation of Appellant, and for all other relief that is fair and just.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Richard B. Dulany, Jr.

___________________________________ 

RICHARD B. DULANY, JR.

Assistant Public Defender

Bexar County Public Defender’s Office

101 W. Nueva St., Suite 310

San Antonio, Texas 78205

(210) 335-0701

FAX (210) 335-0707

richard.dulany@bexar.org

Texas Bar No. 06196400

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
14

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant’s 

Brief In Support of Motion to Withdraw has been delivered by electronic service to 

the Bexar County District Attorney’s Office, Appellate Division, Paul Elizondo 

Tower, 300 101 W. Nueva St., Suite 710, San Antonio, Texas 78205, on April 13, 

2015.

I further certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing brief, as well as 

counsel’s motion to withdraw and letter outlining Appellant’s right to file a pro se

brief, and a motion for pro se access to the appellate record, were sent to: Eberto 

A. Mendez, TDCJ# 01965661, Dominguez State Jail, 6535 Cagnon Road, San 

Antonio, TX 78252-2202, by certified mail, return receipt requested, Article No. 

7012 1640 0002 4217 9888, on April 13, 2015.

/s/ Richard B. Dulany, Jr.

____________________________________

RICHARD B. DULANY, JR.
15

Appendix –

Letter advising Eberto A. Mendez of his rights under Anders v. California, with a 

motion for pro se access to the appellate record.


NO. 04-14-00916-CR

IN THE 

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

OF TEXAS 

AT SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

EBERTO A. MENDEZ,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR PRO SE

ACCESS TO THE APPELLATE RECORD

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

COMES NOW the Appellant in the above styled and numbered cause and 

files this Motion for Pro Se Access to the Appellate Record. 

I.

Appellant’s appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and brief in 

support of the motion, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

II.

The undersigned Appellant wishes to exercise his right to review the 

appellate record in preparing his pro se response to the Anders brief that courtappointed counsel has filed. The undersigned Appellant now moves this Court to 

provide him with free, pro se access to the appellate record, including the clerk’s 
record and reporter’s record. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318-19 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2014).

III.

The undersigned Appellant is presently incarcerated and lacks access to a 

computer. For that reason, he respectfully requests that a paper copy of the 

appellate record be provided to him. He also asks for a 30-day extension of time to 

file his pro se brief.

IV.

This motion is addressed to the Fourth Court of Appeals, Cadena-Reeves 

Justice Center, 300 Dolorosa St., Suite 3200, San Antonio, Texas 78205. This 

motion is delivered to the Fourth Court of Appeals by U.S. Mail, on this the _____ 

day of _________, 2015.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Appellant respectfully 

prays that the Court grant this Motion for Pro Se Access to the Appellate Record. 

Respectfully submitted,

______________________________

 Eberto A. Mendez

TDCJ# 01965661

Dominguez State Jail

6535 Cagnon Road

San Antonio, TX 78252-2202

APPELLANT PRO SE