NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DIANA ALEJANDRA SANCHEZ 

FORERO; ISABELLA CANAS 

SANCHEZ; EMMA CANAS SANCHEZ,

Petitioners,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 23-1461

Agency Nos.

A220-150-331 

A220-150-332 

A220-150-333 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 9, 2024**

Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, N.R. SMITH, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Diana Sanchez Forero (Sanchez), a native and citizen of Colombia and a 

lawful permanent resident of Argentina, petitions for review of a decision by the 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUL 11 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 23-1461

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), dismissing her appeal from an immigration 

judge’s denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

1 We have jurisdiction 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Sanchez did not 

establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal. See Tamang v. Holder, 

598 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010). 

The record supports the BIA’s conclusion that the anonymous telephone 

threats that the Sanchez family received did not rise to the level of past 

persecution. Although “threats may be compelling evidence of past persecution, 

particularly when they are specific and menacing and are accompanied by evidence 

of violent confrontations, near-confrontations and vandalism,” Flores Molina v. 

Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 634 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 

1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004)), “[u]nfulfilled threats are very rarely sufficient to rise 

to the level of persecution,” Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 647 (9th Cir. 2021).

Here, the calls ended after Sanchez changed telephone numbers. Although 

Sanchez’s mother-in-law received threats by telephone thereafter, no one ever 

1 Sanchez has two minor children, who are derivative applicants on her application

and who are co-Petitioners before us. We refer to Sanchez as lead Petitioner in 

text. Andres Felipe Canas Rocha, Sanchez’s husband, filed a separate application 

for relief before the agency; but he is not a party to this case.
3 23-1461

approached Sanchez’s mother-in-law in person, and she never experienced any 

harm. In sum, the record does not compel a conclusion that the BIA erred in 

finding that these threats did not rise to the level of past persecution.2 See SinghKaur v. INS, 183 F.3d 1147, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The record also supports the BIA’s conclusion that Sanchez does not have 

an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution in either Colombia or 

Argentina. See Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).

Again, Sanchez and her family were not threatened after their telephone number

was changed. Moreover, the record demonstrates that Colombian authorities took 

Sanchez’s report and started an investigation into the allegations. Although the 

Colombian authorities were unable to find the perpetrators, this inability does not 

constitute an unwillingness or inability to protect them.3 See Nahrvani v. Gonzales, 

399 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005).

2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Sanchez did not 

2 Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that the threats did 

not rise to the level of past persecution, we need not address (1) whether Sanchez 

was firmly resettled in Argentina or (2) whether the harm suffered was on account 

of a protected ground.

3

In her opening brief, Sanchez argues that “there clearly exists a jurisdictional 

question as to [the Argentina government’s] ability to initiate an investigation 

and/or the detention of this organization operating in Colombia, until potentially 

it’s too late and the threats are realized in Argentina.” But Sanchez did not present 

any evidence to the agency demonstrating that the Argentine government was 

unable or unwilling to protect her. 
4 23-1461

establish eligibility for CAT relief. See Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1215, 

1217 (9th Cir. 2005). Sanchez’s claims for CAT protection are based on the same 

facts as her asylum and withholding of removal claims. The agency permissibly 

concluded that the unrealized threats, which were unaccompanied by any other 

harm, did not reach the level of torture. Moreover, Sanchez does not argue that she 

has a particularized threat of torture based upon the country conditions in either 

Argentina or Colombia. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“Petitioners’ generalized evidence of violence and crime 

in Mexico is not particular to Petitioners and is insufficient to meet [the CAT] 

standard.”). Accordingly, the record does not compel the conclusion that she would 

be tortured by government officials or that they would acquiesce to such conduct in 

either Argentina or Colombia. 

PETITION DENIED.