PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

PEGGY YOUNG, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE OF

AMERICA, INC.; UPS HEALTH

PROGRAM; AETNA LIFE INSURANCE

COMPANY; AETNA DISABILITY AND

ABSENCE MANAGEMENT,

 No. 11-2078 Defendants.

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

FOUNDATION; AMERICAN CIVIL

LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF

MARYLAND; A BETTER BALANCE;

EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES; LEGAL

AID SOCIETY - EMPLOYMENT LAW

CENTER; LEGAL MOMENTUM;

NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN

& FAMILIES; NATIONAL WOMEN’S

LAW CENTER; PUBLIC JUSTICE

CENTER; 

Granted by Supreme Court 7/1/2014 

Vacated and Remanded by Supreme Court March 25, 2015
SOUTHWEST WOMEN’S LAW CENTER; 

WOMEN’S LAW CENTER OF

MARYLAND, INC.; WOMEN’S LAW 

PROJECT,

Amici Supporting Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District Judge.

(8:08-cv-02586-DKC)

Argued: October 24, 2012

Amended: April 10, 2015

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DUNCAN,

Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Gregory joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Sharon Fast Gustafson, Arlington, Virginia, for

Appellant. Emmett F. McGee, Jr., JACKSON LEWIS, LLP,

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jill S. Distler, JACKSON LEWIS, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for

Appellee. Ariela M. Migdal, Lenora M. Lapidus, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New

York, New York; Deborah A. Jeon, ACLU FOUNDATION

OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Amici Curiae.

2 YOUNG v. UPS
OPINION

DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination

Act (the "PDA"), which amended the definition of discrimination on the basis of sex in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 ("Title VII") to provide that it included discrimination

in employment "because of or on the basis of pregnancy,

childbirth, or related medical conditions." 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e(k). Invoking both the PDA and the Americans with

Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.,

Peggy Young ("Young") appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment for her employer, United Parcel Service,

Inc. ("UPS"). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.1

I.

A.

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we recite the

facts in the light most favorable to Young as the non-moving

party. Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of America, 673 F.3d 323,

324-25 (4th Cir. 2012). Three UPS policies lie at the core of

this dispute. First, UPS defined among the essential functions

for all drivers the ability to "[l]ift, lower, push, pull, leverage

and manipulate . . . packages weighing up to 70 pounds," and

to "[a]ssist in moving packages weighing up to 150 pounds,"

J.A. 577.

Second, the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement

(the "CBA") provides temporary alternate work ("TAW")2 to

employees "unable to perform their normal work assignments

due to an on-the-job injury." J.A. 580 (emphasis added). To

1The American Civil Liberties Union (the "ACLU") submitted an

amicus brief in support of Young. 

2We use TAW and light duty work interchangeably. 

YOUNG v. UPS 3
comply with this CBA provision, UPS offers light duty work

to those employees injured while on the job or suffering from

a permanent impairment cognizable under the ADA. Under

UPS policy and the CBA, a pregnant employee can continue

working as long as she can perform the essential functions of

her job, but is ineligible for light duty work for any limitations

arising solely as result of her pregnancy.

Finally, a CBA provision requires UPS to give an "inside

job" to drivers who have lost their certification by the Department of Transportation (the "DOT") because of a failed medical exam, a lost driver’s license, or involvement in a motor

vehicle accident as long as the driver is capable of performing

such a job. Because an inside job often involves heavy lifting,

it is typically not considered light duty work.

Against this backdrop, we turn to the facts before us. We

begin with a general statement of facts, providing additional

information as necessary to the analysis.

Young started working for UPS in 1999, and began driving

a delivery truck in 2002. By 2006 and throughout the relevant

period, Young held a position as a part-time, early morning

driver, also known as an "air driver," apparently in reference

to her responsibility to pick up and deliver packages that had

arrived by air carrier the previous night. Young worked out of

a UPS facility in Landover, Maryland known as the "D.C.

Building." Each morning after clocking in at the D.C. Building and inspecting her delivery van, Young and other air drivers would meet a shuttle from the airport bearing letters and

packages scheduled for immediate delivery. Air drivers were

then responsible for loading their vans and making deliveries.

Young typically finished her work responsibilities by 9:45 or

10 in the morning, and then proceeded to her second job at a

flower delivery company.

In July 2006, following two unsuccessful rounds of in vitro

fertilization, Young requested a leave of absence to try a third

4 YOUNG v. UPS
round. The UPS occupational health manager, Carolyn Martin, granted Young’s request. When Young became pregnant,

she sought to extend her leave. At some point in September

2006, she left with her supervisor a note from Dr. Thaddeus

Mamlenski indicating that she should not lift more than

twenty pounds for the first twenty weeks of her pregnancy

and not more than ten pounds thereafter. Young soon followed up with a phone call to Martin saying that she was not

yet ready to return to work.

During that September 2006 call, Martin informed Young

that UPS policy would not permit her to continue working as

long as she had the twenty-pound lifting restriction. Young

maintains that she sought to explain to Martin that her job

rarely required her to lift over twenty pounds, that other UPS

employees had in any case agreed to assist her, and that she

was willing to do either light duty work or her regular job.

Young characterized the seventy-pound lifting requirement as

illusory because she rarely had to transport large packages,

and when she did, she could use a hand truck or request assistance from other UPS employees.

On October 11, 2006, Young had a check-up with midwife

Cynthia Shawl. At the conclusion of her check-up, Shawl

drafted and signed a short note on National Naval Medical

Center letterhead stating "Peggy Sue Young is currently pregnant and due to deliver on or about May 2, 2007. Due to her

pregnancy it is recommended that she not lift more than 20

pounds." J.A. 510 (the "Shawl note"). The Shawl note also

indicated Shawl was available to provide further information

or answer questions, and listed contact information for her.

Although Shawl did not typically draft such notes, she did so

in this instance because Young had told her she needed "a letter for work stating her restrictions." J.A. 656.3

3The chronological record of medical care indicates Shawl saw Young

for 40 minutes and includes the notation "Released w/o Limitations." J.A.

509. Although Young emphasizes in her brief the tension between the

Shawl note and the "Released w/o Limitations" notation, she does not suggest, and the record does not support, the conclusion that Martin or anyone

at UPS ever saw the "Released w/o Limitations" notation. 

YOUNG v. UPS 5
At some point after her appointment with Shawl, Young

contacted her supervisor at the D.C. Building and requested

to return to work. When Young informed her supervisor of

the note recommending she not lift more than twenty pounds,

her supervisor referred Young to Martin. After speaking with

Young, Martin concluded that, based on UPS policy, Young

was unable to perform the essential functions of her job and

was ineligible for light duty assignment. It is undisputed that

Martin made this determination alone.

Young and Martin spoke by phone at the end of October

2006. In the course of discussing Young’s lifting limitation

and eligibility for work, Martin explained to Young that (1)

UPS offered light duty for those with on-the-job injuries,

those accommodated under the ADA, and those who had lost

DOT certification, but not for pregnancy; (2) Young did not

qualify for short-term disability benefits because she had presented no note stating she could not work at all; (3) Young

had exhausted her leave under the Family and Medical Leave

Act (the "FMLA"); and (4) UPS policy did not permit Young

to continue working as an air driver with her twenty-pound

lifting restriction. Although Martin "empathize[d] with

[Young’s] situation and would have loved to help her," J.A.

1032, Martin believed she was required to treat Young the

same as she would any other UPS employee who had a lifting

restriction that did not result from an on-the-job injury or illness and who could not perform his or her regular job.

According to Martin, she would have allowed Young to return

to work if Young could provide a medical certification

removing her lifting restriction and stating she could perform

the essential functions of her job.

The parties do not dispute that Martin based her decision to

disallow Young from returning to work solely on the basis of

the lifting limitations imposed by Mamlenski and Shawl.

Martin did not believe Young had any other restrictions, and

asserts that had she considered Young disabled within the

meaning of the ADA, she would have encouraged Young to

6 YOUNG v. UPS
apply for an accommodation in accordance with UPS’s ADA

policy. J.A. 575. Although Young takes issue with Martin’s

failure to contact Shawl and seek more information regarding

the recommended lifting restriction, Young does not controvert Martin’s assertion.

Still seeking to return to work, Young approached Myron

Williams, the Capital Division Manager in the D.C. Building,

in November 2006. According to Young, when she explained

her desire to return to work, Williams told her she was "too

much of a liability" while pregnant and that she "could not

come back into the [D.C.] [B]uilding until [she] was no longer

pregnant." J.A. 500.

By November 2006, Young’s FMLA leave had expired.

She then went on an extended leave of absence, receiving no

pay and eventually losing her medical coverage by the end of

the year. During this extended leave, someone—the record

does not disclose who—at UPS ascribed Young’s absence to

"disability" by placing the code for disability on her attendance chart. A UPS employee explained at his deposition that

the disability code does not necessarily mean that the

employee is on approved disability leave; it in some cases

means only that an employee is "not working because of an

off the job situation." J.A. 1836.

Young gave birth on April 29, 2007, and returned to work

for UPS at some point thereafter.

B.

Young filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") on July 23, 2007, and later

amended it. She alleged discrimination on the basis of race,4

sex, and pregnancy. After the EEOC issued Young a right to

4Young is white, and alleged that UPS permitted African-American

pregnant employees to work. 

YOUNG v. UPS 7
sue letter in September 2008, she filed suit in October 2008.

In an amended complaint filed the same month, Young sought

damages for sex and race discrimination under Title VII and

for disability discrimination under the ADA. When Young

sought to amend her complaint a third time in June 2009 to

add a distinct disparate impact claim, the district court denied

her motion.

Following over eighteen months of discovery, UPS moved

for summary judgment in July 2010. In addition to responding

in opposition to UPS’s summary judgment motion, Young

also sought to compel additional discovery, asked for a continuance under Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and moved to dismiss voluntarily her race

discrimination claim. In an opinion issued in February 2011,

the district court granted summary judgment for UPS and

denied Young’s motions for additional discovery, a continuance, and a dismissal of her race discrimination claim.5

 On

Young’s ADA claim, the district court reasoned that UPS had

not discriminated against Young either by asking for a doctor’s note, which it was permitted to do under the circumstances, or by deciding not to accommodate her.

Applying the Title VII burden shifting analysis under

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to

Young’s PDA claim, the district court concluded Young had

not shown direct evidence of discrimination; failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination because she

could identify no similarly situated comparator who received

more favorable treatment than she did; and in any case could

not show that UPS’s non-discriminatory rationale for its decision was pretextual.

The district court denied Young’s motion for reconsideration in August 2011. This appeal followed.

5The district court granted summary judgment in favor of UPS on

Young’s race discrimination, and Young does not challenge this on

appeal. 

8 YOUNG v. UPS
II.

Young challenges the district court’s grant of summary

judgment on her ADA and PDA claims. First, she claims that

UPS impermissibly regarded her as disabled under the ADA.

Second, Young contends that UPS discriminated against her

on the basis of pregnancy in violation of the PDA.6

 In considering these arguments, we review the district court’s grant of

summary judgment de novo, and construe all the documentary

evidence and inferences available therefrom in the light most

favorable to Young. See Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531

(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). Summary judgment is appropriate

if UPS establishes "that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Thus, a genuine issue of

material fact, and not simply "the mere existence of some

alleged factual dispute between the parties," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986), is required to defeat

UPS’s motion. We turn first to Young’s ADA claim.

A.

The ADA prohibits discrimination against "a qualified individual on the basis of disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).7

 To

6Young also makes two arguments we need not consider at length. First,

she contends that the district court erred by denying her motion to amend

her complaint to include a disparate impact claim. See Appellant’s Br. at

65-66. We review a district court’s decision to deny a motion to amend

for abuse of discretion, Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint,

Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 192 (4th Cir. 2009), and find no such abuse here.

Young failed to satisfy the good cause standard under Fed. R. Civ. P.

16(b)(4) to modify the scheduling order. J.A. 126. Second, Young asserts

error in the district court’s decision to deny her motion to compel additional discovery. The district court had permitted over eighteen months of

discovery, and had already twice granted Young’s motions to compel. Its

decision to cut off discovery when it did was not an abuse of discretion.

7Congress amended the ADA in 2008 in order to expand the category

of individuals who fall within its ambit. See ADA Amendments Act of

2008 (the "ADAAA"), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; see also

YOUNG v. UPS 9
establish disability discrimination, Young must demonstrate

that (1) she had a disability as defined in the ADA; (2) she

was a "qualified individual," which entails being able to perform the essential functions of her job; and (3) UPS took an

adverse action against her on account of her disability. See

Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104 F.3d 683, 686 (4th Cir.

1997). Young’s claim fails because she cannot establish the

first of these elements.8

The ADA provides three avenues for establishing the existence of a disability: "(A) a physical or mental impairment

that substantially limits one or more major life activities of

such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C)

being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(1). Young does not press the argument that her pregnancy alone establishes disability. See, e.g., Wenzlaff v.

NationsBank, 940 F. Supp. 889, 890 (D. Md. 1996) ("With

near unanimity, federal courts have held that pregnancy is not

a ‘disability’ under the ADA."). Rather, she contends that

UPS regarded her pregnancy-related work limitations as such.

A "regarded as" disabled claim "includes the circumstance

when the employer ‘mistakenly believes that an actual, nonReynolds v. American Nat’l Red Cross, ___ F.3d ___, No. 11-2278, 2012

WL 6062702, at *5 (4th Cir. Dec. 7, 2012) ("In passing the ADAAA,

Congress was concerned ‘lower courts have incorrectly found in individual cases that people with a range of substantially limiting impairments are

not people with disabilities.’" (quoting ADAAA, 122 Stat. at 3553)).

Because Young filed her claim before the effective date of the amendments, which Congress did not make retroactive, Reynolds, 2012 WL

6062702, at *6 (ADAAA not retroactive to cases filed before its enactment); see also Boitnott v. Corning Inc., 669 F.3d 172, 174 n.3 (4th Cir.

2012) (same), we do not consider how, if at all, the ADAAA’s amendments would affect Young’s ADA claim. 

8Because Young’s claim founders at the first prong, we do not decide

whether Young was a "qualified individual" or whether the ADA’s "reasonable accommodation" requirement attaches to those who are regarded

as disabled. 

10 YOUNG v. UPS
limiting impairment substantially limits one or more major

life activities.’" Wilson v. Phoenix Specialty Mfg. Co., Inc.,

513 F.3d 378, 384-85 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sutton v.

United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999)). Thus, the

employer "must believe . . . that [an individual] has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not

so limiting." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. Major life activities are

"those activities that are of central importance to daily life,"

such as walking, seeing, and hearing. Toyota Motor Mfg.,

Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).9

Finally, where an employee relies on a "regarded as" disabled

theory, we focus "on the reactions and perceptions of the

employer’s decisionmakers . . . ." Wilson, 513 F.3d at 385

(quoting Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d

156, 172-73 (4th Cir.1997), abrogated on other grounds by

Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)) (internal alteration

omitted).

Young identifies three actions on Carolyn Martin’s part as

evidence that UPS regarded her as disabled: soliciting from

Young a doctor’s opinion that she was no longer under any

lifting limitations; preventing Young from working based

only on the Shawl note without independently evaluating

Young’s ability to work or contacting Shawl for more information; and improperly relying on a mistaken belief about

Young’s capacity for work. We briefly consider each.

The argument that Martin improperly solicited the doctor’s

opinion is unclear. The record reflects no evidence that Young

provided such an opinion to anyone.10 The only doctor’s notes

9Both Toyota Motor Mfg. and Sutton interpret the ADA before the 2008

amendments. Although the ADAAA effectively overruled the interpretation offered in these cases, we consider them because we analyze Young’s

claims under the pre-2008 ADA. See supra note 7. 

10The district court had the same concern, noting that Young had not

pleaded in her amended complaint the claim that UPS had improperly

solicited a doctor’s note from her. J.A. 417. 

YOUNG v. UPS 11
in the record are those from Dr. Mamlenski and midwife Cynthia Shawl, suggesting Young lift no more than twenty

pounds. Thus, to the extent Young either claims Martin

improperly solicited the Shawl note or takes issue with Martin’s request that Young provide medical certification that she

was no longer under the lifting restrictions indicated in the

notes from Mamlenski and Shawl, we agree with the district

court’s view that "[b]ecause UPS possessed objective facts

suggesting Young might have lost the ability to perform central job functions, it had a legitimate reason to seek some verification that Young had recovered her ability to perform those

duties." J.A. 420; see also Porter v. U.S. Alumoweld Co., 125

F.3d 243, 247 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding employer’s medical

inquiry was job-related and consistent with business necessity

when employee returned to job involving lifting after back

surgery).

Young’s second contention—that UPS had a duty to seek

additional information from her healthcare providers and

independently evaluate her ability to work—is similarly

unavailing. In Young’s view, UPS should have engaged in an

interactive process to determine whether Young was capable

of performing her job. Although the ADA does advise an

employer to initiate "an informal, interactive process" when

determining whether an individual with a disability needs an

accommodation, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3), no such counsel applies to the determination of whether an employee is

disabled in the first instance. Young presents no rationale,

compelling or otherwise, for concluding that an employer acts

inappropriately in relying on the employee’s own objective

medical evidence. Cf. Breitkreutz v. Cambrex Charles City,

Inc., 450 F.3d 780, 784 (8th Cir. 2006) ("If a restriction is

based upon the recommendations of physicians, then it is not

based upon myths or stereotypes about the disabled and does

not establish a perception of disability.").11

11Although the two documents produced by Cynthia Shawl—the "Released w/o Limitations" notation and the Shawl note—stand in consider12 YOUNG v. UPS
Finally, Young fails to marshal evidence creating a genuine

issue of material fact on the question of whether Martin had

a mistaken belief regarding Young’s capacity for work.

Young offers no evidence indicating Martin believed Young’s

pregnancy substantially limited one or more of her major life

activities. The most the record establishes is that Martin

believed Young to be pregnant and under a temporary lifting

restriction on account of her pregnancy, based on the evidence

Young herself provided. Given the relatively manageable

weight restriction—twenty pounds—and the short duration of

the restriction, there is no evidence that Young’s pregnancy

or her attendant lifting limitation constituted a disability

within the meaning of the ADA. See Williams v. Channel

Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 1996)

("[W]e hold, as a matter of law, that a twenty-five pound lifting limitation—particularly when compared to an average

person’s abilities—does not constitute a significant restriction

on one’s ability to lift, work, or perform any other major life

activity."), abrogated on other grounds by Baird ex rel. Baird

v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 1999); Pollard v. High’s

of Baltimore, 281 F.3d 462, 468 (4th Cir. 2002)

("[T]emporary impairments usually do not fall within the

ADA’s definition of ‘disability.’"). Because Young points to

no more than the objective fact of her pregnancy, and offers

no evidence tending to show that Martin subjectively believed

Young to be disabled, Young cannot adduce evidence to raise

a factual issue on her "regarded as" claim.12

able tension, nothing in the record indicates anyone from UPS ever saw

the former document. Having no reason to believe Young’s doctorrecommended lifting restriction had abated, Martin was under no obligation to consult with Shawl or otherwise seek out more information. 

12The fact that Young was coded as "disabled" standing alone does not

alter this conclusion because there is no evidence in the record linking this

coding to a decisionmaker who worked with Young. See Wilson, 513 F.3d

at 385. 

YOUNG v. UPS 13
B.

We turn next to the heart of Young’s appeal, that UPS violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Although not free

from ambiguity, Young’s core contention appears to be that

the UPS policy limiting light duty work to some employees—those injured on-the-job, disabled within the meaning of

the ADA, or who have lost their DOT certification—but not

to pregnant workers like Young violates the PDA’s command

to treat pregnant employees the same "as other persons not so

affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." 42

U.S.C. § 2000e(k). In a similar vein, the ACLU amicus brief

argues that the PDA requires employers like UPS to provide

pregnant workers like Young light duty work so long as it

does so for any other workers similar in their ability or inability to work even though it concededly does not do so for all

nonpregnant employees.

We analyze a PDA claim as a sex discrimination claim

under Title VII. DeJarnette v. Corning Inc., 133 F.3d 293,

297 (4th Cir. 1998) ("A claim of discrimination on the basis

of pregnancy must be analyzed in the same manner as any

other sex discrimination claim brought pursuant to Title VII."

(quoting Boyd v. Harding Academy, 88 F.3d 410, 413 (6th

Cir. 1996) (internal alteration omitted))). Applying the usual

Title VII analytical construct for sex discrimination claims,

we first consider whether Young has shown any direct evidence of discrimination. Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv.

Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 1996). In the absence of that,

we apply the familiar burden shifting framework articulated

in McDonnell Douglas and subsequent cases. As Young’s

counsel clarified at oral argument, Young challenges the UPS

policy as both direct evidence of discrimination and under the

McDonnell Douglas framework. Accordingly, we assess the

policy in both contexts.

1.

In asserting direct evidence of discrimination, Young points

to both the UPS policy and to disparaging comments from

14 YOUNG v. UPS
Myron Williams as indicative of UPS’s general corporate animus against pregnant employees. Evidence is direct if it "both

reflect[s] directly the alleged discriminatory attitude and . . .

bear[s] directly on the contested employment decision."

Warch v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 510, 520 (4th Cir.

2006) (quoting Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219,

232 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc)). Thus, evidence is direct if it

establishes discriminatory motive with no need for an inference or a presumption. We first consider the challenge to the

UPS policy.

a.

Young contends that the UPS policy that does not provide

light duty work to pregnant workers but does for certain other

employees constitutes direct evidence of discrimination. It is

certainly true that an explicit policy excluding pregnant workers would violate antidiscrimination law. See 29 C.F.R.

§ 1604.10(a) ("A written or unwritten employment policy or

practice which excludes from employment applicants or

employees because of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions is in prima facie violation of title VII."). But no

such policy exists here. By limiting accommodations to those

employees injured on the job, disabled as defined under the

ADA, and stripped of their DOT certification, UPS has

crafted a pregnancy-blind policy, and Young does not contend

otherwise. Such a policy is at least facially a "neutral and

legitimate business practice," and not evidence of UPS’s discriminatory animus toward pregnant workers. Merritt v. Old

Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289, 297 (4th Cir.

2010).

Young and the ACLU argue, however, that UPS’s policy of

accommodating certain employees but not pregnant workers

who are otherwise allegedly similar in their ability or inability

to work nonetheless runs afoul of the PDA. In particular, the

ACLU contends that the PDA explicitly alters the traditional

sex discrimination analysis under Title VII by restricting the

YOUNG v. UPS 15
basis upon which employers may compare pregnant workers

with nonpregnant workers. At its core, this argument posits

that the PDA creates a cause of action distinct from that of

§ 703(a)13 by compelling employers to grant pregnant employees a "most favored nation" status with others based on their

ability to work, regardless of whether such status was available to the universe—male and female—of nonpregnant

employees. Considering the history and structure of the PDA

and the consequences of interpreting it in this way, we cannot

agree.

Passed in 1978 to overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in

General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the

PDA added pregnancy-related discrimination to Title VII’s

general prohibition on sex discrimination. Congress placed

the entirety of the PDA into the "Definitions" section of Title

VII:

The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex"

include, but are not limited to, because of or on the

basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical

conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated

the same for all employment-related purposes,

including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit

programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). As the Supreme Court subsequently

recognized, the PDA "makes clear that it is discriminatory to

treat pregnancy-related conditions less favorably than other

medical conditions." Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock

Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983).

13Section 703(a) prohibits employers from discriminating against "any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment [ ] because of such individual’s . . . sex." 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)(1). 

16 YOUNG v. UPS
In addition to including pregnancy-related conditions

within the definition of sex discrimination in its first clause,

the PDA’s second clause provides that "women affected by

pregnancy . . . shall be treated the same for all employmentrelated purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

Standing alone, the second clause’s plain language is unambiguous. See Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187,

204-05 (1991) ("The second clause could not be clearer: it

mandates that pregnant employees ‘shall be treated the same

for all employment-related purposes’ as nonpregnant employees similarly situated with respect to their ability to work."

(quoting California Fed. Savings and Loan Ass’n. v. Guerra,

479 U.S. 272, 297 (1987) (White, J., dissenting) (internal

alterations omitted))). But the second clause does not stand

alone; it follows the first clause. Confusion arises when trying

to reconcile language in the first clause suggesting the PDA

simply expands the category of sex discrimination (without

otherwise altering Title VII), and language in the second

clause suggesting the statute requires different—perhaps even

preferential—treatment for pregnant workers.

Although the second clause can be read broadly, we conclude that its placement in the definitional section of Title

VII, and grounding within the confines of sex discrimination

under § 703, make clear that it does not create a distinct and

independent cause of action. We further note the anomalous

consequences a contrary position would cause: pregnancy

would be treated more favorably than any other basis, including non-pregnancy-related sex discrimination, covered by

Title VII.

Most courts to have considered the potential incongruence

between the PDA’s first and second clauses have concluded

similarly. See Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734,

738 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The Pregnancy Discrimination Act does

not, despite the urgings of feminist scholars . . . require

employers to offer maternity leave or take other steps to make

YOUNG v. UPS 17
it easier for pregnant women to work. Employers can treat

pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but

nonpregnant employees . . . ." (citation omitted)); see also

Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548-49

(7th Cir. 2011); Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637,

641 (6th Cir. 2006); Spivey v. Beverly Enter., Inc., 196 F.3d

1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 1999); Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines,

Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1998) ("By defining sex

discrimination under Title VII to include pregnancy, Congress

intended to do no more than ‘re-establish principles of Title

VII law as they had been understood prior to the Gilbert decision,’ and ensure that female workers would not be treated

‘differently from other employees simply because of their

capacity to bear children.’" (citations omitted)); but see

Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir.

1996) ("[W]hen a Title VII litigant alleges discrimination on

the basis of pregnancy in violation of the PDA, in order to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination, she must demonstrate only that another employee who is similarly situated

in her or his ability or inability to work received more favorable benefits."). These courts reason that to find otherwise

would be to transform an antidiscrimination statute into a

requirement to provide accommodation to pregnant employees, perhaps even at the expense of other, nonpregnant

employees.

Interpreting the PDA in the manner Young and the ACLU

urge would require employers to provide, for example,

accommodation or light duty work to a pregnant worker

whose restrictions arise from her (off-the-job) pregnancy

while denying any such accommodation to an employee

unable to lift as a result of an off-the-job injury or illness.

Under this interpretation, a pregnant worker who, like Young,

was placed under a lifting restriction by her healthcare provider and could not work could claim that the PDA requires

that she receive whatever accommodation or benefits are

accorded to an individual accommodated under the ADA,

because the pregnant worker and the other individual are sim18 YOUNG v. UPS
ilar in their ability or inability to work—i.e., they both cannot

work. By contrast, a temporary lifting restriction placed on an

employee who injured his back while picking up his infant

child or on an employee whose lifting limitation arose from

her off-the-job work as a volunteer firefighter would be ineligible for any accommodation. Such an interpretation does not

accord with Congress’s intent in enacting the PDA, see Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp., 33 F.3d 1308, 1317 (11th Cir.

1994)("Statements in the legislative history make it clear that

the PDA does not require employers to extend any benefit to

pregnant women that they do not already provide to other disabled employees."), and would thus imbue the PDA with a

preferential treatment mandate that Congress neither intended

nor enacted, see Urbano, 138 F.3d at 208 ("[Plaintiff]’s claim

is thus not a request for relief from discrimination, but rather

a demand for preferential treatment; it is a demand not satisfied by the PDA.").

We are unpersuaded that Ensley-Gaines, on which Young

and the ACLU as amicus rely, effects the watershed change

they ascribe to it. Although the court in Ensley-Gaines stated

the second clause "explicitly alters the analysis to be applied

in pregnancy discrimination cases," 100 F.3d at 1226, it analyzed the plaintiff’s challenge to the United States Postal Service’s policy—a policy akin to the one challenged here—not

as direct evidence of sex discrimination, but as circumstantial

evidence under the McDonnell Douglas framework. See

Reeves, 446 F.3d at 641 n.1 (noting Ensley-Gaines primarily

concerned whether the plaintiff had established a prima facie

case under the Title VII analysis). Moreover, given the troubling consequences just outlined of interpreting the PDA in

this broad manner, see Urbano, 138 F.3d at 208 ("The impact

of Ensley-Gaines is unequivocally to treat pregnant employees who need light duty work better than other employees

with a similar medical need whose conditions arose off-thejob."), it is unsurprising that no other circuit has followed

Ensley-Gaines. We are similarly compelled to disagree with

its analysis.

YOUNG v. UPS 19
We therefore adhere to the majority view that where a policy treats pregnant workers and nonpregnant workers alike,

the employer has complied with the PDA. The UPS policy at

issue is not direct evidence of pregnancy-based sex discrimination.

b.

We next consider whether Myron Williams’s comments

demonstrate "corporate animus" on the part of UPS tantamount to direct evidence of discrimination.14 Young focused

below on Williams’s comments alone, but now contends

those comments amount to evidence of UPS’s "corporate animus." The district court rejected her previous argument on the

ground that Williams wielded no decisionmaking power over

Young.15 See J.A. 402; see also Hill v. Lockheed Martin

Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 288-89 (4th Cir. 2004)

(noting that although "the person allegedly acting pursuant to

a discriminatory animus need not be the ‘formal decisionmaker’ to impose liability upon an employer for an adverse

employment action," the plaintiff must present "sufficient evidence to establish that the subordinate was the one ‘principally responsible’ for, or the ‘actual decisionmaker’ behind,

the action"). Young’s argument on appeal that Williams’s

comments manifest UPS’s corporate animus towards pregnant

workers finds no support in the record; Williams’s statements

stand alone as the only explicit evidence of a pregnancyrelated comment, derogatory or otherwise. Moreover,

Young’s reliance on Merritt, 601 F.3d 289, and Staub v. Proc14Although Williams denies telling Young that her pregnancy made her

a liability and that she should return home until she was no longer pregnant, the procedural posture of this case requires us to accept as true

Young’s account. 

15In fact, Young argues that "it is misguided to look to either Martin or

Williams as ‘the’ decisionmaker;" each of them was simply "enforc[ing]

[UPS’s] standing policy by announcing that Young must go home."

Appellant’s Br. at 54. Thus, Young’s "corporate animus" argument is in

essence another attack on UPS’s policy. 

20 YOUNG v. UPS
tor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011), is inapposite as those cases

involved non-decisionmaker colleagues whose pervasive animus for the plaintiff influenced the ultimate decisionmaker.

No such evidence exists here: Williams neither possessed the

authority to make determinations about Young’s employment

nor sought to influence Martin, who did.16

2.

Because Young presents no direct evidence of pregnancy

discrimination, we next consider whether she offers evidence

sufficient to make out a prima facie case under the McDonnell

Douglas framework. Under this framework, Young must

establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination on her pregnancy claim by showing "(1) membership in a protected class;

(2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment

action; and (4) that similarly-situated employees outside the

protected class received more favorable treatment." Gerner v.

Cnty. of Chesterfield, 674 F.3d 264, 266 (4th Cir. 2012)

(quoting White v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 295

(4th Cir.2004)) (internal alterations omitted).17 Again, the

focus of her challenge is the UPS policy.

Young fell within the protected class, raised at least a genuine issue of material fact regarding her job performance,18 and

16The single statement Young offers from a co-worker suggesting "nobody would have stopped" a manager like Williams from placing Young

on light duty because "[t]hat is just how it works," see J.A. 539, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of disputed material fact. Even assuming

Williams did have such authority to decide whether Young should be

given light duty, Young offers no reason to conclude that he would or

should have interpreted UPS policy regarding the availability of light duty

for pregnant employees any differently than Martin did. 

17We have also described the fourth prong as considering whether the

allegedly adverse employment action occurred "under circumstance[s]

giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Mackey v. Shalala,

360 F.3d 463, 468 (4th Cir. 2004). 

18UPS argues that Young cannot satisfy the second element of the prima

facie case because the lifting restriction rendered her unqualified for an air

YOUNG v. UPS 21
suffered an adverse employment action when she could not

continue working. Thus, the dispute here centers on the final

element of the prima facie case: whether similarly-situated

employees outside the protected class received more favorable treatment than Young, or more broadly, whether UPS’s

decision to prevent Young from either receiving an accommodation or returning to work occurred "under circumstance[s]

giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination."

Mackey, 360 F.3d at 468. In particular, Young and UPS

sharply disagree about who constitutes an appropriate "comparator" in this context.

At bottom Young seeks to compare herself to employees

accommodated under the ADA, drivers who have lost their

DOT certification for medical reasons, and employees injured

on the job. As we have already noted, however, these accommodations were created by a neutral, pregnancy-blind policy—a policy she can attack indirectly no more successfully

than she could directly.

Moreover, we conclude that a pregnant worker subject to

a temporary lifting restriction is not similar in her "ability or

inability to work" to an employee disabled within the meaning

of the ADA or an employee either prevented from operating

a vehicle as a result of losing her DOT certification or injured

on the job. Young is dissimilar to an employee disabled under

the ADA for the same reason she herself was not disabled: her

lifting limitation was temporary and not a significant restriction on her ability to perform major life activities. She is

driver position. See Appellant’s Br. at 48-51. UPS raised this argument

below, see J.A. 168-69, but the district court did not address it. Although

there is (out-of-circuit) case law supporting UPS’s position, see Spivey,

196 F.3d at 1312 ("The [twenty-five pound] lifting restriction imposed on

[the plaintiff] clearly prevented her from performing the responsibilities

required of this position."), the record also indicates Young may have been

able to perform satisfactorily even with the restriction. At a minimum, this

is a disputed issue of material fact inappropriate for a court to decide at

the summary judgment stage. 

22 YOUNG v. UPS
unlike employees guaranteed an inside job or light duty under

the CBA provision19 for drivers who have lost DOT certification for at least two reasons. First, no legal obstacle stands

between her and her work. A driver who has lost his or her

DOT certification is legally disabled from operating a vehicle;

Young’s physical impairment only restricted her ability to lift.

Second, as the district court observed, "those with DOT certification maintained the ability to perform any number of

demanding physical tasks, while Young labored under an

apparent inability to perform tasks involving lifting." J.A.

411. Finally, Young is not similar to employees injured on the

job because, quite simply, her inability to work does not arise

from an on-the-job injury. The CBA provision requiring UPS

to accommodate those employees injured while carrying out

job duties for the company but not while pursuing other activities reasonably places a heightened obligation on UPS to

accommodate the former group. The PDA does not render this

distinction unlawful.

We are also unpersuaded that Martin’s decision occurred

under circumstances "giving rise to an inference of unlawful

discrimination." Mackey, 360 F.3d at 468. According to

Young, these circumstances consist of (1) Martin’s solicitation of a doctor’s note from Young identifying her restrictions; (2) Martin’s statement that UPS policy did not provide

light duty for pregnant workers; and (3) Williams’s comments

about Young as a liability while pregnant. However, with the

exception of Williams’s comments, which played no role in

Martin’s decision, these facts fail to demonstrate the specific

animus Young ascribes to them. Even assuming Martin solicited a note from Young, there is no indication that this was

not done with all employees returning from leave, or that

Martin did so because Young was pregnant. And Martin’s

statement about UPS’s policy providing light duty in three

19Although Young also contends that the CBA was negotiated and interpreted with discriminatory animus, she presents no support for this contention in the record. 

YOUNG v. UPS 23
instances—but not for pregnancy—is simply one of fact. One

may characterize the UPS policy as insufficiently charitable,

but a lack of charity does not amount to discriminatory animus directed at a protected class of employees.

Accordingly, we conclude that Young cannot establish that

similarly situated employees received more favorable treatment than she did, and therefore cannot establish the fourth

element of the prima facie case for pregnancy discrimination.

While not unsympathetic to Young’s circumstances, we are

nevertheless concerned about the problematic potential of creating rights not grounded in the text and structure of Title VII

as a whole.

III.

We therefore affirm the decision of the district court.

AFFIRMED

24 YOUNG v. UPS