No. 14-14-00485-CV 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTEENTH DISTRICT 

HOUSTON, TEXAS 

CAROLYN LARSEN, 

APPELLANT, 

V. 

ONEWEST BANK, FSB, 

APPELLEE. 

APPEAL FROM 155THJUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 

AUSTIN COUNTY, TEXAS 

APPELLEE'S RESPONSE BRIEF 

DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC 

Thomas M. Hanson 

State Bar No. 24068703 

thanson@dykema.com Kevin A. Teters 

State Bar No. 24075678 

kteters@dykema.com DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC 

1717 Main Street, Suite 4200 

Dallas, Texas 75201 

(214) 462-6400 — Telephone 

(214) 462-6401 — Facsimile 

April 7, 2015 
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL 

PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT: 

Carolyn Larsen 

Trial/Appellate Counsel: 

Sidney Levine 

110 Main Street, Suite 201 

P.O. Box 592 

Sealy, Texas 77474 

(979) 885-2989 

(713) 495-9040 

(979) 885-2980 (Fax) 

sealylaw@sbcglobal.net 

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: 

OneWest Bank N.A., formerly known as OneWest Bank, FSB 

Trial/Appellate Counsel: 

Thomas M. Hanson 

Texas Bar No. 24068703 

thanson@dykema.com 

Kevin Teters 

Texas Bar No. 24075678 

kteters@dykema.com 

DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC 

1717 Main Street, Suite 4200 

Dallas, TX 75201 

(214) 462-6400 (Telephone) 

(214) 462-6401 (Facsimile) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

Identity of Parties and Counsel ii 

Table of Authorities Error! Bookmark not defined. 

Statement of the Case ix 

Issues Presented 

Statement Regarding Oral Argument xi 

I. Statement of Facts 1 

A. Appellant's Husband Obtained a Reverse Mortgage in 2005 1 

1. The Loan Agreement 1 

2. The Note. 2 

3. The Deed of Trust 2 

B. Appellant Executed Multiple Loan Documents Establishing that She 

Was Not a Borrower 3 

C. Appellant Knew She Was Not a Borrower When Mr. Larsen Obtained 

the Loan 4 

D. The Loan Was Not Repaid Following Mr. Larsen's Passing and 

Foreclosure Proceedings Were Initiated 5 

E. Appellant Sued OneWest In an Effort to Stop Foreclosure 5 

F. The District Court Granted OneWest's Motion for Summary Judgment 

and Entered Final Judgment Against Appellant 5 

II. Summary of Argument 6 

III. Argument and Authorities 9 

A. Standard of Review 9 

1. Traditional summary judgment standard. 9 

iii 
2. Whether the record contains "some evidence" to support 

Appellant's arguments is not the focus of the Court's review. 9 

B. The Record Establishes That Appellant Is Not a Borrower 10 

1. Appellant is not a party to the Loan Agreement or Note. 10 

2. Appellant was ineligible to be a borrower due to her age ...10 

3. Appellant testified she is not a borrower 11 

4. Appellant signed multiple loan documents as the "non-borrower." 12 

C. Appellant's Description As a Borrower on the Deed of Trust Did Not 

Alter Her Legal Status or Prevent OneWest from Accelerating the 

Loan Following Mr. Larsen's Death , 12 

1. As an initial matter, Texas law required Appellant to sign the 

Deed of Trust. 12 

2. Applying the rules of contract construction to the Loan 

documents, it is indisputable that Mr. Larsen was the only 

borrower. 13 

(a) The Court must consider all of the loan documents when 

determining the parties' intent. 14 

(b) In a situation where the terms of the Deed of Trust and Note 

conflict, the terms of the Note prevail. 16 

(c) A single descriptive label does not alter the clear intention of 

the parties 17 

(d) The Court must attempt to harmonize the provisions of the 

Note and Deed of Trust. 18 

(e) Courts generally may not rewrite contractual provisions 19 

D. The Waiver of Homestead Rights and Special Warranty Deed Are 

Valid 20 

1. Texas law permits waiver of homestead rights. 21 

2. The Waiver of Homestead Rights is valid. 22 

iv 
3. The Special Warranty Deed is valid 22 

(a) Appellant testified she actually intended to convey her 

interest to her husband. 23 

(b) The Deed is supported by consideration. 23 

E. Even if the Waiver of Homestead Rights and/or the Special Warranty 

Deed Are Invalid, OneWest Still Had the Right to Accelerate the Debt 

Upon Mr. Larsen's Death 24 

F. The Loan's Insurability Has Nothing to Do with Its Validity 27 

G. The District Court Did Not Err in Granting OneWest's Summary 

Judgment Motion 28 

IV. Conclusion 28 

Certificate of Compliance 30 

Certificate of Service 31 

v 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Pa es 

Cases 

Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 

124 S.W.3d 154 (Tex. 2003) 19 

Bierwirth v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 

2012 WL 3793190 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 30, 2012, no pet.) 14 

Brandywood Housing, Ltd. v. HCAD, 

No. 14-08-00404-CV, 2010 WL 1752334 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] May 4, 2010, no pet.) 21 

Braniffiny. Co. v. Robertson, 

81 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1935) 14 

Cathey v. Booth, 

900 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1995) 9 

Coastal Plains Dev. Corp. v. Micrea, Inc., 

572 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1978) 17, 18 

Coker v. Coker, 

650 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1983) 18, 19 

Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Attayi, 

745 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 1988, no writ) 18 

Ferguson v. Ferguson, 

111 S.W.3d 589 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) 21, 22 

Hunter v. Clark, 

687 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1985, no writ) 21 

Ingram v. Deere, 

288 S.W.3d 886 (Tex. 2009) 17 

Jones v. Kelley, 

614 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. 1981) 14 

vi 
McKelvain v. Allen, 

58 Tex. 383 (1883) 14 

Mulvey v. Mobil Producing Tex. & NM, Inc., 

147 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied) 9 

Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 

875 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1994) 9 

Neece v. A.A.A. Realty Co., 

322 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1959) 17 

Pentico v. Mad-Wayler, Inc., 

964 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied) 16 

Randall's Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 

891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1995) 9, 10 

Reilly v. Rangers Mgmt., Inc., 

727 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. 1987) 14 

Skelton v. Washington Mut. Bank, F.A., 

61 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.) 24, 25, 26 

Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 

73 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2002) 10 

Stephanz v. Laird, 

846 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 1993, writ 

denied) 17 

Tenneco Inc. v. Enterprise Prods. Co., 

925 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1996) .21, 22 

Thompson v. Kerr, 

No. 14-08-00978-CV, 2010 WL 2361636 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] June 15, 2010, no pet.) 21 

In re Tucker, 

391 B.R. 404 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008) 16 

Warren v. Bank of Am., NA., 

2012 WL 3020075 (N.D. Tex. June 19, 2012) 15 

vii 
Williams v. Williams, 

569 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978) 21 

Statutes 

12 U.S.C. §1715z-20(b)(1) 1, 10 

Texas Family Code Section 5.001 13 

Texas Property Code 41.001(b)(7) 26 

24 CFR §206.33 10, 12 

TEx. CONST. ART XVI, §§ 50(a)(7), 50(c) 26 

TEX. CONST. ART. XVI §50(k) 25 

TEX. CONST. ART. XVI §50(k)(1) 12, 13 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) 10 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) 9 

viii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

The underlying case involved Appellant's efforts to prevent foreclosure of a 

real property lien following non-payment of a loan. Appellant's husband obtained 

a reverse mortgage loan in 2005. The loan stipulated that it would become due 

upon his death. When Appellant's husband passed away in 2010, OneWest—the 

note holder and mortgage servicer—notified Appellant that the loan had become 

due. The loan was not repaid, and OneWest initiated foreclosure proceedings as a 

result. Appellant then sued OneWest, claiming that certain of the loan documents 

were void or, alternatively, that she was also a borrower on the loan (despite 

having not signed the Note) and the loan was therefore not yet due. After 

reviewing all of the evidence in the record and the parties' briefing, the District 

Court determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact on any of 

Appellant's claims and granted OneWest's traditional motion for summary 

judgment. This appeal followed. 

ix 
ISSUES PRESENTED 

1. Did the District Court err in granting OneWest summary judgment where the 

record establishes that Appellant was not a borrower, the loan was due and 

payable following the death of Appellant's husband, and OneWest is 

authorized to foreclose its lien on the property because the loan was not 

repaid? 

x 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 

OneWest does not believe oral argument is necessary or would be of any 

benefit to this Court. This appeal turns on whether OneWest had authority to 

foreclose its property lien after the sole borrower passed away and the loan was not 

repaid. A small number of documents within the record—including the Note, 

Deed of Trust, and Warranty Deed—conclusively establish that OneWest had such 

authority and that the District Court's summary judgment order was proper. 

Appellant has failed to provide any evidence that reasonably calls this authority 

into question. As the key issue before this Court is fundamental and simple, as 

well as easily determined based on the District Court's record, OneWest believes 

that oral argument is unnecessary. 

xi 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 

The facts relevant to this appeal are undisputed: 

A. Appellant's Husband Obtained a Reverse Mortgage in 2005 

Plaintiff/Appellant Carolyn Larsen ("Appellant") married Otis Larsen ("Mr. 

Larsen") in 1987. The couple purchased a home located at 918 N. Meyer Street, 

Sealy, Austin County, Texas 77474 (the "Property") in mid-2004. 

On February 14, 2005, Mr. Larsen obtained a loan from Financial Freedom 

Senior Funding Corporation ("FFSFC") (the "Loan"). C.R. 102-07; 216-24. The 

Loan was an adjustable rate home equity conversion mortgage ("HECM"). 

HECMs are a type of reverse mortgage that permits eligible homeowners to 

convert equity in their home into cash and forgo any loan payments until they 

either pass away or move. The Federal Housing Administration ("FHA"), which 

insures HECMs, requires that all borrowers must be at least 62 years old. See 12 

U.S.C. §1715z-20(b)(1). At the time Mr. Larsen obtained the Loan in 2005, 

Appellant was only 58 and thus ineligible to be a borrower. See C.R. at 5. 

In connection with obtaining the Loan, Mr. Larsen executed a loan 

agreement ("Loan Agreement"), a note ("Note"), and a deed of trust ("Deed of 

Trust"), among other documents. 

1. The Loan Agreement. 

The Loan Agreement sets out the terms and conditions of the Loan. C.R. 

216-24. The Loan Agreement defines Mr. Larsen as the sole "Borrower." C.R. 

1 
216. Likewise, Mr. Larsen is the only person who signed the Loan Agreement as a 

Borrower. C.R. 223. Pursuant to the Loan Agreement, FFSFC loaned Mr. Larsen 

$65,760 in consideration for him executing the Note and Deed of Trust. See C.R. 

217 at ¶2.1; App.'s Br. at 5. 

2. The Note. 

The Note represents Mr. Larsen's agreement to repay the Loan. C.R. 102 at 

¶2. The Note defines the "Borrower" as "each person signing at the end of this 

Note." C.R. 102. Like the Loan Agreement, Mr. Larsen is the only signatory on 

the Note and thus the only person who was entitled to receive the Loan proceeds or 

obligated to repay them. C.R. 107. In exchange for receiving the Loan proceeds, 

Mr. Larsen promised to repay the principal and interest on the Loan when it 

became due. C.R. 102 at ¶2. The Note stipulated that the Loan would become due 

upon Mr. Larsen's death (among other events). C.R. 105 at ¶7(A). 

3. The Deed of Trust. 

The Deed of Trust secures repayment of the Loan by granting a lien on the 

Property. C.R. 108-09. In the event of default, the Deed of Trust authorizes the 

lender to foreclose the Property under a power of sale. C.R. 114 at ¶22. Failure to 

repay the Loan when due constitutes a default and triggers the lender's right to 

foreclose. C.R. 110 at ¶1. Mr. Larsen granted the Deed of Trust to FFSFC' on 

1The Deed of Trust provides that "The covenants and agreements of this Security Instrument 

shall bind and benefit the successors and assigns of the Lender." C.R. 113 at ¶16. It is 

2 
February 14, 2005. C.R. 117. Appellant also signed the Deed of Trust, as required 

by the Texas Family Code and Texas Constitution. See id. The Deed of Trust 

defines her and Mr. Larsen as the trustors, which term is then referred to elsewhere 

in the document as the "Borrower." C.R. 108. 

B. Appellant Executed Multiple Loan Documents Establishing that She 

Was Not a Borrower 

First, Appellant signed a document entitled "Non-Borrower Spouse 

Ownership Interest Certification" during the closing of the Loan ("Non-Borrower 

Spouse Certification"). C.R. 123. Appellant expressly acknowledged that Mr. 

Larsen was entering into a reverse mortgage and that she did not have an 

ownership interest in the Property. Id. Appellant also acknowledged that if Mr. 

Larsen predeceased her and the Loan was not repaid, the Property "may need to be 

sold to repay Reverse Mortgage debt incurred by my spouse" and that she "may be 

required to move from [her] residence." Id. Appellant signed the Certification as 

the "Non-Borrower Spouse" and initialed each paragraph under the same heading. 

Conversely, Mr. Larsen executed the document as the "Borrower" and initialed 

each paragraph as same. Id. 

undisputed that OneWest currently holds the Deed of Trust (and the Note). App.'s Br. at 5. 

Indeed, OneWest purchased certain of FFSFC's assets, including Mr. Larsen's Loan, in 2009. 

C.R. 124-215; see C.R. 83-84. Thus, OneWest is entitled to the same rights as FFSFC under 

the Deed of Trust, including the right to enforce the debt through foreclosure of the Deed of 

Trust. See C.R. 113 at 'ff16. 

3 
Second, Appellant executed a Waiver of Homestead Rights. C.R. 122. This 

Waiver differentiated Appellant's status (as the non-borrower) from her husband's 

(as the borrower), explaining that "[s]hould the borrowing spouse or resident 

predecease you, you may be required to move and sell your home to repay the 

Reverse Mortgage debt . . . ." Id. Appellant also signed the Waiver as the "nonborrower spouse or resident," just as she had in the Non-Borrower Spouse 

Certification. Id. 

Third, Appellant granted all of her interest in the Property to Mr. Larsen via 

a notarized Special Warranty Deed. C.R. 120-21. Appellant testified during the 

temporary injunction hearing that she actually intended to convey her interest to 

Mr. Larsen when she executed the Deed. C.R. 236 at 23:7-12. Appellant 

acknowledged in the Deed that she had received sufficient consideration from Mr. 

Larsen for her conveyance. C.R. 120. 

C. Appellant Knew She Was Not a Borrower When Mr. Larsen Obtained 

the Loan 

During the temporary injunction hearing, Appellant testified that she was 

told on multiple occasions by the mortgage broker that she was not going to be a 

borrower on her husband's loan. C.R. 236 at 21:1-22:7. Appellant also confirmed 

this is why she did not sign the Note. C.R. 237-38 at 28:9-29:2. She further 

admitted that, while she and Mr. Larsen (allegedly) intended to add her to the Loan 

once she turned 62, this was never actually done. C.R. 236 at 24:11-15. 

4 
D. The Loan Was Not Repaid Following Mr. Larsen's Passing and 

Foreclosure Proceedings Were Initiated 

Mr. Larsen passed away in November 2010. C.R. 237 at 25:22-24. As a 

result, the Loan became due and payable in full. C.R. 105 at ¶7(A). Despite 

receiving notice that the Loan was due, the Mr. Larsen's estate failed to repay the 

Loan as required, resulting in a default of the Loan's terms. C.R. 102-03 at ¶¶2, 

4(A); C.R. 110 at ¶1; see App.'s Br. at 9. Pursuant to the Deed of Trust, 

OneWest's only remedy upon default was foreclosure of the Property lien. C.R. 

112 at ¶10. OneWest therefore scheduled the Property for foreclosure on February 

7, 2012. 

E. Appellant Sued OneWest In an Effort to Stop Foreclosure 

Appellant initiated the underlying lawsuit on February 3, 2012. C.R. 3-36. 

Appellant's suit did not state an affirmative claim against OneWest, but rather 

requested temporary injunctive relief and sought declarations that the Special 

Warranty Deed is void and that either the Deed of Trust is void or, alternatively, 

that Appellant was a borrower on the Loan and that the Property cannot be 

foreclosed until her death. C.R. 281-92. 

F. The District Court Granted OneWest's Motion for Summary Judgment 

and Entered Final Judgment Against Appellant 

OneWest moved for traditional summary judgment on October 24, 2013 

("Summary Judgment Motion"). The parties both fully briefed the issues and 

presented evidence, and a hearing on OneWest's Summary Judgment Motion was 

5 
held on February 18, 2014. See C.R. 442. Afterward, the District Court found that 

there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding Appellant's non-borrower 

status or the validity and enforceability of the Deed of Trust. See id; C.R. 456-57.2 

Accordingly, the District Court granted OneWest's Summary Judgment Motion 

and entered final judgment against Appellant. C.R. 442, 456-57. This appeal 

followed. 

II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

Appellant knows she is not a borrower. In addition to admitting this during 

the temporary injunction hearing, Appellant did not sign the Loan Agreement or 

Note, which both expressly provide that Mr. Larsen was the only borrower. 

Indeed, Appellant was several years too young to even qualify as a borrower at that 

time. Further, Appellant executed multiple documents as the "non-borrower 

spouse" and acknowledged that the Loan would become due upon her husband's 

death and that she may be required to move if the Loan was not repaid. Now, 

despite having executed these disclosures, Appellant urges the Court to ignore the 

plain meaning of the loan documents—and Appellant's admitted understanding of 

the terms of the reverse mortgage—to effectively set aside or reform the loan 

transaction. 

2 The District Court modified its Summary Judgment Order on March 6, 2014 to clarify that (1) 

Appellant's claims against OneWest were being denied and (2) that Appellant's claims against 

the other Defendants were being severed and assigned a new cause number so that the 

judgment in favor of OneWest became final. C.R. 456-57. 

6 
The arguments advanced by Appellant in support of her position fail both as 

a matter of law and fact. Because the Property was her husband's homestead, 

Appellant was required by Texas law to sign the Deed of Trust; however, 

Appellant's description as a borrower on the Deed of Trust does not make her so. 

Under Texas law, descriptive labels in a contract do not determine or control the 

legal status of the parties. Courts must interpret the contract based on the intent of 

the parties, evidenced by the contract as a whole. When all of the loan documents 

are read together as a single contract—as required by Texas law—it is patently 

clear that none of the parties to the contract (or even Appellant) intended or 

believed Appellant to be a borrower on the Loan. 

Appellant alternatively contends that she should be treated as a borrower 

because the Waiver of Homestead Rights and Special Warranty Deed are allegedly 

ineffective and/or void. This argument is also without merit. First, contrary to 

Appellant's arguments, a person in Texas may waive her homestead rights so long 

as her intent to do so was clear, decisive and unequivocal. Here, Appellant's 

execution of the Waiver of Homestead Rights easily satisfies this standard. 

Likewise, the Special Warranty Deed is not invalidated by Appellant's ipse dixit 

testimony that the Deed was a sham or that she did not actually receive any 

consideration. Such statements contradict the plain (notarized) language of the 

Deed, as well as her own testimony that she actually intended to convey her 

7 
interest to Mr. Larsen when she executed the Deed. In any event, the validity of 

these documents does not impact the Court's determination. Even if Appellant 

owned the Property as her homestead, the Loan was still valid, she still was not a 

borrower and OneWest still has the right to foreclose due to the default. 

Appellant also incorrectly asserts that she must be considered a borrower 

because the FHA cannot insure an HECM unless repayment of the loan is deferred 

until both homeowners die. The regulation on which she relies does not compel a 

lender to include ineligible borrowers on an HECM. Instead, it only governs the 

FHA's obligation to insure the lender based upon the terms of the loan. Thus, 

whether the FHA will insure this Loan is wholly irrelevant to the question of 

whether OneWest could accelerate the Loan upon Mr. Larsen's death. 

None of Appellant's arguments establish that the District Court erred by 

dismissing her claims. Appellant has not provided any evidence that creates a 

genuine issue of fact regarding the validity of the loan documents or OneWest's 

right to accelerate the loan or foreclose following default. The undisputed record 

establishes that the District Court properly granted OneWest's Summary Judgment 

Motion. Accordingly, the District Court's judgment must be affirmed. 

8 
III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 

A. Standard of Review 

1. Traditional summary judgment standard. 

Orders granting motions for summary judgment are reviewed de novo. 

Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994). When the District 

Court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds relied 

upon, reviewing courts must affirm the order if any of the theories advanced are 

meritorious. Mulvey v. Mobil Producing Tex. & NM, Inc., 147 S.W.3d 594, 604 

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied). 

A traditional summary judgment motion is properly granted under Tex. R. 

Civ. P. 166a(c) when the movant establishes that there are no genuine issues of 

material fact on at least one element of an opposing party's claim or pleads and/or 

conclusively establishes each element of its own affirmative defenses. Randall's 

Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995); Cathey v. Booth, 

900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995). 

2. Whether the record contains "some evidence" to support 

Appellant's arguments is not the focus of the Court's review. 

Appellant contends the District Court erred because the record contains 

"some evidence" to support certain of her arguments. See App.'s Br. at 2. This is 

not the applicable standard of review, however. Had OneWest moved for 

summary judgment under a no-evidence standard, Appellant's "some evidence" 

9 
arguments would have merit here. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Southwestern Elec. 

Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002). But OneWest only moved 

for (and the District Court granted) traditional summary judgment. C.R. 78-244, 

442, 456-57. As a result, this Court must only determine whether the record 

supports the District Court's ruling that there were no genuine issues of material 

fact on Appellant's claims. See, e.g., Johnson, 891 S.W.2d at 644. 

B. The Record Establishes That Appellant Is Not a Borrower 

1. Appellant is not a party to the Loan Agreement or Note. 

The Loan Agreement and the Note establish the mutual promises made by 

each party to the Loan. See C.R. 102-07, 216-24. In particular, they set forth who 

is entitled to receive the loan proceeds and the conditions for repayment (among 

other things). See id. Both the Loan Agreement and Note were signed by Mr. 

Larsen only. C.R. 107, 223. In addition, both provide that Mr. Larsen is the only 

borrower. C.R. 102, 216. Neither Appellant's name nor signature appear 

anywhere on either document. See C.R. 102-07, 216-24. Accordingly, Mr. Larsen 

was the only person to whom funds were loaned or who was under any obligation 

to repay them. See id. Simply put, Appellant did not "borrow" anything. 

2. Appellant was ineligible to be a borrower due to her age. 

To be eligible to obtain an HECM, the FHA requires that all borrowers or 

co-borrowers be 62 years of age or older at the time of application/execution 

(among other things). See 12 U.S.C. §1715z-20(b)(1); 24 CFR §206.33; HUD 

10 
PUBLICATION, FHA REVERSE MORTGAGES (HECMs) FOR SENIORS. As a result, 

FFSFC (and any other entity originating reverse mortgages) was prohibited by 

federal law from providing an HECM to anyone under the age of 62. In this case, 

Appellant was well-under the age of 62 at the time Mr. Larsen obtained the HECM 

in 2005. See C.R. at 5. Accordingly, pursuant to mandatory FHA borrower 

eligibility requirements, Appellant was ineligible—as a matter of law—to be either 

a borrower or a co-borrower on the HECM. If Appellant had tried to be a borrower 

on the Loan, the Loan would not (and could not) have been approved. Thus, to 

adopt Appellant's construction of the term "borrower" would subvert the federallymandated conditions necessary for origination of the HECM. 

3. Appellant testified she is not a borrower. 

At the temporary injunction hearing, Appellant was asked by her attorney if 

the mortgage broker had explained the reverse mortgage to her. She answered: 

Yes . . . . He said we could do it, but I could not. My husband could 

not get all the money unless I signed the papers over, my part. . . . 

And that's the only reason I signed those papers knowing that when I 

reached 62 . . . we could go back to [the broker] and get papers redone 

and I could be put back on the mortgage. 

C.R. 236 at 21:16-22:11. Appellant's testimony not only establishes that she 

knew she was ineligible due to her age, but also that she knew she had to take 

additional steps to become a borrower upon turning 62. Appellant later testified 

that she never took those steps, even after turning 62. C.R. 236 at 24:11-15. 

11 
4. Appellant signed multiple loan documents as the "non-borrower." 

Mr. Larsen and Appellant both signed the Waiver of Homestead Rights and 

the Non-Borrower Spouse Certification. C.R. 122-23. Tellingly, Mr. Larsen 

signed each as the "borrower" and Appellant signed each as the "non-borrower 

spouse." Id. Further, Appellant initialed each paragraph of the Non-Borrower 

Spouse Certification under the "non-borrower spouse" heading (whereas Mr. 

Larsen initialed the same paragraphs as the "borrower"). C.R. 123. In addition, 

Appellant acknowledged in both documents that she understood her husband was 

the sole borrower and that she may have to move from the Property if he 

predeceases her and the Loan is not repaid. C.R. 122-23. 

C. Appellant's Description As a Borrower on the Deed of Trust Did Not 

Alter Her Legal Status or Prevent OneWest from Accelerating the Loan 

Following Mr. Larsen's Death 

1. As an initial matter, Texas law required Appellant to sign the 

Deed of Trust. 

Even though Mr. Larsen was the only borrower, FFSFC could not have 

issued him the Loan unless Appellant joined in granting the Deed of Trust. The 

Texas Constitution, Article XVI, Section 50(k)(1) requires all reverse mortgages to 

be secured by a voluntary lien on the borrower's homestead. Further, this lien 

must be "created by a written agreement with the consent of each owner and each 

owner's spouse." TEX. CONST. ART. XVI §50(k)(1). Here, Mr. Larsen was the 

exclusive owner of the homestead Property as a result of the Special Warranty 

12 
Deed. See C.R. 120-21. The Texas Constitution thus mandated that his spouse—

Appellant—join him in granting the Deed of Trust. See TEX. CONST. ART. XVI 

§50(k)(1). 

Likewise, any time a homestead is encumbered by a lien, the Texas Family 

Code Section 5.001 requires both spouses to join in the encumbrance, regardless of 

"[w]hether the homestead is the separate property of either spouse or community 

property." Therefore, as Mr. Larsen's spouse, Appellant was also required by the 

Texas Family Code to sign the Deed of Trust. 

2. Applying the rules of contract construction to the Loan 

documents, it is indisputable that Mr. Larsen was the only 

borrower. 

Despite executing multiple documents as the non-borrower spouse, not 

signing the Note or Loan Agreement, and even admitting to the District Court that 

she was not a borrower, Appellant submits that she should nevertheless be treated 

the same as a borrower because one line in the Deed of Trust labels her and Mr. 

Larsen as the "Borrower." See App.'s Br. at 11. The District Court properly 

determined, however, that this alone was insufficient to create a genuine issue of 

material fact regarding whether OneWest could accelerate the Loan upon Mr. 

Larsen's death. C.R. 442, 456-57. The established rules of contract construction 

support the District Court's determination. 

13 
(a) The Court must consider all of the loan documents when 

determining the parties' intent. 

It is axiomatic under Texas law that a court's primary goal in interpreting a 

written contract is to determine the intention of the parties based on the plain 

language of the documents. Reilly v. Rangers Mgmt., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 527, 529 

(Tex. 1987). 

Appellant's evidence that she is a borrower is limited to just one line in one 

of the documents comprising this loan transaction. This "evidence," however, may 

not be considered in a vacuum. For more than a century, Texas law has recognized 

that all documents executed as part of a loan transaction must be considered as part 

of the contract between the parties. As stated by the Texas Supreme Court, "all the 

instruments executed at the same time, and in regard to the same matter, must be 

held in legal effect as but one instrument. Under the repeated decisions of this 

court, the [Deed of Trust and Note], taken together, evidence but an executory 

contract by [plaintiff] to sell the land in controversy to [defendant]." McKelvain v. 

Allen, 58 Tex. 383, 387 (1883); see also Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Tex. 

1981) ("The general rule is that separate instruments or contracts executed at the 

same time, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction are to 

be considered as one instrument, and are to be read and construed together."); 

Braniff Inv. Co. v. Robertson, 81 S.W.2d 45, 50 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1935) 

(quoting McKelvain); Bierwirth v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 2012 WL 

14 
3793190 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 30, 2012, no pet.) ("the note and deed of trust 

must be read together when evaluating their provisions"); Warren v. Bank of Am., 

NA., 2012 WL 3020075 (N.D. Tex. June 19, 2012) ("the note and deed of trust 

must be read together in evaluating the terms and construed together as a single 

instrument"). 

Appellant submits that while "[t]his may ordinarily be the rule. . . . this is not 

the ordinary situation; this was a reverse mortgage that mandates the existence of a 

written agreement which must be consented to by both the husband and a the 

wife." App.'s Br. at 25-26. But Appellant does not establish why this requirement 

forces the Court to deviate from the century-old rule that all of the loan documents 

must be construed as a single contract, and indeed it should not. 

Even focusing (as Appellant would like the Court to do) solely on the Deed 

of Trust, Appellant's proffer does not support her claim that the parties intended 

her to be a borrower. Every substantive and/or operative use of the word borrower 

in the Deed of Trust plainly refers only to Mr. Larsen. For example, the first 

paragraph of the Deed of Trust states: 

Borrower has agreed to repay to Lender amounts which Lender is 

obligated to advance, including future advances, under the terms of a 

Home Equity Conversion Loan Agreement dated the same date as this 

Security Instrument ("Loan Agreement"). The agreement to repay is 

evidenced by Borrower's Adjustable Rate Note dated the same date as 

this Security Instrument ("Note"). 

15 
C.R. 108-09. The only person who borrowed money and agreed to repay it 

was Mr. Larsen; he is the sole signatory on both the Note and the Loan Agreement. 

C.R. 102-07, 216-24. The provisions of the Deed of Trust clearly were not 

intended to apply to Appellant. 

(b) In a situation where the terms of the Deed of Trust and 

Note conflict, the terms of the Note prevail. 

Appellant also contends that the terms of the Deed of Trust should trump 

those of the Note. App.'s Br. at 26. This position squarely conflicts with wellestablished Texas law. Pentico v. Mad-Wayler, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 708, 715 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied) ("where there is conflict between the 

terms of the note and the language of the security instrument, whether deed of trust 

or mortgage, the latter must yield."); In re Tucker, 391 B.R. 404, 409 (Bankr. S.D. 

Tex. 2008) ("if there is a conflict between the note and the deed of trust, the note 

prevails"). Thus, to the extent there is any conflict between the Note and the Deed 

of Trust regarding when OneWest could properly accelerate the debt, the terms of 

the Note prevail as a matter of law. Accordingly, because the Loan became due 

upon the death of all borrowers and the Note provides that Mr. Larsen is the sole 

"borrower," the District Court did not err in determining that OneWest could 

accelerate the debt after he passed away. 

16 
(c) A single descriptive label does not alter the clear intention 

of the parties. 

The only reference in the Deed of Trust to Appellant is at the beginning 

when she and Mr. Larsen are described as Trustors, which term is then relabeled as 

"borrower." This description is not controlling, however. It is axiomatic that 

descriptive labels in a contract do not determine or control the legal status of the 

parties. Indeed, "[w]ords used by the parties in a contract do not necessarily 

control the substance of the relationship, nor do the terms used by the parties in 

referring to the arrangement." Stephanz v. Laird, 846 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 1993, writ denied); see also Ingram v. Deere, 288 

S.W.3d 886, 900 (Tex. 2009) ("The terms used by the parties in referring to the 

arrangement do not control."); Coastal Plains Dev. Corp. v. Micrea, Inc., 572 

S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex. 1978) ("when the record demonstrates that the actual effect 

of the arrangement resulting from the agreement is to create a status different from 

that stated in the language of the contract, the parties' designation will not 

control.") 

Instead of relying on descriptive labels, as Appellant does here, courts are 

instructed to look beyond the labels to the operative contractual clauses of the 

agreement to determine the legal status of the parties and the agreement. Neece v. 

A.A.A. Realty Co., 322 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex. 1959) ("greater weight must be 

given to the operative contractual clauses of the agreement, for 'An instrument is 

17 
that which its language shows it to be, without regard to what it is labeled"); 

Coastal Plains Dev. Corp., 572 S.W.2d at 287 (Tex. 1978) (the terms of the 

agreement control over the parties' designations); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Attayi, 

745 S.W.2d 939, 946 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 1988, no writ) (a contract is 

defined by it terms without regard to the parties' labels). 

If the descriptive labels are ignored and the clauses in the Note and Deed of 

Trust are construed together, it is readily apparent that the only intended borrower 

was Mr. Larsen. He is the only person entitled to receive the loan proceeds and the 

only person obligated to repay them. Moreover, this interpretation harmonizes the 

identical acceleration clauses in the Note and Deed of Trust, whereas Appellant's 

construction would effectively moot the acceleration clause in the Note. Accepting 

Appellant's position would violate this Court's obligation when interpreting a 

contract to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that 

none will be rendered meaningless. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 

1983). 

(d) The Court must attempt to harmonize the provisions of the 

Note and Deed of Trust. 

Both the Note and Deed of Trust provide that OneWest "may require 

immediate payment in full of all outstanding principal and interest if . . . [a]ll 

Borrowers die." C.R. 105 at ¶7(A); 111 at 119(a)(0. Because Mr. Larsen was the 

sole borrower on the Note, Appellant cannot dispute that OneWest was entitled to 

18 
require immediate repayment of the Note upon his death. Appellant's construction 

of Paragraph 9(a)(i) of the Deed of Trust, however, means that OneWest must 

nevertheless wait until Appellant also passes away before OneWest may require 

immediate repayment. In other words, Appellant's position, if true, means that 

OneWest's acceleration of the debt was both permitted (under the Note) and 

prohibited (under the Deed of Trust). Plainly, a contractual construction which 

both permits and prohibits the same act is an absurdity. The Court should instead 

interpret these provisions as they were intended—that is, that the Loan became due 

and payable upon (only) Mr. Larsen's death. See Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393. 

(e) Courts generally may not rewrite contractual provisions. 

Appellant's construction would also require this Court to rewrite operative 

sections of the Note and Deed of Trust contrary to the rules of contractual 

construction. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 162 (Tex. 

2003) ("[W]e may neither rewrite the parties' contract nor add to its language."). 

Indeed, Appellant's construction would effectively rewrite the Note such that 

OneWest could not require repayment until both Mr. Larsen and Appellant die, 

even though Appellant is not a party to the Note. Likewise, it would also 

effectively rewrite the Note to impose the repayment obligations on Appellant, for 

which neither she nor OneWest bargained. 

Simply put, there is no conceivable way that the Note and Deed of Trust, 

19 
together with the ancillary loan documents which make up the parties' agreement, 

can be read to infer that the parties intended anything other than that Mr. Larsen 

would be the sole borrower on the loan. This becomes particularly apparent when 

coupled with the fact that Appellant repeatedly acknowledged (and executed 

numerous documents reflecting) that she was a non-borrower spouse—both when 

Mr. Larsen applied for the loan and again when the loan closed. 

Applying these well-settled maxims of contract construction to all of the 

loan documents comprising the HECM loan—which, under Texas law, must be 

construed together in ascertaining the parties' intent—lead to the inescapable 

conclusion that Appellant was not an intended borrower on the loan. Accordingly, 

the District Court properly dismissed Appellant's claim that OneWest must wait 

until both she and Mr. Larsen passed away before accelerating the debt. 

D. The Waiver of Homestead Rights and Special Warranty Deed Are Valid 

Appellant claims throughout her brief that both the Waiver of Homestead 

Rights and the Special Warranty Deed are invalid and, as a result, she maintained 

her interest in the Property and must be considered a borrower. Appellant is 

incorrect that a Texas homeowner cannot waiver her homestead rights, however. 

Similarly, Appellant's ex post facto claim that the Special Warranty Deed is 

invalid is equally without merit. 

20 
1. Texas law permits waiver of homestead rights. 

Texas courts have repeatedly and consistently held that homestead rights 

may be waived. See Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex. 1978); 

Ferguson v. Ferguson, 111 S.W.3d 589, 598 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. 

denied); Hunter v. Clark, 687 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1985, no 

writ). Waiver is defined as the intentional relinquishment of a right actually 

known, or intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming that right. Ferguson, 111 

S.W.3d at 598; Brandywood Housing, Ltd. v. HCAD, No. 14-08-00404-CV, 2010 

WL 1752334 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 4, 2010, no pet.). Any intent 

to waive must be clear, decisive and unequivocal. Ferguson, 111 S.W.3d at 598; 

Tenneco Inc. v. Enterprise Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Tex. 1996). 

At least one recent Texas case has found that a party's execution of a 

document analogous to the Waiver of Homestead Rights at issue here constituted 

waiver as a matter of law. See Thompson v. Kerr, No. 14-08-00978-CV, 2010 WL 

2361636 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 15, 2010, no pet.). In Thompson, 

the Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld summary judgment on an affirmative 

defense of waiver where the parties had signed a settlement agreement waiving 

their claims against each other. The Court succinctly explained that "here, 

[defendant's] waiver argument rest[ed] solely on the language of the Settlement 

Agreement" which, by its very terms, made clear that plaintiffs' had signed the 

21 
settlement agreement with full knowledge of their potential claims and intent not to 

assert or bring same. 

2. The Waiver of Homestead Rights is valid. 

Appellant's execution of the Waiver of Homestead Rights more than meets 

this standard. See C.R. 122. She testified that she willingly signed the Waiver and 

understood that she needed to do so in order for her husband to obtain the loan 

proceeds. C.R. 238-39 at 32:8-33:14. As in Thompson, Appellant had full 

knowledge of the consequences of executing the Waiver of Homestead Rights. 

The Waiver itself spelled out, by its very terms, that in signing the document 

Appellant was giving-up her homestead rights and could be forced to move for her 

home. C.R. 122. Appellant clearly, decisively and unequivocally relinquished her 

homestead rights in order for her husband to obtain the reverse mortgage loan. See 

Ferguson, 111 S.W.3d at 598; Tenneco Inc., 925 S.W.2d at 643. Simply put, 

Appellamt cannot now complain that, contrary to her express actions, she 

"intended" to act differently. 

3. The Special Warranty Deed is valid. 

Appellant contends that the Special Warranty Deed is invalid because (1) 

she did not actually intend to convey her interest to her husband and (2) she did not 

receive consideration. App.'s Br. at 19-23. Appellant's own testimony, plus the 

plain language of the Deed itself, defeat her arguments. 

22 
(a) Appellant testified she actually intended to convey her 

interest to her husband. 

According to Appellant, the standard for determining whether such deeds are 

valid is "whether the grantor actually intended to sell the homestead." App.'s Br. 

at 20. Appellant testified this was precisely her intention: 

Q. (By Mr. Levine) Now, did you sign — did you sign a deed 

conveying your husband the interest in the property? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And was it your intent actually to convey him that interest? 

A. Yes. 

C.R. 236 at 23:7-12. This testimony alone is fatal to Appellant's argument 

that she did not actually intend to sell her interest to her husband. 

(b) The Deed is supported by consideration. 

Appellant also claims the Deed is void because she did not receive any 

consideration from her husband for her interest. App.'s Br. at 10. As with her 

prior argument, this convenient, ex post facto claim is defeated by her own 

statements. Appellant acknowledged in her notarized Deed that she granted her 

interest "[fl or and in consideration of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good and 

valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby 

acknowledged . . . ." C.R. 120. Appellant cannot now claim, against the plain and 

unambiguous face of the Special Warranty Deed, that she did not receive any 

consideration. Her only "evidence" to support her assertion is her ipse dixit 

statement that can never be proven. The District Court properly determined this 

23 
was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of 

the Deed. 

Further, the gravity of Appellant's statements should not be lost on this 

Court. Appellant tells the Court that she had no intention of honoring the Special 

Warranty Deed at the time she signed it. Thus, she concealed her true intention 

and signed the document so she and her husband could obtain loan proceeds. As a 

party requesting that the Court exercise its powers of equity to "modify the Loan 

so that the indebtedness is deferred" until her death, Appellant's fraudulent 

conduct bars her from obtaining equitable relief here. See Skelton v. Washington 

Mut. Bank, F.A., 61 S.W.3d 56, 61 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (after 

noting that plaintiff and her husband had concealed their marriage from the bank to 

obtain the loan, the Court held: "[B]ecause Skelton and her husband agreed that 

Skelton would not also apply for the loan because her credit history was not 

favorable, she is not entitled to any relief because her acts in concealing her 

interest."). 

E. Even if the Waiver of Homestead Rights and/or the Special Warranty 

Deed Are Invalid, OneWest Still Had the Right to Accelerate the Debt 

Upon Mr. Larsen's Death. 

The purpose of Waiver of Homestead Rights and the Special Warranty Deed 

was to ensure FHA's first lien priority on the Property. The FHA requires that the 

HECM lender's lien be the first lien on the property at issue, and that other liens 

24 
and claims (including potential homestead claims by non-borrower spouses) be 

satisfied or released. Because Appellant was a non-borrower spouse, in order for 

Mr. Larsen to proceed with securing the HECM, Appellant was required to give-up 

her homestead rights by deeding her interest in the Property to Mr. Larsen. Absent 

Appellant's relinquishment of her homestead rights—because she was under the 

age of 62—the FHA would not have permitted Mr. Larsen to procure the HECM. 

Thus, Appellant's argument that, if she retained her ownership and 

homestead rights, she must be a considered a borrower for the Deed of Trust to 

comply with the Texas Constitution misses the mark. See App.'s Br. at 11. There 

is no requirement in the Texas Constitution or otherwise that all owners of the 

Property must be a party to the reverse mortgage for it to be valid (and, tellingly, 

Appellant has pointed to none). See TEX. CONST. ART. XVI §50(k). 

Accordingly, whether Appellant actually waived her homestead rights and/or 

deeded her property interest to her husband is irrelevant to whether OneWest may 

foreclose the Property. Skelton v. Washington Mut. Bank, F.A., 61 S.W.3d 56 

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.) is directly on point. There, plaintiffs 

husband bought a house during the marriage using a purchase money loan. Id. at 

58. Plaintiff's husband was the sole borrower on the loan. Id. This loan was 

evidenced by a note and secured by a deed of trust. Id. The home was Plaintiff 

and her husband's homestead and the couple's community property. Id. at 59. 

25 
Following the death of plaintiff's husband, the bank sought to foreclose the deed of 

trust. Id. at 58. Plaintiff filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that, among 

other things, her homestead and community property rights in the home prevented 

the bank from foreclosing its lien. Id. The bank prevailed on its motion for 

summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 

trial court. Id. In so doing, the Court first observed that the Texas Constitution 

expressly permits purchase money liens to encumber homesteads. Id. at 60. Next, 

the Court found that purchase money liens on homesteads were enforceable 

pursuant to Section 41.001(b) of the Texas Property Code. Id. The Court of 

Appeals therefore concluded that "even if the property became impressed with 

homestead claims upon its acquisition, the purchase money lien is not invalid or 

unenforceable under the constitutional provision and is subject to enforcement by 

the express provisions of section 41.001(b) of the Texas Property Code." Id. at 61. 

Likewise, the Court found that the wife's ownership interest in the property could 

not stop the lender from foreclosing its lien because the lien was authorized by, 

and complied with, the Constitution and the Texas Property Code. Id. 

The same applies here. As with purchase money liens, the Texas 

Constitution allows reverse mortgage liens to be fixed on homesteads. Tex. Const. 

art XVI, §§ 50(a)(7), 50(c). And, Texas Property Code 41.001(b)(7) expressly 

provides that "[e]ncumbrances may be properly fixed on homestead property for . . 

26 
. a reverse mortgage that meets the requirements of Sections 50(k)-(p), Article 

XVI, Texas Constitution." Appellant has failed to show how her alleged retention 

of her homestead rights and/or ownership interest in the Property cause the Loan to 

violate the law. Thus, while an invalid Special Warranty Deed and/or Waiver of 

Homestead Rights could potentially cause the Deed of Trust to lose its first lien 

priority, these documents have no bearing on the validity of the Loan or 

OneWest's authority to accelerate the debt following the death of Mr. Larsen. 

F. The Loan's Insurability Has Nothing to Do with Its Validity 

Citing 12 U.S.C. §1715z-20(j), Appellant proclaims the HECM cannot be 

insured unless acceleration of the debt is deferred until both homeowners die. 

App.'s Br. at 14. She then suggests that this somehow alters the intent of the 

parties as evidenced by the documents they signed. Appellant is simply wrong on 

this point. The statute at issue does not compel a lender to originate a loan 

containing any particular terms, but rather only governs the FHA's obligation to 

insure the lender based upon the terms of the loan. Whether the FHA will insure 

this loan or not is, of course, wholly irrelevant to the question of whether OneWest 

may foreclose based on the terms of the Loan. In short, this argument is nothing 

more than a red herring, apparently advanced for the sole purpose of distracting the 

Court from the real issues in this case. 

27 
G. The District Court Did Not Err in Granting OneWest's Summary 

Judgment Motion 

The evidence in the record plainly supports the District Court's decision. 

There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether (1) OneWest was 

authorized to accelerate the debt upon the death of all borrowers; (2) Mr. Larsen 

was the only borrower; (3) OneWest accelerated the debt following Mr. Larsen's 

death; (4) the debt was not repaid; (5) failure to repay the debt was an event of 

default; and (6) OneWest initiated foreclosure proceedings upon the default. 

Likewise, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of the 

Deed of Trust, Special Warranty Deed or the Waiver of Homestead Rights. 

Therefore, the District Court's Summary Judgment Order was proper. 

Accordingly, the District Court's judgment must be affirmed. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated herein, the Court should affirm the District Court's 

Order Granting OneWest's Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as 

grant Appellee such other and further relief, in law or in equity, to which it is justly 

entitled. 

28 
Date: April 7, 2015 

Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Thomas M Hanson 

Thomas M. Hanson 

State Bar No. 24068703 

thanson@dykema.com Kevin A. Teters 

State Bar No. 24075678 

kteters(&,dykema.com 

DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC 

1717 Main Street, Suite 4200 

Dallas, Texas 75201 

(214) 462-6400 — Telephone 

(214) 462-6401 — Facsimile 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 

ONEWEST BANK N.A. 

29 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

I certify that this Response Brief complies with the typeface requirements of 

Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no 

smaller than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also 

complies with the word-count limitations of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i), if applicable, 

because it contains 6,774 words, excluding any parts exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 

9.4(i)(1). 

DATED: April 7, 2015 

CERTIFIED BY: /s/ Thomas M Hanson 

Thomas M. Hanson 

Counsel for Appellee OneWest Bank N.A. 

30 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 

served via the Court's ECF system on Appellant's counsel on April 7, 2015. 

/s/ Thomas M Hanson 

Thomas M. Hanson 

31