COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Frank, Kelsey and Alston Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia

LAWREESE JEROME BOWSER MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0662-13-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK MARCH 4, 2014 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK John R. Doyle, III, Judge Diane P. Toscano (The Law Firm of Diane P. Toscano, P.C., on brief), for appellant. John W. Blanton, Assistant Attorn ey General (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Lawreese Jerome Bowser, appellant, was convi cted in a bench trial of three counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, second or subsequent offense, in violation of Code § 18.2-248. The convictions are for incidents that occurred on three separate dates. On appeal, he argues that no rational trier of fact could have found him guilty, as he did not initiate the drug transactions and was instead persuaded by a police officer to sell drugs to her. Essentially, he contends he wa s the victim of entrapment. 1 For the reasons stated, we disagree with appellant and affirm the trial court.
BACKGROUND “On appeal, ‘we review the evidence in th e light most favorabl e to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reason able inferences fairly deducible theref rom.’” Archer v. Commonwealth, 26

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 Appellant does not contest that he sold drugs to the police officer.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S. E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (q uoting Martin v. Commonw ealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 41 5, 418 (1987)). So viewed, on the afternoon of Februa ry 16, 2012, Norfolk Police Investigator Dallas Greeson was working undercover w ith the Vice & Narcotics Unit. Greeson approached a man who was walking down Manson Avenue. Invest igator Greeson asked th e man “who was looking out,” which is common street parlance for who is selling or who has drugs. The man nodded across the street in the di rection of a man whom Grees on identified as appellant. Appellant approached Investigator Greeson’ s car and asked what she wanted. Greeson said she wanted a dub, which is a street term fo r $20 worth of crack cocaine. Appellant asked Greeson if she was the police, and she said she was not. Appellant said, “Look, I have a lot to lose.” Greeson responded that she also had a lo t to lose and that sh e was trying to get her children back. Investigator Grees on also gave appellant her phone number when he asked for it. Greeson told appellant, “[n]o one really wants to f*** with me out here.” Appellant took a couple of steps back and hesitated. At trial, Greeson explained that she meant that no one else was willing to sell drugs to her. Appellant then asked Greeson where the m oney was, and she handed him $20. Appellant dropped a small, rocklike substance into Greeson ’s passenger seat. The substance was later identified as crack cocaine. As Investigator Greeson drove away, she received a phone call, and she recognized the caller’s voice as appellant’s. He identified hims elf as DL and told her to call him back if she needed to get another hookup. On February 20, 2012, Investigator Greeson telephoned appellant and told him she “needed a little fix.” Appellant said, “I don’t do that anymore. I’m saved.” Greeson said okay, and then appellant asked her where she was. Afte r she told him, appellant told Greeson to meet- 3 - him at a nearby restaurant. Greeson asked a ppellant, “are you goi ng to hook me up?” and appellant told her to just meet him at the restaurant. When Investigator Greeson arrived at the restau rant, she called appellan t. He told her to come inside because he had food for her. Grees on told him she did not want any food and was going to get sick if she didn’t get “the stuff.” Appellant came outside and got into Greeson’s car. He told Greeson that he was very skeptical of her. Appellant asked Greeson, “[a]re you going to ride with me to get it?” Greeson responded thatshe would, and she star ted to pull out of the parking lot. Then appellant got out of Greeson’s car, and he told Greeson, “Meet me at the street you were before the first time but on the next street over. I’m going to follow you.” At appellant’s direction, Invest igator Greeson drove to Vine St reet. When she got there, she called appellant and asked him where he was. Appellant said he had to drop off a car and would be there within twenty minutes. Ten minutes later, Greeson drove away and called appellant. She told him she had to leave, sa ying, “my old man’s going to whip my ass if I don’t get home.” Appellant said he was coming to he r. Greeson made a U-turn, and a car honked at her. Appellant was in the pa ssenger seat of the car. The car pulled up beside Greeson. Appellant nodded at the driver, who then held out his hand. Greeson gave the driver $25, and the driver handed the money to appellant. A ppellant handed the driver two small baggies of suspected crack, and the driver dropped them into Greeson’s hand. On February 23, 2012, Investigator Greeson ca lled the phone number appellant had given her. There was no answer. Greeson then drove to the 1500 block of Manson Street, the location where the first sale had occurred, and saw appe llant. She asked appellant who was “looking out” that day. Appellant responded, “huh?” and Grees on said “let me get a dub.” Appellant again said, “huh?” and Greeson repeated, “let me get a quick dub.” Appellant sa id he did not do that, so Greeson said, “listen, baby, give me a call.” Appellant nodded and said okay.- 4 - Greeson drove away and pulled into the parki ng lot of a convenience store. As she was pulling in, a small white car pulled up behind her and started honking the horn. Appellant was driving, and he pulled in beside Investigator Greeson. Greeson rolled down her window, and appellant told her to get out of the car. As she approached the driver’s side of appellant’s car, he opened the door and threw a small bag of suspect ed crack cocaine to the ground, then held out his hands. Greeson asked appellant where the ba g was, and he pointed to the ground. Greeson handed appellant $20, picked up the bag, and left the parking lot. The Commonwealth introduced appellant’s prior conviction order for possession of heroin with intent to distribute, and it was admitted into evidence without objection. At trial, Investigator Greeson acknowledge d being friendly and using terms like “baby” and “dear” with appellant. She de nied flirting with appellant. The trial court found that the first incident wa s “quite straightforward” with no evidence of entrapment. The court further noted that appellant gave Investigator Greeson his phone number after that transaction, i ndicating “a willingness to engage in future sales.” The court went on to say “that certainly i ndicates – I think just in and of itself indicates that there’s no entrapment here.” Regarding the second tran saction, the court noted that although appellant initially said he no longer solddrugs when Greeson called him, he then directed her to a restaurant, where he sold drugs to her. As fo r the third incident, the court noted that after appellant told Greeson he did not sell drugs, Greeson left and we nt to a convenience store, but appellant followed her and made another sale. The trial court did not accept appellant’s entrapment defense. This appeal follows.- 5 - ANALYSIS Appellant contends that no rational trier of fact could have found him guilty, because he did not initiate the drug transactions wi th Investigator Greeson, but inst ead was persuaded, or entrapped, into selling drugs to Greeson. Sufficiency When the sufficiency of the evidence is cha llenged on appeal, this Court will “review the evidence in the light most favo rable to the Commonweal th and give it all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom.” McGee v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 317, 322, 357 S.E.2d 738, 740 (1987). We will affirm the judgment appealed from unless it appears from the evidence that it “is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. ” Id. (citing Naulty v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 523, 529, 346 S.E.2d 540, 544 (1986)). Moreover, “[i]f there is evidence to suppor t the convic tion, an appellate court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of fact, even if the appe llate court might have reached a different conc lusion.” Commonwealth v. Presley, 256 Va. 465, 466, 507 S.E. 2d 72, 72 (1998). Furthermore, “[t]he cred ibility of a witness and the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are matters solely for the fact finder’s determination. In its role of ju dging witness cred ibility, the fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused and to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt.” Marable v. Commonwealth , 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998) (citations omitted). Snow v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 76 6, 774, 537 S.E. 2d 6, 10 (2000). Entrapment When an appellant asserts an entrapment defens e, the subject of entrapment is an issue of fact and should be resolved by the trial court, as the trier of fact. Schneider v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 379, 383, 337 S.E.2d 735, 737 (1985). The trial court’s factual findings “will not be- 6 - disturbed on appeal unless plai nly wrong or without evidence to support them.” Id. at 382, 337 S.E.2d at 736. Entrapment is an affirmative defense. See McCoy v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 227, 229, 385 S.E.2d 628, 630 (1989). “In Virginia, a crim inal defendant typically bears the burden of ‘producing evidence in support of [an affirma tive defense] sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of [his or her] guilt.’” Williams v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 341, 352, 702 S.E.2d 260, 265 (2010) (quoting Regular Veteran’s Asso c., Ladies Auxiliary v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 683, 688, 446 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1994)). “‘Entrapment is the conception and pla nning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer.’” Mc Coy, 9 Va. App. at 231, 385 S.E.2d at 630 (quoting Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707, 715, 324 S.E .2d 682, 687 (1985)). “There is nothing improper in the use, by the police, of decoys, under cover agents, and informers to invite the exposure of willing criminals and to present an o pportunity to one willing to commit a crime.” Stamper, 228 Va. at 707, 324 S.E.2d at 687. In this case, there was no entrapment. Appellant had a reputa tion for selling drugs. When asked by Greeson who was selling drugs, the unidentified man nodded toward appellant. The first encounter between Greeson and appell ant was initiated by appellant. Further, appellant’s criminal record demonstrates that he has previously been c onvicted of selling drugs. Moreover, during the first encounter with Invest igator Greeson, appellan t asked if she was the police, indicating that he knew he was about to commit a crime. When Greeson gave appellant money, he gave her the cocaine im mediately. The fact that the drugs were already on his person shows his predisposition to sell drugs.- 7 - Furthermore, appellant’s initial hesitancy to sell to Investigator Gr eeson is not surprising. He was about to commit an illegal act, and many people in that situati on would act with some caution. This is particularly true in this cas e, as appellant did not know Greeson. However, appellant initiated the contact with Investigator Greeson, be fore she made any overture toward him, and despite his initial caution, appellant so ld to Greeson shortly after meeting her. After that first transaction, appellant reached out to Greeson once more by calling her and telling her to call him if she need ed to buy drugs again. As the trial court properly noted, this act demonstrated appellant’s predisposition to e ngage in future illegal drug transactions. When Greeson called appellant on February 20, appellant told her he had been saved and no longer sold drugs. Greeson did not attempt to talk appellant into the sale. However, appellant then asked Greeson where she was and told her to m eet him at a restaurant. Appellant set up that transaction and later sold her tw o baggies of crack cocaine. The third transaction occurred on February 23. Again, while appell ant initially denied that he was selling drugs, he followed Greeson af ter she left. Appellant reinitiated the contact with Greeson, and he complete d a third drug transaction. Appellant may have expressed some hesitati on before he sold cocaine to Investigator Greeson, but this does not equate with entrapment. “Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct was the product of a ‘cre ative activity’ th at implants in the mind of an otherwise innocent person the disposition to commit an offense.” Schneide r, 230 Va. at 382, 337 S.E.2d at 736 (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 815, 817-18, 180 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1971)). Even when Greeson asked appellant to sell to her, her actions did not constitute entrapment. See Neighbors v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 18, 19, 197 S.E.2d 207, 208 (1973) (where a police informant begged the defendant to sell him drugs, the defendant did not es tablish that he was entrapped).- 8 - Finally, we find that Investigator Greeson’s us e of terms such as “baby” and “dear” is of no significance. Greeson testified that while she smiled, acted friendly, and used those words, she did not flirt with appellant. Such terms of endearment, under the facts of this case, do not constitute entrapment, as appellan t initiated the drug transactions. The issue of entrapment in this case was a f actual issue resolved by the trial court in its capacity as trier of fact. Giving the judge’s factual findings the we ight to which they are entitled, we cannot say as a matter of law that they are plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence. See Schneider, 230 Va. at 383, 337 S.E.2d at 737. As such, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.
CONCLUSION Appellant was predisposed to sell drugs, so he was not entrapped by Investigator Greeson. As such, the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions, a nd the trial court did not err in finding him guilty. Affirmed.