NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 15-1517

___________

EARL STRONG,

Appellant

v.

TOWN OF SMYRNA DELAWARE; 

SMYRNA POLICE DEPARTMENT

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-14-cv-00465)

District Judge: Honorable Gregory M. Sleet

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 22, 2015

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 23, 2015)

___________

OPINION*

___________

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Earl Strong appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his 

complaint. We will affirm.

I.

In 2012, Strong filed a complaint against the Smyrna Police Department and two 

of its officers in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. Strong v. Dunning, C.A. 

No. K12C-07-005, 2013 WL 3481452 (Del. Super. Ct. June 27, 2013). He asserted 

several claims—including false arrest, wrongful imprisonment, malicious prosecution, 

and defamation—under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, all of which stemmed from his 

March 31, 2012 arrest. The defendants filed a summary judgment motion, which the 

Superior Court granted in June 2013, determining that the defendants were entitled to 

immunity from state tort liability and from liability under § 1983. Id. at *7. Strong 

thereafter filed a motion for reargument, which the Superior Court denied in October 

2013. Strong v. Dunning, C.A. No. K12C-07-005, 2013 WL 5784426 (Del. Super. Ct. 

Oct. 4, 2013). 

Strong did not appeal from the Superior Court’s judgment. Instead, in May 2014, 

he filed a complaint in the District Court against the Town of Smyrna Delaware and the 

Smyrna Police Department. Strong’s federal complaint was nearly identical to his 
Superior Court complaint. His claims, which again included false arrest, wrongful 

imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, stemmed from his March 31, 2012 arrest. The 

defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 

arguing that Strong’s claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The District 

Court agreed, and entered an order dismissing the case on January 26, 2015.1 

Strong timely appealed.

II. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over 

dismissals based on res judicata (also called claim preclusion). See Elkadrawy v. 

Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2009). A federal court must give full 

faith and credit to a final state-court judgment. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005). And as the District Court explained, when deciding 

whether the doctrine of res judicata applies, we look to state law to determine what effect

to give state-court judgments. See Turner v. Crawford Square Apts. III, L.P., 449 F.3d 

542, 548 (3d Cir. 2006). 

Under Delaware law, res judicata operates to preclude a later-filed claim where:

 

1 Although the defendants attached documents from the state court proceeding to its 

motion, the District Court did not need to convert the motion into one for summary 

judgment, as “[t]o resolve a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may properly look at public records, 

including judicial proceedings, in addition to the allegations in the complaint.” S. Cross 

Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 

1999). 
(1) the original court had jurisdiction over the subject matter 

and the parties; (2) the parties to the original action were the 

same as those parties, or in privity, in the case at bar; (3) the 

original cause of action or the issues decided was the same as 

the case at bar; (4) the issues in the prior action must have 

been decided adversely to the appellants in the case at bar; 

and (5) the decree in the prior action was a final decree. 

LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 970 A.2d 185, 192 (Del. 2009) (quoting Dover 

Hist. Soc’y, Inc. v. Dover Planning Comm’n, 902 A.2d 1084, 1092 (Del. 2006)). 

In this case, the District Court correctly determined that all of the elements 

necessary for res judicata to apply were satisfied, and therefore, that Strong’s claims were 

barred. First, the Superior Court had jurisdiction over the parties and Strong’s state tort 

and § 1983 claims. See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 318 (3d Cir. 2001) 

(“State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 cases.”). Additionally, the federal 

and state cases involved the same parties,2 Strong’s claims were denied by the Superior 

Court’s summary judgment decision, his motion for reargument was denied, and he did 

not appeal from the Superior Court’s judgments. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. 

Baron, 413 A.2d 876 (Del. 1980) (“[A] decision on a motion for summary judgment is a 

final decision on the merits, which enables the defense of res judicata to be raised in 

subsequent actions between the parties.”). 

 

2 The Superior Court stated that the Town of Smyrna was the proper municipal defendant 

rather than the Police Department, but that “[g]iven the liberal standard for construing pro 

se pleadings, the Court will treat Plaintiff’s claims against the Police Department as 

claims against the Town of Smyrna.” Strong, 2013 WL 3481452, at *1 n.1.
Finally, scrutiny of the complaints leaves no doubt that the claims in both the state 

and federal cases arise from the same “common nucleus of operative fact” or transaction. 

See LaPoint, 970 A.2d at 193. Strong’s claims arise out of his March 31, 2012 arrest, 

which was also the basis of his state court action. Under Delaware law, res judicata bars 

litigation “between the same parties if the claims in the later litigation arose from the 

same transaction that forms the basis of the previous litigation.” Maldonado v. Flynn, 

417 A.2d 378, 381 (Del. Ch. 1980.) Thus, even had Strong not brought nearly identical 

claims in both lawsuits, any claims that derived from his March 31, 2012 arrest were 

barred by res judicata. 

In short, all of the elements for invoking res judicata to bar Strong’s federal 

complaint were met. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 

Strong’s motion for default is denied.