[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-14063

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-03711-SCJ

JOHN ELMORE, JR., 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

FULTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

DEMARCOS HOLLAND, 

NICOLE K. SAUCE, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(April 8, 2014)

Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 1 of 25 
2

John Elmore, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his amended civil-rights 

complaint, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was illegally arrested and 

denied equal-protection rights in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the police officer 

who prepared affidavits for Elmore’s arrest is entitled to qualified immunity, and 

whether Elmore stated a claim of supervisor liability against the principal of the 

school in which the officer worked. After careful consideration, we affirm the 

dismissal of Elmore’s amended complaint.

I.

Elmore was employed by the Fulton County School District (the “District”)

as a paraprofessional educator.

1

 In that capacity, he assisted a classroom teacher in 

a class with moderately to severely disabled students. One student, who was 

wheelchair-bound and non-verbal, had a history of biting and scratching himself 

whenever he got angry or frustrated. The student would also bite at others if they 

attempted to stop him. 

On December 7, 2011, the student began scratching himself in class. To 

distract him and to stop him from scratching, according to the amended complaint, 

the teacher, Ms. Morrow, lightly sprayed the student with a fine mist of water. A 

 1

 We present the facts as alleged in the complaint, accepting the factual allegations as 

true and construing all reasonable inferences in Elmore’s favor. Butler v. Sheriff of Palm Beach 

Cnty., 685 F.3d 1261, 1265 (11th Cir. 2012). 

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 2 of 25 
3

special-needs nurse who had been meeting with the teacher saw the spraying. The 

nurse later determined that she had witnessed child abuse and made a complaint. 

Nicole Sauce2

, a police officer for the District, investigated the nurse’s 

complaint. Initially, Sauce prepared a memorandum. The entire allegation in the 

memo stated, “Teacher was observed by special needs nurse spraying a special 

needs student in the face for acting out in class.” 

Sauce then conducted several interviews regarding the incident. These 

interviews, which involved at least four witnesses—the classroom teacher, Elmore, 

the nurse, and a student—concerned, among other issues, who, if anyone, had 

sprayed the student. The classroom teacher, Ms. Morrow, specifically stated that

Elmore had not sprayed the student with water. Elmore denied spraying the 

student and stated that the spray bottle was used to demonstrate various things like 

rain. Sauce later falsely stated that Elmore had admitted spraying the student.3

After Sauce’s investigation, the principal of the school, Demarcos Holland, 

made a complaint against Elmore, alleging child abuse. Holland directed Sauce to 

obtain a warrant for Elmore’s arrest. Sauce did so without revealing the 

exculpatory information provided by Ms. Morrow. A Georgia state magistrate 

judge issued two warrants for Elmore’s arrest, one for “Cruelty to Children,”

 2

 At the time of the incident, Sauce’s last name was “Wright.” 

3

 It is not clear to whom Sauce made this statement.

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 3 of 25 
4

O.C.G.A § 16-5-70, and one for “Simple Battery,” O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23. In the 

affidavits for each warrant, Sauce swore that Elmore 

did spray a severe and profound juvenile repeatedly 

about the arms and face because he was agitated that the 

radio was turned down. [Elmore] used the spray to try 

any [sic] stop the juvenile from screaming only to further 

agitate him. . . . The incident took place in the presence 

of two witnesses, a cluster nurse and a student that 

confirmed the incident. 

Elmore was arrested and charged with cruelty to children in the third degree and 

simple battery. As a result, Elmore was fired by Holland and the District. 

II.

Elmore filed his complaint, which he later amended, in the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Elmore’s amended complaint 

asserted two causes of action under § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth 

Amendment for “illegal arrest” (against Sauce and Holland in their individual 

capacities), and violations of the Fourteenth Amendment for the denial of his 

equal-protection rights (against Holland and the District).4

 The defendants moved 

to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), 

Fed. R. Civ. P. Sauce invoked the defense of qualified immunity. 

 4

 Elmore does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of his claim against Holland 

and the District alleging the denial of his equal-protection rights. He also does not challenge the 

denial of his motion to amend his complaint with respect to these claims. We therefore deem 

Elmore’s equal-protections claims abandoned. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 

F.3d 678, 680-81 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that issues not raised on appeal are abandoned). 

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 4 of 25 
5

Elmore responded that Sauce was not entitled to qualified immunity because 

she withheld material, exculpatory information in order to obtain the arrest 

warrants, in violation of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978). 

Elmore also asserted that Sauce was not entitled to qualified immunity because the 

actions he allegedly committed were entitled to complete immunity under 

O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1001, which grants educators immunity from criminal liability for 

student discipline. Elmore argued that Holland was liable for ordering his arrest.

The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court 

determined that Sauce was entitled to qualified immunity. According to the district 

court, even if Sauce had included the exculpatory information, the warrant affidavit 

still established probable cause to arrest Elmore for the offense of simple battery. 

And, the court concluded, probable cause for simple battery rendered his arrest 

valid despite a lack of probable cause for cruelty to children in the third degree. 

Further, the court found, Elmore’s claim of immunity under O.C.G.A. § 20–2–

2001 was an affirmative defense that did not factor into the probable-cause 

assessment. The court also determined that Elmore’s claim against Holland failed 

because Elmore did not allege that Holland was Sauce’s supervisor, nor did he 

allege sufficient factual information to show that Holland directed Sauce to act in 

violation of Elmore’s constitutional rights. Elmore now appeals the dismissal of 

his amended complaint.

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 5 of 25 
6

III. 

We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., accepting the facts 

alleged in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the 

plaintiff’s favor. Butler v. Sheriff of Palm Beach Cnty., 685 F.3d 1261, 1265 (11th 

Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) 

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 

(2007)). 

IV. 

The defense of qualified immunity aims to strike a balance between “the 

need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly 

and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when 

they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 

129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009). Towards that end, qualified immunity protects 

government officials engaged in discretionary functions and sued in their 

individual capacities unless they violate “clearly established federal statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Keating v. 

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 6 of 25 
7

City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir.2013) (brackets and internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Under the qualified-immunity doctrine, the official must first show that she 

was engaged in a discretionary function. Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 

1120 (11th Cir. 2013). It is undisputed that Sauce has established this fact. 

The burden then shifts to Elmore to demonstrate that Sauce is not entitled to 

qualified immunity. See id. To do so, Elmore must show both that Sauce violated 

a constitutional right and that the right was “clearly established . . . in light of the 

specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition[,]” at the time of the 

alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156

(2001). A right must be clearly established to ensure that “officers are on notice 

their conduct is unlawful.” Id. at 206, 121 S. Ct. at 2158. In other words, the 

right’s “contours must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 

739, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2515 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). We may 

decide these issues in either order, but Elmore must make both showings to survive 

a qualified-immunity defense. Maddox, 727 F.3d at 1120-21.

Elmore primarily contends that Sauce is not entitled to qualified immunity 

because she violated Franks by omitting material, exculpatory evidence from her 

warrant affidavits. He also argues that his own immunity from criminal liability as 

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 7 of 25 
8

an educator under Georgia law negated a finding of probable cause and that Sauce 

should have disclosed his potential immunity to the magistrate. Finally, he asserts 

that he may maintain a claim based on the lack of probable cause to arrest for 

cruelty to children, even if probable cause existed for the offense of simple battery. 

A. Alleged Franks Violations

In Franks, the Supreme Court held that a warrant violates the Fourth 

Amendment if the affidavit supporting the warrant contains “deliberate falsity or . . 

. reckless disregard” for the truth. 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S. Ct. at 2684 (concerning a 

search warrant affidavit); see United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 327-29 (5th 

Cir. 1980) (applying Franks to an arrest warrant affidavit).5

 However, only false 

statements which are necessary to the finding of probable cause will invalidate a 

warrant. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S. Ct. at 2676.

The reasoning of Franks also applies to omissions from a warrant affidavit. 

Martin, 615 F.2d at 328. “Thus, a warrant affidavit violates the Fourth 

Amendment when it contains omissions made intentionally or with a reckless 

disregard for the accuracy of the affidavit.” Madiwale v. Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321, 

1326-27 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Without direct 

evidence of intentional or reckless conduct, a plaintiff may raise an inference of 

recklessness where “the facts omitted from the affidavit are clearly critical to a 

 5

 All cases from the former Fifth Circuit issued before October 1, 1981, are binding on 

the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981).

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 8 of 25 
9

finding of probable cause.” Martin, 615 F.2d at 329. Omissions that are made 

negligently will not invalidate a warrant. Madiwale, 117 F.3d at 1327. And “even 

intentional or reckless omissions will invalidate a warrant only if inclusion of the 

omitted facts would have prevented a finding of probable cause.” Id.; see also 

Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he warrant is valid if, 

absent the misstatements or omissions, there remains sufficient content to support a 

finding of probable cause.”). 

Elmore contends that Sauce omitted the following facts about the incident 

from the warrant affidavits: (1) the nurse made no complaint at the time of the 

spraying incident; (2) Sauce previously prepared a memo stating that “Teacher was 

observed by special needs nurse spraying a special needs student in the face for 

acting out in class”; and (3) Ms. Morrow had told Sauce that Elmore did not spray 

the student. As the district court did, we proceed directly to the question of 

whether Elmore’s allegations and the reasonable inferences drawn from them show 

that “inclusion of the omitted facts would have prevented a finding of probable 

cause.” Madiwale, 117 F.3d at 1327; see also Dahl, 312 F.3d at 1235. 

Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances, of which the official

has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe

that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense. 

Jordan v. Mosley, 487 F.3d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 2007). “No officer has a duty to 

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 9 of 25 
10

prove every element of a crime before making an arrest. Police officers are not 

expected to be lawyers or prosecutors.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Rather, in assessing probable cause, we deal with “the factual and practical 

considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], not 

legal technicians, act.” Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Sauce made out two warrant affidavits in this case, one for simple battery 

and the other for cruelty to children in the third degree. A person commits cruelty 

to children in the third degree when he is the “primary aggressor” and commits a 

“forcible felony, battery, or family violence battery” knowing or intending that a 

child under the age of 18 will witness the act. See O.C.G.A. § 16–5–70(d). A 

person commits simple battery when he either “(1) Intentionally makes physical 

contact of an insulting or provoking nature with the person of another; or (2)

Intentionally causes physical harm to another.” O.C.G.A. § 16–5–23.

Sauce swore to the same supporting facts in each affidavit. When we 

consider the facts alleged in the affidavits, as well as the omitted facts about which 

Elmore complains, the universe of facts includes the following: (1) Elmore 

sprayed a severe and profound juvenile repeatedly about the arms and face because 

he was agitated that the radio was turned down; (2) Elmore used the spray to try 

and stop the juvenile from screaming only to further agitate him; (3) a nurse 

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 10 of 25 
11

witnessed the student being sprayed and later made a complaint, but did not 

complain at the time; (4) Sauce’s initial memorandum regarding the complaint 

stated that “Teacher” sprayed the student; (5) the classroom teacher told Sauce that 

Elmore did not spray the student; and (6) the nurse and a juvenile student stated

that Elmore had sprayed the student.

We agree with the district court that the warrant affidavit does not establish

even arguable probable cause to believe that Elmore committed the crime of 

cruelty to children in the third degree. The affidavit does not allege the requisite 

forcible felony or battery, see, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 16–5–23.1(a) (requiring for the 

offense of “battery” the intentional causing of “substantial physical harm or visible 

bodily harm to another”), nor could the facts known to Sauce lead a reasonable 

person to believe that a forcible felony or battery had been committed. 

But including the omitted facts when determining whether probable cause 

existed to believe that Elmore committed the offense of simple battery does not 

negate the probable cause that the magistrate judge found for that offense. See 

Madiwale, 117 F.3d at 1327. The conduct alleged fits within the definition of 

simple battery as intentional physical contact of a provoking nature with the person 

of another. See O.C.G.A. § 16–5–23. And the revised affidavit provides sufficient 

grounds for a prudent person, based on the facts and circumstances, to believe that 

Elmore, not the classroom teacher or another person, committed the offense. 

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 11 of 25 
12

The revised affidavit provides that two witnesses confirmed that Elmore 

sprayed the student, while the teacher and Elmore stated that he did not. Although 

Sauce’s initial memo reflects that “Teacher” sprayed the student, Sauce was not 

present and did not witness the incident. Moreover, Sauce is not an educator, and 

Elmore, a “paraprofessional educator” could fairly have been considered or 

described by her and others such as the nurse to be a “teacher.” In addition, during 

the interview, the nurse apparently named Elmore as the person who had sprayed 

the student. Significantly, the nurse’s account of the incident was also 

corroborated by a juvenile student. 

Nor do Elmore’s allegations provide any reason to doubt that the nurse and 

the student in fact identified Elmore to Sauce. The fact that the nurse “made no 

complaint at the time” does not, without more, undermine the nurse’s credibility, 

particularly when we do not know the length of time between the incident and the 

complaint. As for Elmore and Ms. Morrow’s conflicting statements, each arguably 

had an interest in a determination that Elmore was not involved. Thus, while we 

agree that it certainly would have been better for Sauce to have included the 

alleged inconsistencies in the warrant affidavit, consideration of the omitted 

material would not have precluded a finding of probable cause to believe that 

Elmore committed the offense of simple battery.

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 12 of 25 
13

In any event, even if consideration of all of the facts did not establish actual 

probable cause for the offense of simple battery, the facts are adequate to establish 

arguable probable cause to believe that Elmore violated O.C.G.A. § 16–5–23. See

Madiwale, 117 F.3d at 1327. Sauce conducted an investigation and interviewed 

pertinent witnesses. Despite the conflicting witness statements, and even if Sauce 

had been mistaken, the facts could have led a prudent officer to believe that

reasonably trustworthy information established probable cause for simple battery. 

See Dahl, 312 F.3d at 1234 (“[A]rresting officers, in deciding whether probable 

cause exists, are not required to sift through conflicting evidence or resolve issues 

of credibility, so long as the totality of the circumstances present a sufficient basis 

for believing that an offense has been committed.”); Montoute v. Carr, 114 F.3d 

181, 184 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining the “arguable probable cause” standard). In 

other words, Sauce is entitled to qualified immunity because the omitted facts were 

not “so clearly material that every reasonable law officer would have known that 

their omission would lead to [an arrest] in violation of federal law.” Madiwale, 

117 F.3d at 1327 (quotation marks omitted). 

Elmore also contends that Sauce should have disclosed to the magistrate his 

status an educator and the existence of educator immunity under O.C.G.A. § 20–2–

1001. That contention assumes that Elmore’s potential immunity was relevant to 

the probable-cause analysis. We turn to that question now.

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 13 of 25 
14

B. Educator Immunity under Georgia Law

Elmore asserts that the district court erroneously concluded that Elmore’s 

potential immunity as an educator under Georgia law did not affect the probablecause analysis. Under the circumstances, we find that the district court did not err. 

Elmore claims immunity under O.C.G.A. § 20–2–1001, which provides as 

follows: “An educator shall be immune from criminal liability for any act or 

omission concerning, relating to, or resulting from the discipline of any student or 

the reporting of any student for misconduct, provided that the educator acted in 

good faith.” O.C.G.A. § 20–2–1001(b). Elmore’s former position as a 

“paraprofessional” is included in the term “educator.” O.C.G.A. § 20–2–1001(a). 

Under Georgia law, the defendant bears the burden of proving entitlement to 

educator immunity under Georgia law by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. 

Pickens, ___ S.E.2d ___, No. A14A1593, 2015 WL 872224, at *1 (Ga. Ct. App. 

Mar. 3, 2015); State v. Cohen, 711 S.E.2d 418, 419 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).

In making an assessment of probable cause, officers generally have no duty 

to resolve legal questions or to investigate possible defenses. See Jordan, 487 F.3d 

at 1356-57; cf. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 2695

(1979) (“[W]e do not think a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is required by the 

Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence, whether the 

claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite intent.”);

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 14 of 25 
15

Pickens v. Hollowell, 59 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[P]olice officers have 

no responsibility to determine the viability of a statute of limitations defense when 

executing a valid arrest warrant.”). 

For example, in Morris v. Town of Lexington, Alabama, 748 F.3d 1316 (11th 

Cir. 2014), this Court recently concluded that the possible application of an 

affirmative defense to an assault charge did not affect whether the officers had 

probable cause, or at least arguable probable cause, to believe that the plaintiff had 

committed an assault. Id. at 1325. Similarly, in Jordan, we held that a police 

officer did not need to consider the application of an “apparent-authority defense” 

before seeking the defendant’s arrest. Jordan, 487 F.3d at 1356-57. For that 

reason, we declined to address whether the defense “would have provided Plaintiff 

with a complete defense to the pertinent crime under Georgia law.” Id. 

Elmore cites our unpublished decision in Williams v. Sirmons, 307 F. App’x 

354 (11th Cir. 2009), where we held that “in determining whether probable cause 

to arrest exists, an officer must consider all facts and circumstances within that 

officer’s knowledge, including facts and circumstances conclusively establishing 

an affirmative defense.” Id. at 358-59; see also Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 

873 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[P]robable cause determinations include facts and 

circumstances establishing a statutorily legitimated affirmative justification for the 

suspected criminal act.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). According to 

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 15 of 25 
16

Sirmons, “if an officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances which establish 

an affirmative defense, he or she lacks probable cause to arrest, even when the 

facts and circumstances establish that the person meets all elements of the 

offense.” Sirmons, 307 F. App’x at 359.

Applying that standard in Sirmons, we concluded that the officers did not 

have even arguable probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for fleeing from a traffic 

stop because, even though the plaintiff met all the elements of the offense, the 

officers knew of facts—like the facts that the plaintiff was pregnant, bleeding, in 

distress, and on her way to the hospital for emergency treatment—showing that the 

plaintiff’s flight was justified by the affirmative defense of necessity or duress. Id.

at 359-60. Therefore, we held that the officers were not entitled to qualified 

immunity. Id. at 360. 

Here, however, even if we assumed that officers generally are required to 

consider statutory-immunity defenses in their probable-cause assessments, the 

application of Georgia’s educator-immunity statute was not sufficiently established 

in this case. The statute provides that an educator’s disciplinary actions towards 

students are immune from criminal liability, provided that the educator acts in 

“good faith.” O.C.G.A. § 20–2–1001(b). “‘Good faith’ is a subjective standard: a 

state of mind indicating honesty and lawfulness of purpose; belief that one’s 

conduct is not unconscionable or that known circumstances do not require further 

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 16 of 25 
17

investigation.” Pickens, 2015 WL 872224, at *5 (quotation marks omitted). 

Further, the existence of good faith is a question for the trier of fact. Id. 

Although Sauce knew that Elmore was an educator and that his alleged 

actions were arguably disciplinary in nature, Sauce had some reason to doubt that 

Elmore was acting in “good faith.” Specifically, the nurse made an allegation that

“child abuse” had occurred in the classroom based on the spraying incident, and 

Sauce apparently interviewed a juvenile student who stated that Elmore had 

sprayed the student. Moreover, since Elmore altogether denied having sprayed the 

student, no one asserted that Elmore had sprayed the student in good faith. Based 

on these facts, we cannot say that facts known to Sauce conclusively established 

that Elmore was immune from criminal liability. 

In this respect, Elmore’s reliance on Cohen is misplaced. The Georgia Court 

of Appeals in Cohen upheld the trial court’s grant of immunity from prosecution 

for simple battery, under O.C.G.A. § 20–2–1001, based on the trial court’s finding 

that the defendant acted in good faith. Cohen, 711 S.E.2d at 419-20. But the fact 

that Elmore engaged in similar conduct as the defendant in Cohen does not 

establish that Elmore subjectively acted in good faith, which is a question for the 

trier of fact. See Pickens, 2015 WL 872224, at *5.

In any case, given the absence of binding precedent holding that statutoryimmunity defenses must be considered in a probable-cause determination, 

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 17 of 25 
18

particularly a defense that turns on the subjective intent of the party claiming 

immunity, we cannot say that the law was so clearly established as to have 

provided fair warning to Sauce that her failure to consider, or to inform the 

magistrate of, Elmore’s potential immunity in assessing whether probable cause 

existed was unconstitutional. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 739, 122 S. Ct. at 2515; cf.

Jordan, 487 F.3d at 1355 (“Of course, no police officer can truly know another 

person’s subjective intent.”). Indeed, even Elmore concedes that Sauce may be 

entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the claim that Sauce should have 

informed the magistrate of Elmore’s potential immunity under O.C.G.A. § 20–2–

1001.

C. Whether Probable Cause to Arrest Bars Elmore’s Claims

In resolving Elmore’s claims, the district court concluded that the existence 

of probable cause to arrest Elmore for simple battery rendered his arrest 

constitutionally valid, despite the lack of probable cause for cruelty to children. 

The court relied on the well-established rule that the existence of probable cause 

does not turn on the arresting officer’s state of mind. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 

U.S. 146, 153, 125 S. Ct. 588, 593-94 (2004). So long as the circumstances known 

to the officers, viewed objectively, give probable cause to arrest for any crime, the 

arrest is constitutionally valid even if probable cause was lacking as to some 

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 18 of 25 
19

offenses, or even all announced charges. Id. at 153-55, 125 S. Ct. at 593-94; Lee v. 

Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195-96 (11th Cir. 2002). 

Elmore counters that the rule of Devenpeck applies only to warrantless 

arrests. Where, as here, an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, Elmore asserts, 

probable cause must be assessed independently with respect to each warrant. 

Thus, Elmore argues, he may maintain a claim based on the lack of probable cause 

to arrest for cruelty to children in the third degree even if probable cause to arrest 

for another offense existed. 

In general terms, a warrantless arrest without probable cause provides the 

basis for a § 1983 claim for false arrest. Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 

1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004); see Calero-Colon v. Betancourt-Lebron, 68 F.3d 1, 3-

4 (1st Cir. 1995) (analogizing a §1983 false arrest claim to the common law tort of 

false arrest). Thus, it follows that probable cause to arrest, viewed objectively, 

bars a false-arrest claim. See Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1226; Lee, 284 F.3d at 1195-

96; see also Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1505-06 (11th Cir. 1990 (“The 

existence of probable cause . . . is an absolute bar to a section 1983 action for false 

arrest.”).

By contrast, seizures following the “institution of a prosecution,” such as an 

arrest pursuant to a warrant, generally serve as the basis for a § 1983 claim for 

malicious prosecution. Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 585-86 (11th Cir. 1996); 

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 19 of 25 
20

see also Calero-Colon, 68 F.3d at 4 (“As a general rule, an unlawful arrest 

pursuant to a warrant will be more closely analogous to the common law tort of 

malicious prosecution.”). This Circuit recognizes a § 1983 cause of action for 

malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Wood v. Kesler, 323 

F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003). We have held that “[t]o establish a § 1983 

malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must prove two things: (1) the elements 

of the common law tort of malicious prosecution; and (2) a violation of his Fourth 

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.”6

 Grider v. City of 

Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010).

Generally, in contrast to false-arrest claims, “probable cause as to one charge 

will not bar a malicious prosecution claim based on a second, distinct charge as to 

which probable cause was lacking.” Holmes v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 

673, 682 (7th Cir. 2007) (concerning malicious prosecution under Illinois state 

law); Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 83 (3d Cir. 2007); cf. Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 

1000, 1005 (11th Cir. 1998) (conviction on some charges in indictment does not 

preclude malicious prosecution claim based on dismissal of other charges). In 

Holmes, the Seventh Circuit explained the distinction in this way: when an 

individual is arrested, the seizure is the same whether the arrest was based on one 

 6

 The common-law elements of malicious prosecution include the following: “(1) a 

criminal prosecution instituted or continued by the present defendant; (2) with malice and 

without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused’s favor; and (4) caused 

damage to the plaintiff accused.” Wood, 323 F.3d at 882.

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 20 of 25 
21

or multiple grounds; but once an individual is prosecuted, each additional charge 

imposes additional costs and burdens. Holmes, 511 F.3d at 682-83. 

The district court construed Elmore’s allegations as akin to a claim for false 

arrest because he complained of an arrest without probable cause and identified his 

claim as one for “illegal arrest.”7

 Although two warrants issued, the amended 

complaint alleges that only one arrest occurred (“The arrest of Plaintiff was 

without probable cause or arguable probable cause and in violation of the Fourth 

and Fourteenth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure.”

(emphasis added)). Therefore, to the extent that Elmore challenged only the 

constitutionality of his arrest, the district court would not have erred in concluding 

that Elmore’s arrest was constitutionally valid because it was supported by 

probable cause. See Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153-55, 125 S. Ct. at 593-94; Lee, 284 

F.3d at 1195-96; see also Marx, 905 F.2d at 1505-06; Holmes, 511 F.3d at 682 

(“An arrested individual is no more seized when he is arrested on three grounds 

rather than one[.]”). 

On appeal, Elmore contends that his case is controlled by this Court’s 

decision in Uboh, which concerned a claim for malicious prosecution. And 

Elmore may be correct that he could have maintained a § 1983 maliciousprosecution claim based on the lack of probable cause to arrest for cruelty to 

 7

 At no point in the district-court proceedings did Elmore suggest that his Fourth 

Amendment claim should have been construed as one for malicious prosecution. 

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 21 of 25 
22

children in the third degree. See Holmes, 511 F. 3d at 682-83; Johnson, 477 F.3d 

at 83. Accordingly, the district court arguably may have erred in failing to 

consider the substance of Elmore’s claim as one alleging malicious prosecution. 

But see Calero-Colon, 68 F.3d at 3 (“Even though malicious prosecution and false 

arrest may seem distinct enough in abstract definition, however, in a wrongful 

arrest case—particularly an arrest conducted pursuant to a warrant based on false 

allegations—the lines between the two may become blurred.”). 

Nonetheless, even assuming—as Elmore contends—that this Court’s 

decision in Uboh controls this case, the amended complaint fails to allege facts 

necessary to state a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution. As the Court in Uboh 

explained, “[I]n order to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a 

plaintiff must allege and prove that the criminal proceeding that gives rise to the 

action has terminated in favor of the accused.” Uboh, 141 F.3d at 1004; see also

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2371 (1994) (“One 

element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution action is 

termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused.”). 

Here, Elmore did not allege in his amended complaint any facts establishing 

the common-law element of “favorable termination,” such as the charges being 

dropped or dismissed. Indeed, the amended complaint contains no allegations 

regarding a prosecution following his arrest pursuant to an invalid warrant. Cf. 

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 22 of 25 
23

Whiting, 85 F.3d at 583-84 (“Whiting, however is not claiming just that he was 

seized unlawfully or that a warrant was issued without probable cause: he says he 

was “maliciously prosecuted” in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.”). 

Even if Elmore had been unconstitutionally seized pursuant to an invalid warrant, 

Elmore did not allege a necessary element of a common-law malicious prosecution 

claim.8

 See Grider, 618 F.3d at 1256. Therefore, the amended complaint fails to 

state a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution. Consequently, the district court did 

not err in dismissing Elmore’s § 1983 claim against Sauce, whether it is construed 

as a false-arrest claim or a malicious-prosecution claim, under Rule 12(b)(6).

V.

Finally, Elmore argues that Holland, the principal of the school, is liable 

under § 1983 for ordering Elmore’s allegedly unconstitutional arrest. 

Supervisors cannot be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of vicarious 

liability or respondeat superior. Keating, 598 F.3d at 762. Nonetheless, 

“supervisors are liable under § 1983 either when the supervisor personally 

participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal 

 8

 As part of his statement of facts in his initial brief, Elmore asserts that “[t]he charges 

were dismissed.” However, this allegation did not appear in the amended complaint and Elmore

did not move for leave to amend in the district court to allege that fact. Cf. Wagner v. Daewoo 

Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“A district court is not 

required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff, who is 

represented by counsel, never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the 

district court.”). Further, although Elmore’s failure to allege favorable termination was raised by 

the Appellees in their response brief, Elmore did not then address the issue in his reply brief. 

Thus, in the absence of any guidance from Elmore, we affirm the dismissal of the claim. 

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 23 of 25 
24

connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged 

constitutional violation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The requisite 

causal connection can be established by facts supporting an inference that the 

supervisor directed his subordinates to act unlawfully or failed to stop his 

subordinates when the supervisor knew they would act unlawfully. Id. 

Here, we know from the amended complaint that Holland was the principal 

of the school in which Elmore worked, that Sauce was a police officer for the 

District, and that Holland “directed Defendant Sauce to take out a warrant against 

Plaintiff.” To the extent that Elmore argues that he was liable as a supervisor for 

ordering Elmore’s arrest, Elmore has not alleged facts sufficient to support an 

inference that Holland was, in fact, Sauce’s supervisor or that he had any authority 

over her. See Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(affirming the grant of qualified immunity where the plaintiff failed to show that 

the defendants participated in the plaintiff’s arrest or were supervisors of the 

officer who arrested her). Holland also was not personally involved in Elmore’s 

arrest. See id. Nor do the allegations show that, even if Holland was Sauce’s 

supervisor, Holland directed Sauce to act unlawfully or knew that she would act 

unlawfully by, for example, omitting material information from the warrant 

affidavit. See Keating, 598 F.3d at 762.

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 24 of 25 
25

VI.

In short, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Elmore’s amended civil 

rights complaint. We conclude that Sauce is entitled to qualified immunity from 

Elmore’s § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Fourth Amendment. We further 

determine that Elmore failed to state a claim of supervisor or personal liability 

against Holland for the alleged Fourth Amendment violation.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 14-14063 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 25 of 25