NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 13-3572

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ADAM SCOTT,

 Appellant

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(Crim. No. 2-10-cv-00677-001)

District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

January 12, 2015

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: April 14, 2015)

_________

OPINION*

_________

McKEE, Chief Judge.

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding 

precedent.
2

I.

A. Factual Background

Since we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the background of 

this case, we discuss the events leading to this appeal only briefly. In April 2010, law 

enforcement officials in West Chester, Pennsylvania obtained authorization to conduct a 

wiretap on a cell phone used by Vincent Marchant. The investigation revealed that 

Marchant was actively selling powder and crack cocaine and that his stock was being 

supplied by Appellant Adam Scott.

1

Marchant was arrested on June 2, 2010 and thereafter confirmed that Scott was 

supplying him with illegal drugs. On May 18, 2010, law enforcement officials obtained 

authorization to conduct a wiretap on two cell phones used by Scott. As the wiretap 

investigation continued, law enforcement officials began to conduct physical 

surveillance, including following Scott’s car. However, Scott appeared to notice that he 

was being followed and took measures to evade the surveillance. He also destroyed five 

of his cell phones, and thus all communications from the two cell phones that law 

enforcement officials had been monitoring ceased.

Law enforcement officials were subsequently able to reestablish physical 

surveillance outside the home of Trinity Jennings, where Scott had previously been seen. 

 

1 Marchant began dealing with Scott in February 2009. Until May 2010, Scott was Marchant’s only supplier. Even 

when Marchant started buying from other people, he characterized Scott as his “main supplier.” Marchant bought 

from Scott on a weekly basis, with a regular order of 4.5 ounces of cocaine and 62 grams of crack, although 

sometimes he bought as much as 13 ounces of cocaine in a single transaction. Typically, Scott and Marchant met in 

person to make their transactions. However, on one occasion, Scott left the drugs for Marchant with Darryl Naylor, 

who then delivered them to Marchant.
3

Investigators also began to rely on Darryl Naylor.2 His conversations with Scott had 

been intercepted on the Scott wiretaps, and Naylor thereafter agreed to cooperate with 

law enforcement. Naylor identified Scott’s Everhart Road apartment, where investigators 

also set up physical surveillance. Scott was seen coming and going from this apartment 

building several times.

On September 15, 2010, investigators were alerted by another police department 

that Scott was operating a car registered to Monique Herndon. West Chester police 

officers eventually stopped Scott for a traffic code violation and obtained his consent to 

search the car. A drug detection dog was brought to the scene and alerted to the presence 

of narcotics, but none were found in the brief search. However, the officers did find what 

appeared to be an electronically controlled trigger for a hidden compartment under the 

dashboard and, therefore, seized the car. Police discovered a hidden compartment used to 

transport drugs while searching that car pursuant to a search warrant.

After being stopped, Scott reportedly called Naylor and expressed concern that the 

officers had found the hidden compartment in the car. Scott also told Naylor that he was 

going back to his apartment to clean up, as he was concerned that the officers knew 

where he lived. He also told Naylor that he would subsequently be going to the Spare 

Rib bar in West Chester. Naylor conveyed this information to law enforcement.

 

2 Scott and Naylor became friends in 2005. In 2008, Naylor leased a storefront, an apartment, and a party hall for 

two joint business ventures with Scott. However, when the business ventures proved unsuccessful, the pair began to 

use the property for cooking, packaging, and selling drugs. In the drug scheme, Scott had the majority of customers. 

While Naylor had a few of his own, he primarily assisted Scott with his customers. Naylor helped cook and package 

the drugs and also drove and accompanied Scott and served as a lookout for some transactions. Scott and Naylor 

sold drugs from the storefront for more than a year.
4

Late that night, Scott was arrested at the Spare Rib bar, where officers recovered 

$985 in cash, cell phones, and a key to the Everhart Road apartment. A subsequent 

search of the Everhart Road apartment pursuant to a search warrant disclosed crack 

cocaine, marijuana, a loaded .32 caliber Keltec handgun, eleven cell phones, over 

$15,000 worth of jewelry, and $29,689 in rubber-banded stacks of cash. Police also 

recovered paraphernalia associated with drug distribution and sales as well as plastic bags 

containing crack and marijuana.

B. District Court Proceedings

Thereafter, a federal grand jury returned an indictment3charging Scott on five of 

the eleven counts:

 Count One charged Scott with conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or 

more of cocaine and 280 grams or more of cocaine base (“crack”), in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846;

 Count Seven charged Scott with distribution of 28 grams or more of 

cocaine base (“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(B);

 Count Nine charged Scott with possession with intent to distribute cocaine 

base (“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(C);

 Count Ten charged Scott with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a 

drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); and

 Count Eleven charged Scott as a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

 

3 Marchant was a co-defendant in the indictment. He pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more 

of cocaine and 280 grams or more of cocaine base (“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and five counts of 

distribution of cocaine and crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
5

A jury subsequently convicted Scott on each of the counts in which he was named, 

and Scott was ultimately sentenced to a total of 300 months incarceration followed by a 

period of supervised release. This appeal followed.4

II.

We address each of Scott’s claims of error in turn. 

A. Whether there exists a variance between the indictment and the proof.

1. Standard of Review

“We exercise plenary review over properly preserved claims of . . . variance.” 

United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 531 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. 

Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 2006)). However, where such a claim is raised for 

the first time in a post-trial motion, we review for plain error. Id. (citing United States v.

Tiller, 302 F.3d 98, 105 (3d Cir. 2002)).

Plain error review requires a four-step inquiry, as follows:

First, there must be an error or defect—some sort of deviation from a legal 

rule . . . . Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than 

subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected the 

appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must 

demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. 

Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the court of 

appeals has the discretion to remedy the error—discretion which ought to 

be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 

U.S. 725, 732–36 (1993)) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted).

 

4 We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
6

“[T]he plain-error exception to the contemporaneous-objection rule is to be used 

sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would 

otherwise result.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (quoting United States 

v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. Discussion

Scott contends that his conviction for conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more 

of cocaine and 280 grams or more of crack should be reversed because of the existence of 

a prejudicial variance between the indictment and the proof. He claims that “Naylor’s 

testimony failed to support a single conspiracy . . . . Instead, it tended to show the 

existence of two distinct conspiracies, thus resulting in a fatal variance from the 

Indictment.” (Appellant Br. 26.)

A variance exists “where the charging terms [of the Indictment] are unchanged, 

but the evidence at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the 

indictment.” United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 1121 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing United 

States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 743 n.38 (3d Cir. 1974)). “To prevail . . . [the appellant] 

must show (1) that there was a variance between the indictment and the proof adduced at 

trial and (2) that the variance prejudiced some substantial right.” United States v. Balter, 

91 F.3d 427, 441 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1109 (3d 

Cir. 1985)). 

“Where a single conspiracy is alleged in the indictment, there is a variance if the 

evidence at trial proves only the existence of multiple conspiracies.” United States v. 

Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 196, 200 
7

(3d Cir. 1986)). “We will sustain the jury’s verdict if there is substantial evidence, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, to support a finding of a single 

conspiracy.” United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 345 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Smith, 789 

F.2d at 200).

“To prove a conspiracy, the government must establish a unity of purpose between 

the alleged conspirators, an intent to achieve a common goal, and an agreement to work 

together toward that goal.” United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) 

(citing United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 829 (3d Cir. 1999)). In determining 

whether there is a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies, we consider three factors: 

“(1) whether there was a common goal among the conspirators; (2) whether the 

agreement contemplated bringing to pass a continuous result that will not continue 

without the continuous cooperation of the conspirators; and (3) the extent to which the 

participants overlap in the various dealings.” United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 287 

(3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Kelly, 892 F.2d at 259) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“The government need not prove that each defendant knew all of the conspiracy’s 

details, goals, or other participants.” Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 197 (citing United States v. 

Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 593 (3d Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by United 

States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 727 (3d Cir. 1994)).

“[A] simple buyer-seller relationship, without any prior or contemporaneous 

understanding beyond the sales agreement itself, is insufficient to establish that the buyer 

was a member of the seller’s conspiracy.” Id. (citing United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 

309, 324–25 (3d Cir. 1992)). However, “even an occasional supplier (and by implication 
8

an occasional buyer for redistribution) can be shown to be a member of the conspiracy by 

evidence, direct or inferential, of knowledge that she or he was part of a larger 

operation.” Price, 13 F.3d at 728 (citing Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 594).

[W]here [an alleged coconspirator]’s only involvement in the conspiracy 

appears to be drug purchases, courts have looked to the surrounding 

circumstances to determine whether the defendant is a mere buyer who had 

such limited dealings with the conspiracy that he cannot be held to be a 

conspirator, or whether he has knowledge of the conspiracy to the extent 

that his drug purchases are circumstantial evidence of his intent to join that 

conspiracy.

Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 199.

Scott contends that “the evidence showed two distinct conspiracies with the 

appellant, Scott, as the main supplier or hub of the conspiracy, and Marchant and Naylor 

as separate spokes in the conspiracy” with no “rim” connecting the separate spokes.

(Appellant Br. 27–28.) However, the evidence supports the inference that there was, in 

fact, a single conspiracy.

The conspiracy between Scott and Naylor was more than just a relationship 

between a buyer and seller. Naylor was a principal and trusted associate of Scott. Scott 

and Naylor had been friends for years, had attempted to start legitimate business ventures

together, and found their way into drug dealing together. Naylor helped Scott cook 

cocaine into crack and to package these drugs for sale. (App. 735–36.) Naylor also 

generally helped Scott with his drug customers. (App. 736–37.)

The extent of Marchant’s participation in the conspiracy is more than enough 

evidence of his intent to join the conspiracy between Scott and Naylor. A substantial

amount of drugs was moved by Marchant. He had a standing order with Scott, and he 
9

had previously purchased drugs on credit. Scott and Naylor’s drug scheme was also 

substantially dependent on Marchant. Marchant was Scott’s “horse,” meaning that he 

moved a majority of the drugs. (App. 758–59.) Likewise, Marchant got most of his drugs 

from Scott. (App. 529–30.) 

Not only was Naylor aware of Marchant’s identity as Scott’s customer, but he had 

delivered the drugs to Marchant on Scott’s behalf. (App. 759–60.) Significantly, 

Marchant called Naylor, not Scott, to set up that particular deal. (App. 760.)

When Marchant was arrested, Scott was “pretty shook” and told Naylor that he 

“lost [his] arm,” which Naylor interpreted as “he lost a major part of what he was doing.” 

(App. 764–65.) The relationship between Scott and Naylor was such that since Marchant 

was a major part of what Scott was doing, he was also a major part of what Naylor was 

doing. Thus, the evidence is more than sufficient to show that Scott, Naylor, and 

Marchant were participants in a single conspiracy.

The common goal here is clear: to distribute crack and cocaine. Scott’s remarks 

following Marchant’s arrest indicate that Scott and Naylor’s operation was largely 

dependent on Marchant moving their drugs: he was “a major part” of what they were 

doing. There was overlap both in time and in action between Naylor and Marchant. Scott 

and Naylor were involved in the conspiracy from 2008 until Scott’s arrest in 2010. 

Marchant joined this conspiracy in January 2009, ending with his arrest in June 2010. 

Naylor and Marchant were aware of each other’s role in the conspiracy and had met 

before to complete a drug transaction. 

Accordingly, there is no variance and Scott’s conviction on Count One is affirmed.
10

B. Whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that Scott 

conspired to distribute or possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or 

more of cocaine and 280 grams or more of crack.

1. Standard of Review

Where sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, “we examine the totality of the 

evidence, both direct and circumstantial, and must credit all available inferences in favor 

of the government.” United States v. Sparrow, 371 F.3d 851, 852 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting 

United States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

“We review the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine 

whether any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en 

banc) (quoting United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005)) (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted). Thus, this is a “particularly deferential 

standard,” where we “must be ever vigilant not to usurp the role of the jury by . . . 

assigning weight to the evidence, or by substituting our judgment for that of the jury.” 

Id. (quoting Brodie, 403 F.3d at 133) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

2. Discussion

The evidence clearly supports the jury’s finding that Scott conspired to distribute 

or possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 280 grams 

or more of crack. Marchant’s testimony alone supports this conclusion.

Marchant began dealing with Scott in February 2009 and continued until his arrest 

on June 2, 2010. The last known sale was on May 7, 2010. Marchant testified that at his 
11

first meeting with Scott, he purchased 62 grams of powder cocaine and 62 grams of 

crack. (App. 520.) After this initial sale, Marchant testified that he regularly purchased 

drugs from Scott once a week. (App. 524–25.) Marchant stated that it was “pretty much 

guarantee[d]” that he would meet with Scott for a drug transaction on a weekly basis. 

(App. 526.) For these transactions, Marchant would purchase his standing order of 126 

grams of powder cocaine and 62 grams of crack. (App. 525.) Based on their weekly 

schedule, a rational juror could infer that there were approximately 66 subsequent

purchases in this time period between Scott and Marchant. Following this inference, a 

rational jury could conclude that Scott sold Marchant 66 orders of 126 grams of powder 

cocaine and 62 grams of crack following their initial transaction, which amounts to 8,316

grams of powder cocaine and 4,092 grams of crack—well over the jury’s requisite 

finding for conviction of five kilograms (5000 grams) of cocaine and 280 grams of crack.

While we recognize that Marchant testified that there were times when he would 

go a week without seeing Scott and that sometimes his order varied, we reiterate that we 

view the record in the light most favorable to the government under a particularly 

deferential standard: as long as the jury’s conclusion passes the bare rationality test, i.e.,

it is not completely irrational, we must uphold the jury’s verdict. The jury’s verdict

clearly passed this threshold here. Accordingly, we will again affirm the verdict as to 

Count One.

C. Whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that Scott possessed a firearm in 

furtherance of a drug trafficking activity.

1. Standard of Review
12

We exercise the same standard of review as exercised under Section B supra. 

2. Discussion

Scott alleges that the evidence is insufficient to establish that the firearm recovered 

from the Everhart Road apartment was possessed in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

offense. It is Scott’s contention that the conviction in Count Ten was based solely on 

facts showing that Scott was merely a drug dealer in possession of a firearm and that 

there was no evidence demonstrating that the firearm was used to advance or promote his 

drug dealing activities. We disagree.

We do, however, agree that, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the “mere presence” of a 

gun is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Sparrow, 371 F.3d at 853. Instead, “the 

evidence must demonstrate that possession of the firearm advanced or helped forward a 

drug trafficking crime.” Id. (citing United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 

2002)). Courts are to consider the following factors in determining whether a firearm 

advanced a drug trafficking crime:

[T]he type of drug activity that is being conducted, accessibility of the 

firearm, the type of the weapon, whether the weapon is stolen, the status of 

the possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun is loaded, proximity 

to drugs or drug profits, and the time and circumstances under which the 

gun is found.

Id. (quoting United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 414–15 (5th Cir. 2000)).

This case is strikingly similar to United States v. Sparrow, in which the appellant 

also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at 852. There, as here, we rejected 

that challenge. See id. at 852, 854. In Sparrow, the appellant sold marijuana out of a 

convenience store. Id. at 851. After conducting surveillance of the store, the police 
13

obtained a search warrant and found “a concealed compartment under the floor tiles 

behind the counter.” Id. Concealed in the compartment were “nine large Ziploc bags of 

marijuana, $140 in cash and a loaded Jennings .22 caliber pistol.” Id. at 851–52. The 

appellant did not deny possession of the gun. Id. at 852.

We held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain possession of a firearm in 

furtherance of a drug-related activity predominantly because: (1) the appellant illegally 

possessed the firearm, as a prior felon; (2) the firearm was loaded; (3) the firearm was 

“kept in the same floor compartment as nine large Ziploc bags of marijuana and $140 in 

cash”; and (4) while not necessarily easily accessible, the firearm was “strategically 

located.” Id. at 854.

Scott is also a prior felon and kept the loaded gun in a dresser with a substantial 

amount of crack and marijuana, jewelry, and $29,689 in cash. Specifically, the firearm 

was found in the space underneath the bottom drawer of the dresser where the jewelry 

and much of the cash was found. In Sparrow, we found that the firearm “was placed so 

that it would be immediately available for [the appellant’s] protection whenever he 

retrieved drugs or money from the floor compartment. Therefore, it [was] reasonable to 

assume the firearm was placed in the floor compartment for that purpose and was 

possessed in furtherance of [the appellant’s] drug activities.” Id. The same reasoning 

applies here. Accordingly, the District Court did not err in finding that Scott possessed a 

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking activity.

D. Whether the District Court erred in admitting into evidence wiretap tapes, which 

were allegedly sealed in an untimely fashion absent a sufficient excuse to justify 

the delay.
14

1. Factual and Procedural Background

The government used wiretap recordings of thirteen phone calls between Scott and 

Marchant from the wiretaps authorized for two of Scott’s phones.

Prior to trial, Scott’s attorney requested that the government produce all 

documentation regarding the Title III wiretaps. (App. 51.) In response, the government 

provided additional discovery and stated that all Title III documentation regarding the 

wiretaps had been produced, with the exception of inventory notices. (App. 57.) 

Subsequently, the District Court conducted a hearing on the admissibility of the wiretaps, 

but ultimately allowed that evidence to be admitted. 

After the trial, Scott informed his newly appointed lawyer of his unfulfilled 

discovery requests, which included the sealing orders for the wiretaps. Significantly, 

Scott concedes that he did not file a pretrial motion to suppress the wiretaps.

Proceeding pro se, Scott filed a post-trial motion to compel discovery and 

requested an evidentiary hearing on that motion. He argued that “the wiretap sealing 

orders had never been disclosed and that the [D]istrict [C]ourt erred in admitting the 

wiretap recordings without knowing if they were properly sealed.” (Appellant Br. 54.) 

In response, the government conceded a discovery violation because it had not produced 

the wiretap sealing orders as requested. However, the government contended that Scott 

suffered no prejudice from this violation because the wiretap disks were, in fact, properly 

sealed.
15

On July 2, 2013, the government sent the sealing orders to Scott’s standby counsel 

by e-mail. However, on August 2, 2013, the government learned that standby counsel 

was unable to forward the e-mail to Scott because Scott was then in custody at the 

Federal Detention Center. Consequently, the information was hand-delivered to Scott. 

Thus, prior to sentencing on August 8, 2013, Scott had possession of the sealing orders

for about a week. However, he did not file a motion to suppress the wiretaps before 

sentencing or make an oral motion to suppress at sentencing.

After a post-trial hearing, the District Court denied Scott’s motion for further 

discovery and for an evidentiary hearing on the wiretap sealing issue. Scott now appears 

to make two distinct claims of error pertaining to that issue. First, Scott contends that the 

District Court erred because the “wiretaps and all evidence derived therefrom should 

have been suppressed.” (Appellant Br. 59.) Second, it is Scott’s contention on appeal 

that “the [D]istrict [C]ourt erred by not conducting a full evidentiary hearing on the 

sealing issue where such a hearing would have revealed that the wiretaps were sealed in 

an untimely fashion with no sufficient excuse to justify the delay.” (Appellant Br. 55.)

2. Waiver

The government correctly argues that any claim of error arising from the failure to 

timely pursue suppression of this evidence has been waived.

Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 12(b)(3)(C) provides that a motion to suppress evidence “must 

be raised by pretrial motion if the basis for the motion is then reasonably available . . . .”
16

This Court has held that, under Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 12(b)(3)(C), “a suppression argument 

raised for the first time on appeal is waived . . . absent good cause.”5 United States v. 

Rose, 538 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2008). “This rule applies not only when defendants 

altogether fail to raise any suppression arguments in the District Court, but also when 

defendants fail to raise particular arguments later advanced on appeal.” United States v. 

Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 338 (3d Cir. 2013).

As previously noted, Scott was not sent the sealing orders until after trial and after 

his conviction. On May 17, 2013, when Scott filed a motion for new trial, Scott defended 

his failure to file a motion to suppress, stating: “How could the defense file a motion to 

suppress Scott[’]s [wiretaps] on sealing and inventory grounds if the prosecution has 

never turned over proof of the actual seal or the inventory letters/notices[?] Or at least a 

written explanation of [their] absence[?]”

6

 (Suppl. App. 2.) As Scott did not have the 

sealing orders in his possession before trial, the basis for the motion was not “reasonably 

available” to him, and we find good cause for Scott not making a pre-trial motion to 

suppress.

However, Scott received the sealing orders approximately a week prior to his 

sentencing on August 8, 2013. It is uncontested that Scott did not file a motion to 

suppress the wiretaps between receiving them and his sentencing, nor did he make an oral 

 

5 While “Rose concerned evidence which the defendant sought to suppress under the Fourth Amendment[,] . . . in 

light of the expansive language of Rule 12(b)(3)(C), which applies broadly to ‘a motion to suppress,’” this Court has 

found it “equally appropriate to apply this waiver rule in the Title III context.” United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 

118, 130 (3d Cir. 2012).

6 Further, Scott contends that, if the evidence was disclosed before trial, “the defense would have moved to suppress 

these surveillances.” (Suppl. App. 8.) 
17

motion to suppress the wiretaps at sentencing. Thus, we must determine whether there is 

good cause for Scott’s failure to file a motion to suppress the wiretaps once the sealing 

orders were in his possession.

On the motions hearing on August 8, 2013, while a motion to suppress was not 

filed, Scott did raise a suppression argument, thus making the District Court aware of the 

suppression issue. Scott argued:

[I]f my wiretaps were suppressed, it would have had an effect on the trial. It 

would have an effect on the evidence seized from the apartment . . . if these 

wiretaps were suppressed and there was never any motion to file 

suppressing the wiretaps. Now that I have the sealing orders, there is 

discrepancy issues in the sealing orders and if the wiretaps were suppressed 

it would have had a determination on the guilt or innocence for the trial.

(App. 1341.)

In response, the District Court stated: “You can make the motion, but there’s more 

than just the fact that they weren’t sealed that would reflect upon whether or not they 

would have been suppressed. So your argument at this point is merely speculative.” 

(App. 1342) (emphasis added). Scott thus replied: “The reason this is speculative is that I 

didn’t have it before trial to file a motion to suppress on it.” (App. 1344.) Further, he 

stated: “If I would have had the evidence when I requested it, your Honor, your Honor 

could have made the decision before trial when it was requested to grant or deny the 

suppression of the wiretaps. There was never a motion to file.” (Id.)

The District Court explicitly told Scott that he “c[ould] make the motion.” 

Nonetheless, Scott never made the motion to suppress. Thus, with the District Court’s 

prompting to make the motion and his possession of the sealing orders, Scott has not 
18

shown good cause for not making the motion to suppress. Thus, we will not consider 

whether the wiretaps and all evidence derived from them should have been suppressed. 

Further, we will not consider whether an evidentiary hearing should have been 

held on the motion to suppress. 

“We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of an evidentiary 

hearing on a motion to suppress.” United States v. Hines, 628 F.3d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 

2010). “Such rulings are ordinarily committed to a district court’s sound discretion, 

which we reverse only in rare circumstances.” Id. at 105.

Rule 12(b)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits 

defendants to file ‘motions to suppress evidence’ before trial, but 

evidentiary hearings on such motions are not granted as a matter of course. 

To require a hearing, a suppression motion must raise issues of fact 

material to the resolution of the defendant’s constitutional claim. A motion 

to suppress requires an evidentiary hearing only if the motion is sufficiently 

specific, non-conjectural, and detailed to enable the court to conclude that 

(1) the defendant has presented a colorable constitutional claim, and (2) 

there are disputed issues of material fact that will affect the outcome of the 

motion to suppress.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, since Scott never 

actually moved to suppress—despite being prompted to do so by the court—we do not 

find that the District Court abused its discretion in failing to provide an evidentiary 

hearing.

E. Whether the government’s failure to provide Scott with the complete criminal 

history of one of its primary witnesses, Darryl Naylor, constituted a due process 

violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

1. Standard of Review
19

“Because a Brady claim presents questions of law as well as questions of fact, we 

[ ] conduct a de novo review of the district court’s conclusions of law as well as a ‘clearly 

erroneous’ review of any findings of fact where appropriate.” United States v. Perdomo, 

929 F.2d 967, 969 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Carter v. Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299, 1306 (3d Cir. 

1987)).

2. Discussion

Naylor was a key witness for the government at trial. The following impeachment 

evidence for Naylor was available to the defense prior to, or before the end of trial:

 Three prior drug trafficking convictions

 Three prior drug convictions, two for distribution and one for possession

 Two arrests for selling drugs to a confidential informant

 Pending federal drug charges

 A theft conviction

 A recent DUI conviction

 Recent possession of cocaine (never charged)

At trial, Naylor also disclosed that he was a drug addict, had served time in prison, had 

problems with alcohol abuse, and other evidence that certainly allowed Scott to impeach 

his testimony. 

After trial, the government received Naylor’s PSR and learned that Naylor had a 

more extensive criminal record than had been disclosed at or before trial. The following 

impeaching information about Naylor was thus only discovered after trial:

 Four drug trafficking charges, rather than three

 Three possession charges, rather than one

 Two theft convictions, rather than one

 Two DUI convictions, rather than one

 A burglary conviction

 Three conspiracy charges
20

Scott “contends that Naylor’s undisclosed criminal history was material to his 

defense and that its non-disclosure prejudiced his trial by limiting trial counsel’s ability to 

adequately cross-examine Naylor.” (Appellant Br. 61.) However, at sentencing, while 

Scott was proceeding pro se, he stated:

There were other issues I wanted to raise, but I didn’t feel that—well, I was 

advised that in posttrial motions that it would not be proper to raise, some 

of it was arguments, so I didn’t file the issue about Darryl Naylor’s criminal 

history not being turned over or a lot of other things, ineffective assistance 

or things like that, so more or less these are my post trial motions . . . .

(App. 1365.) The government accordingly argues that, “[b]ecause Scott explicitly 

waived any issue relating to the late disclosure of parts of Naylor’s criminal history, his 

Brady claim is not reviewable . . . .” (Appellee Br. 54.) 

In his reply brief, Scott acknowledges this procedural defect, but asks this Court to 

consider the claim anyway because he was a pro se litigant. We have stated that “we 

tend to be flexible when applying procedural rules to pro se litigants . . . .” Mala v. 

Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013). “And at least on one 

occasion, we have refused to apply the doctrine of appellate waiver when dealing with a 

pro se litigant.” Id. (citing Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993)). 

However, we need not decide whether this leniency should apply here, because the 

evidence Scott complains of was not material when its value is assessed in context with 

the information that Scott did have at his disposal

The materiality of Brady material depends almost entirely on the value of 

the evidence relative to the other evidence mustered by the state. 

Suppressed evidence that would be cumulative of other evidence or would 

be used to impeach testimony of a witness whose account is strongly 
21

corroborated is generally not considered material for Brady purposes. 

Conversely, however, undisclosed evidence that would seriously undermine 

the testimony of a key witness may be considered material when it relates 

to an essential issue or the testimony lacks strong corroboration.

Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 129 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

Impeachment evidence falls squarely within the Brady rule. See Giglio v. United 

States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). “Suppressed impeachment evidence is immaterial 

under Brady, however, if the evidence is cumulative or impeaches on a collateral issue.”

Conley v. United States, 415 F.3d 183, 189 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. 

Dumas, 207 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2000)). “Suppressed impeachment evidence, if 

cumulative of similar impeachment evidence used at trial (or available to the [defendant] 

but not used) is superfluous and therefore has little, if any, probative value.” Id. (citing 

United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 246 (7th Cir. 1995)).

The government argues that “Naylor was already substantially impeached at trial. 

The jury heard that Naylor had a long and sordid history of drug dealing, drug use, and 

theft.” (Appellee Br. 57.) Further, “[t]he jurors knew that Naylor’s history was 

thoroughly unsavory, and that he was cooperating to gain a benefit for himself, and they 

believed him anyway.” (Appellee Br. 57–58.) We agree. Accordingly, regardless of 

whether the Brady claim was waived by Scott, he cannot establish a violation on this 

record. 

III.

Accordingly, for all of the above reasons, we will affirm.