alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Carbaugh *v.*Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company, Appellant.

*Negligence*— Railroads—Automobile-—Collision—Grade *crossing ■*— -Death *of passenger in automobile*— Former *recovery by driver of automobile*— Contributory *negligence of passenger*— Imputed *negligence*— Interference *with driver*— *Increase of danger*— Case *for jury.*

1. In an action to recover for death of plaintiff’s wife, a passenger seated in the tonneau of an automobile at the time of its collision with a train at a railroad grade crossing, she could not be declared guilty of contributory negligence in joining with the driver in testing a manifest danger where there was a verdict in favor of the driver of the automobile in his action against the defendant tried with the present case, such verdict establishing the fact that the driver stopped, looked and listened and that no train was in sight or hearing.

2. In such case, assuming deceased saw or was bound to see the approaching train, since the driver also saw it there was no necessity for interference by her with the operation of the car, as such interference might only have served to increase the danger.

Argued June 5, 1918.

Appeal, No. 68, Jan. T., 1918, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. Cumberland Co., Nov. T., 1916, No. 33, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Cyrus A. Carbaugh v. Philadelphia & Reading Rail*26way Company.

July 17, 1918:

Before Brown, C. J., Moschzisker, Frazer, Walling and Simpson, JJ.

Affirmed.

Trespass for death of plaintiff’s wife. Before Sadler, P. J.

The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court.

Verdict for plaintiff for $2,500 and judgment thereon. Defendant appealed.

*Error assigned,*among others, was in refusing defendant’s motion for judgment non obstante veredicto'.

*J. W. Wetzel,*for appellant.

*Edmund O. Wingerd*and *Joseph P. McKeehan,*with them *D. Eckoard Long,*for appellee.

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Frazer,

This suit arose out of the accident referred to and described in the opinion in Wingert v. Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company, herewith filed. Plaintiff is the husband of Mrs. Carbaugh, one of the victims of the accident, who was riding in the automobile driven by Wingert, the plaintiff in the case above mentioned. She occupied the rear seat of the car, with two other women and a child. Defendant contends deceased failed in her duty to look and listen for an approaching train, and thereby joined with the driver in testing a danger certainly apparent to her had she exercised due care. The verdict in the action by the driver of the automobile against this defendant, which was tried with the present suit, establishes the fact that he stopped, looked and listened and that no train at the time was within sight or hearing; hence, there was no manifest danger to test. Assuming, however, deceased saw or was bound to see the approaching train at the moment it rounded the curve, the driver also saw it, and there was neither oc*27casion nor necessity for interference by her with the operation of the car, and to have done so might only have served to increase the danger: Vocca v. R. R., 259 Pa. 42.

The judgment is affirmed.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

VICTOR MANUEL FIGUEREO

MARTINEZ,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 93 MM 2017

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 31st day of August

, 2017, in consideration of the Motion for

Withdrawal of Counsel, this matter is REMANDED to the Court of Common Pleas of

Northampton County for that court to determine whether Petitioner’s current counsel

should be granted leave to withdraw. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 120 (B) ( providing that an

attorney may not unilaterally withdraw his or her appearance with respect to a criminal

defendant; rather, a court must determine whether leave to withdraw is warranted).

If current counsel is permitted to withdraw, the court is DIRECTED to resolve any

issues relative to Petitioner being appointed counsel or granted leave to proceed pro se

.

The Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County is DIRECTED to enter its order

regarding this remand within 45 days and to prom ptly notify this Court of its

determination

.
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 107 

To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to sunset the limit on the 

maximum rebate amount for single source drugs and innovator multiple 

source drugs. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 3, 2019 

Mr. BURGESS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to sunset 

the limit on the maximum rebate amount for single 

source drugs and innovator multiple source drugs. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SUNSET OF LIMIT ON MAXIMUM REBATE 

4 AMOUNT FOR SINGLE SOURCE DRUGS AND 

5 INNOVATOR MULTIPLE SOURCE DRUGS. 

6 Section 1927(c)(2)(D) of the Social Security Act (42 

7 U.S.C. 1396r–8(c)(2)(D)) is amended by inserting after 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•HR 107 IH

1 ‘‘December 31, 2009,’’ the following: ‘‘and before January 

2 1, 2020,’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Petitioner

 v.

CHRISTOPHER TISDALE,

 Respondent

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 578 EAL 2014

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the

Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 31st day of March, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-51195 Summary Calendar

OTIS BELSER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. W:98-CV-409

- - - - - - - - - - June 23, 2000 Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Otis Belser appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for appointment of counsel. Belser has not demonstrated the "exceptional circumstances" necessary for appointment of counsel in a civil rights case. See Ulmer v. Chancellor , 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982). The district court’s order denying appointment of counsel is therefore AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>

                                   EXHIBIT 23

                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS



We consent to the incorporation by reference in this Annual Report (Form 10-K)
of Brown & Sharpe Manufacturing Company of our report dated February 6, 1998,
except for Note 12, as to which the date is February 13, 1998, included in the
1997 Annual Report of Brown & Sharpe Manufacturing Company.

Our audits also included the financial statement schedule of Brown & Sharpe
Manufacturing Company listed in Item 14(a). This schedule is the responsibility
of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion based
on our audits. In our opinion, the financial statement schedule referred to
above, when considered in relation to the basic financial statements taken as a
whole, presents fairly in all material respects the information set forth
therein.

We also consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements
(Form S-8 Nos. 2-33676, 2-56821, 2-60398, 2-77219, 2-77575, 2-83637, 2-97935,
33-17831, 33-23601, 33-23603, 33-30927, and 33-54496) pertaining to employee
benefit plans, of Brown & Sharpe Manufacturing Company of our report dated
February 6,1998, except for Note 12, as to which the date is February 13, 1998,
with respect to the consolidated financial statements incorporated herein by
reference, and our report included in the preceding paragraph with respect to
the financial statement schedule included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for
the year ended December 31, 1997.



                                       ERNST & YOUNG LLP

Providence, Rhode Island
March 27, 1998
1

No. 03-13-00804-CR

In the

Court of Appeals

Third District

Austin, Texas

Kaitlyn Lucretia Ritcherson,

Appellant

v.

The State of Texas,

Appellee

Appeal from the 331st Judicial District Court

Travis County, Texas

Cause Number D-1-DC-11-302663

State’s Motion for Leave to File

a Supplemental Brief

To the Honorable Third Court of Appeals:

Now comes the State of Texas and files this motion requesting

permission to file the State’s supplemental brief: a letter with additional

authority, which was submitted on April 8, 2015. The State prays that this

Court grant said motion.

Respectfully submitted,

Rosemary Lehmberg

District Attorney

Travis County

ACCEPTED

03-13-00804-CR

4821848

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

4/9/2015 10:43:33 AM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 4/9/2015 10:43:33 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
2

Angie Creasy

Assistant District Attorney

State Bar No. 24043613

P.O. Box 1748

Austin, Texas 78767

(512) 854-9400

Fax (512) 854-4810

Angie.Creasy@traviscountytx.gov

AppellateTCDA@traviscountytx.gov

Certificates of Compliance and Service

I certify that this motion contains 48 words. I further certify that, on the

9th day of April, 2015, a true and correct copy of this brief was served, by

U.S. mail, electronic mail, facsimile, or electronically through the electronic

filing manager, to the defendant’s attorney, Alexander L. Calhoun, Law

Office of Alexander L. Calhoun, 4301 W. William Cannon Dr., Suite B-150,

#260, Austin, Texas 78749.

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20114 4a)
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A15D0316. IN THE INTEREST OF: K. A. AND A. A., CHILDREN

(MOTHER).

On December 1, 2014, the mother’s parental rights to K. A. and A. A. were

terminated. The mother filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied on

February 6, 2015. On March 18, 2015, the mother filed an application for

discretionary appeal from that order.1 We lack jurisdiction.

To be timely, a discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry

of the order to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d); Hill v. State, 204 Ga. App. 582 (420

SE2d 393) (1992). Because this application wasfiled 40 days after entry of the order

the mother seeks to appeal, it is untimely. We thus lack jurisdiction to consider the

application, which is hereby DISMISSED.

The mother’s motion to extend the period for her to electronically file the

application is hereby DENIED. The time requirement for filing a discretionary

application is a jurisdictional requirement, and this Court is unable to accept an

untimely application. See Crosson v. Conway, 291 Ga. 220 (1) (728 SE2d 617)

(2012). A party may request an extension of time for filing a discretionary

application, but the motion must be made on or before the application’s due date. See

1 The mother attempted to file her application for discretionary appeal on

March 10, 2015, but it was returned because counsel failed to comply with Court of

Appeals Rule 46 requiring counsel to electronically file all pleadings with this Court. 

We note, however, that even had the mother properly filed her application for

discretionary appeal on March 10, 2015, her application still would have been

untimely. 

April 01, 2015 April 02, 2015
Court of Appeals Rule 31 (g). Here, the mother’srequest for an extension of time was

not timely. 

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

04/01/2015 04/02/2015
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 4.29

                              CERTIFICATE OF TRUST

                                       OF

                                   PH TRUST I

         THIS CERTIFICATE OF TRUST of PH Trust I (the "Trust"), dated as of
April __, 2002, is being duly executed and filed by the undersigned, as
trustees, with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware to form a
business trust under the Delaware Business Trust Act (12 Del. Code Section 3801
et seq.).

         1. Name. The name of the business trust being formed hereby is "PH
Trust I."

         2. Delaware Trustee. The name and business address of the trustee of
the Trust with a principal place of business in the State of Delaware is Bank
One Delaware, Inc., Three Christina Center, 201 North Walnut Street, Wilmington,
Delaware 19801.

         3. Effective Date. This Certificate of Trust shall be effective at the
time of its filing with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware.

         4. Counterparts. This Certificate of Trust may be executed in one or
more counterparts.


<PAGE>


          IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being all of the trustees of the
Trust at the time of filing this Certificate of Trust, have executed this
Certificate of Trust as of the date first above written.

                                     BANK ONE TRUST COMPANY,
                                     National Association,
                                     as Property Trustee

                                     By:      /s/  John Prendiville
                                              --------------------------
                                              Name:  John Prendiville
                                              Title:    Authorized Officer


                                     BANK ONE DELAWARE, INC.,
                                     as Property Trustee


                                     By:       /s/ John Prendiville
                                              --------------------------
                                              Name:  John Prendiville
                                              Title:    Authorized Officer


                                     BRUCE ROBINSON,
                                     as Regular Trustee

                                     By:      /s/  Bruce Robinson
                                              --------------------------
                                              Name:  Bruce Robinson
In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-14-00067-CR

WILLIAM JASON PUGH, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 402nd Judicial District Court

Wood County, Texas

Trial Court No. 22,042-2013

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Moseley
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On September 12, 2013, in Wood County, Texas, William Jason Pugh was charged, by 

separate indictments, with two counts of aggravated sexual assault of S.C., a child. During the 

trial, evidence that Pugh committed separate extraneous offenses was admitted under Article 38.37 

of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37 (West 

Supp. 2014). After a jury trial, Pugh was found guilty of both counts and sentenced to two terms 

of life imprisonment to run concurrently. 

Pugh has filed a single brief in which he raises issues common to both of his appeals. Here, 

Pugh appeals from his conviction in trial court cause number 22,042-2013 for aggravated sexual 

assault of a child by penetration of the sexual organ of a child younger than fourteen years of age 

by his sexual organ and argues (1) that the State’s notice of intent to introduce extraneous offenses 

during the guilt/innocence phase pursuant to Article 38.37 of the Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure was deficient; (2) that the trial court erred by finding the State’s extraneous-offense 

evidence was “enough to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the extraneous offenses occurred”; 

and (3) that the jury instructions failed to instruct the jury how to apply the beyond-a-reasonabledoubt standard to the extraneous offenses.

We addressed these issues in detail in our opinion of this date on Pugh’s appeal in cause 

number 06-14-00066-CR. For the reasons stated therein, we likewise conclude that error has not 

been shown in this case.
3

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Bailey C. Moseley

Justice

Date Submitted: February 13, 2015

Date Decided: April 15, 2015

Do Not Publish
Organic Livestock and Poultry Standards (OLPS) Final Rule

The Organic Livestock and Poultry Standards (OLPS) Final Rule updates the USDA 

organic regulations (7 CFR part 205) to promote animal welfare and encourage 

consistent livestock production practices. It adds detailed regulations regarding 

indoor and outdoor space requirements for avian species, animal health care 

practices, confinement, transportation, euthanasia, and slaughter.

What Does OLPS Do?

The rule ensures more consistent production 

and certification practices and bolsters trust 

in the organic label. The final rule:

Reduces confusion about organic 

production practices and 

standards

Establishes species-specific 

standards for avian species

Clarifies indoor and outdoor space 

requirements

Strengthens and clarifies animal 

health care regulations

OLPS History + Engagement

Proposed Rule

Published as proposed rule in August 2022

Public Comment

40,336 written comments

57,000 petition signatures

94% of comments and petitions support

the rule

Final Rule

Policy updated based on public comment

Enforcement

 One year implementation period for most

practices, five years for select exceptions

Who is Affected by OLPS?

 USDA accredited

certifying agents

 Livestock Producers

 Consumers

 Processing Facilities

When Do I Need to Comply?

https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/organic-livestock-and-poultry-standards

USDA is an equal opportunity provider, employer, and lender
Organic Livestock and Poultry Standards (OLPS) Final Rule Cont.

OLPS establishes indoor and outdoor space requirements for avian species

• OLPS sets specific space and stocking density requirements for

both indoor and outdoor spaces.

• Poultry must have year-round outdoor access and may only be

confined temporarily in limited situations.

• Porches are prohibited for use as outdoor space.

• Requires weekly monitoring of ammonia in indoor spaces.

OLPS revises production practices for mammals and non-avian species

• Shelter must allow for animals to move, stretch and express

natural behaviors over a 24-hour period.

• Animals must have unrestricted outdoor access year-round.

• OLPS adds species-specific requirements for swine, including

requirements for rooting materials and group housing.

OLPS revises production practices and care standards

• OLPS defines and prohibits several physical alterations (e.g., teeth

clipping, induced molting).

• Other physical alterations may only be performed for safety or

identification.

• Producers must document treatment of sick or injured animals.

OLPS sets clearer requirements for transport and slaughter of animals

• Animals being transported must be clearly identified and able

to walk.

• Transport system must be suitable to the climate to protect

animals from extreme temperatures.

• FSIS humane slaughter standards must be followed.

https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/organic-livestock-and-poultry-standards

USDA is an equal opportunity provider, employer, and lender
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1085 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1085

     To require any amounts remaining in Members' Representational 
Allowances at the end of a fiscal year to be deposited in the Treasury 
     and used for deficit reduction or to reduce the Federal debt.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 7, 2019

 Mrs. Lesko (for herself, Mr. Gosar, Mr. Meadows, Mr. Schweikert, Mr. 
 Biggs, Mr. Davidson of Ohio, and Mr. Chabot) introduced the following 
   bill; which was referred to the Committee on House Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
     To require any amounts remaining in Members' Representational 
Allowances at the end of a fiscal year to be deposited in the Treasury 
     and used for deficit reduction or to reduce the Federal debt.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Give it Back to the Taxpayers Act''.

SEC. 2. REQUIRING AMOUNTS REMAINING IN MEMBERS' REPRESENTATIONAL 
              ALLOWANCES TO BE USED FOR DEFICIT REDUCTION OR TO REDUCE 
              THE FEDERAL DEBT.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any 
amounts appropriated for Members' Representational Allowances for the 
House of Representatives for a fiscal year which remain after all 
payments are made under such Allowances for the year shall be deposited 
in the Treasury and used for deficit reduction, except that in the case 
of a fiscal year for which there is no Federal budget deficit, such 
amounts shall be used to reduce the Federal debt (in such manner as the 
Secretary of the Treasury considers appropriate).
    (b) Definition.--As used in this Act, the term ``Member of the 
House of Representatives'' means a Representative in, or a Delegate or 
Resident Commissioner to, the Congress.
    (c) Effective Date.--This Act shall apply with respect to fiscal 
year 2019 and each succeeding fiscal year.
                                 <all>
```