1

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

MOORE CHRYSLER, INC.,

Plaintiff Below, Petitioner

v.) No. 23-ICA-431 (Cir. Ct. of Logan Cnty. Case No. 22-C-50)

THORNHILL MOTOR CAR, INC., 

d/b/a THORNHILL CHRYSLER DODGE 

JEEP RAM,

Defendant Below, Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Moore Chrysler, Inc., (“Moore”) appeals the August 30, 2023, order of 

the Circuit Court of Logan County which granted Thornhill Motor Car, Inc., d/b/a 

Thornhill Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram’s (“Thornhill”) motion for summary judgment in this 

claim brought pursuant to West Virginia Code §§ 17A-6A-1 to -18 (2015). Thornhill filed 

a timely response.1 Moore filed a reply.

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-

11-4 (2024). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the 

applicable law, this Court finds there is error in the lower tribunal’s decision but no 

substantial question of law. This case satisfies the “limited circumstances” requirement of 

Rule 21(d) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure for reversal in a memorandum decision. 

For the reasons set forth below, the circuit court’s decision is affirmed, in part, and 

reversed, in part. 

On February 18, 2021, Moore filed its Verified Complaint, Petition for Declaratory 

Judgment, and Motion for Injunctive Relief against Thornhill in Mingo County Circuit 

Court. Moore’s Complaint alleged that, under West Virginia Code §§ 17A-6A-1 to -18, it 

was a “new motor vehicle dealer” with its “established place of business” in Williamson, 

West Virginia, selling new Fiat Chrysler automobiles, including vehicles marketed under 

the Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, and Ram brands.

1 Petitioner is represented by Charles R. Bailey, Esq., John P. Fuller, Esq., and 

Kristen V. Hammond, Esq. Respondent is represented by Johnnie E. Brown, Esq., and 

Donovan M. Powell, Esq.

FILED

October 1, 2024

ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
2

In 2018, Fiat Chrysler requested Moore waive its rights under West Virginia Code 

§ 17A-6A-12 and agree that Fiat Chrysler could allow another new Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, 

and Ram dealership to be placed nearby at the Fountain Place Mall in Logan, West 

Virginia. The location would be within Moore’s “relevant market area," as defined by West 

Virginia Code § 17A-6A-3(15). Moore refused to waive its rights and allow another 

dealership within its “relevant market area.” After Moore’s refusal, Fiat Chrysler informed 

Moore that Thornhill would be given a new dealership in Logan, but outside the “relevant 

market area” as defined in the statute. Thereafter, Thornhill began operating a new 

Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, and Ram dealership from a service garage on Dingess Street in 

Logan, West Virginia, and a new sales office from a temporary location in a mobile home 

on Stratton Street in Logan. Thornhill eventually relocated the mobile home sales office to 

the Fountain Place Mall in Logan, where it sold new vehicles on a gravel lot within Moore’s 

relevant market area.

Moore alleged that Fiat Chrysler was statutorily obligated to provide notice to 

Moore before it allowed Thornhill to relocate the Stratton Street sales office to the Fountain 

Place Mall per West Virginia Code § 17A-6A-12(2), but Fiat Chrysler failed to do so. 

Moore also claimed that Thornhill attempted to use the temporary Dingess Street and 

Stratton Street locations as a ruse to relocate to the Fountain Place Mall and deprive Moore 

of its statutorily protected “relevant market area.”

Moore’s complaint alleged that Thornhill was improperly engaging in the operation 

of a new Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, and Ram dealership within Moore’s relevant market area 

and in violation of West Virginia law, and asserted causes of action for constructive fraud 

and tortious interference. The complaint sought injunctive and declaratory relief, and 

monetary and punitive damages.

On March 16, 2021, Thornhill filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue under 

West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) which was denied by order entered June 

29, 2021. On July 14, 2021, Thornhill filed a motion to refer the case to the Business Court 

Division and the court stayed discovery pending resolution of the motion. On November 

3, 2021, Thornhill filed a Petition for a Writ of Prohibition challenging the June 29, 2021, 

denial of the motion to dismiss. On November 18, 2021, the circuit court stayed all 

proceedings pending resolution of the writ of prohibition.

On April 26, 2022, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“SCAWV”) 

granted Thornhill’s writ of prohibition on the basis of improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3) 

of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. See Thornhill Motor Car, Inc. v. Thompson, 

246 W. Va. 581, 874 S.E.2d 693 (2022). SCAWV found that “because venue for Moore’s 

action is proper in Logan County under the general venue statute, § 56-1-1, [rather than 

specific venue based on the location of the dealership under the Dealership Act] we grant 

Thornhill’s request for relief in prohibition and direct the Circuit Court of Mingo County 
3

to transfer venue of the action to Logan County.” Id. at 588, 874 S.E.2d at 700. On May 

26, 2022, the Mandate issued.

The underlying civil action was transferred from Mingo to Logan County Circuit 

Court by Order Transferring Venue entered September 15, 2022, and such transfer was 

retroactively applied to May 4, 2022. Approximately a week after the Mandate was issued, 

on June 3, 2022, Thornhill filed its motion for summary judgment. Moore filed its response 

on August 24, 2022, and a hearing was held on August 30, 2022. The parties submitted 

proposed orders with findings of fact and conclusions of law on September 16, 2022.

On October 21, 2022, and February 1, 2023, Moore’s counsel submitted letters to 

the court requesting entry of an order on Thornhill’s pending motion for summary 

judgment. On June 28, 2023, at the request of Moore’s counsel, the circuit court convened 

a status conference and advised the parties from the bench that an order on the pending 

motion for summary judgment would be entered by July 10, 2023, but no order followed. 

On August 11, 2023, Moore filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus seeking to compel the 

circuit court to render a decision on the pending motion for summary judgment. On August 

30, 2023, the court entered an order finding no genuine issue of fact to be tried and granting 

Thornhill’s motion for summary judgment. SCAWV then entered an order refusing the 

petition for the writ as moot. Moore now appeals the order granting summary judgment.

Our standard of review for a grant of summary judgment is de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, 

Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994) (“A circuit court’s entry of 

summary judgment is reviewed de novo.”). We apply the same standard as the circuit court, 

in that, “[a] motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that 

there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable 

to clarify the application of the law.” Syl. Pt. 1, Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W. 

Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995) (citations and quotations omitted).

On appeal, Moore raises five assignments of error alleging that the circuit court 

erred in granting summary judgment because (1) genuine issues of material fact remained 

in dispute and the court incorrectly applied the pertinent legal standard; (2) summary 

judgment was premature; (3) it failed to consider and rule on Moore’s independent tort 

claim of constructive fraud; (4) it failed to consider and rule on Moore’s independent tort 

claim of tortious interference; and (5) it misconstrued and incorrectly interpreted West 

Virginia Code §§ 17A-6A-1, et seq. Underpinning all these arguments is the assertion that 

the circuit court used faulty reasoning in ruling that the complaint against Thornhill could 

not be brought pursuant to West Virginia Code §§ 17A-6A-1, et seq. 

First, we review the applicable statutory law, including the Legislature’s finding 

that it is:
4

necessary to regulate motor vehicle dealers, manufacturers, distributors and 

representatives of vehicle manufacturers and distributors doing business in 

this state in order to avoid undue control of the independent new motor 

vehicle dealer by the vehicle manufacturer or distributor and to ensure that 

dealers fulfill their obligations under their franchises and provide adequate 

and sufficient service to consumers generally, and to protect and preserve the 

investments and properties of the citizens and motor vehicle dealers of this 

state.

W. Va. Code § 17A-6A-1. Furthermore, West Virginia Code § 17A-6A-2 provides:

In accord with the settled public policy of this state to protect the rights of its 

citizens, each franchise or agreement between a manufacturer or distributor 

and a dealer or dealership which is located in West Virginia, or is to be 

performed in substantial part in West Virginia, shall be construed and 

governed by the laws of the state of West Virginia, regardless of the state in 

which it was made or executed and of any provision in the franchise or 

agreement to the contrary. The provisions of this article apply only to any 

franchises and agreements entered into, continued, modified or renewed 

subsequent to the effective date of this article.

Pursuant to the definitions outlined in section three of this article, both Thornhill and Moore 

qualify as “new motor vehicle dealer[s]” and are not “manufacturer[s]” or “distributor[s]” 

as those terms are defined. See W. Va. Code § 17A-6A-3. Moreover, there are no franchise 

agreements or other agreements between Moore and Thornhill before us here.

Finally, we note that West Virginia Code §17A-6A-16 provides for actions at law 

and damages for violations of this statutory scheme, in pertinent part, as follows:

(1) If a manufacturer or distributor terminates, cancels, fails to renew or 

discontinues a dealer agreement for other than good cause as defined in this 

article, or commits any other violation of this article, the new motor vehicle 

dealer adversely affected by the actions may bring an action for damages and 

equitable relief against the manufacturer or distributor. . . 

(2) A manufacturer or distributor who violates this article is liable for all 

damages sustained by a new motor vehicle dealer as a result of the violation.

We find no language anywhere in the statute that contemplates a mechanism for relief for 

controversies between two dealers. Our Supreme Court of Appeals has also weighed in on 

the purpose of the statute, commenting that its indemnity provision in section sixteen “is 

part of a comprehensive statute intended to regulate the relationship and conduct of 

business between motor vehicle dealers on the one hand, and automobile manufacturers 

and distributors on the other.” City Nat. Bank of Charleston v. Wells, 181 W. Va. 763, 775, 
5

384 S.E.2d 374, 386 (1989) (citing W. Va. Code § 17A-6A-1, et seq.); see also Thornhill 

Motor Car, Inc. v. Thompson, 246 W. Va. 581, 587 n.15, 874 S.E.2d 693, 699 n.15 (2022) 

(“When read in its entirety, the statutory scheme applies specifically and solely to actions 

between new motor vehicle dealers and distributors or manufacturers. . .”).

Accordingly, because Moore and Thornhill are both dealers with no franchise or 

other agreements between them, we conclude that this statutory scheme does not apply to 

the allegations raised by Moore against Thornhill. It follows, therefore, that Moore has no 

standing to bring suit pursuant to this statute against Thornhill and that summary judgment 

of such claims is appropriate under the law. See Raines Imps., Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor 

Co., 223 W. Va. 303, 311, 674 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2009). Consequently, we find no merit in 

Moore’s first, second, third, or fifth assignments of error, as they are all predicated upon

alleged violations of this statutory scheme.

Turning to Moore’s tortious interference claim raised in its fourth assignment of 

error, we note that Moore pled in its complaint that it had a valid “dealership agreement” 

with Fiat Chrysler and that Thornhill intentionally interfered with that contractual 

relationship, harming Moore. Our Supreme Court has held that:

To establish prima facie proof of tortious interference, a plaintiff must show:

(1) existence of a contractual or business relationship or expectancy;

(2) an intentional act of interference by a party outside that relationship or 

expectancy;

(3) proof that the interference caused the harm sustained; and

(4) damages. 

Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Torbett v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co., 173 W. Va. 210, 314 S.E.2d 

166 (1983). Because Moore raised allegations sufficient to make a prima facie case 

independent of the grounds raised by West Virginia Code §§ 17A-6A-1 to -18, it was 

premature for the circuit court to dismiss this cause of action, and summary judgment was 

not warranted under the statutory analysis that applied to the remaining claims. Therefore, 

we reverse the grant of summary judgment solely as to the independent claim of tortious 

interference.

Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s August 30, 2023, order to the extent it 

granted summary judgment against Count III of Moore’s complaint, alleging tortious 

interference, and affirm the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment as to the 

remainder of the claims for relief set forth in Moore’s complaint against Thornhill.

Affirmed, in part, and Reversed, in part.
6

ISSUED: October 1, 2024

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Thomas E. Scarr

Judge Charles O. Lorensen

Judge Daniel W. Greear