Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

BRENT R. DECHERT GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Dechert Law Office Attorney General of Indiana

Kokomo, Indiana

CHANDRA K. HEIN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

NATHANIEL J. RICHARDSON, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 34A02-1408-CR-564

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE HOWARD SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Douglas A. Tate, Judge

Cause Nos. 34D03-1002-FD-165 and 34D03-1301-FD-61

January 20, 2015

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BAKER, Judge 
2

Nathaniel Richardson appeals the sentencing orders issued by the trial court in two 

separate criminal causes. He argues that the trial court erroneously calculated the credit 

time to which he is entitled. Richardson also contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion by failing to enter a sentencing statement in the more recent of the two causes. 

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

On January 13, 2012, Richardson pleaded guilty to class D felony operating a 

vehicle while intoxicated under cause number 34D03-1002-FD-165 (“FD-165”).1 The 

trial court sentenced Richardson to three years, to be served as follows: in-home 

detention for two years with good time credit, ninety days executed in the county jail, and 

nine months of probation, with credit given for seven actual days imprisonment during 

the pretrial phase. Richardson began serving his in-home detention term on January 28, 

2012. On August 1, 2012, the trial court authorized Richardson to travel to Tennessee to 

visit family members from August 3 through August 7, 2012. To compensate for that 

leave time, the trial court added eight days2to his in-home detention term. As originally 

scheduled, Richardson would have finished in-home detention and reported to jail to 

serve the ninety-day term on February 3, 2013.

 

1 Richardson had also pleaded guilty to class A misdemeanor operating while intoxicated, but the trial 

court vacated that conviction based on double jeopardy concerns.

2 Richardson contends that the trial court intended to add four, rather than eight, actual days, but the CCS 

is clear that in exchange for the permission to travel, “Court further amends Defendant’s IHD sentence to 

add 8 days.” Appellant’s App. p. 6.
3

On January 23, 2013, ten days before Richardson was to complete his in-home 

detention under FD-165, Richardson was charged with two new operating while 

intoxicated offenses under cause number 34D03-1301-FD-61 (“FD-61”). On January 24, 

2013, the State filed a non-compliance petition under FD-165, alleging that Richardson 

had failed to comply with the conditions of the in-home detention agreement. On 

January 25, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on the petition, denied Richardson bond, 

and held Richardson in jail under FD-61.

Forty days later, on March 6, 2013, the trial court held another hearing on the noncompliance petition. The trial court granted Richardson a blanket bond for both FD-165 

and FD-61 and authorized Richardson’s release.

3

 On March 15, 2013, the trial court 

found that the pretrial time Richardson had spent in jail under FD-61 satisfied the ninetyday commitment under FD-165. The State did not oppose this award of credit time.

Richardson was released from incarceration under the condition that he report to 

in-home detention immediately upon release. It appears that Richardson reported and 

served in-home detention from March 16, 2013, through March 21, 2014. The record is 

unclear, however, as to whether he was serving this in-home detention as his continuing 

sentence under FD-165 or as a condition of pretrial release under FD-61.

On February 25, 2014, Richardson admitted to the allegations of the noncompliance petition and pleaded guilty as charged in FD-61. On March 21, 2014, the 

 

3 As will be fully explained later in this opinion, it is unclear whether Richardson was actually released on 

March 6 or March 15.
4

State filed a second non-compliance petition related to Richardson’s home detention 

commitment in FD-165, and Richardson was incarcerated as a result of the petition.

4

 On 

March 25, 2014, Richardson admitted to the allegations of the second non-compliance 

petition. Richardson was incarcerated from March 21 through April 21, 2014, on the 

non-compliance petition, for a total of thirty-two days.

On April 22, 2014, the trial court entered a true finding on the two non-compliance 

petitions under FD-165.5 On the same day, the trial court revoked the remaining balance 

of Richardson’s sentence under FD-165:

Defendant was to have completed 738 days on IHD [In-Home 

Detention]. The original sentence was for 730 days, however, the 

defendant went to Tennessee for 8 [sic] days and that was tacked on 

at the end of his sentence. Defendant did not receive good time 

credit as he did not qualify. Court imposes the balance of the 

defendant’s 3 years suspended sentence with credit for time served 

in jail and on IHD. Credit time to be determined.

Appellant’s App. p. 11. On May 7, 2014, the trial court issued the following order

determining Richardson’s credit time in FD-165:

The defendant was to have completed 2 years on IHD and did not 

earn credit time so IHD was for an actual 730 days. An additional 8 

days was tacked on at the end of 730 days as the defendant was 

allowed to travel out of state. Defendant served 729 days of the 2 

years, leaving a balance of 9 days on IHD. Defendant has received 

32 actual days HCCJC [jail] credit under [the second noncompliance petition in FD-165]. Defendant has a balance of 1 Year

 

4 Originally, the State mistakenly filed the non-compliance petition in FD-61, but later corrected the error 

and the CCS reflects that the petition was related to FD-165 rather than FD-61. The petition alleged that 

Richardson had violated the rule of his home detention agreement prohibiting him from consuming or 

possessing alcohol or any other controlled substances.

5 The CCS refers to a singular petition, but inasmuch as the trial court had not yet ruled on either pending 

petition, we infer that it ruled on both.
5

plus 9 days on IHD to serve. 374 days less the 32 [actual] days 

credit. Court now imposes 155 actual days [to be executed at the 

county jail]. Commitment under this cause to run consecutivley [sic] 

to [FD-61].

Id. 

On April 22, 2014, the trial court vacated one of Richardson’s convictions in FD61 due to double jeopardy concerns. The remaining conviction in FD-61 was for class D 

felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated. The trial court sentenced Richardson to 

three years executed, with forty-three actual days credit for time served from January 23 

through March 6, 2013. Richardson filed motions to correct error under both FD-165 and 

FD-61. The trial court denied both motions, and he now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Credit Time Calculation

Richardson argues that the trial court miscalculated the amount of credit time he 

has accumulated under both FD-165 and FD-61. For the purposes of this case,6 with 

respect to pretrial credit, a person who is confined awaiting trial or sentencing earns one 

day of credit time for each day of confinement. Stephens v. State, 735 N.E.2d 278, 284 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2000). On appeal, the defendant bears the burden of showing that the trial 

court erred in calculating the credit time. Gardner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 398, 401 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1997). 

 

6 The credit time statute has since been amended in substance, with a new set of rules in place for 

convictions that occur after June 30, 2014. Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.1. Because Richardson’s convictions 

occurred before that date, we will apply the prior version of the statute.
6

With respect to credit for time spent in a community corrections program—here, 

in-home detention—a person who is placed in such a program as part of a sentence is 

entitled to earn credit time under Indiana Code chapter 35-50-6. Pharr v. State, 2 N.E.3d 

10, 12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). That person, however, may be deprived of earned credit 

time as provided by rules adopted by the Department of Correction. Id. Only the 

Department of Correction may deprive a community corrections participant of earned 

credit time. Id. (holding that “the statutes do not authorize trial courts to deprive 

offenders of credit time while in a community corrections program” and instead the trial 

court is “authorized only to determine the credit time earned” by a defendant in such a 

program).

In this case, Richardson contends that he is entitled to credit time for six different 

periods of incarceration and in-home detention. We will consider each in turn.

A. February 13-February 19, 2010

During these days, Richardson was incarcerated during the pretrial phase of FD165. He is entitled to credit for seven actual days plus seven days of good time credit, for 

a total of fourteen days, to be applied to FD-165. The trial court afforded him with 

fourteen days of credit for this period of time, and we find no error on this basis.

B. January 24, 2012-August 2, 2012 and August 8, 2012-January 22, 2013

Richardson spent this period of time on in-home detention under FD-165. He was 

given permission by the trial court to travel out of state from August 3 through August 7, 

2012, and does not receive credit for those five days. Therefore, Richardson is entitled to 
7

192 actual days for January 24 through August 2, 2012, and to 168 actual days for August 

8, 2012, through January 22, 2013, for a total of 360 actual days credit to be applied to 

FD-165.

In theory, Richardson is also entitled to good time credit for the time spent on inhome detention. And indeed, his initial sentencing order in FD-165 specifies that he was 

sentenced to two years in-home detention “with good time credit.” Appellant’s App. p. 4. 

In 2014, however, when ruling and sentencing on the two non-compliance petitions, the 

trial court noted both that Richardson “did not receive good time credit as he did not 

qualify” and that Richardson “did not earn credit time” while on in-home detention. Id.

at 11. 

Two things are ambiguous from the record. First, it is unclear whether the trial 

court actually revoked Richardson’s good time credit or, instead, whether it was merely 

reporting what had occurred within the community corrections program. Second, it is 

unclear from the record whether the Howard County Superior Court supervises 

Community Corrections in Howard County. If that were the case, then the trial court 

would, in theory, be authorized to revoke Richardson’s good time credit. We agree with 

the State that in this case, Richardson admitted to a violation of his in-home detention 

agreement and, as such, is subject to a loss of good time credit. But it is unclear whether 

the entity that made that determination in this case was authorized to do so. Therefore, 

we remand with instructions to make a clear record about who made this determination 

and why it was made.
8

C. January 23, 2013-March 6 or 15, 2013

On January 23, 2013, Richardson was arrested on new charges under FD-61. The 

State filed a non-compliance petition the next day, and the trial court ordered that he be 

held without bond. There are two issues related to this period of imprisonment. The first 

issue is how long he was incarcerated and the second issue is whether the credit time for 

this period should be applied to FD-165, FD-61, or both.

Regarding the length of incarceration, we are unable to discern the end date from 

the record. On March 6, 2013, the trial court issued a blanket bond for both offenses. 

The record shows that the bond was posted on March 6, 2013, and the State contends that 

Richardson was released on that date. But the record also shows that on March 11, the 

trial court ordered that Richardson “be transported” to a March 15, 2013, hearing, and at 

that hearing, Richardson appeared “in custody of” the sheriff’s department. Appellant’s 

App. p. 8. The CCS further states that on March 15, 2013, it “authorizes the Defendant 

released.” Id. It may very well be, therefore, that Richardson was not actually released 

until March 15, in which case he would be entitled to credit time for March 6 through 

March 15. As the trial court found, Richardson is entitled to forty-three actual days plus 

forty-three good time credit days for the period between January 23 and March 6, 2013. 

We remand for the trial court to determine Richardson’s actual release date, and if he was 

not released until March 15, 2013, to award him with an additional nine actual days plus 

nine good time credit days for March 7 through March 15. We also remand for 

clarification of the CCS entry referred to in footnote 5.
9

Regardless of the length of imprisonment, it must also be determined whether the 

credit time should be applied to FD-165, FD-61, or both. The trial court applied the days 

to both causes. In FD-61, the trial court gave credit for forty-three actual days 

(representing January 23 through March 6). Appellant’s App. p. 125. And in FD-165, 

the trial court found that the time that Richardson was imprisoned during this period 

satisfied the 90-day executed portion of his sentence in that cause. Id. at 8.

On appeal, the State directs our attention to authority standing for the proposition 

that when, as here, a defendant is incarcerated on multiple offenses, and is ordered to 

serve those sentences consecutively, he is not entitled to double credit for his period of 

incarceration. French v. State, 754 N.E.2d 9, 17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The CCS reveals 

that the State did not oppose Richardson’s request to have the credit time applied to FD165 such that it satisfied his ninety-day executed term. Appellant’s App. p. 8. Therefore, 

the State may not argue at this stage that the credit should not apply to FD-165. As for 

FD-61, the transcript reveals that neither the parties nor the trial court discussed whether 

the credit time should also be applied to that cause. The trial court’s order merely 

assumes that it would be the case. Id. at 125. 

Given the well-established authority providing that under these circumstances, a 

defendant is not entitled to double credit, we find that it was erroneous to apply credit 

time for the period of incarceration beginning on January 23, 2013, to FD-61. 

Richardson concedes this point. Appellant’s Br. p. 11. We reverse to the extent that the 

trial court applied forty-three actual days credit time to FD-61, and remand with 
10

instructions to determine the precise end date of this period of incarceration and 

recalculate the days to be applied to FD-165, if necessary.

D. March 16, 2013-March 21, 2014

The record reveals that between March 16, 2013, and March 21, 2014, Richardson 

was on in-home detention. The record does not reveal, however, under which cause he 

was serving this time. The CCS states that the in-home detention is a “condition of 

release on bond,” but the blanket bond covered both FD-165 and FD-61. Appellant’s 

App. p. 7. The CCS also notes that Richardson’s original commitment—presumably, 

FD-165—“shall commence this date with defendant being released upon completion.” 

Id. In other words, we simply cannot tell from the CCS whether the in-home detention 

was being served under FD-165 or FD-61. As a result, we cannot determine to which 

cause these 370 actual days credit time should be applied. 

This difference is not purely academic. If Richardson was serving this time as 

pretrial in-home detention under FD-61, he is not entitled to credit time. See Molden v. 

State, 750 N.E.2d 448, 451 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that “pretrial home detention 

detainees are not entitled as a matter of law to receive credit for time served on home 

detention toward any eventual sentence”). Consequently, we remand with instructions to 

determine under which cause Richardson served in-home detention between March 16, 

2013, and March 21, 2014, and recalculate credit time accordingly, if necessary.
11

E. March 21, 2014-April 21, 2014

On March 21, 2014, Richardson was arrested after the State filed the second noncompliance petition in FD-165. He remained incarcerated until April 21, 2014. He is 

entitled to credit for these thirty-two actual days, plus good credit time of thirty-two days, 

for a total of sixty-four days, to be applied to FD-165. The trial court did so, and we find 

no error on this basis.

In sum, we remand for further proceedings to make the following determinations 

and changes: (1) determine who decided that Richardson was not entitled to good time 

credit for the period of in-home detention between January 2012 and January 2013, and 

whether that entity had authority to make that determination, recalculating credit time if 

necessary; (2) determine whether Richardson was released on bond on March 6 or March 

15, 2013, recalculating credit time if necessary; (3) remove the forty-three actual days 

credit time from Richardson’s FD-61 sentence; and (4) determine under which cause 

Richardson was serving in-home detention between March 2013 and March 2014, 

recalculating credit time if necessary.

II. Sentencing

Finally, Richardson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing 

him in FD-61 because it failed to make a sentencing statement or identify aggravators and 

mitigators. Sentencing is a discretionary function of the trial court, and we afford 

considerable deference to the trial court’s judgment. Eiler v. State, 938 N.E.2d 1235, 

1238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). When sentencing a defendant for a felony, the trial court must 
12

enter a sentencing statement “including reasonably detailed reasons or circumstances for 

imposing a particular sentence.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), 

clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. Even if the trial court has abused its discretion—by, 

for example, neglecting to enter a sentencing statement—we will remand for resentencing 

only “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same 

sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Id. at 491.

Here, the trial court neglected to enter a sentencing statement and failed to explain 

its reasoning at the sentencing hearing. Under Anglemyer, that is an abuse of discretion. 

Our analysis does not end there, however, inasmuch as we must consider proper factors 

with support in the record.

Richardson pleaded guilty to a class D felony. As such, he faced a sentence of six 

months to three years imprisonment, with an advisory term of one and one-half years. 

Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7. The trial court imposed the maximum three-year term.

Richardson has a lengthy criminal history. He has amassed convictions for seven 

misdemeanors, including two for battery and two for operating while intoxicated. He has 

accumulated four felony convictions: class D felony possession of cocaine, two out-ofstate felony convictions for bail jumping, and class D felony operating while intoxicated 

in FD-165. He has admitted to at least five instances of non-compliance with terms of 

community corrections and/or probation. According to the presentence investigation 

report, many of the instances of non-compliance involved consuming alcohol. 

Appellant’s App. p. 194.
13

Richardson pleaded guilty in FD-61, which is entitled to some mitigating weight. 

But his lengthy adult criminal history includes multiple substance-use-related offenses, 

spans multiple states, and evinces an individual with little respect for the law, his fellow 

citizens, or the safety of his community. Richardson has been given multiple chances in 

the past and he has repeatedly violated the terms of more lenient sentences. Under these 

circumstances, we are confident that if we were to remand this cause for a sentencing 

statement, the trial court would reach the same result and impose a maximum three-year 

sentence. Consequently, we decline to remand for a sentencing statement and instead 

affirm the sentence.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VAIDIK, C.J., and RILEY, J., concur.