alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 31.2**

 

**SECTION 302 CERTIFICATIONOF THE PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER**

 

I, David M. Obstler, certifythat:

 

1.             I have reviewed thisQuarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the three months ended March 31,2008 of RiskMetrics Group, Inc. (the “Registrant”);

 

2.             Based on myknowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.             Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.             The registrant’sother certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

(a)           Designed suchdisclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

(b)           [Paragraph omitted inaccordance with Exchange Act Rule 13a-14(a).]

 

(c)           Evaluated the effectivenessof the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in thisreport our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and

 

(d)           Disclosed in thisreport any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reportingthat occurred during the registrant’s first fiscal quarter that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and

 

5.             The registrant’sother certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (orpersons performing the equivalent functions):

 

(a)           All significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and

 

(b)           Any fraud, whether ornot material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 
| Date: May 15, 2008         |
|---------------------------------|
|                            |
| /s/ David M. Obstler            |   |
| David M. Obstler                |
| *(Principal Financial Officer)* |

 

----
# C_2012326EN.01020101.xml

| 26.10.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 326/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 326/1

---

PROTOCOL (No 37)

ON THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXPIRY OF THE ECSC TREATY AND ON THE RESEARCH FUND FOR COAL AND STEEL

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,

RECALLING that all assets and liabilities of the European Coal and Steel Community, as they existed on 23 July 2002, were transferred to the European Community on 24 July 2002,

TAKING ACCOUNT of the desire to use these funds for research in sectors related to the coal and steel industry and therefore the necessity to provide for certain special rules in this regard,

HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union:

Article 1

1.   The net worth of these assets and liabilities, as they appear in the balance sheet of the ECSC of 23 July 2002, subject to any increase or decrease which may occur as a result of the liquidation operations, shall be considered as assets intended for research in the sectors related to the coal and steel industry, referred to as the ‘ECSC in liquidation’. On completion of the liquidation they shall be referred to as the ‘assets of the Research Fund for Coal and Steel’.

2.   The revenue from these assets, referred to as the ‘Research Fund for Coal and Steel’, shall be used exclusively for research, outside the research framework programme, in the sectors related to the coal and steel industry in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol and of acts adopted on the basis hereof.

Article 2

The Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt all the necessary provisions for the implementation of this Protocol, including essential principles.

The Council shall adopt, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, measures establishing multiannual financial guidelines for managing the assets of the Research Fund for Coal and Steel and technical guidelines for the research programme of the Research Fund for Coal and Steel.

Article 3

Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol and in the acts adopted on the basis hereof, the provisions of the Treaties shall apply.

---
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

William Jason Pugh, Appellant

No. 06-14-00066-CR v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

Appeal from the 402nd Judicial District 

Court of Wood County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 

22,041-2013). Opinion delivered by Chief 

Justice Morriss, Justice Moseley and Justice 

Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court 

below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We note that the appellant, William Jason Pugh, has adequately indicated his inability to 

pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED APRIL 15, 2015

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-12-0000612

17-APR-2015

08:09 AM
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                    5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION
EXTRACTED FROM THE CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF
OPERATIONS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                 1,000,000
       
<S>                                                          <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                                         12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                                DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                                     DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                                                    38
<SECURITIES>                                                               0
<RECEIVABLES>                                                            251
<ALLOWANCES>                                                               8
<INVENTORY>                                                               97
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                                         439
<PP&E>                                                                   804
<DEPRECIATION>                                                           375
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                                         1,418
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                                    227
<BONDS>                                                                  744
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                                      6
<PREFERRED>                                                                0
<COMMON>                                                                   3
<OTHER-SE>                                                               376
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                           1,418
<SALES>                                                                1,037
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                                       1,037
<CGS>                                                                    409
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                            409
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                                           0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                           0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                                        26
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                                          100
<INCOME-TAX>                                                              35
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                                       64
<DISCONTINUED>                                                             0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                            0
<CHANGES>                                                                  0
<NET-INCOME>                                                              64
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                                           2.10 
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                           2.00
        


</TABLE>
CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of
FalconTarget, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the
fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),
the undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that to the undersigned’s knowledge:

(a) the Report fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;

and

(b) the information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.

FalconTarget, Inc.

Date: June 21, 2009

By:   /s/   Thomas Kirchner

Thomas Kirchner

Chief Executive Officer, Principal Financial Officer

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

* A signed original of this written statement
required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be
retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
<PAGE>
Exhibit 10.6

          Non-Qualified Stock Option Plan, Administrative Rules and Agreement
          under which officers of the Company were eligible to receive options
          to purchase an aggregate of 878,460 shares (restated for the 2-for-1
          stock split effective February 1998 and the 10 percent common stock
          dividends effective in 1999, 1998, 1997 and 1996) of the Company's
          $2.50 par value common stock.  This Non-Qualified Stock Option Plan,
          Administrative Rules and Agreement are incorporated by reference from
          Form 10-K of Brenton Banks, Inc. for the year ended December 31,
          1997.
     57
DENY; and Opinion Filed April 19, 2018.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-18-00382-CV

IN RE PETER BEASLEY, Relator

Original Proceeding from the 296th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 296-05741-2017

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Bridges, Brown, and Boatright

Opinion by Justice Brown

In this original proceeding, relator complains of the trial court’s order granting the real 

parties in interest’s motion to transfer venue to Dallas County. To be entitled to mandamus relief, 

a relator must show both that the trial court has clearly abused its discretion and that relator has no 

adequate appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. 

proceeding). Based on the record before us, we conclude relator is not entitled to the relief 

requested. 

First, the order complained of is not subject to appellate or mandamus review. The real 

parties in interest moved to transfer venue pursuant to section 15.002(b) of the civil practice and 

remedies code, and the trial court granted the motion to transfer without stating a reason. Section 

15.002(c) of the civil practice and remedies code prohibits appellate or mandamus review of the 

granting of a motion to transfer venue brought under section 15.002(b). TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. § 15.002(c) (West 2017). Where, as here, the motion to transfer sufficiently invoked 
–2–

subsection (b) in requesting a transfer and the trial court did not give a reason for granting the 

transfer request, the order granting the transfer is statutorily beyond our review. E.g. In re Coastal 

Alamo Invs., LLC, No. 04-16-00455-CV, 2016 WL 4444384, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 

24, 2016, orig. proceeding) (denying mandamus relief where venue transferred pursuant to 

15.002(b)); see also Trend Offset Printing Servs., Inc. v. Collin County Cmty. College Dist., 249 

S.W.3d 429, 430 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam); Jones v. Pioneer/Eclipse Corp., No. 05-08-00446-CV, 

2009 WL 1395932, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 20, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 

Further, to the extent the order granting the transfer was not based on section 15.002(b), 

relator has an adequate remedy on appeal because such rulings are generally subject to appellate 

review and none of the limited exceptions to that general rule apply here. See 

Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Thirteenth Court of Appeals, 929 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Tex. 1996) (an 

appellate remedy is generally adequate to correct improper venue determinations); Polaris Inv. 

Management Corp. v. Abascal, 892 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. 1995) (“Texas law is quite clear that 

venue determinations are not reviewable by mandamus.”).

Accordingly, we deny relator’s petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a) 

(the court must deny the petition if the court determines relator is not entitled to the relief sought).

180382F.P05

/Ada Brown/

ADA BROWN

JUSTICE
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

April 7, 2015

No. 04-15-00114-CV

Hari Prasad KALAKONDA and Latha Kalakonda,

Appellants

v.

ASPRI INVESTMENTS, LLC,

Appellee

From the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014-CI-16394

Honorable Karen H. Pozza, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The reporter’s record was due March 31, 2015. On March 30, 2015, the court reporter 

filed a request for an extension of time until May 29, 2015 to file the record. We grant the 

motion in part and order Tracy Plummer to file the reporter’s record by April 30, 2015. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 35.3(c) (stating court of appeals must not grant an extension exceeding thirty 

days in an ordinary appeal).

_________________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 7th day of April, 2015.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
**EXHIBIT
        32.2**
  **CERTIFICATION
        PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**
 **AS
        ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE**
 **SARBANES-OXLEY
        ACT OF 2002**
  Pursuant
        to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and in connection with the
        Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Lightstone Value Plus Real Estate Investment
        Trust, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ended March 31, 2007, as filed with
        the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the
        undersigned, the Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of the Company, certifies
        that:
  (1)
        The
        Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
        the
        Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
  (2)
        The
        information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
        the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
  /s/
        Michael M.
        Schurer
 Michael
        M. Schurer
 Chief
        Financial Officer and Treasurer
 (Principal
        Financial and Accounting Officer)
 May
        15,
        2007
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Thomas Fletcher, Appellant.

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Baker, J.), rendered June 6, 1990, convicting him of robbery in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We have reviewed the record and agree with the defendant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted *(see, Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Paige,*54 AD2d 631; *cf., People v Gonzalez,*47 NY2d 606). Bracken, J. P., Kooper, Lawrence, Balletta and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Carlos Tavares, Appellant.

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard Andrias, J.), rendered June 6, 1990, which convicted defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree and sentenced him, as a predicate felon, to an indeterminate prison term of from *2-Vi*to 5 years, unanimously affirmed. The case is remitted to the Supreme Court, New York County, for further proceedings pursuant to CPL 460.50 (5).

*494Officers Mullen and Healey, while on patrol, observed defendant on April 2, 1989, between 7:30 and 9:00 p.m., accept money from different individuals, go into a nearby building, and return to give the individuals tinfoil packages. On one occasion, after defendant had entered the building, the police officers approached the corner where defendant had been standing. While the officers approached from across the street, defendant came out of the building with a tinfoil packet between his knuckles and approached an unidentified individual. As the officers got closer, the individual fled and defendant dropped the tinfoil packet. The packet was recovered by the officers and it contained white powder, cocaine. Defendant was arrested and at the precinct he was searched and $772 was recovered from him.

At a suppression hearing, the Supreme Court determined that the tinfoil packet was voluntarily discarded and that the money recovered was pursuant to a lawful arrest. While defendant questions the veracity of Officer Mullen’s testimony, there is no reason to doubt the hearing court’s determination as to the credibility of such testimony. *(See, People v Fonte,*159 AD2d 346, *lv denied*76 NY2d 734.)

Defendant also maintains that the fact that $772 was recovered from him should not have been admitted into evidence. However, as defendant was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, the People had to prove that defendant possessed the cocaine with intent to sell. Accordingly, the fact that defendant possessed $772 when he was arrested was duly relevant and properly admitted. *(See, People v Milom,*75 AD2d 68, 72.)

Defendant also challenges several of the prosecutor’s comments made in his summation. However, a review of the comments, in context, reveals that they were fairly made in response to the defense’s posture in summation *(People v Marks,*6 NY2d 67, 77, *cert denied*362 US 912) and did not exceed the permissible "bounds of rhetorical comment”. *(People v Galloway,*54 NY2d 396, 399.)

While defendant asserts that the lesser included offense of criminal possession in the seventh degree should have been charged, there is no reasonable view of the evidence which would permit the jury to conclude that defendant was guilty of criminal possession in the seventh degree, but not in the fifth degree. *(See,*CPL 300.50 [2]; *People v Glover,*57 NY2d 61, 63.) Concur—Murphy, P. J., Carro, Ellerin and Asch, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH 

NO. 02-16-00428-CR 

Charleston Lamon Moody 

v. 

The State of Texas 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

From the 213th District Court 

of Tarrant County (1435751D) 

July 20, 2017 

Opinion by Chief Justice Livingston 

(nfp) 

JUDGMENT 

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

the appeal should be dismissed. It is ordered that the appeal is dismissed. 

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By /s/ Terrie Livingston 

 Chief Justice Terrie Livingston
United States Department of Agriculture 1400 Independence Avenue SW. NOP 5034-2

Agricultural Marketing Service Room 2646-South Building Effective Date: March 20, 2024

National Organic Program Washington, DC 20250 Page 1 of 2

NOP 5034-2 Appendix of Prohibited Materials for Organic Crop Production Rev01 Authorized Distribution: Public

Guidance

Appendix of Prohibited Materials for Organic Crop Production

This list is provided for reference purposes and is not intended to be comprehensive. In addition to the 

materials identified below, any synthetic material that is not included at section 205.601 of the National 

List is prohibited for crop production. The materials listed below have been specifically prohibited on 

the National List at section 205.602, have been petitioned and reviewed by National Organic Standards 

Board and not recommended for addition to the National list, have expired from the National List,

and/or have been reviewed by a Federal agency and determined to be prohibited for organic crop 

production. 

1,4-Dimethylnaphthalene

3-Decen-2-one

6-Benzyladenine

Acetylated Lanolin Alcohol

Acrylic Acid Methyl Ester, Polymer with 

Acrylonitrile and 1,3-Butadiene

Ammonium Nonanoate, except as provided 

on § 205.601

Arsenic

Ash from Manure Burning

Avermectin

Basic Slag, agricultural slag

Biosolids

Calcium Carbide

Calcium Oxide, fertilizer use

Calcium Sulfate (synthetic form)

Captan

Chitosan

Copper Chromium Arsenate 

Coumarone – indene resin

Cryolite

Dextrin 

Ethylene Glycol

Exhaust Gas (Carbon Monoxide)

Glycerin Oleate

Glyphosate

Humic acid, treated with hydrogen peroxide 

(oxidized lignite)

Indole-3-butyric Acid

Lead Salts

Leather Meal

Lime Mud

Magnesium Dihydrogen Phosphite

Monohydrate

Manganous Oxide, except as provided on 

§ 205.601(j)

Methyl Bromide

Methyl Laurate

Monocalcium Phosphate

Nickel Salts, Synthetic

Niter

Pelargonic Acid

Pentaerythritol Monostearate

Pentaerythritol Tetrastearate

Piperonyl Butoxide

Propylene glycol monolaurate (PGML)

Potassium Sulfate (synthetic form)

Propane, for underground rodent control

Rotenone

Sewage Sludge

Sodium Chlorate 

Sodium Fluoaluminate

Sodium Fluoride

Sodium Lauryl Sulfate (SLS)

Sodium Propionate

Streptomycin

Struvite (Magnesium Ammonium 

Phosphate)

Strychnine

Sulfuric Acid, except as provided on 

§ 205.601(j)

Tall Oil

Tetracycline

Tetrahydrofufuryl Alcohol 

Thiram

Tobacco Dust (Nicotine Sulfate)

Triple Phosphate

Urea
United States Department of Agriculture 1400 Independence Avenue SW. NOP 5034-2

Agricultural Marketing Service Room 2646-South Building Effective Date: March 20, 2024

National Organic Program Washington, DC 20250 Page 2 of 2

NOP 5034-2 Appendix of Prohibited Materials for Organic Crop Production Rev01 Authorized Distribution: Public

Note: Substances classified as EPA List 4—Inerts of Minimal Concern may be permitted in pesticide 

products under section 205.601(m). For more information, see NOP 5008.