UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

AARON MICHAEL STEVENSON, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

KVC BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE, 

INC.; JASON HOOPER, Chief Executive 

Officer of KVC; MEGAN NELSON, KVC 

Case Manager; BRITTANY SMITH, KVC 

Case Manager, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 18-3005 

(D.C. No. 5:17-CV-03027-SAC) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

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Before PHILLIPS, McKAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

In November 2014, Franklin County District Court in Kansas adjudicated 

Plaintiff Aaron Michael Stevenson’s child, C.S., to be a “Child in Need of Care.” 

Two years later, Franklin County District Court terminated the parental rights to C.S. 

of both Plaintiff and C.S.’s mother. Defendant KVC Behavioral Healthcare, Inc. 

(“KVC”), a private non-profit organization, placed C.S. in a foster home and began 

providing family support services between Plaintiff and C.S. Plaintiff appealed the 

termination of his parental rights. In February 2017, while his appeal in state court 

 *

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 15, 2018

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

was still pending, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against KVC and KVC 

employees in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas. This complaint 

alleged KVC and its employees violated his constitutional rights by forcing a case 

plan upon him before his paternity was established, prohibiting him from attending 

the same church as his child, and discriminating against him because of his criminal 

history. 

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff did not file a timely 

response. The district court entered an order to show cause why Defendants’ motion 

should not be granted. After Plaintiff still did not respond, the district court granted 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for three reasons. First, the court held the Younger

abstention doctrine, set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), barred the 

court from interfering with the ongoing state court proceedings. Second, the court 

held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on the domestic relations exception to 

federal jurisdiction recognized in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992). 

Third, the court held Plaintiff failed to state a claim under § 1983 because neither 

KVC nor its employees are state actors and Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to 

establish they acted under the color of state law. 

On appeal, Plaintiff fails to address these holdings of the district court’s 

Memorandum and Order. Instead, he repeats the same arguments he made before the 

district court: (1) KVC unconstitutionally forced a case plan on him before paternity 

was established; and (2) KVC unconstitutionally caused him to miss church because 

his son attended that church. As the district court ably explained in its Memorandum 
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and Order, these claims fail because the Younger abstention doctrine denies the 

district court the ability to exercise its jurisdiction. ROA, 44–45; see also 

Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999). 

Where the district court accurately analyzes an issue, we see no useful purpose in 

writing at length. Because the Younger abstention is sufficient to justify the district 

court’s grant of the motion to dismiss, we need not address the other two independent 

grounds on which the district court relied. 

Plaintiff only raises one new issue that he did not raise before the district court 

and, thus, the district court did not address. Plaintiff argues he was unable to contest 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss because he never received a copy of the motion. 

Defendants were required to mail the motion to Plaintiff’s last known address. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C). According to Defendants’ certificate of service attached 

to their motion to dismiss, they did indeed mail the motion to the most recent address 

on record for Plaintiff. At this point, service was complete. See id. Five days after 

Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, Plaintiff entered a notice of a change of 

address. The record shows that same day, the clerk of the District of Kansas 

forwarded the motion to dismiss to this new address. In short, the record indicates 

Plaintiff was appropriately served the motion to dismiss. In any event, nothing 

Plaintiff might have argued in a response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss would 

change the fact that, under the Younger abstention doctrine, the district court could 
4 

not exercise jurisdiction. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court, 

Bobby R. Baldock 

United States Circuit Judge