J

- A10043

- 22

NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.
JEREMY LYNN COONS

Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1121 MDA 2021 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 29, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

- 01

- CR

- 0000525

- 2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J. MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: JULY 19, 2022 Appellant, Jeremy Lynn Coons , appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Adams County Court of Common Pleas , following his bench trial
convictions for two counts of driving under the influence of a controlled substance (“DUI”)

. 1 We affirm

. The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal as follows:

The stipulated facts establish that on May 6, 2020, at approximately 9:08 a.m. , Appellant was driving a vehicle on State Route 116. State Route 116 is a public roadway in Hamilton Township, Adams County. Trooper Matthew Geiman of the Pennsylvania State Police was employed an d on patrol at the time as a patrol trooper. As of the date of this incident, Trooper Geiman had been employed with the PS P for approximately six years, received standard field sobriety testing training while at the academy, and had

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______
1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1) (i), (iii).J

- A10043

- 22

- 2

- arrested approximately 200 people for DUI

— many of which involved marijuana. Trooper Geiman was traveling e astbound on State Route 116 when he observed Appellant’s vehicle travelling w estbound on State Route 116. Trooper Geiman noticed an alleged illegal window tint on Appellant’s vehicle. As Appellant turned his vehicle into a public parking lot in Fairfield Borough, Adams County, Trooper Geim an effectuated a traffic stop o f Appellant’s vehicle on the basis of the alleged illegal window tint. Trooper Geiman’s interaction with Appellant during the traffic stop was visually and audibly recorded by dashcam video and was admitted into evidence for the bench trial. After interacting with Appellant, Trooper Geiman placed him under arrest and transported him to Gettysburg Hospital for blood testing. Appellant initially refused the blood draw, but after Trooper Geiman obtained a search warrant to col lect the same, Appellant ag reed to the blood draw pursuant to the search warrant.
At approximately 11:25 a.m. , two vials of blood were drawn from Appellant’s arm at the hospital and were then sealed and sent to NMS Laboratory for testing. The resulting blood tests showed the presence of active marijuana compounds (Delta

- 9 THC) and metabolites of those compounds (Delta

9 Carboxy THC ) in Appellant’s blood system. M arijuana is a Schedule I controlled substance pursuant to the Controlled Substance, Drug, D evice and Cosmetic Act. (Trial Court Opinion , filed 9/ 3 / 21, at 1

- 3)

. On December 3, 2020, Appellant filed a suppression motion

. Appellant proceeded to a suppression hearing on February 8, 2021

. At that time , Appellant argued that Trooper Geiman lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant or conduct field sobriety test s
. ( See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 2/8/21, at 4 ). The court denied the suppression motion on February 23, 2021.
T he court subsequently conducted a stipulated ben ch trial and found AppellantJ

- A10043

- 22

- 3

-

guilty of two counts of DUI

. O n Ju ne 29 , 2021, the court sentenced Appellant

to an aggregate 84 months of probation with restrictive DUI conditions

. Appellant timely filed a n otice of a ppea l on July 22, 2021

. On August 2, 2021, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant f iled his Rule 1925(b)

statement on August 24, 2021. Appellant now raises three issues on appeal :
Whether the tri al court erred in denying Appellant’s suppression motion because there was no “reasonable” suspicion of DUI to force Appellant out of his vehicle to perform field sobriety tests, or the subsequent probable cause to take his blood, absent the alleged odor o f marijuana and whereby the officer did not specify whether the alleged odor was of burnt or fresh marijuana. Whether the trial court erred in denying suppression after Appellant was directed to get out of his vehicle for an investigative detention, during which law enforcement admittedly engaged in an illegal warrantless search of his vehicle.
Whether the tria l court erred in denying Appellant’s suppression motion because there was not sufficient probable cause to demand Appellant submit to a blood test. (Appellant’s Brief at 14)

. Appellant’s issues are related , and we address them together. Appellant

ar gues that Trooper Geiman conducted a traffic stop due to the tinted windows on Appellant’s vehicle. Appellant maintains that the subsequent traffic stop
should have been limited to an investigation of this vehicle code violation, absent reasonable suspicion of some other criminal activity

. Regarding theJ

- A10043

- 22

- 4

-

existence of reasonable suspicion for other criminal activity, Appellant note s
that there is no evidence that he dr ove erratically or exhibited slurred speech
at the time of the stop

. Although the trooper smelled marijuana , Appellant emphasizes that “ the odor of marijuana, without more, is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicions of criminal activi ty to justify a detention for field sobriety testing, nor can it be used to establish probable cause

.... ” ( Id.
at 2 7 ). Appellant further a lleges that Trooper Geiman’s observations that Appellant’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy are unsupported by the record. Appellant concludes that the record did not support the suppression court’s legal conclusions , and this court must vacate his judgment of sentence on this
basis

. 2 We disagree.
T he following principles govern our review of an order denying a motion to suppress:

An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual f indings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence fo r the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______
2 To the extent Appellant also alleges that the trooper conducted an illegal, warrantless search of the vehicle , the court noted that “the stipulated facts presented at trial did not include any evidence obtained from the search of Appellant’s vehicle.” (Trial Court Opinion at 4). Our review of the re cord confirms the court’s reasoning, and we proceed to address the remaining claims regarding the legality of the vehicle stop, investigative detention, and blood draw.J

- A10043

- 22

- 5

- whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by [those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s leg al conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppres sion court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Ford , 175 A.3d 985 , 989 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal
denied , 647 Pa. 522, 190 A.3d 580 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. P.
Jones , 121 A.3d 524, 526

- 27 (Pa.Super. 2015)). Our analysis of the quantum of cause required for a traffic stop begins with the Motor Vehicle Code, which provides:

§ 6308. Investigation by police officers

* * * (b) Authority of police officer. — Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle’ s registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine number or the driver’ s license, or to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of t his title. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) (emphasis added).

“ [D] espite subsection 6308(b)’s reasonable suspicion standard, some offenses, by their very nature, require a police officer to possess probable cause before he or she may conduct a traffic stop.” C ommonwealth v.J

- A10043

- 22

- 6

-

Ibrahim , 127 A.3d 819, 823 (Pa.Super. 2015) , appeal denied , 635 Pa. 771, 138 A.3d 3 (2016)

. “For a stop based on the observed violation of the Vehicle
Code or otherwise non

- investigable offense , an officer must have probable
cause to make a constitutional vehicle stop.” Commonwealth v. Harris , 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2017)

. S ee also Commonwealth v. Feczko , 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010) , appeal denied , 611 Pa. 650, 25 A.3d 327 (2011) ( stating m ere reasonable suspicion will not justify vehicle stop
when driver’ s detention cannot se rve inves tigatory purpose relevant to suspected violation). Further, we note that an “ investigative detention ” is interchangeably
labeled as a “ stop and frisk ” or a “ Terry [ 3 ] stop.” Commonwealth v. Brame , 239 A.3d 1119, 1127 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal denied , ___ Pa. ___, 251 A.3d 771 (2021)

.

An investigative detention ... constitutes a seizure of a person and thus activates the protections of Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Co nstitution. To institute an investigative detention, an officer must have at least a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Reasonable suspicion requires a finding that based on the available facts, a person of reasonable caution would bel ieve the intrusion was appropriate.
* * * Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able to articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him reasonably to con clude, in light of his experience, that

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______
3 Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).J

- A10043

- 22

- 7

- criminal activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in that activity.
Commonwealth v. B. Jones , 874 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa.Super. 2005) (internal citations omitted). Reasonable suspicion of DUI can arise where an officer observes “ classic signs ” of intoxication , such as the odor of intoxicant s , slurred speech, and glassy eyes

. Commonwealth v. Cauley , 10 A.3d 321 , 327 ( Pa.Super. 2010)

. When an officer possesse s good reason to believe that a driver is intoxicated, he is justified in asking the driver to perform sobriety tests

. See Commonwealth v. Ragan , 652 A.2d 925 , 929 (Pa.Super. 1995) , appeal
denied , 541 Pa. 650 , 6 64 A.2d 540 ( 1995)

. Additionally, “ [t] he administration of a blood test, performed by an agent of, or at the direction of the government, constitutes a search under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.” Commonwealth v.
Johnson , 188 A.3d 486, 489 (Pa.Super. 2018) , appeal denied , 649 Pa. 179, 195 A.3d 852 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Evans , 153 A.3d 323, 328 ( Pa.Super. 2016) )

. T he Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a search

warr ant for a blood draw , provided that they can do so without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search. See Commonwealth v. Trahey , 658
Pa. 340 , 355 , 228 A.3d 520 , 529 ( 2020)

. “ It is hornbook law that search warrants may only issue upon probable cause

.... ” Commonwealth v. Leed , 646 Pa. 602, 615, 186 A.3d 405, 413 (2018).
Probable caus e is established when police have “ k nowledge of sufficientJ

- A10043

- 22

- 8

-

facts and circumstances, gained through trustworthy information, to warrant a prudent man in the belief that a crime has been committed. ”
Commonwealth v. Robinson , 834 A.2d 1160 , 1166 (Pa.Super. 2003) ( quoting Commonwealth v. Aiello , 675 A.2d 1278, 1280 ( Pa.Super. 1996) )

.

“ [T] he smell of marijuana indisputably can still signal the possibility of criminal
activit y ,” an d it “ may be a factor, but not a stand

- alone one, in evaluating the totality of the circumstances for purposes of determining whether police had probable cause

... .” Commonwealth v. Barr , ___ Pa. ___, ___, 266 A.3d 25 , 41 (2021). Instantly, Trooper Geiman testified tha t he observed Appellant’s vehicle travelling westbound on Route 116

. ( See N.T. Suppression Hearing at 10 )

. Trooper Geiman noted that the “front window ” o f Appellant’s vehicle w as “tinted to a degree which prevented me from seeing in the vehicle

. ” ( Id. ) Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, the trooper testified regarding this specific
observation of a vehicle code violation that caused him to execute a traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle. Thus , the record supported the suppression court’s
conclusion that the trooper possessed the requisite probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. See Harris, supra

. See also 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1) (stating vehicle cannot have window tint that obstructs view into vehicle
th r ough windshield, side wing or side window )

. Trooper Geiman testified that as he approached Appellant’s vehicle, he
noticed a strong “ odor of burnt marijuana ” coming from Appellant’s vehicle

.J

- A10043

- 22

- 9

-

( See N.T. Suppression Hearing at 11). The trooper spoke with Appellant and
observed that Appellant’s eyes were glassy and bloodshot, with dilated pupils. ( Id. at 12). Based upon the trooper’s training and experience, he believed Appellant might have been intoxicated. ( Id. ) Additi onally, Appellant appeared “extremely nervous , ” and he “was fidget ing around a lot wh en he

was search ing for his documents. ” ( Id. at 13).
T he smell of burnt marijuana, combined with Appellant’s glassy,
bloodshot eyes , nervousness, and fidgeting, allowed Trooper Geiman to develop reasonable suspicion that Appellant was operating his vehic le while
intoxicated

. See Cauley , supra
. In light of this reasonable suspicion, Trooper Geiman properly ask ed Appellant to exit the vehicle and perfo rm field sobriety test s
. See Ragan, supra

. Appellant subsequently failed the field sobriety test s. ( See Affidavit of Probable Cause , dated 6/15/20 , at 1). Appellant’s inability to pass the sobriety tests , combined with the trooper’s previous observations regarding the odor of marijuana and other indicia of intoxication, yielded the probable cause necessary to support the warrant authorizing the blood draw

. See Robinson, supra ; Johnson, supra

. Based upo n the foregoing , we conclude that the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record , and its legal conclusions are

correct. See Ford, supra

. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief on any of his claims. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence

. Judgment of sentence affirmed.J

- A10043

- 22

- 10

-

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 07/19/2022