ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT			ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Christopher A. Ramsey			Jeffrey A. Modisett

Ramsey & Black					Attorney General of Indiana

Vincennes, Indiana

							Preston W. Black

Bryan A. Jewel					Deputy Attorney General

Kirchoff & Jewel				Indianapolis, IN

Vincennes, Indiana

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

JEFFREY ALLEN WHIPPS,			)

							)

	Appellant (Defendant Below),	)

							)

		v.					)  CAUSE NO. 42S00-9609-CR-623

							)

STATE OF INDIANA,				)

							)

	Appellee (Plaintiff Below).	)

APPEAL FROM THE KNOX CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Murphy C. Land, Judge

Cause No. 42C01-9506-CF-034

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

	A jury found appellant Jeffrey A. Whipps guilty of murder;1 arson, a class B felony;2 and sexual misconduct with a minor, a class C felony.3  The trial court sentenced him to eighty-nine years in prison.  We affirm.

	The evidence at trial tended to prove that Whipps left the

residence of a friend at about 6 a.m. on June 17, 1995, and entered

a home some 150 feet away where a young child and a fifteen-year-

old babysitter were still asleep.  Whipps had sex with the

babysitter, killed her with a stab wound to the center of her

chest, and then set the house afire in two places.

	The following day, the police called Whipps and said they

would like to talk to him.  Two officers drove to the home where

Whipps lived with his mother.  Whipps came out and sat in the back

of the squad car.  In the course of this conversation, one of the

officers noticed that Whipps’ left shoe had been burned.  He told

Whipps he would like to sketch the sole of his shoe.  Whipps

removed the shoe and handed it to the officer.  While sketching,

the officer noticed what he thought was blood on the shoe.  He

handed it to his superior officer.  After examining it, the senior

officer stopped the interview and said it was time to read Whipps

his Miranda rights.

	There was a brief tug of war over the shoe, which the officers

won.  Whipps proceeded to give a statement (the first of three

denying involvement in the crime).  The police apparently did not

arrest Whipps on this occasion, but they did keep his shoe.  After

holding a hearing on Whipps' motion to suppress, the trial court

permitted Tthe State to offered the shoe as evidence during Whipps’

trial.

	Whipps contends that the shoe should have been excluded as the

product of a seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment.  He notes

the absence of a warrant and contends his passing of the shoe was

involuntary.

	We test questions of voluntariness by reviewing the totality

of the circumstances.  Williams v. State, 611 N.E.2d 649, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied.  It is apparent that the trial court was justified in viewing the circumstances under which Whipps handed

the officer his shoe as voluntary.  Having once received the shoe

from suspect Whipps and having observed it was burned and possibly

bloody, the officers were authorized to retain it.  They had

obtained access to the shoe lawfully and its incriminating nature

was immediately apparent.  These two facts authorized seizure of

the shoe under the Fourth Amendment.  Taylor v. State, 659 N.E.2d 535, 538-39 (Ind. 1995).  It was properly admitted as evidence.

	Whipps also claims error in permitting the child who was under

charge of the babysitter to identify him in the courtroom.  Whipps

did not object when the child identified him, however, and thus has

not preserved this issue for appeal.  Clausen v. State, 622 N.E.2d 925, 927-28 (Ind. 1993).

	Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Dickson, Sullivan, Selby, and Boehm, JJ., concur.