NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LORENA FUENTES DE RAMIREZ, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

JEFFREY A. ROSEN, Acting Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 18-73358 

19-72883 

Agency No. A208-924-017 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted January 11, 2021**

Pasadena, California

Before: WATFORD, FRIEDLAND, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

Lorena Fuentes de Ramirez and her two children, who are natives and 

citizens of El Salvador, petition for review of a decision of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing their appeal from an order of an 

immigration judge (“IJ”) denying their applications for asylum, withholding of 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JAN 13 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 Fuentes 

de Ramirez also argues that the agency2lacked jurisdiction and violated her due 

process rights, and that it erred in denying her request for a continuance to allow 

for consolidation of her proceedings with her husband’s. We have jurisdiction 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition for review. 

Fuentes de Ramirez moved to terminate her proceedings, arguing that she 

was improperly denied a credible fear interview, and that the IJ consequently 

lacked jurisdiction over her applications. We review questions of law de novo, 

except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the 

governing statutes and regulations. Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th 

Cir. 2004). The government properly exercised its discretion by placing Fuentes 

de Ramirez in regular removal proceedings, Flores v. Barr, 934 F.3d 910, 916 

(9th Cir. 2019) (citing Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 520, 521-22 

(BIA 2011)), which do not require a credible fear interview, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 

Contrary to Fuentes de Ramirez’s argument, 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(a)’s grant of initial 

jurisdiction to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services does not apply here. See 

1 Because Fuentes de Ramirez’s children’s applications are derivative and 

allege no claims independent of their mother’s, this disposition refers to Fuentes de 

Ramirez’s petition in the singular for simplicity. 

2 We refer to the BIA and the IJ collectively as “the agency.” See MedinaLara v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that this court will 

review both the BIA and the IJ’s decisions when the BIA cites Matter of Burbano, 

20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994)). 
3 

8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b).

Alternatively, Fuentes de Ramirez argues that her due process rights were 

violated because she was entitled to a credible fear interview. We apply de novo 

review to claims of due process violations in immigration proceedings. Lianhua 

Jiang v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2014). Even if it had been an error to 

deny Fuentes de Ramirez a credible fear interview, to prove a due process violation 

resulting from the denial, she would need to “show prejudice, which means that the 

outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.” 

Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000). Fuentes de Ramirez has not 

shown prejudice due to being placed in regular removal proceedings instead of 

expedited removal proceedings. The procedures are similar under either form of 

review, except that an immigrant in expedited removal proceedings faces the initial 

hurdle of having to pass a credible fear screening, after which an IJ will consider 

her claims de novo. See Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th 

Cir. 2020). By skipping the credible fear stage, Fuentes de Ramirez was 

effectively treated as though she passed the credible fear interview—no better 

outcome could have resulted from having a credible fear interview. 

Fuentes de Ramirez nonetheless argues that she suffered prejudice because 

the agency made an adverse credibility determination based, in part, on her failure 

to mention threats or extortion in El Salvador during her initial interview at the 
4 

border. According to Fuentes de Ramirez, a credible fear interview would have 

given her the opportunity to testify about her experience in more detail, and this 

additional testimony would have bolstered her credibility. Nothing in the record 

suggests that the availability of credible fear testimony would have prevented the 

agency from relying on the significant inconsistencies in Fuentes de Ramirez’s 

other evidence, including her border interview, hearing testimony, and 

documentary evidence. Therefore, we decline to hold that the government violated 

Fuentes de Ramirez’s constitutional rights. 

The agency did not abuse its discretion by denying Fuentes de Ramirez’s 

motion to continue her proceedings so that she could consolidate her proceedings 

with her husband’s. See Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(stating the standard of review). Fuentes de Ramirez’s husband’s case was already 

before the BIA when she made the request, and the lack of consolidation had no 

effect on his ability to testify in support of her case. 

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility 

determination. Fuentes de Ramirez testified that the MS-13 gang extorted her 

husband, threatened to kill her family, killed two of her neighbors, and told her to 

leave the area. The agency found that Fuentes de Ramirez failed to mention key 

parts of this story during her border interview, and that there were significant 

inconsistencies between her border interview, hearing testimony, and documentary 
5 

evidence as to the circumstances surrounding her neighbors’ murders and the 

extortion threats received by her family members. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 

F.3d 1034, 1047 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen an inconsistency is at the heart of the 

claim it doubtless is of great weight.”). Fuentes de Ramirez’s explanations—

mainly, that she was improperly denied a credible fear interview and that her 

inconsistencies should be considered trivial—do not compel a contrary conclusion. 

See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000). In the absence of credible 

testimony, Fuentes de Ramirez’s asylum and withholding of removal claims 

fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).3 

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because 

Fuentes de Ramirez failed to show it is more likely than not that she will be 

tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El 

Salvador. See Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014).4

3

In light of our conclusion regarding credibility, we need not reach the 

agency’s alternative holdings that Fuentes de Ramirez failed to establish a nexus 

between her fear of persecution and a protected ground, that the government was 

unable or unwilling to protect her, or that she could not relocate within El Salvador 

to avoid persecution. See Simeonov, 371 F.3d at 538.

4 With respect to petition no. 19-72883, the BIA did not abuse its discretion 

by denying Fuentes de Ramirez’s motion to reopen. Her challenge to the IJ’s 

jurisdiction based on Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), is foreclosed by 

this court’s recent precedent. See Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1159 (9th 

Cir. 2019) (holding that Pereira’s “narrow ruling does not control” questions of an 

Immigration Court’s jurisdiction over removal proceedings). The Government’s 

motion for summary disposition (Docket No. 6) of that petition for review is 

granted because the questions it raises are so insubstantial as not to require further 
6 

PETITION DENIED.

argument. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating 

the standard). The motion for a stay of removal in petition no. 19-72883 (Docket 

No. 1) is denied as moot.