UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JERRY W. MURRAY,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

DA-0752-13-0407-I-1

DATE: January 22, 2015

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Andrea Goplerud, Esquire, and Jessica L. Parks, Esquire, Washington, 

D.C., for the appellant.

William J. Flynn, Del Rio, Texas, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Anne M. Wagner, Vice Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which 

affirmed the agency’s removal action. Generally, we grant petitions such as this 

one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; 

 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add 

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, 

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not 

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a 

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board 

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation 

or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings 

during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent 

with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting 

error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal 

argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not 

available when the record closed. See Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 

section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this 

appeal, and based on the following points and authorities, we conclude that the 

petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the 

petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. We MODIFY 

the initial decision to supplement the administrative judge’s nexus analysis, but 

we agree with the administrative judge’s finding that there is a nexus between the 

sustained misconduct and the efficiency of the service. Except as expressly 

modified by this Final Order, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Effective May 17, 2013, the agency removed the appellant from his GS-11 

Paralegal Specialist position in the Asset Forfeiture Office (AFO) of the U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) based on the following two charges: 

(1) false report to the Val Verde Sheriff’s Office; and (2) false insurance claim to 

GEICO insurance company. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 7-10. The 

appellant appealed his removal to the Board and requested a hearing. Id. at 1-5. 

He admitted to the first charge but disputed the second charge and argued that the 

penalty of removal was unreasonable given certain mitigating factors, the 

deciding official failed to properly weigh the relevant factors, and the agency 

treated him disparately compared to other employees who engaged in similar 

misconduct. IAF, Tab 14 at 17-34, Tab 16 at 1, Tab 40, Initial Decision (ID) at 6 

n.4. He also raised the affirmative defenses of race discrimination, lack of due 
3

process, and harmful procedural error. IAF, Tab 1 at 3, Tab 14 at 31, 34; see

IAF, Tab 16, Tab 24; ID at 8-9. The appellant withdrew his request for a hearing

and the parties presented closing arguments over the telephone. IAF, Tabs 27, 

39. 

¶3 The administrative judge issued an initial decision affirming the removal 

action. ID at 1, 19. He sustained both charges, found a nexus between the 

sustained misconduct and the efficiency of the service, and determined that the 

penalty was within the bounds of reasonableness. ID at 2-6, 12-19. The 

administrative judge additionally found that the appellant failed to prove his 

affirmative defenses. ID at 6-12.

¶4 The appellant has filed a petition for review and primarily challenges the 

administrative judge’s findings regarding nexus and the reasonableness of the 

removal penalty, including his claim of disparate penalties. Petition for Review 

(PFR) File, Tab 4 at 4, 9-27. The agency has responded in opposition. PFR File, 

Tab 5. The appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response. PFR File, Tab 6.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

The agency proved the charged misconduct and the existence of a nexus between 

the misconduct and the efficiency of the service.

¶5 The appellant does not contest in his petition for review the administrative 

judge’s finding that the agency proved both charges of misconduct. PFR File, 

Tab 4 at 9. However, he argues that the agency failed to prove a nexus between 

the sustained misconduct and the efficiency of the service. Id. at 9-15; PFR File, 

Tab 6 at 5-9. We modify the initial decision to discuss the proper standard for 

evaluating nexus when off-duty misconduct is involved and to supplement the 

administrative judge’s nexus analysis.

¶6 The nexus requirement, for purposes of determining whether an agency has 

shown that its action promotes the efficiency of the service, means there must be 

a clear and direct relationship between the articulated grounds for an adverse 

action and either the employee’s ability to accomplish his duties satisfactorily or 
4

some other legitimate government interest. Merritt v. Department of Justice, 

6 M.S.P.R. 585, 596 (1981), modified on other grounds by Kruger v. Department 

of Justice, 32 M.S.P.R. 71, 75 n. 2 (1987). An agency may show a nexus between 

off-duty misconduct and the efficiency of the service by three means: (1) a 

rebuttable presumption in certain egregious circumstances; (2) preponderant 

evidence that the misconduct adversely affects the appellant’s or coworkers’ job 

performance or the agency’s trust and confidence in the appellant’s job 

performance; or (3) preponderant evidence that the misconduct interfered with or 

adversely affected the agency’s mission. See Kruger, 32 M.S.P.R. at 74.

¶7 The agency argues that it established a nexus under the second Kruger

category because the appellant’s misconduct “undermined the Agency’s trust and 

confidence in the Appellant’s ability to successfully perform his work as a 

paralegal.” PFR File, Tab 5 at 10. In the decision letter, the deciding official

stated, “I have lost confidence in your integrity and ability to perform the duties 

of your position, or those of any other position, within this Agency.” IAF, Tab 1 

at 8. He also stated in a declaration made under penalty of perjury that the 

appellant’s “dishonest behavior negatively impacted [his] ability to effectively 

perform his duties on the government’s behalf” and “his lack of mature judgment 

and misconduct undermined my confidence in his ability to carry out the duties 

and responsibilities of his position.” IAF, Tab 37 at 11. The deciding official

testified during his deposition that the agency “cannot have one of [its]

employees lying to a member of law enforcement,” IAF, Tab 30 at 71-72, and that 

the appellant violated “the confidence of the public,” id. at 35-36.

2

 2 Management’s loss of trust and confidence under the second Kruger category must be 

related to the employee’s job performance. See Doe v. Department of Justice, 565 F.3d 

1375, 1377-83 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding the Board’s nexus analysis inadequate and 

remanding the case for more specific findings demonstrating the off-duty misconduct of 

the appellant and the impact of that conduct on his ability to perform his job or the 

mission of the agency); Brown v. Department of the Navy, 229 F.3d 1356, 1360-61 

(Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding management’s trust and confidence in the appellant was 

undermined where he initiated an adulterous affair with the wife of a deployed Marine 
5

¶8 The appellant disputes the agency’s characterization of the nature of his job 

duties and claims that his duties were “essentially ministerial in nature.” PFR 

File, Tab 6 at 8. The appellant further contends that “he had no actual role in 

determining whether a vehicle was stolen other than giving stolen vehicle reports 

to [his supervisor] and making sure the reports were in the file.” Id. The 

appellant also asserted that he did not deal with stolen vehicle reports. IAF, Tab 

34 at 13 (affidavit); see IAF, Tab 18 at 110 (interview with the agency’s fact 

finder). To support his position, the appellant relies on the testimony of his 

former assistant. PFR File, Tab 4 at 6, 12, 15, Tab 6 at 7; see IAF, Tab 35 at 5-6. 

She testified that she did not recall a time when the appellant obtained a stolen 

vehicle report by contacting a law enforcement agency. IAF, Tab 28 at 13-14. 

However, it is unclear whether the former assistant’s deposition testimony 

addresses her previous duties as a Paralegal Assistant or her current duties as a 

 

who was a member of a unit that he was directly responsible for supporting, thus 

implicating his managerial responsibilities on the unit); Royster v. Department of 

Justice, 58 M.S.P.R. 495, 500 (1993) (finding that the agency established by 

preponderant evidence that the appellant’s misconduct adversely affected its trust and 

confidence in the appellant’s ability to perform his duties where the sustained 

misconduct involved making a threat of violence to a woman, thus relating to the 

appellant’s duties of maintaining the safety, custody, and control of female inmates). 

Grounding disciplinary actions on such a nebulous standard as loss of trust alone, 

however, is contrary to the theory of the Civil Service Reform Act that disciplinary 

actions may be taken only in the efficiency of the service. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 

1161, 1165-67 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“[a] reviewing court must at least be able to discern 

some reasonably foreseeable, specific connection between an employee’s potentially 

embarrassing conduct and the efficiency of the service”); see Doe, 565 F.3d at 1380 

(using only “clearly dishonest” as a standard for nexus risked arbitrary results, “as the 

question of removal would turn on the Board’s subjective moral compass”). 

Accordingly, a deciding official’s statement that he has lost confidence in an

appellant’s ability to perform the duties of his position or of any other position within 

the agency, absent evidence or argument showing how his loss of confidence in the

appellant is related to the appellant’s job performance, is insufficient to establish nexus 

under the second Kruger category. We need not reach the issue of whether the agency 

in this case established nexus under the second Kruger category because, as discussed 

below, the record reflects that it established nexus under the third Kruger category. 
6

Paralegal Specialist, as claimed by the appellant. Id. at 4-19; see IAF, Tab 35 at 

5-6; PFR File, Tab 4 at 12, Tab 6 at 7.

¶9 In contrast, the appellant’s first-line supervisor has consistently stated that 

determining the validity of stolen vehicle reports was one of the appellant’s 

primary duties and it involved contacting law enforcement agencies and

collecting stolen vehicle reports. IAF, Tab 10 at 19 (written memorandum), Tab 

18 at 103 (interview with the agency’s fact finder), Tab 29 at 22-23, 26-27, 29, 32 

(deposition testimony), Tab 35 at 5-6 (declaration). The position description for 

a GS-11 Paralegal Specialist position is consistent with the agency’s contention 

that the appellant dealt with stolen vehicle reports. IAF, Tab 11 at 4 (“Develops 

and evaluates all evidence, facts and circumstances relating to the case . . . .”). 

The deciding official also relied on the position description to determine the 

appellant’s duties, IAF, Tab 30 at 17 (deposition testimony), which he believed

involved stolen vehicle claims, id. at 72, Tab 37 at 10 (declaration).

¶10 The appellant’s allegation that he did not deal with stolen vehicle reports

conflicts with the position description and the opinions of both the deciding 

official and the appellant’s first-line supervisor. However, we need not make 

credibility determinations because, even assuming the appellant did not deal with 

stolen vehicle reports as part of his primary duties, we find that the nature of the

work accomplished in the AFO is so related to the appellant’s misconduct that it 

establishes a nexus under the third Kruger category. See, e.g., Kruger, 

32 M.S.P.R. at 76 (holding that the appellants’ use of marijuana was antithetical 

to the agency’s law enforcement and rehabilitative programs that they were

responsible for monitoring). The purpose of the AFO is to process seized items, 

such as vehicles, for administrative forfeiture. IAF, Tab 35 at 4. Sometimes, the 

seized vehicles are reported as stolen and the office must investigate the validity 

of the stolen vehicle reports. Id. at 5. Additionally, the office is small and only 

has five employees. Id. The office processed 313 seized vehicles during fiscal 

year 2013, and 309 seized vehicles in fiscal year 2012. IAF, Tab 37 at 5. Thus, 
7

the appellant’s conduct in intentionally filing a false stolen vehicle report with 

the police and the insurance company is antithetical to the office’s mission of 

conducting administrative forfeiture in part by determining the validity of stolen 

vehicle reports. See Kruger, 32 M.S.P.R. at 75-76.

¶11 Therefore, we agree with the administrative judge’s implicit finding that the 

agency established a nexus between the appellant’s misconduct and the efficiency 

of the service. ID at 19.

The deciding official properly weighed the relevant Douglas factors and the 

penalty of removal was within the tolerable limits of reasonableness.

¶12 In his petition for review, the appellant argues that the deciding official 

misapplied the Douglas factors 3 and the penalty of removal is excessive under the 

circumstances. Where, as here, all of the agency’s charges have been sustained, 

the Board will review an agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency 

considered all of the relevant Douglas factors and exercised management 

discretion within tolerable limits of reasonableness. Portner v. Department of 

Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 10 (2013). In determining whether the selected 

penalty is reasonable, the Board gives due deference to the agency’s discretion in 

exercising its managerial function of maintaining employee discipline and 

efficiency. Id. The Board will modify a penalty only when it finds that the 

agency failed to weigh the relevant factors or that the penalty the agency imposed 

clearly exceeded the bounds of reasonableness. Id. However, if the deciding 

official failed to appropriately consider the relevant factors, the Board need not 

defer to the agency’s penalty determination. Id. 

¶13 The administrative judge determined that the deciding official’s penalty 

determination was entitled to deference. ID at 14, 19. The administrative judge

found, based on the deciding official’s decision letter, testimony, and declaration, 

 3 In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), the Board 

articulated a nonexhaustive list of 12 factors that are relevant in assessing the penalty to 

be imposed for an act of misconduct.
8

that he considered the relevant Douglas factors. IAF, Tab 1 at 7-10, Tab 30 at 

19-20, 92, Tab 37 at 10-11. Specifically, the deciding official considered that the 

appellant’s duties involved access to stolen vehicle reports and that he had 

contact with law enforcement agencies. IAF, Tab 37 at 10. The deciding official

further explained that the appellant had no rehabilitation potential. IAF, Tab 1 at 

8, Tab 37 at 11. The deciding official also noted that the penalty was consistent 

with CBP’s Table of Penalties. IAF, Tab 30 at 64-65, Tab 37 at 11. He 

considered, as mitigating factors, that the appellant had over 5 years of service 

with good performance ratings and no prior disciplinary history, but concluded 

that these factors were outweighed by the seriousness of the misconduct. IAF, 

Tab 1 at 8, Tab 37 at 11.

¶14 The appellant argues on review that the deciding official failed to consider 

other mitigating factors such as the appellant’s remorse or rehabilitation

potential. PFR File, Tab 4 at 10, 22-24, Tab 6 at 10-11. The appellant cites Raco 

v. Social Security Administration, 117 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 16 (2011), as support for his 

argument that the fact that he alleged that his first-line supervisor told him to 

report his vehicle as stolen does not demonstrate lack of remorse. PFR File, Tab 

4 at 24. The appellant’s case is distinguishable from Raco because the deciding 

official here recognized the appellant’s remorse, whereas the agency in Raco

argued that the employee was not remorseful. See Raco, 117 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 16. 

Specifically, the deciding official stated in the decision letter that the appellant 

“eventually accepted responsibility for [his] actions,” IAF, Tab 1 at 8, and noted

in his declaration that the appellant “apologized for his actions,” IAF, Tab 37 at 

11. The appellant also argues that his more than 2 years of employment in the 

Logistics Department following his misconduct demonstrates his rehabilitation

potential. PFR File, Tab 4 at 22, Tab 6 at 11. However, the appellant’s duties in 

the Logistics Department were inconsistent with his duties as a Paralegal

Specialist, and the deciding official stated that permanent reassignment was not 

feasible. See IAF, Tab 37 at 11 (“Reassigning [the appellant] to Logistics or 
9

another department is not feasible as the AFO is the only unit in the Sector that 

has a Paralegal Specialist.”). Therefore, the appellant’s continued employment in 

the Logistics Department does not show that he could be rehabilitated to his 

Paralegal Specialist position.

¶15 The appellant further alleges that the deciding official improperly held the 

appellant to a higher standard of conduct because he worked for a law 

enforcement agency. PFR File, Tab 4 at 16-18, Tab 6 at 9-10. In the decision 

letter, the deciding official stated, “Integrity is one of CBP’s Core values and as 

an Agency with law enforcement functions, it is imperative that all employees 

demonstrate high standards of integrity.” IAF, Tab 1 at 7. The deciding 

official’s statement is supported by CBP’s Standards of Conduct. IAF, Tab 10 at 

177-87. The agency imposes this high standard of integrity on all CBP 

employees, not just supervisors and law enforcement officers. Id. at 177-78. The 

appellant further argues that the deciding official improperly considered as an 

aggravating factor the possibility that the appellant’s ability to testify in trials 

would be impaired. PFR File, Tab 4 at 13-14, 18. We agree that the deciding 

official erred by suggesting that the appellant may “be called upon to testify in 

court proceedings” when in fact the appellant would not have an opportunity to 

testify in criminal cases. IAF, Tab 1 at 7. However, the deciding official’s error 

is immaterial to the outcome of the case because the penalty is supported by the 

deciding official’s consideration of the relevant factors and is within the bounds 

of reasonableness. The appellant also alleges that the deciding official and 

administrative judge improperly compared the appellant to supervisors and law 

enforcement officers. PFR File, Tab 4 at 16-18, Tab 6 at 9-10. However, the 

deciding official and administrative judge compared the appellant to such 

employees to demonstrate their similar misconduct, not to hold the appellant to 

the higher standard of a supervisor or a law enforcement officer. See IAF, Tab 30 

at 61-63; ID at 14-15. Thus, the deciding official properly determined that the 
10

nature of the appellant’s misconduct was serious given the actual duties of his 

position and did not hold him to a higher standard of conduct.

¶16 Finally, the appellant argues that the deciding official applied an automatic

penalty of removal for falsification and did not consider any alternative penalties. 

PFR File, Tab 4 at 16, 18-21, Tab 6 at 10. We disagree. The deciding official did 

not automatically apply the removal penalty, but instead properly considered the 

relevant Douglas factors. IAF, Tab 1 at 7-8, Tab 30 at 92, Tab 37 at 10-11. The 

deciding official discussed previous cases where he removed employees for 

dishonest conduct to demonstrate the consistency of the penalty for similar 

misconduct.

4

 IAF, Tab 30 at 61-63, 92-93. We also find that the deciding 

official properly considered alternative sanctions. See id. at 92-93. The appellant 

further argues that the agency misapplied the Table of Penalties, PFR File, Tab 4 

at 18-19, 21, however, we find that the agency properly considered the range of 

penalties stated in the Table of Penalties in deciding to remove the appellant, see

IAF, Tab 30 at 64-65, 92-93. Furthermore, the penalty of removal is within the 

range of appropriate penalties for falsification. IAF, Tab 10 at 167-68. 

Therefore, the deciding official did not impose a default penalty of removal for 

falsification.

¶17 Under the circumstances of this case, we find that the deciding official

considered the relevant Douglas factors, and the penalty of removal did not 

exceed the tolerable limits of reasonableness. 

The appellant’s proffered comparators were not similarly situated and his 

disparate penalties claim lacks merit.

¶18 The appellant argues on review that the administrative judge improperly 

concluded that the appellant’s proffered comparators were not similarly situated 

to the appellant. PFR File, Tab 4 at 24-27, Tab 6 at 11-12. With regard to 

putative comparators, there must be “enough similarity between both the nature of 

 4 The appellant’s argument regarding his disparate penalties claim is discussed later in 

this Final Order.
11

the misconduct and the other factors to lead a reasonable person to conclude that 

the agency treated similarly-situated employees differently, but the Board will not 

have hard and fast rules regarding the ‘outcome determinative’ nature of these 

factors.” Boucher v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 640, ¶ 20 (2012) (quoting 

Lewis v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 657, ¶ 15 (2010)). An 

appellant’s initial showing of disparate penalties triggers an agency’s burden to 

prove a legitimate reason for the difference in treatment between the appellant 

and other employees. Boucher, 118 M.S.P.R. 640, ¶ 24.

¶19 The appellant submitted evidence of three alleged comparators. IAF, Tab 

14 at 58-79. In the first case, a Border Patrol Agent was suspended for 45 days 

for four charges of misuse of his position as a law enforcement officer, misuse of 

his service-issued collapsible baton, failure to provide truthful information, and 

unauthorized outside employment. Id. at 74-79. However, the alleged 

comparator is not valid because his proposed removal was reduced as part of a 

settlement agreement. Id. at 78-79; see Portner, 119 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 20 n.4 (the 

Board has held that, where another employee receives a lesser penalty, despite 

apparent similarities in circumstances, as a result of a settlement agreement, the 

agency will not be required to explain the difference in treatment). 

¶20 In the second case, an Automotive Mechanic was suspended for 15 days for 

failure to be forthright and using personally-owned containers to transport 

gasoline owned by the U.S. Government. IAF, Tab 14 at 58-64. The failure to be 

forthright charge was based on the employee’s conflicting statements made 

during interviews with the agency’s investigators and his written response. Id. at 

61. The deciding official in the Automotive Mechanic case considered several 

mitigating factors, including the employee’s more than 13 years of service, lack 

of prior discipline, and potential for rehabilitation. Id. at 62. In contrast, the 

appellant had less than 6 years of service and the deciding official felt that the 

appellant had no potential for rehabilitation. IAF, Tab 1 at 8. Additionally, the 

appellant’s dishonesty was more serious because he made false claims with an 
12

intent to deceive both a law enforcement agency and an insurance company, id. at 

7-8, 18; ID at 2-6, whereas the employee in this case was not forthright in his 

responses, IAF, Tab 14 at 61-62. Therefore, we find that the employee was not 

similarly situated.

¶21 In the third case, a CBP Officer was suspended for 3 days for one sustained 

charge of misrepresenting information on his time and attendance record. IAF, 

Tab 14 at 66-72. The employee was scheduled for military leave on a particular 

day, but he was later excused from attending training because he felt unwell. Id.

at 70-71. The charge was based on the employee’s failure to request approved 

leave when the basis for the prior authorization of military leave was cancelled. 

Id. The employee’s single instance of failing to change 1 day of military leave to 

another form of approved leave was much less serious than the appellant’s 

intentional filing of a false police report and insurance claim. See IAF, Tab 1 at 

7, 18; ID at 2-6. Thus, the employee in the CBP Officer case was not similarly 

situated to the appellant.

¶22 For these reasons, we conclude that the administrative judge properly found 

that the appellant’s three proffered comparators were not similarly situated to the 

appellant. Accordingly, we discern no basis for disturbing the administrative 

judge’s finding that the appellant’s allegation of disparate penalties lacks merit.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request further review of this final decision.

Discrimination Claims: Administrative Review

You may request review of this final decision on your discrimination 

claims by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See Title 5 

of the United States Code, section 7702(b)(1) (5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1)). If you 

submit your request by regular U.S. mail, the address of the EEOC is:
13

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit your request via commercial delivery or by a method 

requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, NE

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

You should send your request to EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after 

your receipt of this order. If you have a representative in this case, and your 

representative receives this order before you do, then you must file with EEOC no 

later than 30 calendar days after receipt by your representative. If you choose to 

file, be very careful to file on time.

Discrimination and Other Claims: Judicial Action

If you do not request EEOC to review this final decision on your 

discrimination claims, you may file a civil action against the agency on both your 

discrimination claims and your other claims in an appropriate United States 

district court. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2). You must file your civil action with 

the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your receipt of this order. If 

you have a representative in this case, and your representative receives this order 

before you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar 

days after receipt by your representative. If you choose to file, be very careful to 

file on time. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on race, color, 

religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be entitled to 

representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any requirement of
14

prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f) and 

29 U.S.C. § 794a.

FOR THE BOARD:

Washington, D.C.

______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board