Filed 04/06/20 by Cler k of Supreme Court


### IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2020 ND 77

Wendy Michele Willprecht, Plainti ff, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee

v. Kevin John Willprecht, Defendant, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant

No. 20190201

Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, the Honorable John C. Irby, Judge.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice , in which Chief Justice Jensen and Justices VandeWalle and Cr others joined. Justice Mc Evers filed an opinion concurring specially. Jason W. McLean, Fargo, N.D., for plai ntiff, appellant, and cross-appellee.
Robert J. Schultz, Fargo, N.D., for de fendant, appellee, and cross-appellant.1 Willprecht v. Willprecht No. 20190201
Tufte, Justice.
[¶1] Wendy Willprecht appeal s and Kevin Willprecht cross-appeals from a judgment granting the pa rties a divorce, distribut ing the marital estate, awarding primary residential responsib ility for the partie s’ children, and ordering child support. We conclude th e district court’s property distribution is not clearly erroneous, but the court erred in calc ulating Kevin Willprecht’s child support obligation. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I
[¶2] Wendy and Kevin Willprecht were marrie d in 1999. They had four minor children together at the time of the divo rce trial. Kevin Willprecht is a selfemployed farmer, and the parties acquiredfarmland througho ut the marriage. In 2018, Wendy Willprech t sued for divorce.
[¶3] The parties stipulated Wendy Willpre cht will have primary residential responsibility for the child ren and Kevin Willprecht w ill have parenting time. The district court adopted the parties’ sti pulation and incorporated it in the divorce judgment.
[¶4] The district court held a bench trial on the remaining issues, including property division, spousa l support, and child support. The court distributed the parties’ property and debts and aw arded Wendy Willprech t a net property award of $2,076, 302 and Kevin Willprecht a net pr operty award of $3,562,998. The court calculated Kevin Willprecht’ s child support oblig ation and ordered him to pay $3,092 per month in child su pport. The court concluded no spousal support was requiredand ordered each party would be responsible for their own attorney’s fees.

II
[¶5] Kevin Willprecht moved to dism iss the appeal, arguing Wendy Willprecht has accepted subs tantial benefits of the judg ment. He argues that Wendy Willprecht accepted th e real estate she was aw arded, she sent letters2 demanding he pay the credit card and ba nk debt, she threat ened contempt if he did not pay the debt, and she demand ed the rental income from farmland and half of the crop-price protection payment immediately ev en though no due date was set in the judgme nt. He contends Wendy W illprecht waived the right to appeal by accepting over $1 million in assets and taking affirmative steps to receive the benefits by drafting the d eeds and requesting i mmediate payment.
[¶6] Generally, one waives the right to appe al by unconditionally, voluntarily, and consciously accepting a substantia l benefit from a divorce judgment. Tuhy v. Tuhy , 2018 ND 53, ¶ 7, 907 N.W.2d 351. A party moving to dismiss the appeal must clearly establish waiver of th e right to appeal by the other party. Id. This Court has sharply limited th e waiver rule in divorce cases. Id. We have said:
The party objecting to the appeal has the burden of showing the benefit accepted by the appeali ng party is one which the party would not be entitled to without the decree. There must be unusual circumstances, demonstrating prejud ice to the movant, or a very clear intent on the part of th e appealing party to accept the judgment and waive the right to ap peal, to keep this Court from reaching the meri ts of the appeal.

Id.
[¶7] Kevin Willprecht does no t allege he is prejud iced. Wendy Willprecht argues she should receive a greater shar e of the property as well as spousal support. Kevin Willprech t does not argue that th e district court erred in distributing the marital estate or that We ndy Willprecht is enti tled to less than she was awarded. Wendy Willprecht di d not receive and accept any benefits that she would not be enti tled to receive if the judgment were reversed. See Eberle v. Eberle , 2009 ND 107, ¶ 24 , 766 N.W.2d 477; Sommers v. Sommers , 2003 ND 77, ¶ 6, 660 N.W.2d 586. Kevin Willprecht has not established that Wendy Willprecht clearly waiv ed the right to appeal. We deny his motion to dismiss the appeal.3 III
[¶8] Wendy Willprecht argues the distric t court erred in distributing the marital estate.

A
[¶9] Wendy Willprecht argues the distric t court erred in determining the value of the parties’ property. She contends the court misapplied N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24, the parties agreed to the valu ation for some of th e property but did not reach an agreement on the valuation for other property, and the court used a different valuation date to determine the value of the other property. She claims the agreed-to valuation date must be used for all of the parties’ property and different dates cannot be used for different property.
[¶10] A district court’s findings on the va lue of marital prop erty will not be reversed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Lee v. Lee , 2019 ND 142, ¶ 6, 927 N.W.2d 104. A finding is clea rly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, there is no ev idence to support it, or, on the entire record, this Court is left with a definite and firm co nviction a mistake has been made. Id. “A choice between two permissible views of the evidence is not clearly erroneous if the [district] court’ s findings are based either on physical or documentary evidence, or inferences from other facts, or on credibility determinations.” Id. (quoting Hoverson v. Hoverson , 2001 ND 124, ¶ 13, 629 N.W.2d 573). The court’s valuation depends on the evidence the parties present. Lee , at ¶ 6.
[¶11] The district court found the parties ag reed on the value of many assets, but they disagreed about the values of the business assets, particularly the harvested crops in storage. The court found ther e were three potential dates to use for valuation: “[t]he date of separation (Decem ber 2017), the date that the action was initiated (May 2018), and th e date of trial (March 3, 2019).” The court decided to use the date of separation, finding Kevi n’s valuation as of that date was the most “well-supported” bythe evidence.4 [¶12] Section 14-05-24(1), N.D.C.C., governs the district court’s distribution of the marital estate, includ ing the valuation of ma rital property, stating:
When a divorce is granted, the court shall make an equitable distribution of the proper ty and debts of the pa rties. Except as may be required by federal law for specific property, and subject to the power of the court to determine a date that is just and equitable, the valuation date for marital proper ty is the date mutually agreed upon between the parties. If th e parties do not mutually agree upon a valuation date, the valuatio n date for marital property is the date of service of a summons in an action for divorce or separation or the date on whic h the parties last separated, whichever occurs first.
[¶13] The primary purpose in interpreti ng a statute is to determine the legislature’s intent. Markegard v. Willoughby , 2019 ND 170, ¶ 9, 930 N.W.2d 108. We interpret statutes as a whole and harmonize them to give meaning to related provisions. Baker v. Autos, Inc. , 2019 ND 82, ¶ 10, 924 N.W.2d 441. We construe statutes to give effect to each provision, so no part is rendered inoperative or superfluous. N.D.C.C. § 1- 02-38. We give meaning and effect to every word, phrase, and sentence. Baker , at ¶ 10. We give words in a statute their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, unless they are defined by statute or a contrary intention plainly appears. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02. “When the wording of a statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pret ext of pursuing its spirit.” N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05.
[¶14] The plain language of N.D.C.C. § 14 -05-24(1) states th at the valuation date “is the date mutually agreed upon between the parties.” If the parties do not agree upon a valuation date, the valuat ion date “is the date of service of a summons . . . or the date on which the parties last separated, whichever occurs first.” The statute does no t preclude an agreement to different valuation dates for different items of property. If the pa rties agree to a valuation date only for some property and not for other property, the statutor y default will supply the date for valuing th e other property.5 [¶15] Here, the parties ag reed to the same valuations for most of the assets in the marital estate. For th e assets the parties were unable to agree on, the district court determined the value of the property as of the date of separation, which was the default unde r the statute. The court did not misapply N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24.

B
[¶16] Wendy Willprecht argues the district court erred by failing to value and include the 2018 crop in the property distribution. She contends the court should have used the crop insurance to determine the value of the crop because the evidence established the crops were insured under revenue protection crop insurance and guaranteed Kevin Willp recht would receive at least a set amount for the crops.
[¶17] The district court used the date of th e parties’ separati on to determine the value of property that the parties we re unable to agree upon, including the crops. The court found the parties separa ted in December 2017. The 2018 crop did not exist at the time of the separati on. The court did not err by failing to include the 2018 crops in th e property distribution.

C
[¶18] Wendy Willprecht argues the district court’s distribution of the marital estate was inequitable and is not supporte d by the court’s findings. She claims Kevin Willprecht received a net award of $3,562,998 and she received a net award of $2,076,302, including a $750, 000 equalization payment, which is a difference of $1,486,696. She conten ds the court’s explanation for the substantial disparity is inadequate beca use it did not address her contribution to the marriage, Kevin Willprecht’s be havior and noneconomic fault, or the 400% gains in the value of the farmland.
[¶19] A district court’s property distribut ion will not be re versed unless the court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Swanson v. Swanson , 2019 ND 25, ¶ 5, 921 N.W.2d 666. Th e district court must make an equitable property distribution. N.D.C. C. § 14-05-24(1). Th e court must include all of the parties’6 assets and debts in the marital estate and then consider the Ruff-Fischer guidelines to determine an equitable distribution. Swanson , at ¶ 6. The RuffFischerguidelines include the following factors:
[T]he respective ages of the part ies, their earning ability, the duration of the marriage and co nduct of the parties during the marriage, their station in life, th e circumstances and necessities of each, their health and physical condition, their financial circumstances as shown by the pr operty owned at the time, its value at the time, its income-producing capaci ty, if any, whether accumulated before or after the marriage, and such other matters as may be material.

Lee , 2019 ND 142, ¶ 12, 927 N.W.2d 104 (quoting Schultz v. Schultz , 2018 ND 259, ¶ 27, 920 N.W.2d 483). The court is not required to make specific findings for each factor, but it must specif y a rationale for its decision. Lee , at ¶ 12. The distribution does not need to be eq ual to be equitable, but a substantial disparity must be explained. Swanson , at ¶ 9.
[¶20] The district court found Wendy Willp recht was 42 years old and Kevin Willprecht was 45 years old at the time of the trial, they were married in 1999, they own a parcel of real property containing the ma rital home, and they also own several hundred acres of farmland. The court fo und Kevin Willprecht is a self-employed farmer; he is the sole owner of a familyfarm corporation, which owns the farm equipment and conducts the farming operations; and he owns the farmland the corporation farms and he collects the rent on the land. The parties agreed they would include th e assets and liabilit ies held by the corporation with their own assets and li abilities instead of trying to place a value on the shares of stock in the corporation. The court found:
Kevin farmed for several years prior to the marriage. With the exception of a quarter section of property located in Cass County purchased by th e parties after the marriage, the farmland came from Kevin’s family and was either purchased at a discount or was gifted, outright, to Kevin. In particular, the tracts described in the Rule 8.3 listing as Tracts 9 and 7 described as the South half of the Southwest quarter of Sectio n 8 and the North half section of the Northwest quarter Section 17, Township 130 North, Range 537 West, had a valuation agreed upon by the parties of $864,273. These tracts were a gift from Kevin’s parents.

The court awarded Kevin Willprecht most of the fa rmland, vehicles, crops, personal property in his possession, farm equipment, and all of the parties’ debts. The court awar ded Wendy Willprecht the marital home, a quarter section of real property, her vehicle, an IRA, half of the crop protection payment, and the personal property in her possession. The court further ordered Kevin Willprecht to make an equalization pa yment of $750,000 to Wendy Willprecht. The co urt ordered the equalizati on payment be made in fifteen annual installments with three percent interest, for payment in the amount of $62,825 per installme nt, starting April 1, 2020.
[¶21] The district court explaine d the disparity, stating:
The ending result of the divisi on of property is that the plaintiff will receive approximatel y 37 percent and the defendant will receive approximately 63 perce nt of the net marital estate. When considering the ou tright gifts of Tracts 7 and 9 from Kevin’s parents to Kevin for la nd valued in this divorce at $864,273, Kevin’s testimony that other gifts we re given by his parents to him, and that other land purchased fr om his parents was purchased at a discounted price, any disparit y has been accounted for. The Court also takes into account th at crop assets are essentially “double counted.” While crops are an asset, crops are also next year’s income and have been usedto calculate Kevin’s income for child support purposes.

. . . . The Court finds that the division of property, while not equal, is equitable and is in line with the Ruff-Fischer Guidelines. Taking into account the outright gift of property from Kevin’s family to him valued now at $864, 273, discounted land purchases, other gifts, and the “double counti ng” of crop assets, there is no real substantial disparity in th e assets awarded to each party.
[¶22] “[S]eparate property, whether inherite d or otherwise, must initially be included in the marital e state, and [this Court has] never held that property brought into a marriage or acquired by gift or inheritance by one spouse, be irrevocably set aside to that spouse.” Swanson , 2019 ND 25, ¶ 9, 921 N.W.2d8 666. But the property’s origin is one factor the court may consider. Id. This Court has recognized “‘the importance of preserving th e viability of a business operation like a family farm ,’ and ‘liquidation of an ongoing farming operation or business is ordina rily a last resort.’” Id. at ¶ 10 (quoting Rebel v. Rebel , 2016 ND 144, ¶ 11, 882 N.W.2d 256).
[¶23] The district court explaine d Kevin Willprecht’s pa rents gifted him some of the farmland and sold him other land at a discounted pric e. The farmland is used in the farming operation. Th e court considered the source of the property and the Ruff-Fischer guidelines. The court allocated most of the farmland and all of the parties’ debt to Kevin Willprecht, and also ordered him to pay $750,000 to Wendy Willprecht as an equaliz ation payment. The court adequately explained the disparity in th e distribution. The court’s distribution was not induced by an erroneous view of the law, and the evidence supports the court’s findings.
[¶24] Wendy Willprecht argues the distric t court erred by making the equalization payment over time and dela ying the payment for one year without explanation. When an equalization pa yment is ordered, the court may award interest at any appropriate rate and may order the beginning of the payments on any appropriate date. Schultz , 2018 ND 259, ¶ 29, 920 N.W.2d 483. A court has discretion in setting the rate of interest and the beginning date. Id. The district court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, when it mi sinterprets or misapplies the law, or when its decision is not th e product of a rational me ntal process leading to a reasoned determination. Id. The district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding the starting date of the equalization payments.
[¶25] We affirm the district court’s proper ty division, concluding it is not clearly erroneous.

IV
[¶26] Wendy and Kevin Willprech t argue the district cour t erred in calculating Kevin Willprecht’s childsupport obligation.9 [¶27] Child support determinations invo lve questions of law, which are fully reviewable, findings of fact subj ect to the clearly erroneous standard, and in some areas, matters of discretion subject to the abuse of discretion standard. Minyard v. Lindseth , 2019 ND 180, ¶ 6, 930 N.W.2d 626. The child support guidelines, N.D. Admin. Code ch. 75-02-04.1, gove rn child support determinations. Thompson v. Johnson , 2018 ND 142, ¶ 9, 912 N.W.2d 315. “A court errs as a matter of law if it does not comply with th e requirements of the child support guidelines.” Wolt v. Wolt , 2019 ND 155, ¶ 5, 930 N.W.2d 589.

A
[¶28] Wendy Willprecht argues the district court failed to pr operly apply the child support guidelines to determ ine Kevin Willprech t’s child support obligation. She claims the court shouldhave determined a five-year average of Kevin Willprecht’s income from self-e mployment, instead of the three-year average the court used.
[¶29] A correct finding of net income is necessary to calculate the proper amount of support. Minyard , 2019 ND 180, ¶ 7, 930 N. W.2d 626. Section 75- 02-04.1-01(6), N.D. Admin. Code, defi nes net income and explains certain amounts are deducted from the obligor’s gross income to determine the net income. Gross income is defined as “income from any source, in any form,” except for certain specific exclusions. N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-01(4). After the district court dete rmines an obligor’s net income, the court applies that amount to the guidelines to ca lculate the child support obligation. Thompson , 2018 ND 142, ¶ 9, 912 N.W.2d 3 15. The amount of child support calculated under the guidelines is “reb uttably presumed to be the correct amount of child support[.]” N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-13.
[¶30] Income must be documented throu gh the use of tax returns, wage statements, and other informat ion to fully apprise the co urt of all gross income. N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-02(7). “Where gross inco me is subject to fluctuation, regardless of whether the ob ligor is employed or self-employed, information reflecting and covering a peri od of time suffici ent to reveal the likely extent of fluctuations must be provided.” Id. Recent past circumstances are generally a reliable indicator of futu re circumstances co ncerning income.10 N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-02(8). “I f circumstances that materially affect the child support obligation have changed in the recent past or are very likely to change in the near fu ture, consideration may be given to the new or likely future circumstances.” Id. “A district court cannot arbitrarily ignore the guidelines simply because it feels the ob ligor’s tax returns do not reasonably reflect the obligor’s income without or dering the parties to present more information and making specif ic findings of fact.” Thompson , 2018 ND 142, ¶ 10, 912 N.W.2d 315.
[¶31] Section 75-02-04.1-05, N.D. Admin. Code, applies to determine net income from self-employment, stating:
Self-employment activities may ex perience signific ant changes in production and income over time. To the extent that information is reasonably available, the average of the mo st recent five years of each self-employment activity, if undertaken on a substantially similar scale, must be used to de termine self-emplo yment income. When self-employment activity has not been operated on a substantially similar scale for five years, a shorter period may be used. N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-05(4).
[¶32] The district court found:
Taking into account the current agricultural conditions and the fact that no evidence was provided that woul d indicate that these conditions would change in the near future , Kevin’s three-year income average is appropriate under the law and guidelines to be used to base his child support calculation. After reducing Kevin Willpre cht’s three-year average income by the amount of the rent for the property in Cass County that was awarded to Wendy Willprecht, the court found Kevin W illprecht’s income for child support purposes is $144,078.
[¶33] Wendy Willprecht presented the part ies’ joint tax re turns for 2013 through 2017 showing Kevin Willprecht’ s income from the farming operation and land rentals. Kevin Willprecht presented the farm corporation’s tax11 returns for 2012 through 2017 and his 20 18 individual tax re turn. The parties presented sufficient eviden ce for the district court to calculate a five-year average of Kevin Willprecht’s self-emp loyment income, but the court found a three-year average would be appropriate given current agricultural conditions. We have said, “The guid elines must be applied us ing common sense and in consideration of the circumstances.” Brew v. Brew , 2017 ND 242, ¶ 28, 903 N.W.2d 72 (quoting Rathbun v. Rathbun , 2017 ND 24, ¶ 9, 889 N.W.2d 855). It is not clear what evidence in the re cord the court was referring to. The court did not make sufficient find ings supporting its decisionto calculate the child support obligation on a three-year average of Kevin Willprecht’s selfemployment income.
[¶34] The district court erred by failing to make sufficient findings to support using a three-year average to determ ine Kevin Willprecht’ s self-employment income to calculate his child support obligation.

B
[¶35] Wendy and Kevin Willprech t argue the district court erred by failing to include a child support ste p-down provision and ordering Ke vin Willprecht’s child support obligation woul d not be reduced as each child reaches the age of majority. They argue the court’s deci sion does not comp ly with the child support guidelines and the court cannot refuse to order a step-down in the amount of support as each child reache s the age of majorityto alleviate the need for spousal support.
[¶36] The district court ordered:
Kevin shall pay Three Thousand Ninety-Two Dollars ($3,092) per month child su pport for the minor children commencing May 1, 2019, and continuing on orbefore the 1st day of each month thereafter until suchtime as each child reaches the age of 18, marries, dies, or is emancipated. The child support obligation is based upon the North Dakota Child Support Guidelines and Kevin’s net monthly income of $8,205.

. . . .12 Kevin will not be entitl ed to “step down” calcul ations of his child support obligation as each child become ineligible for child support. The Court makes this determinat ion in conjunction with the decision not to award spousal support as set forth below.
[¶37] The district court is limited in the ability to award post-minority child support to circumstances under which th e parents have a sta tutory legal duty to support adult children. See N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2; Larson v. Larson , 2005 ND 67, ¶¶ 12-15, 694 N.W.2d 13. The co urt erred by ordering the child support amount will not decrease as each child reaches the age of majority.

C
[¶38] The district court erred as a matter of law by failing to comply with the child support guidelines. We therefor e reverse the court’s child support decision and remand for the court to recalculate Kevin Willprecht’s selfemployment income according to the most recent five years or make sufficient findings to support usi ng a three-year average an d to include a step-down calculation.

V
[¶39] Wendy Willprecht argues the district court erred by denying her request for spousal support. She contends that the court did not properly consider her need for support and Kevi n Willprecht’s ability to pay and that the court improperly tied its decisi on on spousal supp ort to its child support decision.
[¶40] A decision about spousal support is subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. Schmuck v. Schmuck , 2016 ND 87, ¶ 6, 882 N.W.2d 918. In deciding whether spousa l support is appropriate, the court must consider the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, the needs of the spouse seeking support, and the ability of the other spouse to pay. Id. Property distribution and spousal support are interrelated and often must be considered together. Id.
[¶41] The district court deni ed Wendy Willprecht’s request for spousal support. The court considered the Ruff-Fischer factors. The court also made13 findings about Wendy Willp recht’s need for suppor t and Kevin Willprecht’s ability to pay, stating:
Wendy works part-time for Sar gent County at Emergency Management and occasionally substi tute teaches. Her income is approximately $2,100 pe r month. She is al so provided with a single health insurance coverage . She will also be netting approximately $19,333 in farm re nt. Her annual earned income ($2,100 x 12) and her farm rent, $19,333 is $44,533. Kevin’s annual projected income, before taxes is $144,078. From this amount he will be pa ying approximately $24,000 in health insurance premiums. Kevin’s annu al child support obligation will exceed $36,000 per ye ar. In addition, he will be making an equalization payment annually to Wendy in the amount of approximately $63,000. As a result, Wendy will have more spendable income availa ble to her household than Kevin. Kevin is obligated to pay all of the debts of the parties. Wendy has a quality home with no mortgage obligation against it. Her vehicle is paid for. The Court did not include any “step-down” calculations for Kevin’s child support. This was do ne deliberately by the Court in light of the income disp arity of the parties.

The court concluded it would not aw ard either party spousal support.
[¶42] The district court explained that its decision not to include a step-down calculation for the child support and modi fy the obligation as the children each reach the age of majority was done delib erately to compensate for the disparity in the parties’ incomes. The court’s decision indicate s the child support amount is to equitably balance the burdens of the divorce. This is improper. See Stock v. Stock , 2016 ND 1, ¶ 23, 873 N.W.2d 38. Child support is for the care and maintenance of the minor child, and spou sal support is intended to equalize the burdens of the divorce. Id. ; see also N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08 (stating parents have a duty to support their ch ildren). As we explained in Stock , if the court found Wendy Willprecht established a n eed for $3,092 per month but Kevin Willprecht currently lacks the ability to pay that am ount, the court should have explicitly stated as much. See Stock , at ¶ 23.14 [¶43] Because the district court tied its sp ousal support decisi on to its child support decision and we are revers ing the child support decision and remanding for the court to include a step-down ca lculation for the child support, we are unable to properly re view the spousal suppo rt decision. We reverse the court’s spousal support deci sion and remand for reconsideration.

VI
[¶44] Wendy Willprecht argues the district court erred by failing to award her attorney’s fees. She claims the court fa iled to adequately explain its decision denying her request fo r attorney’s fees.
[¶45] The district court has discretion to award attorney’s fees in divorce proceedings under N.D. C.C. § 14-05-23. See Heinle v. Heinle , 2010 ND 5, ¶ 32, 777 N.W.2d 590. The distr ict court’s decision will no t be reversed on appeal unless the court abused its discretion. Id. We have explained the district court must balance the requesting party’s need for attorney’s fees against the other party’s ability to pay. Id. “The court should consider the property owned by each party, their relative incomes, whether property is liquid or fixed assets, and whether the action of either part y unreasonably increa sed the time spent on the case.” Id. (quoting Reiser v. Reiser , 2001 ND 6, ¶ 15, 621 N.W.2d 348).
[¶46] Wendy Willprecht requested attorn ey’s fees, arguing that Kevin Willprecht has the ability to pay and thatshe demonstrated her need for fees through her testimony and other eviden ce. The district court denied her request, stating, “Each party will be responsible for thei r own attorney’s fees.” The court did not provide any further explanation.
[¶47] Because the district court did not adequately explai n its decision denying Wendy Willprecht’s request for attorney’s fees, we are unable to determine whether the court properly considered the factors and whether it properly applied the law. Deyle v. Deyle , 2012 ND 248, ¶ 23, 825 N.W.2d 245. We remand for reconsideratio n and for the court to ma ke adequate findings explaining its decision.15 VII
[¶48] We have considered the remaining issues and argume nts and determine they are either unnecessary to our decisi on or are without merit. We affirm the judgment in part, reverse in part , and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[¶49] Jerod E. Tufte Gerald W. VandeWalle Daniel J. Crothers Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
McEvers, Justice, co ncurring specially.
[¶50] I agree with and join the majority in se ctions I, II, IV, V, VI, and VII. I concur specially in section III.
[¶51] Respectfully, I think the majority ha s oversimplified Wendy Willprecht’s argument by stating “[s]he claims the agreed-to valu ation date must be used for all of the parties’ property and diffe rent dates cannot be used for different property.” Majority, at ¶ 9. Wendy Willprecht argu ed that N.D.C.C. § 14-05- 24 was ambiguous. In her argument re garding the interpre tation following the amendment of N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24, she states:
However, it is unclear what happens when some valuation dates are agreed to and others are not. The plain language of the sta tute refers to a singular valuation date for the marital proper ty. N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1). It does not appear to account for situations where the parties may agree on values from one date an d then attempt to apply different valuation dates to other properti es that will benefit his or her claim. In interpreting a statute, this Court’s primary goal is to ascertain the intent of the legislature by fir st looking to the plain language of the statute and givingeach word of the statute its ordinary meaning. Wilkens v. Westby , 2019 ND 186, ¶ 6, 931 N.W.2d 229. A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to meanings that are different, but rational. Id. Lastly, this Court presumes the legislature did not intend anabsurd or ludicrous result or unjust consequences, and it con strues statutes in a practical16 manner, giving consideration to th e context of the statutes and the purpose for which they were enacted. Id. Moreover, the District Court also expressed a level of uncertainty with regard to this statute. At one point the District Court stated that it was afforded some level of flexibility and that it is not bound by the initiation of the action. Later, when discussing the admissibility of crop insurance information found in Exhibit 26, Kevin argued that th e legislature provided a set timeframe for valuation. Wend y provided a co unter-argument that in a situation where a party could manipulate values

― such as the nature of farming

― relying solely on the date of separation without discretion would produce a result that was not intended by the legislature. The District Court overruled Kevin’s objection as to the line of questioning. However, both Kevin and Wendy made claims that were rational wi thin the meaning of the statute. There is ambiguity in N. D.C.C. § 14-05-24 (1). . . . To allow for the use of one date, agreed upon afte r the date of commencement of the action for some property, while allowing for a party to withhold agreement on the valuation of othe r property on that same date because it may not benefit him or her, would lead to a ludicrous and unjust result. In cases where there are issu es as to valuation dates and agreed upon valuations, the reason able application of the statu[t]e is not to apply separate dates for each piece of property. Rather, the logical approach would be to us e the date that was agreed to or the valuation closest to that date. In appl ying different valuation dates to different properties, when the majority of the property was valued post-commencement, the Di strict Court committed an error as a matter of law. It committe d that error because the statute itself is flawed and ambiguous.
[¶52] I agree with Wendy Willpre cht that the statute is ambiguous. I also agree that a party may withhold agre ement on the valuation of certain property because it may not benefit him or her, which may le ad to a ludicrous and unjust result. Howeve r, I disagree with her that reversal is required.
[¶53] I maintain my previous position thatthe statute is am biguous and that the legislature intended to give distr ict court’s discretion in deciding the valuation date when parties do not agree under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1). Messmer v. Messmer , 2020 ND 62, ¶¶ 24-29 (McEvers, Justice, concurring in17 part and dissenting in part). If the co urt has discretion on the valuation date, the gamesmanship described by Wendy W illprecht can be dealt with to avoid a ludicrous or unjust result.
[¶54] The district court appears to have a pplied its discretion rather than deciding it must use the ear liest date provided in N.D. C.C. § 14-05-24(1). In its memorandum opinio n, the court stated:
The purpose of N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24 is to give the Court a frame of reference in which to value an othe rwise potentially moving target. Farms are somewhat unique in that a crop in the ground is valued is differently than crop in the bi n. The Court sees three potential dates for valuation. The date of separation (December 2017), the date that the action wa s initiated (May 2018), and the date of trial (March 3, 2019). None of these three dates involve growing crop. It could be argued th at some crop was in th e ground in May of 2018. Only speculative evidence was presented to the Court as to what was actually in the ground orits value at that time. Given the consistency of the farming oper ation and the fact that growing crop is not in consideration, the sn apshot of crop values provided to the Court in December 2017 is likely very consistent to what would be snapshot of crop values at the date of trial. Again, there was no evidence as to the actualvalue of growing crop in the ground in May 2018. In May 2018, much of the farm’s crop assets may have been in the ground. Wh ile estate tax litigators may place some type of income in respect of a decedent value on growing crops, the reality is that this is th e point of time at which most crop assets are at risk. The Court find s Kevin’s valuatio n to be the most useful and most well-supported valu ation of harvested crop assets.18 [¶55] The parties here agreed on multiple valuation da tes in regard to the following property: 1) personal property with an appraisal date of July 17, 2018; 2) farmland with an appraisal da te of September 14, 2018; and 3) the marital home with an appraisal date of October 24, 2018. They did not agree on which date to value th e crops. While I may not ha ve chosen the date of separation to value the crops, I cannot say the di strict court abused its discretion in doing so. Therefore, I co ncur with the majority that the district court, on this issue, should be affirmed.
[¶56] Lisa Fair McEvers