alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 41883

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL JAMES WILSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 464

Filed: April 15, 2015

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, State of Idaho, Nez 

Perce County. Hon. Jeff M. Brudie, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and consecutive unified sentences of twelve years, with 

four years determinate, for aggravated assault and three years, with one year 

determinate, for burglary, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Eric D. Fredericksen, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GUTIERREZ, Judge; LANSING, Judge;

and GRATTON, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM

Michael James Wilson was found guilty of aggravated assault as a lesser included offense 

of attempted first degree murder, Idaho Code § 18-1401, and felony burglary, I.C. 18-1401, with 

a weapons enhancement for use of a firearm or deadly weapon, I.C. 19-2520. The district court 

imposed a unified sentence of twelve years, with four years determinate, for the aggravated 

assault and a unified sentence of three years, with one year determinate, for burglary and ordered 

that the sentences be served consecutively. Wilson appeals, contending that his sentences are 

excessive.
2

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and 

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Wilson’s judgment of conviction and sentences are affirmed.
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3597

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

James Swift, also known as James Equanice Swift

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of North Dakota - Fargo

____________

 Submitted: April 2, 2015

Filed: April 16, 2015

[Unpublished]

____________

Before BYE, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

James Swift directly appeals the sentence the district court imposed after he 1

pled guilty to a drug-related charge. His counsel has moved to withdraw, and has

The Honorable Ralph R. Erickson, Chief Judge, United States District Court

1

for the District of North Dakota.
filed a brief citing Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and acknowledging an

appeal waiver in Swift’s plea agreement. 

Upon careful de novo review, we conclude that the appeal waiver is

enforceable. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-90 (8th Cir. 2003) (en

banc) (appeal waiver will be enforced where appeal falls within scope of waiver, plea

agreement and waiver were entered into knowingly and voluntarily, and no

miscarriage of justice would result); see also United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702,

704 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver). 

In addition, having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488

U.S. 75 (1988), we find no non-frivolous issues outside the scope of the appeal

waiver. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal based upon the appeal waiver.

As for counsel’s motion to withdraw, we conclude that allowing counsel to

withdraw at this time would not be consistent with the Eighth Circuit’s 1994

Amendment to Part V of the Plan to Implement The Criminal Justice Act of 1964. 

We therefore deny counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature, without prejudice to

counsel refiling the motion upon fulfilling the duties set forth in the Amendment.

Judge Colloton would grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See United States

v. Eredia, 578 Fed. Appx. 620, 621 (8th Cir. 2014) (unpublished per curiam)

(Colloton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

______________________________

-2-
United States Department of Agriculture 1400 Independence Avenue SW. Policy Memo 11-14

Agricultural Marketing Service Room 2646-South Building

National Organic Program Washington, DC 20250

PM 11-14 Labeling of Textiles that Contain Organic Ingredients Rev02 10 31 11 Authorized Distribution: Public 

Page 1 of 2

Policy Memorandum

To: Stakeholders and Interested Parties 

From: Miles McEvoy, Deputy Administrator 

Subject: Labeling of Textiles That Contain Organic Ingredients

Date: Original Issue Date – May 20, 2011

The USDA regulates the term “organic” as it applies to agricultural products through the 

National Organic Program (NOP) Regulation, 7 CFR Part 205. Raw natural fibers, such as 

cotton, wool, and flax are agricultural products and are covered under the NOP crop and 

livestock production standards. The NOP regulations do not include specific processing or 

manufacturing standards for textile products. However, in keeping with NOP’s inclusive scope 

policy, any textile product produced in full compliance with the NOP regulations may be labeled 

as NOP certified organic and display the USDA organic seal.

The NOP does not restrict the use of the term “organic” in the labeling of textile products that are 

certified under third-party certification bodies as long as all of the fibers identified as “organic” 

in these textile products are produced and certified under the NOP regulations. Textile products 

that are produced in accordance with the Global Organic Textile Standard (GOTS) may be sold 

as organic in the U.S. but may not refer to NOP certification or display the USDA organic seal.

Textile products that are labeled as “organic” may:

• Use label claims that identify specific types of organic fibers

• Use statements identifying the percentage of organic fibers

Textile products that are labeled as “organic” must not:

• Use the USDA organic seal unless they are certified in accordance with the NOP 

regulations.

• Imply or lead the consumer to believe that the final product is certified under the NOP 

regulations unless they are certified in accordance with the NOP regulations.

• Use a combination of both organic and non-organic sources for a single fiber that is 

identified as “organic” in the final product.

These policies do not supersede requirements of other Federal and State laws. The NOP labeling 

requirements are in addition to those required by the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Textile 

and Wool Acts.
United States Department of Agriculture 1400 Independence Avenue SW. Policy Memo 11-14

Agricultural Marketing Service Room 2646-South Building

National Organic Program Washington, DC 20250

PM 11-14 Labeling of Textiles that Contain Organic Ingredients Rev02 10 31 11 Authorized Distribution: Public 

Page 2 of 2

References:

Other Laws and Regulations

Information on FTC labeling requirements for textiles can be found at the following website: 

http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/textilejump.shtm

Document Control:

This document supersedes the NOP fact sheet titled “Labeling of Textiles Under National 

Organic Program (NOP) Regulations” dated July 2008, which is now obsolete.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-21-00161-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF J.G.I.G.

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019-PA-01378

Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARTINEZ, JUSTICE WATKINS, AND JUSTICE RODRIGUEZ

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED. It is ORDERED that no costs be assessed against appellant in relation to this appeal. 

SIGNED September 15, 2021.

_____________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TEOFILO MEDINA, JR.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 09-99015

D.C. No.

2:94-CV-01892-

RSWL

TEOFILO MEDINA, JR.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

R. K. WONG,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 09-99016

D.C. No.

2:97-CV-07062-

RSWL

ORDER

Filed April 16, 2015

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Kim McLane

Wardlaw, and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.
2 MEDINA V. CHAPPELL

ORDER

In light of Petitioner’s death, we vacate the opinion filed

March 26, 2015 as moot, and remand to the district court with

instructions to dismiss the habeas petitions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
1 

Filed 4/15/15 P. v. Fisher CA3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

(Placer) 

---- 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

ROBERT HENRY FISHER, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

C076203 

(Super. Ct. No. 62112580A) 

 This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). 

Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, we affirm the judgment. 

 We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of 

the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.) 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 A jury previously found defendant guilty of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, 

§ 459) and bringing drugs into a jail (§ 4573). A jury also found true the allegation that 

defendant brought drugs into a jail while he was released on bail or on his own 
2 

recognizance. (§ 12022.1.) (People v. Fisher (June 24, 2014, C074582) [nonpub. opn.].) 

The trial court then sentenced defendant to a term of five years eight months in county 

jail. (Ibid.) This court affirmed that judgment in June 2014. (Ibid.) 

 On April 7, 2014, the trial court presided over a restitution hearing. The People 

requested direct victim restitution totaling $71,300. Defendant’s victim testified and a 

property list report prepared by the Placer County Sheriff’s Department was submitted 

into evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered defendant to pay 

restitution to his victim in the amount of $55,800, “with interest at the rate of 10% per 

year from March 10, 2012.” 

WENDE REVIEW

 We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening 

brief setting forth the facts of the case and, pursuant to Wende, requesting the court to 

review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. 

Defendant was advised by counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days 

of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days have elapsed, and we 

received no communication from defendant. 

 Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no arguable error 

that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. 
3 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. 

 MURRAY , J. 

We concur: 

 ROBIE , Acting P. J. 

 HOCH , J.
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State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: April 16, 2015 105406 

________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

NEW YORK, 

Respondent, 

v MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JAMES DONAH, 

Appellant.

________________________________

Calendar Date: February 24, 2015

Before: McCarthy, J.P., Garry, Egan Jr. and Lynch, JJ.

__________

M. Elizabeth Coreno, Saratoga Springs, for appellant.

Andrew J. Wylie, District Attorney, Plattsburgh (Nicholas

J. Evanovich of counsel), for respondent.

__________

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Lawliss, J.),

rendered March 5, 2012 in Clinton County, convicting defendant

upon his plea of guilty of the crime of burglary in the third

degree. 

Defendant waived indictment and, in satisfaction of a

superior court information, pleaded guilty to burglary in the

third degree and waived his right to appeal. He thereafter was

sentenced as a second felony offender to the agreed-upon prison

term of 2 to 4 years. Defendant now appeals.

We affirm. Contrary to defendant's contention, his waiver

of the right to appeal is valid. Supreme Court distinguished the

right to appeal from those rights automatically forfeited by

defendant's guilty plea, and defendant executed a written waiver

in open court. Accordingly, defendant knowingly, voluntarily and
-2- 105406 

intelligently waived his right to appeal his conviction and

sentence (see People v Oginski, 123 AD3d 1303, 1303 [2014];

People v Dyckman, 114 AD3d 994, 995 [2014], lv denied 23 NY3d

1036 [2014]). Given defendant's valid waiver of appeal, his

challenge to the severity of the sentence is precluded (see

People v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Fate, 117 AD3d

1327, 1329 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1083 [2014]; People v White,

96 AD3d 1299, 1300 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1029 [2012]).

McCarthy, J.P., Garry, Egan Jr. and Lynch, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court
Hemp Program Certification 

by Regina Gasco-Bentley, Chairperson of the Little Traverse 

Bay Bands of Odawa Indians. 

Pursuant to Section 297B(a)(2)(A)(vii) of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, I 

certify that the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians hasthe resources and personnel 

necessary to carry out each of the practices and procedures identified in Section 297B(a)(2) of 

the Act, the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians Hemp Authorization and Regulatory 

Commission Statute, and the Hemp Regulatory Commission Regulations for Sampling, THC 

Testing and Post-Testing Actions and Disposal ofNoncompliant Plants and Products. 

Date: June 9th, 2020. 

j 

Regina Gasco-Bentley, Chairperson 

Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
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     THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL  INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FINLAY
ENTERPRISES,  INC.  FORM 10-Q AND IS  QUALIFIED  IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
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<RECEIVABLES>                                  37,066
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 555,437
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          246,338
<BONDS>                                        225,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
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<OTHER-SE>                                     75,512
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   555,437
<SALES>                                        338,358
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               338,358
<CGS>                                          165,413
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</TABLE>
# C_2012326EN.01004701.xml

| 26.10.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 326/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 326/1

---

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

PART SEVEN

GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS

GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 343

(ex Article 291 TEC)

(ex Article 291 TEC)

The Union shall enjoy in the territories of the Member States such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the performance of its tasks, under the conditions laid down in the Protocol of 8 April 1965 on the privileges and immunities of the European Union. The same shall apply to the European Central Bank and the European Investment Bank.

---
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-20557 Summary Calendar

HOWARD VANZANDT WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus MORRIS M. JONES, JR., LAWRENCE N. HODGES, AL LOSACK, CARROL PICKETT, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. CA-H-95-455

- - - - - - - - - - January 7, 1997 Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Howard Vanzandt Williams appeals the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants in a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Williams argues that the appellants are not qualifiedly immune from suit on the claim that they conspired to retaliate against him. We have reviewed the record and Williams’ brief and conclude thatNo. 96-20557 - 2 - Williams’ claims are without merit for essentially the same reasons set forth by the district court. Williams v. Jones , No. CA H 95-455 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 1996). Williams’ appeal is frivolous and is dismissed. 5th Cir. R. 42.2. We caution Williams that any additional frivolous appeals filed by him or on his behalf will invite the imposition of sanctions. To avoid sanctions, Williams is further cautioned to review all pending appeals to ensure that they do not raise arguments that are frivolous.
APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the

citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under

the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

APR 15 1998

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KENNETH JORDAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 97-1329

(D.C. No. 96-CR-498-N)

(District of Colorado)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before PORFILIO, KELLY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered

submitted without oral argument.

Following a guilty plea to charges of armed robbery and use and carrying a firearm

in relation to a crime of violence, appellant was sentenced to a term of life under 18
1Appellant’s counsel has filed an Anders brief. Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

738 (1967).

- 2 -

U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A). To arrive at this sentence, the district court applied two prior

convictions of armed robbery. Appellant contends the enhancement was improper

because the first of those prior offenses was committed more than fifteen years before

sentencing in this case.1 The government correctly points out this makes no difference

under the guidelines because appellant had been in custody on that offense within the

fifteen-year limitation of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e).

The record indeed shows although appellant was convicted on the first offense on

March 9, 1979, he was paroled from that sentence on September 9, 1983. Moreover,

having violated that parole and having been reincarcerated, he was paroled again on

October 6, 1993. The offense of conviction in this case was committed December 6,

1996, within fifteen years after appellant’s 1983 and 1993 release dates. Thus, the initial

conviction was appropriately applied by the district court to enhance the present sentence. 

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1) (enhancement applies when defendant has been “incarcerated

during any part of such fifteen-year period.”). See United States v. Novey, 922 F.2d 624,

626 (10th Cir. 1991).

Appellant also contends the sentence was a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The contention is meritless. A sentence
- 3 -

within the prescribed statutory limits generally cannot be found to violate the Eighth

Amendment. United States v. Youngpeter, 986 F.2d 349 353 (10th Cir. 1993).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is

GRANTED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

John C. Porfilio

Circuit Judge