[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-13578

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:07-cr-00013-WLS-TQL-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

BRUCE BROWN, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

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(April 14, 2015)

Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Bruce Brown appeals his 235-month sentence, which the district court 

imposed after he pleaded guilty to distribution of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of 

a public housing facility, and his consecutive 24-month sentence, imposed upon 

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revocation of supervised release. On appeal, Brown argues that: (1) the district 

court erred in calculating drug quantity at sentencing; (2) a 235-month sentence 

was greater than necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing; (3) his 2007 

conviction was double-counted because it was used once in the career offender

calculation, and again in sentencing him for revocation of supervised release; and 

(4) the district court erred by imposing a 24-month revocation sentence that runs

consecutive to his new term of imprisonment. After careful review, we affirm.

We review for clear error the district court’s determination of the drug 

quantity for which a defendant is held responsible at sentencing. United States v. 

Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005). We review the sentence a 

district court imposes for “reasonableness,” which “merely asks whether the trial 

court abused its discretion.” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 

2008) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007)). We also review 

the sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release for reasonableness. 

United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106 (11th Cir. 2006). Similarly, we 

review the district court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Covington, 565 F.3d 1336, 1346 (11th Cir. 2009). 

First, we reject Brown’s claim that the district court clearly erred in its drug 

quantity estimate. When a district court imposes a sentence and determines that 

the quantity of drugs seized does not reflect the scale of an offense, the court may 

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approximate the appropriate quantity of drugs attributable to the defendant, so long 

as the estimate is fair, accurate, and conservative. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1296. In

making this estimate, the court may use evidence showing the average frequency 

and amount of a defendant’s drug sales over a given period of time. Id. When a 

defendant objects to a factual finding used in calculating the drug quantity, the 

government bears the burden of establishing the disputed fact by a preponderance 

of the evidence. Id. “Preponderance of the evidence” is a relaxed evidentiary 

standard, but the court must still base its determination on sufficient evidence. Id. 

We accord great deference to the district court’s credibility determinations. United 

States v. Gregg, 179 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 1999).

Here, the evidence about drug quantities was based on information obtained 

from a cooperating co-conspirator. An investigator testified that this estimate was 

consistent with the investigation, which included two controlled buys, intercepted 

phone calls, and surveillance. While Brown argued that this information was 

untrustworthy, we accord the district court’s credibility determination great 

deference. Because the court found the testimony credible, there was sufficient 

evidence for the court to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Brown 

should be held accountable for 61 ounces of cocaine base, and 15 ounces of 

cocaine powder.

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We are also unpersuaded by Brown’s claim that his 235-month sentence was

substantively unreasonable. In reviewing the “‘substantive reasonableness of [a]

sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard,’” we consider the 

“‘totality of the circumstances.’” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Gall, 552 U .S. 

at 51). The district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than 

necessary to comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).1

 “[W]e will 

not second guess the weight (or lack thereof) that the [court] accorded to a given [§ 

3553(a)] factor ... as long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable in light 

of all the circumstances presented.” United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 

(11th Cir. 2010) (quotation, alteration and emphasis omitted). The party 

challenging the sentence bears the burden to show it is unreasonable. United 

States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). While we do not 

automatically presume a sentence falling within the guideline range to be 

reasonable, we ordinarily expect that sentence to be reasonable. United States v. 

Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005).

 1 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the 

seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the 

offense; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to 

protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training 

or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) the 

pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted 

sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

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Here, the Guidelines classified Brown as a career offender, and the district 

court placed great weight on his criminal history, and the fact that he had 

previously been convicted of a drug trafficking crime. The court additionally 

expressed concern that he had committed the instant offenses within months, if not 

weeks, of his release from custody. Considering this and other sentencing factors, 

the court selected a sentence within the guideline range, which suggests 

reasonableness. In light of Brown’s history and characteristics, as well as the 

circumstances and nature of the offense, his sentence was not unreasonable. 

Nor are we convinced by Brown’s challenges to his revocation sentence. 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), upon finding that the defendant violated a 

condition of supervised release, a district court may revoke the term of supervised 

release and impose a term of imprisonment after considering specific factors set 

forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The district court is not 

required to explicitly state that it considered the § 3553(a) factors, as long as the 

court’s comments demonstrate that it considered the factors when imposing 

sentence. United States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir. 2007). The 

court’s goal is to sanction “the defendant’s breach of trust,” not the defendant’s 

original criminal offense conduct. U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Pt. A, intro. comment. 3(b). 

When considering what sentence is substantively reasonable in light of that breach, 

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the Guidelines expect that “the nature of the conduct leading to the revocation 

would be considered in measuring the extent of the breach of trust.” Id.

If a prison sentence is imposed on a defendant subject to another term of 

imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently, partially concurrently, or 

consecutively. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d). In deciding whether to 

impose a consecutive or concurrent sentence, the court must consider the § 3553(a) 

factors, the type and length of the prior undischarged sentence, the time already 

served, the time likely to be served before release, and the court that imposed the 

prior sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, comment. (n.4(A)). 

In this case, there was no “double-counting” of Brown’s 2007 conviction. 

That conviction was part of his criminal history for Guidelines purposes, which 

would have been true even if he had not been on supervised release at the time. 

Further, the revocation of supervised release was based on his new conviction, not 

his old one. Finally, the court’s imposition of a revocation sentence was not 

another punishment for his 2007 conviction, but rather a sanction for his breach of 

trust. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Pt. A, intro. comment. 3(b).

As for the district court’s decision to run Brown’s revocation sentence 

consecutive to his new term of imprisonment, the court explicitly considered the 

relevant § 3553(a) factors, and determined that running the sentences concurrently 

would fail to punish the violation of supervised release. Since the district court 

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expressed concern that Brown had resumed selling drugs shortly after his release 

from custody, this determination was reasonable.

AFFIRMED.

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