J-S13044-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: D.I.G., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: H.G. No. 1807 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order entered September 26, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, 

Orphans’ Court, at No: 045 of 2014 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MUNDY, and STABILE, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED APRIL 13, 2015 

H.G. (“Mother”) appeals from the order in the Court of Common Pleas 

of Westmoreland County voluntarily terminating her parental rights to her 

natural male child, D.G. (“Child”), born in August of 2009. We affirm. 

The record reveals that, on May 12, 2014, A.Y., and his wife, M.Y. 

(collectively, “Adoptive Parents”), filed a report of intent to adopt Child, 

wherein they averred that Child had been in their physical custody since 

March 28, 2014, with permission of Mother. In addition, on May 12, 2014, 

A.Y. and M.Y. filed a petition to confirm consent and attached thereto 

consents to the adoption of Child executed on April 11, 2014, by Mother and 

putative father, C.L.B. (“Father”). The orphans’ court accurately set forth 

the procedural history thereafter as follows: 

The hearing was initially scheduled on June 14, 2014, but was 

later rescheduled to July 23, 2014. Father was not properly 

served with notice of the rescheduled hearing date. As a result, 

the Court continued the hearing as to Father until August 20, 

2014 and proceeded with testimony as to Mother, who was 

present and represented by counsel. 
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At that hearing, Adoptive Parents both testified that they never 

received any notice within the thirty day period between the 

signing of the consent and the filing of the petition that Mother 

intended to revoke her consent. They also both testified that 

they intended to adopt the minor child in the event that the birth 

parents’ rights were terminated. Mother did not provide any 

testimony at the scheduled hearing. There were no issues raised 

at that time as to fraud or duress placed upon Mother in signing 

the consent, and no allegations of an incompetency of Mother 

that led to fraud or duress in signing the consent. Mother’s 

counsel merely indicated on the record that Mother did not wish 

for the adoption to proceed. Although no revocation of consent 

was filed or served on Adoptive Parents, the Court in an 

abundance of caution gave Mother every opportunity to crossexamine the Adoptive Parents and participate in the hearing. In 

addition, the Court even granted Mother’s counsel’s request for a 

ten[-]day period to submit legal authority as to why the Court 

should not accept Mother’s consent and permit the adoption. 

The record was also left open to address the Petition to Confirm 

Consent in relation to Father. 

On August 20, 2014, Father failed to appear for the scheduled 

hearing despite proper service. Mother and her counsel did 

appear along with Adoptive Parents and their counsel. At that 

time, Mother’s counsel submitted a Petition to Withdraw 

Consent, which was not filed of record but was provided before 

the hearing to both opposing counsel and the Court. This was 

the first written notice that Mother intended to revoke her 

consent to the adoption. Mother based her petition on an 

argument that she was not mentally competent to consent, and 

therefore her consent was not intelligent, voluntary, and 

deliberate. Counsel for Adoptive Parents filed Preliminary 

Objections to Mother’s petition based on the timeliness outlined 

in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711 for revocation of consent to adoption.1 

After review of the statute and applicable case law, this Court 

granted the Preliminary Objections based on a strict 

interpretation of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711. 

After application of the statute, the Court entered an Order 

dated August 20, 2014 accepting the signed consents of both 

Father and Mother and terminated the parental rights of both. 
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Due to an error at the Register of Wills Office, the August 20th

Order of Court was not properly sent to Mother’s counsel. 

Pa.R.A.P. [ ] 108 states that the day of entry of an order shall be 

the day the clerk of court mails or delivers copies of the order to 

the parties. Therefore, the appeal period did not start to run 

until September 26, 2014. . . . 

___________________________________________________

1

 Mother’s counsel failed to provide proper notice of her Petition. 

She indicated to the Court that the information regarding her 

client’s incompetency came to her attention shortly before the 

scheduled hearing. As a result, Adoptive Parents’ counsel was 

not able to provide proper notice of the Preliminary Objections 

raised. Out of an abundance of caution, the Court addressed 

both documents as they were before the Court. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/14, at 1-3 (citations to record omitted). 

 On October 24, 2014, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). Father did not file a notice of appeal. The orphans’ 

court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on November 5, 2014. 

 On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review: 

A. Did the lower Court abuse its discretion by terminating 

[Mother’s] parental rights by not conducting further review of 

newly acquired evidence of [Mother]’s disability – which 

prevented her from executing a valid consent – and by allowing 

this adoption to proceed without further investigation of putative 

father’s consent and issues surrounding the alleged

intermediary? 

B. Did the lower Court fail to consider the best interests of the 

child by transferring custody to the prospective adoptive parents 

without further investigation of putative father’s consent – in 

addition to issues surrounding the alleged intermediary and any 

other proper investigative reports related to the adoption? 

Mother’s Brief at 2. 
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This Court has explained, 

“[T]he interpretation and application of a statute is a question of 

law that compels plenary review to determine whether the court 

committed an error of law.” Wilson v. Transport Ins. Co., 889 

A.2d 563, 570 (Pa. Super. 2005). “As with all questions of law, 

the appellate standard of review is de novo and the appellate 

scope of review is plenary.” In re Wilson, 879 A.2d 199, 214 

(Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc). 

In re Adoption of J.A.S., 939 A.2d 403, 405 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal 

denied, 954 A.2d 577 (Pa. 2008). 

 At issue in this case is the application of Section 2711 of the Adoption 

Act, which provides, in relevant part: 

§ 2711. Consents necessary to adoption. 

(a) General rule. -- Except as otherwise provided in this part, 

consent to an adoption shall be required of the following: 

 

. . . 

(3) The parents or surviving parent of an adoptee who 

has not reached the age of 18 years. 

. . . 

(c) Validity of consent. -- No consent shall be valid if it was 

executed prior to or within 72 hours after the birth of the child. 

A putative father may execute a consent at any time after 

receiving notice of the expected or actual birth of the child. Any 

consent given outside this Commonwealth shall be valid for 

purposes of this section if it was given in accordance with the 

laws of the jurisdiction where it was executed. A consent to an 

adoption may only be revoked as set forth in this 

subsection. The revocation of a consent shall be in writing 

and shall be served upon the agency or adult to whom the 

child was relinquished. The following apply: 

 (1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (3):
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. . . 

(ii) For a consent to an adoption executed by a birth 

mother, the consent is irrevocable more than 30 days 

after the execution of the consent. 

(2) An individual may not waive the revocation period 

under paragraph (1). 

(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the following apply: 

 

(i) An individual who executed a consent to an adoption 

may challenge the validity of the consent only by 

filing a petition alleging fraud or duress within the 

earlier of the following time frames: 

(A) Sixty days after the birth of the child or the 

execution of the consent, whichever occurs later. 

. . . 

(ii) A consent to an adoption may be invalidated only if

the alleged fraud or duress under subparagraph (i) is 

proven by: 

(A) a preponderance of the evidence in the case of 

consent by a person 21 years of age or younger; or 

(B) clear and convincing evidence in all other cases. 

. . . 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711 (internal emphasis added). 

In In re Adoption of J.A.S., supra, this Court stated: 

Significantly, [ ] Section [2711] describes the timeline for 

revocation of a consent to adoption, as well as a challenge to its 

validity (and only on the grounds of fraud or duress). This 

Section further makes clear that a revocation and/or a challenge 

to the validity of a consent to adoption must be in conformity 

with the Act. 
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. . . 

Hence the statute renders a consent to adoption irrevocable 

more than thirty (30) days after execution. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2711(c)(1)(ii).2 Additionally, the statute precludes a challenge 

to the validity of the consent to adoption after sixty (60) days 

following the birth of the child or the execution of the consent, 

whichever occurs later, and only upon the grounds of fraud or 

duress. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c)(3)(i)(A). 

___________________________________________________

2

 Nothing in the statutes presupposes the “validity” of the 

consent. 

In re Adoption of J.A.S., 939 A.2d at 407-408. 

 In In re Adoption of J.A.S., this Court reversed the order of the 

orphans’ court that overruled the appellant’s preliminary objections to the 

birth mother’s petition to revoke her consent to adoption. In that case, the 

birth mother’s petition was untimely with respect to both her attempt to 

revoke her consent and her attempt to challenge its validity. However, the 

court had concluded the consent was “void ab initio, because at first it had 

omitted [b]irth mother’s marital status (and [the] [a]ppellant’s name as the 

adoptive parent, which no one disputed).” Id. at 408. Thus, we explained 

the court, in essence, had concluded that a “valid” consent to adoption “was 

a necessary predicate under the statute before the timeliness provisions for 

revoking and/or challenging the validity of the consent were triggered.” Id. 

We disagreed stating that, 

[t]he practical consequence of the court’s interpretation 

effectively permitted [b]irth mother to challenge the validity of 

her consent to adoption at any time, based upon the existence of 
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a technical omission in the form of the initial consent. This lack 

of finality is exactly the mischief the legislature intended to 

remedy with the revision to Section 2711 of the Adoption Act in 

2004, the purpose of which was to afford finality to the adoption 

process. 

Id. (footnote omitted). 

 Turning to Mother’s issues in the subject appeal, she acknowledges 

that the petition to revoke her consent to adoption “was not timely filed 

and/or timely presented.” Mother’s Brief at 5. Indeed, Mother filed the 

petition on August 20, 2014, which was 131 days after she executed her 

consent to the adoption. Therefore, Mother’s petition was untimely with 

respect to both her attempt to revoke her consent and her attempt to 

challenge its validity. Nevertheless, Mother argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion by not considering the validity of her consent on the 

basis that she lacked the mental capacity to consent to the adoption. 

Specifically, Mother’s counsel states that Mother and her family provided 

documentary evidence to counsel on August 14, 2014, six days before the 

hearing on August 20, 2014, that allegedly demonstrated Mother lacked the 

mental capacity to consent. 

 In confirming Mother’s consent and terminating her parental rights, 

the orphans’ court relied on our decision in In re Adoption of J.A.S.,

supra, in first reviewing the timeliness of Mother’s petition to revoke. The 

court determined that the petition was not timely. Therefore, the court did 

not reach the merits of Mother’s challenge to the validity of her consent. We 
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conclude that the court properly applied the controlling statutory and case 

law to the facts of this case. Mother’s petition to withdraw her consent, filed 

131 days after she executed her consent to adoption, fell well outside of 60 

days provided for under Section 2711. Thus, we discern no error of law by 

the court in confirming Mother’s consent and voluntarily terminating her 

parental rights. 

Mother also argues that the court abused its discretion and erred by 

failing to “question if the requirements of [Section] 2711 have even been 

met as to putative father.” Mother’s Brief at 9. Specifically, Mother asserts 

that, “no DNA analysis has been done” with respect to Father, and, 

therefore, “serious questions arise if putative father is even the biological 

father of the minor child.” Id. at 8. We conclude that Mother’s argument is 

waived because she failed to raise it in the orphans’ court. See MacNutt v. 

Temple Univ. Hosp., 932 A.2d 980, 992 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that in 

order to preserve an issue for appellate review, litigants must make timely 

and specific objections during trial). 

Lastly, Mother asserts that an intermediary facilitated the adoption of 

Child. Mother argues there “were no reports filed as to investigation of the 

adoptive parents’ home, nor was any other further investigation done, such 

as criminal background checks, before this child was placed into the adoptive 

home.” Mother’s Brief at 9. In response, the orphans’ court stated, 
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A report of an intermediary is required under 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2533 [(Report of intermediary)] and occurs in relation to a 

report of intention to adopt. It does not occur in relation to a 

confirm consent. Therefore, the existence of an intermediary 

does not apply in the current matter[,] and this Court was not 

required to address it in entering the August 20th Order. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/14, at 9. We agree with the court that a report of 

an intermediary was not relevant to the subject hearing to confirm the 

consents to adoption executed by Mother and Father. Accordingly, as 

Mother’s issues on appeal are without merit, we affirm the order. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 4/13/2015