alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                   EXHIBIT 4.4

                             AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO THE
                             RWD TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
                AMENDED AND RESTATED EMPLOYEE STOCK PURCHASE PLAN

                              W I T N E S S E T H:
                              - - - - - - - - - -

     WHEREAS, Section 20 of the RWD Technologies, Inc. Amended and Restated
Employee Stock Purchase Plan (the "Plan") authorizes the Board of Directors (the
"Board") of RWD Technologies, Inc., a Maryland corporation (the "Corporation"),
to amend the Plan at any time; and

     WHEREAS, the Board now finds it desirable and in the best interests of the
Corporation to increase the number of shares of common stock of the Corporation,
par value $0.10 per share ("the Common Stock"), authorized for issuance under
the Plan by 400,000 shares.

     NOW, THEREFORE, the Plan is amended, effective as of February 20, 2002, as
follows:

                              First and Only Change
                              ---------------------

     Section 1 of the Plan is amended in its entirety to read as follows:

          "Subject to adjustment as provided herein, the aggregate number of
     shares of Common Stock that may be made available for purchase under the
     Plan is 875,000 shares. The shares issuable under the Plan may, in the
     discretion of the Board of Directors of the Company (the "Board"), be
     authorized but unissued shares of Common Stock, shares purchased on the
     open market, or shares from any other proper source."

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Corporation has caused this Amendment to be
executed by its duly authorized officers this 20th day of February, 2002.

ATTEST:                                   RWD TECHNOLOGIES, INC.


By: /s/ Laurens MacLure, Jr.,             By: /s/ Robert W. Deutsch
    ------------------------------------     -----------------------------------
         Laurens MacLure, Jr., Secretary           Robert W. Deutsch, Chairman
                                                   and CEO

                                      -9-
#### In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Floyd Parker HUTCHINS, Deceased. Ruth B. Hutchins McDONALD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Donald L. HUTCHINS, Personal Representative-Appellee.

No. 79CA0031.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.

Aug. 9, 1979.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 6, 1979.

Law Offices of Timothy W. Hasler, Joseph H. Fonfara, Fort Collins, for petitioner-appellant.

Wyatt, Williams, Williamson & McCabe, Dave Williams, Fort Collins, for personal representative-appellee.

STERNBERG, Judge.

The appellant, Ruth B. Hutchins McDonald, and Floyd Hutchins were married on December 5, 1972. In February 1974, she filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in California, and in October of that year, the California court entered an interlocutory decree of divorce, which included a disposition of all marital property. Neither party took any action to obtain a final decree and no final decree was entered.

Floyd Hutchins died on November 7, 1977, while domiciled in Colorado, and his handwritten will dated June 7, 1974, giving his entire estate to his two sons, was lodged for probate. The appellant filed a petition to take her elective share of the estate as surviving spouse. She also filed a request for exempt property allowance, family allowance, and homestead allowance, which the personal representative denied. The appellant then sought a court order granting these allowances.

During the pendency of this petition, upon the request of the decedent’s sons, the California court entered a final decree of divorce *nunc pro tunc*as of December 10,1974. Appellant initially appealed this judgment in California, but that appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute it. Relying upon this final judgment *890of the California court, the district court held that the appellant was not the surviving spouse and therefore denied her claims. We affirm the judgment of the district court, but on a different basis.

We do not reach the question of the validity of the *nunc pro tunc*entry of the final decree of divorce. Rather, we conclude that the appellant is precluded from claiming benefits as a surviving spouse by that portion of the Colorado Probate Code that provides that for purpose of such benefits the term “surviving spouse” does not include “a person who was a party to a valid proceeding concluded by an order purporting to terminate all marital property rights.” Section 15-11-802, C.R.S. 1973.

In California the division of marital property in an interlocutory decree such as was entered here is appealable. Cal.Civ.Code § 4514 and 4810 (West); *Darter v. Magnussen,*172 Cal.App.2d 714, 342 P.2d 528 (1959). Thus, the division of marital property in the interlocutory decree in California on October 10, 1974, was “an order purporting to terminate all marital property rights.” The time for appeal having elapsed, the proceedings have been “concluded” within the meaning of § 15-11-802, C.R.S. 1973. Therefore, appellant is not a surviving spouse entitled to exempt property allowance, family allowance, homestead allowance, or elective share.

Judgment affirmed.

PIERCE and VAN CISE, JJ., concur.
Inspection and Weighing Program Obligations by Office – FY 22

Obligation Categories

Salary and 

Benefits Travel

Shipping and 

Moving 

Expenses

Rent and 

Utilities Printing

Other 

Services

Supplies and 

Materials Equipment

Insurance 

Claims Interest Paid Office Total

FGIS Deputy Admin. $739,053 $14,397 -$2,110 $2,884 $907 -$238,946 $3,386 $228 $0 $0 $519,799

Field Management Div. $483,950 $32,035 $0 $713 $0 $52,150 $7,481 $0 $0 $0 $576,329

Quality Assurance Div. $17,318 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $17,318

Master Scale Depot $276,202 $20,218 $0 $11,683 $0 $5,489 $5,124 $106,107 $0 $0 $424,822

New Orleans $17,638,726 $334,194 $41,482 $397,604 $1 $27,323 $274,236 $21,095 $7,169 $16 $18,741,845

Domestic $418,774 $15,165 $0 $0 $0 $283 $2,602 $0 $0 $0 $436,823

Tech & Science Div. $406,793 $538 $5 $3,950 $0 $60,383 $32,714 $9,141 $0 $0 $513,523

Toledo $1,993,597 $153,230 $24,012 $93,604 $4,145 $5,236 $66,713 $6,043 $0 $0 $2,346,578

Portland $2,232,084 $ 71,711 $34,783 $173,040 $4,047 $10,767 $69,981 $3,876 $0 $0 $2,600,288

League City $6,407,708 $168,258 -$3,253 $234,998 $0 $6,061 $67,701 $18,952 $49,999 $0 $6,950,424

Overhead 1 -$3,961 $0 $1,610 $231,725 $13,832 $2,426,270 $5,821 $0 $0 $0 $2,675,298

TOTAL $30,610,243 $809,744 $96,530 $1,150,199 $22,932 $2,355,016 $535,758 $165,442 $57,168 $16 $35,803,048

1 Overhead includes AMS Overhead obligations, Departmental Charges (Central Charges & Greenbook), and prior year overhead adjustments.

Dated: 11/21/2022
# C_2012326EN.01004701.xml

| 26.10.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 326/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 326/1

---

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

PART THREE

UNION POLICIES AND INTERNAL ACTIONS

UNION POLICIES AND INTERNAL ACTIONS

TITLE VII

COMMON RULES ON COMPETITION, TAXATION AND APPROXIMATION OF LAWS

COMMON RULES ON COMPETITION, TAXATION AND APPROXIMATION OF LAWS

CHAPTER 2

TAX PROVISIONS

Article 110

(ex Article 90 TEC)

(ex Article 90 TEC)

No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products.

Furthermore, no Member State shall impose on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other products.

---
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 92 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. CON. RES. 92

Authorizing the printing of a revised and updated version of the House 
          document entitled ``Women in Congress, 1917-2006''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 26, 2020

 Ms. Lofgren submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was 
           referred to the Committee on House Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
Authorizing the printing of a revised and updated version of the House 
          document entitled ``Women in Congress, 1917-2006''.

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),

SECTION 1. PRINTING OF REVISED VERSION OF ``WOMEN IN CONGRESS, 1917-
              2006''.

    (a) In General.--An updated version of House Document 108-223, 
entitled ``Women in Congress, 1917-2006'' (as revised by the Library of 
Congress), shall be printed as a House document by the Public Printer, 
with illustrations and suitable binding, under the direction of the 
Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives.
    (b) Number of Copies.--In addition to the usual number, there shall 
be printed such number of copies of the document referred to in 
subsection (a) as does not exceed a total production and printing cost 
of $500,000, of which--
            (1) 80 percent shall be for the use of the Committee on 
        House Administration of the House of Representatives; and
            (2) 20 percent shall be for the use of the Committee on 
        Rules and Administration of the Senate.
                                 <all>
```
#### S. D. Wanton, Plaintiff in Error, v. The State of Florida, Defendant in Error.

(Supreme Court of Florida, *En Banc,*

December 3, 1907).

Writ of Error to Criminal Court of Record, Duval county; John S. Maxwell, Judge.

No appearance for plaintiff in error.

W. H. Ellis, Attorney General, for the state. •

This action was brought by the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error. There was judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant takes writ of error. Dismissed on motion of counsel for defendant in error.
ACCEPTED

12-14-00253-CV

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS

1/6/2015 4:54:34 PM

CATHY LUSK

CLERK

 RECEIVED IN

12th COURT OF APPEALS

 TYLER, TEXAS

 1/6/2015 4:54:34 PM

 CATHY S. LUSK

 Clerk

4/8/2015
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-40760

In the Matter of: HADLEY COHEN; MELINDA K. COHEN, 

 Debtors

------------------------------

HADLEY COHEN, 

 Appellant

v.

THIRD COAST BANK, SSB, 

 Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:13-CV-610

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The judgment of the district court is affirmed for the following reasons.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 8, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 14-40760 Document: 00512998076 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/08/2015
No. 14-40760

Appellant concedes that his representations to the bank of his assets and 

liabilities were false. The bankruptcy court trying the case found that the bank 

justifiably relied on the false representation to its damages, as found.

Plaintiff argues that the finding of reliance was clear error because the 

bank had knowledge of the risk of accepting the representations without 

conducting an investigation that would reveal the falsehood. This court will 

not impose on banking officials this requirement. Under all of these 

circumstances and the customary practice of lending institutions, it is 

necessary for them to be able to accept what Plaintiff signed as true. The 

finding stands.

The Plaintiff also seizes on the language in the statute § 523(a)(2)(A), 

excluding discharge for “a statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s 

financial condition.” Because the borrowing base certificates are statements of 

financial condition, the argument is that for Plaintiff to be discharged the court 

has to go to the following statutory requirement and require a finding of 

reasonable reliance. He misreads Bandi v. Becanel where this court 

distinguished statements that are only about general conditions of the 

borrower from specific falsifications on the ability to repay the lender, 

misstatements of inventory and denial of other secured creditors with priority 

– as was true here – that are not dischargeable.

AFFIRMED.

2

 Case: 14-40760 Document: 00512998076 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/08/2015
<HTML>
<HEAD>
 <TITLE>SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF">
 <P ALIGN=right><B> Exhibit 21 </B></P>
 <H1 ALIGN=CENTER><FONT
 SIZE=3>BULOVA CORPORATION</FONT></H1>
 <H1 ALIGN=CENTER><FONT
 SIZE=3>Subsidiaries of the Registrant</FONT></H1>
 <H1 ALIGN=CENTER><FONT
 SIZE=3>December 31, 1999</FONT></H1>

 <TABLE CELLPADDING="0" CELLSPACING="0" WIDTH="686">
  <TR VALIGN="BOTTOM">
   <TH>Name of Subsidiary <HR WIDTH=30% SIZE=1 COLOR=BLACK NOSHADE> </TH>
   <TH>Organized under
   <BR>
   the Laws of <HR WIDTH=95% SIZE=1 COLOR=BLACK NOSHADE> </TH>
   <TH>Business
   <BR>
   Names <HR WIDTH=95% SIZE=1 COLOR=BLACK NOSHADE> </TH>
  </TR>
  <TR VALIGN="BOTTOM">
   <TD WIDTH="68%" ALIGN="LEFT" HEIGHT="30"> <DIV ALIGN="center">Bulova Watch
     Company Limited</DIV>
   </TD>
   <TD WIDTH="19%" ALIGN="LEFT" HEIGHT="30"> <DIV ALIGN="center">Canada</DIV>
   </TD>
   <TD WIDTH="13%" ALIGN="LEFT" HEIGHT="30"> <DIV ALIGN="center">Bulova</DIV>
   </TD>
  </TR>
 </TABLE>
 <P>     The names of certain subsidiaries which, if
   considered as a single subsidiary, would not constitute a “significant
   subsidiary” as defined in Regulation S-X have been omitted. </P>
 </BODY>
</HTML>
ELECTRONIC RECORD

02-14-00068-CR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY

02-14-00069-CR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT

COA # 02-14-00070-CR OFFENSE: ATT. AGG. KIDNAPPING

STYLE: jones, rory COUNTY: Denton

COA DISPOSITION: AFFIRM TRIAL COURT: 211th District Court

DATE: 11/20/14

F-2014-0079-C, F-2014-0080-C & FPublish:NO TC CASE #: 2014-0081-C

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS **—m *ms -fnWH tVTTtY

STYLE: JONES, RORY v.

PRO £6 Petition

FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IN CCA IS:

DATE: 3MZWS

JUDGE: -&A, UAAU^y ,

CCA#: it 7g»/v

CCA Disposition:

DATE:

JUDGE:

SIGNED: PC:

PUBLISH: DNP:

PRO se MOTION FOR

REHEARING IN CCA IS: </«n'6-^

JUDGE: /^ /)/>rt>'//£7 2&/*~

ELECTRONIC RECORD
pi in copy OFFICIAL NOTICE FROM COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

P.O. BOX 12308, CAPITOL STATION, AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711

M&S" \ . ...

4/16/2015 |gl ^£Ml «sfel COA No. 02-14-00069-CR

JONES, RORY Tr.vefcrNdT!Et2014-0080-C PD-1677-14

Pursuant to Rule 69.4(a) T.R.A.P^theVeeord)is*TOtumed to the court ofappeals. ^^ Abel Acosta, Clerk

2ND COURT OF APPEALS CLERK

DEBRASPISAK

401 W. BELKNAP, STE 9000

FORT WORTH, TX 76196

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Anthony L. Caruso, Respondent.

—Order unanimously affirmed and indictment dismissed. Memorandum: We affirm the order of the suppression court. The search of the shed at defendant’s residence exceeded the scope of the search warrant which authorized a search of the residence described as: "A two story flat roof dwelling, first floor grey *[sic]*cement block, 2nd story brown barn board, the residence is located at 101 Buffalo Street, City of Hornell, Steuben County and located on the North side of the street and is the first house East of Dealy Street”. One of the most fundamental characteristics of a search warrant is that "[t]he authority to search is limited to the place described in the warrant and does not include additional or different places” *(Keiningham v United States,*287 F2d 126, 129; *see also, People v Green,*33 NY2d 496, 499). In order to protect the Constitutional right of privacy *(see,*US Const 4th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 12) from arbitrary police intrusion, "nothing should be left to the discretion of the searcher in executing the warrant” *(People v Nieves,*36 NY2d 396, 401). Rather, "[p]articularity is required in order that the executing officer can reasonably ascertain and identify * * * [the] places authorized to be searched” *(People v Nieves, supra,*at 401; *see, People v Henley,*135 AD2d 1136, *lv denied*71 NY2d 897).

Further, the indictment must be dismissed since the unsuccessful appeal by the People precludes further prosecution of defendant for the charges in the accusatory instrument *(see,*CPL 450.50 [2]; *Matter of Forte v Supreme Ct.,*48 NY2d 179, 185-188; *People v Felton,*171 AD2d 1034). (Appeal from Order of Steuben County Court, Scudder, J.—Suppress Evidence.) Present—Denman, J. P., Boomer, Pine, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-14-00419-CV

Diana Gonzalez

v.

Jose L. Medina Jr. d/b/a JRS Coin Laundry

On Appeal from the

County Court at Law No. 2 of Nueces County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 2012-CCV-60239-2

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The Court 

orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED. Costs of the appeal are adjudged 

against appellant.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

April 16, 2015
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-15-00116-CV

Lee WEIR, Mike Weir and Al Weir,

Appellants

v.

Holt Texas, LTD. d/b

HOLT TEXAS, LTD. d/b/a Holt Cat,

Appellee

From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2012-CI-00097

Honorable Gloria Saldaña, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARION, JUSTICE ANGELINI, AND JUSTICE BARNARD

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED FOR 

WANT OF PROSECUTION. Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal, asserting this appeal should 

be dismissed because appellants failed to timely file a notice of appeal, is DENIED AS MOOT.

It is ORDERED that costs of appeal are assessed appellants.

SIGNED April 8, 2015

_________________________________

Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
August 3, 2015

Mr. Brian Trudeau

Trudeau Consulting LLC

18 Old Castle Drive

Newtown, CT 06470

Dear Mr. Trudeau :

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption from

part 21; § § 45.23(b)

, 61.113(a) and (b)

. 91

. 407(a) (1), 91.409(a)(2), and 91. 417 (a) and (b) of

Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). It explains why we can not process your

request and what you should do in the next 30 days.

Why We Can n o t Process Your Request

We entered your May 18, 2015

, exemption request on behalf of Trudeau Consulting, LLC.

into the public docket (No. FAA− 2015

− 1967 ), but we are unable to process your request any

further. The information you sent does no t comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy

enclosed). For us to consider the request any further, you must send us all of the following:

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would

benefit the public as a whole.

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request.

For more detailed information relating to submitting petitions for exemption, please visit

http://aes.faa.gov/petition/index.html . This website helps the petitioner to meet Federal

Avia tion Administration (FAA) requirements outlines in § 11.81 and helps answer any

questions you may have.

What You Should Do

If you want us to process your request any further, you must submit the requested information

within 30 days. Please note that § 1 1.63(d) requires you to send your petition for exemption

at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption.2

If We Do Not Hear From You

If we do not receive the information, we will close the docket without notifying you further.

I f you have any questions you may call the 333 Information Line (202) 267

- 2999.

Sincerely,

/s/

Brittany Newton

Program Analyst, Airmen and

Airspace Rules Division

Enclosure3
# STATE OFLOUISIANA



# COURTOFAPPEAL,FIRSTCIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS JOHN KEVIN O' DOWD NO. 2021 KW 1533 

### FEBRUARY 25, 2022 In Re: John Kevin O' Dowd, 

### applying for 

### supervisory writs,



### 22nd Judicial District Court, Parish of St. 

### Tammany, No. 506, 284. BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C. J., PENZATO AND HESTER, JJ.

WRIT DENIED. VGW AHP CHH

COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT

DEP 

### CLERK OF COURT

FOR THE COURT
#### Julian Middleton, Respondent, v Margaret Middleton, Appellant.

—In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by a judgment entered November 12, 1987, the defendant wife appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Marrocco, J.H.O.), entered November 6, 1989, as denied her motion to vacate and set aside the financial portion of a stipulation of settlement entered into between the parties on April 28, 1987.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

Initially, we note that the wife failed to establish a reasonable explanation for her failure to raise the claim that the stipulation was unconscionable on her prior motions to set aside the stipulation, so she is barred from raising that claim now. Moreover, her claim that the motion was one for renewal, because it was based upon newly discovered information regarding the value of her husband’s pension, is unpersuasive. The wife was aware of the pension and could have previously ascertained its value.

In any event, the wife’s contention that the stipulation is unconscionable is meritless. It is well established that a stipulation of settlement will not lightly be set aside, especially where, as here, it is made in open court by parties represented by counsel, after engaging in negotiations between themselves and in consultation with the court prior to the time the terms are placed on the record *(see, Cantamessa v*
      *656
      *Cantamessa,*170 AD2d 792; *Golfinopoulos v Golfinopoulos,*144 AD2d 537; *Bossom v Bossom,*141 AD2d 794, 795). Indeed, "[j]udicial review is to be exercised circumspectly, sparingly and with a persisting view to the encouragement of parties settling their own differences” *(Christian v Christian,*42 NY2d 63, 71).

The wife’s decision to accept a lump sum of $10,000 in full settlement of any claim she might have had to an equitable distribution of the husband’s pension cannot be viewed as one which no rational person would make and that no fair or honest person would accept *(see, Christian v Christian, supra).*Although the husband retained all of his pension, courts will not set aside an agreement on the ground of unconscionability simply because it may have been improvident *(see, Cantamessa v Cantamessa, supra; Golfinopoulos v Golfinopoulos, supra; see also, McFarland v McFarland,*70 NY2d 916; *Christian v Christian, supra,*at 71-72). Thompson, J. P., Kunzeman, Miller and O’Brien, JJ., concur.