1 

Filed 4/14/15 Sohal v. Crossland CA3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

(Tehama) 

---- 

GURDEEP SOHAL et al., 

 Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

 v. 

CHARLES CROSSLAND et al., 

 Defendants and Respondents. 

C072297 

(Super. Ct. No. 62747) 

ORDER MODIFYING 

OPINION AND DENYING 

REHEARING 

[NO CHANGE IN 

JUDGMENT] 

THE COURT: 

 It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on March 18, 2015, be modified as 

follows: 
2 

 In the first paragraph on page eight, insert the following text as a footnote after the 

sentence, “The appropriate disposition of an appeal for which the appellants have no 

standing is dismissal.” 

 In a petition for rehearing, with an accompanying request for judicial notice, the 

Sohals argue that they have standing in this litigation because the bankruptcy court 

actually abandoned the real property at issue and therefore “necessarily” abandoned the 

state court litigation. We conclude (1) the argument is forfeited because it was made 

after we issued our decision and (2) in any event, it is without merit. 

 The Crosslands made the standing argument in their respondent’s brief on appeal, 

yet the Sohals did not respond in their reply brief. Instead, they waited until after the 

decision was filed to make their argument for standing in their petition for rehearing. 

This untimely argument is forfeited. (Gentis v. Safeguard Business Systems, Inc. (1998) 

60 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1308 [arguments cannot be raised for first time in petition for 

rehearing].) 

 Even if we were to grant the request for judicial notice and consider the argument, 

we would find that it is without merit. The Sohals’ petition for rehearing and 

accompanying request for judicial notice seek to establish that, even though the record on 

appeal did not so reflect, the bankruptcy court abandoned the real property by order. The 

problem with the argument is that the dismissal of the appeal for lack of standing is based 

on the bankruptcy trustee’s ownership over the litigation, not ownership of the real 

property. 

 In the petition for rehearing, the Sohals twice write that abandonment of the real 

property “necessarily” means that the bankruptcy court abandoned its claim over the state 

court litigation, which included more than just the real property issues. Nowhere in the 

petition for rehearing do the Sohals provide authority for the proposition that 

abandonment of the real property necessarily abandons ownership over litigation that 
3 

includes real property issues. The proposition is not self-evident. Because the Sohals 

provide no authority for the proposition, the issue is forfeited. (Lafferty v. Wells Fargo 

Bank (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 545, 571-572.) 

 Because it would serve no purpose, the request for judicial notice is denied. 

 This modification does not change the judgment. 

 The petition for rehearing is denied. 

THE COURT: 

 RAYE , P. J. 

 NICHOLSON , J. 

 HOCH , J. 
1 

Filed 3/18/15 (unmodified version) 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

(Tehama) 

---- 

GURDEEP SOHAL et al., 

 Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

 v. 

CHARLES CROSSLAND et al., 

 Defendants and Respondents. 

C072297 

(Super. Ct. No. 62747) 

 Gurdeep and Jasbir Sohal purchased real property and a business from Charles and 

Patricia Crossland. Later, the Sohals stopped paying on the loan provided by the 

Crosslands and sued the Crosslands. The Crosslands cross-complained and prevailed at 

trial on both the Sohals’ complaint and their own cross-complaint. Before the trial court 

could enter judgment, however, the Sohals filed a bankruptcy petition. Despite the 

automatic bankruptcy stay, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Crosslands. 

The Crosslands obtained relief from the stay in the bankruptcy court, but, instead of 
2 

obtaining a new judgment, they proceeded to a judicial foreclosure on the property. After 

the Crosslands repurchased the property in the judicial foreclosure sale, the Sohals moved 

to set aside the judgment, arguing that, since the judgment was entered while the 

bankruptcy stay was in effect, it was void. The trial court denied the motion, and the 

Sohals appeal. 

 We conclude that the Sohals have no standing to move to set aside the judgment or 

to appeal the trial court’s denial of the motion because the property and related litigation 

became part of the bankruptcy estate. Ownership over this litigation was never 

abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee. 

 We also conclude that the Sohals’ appeal from the trial court’s later order of costs, 

including attorney fees, is without merit because the Sohals make no argument in their 

briefing challenging the order of costs. 

 We therefore dismiss the appeal from the order denying the motion to set aside the 

judgment and affirm the order of costs. 

BACKGROUND 

 Before we recount the background, we must comment on the Sohals’ briefing. 

Much of their opening brief contains statements of fact or procedure without a reference 

to the record on appeal. Because of this, the Sohals’ briefing is “in dramatic 

noncompliance with appellate procedures.” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 

1229, 1246.) We will not consider any statement of fact or procedure not supported by a 

reference to the record on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C); Schmidlin v. 

City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 738.) We therefore disregard those 

statements in the Sohals’ briefing not properly supported and consider only statements 

that have an accompanying citation to the record on appeal. 
3 

 In April 2006, the Crosslands sold real property and their business (collectively, 

the Country Store) in Tehama County to the Sohals for $1.2 million.1 The Sohals paid 

about half the purchase price in cash, and the Crosslands provided a loan for the 

remainder of the purchase price, secured by a deed of trust on the property. In 2009, the 

Sohals stopped paying on the loan. 

 Also in 2009, the Sohals sued the Crosslands, alleging various breach of contract, 

misrepresentation, rescission, and other causes of action. The Crosslands crosscomplained, seeking reformation, judicial foreclosure, and a receivership. At the close of 

the Sohals’ case-in-chief in the jury trial on the legal causes of action, the trial court 

granted the Crosslands’ motion for nonsuit. The trial then continued before the court 

alone on the equitable causes of action alleged by the parties. 

 At the close of the court trial, the court found against the Sohals on their rescission 

cause of action and in favor of the Crosslands on their reformation and judicial 

foreclosure causes of action. The court found that, as of October 17, 2009, the Sohals 

owed the Crosslands $570,365.16, and were in default. 

 On July 7, 2011, the trial court announced its tentative decision and directed the 

Crosslands to prepare a proposed judgment. 

 On August 1, 2011, the Sohals filed a voluntary petition for chapter 7 bankruptcy 

in the Northern District of California, including the Country Store in the bankruptcy 

estate. 

 On August 4, 2011, the trial court signed the judgment, reflecting the tentative 

decision, even though the bankruptcy stay was in effect. 

 

1 The Sohals’ adult son, Gurmukh Singh Sohal, was also involved in the transaction 

and the resulting litigation, but he is not a party to the motion to set aside the judgment or 

this appeal. 
4 

 The Crosslands filed a motion for relief from the bankruptcy stay in the 

bankruptcy court as to the Country Store. The parties stipulated to relief from the 

automatic stay, and an order of the bankruptcy court was entered based on the parties’ 

stipulation. As relevant here, the bankruptcy court’s order stated “[t]hat [the Crosslands] 

are hereby granted relief from the automatic stay and may take the following actions with 

respect to [the Sohals] and [the Country Store]: (a) foreclosing a foreclosure, whether 

judicially or non-judicially . . . that certain deed of trust . . . encumbering said property; 

(b) prosecuting [the superior court action], solely for the purpose of reducing to 

judgment, noticing and conducting a judicial foreclosure sale of said property; (c) 

enforcing the judgment in [the superior court action], through legal process or otherwise, 

solely for the purpose of recovering possession of said property; (d) recovering 

possession of said property by other lawful means; and (e) prosecuting, if necessary, an 

unlawful detainer action against the debtors, or anyone claiming the property thereunder, 

solely for the purpose of recovering possession of said property.” 

 This order, based on the parties’ stipulation, was entered on November 18, 2011. 

 After the bankruptcy court issued the order granting relief from the stay as to the 

Country Store (no relief from the stay was granted as to money owed to the Crosslands), 

the Sohals attempted to have that order rescinded on several occasions. Each attempt was 

denied by the bankruptcy court. 

 In January 2012, the trial court issued a writ of sale and, on August 8, 2012, the 

sheriff sold the Country Store to the Crosslands for about $580,000. 

 Also on August 8, 2012, the Sohals filed a motion to set aside the judgment, 

arguing that it was void because it was entered while the bankruptcy stay was in effect. 

 The trial court denied the Sohals’ motion to set aside the judgment on August 28, 

2012. The Sohals filed a notice of appeal from that order on October 10, 2012. 
5 

 On October 23, 2012, the trial court entered an order awarding more than $20,000 

in costs, including attorney fees, to the Crosslands. The Sohals filed a notice of appeal 

from the costs order on November 26, 2012. 

DISCUSSION 

 The Crosslands argued in their respondents’ brief that the Sohals do not have 

standing to maintain this appeal, or the underlying motion to set aside the judgment from 

which the appeal is taken, because the Country Store and associated litigation became 

part of the bankruptcy estate, and the trustee did not abandon the action. The Sohals did 

not respond to this argument in their reply brief.2 We conclude that the Crosslands are 

correct. The Sohals do not have standing to maintain this appeal or the underlying 

action.3

 Why the Sohals want to set aside the judgment on which the judicial foreclosure 

sale was based has not been clear in this action until the Sohals filed their reply brief on 

appeal. A judicial foreclosure sale “is absolute and may not be set aside for any reason.” 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 701.680, subd. (a).) That absolute language is tempered only by 

subdivision (c) of the same statute, which does not apply here. If the sale was improper 

and the creditor purchased the property, the debtor has 90 days after the sale to 

commence an action to set aside the sale. (Code Civ. Proc., § 701.680, subd. (c)(1).) It is 

undisputed that the Sohals did not commence an action within 90 days, so the sale is 

absolute and final. 

 

2 We would consider the Sohals’ standing in this action even if the Crosslands had 

not raised the issue because it is jurisdictional. (Conservatorship of Gregory D. (2013) 

214 Cal.App.4th 62, 67.) 

3 We take judicial notice of documents in the record on appeal that were filed in the 

Sohals’ bankruptcy proceeding in the Northern District of California, case No. 11-57232-

ASW07. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) 
6 

 In their reply brief, the Sohals cite subdivision (b) of Code of Civil Procedure 

section 701.680, which provides that, if the judgment on which the judicial foreclosure 

sale was based is set aside, “the judgment debtor may recover from the judgment creditor 

the proceeds of a sale . . . .” In emphasized text, the Sohals declare this to be “no small 

thing.” So the Sohals wish to claim the proceeds of the judicial foreclosure sale under 

this provision. 

 The Sohals also assert that they may have some right to equitable redemption of 

the property. For this assertion, they rely on the extreme case of Lang v. Roché (2011) 

201 Cal.App.4th 254 at pages 262 to 265, in which the appellate court held that the 

judgment debtor could recover property sold in a judicial foreclosure, despite Code of 

Civil Procedure section 701.680, because the judgment creditor fraudulently avoided 

serving notice of the action on the judgment debtor. But the action between the Sohals 

and the Crosslands is not an extreme case involving fraudulent and surreptitious 

prosecution of an action without the defendant’s knowledge. It is clear that the only 

possible remedy is recovery of the proceeds of the sale under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 701.680, subdivision (b). 

 While recovery of the proceeds of the judicial foreclosure sale may be the Sohals’ 

desire, they have no standing to set a side the judgment. A debtor in bankruptcy may not 

pursue an action based on an asset of the bankruptcy estate unless the right to maintain 

that action has been abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee. (Bostanian v. Liberty Savings 

Bank (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1075 (Bostanian).) 

 In Bostanian, the Court of Appeal concluded that a cause of action for improper 

foreclosure upon a bankruptcy estate asset that arose postpetition constituted property of 

the estate that could be pursued only by the chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, unless the 

trustee abandoned the action. The court held that the bankruptcy estate includes not just 

property but also any cause of action arising from that property. (Bostanian, supra, 52 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1083.) Specifically, a cause of action for improper foreclosure of estate 
7 

property is also the property of the bankruptcy estate. (Id. at p. 1084.) Since the cause of 

action is property of the bankruptcy estate, only the bankruptcy trustee has standing to 

assert the cause of action. The bankruptcy debtor may obtain standing only if the 

bankruptcy trustee formally abandons the cause of action. (Id. at pp. 1085-1087.) 

Bostanian relied on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Reichert v. 

General Ins. Co. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 822 (Reichert), in which the court held that the 

bankruptcy trustee holds title to any legal claims in the bankruptcy estate, and the debtor 

has no standing to assert those claims. (Bostanian, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1081-

1083.) 

Bostanian also cited and rejected as contrary to federal law and the controlling 

authority of Reichert those California Court of Appeal cases holding that a debtor has 

standing to continue to prosecute a pending case which has become property of the 

bankruptcy estate. (Bostanian, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1082-1083.) 

 Nothing that we have found in the record on appeal indicates that the Sohals’ 

bankruptcy trustee abandoned the asserted claim against the Crosslands for the proceeds 

of the judicial foreclosure sale. The bankruptcy court granted relief, as noted above, for 

the Crosslands to obtain judgment and foreclose on the Country Store property. But the 

trustee did not formally abandon the claim the Sohals assert now for the proceeds of the 

judicial foreclosure sale. So on this record, the Sohals do not have standing to pursue a 

motion to set aside the judgment in favor of the Crosslands. Consequently, they also 

have no standing to appeal the trial court’s denial of the motion.4 

 

4 In Bostanian, the court determined that “[f]airness dictates plaintiffs should be 

given an opportunity to secure an abandonment by the trustee in the bankruptcy court. 

They shall have 30 days to do so.” (Bostanian, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1087.) Here, 

on the other hand, it appears that the bankruptcy proceeding has ended, and, in any event, 

the equities do not favor the Sohals because they agreed to judicial foreclosure on the 

property in their stipulation in the bankruptcy court. 
8 

 The appropriate disposition of an appeal for which the appellants have no standing 

is dismissal. (See In re Paul W. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 37, 65.) 

 We must address one more matter: 

 There were two notices of appeal in this case. The first dealt with the denial of the 

motion to set aside the judgment. The second dealt with the trial court’s later order 

awarding costs, including attorney fees, to the Crosslands. In their opening brief, the 

Sohals make no argument that the order of costs was improper. Since the award of costs 

stands unchallenged, we must also affirm that order. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 

67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785.) 

DISPOSITION 

 The appeal from the order denying the motion to set aside the judgment is 

dismissed. The order awarding costs, including attorney fees, is affirmed. The 

Crosslands are awarded their costs on appeal.5 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).) 

 NICHOLSON , J. 

We concur: 

 RAYE , P. J. 

 HOCH , J. 

 

5 The Crosslands also request an award of attorney fees as an element of costs on 

appeal. That is a matter to be raised in the trial court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.278(c).)