denied the Citizens' complaint and petition for writ of mandate and 

concluded that the City did not abuse its discretion in annexing the 

Territory. The district court also concluded that actions taken since the 

complaint was filed resolved the issues raised by the Citizens' and 

rendered their claims for relief moot. 

The Citizens now appeal, arguing that: (1) the district court 

erred when it concluded the Citizens' action was moot; (2) the City abused 

its discretion because the annexation adversely affected the Citizens; (3) 

the City violated NRS 268.625, which requires all annexations under NRS 

268.670 to fall within the City's sphere of influence and the City of Reno 

2003-2009 Annexation Program; (4) the City violated NRS 268.670(2) 

because the Territory was not contiguous to the City; (5) the City abused 

its discretion because the annexation was illogical without a municipal 

purpose; and (6) the City abused its discretion because the annexation 

created unincorporated islands and lacked necessary municipal services to 

develop the Territory. 

The City's annexation did not violate any statutory requirements and was 

within its discretion2 

"When a district court's decision to grant declaratory and 

injunctive relief depends on a pure question of law, our review is de novo." 

Educ. Initiative PAC v. Comm. to Protect Nev. Jobs, 129 Nev. „ 293 

P.3d 874, 878 (2013). "And while a district court's decision to deny 

extraordinary writ relief is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion, 

we resolve issues of statutory construction de novo even in this context." 

2We disagree with the district court's determination that subsequent 

planning actions have rendered the Citizens' complaint moot. See Rio All 

Suite Hotel & Casino v. Phillips, 126 Nev. „ 240 P.3d 2, 4 (2010); 

Sunrise Manor Town Protective Ass'n v. City of N. Las Vegas, 91 Nev. 713, 

541 P.2d 1102 (1975). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

2 
Las Vegas Taxpayer Accountability Comm. v. City Council of Las Vegas, 

125 Nev. 165, 172, 208 P.3d 429, 433-34 (2009). Additionally, the district 

court may determine whether a municipal entity has exceeded legislative 

authority and abused its discretion in extending its boundaries. NRS 

268.668; see also Citizens for Cold Springs v. City of Reno (Cold Springs I), 

125 Nev. 625, 633-34, 218 P.3d 847, 852-53 (2009); Clark Cnty. v. City of 

N. Las Vegas, 89 Nev. 10, 12, 504 P.2d 1326, 1328 (1973); State ex rel Bibb 

v. City of Reno, 64 Nev. 127, 132, 178 P.2d 366, 368 (1947). 

The City did not abuse its discretion by annexing the Territory 

because the annexation did not adversely affect the Citizens 

The Citizens maintain that invalidating the annexation will 

result in development at a lesser intensity in the Cold Springs Valley. 

We disagree. 

In Cold Springs I, we made clear that "in order to establish an 

abuse of discretion, it is necessary to demonstrate an adverse effect; if the 

party does not suffer an adverse effect, it could not establish an abuse of 

discretion in the decision as it applies to the party." 125 Nev. at 634, 218 

P.3d at 853. We concluded that the Citizens had standing to challenge the 

City's annexation, but remanded the matter to district court to make a 

factual determination as to whether the City had abused its discretion 

pursuant to NRS 268.668. Id. at 633-34, 218 P.3d at 852-53. We 

instructed that in order to determine whether an abuse of discretion 

occurred, the district court must consider whether the Citizens actually 

established the adverse effects they claimed in their complaint. Id. at 633, 

218 P.3d at 852. We concluded that an adverse effect included both 

current and "reasonably ascertainable future harm[s]." Id. at 632-33, 218 

P.3d at 851-52. Only a claim of adverse effect is necessary for standing 

purposes, but a successful challenge to the annexation requires an actual 

3 
showing that the Citizens have or will reasonably suffer an adverse effect. 

Id. at 634, 218 P.3d at 852. 

We conclude that the Citizens have not demonstrated an 

adverse effect necessary to support its claim that the City abused its 

discretion. See Cold Springs I, 125 Nev. at 634, 218 P.3d at 853. The 

Citizens' arguments for adverse effect are purely speculative and 

hypothetical. The Citizens have not cited to any specific evidence that due 

to the annexation, the housing density will change for the Citizens' 

properties. Crucial to this case is the fact that the Citizens' property is not 

part of the annexed territory. The City will only have jurisdiction over the 

neighboring Territory, not the Citizens' land. Therefore, no certainty 

exists regarding any adverse effects stemming from the annexation, 

specifically from Ordinance 5667. The Citizens still have the opportunity 

to challenge future zoning amendments, regardless of the annexation. 

Because the 2007 Regional Plan includes the Territory in the Truckee 

Meadows Service Area, there is also no certainty that remaining in 

Washoe County will guarantee the Citizens a low density development or 

rural way of life. 

The City's annexation did not violate NRS 268.625, pertaining to 

long-form annexation procedures, because the annexation was 

initiated under NRS 268.670's alternate short-form procedures for 

voluntary annexations 

The Citizens argue that the Cold Springs annexation violated 

NRS 268.625 because the land fell outside of the City's sphere of influence 

and the City of Reno 2003-2009 Annexation Program. 3We disagree. 

3 0n May 14, 2003, the City adopted the City of Reno 2003-2009 

Annexation Program, which identified areas in the City's sphere of 

influence that were eligible for involuntary annexation under the longform procedures set forth in NRS 268.610 through NRS 268.668, inclusive. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

4 
We review issues of statutory construction de novo. Hardy 

Cos. v. SNMARK, LLC, 126 Nev. , 245 P.3d 1149, 1153 (2010). 

We will not look beyond the statute's plain language when a statute is 

clear on its face. Wh,eble v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 128 Nev. 

, 272 P.3d 134, 136 (2012). "[P]olicy arguments are unavailing in the 

face of an unambiguous, controlling statute." Randono v. CUNA Mut. Ins. 

Grp., 106 Nev. 371, 375, 793 P.2d 1324, 1327 (1990). This court "must 

assume that the legislature, when it enacted the statute, was aware of the 

various policy considerations and purposely drafted the statute to read as 

it does." Id. 

We conclude that the Citizens improperly conflate short-form 

or voluntary annexation (pursuant to NRS 268.670), and long-form or 

involuntary annexation (pursuant to NRS 268.636). This court will not 

import involuntary long-form annexation procedures into this case where 

the real parties in interest clearly initiated voluntary short-form 

annexation procedures under NRS 268.670. 

The language of NRS 268.670(1) is plain and unambiguous 

because it is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation. It states, in 

part: 

1. As an alternative to the procedures for initiation 

of annexation proceedings set forth in NRS. 

268.610 to 268.668, inclusive, the governing 

body of a city may, subject to the provisions of 

NRS 268.663 and after notifying the board of 

county commissioners of the county in which 

the city lies of its intention, annex: 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

(b) . . . contiguous territory if 100 percent of 

the owners of record of individual lots or parcels of 

land within such area sign a petition requesting 

the governing body to annex such area to the city. 

If such petition is received and accepted by the 

governing body, the governing body may proceed 

5 
to adopt an ordinance annexing such area and to 

take such other action as is necessary and 

appropriate to accomplish such annexation. 

(Emphases added). NRS 268.670(1) specifically states that it is an 

"alternative to the procedures for initiation of annexation proceedings set 

forth in NRS 268.610 to 268.668, inclusive." We have previously 

recognized the existence of the alternative long-form and short -form 

annexation procedures. See Bratcher v. City of Las Vegas, 113 Nev. 502, 

505-06, 937 P.2d 485, 487-88 (1997) ("Where unanimous property owner 

consent to annexation has not been obtained, the formal or long-form' 

procedure . . . must be followed. However, where all owners of the 

property to be annexed have signed an annexation petition, the alternate 

summary or 'short form' procedure. . . may be invoked."). 

NRS 268.670 is specific and represents the short -form 

voluntary annexation procedure that allows the property owners 

themselves to initiate the annexation, not the local government. 

Alternatively, NRS 268.610 through NRS 268.668 represent the long -form 

procedures for involuntary annexations initiated by either a majority of 

landowners or the city. See NRS 268.636; see generally Phillips v. City of 

Reno, 92 Nev. 563, 565, 554 P.2d 740, 741 - 42 (1976). Therefore, we 

conclude that general requirements within NRS 268.625 regarding 

programs of annexation and spheres of influence are inapplicable to 

voluntary annexations under NRS 268.670's specific procedures. See 

Canarelli v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. , 265 P.3d 

673, 677 (2011) (providing that we construe "statutes to preserve harmony 

among them"). 

We conclude that to interpret NRS 268.670 as simply a first 

step in initiating annexation, yet still subject to requirements within NRS 

268.610 to 268.668, inclusive, would render the statute meaningless. See 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 44, 

6 
7 

21111DEREWI§MiMaiff.i 

Leven v. Frey, 123 Nev. 399, 405, 168 P.3d 712, 716 (2007) (stating that 

statutory interpretation should not render any part of a statute 

meaningless nor produce absurd or unreasonable results). NRS 

268.636(1) already allows for a majority of property owners to petition for 

annexation through the involuntary, long -form annexation procedures. 

NRS 268.670 gives 100% of contiguous property owners the voluntary 

right to petition the City for annexation and facilitate the planning of their 

property. Because NRS 268.625 involves procedures pertaining to longform annexation and the annexation at issue was initiated by short-form 

annexation under NRS 268.670, we conclude that the city did not violate 

NRS 268.670 by straying outside of the parameters of NRS 268.625 when 

annexing the Territory. See also 01-21 Op. Att'y Gen. 119 (2001) 

(interpreting these same statues and opining that pursuant to NRS 

268.670, so long as voluntarily annexed lands were contiguous with city 

property, the city did not need to include such territory in its sphere of 

influence). 

The City did not violate NRS 268.670(2) because the Territory was 

contiguous 

The Citizens argue that the Cold Springs annexation was not 

contiguous as required under NRS 268.670(2). We disagree. 

NRS 268.670(1) requires that the territory voluntarily 

annexed by 100 percent of landowners be contiguous to the city. NRS 

268.670(2) defines contiguous as: 

either abutting directly on the boundary of the 

annexing municipality or separated from the 

boundary thereof by a street, alley, public right-ofway, creek, river or the right-of-way of a railroad 

or other public service corporation, or by lands 

owned by the annexing municipality, by some other 

political subdivision of the State or by the State of 

Nevada. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

q2.5M.4,2 
(Emphases added). For contiguity of an entire annexed territory, courts 

generally require that one tract be contiguous to the city, and all the tracts 

be contiguous to each other. See Botsford v. City of Norman, 354 F.2d 491, 

494 (10th Cir. 1965) ("If all of the tracts are contiguous to each other, and 

one of them is contiguous to or adjoins the municipality, that is sufficient" 

(quotation omitted)); see also City of Waukee v. City Dev. Bd., 590 N.W.2d 

712, 717 (Iowa 1999) ("Although not all of the parcels adjoin or share a 

common boundary with the city . . . all of the parcels are contiguous to 

each other in the sense that there is no parcel that does not share a 

boundary with a parcel included in the [annexed territory]."). 

We conclude that the Territory was contiguous because lands 

owned by Washoe County separated the Territory from the City's 

boundary. See NRS 268.670(2) (requiring no percentage of contiguity). It 

is undisputed that the City's boundaries in the north abut and lie along a 

Washoe County parcel, which in turn on its west portion abuts the 

Territory for approximately 22 feet. Additionally, the remaining tracts of 

the Territory are contiguous to each other. The record also indicates that 

the United States owns and has jurisdiction over numerous sections 

interspersed with the Territory. These federal lands largely affect the 

character and shape of the Territory. Therefore, we conclude that the City 

did not abuse its discretion in annexing the Territory because substantial 

evidence supported the City's finding that the Territory was contiguous to 

the City under NRS 268.670(2). See also City of Claremore v. Town of 

Verdigris, 50 P.3d 208, 212 (Okla. 2001) (holding that a 50-foot-wide point 

of contiguity was enough to establish a city's limits were contiguous to a 

voluntarily annexed property). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

rilitiMEMSEMEMM IlLiMMEEMINNEN 
The City did not abuse its discretion because the annexation is 

logical and done with a municipal purpose 

The Citizens maintain that the Cold Springs annexation is 

illogical with no municipal need under NRS 268.625(2) and RMC 

§18.04.301(d)(1). We disagree. 

The Citizens rely on NRS 268.625(2)(b), which requires the 

City to hold a public hearing to consider the "logical extension of city 

limits," amongst other considerations, before adopting a program of 

annexation. However, because the City annexed the Territory pursuant to 

NRS 268.670, as previously discussed, NRS 268.625(2)(b) is inapplicable to 

this case. Alternately, RMC § 18.04.301 provides for an annexation review 

process for annexations pursuant to NRS 268.670 and states, in part, that 

when the City considers an application for annexation, it shall consider 

"the location of the property to be considered for annexation." RMC § 

18.04.301(d)(1). However, the location of the property is but one of many 

considerations, and the record indicates that the City did not abuse its 

discretion because substantial evidence supports the reasonableness of the 

location of the Territory's boundaries. Regarding municipal purpose, the 

record indicates that the City has limited expansion opportunities 

geographically and the Territory has a major freeway, railroad access, and 

is adjacent to water and sewer systems in the developed area. 4 

4The location of the Territory will not cause the Citizens to lose their 

right to representative government on the issues of long-range planning 

and development because the Citizens' land is still within Washoe 

County's jurisdiction. Therefore, the Washoe County Commission still 

represents the Citizens and the Truckee Meadows Regional Planning 

Agency still represents the long-term planning in Washoe County. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

9 
The City did not abuse its discretion because its creation of an 

unincorporated island was reasonable and it properly considered 

existing municipal services 

The Citizens argue that the City's annexation improperly 

created at least one island of unincorporated territory and lacked 

necessary municipal services needed to develop the annexed land under 

NRS 268.625(2), NRS 268.6255, NRS 268.646(4), and RMC § 

18.04.301(d)(4). We disagree. 

Regarding the alleged islands, the Citizens rely on NRS 

268.6255(2)(a), which requires that land proposed for annexation within a 

program of annexation not create an island of 40 acres or less. Again, 

because the City annexed the Territory pursuant to short form procedures 

within NRS 268.670, we conclude that NRS 268.6255(2)(a) is inapplicable 

to this case. However, RMC § 18.04.301(d)(9) states, in part, that when 

the City considers an application for annexation, it shall consider 

"[w]hether the annexation creates any islands." 

We conclude that the City's decision to create an island was 

both permitted and reasonable. See Rooker v. City of Little Rock, 352 

S.W.2d 172, 175-76 (Ark. 1961) (concluding that enclaves in an annexed 

territory did not destroy contiguity); Kunkel v. Champaign Cnty. Bd. of 

Commrs, 895 N.E.2d 905, 912 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (noting that an 

isolated island of land did not support rejection of annexation if the 

decision to create the island was not unreasonable); In re Appeal of 

Jefferson Twp. Bd. Of Trs., 605 N.E.2d 435, 439 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) 

(recognizing islands would not defeat annexation when decision to create 

islands was not unreasonable). The City did not abuse its discretion here 

because Utilities, Inc., a water utility, owns the disputed land that makes 

up the only unincorporated island and a water utility does not have the 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

10 
same need for services as populated areas of the Territory do. 5Therefore, 

we conclude that creation of an island was not unreasonable and does not 

defeat annexation. 

Regarding municipal services, the Citizens again rely on NRS 

268.625(2), NRS 268.6255, NRS 268.646(4), which are inapplicable to this 

case involving a voluntary annexation pursuant to NRS 268.670's short 

form procedures. RMC § 18.04.301(d)(4) requires the City to consider 

"Nile location of existing and planned water and sewer service." Cf. City 

of Reno v. Citizens for Cold Springs (Cold Springs II), 126 Nev. „ 

236 P.3d 10, 18 (2010) (concluding that former RMC § 18.06.404(d)(1)(b) 

required local governments to make specific findings about plans for 

adequate services and infrastructure prior to the adoption of master plan 

amendments). 

We conclude that the City did not abuse its discretion because 

it considered the location of existing and planned water and sewer service. 

See RMC § 18.04.301(d)(4). For example, prior to annexation, Utilities, 

Inc. provided the water and Washoe County provided the sewer in the 

Cold Springs Valley. The annexation application identified the source of 

water and sewer as the Truckee Meadows Water Authority and the 

Truckee Meadows Water Reclamation Facility. The City's 2004 staff 

report opined that potential areas to extend water and sewer included 

Truckee Meadows Service Area Study areas. The City also considered the 

5We further conclude that Silver Knolls is not an island because it is 

not fully enclosed. In its program of annexation, the City has a policy not 

to annex territory within an unincorporated island over the property 

owner's protest. The City's Master Plan contains a similar policy that it 

will not annex territory over the property owner's protest. The Silver 

Knolls residents did not want to be part of the Territory, and therefore, we 

conclude that the City acted reasonably in respecting those residents' 

concerns. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

1 1 
Adm. P 

Pickering 

, C.J. 

J. 

BEEMIMMEI 

input from various employees of Washoe County regarding imported water 

options and potential water projects. 

Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the district court 

AFFIRMED. 6 

Gibbons 

, J. 

Hardesty 

Parraguirre 

J. 

Douglas 

C)4A---el?4 

Cherry 

C.03 11114 

Saitta 

6We have considered the parties' remaining arguments and conclude 

they are without merit. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

12 

J. 
cc: Second Judicial District Court Dept. 10 

John L. Marshall 

Caroline Kurnik 

Christine Terelak 

Reno City Attorney 

Sourwine & Sloane, Ltd. 

Frank Kurnik 

Holland & Hart LLP/Ren.o 

Irene Mullen 

Joe E. Gardner Family Trust 

Gunderson Law Firm 

Mike Mullen 

Prezant & Mollath 

Zygmunt Terelak 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

13