Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1408-CT-391 | July 8, 2015 Page 1 of 7

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Stephen L. Williams

Kyle T. Ring

Williams Law Firm 

Terre Haute, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Robert B. Thornburg

Maggie L. Smith

Timothy L. Karns

Frost Brown Todd LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Cathy Rexroad, et. al.,

Appellants-Plaintiffs,

v.

Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc.

d/b/a R+L Carriers, R&L 

Carriers Shared Services, LLC,

and Richard C. Maples, Sr.,

Appellees-Defendants, 

July 8, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A04-1408-CT-391

Interlocutory Appeal from the 

Marion Circuit Court

The Honorable Louis F. Rosenburg, 

Judge

The Honorable Mark A. Jones, 

Commissioner

Cause No. 49C01-1303-CT-9775

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary 

[1] Appellee-Defendant Richard C. Maples, an Ohio resident, was employed as a 

truck driver by Appellant-Defendant R&L Carriers, an Ohio limited liability 
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company. The tractor-trailer driven by Maples was owned by AppelleeDefendant Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc. (“Greenwood”). On February 14, 

2012, while in the course of his employment, Maples was driving on an Indiana 

interstate when he lost control of his vehicle and struck another tractor-trailer 

resulting in the death of Arnold Rexroad, Sr. (“Rexroad”), an Illinois resident. 

Several members of Rexroad’s family were named as special administrators of 

his estate and filed a negligence action against defendants. Ultimately, 

Greenwood admitted that it was entirely at fault for the accident. Plaintiffs 

requested that the trial court apply Illinois law to the only remaining unsettled

issue, damages. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ request and chose to apply 

Indiana law. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On February 14, 2012, Rexroad was driving a tractor-trailer on Interstate 70 in 

Hendricks County, Indiana when he began experiencing mechanical 

difficulties, pulled his tractor-trailer onto the right shoulder, and called for a tow 

truck. Lindsey Measel, an Indiana resident, was travelling on the same 

interstate and, as Rexroad’s tractor-trailer was being loaded on to the tow truck, 

Measel slowed her vehicle in the left-hand lane. Maples, who was driving a 

tractor-trailer directly behind Measel, was forced to change lanes in order to 

avoid striking Measel’s vehicle. As a result, Maples lost control of his tractortrailer and collided with Rexroad’s vehicle. Rexroad died as a result of his 
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injuries. At the time of the accident, Maples was operating his tractor-trailer in 

the course of his employment with Greenwood. 

[3] Rexroad was survived by his wife, Cathy Rexroad, his children, Greta Rice, 

Cody Rexroad, Theresa Sutter, Janice Linder, and Arnold Rexroad, Jr., and his 

step-children, Shannon Bennett and Mark Gibson (collectively the “Plaintiffs”). 

On October 4, 2012, Plaintiffs, who are all Illinois residents, were named as 

special administrators of Rexroad’s estate. Plaintiffs brought suit against 

Greenwood alleging negligence in the operation of Maples’s vehicle resulting in 

Rexroad’s death. Measel was also named as a defendant in the complaint. 

[4] The parties met during pre-trial conferences on November 10, 2013 and May 

16, 2014. On June 16, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum with the trial court 

requesting that the trial court apply Illinois law to the case. On July 1, 2014, 

following a hearing on the choice-of-law question, the trial court determined 

that Indiana law would apply. The following day, during the final pre-trial 

conference, Greenwood admitted to being solely at fault for the accident and 

death of Rexroad. Greenwood’s stipulation to being at fault included a 

condition that it was effective only so long as Indiana law applied. Plaintiffs 

reached a settlement with Measel who was then dismissed from the case. Also 

on July 2, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting the trial court to reconsider 

its ruling on the choice-of-law issue. On July 18, 2014, the trial court denied 

Plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider. This interlocutory appeal follows. 

Discussion and Decision 
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[5] The only issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court properly

determined that Indiana law applies. Such an issue is purely a question of law. 

Appellate courts evaluate questions of law de novo and owe no deference to a 

trial court’s determination of such questions. Seel v. State, 739 N.E.2d 170, 172 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2000); See also Simon v. U.S., 341 F.3d 193, 199 (3d Cir. 2003).

Choice of Law1

[6] The Indiana Supreme Court established an analysis for addressing choice-oflaw questions in Hubbard Manufacturing Co. Inc. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071 

(Ind. 1987). “[I]n tort cases[,] Indiana choice-of-law analysis now involves 

multiple inquiries. As a preliminary matter, the court must determine whether 

the differences between the laws of the states are ‘important enough to affect the 

outcome of the litigation.’” Simon v. U.S., 805 N.E.2d 798, 804-05 (Ind. 2004) 

(quoting Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d at 1073). Here, the parties agree that there are 

substantial differences between Indiana and Illinois law.2 

If such a conflict exists, the presumption is that the traditional lex loci 

delicti rule (the place of the wrong) will apply. Under this rule, the 

court applies the substantive laws of the “the state where the last event 

necessary to make an actor liable for the alleged wrong takes place.” 

 

1 As a threshold issue, Greenwood argues that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirements of Indiana 

Trial Rule 44.1(B), and its accompanying statute Indiana Code section 34-38-4-4, by failing to provide 

reasonable notice of their intention to apply the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, ergo they should be precluded 

from requesting that Illinois law be applied. However, where possible, we prefer to address cases on their 

merits. Armstrong v. State, 932 N.E.2d 1263, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Furthermore, the trial court heard 

Greenwood’s notice argument and, apparently, found it unavailing, choosing instead to address the merits of 

the case in its order. 

2 Briefly, the relevant difference between the two states’ laws is that “Illinois law permits recovery by all of 

the deceased’s children, adult as well as minor, whereas Indiana does not.” Appellee’s App. p. 211. 
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[Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d at 1073]. This presumption is not conclusive, 

however. It may be overcome if the court is persuaded that “the place 

of the tort ‘bears little connection’ to this legal action.” Id. at 1074. 

Id. 

[7] In Hubbard, an Indiana man was killed in Illinois while working on a lift used to 

repair street lights. The man’s wife brought a products liability action against 

the Indiana company that had built the lift. Id. at 1072. Although the harm 

occurred in Illinois, the court found that the issue at the heart of the litigation 

was the alleged defective manufacturing of the Indiana company, and that the 

location of the harm was insignificant to determine whether the company was 

liable. Id. at 1073. As such, they chose to apply Indiana law. Id. 

[8] In Simon, the Indiana Supreme Court discussed when it is appropriate to 

overcome the presumptive lex loci delicti rule. 805 N.E.2d 798. In short, the 

dispute in Simon involved a plane that crashed in Kentucky; however, the 

allegedly negligent acts at issue occurred in Indiana (plaintiffs alleged that the 

air traffic controllers in Indianapolis negligently cleared the plane for landing). 

Next, we must examine whether the place of the tort “bears little 

connection” to the legal action. Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d at 1074. This is 

one of the rare cases in which the place of the tort is insignificant. 

The negligence at issue occurred in Indiana and the District of 

Columbia, and none of the victims or the parties are residents of 

Kentucky (except to the extent that the United States is a “resident” of 

every state). The plane flew over multiple states during the course of 

the flight, and the crash might have occurred anywhere. In addition, 

unlike in cases involving an automobile accident, the laws of the 

state where the crash occurred did not govern the conduct of the 

parties at the time of the accident. Consequently, we conclude that 

the place of the tort was an insignificant contact in this case.
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Id. at 806 (emphasis added). Simon indicates that the presumption of applying 

the lex loci delicti rule is strong and should only be overcome in rare cases, and 

that automobile accidents were generally not intended to fall under this 

exception. The rationale behind lex loci delicti is that the laws of the state where 

the tort occurred usually govern the conduct of the parties. As is pointed out by 

the court in Simon, in the case of an automobile accident, the laws of the state in 

which the accident occurs govern the conduct of the parties. Clearly then, 

under this doctrine, the laws of Indiana would be applied to determine liability 

in this case. 

[9] However, Plaintiffs argue that because Greenwood has admitted fault for the 

accident, the only remaining issue is damages, and so the location of the 

accident is no longer relevant; thus, this court should apply Illinois law. 

Unfortunately for the Plaintiffs, this logic would require this court to engage in

dépeçage, which is not a practice that has been accepted in Indiana. 

Dépeçage is the process of analyzing different issues within the same 

case separately under the laws of different states. Although Indiana 

allows different claims to be analyzed separately, it does not allow 

issues within those counts to be analyzed separately. For example, an 

Indiana court might analyze a contract claim and a tort claim 

independently but would not separately analyze and apply the law of 

different jurisdictions to issues within each claim. Dépeçage has not 

been part of Indiana’s lexicon. Under our history as a lex loci delecti

state, Indiana courts applied the law of the state in which the tort was 

committed. [Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d at 1073]. Courts did not consider 

whether the law of a different state might be more relevant to the 

claim, much less to individual issues within the claim. 

Id. at 801-02 (footnote omitted). 
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[10] Plaintiffs essentially argue that Greenwood’s admission of fault effectively 

negates the importance of the location of the accident and, consequently, the lex 

loci delecti presumption. We disagree. For one, this approach would cause 

peculiar results in cases such as this. At any point during litigation, if the 

defendant admits fault, then the applicable state law could change. Such a 

precedent would significantly discourage stipulations of fault. Furthermore, we 

think it would be improper to so easily disregard the lex loci delecti presumption.

“People do not take the laws of their home state with them when they travel but 

are subject to the laws of the state in which they act.” Id. at 807. Indiana law 

unquestionably applies to determine liability in this case. To apply another

state’s laws to the issue of damages would require us to engage in dépeçage, 

which we cannot do. Id. 

[11] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.