J-S40041-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.B., 

A MINOR, 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

APPEAL OF: T.B., 

 Appellant No. No. 141 MDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order January 8, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County 

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-54-JV-0001904-2004 

CP-54-JV-0001944-2004

BEFORE: BENDER P.J.E., BOWES, AND PANELLA, JJ. 

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2014 

 The learned majority correctly recognizes that this Court is required to 

preliminarily determine whether an order being appealed from provides this 

Court with jurisdiction. Accordingly, we may sua sponte raise and address 

whether the order in question is appealable. However, I respectfully 

disagree with the majority’s conclusion to quash. In my considered view, 

the order falls within Pa.R.A.P. 311(6), which authorizes an interlocutory 

appeal from the grant of a new trial in a civil proceeding or a criminal trial in 

certain instances. 
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 As noted by the majority, this matter involves a complicated and 

unusual procedural history. Since the majority has ably detailed that 

background, I need not repeat it.1

 The following facts are pertinent to my 

position. T.B. and the Commonwealth agreed to and did proceed to a civil 

commitment hearing. This civil commitment hearing occurred immediately 

after the court found a prima facie case that T.B. was in need of involuntary 

treatment at his dispositional review hearing. Both the Commonwealth and 

T.B. presented expert testimony regarding whether he was in need of 

continued involuntary commitment. The parties rested, made arguments, 

and at the conclusion of the civil commitment hearing, the court took the 

matter under advisement and, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6403(c)(6),2

indicated it would issue a decision in five days. 

Rather than resolve the merits of the matter in five days as required 

by § 6403(c)(6), the court purported to reject the parties’ offer to conduct 

the civil commitment hearing. Despite the fact that the civil commitment 

hearing had already occurred and the evidence received, the court sua 

sponte directed that a new civil commitment hearing be held, and requested 

____________________________________________ 

1

 A detailed history also may be found at In re T.B., 75 A.3d 485 

(Pa.Super. 2013). 

2

 The statute reads, in relevant part, “A decision shall be rendered within 

five days after the conclusion of the hearing.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6403(c)(6).
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the presentation of additional evidence. T.B. appealed. Notably, the 

Commonwealth does not seek to quash. 

 The majority correctly finds that this order is not a final order. 

However, without discussion, in a footnote, it summarily states that T.B.’s 

appeal “does not fall under the confines of Pa.R.A.P. 311[.]” Majority 

Memorandum, at 8 n.1. I believe that this order implicates Rule 311(6). 

That rule allows an appeal from “[a]n order in a civil action or proceeding 

awarding a new trial, or an order in a criminal proceeding awarding a new 

trial where the defendant claims that the proper disposition of the matter 

would be an absolute discharge[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 311(6). Specifically, it is my 

view that the term “trial” in Rule 311(6) encompasses civil commitment 

hearings. 

 A civil commitment hearing requires that the individual whom the 

Commonwealth is seeking to commit receive notice of the hearing and a 

copy of the petition for involuntary commitment. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6403(b)(3). 

The person is entitled to counsel, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6403(b)(3), including the 

effective assistance of counsel. See In re Hutchinson, 454 A.2d 1008 (Pa. 

1982). If the individual cannot afford an attorney, the court appoints a 

lawyer. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6403(b)(3). The person has the right to an 

independent expert in the area of sexually violent behavior, and the court 

must provide reasonable fees to secure such an expert if the individual 

cannot afford one. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6403(b)(4). 
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The individual cannot be compelled to testify, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6403(c)(1), 

and is permitted to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 6403(c)(2). The court acts as a fact-finder and must determine by 

clear and convincing evidence whether involuntary commitment is 

warranted. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6403(d). If the court finds insufficient evidence 

has been introduced, it must discharge. See In re K.A.P., 916 A.2d 1152, 

1156 n.3 (providing overview of 42 Pa.C.S. § 6403 set forth by the Office of 

the Attorney General). The commitment hearing is public and a record is 

made of the proceeding. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6403(c)(3)(4). All of these elements, 

though not dispositive in and of themselves, are traditional aspects of a 

criminal trial.3

 I do not mean to suggest that the plain legal definition of “trial” was 

the intent of the Supreme Court in adopting Rule 311(6). That definition, 

which provides that a trial is “a formal judicial examination of evidence and 

determination of legal claims in an adversary proceeding[,]” Black’s Law 

Dictionary, (7th Ed. 1999), is too broad. In this respect, I recognize that 

there are proceedings such as PCRA hearings or pre-trial suppression 

hearings that meet several of the same requirements outlined above that 

are not trials. Of course, a PCRA proceeding differs from a trial in a host of 

respects. 

____________________________________________ 

3

 I acknowledge that a civil commitment hearing is not a criminal 

proceeding. 
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 Further, this was not a pre-trial matter, which our Supreme Court has 

stated, “by definition are distinguishable from the actual trial.” 

Commonwealth v. Harmon, 366 A.2d 895, 897 (Pa. 1976). Neither is this 

a post-trial proceeding that is seeking to preserve or litigate issues that 

occurred before or during trial. Rather, a civil commitment hearing is its 

own autonomous proceeding bearing all of the trappings of a trial. 

Accordingly, I would hold that a civil commitment hearing is a civil 

proceeding that fits within the ambit of the term “trial” in Rule 311(6). Cf. 

Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 339 A.2d 764, 771 (Pa.Super. 

1975) (“involuntary commitment involves the same fundamental liberty that 

is at stake in criminal proceedings”); Id. at 772-773 (“The serious 

deprivation of liberty and the unfortunate stigma which follow involuntary 

commitment render the distinction between ‘criminal’ and ‘civil’ proceedings 

meaningless.”). Since this proceeding was the equivalent of a trial, and the 

court below sua sponte directed a new civil commitment hearing be 

conducted, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to quash 

this appeal.