IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-1448

Filed April 8, 2015

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF RAMNEEK BHOGAL

AND DORI BHOGAL

Upon the Petition of

RAMNEEK BHOGAL,

Petitioner-Appellant,

And Concerning

DORI BHOGAL, n/k/a DORI CLARK,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, John D. Telleen, 

Judge. 

Appeal from the ruling and order denying petitioner’s application to modify 

a decree of dissolution of marriage. AFFIRMED.

Matt O’Hollearn of Brick Gentry, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellant.

Maria K. Pauly of Maria K. Pauly Law Office, P.L.L.C., Davenport, for 

appellee.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, J.

Ramneek Bhogal appeals from the district court’s ruling and order denying 

his application to modify the decree of dissolution of marriage between he and 

Dori Bhogal, now known as Clark. Our review in this equity action is de novo; we 

give deference to the trial court's fact findings, especially those involving the 

credibility of the witnesses, but we are not bound by those findings. See Nicolou 

v. Clements, 516 N.W.2d 905, 906 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).

Ramneek and Dori divorced in March 2007. The dissolution decree 

granted the parties joint custody and joint physical care of their two minor 

children. In January 2015, Ramneek filed his application to modify the decree of 

dissolution of marriage, seeking primary physical care of the children. The event 

that ultimately precipitated Ramneek to file his modification application was Dori’s 

decision to leave her husband and cohabit with a same-sex partner without any 

notice to Ramneek or their children. In his application, Ramneek claimed there 

were material changes in circumstances supporting modification, to wit: Dori 

allegedly had an unstable marital relationship, home environment, and living 

arrangements; Dori allegedly was participating in immoral behavior; the parties 

allegedly had notice issues and inconsistent parenting abilities; and Dori 

allegedly did not properly tend to the needs of their special-needs son. The 

matter came on for trial in July 2014, and the district court denied the application 

for modification.

The party requesting modification has the burden of establishing a 

substantial change in material circumstances. A substantial change in 
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circumstances is one that is more or less permanent, not contemplated by the 

court when the decree was entered, and that affects the children’s welfare. See 

In re Marriage of Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983); In re Marriage of 

Thielges, 623 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000). After establishing a 

substantial change in circumstances, the party seeking modification must also 

establish the ability to minister more effectively to the needs of the children. See 

Frederici, 338 N.W.2d at 158. This is a “heavy burden,” and rightly so. See 

Thielges, 623 N.W.2d at 235–37; In re Marriage of Rosenfeld, 524 N.W.2d 212, 

213 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). To promote stability in the children’s lives, our courts 

have concluded that “once custody of children has been determined, it should be 

disturbed only for the most cogent reasons.” Dale v. Pearson, 555 N.W.2d 243, 

245 (Iowa Ct. App.1996).

On appeal, Ramneek argues that the change in Dori’s relationships, 

change in Dori’s housing situation, and lack of communication between the 

parties, among other things, constitute a substantial change in circumstances. 

On de novo review, we conclude Ramneek failed to prove a substantial change 

in circumstances. While there is no doubt that Dori’s unnoticed move 

demonstrated poor judgment, this appears to be an isolated circumstance and 

not a permanent and substantial change in circumstances warranting 

modification of a care arrangement that has worked for the parties and their 

children for a number of years. The district court’s ruling and order best sums 

the situation: 

Up until December 2013, this family overall was a very good 

example of how a shared care arrangement can work in the best 
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interests of the children. These parents are by and large respectful 

of each other, each is heavily involved in the children’s lives, each 

are loving, quality parents, the communication has for the most part 

been effective, they keep the interests of their children paramount 

and neither run down the other. They have well behaved, loving 

children who are happy with the present shared care arrangement. 

Ri. does well in school and Ro. does as well as can be expected, 

given his significant challenges. The Court is not suggesting that 

the situation has been perfect. Petitioner has been frustrated with 

Respondent’s perceived lack of diligence with respect to medical 

issues but looking at the big picture, these are certainly children 

that have received overall stellar medical care. Ramneek agreed 

that Dori is basically a good parent, at least up until her sudden 

move in December of 2013. As noted above, the Court agrees that 

the way in which Dori handled that situation was extremely poor. 

However, the big picture here is that we have two quality parents 

who throughout the vast majority of the time since their 2007 

divorce have co-parented successfully and the children have been 

doing well and are very happy under the present shared care 

arrangement. The Court finds that Dori’s recent move of residence 

and into the same-sex relationship and the other issues raised by 

Ramneek do not constitute a substantial change in circumstances 

not contemplated by the Court at the time of the entry of the 

Decree. 

We agree with the district court’s resolution of the issue. We have 

considered the parties’ arguments, whether set forth explicitly herein, and we 

affirm the judgment of the district court without further opinion. See Iowa Ct. R.

21.26(a), (b), (d), and (e).

AFFIRMED.