No. 01-14-00892-CV

In the Court of Appeals 

for the First Judicial District 

Houston, Texas 

 

ADELAIDA SALAZAR BAUTISTA A/K/A ADELAIDA ALVARADO, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF MARIA JENNIFER AIDE 

A/K/A MARIA JENNIFER ALVARADO, A. A., A. A., I. S. A., M. A., AND E. 

A., MINORS; AND IRINEO ALVARADO AND MARIA ANA MOCTEZUMA, 

Appellants, 

v.

TRINIDAD DRILLING LIMITED, 

Appellee. 

 

On Appeal from the 

270th Judicial District Court of Harris County 

 

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 

 

 Respectfully submitted, 

By /s/ Geoffrey E. Schorr 

Geoffrey E. Schorr 

geoff@schorrfirm.com 

Texas Bar No. 24029828 

A. Jared Aldinger 

Texas Bar No. 24068456 

jared@schorrfirm.com 

SCHORR LAW FIRM, PC 

ACCEPTED

01-14-00892-CV

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

4/13/2015 4:15:35 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 4/13/2015 4:15:35 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
328 W. Interstate 30, Suite 2

Garland, TX 75043

Tel. (972) 226-8860

Fax (972) 226-9787

Hutton W. Sentell 

Texas Bar No. 24026655

hsentell@ashmorelaw.com

ASHMORE LAW FIRM, P.C.

3636 Maple Ave.

Dallas, TX 75219

Tel. (214) 559-7202

Fax (214) 520-1550

Andrew P. McCormick

Texas Bar No. 3457100

amccormick@mlm-lawfirm.com

McCORMICK, LANZA & McNEEL, LLP

4950 Bissonnet Street

Bellaire, TX 77401

Tel. (713) 523-0400

Fax (713) 523-0408 

ATTORNEYS FOR 

PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS ADELAIDA 

SALAZAR BAUTISTA a/k/a ADELAIDA 

ALVARADO, Individually, and as next 

friend of MARIA JENNIFER AIDE a/k/a 

MARIA JENNIFER ALVARADO, A. A.,

A. A., I. S. A., M. A., and E. A.,, Minors

And

By: /s/ Justin K. Hall

Justin K. Hall

Texas Bar No. 90001828

jkhall@justinkhall.com

328 W Interstate 30, Suite 2

Garland, Texas 75043

Tel. (972) 226-1999

Fax (972) 226-2221
Attorney for Plaintiffs, Irineo Alvarado and 

Maria Ana Moctezuma

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Page iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BRIEF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

I. Summary of Argument............................................................................1

II. This action is not based on imputed liability or jurisdictional contacts, 

and alter-ego or other veil-piercing theories are not at issue. ..............3

III. This Court should apply a de novo review to factual issues, with 

inferences drawn in favor of jurisdiction...............................................5

IV. Trinidad Limited is subject to specific jurisdiction based on its own 

acts. ..........................................................................................................9

A. Plaintiffs claims are not based on veil piercing; Trinidad Limited is 

subject to jurisdiction for its own contacts with drilling operations in 

Texas. .....................................................................................................11

B. Michiana supports jurisdiction in this case............................................11

C. Trinidad Limited has not controverted Plaintiffs’ allegations and 

evidence of jurisdiction..........................................................................15

V. Trinidad Limited is also subject to general jurisdiction based on its 

own acts. ................................................................................................16

VI. Prayer.....................................................................................................20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Page v

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Texas cases Page(s)

Arvizu v. Estate of Puckett, 364 S.W.3d 273 (Tex.2012) 18

Certified EMS, Inc. v. Potts, 392 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. 2013) 4

Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. 2011) 18

Fung v. Fischer, 365 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012) 4

Gilcrease v. Garlock, Inc., 211 S.W.3d 448 

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, no pet.). 8

Glattly v. CMS Viron Corp., 177 S.W.3d 438 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1 Dist.] 2005, no pet.) 19

Greenfield Energy, Inc. v. Duprey, 252 S.W.3d 721 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14 Dist.] 2008, no. pet.) 4

IHS Cedars Treatment Center of DeSoto, Texas, Inc. v. 

Mason,143 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. 2003) 4

Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 

301 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2010) 8

Mackey v. Midland-Odessa Transit, No. 11–13–00083–CV, 

2015 WL 1501466 (Tex. App.—Eastland March 31, 

2015, no. pet. h.) 7

Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten, 

168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005) 12, 13

Moncrief Oil Int'l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 

414 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. 2013) 9

Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass'n v. Gibson, 

897 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1995) 5, 8

Otis Elevator Co. v. Parmelee, 850 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1993) 6, 7
Page vi

RSR Corp. v. Siegmund, 309 S.W.3d 686 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) 17

Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2002) 7 

Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 

133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) 7

Federal cases

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) 10

Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) 13, 14, 15

Doe v. Catholic Soc. of Religious and Literary Educ., 

2010 WL 345926 (S.D. Tex. 2010) 4

Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., Inc., 

188 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 1999) 7

Helicopteros Nationales de Columbia,S.A. v. Hall, 

466 U.S. 408 (1984) 10, 13

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) 13

Suzlon Wind Energy Corp. v. Shippers Stevedoring Co., 

2008 WL 686206 (S.D. Tex. 2008) 4

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 

444 U.S. 286 (1980) 10

Internat’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) 19
Page 1

No. 01-14-00892-CV

In the Court of Appeals

for the First Judicial District

Houston, Texas 

ADELAIDA SALAZAR BAUTISTA A/K/A ADELAIDA ALVARADO, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF MARIA JENNIFER AIDE 

A/K/A MARIA JENNIFER ALVARADO, A. A., A. A., I. S. A., M. A., AND E. 

A., MINORS; AND IRINEO ALVARADO AND MARIA ANA MOCTEZUMA,

Appellants,

v.

TRINIDAD DRILLING LIMITED,

Appellee.

On Appeal from the

270th Judicial District Court of Harris County

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

I. Summary of Argument

In their opening brief, Plaintiffs/Appellants (“Plaintiffs”) raised three issues. 

First, Plaintiffs addressed the standard of review. More specifically, Plaintiffs

demonstrated that a proper reading of Texas Supreme Court precedent indicates

that this Court should apply a de novo review to both facts and law, with any 
Page 2

conflicts in the evidence resolved in favor of jurisdiction. See Appellants’ Brief at 

10-13.

Next, Plaintiffs demonstrated that Trinidad Drilling Ltd. (“Trinidad 

Limited”) is subject to specific jurisdiction in this case, regardless of the standard 

of review to be applied. More specifically, Plaintiffs demonstrated that the 

undisputed allegations and the great weight and preponderance of evidence show 

that Trinidad Limited purposefully availed itself of Texas law—by controlling, 

setting policies for, and taking responsibility for aspects of drilling operations in 

Texas—and that Plaintiffs claims arise from such contacts with Texas. See 

Appellants’ Brief at 13-30.

Finally, Plaintiffs demonstrated that Trinidad Limited maintains continuous 

and systematic contacts with Texas—including the continuous physical presence of 

a high-level manager maintaining an office in Houston—such that it should feel at 

home in the state. As such, Trinidad Limited is also subject to general jurisdiction. 

See Appellants’ Brief at 30-33.

Trinidad Limited responds primarily by mischaracterizing Plaintiffs’ 

arguments. Most prominently, Trinidad Limited argues that Plaintiffs are 

attempting to base jurisdiction on contacts of a subsidiary, and that Plaintiffs

therefore must establish that the two companies are alter egos of each other. To 

the contrary, Plaintiffs’ allegations and arguments make clear that neither liability 
Page 3

nor jurisdiction is based on any imputed acts of a subsidiary. Rather, both liability 

and jurisdiction are based on Trinidad Limited’s own acts—i.e., its own 

participation in drilling operations in Texas—and those acts are attributable to 

Trinidad Limited regardless of whether the drilling itself is conducted by Trinidad 

Limited’s own employees, its subsidiary’s employees (as in this case), or 

employees of an unaffiliated company. 

Because of the pervasiveness of the alter-ego argument in Trinidad

Limited’s response, it is separately addressed in Section II below. The remainder 

of Trinidad Limited’s arguments are addressed, as appropriate, in Section III (legal 

standards), Section IV (specific jurisdiction), and Section V (general jurisdiction).

II. This action is not based on imputed liability or imputed jurisdictional 

contacts, and alter-ego or other veil-piercing theories are not at issue.

Trinidad Limited attempts to confuse the issues by asserting that Plaintiffs’

claims are based on veil-piercing and that Plaintiffs must establish that Trinidad 

Limited is the alter ego of its subsidiary in order to maintain jurisdiction. 

However, this argument is nothing but a red herring. The allegations of the Third 

Amended Complaint make clear that Plaintiffs do not seek to hold Trinidad

Limited liable (or subject to jurisdiction) for any imputed acts of its subsidiary. 

Instead, Plaintiffs allege that Trinidad Limited is liable (and subject to jurisdiction)

for its own participation in drilling activities in Texas. 
Page 4

There is no mystery in this type of claim. This Court is well aware that an 

entity may be vicariously liable for the acts of another person or entity (under 

theories such as respondeat superior, alter ego, etc.) and separately liable for its 

own acts, such as negligently creating or implementing policies. See, e.g., IHS 

Cedars Treatment Center of DeSoto, Texas, Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 802

(Tex. 2003); Fung v. Fischer, 365 S.W.3d 507, 522-26 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012), 

disapproved on other grounds by Certified EMS, Inc. v. Potts, 392 S.W.3d 625, 

626-27 (Tex. 2013); Doe v. Catholic Soc. of Religious and Literary Educ., 2010 

WL 345926, *1 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 

The same principle is equally true in the context of jurisdiction. Suzlon 

Wind Energy Corp. v. Shippers Stevedoring Co., 2008 WL 686206, *8 (S.D. Tex. 

2008) (separately addressing imputation of contacts and direct contacts);

Greenfield Energy, Inc. v. Duprey, 252 S.W.3d 721, 730 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 

Dist.] 2008, no. pet.).

In this case, Plaintiffs do not attempt to impute any contacts of the 

subsidiary company to Trinidad Limited; rather, they contend that Trinidad 

Limited is subject to jurisdiction based on its own contacts, such as setting policies 

for drilling operations in Texas, exercising control over drilling operations in 

Texas, and maintaining the physical presence of a high-level manager in Texas. 

Such contacts do not depend in the slightest on whether Trinidad Limited controls 
Page 5

the internal affairs of its subsidiaries, intermingles funds, etc.; rather, they exist 

independently of such issues. In fact, Trinidad Limited’s contacts would apply 

with equal force if the other entities involved in the drilling operations were 

unaffiliated with Trinidad Limited’s ownership. Thus, the question before the 

Court does not involve the relationship between Trinidad Limited and its 

subsidiary, but rather between Trinidad Limited and its operations in Texas.

III. This Court should apply a de novo review to factual issues, with 

inferences drawn in favor of jurisdiction.

In section IV of their opening brief, Plaintiffs pointed out that various Texas 

courts had routinely applied a standard of review—requiring the appellate court to 

imply findings in support of the judgment if adequately supported by evidence—

without regard to the context in which it was created. Plaintiffs further pointed out 

that this standard does not logically apply to cases declining jurisdiction based on 

“cold records,” since the application to this type of situation is contrary to the 

underlying principles of Texas law (e.g., placing the burden on defendant of 

negating “all bases of jurisdiction”). Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass'n v. Gibson, 897 

S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. 1995). 

In this case, Trinidad Limited does not contend that the Court is bound by 

prior precedent to apply the commonly-cited standard. Instead, it argues only that: 

(1) the issue is irrelevant; and (2) Plaintiffs’ suggested standard is inconsistent with 
Page 6

the fact that Rule 120a allows a special appearance to be decided on a paper 

record.

The former argument is partially correct. The Court can decide this appeal 

without reaching this issue, but only if it reverses the trial court. In other words, 

the Court can find that jurisdiction exists based on the undisputed allegations and 

evidence. However, it cannot affirm the trial court without resolving conflicts in 

the evidence.

The latter argument—that a paper record inherently requires deference to the 

trial court’s decision—simply is illogical. There is no reason why a deferential 

standard of review should apply to issues decided on a paper record, and such a

standard is not applied to the bulk of paper-record motions. As the Texas Supreme 

Court has explained, “[u]nder these circumstances”—where the trial court bases its 

decision solely “on the papers filed and the argument of counsel”—“there are no 

factual resolutions to presume in the trial court’s favor.” Otis Elevator Co. v. 

Parmelee, 850 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tex. 1993). 

Instead, the standard of review applicable to a particular type of motion is 

based on whatever fundamental principles are applicable to that type of motion. 

See, e.g., id. (applying standards appropriate for motion for sanctions). For 

instance, motions for summary judgment are based on a de novo review, with all 

conflicts in evidence resolved against the movant, in accordance with the 
Page 7

underlying presumptions for summary judgment. See, e.g., Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. 

Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002). The same is true in the context of subject 

matter jurisdiction: “When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of 

jurisdictional facts, the trial court considers relevant evidence submitted by the 

parties to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised,” and the “appellate court does the 

same.” Mackey v. Midland-Odessa Transit, No. 11–13–00083–CV, 2015 WL 

1501466, *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland March 31, 2015, no. pet. h.) (citing Texas 

Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004)). 

Thus, the appellate court will uphold jurisdiction (regardless of the trial court’s 

decision) if the evidence at least raises a fact question on the existence of 

jurisdiction. See, e.g., id. (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228). Likewise, federal 

courts apply a similar standard in the context of personal jurisdiction—the issue in 

this case. Specifically, appellate courts resolve all conflicts in the evidence in 

favor of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 

619, 625 (5th Cir. 1999) (“accept[ing] as true the nonmover's allegations and 

resolv[ing] all factual disputes in its favor”). In each case, the evidentiary 

presumptions are made in accordance with the fundamental policies involved, 

rather than blind deference to the trial court, since a paper record involves “no 

factual resolutions to presume in the trial court’s favor.” Otis Elevator Co. v. 

Parmelee, 850 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tex. 1993). 
Page 8

Indeed, this principle is true even in those rare cases where Texas law has 

applied an extremely deferential standard to the trial court based on paper records. 

Most obvious is the issue of venue. In cases involving a motion to transfer venue, 

the issue is almost always appealed after a final judgment. Thus, policies such as 

preserving finality of judgment and judicial efficiency (by avoiding multiple trials) 

justify an extraordinary deference to the venue decision, i.e., by searching the 

entire record to determine if any probative evidence supports the final venue. See, 

e.g., Gilcrease v. Garlock, Inc., 211 S.W.3d 448, 459 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, 

no pet.). Likewise, in the personal jurisdiction context, the commonly cited

standard can be justified when a special appearance is denied, i.e., when a court 

finds jurisdiction exists. See, e.g., Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 

653, 657 (Tex. 2010). This is so because Texas applies an extraordinarily high 

burden on a party challenging jurisdiction—requiring the defendant to “negate all 

bases of jurisdiction”—and it is therefore appropriate for an appellate court to 

affirm an order maintaining jurisdiction whenever there are disputed facts that 

could justify such a ruling. Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass'n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 

772 (Tex. 1995). 

In contrast, there is no logical reason for applying such a standard when the 

trial court declines jurisdiction. In such cases, the appellate court should conduct a 

de novo review, with all conflicts in the evidence resolved in favor of jurisdiction, 
Page 9

in accordance with the underlying principle that the defendant bears a heavy 

burden to negate jurisdiction.

1

 See id. Moreover, principles of judicial efficiency 

counsel in favor of a presumption in favor of jurisdiction, as the denial of 

jurisdiction will require an entirely new case in a new forum and in many cases 

(such as this one) will require duplication of lawsuits. As such, it is appropriate to 

apply a de novo review, with all conflicts resolved in favor of jurisdiction, rather 

than conflicts being resolved in favor of the trial court’s decision. 

In any event, appellate courts always apply a de novo review to issues of 

law, and the undisputed facts and evidence are sufficient to reverse the trial court, 

for the reasons discussed below. See, e.g., Moncrief Oil Int'l Inc. v. OAO 

Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 150 n.4 (Tex. 2013) (reversing trial court without 

deciding the standard of review, because the record justified reversal under any 

standard).

IV. Trinidad Limited is subject to specific jurisdiction based on its own acts.

In section V of their opening brief, Plaintiffs demonstrated that the 

uncontroverted allegations and evidence are sufficient to subject Trinidad Limited

 

1 As noted in the opening brief, numerous Texas courts have criticized the commonlyused standard, but nevertheless believed that the standard was mandated by Texas Supreme 

Court precedent. To the contrary, Plaintiffs are unaware of any Texas Supreme Court case that 

has issued a holding on this issue, and Trinidad Limited cites none. Instead, it appears the Texas 

Supreme Court’s references to this standard are all dicta, as they all: (1) involved a decision 

based on live evidence, to which trial-court deference is ordinarily appropriate; (2) involved trialcourt decisions to maintain jurisdiction; or (3) mentioned the standard without applying it, 

because the relevant facts were undisputed. In any event, the Texas Supreme Court has now 

confirmed that it has now decided the issue, and has left its resolution for another day. Moncrief 

Oil Int'l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 150 n.4 (Tex. 2013).
Page 10

to specific jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction is established by showing that: (1) the 

defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum state; and (2) the lawsuit “arises 

from” or relates to the defendant's contact with the forum state. Helicopteros 

Nationales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984). In this

context, the “minimum contacts” prong is satisfied when a defendant “purposefully 

avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,” such 

that the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in the 

forum state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985); WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980). 

In this case, Plaintiffs satisfied these factors by demonstrating that 

uncontroverted allegations and evidence are sufficient to show:

 That Plaintiffs’ claims “arise from” allegations that Trinidad Limited

set policies for, and exercised control over, the safety aspect of 

drilling operations; see Appellants’ Brief at 14-16;

 That Trinidad Limited did set policies for, and exercise control over, 

the safety aspect of drilling operations, see Appellants’ Brief at 16-24;

 That Trinidad Limited knew that, intended that, and took actions to 

ensure that its policies and control would govern such operations in 

the state of Texas, see Appellants’ Brief at 24-27.
Page 11

In response, Trinidad Limited does not directly address these arguments. 

Instead, it attempts to confuse the issues by addressing straw-men arguments.

A. Plaintiffs’ claims are not based on veil piercing; Trinidad Limited is 

subject to jurisdiction for its own contacts with drilling operations in 

Texas.

In section I(A)(1) of its response brief, Trinidad Limited mischaracterizes 

Plaintiffs claim as one based on veil piercing and therefore asserts that Plaintiffs 

have the burden to show “the parent controls the internal business operations and 

affairs of the subsidiary,” etc. However, as discussed in section II above, that is 

not the case. Plaintiffs do not assert liability or jurisdiction based on any improper 

corporate relationship with Trinidad Limited’s subsidiary. Rather, liability and 

jurisdiction are based on allegations and evidence that Trinidad Limited itself 

directly set policies and exercised control over particular activities in Texas. 

Trinidad Limited’s participation in such activities constitutes direct contact with 

Texas, regardless of whether the policies were ultimately executed by its own 

employees, a subsidiary’s employees, or an unaffiliated entity’s employees. This 

issue has been addressed in more detail in section II above.

B. Michiana supports jurisdiction in this case.

In section I(A)(2) of its response brief, Trinidad Limited mischaracterizes 

Plaintiff’s arguments as asserting that it is subject to jurisdiction solely because the 

“effects” of Trinidad Limited’s negligence were “felt in Texas” or because its 
Page 12

negligence “cause[d] an injury in Texas.” By virtue of this mischaracterization, 

Trinidad Limited asserts that Plaintiff’s arguments are barred by Michiana. 

However, nothing could be further from the truth. To the contrary, Michiana’s 

analysis fully supports the exercise of jurisdiction in this case. 

Michiana dealt with a contract between a mobile-home purchaser in Texas 

and a mobile-home seller in Indiana. Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten, 

168 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tex. 2005). The contract resulted from an unsolicited phone 

call initiated from Texas by the purchaser, and the seller had no other contacts with 

Texas. Id. The purchaser sued the seller for breach of contract and for 

misrepresentation. 

Under these circumstances, the Texas Supreme Court held that the seller was 

not subject to jurisdiction in Texas. In doing so, the Texas Supreme Court

disapproved of prior decisions holding that a single phone call, without more, 

would establish jurisdiction in Texas. Id. at 791-92. However, Michiana did not 

otherwise alter existing law. Instead, the Texas Supreme Court (as it had to do) 

acknowledged prior United States Supreme Court precedent holding that 

jurisdiction could be based on a tort’s “effects” in a forum state in certain 

circumstances. The significance of Michiana is simply that it construed the United 

State Supreme Court as holding that jurisdiction could not be based solely on the 

“effects” or “brunt” of harm on the plaintiff, as such a standard would make 
Page 13

jurisdiction turn on the location of the plaintiff. See, e.g., id. at 789-92. But this is 

not a new principle, as the United States Supreme Court has emphasized that the 

jurisdictional analysis is based on the relationship between the defendant, the 

forum state, and the litigation. E.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. 

Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, (1984) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 

(1977)). 

As is readily apparent, Michiana does not adversely affect Plaintiffs’ case in 

the slightest, as Plaintiffs do not assert jurisdiction simply because the “effects” of 

Trinidad Limited’s torts were felt in Texas. Instead, this case falls squarely within 

principles of Calder v. Jones and similar cases, as construed in Michiana. In 

Calder, the plaintiff’s claims of a plaintiff in California “arose from” allegations 

that a writer and editor made a defamatory article about the plaintiff. Id. at 789

(citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 785 n.2 (1984)). The writer and editor did 

not themselves take any action in California, but they were aware that their 

employer would widely publish the article in California, and that the effects of the 

article would be felt there. Id. (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 785 n.2 (1984)). The 

United States Supreme Court therefore held that the writer and editor were subject 

to jurisdiction in California because they had “directed” a tort to California. Id. 

(citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 785 n.2 (1984). As characterized by the 

Texas Supreme Court, the significance of Calder v. Jones does not depend on 
Page 14

whether a tort was committed, but rather simply that the writer and editor knew 

and intended that a third-party (their employer) would extensively publish the 

article in California. Id. Thus, under the Texas Supreme Court’s characterization 

of Calder, a tort directed to Texas will support jurisdiction so long as “the 

defendant's conduct and connection with the forum” play a critical role. Id. at 789. 

Here the uncontroverted allegations and evidence show that “[Trinidad 

Limited]’s conduct and connection with [Texas] play a critical role.” See Id. at 

789. Plaintiffs’ claims “arise from” allegations that Trinidad Limited (the parent 

company) set safety policies for drilling operations, exercised control over drilling 

operation, etc. See Appellants’ Brief at 14-16. The uncontroverted allegations and 

evidence then demonstrate that it knew and intended that its policies would govern 

both personnel and property related to drilling activities in Texas. See Appellants’ 

Brief at 16-27. As such, its policies necessarily availed itself of Texas law, since 

the laws of Texas would govern the propriety of such operations. Moreover, 

Trinidad Limited took affirmative action to ensure that its policies would be 

carried out in Texas. Indeed, the facts in this case go well beyond the facts of 

Calder, since the implementation of these policies was partially done by Trinidad 

Limited’s own employees while physically located within the boundaries of Texas. 

The fact that the policies themselves were ultimately carried out by employees of 

another entity (its subsidiary) makes no difference, just as it made no difference in 
Page 15

Calder that the defamatory statements were shipped to California by another entity 

(the employer). Trinidad Limited has purposefully availed itself of Texas law, and 

this action arises from Trinidad Limited’s own contacts with Texas.

C. Trinidad Limited has not controverted Plaintiffs’ allegations and 

evidence of jurisdiction.

Finally, in section I(B) and I(C) of its response brief, Trinidad Limited

asserts that it has controverted Plaintiffs’ allegations and evidence. However, it 

has done nothing of the kind. As to the allegations, Trinidad Limited simply 

repeats its arguments regarding veil piercing, which are discussed at length above. 

As explained in Plaintiffs’ opening brief, Trinidad Limited has not controverted 

Plaintiffs’ allegations, such as:

 “At all relevant times” Trinidad Limited “exercised . . . control 

and took responsibility for overseeing safety policies and 

procedures for the crews on the drilling rigs.” 

C.R.38 ¶ 4.07. Indeed, Trinidad Limited produces no evidence regarding the 

“relevant time period” whatsoever.

As to the evidence, Plaintiffs anticipated and addressed Trinidad Limited’s 

argument in their opening brief. See Appellants’ Brief at 16-27. For instance, as 

to the “remedial measures,” Plaintiffs’ demonstrated that Mr. Foreman (whatever 

his other roles) was acting as an agent of Trinidad Limited (the parent company) 

and that he was not simply reporting on an investigation. See Appellants’ Brief at 

18-21. To the contrary, his own memo shows that he participated directly in 
Page 16

setting and implementing remedial policies in connection with operations in Texas, 

the rest of America, and Canada. See C.R.79-80. Although such remedial 

measures cannot be used to show negligence, they are affirmative evidence of 

“control” at the time of the accident. See Tex. R. Evid. 407. Likewise, the 

remaining evidence demonstrates that Trinidad Limited controlled and set policies 

for operations exactly as explained in the opening brief. 

More importantly, Trinidad Limited does not even address the most 

significant allegations and evidence cited in the opening brief—the allegations and 

evidence that Trinidad Limited intended, and took steps to ensure, that its policies 

would be carried out in Texas. This issue is fully addressed in Plaintiffs’ opening 

brief, which demonstrated that Trinidad Limited is subject to specific jurisdiction 

for its own acts. See Appellants’ Brief at 24-27.

V. Trinidad Limited is also subject to general jurisdiction based on its own 

acts.

Finally, in section VI of their opening brief, Plaintiffs demonstrated that

Trinidad Limited is also subject to general jurisdiction in Texas, most notably by a 

high-level manager maintaining an office in Texas. Although general jurisdiction 

does not require physical presence in the state, the physical presence of an agent or 

office is sufficient to create general jurisdiction if the agent’s role is “central” to the 

defendant’s business. See, e.g., RSR Corp. v. Siegmund, 309 S.W.3d 686, 708 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.).
Page 17

In this case, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Rodney Foreman 

acts as the “General Manager of Corporate HSE” for “Trinidad Drilling Ltd.” (the

parent company) and that he maintains an office in the Houston area. See 

Appellants’ Brief at 31-32 (citing, e.g., C.R.79-80, 90-91; Supp.C.R.313). Thus, 

there is no question that Trinidad Limited maintains a “physical presence” in 

Texas. 

Likewise, there is no dispute that this Texas presence is central to the 

business of Trinidad Limited. This fact is apparent from Mr. Foreman’s title with 

the parent company. Mr. Foreman is not a low-level representative; instead, he is 

fairly-obviously a high-level officer: “General Manager of Corporate [Health, 

Safety, and Environment]” for “Trinidad Drilling Ltd.” Moreover, this is 

confirmed by the other undisputed evidence in the record. Mr. Foreman reports 

directly to the executive officers of Trinidad Limited (the parent company), rather 

than to intermediate managers or to officers of any subsidiary. C.R.75-76, C.R.90-

91, Supp. C.R.329. He participates directly in the creation and implementation of 

safety policies for all the drilling operations in the United States and Canada. See, 

e.g. C.R. 79-80. Indeed, Trinidad Limited (the parent company) has expressly 

cited Mr. Foreman as its spokesman for safety issues in communications with its 

investors. Supp. C.R.313.
Page 18

In response, Trinidad Limited asserts that “Rodney Foreman is not employed 

by Trinidad Ltd.; he is employed by Trinidad L.P.” Appellee’s Brief at 18-19. 

However, this assertion is both a misstatement of evidence and an irrelevant 

statement. 

First, this statement mischaracterizes the record, which is devoid of any 

evidence that Mr. Foreman is not an employee of the parent company. To the 

contrary, the only evidence is that Mr. Foreman is “paid by” the subsidiary. See 

Supp. C.R.357. However, payment by the subsidiary does not determine whether 

Mr. Foreman is also an employee of the parent, Trinidad Limited. See, e.g., 

Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 373 (Tex. 2011) (noting that, under threeparty residency arrangement, resident was paid by one entity but under the legal 

right of control of another entity); cf. Arvizu v. Estate of Puckett, 364 S.W.3d 273, 

276–77 (Tex.2012) (holding that multiple entities were liable for acts of 

employee). 

As this Court is well aware, a person can wear multiple “hats” for multiple 

entities. See e.g., Glattly v. CMS Viron Corp., 177 S.W.3d 438, 442 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). In each case, the entity for which the “hat” is 

being worn is likewise responsible for the employee’s actions.2 In this case, 

 

2

 In many cases, the wearing of multiple “hats” can also lead to alter-ego or other veilpiercing issues. However, those issues are not before the Court, as discussed at length earlier in 

the Texas.
Page 19

whatever other hats he may wear, Mr. Foreman is indisputably wearing the 

“General Manager of Corporate HSE” hat for “Trinidad Drilling Ltd.,” and he 

wears that hat in Houston, Texas.

Second, the statement is irrelevant, since this issue does not turn on whether 

Mr. Foreman is an “employee,” under any definition of that term. A corporation 

does not act only through “employees.” Instead, a corporation acts through all of 

its “people”—whether officers, directors, employees, or agents. See Internat’l 

Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). In this case, whether or not Mr. 

Foreman is an “employee” under some meanings of that term, undisputed evidence 

shows that he quite probably is an “officer” of Trinidad Limited for jurisdictional 

purposes, and he most definitely is acting as its “agent.” Indeed, Trinidad Limited

does not even attempt to dispute this fact. 

Aside from Mr. Foreman’s presence in Texas (which is sufficient in itself), 

Plaintiffs also demonstrated that Trinidad Limited has a director residing in Texas, 

and that its “banker” has been “Wells Fargo, N.A.” in “Houston, Texas.” 

Appellants’ Brief at 32 (citing, e.g., Supp. C.R. 237; C.R. 267; C.R. 300; C.R.329; 

C.R. 348. These points are adequately addressed in the opening brief and need no 

elaboration. 

In summary, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Trinidad Limited

maintains a continuous physical presence in Texas, through its high-level agent, 
Page 20

and that its agent’s activities are central to its business. Therefore, this physical 

presence—standing alone—demonstrates that Trinidad Limited has “continuous 

and systematic contacts” sufficient to make it “at home” in this forum. Moreover, 

if the physical presence of its high-level agent were not independently sufficient to 

establish general jurisdiction, such jurisdiction is also supported by the great 

weight of evidence. Therefore, whether or not the Court concludes Trinidad 

Limited is subject to specific jurisdiction, the trial court’s decision should be 

overruled on the basis of general jurisdiction.

VI. Prayer

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that this Court 

reverse the trial court, render a decision denying Trinidad Limited’s special 

appearance, and remand this action for proceeding on the merits.

Respectfully submitted,

By /s/ Geoffrey E. Schorr

Geoffrey E. Schorr

geoff@schorrfirm.com

Texas Bar No. 24029828

A. Jared Aldinger

Texas Bar No. 24068456

jared@schorrfirm.com

SCHORR LAW FIRM, PC

328 W. Interstate 30, Suite 2

Garland, TX 75043

Tel. (972) 226-8860

Fax (972) 226-9787
Page 21

Hutton W. Sentell 

Texas Bar No. 24026655

hsentell@ashmorelaw.com

ASHMORE LAW FIRM, P.C.

3636 Maple Ave.

Dallas, TX 75219

Tel. (214) 559-7202

Fax (214) 520-1550

Andrew P. McCormick

Texas Bar No. 3457100

amccormick@mlm-lawfirm.com

McCORMICK, LANZA & McNEEL, LLP

4950 Bissonnet Street

Bellaire, TX 77401

Tel. (713) 523-0400

Fax (713) 523-0408 

ATTORNEYS FOR 

PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS ADELAIDA 

SALAZAR BAUTISTA a/k/a ADELAIDA 

ALVARADO, Individually, and as next 

friend of MARIA JENNIFER AIDE a/k/a 

MARIA JENNIFER ALVARADO, A. A.,

A. A., I. S. A., M. A., and E. A., Minors

and

By: /s/ Justin K. Hall

Justin K. Hall

Texas Bar No. 90001828

jkhall@justinkhall.com

328 W Interstate 30, Suite 2

Garland, Texas 75043

Tel. (972) 226-1999

Fax (972) 226-2221

Attorney for Plaintiffs, Irineo Alvarado and 

Maria Ana Moctezuma
Page 22

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation of 

TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(2)(B) because it contains 4,445 words, excluding the parts of

the brief exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1). In making this certification, I

am relying on a word count performed by the Microsoft Word software used to

prepare this brief.

By /s/ Geoffrey E. Schorr

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on April 13, 2015, a true and correct copy of this 

Appellants’ Brief was served on counsel for Appellee via: the Texas e-file system 

which will send a notice of this electronic filing to Michael Beckelman and Sean 

Higgins, at their email addresses on file with the electronic filing manager.

By /s/ Geoffrey E. Schorr