[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 12-10253 

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cr-00008-SPM-GRJ-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SHELTON WARREN MORRIS, JR., 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

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(November 30, 2012)

Before CARNES, MARCUS, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Shelton Morris, Jr. appeals his statutory maximum sentence of 36 months 

imprisonment, imposed following the revocation of his supervised release under 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Morris challenges the adequacy of the district court’s 

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articulated findings, the accuracy of its sentencing guidelines calculations, and the 

overall procedural reasonableness of his sentence. 

I.

In July 2008, Morris pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), and was sentenced to 22 months in prison to be 

followed by 5 years of supervised release. As a condition of his supervised 

release, Morris was required to abstain from committing any additional federal,

state, or local offenses. Nevertheless, while serving his term of supervision, 

Morris was arrested in Florida on charges of domestic battery, felony battery, and 

obstruction of justice, all of which stemmed from an incident involving his 

girlfriend, Stacie Ruth Johns. The arrest report recounted a violent altercation 

between Morris and Johns, which purportedly involved Morris striking her with his 

fists and a telephone cord, choking her, and then physically restraining her so that 

she could not call the police. Based on the offenses outlined in the arrest report, 

Morris’ probation officer filed a petition to revoke his supervised release. 

After the petition was filed, Morris was charged by information in state court 

with (1) domestic battery by strangulation, (2) aggravated battery with a deadly 

weapon, and (3) tampering with a witness, victim, or informant. Morris pleaded 

nolo contendere to the witness-tampering count and state prosecutors dismissed the 

remaining charges. 

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Following the termination of the state proceedings, Morris’ probation officer 

prepared a “dispositional report,” notifying the district court about his conviction 

for witness tampering, a first-degree felony, and calculating the applicable 

sentencing guidelines range. The probation officer classified the offense as a Grade 

A violation under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1) because it was a “crime of violence” 

punishable by more than one year in prison. Coupled with Morris’ criminal history 

category of II, the Grade A violation yielded an advisory guidelines range of 15 to 

21 months imprisonment. Because Morris’ original federal offense was a Class B 

felony, the statutory maximum sentence that could be imposed upon revocation of 

his supervised release was 3 years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). 

At his revocation hearing, Morris admitted to violating the terms of his 

supervised released by committing the Florida offense of witness tampering. Based 

on that admission, the district court revoked his supervised release and proceeded 

to sentencing. The court explained that Morris’ guidelines range for the violation 

was 15 to 21 months imprisonment, though it had the authority to impose a 

maximum term of 3 years. Morris objected that it was not necessarily clear, based 

solely on the language of Florida’s witness-tampering statute and the charging 

information, whether his offense constituted a crime of violence and, thus, whether 

it qualified as a Grade A or Grade B violation for purposes of calculating his 

guidelines range. 

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In response, the government suggested that the witness-tampering offense 

qualified as a Grade A violation because it was a first-degree felony, and also 

sought to introduce copies of the state information and arrest report to demonstrate

the violent nature of the offense. The district court admitted both documents over 

Morris’ objection that, under Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 

1254 (2005), they could not be relied upon in determining whether his state offense 

amounted to a crime of violence. The government then requested an upward 

variance from the guidelines range based on the violent nature of Morris’ conduct 

and the fact that he committed a first-degree felony while serving his term of 

supervised release. 

Without making an express determination about the violation grade or 

explicitly overruling Morris’ objection on this point, the district court concluded 

that a statutory maximum sentence of 3 years was appropriate given the 

seriousness of the offense and the need to protect the public, to afford adequate 

deterrence, and to provide just punishment. In imposing sentence, the court 

explained that it had carefully considered the parties’ arguments and the sentencing 

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the applicable guidelines range.

II.

Morris contends that the district court erred in failing to make specific 

findings concerning the applicable violation grade and guidelines range, failing to 

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rule on his objection that his witness-tampering offense should be classified as a 

Grade B violation under the guidelines, and failing to give an adequate explanation 

for imposing an upward variance to the statutory maximum. He further argues that 

the record does not support a finding that his offense was a crime of violence 

warranting a Grade A classification.1

 Morris maintains that these alleged errors 

and omissions also render his sentence procedurally unreasonable. 

We review the procedural reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse of 

discretion standard, though “the degree of deference that is due varies with the type 

of procedural error alleged.” United States v. Register, 678 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th 

Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we review de novo a district 

court’s application of the sentencing guidelines, and its factual findings for clear 

error. Id. We may, however, affirm a sentencing determination on any ground 

supported by the record. United States v. Acuna-Reyna, 677 F.3d 1282, 1284 

(11th Cir. 2012).

When reviewing the procedural reasonableness of a sentence, we must 

ensure “that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as 

 

1 Morris also contends that, under Shepard v. United States, the district court improperly relied 

on the charging information and arrest report in concluding that his state offense qualified as a 

Grade A violation. Shepard, however, concerned the types of materials that courts could 

examine in determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony for purposes of 

the Armed Career Criminal Act, see 554 U.S. at 16, 125 S.Ct. at 1257, and we have yet to 

conclusively decide in a published opinion whether its holding applies to revocation proceedings. 

We need not resolve the issue in this case because, as will be discussed, Morris’ offense qualified 

as a Grade A violation regardless of whether it constitutes a crime of violence. 

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failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the 

Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a 

sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the 

chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines.” 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007). A district court, 

however, is not required to state that it has explicitly considered each of the § 

3553(a) factors or discuss them specifically. United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 

1329 (11th Cir. 2005). A district court’s acknowledgement that it considered the 

defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors is sufficient explanation for a 

particular sentence. Id.

We have also recognized that, to facilitate appellate review and avoid 

unnecessary remands, a district court should make explicit legal and factual 

findings in support of a sentencing decision. United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 

1213, 1293 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Villarino, 930 F.2d 1527, 1528–29 

(11th Cir. 1991). In addition, a district court must rule on any disputed sentencing 

issues or determine that such a ruling is unnecessary because it will not affect 

sentencing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B). However, a district court’s summary 

disposition of a dispute and failure to make specific findings will not preclude 

meaningful appellate review where its sentencing determinations are based on 

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clearly identifiable information in the record. See Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1293; 

Villarino, 930 F.2d at 1529. 

Although the district court did not make an express finding concerning the 

applicable violation grade or explicitly overrule Morris’ objection that his witnesstampering offense should be classified as a Grade B violation, its findings are 

sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review of its sentencing determinations. 

The court calculated a guidelines range of 15 to 21 months imprisonment, which 

was consistent with the probation officer’s conclusion that the witness-tampering 

offense qualified as a crime of violence warranting a Grade A classification, and it 

never deviated from this initial calculation. Under the circumstances, we find it 

sufficiently clear from the record that the district court tacitly adopted the findings 

set forth in the probation officer’s dispositional report, thereby implicitly 

overruling Morris’ objection. Moreover, the district court sufficiently explained its 

reasons for imposing a statutory maximum sentence of 3 years imprisonment. The 

court stated that it had the considered the parties’ arguments and the § 3553(a) 

factors, and specifically referenced a number of those factors, including the 

seriousness of Morris’ offense and the need to afford adequate deterrence, provide 

just punishment, and protect the public. 2 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2). 

 

2 In his counseled brief, Morris does not specifically contend that his sentence was substantively 

unreasonable. Consequently, we need not decide whether the extent of the upward variance 

imposed by the district court was adequately justified by the § 3553(a) factors. See United States 

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The only question that remains is whether the district court correctly 

calculated a guidelines range of 15 to 21 months imprisonment. Chapter 7 of the 

guidelines, which governs violations of supervised release, recommends 

sentencing ranges based on the grade classification of a violation and the criminal 

history category applicable at the time a defendant was originally sentenced to a 

term of supervision. See U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1(a), 7B1.4(a) (2011). Grade A 

violations include conduct amounting to a “crime of violence” that is punishable 

by more than one year in prison and any other offense “punishable by a term of 

imprisonment exceeding twenty years.” Id. § 7B1.1(a)(1). Grade B violations, by

contrast, encompass all “other federal, state, or local offense[s] punishable by a 

term of imprisonment exceeding one year.” Id. § 7B1.1(a)(2). A defendant with a 

criminal history category of II is subject to an advisory guidelines range of 15 to 21 

months imprisonment for a Grade A violation, and 6 to 12 months for a Grade B 

violation. Id. § 7B1.4(a). 

Even assuming that the district court improperly classified Morris’ offense 

as a crime of violence, any error in this respect was harmless for two independent 

reasons. As a general principle, we are not required to vacate a sentence if it is 

likely that, despite a guidelines error, “the district court would have imposed the 

same sentence.” United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1219, 1314 (11th Cir. 

 

v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that claims or issues that are not 

clearly raised on appeal are deemed waived). 

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2009). By varying upward to the statutory maximum sentence in this case, the 

district court indicated its intention to give Morris the longest sentence that it could 

and, thus, any error it may have committed was harmless. See id. at 1314–15 

(holding that a guidelines error was harmless where the district court, by varying 

upward to statutory maximum, indicated its intention to give the defendant the 

greatest sentence that it could). 

More fundamentally, the district court properly classified Morris’ offense as

a Grade A violation and correctly calculated a guidelines range of 15 to 21 months 

imprisonment. Regardless of whether the witness-tampering offense qualifies as a 

crime of violence, the record shows that it was a first-degree felony, which is 

punishable under Florida law by a term of imprisonment of up to 30 years. See

Fla. Stat. § 775.082(3)(b). Based solely on the fact that the offense was punishable 

by more than 20 years in prison, Morris’ state conviction qualifies as a Grade A 

violation under the guidelines. See U.S.S.G. 7B1.1(a)(1)(b). Because Morris has 

failed to demonstrate that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable, we affirm.

AFFIRMED. 

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