*

Honorable W.B. Hand, Senior United States District Judge

for the Southern District of Alabama, sitting by designation. 

 1R-113-7. 

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 93-9404.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Glenda NORRIS, Defendant-Appellant.

April 25, 1995.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of Georgia. (No. 3:92-00006-CR-ATH(DF), Duross

Fitzpatrick, Chief Judge.

Before EDMONDSON and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and HAND*

, Senior

District Judge.

HAND, Senior District Judge:

Defendant-appellant Glenda Norris, president, co-owner, and

director of the now defunct1 Athens School of Cosmetology of

Athens, Georgia, and other defendants were indicted on December 21,

1992, in the United States District Court for the Middle District

of Georgia under 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiring to defraud the

United States through student-grant and -loan programs from July

1988 through June 1990. The indictment alleged, inter alia, that

Mrs. Norris's mother, son-in-law, and three children, including

Keith Norris, all of whom were also defendants below, received

student grants from the federal government and student loans

guaranteed by the federal government to attend the Athens School of

Cosmetology. Instead of enrolling, they performed personal

services and errands, including baby sitting, house cleaning, and
 2

R-1. 

 3Presentence Investigation Report, ¶ 5. 

 4Id. at ¶ 12. 

 5R-113-8. 

 6R-107; R-113-11. 

construction work, for the co-owners of the school. There were

$6,290 in grants and $35,550 in loans for a total of $41,840.2

The government began investigating in April 1989 and

recommenced its investigation on February 7, 1990.3

 Mrs. Norris's

son, Keith Norris, repaid $6,625 in loans from March 16, 1990, to

September 30, 1993.4

Mrs. Norris entered a guilty plea. At sentencing, on November

8, 1993, the district court agreed with the presentence

investigation report and found that the "loss" to the government

was $41,840. 5

 The base offense level under the United States

Sentencing Guidelines was offense level 6. See U.S.S.G. §

2F1.1(a). The district court then made five adjustments to the

offense level, including a five-level increase because the loss was

greater than $40,000. See id. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(F). After the five

adjustments, Mrs. Norris was at offense level 14, which had a

sentencing range of 15 to 21 months with her criminal-history

category. See id. § 5A (sentencing table). The district court

sentenced Mrs. Norris to 18 months' imprisonment followed by three

years' supervised release, and ordered her and the other co-owner

of the school to pay restitution of $35,215. That amount was the

difference between $41,840 (the total of the grants and loans) and

$6,625 (the amount her son had repaid).6
In calculating the loss to the government, the district court

(1) counted both grants and loans and (2) did not subtract what her

son had repaid. Mrs. Norris appeals on both points. She contends

the district court should have counted only the grants. In the

alternative, she contends the district court should have included

both grants and loans but excluded the loans which her son had

repaid. Had the district court counted only the grants, or had it

counted both the grants and the loans but excluded those amounts

which her son had repaid, the amount of the loss would have been

under $40,000. Instead of a five-level increase under U.S.S.G. §

2F1.1(b)(1)(F), she would have received less of an increase for the

amount of the loss. See id. § 2F1.1(b)(1). Her total offense

level would have been lower.

 The calculation of the amount of a loss under the sentencing

guidelines is reviewed for clear error, while an interpretation of

the guidelines is reviewed de novo. United States v. Menichino,

989 F.2d 438, 440 (11th Cir.1993) (citing United States v. Odedina,

980 F.2d 705, 707 (11th Cir.1993); United States v. Shriver, 967

F.2d 572, 574 (11th Cir.1992); United States v. Smith, 951 F.2d

1164, 1166 (10th Cir.1991)); see also United States v. Cannon, 41

F.3d 1462, 1466 (11th Cir.1995) (the court of appeals reviews

findings of facts for clear error and reviews the sentencing

court's application of the sentencing guidelines to the facts de

novo (citing United States v. Davis, 902 F.2d 860, 861 (11th

Cir.1990); United States v. Rodriguez, 959 F.2d 193 (11th

Cir.1992))).

I
The United States Sentencing Guidelines define the "loss" in

cases involving fraud or deceit.

[T]he loss is the value of the money, property, or services

unlawfully taken[. I]f an intended loss that the defendant

was attempting to inflict can be determined, this figure will

be used if it is greater than the actual loss....

There are, however, instances where additional factors are to

be considered in determining the loss or intended loss: ...

(b) Fraudulent Loan Application and Contract Procurement Cases

In fraudulent loan application cases and contract procurement

cases, the loss is the actual loss to the victim (or if the

loss has not yet come about, the expected loss). For example,

if a defendant fraudulently obtains a loan by misrepresenting

the value of his assets, the loss is the amount of the loan

not repaid at the time the offense is discovered, reduced by

the amount the lending institution has recovered (or can

expect to recover) from any assets pledged to secure the loan.

However, where the intended loss is greater than the actual

loss, the intended loss is to be used....

U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment. (n. 7) (emphasis added); see also

Menichino, 989 F.2d at 441 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment. (n.

7(b)); United States v. Baum, 974 F.2d 496, 499 (4th Cir.1992);

United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 534 (3d Cir.1991); Smith, 951

F.2d at 1167-68)); Kopp, 951 F.2d at 536 (citing U.S.S.G. §

2F1.1).

II

 We first consider the propriety of including both grants and

loans in the loss, instead of only the grants. Section 2F1.1

clearly permits including the loans in the loss. See U.S.S.G. §

2F1.1, comment. (n. 7(b)).

III

 We next consider the propriety of including in the loss the

amounts which the appellant's son had repaid.

Mrs. Norris pointed out at oral argument that an example in
 7

R-113-8, 9. 

application note 7(b) is a loan involving collateral and one whose

repayment is not necessarily deferred. See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1,

comment. (n. 7(b)). By contrast, student loans usually require no

collateral and allow repayment after the academic year for which

they are made. Therefore, she would have us hold that her son's

repaid loans should not be included in the calculation. We

disagree. The example in application note 7(b) is an illustration,

not a restriction. The facts of this case may not resemble the

facts of the example, but that does not mean that the application

note, or the principle which the example illustrates, does not

apply.

The Fourth Circuit has held that "the potential consequences

of default, rather than the amount of the loan, best measure the

"loss' to which [the defendant] exposed the lender.... Payments

made by [the defendant] should also be considered." Baum, 974 F.2d

at 499 (quoting United States v. Rothberg, 954 F.2d 217, 219 (4th

Cir.1992)). We agree with Baum in that a district court which uses

application note 7(b) should consider repayments; however, Baum

does not state, and we decline to hold, that repayments can never

be included in the loss. See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment. (n. 7(b)).

The record in this case does not warrant our finding of fault

with the court's conclusion. The trial court took note of the fact

of repayment by the son in determining the amount of restitution

due. The court reduced the restitution by the amounts repaid but

found that such repayment came "way too late" to reduce the loss.7

In so concluding, the court complied with the requirement of
 8

Addendum to Presentence Investigation Report, 2. 

application note 7(b) to consider the amount of the loss when the

"offense" was "discovered."

 The presentence investigation report states that "no payments

were made toward the loans until after the offense had been

discovered by the authorities."8 Although some other parts of this

report were objected to and discussed at sentencing, this crucial

point was not. Without objection and in the absence of manifest

injustice, this conclusion becomes binding. See United States v.

Brokemond, 959 F.2d 206, 210 (11th Cir.1992) ("Appellant did not

file an objection to the sentencing report and did not object at

sentencing when no downward departure was granted. ...

Consequently, he is precluded from raising the issue for the first

time on appeal." (citing United States v. Asseff, 917 F.2d 502,

506 N. 4 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Pritchett, 898 F.2d

130, 131 (11th Cir.1990))); United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097,

1103 (11th Cir.) ("Where the district court has offered the

opportunity to object and a party is silent or fails to state the

grounds for objection, objections to the sentence will be waived

for purposes of appeal, and this court will not entertain an appeal

based upon such objections unless refusal to do so would result in

manifest injustice."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 275,

112 L.Ed.2d 230 (1990), overruled on other grounds, United States

v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136, 1137 (11th Cir.1993) (en banc). This

result is further supported by the fact that defense counsel was

given at least two additional opportunities to object to the
 9

R-113-9, 12. 

findings of the presentence investigation report.9 There were no

objections, so under our holdings any such objections now come too

late.

AFFIRMED.