RENDERED: AUGUST 19, 2022; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2021-CA-1343-ME

SCOTT DUNBAR APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT

HONORABLE LAUREN ADAMS OGDEN, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 21-D-503425-001

ODELIN VIDAL APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: DIXON, JONES, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, K., JUDGE: Scott Dunbar appeals from the Jefferson Family 

Court’s order maintaining the imposition of an emergency protection order (EPO) 

in favor of Odelin Vidal for sixth months; Dunbar argues the EPO should have 

been dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over him.

On October 2, 2021, Vidal filed a petition for an order of protection 

based upon allegations of domestic violence that took place in Indianapolis, 
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Indiana, on September 30, 2021. Later that day, the Jefferson District Court 

granted a temporary interpersonal protective order (TIPO) and scheduled a virtual 

hearing to consider whether an interpersonal protective order should be granted.

On October 14, 2021, only Vidal appeared as Dunbar had not yet been 

served. Based on Vidal’s representation that she and Dunbar had previously lived 

together, the district court transferred the matter to family court for consideration 

as to whether a domestic violence order (DVO) was warranted.

At the next scheduled hearing, on October 26, 2021, Dunbar appeared 

virtually with counsel before the family court, but Vidal did not appear. The 

docket order indicated Vidal was told she did not have to appear because Dunbar 

had not yet been served. Dunbar immediately raised an objection to the family 

court’s having jurisdiction over him, but the family court determined this should be 

heard at the next hearing.

At the November 9, 2021 virtual hearing, finally both parties 

appeared. Dunbar again raised his jurisdictional objections, stating that all of the 

alleged acts of domestic violence occurred in Indiana and he had no minimal 

contacts with Kentucky as he did not live in Kentucky or transact any business in 

Kentucky. Dunbar argued the family court did not have personal jurisdiction over 

him based upon International Shoe Company v. State of Washington, Office of 

Unemployment Compensation and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 
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L.Ed. 95 (1945), and that bringing him before a Kentucky court offended his due 

process rights.

The family court stated that pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes 

(KRS) 403.725, it could appropriately act where the victim of domestic violence 

either resided within or fled to the state of Kentucky. Dunbar argued this was 

incorrect, as that statute only dealt with venue. 

The family court responded: “Well, I certainly appreciate the 

arguments and you can perhaps take it up with the Court of Appeals after we’re 

done, but we’re going to go ahead and proceed with this hearing.” The family 

court then heard testimony from the parties and exhibits were admitted into 

evidence. 

At the conclusion of the evidence, the family court made findings that 

domestic violence had occurred and may occur again based on specific incidents 

Vidal testified occurred and the threats Dunbar made to her. The family court 

explained it believed that the relationship between the parties was over and they 

should stay away from each other, but that it preferred to try to avoid issuing a 

DVO unnecessarily. The family court therefore ruled that the EPO would continue 

until it expired on April 2, 2022, which was appropriate to address the aftermath of 

this short-term relationship, “let the dust settle,” and keep everyone safe. 
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The family court via a docket order summarized its findings and 

decision. It denied Dunbar’s “ongoing personal j’n concerns/objections” on the 

basis that Vidal “fled to KY from IN to escape domestic violence[.]” It stated: 

“EPO remains in place until its expiration 4-2-2022, given the need for short-term 

protection. Ct adopts its oral findings put on the record as though fully set forth 

herein.”

Dunbar argues on appeal that the family court’s maintenance of the 

EPO should be reversed, with the case dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

He argues it is undisputed that based on his and Vidal’s testimony that Dunbar had 

no contacts with Kentucky and there was no nexus between Kentucky and the facts 

underlying the domestic violence petition other than the fact that afterward Vidal 

came to Kentucky for safety. He argues that venue cannot be bootstrapped into 

providing personal jurisdiction and states that the question on appeal is whether the 

due process required for personal jurisdiction can be usurped by the domestic 

violence venue statute. Dunbar notes that the EPO would likely expire before this 

matter is reviewed on appeal but asks that it still not be dismissed as moot because 

it is capable of repetition and evading review. Vidal did not file a responsive brief.

We will address Dunbar’s appeal on the merits as we agree that the 

issuance and expiration of an EPO against him before it can be heard on appeal is 

capable of repetition and evading review. See generally Morgan v. Getter, 441 
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S.W.3d 94, 100 (Ky. 2014). We disagree, however, that Dunbar is entitled to 

relief. 

While we acknowledge the import of International Shoe Company

and Caesars Riverboat Casino, LLC v. Beach, 336 S.W.3d 51, 56 (Ky. 2011), and 

the limited reach of our long-arm statute, KRS 454.210, domestic violence orders 

are different from the typical case in that they are meant to prevent future violence 

against victims rather than to punish or provide compensation for past actions. Our 

Courts are allowed to govern behavior within our borders to prevent harm to 

victims of out-of-state domestic violence. 

The case of Spencer v. Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14, 18-19 (Ky. App. 

2006), which Dunbar did not address, controls. In Spencer, our Court was tasked 

with deciding whether under KRS 403.725(1) “a Kentucky court may issue a 

protective order against an individual over whom the court does not have personal 

jurisdiction.” Spencer, 191 S.W.3d at 16. The Court had no trouble in concluding 

that Kentucky courts did not have personal jurisdiction over the husband where the 

alleged abuse took place in Oklahoma between Oklahoma residents and the 

husband was now a Nevada resident but noted that “the language of KRS 403.725 

clearly envisions a court granting a protective order when a victim of domestic 

abuse has fled to this state.” Id. at 17. 
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The Spencer Court explained “[w]e must balance the due process 

rights of the defendant against the interest of the Commonwealth in protecting the 

victims of domestic violence” and it reviewed this issue of first impression by 

considering the case law of other jurisdictions before adopting the reasoning of 

New Jersey in Shah v. Shah, 875 A.2d 931 (N.J. 2005). Spencer, 191 S.W.3d at 

17-19 (footnote omitted). The Court recounted that in Shah:

In its opinion, the court drew a distinction between a 

prohibitory order that serves to protect the victim of 

domestic violence, and an affirmative order that requires 

that a defendant undertake an action.

The former, which allows the entry of an order 

prohibiting acts of domestic violence against a 

defendant over whom no personal jurisdiction 

exists, is addressed not to the defendant but to the 

victim; it provides the victim the very protection 

the law specifically allows, and it prohibits the 

defendant from engaging in behavior already 

specifically outlawed. Because the issuance of a 

prohibitory order does not implicate any of 

defendant’s substantive rights, the trial court had 

jurisdiction to enter a temporary restraining order 

to the extent it prohibited certain actions by 

defendant in New Jersey.

An affirmative order, on the other hand, involves the 

court attempting to exercise its coercive power to compel 

action by a defendant over whom the court lacks personal 

jurisdiction.

The court held that minimum contacts considerations 

forbid the entry of a final restraining order because by 

statutory definition it had to include affirmative relief, 

such as the surrender of firearms and firearm permits, the 
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payment of a civil penalty, and surcharge, and collateral 

consequences such as enrollment in a central offenders 

registry.

In our view, the distinction made by New Jersey’s 

highest court between prohibitory and affirmative orders 

represents the fairest balance between protecting the due 

process rights of the nonresident defendant and the 

state’s clearly-articulated interest in protecting the 

plaintiff and her child against domestic violence.

Spencer, 191 S.W.3d at 18-19 (footnotes omitted). 

While the language of KRS 403.725 was amended after Spencer, it 

still provides in KRS 403.725(2) that “[t]he petition may be filed in . . . a county 

where the victim has fled to escape domestic violence and abuse.”1 We interpret 

this language broadly to fulfill the purposes of our domestic violence statutes in 

allowing victims to obtain “short-term protection against further wrongful conduct 

in order that their lives may be as secure and as uninterrupted as possible;” and 

1 We agree with the reasoning in Vernooy v. Sullivan, No. 2016-CA-000446-ME, 2017 WL 

3446977, at *2 (Ky.App. Aug. 11, 2017) (unpublished), but do not cite it as authoritative, that in 

amending this statute and moving the relevant language from KRS 403.725(1) to KRS 

403.725(2), there is

no indication that the General Assembly intended to alter the prior 

law or to limit the entry of a DVO to only when the acts of 

domestic violence occurred in Kentucky and involved Kentucky 

residents. Considering the current language of KRS 403.725(2), 

and in the absence of a clearer statement from the legislature, we 

conclude that a Kentucky court retains jurisdiction to enter a DVO 

for the protection of a person who has fled to this state to escape 

domestic violence.
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also providing law enforcement officers with the means to protect victims. KRS 

403.715(1), (2), and (3).

The EPO prohibited Dunbar from having any communication with 

Vidal, ordered him to remain 500 feet away from her, and prohibited Dunbar from 

engaging in any third-party contact, social media contact, or text messaging with 

Vidal for a period of six months.2 “Insofar as the order prohibits [Dunbar] from 

breaking the law in Kentucky by approaching [Vidal], it comports with due 

process.” Spencer, 191 S.W.3d at 19. 

Had Dunbar violated the EPO by approaching Vidal in Kentucky or 

committing further acts of domestic violence against her here, he would have 

freely subjected himself to the authority of Kentucky and the possible 

consequences of such actions. Apparently, Dunbar did not violate the EPO as 

Vidal failed to file for a DVO before the EPO expired and did not file an appellate 

brief. Therefore, it appears that the EPO properly served its purpose.

Accordingly, we affirm the Jefferson Family Court’s imposition of the 

limited EPO protecting Vidal as not violating Dunbar’s due process rights.

ALL CONCUR.

2 The order also restrained Dunbar from disposing of or damaging any property of the parties,

but as there was no allegation that Dunbar had any property of Vidal’s or joint property of theirs 

in his possession, that provision is a nullity. 
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

J. Bart McMahon

Louisville, Kentucky

NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.