UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

RONNY DARNELL, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

JUSTIN JONES; DON SUTMILLER; 

JANET DOWLING; KATRYNA FRECH; 

JAMES SMASH; MICHAEL ADDISON; 

BUDDY HONAKER; JAMES 

KEITHLEY; JOEL B. McCURDY, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 14-6195 

(D.C. No. 5:12-CV-01065-M) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before LUCERO, TYMKOVICH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Ronny Darnell, also known as Phoebe Halliwell, appeals the dismissal of her 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

I 

Darnell, a state prisoner appearing pro se,1

 asserts that her constitutional rights 

were violated by Oklahoma Department of Corrections (“ODOC”) employees. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. 

App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

April 16, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
-2- 

Darnell identifies as a male to female preoperative transsexual with Gender Identity 

Disorder (“GID”). She alleges that Oklahoma prison officials have refused to 

provide her with appropriate medical treatment for GID, including hormone therapy 

and consultation with a specialist experienced in treating individuals with GID.

On April 19, 2012, Darnell filed a “Request to Staff” inquiring about the 

denial of her request for GID treatment. Dr. James Smash responded that “[n]o one 

is being treated in [the Department of Corrections] for this as far as I know,” and 

informed Darnell that she was “welcome to go higher in mental health if not 

satisfied.” Darnell then filed an “Offender Grievance Report Form” requesting that 

Dr. Smash be directed to provide treatment. This request was denied by Katryna 

Frech, who wrote that “[g]eneral counseling is not provided for individual issues that 

are not mental health in nature.” 

Darnell attempted to appeal the denial of her request to the Administrative 

Review Authority at ODOC. On June 5, 2012, the appeal sent by Darnell was 

returned unanswered and accompanied by a document informing Darnell that medical 

grievances must be submitted to the Chief Medical Officer (“CMO”) at a specifically 

provided address. Darnell alleges that she was misinformed by a law library 

supervisor as to where her appeal should have been sent, and that after the return of 

the appeal, she again requested that prison staff fax the document to the CMO. 

 1

 We construe Darnell’s pro se filings liberally. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 

1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). 
-3- 

Darnell never mailed her appeal to the CMO; instead, she filed an action in the 

district court. 

On defendants’ motion for summary judgment, a magistrate judge 

recommended that the complaint be dismissed based on Eleventh Amendment 

immunity to the extent that Darnell requested monetary damages, that the remaining 

federal claims be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required 

by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), and that the court decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over Darnell’s state-law claims. The district court adopted 

these recommendations and dismissed the complaint. Darnell now appeals. 

II 

We review the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo. Willis v. 

Bender, 596 F.3d 1244, 1253 (10th Cir. 2010). In conducting this review, we take 

the evidence in the light most favorable to Darnell, the party opposing summary 

judgment. McCarty v. Gilchrist, 646 F.3d 1281, 1284 (10th Cir. 2011). “Summary 

judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 1284-85 (quotation 

omitted). 

On appeal, Darnell meaningfully challenges only the district court’s dismissal 

for failure to exhaust and has thus waived review of all other issues. See Adler v. 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Arguments inadequately 

briefed in the opening brief are waived.”). Our review of a dismissal under the 

PLRA for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is de novo. Patel v. Fleming, 
-4- 

415 F.3d 1105, 1108 (10th Cir. 2005). The PLRA requires a prisoner to exhaust all 

available administrative remedies before bringing suit with respect to prison 

conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion under the PLRA requires “compliance 

with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford v. Ngo, 

548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). “An inmate who begins the grievance process but does not 

complete it is barred from pursuing a § 1983 claim under the PLRA for failure to 

exhaust [her] administrative remedies.” Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 

(10th Cir. 2002). 

We agree with the district court that Darnell failed to exhaust her 

administrative remedies. ODOC has adopted a multi-step process through which an 

incarcerated individual may seek formal review of complaints relating to conditions 

of confinement. As part of this process, an incarcerated individual seeking to appeal 

a decision pertaining to a medical grievance must submit the appeal to the CMO 

through the U.S. Postal Service. Because Darnell failed to mail her appeal to the 

CMO, that appeal was returned to her unanswered but accompanied by a form that 

explained why the appeal was being returned and provided her with the proper 

address for the CMO. She never mailed her appeal to the proper address. 

 Darnell contends that prison officials prevented her from exhausting required 

administrative remedies. See Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th Cir. 2010) 

(“Where prison officials prevent, thwart, or hinder a prisoner’s efforts to avail 

h[er]self of an administrative remedy, they render that remedy ‘unavailable’ and a 

court will excuse the prisoner’s failure to exhaust.”). Specifically, Darnell contends 
-5- 

that after her appeal was returned, she submitted a formal request to staff asking a 

prison official to fax her document to the CMO. This argument is unavailing. 

Darnell does not contend that she was prohibited from mailing her appeal to the 

CMO though threats or intimidation. See Tuckel v. Grover, 660 F.3d 1249, 1252 

(10th Cir. 2011). It is undisputed that Darnell did not resubmit her appeal to the 

CMO pursuant to the ODOC process that directs such appeals to be “submitted in a 

separate envelope and mailed through the U.S. Postal Service.” 

Because Darnell failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as required by 

the PLRA, we do not reach the merits of her claims. 

III 

The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED. Darnell’s motion to proceed 

in forma pauperis is GRANTED. We remind Darnell that she remains obligated to 

continue making partial payments until the entire filing fee has been paid. 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge