307, 319 (1979); Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev. 807, 816, 192 P.3d 721, 727 

(2008). 1 

Trial testimony indicated that although Owens did not initiate 

the confrontation, the unarmed victim was driving away in his vehicle 

with the windows down, posing no immediate threat, when Owens pointed 

a firearm in his direction, fired multiple shots, and hit the victim in the 

back of the head. Owens subsequently fled from the scene in another 

vehicle. Four .25 caliber automatic cartridge casings and Owens' broken 

glasses were found at the location of the shooting. The victim identified 

Owens as the perpetrator and videotaped surveillance footage capturing 

the incident was played for the jury. 

It is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to give 

conflicting testimony, McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 

(1992), and a jury's verdict will not be disturbed on appeal where, as here, 

sufficient evidence supports the verdict, Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 

624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981); see also NRS 193.330(1); NRS 200.010(1); NRS 

200.030(1)(a); NRS 200.481(1)(a); NRS 202.285(1)(b). Therefore, we 

conclude that Owens' contention is without merit. 

Second, Owens contends that the district court erred by 

allowing the admission of the surveillance videotape capturing the event 

leading to the instant charges because the State failed to establish the 

chain of custody. Any gap in the chain of custody, however, or any doubt 

about tampering, "goes to the weight of the evidence" and not its 

admissibility. Sorce v. State, 88 Nev. 350, 352-53, 497 P.2d 902, 903 

'Owens is not challenging his conviction on the count of carrying a 

concealed firearm. 

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• (1972), see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n.1 

(2009) (gaps in the chain of custody usually go to the evidence's weight not 

admissibility). Nevertheless, our review of the trial transcript reveals that 

the State established a sufficient and reasonable chain of custody. See 

Burns v. Sheriff, 92 Nev. 533, 534-35, 554 P.2d 257,258 (1976). Therefore, 

we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

admitting the evidence. See Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 267, 182 P.3d 

106, 109 (2008). 

Third, Owens contends that the district court erred by 

overruling his objection based on the best evidence rule to Detective 

Carter's testimony pertaining to the surveillance videotape. See NRS 

52.235 ("To prove the content of a writing, recording or photograph, the 

original writing, recording or photograph is required, except as otherwise 

provided in this title."). Owens now claims that Detective Carter's 

"interpretation" of the videotape "ran the risk of invading the province of 

the jury" and was unfairly prejudicial. Owens objected only once during 

Detective Carter's challenged testimony and argues that plain error 

requires the reversal of his conviction. See NRS 178.602 ("Plain errors or 

defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not 

brought to the attention of the court."). We disagree with Owens' 

contention. 

Initially, we note that Owens offers no cogent argument in 

support of his claim that Detective Carter's testimony during the playing 

of the surveillance videotape violated NRS 52.235. The videotape, 

depicting six different views of the crime scene, was admitted and played 

for the jury, and Owens cannot demonstrate that the district court erred 

by overruling his objection. Additionally, Owens did not object below on 

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the basis that Detective Carter's "narration" amounted to improper lay 

witness testimony, see NRS 50.265, and Owens "cannot change [his] 

theory underlying an assignment of error on appeal," Ford v. Warden, 111 

Nev. 872, 884, 901 P.2d 123, 130 (1995). Nevertheless, based on our 

review of the trial transcript and surveillance videotape, and considering 

the overwhelming evidence of guilt noted above, we further conclude that 

Owens cannot demonstrate plain error entitling him to the reversal of his 

conviction. See Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003) 

(when reviewing for plain error, "the burden is on the defendant to show 

actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice"); see also United States v. 

Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 503 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding narrative admissible as 

lay witness opinion testimony which did not invade province of jury). 

Fourth, Owens contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by overruling his objections and admitting several photographs 

depicting the victim's injuries, blood-stained clothes, and blood in the 

victim's vehicle. Owens claims the photographs were irrelevant, 

inflammatory, prejudicial, and cumulative. Prior to trial, the district court 

denied Owens' motion in limine seeking to exclude several of the 

photographs "without prejudice to raise the issue as to cumulative[ness] at 

the time of trial." We disagree with Owens' contention. 

"We will not disturb a district court's decision to admit 

photographic evidence unless the district court abused its discretion." 

West v. State, 119 Nev. 410, 420, 75 P.3d 808, 815 (2003). "Despite 

gruesomeness, photographic evidence has been held admissible when it 

accurately shows the scene of the crime, . . and when it reflects the 

severity of wounds and the manner of their infliction." Theriault v. State, 

92 Nev. 185, 193, 547 P.2d 668, 674 (1976) (citations omitted), overruled 

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on other grounds by Alford v. State, 111 Nev. 1409, 906 P.2d 714 (1995). 

At the hearing on Owens' motion in limine, the State argued that due to 

the multiple crime scenes and charged counts, the proffered photographs 

were relevant. The State also noted that duplicative photographs were 

excluded and would not be presented to the jury. At trial, the State 

argued that "each and every photograph shows something a little different 

that is important to the State to be able to prove this case. beyond a 

reasonable doubt." The district court overruled each objection by Owens 

and we conclude that Owens fails to demonstrate that the district court 

abused its discretion. 

Fifth, Owens contends that the district court erred by denying 

his oral motion to record all bench conferences. Owens acknowledges that 

our holding in Preciado v. State, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 6, 318 P.3d 176, 

178 (2014), does not support his claim. Nevertheless, Owens asks that we 

modify Preciado and recognize that "the subsequent memorialization of 

conferences is not an adequate substitute for contemporaneous recording" 

and violates due process. We decline Owens' request and conclude that 

the district court did not err by denying his motion. 

Sixth, Owens contends that the district court erred by 

rejecting his proposed jury instructions clarifying self-defense and 

attempt. We disagree. "This court reviews a district court's decision to 

issue or not to issue a particular jury instruction for an abuse of 

discretion." Ouanbengboune v. State, 125 Nev. 763, 774, 220 P.3d 1122, 

1129 (2009). Here, the district court heard arguments from counsel and 

rejected Owens' proposed instructions after determining that they were 

sufficiently covered by other jury instructions. We agree and conclude 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Owens' 

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proposed instructions on self-defense and attempt. See Vallery v. State, 

118 Nev. 357, 372, 46 P.3d 66, 77 (2002) (noting that a district court does 

not err by rejecting defendant's proposed instruction related to his theory 

of the case if it is substantially covered by other instructions). 

Seventh, Owens contends that the district court erred by 

rejecting two negatively-phrased jury instructions on reasonable doubt 

specific to the counts of attempted murder and carrying a concealed 

firearm. "[S]pecific jury instructions that remind jurors that they may not 

convict the defendant if proof of a particular element is lacking should be 

given upon request." Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 753, 121 P.3d 582, 

588 (2005). "[A] positive instruction as to the elements of the crime does 

not justify refusing a properly worded negatively phrased . . . instruction." 

Id. (quoting Brooks v. State, 103 Nev. 611, 614, 747 P.2d 893, 895 (1987)). 

Here, even assuming the district court erred by not giving the two 

proposed instructions, "we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the jury's verdict was not attributable to the error and that the error was 

harmless under the facts and circumstances of this case." Id. at 756, 121 

P.3d at 590. 

Finally, Owens contends that the district court erred by 

refusing his request to add "including by reason of self-defense' after the 

'not guilty' option on the verdict forms" because "self-defense was a 

complete defense to three of the four charges." Whether a special verdict 

form should be used depends on "the particular circumstances of [each] 

case," and the district court's decision is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Reed, 147 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385, 

392 (9th Cir. 1976)). Here, the State argued below that the proposed 

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Gibbons 

J. 

additional language to the verdict form was "confusing and not necessary, 

because the jury can acquit for other reasons besides self defense." The 

district court agreed with the State and rejected Owens' proposed verdict 

form. We agree and conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying Owens' request. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

Saitta 

J. 

cc: Hon. Elizabeth Goff Gonzalez, District Judge 

Clark County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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