NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois corporation, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. PENSKE TRUCK LEASING CO., L.P., a Delaware Limited Partnership; OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, a Pennsylvania Corporation,

Defendants

- Appellants, and MELBA FERNANDEZ; DOES, 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants. No. 20

- 55893 D.C. No. 2:20

- cv - 01342

- SVW

- PVC
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding Submitted June 15, 2021 * Anchorage, Alaska

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3. 

# FILED
OCT 15 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Before: RAWLINSON, CHRISTEN, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges. Dissent by Judge RAWLINSON In the district court, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. sought declaratory relief establishing that Penske Truck Leasing Co. and Old Republic Insurance Co. (collectively, “Defendants”) are required to prov ide primary liability coverage to L&L subject to a combined single liability limit of $750,000. We affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment to State Farm. “We review de novo the district court’s order granting summary judgment and its interpretation of state law.” Diaz v. Kubler Corp. , 785 F.3d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion. Tabares v. City of Huntington Beach , 988 F.3 d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2021). In interpreting California law, we follow the California Supreme Court’s decisions. Diaz , 785 F.3d at 1329. If there is no applicable California Supreme Court decision, we rely on state appellate court opinions, statutes an d treatises. Id. We start with the language of the Rental Agreement. United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Worldwide, Inc. , 555 F.3d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 2009). “The clear and explicit meaning of the[] provisions, interpreted in their ordinary and popular

se nse, unless used by the parties in a technical sense or a special meaning is given to them by usage[,] controls judicial interpretation.” Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mut. Ins. Co. , 855 P.2d 1263, 1270 (Cal. 1993) (internal quotation3

mark s and citations omitted). California courts “construe [insurance policies] as would a reasonable layperson, not an expert, attorney, or a historian.” E.M.M.I. Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. , 84 P.3d 385, 391 n.2 (Cal. 2004) (citation omitted). “A provision will be considered ambiguous when it is capable of two or more constructions, both of which are reasonable.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NASA Servs., Inc. , 957 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch. , 73 P.3d 1205, 1213 (Cal . 2003)). We agree with the district court that the Penske Provides Coverage insurance provision is ambiguous. A layperson could reasonably interpret this provision in two ways: first, to cover the commercial vehicle being rented, as State Farm urges; or second, to cover non - commercial vehicles irrelevant to this transaction, as Defendants urge. Defendants argue “basic automobile liability insurance” is unambiguous as a term of art defined by state code. But we are interpreting a contract, not a statute, and the contract did not use “basic automobile liability insurance” “in a technical sense” or give it “special meaning.” See Bay Cities , 855 P.2d at 1270. The contract’s proviso “ with limits as required by the state financial responsibility law or other applicab le statute” does not define “basic automobile liability insurance” or specify it is a term of art, and there are financial responsibility laws and statutes applicable to both commercial and personal vehicles. See E.M.M.I. Inc. , 84 P.3d at4

390; Utah Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Assn. v. United Servs. Auto. Assn. , 230 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 1021 (Ct. App. 1991) ( “L aypersons cannot be expected to know of statutory limitations or exclusions on coverage not contained in their insurance policies.”). The term “basic automobile liability insurance” is ambiguous because “it is not defined in the policy and . . . a layperson’s understanding would differ from the legal definition of the term.” Lunsford v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co. , 18 F.3d 653, 654 ( 9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted ). Indeed, Defendants themselves repeatedly refer to L&L’s commercial vehicle policy with State Farm of $1 million liability coverage as “an automobile liability policy.” If Defendants’ “attorney[s]” and “insurance expert [s]” use the term “automobile liability” insurance interchangeably to cover commercial vehicles, a layperson would most likely do so as well. See Crane v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. , 485 P.2d 1129, 1130 (Cal. 1971). T he contract as a whole also shows the insurance provision to be ambiguous. Bay Cities , 855 P.2d at 1271. The cover of the policy declares in bold font that it is for commercial rentals, and the Penske Provides Coverage insurance provision is in the Commercial Rental section. A layperson could think that the Penske Provides Coverage “basic automobile liability insurance” covers commercial vehicles in an amount comparable to the alternative $1,000,000 Customer Provides5

insurance requirement, which the Agreement presents as the only other o ption in the very next subsection. Defendants’ view “basic automobile liability insurance” as covering an amount appropriate only for Household Rentals, but that would be both legally inadequate and practically pointless for a Commercial Rental. We concl ude that the cases cited by Defendants (including an unpublished California Court of Appeal decision) are inapt due to varying factual and legal differences. The dissent relies on an unpublished California Court of Appeal
case, Golden Eagle Ins. Corp. v. P enske Truck Leasing Co. , No. E062118, 2015 WL 5320546 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2015), to argue that we misconstrue California law. But California prohibit s other courts from citing its unpublished

cases. See Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. v. Grunwald , 40 0 F.3d 1119, 1126 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Cal. Rules of Court 8.1115(a)) (“Under California Rules of Court . . . an unpublished opinion cannot be cited to or relied on by other courts.”); Cal. Rules of Court 8.1115(a) (with exceptions not relevant her e, “an opinion of a California Court of Appeal or superior court appellate division that is not certified for publication or ordered published must not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action.”). As such, it would be improper for o ur court to rely upon this unpublished, uncitable case. That California courts have occasionally ignored their own rule, as the dissent points out, is no reason to assume that they would regularly do so, or adopt the reasoning of the unpublished decision in6

Golden Eagle . And because California litigants and courts cannot rely on or cite to it, the absence of comment on it from the California courts is similarly unconvincing

. Ultimately, we do not apply a presumption that California courts will follow an unpublished appellate court opinion, as we do with a published opinion of a state appellate court. See Ryman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 505 F.3d 993, 994

– 95 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W ]here there is no convincing evidence that the state supreme court would decide differently, a federal court is obligated to follow the decisions of the state’s intermediate appellate courts.”) (quoting Vestar Dev. II, LLC v. Gen. Dynamics Corp. , 249 F.3d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)). As the dissent points out, we are not precluded from considering the unpublished opinion. But given our interpretation of other, published California court decisions, the unpublished decision in Golden Eagle is not a conclusive indication of how California courts would rule in a precedential opinion, and we therefore decline to rely on it here. There was no genuine dispute that L&L customarily relied on Penske Provides Coverage to insure its re ntals of commercial vehicles; L&L did not need a minimal personal vehicle policy; L&L was never told that Penske Provides Coverage limited coverage to a certain amount; and the Penske Provides Coverage7

$20 per day fee was 320% more expensive than the State Farm Policy’s commercial vehicle coverage policy per day average. Moreover, “ambiguous language is construed against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist. In the insurance context, we generally resolve ambiguities in favor of coverage.” AIU Ins . Co. v. Superior Ct. , 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990) (citation omitted). Even accepting Defendants’ arguments that L&L’s objectively reasonable expectations were undeterminable, summary judgment in favor of State Farm was still proper. Int’l Bhd. of Te amsters , 957 F.3d at 1042 (citations omitted). Because the language here is ambiguous, we affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment for State Farm. AFFIRMED.State

F arm v . Pe nske Truc k Le asing C

o. , Case No. 20-55893 Raw linson, Cir c uit Judge , disse nting: This a ppe a l involve s the a

pplic a tion of C a l ifornia la w . In tha t c i rc u m sta

nc e ,
we a re bound to follow pre c e de nt from the C a lifornia

Supre m e C ourt. Se e N

orc ia

v . Samsung Te le c o m m. Am., LLC , 845 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th C ir. 2017). In the

a bse nc e of pre c e de nt from the Supre m e C ourt, it is our ta sk to pre dic t how the C a lifornia Supre m e C o urt would a ddre ss the issue

. Se e id. In m a king this pre d ic tion, we give c re de nc e to rulings from the C a lifornia

C ourt of Appe a l. Se e Oak land Bulk & Ov e r

size d Te rminal, LLC v . C

i ty of Oak land , 960 F.3d 603, 610- 11 (9th C ir. 2020). B e c a

use the m a

jority disposition dive

rge s from this e sta blishe d

a pproa c h , I re s pe c tfully

disse nt. This c a se involve s c ontra c tua l inte rpre ta tion. The c ontra c t c la u se a t issue

wa s pa rt of a tra n sa c tion be t

we e n Pe nske a nd a

c om m e rc ia l c ustom e r who re nte d a fre ightline r truc k. The c ontra c t provide d in pe rtine nt pa

rt: Pe nske Provide s C ove ra ge . If C u stom e r e le c t s Pe nske Lia bility C ove ra ge , Pe n ske a gre e s to provide lia bility prote c t ion for C ustom e r . . . in ac c ordanc e w ith the standard prov isions of a basic automobile liability insuranc e polic

y . . ., with lim

its a s re quire d by the sta

te fina nc i a l re sponsibility

la w or othe r a

p plic a b le sta tute
. (e m pha sis a dde d ). B oth the distric t c ourt a

nd the m a jority ignore d the c l e a r a nd e x plic it 

# FIL ED
OCT 15 2021 M OLLY C. DW Y E R, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

1la

ngua ge re fe re nc ing “ ba sic a utom o bile lia

bility ” a n d re lie d inste a d on the fina l phra se to c onc lude tha

t Pe nske wa s re q

uire d to provide c ove ra g e in the a m o unt

re quire d for c om

m e rc ia l m otor c a rrie rs. The proble m with the c onc lusion re a c he d by the distric t c ourt a

nd the

m a jority is tha t it flie s in the fa c e of a

C a lifornia

C ourt of Appe a l de c ision dire c tly on point, Golde n Eagle

Ins. C orp. v . Pe nsk

e Truc k Le asing C

o. L.P. , No. E062118, 2015 W L 5320546 (C a l. C t. App., Se pte m be r 14, 2015). In Golde n Eagle , the

e xa c t sa m e polic y provision wa s a t issue . Insure r Golde n Ea gle , sim ila rly to Sta te Fa rm , a rgue d tha t this ide ntic a l c ontra c t la ngua ge obliga

te d Pe nske to provide

c ove ra ge in the a m ount re quire d for c om m e rc ia l m otor c a rrie rs ($750,000), a s oppose d to the substa

ntia lly lowe r a m ounts re quire d for a utom obile lia

bility insura nc e ($15,000 for injury to one pe rson/$30,000 for injury to two or m o re pe rsons/$5,000 for prope

rty da m a ge ). The C a lifornia C ourt of Appe a l re

je c te d the insure r’ s a

rgum e nt, e xpla ining tha

t the te rm s of the c ontra c tua l provision “ pla in[ly ]

. . . e sta blish tha t Pe nske is prom ising to provide a ba sic a utom obile lia

bility insura nc e polic y .” Id. a t *2 (c ita tions a nd inte rna l quota

tion m a rks om itte d ). The C ourt c la rifie d tha t “ a utom obile lia

bility insura n c e is a te rm of a rt a

nd trigge rs . . .
re quire m e nts tha

t a re diffe re nt from

the re quire m e nts . . . a

pplic a ble to c om

m e rc ia l

ve hic le s.” Id. (c ita

tions a nd inte rna l quota

tion m a rks om itte d).

2The C ourt a lso disa g re e d with the c onte ntion tha

t the provision wa s unc le a r,
c la rify ing tha

t: A plain re ading

of Pe nske ’ s Lia

bility Insura nc e provision doe s not support a n inte rpre ta t ion tha

t Pe nske inte nde d to provide a lia

bility polic y with the $750,000 lim i t re quire d unde r the M otor C a rrie rs of Prope rty Pe rm it Ac t. In c le ar te rms , the Lia bility Insura nc e provision prom

ise s to provide a

ba s ic a utom obile lia

bility insura nc e polic y .

. . . B y the c le ar language

of the Lia

bility Insura nc e provision, Pe nske prom ise s to provide its c om m e rc ia l re n ta l c ustom e rs with only the c ove ra ge re quire d for a n a utom obile lia

bility insura nc e polic y . Ha d Pe nske inte nde d to provide the $750,000 c o m bine d single lim i t re q uire d for c om

m e rc ia l m otor ve hic le s unde r the M o tor C a rrie rs of Prope rty

Pe rm it Ac t, its Lia

bility Insura nc e provision would not inc lude the phra se “ ba sic a utom obile lia b ility insura nc e polic y ,” but ra

the r “ c om m e rc ia l ve hic le lia

bility insura nc e polic y ,” or the like

. Id. a t *3 (e m

pha s e s a dde d). The C ourt e m

pha s iz e d tha

t the la n gua g e of the provision wa s pla i n a nd the

m e a ning wa s c le a r. Se e id. The C ourt de c la re d tha t a ny othe r inte rpre ta tion would

run a foul of C a lifornia ’ s rule s of c ontra c t inte rpre ta tion. Se e id. a t *2-*3. The C ourt e xpre ssly

re je c te d Golde n Ea gle ’ s va

rious a rgum e n ts for inte rpre t ing the

c ove ra ge provision a s “ re fe re n c ing the M otor C a rrie rs of Prope rty Pe rm it Ac t.” Id.

a t *3. The C o u rt found those a rgum e nts “ unpe rsua s ive be c a use e a c h re quire s us to

3ove rlook the c le ar phrase ‘ b a sic a utom obile lia

bility polic y .’ ” Id. (e m

pha sis

a dde d). The C ourt re a sone d t ha t Golde n

Ea gle ’ s a rgum e nts c o uld only suc c e e d if the C ourt “ we re to find [“ ba sic a utom obile lia

bility insura nc e polic y ” ] a m

biguous, whic h [it did] not.” Id. The C ourt c onc lude d: Nothing in the Lia

bility Insura nc e provision or a

ny othe r pa rt of the re nta l a gre e m e nt m e ntions a “ c om m e rc ia l m otor ve hic le ,” a

“ c om m e rc i a l ve hic le lia

bility insura n c e polic y ,” a “ m otor c a rrie r of prope rty ,” or the “ M otor C a rrie rs of Prope rty

Pe rm it Ac t.” W e c a nnot re a d suc h re fe re nc e s into the provision to trum p the c le a r e xisting re fe re nc e to ba sic a

utom obile lia

bility

. Id. (e m pha sis a dde d). In sum , the C a lifornia C o urt of Appe a l c l e a rly , e m pha t ic a lly , a nd de c isive ly

re je c te d the re sult re a c he d by the m a jority

. In doing so, the

c ourt use d the words

“ c l e a r” or “ c le a

rly ” re pe a te dly

in disc ussing the polic y

provision a

t issue . The

m a jority a c knowle dge s the C ourt of Appe a l de c ision, but e sc he w s it a s unpublishe d a

uthority . Howe ve r, we ha ve spe c ific a lly c onc lude d tha

t unpublishe d

a uthority inform s our de t e rm i na tion of how the C a lifornia

Supre m e C ourt would de c ide a que s tion of C a lifornia la

w. Se e Employ e r

s Ins. of W

ausau v . Granite State Ins. C o. , 330 F.3d 1214, 1220 n.8 (9th C ir. 2003) (c onside ring unpublishe d C a lifornia C ourt of Appe a l de c i sion, de spite “ h a v [ing] no pre c e de ntia l va lue ,” a s
4“ a c c ura te ly

re pre s e nt[ing] C a l i fornia la w” ) (c ita tion om itte d); se e also U.S. Bank , N .A., Truste e for Banc

of Ame ric a Funding C

orp. Mortg. Pass-Through C e rtific ate s, Se rie s 2005-F v . W

hite Horse Estate s Home ow ne rs Ass’n , 987 F.3d 858, 863 (9th C ir. 2021) (e xpla ining tha t unpublishe d sta

te de c isions m a y

be

c onside re d in inte rpre ting sta t e la w). Afte r a ll, thre e C a lifornia judge s inte rpre ting C a lifornia la w a re a fa r m ore a c c ura te ba

rom e te r of how the C a l ifornia Supre m e C ourt would de c ide this issue

. Se e Employ e rs Re insuranc e C orp. v . K arussos , 65 F.3d 796, 799 (9th C ir. 1995), ov e rrule d on othe r grounds by Gov e rnme nt Employ e e s Ins. C o . v . Dizol , 133 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th C i r. 1998) (obse rving tha t

“ the sta te s re gula te insura n c e c om pa nie s for the prote c tion of the ir re side nts, a nd
sta te c o urts a

re be st situa

te d to ide ntify

a nd e nforc e the public polic ie s tha t form the founda

tion of suc h re gula

tions” ) (c ita

tion a nd inte rna l quota

tion m a rks

om i tte d). The m a jority c a sts a side the we ll-re a sone d opinion of the C a lifornia

C ourt of Appe a l be c a

use , “ C a l ifornia

prohibits othe

r c ourts from c iting its unpublishe d

c a se s.” Majority

Disposition p. 5. The m a jority c ite s for this proposition our de c ision in C

re dit Suisse

First Bos. C

orp. v . Grunw a ld , 400 F.3d 1119, 1126 n.8 (9 t h C ir. 2005). Howe ve r, in tha t c a se , the C a lifornia

Supre m e C o urt ha d gra

nte d

re vie w of the C ourt of Appe a l de c ision, the re by supe rse ding tha

t de c ision. No

5sim ila

r c irc um s ta

nc e is pre s e nte d in this c a se . As note d be low, no c ourt ha s que stione d in a

ny wa y the C ourt of Appe a l de c i sion in Golde n Eagle

. And, both be fore a nd a fte r C

re dit Suisse , we ha ve c onside re d unpublishe d de c isions to inform our de te rm ina tion of how the C a lifornia

Supre m e C ourt would de c ide a que stion of C a lifornia la w. Se e e .g., Employ e rs Ins. Of W asau , 330 F.3d a

t 1220 n.8 (pre

C re dit Suisse ) a n d U

.S. Bank , 987 F.3d a

t 863 (post -C

re d it Suisse ) se e also Danie l

v . Ford Motor C

o. , 806 F.3d 1217, 1223 n.3 (9th C ir. 2015) (re c ogniz ing tha t

“ [e ] ve n though unpublishe d C a lifornia C ourts of Appe a l de c i sions ha v e no pre c e de ntia l va lue unde r C a lifornia la w, the Ninth C irc uit is not pre c lude d from

c onside ring suc h de c isions a s a possible re fle c tion of C a lifornia la w” ) (c ita tion a nd inte rna l quota

tion m a rks om itte d); Be e man v . Anthe m Pre sc ription Mgmt., LLC

, 689 F.3d 1002, 1007-08 & n.2 (9th C ir. 2012) (e n ba nc ), a s ame nde d

(re l y i ng on unpublishe d de c isions of the C a lifornia

C ourt of Appe a l a s “ a c c ura te l y
re pre se nt[ing] C a lifornia

la w . . . [a ] lthough the y a re not pre c e de nt” unde r C a lifornia rule s ) (c ita

tion om itte d); Robe rts v . Mc A fe e , Inc

. , 660 F.3d 1156, 1167 n.6 (9th C ir. 2011) (a

rtic u la ting tha

t “ [e ] ve n though unpublishe d C a lifornia C ourts of Appe a l de c isions ha

ve no pre c e de ntia l va lue unde r C a lifornia la w, the Ninth C irc uit is not pre c lude d from c onside ring suc h de c isions a s a possible re fle c tion of C a lifornia la w” ) (c ita tion a nd inte rna l quota

tion m a rks om itte d); W

ashington v

.
6C

al. C ity C orr. C tr. , 871 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1028 n.3 (E.D. C a l. 2012) (sta ting tha t

“ [t] he C ourt m a y

c ite unpublishe d C a lifornia a ppe lla te de c isions a s pe rsua sive

a uthority ” ) (c ita

tion om itte d); s e e also Ov itz v . C hartis Prop. C

as. C o. , No. C V 15-3916 PSG (PLAx), 2015 W L 12746209, a

t *4 (C .D. C a l. Se pt. 14, 2015) (obse rving the Ninth C i rc uit’ s c onc lusion tha t “ unpublishe d C ourt of Appe a l de c isions c a n be use ful in de te rm ining how a C a lifornia

c ourt would rule on a

n issue of sta

te la w” ) (c ita tion om itte d). Inde e d, this “

prohibition”

re l ie d upon by

the m a jority is re gula rly disre ga rde d, a s C a lifornia

c ourts ha ve not only

c i te d to, but a dopte d

the re a soning of unpublishe d de c isions. Se e , e .g. , C y nthia D. v . Supe r ior C

t
. , 5 C a l. 4th 242, 254 (1993) (in ba

nk) (c iting to a

nd “ a da pting” a na ly sis from the c onc u rre n c e to a n unpublishe d opinion); Sav e Lafay e tte Tre e s v . C ity of Lafay e t te , 32 C a l. App. 5th 148, 161 n.11 (2019) (a

dopting the

re a soning of a

n unpublishe d de c ision a s the

c ourt’ s “ own” ). Nota bly , in the six y e a rs sinc e Golde n Eagle wa s de c ide d, ne ithe r the C a lifornia Supre m e C o urt nor a

ny C a lifornia

C ourt of Appe a l ha s que stione d the de c ision or the a na ly s is in tha t c a se . This sile nc e is signific a n t be c a use C a lifornia

c ourts routine l y

e x pre s s a pprova l of or disa gre e m e nt with unpublishe d de c isions. Se e , e .g. , C harle s J

. Vac anti, M.D., Inc . v . State C omp. Ins. Fund

, 24 C a l. 4th 800,

7810-12 (2001) (disa gre e i ng with re a soning a rtic ula te d in unpublishe d de c ision); Pe ople v . Ge ntile , 10 C a l. 5th 830, 849-50 (2020) (re m a ining unpe rsua de d by

two unpublishe d de c isions c ite d in support of the distric t a ttorne y ’ s c onte n tions); Hadian v . Sc hw artz , 8 C a l. 4th 836, 842 (1994) (in ba n k) (gra nting re vie w of a

nd

re ve rsing unpublishe d de c i sion); Pe ople v . Martine z , 15 C a l. App. 5th 659, 662 (2017) (obse rving tha

t “ a ll C a lifornia

a ppe lla te distric ts . . . ha

ve we ighe d

in on [a n issue splitting the c o urts of a p pe a l] (a lbe it in unpublishe d opinions),” a nd

c onside ring unpublishe d de c isions in re solving the issue ); Pe ople v . Mc

Danie ls , 21 C a l. App. 4th 1560, 1566 n.2 (1994) (sta ting tha t “ [i] f the te xt of this opinion sounds fa m ilia r to the pa rtie s a nd the c ourt be low, it should. M uc h of it is sim

ply
ta ke n from

the unpublishe d opinion by Division Four in Pe o

ple v . Fanne

y (Nov. 30, 1990) A049446, involving the ide ntic a l issue , the sa m e c ourt a nd c ounse l. . . . [T] h e a na ly sis in a

n unpublishe d opinion m a y prope rly be c onside re d” ); Pe o

ple v . Bullard , No. C 091975, 2021 W

L 3751139, a

t *2 (C a l . C t. App. Aug. 25, 2021) (a pproving of the

re a soning de line a te d in a n unpublishe d de c i sion “ [a ] lthough . . .

c onta ine d in a

n unpublishe d portion of the opinion” ) (c ita

t ion om itte d). B e c a

use the m a jority goe s a stra

y by fa iling to follow the

C a lifornia

C o urt of Appe a l’ s onpoint de c ision, I re spe c tfully disse nt.

8